Date: 2015
Type: Article
Evolution of impatience : the example of the farmer-sheriff game
American economic journal : microeconomics, 2015, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 295-317
LEVINE, David K., MODICA, Salvatore, WEINSCHELBAUM, Federico, ZURITA, Felipe, Evolution of impatience : the example of the farmer-sheriff game, American economic journal : microeconomics, 2015, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 295-317
- https://hdl.handle.net/1814/39303
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/39303
Full-text via DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130188
ISSN: 1945-7669; 1945-7685
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