



Department of History and Civilization

“A Business Approach to Transatlantic Migration: The introduction of steam-shipping on the North Atlantic and its impact on the European Exodus 1840-1914”

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**“A Business Approach to Transatlantic Migration: The
introduction of steam-shipping on the North Atlantic and its
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Growing up my career ambitions have shifted quite often. As it too quickly became clear that my childhood dream of becoming a professional football player would not materialize, I started contemplating many alternatives. Yet, one that never really crossed my mind, was becoming an academic. If I eventually ended up writing a PhD, I owe it, in the first place, to Prof. Eric Vanhaute, who assisted me in writing my masters thesis at the Ghent University. Every time I walked into his office with some doubts and questions about the thesis, I walked out with a good portion of self-confidence and motivation. Apparently with so much of it that he suggested writing out a PhD proposal. As I still had not decided on an alternative for my childhood dream, this one did not sound too bad. If I ever applied to the European University Institute in Florence, it is because of him.

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Introduction

Main thesis question, geographic delimitation and periodization

Why, yet another study on the long 19th century European mass-migration movement to the US, when during the last decade migration historians have encouraged a shift away from the Atlanto-centrism and Modernization-centrism that has dominated the sub-discipline (Lucassen and Lucassen, 1996, 28-30; Hoerder, 2002, 10-18)? For many, the topic seems saturated, yet one particular and reoccurring question has not yet received a satisfying answer: how did the migrant trade evolve and influence the relocation of approximately thirty five million migrants across the Atlantic, of whom an ever increasing percentage returned and repeated the journey during the steamship era? More than half a century ago Maldwyn Jones, Frank Thistlewaite, and Rolf Engelsing drew attention to the fact that transatlantic migration was determined by trade routes (Jones, 1956, Engelsing, 1961; Thistlewaite, 1960). Migrants essentially became valuable cargo, on a shipping route made up of raw cotton, tobacco or timber from the New World; a route that had room to spare on the return leg of the journey. Rolf Engelsing in particular documented how the maritime business community reacted to this trade opportunity, by erecting inland networks, directing a continuous flow of human cargo to the port of Bremen during the sailship-era. Marianne Wokeck later stressed the Atlantic dimensions of these networks, by dating the origins of non-colonial mass migration movements to the 18th Century (Wokeck, 1999).

A comprehensive analysis of the further development of the trade during the steamship era -when the movement gained intensity and the foundations were being laid of what Aristide Zolberg described as the great global wall to protect industrious nations from the invasion of the world's poor- is still absent. This explains why migration historians, such as Dudley Baines, or maritime historians, as Michael Miller, have observed that: “*we know very little about the activities of shipping companies and shipping agents*” and that “*oddly enough, migration historians and maritime historians have often written about transoceanic crossings like two ships passing in the night*” (Baines, 1991, 48; Miller, 2007, 175). As Miller has pointed out, maritime historians have also failed to pick up on the early observations of Robert Greenhalgh and Engelsing

regarding the influence of human freight trade on port activities (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939; Engelsing 1961). Despite the pioneering role of the North-Atlantic passenger business in introducing both technological and organizational innovations to the shipping industry, few maritime historians have broached the topic. The exceptions who have - like Robin Bastin, Francis Hyde or Birgit Ottmüller-Wetzel- limited their analysis to one port or company (Bastin, 1971; Hyde, 1975; Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986).

Frank Broeze underlined that the restricted scope of most maritime studies fails to address the overall dynamics of port competition, which propagated the expansion international maritime networks. He encouraged new studies to adopt transnational, comparative, multi-disciplinary and multi-thematic approaches (Broeze, 1994, 1995 and 1998). This research aims to answer this call by integrating the work of migration historians with that of their maritime colleagues who have failed to find a common ground, despite the interrelationship between maritime and migration networks which converged in ports. Moreover, the connections between both are further underlined by the fact that the business did not leave the authorities unaffected, especially as the trade greatly influenced the development of the merchant marine. As central governments gained power throughout the century, the urge to control migration was not only motivated in controlling the quality and quantity of migrants, but also in using the movement to stimulate the fleet under the national flag. The study is centered on the evolution of Rotterdam as a transatlantic migration gateway within the Hamburg-Le Havre range, and on the Holland America Line as a member of the wide web of shipping conferences regulating the North Atlantic passenger trade. Yet, this port did not stand alone in being in direct competition with its continental rivals within the Hamburg-Le Havre range, and indirectly with the British migration gateways.

The competition greatly influenced the delimitation of both hinterland and foreland which these ports connected and from where these companies tapped migrants. In order to underline the Atlantic dimension of these networks, there will be a focus on the foreland -the American market of prepaid and return tickets- and on how it helped shaping the expansion of the hinterland towards Eastern Europe and the Orient. This analysis of European mass migration between 1840 and 1914, as an international maritime business, will shed more light, on the one hand, on the development of shipping

conferences which sustained the growth of passenger liners into vast multi-nationals. On the other hand, it will demonstrate the impact of these companies on the path dependency and the legal framework of migration in the Atlantic World.

The sauces used to spice up the thesis

Alfred Chandler encouraged the treatment of business history as an institutional history by promoting the use of non-quantifiable data based on letters, periodicals, memoranda and general accounts; which often provide tools for analyzing economic change as effectively, and in greater depth, than by the compilation and the manipulation of numbers. Chandler supported John Higham's endorsement of a history that is less concerned with motives than with structure and process, by allowing for a *better understanding of how groups and agencies such as political parties, corporations and communities have molded behavior and regulated distribution of power* (Chandler, 1988, 301-302).

By using qualitative, rather than quantitative data, this research will try to improve upon our understanding of how people moved -rather than why they moved- by reconstructing the *visible hand* of steam-shipping companies in the transatlantic migration process. Diplomatic correspondence from countries with economic interest in transatlantic migrant transport was used to analyze the attempts of ports, within the Hamburg-Le Havre range to both lure migrants and to open steamship connections with the US for the period 1840-1870. Consuls constituted an important source of information on trade opportunities and established contacts with local authorities and businesses in order to promote trade relations with home-based shipping enterprises. Especially for new developing markets, for which uncertainties and thus transaction costs were considerably high, consuls played a vital 'pre-conditioning' role in developing these new markets located far away from the home country (Muller, 2002; Muller and Ojala, 2002).

Research on the correspondence of representatives in New York and Washington in the French Diplomatic Archives (Nantes); Dutch national archives (The Hague); the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brussels) and State Archives of Hamburg and Bremen produced mixed results. A lot depended on practical problems, such as whether the correspondence had been preserved or whether permission in using a digital camera

was granted, and it also depended on the quality of information sent through by the consul and by the interests of the government on the issue. The Belgian archives, in particular revealed a lot of information on views from local and national authorities on the migrant trade.

With regards to shipping company archives used to analyze the period between 1870 and 1914 a similar strategy was deployed in uncovering the primary source materials of the Continental lines. Archive material on the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique can be found at the Centre d'Archives du Monde du Travail in Roubaix and the French Line Archives in Le Havre- both contain similar documents consisting mainly of official reports on the various meetings with shareholders, boards of administration, boards of directors, and which reveal little on the organization of the traffic. The fate of the archives of the Antwerp-based Red Star Line remains a mystery. Neither the local archives in Antwerp nor the national archives in Brussels carry these records and it seems that these documents did not survive. The North German Lloyd archives were destroyed, yet the Bremen State Archives kept primary source material of migrant brokers. This source was not used here, yet it could reveal new information on the company. Unfortunately access to the Hamburg America Line archives was denied. Based on the inventory, it appears that more documents were preserved there than by any of the other companies, yet the majority of the documents held seem to be annual reports which were available to the public.

Conversely, the Holland America Line collection at the community archives of Rotterdam stands out for both its accessibility as well as for the wealth of materials that are preserved there. Only for the first decade of its operations is the information scarce and from midway through the 1880s the complete letter books of directors and agents on all sorts of operating issues can be found. Furthermore, the collection contains the conference agreements concluded between the shipping companies; minutes of the conference and sub-conference meetings; and correspondence of the conference secretary with the members, etc.

This research is based predominantly on the letters sent from the New York head-agent of the company to the directors. As all the North-Atlantic passenger lines had their most important foreign offices in New York, the correspondence not only reveals crucial

information on the company operations but also on that of its competitors. It is divided into two series, one labeled as general correspondence in which dates from 1884, and the other as passage correspondence, running from 1889 onwards. The general correspondences are made up of weekly to daily reports on the pressing issues regarding freight, passage, infrastructure, personnel, political situation, etc. The even more regular passage correspondence deals exclusively with all aspects of first, second and third class passenger traffic. Despite being records which are fairly complete, there are some gaps (of about two month periods of time) when the head-agent returned for a visit to Rotterdam; this occurred every three years initially, and seemed to have become a yearly event towards the end.

Both sets of records also contain the coded telegrams received by the head-agent, and attachments such as newspaper articles or pamphlets, and sometimes include replies of directors or letters of third parties. Of the last category, series reports on the congressional activity on migration and maritime issues of the shipping lobbyist Claude Bennett provide extra information on the industry's lobbying strategies in Washington. To complement the information drawn from the letters various other files were consulted for information pertaining to the earlier years. Furthermore, the various conference agreements and minutes of the meetings were analyzed, and especially those of the New York Continental Conference through which the members organized the traffic, the migrant-agent network, and set the ocean passage rates for the American market.

The minutes of the Continental Conference are on hand from 1885 to 1902 and of the Continental Standing Complaint Committee from 1896 till 1907. A brief comparison with the Cunard Line Archives (Liverpool), from which some material was drawn for this research, underlines the value and completeness of the HAL archives which still have a lot to reveal. Finally, some electronic resources facilitated access to valuable contemporary documents. Firstly, the Harvard University on-line Open Collections Program provided easy access to government documents and correspondence of the Immigration Restriction League in their fund 'Immigration to the United States 1789-1930'. The outline was completed with the help of the e-library program of Stanford University, for some volumes of the Dillingham Commission which are not yet available

on the Harvard website. The final very practical source which helped in reconstructing contemporary debates was 'The New York Times' online archive.

The initial intention of the research was to compare two ports and companies. But the disproportionate amount of archive material, and especially the way migration business was organized as the primary sources revealed, indicated that the transnational entangled histories approach was more appropriate. As Jürgen Kocka and David Thelen demonstrate entanglements are inherent to migration and transnational commerce studies and these topics had a pioneering role in the development of this method. Therefore it is unsurprising to note that a study on both transnational commerce and migration confirms the far reaching mutual interaction which governed the competitive nature of the migrant business. The major advantage of the strategy is that the multidimensional and dynamic approach allows for a binding together of the micro and the macro levels of analysis- the need for which has been underlined by both maritime and migration historians alike (Haupt and Kocka, 2004, 33; Kocka, 2003 42-43; Thelen, 1999, 970-973; Werner and Zimmerman, 2003, 11-16).

A business approach to international migration: the various levels of analysis

Over the last fifty years the models of analysis of transatlantic migration movements have expanded and contracted. The studies focusing on the impact of the movement on the receiving country at one end, and on the sending country at the other end, led to the 'push and pull' model attempting to establish the point of the spectrum that determined the flows. Subsequent researchers suggested amplifying the scope from the national to the international level, focusing on the interactions between both ends of the trajectory and the formation of an 'Atlantic World' in which both parts converged. This legacy, which we are indebted to Brinley Thomas in presenting, culminated with the works of Gould, Kevin O'Rourke, Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson. Globalization studies and the neglect of other long distance migration movements moved Dirk Hoerder to broaden the scope to 'world-systems'. In the meantime, other models developed which criticized the broad top-down perspectives for failing to consider the individual migrant and the non-quantifiable social, cultural and political aspects of the movement. Many of the migrants made their decision to leave within the context of the family economy and

relying on personal networks to obtain; information on opportunities abroad, means to make the crossing, secure employment, etc.

These bottom-up micro studies allowed for reconstructing chain migration patterns, which are based on: “*interpersonal ties connecting migrants to former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin.*” These constitute a form of social capital stimulating the movement by reducing the costs, fears and risks of migration. Around these migration networks institutions, organizations and entrepreneurs with particular interests developed and tried to profit from and influence the moves (Massy, 1999, 43-47). The discipline’s biggest challenge remains in developing a system-based approach, connecting micro and macro levels of analysis (Boyd, 1989, 641; Fawcett and Arnold, 1987, 456; Facewett, 1989, 672-675; Moch and Jackson, 1996, 60-68; Morawska; 1996, 186-187). To bridge this gap Hoerder put forward social and human capital approaches, on a meso-level of: “*mediating networks and interacting segments, including mental maps of the world systems, offering a more comprehensive perspective on migration process*” (Hoerder, 1996, 84; 2002, 10-18).

Some, like Portes, suggest that the meso-level is the only functional level of analysis in the study of international migrations like transnational communities (Portes, 1999, 21-33). David Gerber later suggested a higher level of analysis in linking the meso with the macro level; taking up Nina Glick Schiller’s concept of ‘transnational social fields’ connecting the individual networks that do the planning and make the resources available to the institutions, business and agencies facilitating the movement and encompassing the influence of governments, businesses and public agencies on how networks take shape and evolve. Scholars such as Gerber and Glick Schiller underline the need for comprehensive studies including the social, economic and political processes that shape transnational migration (Glick Schiller, 1999, 97-98; Gerber, 2006, 231-238).

Taking up Salt and Stein’s suggestion of viewing international migration as a business, dating back to the nineteenth century North-Atlantic movement, the pivotal role of shipping companies as mediators between networks and segments on one hand and governments, business and public agencies on the other hand regulating the migration process, becomes explicit (Salt and Stein, 1997, 467-68). This study locates itself on the

'transnational business field', linking the macro with micro from top-down- previous efforts have tended to do this from the bottom up. Analyzing the competition between companies to acquire and increase their migrant business does not only reveal new information on relations between migrants and business, but also between migrants and potential migrants and between migrants and the government. It is important to be reminded that in this transnational process nations and nation-states continued to be important constituent elements (Gabaccia,1999, 1117-1118).

Shipping companies headed the big business networks which developed around the movement consisting of migrant brokers, agents, labor recruiters, charity and philanthropic organizations, railroad companies and banks. These networks as Miller pointed out: "*provided the organization means and often initiatives by which the great transoceanic migration flows of humanity occurred*" (Miller, 2006, 190). The networks that extended to both sides of the Atlantic provided the shipping companies with a direct link to the purchasers of the ticket- either the migrant himself, a padrone or a charity organization in Europe or friends, relatives and various third parties in the US.

How did these systems reinforce chain migration patterns, and how did it allow people traveling outside these chains to make the crossing? As managers of these networks, shipping companies were key links in this system, but how did they administer these functions? Kristian Hvidt, Birgit Brattne, Amoreno Martellini, Odd Lovoll and Agnes Bretting have all investigated the role of migrant agents in the transatlantic migration process from a European perspective, yet as Hvidt underlined the lack of information on the steamship companies managing them obstructs far reaching conclusions on their true impact (Brattne, 1976; Bretting, 1991; Hvidt, 1978; Lovoll, 1993; Martellini, 2002; Morner, 1992)

Much of the research in maritime history has focused on the relations between shipping lines and shippers who provided the companies with goods. On the relation between passenger lines and the network of migrant brokers and agents supplying the companies with passengers, the literature is practically inexistent. By filling this gap for the American market of ocean passages sales, including prepaid and return tickets this study reconstructs how the shipping lines were linked to the individual networks of the migrant. It sheds more light on the profile of migrant agents and brokers, on the

marketing strategies used to promote ocean passage sales, and on the variety of services rendered to the migrants etc. To what extent did ethnicity play a role in this? How was the passage organized once a prepaid ticket was sold? How far was railroad transport included? What was the relationship between shipping companies and railroad companies? To what extent did the business evolve into an integrated transport system, providing a door-to-door service? What about padrones, labor agents philanthropic and charity organizations assisting the migrants on their way and after arrival? Did they deal with companies directly or through the agent network? How did American and European authorities try to regulate ocean passage sales?

The organization of the network connecting the shipping companies to the individual migrant can only be fully understood by analyzing how shipping lines 'battled' each other for the migrants. The second half of the nineteenth century was marked by the rise of big business which in the shipping industry led to the formation of joint stock companies which spurred the adoptions of technological innovations closing the distances between old and new worlds (Boyce, 1995, Keeling, 1999). The North-Atlantic passenger lines led the way in technological, and as will be argued organizational, innovation. The keen competition between steamship companies pushed them to collude and to form cartels, known as shipping conferences, which are still the most common form of organizing overseas trade routes today. In these conferences, the companies tried to relieve the market from the fierce competitive pressures, both internal and external. The theoretical framework supplied by maritime historians on shipping cartels regulating cargo traffic will be applied to the steerage market.

First, the transition from sail to steam and the impact of the rise of big joint-stock companies on the organization of the traffic will be analyzed. How did a passenger line, such as the Holland America Line, structure the business on both sides of the Atlantic? How did it outlive the keen competition of other companies and acquire membership of the wide web of conference agreements regulating the traffic? The HAL's position as a core member of the 'Nord-Atlantischer Dampfer-Linien Verband' allows an in depth analysis of the success and failures of these agreements for the European continental market. What were the main internal pressures of the agreements and how did the lines try to neutralize these? How did the Continental lines manage to fend off external

pressures from other sub-markets and prevent penetration into the market of new lines? On a broader scale, to what extent can the success or failure of these horizontal combinations and the way the traffic was organized, explain the contrasting business structures compared to other contemporary industries, such as railroad companies which showed stronger tendencies towards vertical integration. Simultaneously, the impact of these agreements on the individual migrant will be tested. Special focus goes to how these were used to gain control over the migrant-brokers and agent network imposing rules regulating the sales. It will also be tested as to what extent the companies managed to control the routing of the migrants through those agreements.

Last but not least, a price series of the ocean crossing from Rotterdam to New York, for the period 1885 until 1914, will be reconstructed. Economic historians long underlined the dramatic importance of declining transport costs, due to technological innovations in the late nineteenth century, for the overseas freight traffic accelerating the Atlantic convergence (North, 1958; Harley, 1988, Williamson et. al., 1994, 25, 214). The lack of information on passenger rates made researchers, until recently presuppose that these followed the same trend. Drew Keeling, a notable exception who shares an interest in both maritime and migration history, reconstructed quarterly averages indicating that the passenger rates actually increased. This evolution was previously denoted by Knick Harly and Hvidt (Harley, 1990; Hvidt, 1975). The price series presented here allows for a refining of Keeling's findings and to reconstruct the financial impact of the agreements on the migrant's transatlantic crossing.

Finally, the business-centered approach of international migration allows both to reassess the contemporary views of the authorities on the movement and the way shipping companies placed themselves between the migrant and the state as the latter tried to increase their control on the movements of the former. An analysis of the measures adopted to regulate the migrant transport by the authorities involved in the Hamburg-Le Havre range-New York route, and their efforts to support the opening of transatlantic steamship connections in the first half of the nineteenth century, underlines the primary contemporary concerns about migration. On one hand there was the tendency to obstruct the flow to prevent aliens from becoming a public charge. On the other hand there was the tendency to encourage the flow, because it contributed to the

development of the merchant marine under the national flag, which was of capital importance during military conflicts. The contrasting attitudes of the various parties involved in the Hamburg-Le Havre range will be analyzed. To what extent did it influence the routes chosen by migrants? Did it accelerate the transition from sail to steam? To what extent did the authorities' interest in the migrant trade change our views of the State as a passive actor in the transatlantic migration movement during that period? How did it influence the governments' stance towards migration in the subsequent period, which was crucial in the formation of nation-states?

Only recently have migration researchers, such as Cherryl Shanks, Patrick Weil, James Hollifield, Carl Strikwerda and Aristide Zolberg, brought the State back into the debate. Not surprisingly academics from countries of immigration had tackled the theme, as receiving countries have been more pro-active than sending countries in developing means to control the movement. But have they really? Douglas Massy and Hollifield underlined the lack of research on government behavior in the country of origin (Massy, 1999, 50-51; Hollifield, 2000, 173). The perception of control has, so far, been too restricted on one hand to the abilities of nations to regulate emigration of citizens and immigration of aliens, and later on the other hand on the efforts to speed up assimilation or means to prevent migrants from giving up their home country.

The business migration approach opens up the restricted outlook pointing to the fact that between emigration and immigration countries other nations positioned themselves because of the economic interests involved in transporting these migrants. Strikwerda rightly pointed out that the boom in trade and diplomacy between nations greatly affected the flows despite the lack of an international migration regime (Strikwerda and Geurin, 1993, 10-12 and Strikwerda, 1999). What he failed to note is that there were efforts to create an international regime, not one aimed at regulating emigration of citizens or immigration of aliens, but one trying to regulate the migrant trade. As will be argued, understanding that migration was, in the first place, a trade issue helps in locating Shanks' observation that debates first centered on the fact of whether nations had the right to exclude, and later moved to how many to exclude and who? The fact that during the last quarter of the nineteenth century the American Federal Government usurped the power of local and state authorities over migration issues,

through Supreme Court decisions based on the argument that the matter fell under foreign commerce, stresses this fact. The majority of laws enacted during this period in all the seaboard countries concerned, dealt with the regulation of overseas migrant transport.

As Zolberg observed it was through these laws that the US took its first steps to control the quantity and quality of migrants (Zolberg, 2003; 2006). Gradually developing the means of remote border controls by trying to export inspections to the country of origin instead of arrival, an increasing amount of responsibility for these controls were put on the shipping companies who brought the migrants. Just like the airlines today, shipping companies back then effectuated the initial controls of those trying to enter the US. They therefore offer a first hand source of how laws were enforced and the consequences thereof. This work answers the call of Erika Lee for the need of refining research of US immigration policies for this formative period, which to date has been based predominantly on Nativists and Congressional debates and laws ensuing from these (Lee, 2006, 7-12).

Migration researchers have pointed to the big gap between the purported intent and the practical effect of legislation, part of which can be explained by the difficulties of enforcement (Calavita, 1998, 147). As David Tichenor stated immigration policy can only be understood by taking into account the evolving governing institutions regulating migration, expert narratives which gained importance during the Progressive Era, global pressures and interests group alliances (Tichenor, 2002, 45). By examining the shipping industry in these group alliances, new light will be shed on; how the relations shifted, creating strange bed-fellow coalitions; the amount of expertise material about immigration issues produced during this period; the impact of shipping companies on the output and working of the changing governing institutions; and the influences of global pressures preceding WOI. Using Adam McKeown's words, this analysis recognizes that *“rather than understanding migration and its control in terms of a simple dichotomy between states and migrants, we need to envision a much more complex framework of*

mobility and regulation in which transportation and business play an important and overlapping role".¹

This framework will be reconstructed here on two levels. Firstly, how did shipping companies influence the enactment of American migration and maritime regulation? In Europe a growing number of countries started to pass measures directing citizens or transmigrants to travel on national lines and stimulate the merchant marine under the national flag. As a receiving country, the US was in a privileged position to follow the example and revive the ever declining merchant marine- which prior to the Civil War had dominated the North Atlantic migrant trade. That they did never while nationalists and jingoist feelings were mounting is surprising. How much did the increased collaboration between foreign shipping lines controlling the North Atlantic passenger trade weigh on American maritime policies? As Clemens underlined, how interest groups organize is equally important as to why (Clemens, 1997, 6). How far did the shipping lobby go to protect its main source of revenue, the migrant trade from being restricted? Especially towards the turn of the century, an increasing number of institutional changes opened up lobbying opportunities for pro- and anti immigration restrictionist who fought an intense public debate on the issue. How did shipping companies make use of these to prevent, obstruct, delay or amend immigration laws? As public opinion became ever more influential, what did they do to mobilize it? Does the analysis of the shipping lobby shed more light on Claudia Goldin's observation that the perplexing part of US immigration restriction history is that it took so long to close the doors (Goldin, 1994)?

A second level of analysis brings us from theory to practice by taking a closer look at the influence of shipping lines on the enforcement of these laws. How did gatekeepers interpret and apply them? To what extent did the opinion of immigrant inspectors on the racially loaded debate about desirability of the migrant matter? Did they consider migrants from eastern and southern Europe as being white before their arrival, being white upon arrival or, as in-betweens? To what extent did shipping companies try to reduce the increased tendencies of implementing controls based on the various degrees

¹ Unpublished comment on paper "The Battle for the Migrants: The evolution from port to company competition 1840-1914" Feys Torsten, International conference international conference held in Florence, Italy, 18-19 November 2005.

of whiteness? Did they offer means to excludables to circumvent the legislation prohibiting their entry? What was the impact of the information flow spread by the shipping companies about the growing immigration restrictions on the chain migration patterns of transatlantic migrants?

In short the connections between maritime and migration history are embedded in social networks, economic interests and political decisions. Only an analysis of all aspects can come close of giving a total picture of the impact of steamshipping companies on transatlantic migration. After raising so many questions, it is time to get to the corpus of the examination; an analysis which is divided in three chronological parts. The first part covers the rise of steam shipping on the North-Atlantic from 1840 to 1870; followed by a section on the formation of shipping cartels between 1870 and 1895; and the narrative concludes with the consolidation which took place during the Progressive Era from 1896 to 1914.

PART 1: State policies and their influence on the connections between maritime and migration networks 1830-1870

Chapter I: The competition for the migrant trade in the Hamburg-Le Havre seaport range

Transatlantic migrants have strongly relied on existing trade routes to make their move to the New World. The paths they used were imbedded in pre-existing commercial networks which as restrictions to migrate decreased, embraced this new trade. Merchants quickly observed the profitability of human cargo as the first non-colonial mass migration movement of Germans to the United States took place in the eighteenth century. They used their commercial networks to set up the Redemptioner-system facilitating the move of pioneers. These transatlantic networks connecting out-migration with in-migration regions -hinterland with foreland- converged in ports where the competition for the migrant trade was concentrated. This competition intensified during the nineteenth century as the trade gained importance due to increasing migrant flows. Ships on the North-Atlantic trade route bringing cotton, tobacco and timber to Europe often headed westbound in ballast. Migrants therefore constituted a valuable commodity drawing ships

to migrant gateways. As this relocation business attracted other trades, contributing to the general development of a port, some authorities started to work out policies to direct migrants via certain routes. By contrasting the case of Antwerp with Rotterdam, in the broader context of the Hamburg-Le Havre range, the impact of commercial networks on the path dependency of migrants, the organization of the transport and the influence of government policies will be discussed.

1) Maritime networks and migration: love at first sight

As Canny argued labor demand as such does not suffice to trigger in-migration. No major migration movement takes place, until it becomes profitable for the carriers of human cargo to make the connection between supply and demand (Mörner, 1992, 277). The eighteenth century carriers of Germans and Irish migrants used the improvements in shipping technology and management developed for the slave trade. The route of those migrants depended on the accessibility of a port, the trade connections from these ports and maritime policies of governments involved. The majority of the migrants came from southern and western Germany from where the Rhine offered an easy access to the sea. The pre-existing business contacts between Rotterdam, London and Philadelphia merchants offered a second advantage which allowed Rotterdam merchants to dominate the trade, keeping Amsterdam a distant second. As the movement spread to northern and eastern Germany, Hamburg positioned itself in the market. Merchant ties between Hamburg and England attracted migrants to the Hanseatic city. The English Navigation Acts restricting the trade to its colonies to vessels sailing under the national flag and obligating ships to call at English ports on their transatlantic run turned London into the nodal point for the traffic.

Initially, the flow of migrants was irregular and was organized in groups. English ship-owners relied on information on when and how many migrants were preparing to make the move, obtained through English shipping agents in Rotterdam. Based on that information, vessels were chartered to call to Rotterdam where the shipping-agent took care of fitting and provisioning the ship for the crossing. The agent was also responsible to contract the passengers and coordinate their influx at the port according to the arrival

of the ship, to limit the transit costs and so as to avoid trouble with the Dutch authorities. To avoid destitute migrants from getting stuck at the port and becoming a public charge, only passengers with passports and contracts for ocean passage were allowed to enter the territory. For groups a military escort had to be arranged.

As the flow reached a climax midway through the century the competition for the trade intensified. Shipping agents specialized in becoming migrant brokers, diversifying their strategies to contract migrants. Their contacts informing them on the supply of migrants in the hinterland consisted mainly of boatmen working on the Rhine waterway-system. These men started to work as go-betweens on a commission-basis per passenger with the migrant broker. As competition increased, they were joined by an expanding network of inland migrant-agents soliciting migrants. Overseas contacts informed the broker of so-called 'newlanders' on their way to Germany. These returning migrants often traveled home for American land-speculators and employers who were aware of their enticing influence on chain migration patterns. Migrant brokers also gave commissions to these recruiters guiding countrymen to the New World. Furthermore, contacts with border agents were used to ensure a smooth transition. The higher numbers during the peak years allowed new merchants into the market, despite the growing specialization. Some new brokers used Hamburg to avoid both transit obligations and the competition of the well-established Rotterdam-networks (Wokeck, 1998, 58-115).

As a result of the increasing competition the Redemptioner migrant-system became dominant. Migrant brokers helped settlers in assisting friends and relatives to join them, by accepting payment upon arrival in Philadelphia. The price of the crossing only fluctuated between 5 and 8 pounds, yet the services included varied according the contract. If money for the ocean passage could not be retrieved from relatives there were enough employers who gladly paid the outstanding debt for the newcomer in exchange for an agreement of servitude. This system of giving credit for the crossing, by brokers to migrants willing to work it off and tying themselves to an employer, reflects the growing influence of the foreland on the market. Initially, Charleston, New York and *Nova Scotia* also tried to lure German settlers to populate the surrounding lands. However, Rhinelanders' chain-migration patterns were strongest to Philadelphia because of the reputation of work opportunities and the strong commercial networks. More and more of

the new arrivals disembarked off the vessels of Philadelphia ship-owners during the second half of the eighteenth century. London started to lose its importance as a nodal point. The peak years led to a concentration of the business, as illustrated by the Stedman agency, the leading migrant brokers in the business. The English brothers climbed the ladder from being captains, and then shipping agents in Rotterdam and Philadelphia to their becoming the shipowners of seven ships.

The Redemptioner-system gave more importance to Philadelphia merchants who gauged the demand for servitude labor and were responsible in cashing in the deferred payment of the passage. The Philadelphian control on the market could also be observed in legislation regulating the traffic. Pennsylvanian authorities imposed stricter regulations on space allotment and provisions, improving the traveling conditions for the migrants. In the Redemptioner system, healthy migrants were worth more and the increasing cost for the transport could be regained through a longer period of servitude. The laws made it harder for sometime participants during peak periods to penetrate a highly fluctuating market, further enhancing the concentration of the business (Fertig, 1996, 271-290 and Wokeck, 1998, 58-115).

However the German migrant trade never reached the same levels after the Seven Year's War. Transatlantic migrant flows ebbed away as Germans chose Eastern destinations over America. Along with the decreasing numbers, the commercial networks enabling the move deteriorated because of falling profits. The subsequent American and French revolutions completely disrupted the existing maritime and migration networks. Rotterdam's close ties with England had a negative impact on the trade with Philadelphia during the American war for Independence. Amsterdam became the port of choice for the reduced traffic while Rotterdam redirected its trade relations to southern states which offered no prospects for migrants. Trade came to a standstill during the Continental Blockade (Van der Valk, 1976, 150-152). The relocation of more than a hundred thousand Germans crossing the Atlantic in the eighteenth century pioneered the networks through which the nineteenth century exodus took place. Many similar patterns can be observed when the movement picked up again; such as expanding migration networks imbedded in maritime networks, port competition for the trade on both sides of the Atlantic, increasing concentration of a specializing business and emerging legislation

regulating transit and ocean transport which Americans tried to use as a tool of remote control.

2) Balancing between a threat for welfare systems to a lucrative commodity stimulating trade: early migration policies

The end of the Napoleonic Wars ushered in a new era releasing people from their ties to the land, making the subsequent transatlantic exodus possible. One of the consequences of this freedom of movement was that it undermined the organization of poor relief based on place of birth. Congestion of destitute people was apparent in cities and particularly in migration port-cities. Passengers lacking means to complete their voyage got stranded and became a public charge. Authorities faced the dilemma of facilitating the shipping companies to attract the trade or block the access of migrants to prevent them from becoming a public charge. As the migrant trade gained importance, some authorities actively collaborated with shipping interests in harmonizing both aspects allowing ports to have an edge on rivals lacking this support.

2.1) The rush to Amsterdam but whereto?

The end of the wars combined with agricultural crisis triggered a new migration surge from the Rhinelands. Amsterdam became overflowed with people seeking passage to the New World. Yet sailings were very limited. Because of the long waiting periods, in Amsterdam many became broke before being able to embark. Moreover, many had arrived with insufficient means, relying on the Redemptioner-system through which half to two thirds of the eighteenth Century settlers had made the crossing. However, this system was not organized as it used to be when Rotterdam dominated the business. Destitute migrants piled up in Amsterdam. The limited supply of ships and the excessive demand for berths inflated the cost for transport and thus the periods of servitude. Shippers exploited the by situation overcrowding ships (Grubb, 1994, 803-804; Fouché, 1992, 143-145; Van der Valk, 1976, 151 and Bade, 1997, 16).

While on eighteenth century crossings ships averaging 150 tons had a capacity of about three hundred migrants, the ship *April* left Amsterdam with more than thousand migrants of whom nearly half did not reach Philadelphia alive (Wokeck, 1998, 78 and Handlin, 1973, 50). Other ships also showed unusually high mortality rates (Bade, 2000, 128).² This development, combined with rumors of long servitude contracts and of Dutch authorities deporting destitute French and Germans across the borders, pushed authorities of some German states to call a halt to emigration, while the French tried to prevent the departure of nationals without sufficient means. The experience would put an end to the use of Dutch ports by German migrants as natural gateways to the New World. It also caused the Redemptioner-system in the United States to disappear, because of the rise of superior methods of financing the move. With the increasing flow chain-migration patterns strengthened allowing the poorest to rely on remittances instead of servitude on contracts (Grubb, 1994, 794-824; Fouché, 1992, 19-30; Bade, 2000, 130-134 and Van der Valk, 1976, 151). The events also produced indignation on the other side of the ocean leading to the first federal migration law. Immigration was considered a State issue, however international trade regulations fell under federal authority. To prevent similar tragedies Congress passed an act regulating space allotments and provisions for the eastbound leg on all ships landing migrants in American ports. This Passenger Act was the first step towards a policy which Zolberg rightly defined as 'remote border control'. By decreasing the capacity, and hence increasing the cost of shipping human freight, authorities affected both the quality and quantity of immigration (Zolberg, 2006, 99-122). On one hand port competition hindered the implementation of these laws, but on the other hand paradoxically it also contributed to its spread.

The American economic crisis of 1819 to 1822 brought a provisional end to the surge. The experience of stranded migrants pushed the Dutch authorities to pass laws to avoid a recurrence. The laws of 1828 and 1832 prohibited the entrance of migrants who did not have their crossing already paid for. They also needed a passport and a special migrant certificate from the Dutch consul. Moreover, all responsibility for the maintenance of the migrant, when on Dutch soil, fell on the merchant who arranged the

² On March 6th 1818 three ships sailed in New Orleans landing only 597 passengers of the 1100 who had embarked in Holland (Bade, 2000, 134).

crossing. These measures illustrate the main source of concern of State authorities which marked migration policies in the Atlantic World throughout the nineteenth century; namely the problem of destitute aliens (Caestecker, 1998, 74-76 and 2003, 122; Lucassen, 1996, 241-250; Noiriel, 1988, 74). It is hard to estimate to what the extent to which border controls did or had the means to implement the laws. Yet, Wokeck's study pointed out that even in the eighteenth century migrants were controlled on the possession of passage contracts when entering the Netherlands and that the border-agents became an integrated part of the network through which migrant brokers contracted their passengers. The increased formalities hardly resulted in the developments of alternative routes but instead contributed to the spread of the inland migrant-agents consolidating the networks through which migrants traveled. However by 1815 these commercial networks had disintegrated. The sparse trade relations between Amsterdam and American ports were no longer able to support such networks. This time the measures designed to prevent destitute migrants from entering its territory proved an extra incentive to drive the flow to rival ports. The Dutch, authorities interested only in the development of colonial trades, remained indifferent towards that evolution (Horlings, 1995). Amsterdam and Rotterdam would fall out of the developing cotton triangle which helped shape nineteenth-century migrant routes to the United States.

2.2) Le Havre and the cotton triangle

Besides the relocation of Germans from the continent there was a parallel migrant movement from the British Isles. Many Irish had moved through similar networks directly via Irish ports (Wokeck, 1999, 168-219). In the nineteenth century this movement was diverted through English ports, predominantly Liverpool. Across the Atlantic the potential of human freight had not gone unnoticed by Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore merchants. They managed to attract an increasing share of primary goods from southern states to ship them to European ports from which they could tap dry goods and migrants for the return leg (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 94-122). Liverpool, Le Havre and Bremen became the principal European axis for this trade route.

The freedom of movement of people accompanied by the liberalization of trade made Le Havre a migrant gateway.

A new trade agreement of 1822 between France and the U.S. allowed the French port to become the European nodal point for the cotton trade. Coach wagons transporting cotton to out-migration regions such as the Elzas and Switzerland picked up migrants on their way back to Le Havre. The port had various advantages over its rivals. The crossing was shorter, more direct, and ships did not depend on favorable winds to gain access to the sea. Also, passport regulations were ill-observed and frequent departures limited the waiting periods at the port (Fouché, 1992, 150-151). The innovation of liner shipping further decreased transit times. The first experiments of ships leaving at set times, as opposed to tramps waiting for a certain amount of cargo, sailed between New York and Liverpool in 1818. Due to its success the practice quickly spread to routes where trade volume sustained liner shipping (Horan et al, 1982, 80-106). American merchants and shipowners dominated the New-York Le Havre trade. American migrant brokers, such as Washington Finlay, managed migrant and recruiting-agent networks through which they successfully secured passengers from the German hinterland to Le Havre. Finlay quickly acquired a dominant position for the German migrant transport via Le Havre using aggressive advertising pricing and recruiting policies (Bretting, 1991, 51, 65; Van der Valk, 1976, 152).

Yet the problem of destitute migrants stranding on the French territory worried the Minister of the Interior. In 1830 and 1831 circulars were sent to consuls in out-migration regions and frontier provinces stipulating that migrants heading to the U.S. needed to acquire a visa for their passport from a French consul. The visa could only be obtained if the applicant possessed 200 florins. This sum was doubled shortly thereafter. In 1836 the entrance to French territory was restricted to passengers with a contract for ocean passage or with the cash equivalent for the purchase thereof. The lack of border control stations hindered the implementation of these laws. Moreover, the network of migrant agents provided means to circumvent the regulations by smuggling passengers across borders or providing fake passports (Fouché, 1992, 68-72). The lack of French laws regulating the ocean transport or preventing migrants from abuse while the measures prohibiting entrance of destitute migrants, reflect the meager interest of French

authorities in stimulating the migrant-trade. Le Havre migrant brokers met the lack of support of the authorities by tightening their networks in the hinterland.

2.3) The rise of Bremen as ‘the’ migrant gateway to the New World

Bremen authorities were the first on the European continent to realize the importance of the migrant trade and passed laws contributing to its development. The early appointment of F. Wichelhausen as American consul in Bremen in 1796, one of the first on the European continent, reflected the growing trade relations between the Hanseatic city and the United States.³ Yet, the poor accessibility from out-migration regions impeded Bremen in competing with rival ports. The restrictive measures in other countries and the unstable political situation in France and the Low Countries in the early 1830s drove the migrants to Bremen (Armgor, 1992, 15-42 and Gelberg, 1973, 10). During the previous decade, the control of Bremen merchants on the trade through the port reached an absolute low because of the lack of exports. As noted by contemporaries, in the exchange trade between two countries, shippers from the country with the larger exports had a natural advantage.

The merchant marine, under the Bremen flag, declined dramatically. Two ships out of three left the Hanseatic city in ballast. American ships dropped off rice, sugar, coffee and tobacco but called elsewhere for their return load (Engelsing, 1963, 49-79). The passage of 3,500 migrants in 1830 had a far reaching impact on the further development of Bremen’s commerce. The migrant became ‘the’ commodity around which the shipping industry developed. Aware of the geographic disadvantages, the merchant community invested great efforts in establishing tight networks of migrant agents to secure the flow from the hinterland. Agencies were opened in Frankfurt, Darmstadt, Giessen and further south in Mannheim, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Nürnberg, etc. to promote Bremen as a migrant gateway, sell passages and help the migrants on their way. The organization of the migrant business was strictly regulated due to a trade situation peculiar to Bremen.

³ Wichelhausen formed a partnership with Buxtorf with whom he managed a shipping line providing passenger service to Baltimore.

The lack of an industrious hinterland forced Bremen tradesmen to establish merchant-ship owner firms managing both trade and transport. The city's corporate economic structures imposed the appointment of elected official brokers, assisting and supervising the freighting of ships for which they received small fees regulated by law. They were not allowed to act their own initiative, nor to receive commission which led to the formation of an outside network of private entrepreneurs recruiting migrants and negotiating transport rates. Efforts to block out the entrepreneurs were in vain and pushed brokers to engage in extra-legal recruiting activities. In fear of loosing the supervision of the trade the authorities legalized the activities of the entrepreneurs who increased their grip on the business to the detriment of the brokers (Hoerder, 1993, 74-75 and Prüser, 1964, 156).

As a result of the close ties between the authorities and the merchant community of the Hanseatic city a progressive legislation regarding migrant transport was passed in 1832. The regulations were designed both to protect the city of the burden of destitute migrants and to protect the migrant from abuses on their way to the New World. Passengers unable to pay for the crossing would be expelled from the city. To reduce waiting periods at the port migrants were encouraged to book their trip in advance. The American Passage Act of 1819 was used as an example to regulate the ocean leg of the passage. It placed the responsibility of provisioning on shipowners putting an end to the practice of self-provisioning. The seaworthiness of ships and provisions were controlled by city officials. Finally shipowners needed to carry insurance to refund the passengers in case of accidents (Armgor, 1992, 42-44 and Hoerder, 1993, 74).

Despite making the travel more expensive compared to rival ports it allowed Bremen merchants to increase the migrant-flow through the port (see annex 1). The visionary merchant community realized the importance of the quality of service and reputation of the port. From a collective fund raised by a tax levied per passenger a huge advertising campaign with broadsheets, posters and newspapers ads was set up in out-migration regions pointing to the advantages of Bremen as a migrant gateway. The migrant business pioneered the large scale use of newspapers as an advertising medium. Word of mouth publicity was assured by the expanding network of migrant agents using sub-agents in small towns, usually people active in public life such as inn-keepers,

pastors, grocers (Armgor, 1992, 43). Letters from the New World of satisfied customers directed friends and relatives the same way they came (Kamphoefner, et al., 1991). The migrant flow through Bremen swelled reaching the 10,000 mark in 1832 and surpassing 15,000 in 1837. It allowed Bremen merchants to take control over the inbound trades from the United States. The migrant business enabled these tradesmen to quote lower rates for freight, mainly tobacco. Bremen quickly became the European capital for the tobacco business which; would remain the most important industry of the city and its surroundings up to the end of the nineteenth century. By 1840 the trade to the United States was controlled by the Bremen flag driving out American ships to rival ports such as Le Havre and Antwerp (Engelsing, 1963, 49-76 and Prüser, 1963, 156).

The metamorphosis of the trade situation in Bremen illustrates the importance of the migrant transport on trade routes. Whereas up until that point, migrants ha mainly followed established trade routes, trade started to follow migrant routes. Despite the geographical disadvantages and the higher costs of ocean transport the Hanseatic city managed to rival Le Havre as the main migrant gateway to the United States. Bremen demonstrated that the choice of migrant route was not only based on rational economic factors such as lowest cost and shortest or most accessible travel route. The dynamic merchant community compensated the poor accessibility with progressive legislation, active advertising and recruiting campaigns. They understood the importance of gaining the confidence of those who considered taking the plunge to the New World and to familiarize them with means to do so. While higher authorities of rival ports feared the migrant, Bremen officials embraced them. The early engagement of Bremen merchants on the continent gave the port an edge which it would not loose until 1914. Yet the success story did not go unnoticed in neighboring ports.

3) Coming out of the shadows of the ‘Dam’ ports: the Belgian independence and the revival of Antwerp

The first port which tried to challenge the dominant positions in migrant transport of Le Havre and Bremen was Antwerp. Belgian authorities tried to back up their political independence with an active economic policy. By establishing trade relations with other

countries the young nation hoped to create goodwill with other states to consolidate its independence. Antwerp which after two and half centuries managed to throw off the yoke of Dutch ports obstructing its development, served as nodal point for this purpose.⁴ Positioning the port on the blooming North American route was one of the priorities. Merchants and authorities were aware of the importance migrant traffic to do this. The efforts of the Belgian government to lure migrants to Antwerp will be discussed. The success of migrant trade and its influence on migration policies of nationals will also be analyzed.

3.1) Positioning Antwerp among the migrant gateways to New World

A Belgian official Désiré Behr reported the following on the migrant transport via Bremen:

“We know that Germany sends out thousands of emigrants to America every year. The city of Bremen has passed such perfect regulations for the transport of emigrants, that only this port organizes these transports. Once arrived in Bremen this cargo moves itself without extra costs and it allows the Bremen merchants on their way back to ship a variety of goods such as tobacco and cotton at half the regular price. As most of the German emigrants come from Westphalia, Thuringia and Switzerland it is very likely that they would prefer to travel through Antwerp if they would find the same conditions as in Bremen.”⁵

Various drafts were drawn up, yet it would take another five years before the law regulating migrant transport was passed. The existing ones dating back to the Dutch rule were abrogated.⁶ The Bremen and American laws were clearly used as an example. The space requirements of two passengers per five tons were taken over from the American

⁴ The rebellion in the Low Countries against Spain and the subsequent formation of the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands led to the closure of the port of Antwerp. Many tradesmen moved to Amsterdam contributing to the economic development of the port. Only under French rule two centuries later did the port regain its access to the sea. During the subsequent Dutch rule the interests of Antwerp remained subordinate to Dutch ports. The Netherlands refused to recognize Belgium and hindered sailings on the Westerscheldt, the port's access to the North Sea. When signing the XXIV articles, recognizing Belgium's independence, the Dutch preserved the right to levy toll on the Westerscheldt. To enhance the trade through Antwerp the Belgian government decided to refund these tolls to all ships except the ones navigating under the Dutch flag. (Blom and Lamberts, 1995 120-256).

⁵ ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, D. Behr, Report on the Migrant Transport through Bremen, April 5 1838.

⁶ These were the ones passed by the Dutch government of 1828, yet they were not rigorously implemented.

law, while provision requirements for ninety days on the North Atlantic were copied from Bremen.⁷ A commission of city officials was established to control the seaworthiness of the ship, provisions, amounts of medicine aboard, accommodations and space allotment on the between decks.⁸ The law was used to set up a broad advertising campaign in Germany and Switzerland promoting the advantages of Antwerp as a migrant port. The Belgian minister of Foreign Affairs relied on the consular network to distribute the advertisement to local newspapers and to migration agents. Consuls also had to assist Antwerp ship-owners to establish solid agencies representing them in the area and assuring the migrant flow.⁹

The main advantage of Antwerp in securing passengers from the south-western German states was the opening of the Iron Rhine connecting Cologne with Antwerp as early as 1843. The policy of the authorities stimulating Belgium as an important transit country resulted in a dense railroad network, unequalled on the European continent. Prior to the opening of the railroad connection migrants used the cheap Rhine waterways to Rotterdam from where they were shipped to Antwerp.¹⁰ Getting the often voluminous luggage of migrants to the port of embarkation posed one of the main problems for the inland leg of the trip. The transport was easier via waterways than by coach wagons and influenced the choice of migrant routes (Fouché, 1992, 144-156). The Belgian authorities obtained the free transport of luggage from the railroad company and used the opening of the Iron Rhine to launch a new advertising campaign promoting Antwerp as a migrant gateway.¹¹ It was the first port to be directly connected by railroad. Yet despite the efforts the flow through Antwerp declined.¹²

Besides Antwerp, Rotterdam (see below) and Hamburg had renewed their interest in the trade. Initially, Hamburg had opposed the trade passing a law in 1832 blocking the entry of migrants to the port. Trade relations were centered upon Britain; hence traffic on the North Atlantic was sparse. The success of the neighboring Hanseatic city caused a

⁷ The laws applied to all long distance routes yet provisions varied according to the estimated traveling time.

⁸ Pasionomie, law number 271, March 14 1843, p. 257.

⁹ ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, Letter of Consul M. Muhlens to Minister of Foreign Affaires, 12-4-1843.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, Letter of the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce to Minister of Foreign Affaires, 10-6-1843.

¹¹ *Ibid*., Nachricht fur Auswanderer nach Amerika, Consul M. Muhlens, February 1844.

¹² *Ibid*., Letter of Minster of Public Works to Minister of the Interior June 25 1845.

policy change. Hamburg ships started to call at Bremen to load migrants on their way to Britain (Walker, 1965, 88-89). The Irish and English migration generated great profits for ships operating between Britain and the U.S. Through feeder services from the continent British ports tried to attract part of the continental flow at lower rates, to maximize their capacity. The strong trade relations with Hamburg established an indirect migration pattern which would persist throughout the nineteenth century, to the great annoyance of Hamburg shippers opening direct routes to the United States. Hamburg passed legislation based on the Bremen model which applied only to ships sailing directly to the United States. Yet these were ill-observed. Migrants traveling indirectly through Hull and Liverpool, on the whole were exempted of these regulations. It gave the port a bad reputation as migrant gateway to the New World. Early 1840's attempts to enforce the laws were opposed by shippers who believed that regulations undermined rather than stimulated the competitive position of the port. Instead, the mercantile section of the Hamburg Patriotic Society established a bureau to inform and protect migrants. The society planned to open branch offices inland and at popular destinations. It gathered and spread information of migrants abroad and on the opportunities to assist prospective travelers in choosing their destination. The society assisted the migrant with the expedition protecting him from abuse on his way to the New World.¹³ But the poor results pushed the Senate, midway through the decade, to pass and enforce regulations conforming to Bremen's. Subsequently, the migration fever swelled and spread to Hamburg's North and East German hinterland allowing the city to catch up with its rivals (Walker, 1965, 92 and Gelberg, 1973, 10-13).

3.2) Increased efforts of the Belgian government to remain competitive

The intensified competition for the trade was met by increasing efforts of the Belgian government to promote Antwerp. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed a special commission investigating the decline of 1844 and proposing measures to increase migration through Antwerp. The report reflects the various factors which influenced

¹³ If they actually did, remains uncertain. *Ibid*, Letter of the Hamburg Consul to the Minister of Foreign Affairs June 28 1842.

migrant flows. First strong winds had hindered the access of Antwerp in April and May diverting American ships to Rotterdam and Le Havre whereto migrants needed to be forwarded. Second, a proposal to increase tariffs drove away a number of American ships bringing in tobacco and designed to take migrants on their way back. A third factor was the high death rates in the Belgian colony of Santo Thomas de Guatemala. Many colonists came from Germany and the event received wide coverage in the German press (Walker, 1965, 81). Rival migrant agents used the event to advice against migrating through Belgium. Fourth, Bremen had built up an impressive fleet conceived of for the transport of migrants while Rotterdam's connection to the Rhine-waterways provided a cheap connection to the hinterland. To compete with the Iron Rhine Dutch steam-shiping companies on the Rhine lowered their fares to Rotterdam.¹⁴ Many Antwerp-passengers still used the waterways through Rotterdam, from where local agents often convinced them to leave from there. The regulations protecting the migrant received praise, yet a too strict an application of these rules unnecessarily increased the costs; which at the time, came to 110 franks including food. The commission recommended giving shippers possibility of adapting the food supplies to the taste of the migrants, and that the quantity during spring and summer was being reduced from ninety to seventy five days.¹⁵ They suggested relaxing passport controls of the maritime policy. Passports cost ten to twelve franks and many did not bother to acquire one.¹⁶ Infrastructure to handle the baggage at the port had to be improved. Cheaper accommodation at the port needed to be provided in a building designated by the community council. The authorities were advised to appoint an emigration inspector protecting migrants from abuses at the

¹⁴ Dutch companies offered transportation from Mayence to Rotterdam for two thalers. ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, Letter of Minster of Public Works to Minister of the Interior June 25 1845.

¹⁵ The Antwerp chamber of commerce pleaded to substitute rice, beans and peas by biscuit rusk, and potatoes, a diet which Germans are much more familiar with. The strict regulations brought the cost of provision at 40 franks which according the Chamber was much more than other ports. The cost of the berth on ships leaving on a fixed date was between 70 and 80 franks that year. In 1842 eighty franks was quoted. *Ibid.*, Letter of Antwerp chamber of commerce to Ministry of Foreign Affaires August 17 1842.

¹⁶ The maritime policy refuted the claim that they required a passport from all migrants on which they put a visa before embarkation. The police said to also accept birth certificates or any kind of official certificates. Three fourths of the migrants had no passports according to them. *Ibid.*, Letter of the maritime police to Ministry of Foreign Affaires January 28 1846.

port. Finally the cost for direct access to the port had to be reduced to prevent the migrants from passing through Rotterdam.¹⁷

These events exemplify the aspects on which the competition for the migrant trade centered; port infrastructure and technological evolution, trade and migration policies, cost of inland and ocean transport, transit facilities and accessibility to the port, and the quality of service and reputation of the port. The developing transatlantic steamshipping could put an end to the dependency on winds to sail in and out of Antwerp. Simultaneously, the tonnage of ships was rapidly increasing forcing ports to adapt their infrastructure accordingly. The period is also marked by the liberalization of trade. The Congress of Vienna with the abolition of slave trade and the new tradition of diplomatic consultation created an international regime stimulating cooperation, free trade, economic integration and international migration (Strikwerda, 1999, 374-375). The transition from protectionism to free trade triggered numerous negotiations regarding trade and navigation treaties. Speculations on the outcome of these negotiations, as in 1844 and 1845 often temporarily influenced trade routes and hence migration routes (Laurent, 1965, 951). The price competition seemed to have brought down the basic rate for a berth to 80 francs excluding provisions, sleeping and cooking utensils. Shippers feared strict application of measures regulating migrant transport increasing the cost or hindering the transit of migration such as the ones regarding provisions and passports mentioned above. It is impossible to measure to which extent the laws were applied, and ship-owners and migrant brokers quickly found means to circumvent them. This often occurred with the consent of the authorities to protect the competitive position of the port (Spelkens, 1976, 83-101). The competition also moved to the inland transport. To counter Rotterdam authorities obtained a thirty percent reduction of the 'Cologne Steamship Company' for migrants heading to Antwerp. On top of free transportation of luggage, migrants using the Iron Rhine also received a thirty percent reduction on the fare- which little later was set at fifty percent for migrants traveling in groups.¹⁸ The expanding railroad network and decreasing costs stimulated the direct access of Antwerp.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the governor of Antwerp January 30 1846.

¹⁸ The thirty percent reductions were introduced end of November 1844. *Dutch companies offered transportation from Mayence to Rotterdam for two thalers or 7,50 francs. The travel with steamboats from Mayence to Cologne cost 5,75 francs plus 10,50 francs for the railroad leg to Antwerp totaling 16,25*

Finally, the frequent advertising campaigns illustrate the importance of the information on and reputation of the port. The Belgian authorities used the consular network to promote Antwerp in foreign out-migration regions, mainly the German hinterland. All kinds of excuses varying from announcing sailing dates, new legislation, the opening of railroad connections or special migrant fares were used to advertise the Belgian migrant route. Consuls were asked to keep an eye out for negative publicity appearing in the German press, such as reports on migrant abuses, shipwrecks or as mentioned above the failed attempt of the Belgian authorities to establish a colony in Santo Thomas de Guatemala. These smear campaigns were viewed as attempts by the German authorities to direct their nationals to Bremen and Hamburg. Consuls refuted rumors on mistreatment of migrants in Antwerp and enforced these claims with a broad publicity campaign announcing the appointment of an official emigration inspector. The government inspector had to protect migrants, provide them with information and handle their complaints (Maesens, 1978, 33). This reputation not only needed to be defended in Europe but also overseas. The New York Consul Henri Mali advertised the Belgian legislation, reductions on the Iron Rhine etc. in the American press.¹⁹ Francis Thompson, one of the first migrant brokers in New York enabled immigrants settled in the U.S. to transfer funds to friends and relatives to follow in their footsteps. The potential of chain migration patterns was quickly observed by migrant brokers overseas. They pioneered what would later develop in the sale of prepaid tickets by an expansive network of migrant agents across the U.S. (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 339-340). Promoting Antwerp in the U.S. served to create goodwill with American authorities and to convince immigrants to guide friends and relatives through the Belgian port. The efforts of the government paid off, increasing both migration rates and the maritime traffic on the North Atlantic (Veraghtert, 1977, LXI).

4) The economic crisis and assisted migration through Antwerp

franks. The commission urged to bring it down to 11 franks to make an end to indirect migration through Rotterdam. ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, Letter of Minister of Public Works to Minister of the Interior June 25 1845.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Letter of Minister of Foreign Affaires to H. Mali, January 30 1844.

By the time Europe was hit by the economic crisis midway the 1840's well-established competing networks assisting people to relocate overseas were operative. Yearly arrivals in the United States quadrupled during the decade 1845-1855, in comparison to the previous decade with averages going from 76,675 to 309,572 (Willcox, 1929, 399). Authorities weighed down by a growing population depending on poor relief started using the networks as a security valve. On the other side of the Atlantic land-speculators, railroad companies and some state authorities sought people to cultivate their lands. The growing competition to populate the lands moved from the United States to the European continent, from where migrants were directed and actively recruited. In the wake of this movement numerous philanthropic organizations were founded claiming to defend the migrants' interest, yet often with a profit motive. The share of migrants receiving direct assistance of recruiting agents and state authorities remained relatively low. Yet their impact on bringing Europe and the US closer in the mental maps of Europeans, through the spread of information and reopening the migrating possibilities to all sections of the population, can not be overlooked. The Belgian case is used here to analyze the repercussions of the economic crisis and the increasing migration movement on migrant policies and migrant transport.²⁰

4.1) New Flanders as a security valve for 'Old' Flanders: the foundation of agricultural colonies with government support

With the economic crisis the problem of destitute migrants getting stranded on their way reemerged. The Prussian government asked the Belgian authorities to take measures preventing Germans with insufficient means from crossing the borders.²¹ They copied the procedures used by the French government requiring the possession of 200

²⁰ Many opinions about migration in Belgium were also circulating in Germany where the debate was obviously much more prominent given the high numbers moving overseas. As in Belgium, the debate centered on whether restrictive, encouraging or non-intervention policies had to be adopted. The increasing number of philanthropic organizations concerned with the movement held a big conference end of 1848 successfully lobbying with the authorities to expand the programs of assisted migration or at least to facilitate the movement. Yet Prussia's efforts to capitalize on the national sentiment through the Union scheme after the collapse of the Frankfurt Parliament resulted in renewed attention for migration. Prussia's intention to control and even restrict the movement was successfully opposed by the Hanseatic cities who vigorously defended their interest in migrant trade (Walker, 1965, 103-178).

²¹ ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848; Letter of Prussian envoy to the minister of Foreign Affairs January 10 1847.

franks by all Germans traveling through to Antwerp.²² The authorities were immediately submerged by complaints of migrant brokers and ship-owners. The Antwerp Chamber of Commerce was outraged by the lack of communication about the measure, hearing about it through the German press and its disruptive effect on the migrant trade. Especially because:

“Often contracts between migrant brokers at the port and German migrant agents or communities stipulate that the payment for transportation is to be carried out on installment, not by the emigrant but by the communities, agents or another designated third party. Such contracts which have been concluded for thousands of emigrants are now under review. It is impossible for the communities to give the sum to the emigrant because frequently they still need to sell the migrant’s possessions to cover part of the cost. We would like to remind that these shippings stimulate our maritime trade and relations with transatlantic countries. That they multiply export possibilities to the advantage of our national industry, procuring an outbound cargo for ships using our port these shippings lower the incoming freight rates of cotton, tobacco, cereals and other products. Furthermore, each migrant stays on average 5 to 6 days spending about seventy franks on provisions, lodging, utensils, etc. which times 13.000 for 1846 gives the lump sum of 910,000 franks. If the berth rate is added, which at present amounts to eighty franks and whereto the national marine takes an important part, the business yields a profit of 1,950,000 franks. Tolls and taxes collected on ships involved in the traffic surpassed one million franks. Also despite the reduction the railroads are benefiting from the trade. Our trade relations with the United States have already increased to such extent thanks to the passage of emigrants that the government no longer considers the premiums favoring the navigation line to the United States to be needed. Moreover, only a very limited number were sent back.²³”

On the day of the receiving of the letter the measures were repealed while migrant brokers stood as surety for the crossing.²⁴ Even if the ‘thousands’ mentioned by the Chamber of Commerce were likely to have been exaggerated to speed up prompt action, the letter illustrates how migration networks adapted to the needs of communities in assisting community members to relocate and this reconfirms the importance of migrant transportation for trade in general. This German practice stimulated the Belgian authorities to use the migration networks as a security valve for a growing and impoverished population.

²² *Ibid.*, Letter of the Minister of Justice to the Minister of Foreign Affairs February 13 1847.

²³ *Ibid.*, Reports of the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce to the Minister of Foreign Affairs January 14 and March 6 1847.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Letters of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Justice March 8 and May 12 1847.

Yet, the fiasco of Santo Thomas de Guatemala had planted some doubts regarding direct intervention of authorities on emigration. The colony had been established to stimulate trade and to increase the political influence through territorial expansion backing up the 'raison d'être' of the young nation. Mis-management and high death rates left the Belgian government with a financial hangover and a blackened reputation (Schepens, 1976, 86-92; Stols, 1999, 234 and van den Bosche, 1997, 1-12).²⁵ The public and parliamentary debates were divided between the belief that the State always had to take care of its nationals, considering every migrant as a loss for the military- and workforce, while the Malthusian idea of overpopulation was gaining ground. As a report on the crisis which predominantly hit the Flemish countryside demonstrated provinces with the highest population density, Brabant and West-Flanders, had a ratio of one out of every 4.86 inhabitants and one out of 3.87 who depended on charity support. The province of Luxemburg, which had the lowest population density, had a ratio of one out of every 70.²⁶ Exporting part of the population offered a security valve and opened ways of enhancing trade relations by using migrants as ambassadors and as consumers of Belgian products abroad.

Politicians favoring migration envied the successful Irish and especially German flow passing through Antwerp, using them as example to convince opponents.²⁷ The crisis over which two governments fell in as many years, called for pressing action. The government financed new attempts to establish colonies. Demographic motives, now having the upper-hand over political or economic motives, influenced both the choice of location as well as the kind of colony. The authorities intended to set up an exemplary self-sufficient agricultural colony which would stimulate local authorities and charity

²⁵ This failure was mainly caused by: the hesitation of the administration of the colony whether to organise the settlement as an agricultural colony or as a trading company; the poor choice of the colonists; the many colonists who committed a breach of contract; the interference of king Leopold I in the appointment of the administration; the presence of Belgian militaries and the mutual distrust with the Guatemalan authorities. In 1845 and 1846 the death 211 out of 871 colonists in eighteen months scared off many Belgians for emigration.

²⁶ ABMFA., Emigration, 2946, III, Renseignements et documents fourni à la commission du travail 1886, Letter of Minister of Foreign Affaires to the provincial governors 1847.

²⁷ For the parliamentary debates see : Chambre de Représentants, Compte rendu de l'emploi du crédit extraordinaire de 1.000 000 ouvert au département de l'intérieur par la loi du 21/6/1849 séance du 5/2/1852, (Bruxelles, 1852) and Annales parlementaires, Chambre de représentants, séance du 15-2-1845, p. 814-816 séance du, 31/5/1849 pp. 1522-1585 et séance du 9/5/1854, Bruxelles, pp. 1652-1660. The contemporary literature reflect the different views about migration : (Cartuyvels, 1850 ; De Ham, 1849; Hansen, 1849; Vander Streaten-Ponthoz, 1847).

institutions to invest in similar projects as an alternative for the existing poor relief. The experience in Santo Thomas convinced initiators to choose a location with a similar climate as in Belgium, which based on the report of Auguste Van der Straeten-Ponthoz, fell on the United States (Feys, 2003, 10-43 and 2004, 203-204).

The Belgian official, Van der Straeten, was in 1844 sent on an exploratory mission to investigate the matter of emigration to the United States, and to examine the opportunities the country offered for Belgian trade.²⁸ Forty years later his report would still be quoted in Belgium as ‘the’ point of reference on the opportunities in the US. It was also used for propaganda abroad, in Germany and the Netherlands. Scholte translated the paper into Dutch and published the report for the attention of potential migrants in the Netherlands. Kollman did the same in Germany (Feys, 2003, 5-9; Stokvis, 1977, 126 and van der Straeten-Ponthoz, 1846, De Smet, 1959, 164).²⁹ Reliable information was crucial for the migrant’s success and authorities recognised the need to provide alternatives to the often biased information circulating in Europe through migrant agents, philanthropic organizations, recruiting agents for railroads or land-speculators etc. Even letters from immigrants were sometimes forged, the so-called bacon-letters, which were used to influence migrant decisions (Thielemans, 1999, 131).

The exploratory mission complemented the consular reports and provided the Antwerp emigration inspector and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with trustworthy information which was transferred to anyone soliciting for it. Based on the information which was amassed the authorities subsidized two colonies, one called New Flanders in Sainte-Marie, Pennsylvania and another in Kansas, Missouri. New Flanders was

²⁸ The five main questions that needed to be investigated underline the purpose of the mission: (1) what advantages does the American government offer to attract emigrants? (2) How are the colonists doing that settle in the country and what are their moral and material condition? (3) Where did they settle? Why? What is the influence on the trade relations between the country of emigration and immigration? Do the emigrants still have ties with their home country? What are the consequences for commerce? (4) What is the best place for Belgian emigrants to settle for their own good and for the good of the trade relations between Belgium and the United States? (5) In what way does the Belgian government need to intervene in Belgium and in America? Could the government in collaboration with the American government, regulate the emigration to protect the emigrants and to make this movement as efficient as possible? ABMFA, Emigration, 2020, I, Emigration 1834-1848, Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Vanderstraeten-Ponthoz April 15 1844,

²⁹ The original publication was called: “Recherches sur la situations des émigrants aux Etats-Unis de l’Amérique du Nord” (Meline, Bruxelles, 1846). Translated in German by Fr. Osswald *Forschungen über die Lage der Auswanderer in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika* (Kollmann, Ausburg, 1846); in Dutch by Scholte *Onderzoek naar den toestand der Landverhuizersin de Verenigde Staaten van Noord-Amerika* (Van Heyningen, Utrecht, 1847).

established in collaboration with the ‘American Association for the Colonisation of Sainte-Marie’ one of the many ‘philanthropic’ associations seeking buyers and cultivators for their lands.³⁰ A government official, Victor De Ham, headed the project leading fifty nine volunteers who had previously depended on poor relief in their community. The volunteers signed a contract binding them to cultivate the lands and to contribute to the development of the colony for three years. In exchange, transport costs and all the necessary materials for the cultivation of the lands were provided for. Every year, groups of fifty colonists would be sent to the New Flanders by the government. A similar arrangement was made with Maguis Guinotte & Co who managed the colony in Kansas. Emigration Inspector Thielens helped to arrange transport (Feys, 2003, 28-54 and 2004, 204-210). Contracts binding the migrants to periods of servitude significantly resembled the eighteenth century Redemptioner-system and the subsequent padrone-system. Yet these contracts had no legal leg standing in the US which placed colonisation associations in a vulnerable position in terms of breach of contract.³¹ Colonists took advantage of the fierce competition among land-speculators to move to where better conditions were offered. Hence, the subsistence of such colonies depended greatly on the ability to tie pioneers to the lands, hoping that their success would trigger chain migration patterns. The Belgian attempts failed to do so and forced the government to give up on the idea of establishing agricultural colonies.

4.2) Giving beggars criminals and ex-convicts a fresh start in America

This however did not put an end to assisted migration by Belgian authorities. The Antwerp governor Theodor Teichmann, the emigration inspector Jean-François Thielens and the biggest migrant broker of the port Adolphe Strauss set up a network which assisted beggars, ex-convicts and convicts in migrating. During the economic crisis beggar workhouses for beggars became overcrowded. These institutions detained people who had been charged with being vagabonds or for begging and being a burden on their

³⁰ German and Irish had already settled on the colony’s territory in which a Belgian priest, J Cartuyvels had some interests.

³¹ In the Redemptionist-system state authorities registered the contracts providing a legal framework which protected both employers as migrants (Grubb, 1994, 797). Subsequent assisted movements were isolated and never reached the same scale or organization.

community. Not surprisingly, the Community Council of Antwerp pioneered the alternative strategy of paying for the ocean crossing to the United States (Boumans 1963, 470-504 and Feys, 2004, 211-219). The governor Teichmann quickly tried to convince all communities, in his province, to follow the example:

“By sending detainees of beggar workhouses, the community gets rid of miserable individuals who inevitably would have spread the begging to their families. The community offers them a new chance for a better future and to get new morals in a country where the salary is much higher and where the immigrant escapes from the shame of his past and the influence of his disruptive companions. The crossing, food included, costs on average between 160fr. and 180fr. per adult, which is only a bit more than the price of confinement for one year. This sum also includes the expenses for the equipment and some pocket money to get through the first days of their stay in the United States. The emigration inspector Thielens has already sent you a brochure. He keeps an eye on the embarkation of the beggars. Only moments after their liberation beggars get convicted again to be sent once more to the beggar workhouse which they consider to be a permanent shelter. In case of interest the communities can get directly in touch with mister Thielens.”³²

The reaction of the communities varied; some needed to be reminded that the candidates had to volunteer, while others expressed the concern of whether they would be better off overseas. This concern was not totally unfounded considering their history as destitutes and the limited resources they were provided with in making a fresh start, consisting of: “*a shirt, two pairs of socks, two handkerchiefs, a pair of pants, a pair of shoes, a hat, a cardigan, a towel, a suitcase, a brush, a comb, smoking tobacco and pipes, chewing tobacco, Dutch gin, white soap, cooking materials, straw mattress, pillow, blanket and 15fr. pocket money.*”³³ All communities eventually corroborated. When the request came from a detainee whose community of residence could not be traced back, the Ministry of Justice financed the move and sometimes these were forwarded to Sainte-Mary. The intervention of the national authorities spread the practice to other provinces of the country.

The system was even extended to exconvicts and some criminals were pardoned on the condition of going overseas. The Committee for After-care and Resettlement of

³² PRA, Provinciaal Bestuur, Bedelaarsgestichten, 78, I, Emigratie 1850-1855. Letter from Teichmann to the administration of Turnhout.

³³ *Ibid.*, Contract signed by J. Veezen, Charles Vasteneer, x, x, x, and x December 27 1850.

freed Prisoners assisted exconvicts in reintegrating into society by finding work for them. The Committee put some to work as sailors on boats leaving from Antwerp (Boumans, 1965, 485). Therefore, it was only a small step to finance the move of exconvicts to the US, just like they Belgian authorities did with beggars. The Minister of Justice, Tesch provided everyone with a passport and a special certificate which masked their history of incarceration. Everything needed to be done in great secrecy. Teichmann handled the correspondence with the communities, while the emigration inspector Thielens who had worked for the governor as Cabinet's Secretary arranged practical details. Most of the 750 registered beggars, ex-convicts and convicts who migrated this way between 1850 and 1856 did so through Adolphe Strauss. The most dominant migrant broker in Antwerp even signed an exclusivity contract with Thielens for these movements, in exchange for a fixed price of 180 franks- eighty for the berth, forty for provisions and sixty for the equipment.³⁴ For the poorest communities Thielens and Strauss made special arrangement to get beggars positions as sailors. The costs in outfitting the beggar with the necessary sailor materials only amounted to 115 franks. Returns were unlikely since no steerage berths were available for the eastbound leg, and cabin berths cost about 500 franks.³⁵ Only two percent ever returned. Thielens and Strauss built a strong relationship which lasted nearly thirty years. The task of the Emigration Inspector was to inform and to protect the migrant, yet his close relations with Strauss suggest that he also had financial interests in business.

Assisted relocation shows how the networks through which transatlantic migrants moved expanded and became increasingly complex. The organization of the transport centered in the hands of migrant brokers at the port of embarkation – a move which became increasingly institutionalized as the authorities' concern for the wellbeing of the migrant, but more especially for the trade it generated, grew. The Belgian case illustrates that increasing contacts between migrant brokers and authorities did not limit itself to adapting policies according to the needs of the business. Antwerp migrant brokers drew migrants from the hinterland, in collaboration with local German authorities, who paid

³⁴ During the rush in 1854 prizes seemed to have gone up a bit, while sometimes communities paid extra for inland travel in the United States.

³⁵ PRA, Provinciaal Bestuur, Bedelaarsgestichten, 78, I, Emigratie, 1850-1855, Letter of Thielens to Teichmann.

for the crossing of their poorest in installments. It inspired the Belgian government to follow suit. Through the Emigration Inspector Thielens local and national authorities were directly connected to the networks sending passengers overseas. Thielens was also responsible for gathering and distributing information on migration opportunities, in which he was assisted by official exploratory missions and consuls. Bremen and Hamburg copied Antwerp by appointing a government inspector with similar responsibilities (Gelberg, 1973, 12-13).³⁶ The networks through which migrants moved expanded but not only in Europe. Maritime routes are always the result of interplay between hinter- and foreland. In the case of the transatlantic migrant transport this foreland had an important impact on who migrated and how.

5) New York as ‘the’ nodal point for the American Foreland

While in Europe ports competed in sending over migrants, competition to receive the migrants occurred in the United States between the Atlantic ports of Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and New York. The Erie Canal provided New York with the best connections to the interior, which were complemented with extending railroad networks such as the ‘Erie Railroad Co’ and the ‘New York Central Railroad Co’ and coastal shipping. As James Bennett, the owner of the *New York Herald*, the city’s biggest newspaper underlined, infrastructure and technological innovation were key elements in maintaining an edge over rival ports. He advocated the development of railroad networks and from 1836 onwards he pressed for New York to become the American terminus of transatlantic steamship lines.

Yet, of equal importance was the port’s development as a financial capital of the country, allowing New York merchants to gain control of the eastbound trades. In a system where New York financiers bought, for example, cotton before it was planted or flour before it was milled American planters and farmers were placed in a chronic state of debt. Financiers collected interests in return and directed a big share of the American export to the port. The money they advanced also attracted the nations’ storekeepers to New York, where they replenished their stocks with imports and domestic products. By

³⁶The information bureaus in both Hanseatic cities opened in 1851.

controlling these trades traffic to the port increased and so did the migrant flow arriving in New York. Prior to the Civil War more than two-thirds of the migrants landed in New York, keeping rival ports a distant second (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 94 and Crouthamel, 1989, 92). Due to the importance of the migrant trade on the North Atlantic, the financiers tried to gain control of the networks supplying this 'commodity'. The lack of this control had driven large parts of the tobacco business into the hands of Bremen tradesmen (Engelsing, 1963, 66-76). This explains why American migrant brokers, such as Finlay in Le Havre, established themselves in Europe. But, contracting ocean transport for migrants was not limited to the European continent. With the growing migrant stock in the U.S. an increased number made the crossing through remittances sent from the New World. This demand resulted in a new market of prepaid tickets -these were bought in the United States allowing family members or acquaintances to join settled migrants. Land-speculators, employers, railroad companies, state authorities etc. tried to direct the new arrivals according to their needs. The competition among them spread to the European continent through the transport networks. The increasing migrant flow involved a growing number of regulations and opened up the debate as to whether it should be restricted or not. The intensifying competition for the migrant trade, which expanded to the other side of the Atlantic as the American migration legislation developed, will now be discussed.

5.1) Chain-migration patterns and transport networks

The failures of 'Santo Thomas', 'New Flanders' and 'Kansas' pushed the government into a non-intervention policy regarding emigration of nationals, limiting its role to informing the population of opportunities. The unsubsidized migration movement from the provinces Brabant and Namur to Wisconsin stimulated the decision. The population increase, and the scarcity of land and augmenting rents, meant that more than of the population in the area dependent on poor relief. A local reverend initiated a movement by organizing a collection to fund the crossing of ten families. State authorities in Wisconsin offered lands at very low rates to attract future taxpayers. To stimulate these efforts the authorities appointed immigration officials in New York to

convince new arrivals of the advantages of Wisconsin (Krabbendam, 2006, 59). The letters sent home about cheap and abundant lands, which could be bought on credit, were read with immense levels of interest. The subsequent chain migration attracted all sorts of interested parties. The emigration inspector Thielens and migrant broker Strauss set up a promotional campaign for Wisconsin in order to profit from the move. The American Association for Property and Land financed the return of a pioneer who would convince fellow villagers to settle on the lands. The pioneer, Streyckmans, received a commission per migrant; for whom the cost of the ocean crossing, as organized by Strauss would be advanced by the association. The recruiting agent easily found two hundred and fifty volunteers. In the wake of the pioneers a total of approximately 10,000 people relocated to Wisconsin between 1852 and 1857 (Thielemans 1998 123-137; De Smet 1957, 24-25; Ducat et al, 1986).

This movement exemplifies various influences which steered migration. The sociological approach within migration history has put forward chain-migration patterns as principal causative for migrant flows. According to the theory, personal decision to migrate was predominantly taken within the family-sphere. Previously settled villagers, local acquaintances or family-members were the main source of information in instigating the departures. These individuals often advanced the money for the crossing, and provided new arrivals with a provisional place to stay and helped them to find work. This theory stresses the importance of the foreland or countries of destination on the path dependency of migrants. Yet what sociologists have failed to acknowledge is that chain-migration patterns were built around commercial networks which originated from the profitability of migrant transport. Because of the fierce competition for this lucrative trade these networks expanded and adapted quickly to stimulate and meet the needs of the demand. All interested parties concerning migration were eventually connected through these networks which helped in shaping chain-migration patterns. The unassisted and largely successful Belgian migration wave to Wisconsin contrasts with the subsidized failures of New Flanders and Kansas. American land-speculators sent over agents to Europe, to direct and to even advance the cost of the transport binding customers, a practice which was commonly used by American businessmen in other trades. But, tying migrants in the 'land of the free' where the competition to populate property was fierce

proved a difficult challenge. Most of the migrants traveled outside the networks of government and land-speculators' assistance and a growing number settled in cities rather than in the countryside. However, migrants using the assistance of family, acquaintances, governments, land-speculators, employers, etc. or traveling on their own initiative all had to pass directly or indirectly through the migrant broker at some stage. This privileged position allowed migrant brokers to use the various actors to their advantage. Their inside position in the market enabled them to quickly adapt the means of traveling to the changing needs of the demand. As the business became specialized an increasing amount of services were offered through the migrant-agent network, greatly facilitating the move.

How migrant brokers developed means to stimulate new market opportunities, has already been illustrated with their efforts to facilitate and encourage communities assisting their poorest to the New World. They did the same to enhance chain-migration patterns. The 'Bielefeld' letter collection, a valuable source in uncovering the dynamics of chain-migration, shows that transfers occurred in both directions- underlining the fact that it was not only the poor who migrated (Kamphoefner et. al., 1991). Initially, the immigrants only way of financing the crossing for someone joining them was by giving the money to people who were traveling to Europe- often shippers or captains or by transferring the money through banks. The banking business generated by mass-migration remains an unexplored field, yet research indicates, that the system of remittances put an end to the Redemptionist-system- which according to Farley Grubb had financed one third of the Irish and German migration by 1834. This system could only be sustained as the flow grew, allowing regular banking and merchant connections to be established. Only then could the reputation for honesty, that repeat business created, give enough guarantees to immigrants entrusting their money with bankers or shippers. The increased shipping traffic and banking connections also decreased the transaction costs of remittances. Finally the expansion of industrial employment made loans on future wages possible to finance the crossing of friends or relatives and provided jobs for the newly arrived to help in paying off the debt (Grubb, 1994, 816-818).

The transition from the redemptionist- to the remittance-system explains the increase of migrant-brokers in the United States. New York merchants quickly noted the potential of expanding the market selling ocean passage across the Atlantic. The

connections between Liverpool and New York merchant houses Grimshaw and Thompson led to the establishment of the first Emigration Office in New York. Other businessmen followed suit, such as W. Tapscott, Douglas Robinson & Co., Rawson & Mc Murray and Bros & Co. specializing in chartering the between-decks of ships and filling them with migrants on the westbound leg of the trip. Human freight was assured through contacts with migrant brokers in European ports and recruiting agents traveling to Europe while they also offered settled migrants the possibility of paying for ocean passage for someone to join them (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 339-341). This developed in the market of pre-paid tickets- a system in which at least thirty percent of the migrants made the crossing during the steamship era. The remittance-system seems to have encouraged migrant brokers and migrant agents to combine banking and passage business, especially in the US. The banking world profited from the booming money exchanges and money transfers generated by mass-migration and again migrant brokers served as go-between. As the competition for the business in the US increased, networks of migrant-agents spread inwards to popular in-migration regions. This further stimulated the sale of tickets for inland transport in the United States, along with the ocean transport. Initially, frauds and abuses with these tickets were not totally uncommon, nevertheless it stimulated the creation of a door to door service and in the long run an integrated Atlantic transport network. The improved organization fueled the developing chain-migration patterns.

5.2) American migration legislation, and the rise of Nativism

Just as in Europe, ship-owners and migrant brokers had to protect their business from regulations which would impede its further development. What preoccupied the authorities was much the same as in Europe – the threat of migrants becoming a public charge. On one hand the division between federal and state authorities regarding migration matters allowed shipping interest to play one against the other. On the other hand just as in Europe port competition helped shipping interests to obtain concessions from authorities to their advantage. The supreme courts delimited the federal authority to regulate of migrant transport, which fell in the sphere of international and interstate

commerce. The responsibility to prevent the entrance of paupers and convicts was deemed a police matter and thus fell under state authority. Those three actors, seaboard states, federal government and shipping industry shaped American immigration policy (Zolberg, 2003, 195-220 and 2006, 99-125). As was the case in Europe, regulation of the trade predominated, yet through these three actors acting simultaneously the first attempts to control quality and quality were introduced- an often neglected fact by migration historians (Mullan, 1998, 30).

Zolberg typified the period preceding the Civil War as the ‘rehearsal of remote control’ era (Zolberg, 2003, 197). The best way of preventing undesired subjects from getting in is to prevent them from leaving. The humanitarian ideals of the Passenger Act of 1819 protecting the migrant from abuse, underlies the intention of increasing the cost of migration to block the entry of the poorest. The law had the merit of serving as an example for future European legislation as seen for Bremen, Antwerp and Hamburg not only for the North Atlantic routes but for all lines involving migrant transport. Yet the means of controlling the implementation of the laws were limited while ways to circumvent them were numerous. For instance, controls of Belgian inspectors could not impede ships leaving Antwerp, from picking up additional passengers in Flushing.³⁷ This indicates that in the United States, where the same measures regarding space applied, they were either easy to circumvent or to not apply to strictly. Out of fear that ship-owners would send their ships to where controls were lax, allowing them to maximize the profits, laws were not strictly implemented on either side of the Atlantic. Moreover, legislation was slow in adapting to the rapidly evolving technological improvements of ships. It took another thirty years to renew the passenger legislation. The federal government gathered information through their consuls on the dumping of criminals and paupers from Europe, yet attempts to pass legislation on the matter were blocked by the Supreme Court. Hence, the only way for the federal government to restrict the flow was by increasing the cost and therefore decreasing the capacity of ships. The Passenger Act of 1847 successfully did this. The miscommunication about when they became effective

³⁷ ABMFA, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, anonymous letter to the Foreign Minister of Foreign Affaires August 19 1846.

created confusion and delayed sailings.³⁸ Yet, the shipping lobby managed to pass a new law early in 1848 adjusting capacity requirements to the old standards. The booming American shipping industry increased its carrying capacity by fivefold between 1830 and 1860 (Hutchins, 1939, 272). The growth allowed the shipping lobby to expand its influence on legislative bodies (Zolberg, 2006, 131). The readjustment safeguarded the competitive position of the narrow American ships built for speed, rather than capacity, which differentiated them from British vessels. It allowed the construction of three-decked passenger ships instead of the normal two-decked, increasing the capacity of American vessels to up to a thousand passengers- nearly double what the 1847 regulations permitted. This type of ships dominated the migrant trade on the Le Havre and Liverpool routes during the next decade. During the peak of the nativist surge midway through the 1850s, shipping, railroad and business interests prevented far-reaching restrictive immigration laws. The shipping lobby also successfully obstructed renewed attempts in reducing the carrying capacity of ships. The adaptation of the 1855 Passenger Act remained a dead letter because of the careless drafting of the law (Jones, 1989, 324-326). After the Civil War, the federal government increased its grip over immigrant legislation and pressed for the policy of remote control using shipping companies to enforce their measures. In the meantime the control over the migrant transport gradually passed from American to European flagged ships. To prevent the US Congress to pass migration or maritime laws restricting the migrant flow, which represented their main source of revenue; shipping companies organized a strong lobby group and joined forces with other interest groups sharing the same interests. If unsuccessful they tried to find ways to circumvent restrictive measures.

Not every one was pleased with the shiploads of new arrivals sailing in. A growing part of the population saw migrants, especially the large influx of Irish Catholics as a threat to the values and institutions of the country. Sporadic uproar against the

³⁸ In a letter of the Dutch envoy in Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affaires reported on the confusion regarding when it became effective. The American minister in The Hague reported that shippers and passengers suffered financial loss because of the miscommunication on when it would become effective. This was confirmed by the yearly report of the Antwerp emigration inspector in 1842. The Antwerp Chamber of Commerce confirmed that the prices had slightly gone up due to the American legislation. (M 42 Dispatches from US ministers to the Netherlands 1794- 1906 / roll 17 April 1845 - September 1850 and AMBZ, 2020, Emigration I: 1834-1848, Letter February 7 1842 and June 30 1847 and NA 2.05.13, Gezantschap in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika, Letter 27 1847.

foreign-born population developed into an organized movement of xenophobic known as the Know Nothings. The movement fed on the widespread assumption that Europe sent their worst subjects and even assisted paupers and criminals in getting overseas. American consuls in Europe were asked to keep an eye out for the dumping policies of European governments. American State authorities drew up measures in preventing migrants of becoming a public charge and levied a head-tax to cover the costs to improve the immigrant controls at the ports of entry. But, the constitutionality of the head-tax, collected upon arrival, was successfully challenged by shippers for interfering with international commerce. In the US, attempts by Eastern seaboard states to pass tighter immigration controls on national level, were countered by immigrant-hungry Southern and Western States. The states maintained the right to require bonds from captains landing passengers likely to become a public charge. Instead, a system was set-up where captains paid commutation fees - essentially a head tax- but competition between Atlantic ports soon undermined the measure. Frequently cuts on commutation fees were made to avoid ships unloading passengers in rival ports with lower fees (Klebaner, 1958, 272-283). With the big influx of migrants between 1845 and 1857 calls to restrict the flow gained a momentum. The Antwerp case-study proved that claims of dumping paupers and convicts were not totally unfounded.

The Belgian government not only used Antwerp to get rid of undesired nationals but it also tried to attract assisted migration trajectories from foreign authorities in order to increase the migrant flow through the port. Besides attracting German assisted migration the Minister of Foreign Affairs asked M. De Gremus de Sturler, the Belgian Consul General in Bern, to direct the assisted migration of indigent Swiss to Antwerp.³⁹ On the other side of the Atlantic, the vigilance in spotting incoming paupers increased. In 1847, New York State authorities appointed an Emigration Commission which was responsible for protecting newcomers from abuses and defrayed the costs for migrants who became a public charge, before obtaining American citizenship. The conviction grew that controls assuring good quality of service and a good reputation attracted, rather than discouraged the immigrants from New York. With the commutation fees and the

³⁹ PRA, Provinciaal Bestuur, Emigratie, nr. 275, Landverhuizers - kolonies 1851-1860, Letter from Vilain XIII to Teichmann September 5 1855.

help of shipping industries, several health, employment and control institutions were built, such as Castle Garden, enhancing the screening of incoming migrants (Erickson, 1976, 269-272, Klebaner, 1958, 274-275). The Antwerp Emigration Inspector, Thielens, appointed a special agent in New York, Mr. Kiehn to welcome, direct and find jobs for assisted Belgians. This way Thielens wanted to avoid that they lingered in the city and called the attention of the American authorities. Kiehn who was related to A. Strauss and whose father provided the migrants with equipment and food supplies in Antwerp, warned of sending large groups. He had not been able to place a group of fifty who found their way to the New York Consul, Henry Mali. To avoid a scandal, the consul paid for their transport inland, yet he strongly opposed the practice.⁴⁰

For more than a decade, the consul published the Belgian laws regulating the migrant transport; advertised reductions for the Iron Rhine; and announced sailing dates, in order to uphold the reputation of Antwerp as a migrant gateway. This was important to create goodwill among local authorities and to advertise the port for the developing prepaid market. Mali also feared that the practice could compromise the success of the long-awaited steamship line connecting Antwerp with New York. The practice lasted until a letter implicating the provincial authorities of Liege and Antwerp regarding the sending of three prisoners and some beggars fell into the hands of the American press towards the end of 1854.⁴¹ This coincided with height of the nativist movement creating a diplomatic incident between Belgium and the United States. When the *Rochembeau* sailed in from Antwerp, authorities tipped off by the American consul in Antwerp arrested twelve passengers under suspicion of being paupers or criminals (Feys, 2003, 58-68 and 2004, 211-220). The Emigration Commission declared that for years they had suspected that Antwerp had been serving as a centre of the shipment of the lowest class of emigrants coming from Belgium, Germany and Switzerland. Strauss was accused of specialising in the emigration of subjects who authorities wanted to get rid of.⁴²

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Letter from d'Hoffschmidt de Resteigne to Teichmann December 13 1851.

⁴¹ See following articles in the New York Times; "The Belgian Convicts or Paupers" 25-12-1854, "The case of the Twelve Belgians" 27-12-1854, "Emigrant Paupers" 1-1-1855, "The Belgian paupers – The Mayor's decision" 15-2-1855, "Commissioners of Emigration – the Belgian Convicts" 16-2-1855, "The Mayor and the Belgian Consul" 17-2-1855, "The imprisoned Belgians" 27-2-1855, "Communication from the Mayor Wood – Introduction of foreign Criminals and Paupers" 5-2-1856.

⁴² ABMFA, 2020, Emigration, IV, Letter from the Emigration Commission to Mali February 15 1855.

The case received a lot of coverage in the American press and reopened the debates about passing laws in the House and Senate preventing the immigration of criminals and paupers (Hutchinson, 1981, 39-42). But, except for the Passenger Act no federal laws against paupers and criminals were passed. Those detained on the *Rochembeau* were eventually released after a decision in the Supreme Court on the basis of *habeas corpus* (Boumans, 1965, 493-494). The port of Antwerp looked worse than ever at a very significant time. The Americans threatened to impose extra taxes on ships coming from the Belgian port. The vessels arriving from Antwerp after the *Rochembeau* were subjected to extra controls and were held up for long periods of time. Gall, the American consul in Antwerp, required that all emigrant candidates for the US would pass through his office. The emigrants had to pay him one frank and had to solemnly swear that they were not paupers or convicts. Teichmann, the Antwerp governor, did not believe that Gall had received an official mandate to take these measures, but given the circumstances, he did not want to lodge a complaint.⁴³

The measures endangered the competitive position of Antwerp as a migrant gateway and demanded immediate action. The sending of Belgian paupers and criminals was diverted to Canada and Brazil and was eventually stopped. Other authorities seemed to have followed suit, stopping programs of assisted migration to the United States after the American consuls undertook a thorough investigation of the subject throughout the continent.⁴⁴ The Belgian authorities started a new campaign to regain the confidence in the United States for Antwerp as a migrant gateway. This was needed since the long-awaited opening of a steamship line relied predominantly on migrant transport as a source of revenue. The transition from sail to steam had set in. But as Cohn underlined, the nativist surge triggered the downfall of the first mass-migration movement (Cohn, 2000, 361-383). The subsequent economic recession and Civil War brought the flow to a

⁴³ Six months later when the storm of protest caused by the *Rochembeau* case calmed down Belgian authorities objected Gall's doings. With support of American captains Gall was denounced to act on the sole purpose of enriching himself. The use of consuls to control the migrants at the ports of embarkation would be a recurrent issue up to 1914. While the American authorities considered the consuls as an ideal tool of remote control European countries questioned the consuls' authority affecting their sovereignty. Reoccurring discussions prevented the implementation of clear policy. *Ibid.*, Letter from Teichmann to Vilain XIII May 24 1855.

⁴⁴ NYT, "Communication from the Mayor Wood – Introduction of foreign Criminals and Paupers" February 5 1856.

practical standstill. The second mass migration wave powered by steam, built further on the networks established during the sail-ship era and largely outsized the previous one.

Chapter II: Was Antwerp; “the frog in the table, which wished to reach the size of an ox?”: the keen competition to open up transatlantic steamship lines

The introduction of steamshipping on the Atlantic further reduced traveling time, risks and costs of migration. During the 1850s steamships started to penetrate the market of migrant transport. Two decades later the transition from sail to steam was complete. Yet, the success of steamshipping was preceded by many failures and this was despite the active support of governments. The apprehension among financiers to invest in a capital intensive business experiencing the growing pains of technological innovation was important. Some governments intervened by supporting this new transport method to stimulate trade. Because of the growing importance of the North Atlantic trade, keen competition among ports developed to attract such a line. This was further stimulated by the wide coverage the race for the fastest crossing of the Atlantic received in the press, and quickly grew out to be a question of national prestige. In this chapter, the failures and successes in opening a transatlantic steamship line within the Hamburg-Le Havre range - with special focus on Rotterdam and Antwerp- will be analyzed. This facilitates the comparison of diverse contemporary maritime policies and their impact on trade and thus migrant routes. To what extent did national governments support the opening up of transatlantic steamship lines? For what reasons, and in what way were they successful? Were policies of attracting migrants to national ports and the opening up of a steamship line related? Were there any attempts to commercialize migrant transport on steamships before the successful breakthrough of the Inman Line? Did those have an immediate effect on the organization of migrant transport by sail? By using the consular correspondence of French, Bremen, Dutch and Belgian diplomats in the United States new light will be shed in answering these questions.

1) A *British Queen* in service of Belgian authorities: the beginnings of transatlantic steam-shiping

1.1) The Dutch and Belgian maritime policies compared

The simultaneous arrivals of *Sirius* and *Great Western* in New York, from Liverpool, in 1838 gave rise to intense competition among European and American ports to open up a transatlantic steamship line (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 313). Initially, steamships concentrated on the British-North American route. The first continental port to challenge this dominance was Antwerp (De Boer, 1998, 8 and Laurent, 1965, 938-952). The Belgian government believed that, like railroads, maritime connections powered by steam requiring big investments needed the financial support of the State which would eventually lead to the same revolution as railway transport.⁴⁵ The reasons for this active policy are summarized in a report which convinced the parliament to pass a special navigation law midway through the 1840s to subsidize a line between Antwerp and New York:

“With the industrial evolution the wealth of nations will greatly depend on its commercial importance and its ability to force other nations to trade through them. The geographical position of Belgium enhances her development as a nodal point for trade. By stimulating this, the government will give the young nation more political power. Nations that enjoyed the benefits of Antwerp could later be lobbied to push for the free navigation of the Scheldt.⁴⁶ It’s the best way of fighting off the influence of our natural rival, the Netherlands and contesting its dominant position in the German transit-trade because of its natural advantages through the Rhine and the Meuse. If we succeed we’ll obtain the sympathy of the powerful German State and become less dependent of France. Moreover, strong trade relations with the United States will result in an important political alliance with the nation which is predestined to rule the waves. A steamship connection with New York is a complementary link to our railroad network, and vital to globalize our depository function in this economic transit system. The dependency of favorable winds to enter and leave Antwerp has hampered regular and fast services to the United States which are essential to attract manufactured goods for export. Steam shipping solves this problem and will stimulate American and Belgian merchants to examine the opportunities for increased trade between

⁴⁵ The intervention of the Belgian government was also stimulated by the European economic crisis which made credit to invest in new technology hard to obtain. This crisis had tempered the elaborate plans of the ‘Société Générale Belge de Bateaux à Vapeur’ organized by Antwerp merchants to build 14 ships for lines to various European and transatlantic destinations (Laurent, 1965, 939 and Veraghtert, 1986, 209).

⁴⁶ To enhance the trade through Antwerp the Belgian government decided to refund the tolls levied by the Dutch authorities on all ships except those sailing under the Dutch flag. With the increasing commerce, however, this started to weigh heavily on the government’s funds. Moreover, with the liberalization of trade there was a tendency to eliminate such tolls. The Sont and Stade toll had been bought out by the maritime nations, leaving the Scheldt with the only remaining toll, which the Belgian authorities continued to lobby against. These efforts materialized in 1863 when the Belgian government and the maritime nations agreed to pay 36,278,560 Belgian *francs* to make the navigation of the Scheldt free (Veraghtert, 1977).

the two nations, traveling time being reduced to two weeks. Finally it would improve the competitive position of the port of Antwerp.”⁴⁷

If a country questioned the right of existence of the young nation by force, then the merchant marine under the national flag could be used to retaliate. The report clearly reflects the geopolitical orientation of Belgium’s trade policies. These contrasted with the Dutch policies. Simultaneously, a project was presented to the Dutch government to open a steamship line between Rotterdam and New York, with the principal revenue to be derived from migrant transport; although, this was never seriously considered by the authorities.⁴⁸ Dutch maritime interests centered on the trade with the colonies in the East Indies. Between 1815 and 1850 these colonies came to dominate Dutch shipping, while the US became relatively insignificant. Government intervention in colonial trade, through the *Nederlandse Handels Maatschappij* (NHM), offered high freight rates and guaranteed return cargo. The colonial trade was organized in such a way that there was no need for rapid transport. As a result, merchants continued to use less expensive sailing ships rather than investing in more costly steamers. The Dutch institutional structure therefore slowed the transition from sail to steam and the evolution to large-scale ship-owning companies. Sailing ships for the colonial trade thus attracted capital flows which were crucial for the transport of passengers. Moreover, this colonial trade policy caused the Dutch business community to have an aversion to the German transit trade. The Dutch laws restricting the German trans-migrant movement through the country corroborates this aversion. It was the German states that forced that the Dutch government to make concessions to liberalize transport on the Rhine. This facilitated the transit of goods, the volume of which started to rise as early as the 1830s. The colonial trade brought tropical goods to the Dutch ports which were traded further up the Rhine and with other European ports. The focus on these staple trades delayed the transition to the transit traffic, i.e., from an emphasis on trade to a concern with transport. Moreover, NHM, favored the port of Amsterdam over Rotterdam, despite the fact that connections

⁴⁷BGRA, I 215, no. 4052, *Vaart der British Queen*, eerste stoomvaart verbinding Antwerpen, 1840-1847, “Report on the Opening of a Steamship Line between Antwerp and New York,” April 25 1840 and presented to the Belgian Chamber of Representatives June 1 1840 by M. De Garcia de la Vega and Isidore Fallon.

⁴⁸The prospectus of marine officer G. Roentgen planned to transport migrants as low as 100fr. for the crossing. GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 6, Letter of F.H. Nollen to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 3 1839.

from the former port to the German hinterland were far inferior to those emanating from Rotterdam and therefore less suitable for transit traffic. For these reasons, the once thriving commercial relations between Rotterdam and the US deteriorated (De Nijs, 2001, 39-53; Horlings, 1995; Blasing and Langenhuyzen, 1998, 103-126).

This explains why migration through the Netherlands to the United States remained low during this period notwithstanding the geographical advantages especially of Rotterdam. Many German migrants arriving in the Dutch port through the Rhine embarked on ships to Antwerp, Le Havre or England where sailings to the U.S. were more frequent. In spite of favoring Amsterdam the NHM still made sure that three out of eight ships coming from the East Indies stopped in at Rotterdam. This was enough to keep most Rotterdam merchants happy with the profits made through the colonial trade. Because of this colonial maritime policy Rotterdam merchants stuck to their old ways of doing business. Merchants preferred to do the transactions on their own as much as possible, avoiding having to call upon intermediaries. This prevented transition to large-scale business. Furthermore, merchants showed an aversion to transit traffic with Germany, some even considered it as a threat to Rotterdam. The presidents of the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce openly opposed modernization such as steamshipping and railroads and considered transit traffic as the archenemy. The city council shared this conservatism explaining the deplorable state of public services and infrastructure in the city (Nieuwenhuys, 1952, 48-72 and De Nijs, 2001, 42-52). This explains why G. Roentgen found little support among Rotterdam merchants in financing his project of opening a steamship line for migrant transport to the United States.

1.2) The *British Queen*: the first Continental transatlantic steamship line

Nevertheless, the plans of Roentgen and a project to connect Le Havre with New York by steam spurred the decision of the Belgian government. Through the intermediary of the Belgian ambassador in London, van de Weyer the *British Queen* and *President* were bought from the British and American steam navigation Co. At the time of the purchase of the steamers the government still had not concluded an agreement with a society to manage the line. David Colden, a New York businessman, was not deemed

capable of leading the project. Other Americans also picked up interest in the Belgian subsidies. Edward Derby, chairman of the Western Rail Association, lobbied for Boston through Serruys the Belgian envoy in Washington. The emerging rail connection allowed easy access inland for migrants and the port would provide the necessary infrastructure—docks, piers etc.⁴⁹ Raising capital seemed to be the biggest obstacle, despite the yearly subsidy of 400,000 francs. The government also preferred to leave it in Belgian hands, but negotiations with Antwerp merchants who initially warmly supported the steamship project over subsidies for sailing ships, tailed off.⁵⁰ After a similar occurrence in Europe, an economic crisis had broken out in the US, throwing the existing steamship lines into difficulties and hence spoiling the enthusiasm of investors.⁵¹ In the end, an agreement was reached with three Antwerp merchants; Jean-François Catteaux-Wattel, Jules Lejeune and George Jullie establishing the Belgian Steam Navigation Service Antwerp-New York.⁵² Just as Roentgen's proposal had done, the project also prospected migrant transport as a source of revenue. Unlike Cunard, which offered only first-class passage, a second class had to be available to make transatlantic passages accessible to travelers from all social classes.⁵³ In order to compete with other ports, tariffs for cabin passengers and valuable goods had to be ten percent lower than those of Cunard and could not exceed the prices of the prospective French line.

⁴⁹ Colden was described as an integer person yet not a good businessmen and American capitalist appeared to have been skeptical about him. He was not the only American to react to the law passed by the Belgian Government. ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889 letter of consul Mali and Letter of E. Derby to Serruys July 5 and October 9 1840.

⁵⁰ An inquiry among Antwerp merchants in 1839 had indicated that they favored a subsidized steamship line rather than sailing ship line to meet the competition of England and Le Havre. The contract to buy steamers was signed March 17 1841 while the provisional agreement with the Antwerp business men was concluded on April 4 1841 and certified by royal decree on November 29 1841. BGRA, I 215, no. 4052, anonymous letter to the Minister of the Interior and ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889 Report of M. De Garcia de la Vega and Isidore Fallon at the Belgian Chamber of Representatives June 1 1840 and (Laurent, 1965, 939-941).

⁵¹ According to a report on steam-shipping of 1841 presented during a debate in the Belgian chamber of representatives the British government had to raise the subsidies of both the Cunard Line and the West Royal Mail Company to prevent bankruptcy. The Great Western who enjoyed a very good reputation had to dissolve. The 'British and American steam navigation Co' stopped its activities. While the '*Precurseur*' finished that year but never taken into service. *Ibid.*, Séance March 10 1843

⁵² The government even tried to convince the leaders of the British American Steam-shipping Company to open an office in Antwerp and manage the new line from there with the subsidies of the authorities but to no avail. *Ibid.*, various correspondence 1841.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Vaart der *British Queen*, eerste stoomvaart verbinding Antwerpen, 1840-1847, BRGA, I 215, no. 4052, navigation law of June 29 1840.

But, besides the economic downturn the enterprise received another serious blow when the *President* sank on its way back from New York, just prior to its delivery.⁵⁴ This seriously damaged the reputation of the sister-ship *British Queen* of which the maiden voyage under Belgian banner was announced for the fourth of May 1842. Catteaux-Wattel and Jullie resigned even before the first sailing had even taken place.⁵⁵ The line seemed to be doomed even before the maiden voyage. To make matters worse Bishops Basteys announced an agreement with one of the biggest New York merchant houses for the opening of a regular sail connection leaving every two weeks.⁵⁶ Due to the economic crisis the passenger movement had dropped considerably making Lejeune question the nation of transporting migrants. George Schuyler, a New York engineer had studied the question of migrant transport in the United States and Europe. Applying for the head-agency in New York and the contract to build a ship to replace the *President* in the US, Schuyler tried to convince the Belgian company to center their efforts on migrants.⁵⁷

The company opted for a mixed service including cabin passengers and migrants which had to be absolutely separated. Contact between the two had to be avoided at all cost to protect the reputation of the line. The *British Queen* left with fifty passengers, after calling at Southampton, and due to bad weather only arrived in New York twenty-eight days later. The poor results again raised the question of opening the passenger service to upper class migrants, such as well-off farmers or craftsmen for 10 pounds or 400 francs, or even the lowest class of migrants for 4 pounds or 100 francs.⁵⁸ For the second sailing, the English crew was prematurely replaced by inexperienced Belgians leading to many complaints of bad treatment by unsatisfied passengers.⁵⁹ After a third

⁵⁴ ABMFA 2241, Steam-shiping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter June 18 1841.

⁵⁵ ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shiping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Report of the general council of the "Belgian Steam Navigation Service Antwerp-New York, February 1 1842.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, February 15 1842.

⁵⁷ BGRA, I 215, no. 4052, Vaart der *British Queen*, eerste stoomvaart verbinding Antwerpen, 1840-1847, Letter of G. Schuyler to Lejeune January 31 1842.

⁵⁸ ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shiping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Reports of the general council of the "Belgian Steam Navigation Service Antwerp-New York March 15 1842 and June 10 1842.

⁵⁹ As part of the agreement with the Belgian governments the line was used to train nationals to manage the service. Yet to cut in the costs Captain Keene and his crew was replaced by Lieutenant Eyckholdt and his crew. *Ibid.*, 1839-1889, Le Hardy de Beaulieu to MFA May 30 1847 and (De Boer, 1998, 8).

loss-making crossing, and not very promising prospects of the American economy, the activities were suspended (De Boer, 1998, 8 and Veraghtert, 1977, III 13-25).

Despite the failure the active policy of the Belgian authorities produced the first challenge to the British dominance of transatlantic steam-shipping. But, the lack of connections with American businessmen, and publicity overseas, further contributed to the decline. The Belgian government still had not concluded a trade treaty with the United States, illustrating its indifference towards overseas relations (Laurent, 1965, 941-942).⁶⁰ Although the breakthrough of migrant transport by steam only took place in the 1850s it is clear that the first steamship projects had seriously considered migrant transport as a source of revenue. But as Graham underlined, the introduction of steam spurred the technological innovation in sail shipping in its attempt to remain competitive. Size and speed crept steadily upwards after the introduction of steamships (Graham, 1956, 74-88, Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939, 333). The French consul in New York, in collecting information for the opening of a steamship line, observed: "*Sailships anticipated the feared competition of steamships for the emigrant transport by lowering the prices from 150fr. to 120fr. and even 100fr. Moreover the accommodation on sailships improved considerably.*"⁶¹

Efforts by sail-shippers to protect this lucrative market by lowering the cost for steerage berths on sailing ships at the beginning of 1840s, has been noted by other scholars.⁶² In Antwerp, it seemed to have encouraged the establishment of packet sailing ships, leaving on set dates. The government stimulated these lines with premiums per ton of shipping space, while imposing maximum rates. This resulted in the first subsidized packet line to New York as early as February 1841. This policy proved to be successful as by 1844 Antwerp counted eight regular long distance services to New York

⁶⁰ Belgian ships had received temporary 'most favored nation treatment' but due to mounting diplomatic tensions on the third sailing the British Queen was subject to extraordinary American tariffs on her tonnage (Laurent, 1965, 941-942).

⁶¹ The exchange rate for one dollar amounted to 5,3 fr. which means that the price dropped from 28,3\$ to between 22,6\$ and 18,9\$. ADN, Consulsats, New York, 7, Letter from the French consul in New York to the Ministry of Foreign Affaires, August 12 1842.

⁶² Wegge and Engelsing noted a decrease in migrant crossing at the beginning of the 1840's. While in 1839 the transport cost from Bremen varied from 21\$ to 28\$ it dropped between 14,7\$ and 19,6\$ in 1841 reaching a low in 1843 of 14\$ to 16,1\$ (Wegge, 1998; Engelsing, 1961). Greenhalgh-Albion stated that during the 1840's and 1850's the steerage rates ranged between 15\$ and 25\$ (Greenhalgh-Albion, 1939).

(Veraghtert, 1986, 210-211). The increased efforts of sailing ships for the migrant trade lowered the cost of migration, while the service improved and may have delayed the transition of migrant transport to steam. Notwithstanding the success of sailing packets, the desire to connect Antwerp with the US by steam never ebbed away. The efforts of the Belgian authorities did not go totally unnoticed across the Atlantic, as the government became aware of the importance of overseas relations in which the diplomatic corps played a notable role.

2) The American challenge to the British dominance: Some fine old German wines for American subsidies

2.1) The diplomatic corps, commercial opportunities and migrant transport

The importance of consuls as a source of information on legal, commercial and political developments abroad has only recently been stressed in maritime history. Consuls established contacts with local authorities and merchant communities to promote trade relations with shipping enterprises based in their homelands. Especially in new markets, where uncertainties and hence transaction costs were considerable, consuls played a vital role (Müller and Ojala, 2002, 23-41; Müller, 2002, 173-188 and 2004, 17-32). In the nineteenth century two systems were adopted to organize the rapidly-expanding consular corps. On the one hand, there was the system of honorary consuls; often merchants who received no remuneration other than the fees derived from certain official duties. Such consuls lived off the profits from trade, while the title of “consul” conferred a certain prestige within the business community. The Netherlands, Belgium and the cities of the German Hanse employed this system, albeit with some salaried consuls in key locales. On the other hand; countries such as France and the UK used a system of salaried officials, career consuls who were forbidden to engage in trade (Kennedy, 1990, 72-85 and Kurgan, Tamse et al, 1981, 268-276). What follows is an analysis of the efforts of diplomatic representatives to convince the American authorities of using a national port as a European terminal for their subsidized line. This narrative is based on the correspondence between the Belgian consul in New York and the Dutch

envoy in Washington, with their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and it is complemented with the use of some French and German consular correspondence.⁶³

2.2) The Dutch North Atlantic trade relations hitting rock bottom, the American subsidies-issue as a first wake-up call.

Of the first wave of steamship companies only one managed to keep afloat, the Cunard Line. With the help of considerable government subsidies it offered a biweekly service between Liverpool, Halifax and Boston which quickly expanded to New York. The line sailing under the 'Union Jack' gained significant prestige, yet a growing number of Americans called for an alternative flying the 'Stars and Stripes'. The American government answered these calls by freeing up part of the budget to support steamship lines providing a mail service to Europe. Because of the big overhead-cost involved in steam-shipping, the *laissez-faire* policy temporarily moved to subsidizing navigation. The news quickly spread across the Atlantic triggering keen competition between various European ports to serve as a terminal for the line (Greenhalg, 1939, 314-335 and Hutchins, 1939, 325-356).

The ports of Bremen, Hamburg, Antwerp, Le Havre, Brest, Lisbon, Southampton, Bristol and Liverpool made the shortlist of the American government as potential terminals. The absence of Amsterdam and Rotterdam reflects the extent to which trade relations between both countries had deteriorated (Broeze, 1994, 86-87). It served as a first wake-up call for the Dutch government and merchant community who wanted to avoid that the chief rival, Antwerp would be chosen.⁶⁴ First the migration laws of 1837 were compared with the existing Bremen laws. The minister of Foreign Affairs concluded that they did not put extra costs on ship owners and that they were not less suitable in protecting the safety of the emigrant. The problem was the lack of publicity of those in out-migration regions, and that the US had been responsible for the bad

⁶³The correspondence of the Dutch consul in New York has only been preserved from 1874 onwards and has been completed with an analysis of the correspondence of the Dutch envoy in Washington after 1840.

⁶⁴ Already with the service of the British Queen the Dutch authorities considered to collaborate with the French initiative of opening a steamship line to the US. It hoped to make use of the French connections to prevent Antwerp from taking over the trade with Switzerland and Germany. See AMBZ 2241, Various letters of J. de Chimay, Belgian envoy in The Hague to the Minister of Foreign Affairs June 29 to July 5 1840.

reputation of the Netherlands as a transit country.⁶⁵ Dutch consuls in German out-migration regions frequently reported about negative publicity about Rotterdam and viewed them, just as their Belgian colleagues did also, as attempts by German authorities to direct the flow to the national ports (Stokvis; 1977, 154-170). Dutch authorities decided to launch a publicity campaign in the US for their ports as ideal gateways for the North Atlantic traffic, and thus for the opening of a steamship line.⁶⁶ The Dutch consuls and envoys in the US were asked to redouble their efforts when the authorities found out that an American delegation was on its way to Belgium to discuss the possibilities. The consuls published articles in the American press pointing to the advantages of Dutch ports, especially Rotterdam in comparison to Antwerp.⁶⁷ When the attention of the American authorities shifted to Bremen the envoy put more stress on the advantages of Rotterdam over the Hanse port. Although migrant transport was not considered in the initial plans of the steamship line, the strategic location of Rotterdam for this trade had to be stressed.⁶⁸

The efforts never materialized in concrete statutes of a company with interests on both sides of the Atlantic and hence the Dutch ports were never considered. Yet it revived the Dutch interest in the North Atlantic trade in which the opening of steamship line and attracting the migrant flow to the port became key factors. According to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, the only reason why Bremen, Antwerp and Le Havre had

⁶⁵ NA 2.05.13 Gezantschap in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika, 1814-1940, Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the envoy in Washington, Gevers, October 3 1844.

⁶⁶ Amsterdam and Rotterdam were described as the *most suitable, most secure and by far the most profitable ports* for opening a steamship line for the following reasons: 1) a daily, speedy, comfortable and cheap steamship service connected Basel to the Dutch ports through the Rhine 2) passengers and their luggage could immediately be transferred on the transatlantic connection since the landing stage were nearby each other 3) there were regular departures of fully equipped ships to the U.S., especially to New York and Baltimore 4) a steam towing service provides quick access from the ports to the sea, an important advantage which is not to be found in any other port, 5) moreover, the Royal Decree of the 28-12-1837 submits the ship owners, ship merchants and ship brokers involved in migrant traffic in the Netherlands to certain regulations. A Supervision Committee, whose members are well respected people of the community, observes if they act accordingly and also control the ships and the provisions boarded for the crossing. *Ibid.*, Letter from MFA to Gevers envoy in Washington January 11 1845.

⁶⁷ The Minister pointed out to the negative effects this could have on the Dutch trade with America. This while the Dutch ports have many more advantageous to offer and that a previous attempt to establish such line in Antwerp had failed. He stressed that the improvements of Rhine steamboats made the transport over water nearly as fast as over rail and that soon the railroads to the Dutch ports would be completed and be as accessible as Antwerp. Moreover he stated commercial legislation and tariffs in Belgium were much less liberal and profitable for the trade than the Dutch were. Furthermore, he referred to the advantageous for passenger transport. *Ibid.*, Letter from M.F.A. to Gevers, February 18 1845.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Letter from MFA to Testa, January 20 1846.

attracted the biggest part of the migrant traffic was that in the Netherlands the matter had not received enough attention. Many migrants embarking in Antwerp came through Rotterdam first, preferring the Rhine boat connections over the Iron Rhine.⁶⁹ The interest in migrant transport was also spurred by the increasing flow of nationals to the US. A big part of the Dutch migrants traveled through the migrant broker Johan Wambersie, the American consul in Rotterdam (Swierenga, 1994, 114-115 and Van der Valk, 1976, 157). The growing internal market led to an intensified competition. The Dutch migration movement was partly triggered by the intolerant religious policy after 1839, pushing away repressed Seceders, and by the declining economy which reached a low point during the potato crisis 1845-47. A growing amount of the population became dependent on charity (Swierenga, 2001; Hinte, 1928).

Suggestions for state-sponsored emigration fighting poverty gained momentum during the crisis years. In 1846, the government supported a project to establish an agricultural-colony in Surinam similar to the Belgian initiative in Santo Thomas de Guatemala. It had the same unfortunate outcome with high death rates. It deterred the government from actively supporting emigration and thus no attempts were made to encourage migration to the United States. On the contrary a law was passed to strictly monitor the emigration of nationals so the state could intervene in case the movement got out of hand. Authorities even secretly stimulated anti-emigration propaganda (De Jong, 1975, 129-153, Stokvis, 1977, 160 and Krabbendam, 2006, 58-66). The liberal opposition portrayed the migration of nationals as a sign of bad governance. They blamed the high taxes imposed by the government for the loss of compatriots to the New World (Van Stekelenburg, 1991, 82-86). Yet, even the increasing flow of nationals did not result in better protective measures for migrants. The envoy in Washington even advised migrants to go through Bremen instead of Rotterdam. He praised Bremen ships for taking care of the food supplies, which were included in the price for the passage. In Rotterdam migrants got exploited for these supplies; were charged a lot and received very poor quality in return. Also the lack of decent and affordable lodging in Rotterdam and abuses regarding monetary exchange were mentioned.⁷⁰ The repeated calls from the Rotterdam

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 23.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Letter from MFA to Testa, December 11 1845.

merchant community to adapt the Dutch laws according to the Bremen model remained unanswered. In short, the renewed interest in the North-Atlantic trade was in no way powerful enough to turn the tide from the colonial maritime policies.

2.3) The Bremen versus Antwerp lobby and their bids to host the American steamship line

Antwerp, unlike Rotterdam, was a serious contender in functioning as a terminal for the American steamship line. The previous efforts of the Belgian government had not gone unnoticed across the Atlantic. Diplomatic relations between both countries improved and had led to a new more liberal trade agreement. Attracting the line would not only boost the national economy but also the international prestige of the young nation. The envoy in Washington, Serruys, and Henry Mali, consul in New York, were ordered to exert all possible influence on members of commerce and postal committees of Congress. They made sure that articles appeared in the American press praising the advantages of Antwerp over Le Havre and Bremen, the two principal rivals for the opening of a steamship line. Antwerp's railroad and steamboat connections throughout Europe guaranteed timely redistribution of mails, goods and passengers. Bremen on the other hand was as being trapped within the Hanover state borders with poor railroad connections and no service to London. It depended on Hamburg for the English trade, while contacts between the Hanse towns diminished. Moreover, ships had to cross the feared North Sea to reach the port. Le Havre had better connections, yet these were not as good as Antwerp and they did not offer the same promising prospects regarding the transit trade with German states. Belgium's new trade agreements with the US and the *Zollverein* opened more possibilities. The Iron Rhine offered the ideal connection for the German migrants.⁷¹

The plans of the French government to open their own steamship connection to the US reassured the Antwerp bidders that the Americans would not pick a route with a newly established competitor.⁷² Being too confident about the rational advantages of

⁷¹ BGRA, 4052, Report by Serruys 'Antwerp vs Bremen' quoted in a report of Le Hardy de Beaulieu s.d.

⁷² Already early 1840's the French supported a company to open a steamship line. The authorities had appointed a commission, 'Commission de Gomer', for that purpose. New York put free docks at the

Antwerp; Belgian authorities underestimated the importance of the art of lobbying something Bremen merchants were much more familiar with. The Hanse city dispatched a lobbyist-negotiator, Theodor Gevekoht, to the US authorized to deal with American authorities on the steamship line.⁷³ It was not only the congressmen who needed to be convinced, but also the American capitalists. Steam-shipping had not proved to be a profit making business yet. Only the royal subsidies kept the Cunard Line afloat and investors doubted that the American government would invest the same amounts. Raising capital for the line remained very difficult, hence concrete proposals were few and far between.⁷⁴

The dynamic activity of Bremen was not surprising given its strong orientation on the North Atlantic which revived the trade through the port. Although unnoticed by Belgian or Dutch contemporaries, Bremen's first plans to open a steamship line date back to 1840. Carl Keutgen projected a line transporting mail, fine goods, 1st, 2nd and 3rd class passengers. Keutgen relied on the national pride of German investors to remain ahead of the French and Belgians.⁷⁵ Five years later, the bidders for the American subsidy still played on the same sentiment but by then on both sides of the Atlantic. With the continuous migrant stream, the German community in the US gained importance. The community signed a petition used to support the bid for the opening of steamship line to the old country in Congress.⁷⁶ Important German merchants in the US such as Schumacher, Bremen consul in Baltimore and Delrichs assisted Gevekoht in convincing the American authorities. A massive propaganda campaign was set up in the American press, where German newspapers, such as the *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung*, had made their appearance.⁷⁷ The booming trade relations between Bremen and the US were used as

disposition of the line. AND, New York, 7, September 19 1842 and ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter of Mali to MFA September 27 1845.

⁷³ Gevekoht was a Bremen businessman who had resided some years in the US and thus had a network on which he could rely upon arrival.

⁷⁴ ABMFA, 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889 Letters of Mali to MFA September 27 1845 and letter of Serruys October 15 1845.

⁷⁵ BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-1867, Prospectus C. Keutgen October 31 1840.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Letter of Gevekoht to Duckwitz November 4 1846.

⁷⁷ The German language press revived in the 1830's with the founding of *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung* und *Herold*, the Saint Louis *Anzeiger des Westens* and the Cincinnati *Volksblatt*. It boomed during the 1840's, the number of German newspapers augmenting from 40 to 133 (Jones, 1992, 120). The Bremen

main argument for the Bremen bid. The migrant statistics of various European ports showed the dominance of the German port.

The Bremen Senate increased the pressure on the Hannover to complete the railroad works connecting the port to Stettin, Berlin and hence Vienna, Trieste, etc. Connections to south-western German states would soon be opened. The Senate which had already made big efforts in building Bremerhaven continued to invest in a new landing space to harbor big steamships. A new trade agreement between the *Zollverein* and US helped the cause. Moreover, Hannover had agreed to stop levying tolls on American products and to collaborate in obtaining this for the whole *Zollverein*, following the Belgian example in the competition for the bid.⁷⁸ Some Bremen Senators feared that their independence from the *Zollverein* and commercial future was at stake. As Arnold Duckwitz put it: “*If Antwerp is chosen Bremen would probably be forced into the Zollverein which would be negative for the commerce with the US, would imply higher duties on tobacco and would lead to a decline of its use.*”⁷⁹

The Belgian emissaries, Serruys and Mali, remained very active. Serruys negotiated with the American Secretary of State Buchanan to conclude yet another trade agreement based on ‘most favored nations’ principles. This agreement included a clause that in case a steamship line would be opened it would be exempted from all transit duties and pilotage expenses. He also visited Cave Johnson, the postmaster general responsible for the subsidies to lower the mail tariffs between both countries, favoring a future mail service. Serruys praised Mali for his efforts in promoting Antwerp among New York capitalists. The Belgian consul, running a merchant house in the city had already served as New York head-agent for the *British Queen*. He built a fortune in the US and enjoyed a good reputation among the American business community. Yet Serruys stressed the need for fellow countrymen to follow his example as the only way to strengthen the trade

and Belgian lobby tried to get mentioned in the Daily Union which they considered as the voice of the administration.

⁷⁸ BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-1867, Various loose newspaper articles June 10 1847, letters of Duckwitz to A Dudley Mann, American consul in Bremen January 17 and October 7 1845.

⁷⁹ Mann also lobbied in the meantime with the American authorities to appoint a chargé d’Affaires in Hanover. It was believed that a treaty between the US and Hanover would allow the North Sea states to remain independent from the *Zollverein*. This materialized in an agreement between Hanover and the US early 1846. *Ibid.*, Letters November 10 1845 and March 26 1846.

relations between the countries. The envoy reported that the German community had joined forces to support Bremen's candidacy and believed them capable of raising the necessary capital.⁸⁰ He informed the Belgian authorities of Gevekoht's arrival and advised them to send someone as well.⁸¹ Gevekoht joined Dudley Mann, former Bremen consul, and the Prussian *chargé d'affaires* in Washington, Gerolt, where they all advocated Bremen as the terminal.⁸²

The lobbying activities increased as the date to file propositions with the postmaster general came to a close. Mann received a shipment of the most exquisite kind of old German wines thinking it may be useful to give the gentlemen in Washington a taste of it.⁸³ The former Bremen consul lobbied with the postmaster general and also with the President in gaining their support for Bremen.⁸⁴ Mann even convinced Henry Hillard, former American envoy in Brussels, and member of the House Committee which had charge of the project, to give his vote to Bremen instead of Antwerp.⁸⁵ The Bremen lobby managed to sideline Antwerp, yet Le Havre became the main rival. The French envoy, backed by many New York merchants, and even the British envoy vigorously opposed the German candidacy.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ As Mali mentioned, not the whole German community supported Bremen's bid. Some were not convinced of the port's location and believed Antwerp to be more convenient, especially German from the Rhine districts. ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter of Mali to MFA January 26 1846.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Letters of Serruys to MFA, December 6, 27 and 28 1845, January 13 1846.

⁸² Mann led the lobby campaign for Bremen. On his way back to the US Mann visited English ports to report on which could suit best as port of call for the Bremen-line. He selected Cowes as most secure port where vessels can touch without coming to anchor. Mails could be in London and Le Havre respectively 3 and 6 hours later. After a while it had become dangerous for him to make official communications for the Senate, probably in view of his new appointment in Trieste. This is the reason why Gevekoht was sent to work under his orders. Mann would later be bestowed as honorary citizen of Bremen for his efforts. BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-1867, Letters of Mann to Duckwitz September 30 1845 and August 18 1846.

⁸³ For the connoisseurs of wine the shipment consisted of eighty one bottles of 1727 Rudesheimer Berg Rosewein, 25 bottles of 1822 Rudesheimer Berg Ausstich Cabinet, and 50 bottles of 1783 Johannisberger Cabinet. Letter of Duckwitz to Mann October 7 1845. A bit later a similar shipment was sent to the German Society of New York to create goodwill there. *Ibid.*, Letters October 7 and November 21 1845.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Letters of Mann to Duckwitz September 29 and October 14 1845.

⁸⁵ The fact that both lodged in the same house helped influencing the House Representative of Alabama. Even Thomas Green the American consul of Antwerp who had resided for a long period in Germany supported Bremen to the great annoyance of Beaulieu. Only the contemporary envoy in Brussels Thomas Clemson helped Antwerp's bid *Ibid.*, letters of Mann to Duckwitz December 13 and 29 1845 and ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter of Beaulieu to MFA April 14 1847.

⁸⁶ BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-1867, Letter January 29 1846.

In the end, the postmaster received four proposals from American capitalists for lines to Le Havre and Bremen. In the meantime, Le Hardy de Beaulieu replaced Serruys as envoy in Washington. He tried to convince the American entrepreneurs of changing to Antwerp, or at least to use it as a port of call by one of them. According to Le Hardy, Edward Mills the principal initiator had been forced to choose Bremen by the postmaster general and this to the discontent of New York merchants. Like many of his New York colleagues, he had contacts with Le Havre and preferred the French port, and even the Belgian port, over Bremen. Yet the tobacco lobby convinced Washington to go against the New York merchants' interest. The Belgian envoys printed new pro-Antwerp pamphlets to distribute among Congressmen and wrote articles for the press. However, the Bremen lobby had bribed the American press to no longer publish pro-Antwerp articles.⁸⁷ The authorities appointed a consul general in New York, Adolphe Moxhet, to help the cause. Even the Prussian consul of New York, Mr. Schmidt favored Antwerp over Bremen, but he had his hands tied because of the position of his superior, Gerolt. The Belgian envoy in Prussia, Nothomb, obtained guarantees from Prussian authorities to support the Antwerp candidacy, yet it resulted in an empty promise.⁸⁸ The Belgians did not lack the zeal in lobbying, yet they failed in having someone to negotiate directly; and especially someone like Gevekoht who attracted capital in support of the bid.

In June 1846, a dual contract with Mills' Ocean Steamship Navigation Company was made official by Congress. Mills received \$200,000 a year for a biweekly service to Bremen via Southampton; subsequently, another contract awarded worth \$150,000 for a biweekly service to Le Havre. Unlike other American bidders, such as R. Forbers, M. Sloo, E. Collins, and J. Smith, Mills was virtually unknown in American maritime circles. Washington's choice of Bremen and Mills received no support from New York, the financial capital of the country. Despite the help of Gevekoht to move the German

⁸⁷ Pamphlets included that of Camille Le Hardy de Beaulieu, *Projet d'une ligne postal a vapeur d'Anvers a New York, Brussel*, 1847, 48p. and Henry Maly *Antwerp and Bremen with reference to the projected steamship line between US and Europe*, Washington, 1846, 24p. Yet Johnson the postmaster general came from Virginia and was accused by Beaulieu to solely defend the interests of the Tobacco industry. Because of their influence Beaulieu could no longer find papers willing to publish articles signed by important New York merchant houses favoring Antwerp. ABMFA 2241, *Steam-shiping Antwerp New-York*, 1839-1889, Letters May 7 and June 24 1846.

⁸⁸ ABMFA 2241, *Steam-shiping Antwerp New-York*, 1839-1889, Letter of Le Hardy de Beaulieu to MFA February 28 and June 4 1846.

community to invest in the shipping line, the necessary capital could not be raised. The lobbyist returned home for financial support. The Bremen Senate contributed \$100,000, a sum equaled by Prussian authorities, while other German states such as Sachsen, Hanover, Baden, Oldenburg, Frankfurt, Nassau, Darmstadt and Hessen promised an additional \$200,000. The *Washington* undertook her maiden voyage in June 1847, followed by the *Hermann* the following spring.⁸⁹ In the intervening period, the French had opened a service to New York with the *Union*, which excelled in inefficiency and was forced to cease its service shortly thereafter. The inferior quality of the steamers of the Bremen Line could not rival the Cunard Line. Mills was unable to raise funds for the Le Havre contract which the American authorities assigned to Mortimer Livingstone and his Havre Steam Navigation Company instead. Despite the subsidies, both lines were only a qualified success and never induced development and expansion during their ten-year existence. Only the subsidized Collins Line, sailing to Liverpool, boosted American hopes in rivaling the British fleet.

3) The end of Cunard's dominance and the breakthrough of migrant transport on steamships

If the 1840s were characterized by the growing pains of steam-shiping and skeptic capitalists who refrained from investing in this branch, the 1850s marked a turnaround with the commercial success of unsubsidized lines drawing their revenues from migrant transport. The analysis of the various prospects for the opening of a transatlantic steamship line during the 1840s illustrated the extent to which this breakthrough had been anticipated. Sailing ships tried to protect this lucrative market, and possibly delayed the transition, but they could not prevent it. Plans for long distance steamship lines within the Hamburg-Le Havre range boomed because of the growing awareness that a lack of those endangered the competitive position of the port, especially since trade through Liverpool thrived because of its steamship connections. The success

⁸⁹ The westbound prices quoted for the *Washington* were 120 dollar first class and 60 dollar 2nd class. The national pride attached to the line is reflected by the names chosen for the ships. *Hermann* alluded to the liberator of Germany from Rome like *Washington* did for America from England. *Ibid.*, letter of Beaulieu to MFA May 10 1847 and BSA, 2-R 11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-1867, various newspaper articles 1847.

and failures of these ports, which will be discussed here, had an important impact on their prominence as migrant gateways in subsequent periods. Moreover, with the introduction of steam, conference agreements made their appearance in the maritime world and return migration became conceivable. In short, the evolution of steam-shipping during the 1850s helps in explaining the important repercussions it had on the second mass-migration movement following the Civil War.

3.1) The Anglo-American rivalry and the beginning of migrant transport by steam

In the wake of the efforts of the New York merchant community to open a steamship line to Europe the Cunard Line obtained a subsidy increase to extend its service with a biweekly sailing to New York.⁹⁰ This decision was spurred by the American subsidy awarded to Edward Collins for the opening of a line to Liverpool; in direct competition to the British market leader.⁹¹ The steamers of the United States Mail Steamship Co, popularly known as the Collins Line, managed to steal the blue ribbon -a distinction awarded to ships with the fastest trans-Atlantic crossing- from the Cunard Line. The Collins vessels also exceeded their competitors in size and the rivalry quickly evolved into a matter of national prestige, fueled by the popular press eagerly reporting on each sailing of both lines (Crouthamel, 1989, 87).⁹² The popular attention for the Anglo-American struggle for maritime supremacy was used by both lines to maintain or increase their subsidies.⁹³

⁹⁰ The Cunard Line received extra subsidies amounting to 145,000 pounds from British Admiralty to double its fleet to eight ships. The New York service quickly overshadowed the Boston one.

⁹¹ Collins, operating a passenger service by sail with the Dramatic line started lobbying for subsidies in 1841 and saw his efforts finally rewarded by an Act of Congress passed March 3 1847 awarding 385,000 dollars for 20 round trip sailings a year with five first class steamers, '*capable of beating the Cunarders*'.

⁹² As Crouthamel noted with the rise of sensational popular press such as the New York Herald: *Fires were always news, as were shipwrecks, and transatlantic steamboat races were exciting.* This would remain so throughout the period. Bennett a keen traveler to the old continent developed a particular interest for steamshipping. He despised the British monopoly and fervently supported subsidy policies especially to the Collins Line (Crouthamel, 1989, 31, 39 and 87).

⁹³ Collins' lobbying efforts in Congress, culminating in huge party in Washington for the inauguration of the *Baltic* honored by the presence of the President and 2000 other prominent officials resulted in an increase from 385,000 to a yearly contribution of 853,000\$. Cunard used the rivalry to maintain his subsidy which was challenged by the establishment of new non-subsidized British lines.

The rivalry spurred technological innovation, yet behind the scenes the lines concluded a secret agreement neutralizing the competition. A month before the first sailing of Collins' *Atlantic* both companies established what is known as the first oceanic steamship cartel pooling revenues and setting minimum rates for both passengers and cargo. The British were the initiators of the agreement, wanting to avoid a rate war and fearing that the ambitious Americans may outrival them in cabin passenger transport. The statistics for 1852 proved that the fears were not unfounded; Collins carried 4,306 passengers against Cunard's 2,969. Yet, despite occasional price cuts inducing passengers to choose a certain line over another, the agreement was respected and it worked to the advantage of the Cunard Line. The contract protected the British Line from American ships which had a decided superiority in speed and service, and in the long run allowed it to consolidate its position in cabin passage and mail transport on the North Atlantic.

The success of the fast crossings of Collins' company in attracting passengers also had downsides, pushing the company into taking on increased costs and risks. The speed was obtained through heavy coal consumption and by straining the engines so that they were in need of constant repairs. More importantly, because of the rivalry the line suffered two shipwrecks, with heavy passenger losses.⁹⁴ On the contrary, the more conservative Cunard Line never lost a ship prior to 1915, earning an impeccable reputation based on the regularity of service and safety of ships, which proved crucial for the passenger business. While Cunard paid out dividends to its shareholders, Collins never returned anything to his investors and was forced out of business by 1858. The failure of Collins had important repercussions on the American maritime policies, withdrawing their direct financial support of oceanic steamship lines. The contract with the Bremen Line was ended that same year and the Le Havre connections did not survive the Civil War. The national policies, which placed the American steamships at a disadvantage, in both their construction and their application, would practically drive the American flag out the North Atlantic. This means that with the subsequent transition from sail to steam, the lucrative migrant business which had been dominated by

⁹⁴ In 1854 the *Artic* collided with *Vesta* and sank with a loss of 300 lives including Collins' wife, son and daughter. The loss of the *Pacific* without a trace in 1856 signified the beginning of the end for the American Line.

American sailing packet companies would be left almost entirely in the hands of foreign steamship companies (Hutchins 325-357, Greenhalgh 312-335, Sloan 83-100, Hyde 38-52, Safford 53-85).

The conservative policy of the Cunard Line, to which the company owed its reputation as the safest vessels on the North Atlantic, delayed the adaptation of technological innovations used by rival lines establishing themselves on the market. The contract with the Admiralty, including requirements of shipbuilding, also limited the company's freedom to apply innovations which unsubsidized rivals did not have to deal with. Unlike the Cunard Line, the management of the Inman Line in inaugurating a steamship service on the Liverpool-Philadelphia route in 1850 experimented with new inventions. The use of the iron hull and screw propellers, instead of the wooden paddle-wheel steamers used by Cunard, grew to be the proto-type for all subsequent liners. Wooden ships had reached a limit in size, but with the introduction of iron, ships of virtually any size could be built. The increased capacity of ships offered the possibility of lowering the prices and hence steamship travel could be opened up to the poorer class of migrants. The costs also decreased due to engine improvements which reduced the coal consumption and the space on board required for coal. In the meantime, Liverpool had developed into 'the' nodal point for the migrant traffic to the US. It did not only attract nationals, and the neighboring Irish, but also Germans and Scandinavians due to the good railroad connections to Hull where feeder services dropped off continental migrants.

The Inman Line opened up the market of migrant transport on steamships in 1852. William Inman and his wife are believed to have traveled as steerage passengers on sailing packets several times to find out how the organization and service of the transport could be improved. Inman built in separate compartments for women, men and families, offered individual berths for each steerage passenger, three cooked meals per day, an on-board doctor, towels, soap and decent washing facilities. The ships were chartered during the Crimean War, temporarily disrupting the development of the line.⁹⁵ By the end, of the war the migrant flow to the US had dropped yet the company stuck to its

⁹⁵ The loss of two steamers that same year was equally responsible for the setbacks suffered in developing the line. The loss of the *City of Glasgow* the line's founding steamer vanished that same year with no one of the 480 passengers surviving the event to tell what occurred. Still in 1854 the '*City of Philadelphia*' also wrecked on her maiden trip yet without loss of life.

policy of migrant transport shifting its American terminal to New York and calling at Queenstown, the principal Irish migrant gateway. The service became weekly in 1860 and twice a week six years later (Hyde, 1975, 72; Keeling, 1999b, 41, Greenhalgh, 1939, 346 and Coleman, 1977, 25-27). Other lines soon followed, such as the Hamburg America Line and the Nord-Deutscher Lloyd from Bremen. When the Collins Line closed its books, Inman took over the sailing dates of the American company, increasing its revenues drawn from mail transport. The company also gained ground on the cabin passenger market and it did all this without subsidies from the British government.⁹⁶ Cunard's monopoly faced its first lasting challenge and was forced to enter the steerage business in 1860, speeding up the transition from sail to steam. In 1856, only one out of twenty-eight migrants arrived by steam, while four years later the number climbed to one out of three.⁹⁷ Despite charging more than sailing packets, there was no lack of migrants prepared to pay the difference for the many advantages it offered.⁹⁸ The crossing could now be made in less than two weeks, while sailing packets averaged five to six weeks.⁹⁹ No longer being dependent on winds, the regularity of sailing also increased. This shortened the time during which migrants remained without income and reduced the risks of contracting disease at sea. Yet, the most important impact on migration patterns of Inman's innovations –which proved steam-shippping's profitability without subsidies based on migrant transport and which triggered the subsequent steamshipping boom- was that migration became less definitive. An increasing number of migrants started to leave with the intention of returning, further reducing the barriers separating Old and New World.

3.2) The emergence of migrant transport by steam in continental ports within the Hamburg-Le Havre range

⁹⁶ An Anonymous letter sent to Doppelaar, commissioner of a society prospecting to open a line from Rotterdam reported that Collins and Cunard quoting 35 pounds for first class travel greatly suffered from the low rates of the Inman Line, quoting only 20 pounds for 1st class passengers on the *City of Glasgow*. GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 7.

⁹⁷ In 1856, 5000 out of 141,000 migrants, in 1860 34,000 out of 108,000 (Greenhalgh 1939, 349)

⁹⁸ Keeling estimated that the initial prices of eight pounds were twice the ones charged by sailing ships. Midway the 1860 the price was reduced to 5 pounds nearing the rates paid on sailing ships ranging from three to five pounds (Keeling, 1999, 42).

⁹⁹ The first class clippers had even reduced the crossing to three to four weeks yet during the sailing ship era migrant transport remained a fragmented business. Many still made the crossing on chartered ships instead of liner services

3.2.1) Rotterdam's awakening from commercial nostalgia

The efforts of the Dutch envoy in Washington to promote Rotterdam as a possible terminal contrasted with the attitude of the Chamber of Commerce of the port, reflecting the still predominant aversion towards the German transit and migrant trade. On the efforts of the Minister of Foreign affairs the Chamber stated that the amount of trade with the US did not justify the opening of such a line. A report containing 'advice to promote the emigration of Germans through the Netherlands and regarding the commercial interests of the country' was shelved by the Chamber of Commerce (Stokvis, 1976, 173-174). Nevertheless, not all Rotterdam merchants were blind to the promising prospects of North-Atlantic steam-shipping. Eventually, the Chamber of Commerce could be convinced of trying to let Mills' ships call at Rotterdam.¹⁰⁰ When the efforts proved unsuccessful some prominent Rotterdam merchants decided to take matters into own hands.¹⁰¹ In 1850, the Rotterdam-American Steamship Company was established estimating the needed capital for opening a line to New York at 1,200,000 guilders. Jan Willem Van Oord traveled to Scotland to negotiate the construction of two similar ships to the *City of Glasgow* of the Inman Line. The same year 750,000 guilders were raised but the society wanted at least one million before starting operations. Attempts were made to find investors abroad in Germany, England and in the US where the New York merchant house 'Boonen and Graves' was contacted.¹⁰² Yet they advised against the opening of the line because of the murdering competition of the Cunard Line; the lack of

¹⁰⁰ NA, 2.05.13 Gezantschap in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika, 1814-1940 Various letters between MFA and the Dutch envoy Testa 1846-1848.

¹⁰¹ A letter to the Dutch King asking support mentioned A. Plate, Dorrepaal. Bunge, Serruys, Phillippi, Jacobson as commissioners and Jan-Willem van Oord as president. Seeking financial help the society eventually only obtained the patronage of Prince Frederik. G.A.R., HAL, 3.04.16 W.A., 7 Stoomboot Amerika 1850.

¹⁰² The spelling of the name 'Boonen' was partly erased. It may just as well be Rooran. Graves was related to the Cunard family and the merchant house collaborated with the Havre Line underlining its expertise in Ocean Steam navigation. The society was approached by Baltimore merchants to convince the company to use that port as a terminal. The completion of the Baltimore Ohio Railroad connections to Saint Louis and Cincinnati offered the best prospects for the migrant trade. In Baltimore the company would receive much more support from local authorities than in New York and would not have to deal with competitors. C.G. Baylon, American consul in Amsterdam on the contrary tried to convince the company to use Norfolk, Virginia to throw the trade with southern states of the yoke of Liverpool and New York. GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 7 and 10-3.

support from the Dutch government; and the limited volume of valuable German and Dutch mercantile goods making the enterprise too dependent on the steerage passenger business.¹⁰³ The repeated applications for subsidies from the Dutch government, and the local authorities of Rotterdam, remained unsuccessful. The company even turned to the Prussian government, which refused because it would conflict with the significant support it had given to Bremen. After five years, only 860,000 guilders were raised and the plans were shelved (Mees, 1883, 5-6; De Boer; 1998, 7-10).

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the colonial trade policies had taken away the incentive to invest in steam shipping. The ostrich trade policies lead to the decline of the once so preeminent Dutch merchant marine. It was only during the 1850s that the Dutch woke up from the commercial nostalgia of the Golden Ages and the economic stagnation. The government started to invest heavily in infrastructure to facilitate the transit trade from Germany which worked as a catalyst for the Dutch industrialization. The government contributed to modernizing port facilities and to expanding the railroad-network; two aspects in which the Netherlands seriously lagged behind their neighbors. Yet, the evolution from commercial traditionalism with the hostile attitudes towards transit trade to modernization was a slow process. During the 1850s, the liberalization of trade policies occurred. The decades of disputes between Prussia and Holland over the free Rhine trade came to an end with a new treaty in 1851 granting the Germans their liberal demands (Blasing and Langenhuyzen 102-108 and Horlings, 1995, 194-197). It was only during the early 1850s that Testa negotiated a new trade agreement with the US. Gever had repeatedly urged for this ten years before; pointing out that the high tariffs harmed trade relations between the countries.¹⁰⁴ Yet, his advice had been completely ignored up to 1853, when the protective barriers were taken away -long after the neighboring countries had lifted them. Tolls for using the Voorne channel decreased considerably. Publicity was to be given to this in the American press to encourage new trade between the countries.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 7 letter of merchant house Boonen and Graves to J.W. van Oordt May 14 1851.

¹⁰⁴ NA, 2.05.13 Gezantschap in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika, 1814-1940, Correspondence 1840-1865.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

Also in 1853, Dutch authorities finally made work of reviewing the laws regulating the migrant passage through the Netherlands yet it would take eight years before the proposal was enacted. The new law, based on the Belgian and German rivals, significantly simplified the conditions of admission. Passports or other certificates were no longer needed. The law also subjected the lodging to controls while inspection of ships was increased. The requirements imposed on ships were based on the American laws. New Committees of Supervision were created. They also had to handle the complaints of the migrants and to provide them information. The main occupation of the Committee was to improve the reputation of Rotterdam abroad (Van der Valk, 1976, 159-160). Dutch consuls frequently published the laws, and the yearly reports of the Supervision Committee in German out-migration regions, during the years that followed.¹⁰⁶ But, as the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce noted, the laws were too little too late. Direct migration to the US had come to a complete standstill. In 1863, only 39 out of the 938 migrants registered by the Supervision Committee passing through Rotterdam had traveled directly. In 1864, the ratio amounted to 542 out of 3,161 and in 1865 it was 752 out of 3,983. Most of the transit migrants traveled on to London or Liverpool. The chamber did not expect any direct effect of the laws, since the migration flows had completely shifted to other ports and redirecting them to Rotterdam would be a long process. As will be seen in the following chapters, these predictions were not unfounded. The lack of transatlantic steamship connections would be felt. The migrant flow through Rotterdam eventually revived yet it would never catch up on its German and English rivals.

3.2.2) Was Antwerp much like a frog or was it an ox to be reckoned with?

Conversely to the Netherlands, the Belgian government had heavily invested in port infrastructure and railroad connections during the first half of the nineteenth century. Their orientation to the German hinterland paid off, drawing twenty-seven percent of the volume of transport to the German hinterland (Blasing and Langenhuizen, 1998, 108-109

¹⁰⁶ NA, 2.05.10.04, Nederlands Gezantschap in duitse Bond Fankfurt, Nassau, Hessen en Keur-Hessen 1816-67, NR 14 Nassau Ingekomen en minuten van uitgaande brieven 1830-66; Numerous letters from the MFA to the consuls in the region 1861-1866.

and Horlings, 1995, 208). The efforts to attract migrants to Antwerp were also rewarded with a steady increase of the flow, yet it continued to trail behind Le Havre and Bremen (see annex 1). The active subsidy policy supporting maritime lines to the US exerted a pull on some sailing packets yet the French and German port still had far superior connections. The Antwerp governor stressed the fact that the commercial future of the port heavily relied on the decent organization of migrant transport. He pleaded for investment of the money given to maritime lines in extra measures to attract migrants, claiming that steorage passengers made subsidies superfluous as they served as a magnet for shipping lines.¹⁰⁷

However, the Belgian government continued with its active policy and the opening of a steamship line remained a priority. Slowly the conviction grew that Mills did not need to be convinced to alternate his Bremen service to Antwerp one out of every two crossings, but that the port should rely on its own strength and take initiative. When the French government announced their service, it was no longer a question as with the acquisition of the *British Queen* to be ahead of the competitors, yet it was a matter of not falling behind to become a second rate port and loosing its position on the German hinterland.¹⁰⁸ Belgian diplomats in the US often blamed the Antwerp merchant community for their lack of initiative. According to Beaulieu, the Bremen merchants were much more supportive of the lobbying efforts of their officials, which were contributing to their success.

Yet, the Antwerp merchants seemed to let go of the failure of the *British Queen* and took a more active stance. Continuous efforts were made through the Belgian

¹⁰⁷ They did not have the first class packets as sailing from Antwerp and the subsidy to the sailing service to New York was even withdrawn in 1847 because of the lack of regularity. ABMFA, 2020, Emigration, II, Letter of the Teichmann to MFA January 14 1847 and ABMFA 2241, Steam-shiping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letters of Moxhet to MFA October 17 and November 9 1846.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, In a letter of May 20 1847 the Antwerp Chamber reported to the MFA that the government would open the New York service on May 30. The steamship *Chritophe Colombe*, *Canada*, *Darien* and *Ullowa* would provide the service. First class cabin passage amounted to 1000 Franks, second 500fr. and third 300fr. including food and wine. The line never operated at full force yet there is very little information available on the beginning of French steam shipping starting with the *Précurseur* built in 1841 for a New York service but apparently never put in use. If the information of the Chamber of commerce is right the line seemed to have inaugurated the steamship crossing for migrants. Yet the line did not operate for long, never at full force and it is unknown if they carried out their intentions of transporting 3rd class passengers. The French Line eventually operated with other ships than the ones mentioned by the chamber of commerce namely; the *Union*, *New York*, *Missouri* and *Philadelphia* and initially sailed from Cherbourg before moving to Le Havre. Further investigation should shed more light on the obscure beginning years of French steam shipping.

emissaries in Germany to obtain the support of the Rhine States and Prussia, for a line from Antwerp.¹⁰⁹ This resulted in a prospect backed by Antwerp and Rhine merchants *Compagnie Belge-Rhéneane de navigation transatlantique*. All possible ways were explored. The Belgian envoy in Washington established contacts with the Danish envoy and Mr. Hanson planned to open a service from Gluckstadt to New York with the financial support of the Danish King. The envoy discussed the possibility of establishing a Belgian-Danish company, with alternating a service between Antwerp and Gluckstadt to New York.¹¹⁰ Both possibilities faded away however with the outbreak of the 1848 revolution. That same year, an Antwerp emigration agent, Antoine Laane, backed by English investors planned to open *The Belgian Transatlantic Steamship Navigation Company* with four small slow steamers specialized in the transport of migrants and complemented with some goods. He inquired for possible subsidies, from the government, or at least a guarantee of interest in capital to attract investors.¹¹¹ J. Claes, traveling on a Belgian subsidy to promote trade connections with Belgium, reported on yet another possibility. *The Neptune Ocean Steamship Company* projected a line also aimed at migrant transport financed by both the American and Belgian government. Antwerp also fitted into the plans of the American, Ambrose Thompson, in his trying to obtain governmental support for a line to China and one between Philadelphia and Norfolk with the Belgian port.¹¹² Even C. Vanderbilt showed interest in opening a line to Antwerp. However the poor results of the Bremen Line tempered the enthusiasm of the American authorities for more lines.

The project of Laane gained the favor of Antwerp merchants applying for government assistance. Laane contended with competition from Adolphe Le Hardy de Beaulieu, who was backed by French and English financiers.¹¹³ Yet the economic crisis of

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, various letters, especially in 1847 and 1848 and GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 7, statutes of the enterprise.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Letter of Beaulieu to MFA March 8 1848

¹¹¹ The price for a migrant berth was set at 150 franks. *Ibid.*, Letter Antoine Laane to MFA September 7 1849.

¹¹² He met among others Gordon Bennett editor of the *New York Herald* which already had a circulation of 36,000 asking him to publish more articles on the young nation. In his prospect Claes planned to charge 200fr. for migrants not including food. This had to enable them to compete with sailing packets charging 100 to 120 franks while food for ninety days at 1,5 franks per day needed to be carried along bringing the price between 235 and 255 Franks *Ibid.*, letter November 22 1849.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, Letter of A. Le Hardy de Beaulieu January 19 1850.

the 1840s had left the Belgian government with a very small budget to distribute, while all prospects dealt with the same difficulty - raising capital. Laane and Le Hardy joined forces to improve their chances. Promoters traveled through Europe and the US to find investors willing to invest but to no avail. The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs kept on receiving other prospects.¹¹⁴ The migrant stream and the transit trade through Antwerp were declining, pushing the authorities to take measures (see annex 1). A draft proposal was drawn up by the different ministries to see the conditions under which and the manner in which they could support a steamship line.¹¹⁵ The authorities realized that they would not be able to compete for mail and passenger service with the fast first class steamers of the Liverpool lines. Hence, they opted for a slower and smaller line, focusing on migrant and freight transport considered a fast service with first class steamers.¹¹⁶ Antwerp merchants started to file propositions again.

The proposition which eventually enjoyed the support of the Belgian government came from E Weber, C. Spillaerd and G. Nothomb. It was representative of the other proposals of the time and it clearly illustrates the ongoing shift to migrant transport by steam. The capital required for the venture was set at five million Belgian francs. Five small ships of 1,200 tons, equipped with engines of two hundred horse power, would provide a fortnightly service. The company requested a subsidy of 1,200 francs per voyage and a guarantee of interest on the capital to attract investors. The ships would accommodate fifty first class passengers, have limited room for freight transport, but the main commercial object was migrant transport, providing for five hundred steerage passengers. The price estimates included food costs, estimated at 10 francs and the head tax hospital, and New York port costs estimated at another 30 francs (see table 1).¹¹⁷

Table 1: Price averages for the crossing including food provisions

¹¹⁴ One of the French entrepreneurs, M. Leduc dated June 10 1851; another of German businessmen residing in Antwerp Dienziger and Diesch December 1 1851. Through the intermediate of Le Hardy de Beaulieu traveling in the US a number of propositions were formulated such as one from American capitalist Rhodes January 18 1852, another from Philadelphian entrepreneur E. Lincoln. He also aroused the interest of English investors such as A. Lelievre, E.W. Morris, G. Rennie and Co planning to open a line for migrants charging 10 pounds for second class and 6 pounds for third class berths.

¹¹⁵ ABMFA 2241, Steam-shippping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Correspondence between ministries January 22 1852.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Correspondence between various ministries March and April 1853.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* Prospect of the company 1853.

| Month | Price by sail | Price by steam | Estimated passengers | Revenues in B.Fr. |
|-----------|---------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| January | 100 | 115 | 125 | 14375 |
| February | 100 | 115 | 250 | 28750 |
| March | 120 | 130 | 500 | 65000 |
| April | 150 | 180 | 500 | 90000 |
| May | 130 | 150 | 500 | 75.000 |
| June | 120 | 130 | 500 | 65000 |
| July | 120 | 130 | 375 | 48750 |
| August | 130 | 150 | 500 | 75.000 |
| September | 135 | 155 | 500 | 77500 |
| October | 120 | 140 | 500 | 70000 |
| November | 110 | 125 | 250 | 30000 |
| December | 100 | 110 | 125 | 13750 |

The big competitive advantage of steamships over sailing ships was their speed which reduced the cost for provisions. In most ports, sailing ships needed to provide food provisions for 90 days. To avoid potential abuses of captains, withholding food provisions and selling them on arrival in New York, laws were passed obliging them to distribute the remained of the food supplies among steerage passengers after the trip.¹¹⁸ These laws were not adapted to include steamships, giving them an important advantage in undercutting on the price. The table also reflects that prices fluctuated according to the season of travel, which peaked during spring and summer. After having been approved by the Chamber of Representatives, the Minister of Foreign Affaires defended the project in the Senate claiming that migrant transport had become one of the catalysts of maritime business:

“There are few things that are so well understood as the keen battle between the ports to contract migrant illustrates. The number of migrants embarking in Antwerp is growing yet we are far from reaching the amounts passing through our rival ports. While Antwerp’s last year total was limited to 14,900, Le Havre numbered 60,000, Hamburg 30,000 and Bremen 58,500. This proportion can and has to be modified. Some very interesting propositions have been made to boost

¹¹⁸ This was so in Belgium yet it can only be guessed to what extent these were implemented. The laws were adapted to include steamships in 1855 stating that steamships needed to carry provisions for 35 days which was lowered to 20 days in 1858. The minimum price was said to be 105 franks would lower than the Inman line rates.

the emigrant passage through Antwerp from the moment that the port will be connected by steam navigation to New York.”¹¹⁹

The Senate overwhelmingly approved the propositions to support the project.¹²⁰ Thielens, the Antwerp emigration inspector, was appointed as government commissioner of the company while Henry Mali, the New York consul, represented the line in the US.¹²¹ The Antwerp merchants took 1,500 stock options, while the Belgian bank, Société Générale, bought another -1,000 enough for half of the capital which allowed the Belgian Royal Transatlantic Steam shipping Company to begin its operations. The consular corps was asked to promote the opening of the line in their region. Yet again the project failed. The construction of the ships was entrusted to Amsterdam shipbuilders, rather than the more experienced British builders. The delivery of the first two ships suffered long delays and they proved to have serious shortcomings on their maiden voyages. The costs had been seriously underestimated, and the company soon was making significant losses. After the Crimean War, many vessels returned to transatlantic service, depressing the demand for shipping capacity. As a result, the company folded in 1858 before the last two vessels could be launched.¹²² With this failure, the decline of Antwerp as a migrant gateway to the New World set in. Despite the efforts of the authorities the port was not able to take a prominent position on the North Atlantic trade route. De Mann’s assessment of Antwerp being ‘the frog in the table, which wished to reach the size of an ox’, seemed to be confirmed, for the time being.¹²³

¹¹⁹ ABMFA 2241, Steam-shipping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Summary of parliamentary debates 10 June 1853 and BGRA, TO 74, Correspondence 1853.

¹²⁰ The Senate was only apprehensive on how. Especially the guarantee on capital had never been accorded before and they feared to create a dangerous precedent for other industries. In the end all port dues were lifted, a subsidy of 1200 francs per ship and 4% guarantee on capital were given.

¹²¹ Mali was promoted as consul general of New York to facilitate his tasks. He was responsible to contract freight for the eastbound leg and received a 2,5% commission for each passenger ticket sold. ABMFA, Consuls et Consulats, New York, pers. 623; Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Henri Mali, consul, New York.

¹²² Again, the construction of the five vessels took much longer than planned. The company only began operations on 29 December 1855, but the first crossing of *Belgique* turned into a fiasco. Due to serious leaks the vessel had to call three times at English ports for repairs; after its last call on 24 January 1856, the crossing to New York was cancelled, and it took eight months before the ship could be put back into service. Although *Belgique* was joined by *Constitution* and *Leopold J*, the company folded in 1857 before the next two vessels built on Belgian shipyards could be launched.

¹²³ BSA, 2-R-11, Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-1867, Letter of De Mann to Duckwitz December 13 1845.

3.3) The second empire and the Pereire brothers: first steps in Le Havre's de-Americanization

Like the Netherlands, France was lagging behind its neighbors regarding infrastructural development. Because of the lack of capital and the inadequate government policies for railroad building, the country still did not have an efficient national transport network by 1850 (Smith, 2006, 64-65). The government supported attempts to support transatlantic steamship connections, yet it failed to produce satisfying results on the North Atlantic. During the early 1840s a government commission, 'Commission de Gomer' was appointed to open a steamship line between Le Havre and New York.¹²⁴ During the early 1840s constant rumors on the imminent opening of such line circulated, but never seemed to have materialized. The French-American trade was pretty much left entirely in the hands of American business man, eighty six percent of the trade occurring on American vessels during the fiscal year of 1841.¹²⁵ In 1847, the French government fearing a fall behind England, US and Germany in transatlantic steam shipping subsidized the opening of a line. The French Line operated four steamers; *Union*, *New York*, *Missouri* and *Philadelphia* sailing initially from Cherbourg before moving to Le Havre. Only the *Union's* first trip was successful, all others suffered constant delays. The line became a laughing stock in New York, hurting French national pride. The two sailings in November 1847 only numbered five and eleven eastbound passengers. In the beginning of January, unable to do something about the delays, the service was suspended (Greenhalgh, 1939, 320-324).

After the 1848 revolution attempts of reformers to revive the economy were obstructed by a political stalemate which only came to end with the *coup d'état* of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte December 1851. In the subsequent decades the banking revolution which set in during the previous decades, with the introduction of joint stock companies with limited liability took decisive turn when the Pereire brothers, Emile and Isaac founded the *Crédit Mobilier* in 1852. The institution provided the means to finance the industrial development of France, making capital available for the modernization of port

¹²⁴ AND, Nr 7 Reports on steam shipping of the New York consul to MFA Letters August 18 and September 16 1842.

¹²⁵ Unfortunately the consular correspondence of New York for the period 1845 to 1854 has not been preserved. *Ibid.*, letter September 24 1842.

infrastructure, expansion of railroads and steamship lines (Smith, 2006, 67-69). The Pereire brothers were the driving force behind the establishment of the transatlantic shipping company Compagnie Générale Maritime in 1855. Nonetheless, it would take a reorganization of the company and another nine years before the Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, with the help of government subsidies, offered a successful service on the Le Havre-New York route.

In the meantime American investors and ship-owners provided first class sailing ship and steamship connections between Le Havre and New York. When Mills failed to gather enough capital to pay off the third ship *Franklin* intended for the Le Havre service, he lost the American mail contract for that route to Mortimer Livingstone. The American businessmen, with experience in the packet service, started the service with *Argo* and *Fulton* later completed with the *Franklin* and the *Humboldt*. These decent ships were, however, not of the same class of the Collins and Cunard steamers. The success of the line was hampered by a new law lifting restrictions on British ships to carry national goods. Cunard immediately opened a feeder service from Le Havre in accordance with the British company's sailings to carry continental goods fighting the newly established American lines.¹²⁶ The Havre Line was making losses, and had troubles in fulfilling the requirements for the American mail subsidy, an opportunity used by the Belgian envoy in Washington, Bosch to convince the American authorities of sailing to Antwerp instead. Bosch was backed by A. Thompson, and American entrepreneurs strongly soliciting for government subsidies and both gained the favor of the postmaster general to alter the subsidies. Congress decided likewise but an intensive lobby-campaign of Livingstone and the French envoy in Washington deferred the transition.¹²⁷ Thompson's bid to buy the ships from the Havre Line was stopped partly because the line started to make profits. The American businessman traveled to Belgium negotiating favorable conditions for the project. But, in the meantime the Belgian government had concluded a contract with the

¹²⁶ Moxhet suggested to establish a similar service from Antwerp in anticipation of the opening of direct line. An Antwerp newspaper article probably dating from 1851 announced the opening of such service stating that New York was now only 16 to 18 days away yet it never materialized. ABMFA 2241, Steam-shiping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letter of Moxhet to MFA, January 22 1850.

¹²⁷ Bosch even gave a speech for the shareholders of the Union Line to convince them of the benefits of a changeover. *Ibid.*, various letters of Bosch and Thompson to MFA between May 23 1852 and February 1854.

Belgian Royal Transatlantic Steam shipping Company. The American had hoped to receive extra subsidies but returned from empty handed and abandoned the project.¹²⁸

In the end, the Havre Line retained the contract, but had to tolerate a new competitor on the route in 1855 Cornelius Vanderbilt opened his Vanderbilt European Line. Both lines, however, stopped their activities during the American Civil War. The initial plans of the Compagnie Générale Maritime included a steamship line to New York targeting migrant transport as the primary source of revenue.¹²⁹ Arthur Gautier started the operations with the *Barcelone*, leaving the first class business to Collins and Cunard steamers, he concentrated on the third-class westbound and second-class eastbound passengers, but the ship only made some crossings in 1856.¹³⁰ The plans only fully materialized some nine year later, but in the meantime French authorities started to adapt its laws regarding migrant transport which had remained relatively unchanged from the 1830s.

On the contrary to Antwerp, Hamburg and Bremen, where laws were drawn up in accordance with the migrant broker and ship owner's interests, there seemed to have been a total lack of dialogue between the French authorities and the Le Havre merchants. The three-month closure of the French borders for all migrants on their way to the New World during the cholera scare of 1849 illustrates this. The lack of laws regulating migrant transport was used by the Prussian government in 1853 as an excuse to prohibit transatlantic migration of nationals through French ports, diverting them to Bremen and Hamburg. This event eventually led to a shift in policies of the French government facilitating the transit rather than obstructing it, dedicating much attention to protecting the migrant from abuses. The imperial decree of 1855 was passed, adapting French regulations to the German and Belgian model.¹³¹ Five years later, the decrees regarding migrant transport were bundled into laws fitting the needs of the new era of migrant

¹²⁸ Thompson then traveled to Netherlands hoping to obtain the support of the Dutch authorities but without success.

¹²⁹ CAMT 9AQ, 2-7, Dossiers des assemblées générales, 1855-1914.

¹³⁰ AND, Letter of the Consul in New York to the MFA, March 26 1856. and letter November 12 1860.

¹³¹ This included the establishment of government commissions supervising the transport both over land as at sea. Emigration agents now had to apply for a concession from the government and requirements for crossing the borders were restated. The regulations also included measures regarding migrant contracts, provisions, space allocations etc. similar to the ones adopted by other European migrant ports.

transport by steam. With this transition, the American flag which had dominated the North Atlantic migrant trade through Le Havre, disappeared to make room for French companies (Fouché, 1992, 69-78 and de Vannoise-Pochulu, 1993, 138-142).

3.3.4) Bremen versus Hamburg: The rivalry among the Hanse cities for the North Atlantic trade

With their active efforts to attract the American subsidized steamship line Bremen characterized itself as ‘the’ port of the *Zollverein*, with direct connection worldwide, much to the disdain of Hamburg. The contacts between both ports decreased, further fueling the rivalry. As seen in the previous chapter, the Hamburg Senate started to change its policies toward migrant transport during the 1840s, no longer obstructing the developing traffic which was predominantly indirect via England because of the strong trade relations with the British Isles. Hamburg closely followed the changes in migrant transport legislation of Bremen and adapted its laws accordingly, yet its poor reputation regarding inferior protection and quality of service persisted. The Senate had little control on the indirect migration through England, which was cheaper, yet passage occurred under strenuous conditions and abuses were frequent (Gelberg, 1973, 10-16; Bretting, 1991, 28). Hamburg lacked direct connections to rival their neighbors’ dominant position.

The growing interest of Hamburg merchants for the North Atlantic trade and the will to counter Bremen’s ‘arrogance’ by establishing direct connections led to the founding of the Hamburg-Amerikanischen Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft (HAPAG).¹³² The New York bound sailing ships offered room for 20 first-class, and 200 steerage passengers. The company deployed great efforts in expanding the migrant-agent network connecting out-migration regions with the port. The 1848 revolution and subsequent Danish-German conflict disrupted the service but during the 1850s HAPAG developed into a first-class sailing ship company, allowing the port to catch up its lag behind on continental rivals migrant transport. The success was crowned by the inauguration of a steamship service in 1855 with the *Hamonia* combining both cabin as steerage passage

¹³² After his mission as envoy in Washington, Serruys took up the consular position in Hamburg closely following the evolutions in steam shipping on the North Atlantic both in Hamburg as in Bremen. ABMFA 2241, Steam-shiping Antwerp New-York, 1839-1889, Letters of Serruys to MFA, 1847-1848.

with a capacity for 54 first-, 136 second-, and 310 third-class passengers.¹³³ The cornerstones were laid for what would grow to become the biggest shipping company worldwide, by the century end (Witthöft, 1973, 9-18 and Wrede, 1997, 16-48).

However, Bremen kept a leading role in migrant transport on the continent and this, as pointed by rivals during the lobbying campaigns, was not so much because of its natural advantages or geographic location as it was because of the specific nature of the business organized through the migrant agent-network. The Belgian envoy in Berlin praised the dynamic activity and organization of the Bremen migrant brokers who did not wait until they arrived at the port, but migrant-agents nationwide in a way took the migrant by the hand, at the point of departure and guided him all the way to the New World.¹³⁴ Thanks to the active role of the Bremen merchant community, the port also won the battle for the American steamship line. Besides the obvious commercial motives, the Hanseatic city also wanted the contract as a means of remaining outside of the grip of the *Zollverein*. Yet the 1848 revolution and the Danish-German war increased the desire of the *Zollverein* to control the Free City ports, and their merchant marine.

As the American Line did not produce the expected results, and as Inman had proven that migrant transport by steam was profitable, Bremen merchants opened a new steamship line. A. Fritze & Company launched a service with the *Hansa* and *Germania* targeting migrants in 1853.¹³⁵ However, the outdated wooden paddle steamers did not produce the same results as the iron screw propelled steamers inaugurated by Inman. When the Vanderbilt European Line took over Mills' contract with such steamers in 1857, and with the establishment of the North German Lloyd (NDL) that same year, *Hansa* and *Germania* disappeared from the North Atlantic route. After a difficult start, only the NGL maintained its service after the Civil War, monopolizing the migrant trade to US and in the process becoming the fourth biggest shipping company worldwide right after the HAPAG (Armgor, 1993, 46-47).

¹³³ The Belgian consul general, Mr. Swaine, in Hamburg reported that a steamship line had been opened from Hamburg to New York with two ships. Yet the chartered vessel, *British Queen* left the company after the first crossing while the second *Helena Storiean* constructed disappeared on its second voyage putting a premature end to the company. *Ibid.*, Letter March 31 1851.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, Letter of Nothomb, envoy of Berlin to MFA, June 13 1849.

¹³⁵ The *Hansa* was refitted to carry 700 migrants and 50 first class passengers, the price for the steerage crossing was set at 40\$ <http://www.geocities.com/mppraetorius/com>. Palmer list of merchant vessels

CONCLUSION PART 1: State policies and their influence on the connections between maritime and migration networks

Strikwerda has refuted the state's secondary influence on migration flows, as claimed by most migration historians, stressing the demographic and economic causes instead (Strikwerda, 1993 and 1999). He rightly points out that during the last two centuries, international regimes of the Western World have strongly affected tides of migration, despite the lack of an international migration regime, through trade and diplomacy: *“the significant degree of international cooperation, free trade and economic integration which arose in the 19th century was only possible because of this diplomatic transformation which created the first modern international regime”* (Strikwerda, 1999, 375). What seems to have escaped the attention of both migration and maritime historians is the commercial importance that the movement of transatlantic migrants generated. Based on the lack of laws restricting or encouraging nationals from moving or foreigners from entering, it has been wrongly assumed that nineteenth-century governments had little impact on migration. For nineteenth-century authorities with ports involved in the North Atlantic trade, the main preoccupation was not so much who moved and is much more, how and from where, they moved.

The legislation regulating how people moved would later be used by the American authorities to try to control the quality and quantity of the people who moved. As was the case in Hamburg, and especially in Antwerp and Bremen, conscious efforts were made by the authorities to facilitate the transit of migrants; reconciling it with initial fears of burdening the public welfare system. Migrant brokers were assisted through the consular corps in expanding their migrant agent network in out-migration regions. The consuls also advertised migrant gateways swelling the information flow about the ‘New World’ and ways to reach it. New routes to join the port were opened and the border controls were adapted to allow the greatest flow possible to pass through. Rotterdam, the pioneering migration port on the European continent, missed the boat during the first half of the nineteenth century because of adverse maritime and migrant trade policies. Le Havre, on the contrary flourished despite the lack of interest of central authorities to stimulate the trade thanks to the dynamic activities of predominantly American

merchants to attract the migrant trade to the French port. The formation of the eastbound cotton and westbound migrant triangle through New York illustrates the extent to which migrant networks were imbedded in trade networks with ports as nodal points.

National studies on migration policies have focused on the influence authorities had on the movement of nationals, yet they have failed to observe the impact authorities with interests in migrant trade had on the movement of foreigners. As seen by contrasting the Dutch with the Belgian maritime state policies, governments played an active role in maritime and migration progressions in both countries. With Rotterdam, the Dutch had the most appropriate continental gateway for the migrant trade which would have stimulated the transatlantic movement had the state shown some interest in North Atlantic traffic. Belgian authorities, on the contrary, strongly supported Antwerp in competing with other ports to attract the trade. This spurred the passage of laws protecting the migrant on their way to; and during their stay at the port, while measures were taken to assure the wellbeing of the migrant during the crossing. Although abuses could never be eradicated, the awareness of the importance of the word of mouth publicity in the trade spread rapidly among merchants and authorities. This contributed to the low death rates among passengers heading to the US, which together with the increasing organization of the migrant transport from place of departure to the final destination reduced the costs, risks and fears in making the move. The growing flow had converted the migrant into a lucrative product, determining trade movements on the North Atlantic, the busiest long distance sea route. Authorities backed the development of the trade to support the national economy through which they tried to increase their political influence, and in the case of the US, Bremen and Belgium aimed at consolidating political independence. In the wake of this, new liberal trade treaties were signed between European authorities and the US allowing the Atlantic economic integration to further develop. Migrant communities established in the US reinforced the economic ties between the home country and the new world. Because of this and the belief that migration served as a security valve during economic crisis, Belgian and German authorities encouraged the movement of nationals. Yet the practice was stopped when it started to threaten trade relations between the countries.

The competition for the North Atlantic trade also spurred technological innovation, both in sailing packets through which most migrants traveled before the American Civil War, as in steam shipping, which started to take over the market from 1850s onwards. With little capital available, government subsidies were crucial for the establishment of the pioneering transatlantic steamship connections. These were the object of national prestige causing a fierce competition to have the first-class steamers flying under the national flag. This was used by steam shipping companies to increase the government's contribution while secretly concluding agreements to neutralize cut-rate competition. These cartels or steam shipping conferences characterized the subsequent organization of the trade during the steamship era. The diplomatic corps, important contributors to the formation of the first modern international regime, played a key role in the opening of such lines, by lobbying for foreign state support; finding foreign investors; promoting the line; renegotiating new trade and postal treaties; or acting as shipping agents for the lines. Their role decreased when the Inman line proved that such a line could be managed without state help when using migrants as main source of revenue; allowing the transition from sail to steam to occur. Yet even during the steamship era consuls retained their importance as informers on new developing markets leading to the opening of new routes (Manitakis, 2007, 63-74).

As pointed by Hyde: *“the real point to grasp is that it was the steamship which changed the whole nature, organization and profitability of the migrant trade”* (Hyde, 1975, 23). Only because of the increased organization and commercialization of this trade, based on a system which had been developing since the eighteenth century, was the transatlantic migrant movement able to attain the sheer volume it had. These high numbers allowed the steam shipping companies involved in migrant trade to position themselves among the biggest companies worldwide. Maritime and migration networks have too often been considered as parallel networks however the commercialization of migrant transport firmly connected both. These networks encompassed the whole Atlantic world connecting state authorities, business and labor interests with the individual migrants, yet the key role of steam shipping companies in these remains unexplored. The works of Engelsing and Wockek in analyzing how the business was organized during the sailship era have not been followed by a study analyzing the true

impact of steam shipping on the organization of the trade (Engelsing, 1963 and Wokeck, 1998). The following section, predominantly based on the archives of the Holland America Line (HAL) which ran a service between Rotterdam and New York, intends to fill that lacuna in the literature.

Part II: Full steam ahead: from cut-throat competition to the formation of shipping cartels, 1870-1896

The impact of steam shipping on migration patterns has not gone unnoticed by migration historians. By reducing the duration of the crossing to less than two weeks, and by increasing the regularity of sailings, mortality rates dropped to below one percent. By limiting transit and traveling time, the period during which the migrant remained without income decreased. This changed the nature of migration, where it became less permanent and comprised of a growing number of single individuals making the crossing to earn a certain amount of capital, before eventually returning to their families in the home country instead of moving permanently with the family. This transition from sail to steam on the North Atlantic was delayed by the Civil War and an economic recession preceding the conflict. After the war, when the movement regained its importance, from 1863 onwards, steamships had difficulties in catering for the increasing demand. Gathering capital for steamship enterprises, and the construction of vessels, was a slow process. By 1873, sixteen steam shipping companies operated on the North Atlantic, driving sailing ships for migrant transport off that route (Cohn, 2005, 469-495).¹³⁶

The formation of joint-stock companies allowed ship owners to do migrant business on an unprecedented scale. These maritime enterprises developed into icons of national prestige, on which a wide variety of popularizing literature has appeared, often sponsored by the company itself. These publications usually provide a chronological overview of the company history, with a focus on the directors of the companies and the evolution of the fleet.¹³⁷ There are few academic studies, and there are none have

¹³⁶ By 1873 97% of the migrants arriving at New York did so by steam, three years later the last migrant transport by sailing ship was recorded.

¹³⁷ Just to quote a few (Barbance, 1955; De Boer, 1998; Dschaad, 1973, Finch, 1988; Guns, 2004; Miller, 1998; Offrey, 1994; Vervoort, 1999, Wentholt 1973)

analyzed the impact steamship liners had on the organization of the migrant business.¹³⁸ One notable exception is the work of Robin Bastin, yet the archives of the Cunard Line did not facilitate an in depth analysis. In particular the formation of shipping conferences and how they worked was not explored by Bastin (Bastin, 1971).¹³⁹ The work of Erick Murken dating back to 1922, remains the only study which tried to encompass the working of the various shipping conferences regulating the traffic of freight, cabin and steerage passengers, by using the minutes of the meetings (Murken, 1922). The focus however was on the negotiations of the agreements without looking at their impact on; the price of the crossing, the relationship between shipping companies and migrant brokers and agents, the further integration of the Atlantic transport network including inland transfer, their influence as a lobby-group on legislation and policies on both sides of the Atlantic, the means offered by these companies to circumvent restrictive regulations etc.

In this study, conference minutes will be reassessed by integrating the literature on shipping conferences and cartel formation and analyzing the extent to which they were successful in reducing competitive behavior in controlling the migrant market. The minutes complement the correspondence between the directors of the Holland America Line (HAL) running a service from Rotterdam to New York, and their head-agent at the port of arrival. The variety of correspondence with head agents, other companies, authorities etc. allow investigation as to how one of the most lucrative shipping businesses of the nineteenth century, was organized during the age of steam shipping. What follows is a reconstruction divided in two chronological parts, using 1896 as turning point. That year an agreement was signed between all important shipping lines operating on the North Atlantic route and the so-called new migrants surpassed the old-stock in numbers arriving in the US. Unfortunately, few documents relating to the first decade of the Dutch shipping line have been preserved. The company's general correspondence between New York and Rotterdam is available from 1884 onwards, while the collection of the correspondence regarding passage business is complete from

¹³⁸ (Boyce, 1995; Hyde, 1975 and 1978; Ottmuller-Weztel, 1986; Bastin, 1971; Flayhart, 2000 de Vannoise-Pochulu 1993; Armgort, 1992).

¹³⁹ Hyde's chapter on emigrant traffic through Liverpool is for the greater part based on Bastin's work.

1889. The minutes of the New York Continental Conference regulating the American market are available for the period 1885-1902. This conference was subordinate to a similar agreement managed by the directors of the companies in Europe which by 1892 formed evolved into a pool-agreement known as the North-Atlantische Dampfer-Linien Verband. Minutes of this conference are used to complete the analysis.

The main object of this study is the American market of ocean passages; hence the selling of prepaid and return tickets. This second part begins with a chapter on the foundation of the HAL, locating the importance of New York as a nodal point for the traffic and the relevance of the American market for the shipping companies. The second chapter is dedicated to the network of migrant brokers and agents, their function as go-betweens for shipping companies and migrants and responsibilities towards both. A third chapter analyzes the working of the conference agreements and their impact on the cost for the crossing reconstructing ocean price series for the members of the Continental Conference between 1885 and 1896. A fourth chapter takes a closer look at the increasing number of immigration laws enacted by the American authorities, the role of shipping companies in implementing and circumventing these, and the shipping lobby's attempts to impede migration and maritime policies which could hinder their business from being adopted.

Chapter I: The establishment of the Holland America Line: New York as a nodal point for the migrant trade.

1) The rise of Dutch passenger liners powered by steam

1.1)The transition from sail to steam and the formation of joint-stock companies with limited liability

As seen in the previous chapter the large sums of capital needed for steamship ventures caused many prospects to never make it beyond the planning stage. Even prior to the advent of steam, specialized shipowners who made making their living from managing and owning ships, had made their appearance. The traditional form of spreading the risk, by using a large investor base, and dividing the shares in 64 parts, was replaced by a limited number of financiers. But, steamships were more costly both to construct as to operate, and so the investor base had to be broadened again. Shipping

companies adopted the joint stock structures to facilitate the accumulation of the required capital. After the 1860s limited liability replaced private partnership allowing capital increases needed for the establishment of scheduled large scale steamship services. Yet as noted by some historians, the maritime world was slow to adopt the new legal structures, mistrusting the structures for encouraging opportunistic behavior. And, the entities that did adopt them usually consisted of private networks bound together by business or personal ties. Steamship entrepreneurs still heavily relied on personal contacts to gather capital and to obtain information concerning prospects of a venture (Boyce, 1995, 27-33).

As seen with the establishment of many companies during the 1840s finding capital outside the nucleus of merchant communities attached to one port was not in evidence. The Antwerp and Rotterdam prospects often turned to the German hinterland or the American foreland to find financiers, but these potential investors usually reacted with apprehension. The problems Mills had in gathering funds, despite the American mail subsidies, underline the importance of the reputation of the entrepreneur in gaining support from the merchant community. The ease with which the Belgian government obtained information on the trustworthiness of nationals or foreign entrepreneurs applying for subsidies through the consular network, indicate that this was readily available. Accumulating enough reputation to attract capital beyond the personal networks was a long process, yet it was a necessary one to expand the services to remain competitive in the liner business. The increasing migrant flow and promising business prospects stimulated steamship building and led to a boom of new companies during the early 1870s. Suddenly, the Netherlands, whose trade relations with the US had hit rock bottom found herself connected by two direct steamship lines to New York.

1.2) The steamship boom in the Low Countries early 1870s

In 1863, Belgium capitalized on the abolishment of the Sont, Belt and Stade tolls to obtain the free access of the Westerscheldt, Antwerp's gateway to the sea.¹⁴⁰ The

¹⁴⁰ The Dutch envoy in Washington reported on the lobbying efforts of his Belgian colleague in the American press and in Congress to obtain the support of the United States. He set up a campaign refuting the Belgian claims, by pointing to the differences between the Sont and Scheldt tolls. NA, 2.05.13, Gezantschap VS, Correspondence with MFA, Nr 28, June 23 1858.

burden on the Belgian government, in repaying the tolls levied on ships using Antwerp to safeguard its competitive position, had become unbearable with the increasing traffic. The free navigation of the Scheldt was bought dearly with the help of twenty seven other nations trading with Antwerp. The Dutch authorities received a lump sum of 36,278,560 francs (17,141,670 guilders) which was used to modernize the infrastructure to bring it on par with its neighbors (Hancke and Himler, 1993, Veraghtert, 1986, 73). The abolishment of the toll and the collapse of the colonial trade policies, enhanced rivalry with the Belgian port for the North Atlantic trade. The opening up of a steamship line to the US became one of the focal points of this competition. American shipping entrepreneurs tried exploiting the rivalry by juxtaposing the bids of both countries to obtain the best possible conditions.¹⁴¹ With the French-German war the trade activity in the Belgian and Dutch ports with the US intensified, stressing the urgent need of a steamship line.¹⁴² In the end Dutch merchants convinced by the high dividends paid out by German steamship companies took matters in their own hands.¹⁴³

Three projects were launched at the end of the 1860s, one to establish a line from Flushing, another from Amsterdam and finally a third one from Rotterdam. In 1869, Marin H. Jansen, an influential Dutch naval officer, published a pamphlet on his project to open a line between Flushing and Norfolk soliciting government subsidies.¹⁴⁴ Simultaneously, Amsterdam merchants circulated a pamphlet announcing that the Royal Netherlands Steamship Company (RNSC) would expand its Baltic and Mediterranean service with a line to New York combining freight, cabin and steerage passenger

¹⁴¹ For example Salem and Co a New York shipping company negotiated with the Belgian government to open a line between Antwerp and New York. The Dutch envoy in Washington tried to convince the entrepreneurs to use Flushing or Rotterdam instead. Through the American envoy in The Hague the company committed itself to use one of the Dutch ports on the following conditions: 1) that the Dutch government guaranteed an annual 5% interest on the invested capital 2) that they convinced other European governments to use this mail service. NA, 2.05.13, Gezantschap VS, Correspondence with MFA, Nr 36-37, August 11 1866 and January 24 1867.

¹⁴² The U.S.-mail service from Bremen and Hamburg with New York got suspended because of the hostilities. The American considered an alternative in the Low Countries, especially Antwerp. The Dutch envoy in Washington promoted Flushing as a worthy alternative to the American postmaster-general. The envoy stressed that Flushing offered a better alternative than Antwerp since it wasn't as tide sensitive. Yet the war did not last long enough for the service to move elsewhere. *Ibid.* Nr 40, August 8 and 17 1870.

¹⁴³ During the so called 'record years' 1860-1873 the German companies' returns on invested capital reached record heights of 20% in 1865 and 1866 (Heffer, 1986, 316-318).

¹⁴⁴ M.H. Jansens, *Een brug over den Oceaan*, (1869)

business.¹⁴⁵ That same year, Antoine Plate published an article in *De Economist* building further on his father's efforts to open a line from Rotterdam to New York (Plate, 1869, 558-571).¹⁴⁶ This literature reflects the increased activity of Dutch merchants to open a line, and the competition among each other to attract investors. Despite the support of the local merchant community for each project, raising capital remained very difficult. Unable to collect the funds needed for a service with four steamers, Plate set up a limited partnership with Otto Reuchlin in early 1871, by ordering two small steamers for the transport of goods and steerage passengers. Their decision was spurred by Jansen's bid for subsidies backed by five members of the Second Chamber and soon to be voted on in Parliament. The efforts of the Rotterdam merchants resulted in the refusal of the Dutch authorities to finance a company which could compromise the success of a similar non-subsidized enterprise. Plate and Reuchlin eliminated the Flushing competition but could not prevent that their Amsterdam rivals starting their New York service simultaneously. Yet the first two years trade on the North Atlantic boomed, allowing both companies to see good results. The initially successful sailings convinced investors and allowed both companies to expand. Plate, Reuchlin and Co restructured in a public limited company under the name Netherlands-American Steamship Company, popularly known as the Holland-America Line. Financing the project was made easier, as a result of the support of Louis Pincoffs and Martin Mees directors of the Rotterdam Trade Union and the Rotterdam Bank. It was not only members of the Rotterdam community who bought shares. The biggest shareholder was a Groningen entrepreneur, W. A. Scholten who invested 600,000 guilders in the project. The capital was increased from nine hundred thousand to two million guilders Van der Valk, 1976, 161-162; Zevenbergen, 1990, 39-40; De Boer, 1998, 10-19; Wentholt, 25-33 1973; Reuchlin, 1973, 68-72).

The company shared many the characteristics observed by Boyce of similar British enterprises. Something which was unique to liner companies was that a wealthy

¹⁴⁵ Plans of Amsterdam merchants were hindered because the ongoing works on the North Sea Canal blocked the access of big steamers to the port. Plans to start the service from Flushing and later move it to Amsterdam could not convince investors.

¹⁴⁶ His father F.J Plate was the initiator of the attempt in the early 1850's to open a line from Rotterdam (see part I chapter II). Plate senior also was appointed as member of the 'Control Commission of Emigration' established with the new migration laws early 1860's supervising the passage of migrants through Rotterdam and trying to revive the port as a migrant gateway through advertising campaigns in out-migration regions (Van der vank 159-161, Zevenbergen, 1990, 39).

businessman could be identified with the project. Also, just as British enterprises the founders had been shipping agents, in particular the Plate family had a long tradition as such. Furthermore, except for Scholten, the investors and initiators came from the same port community, which was quite homogeneous at the time. The company started as a partnership and later became a limited liability company. Compared with British enterprises, interests of ship builders in the company were initially weak. British shipyards had accumulated an important lead in steam-shipping construction. The HAL therefore relied on British shipyards to construct or refit their ships. With the importance of local networks for the formation of shipping liners British companies, had the advantage of developing stronger ties with national ship builders. Yet over the years relationships between HAL directors and British shipbuilders tightened and eventually played an important role in the further developments of the company. (De Nijs, 2001, 34-58; Boyce, 1995, 56-60). The quality of the management of a line was reflected by a strict regularity of service allowing cargo booking, stevedoring and bunkering to proceed smoothly, essential for the good reputation of the line; the success of which greatly depended on the ability to maximize capacity utilization and to minimize average total costs by attracting a consistent and balanced flow of cargo and passengers in both directions. Both cargo and passenger booking agents played a key role in securing a constant flow of passengers and goods (Boyce, 1995, 36).

The minutes of the company show that the associates debated as to whether to put the stress on transport of freight or on steerage passengers. The majority voted for the latter, which then triggered long discussions on the selection of a broker who regulated the migrant transport for the company. The question was whether to give the responsibility to a broker in Germany or in the Netherlands. Yet the associates feared being unable to find a broker in Germany who would commit to the exclusivity of sale for the company, something they considered to be crucial to bridge the backlog with their competitors in the initial years. They believed that a new firm lacked the means of being very competitive, while brokers who also worked for other companies usually booked for companies offering the best service and lowest price. Therefore the HAL directors came to an agreement with three of the most important Dutch migrant brokers whom formed the firm Van Es, Wambersie and Ruys to perform the service. They committed to

positioning agents in European out-migration regions to attract more migrants to the port in exchange for a fixed commission on each passenger booked. To ensure cargo for the westbound leg of the trip, the shipping company appointed Wambersie and Son as ship brokers.¹⁴⁷ John Wambersie, the former American consul and the most important migrant broker in Rotterdam from 1839, largely contributed to the establishment of the line which explained his prominent role in the company. Like many brokers at the time, he combined the sale of ocean passage with railroad passage, by representing the American Erie Railroad Company and receiving 12.5 percent commission on each ticket sold. His long state of service had allowed him to establish a wide network of contacts with migrant agents inland. Complementing this with the contacts of Van Es and Ruys had to enabled him to fill the steerage capacity of the HAL ships (Swierenga, 1994, 107,114-117 and Van der Valk 1976, 156-158).

The economic downturn which set in at the end of 1873 quickly tempered the optimism in steam shipping industries as the construction boom overreached itself. Many other companies had been founded simultaneously, like for example the Red Star Line (RSL) in neighboring Antwerp; which increased the pressure from competition in a falling market. Transport rates for passengers, and especially for freight, fell accordingly. The boom had created an overcapacity on the North Atlantic which would persist up to 1914 leading to intensifying competition and rate wars. British companies advertised crossings for as low as two pounds from Liverpool in 1875.¹⁴⁸ The Rotterdam-based company was immediately confronted with the fluctuating character of the migrant trade which depended on the activity on both sides of the Atlantic, making it very hard to predict the flow which was more unstable on the North Atlantic than on any other migrant route. Unlike the longer-established first-class liners carrying mail and cabin passengers, which were less sensitive to business cycles, the HAL had little in the way of alternative resources to fall back on (Aldcroft, 1974, 287 and Hyde, 1975, 62-68). The

¹⁴⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 9-2 Plate Reuchlin en co / notullen, vennootschap, vergaderingen. Minutes of the meeting of May 1871 and January 1872 and letters of Reuchlin to the stockholders March 27 and June 26 1872.

¹⁴⁸ Continental Lines followed suit with the HAPAG's prices dropping from 55 thalers midway 1873 to 45 and eventually 30 midway 1874 (Heffer, 1986, 319-320).

Dutch company suffered heavy losses between 1874 and 1876 forcing it to halve the capital to one million guilders.

The HAL decided to reorganize and it took the passenger business in Europe into own hands in 1877.¹⁴⁹ New migrant brokers and agents were approached to book directly through the company. One of the ventures involved in this was the firm Prins & Zwanenberg, in Groningen, which dominated the market in the northern parts of the country and attracted business from across the German border.¹⁵⁰ Prins & Zwanenberg also placed partners and representatives, such as Martin Prins son of the senior partner, among Dutch settlements in the US selling prepaid and railroad tickets. Through the American representatives, the firm expanded its activities to land speculating in frontier areas. With brochures and newspaper advertisements, the company tried to direct the migrants to the US and if possible to their lands (Gottheil, 1914, 59; Zevenbergen, 1990; De Boer 1998, Swierenga, 1994, 116-117). Prins & Zwanenberg illustrate the transatlantic dimensions of the migrant trade and that the activities of migrant brokers and agents reached much further than the mere selling of transport tickets- which will be discussed in the next chapter. It reflects the growing importance of the foreland for the migrant transport market which all came together in New York.

2) Where all passenger liners meet: New York as ‘the’ nodal point for the migrant traffic

2.1) The American foreland and migrant transport

Recent studies on port history have stressed the fact that ports do not stand alone but instead have to be studied as nodal points between the hinterland and the foreland. During the first global century, competition between ports intensified making this an inevitable feature of port studies (Loyen, 2003, 3-6). As David Williams put it:

“Competition between ports is very much a matter of dock facilities and hinterland networks. Discussion has focused on these, yet a feature yet to be

¹⁴⁹ The three migrant brokers had always worked for various lines. It remains unclear whether they were forced to give up the agencies of the other lines yet it seems improbable that they never did.

¹⁵⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 18, Correspondence Scholten, Letter of Van der Hoeven to Scholten January 31 1877.

explored is that of how ports promoted themselves through advertising, publicity and public relations.”¹⁵¹

In the first section the role of the government in promoting ports as migrant gateways and nodal points for the North Atlantic traffic has been touched on; illustrating the importance of the diplomatic corps during the first half of the nineteenth century in advertising ports abroad. With the transition from sail to steam, and the subsequent concentration of the migrant transport business in the hands of one or a limited number of steamship companies in European ports, a shift from port to company competition took place (Feys, 2007, 27-47). As will be discussed in the following chapters the HAL-company agents took over the efforts of consuls abroad to attract the migrant flow to Rotterdam. In doing so, promoting the good reputation of Rotterdam as a migrant gateway became more and more associated with services offered by the HAL. Migrants no longer migrated through a port but also with a specific company whose reputation often reflected that of the harbor. The brand of Rotterdam as migrant gateway was used and eventually taken over by the HAL.

However, the main focus remains the connections between maritime and migration networks expanding from ports. As illustrated by Gordon Boyce, the growth of shipping companies during the long nineteenth century greatly depended on networking activities through agents, brokers and conferences (Boyce, 1995 and Williams, 2003, 15). In this study, dock facilities and port infrastructure receive little attention while hinterland networks are only briefly touched on. The influence emanating from the foreland on this Atlantic trade, barely explored by maritime historians, constitutes the main subject of analysis. The particular nature of migrant transport business shaped by chain migration patterns based on a vast agent-network spreading on both sides of the Atlantic created market specific features turning the foreland into a very important catalyst for passenger liners.

On one hand, according to estimates thirty to fifty percent of the market of third-class westbound ocean passage was sold in the US through prepaid tickets.¹⁵² On the

¹⁵¹ David M. Williams, “Recent Trends in Maritime and Port History,” in Reginald Loyen, *et al.* (eds.), *Struggling for Leadership: Antwerp-Rotterdam Port Competition between 1870-2000* (Leuven, 2003), p. 18.

¹⁵² Muken estimated the share of prepaids in the total sales to amount to anywhere between 25 and 35% which is corroborated by the data collected by the Dillingham commission for the period 1908-1910.

other hand, steam shipping stimulated return migration amounting to thirty percent of the westbound movement by the turn of the century, developing into an important source of revenue on the North Atlantic. These figures reflect the direct impact of these markets. Yet as estimated by Gustav Schwab, New York head-agent of the NGL, when adding the indirect business caused by the sale of prepaid tickets, the market was responsible for at least 60 percent of the arrivals:

“The ticket is sent to John Smith to some village of Germany, and the whole village knows that he has a ticket from his brother to come over; that he is working on a farm, not subject to military duty, paying very little taxes, and generally believing that he is in a pretty good country and would like his brother to come. His brother tells all his friends and neighbors, and brings with him, two, three, or four men to this country they heard of. So this prepaid business is of immense importance.”¹⁵³

Information flows traveling back to Europe, on how and with what company to move, via mail and returnees increased the importance of the company’s reputation in the US. Also, with immigrant legislation falling under federal jurisdiction, pressures on the American government to restrict the movement increased. Shipping companies paid close attention to American migration and maritime policies and tried to prevent these from compromising their business. New York, by attracting the large majority of the new arrivals during the steamship era, developed into the biggest migrant hub worldwide where migrant transport business thrived.

2.2) The Big ‘Migrant’ Apple

Whereas the competition for the trade in Europe resulted in the development of various important migration ports, on the other side of the Atlantic New York succeeded in monopolizing the trade. With its superior connections to the hinterland and its control as financial capital over eastbound trades, the port outrivaled Atlantic competitors.

There are great variations however depending on origins. Jews for instance had very percentages. The info collected by Scandinavian researchers for the period 1882-94. Figures of the Allan Line indicate that 57,6% traveled on prepaids in 1882, while the American Line and National line exceeded that figure. In 1892 the figure increased to 73,9%. The combined average of British lines for that year amounted to 47% prepaid’s (Lovoll, 1993, 56).

¹⁵³ Testimony of Gustav Schwab during the hearings before the industrial commission in New York July 25 1899 quoted in C. Erickson, 1976, 232.

During the 1860s, federal banking laws turned New York into the country's banking centre allowing the port to consolidate its commercial dominance. The National Currency Act designated the city as 'Central Reserve City' further stimulating money from the country to flow towards New York (Born, 1977, 92-93). In the other direction migrants continued to spread nationwide from the port. As the migrant trade gained importance the city invested in infrastructure assuring a smooth transition of new arrivals.

Just as had occurred in Europe, port and state authorities did not want to impose too many regulations on incoming ships to prevent them from diverting to rivals. Yet with the competition for the trade, the reputation of the port of arrival became equally important as that of the port of embarkation. This stimulated authorities to pass measures to protect migrants from abuses, with New York taking a leading role. In 1847, immigration matters were placed under the special authority of Commissioners of Immigration, including the mayors of Brooklyn and New York, and including members of the Irish and German organizations. Their activity resulted in new landing station at Staten Island which was made up of hospitals, information centers, complaint bureaus and culminated with the opening of Castle Garden in 1855. This predecessor to Ellis Island seriously reduced the activity of swindlers making a living off the naivety of new arrivals. The landing station served as an information center, coordinated inland travel, offered cheap food and lodging until departure, provided currency exchange services, and housed a labor exchange office arranging immediate employment, etc. (Erickson, 1976, 270-272). At times, the reputation of Castle Garden suffered from misuse of authority by officials working at the landing station, yet the institution further contributed to attracting 85% of the total arrivals at Atlantic ports by 1860.

The next decade in the transition from sail to steam New York's secured its preeminence. Controlling the migrant trade contributed to the general development of the port and allowed New York to maintain its edge on Baltimore, Philadelphia and Boston. The major passenger liners involved in the migrant trade gave direct first class steam connections to Europe, which greatly contributed to New York's supremacy (Heffer, 1986, 156-173).¹⁵⁴ Various efforts by Baltimore, Boston and Philadelphia, to divert part

¹⁵⁴ New York obtained this hegemony of steam by the 1860 and maintained it up to 1914. In 1890 twenty nine steam-shipping companies transported migrants and passengers from Europe to New York.

of the migrant flow, had very limited success.¹⁵⁵ Up to 1914, New York's share of the migrant flow hung around 85% with some peaks of 95%.¹⁵⁶ Because of the unfavorable shipping legislation the trade, with the exception of the Philadelphia-based American Line, was left entirely in the hands of foreign companies (Flayhart, 2000; Safford, 1985). Whereas in 1862 still 82% of the migrants leaving from Liverpool boarded American ships, five years later British ships transported 80% of the trade. New York was the place where all these foreign lines, with head-quarters spread around Europe, met through their branch offices often located on Broadway. It turned the port not only into the nodal point of the American passenger market but also into the center for obtaining information on rival shipping companies (Bastin, 1971, 29).

2.3) The opening of the Holland America Line's head-agency in New York

Antoine Plate crossed the Atlantic in the summer of 1871 to secure dock space in New York and appoint an agency coordinating the business on the spot.¹⁵⁷ He contracted the Dutch consul of the city who ran a shipping agency Burlange and Company, to represent the Rotterdam line in New York.¹⁵⁸ The company had a lot of experience with trade from New York to Dutch and Belgian ports. Plate believed that Burlange's position added prestige to the line and would help him to establish contacts in the US.¹⁵⁹ He also concluded an agreement with Funch and Edye to act as ship brokers. Contacts in New York also stressed the importance of scrupulous regularity of sailings occurring best on fixed days rather than fixed dates, being much easier to remember. Similar to other companies, the names of the ships needed a special characteristic to impress the company

Boston only numbered six such services that same year while Philadelphia counted four and Baltimore only two.

¹⁵⁵ The Pennsylvania Railroad Company founded both the Red Star Line and the American Line in an effort to divert part of the traffic from New York to Philadelphia during the 1870's but eventually had to divert most of its activities to New York. For the same reasons the Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company offered many facilities to steamship lines to attract them to Baltimore. Of all rivals Boston managed maintain various passenger lines throughout the period yet the port remained a very distant second.

¹⁵⁶ According to Swierenga New York attracted 76% of the total migration in 1888 and after the opening of Ellis Island in 1892 the share would even have surpassed the 95% mark (Swierenga, 1994, 120).

¹⁵⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 9-2, Letter July 22 1871.

¹⁵⁸ R.C. Burlange was consul of New York from 1855 to 1881 (Krabbendam, 2005, 167-181).

¹⁵⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt Archief, 9-2, Letter of Reuchlin to the stockholders November 14 1871.

name in the memory of people, with suggestions of names of Dutch towns, ending with –zee, –dyk or –dam.¹⁶⁰ The popularity of the line often depended on superficial issues, the hence the serving of steerage passengers with a decent pint of Claret on Sundays, could make a difference, according to the contacts. Furthermore, passenger lists needed to arrive prior to the ship, allowing the company agent to answer inquiries about people expected to arrive. In case of accidents the agents needed the powers to act quickly because newspapers could make or break a line by reporting on the poor treatment of customers. Finally, an absolute necessity was the appointment of a Dutch official at Castle Garden.¹⁶¹

Plate listened to advice given, choosing Saturday to sail out from Rotterdam, using ship names ending with –dam, giving the agent the required responsibilities and making a priority of appointing someone at Castle Garden. The advice reflects the importance of the reputation of a line and the impact the popular press had on it. John Wambersie advised the appointment of a passage agent in the US referring to the important revenues German companies retrieved from the business of prepaid tickets.¹⁶² Yet, during the early years the activities in New York were limited to securing cargo for the eastbound trip. The appointment of R. Burlange, as head-agent, was short-lived and he was replaced by Cazaux van Staphorst during the transition into a public limited company.¹⁶³ The tasks of van Staphorst, as described in the contract, focused on establishing contacts with export and import houses, supervising ships arriving in New York and the activities of Funch & Edye. He received a salary of 10,000 guilders and had to commit to not getting involved in other commercial activities.¹⁶⁴ Eventually the

¹⁶⁰ The company named all of its ships with town names ending on –dam except two of the first ships one called after the main investor, W.A. Scholten and the other after the engineer in charge of the modernization of the port P. Caland. When later passenger ships were complemented with freight ships, they were given town names ending on –dyk to differentiate both services.

¹⁶¹ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 6 Stoomvaart Amerika 1850, Anonymous letter sin data.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 9-2 Letters of Reuchlin to the stockholders March 27 and June 26 1872.

¹⁶³ The company clearly recruited its representatives overseas among the Dutch community. During the 18th century the brothers Nicolas and Jan van Staphorst established one of the pioneering migrant broker firms in Rotterdam. Possibly these were ancestors of C. van Staphorst which would underline the durability of commercial connections on certain trade routes often strengthened through family ties (Risch, 1939, 241).

¹⁶⁴ The contract with Cazaux van Staphorst stipulated that he was not allowed to engage in any other business activities. It seems likely that R. Burlange was not prepared to give up his other shipping activities to Dutch and Belgian ports while the HAL-directors may have feared a conflict of interest, explaining the exclusivity contract with van Staphorst. GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt Archief, 44,

company appointed a specialized passenger agency, L.W Morris & Co to sell third-class and cabin berths for the company in the US.¹⁶⁵ The company operated as it had in Europe, on a commission base per passage sold through a wide agency-network which it managed. Every little piece of business was welcome during the crisis of the 1870s especially for the young companies established during the steam shipping boom. Some were short-lived, such as the Hamburg based Adler Line taken over by the Hamburg America Line or the Norse American Line which left the North-Atlantic to never return (Heffer, 1986, 309 and Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 146-149).¹⁶⁶ The Holland America Line struggled just as its newly founded competitors did in Amsterdam and Antwerp.

2.4) The internal rivalry between the ‘Dam’ ports

Internationally the eyes of Rotterdam merchants were focused on Antwerp as the main rival for the North Atlantic trade. However, the internal rivalry between Rotterdam and Amsterdam weighed heavily on the operations of the Holland America Line. The early success of the Royal Netherlands Steamship Company convinced the directors to invest in big first-class steamers with a price tag of one million guilders each. By the time they were launched, the market had completely collapsed. The company used the ships for the Far East trade before being laid up, in 1876, for lack of returns. Three years later the CGT bought the vessels for a trifle just as the North Atlantic market picked up again. The HAL started to make profits after several meager years, while Amsterdam merchants soon regretted the selling of both ships. The Dutch Trade Company of Amsterdam negotiated with the HAL to split their service between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The

Correspondence with head-agent in New York, H. Cazaux van Staphorst 1874-84, Contract between Cazaux and NASM 1874.

¹⁶⁵ Whether this agency in New York had any relation with the homonymous agency in Hamburg where Albert Ballin started off his career following in his fathers' footsteps could not be established (Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 14).

¹⁶⁶ The 'Transatlantischen Dampfschiffahrts Gesellschaft' better known as the Adler Line was founded in 1872. Investors generously financed the project building ships to provide a weekly service. The company tried to convince the directors of the Hamburg America Line to collaborate yet the latter was not prepared to allow a competitor to penetrate its market in the home port without putting up fight. The collapsed market and the competition of the Hamburg America Line cutting its prices by half forced the company to back down. HAPAG took over the seven ships and docking space of the company in 1875. The Norwegian American Line started a service for Norwegian migrants in 1871 yet with the collapse of the market it diverted its ships on European routes (Heffer, 1986, 309 and Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 146-149).

HAL directors did not oppose the idea in the long run but refused to divide the fleet before being able to offer a weekly service between Rotterdam and New York (De Boer, 1998, 10-20). Offended by the refusal, the Amsterdam merchant community decided to reopen the RNSC service to New York with chartered ships, increasing the rivalry between the two.

Scholten strongly criticized the decision of the HAL-directors, accusing them of sacrificing the interests of the stockholders to benefit of the city of Rotterdam. He blamed the pride and jealousy of Rotterdam merchants towards Amsterdam businessmen for bringing a fierce competitor in the trade, which once the passenger flow dropped again could cause the downfall of the company.¹⁶⁷ The directors vigorously defended their decision, stating that in the interest of the stability and viability of the firm, ships had to leave from one port. All other steamship lines limited themselves to one port, except the two biggest ones whose fleet outgrew the business of the homeport. That this port, with its unique connection to the German hinterland, should be Rotterdam was obvious to anyone who was familiar with steam shipping to the US. Moreover, the board of directors pointed out to Scholten that Antwerp was a much bigger and dangerous competitor to Amsterdam. Every week, three big steamers left the Belgian port for the US which was a lot more important than a small three weekly service from Amsterdam. Furthermore, they argued that if there had been good prospects for a line from Amsterdam the KNSM would not have sold their ships at a third of the construction price the year before. The directors blamed the Amsterdam-based company for a lack of collaboration during the 1870s. The RNSC had neglected the advice against the construction of first-class steamers, at a time when the HAL was constrained to sell their own ships under construction as a result of lack of trade. The directors had passed on a lot of valuable information and had even drawn up a scheme for collaboration and common management, which was totally ignored by the Amsterdam-based company. They concluded that if there was an issue of jealousy, it could only come from the capital.¹⁶⁸ The reply reflects that the decision was based on a sound business strategy, yet the

¹⁶⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 18 Correspondence Scholten, Letter to the board of directors May 2 1881.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.* Letter of the board of directors to Scholten, May 4 1881.

undertone clearly indicates the tensions between the Amsterdam and Rotterdam merchant communities.

These tensions increased as it became clear that the HAL managers seriously underestimated the potential of the RNSC. The three weekly service became weekly as three chartered ships joined the line. By the end of 1881, the company transported 10,000 passengers to New York- as opposed to HAL's 16,000. An extraordinary meeting was called with the stockholders discussing the measures to be taken against the competition of the RNSC. The company was also confronted with another problem, namely the silting up of the *Nieuwe Waterweg* hindering the ships' access to the sea. The stockholders approved the opening of a competitive service from Amsterdam with the two biggest ships, keeping the other four in Rotterdam. The RNSC reacted by chartering two more ships. Over the period of one year, Amsterdam went from zero to eight steamships going to New York. In 1882 the RNSC carried 15,000 passengers across the Atlantic closing the gap on the HAL with 18,000 passengers. The spectacular boom of migrant traffic through Amsterdam confirms the importance of the migrant-agent activity in directing migrants to certain ports; superior access routes to out-migration regions were of secondary importance.

The battle between the Dutch ports was also fought across the Atlantic. The Dutch emissaries of Washington and New York reported on smear campaigns in the American press against the Dutch lines. The increased competition between steam shipping companies for the migrant trade was put forward as main reason for this development, German lines, in particular, were suspected of trying to divert the migrant flow to their ports. Yet, after the sinking of the *Edam* the envoy investigated one of these campaigns and traced it to de Toelaer, the head-agent if the RNSC. The Dutch envoy in Washington organized an advertising campaign in the American press, refuting the adverse publicity on both ports.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ The correspondence dates back to the second half of 1882 after the passage of new American laws regarding migrant transport. Controls on ships increased and quite a few ships were fined for not applying to the rules. Some companies as the RNSC questioned the American jurisdiction asking the envoy to intervene. With the increased controls a growing number of stories on abuses on board of ships, trustworthy or not, leaked to the press. This was the case for instance for the *Nemsis* of the RNSC mistakenly labeled as 'Floating Coffin' also by the 'New York Herald'. The articles of Toelaer against the HAL appeared in the 'Scientific Times'. The envoy stressed that the article did not reflect in any way the American public opinion about the line, but that it was considered as an envious deed from one Dutch

In the competition with the Amsterdam Line in New York, the HAL had a particular source of information on the movements of its rival. At the end of 1880, the Amsterdam merchants had contacted Funch & Edye to act as ship brokers for the Amsterdam Line which at the time was expected to only transport freight. Not wanting to damage the relations with the HAL, Funch & Edye asked van Staphorst to inform on possible objections from the board of directors to do so. They claimed that by accepting to act as ship brokers for the freight business of the Amsterdam Line, it would allow the HAL to gain control over its rival. Van Staphorst disagreed, fearing that the RNSC would take advantage of the many years of expertise that the agency had acquired on the Dutch-American trade while doing business for the HAL. Moreover, it gave the Amsterdam Line the opportunity to send over an agent who van Staphorst would be unable to refuse from taking office in their buildings. The Amsterdam Line risked getting access to HAL files revealing the true inwardness of the Rotterdam line. The HAL shipping agent deplored the fact that they had allowed the Antwerp based White Cross line to do so, but stressed that there was still a big difference between Antwerp and Amsterdam.

Van Staphorst stated that he had always praised Edye for the great impartiality with which the ship broker managed to keep the interests of the Antwerp and Rotterdam apart, however this would be impossible between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The board of directors did not share the opinion of the New York shipping agent giving their go-ahead for a trial period on the condition that Funch & Edye divided the commission. Van Staphorst insisted on the risks of such enterprise. The ship broker would do its utmost to make the business to Amsterdam work. He pointed to the contract between HAPAG and Funch & Edye, committing not to serve any other steamship line from or to Hamburg. Their appointment by the German company in 1875 was mainly to keep them out of the hands of possible competitors.¹⁷⁰ Van Staphorst advised following this example, but to no

Company against the other. The consul added that because of the freedom of press all sorts of things were regularly published and the public does not attach the same importance as in Europe to what appears in the press. NA, 2.05.13, Gezantschap Washington, Nr 1158 overtreding van Am wetten bij het vervoer van Ne lv naar de VS 1882.

¹⁷⁰ The date of the contract between Funch & Edye and the HAPAG may indicate that the ship brokers worked for the Adler Line. Probably once HAPAG took over its rival it signed a contract of exclusivity with the ship brokers to avoid another competitor to benefit from their expertise.

avail.¹⁷¹ A good year into the agreement the shipping agent reported that the situation had become unsustainable. He accused Funch & Edey of frequently sacrificing the interests of the company to the benefit of the RNSC. To date this had been tolerated, but with the opening of the HAL-service from Amsterdam van Staphorst urged to force the ship brokers to stop doing business with the Amsterdam Line, even if this open act of hostility towards RNSC further fueled the rivalry.¹⁷² It remains unclear as to whether the directors followed the advice from New York. In 1882, the competition intensified and the silting up of Rotterdam's access to the sea persisted driving the company to come to terms with the Amsterdam merchant community. Early in 1883 both companies reached an agreement. HAL committed to taking over the RNSC's service to New York, guaranteeing that the same number of sailings would leave from Amsterdam as from Rotterdam during the next ten years (De Boer, 1998, 18).

The strategy chosen by the HAL-directors in competition with the RNSC allowing Funch & Edey to trade for the rival, illustrates the importance of the relationships between ship broker, shipping agents and ship owners. One's position in these networks was based on accumulated reputation, which reflected opportunistic behavior. According to the principal-agent theory, in a world of uncertainty and asymmetric information, the principal partly depended on an agent for information gathering and decision-making. In a business where trust and reputation defined the relationship between the actors, the ability of ship owners in judging opportunistic behavior of agents and brokers played a key role for the success of the company. Expanding networks to increase the information flows on business opportunities and its actors allowed owners to make the decisions on which the course of growth of the enterprise depended. The company relied on the importance of reputation restricting the opportunistic behavior of Funch & Edey. Through the ship broker the directors gained access to inside information on the rival's business and even shared in the profits of their competitor. This compensated for; possible inside information going the other way; for the fact that the rival profited from the trade specific expertise of the broker accumulated while doing business with the HAL, and for the risk of losing the ship broker's favor to a

¹⁷¹ GAR,HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 44, Correspondence with H Cazaux van Staphorst 1874-84, correspondence with board of directors November 22 and 24 1880.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, Letters November 22 1880 and March 3 1882.

rival company if business opportunities revealed very promising. In the shipping world, ship brokers and shipping agents often climbed the ladder, in becoming shipowners, by accumulating knowledge and reputation. Sometimes the information acquired information on a business route incited them to compete directly with their former employers (Boyce, 1995, 45-73).

In the run up to 1914, the levels of doubt rose, as to the efficiency of Funch & Edey as ship brokers, in several instances. Yet, the HAL never seriously considered engaging another ship broker. The main reason not to change was the growing competition for freight traffic between American Atlantic and Dutch ports. These competitors specialized in freight, putting a serious challenge to the HAL in combining passenger and freight transport, and hence being less flexible. At the turn of the century, the company decided to diversify to meet the keen competition. They launched a freight service with the so called –dyk ships. Breaking relations with Funch & Edey could have driven the ship brokers to existing competitors, or could have led to the establishment of another competing line. With their expertise built up over the years working for HAL, the ship brokers represented a serious threat. Passenger liners not only ran this risk with their cargo business but also with the passenger business which they entrusted into the hands of passenger brokers- this will be discussed in the following chapter. With the Amsterdam competition finally neutralized, the efforts could now be centered on Antwerp, which had developed as a serious contender.

3) Red Star Line: ‘Belgian Royal and United States Mail Steamships sailing every Saturday between New York and Antwerp’¹⁷³

3.1) Antwerp’s decline and new legislation

After reaching a peak of 25,719 migrants transported directly from Antwerp to the New World in 1854, the flow gradually declined. The failure to establish a direct steamship line initiated the downfall which accelerated as the transition from sail to steam took place. By 1871, direct migration had come to a complete standstill. Antwerp

¹⁷³ This is how the company named itself in advertising pamphlets of 1886 and 1890 (Vervoort, 1999, 6 and 47).

became a mere transit port providing migrants to British ports through feeder services (Broeze, 1994; Stevens, 1998, Veraghtert, 1977). The Belgian authorities renewed their efforts to attract the migrant traffic hoping to redress the situation. It appointed a special commission to investigate means to revive the migrant trade and to adapt the outdated legislation regarding migrant transport.¹⁷⁴

As the authorities stressed the laws had no intention of impeding the flow, on the contrary they were hoped to contribute to the development of the traffic reconciling business interests with public order and humanity. The commission used the laws of the neighboring countries as an example of adapting the regulations to the changed conditions of migrant transport under steam. In particular, the lack of laws controlling the honesty, morality and solvency of migration agencies received a lot of attention (Spelkens, 1976, 93). France, Germany and the Netherlands had increased their control on these agencies; the first two concessions were given to nationals only (see chapter II). Especially in Germany, this was increasingly used to direct nationals to German ports. Early 1870s, agents doing business with Henri Strauss, Antwerp's main migrant broker, were forced to give up their business relations if they wanted to retain their migrant concession (Spelkens, 1976, 94-98).¹⁷⁵ Belgian authorities did not impose citizen restrictions, since most of the migrant business was in the hands of merchants with German roots. Yet the law of 1876 stated that shipping agencies and their agents wishing to engage in the migrant trade now had to apply for a concession at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which needed to be renewed on a yearly basis. Shipping agencies needed to pay a deposit anywhere between 20,000 to 40,000 francs.

Other measures protected the migrant in case the shipping agencies did not carry out the obligations as stipulated in the contract. Violations observed by the Maritime

¹⁷⁴ Another event influencing the decision to revise the regulation was the scandal regarding the *Giuseppe Baccarich* arriving in New York with 18 deceased in June 1867. The matter received wide coverage in the American and German press blaming the Antwerp migrant broker A. Strauss for providing inadequate food provisions and transport conditions for the crossing. The Belgian authorities leading a special investigation in the matter strongly refuted the accusations. The New York consul vigorously defended the name of Antwerp as migrant gateway. The Belgian authorities considered the smear campaign as yet another attempt of the German ports to divert the flow (Feys, 2003, 133-137 and Spelkens, 1976, 87-89).

¹⁷⁵ Henri was the son of Adolphe Strauss one of the pioneering migrants agents of Antwerp. Abuses committed by Strauss were largely exaggerated in the German and American press, yet the claims were not totally unfounded. Even in Antwerp the firm built up a dubious reputation (Feys, 2003 and Spelkens, 1976, 97).

Commissioners in Antwerp or by consuls abroad were punishable by fine. The legislation obligated migrant agents to welcome their clients upon arrival at the railroad stations, guiding them to the lodging houses and taking care of their luggage. These local agents needed to obtain permission from the Communal Administration of Antwerp in granting access to the railroad station, and it was decreed that they worked for a recognized shipping agency. With these regulations the authorities hoped to put an end to the activities of the numerous runners at the port living off the naivety of migrants (Spelkens, 1976, 94-96).

But, what Antwerp really needed to revive, in terms of the migrant traffic, were direct steamship lines to the US. On September 9th 1870 the Belgian parliament passed a law granting a mail subsidy of minimum 300,000 francs to any line providing a direct steam connection to the US. During the following summer, due to the lack of response, the sum was raised to 500,000 and there was an exemption made of beacon and pilotage dues.¹⁷⁶ When American representatives proposed a project, backed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company the authorities quickly came to an agreement.

3.2) The Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the International Navigation Company

The failure of the Société belge des bateaux à vapeur transatlantique and its sister company for a service to South America financed by the same Antwerp merchant group, made financiers reluctant to invest in a steamship line to US. The Belgian government abandoned its hopes to launch a national fleet with domestic capital, stopping the practice of direct subsidies and interest guarantees. Instead, the government tried to lure foreign lines to Antwerp by offering lucrative mail contracts to companies using the port. The lack of services to the US constituted the biggest drawback for Antwerp's commercial development and remained an absolute priority for the authorities (Devos, 1988, 81-97; Veraghtert, 1986 72-84) The Belgian policies stimulating the trade through Antwerp did not go unnoticed abroad, especially in the US where plans were elaborated to revive the merchant marine. The rebirth of the American merchant marine after the Civil War

¹⁷⁶ BGRA 4054, House of Representatives, Session 252, July 5 1887.

centered on the West leaving the North Atlantic maritime route in European hands (Ville, 1990).

However, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company (PRR) constituted an exception, launching an initiative to regain a prominent position on that route. The directors of the railroad company shared the view, common among contemporaries, which considered maritime lines as being natural extensions of their services. By opening a steamship line to the European continent, the Philadelphia based company wanted to divert part of the North Atlantic traffic dominated by New York to Pennsylvania. The New York Central Railroad one of the PRR's greatest rivals made big profits from the transport of migrants to and from the American hinterland. The Pennsylvanian company wanted to get their hands on this lucrative business by founding a passenger liner. The battle for the migrant clearly did not only limit itself to ocean but also to railroad transport. Philadelphia was not only lagging on New York, but also behind Boston, which with the Cunard service had a first-class steam connection from the beginnings of transatlantic steamshipping while the strong trade relation between Bremen and Baltimore stimulated the North German Lloyd to open a service in 1867.

The PRR first tried to take over the Anchor Line, one of the pioneers in migrant transport by steam running a service between Glasgow and New York. When the attempt failed, the directors decided to provide substantial financial backing for an American-flag steamship line. The PRR bought an important part of the shares and gave a guarantee of interest on invested capital, which immediately attracted active support of the local merchant community to found the American Steamship Company of Philadelphia- also known as the American Line. The PRR also supported another venture, the International Navigation Company (INC) launched by some entrepreneurs doubting the success of a line under the American flag. Vessels built in American shipyards cost approximately 30% more than those built in Europe which, combined with the high wages of national crews, constituted important surcharges for the right to fly the Stars and Stripes.¹⁷⁷ The shipbrokers Peter Wright and Sons, chief initiators of this project, wanted to operate a line under a foreign flag. Peter Wright's close ties with the well respected firms

¹⁷⁷ Finch calculated that the salaries of British crews were half that of their American counterparts. This difference added to the higher cost of coals, supplies and insurance in America amounted to 50,000 dollars extra costs per ship per year (Finch, 1988, 35).

Richardson, Spence & Company in Liverpool and vander Becke & Marsily in Antwerp influenced his preferences for European terminals. Since the American Line had opened a service to Liverpool, Antwerp became the first choice for the INC. Aware of the favorable predisposition of the Belgian government to support steamship connections Wright sent Clement Griscom to negotiate the best possible conditions. Wright also convinced the Belgian envoy in Washington of the great potential of a steamship line connecting the PRR and Belgian railroad network on the migrant traffic.¹⁷⁸

The envoy supported the American bid that had to rival with the North German Lloyd. The German company proposed letting some of their ships, which would remain under the German flag, call at Antwerp guaranteeing a two weekly service to New York. Griscom, however, had far fewer demands and offered a lot more advantages.¹⁷⁹ He quickly reached an agreement with the Belgian authorities. The government granted; a yearly subsidy of \$100,000 for postal services; free wharfage at Antwerp; exemption from beacon and pilotage dues; Belgian train stations would serve as selling points for ocean passage free of charge; and a rebate on Belgian coal used by the company.¹⁸⁰ In return, Griscom conceded to splitting the service between Philadelphia and New York.¹⁸¹ In order to facilitate Griscom's negotiation position to obtain a similar subsidy from the American authorities, the Belgian government agreed to adapt the contract to the needs, even allowing a stopover at an English port.¹⁸² Delfosse, the Belgian envoy in Washington supported Griscom and worked on a new favorable postal agreement between both countries.¹⁸³ The consular corps also promoted the line and reported that the American owners had organized huge propaganda campaigns to make the line known to the public.¹⁸⁴ With the Société Anonyme de Navigation Belge Américaine known as the Red Star Line (RSL) Antwerp finally had its long awaited regular steamship connection to the US (Flayhart, 1998, 129-137 and 2000, 79-85 and Finch, 1988, 33-37).

¹⁷⁸ BGRA, 4055, Letter of Wright to Delfosse, envoy at Washington, September 17 1871.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 4056, Letter of MFA to Minister of Finance April 4 1873.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Agreement between INC and Belgian government s.d.

¹⁸¹ Apart from the government support Griscom did not seek any capital in Belgium. The INC held nearly all the shares except an insignificant number bought by von der Becke and Marsily (Finch, 1988, 23).

¹⁸² BGRA, T 074, Ministry of Finance, 351, correspondence between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Works, January 19 until February 2 1872.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 4056, Delfosse to MFA August 14 1873.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.* report 1877.

Early in 1873, the RSL started its service with the *Vaderland*, was built just as two other sister ships, to carry 800 steerage and 70 cabin passengers each. The company engaged Strauss and sons as migrant brokers. Like all other newly established steamshipping companies it had difficulties to remain afloat during the subsequent crisis. Two smaller companies preceded the RSL in providing migrants a steamship connection to the US increasing the competition during the first decade of operations. Daniel Steinman, one of Antwerp's main shippers and migrant brokers during the sailing ship area started organizing migrant transports with chartered steam vessels to New York.¹⁸⁵ With the booming migrant business in the early 1870s, the Engels Line trading with South-America and India temporarily diverted its steamship to the North Atlantic. Both companies joined forces in 1879 to provide a regular service under the name of White Cross Line (WCL). With the absence of a steamship connection during the ascendancy of steam in the 1860s a well established British feeder service positioned itself in Antwerp. Especially the Inman Line attracted continental migrants from the Belgian port. Besides the internal competition, the newly established companies in rival ports such as the HAL and RNSC did not facilitate the market entry of RSL.

Yet, despite the depressed business conditions and the keen competition the company produced encouraging results. The American Line on the other hand accumulated losses. Dissatisfied with the management of the Liverpool Line the PRR board reorganized the company entrusting the responsibility for operating the American ships to Peter Wright and Sons in 1874. The combination allowed cutting costs and running ships on a complementary service¹⁸⁶. The anticipated postal subsidies from the federal government, after year long lobbying efforts in Congress, fizzled out. Missing out on a unique opportunity of selling the ships to the Russian navy was the ultimate defeat for the PRR board, refusing to give any additional assistance to the loss-making American Line. By 1884, the company was forced to wind up the affairs. On the insistence, and with financial support of the PRR, the International Navigation Company

¹⁸⁵ Steinmann repeatedly complained about the unfair competition of its subsidized rival. When during the economic crisis the RSL could not meet the requirements of the postal contract Steinmann did not hesitate to agitate against the line in the Belgian press to take over the mail contract. *Ibid.*, 4056 and 4057.

¹⁸⁶ The International Navigation company also operated two ships on the Liverpool route under British flag. The four ships of the American Line allowed running a weekly service between Philadelphia and Liverpool (Flayhart, 2000, 41).

took over the American Line which continued to sail as a wholly owned subsidiary of the INC. This laid the foundation for a concern which gradually sought to expand its share of the North Atlantic trade and eventually resulted in the biggest merger in shipping history.

4) Conclusion

The establishment of the Holland America Line confirms the findings of previous research on the changes in legal structures of shipping companies with the transition from sail to steam. Resulting from the initiative of local shipping agents, the HAL started as a partnership evolving into a limited liability company as a result of the support of the Rotterdam merchant community. The founders relied on Scholten as main financier of the project. The company appointed local brokers responsible for cargo, and others for passengers, on both sides of the Atlantic to fill vessels. The brokers were used by the company to expand their networks, ensuring a constant flow of freight and passengers but also to obtain information on business opportunities and rival companies. With the introduction of steam, the American market of ocean passage rapidly gained importance with the increasing number of prepaid and return passages. New York's supremacy in attracting the migrant traffic transformed the port into 'the' nodal point where the Atlantic networks came together. Yet, how passenger liners integrated the widespread pre-existing networks of migrant brokers and agents remains unclear. Bickelmann suggests that migrant brokers and agents lost their influence when shipping companies gained control of the forwarding business by separating freight and passenger services with the completion of the transition from sail to steam (Bickelmann, 1982, 135). Agnes Bretting also points to a decreasing influence of the agent-network in the bookings of migrants once the steamship companies were well established (Bretting, 1991, 84-90).

On the other end of the spectrum Wyman quotes a representative of the Italian society of Emigration stressing that migration agents only became important after the introduction of steam which had cheapened and eased the crossing resulting in a new level of intensified business competition (Wyman, 1993, 25-26). Migration historians generally take on the former assumption, playing down the role of the transport sector on migrant flows. The lack of interest of maritime historians for in nineteenth century North

Atlantic passenger trade contributed to this hypothesis which has however never been the object of an in depth analysis. With the exception of Brattne's study, a lack of research using first hand sources has led to many assumptions and speculations based on secondary sources giving no conclusive arguments on the impact of the agent-network. Using the HAL archives some new insights as to the organization of this agent-network, and its relation with the company, will be discussed in the two chapters to follow.

Chapter II: 'We got prepaid and return tickets to ride': chain migration patterns and the American network of migrant agents

Migration historians have very much focused on finding answers as to why people migrated and what elements influenced their decision to do so? How people migrated has received very little attention, and as Miller observed, Atlantic migration only reached a high scale as a result of the business networks consisting of lodging house owners, local agents, recruiters, labor agencies, migrant brokers, trading, railroad and shipping companies (Miller, 2006, 205). Micro studies on migration exposed the shortcomings of initial macro studies, for not taking non-economical variables into account. They highlighted the regional differences, and the importance of family and kin, on the migrant decision. Successful pioneers encouraged migration through letters and remittances establishing 'chain migration' patterns diffusing from kin relations to fellow villagers, regions, nations and even whole continents.

Yet, most of these bottom-up studies treat the vast networks of migrant agents and system of prepaid tickets managed by shipping lines as parallel networks existing beside chain migration patterns and having little or no impact on migrant flows. That is, if they are considered in the first instance. Migrant agents are treated as mere traveling agents, facilitating the move without stimulating it. Those studies neglect the fact that transatlantic migration patterns developed around pre-existing maritime trade routes and networks prospering off the commercialization of migrant transport. In this chapter, the debate in migration and maritime literature on the influence of migrant agents will be sketched. The terminology of migrant brokers, expedients, agents, runners etc. will be treated to deconstruct the various layers within the vast agent-network. Who were they? What did their activities consist off? What was their position towards shipping

companies? Did it change with the introduction of steam? How did these go-betweens link the individual migrant with one or another shipping company?

1) The Dillingham Commission, Larsson brothers and migrant legislation as primary contemporary sources for migrant-agent activity

1.1) The Dillingham Commission

There are three main sources which have been used to evaluate the activity of the agent network; first the reports of the Dillingham Commission, second the archives of the Larson brothers, Swedish migrant brokers and finally the legislation regulating the activities of agents and brokers complemented by police records dealing with the implementation of these. Around the turn of the century ardent debates about the need to restrict immigration into the US resulted in the formation of a parliamentary commission investigating the subject, known as the Dillingham Commission. The commission took four years to finish its report consisting of 41 volumes, with one on the emigration conditions in Europe and another on the steerage conditions, immigrant banks and aid societies (Dillingham Commission Reports, 1911 vol. 4 and 37). This unique contemporary source has been used by migration historians to stress the importance of chain migration patterns on the North Atlantic. The commissioners traveled through Europe to establish the causes for emigration and to investigate whether the movement was inflated by shipping companies and migrant agents.

As the Progressive Era unfolded the need for scientific information on the issue grew stronger. Various American officials had preceded them during the preceding two decades and most came to the same conclusion as the Dillingham Commission: “*To say that steamship lines are responsible, directly or indirectly for this unnatural immigration is not the statement of a theory, but a fact*” (Wyman, 1993, 31). American inspectors reported on extensive promotional campaigns for shipping companies through their local agents distributing propaganda on opportunities in the New World; agents advancing the money and providing means to finance the crossing on installments; assisting with auctioning off the migrant’s property; and guiding the migrants through to the final destination, etc. The findings of contemporary inspectors have been played down by

migration historians. Some have pointed to the biased nature of the source. With the new wave of nativism the pressures increased on inspectors to write reports advising Congress to adopt restrictive measures. The fact that mainly foreign steamship companies prospered off the American *laissez-faire* policy intensified the anti-immigration sentiment among inspectors. They constantly placed the shipping companies under suspicion for helping prohibited classes of migrants from passing through the control stations (Schulteis, 1893, 45). Researchers have fittingly pointed out to the bias of the inspectors, yet doing this does not prove that they were wrong. As will be debated in the following chapters the impact of transport sector may have reached even further than what these contemporaries observed.

While underlining the bias regarding the influence of steamship companies, chain-migration advocates were less critical on the statistical information provided by the commission used as one of the pillars reflecting the impact of chain-migration patterns. Between 1908 and 1910 the Commission recorded the number of passengers arriving with a prepaid ticket, averaging approximately 30%. The migrants were also asked, upon arrival at Ellis Island, whether they planned to join family or friends of which 79% replied the first 15% the latter, leaving only 6% without contacts (Dillingham Commission Reports, 1911 vol. 3, p 359-363). This information based on the passenger manifests does not necessarily represent the actual situation. Yet, researchers have too often used these figures without much critical thought. American Immigration legislation left a significant margin for interpretation, leaving the implementation of the laws to the good judgment of the Commissioner of Immigration and inspectors of Ellis Island. The fear of paupers had not disappeared over time and pressures to restrict migration increased.

From 1893, onwards the shipping manifests had to state whether the migrant possessed \$30 or more and if not, how much. Since the law prohibited the entrance of paupers, this information was gradually used to refuse migrants who were likely to become a public charge. If the migrant could mention a relative or a friend it hardly mattered whether they had a penny to their name or not. The contract labor law, prohibiting the entrance of migrants with work already arranged, meant that future earnings could not be used as an argument. When taking charge of Ellis Island in 1902,

William Williams imposed the need for a certain amount of money to obtain the right of landing. Moreover, passengers who were traveling on prepaids and joining kin or relatives needed pocket money, but less than migrants traveling outside these chains.¹⁸⁷ During his second term, starting in 1909, the Secretary of Department of Commerce and Labor had to blow the whistle on him because deportations of aliens had increased beyond reason. The commissioner required that all migrants possessed \$25 on arrival. Mentioning friends or relatives who could act as guarantor for the limited means helped avoiding in depth inquiries from the Board of Investigation. Shipping companies quickly spread the word about these changes across the Atlantic, informing the migrants of the importance of mentioning contacts in the US and carrying some cash to avoid deportations, which occurred at their cost.¹⁸⁸

If the local migrant agent did not make arrangements, shipping companies used the time migrants spent at the port and at sea finding solutions for them to get through Ellis Island.¹⁸⁹ They even hired interpreters to prepare the passengers on board, or they advanced the money when needed (Schulteis, 1893, 43 and de Vannoise, 1993, 89). Hence, on one hand many migrants may have mentioned the name of family and friends without having the intention of joining them. While on the other hand, not being able to control in depth the exactness of the statements of the mass of migrants arriving at Ellis Island contacts may have been fictive.¹⁹⁰ At the time when the commission collected its data the controls regarding pocket money intensified, while the importance of mentioning

¹⁸⁷ Migrants with no relatives or friends and very limited means had been sent back at times depending on the strictness of controls on Ellis Island. Migrants with relatives and friends were released from this requirement until Williams in 1903 also started to require a minimum sum for passengers with ties and traveling with prepaid tickets, despite disposing of ticket for inland transport and names of families they were about to join. Passengers needed a minimum of ten dollars. Shipping companies moved heaven and earth contacting relatives to wire the required sum to Ellis Island allowing the landing of migrants. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, correspondence between 1893 and 1910. Figures for the fiscal year 1902 starting July 1901 ending June 1902 quoted in an article of the Washington post coming from the Commissioner of Immigration points to the impact of a strict implementation: the 545,750 new arrivals possessed on average \$5,51 and only 22,275 had \$30 or more (Washington Post January 3 1903: "*Alarmed about Immigration*").

¹⁸⁸ HAL, GAR, 318.04 Passage Department, 221-226, Various Letters from July 13 1909 until May 27 1910.

¹⁸⁹ The HAL archives show that stewards of the HAL briefed migrants on how to pass interrogations at Ellis Island. This was also noted by Schulteis stating that the Anchor Line engaged special interpreters to prep the migrants for the controls on arrival (Schulteis, 1893, 43).

¹⁹⁰ Even if the second and third year of analysis few migrants passed through because of the economic recession, Ellis Island had no means to verify the authenticity of the statements. Only suspicious cases were investigated by the board of investigation at Ellis Island.

a contact had become common knowledge in the migrant business. The results of the statistics used by the Dillingham Commission may have seriously overestimated the importance of kin and acquaintances, underestimating the number of migrants arriving without such ties.

Having said this, what follows does not necessarily refute chain-migration theories but stresses that shipping companies were in great part responsible on how these developed. Focus goes to the prepaid ticket market which, *in se* does not consider the ones falling outside these chains. As Baines rightly noted, the narrow attention of studies to chain-migration patterns may overestimate the importance of these family and kin relations. Migrants who moved outside these chains are much harder to trace (Baines, 1991 and 1994). This can not be stressed enough.

1.2) The Scandinavian sources

The study of Berit Brattne still constitutes the main point of reference used by historians to measure the impact of the migrant agent network. Using the archives of the Swedish migrant brokers of the Larsson Brothers, a source unique of its kind, Brattne concluded that the extensive propaganda campaigns and pricing policies of the transport sector only had a marginal effect on emigration (Brattne, 1976, 199). The conclusions are based on the sparse bookings the Larsson brothers received through the direct actions of subagents. Moreover an increase in subagents had little impact on their passenger volume. Collaborating with more effective sales promoters, i.e. Swedish Americans, bypassing subagents altogether proved more effective. Most propaganda spread by the Larssons brothers contained information on the advantages of the particular line, services at the port of embarkation, while details on conditions and prospects in the US, prohibited by law in 1883, were brief. The ads were monotonously repeated in the press. The correspondence with possible clients suggests that they had little influence on the decision to migrate. Finally, Brattne underlined that price fluctuations due to during rate or conference price agreements had little impact on the migrant flows, it only delayed or accelerated the move (Brattne, 1976, 176-200).

Oddly enough Brattne writes very little about the relationship between the migrant brokers and the shipping company employing them. Shipping conferences are mentioned, yet not a word about how they worked and how they tried to regulate the agent-network is written. The pioneering work of Murken on North Atlantic shipping conferences was not even used (Murken, 1922). These are crucial factors neglected by a research claiming to analyze the impact of shipping companies and their agents on migrant flows. Does the lack of indication of the direct influence on the migrant decision by agents and subagents in this correspondence reflect their meager impact? Why should direct indications even be mentioned in these letters? Moreover agents and subagents are reduced to mere traveling agents while other studies indicate that their activities went far beyond that. Why not in Sweden? Did subagents sell exclusively for the Larsson brothers, or also for other brokers and companies as in the many other places? In short, had Brattne used the source to explain how people migrated instead of why we would know more about the impact of the migrant transport sector on Swedish migration?

The dearth of studies on the transport system behind the nineteenth century transatlantic exodus contributed to the generalization of Brattne's findings- this while historians such as Gould have stressed the regional differences of migration patterns (Gould, 1979, 1980). Brattne's case study of the Swedish situation during the 1880s has clarified market specific features. Emigration already had strong roots in Sweden and the Guion Line was already well established on the market by the 1880s. A study of the Italian market, which started its expansion of a line entering the market, gives a completely different picture.¹⁹¹ Also on one hand the Swedish government was inclined to oppose the movement prohibiting propaganda on opportunities in the US (Brattne, 1976, 188). While on the other hand the Swedish maritime policies imposing twice the space requirements for the transport of migrants than British vessels made it impossible for the national marine to profit from the trade. Revoking these laws in the 1880s came too little too late. The British lines had a tight grip on the Scandinavian market, making arrangements to keep out the German rivals (Hyde, 1978, 200-202; Lovoll, 1993, 60).

¹⁹¹ Studies on Italian migration seem to confirm that. Agents not only sold tickets, but also loaned funds for passage and passport to even help auction off the emigrant's property. With the growing remigration a new encouragement for emigration was used: you could always come back (Wyman, 1999, 22-36; Schulteis, 1893, 36-48).

Markets where governments favored migration and where national lines were involved, usually receiving privileges from the authorities to attract the trade, such as for instance the Italian should reflect other dynamics. In short, by bringing the superstructure of governments and shipping companies back into the picture some new insights can come forward on the role of the migrant agent network; the link to the individual migrant.

At the other end of the spectrum Kristian Hvidt attributed much more relevance to the influence of the shipping companies and migrant agents on the global movement. He agreed that price policies of the shipping companies had little short term influence on migration flows, yet he blamed his Swedish colleague for underestimating the impact of agencies. Hvidt's problematic, to build on his intuition, was the sources he used. The second hand source, Copenhagen's policy records only allowed him to point to things instead of doing an in-depth analysis. The so called "Yellow Book" containing conference regulations of the British lines organizing agent activities in Denmark was put forward as a key to understanding the working of the transport system. Both scholars opened a debate which few have picked up (Brattne, 1976, Hvidt, 1975 and 1978).

During a conference debate Hvidt restated his concern for the neglect of the transportation system on mass migration where Erickson and Åkerman pointed to the lack of sources in Bremen, Hamburg, Hull and Liverpool (Mörner, 1992, 283). Drew Keeling gives a good survey on how the debate sporadically continued to unfold, based on second hand sources. Agents became increasingly stigmatized as mere facilitators, organizing the move. Keeling corroborates this view, only conceding just as Maldwyn Jones or Dirk Hoerder had that during the beginning of mass migration agents stimulated pioneers to move. He attributes more importance to the shipping companies in the process yet does not explicitly state in what way, this occurred except by reducing risks of the actual move (Hoerder, 1991, 79; Keeling, 2007, 118-122; Jones, 1992, 157).

2) The myriad of names defining the various links in the agent-network: migrant agents, brokers, expedients, subagents, runners, peddlers, subagent's subsidiaries, recruiters, Yankee's, Newlanders, etc. denomination

2.1) The migrant broker

The variety of names designating the various actors in the network, connecting the shipping companies with the migrant, reflects the need for clear definitions. What Brattne and especially Hvidt failed to observe was that shipping companies built further on the pre-existing networks established in the sailship era. He claimed that prior to steam: “*migrants were recruited in a haphazard way often by a captain of a sailing ship or a recruiting agent of an American or Canadian company*” (Hvidt, 1978, 180). His division in agents, sub-agents and Yankee recruiters fails to reflect the complexity of the networks or of their maritime backgrounds. In this study, the classification into migrant brokers, agents and subagents of Hartmut Bickelmann is used, and adding recruiting agents to the list (Bickelmann, 1982, 136).¹⁹²

The first link below the shipping company is the migrant broker. These started off as shipping brokers adding migrant trade to their activities, and as the movement swelled they specialized. During the sailship era they chartered the between decks of the ships, outfitted them for transport, secured the passenger through agents and coordinated the sailing dates. With the evolution from tramp to packets leaving on set dates and the construction of ships built for migrant transport the organizational tasks of the brokers decreased. They centered their efforts on managing their agent-network which became a full time activity with the increased competition. The rivalry to recruit arriving migrants at the port through subagents or runners quickly expanded inland. Yet the practice of recruiting at the port never totally disappeared. How the proportion of migrants arriving without passages evolved over time will probably always remain uncertain. Studies seem to indicate that by the steamship era the majority of first time migrants arrived with their passage already booked. As seen previously, early migrant transport legislation requiring relocaters to have their ticket booked or possess a certain amount of money to cross borders, contributed to this evolution.¹⁹³

¹⁹² This classification is derived from the German research on the national networks subdividing it into Makler (broker), Expedienten (agents), and Unteragenten (sub-agents). The German literature on agent-networks and legislation regulating it is more advanced than any in other country. Especially for the sailingship era the works of Engelsing and Bretting reconstruct how this took shape (Bretting 1991; Engelsing 1961. Yet other studies just to name a few are also useful (Bade, 1992; Hoerder, 1993; Gelberg, 1973; Walker, 1964; von der Straeten, 1997). Yet the implementation of the laws and organization of the network during the steamship era remains to be explored.

¹⁹³ Agnes Bretting however argues that once the steamships were well established the bookings at the port increased again based on the agreement between HAPAG and Hamburg expedients and the contemporary observations of Philippovich. Yet at one hand the agreement does not reflect an increase of

Migrant brokers relied on migrant agents in cities and main transit points inland to forward clients. Often these migrant brokers had first hand experience having spent some time in the US themselves. The main migrant agent in Rotterdam, Johan Wambersie, was born of Dutch parents in Savannah in 1806 but the family returned to Rotterdam in 1833. He established a ship- and migrant broker agency. His appointment as American consul boosted his reputation in the business (Van der Valk, 1976, 157 and Swierenga, 1994, 114). Four out of five of the Larsson Brothers migrated for a time to the US during their youth to familiarize with the business and acquire language skills (Brattne, 1976, 182). This was a common practice in the shipping world, heavily relying on personal networks to obtain reliable information. To consolidate ties with overseas shipping agencies, young family members were often sent overseas as apprentices. Hvidt observed the same in Copenhagen where migrant brokers shared a common past as migrants. Contacts they had established abroad with railroad land offices and employment bureaus created extra incomes (Hvidt, 1978, 181). On the European continent, the activities of the migrant brokers became a primary concern of the authorities trying to attract the migrants to the ports. To safeguard a good reputation of migrant gateways protecting migrants from abuses migrant brokers and agents had to pay a deposit to obtain permission to act as such which had to be renewed on a yearly basis. This caution could be used to compensate migrants if abuses had been certified or when the brokers were not able to carry out their contract. German legislation dating back to the sailship era, especially in Bremen, had a pioneering role in this which gradually spread across the continent. The money for the cautions was often advanced by ship owners (Bretting, 1991, 31-40; Bickelmann, 1982, 136; Fouché, 1992, 74-81; Gelberg, 1973, 10-17; Hoerder, 1993, 74 Hvidt, 1978, 180-190; Spelkens, 1976, 83-96; van der Valk, 1976, 158-161 and de Vannoise- Pochulu, 1993, 44-47).

direct business done at the port. The lion's share of the business done by Hamburg migrant brokers involved in the agreement was done through branch offices and sub-agents inland or in the US. On the other hand the numbers given by Philippovich for the 1880's are not compared with numbers for the previous period. The bases used by Bretting to point to an increase of the so called 'Platzgeschäft' do not seem to be conclusive enough (Bretting, 1991, 85). It is true however that with the improved transport connections to the port of embarkation and the numerous regular departures from the port it became much easier for the migrants to bypass the migrant-agents. Yet it remains questionable if they did, because migrants agents still provided special railroad fares, organized their lodging at the port and continued to give useful information on the organization of the trip, the inspections and legislations to go through and on opportunities and dangers in the US.

Just as with cargo ship brokers successful migrant brokers, sometimes climbed the ladder to become ship-owners and to run a line themselves. This was the case, for instance, with the migrant brokers Williams and Guion engaged by the Cunard Line in 1860 when they were forced to launch themselves on the migrant market. Hyde stressed the fact that shipping companies were: “*largely dependent on the efficiency and goodwill of their agents, especially for steerage passengers because they were more responsive to skillful sales talk than cabin class travelers*” (Hyde, 1975, 77). The experience of Guion and Williams, running a line of sailing packets transporting migrants prior to their engagement with Cunard allowed the steamship line to profit from the wide network of agencies in strategic ports built up by the Guion and Williams over the years. Their success in attracting steerage business for the Cunard Line inspired them to stop their activities as migrant brokers to enter the steam-shipping business. Four years later the Guion Line carried more steerage passengers than their ex-employers, the Cunard Line (Bastin, 1971, 28; Boyce, 1995, 36 and Hyde, 1975, 77-78). As Murken stressed these migrant brokers or ‘*Auswanderungsexpedienten*’ managing their independent agent-network were often more powerful than the shipping companies in the steerage business (Murken, 1922, 15).

2.2) Migrant agents, subagents, newlanders and runners

Migrant agents were commissioned by several migrant brokers at different ports attracting a sufficient amount of business to open permanent offices. Because of the fluctuations in migrant flows and the various side-industries the movement generated, agents usually combined selling passages with other trades. Arranging migrant transport often attracted clients for other business, bankers for example who could profit from money exchanges and money transfers. From their part they relied on sub-agents connecting them to the surrounding rural areas. The amount of business of the sub-agent remained small, yet because generally he constituted the first link to the person willing to purchase steerage passage the sub-agent played an important role. Migrants preferred booking through someone familiar hence local sub-agents were more likely to earn the trust of purchasers than random recruiters or unknown agents, the sub-agent gave

important advice on where and how travel (Bretting, 1991, 65-66). Preferably these subagents consisted of people, who by way of profession or position in the local community came into frequent contact with locals or travelers, but all kinds of professions had propaganda signs supplied by the shipping companies posted in front of their houses ranging from religious leaders to mayors, innkeepers, shopkeepers, schoolteachers, hotel-owners, notaries, tradesmen, craftsmen, farmers, retired police officers, barbers, shoemakers etc (Wyman, 1993, 26; Bickelmann, 1982, 136; Evans, 2007, 57; Hvidt, 1978, 186; Martellini, 2002, 301-302) When recruiting agents for the Dutch market the Holland America Line described the profile and tasks of candidates as follows:

“Agents had to be recruited from people which were held in high regards by their community and needed to possess administrative skills. Knowledge on the conditions with the United States was an important plus. They had to thoroughly brief the passenger before the departure, make the arrangements for their luggage, fill out the required forms and point to the advantages of the Holland America Line Hotel in Rotterdam. The agents needed to be familiar with the American immigration laws and sanitary requirements to inform third class passengers and avoid deportations. They had to warn passengers against fraudulent land and colonization companies. Special attention had to be drawn to advertising matters such as billboards in train stations and public places or ads in the popular press. They were responsible for organizing the publicity campaigns in their regions. Finally the agents had to send in reports on the status of the business on a regular basis.”¹⁹⁴

By 1890, the Holland America Line managed a network of more than two thousand agents spread across the European continent (van der Valk, 1976, 163).

These locals were often joined by recruiting agents for railroad trusts, land-grant companies, immigrant commissions of various states, or new world employers.¹⁹⁵ They were generally migrants traveling back to the home country, trying to convince fellow countrymen to make the move to the New World. These recruiting agents also known as

¹⁹⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 1, Letter November 5 1897.

¹⁹⁵ Wisconsin and Michigan actively advertised the opportunities the state offered for settlers before the Civil War. After 1865 other northwestern states also started encouraging immigration through advertising campaigns in Europe and eastern States. Especially Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa managed to attract a significant of foreign-born population through these campaigns. Southern states followed suit but with limited success. The land grant railroads started promotional campaigns in Europe during the 1850's and boomed during the 1870's and 1880's. These offered greater inducements than State immigration bureau, through reduction on transport, work upon arrival, land to be cultivated and long term financing plans (Jones, 1992, 161-162).

newlanders or *Yankees* made arrangements with migrant brokers or directly with shipping companies to obtain special conditions for the crossing of the recruits. With the increasing regulations regarding migrant transport, authorities tried to protect migrants from abuses but also tried to gain control of the movement. German and Austrian-Hungarian legislation established as early as 1852, stated that these migrant agents, subagents and recruiting agents needed to obtain concessions from local authorities certifying their good morals and controlling their activities (Just, 1989, 53 and Bretting 1991, 50-56). The German and Austrian authorities gave out the concessions to nationals only. Other European countries gradually adapted these practices. The laws proved difficult to apply and could never prevent a wide network of unauthorized runners, peddlers or subagents' substitutes from operating beneath the network of official representatives. Exclusivity in these networks seemed to have been an exception, all working for different shipping companies, brokers or agents.

Because of this network people, considering a move usually did not even have to leave their village for making arrangements to cross the Atlantic. On the payment of the fare the agents or sub-agents gave a provisional 'Shipping-ticket' which was printed and numbered by the migrant broker where the name of the buyer, the number of passengers, the port of departure, the shipping company and the money received had to be clearly mentioned. Some weeks before the departure, the subagents contacted the brokers about when his client wished to leave, proposing a ship based on the list of departure sent around by the shipping companies. The expedient then communicated on what ship the berths were reserved and on what day the passenger needed to leave his hometown to arrive in time at the port. The combined sale of ocean passage and inland travel was common (Just, 1989, 49).

Even during the 1840s and 1850s the competition between the American railroad and steamship companies for the inland transportation had moved to Europe. American authorities pressured European governments to put an end to this practice because of the widespread frauds in the business, yet this only resulted in the temporary prohibition in

some European countries.¹⁹⁶ Agents earned an extra commission on the sale of these tickets. With the often shared interests of inland transport companies attached to a certain port in attracting the trade, special migrant fares were offered.¹⁹⁷ Because of the common interest, migrants benefited from this increasingly integrated transatlantic transport network. Sub-agents helped the migrant on his or her way to the train stations and sometimes even accompanied them to the port when big groups traveled together. Otherwise, other agents assisted them along the way in key transit points.

Port authorities quickly understood the importance of protecting relocaters from all kinds of scalpers trying to defraud migrants by overcharging for lodging, money exchanges, traveling utensils, sale of false inland travel tickets etc. In 1847, to fight off the bad reputation of migrant abuses at the port of Antwerp the governor asked the migrant brokers to advise him of new arrivals beforehand.¹⁹⁸ A police escort was then arranged to bring the migrants to a place indicated by the migrant brokers. Later police escorts were replaced by representatives of the migrant brokers who had received special police permission to get access to the platforms welcoming the migrants and guiding them to the lodging houses or the ship. In other European migrant ports similar measures were taken (Gelberg, 1973, 10-40; Spelkens, 1976, 71-81 and Zevenbergen, 1990, 38-40). The same was done on the other side of the Atlantic to assist the passenger to his or her final destination.¹⁹⁹ Migrants who booked through a 'newlander' often enjoyed the privilege of being accompanied by him to the final destination.

¹⁹⁶ This was the case in Prussia. The Belgian and French government also considered prohibiting the sale to stop abuses. Yet this measure seemed to have been rapidly revoked (Fouché, 1992, 68-72 and Feys, 2003).

¹⁹⁷ Belgian railroads first offered a 30% discount to migrants joining Antwerp which was later increased to 50%. Railroad companies connecting Switzerland to Le Havre not only gave special migrant fares but organized special trains for the transport. Same goes for trains connecting Hull with Liverpool. Rhine boats connecting Rotterdam with the hinterland and subsequent railroads gave special fares. Bickelmann states that German railroads stopped giving reductions after their nationalization during the 1850's. This fitted in the new policies that emigration should not be encouraged by German states. Last special migrant fares on German railroads would date back to 1879, according to Bickelmann (Bickelmann, 1982, 138). Yet the Holland America Line archives indicate that that NGL and HAPAG successfully renegotiated special migrant fares at the end of the 1880's. Maybe these were limited to foreign transit-migrants but German shipping companies did quote special migrant fares also after 1879.

¹⁹⁸ BAMFA 2020, Emigration, I, Letter of the Antwerp governor to MFA January 17 1847.

¹⁹⁹ As stated previously migrants also found their way to the port on their own and many arrived in New York without tickets for inland transport. Yet as the movement persisted and the agent networks had time developed, it is safe to say that a big majority then arranged the travel to the port through the agent.

Apart from arranging the transport for the migrants, the agents also provided other services but it is hard to know to what extent the facilities offered by some agents can be generalized. Sub-agents and agents also helped in obtaining official travel documents. Passports were not a prerequisite to board ships and enter the US but the tendency of the European authorities during the second half of the century to increase their grip on the movement contributed to their use. Especially the Russian, Hungarian and Italian authorities tried to direct and control emigration through passport issues long before the WOI. This created new market opportunities for migrant agents assisting relocaters to travel clandestinely. Swiss migrant agents, for instance, often advertised in Italy that they could arrange the transport without passport. The enforcement of the Italian government requiring a passport from nationals leaving from Italian ports opened a market opportunity which Swiss migrant agents quickly exploited sending those who could not obtain one through northern ports. As the circular of the Swiss agency Carecco en Brivio to Italian sub-agents illustrates:

“We will accept your passengers for New York at net rates of 120 franks from Chiasso through Antwerp with RSL or English steamers. Make sure your passengers arrive in Chiasso on Tuesdays year-round. Migrants coming through Milan have to go the trattoria which address has previously been sent. We accept passengers, even without passports guaranteeing their embarkation. Instruct your passengers not to confide in anyone, never tell that they are going to America and hide any addresses or papers linking them to their destination. If someone inquires about where they are going they should frankly respond that they are on their way to Switzerland looking for work. To make reservations you need to send us beforehand their names, address, etc and a bond of 50 Lire for each migrant.”²⁰⁰

In countries such as Russia which opposed emigration, a clandestine network of agents was formed helping migrants on their way. They smuggled relocaters over the Russian borders. The migrant trade was a dangerous business in Russia where agents risked a trip to Siberia if their bribes to local authorities were not big enough (Just, 1989, 54-55).²⁰¹ Agents and subagents also assisted their clients with selling whatever properties they had (Wyman, 1993, 27 and Thielemans, 1999, 129).

The agents played an important role by spreading all sorts of information not only on how to migrate, but also whereto and why. There are no means of measuring the

²⁰⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department: Conference negotiations, 226, Letter April 19 1894.

²⁰¹ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 114, Letter November 23 1900.

impact of this on migrant flows, yet it has generally been played down by historians. For example, the studies of Yuzo Murayama or John Rice and Robert Ostergren on the impact of the diffusion of information on migration do not even consider the role of the transport sector (Murayama, 1994, 125-147 and Rice and Ostergren, 1978, 1-15). John Gould stressed the importance of information flows and the impact of “diffusion” and “feedback” on patterns of European inter-continental migration. First hand information on the conditions in the New World of pioneers to kin and fellow villagers determined the volume and how the fever spread from villages to regions (Gould, 1979, 614-616 and 1980, 41-112) A series of migrant letters contains detailed information on the conditions in the New World, and advice on whether and how to join the migrants (Kamphoefner, Heiblich and Sommer, 1991).

Outside of migrant letters, the New World and transatlantic migration received wide coverage in the developing popular press. Recruiters and migrant agents eagerly used the press to advertise opportunities and the means to travel to the New World. The advertisement techniques used to promote shipping companies and migrant agents predated modern practice by 100 years and were extremely forceful in their appeal (Bastin, 1971, 11 and Hyde 1975, 65). Migrant agents also distributed brochures and circulars paid for by the shipping companies promoting the advantages and sailing dates of the Line. They contained sound advice to migrants, details of the services offered but information about the conditions in the US remained brief (Brattne, 1976, 191). American authorities of western and southern states, employers, railroad and landowning companies also used these networks to spread their propaganda. However, according to Brattne the monotonously repeated advertisements and propaganda had little influence on the migrant decision, especially after 1883 when the Swedish authorities prohibited the circulation of propaganda on opportunities in the New World. Even in 1852 the Austrian-Hungarian authorities had forbidden such propaganda on its territory and German authorities later followed suit (Just, 1989, 37). Despite the prohibition, Schulteis noted that Belgian and Dutch printers published German pamphlets and booklets which clandestinely circulated through the agent-network (Schulteis, 1893, 23).²⁰² Gould

²⁰² With the transition from sail to steam, shipping companies wanted to avoid any associations between the line and landowning or colonization companies. Stories on abuses and failures of the latter

attributed much more importance to the role of the agents as information diffusers than Brattne:

“At least, the constant representation to the public on the opportunities in other countries and the proffer of practical information about ways and means must have been a factor in the diffusion of the habit of emigration (...). Any advertising expert knows that it is constant repetition rather than reasoned (or valid) argument which sells the product” (Gould, 1980, 275).

Agents also provided information on the American immigration laws which from 1882 onwards extended the list of excluded classes. The American authorities integrated these agents into their policies of remote control imposing that immigration laws be posted in the offices of European agents. But, the agents also provided information and means to circumvent laws restricting emigration or immigration. For instance agents' assisting young males to migrate in order to avoid military service was a common practice. On the other hand agents prepared their clients on the tests and interviews at landing stations informing them what answers needed to be given to pass the 'golden door'. If risks were judged to be too high, alternative routes through Canada could be suggested.

Michael Just concluded that the agent-network stimulated Europeans to migrate, and especially pioneers. As the movement from a region intensified and persisted their job was made easier since word of mouth publicity from pioneers constituted the best means of instigating new departures. It remains difficult to estimate their true impact on the migrant's decision. Agents by themselves could not motivate someone to leave yet they could win over people who contemplated turning their back on the home country (Just, 1989, 60-61).

Agents were a vital link in the transatlantic transport network, enabling the mass-migration movement to unfold. As legislation regulating both emigration and immigration increased the agents helped the migrants to fulfill the necessary requirements or to circumvent altogether. They swelled the information flow on the New World and on how to reach it. Combined with the technological innovations in transport

could blacken the reputation of the shipping company. The Holland America Line seemed to have discouraged the spread of information on these through their agents towards the end of the century. Some were allowed to put their pamphlets at the disposition of the HAL-clients if their good intentions were certified by the New York head-agents. Special fares could be obtained for groups yet any public associations with these ventures had to be avoided. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 1, Letter November 5 1897 and 221-226.

and communication this helped lifting the psychological fear of migration to the extent that a long and fearful journey to New York evolved into something, which for Italians was easier to consider than a trip to Rome and could be repeated on a yearly base- which for the Irish was much less of a journey into unknown territory than looking for work in an Irish city (Gould, 1980, 294-295). The availability of agents across Europe organizing the voyage of the migrant from their village to the final destination and their constant advertising campaigns in local newspapers brought the New World a lot closer in the mental map of many Europeans.

The integration of both worlds was further enhanced by the networks of agents in the US selling pre-paid and return tickets. The following section discusses the American agent-network, which strangely enough in a field stressing the importance of chain migration patterns has, received no consideration whatsoever. An important difference between the agent-network in Europe, when compared to the US is the complete lack of regulations in the latter. Therefore before crossing the Atlantic, the laws passed in Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Denmark need to be briefly examined.

2.3) European laws regulating the agent-network in continental countries with important migrant gateways

The first protective ordinance of the Bremen Senate dates back to 1832. Other German states soon followed, with Baden introducing the first surety bond of 20,000 Gulden for migrant agents. Bavaria built further on these regulations by introducing formalities to be included in the contract which demanded the issue of visas by the Bremen consul. The other states soon followed suit, passing similar legislation. The most important feature of these laws was the agents' concession enabling the authorities to control both their number and their activities. Legislations including concession regulations were passed in Baden, Württemberg, Hessen (1847); Mecklenburg (1852); Prussia, Sachsen, Frankfurt, Kuhresen, (1853) and other smaller states. The free port cities Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck did not introduce concessions yet they established institutions to control the brokers' and agents' activities. In all states however the privileges of acting as an official migrant agent could be withdrawn and sometimes it was subject to renewal every year. Surety bonds varied from 300 Thaler to 30,000 Marks. The

laws established contractual obligations. The efforts of Prussia to standardize the measures for all states late 1840s only materialized in 1897. Concessions now needed to be obtained from the central government. Only nationals could apply; they needed to have their residence in the region where they intended to establish their business and an authorization of a licensed entrepreneur for whom they were acting. Agents acting without concession risked one year imprisonment and a fine up to 6000 Mark (Bretting, 1991, 31-40; Gelberg, 1973, 10-14, and Hoerder, 1993, 75).

The Belgian government adopted a law in 1875 strictly regulating the duties of shipping agencies and their agents. Migrant brokers needed to obtain the permission of the authorities to act as such and had to pay a deposit of between 20,000 to 40,000 francs. As the abuses persisted, the concession became subject to yearly renewal. The law of 1890 made the shipping companies responsible for the actions of their brokers, agents and sub-agents. They needed to hand in a list of all the authorized migrant agents and sub-agents allowing the government emigration commissioner to investigate the moral character of these agents through the local authorities where they resided. Yet on several occasions the RSL refused to hand over the list, claiming that it could be used by rival companies to lure away their agents. The authorities did not press the RSL in conceding which reflects both the power of the company and the still ever prevailing economic rather than humanitarian concerns of the government when regulating the trade (Spelkens, 1976, 94-96; Feys 2003).

In the Netherlands, the law of 1862 included a clause establishing supervision commissions in Amsterdam and Rotterdam that needed to promote the ports as emigration gateways and to protect the migrants from abuses. They investigated complaints from migrants against dishonest agents. Deposits from brokers and agents were collected and supervised by local authorities (Van der Valk, 1976, 157-161). In France, article 4 of decree of January 15 1855 established that shipping companies transporting migrants and agencies recruiting those needed to receive an authorization granted by the Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Public works on payment of a deposit, ranging from 15,000 to 40,000 francs. The concession could be withdrawn when problems occurred. The agencies were responsible for their agents and sub-agents who needed to obtain an authorization from the emigration bureau of the Department of

Interior. The law also contained stipulations as to what the contracts used by these agencies needed to contain. Conversely to Belgium, these laws were strictly implemented. From 1880 onwards, despite strong protests of the migrant brokers the price needed to include the board and lodging at Le Havre. No major changes were made to the impositions of 1855 which were molded into new imperial laws and decrees in 1860 and 1861 (Fouché, 1992, 76-81; de Vannoise- Pochulu, 1993, 44-47, 68-72, 139-144).

The Danish emigration law of 1868 imposed a security bond of 10,000 riksdaler on migrant brokers, leading to a concentration of these brokers in Canal Street, Copenhagen. They needed to provide the police authorities with a list of inland agents working for them and for whom they were responsible. From 1868 until 1876 the migrant brokers rose from 6 to 12, agents from 126 to 571. By 1886, when Danish migration peaked, 15 brokers managed a network of 1053 agents. The number decreased to eight and 300 during the slump of the 1890s. The moderate revival at the turn of the century brokers and agents increased to 10 and 700 respectively. Despite the regulations, migrant agents remained largely beyond police control. Sub-agents and recruiting agents escaped the vigilance of the Danish authorities under these laws (Hvidt, 1868, 180-190).

European countries directly involved in the first wave of mass migration had passed laws to control the expansion and activities of the agent-network by the time steamship companies took over the migrant transport market from sailing ships. However, for lawmakers also the distinction between brokers, agents and sub-agents was not always clear. The French and German authorities imposed the same surety bonds for both brokers and agents. In Denmark this was limited to brokers, yet it remains unclear as to whether the Danish authorities made much distinction between agents and sub-agents. Therefore, in France and Germany only a small number could afford the surety bond, increasing the number of sub-agents whereas in Denmark a lot of what in Germany and France would be called sub-agents were classified as agents.

With the introduction of specialized liner shipping services, the differences also tended to disappear, possibly explaining the divergence between laws passed before 1860s and the ones after. Initially, brokers chartered the steerage decks and opened agencies inland to fill them. Yet, with specialized ships chartering was not necessary any

longer and brokers lost part of their role as middlemen between ship-owners and migrant agents. Most of the brokers retained a wide network of inland agents and sub-agents but they could not prevent some inland-agents from breaking away from them dealing directly with the companies and attracting the same amount of business. Except for one having its offices at the port and the other inland, nothing else differentiated them any longer. A hierarchy persisted nonetheless, based on the amount of business a middleman controlled. Brokers, inland or at ports became middlemen on whom shipping companies relied to obtain the gross of their share from one of their submarkets. The geographical delimitation varied from provinces to whole countries. The rest came from other brokers or smaller agents with whom they increasingly started to deal directly. Agents limited their business to local regions, relying on sub-agents in small towns. To make the network manageable for shipping companies it needed to be limited, therefore they never dealt with sub-agents directly.

Hence, during the steamship era the differentiation is more based on the geographic area and amount of business middlemen controlled, rather than on specific services they performed. As the migration fever spread to Eastern and Southern European countries new laws regulating the migrant trade in Italy (1888 and 1901), Spain (1907) Hungary (1900), Austria (1904) reflect this evolution. The various layers connecting the migrant with the shipping companies made it very difficult to implement the laws. Therefore in 1901 it revoked concessions given to migrant brokers to recruit migrants, only giving the ministerial permission to do so to shipping companies leaving from Italian ports. These were allowed to appoint agents, representatives of the shipping companies for whom they were directly responsible. By reducing the layers of middlemen the authorities wanted to make the market more transparent enabling the prosecution for abuses of the emigration laws to be more effective and to put an end to the possibilities for sub-agents, agents, brokers and shipping companies to blame each other in cases of violations. The law even made adaptations of steerage rates pending of the emigration commissioner's approval (Martellini, 2002, 294-302; Murken, 1922, 362-364). Yet the overall-goal proved ill-effective. Formally, the law limited the actors to shipping companies and their representatives, yet in practice the old structural hierarchy persisted, keeping backdoors open. On the other side of the Atlantic, where

approximately half of the transatlantic steerage tickets were sold only a couple of states started regulating the sale of ocean passage through immigrant banks after the turn of the century.

3) The Holland America Line and its agent-network: the organization of the sale of prepaid and return tickets in the US

3.1) The sale, distribution and organization of prepaid and return passages

Despite the concentration of the business that took place with the transition from numerous small sail-ship lines and tramps to major steam shipping companies, these migrant brokers maintained their position as middlemen between migrants and ship-owners. Their strong ties with migrant agents and sub-agents both in Europe and the US enabled them to maintain the control over the supply of steerage passengers. By 1884, Morris & Son, the Holland America Line passage agents in New York, coordinated the activities of 1,400 agents and subagents spread nationwide selling prepaid and eastbound tickets.²⁰³ Morris & Son managed the cabin and migrant business, which generally were treated by parallel networks of agents and subagents. With the boom of transatlantic tourism after the generalization of steam shipping, specialized agencies dealing with cabin passage opened in bigger cities. Wealthy Americans, most especially, were drawn to Europe generating the biggest part of steam shipping companies' revenues drawn on cabin passage. An intermediate class between the first-class cabin passage and third-class steerage passage quickly developed, responding to the demand of the increasing volume of low budget business travel and an upgraded service for wealthier migrants.

Second-class passengers paid approximately \$10 more than what they would for steerage berths and offered the advantage of being absolved from passing through the immigrant controls upon arrival. This backdoor was often used by people from the excluded classes being able to afford the extra expense to enter the country. Migrants used those backdoors individually, yet this was also organized on a larger scale for certain categories. For instance, the Mormon Society, who actively recruited in Europe, established special agreements with the HAL and the Guion Line through the migrant

²⁰³ Ten years later the agent-network controlled by the H.A.L. expanded to 2000. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 223, November 25 1893.

broker Spence, to obtain cheap second-cabin fares. Most agents therefore sold the intermediate second-class passages. The vast majority of Morris' contacts were migrant and sub-agents which reached far inland into rural communities. Shipping companies heavily depended on revenues from passage traffic. Keeling estimated that the Cunard Line drew half of their revenues from migrant transport, while freight and non-migrant transport accounted for nearly a quarter each. The share of steerage business for smaller lines, especially during the initial years must have been larger because cabin passengers were more sensitive to the reputation and services on board than migrants (Keeling, 2007). Hence, the external firms managing the passage business shared a big responsibility in the success of a line.

The activities of agents and subagents were similar in Europe, yet there they focused mainly on making shipping companies known to the public. The one-sided view of considering the migrant business as a purely westbound movement led to a neglect of the competition for the eastbound traffic, which according to rough estimates amounted to 30 percent of the westbound movement between 1815 and 1914 (Gould, 1979, 609). The organization of the market contributed to swelling the return movement. The permanent overcapacity noted by historians on the westbound route after the steamship boom of the 1870s was much more pronounced on the return leg of the trip. This overcapacity kept the eastbound prices at lower levels than those westbound (Murken, 1922, 52-54). Also, rate wars between shipping companies tended to start when the westbound market collapsed due to economic recessions, as was the case during the 1870s and midway the 1890s and in 1907. Conference agreements rarely survived the pressures of the collapsed westbound market. These periods were used to measure the strength of the rival companies before renegotiating the agreements when the market picked up again. Rate wars always spread to the eastbound market drastically lowering the prices just when business conditions in the US favored remigration. Only during the Panic of 1907 did the high demand for return steerage berths managed to temporarily neutralize this tendency when shipping lines maintained high rates for some months despite a rate war. It underlines the growing market forces of the return migration movement which gained intensity but never enough to compensate the loss on the westbound traffic for shipping companies.

These specific market conditions must have stimulated the eastbound movement, which seemed to be conditioned by in economic downturns, during crisis years. The high return rates during America recessions underline Russel King's observation that economical rather than non-economical factors weigh more heavily on the decision to return, and that often unfavorable economic condition in the immigration country are determinant (King, 2001 18-21). Although an increasing number of migrants arrived with the intention of returning anyways, American business conditions largely influenced whether they eventually did return and the timing of their return.²⁰⁴ By reducing time and global costs for the crossing, steamships reinforced seasonal transatlantic migration patterns described by contemporaries as 'birds of passage'. Return and repeat migration, developed during the 'old' wave from Northwestern Europe, spurred by technological innovations was more pronounced throughout the succeeding period when predominantly Eastern and Southern Europeans started to cross the Atlantic right after winter to return as early as the next autumn (Baines, 1994, 533-536; Piore, 1979, 148-154).

Shipping companies started to organize special 'Christmas sailings' to respond to the increasing demand for eastbound crossings for people wanting to rejoin their family around that time of the year which illustrates how the movement became institutionalized. Just as in Europe, shipping companies did not passively wait for clients to make up their minds to move. As a letter of 1883 of van Staphorst to the directors anticipating a brake up of the conference agreement and a subsequent rate war illustrates:

"We need to prepare pamphlets targeting Germans for whom the American experience has been a bitter disappointment inciting them to return home. The leaflets need to promote Rotterdam as ideal gateway for the Rhine region. Dutch are hard to agitate since most of them are farmers who are stuck to their lands. The Dutch who do return, nearly automatically end up with us."²⁰⁵

Van Staphorst underlines the important difference between agrarian settlers and industrial laborers as to their probabilities of return. The ascendancy of the industrial society throughout the nineteenth century significantly increased transatlantic mobility. The New

²⁰⁴ As King and Morawska observed personal, social, ethnic and cultural factors also greatly shaped the return movement. It explains why a lot of the migrants who had the intention to return never did and vice versa. It is not the intention here to reduce the return migration movement to one spurred by economic conditions yet only to underline the great importance of economic fluctuation in the transatlantic case. (King, 2001; Morawska, 1985, 1991, 1996).

²⁰⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112, Letter November 21 1883.

York head-agents of the HAL frequently reported on the difficulties in estimating the number of eastbound bookings which usually only started to come in shortly before their departure. With the overcapacity and daily departures from New York to Europe many return migrants bought their ticket only after their arrival in New York. The port with the largest concentration of migrant brokers, agents, subagents and runners worldwide was probably the best place to negotiate a cheap homeward journey. Many of the more experienced travelers seemed to have been well aware of that.

The United States was also submerged by wide advertising campaigns organized by shipping companies to acquire their share of the prepaid market. As in Europe, agents and subagents were responsible for advertising the lines in their area and local press. They were provided with rate and time table sheets, advertising materials and ticket books of steamship companies. When people came knocking on the door to pay for the crossing for someone in Europe, the agent contacted the migrant broker. He passed on the information to the general agent of the shipping company who sent weekly lists, to Rotterdam, of who needed to be contacted with traveling instructions. The purchaser was handed a receipt and a numbered shipping ticket where the name of the shipping company or migrant broker, the port of embarkation, names of the passengers and amount paid for the ticket had to be mentioned. The agent sent the ticket to the passenger to start preparing for the trip and to await instructions from the shipping company. The recipient was then contacted by the nearest local European sub-agent or by the shipping company directly to arrange his forwarding to the port of embarkation. Through this network, companies could arrange for this to be done according to the sailing dates, minimizing the time spent at the port and cutting down the extra costs for the passenger. Generally, prepaid ocean passage was sold together with railroad tickets to the port of embarkation and from the port of arrival to the final destination on which migrant agents earned an extra commission. When a prepaid ticket was purchased the passenger was given up to one year to prepare for his trip.

Like in Europe agents usually did this as a side earning and could vary from being innkeepers, hotel-owners, notaries, insurers, bankers, mine-owners, railroad employees,

newspaper-editors²⁰⁶, storekeepers etc. Some specialized and made a living off it, but for most it was a means to earn an easy commission and to get in touch with potential laborers or clients for other business. Land speculators were avoided because companies did not want to run the risk of failed colonization attempts being associated with the line, which might damage its reputation. The origins of the agent depended on the dominant migrant community in the area, yet by mastering other foreign languages he could extend his business to other ethnicities. Although, nearly all agencies were appointed to men, many women helped their spouses, especially in rural areas where the business was often transacted at home.²⁰⁷ Steamship companies provided them with rate and time table sheets, advertising materials and ticket books but generally failed to generate enough business for one agent to impose the exclusivity of sales. Migrant entrepreneurs from their part tried to obtain the agency of as many shipping companies as possible to boost their prestige and increase their business. To retain the agency of the shipping companies the agents needed to spread their sales among the companies it represented yet the shipping company offering the best facilities and the highest commission was likely to get the gross of the business. The amount of pre-paid tickets sold over the winter served as an indicator for the westbound migrant traffic, which peaked between April and September.

3.2) Taking matters into own hands: The appointment of W.H van den Toorn as HAL New York head-agent

Despite the important revenue drawn from passenger transport, the directors of the company considered discontinuing the business, limiting the activities to freight transport. By the end of 1884, the company had suffered four shipwrecks in two years; the *Edam*, *Rotterdam*, *Maasdam* and *Amsterdam* severely affecting the reputation of the line. It forced the company to draw up a reorganization plan to cut costs and to regain the confidence of the traveling public. One of the measures was sending someone from

²⁰⁶ Editors of foreign language press used their privileged position to advertise the sale of prepaids and return tickets reaching a public of very potential clients. The foreign press rose spectacularly between 1883 and 1920, when 3,500 new foreign language papers appeared on the American media scene. Few lasted yet there the variety of language represented in these considerably increased (Jones, 1992, 195).

²⁰⁷ This is based on sporadic reports of traveling agents of the H.A.L. visiting the sub-agents to control their activities and maintain good relations with them. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 72-76 and 221 – 226.

Rotterdam familiar with the inside operations of the home port to manage the business in New York.²⁰⁸ W.H. van den Toorn quickly replaced van Staphorst as head-agent.²⁰⁹ From outside New York, van den Toorn had a great deal of difficulty in establishing himself in the local business community, especially because van Staphorst held a grudge for losing his position and did everything in his power to blacken the reputation of both his substitute and the Holland America Line. The Head Agent's gateway to credibility in the New York business community seems to have been his membership in the Holland Society of New York, an elitist group composed of Americans who could trace their Dutch roots back to the state's founding fathers. Through John R. Planten, the consul in New York, van der Toorn was introduced to the Society and began to make a name for himself. The head agents used the company's ships in organizing dinners and little excursions to create goodwill among the Dutch community of New York.

Van der Toorn urged the Board to take more aspects of the business into its own hands. He proposed taking charge of the loading and unloading of the ships in New York, following the example set by the Red Star Line. Furthermore, he suggested taking control of the freight business in Rotterdam, which was then entrusted to Wambersie and Son. By doing this, he argued, the company's interests would be much better served than by leaving it to shipbrokers. More importantly, the head agent also convinced the directors to take over the control of the American passage business from Morris & Son. Van den Toorn urged the training of Krummeich and sent him over to run the passage business under his control. This fitted in with the new policy of the HAL, sending over employees from the Netherlands where they had time to familiarize themselves with the company's philosophy. The directors believed that nationals were more trustworthy than foreigners. An increasing share of the American personnel was replaced by young men trained in Holland.

The reasons for the takeover were twofold. It first allowed the HAL to cut down on the commission paid to Morris, which fluctuated depending on the intensity of the competition for the market. In August 1885 when the lines had just signed the continental conference agreement and hence when commissions were lower Morris received \$6.5 per

²⁰⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 53, November 2 1884.

²⁰⁹ Van Staphorst left with slamming doors taking all the archives of the early period and with him.

cabin and \$6.25 per steerage passenger he booked directly. On tickets sold arranged through his agents the broker earned \$2 for cabin and \$2.25 for steerage bookings. Based on the books of Morris, van den Toorn calculated that Morris sold 25 percent of the cabin passages directly but 93 percent of the steerage tickets were sold through agents. In total Morris & Company earned, with these commissions, on average \$10,675 per year.²¹⁰ Secondly, Morris' son, Frank showed little interest in following in his father's footsteps and did not manage the business with the same zeal, losing control over the sub-agents. Hence the company's interests would be better looked after under Krummeich who had to increase their market share. To guarantee a smooth transition the HAL came to an agreement with Morris who allowed Krummeich to do an internship at Morris & Sons before taking control of the business in 1886. In exchange, Morris still participated in the company's profits for the following two years. Van den Toorn defended the expense, stressing that parting in disagreement would have cost the company a lot more.

HAPAG proved the head-agent right as the same transition which most passenger liners went through did not occur as easily for all companies.²¹¹ In 1892, the German Line took over the passage business from C.B. Richard & Company who had represented HAPAG practically since its founding in 1847. The migrant broker used all his influence to tarnish his former employer. Richard contracted passengers for rival British lines and took the head agencies of new smaller lines competing on the same routes as HAPAG. The migrant broker also proceeded against his former employer for being member of various shipping conferences allegedly in violation of Sherman Anti-trust Act.²¹²

²¹⁰ To do the math van den Toorn took the following averages; 250 cabin passengers booked directly, 750 others through agents, 200 steerage passengers booked directly, 2800 indirectly. He estimated the salaries paid to personnel needed to run the office, the rent and other expenses at 7975 dollars representing a saving of 2700 dollar. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112, Letter August 16 1885.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, Letter June 23 1886.

²¹² The agency C.B. Richard & Co first booked as many passengers as possible for rival lines and then took on the head agency of Atlantic Line later known as the Prince Line (1897), Lloyd-Italiano (1905) with a service to the Mediterranean, the Christianson Line (1898) with a service from Copenhagen, Antwerp to New York and Baltimore, the Russian Volunteer Line (1906) with a service between Libau-Rotterdam-New York., the Austro-Americana (1904) with a line to Trieste and Fiume. Richards' first complaint came in 1898 against the Mediterranean Conference Lines and ended with the acceptance of the Prince Line in the conference. When taking on the agency of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, members of the Continental Conference constantly feared a new complaint by Richard. See G.A.R., H.A.L., 318.04, 72-76 and 221 – 226.

Taking over the control of the agent-network would prove much harder than anticipated. As the HAL grew, new offices were opened in key transit points on both sides of the Atlantic to coordinate the business.²¹³ Van den Toorn wanted to appoint someone above Krummeich, for all passage business on both sides of the Atlantic, in order to increase cohesion.²¹⁴ The New York head-agent replaced young passage personnel with more experienced men to better the relations with migrant agents. Contacts with western agents had deteriorated under Morris and were strengthened by personal visits.²¹⁵ Two ‘travelers’ were hired who visited the agents to discuss and control the business.²¹⁶ General Passage agents were appointed to control the sub-agents in specified districts.²¹⁷ The general agents were not allowed to book for other lines. On each passage booked by a sub-agent in their district they received a \$1 commission.²¹⁸ When discussing the takeover of the passage business, Van den Toorn reassured the directors that they might lose some agents, but not many because as they formed part of the continental shipping cartel, they were assured of having the best and most respectable agents. In the event that they stepped out of the shipping cartel, a wide network of maybe less solid but very active non-conference agents existed on which they could fall back on.²¹⁹

The figures for 1895 indicate that the number of agencies remained relatively stable with 577 agencies in the east, 595 in the west, 36 on the Pacific, and 56 in New York.²²⁰ Yet they do not include a wide network of unofficial runners and peddlers. As will be seen in the next chapter getting control over the passage business proved much harder than anticipated. The agents were able to exploit the rivalry among shipping lines

²¹³ Such as Amsterdam, Leipzig, Paris, Vienna in Europe and Chicago, Boston, St. Louis, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and New Orleans in the US.

²¹⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112, Letter February 8 1887.

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, Letter April 8 1886.

²¹⁶ They spent half the year traveling and the other half at the passage office in New York or Chicago because the company wanted to prevent personal from alienating with business policies. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters February 1 1886 and August 30 1895.

²¹⁷ Two for Western states, one for Pacific, one for New England territories and another one for Southern states.

²¹⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, Letter April 30 1885.

²¹⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt, 18/3, Letter November 21 1884.

²²⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 154, Report New York Office, 1895. By 1890, 3200 agents represented the HAPAG in the US; 1800 the RSL and 1500 the Anchor Line (Jones, 1992, 160). John M. Kirk of the Inman Line stated that they had 3400 agents in the US outside of New York. See New York Times: “Beginning their labors: The question of American Immigration” June 26 1888.

to increase their grip on the market. Van den Toorn quickly realized that measures to control the agents within the firm were insufficient. Shipping companies needed inter-firm collaboration through shipping conferences if they wanted to prevent their profits from ending up in other people's pockets.

Other than in Europe, these migrant brokers and agents did not need a concession from the authorities. In most European countries concessions were introduced to fight abuses against migrants. Yet, an increasing number of European countries started using the legislation regarding migrant transport to favor national companies. For instance, the German authorities moved to prohibit agents from booking for foreign lines but fearing diplomatic repercussions a concession was given to all major lines except the HAL.²²¹ Some German federal states had already banned the Dutch company from its turf during the 1880s, because a number of its brokers advertised the Line as the best route for people looking to evade their military obligations. At Dutch ports no military papers or passports were required (Bretting, 1991, 40-62). In the early 1890s the company successfully convinced some federal states, such as Württemberg and Sachsen to reappoint HAL agents. To retain the concession it was essential for the line to make sure that no agent had contracted illegal Germans. At times when concessions were withdrawn, the company still booked passengers from these regions through prepaid tickets. German authorities could do little in preventing the Dutch company from selling these tickets in US where a big part of the German bookings occurred. American agents sent instructions on how to evade German border controls and to migrate illegally through Rotterdam. Putting an end to this practice proved very difficult.

To control the American migrant agents or purchasers of prepaid tickets for these regions, the HAL insisted on sending the tickets or instructions directly. Everything had to be organized from the home office in Rotterdam, from where they contacted the passenger. Despite the company's efforts, agents persisted in their old habits. Rival lines made sure affidavits of this made their way to the German police that closely monitored the activities of the Line. The HAL never got rid off its reputation of assisting Germans

²²¹ Already in some German states as early as 1882 HAL agents started to lose their concessions. This law of 1897 favoring HAPAG and NGL which was probably their brainchild backfired against them when other European countries such as Italy, later used it as an example to promote their national lines to the disadvantage of the German lines (Murken, 1922).

to circumvent the national laws and therefore failed to obtain the concession under the German Emigration Act of 1897. That the exclusion of the HAL also favored the national lines involved in the migrant traffic probably also influenced the Reichstag's decision. The HAL relentlessly lobbied to redress the decision through the Dutch diplomatic representatives, their German trade partners and even ordered two new passenger ships from German shipbuilders – the first foreign company to do this - to regain the favor of the German government. The company even named the first ship *Potsdam*, yet the German authorities could not be convinced to adapt the laws. However, the American market provided possibilities of getting around European legislation by obstructing the traffic through certain routes.²²²

Prepaid tickets also provided steamship lines with effective means to circumvent laws restricting emigration from Europe. This proved useful for instance in Russia where agents had to work clandestinely yet the authorities could do little to impede the sale of prepaid tickets in America.²²³ Prepaid passengers made their way to Libau where Hoffmann & Bielby, provided them with the necessary government passports allowing their forwarding to the New World via the Holland America Line.²²⁴ The Austrian-Hungarian government even intercepted letters from America screening them for prepaid tickets. As a counter measure the HAL asked the Austrian-Hungarian agents in America to no longer contact the passenger themselves but to leave it up to the Rotterdam agency of the company. They then sent an order to the passenger along with the traveling instructions directly or through their Vienna-office.²²⁵

Prepaid tickets gave companies a means to circumvent both laws favoring the transport of migrants through national lines over foreign lines and laws restricting emigration from Europe. This further contributed to the growing importance of the American market in selling migrant transport. Some companies relied more heavily on prepaid passages than others depending on the legislation and the migration patterns of

²²² GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters March 14, October 18, 1894; GAR, HAL, 318.04, A1, Correspondence with Berlin office, Letter January 14 1898.

²²³ Especially after 1888 the Russian government made it hard for Jewish migrants to obtain passports. Officials abused their power to surcharge for the issue of a passport, the average price being twenty rubles or about ten dollars while it took three months to deliver. Migrant agents assisted in obtaining a passport or offering alternatives to evade the passport requirements (Diner, 1992, 43).

²²⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.04, NY Passage Department, 222, Letter October 24 1893.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, Letter March 24 1891.

their hinterland. The Holland America Line attracting business from the eastern hinterland was already showing patterns with above average percentages of prepaid passages and with increasingly restrictive measures strongly relied on its foreland to obtain its market share. The table dividing the migrants going through Rotterdam per nationality reflects the orientation of the HAL market. According to Murken the Holland America Line sold 50% of its tickets in the US (Murken, 1922, 47).²²⁶ The agents and migrant brokers supporting this system in the US, had no red tape to deal with to enter the migrant trade, leaving them under the exclusive control of the steamship lines. This control was particularly difficult to obtain in New York.

TABEL I: Emigration via Rotterdam according to their nationality 1887-1914²²⁷

| Year | Dutch | German | Austrian | Hungarian | Russian | American | Other | Total |
|------|-------|--------|----------|-----------|---------|----------|-------|-------|
| 1887 | 2659 | 3754 | 1135 | 0 | 314 | 822 | 2451 | 11135 |
| 1888 | 2162 | 3316 | 685 | 0 | 515 | 315 | 2616 | 9609 |
| 1889 | 5862 | 4378 | 397 | 421 | 743 | 700 | 2751 | 15252 |
| 1890 | 2057 | 2640 | 1589 | 946 | 1111 | 117 | 1439 | 9899 |
| 1891 | 3169 | 4985 | 2727 | 4314 | 7312 | 428 | 1737 | 24672 |
| 1892 | 5182 | 4860 | 1207 | 5729 | 2582 | 147 | 1284 | 20991 |
| 1893 | 4598 | 6737 | 11275 | 679 | 10826 | 301 | 1492 | 35908 |
| 1894 | 983 | 1748 | 3166 | 277 | 6072 | 128 | 659 | 13033 |
| 1895 | 1156 | 1737 | 2588 | 3012 | 5048 | 115 | 487 | 14143 |
| 1896 | 1251 | 1196 | 2587 | 2105 | 3633 | 31 | 260 | 11063 |
| 1897 | 611 | 804 | 1934 | 762 | 2599 | 75 | 220 | 7005 |
| 1898 | 746 | 959 | 4725 | 1751 | 3862 | 49 | 467 | 12559 |
| 1899 | 1227 | 951 | 6569 | 2301 | 6820 | 42 | 1052 | 18962 |
| 1900 | 1854 | 1938 | 7450 | 3072 | 13261 | 98 | 5708 | 33381 |
| 1901 | 1791 | 1874 | 5803 | 4506 | 14352 | 107 | 4472 | 32905 |
| 1902 | 2201 | 2251 | 8408 | 8026 | 19148 | 173 | 5328 | 45535 |
| 1903 | 2835 | 2571 | 8592 | 8439 | 24976 | 184 | 5233 | 52830 |

²²⁶ Murken does not specify on what documents he founded this statement nor to what period it applies. Yet the growing importance of the prepaid market is confirmed by the testimony of Emil Boas before the Ford congressional committee investigating the immigration question 1888 stating that about 40 percent of the company's business was in prepaid tickets. NGL also sold the same amount whereas prepaids constituted 33% of the Guion and National Line's business (see New York Times June 26 1888).

²²⁷ The numbers are based on the Emigration commission of Rotterdam which are published in the yearly communal reports of Rotterdam. Taken from Valk L. "Landverhuizers via Rotterdam in de negentiende eeuw" in: *Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch jaarboek* (Amsterdam, 1976 p. 165). 1) The figures up to 1892 do not reflect the total carryings by the HAL because up to that date the company also ran a service from Amsterdam. 2) Smaller companies also started to tap from Rotterdam during the following years: a) North Atlantic Transport Line b) Russian Volunteer Fleet c) Uranium Line Especially the last line was a serious competitor 3) HAL share of these based on the figures of westbound third class transport from the NDLV records shows the % of the total transported by the company (still to be added) 4) Van der Valk does not state what the source considered as migrants, only third class, seems most likely or second class as well?

| | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|
| 1904 | 2224 | 1446 | 5403 | 4391 | 31835 | 228 | 3489 | 49016 |
| 1905 | 1965 | 1511 | 6105 | 8809 | 34878 | 235 | 2071 | 55574 |
| 1906 | 2069 | 1354 | 4794 | 6587 | 31944 | 171 | 2002 | 48921 |
| 1907 | 3435 | 1729 | 8084 | 13794 | 27521 | 255 | 4484 | 59302 |
| 1908 | 1695 | 821 | 2681 | 1874 | 8269 | 373 | 1366 | 17079 |
| 1909 | 1600 | 1101 | 6131 | 6569 | 24506 | 409 | 3245 | 43561 |
| 1910 | 2605 | 1175 | 10206 | 5873 | 35290 | 439 | 5309 | 60897 |
| 1911 | 2165 | 865 | 9146 | 4182 | 20837 | 405 | 2773 | 40373 |
| 1912 | 1555 | 1315 | 11415 | 6949 | 39115 | 456 | 6585 | 67390 |
| 1913 | 1817 | 1958 | 17252 | 9312 | 44299 | 380 | 7452 | 82470 |
| 1914 | 1779 | 882 | 8276 | 3663 | 12567 | 3842 | 2336 | 33345 |

3.3) New York, capital of transatlantic passage sales: immigrant banks and their interests in the ocean passage market

Among the wide variety of professions represented in the American agent-network, bankers were by far, predominant. With a growing number of the migrants coming to the New World with as main objective acquiring savings, immigrant saving banks quickly multiplied. Selling ocean passages was a good way of attracting new clients managing their account, money transfers and currency exchanges (Wyman, 1993, 59-60). New York had a very high concentration of such ‘migrant bankers’ specializing in this business. Schulteis, in investigating the causes of migration in Italy for an official mission for Congress, claimed that a significant number of Italian bankers in New York advanced the money for the prepaid ticket- which migrants paid off with the first monies made in the US. These prepaid ticket blanks circulated ‘en masse’ in the US and were sold in installments as low as \$2 a month. Italian bankers had grown prosperous on the interest collected from the money advanced for prepaid tickets. Schulteis claimed that the prepaid system was used, on a large scale, by American employers to violate the contract labor laws, which prohibited the entrance of immigrants who had made previous arrangements for work. The inspector urged the authorities to prohibit the sale of prepaids (Schulteis, 1893, 32-34).

The *padrone*-system, a popular form of often indentured apprenticeships in the Mediterranean culture was exported to the US where labor agents, so-called padroni relied on chain migration patterns, traveled to Europe or used immigrant banks to recruit unskilled labor on contract at a fixed wage to then supply them to American employers.

They often advanced the money for the crossing and by the turn of the century the system was established in the US. Many of the initial Italians who migrated to the US, did so on credit tickets in a form of debt peonage which was also well established in the Italian culture (Erickson, 1976, 216-17; Gabaccia, 2002, 62-65; Jones, 1992, 164).²²⁸ Few of these recruitments happened under formal contracts of indenture, conversely to what restrictionist led the public to believe. Yet, despite the tendency of contemporary accounts to overstress the influence of new world employers and the transport sector on migrant flows pressing for immigration restrictions, Schulteis' report sheds some light on a much neglected side-industry profiting from migration – the banking world.

Maybe the scale on which employers and banks advanced the money for the crossing is exaggerated, yet the institutionalization of the practice shows that it was well established. These Italian bankers / migrant agents, concentrated in Mulberry Street in New York, controlled an important part of the Mediterranean market. This system of advancing money for prepaids was also common on the Continental market. Especially Jewish bankers/ migrant agents got their hands on this market concentrating in Grand and Canal Street.²²⁹ Due to the fierce competition for the trade they relied on a wide network of runners and peddlers bringing in new clients. Peddlers and runners received part of the commission and to increase their sales migrant agents often returned the other part as a discount to the purchaser. As Van den Toorn noted they sold tickets with a profit margin as low as 25 cent in order to do the money exchange for the passengers. Yet due to keen competition the profit margin on these had been drastically reduced as well. The primary goal was to get their hands on savings or on the remittances sent to Europe to practice usury.²³⁰

Van den Toorn divided the Canal Street bankers involved in migrant business into two groups. On one hand, there were bankers who only issued tickets when the full amount was paid. On the other there were bankers who worked with scalpers and peddlers selling passages on credit allowing the relatives, friends or another third party to pay for the crossing in installments. Five to six dollars was enough to buy a ticket on

²²⁸ According to Jones the active recruitment of padrones in Italy declined after the 1890's. The padrones became mere employment agents. The padrone-system was also adopted by Greeks and Syrians (Jones, 1992, 164-165).

²²⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Passage Department, Letter November 11 1892.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, Letters April 3 1888 and May 15 1891.

credit. Such agents became dependent of peddlers recovering the money to bring in the necessary cash.²³¹ Frequently such agents went bankrupt and disappeared leaving important outstanding debts with the steamship lines.²³² Just as Schulteis had done, Van den Toorn reported to the board that in some places of the American interior orders were bought on directions of private persons or firms but part of the ticket was paid for by the migrant in Europe. Industrialists advanced the money for the crossing of future employees.²³³

The system of prepaid tickets also favored speculation by these agents.²³⁴ The prepaid tickets were valid for a year, thus when prices were low, especially during rate wars, the agents ordered prepaid blanks in bulk writing these out to fictive people. When prices increased these were sold with extra profit margin. If prices dropped or tickets could not be sold in time the agents' loss was limited to the 5% cancellation fee. As the migrant brokers extended their networks on both sides of the Atlantic and the competition among agents increased, cheaper European cash rate orders started to circulate in the US. Ocean passage rates in Europe were lower than prepaid rates and the commissions were higher, resulting in an important difference of net rates on both sides of the continent. Jewish migrant brokers in Hamburg opened branch offices in New York or collaborated with well-established American brokers and started issuing their own passage orders drawn on the European houses at cash rates. Such orders were then exchanged for European cash rate tickets by migrant brokers in Hamburg.²³⁵ The difference between prepaid and cash rate balanced between \$3 and \$5 during the 1880s allowing the brokers to seriously undercut the prepaid price.²³⁶ Slowly but surely the practice spread across the

²³¹ *Ibid.*, Letter May 15 1891.

²³² To protect themselves companies substituted prepaid blanks with receipt books to prevent agents from disappearing with unaccounted for prepaid blanks. *Ibid.*, Letters February 19 1889 and April 24 1891.

²³³ *Ibid.*, Letter July 5 1893.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, Letter May 15 1891.

²³⁵ This practice was also used by the Italian bankers of Mulberry Street, see NYT "Beginning their labors: The question of American Immigration" June 26 1888.

²³⁶ This estimate is based on the repeated calls to increase the cash rate and decrease the prepaid rate by a combined amount of two to five dollars. In January 1890 the difference on net ocean rates was 4,7\$ with prepaids at 19\$ while Hamburg cash rates were at 60 Mark. This difference was only gradually reduced. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters January 20 1890 and July 15 1892. Ottmüller-Wetzel misinterpreted Murken as would he have stated that prepaid prices tended to be 20 to 40 Marks lower than cash rates in Europe. This price difference applied to return rates being lower than the westbound rates.

US. Orders drawn on European houses, at cash rates, drove out the prepaid tickets.²³⁷ The keen rivalry among shipping companies allowed the migrant brokers to play out the lines against each other. Instead of uniting their strengths to increase their grip on the migrant brokers, shipping lines paid out extra commissions and all kinds of other facilities spurring the development of the order-system to gain the favor the brokers. Conference rules supposedly stimulating the collaboration between the lines to control the agent-network were flagrantly violated.

The HAL could not avoid this evolution spoiling Van den Toorn's plans of taking control over the passage business in the US. Van den Toorn was forced to start a close collaboration with the Hamburg migrant broker Louis Scharlach "Banking Exchange, Passage Forwarding, Insurance and Foreign Express Company". He belonged to the class of migrant bankers who only issued tickets when the full amount was paid. The firm opened offices in Hamburg and New York and started forwarding passengers from the German port to Rotterdam. The transport between the ports cost \$2.25 while the price differential with regular HAPAG and NGL steamers was \$3 and \$5 for express service. The differential of the cheapest direct service of HAPAG was only \$1. Thus, if adding the railroad fare, the passage through Rotterdam imposed extra travel and cost \$1.25 more than the lowest class of HAPAG steamers. This undermines the assumption that passengers traveled through the cheapest and most convenient route. It also underlines the importance of the migrant agents and brokers in persuading purchasers of ocean passage to travel through certain routes.

This explains why the lines went to great lengths to win over these migrant brokers and agents for the company through free passages, special diners on board of ships etc. Yet the relations built up over the years with American agents deteriorated as Scharlach gained control of the companies' third-class passage business. American agents had to establish contacts with migrant brokers such as Scharlach to get their hands on cash orders and alienated from the steam shipping companies. This happened with the company's consent giving Scharlach 'carte blanche' to use all possible means to attract as many passengers as possible. The board of directors deplored this evolution but claimed

²³⁷ Sources indicate that at least as early as 1885 orders circulated in the US and that by 1888 they did on a large scale.

that the practices of rival lines forced them to follow suit if they wanted to remain competitive. The Red Star Line gave the same facilities to S. Jarmulowsky while the North German Lloyd entrusted most of their business to Friedrich Missler. Besides the disadvantage of alienating agents from the company it also had a negative effect on the reputation of Rotterdam. The indirect migration through Hamburg contributed to the development of a rival port, while obstructing the promotion of Rotterdam as a migrant gateway.²³⁸

The directors of the HAL were aware that the Hamburg migrant brokers with their local interest in boarding houses, banks, etc. had no intention of forwarding the migrants directly to Rotterdam on the long run. Therefore the collaboration with Hamburg brokers threatened to create migration patterns directing the bigger part of the relocators to the German port. Hence the company also started to collaborate with another Jewish migrant broker, Bruno Weinberger, who belonged to the class of bankers selling passages on installments. The HAL took the financial risk of working with this category of bankers on the condition that he would forward his passengers directly to Rotterdam. Van den Toorn added another condition revealing how the Hamburg migrant brokers extended their networks to direct passengers where they wanted. The New York head-agent of the Dutch Line had to specify that the company consented to bribe but not to swindle or extort border agents.²³⁹ The Jewish migrant brokers corrupted the business on both sides of the Atlantic increasing their grip on the market to the detriment of the shipping companies.²⁴⁰

Of all shipping companies the HAPAG suffered most from the activities of the Jewish brokers, who increased the indirect passage through the company's home port. Because of the lack of the lack of coordination among shipping lines in regaining control of the business, Ballin decided to attack the Jewish migrant brokers at the heart of their business. The HAPAG passage business in New York was still in the hands of the

²³⁸ Ideally ports tried to attract passengers directly over land. However, it always took the companies some time before getting known in new out-migration regions and to organize the routes appointing agents at transit points to guide passengers. Especially, when they had to direct passengers from regions where rival ports had geographical advantages. Rotterdam had the extra difficulty for Eastern European passengers of only having a concession to appoint agents for the transit in Leipzig. The concession in Berlin had been withdrawn in 1883. Moreover, HAPAG and Hamburg migrant brokers excelled in bribing eastern European border guards. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-224, 1887-1897.

²³⁹ *Ibid.* 221, September 16 1889.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 222, August 5 1892.

banking and passage office C.B. Richard & Company. They opened a bank and passage office in Canal Street to directly compete with the Jewish brokers.²⁴¹ The HAL contemplated to doing the same but their connections with the Jewish community were not strong enough to find a person of trust to run the business.²⁴²

Van den Toorn then suggested launching themselves on the money transfer market. People buying prepaid tickets often transferred money for the extra costs for the crossing. Moreover, the transfer market was the best way of advertising to potential clients. By including advertisements of the company with the money transfer, in countries where this was not prohibited, they would reach people who were most likely to migrate. Van den Toorn suggested that migrants were likely to travel with the company they first heard of. Schumacher & Company head-agent of the Baltimore NGL, White Star Line, Guion Line and Red Star Line had done so with success. Richard & Company was even doing big business with these.²⁴³ Moreover, if the increasing anti-immigration movement in America as confirmed by the Stump Bill trying to hinder the prepaid system should prevent the sale of prepaids, they risked losing ground on competitors who were involved in the money transfer market. Some also preferred to transfer money instead of buying prepaid tickets, especially when prices were high. The directors agreed to do a test in Germany, Switzerland, Austrian-Hungarian Empire, France and the Netherlands.²⁴⁴ Ballin also concluded special agreements with migrant agents at the Prussian-Russian frontier and with the Jewish Aid Society of Berlin where most Russian passengers called for help while in transit, to counter the migrant brokers. However, Ballin realized that the most efficient way to purge the ticket sale was by increasing unity among shipping lines.

4) Conclusion

In short reducing the activities of migrant brokers and agents to mere travel agencies arranging a trip to the New World greatly underestimates their role in the European exodus. Part III will go more into detail as to the profile of the American

²⁴¹ *Ibid.* 221, Letter August 12 1890.

²⁴² *Ibid.* 222, Letter May 15 1891.

²⁴³ According to Van den Toorn, Richard was wiring back 8,500,000\$ to Europe every year. *Ibid.*, 222, Letter July 25 1891.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 222, Letters July 25 and September 23 1892.

migrant agent, the various services offered and the close connections with the banking world. The difficulties of major shipping lines in controlling the market of migrant transport refute the assumption that those agents and brokers have lost their influence on the market with the transition from sail to steam. Conversely, increased rivalry among shipping lines allowed Jewish brokers to prosper as they never had before. The next chapter analyzes how shipping companies tried to neutralize the competition among each other through conference agreements and how by doing so they tried to control the agent-network. The horizontal collaboration in the form of cartels was typical for the steam shipping industry. Business historians have emphasized that in this sector the logical vertical integration did not follow (Chandler, 1977, 189-192; Boyce, 1995, 6 and 2001, 15). Yet the analysis of the HAL seems to weaken this argument somewhat as it shows clear signs of vertical integration which were more pronounced in the passenger than in freight business. By taking the passenger trade into its own hands and by opening an increasing number of company offices at key transit points on both sides of the Atlantic the Dutch Line tried to move forward into the market. Yet to do so and to acquire the control over the agent-network the collaboration of other steamship lines was required, especially in the US where in the absence of legislation they had much scope to operate. As will be argued in the following chapter and part III, the success of passenger conferences significantly influenced the structures of the companies and their tendencies towards vertical integration.

Chapter III: Competition and collusion: the growing pains of shipping conferences.

1) Introduction: Price fixing and price fluctuations on the North Atlantic

The introduction of steamships on the transatlantic route had a major impact on the traffic of goods and people in the Atlantic world. Organizational and technological improvements in shipping sharply decreased freight rates (North, 1958, 538-555; Harley, 1988, 851-876). This decline was the main factor for the convergence of the commodity market before 1914 (Williamson and Hatton, 1998). On the contrary to freight rates, we have little information on nineteenth century transatlantic passenger fares yet based on

circumstantial evidence it has been assumed by historians that the real price for passenger transport remained stable in the long run (Williamson and Hatton, 1998; Hyde, 1975; Keeling, 1999). This stability is generally ascribed to the organization of steamship lines in conferences fixing prices and regulating competition. Only during periodic rate wars among steam shipping companies was the price brought down to two pounds. Keeling reconstructed yearly averages for the Cunard Line from Liverpool to New York showing that prices on the North Atlantic route fluctuated from three to six pounds between 1885 and 1914 (Keeling, 1999b, 65-66).²⁴⁵ The other incomplete series reconstructed by Hvidt for the same period reflects the same tendency (Hvidt, 1971). The extent to which prices can be called stable with this information is debatable. Based on the fact that rate wars triggered by depressed business conditions did not result in a direct increase of migrant volume the influence of the transport price on migration flows has been minimized (Brattne, 1976; Williamson and Hatton, 1998; Keeling, 1999; Thomas, 1956). Yet, none of these studies have considered how the market was organized or what elements influenced the price fixing of North Atlantic passage. These studies only mention when conference agreements were at work, but not how they worked or how effective they were.

This chapter will try to shed more light on how this Atlantic market, divided into prepaid tickets sold in the US and 'European cash rates' placed in sale in Europe was organized through shipping conferences. As the migrant fever spread across Europe, the market was sub-divided into three regions; the British-Scandinavian, the Continental and Mediterranean market (Murken, 1922). The activities of the New York Continental Conference regulating the prepaid business is analyzed here using the Conference Minutes and the correspondence between the head-agent in New York and the board of directors of the Holland America Line, one of the four members of the conference. The minutes allow the reconstruction of a price series of westbound prepaid tickets and eastbound return tickets of four continental steam shipping companies running lines to New York between 1885 and 1895; the Red Star Line (RSL) from Antwerp, the Hamburg

²⁴⁵ C. Harley actually preceded Keeling in reconstructing these averages for Cunard Line showing the same fluctuations (Harley, 1990). The rate of exchange used by bankers in 1909 was \$4,866 to the pound. Hvidt used an exchange rate of \$6 to pound, hence roughly the prices varied from \$14,5 to \$36 (Dillingham Commission Reports, vol. 37, 1911, 242 and Hvidt, 1971).

America Line (HAPAG), North German Lloyd (NGL) from Bremen and the Holland America Line (HAL) from Rotterdam. The minutes provide further details on ways through which the conference tried to neutralize internal and external competition. Yet, much more revealing is the correspondence between the head-agent and the board of directors which gives an inside look on the organization of passenger business. Greenhill pointed to the difficulties of the dispersed location of the different ports in analyzing the conference dynamics. The meetings left very little written sources with which to analyze the strategies behind the agreements, explaining why literature on shipping conferences is rather sparse (Greenhill, 1998, 55).

Conversely to Europe where board of directors involved in migrant trade were spread over the continent, the head offices in the US concentrated around Broadway. Not having the problem of disperse location conference meetings could easily be held whenever needed. Since most of the decisions of the New York Continental Conference were pending of the approval from the directors and depended on regulations of the European cash business, it generated a dense correspondence. Like the work of Genesove and Mullin on the Sugar cartel, the correspondence provides insights into the reasoning behind firm's actions and what mattered during the negotiations to reach an agreement (Genesove and Mullin, 2001, 379-398). The success of the New York Continental Conference in regulating competition will be analyzed. Attention will be divided between external and internal pressures on the conference. What factors influenced the price fixing on the North Atlantic Route? What did the competition center upon? How successful was the conference in fixing prices?

2) Shipping conferences on long distance routes: their real origins?

Shipping conferences or rings are collusive agreements to mitigate competition and iron out the effects of trade fluctuations, primarily to regulate prices and market shares. They are among the earliest cartels in international trade (Ville, 1990, 95; Marx, 1953, 3). The origins are generally ascribed to the need of shipping companies to ease the pressures of destructive competition cutting in prices and profits caused by overcapacity on a certain route (Greenhill, 1998, 58-59). The first shipping conference has generally

been agreed to be the UK-Calcutta Conference regulating the tea trade established in 1875 (Deakin and Seward, 1973 1-3; Marx, 1953, 46; Ville, 1990, 95). The practice quickly spread and is still in use today, more than 150 conferences were operative in 2001 (Sjostrom, 2004, 82).

Research on conference-systems has concentrated on freight transport, neglecting the impact it had on passenger transport.²⁴⁶ In fact, the only substantial research on shipping rings regulating passenger traffic from Erik Murken dates back to 1922. Murken analyzed the in 1892 established Nord Atlantische Dampfer Linien Verband between RSL, HAL, NGL and HAPAG. The NDLV subsequently made arrangements with other conferences which by 1914 grew out to twelve separate agreements between 30 lines carrying passengers on the North Atlantic (Murken, 1922). The sparse research led to the misconception that conferences on the North Atlantic only appeared around that time, yet as seen in previously already during the 1850s the competition between steamshipping companies pushed them into collusion. When discussing Sloan's analysis of the cartel between Collins and Cunard Williams stated: "*perhaps its significance lies in the field of national rivalry, for it does not have much significance in the history of cartels: the agreement did not last long, ensure successful operations, or set a precedent*" (Williams, 1999, 206). But didn't the Cunard and Collins agreement set a precedent?

Up to 1914 the North Atlantic was the busiest long distance route where steam shipping competition was the keenest and technological innovation was first introduced. Cunard's hope to control the steam shipping traffic became idle in the 1850s when the opening of new lines from continental ports boomed. But worse was the growing competition in the nearby port of Glasgow with the Allan Line (1854) and Anchor Line (1856), and in the home port of Liverpool where besides the Inman Line, the Guion Line (1862), National Line (1863) and White Star Line (1869) started services to New York. Falkus argued that the very dominance of the British merchant marine on long distance routes brought these conferences into life (Falkus, 1990). This concentration in Liverpool

²⁴⁶ One notable exception is the attempt made by Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak in a working paper "Passenger Shipping cartels and their effect on transatlantic migration" (Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak, 2001). They concluded that for the period 1899-1914 shipping conferences reduced the migrant flow by at least a fifth which clearly contradicts the above mentioned conception as would shipping companies and the price for the crossing only have a minor impact on the migrant flows. Their findings will be tested in the following part.

unarguably facilitated negotiations. Early on, a Liverpool Steamship owners Association was established to defend common interests (Hyde, 1975, 94). Non-economical variables such as group cohesion based on same social background and locality, being clustered in the same port Liverpool or Glasgow ensured stability and facilitated the formation and working of conferences (Greenhill, 1998, 66-67). Boyce illustrated the importance of personal networks and inter-firm communication for the expansion of British maritime enterprises (Boyce, 1995).

The agreement between the Cunard Line and Collins Line had been beneficial for the English Company. Once the transition to include migrant berths on ships was completed, than why would Cunard not seek to build on the previous experience? Hyde found indirect evidence that by 1868 a conference agreement, fixing freight rates and minimum passenger fares was concluded between the Glasgow and Liverpool steamshipping companies. By 1870 those companies practically monopolized the passenger traffic by steam on the North Atlantic route and organized themselves in the North Atlantic Passenger Steam Traffic Conference (Aldcroft, 1974, 289; Hvidt, 1978, 193; Hyde, 1975, 94). The boom in steamship building early 1870's completed the transition from sail to steam (Cohn, 2005, 469-495).

However, Cohn argued that up to the 1870s the demand for new steamships lagged behind the passenger demand and also that the price for steerage berth on steamers balanced between 5 and 7 pounds for the period 1855-1875 (Cohn, 2005, 483). This seems to remove the main reasons for the establishment of conferences, namely increased competition which creates excess capacity and lower prices. So then what other than locality and personal networks explains the establishment of the conference? The reason for it can be found in the specific characteristics of the migrant market itself. Boyce underlined the co-operative dimension of conferences, its importance to shape relations between shippers and shipowners and amongst shipowners, criticizing economists for focusing on market power and cost/service driven necessity of conference regulation (Boyce 1995, 161). The major difference between the shipment of cargo and migrants is that the former is supplied by shippers in the port while the latter was provided by a wide network of migrant brokers, agents and subagents which spread on both sides of the Atlantic. Models explaining the viability of conferences are based upon a common

interest between shippers and ship owners (Pirrong, 1992, 89-131; Sjoström, 2004, 88-95).

This was not the case between the migrant agent-network and shipowners. These go-betweens worked on a commission basis and were employed by various shipping companies. Lines were not able to obtain exclusivity of sales from agents.²⁴⁷ If the demand for crossing the Atlantic was not very price sensitive, as some claimed and that increased competition yielded higher commissions migrant agents had no reason to favor a stable market- and instead profited from higher commissions during rate wars. Therefore, a plausible explanation as to the main incentive for passenger liners to organize themselves in conferences was to control the broad agent-network. Hvidt pointed to the in 1871 published 'Yellow Book' of the North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference containing regulations for Danish migrant agents. He also found evidence that they appointed migrant brokers in Copenhagen who organized themselves in a sub-conference regulating the local business and reporting to the main body in Liverpool (Hvidt, 1978, 193).

Research in the HAL-archives disclosed that the first conference of British lines regulating the American market of prepaid and return tickets goes back to 1872 with the establishment of the New York North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference. The various agreements between British lines controlling the traffic from the British Isles, Scandinavia and gaining grounds on the continent concerned the organization of the agent network and transport prices. From the 1860s onwards, the German companies Hamburg America Line and North German Lloyd pierced through the British dominance of transatlantic steam-shipping. All other lines of various nationalities, which were subsequently established, never made up the backlog on the biggest German and British firms. The competition for the trade organized itself around this rivalry. To strengthen its competitive position the German companies tried to unite lines transporting migrants directly from the European mainland to the US in similar conference agreements as their

²⁴⁷ The archive research did not produce clear answers on why companies could not impose exclusivity of sales of subagents. A probable explanation could be that the sales for one company could not generate enough business to convince agents and subagents to enter the business. Possibly only the combined sales of different companies made it worthwhile, keeping people motivated to sell ocean passage.

British rivals. This resulted, among other agreements in the establishment of the New York Continental Conference regulating the migrant transport market in the US.

3) The establishment of the New York Continental Conference and the organization of the American third class passage market

The increased competition for the migrant transport and the experience of the slump (1873-1879) creating overcapacity on the North Atlantic favored collusion. Keeling pointed out that the incentives for cartelization in migrant transport proved to be stronger than freight transport because the underlying demand was both more sensitive to economic swings and less dependent on transport prices. Economic downturns had bigger impacts on the migrant flows than on freight movements (Keeling, 1999a, 199). This first lasting continental conference was established in 1885 and tried to unite the lines transporting migrants directly from the European mainland to the US. The conference in New York was the result of a parallel agreement signed by the directors of the companies to regulate the business on the old continent. The HAPAG, NGL, RSL and HAL had already tried to join forces in 1883, but direct outside competition of the Carr Line in Hamburg and the White Cross Line in Antwerp saw it fall apart after a few months.²⁴⁸ Under the pressure of dropping migration rates in 1884 and 1885 the North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference dissolved as well (Hyde, 1975, 103).²⁴⁹ A general rate war broke out making prepaid prices fall from approximately \$20 to anywhere between \$6 and \$12.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Unfortunately the minutes of the first conference have not been preserved. A letter of Van den Toorn to the board of directors on November 23 1883 referred that the agreement was not beneficial for the members and on the verge of being dissolved. Carr Line and White Cross Line were quoting lower rates and paying higher commissions luring away the passengers from the members. Van den Toorn mentioned that H.A.P.A.G. respected the agreements but that Red Star Line cheated to protect its share. The Le Havre based Compagnie Generale Transatlantique did not join the first agreement. GAR, HAL, 318.02, 112-121, General Correspondence, Letter November 21 1883. Ottmüller-Wetzel mentions another attempt in 1884 including the Carr line without the CGT and HAPAG but because of the inland tariffs of the H.A.L. the agreement could not be carried out (Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 153).

²⁴⁹ The Conference was dissolved in March 1884 and reorganized under the North Atlantic Passenger Conference in Januari 1886 with a provisional agreement. A previous agreement on outward rates was reached in July 1885.

²⁵⁰ Van den Toorn mentions gross prices of twelve dollars for the HAL and ten dollars for the German Lines GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter January 16 1886. Huldermann even quotes rates as low as six dollars, however he does not specify whether these were net or gross rates (Huldermann, 1922).

In the meantime HAPAG started negotiations to takeover the Carr Line. As the market recovered at the end of the 1870s new steam shipping companies were founded. After taking over the Adler Line two new lines opened a service from Hamburg to New York the Union Line and Carr Line. Especially in the latter, HAPAG found a serious contender for the migrant traffic. In 1885, the three lines reached an agreement which saw Albert Ballin who had managed the passage business for the Carr Line, make his entry into the HAPAG. With the agreement some of the external pressures on the conference were relieved allowing the Continental Conference to be renewed. Under the impulse of Ballin the conference system later expanded to include the entire North Atlantic traffic (Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 150-157).²⁵¹

After long negotiations the Continental Conference reorganized in May 1885.²⁵² Minimum differential rates were fixed based on the quality of the service that the lines offered (see appendix 3). The HAL, having the oldest and slowest steamers on the New York route, obtained differentials to their advantage. The RSL service to Philadelphia and the NGL service to Baltimore were taken up in the agreement.²⁵³ Rates were lower on these less popular routes. The fares could only be changed if the differentials were maintained. Prices quoted were gross ocean fares, including the agent's commission. Charges for inland travel could not be included and rate sheets of continental inland fares had to be sent to the secretary. Meetings were held monthly, except if a special one was called in between. Decisions had to be made unanimously. The agent commission was set at \$3 covering all expenses except advertising in newspapers. Each company appointed general Agents for the Pacific coast, Western States and Southern states defending the company's interests with the agents of the area in exchange for one dollar commission on every ticket sold in their districts. Discounts, commissions, or allowances of any descriptions to influence passengers were not allowed. The cancellation fee for a ticket

²⁵¹ In 1885 the HAPAG negotiated the takeover of the Carr Line. In the end the Carr Line merged with the Union Line which came to a pooling agreement with the HAPAG in 1886 (Ottmüller-Wetzel, 1986, 150-158).

²⁵² Already in December 1884 a draft was drawn up for the reorganization of the conference. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, Continental Conference minutes, Meeting March 29 1886, Minute 200.

²⁵³ All lines were allowed to book passengers at agreed ocean rates to and from Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York. This means that the HAL was allowed to give free railroad transport from and to New York to Boston, Baltimore and Philadelphia which cut the edge of the competition between those ports. This obviously cut in the profits of the shipping company to the advantage of the migrants.

was set a five percent. Circulars to agents could not contain comparisons with other members nor could a newspaper that attacked a line be supported by a member.

Every breach was reported to the Secretary who if necessary passed the complaint on to the Arbitrator William Booker, British consul in New York. He enjoyed the same powers which were entrusted to him as such by the North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference. Booker was empowered to look into the books of the companies. The costs for investigating complaints were covered by a special fund raised by the members. His decision was final and \$1000 had to be deposited as a bond. The agreement was valid for six months, and withdrawal was possible with one month notice.²⁵⁴ Finally the secretary had to notify the former members of the North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference of the reorganization of the Continental Conference. If they advanced steerage rates on the basis of \$25 rate and fix the commission on \$2 for their British, Scandinavian and Continental business alike, increase the childrens rate by charging adult fares from years ans upward instead of twelve and charge infants \$2 instead \$1, they would do the same.²⁵⁵

A circular followed to the agents notifying them of new regulations which predominantly tried to make agents adhere to the Conference rules. No returns or divisions of the commission could be given nor could improper inducements be held out to purchasers of tickets. Agents were prohibited from engaging sub- agents dividing the commission with them. The actual amount received for passage money had to be entered on the ticket and no credit could be given to the purchaser. Shipping companies only paid commission on the actual issue of the ticket and the direct receipt by the agents of the passage money. Agents were not allowed to issue certificates, orders or tickets for prepaid passage drawn on or advised to any person or company other than the lines actually employing such agent. The selling of tickets was restricted to a certain area preventing agents from invading each others territory and preventing them from sending their tickets to New York or any other place for sale. Violations of other agents had to be reported with proofs to the secretary. The punishment depending on the infraction could

²⁵⁴ This was brought to two months meeting 14-4-1887 and changed on 25-5-1890 to sliding periods of fifteen days if only one, ten days when two and a week if three companies or more gave notice of withdrawal. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, meetings April 14 1887 and May 25 1890.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Meeting May 15 1885 "Articles of an agreement entered into by and between the managers of the Continental Lines for the purpose of regulating rates of passage and the business connected therewith." and minutes 1-27 of the Continental Conference.

vary from a minimum fine equal to the amount of the ticket to the disqualification of the agents. Agents at default would be disqualified and lines agreed not to engage any dismissed or disqualified agents.

4) The working of the Continental Conference up to the formation of the NDLV

The evolution of the ocean fare serves as a good indicator for the success of the conference. To what extent were they able to augment prices? To do so, applying Osborne's model to this case the cartel had to overcome both external as internal pressures. The external problem boils down to the extent to which were they able to predict and limit the market share of outsiders to keep the agreements viable? Internal problems were first to find a workable and profitable contract surface; second make sure that the agreement approximates expected shares for each member, third the ability to detect cheating and fourth means to deter cheating. For both Osborne and Stigler the detection of cheating played a crucial role in collusion. Secret violations of the agreement, especially in the form of price cuts gave shipping lines the possibility of increasing their market share. According to Stigler, if means of detection are weak then prices will not be able go much above the competitive level reducing inducements of price cutting to minimum. The basic method of detection is to note when price cutters are obtaining business which a line otherwise did not obtain (Osborne, 1976, 835-844 and Stigler, 1964, 44-61). Information on the market share of each line was readily available as American ports registered all third class passengers coming in. The fluctuation in sales of migrant agents in certain regions also served as a serious indicator. Yet the biggest problem was to obtain proof that the increased share was obtained by cheating. What will follow is an analysis of the external and internal pressures during the first seven years of the cartel which aimed at fixing prices and controlling the agent-network up to the formation of the NDLV when the continental traffic was divided in quotas.

4.1) Harmonizing the external pressures

4.1.1) The connections between British-Scandinavian, Continental and Mediterranean markets

The external pressures on the conference were considerable. The European migrant market was divided in three sub-markets; the British-Scandinavian, the Continental and the Mediterranean (see appendix 4). The British-Scandinavian market was predominantly in the hands of the British lines. They managed to prevent foreign lines from taking significant numbers of British and Irish migrants from their home ports (Murken, 1922, 58).²⁵⁶ This internal market covered the major part of the revenues of the British lines. They had a strong foothold in the Scandinavian market through long established feeder services, such as the Hull based Wilson Line (Brattne, 1976, 176-202; Evans, 2007, 52-55; Hyde, 1975, 60-62).²⁵⁷ Despite the geographical advantages and efforts of the German lines and the Copenhagen based Thingvalia Line to increase their market share, the majority of Scandinavians preferred traveling with British ships. The big advantage of the British lines on the Continental lines the protection of their own market while having a foothold on the Continental market.

The strong trade relations between Hamburg and England during the early years of mass migration transformed Hamburg into the most important hub for indirect transatlantic migration through English ports from the continent (Engelsing, 1961; Gelberg, 1973, 10-13).²⁵⁸ The ties between migrant brokers and agents in Liverpool and

²⁵⁶ Murken states that the British Board of trade imposed foreign ships transporting migrants from the British Isles to be built according to the standards of the Passenger Act. They had to possess a Board Trade Certificate and go through extensive time consuming controls before every sailing. These inspections blocked out the foreign lines. Murken however fails to explain why the American Line was exempted from that rule (Murken, 1922, 58). Also the NGL used Southampton as port of call and even obtained British mail subsidies in 1874. Furthermore Aldcroft suggests that a special agreement was concluded in 1886 allowing the HAPAG to take passengers from British ports (Aldcroft, 1968, 348-49). The archives of the Holland America Line do however point out that it resulted very difficult for Continental Lines to attract British passengers. The archive research indicates that during rate wars efforts to attack the British Lines on their home market centered on the Eastbound return route. Only during the 1894-1895 rate war did the HAPAG mention controls impeding the Continental Lines from boarding British steerage passengers on the Westbound Route. The Scandinavian market was a much easier target for the German Lines to attack the British Lines. Further research is needed however to shed light on the reasons why on the Westbound route the British internal market seemed impenetrable for Continental Lines.

²⁵⁷ The Wilson Line would later also provide a feeder service from Libau from where many continental passengers, mainly Russian Jews, migrated indirectly through England to the U.S.

²⁵⁸ Unlike Bremen the Hamburg authorities initially opposed the migrant trade. Only during the 1840's did the Hamburg merchants realize the importance of the trade (see part I). The lag of interest for the direct transatlantic transport from Hamburg and the long established trade relations between British ports and the Hanse town favored indirect migration. The indirect migration through Rotterdam quickly

Hamburg were well established and institutionalized by British and Hamburg Senate laws.²⁵⁹ These ties constituted the achilles heel of the Continental Conference. During the 1880s, indirect migration from the German port via England often totaled 50 percent or more of the number traveling directly (Moltmann, 1989, 314). Although the continental traffic only represented a small percentage of the total business of British lines, it allowed them to constantly pressure the Continental lines which were to a large extent dependent of the goodwill of the British lines to raise their prices or lower commissions for the continental traffic.²⁶⁰

At that time the Mediterranean market coincided with the Italian market which was starting to pick up. Some lines, such as Fabre Line and Italian Line, opened a direct service to New York. Other British and Continental lines also tried to lure those Italians to their ports. Especially the CGT which drew migrants mainly from South-West Germany and Switzerland with special railroad services saw the Italian market as the most natural territory to expand (de Vannoise-Pochulu, 1993, 10-17). The company increasingly centered its efforts on the Mediterranean and Oriental market which boomed from the 1890s to 1914 attracting English and German lines to open direct services from there.²⁶¹ At one of the first meetings of the continental conference it was decided that direct and indirect lines should try to unite in a Mediterranean conference to fix through rates to these points.²⁶² The Mediterranean conference was formed in November 1885.²⁶³

decreased once the Holland America Line was established (Van der Valk, 1976, 162). The Inman had to stop its feeder service from Antwerp immediately after the opening of the Red Star Line (Flyhart, 2000, 113). However, the HAPAG which grew out to be the biggest shipping company worldwide was never able to make an end to the indirect migration through its homeport (Broeze, 1992, 1-3).

²⁵⁹ Passage brokers and emigration agents in Liverpool needed to get a certificate from the authorities agreeing to abide the English laws. For those who worked with brokers in Hamburg, a copy had to be deposited with the Hamburg consul agreeing to abide both Hamburg Senate and English laws from 1855 onwards. Contracts were made between Michols & Co from Liverpool with Morris & Co in Hamburg, Sable & Searle with L. Scharlach & Co, S. Stern with Falck & Co, W. Inman with J. Kirsten, Hartmann with O. Moeller, D. Mac Iver with G. Hirschmann, Magnus Ballin with Morris & Co, Hamburg Staatsarchiv, Consulaat Liverpool: Auswanderungsangelegenheiten 1851-68 nr 8.

²⁶⁰ In 1894 the British Market-share of steerage passengers consisted of 70% English and Irish, 22% Scandinavian and 8% Continental passengers. 1894 was a year with low migration and a rate war was going on between the Continental lines and the British lines hence the efforts to attract continental passengers were considerable during that year. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 223, Letter May 9 1894.

²⁶¹ Most Italians initially came from the North and reached huge numbers once the movement spread to the South. Greeks and Syrians soon followed.

²⁶² GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter January 16 1886 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, Meeting May 25 1885, minute 41.

The reason for the Continental lines to organize the Mediterranean market was its dependence of the stability of other markets to be able to raise continental fares. If rates for Italian destinations differed too much from the continent than Swiss and Austrians may choose that route instead of going through continental ports. If Scandinavian rates were lower than continental rates than Germans and Poles would be booked at the lowest price. If the rate difference between the continent and British Isles was too big, continentals traveled to Liverpool which had frequent services to many continental destinations. In short, the different conferences were dependent on each other to increase rates.

4.1.2) Outside rivals on the Continent: Thingvalia and French Line

The Continental market ranged from Spain to Russia and was in full expansion to the east at the time. The Continental Conference had been drawn up to include both Thingvalia Line and CGT. The Danish Line focused on the Scandinavian market but the geographic position of Copenhagen allowed them to easily target the continental market. However, the Danes could not be convinced to join the conference.

The exclusion of the French Line had greater repercussions on the working of the conference. Having to a great extent the same hinterland as the members of the conference, they could not permit to fix rates and commission that differed much of the CGT without risk of losing a share of the traffic.²⁶⁴ After months of futile negotiations the Continental lines increased the ocean rates by \$2,5 while taking measures to force the CGT in the conference. The lines did not use fighting ships which consisted of appointing steamers of conference members at drastically reduced rates that coincided as much as possible with the CGT's sailings.²⁶⁵ Neither did they cut on the ocean rate affecting all continental business. Instead they cut on the railroad rates to popular destinations of the French Line's traveling public. These railroad tickets were sold below cost while they followed the CGT's raise of commission, paying \$4 on eastbound tickets. Furthermore,

²⁶³ It consisted of the Italian Line, Fabre Line, Red Star Line and the Holland America Line.

²⁶⁴ The French would only join if \$25 for the express service was used as a base to fix the rates. However, the prepaid rate for NGL express was set at \$22, but it was prospected to reach \$30. When it did it was agreed that the HAL would be allowed to increase its differential. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, Meeting July 15 1885, minute 63, 67.

²⁶⁵ By sharing the costs conferences often use the technique to drive out an outside line of a certain route or force them to enter the agreement

agents were notified that unless they relinquished the agency of the French Line, ticket books of the conference lines would be withdrawn from them.²⁶⁶ The French Line then had to rely on a parallel network of non-conference agents for selling their tickets.²⁶⁷

Six months later the British lines finally reorganized. They quoted continental rates at a basis of \$22 for express service, \$5 lower than the Continental lines. Only if the CGT joined the Conference, would the British lines would raise their rates. The British lines helped pressuring the French to enter the conference by using the agent network.²⁶⁸ Negotiations with CGT resumed. The French Line tried to obtain the right to quote equal railroad rates as the RSL and HAL to what it called its special territory, Switzerland, France and Northern Italy. The latter refused to give up their geographical advantage to these points. They agreed to cancel special rates using the actual inland tariff instead. Commissions were lowered and the rates set at on a basis of \$27 for express service. This cleared the path to enter further negotiations with the British lines.

4.1.3) The network of migrant brokers and agents: the concentration in New York

One of the priorities of the Continental Conference was to impose ‘city rules’ in New York. At the port where the sale of passage tickets for the American market concentrated, chaos reigned because of the proliferation of agents and runners.²⁶⁹ Besides through migrant agents, tickets were sold over the counter by innkeepers, boardinghouses, peddlers etc. With ‘city rules’ the lines wanted to do away with the middleman and restrict the sale of ocean tickets in New York to the company’s office. This would greatly increase the control over the business and do away with commission costs. To do so without important losses of market share all the lines had to adhere. Once the British reached their provisional agreement the members of the Continental

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.* meeting May 3 1885, minutes 39; meeting July 15 1885, minute 63 and meeting August 20 1885 minutes 74 and 85.

²⁶⁷ In a letter of Van den Toorn to the Board of directors on joining the Continental Conference he reassured the directors that they may lose some agents, but not many because as a conference line they were assured to have the best and most respectable agents. In case they stepped out of the conference there existed a wide network of maybe less solid but very active non-conference agents to fall back on. GAR, HAL, Wentholt Archief, 318.14, 18/3, Letter November 11 1884.

²⁶⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter January 16 1886.

²⁶⁹ Emil Boas when testifying before the Ford congressional committee stated that 75% of the tickets sold in the US were sold in New York, NYT “Beginning their labors: The question of American Immigration” June 26 1888.

Conference limited the number of sub-agents in the city to twelve, two in Williamsburg and one each in Hoboken, New Jersey and Brooklyn. The commission over the counter would still be paid as long as the British lines did and the French line did not join the conference.²⁷⁰

Besides stopping the proliferation of agents and runners the lines wanted to counter the developing order-system with the 'city rules'. Some American agents started offering orders for steerage passage from Hamburg to New York \$4 below the British Continental prepaid rate. Such orders were then exchanged for European cash rate tickets by the brokers of the British lines in Hamburg.²⁷¹ The German line informed the conference members that unless the British lines raised the European cash rates, they would see themselves forced to lower the prepaid rate to meet said competition.²⁷² The HAPAG opened a New York-Baltic service, to and from Copenhagen, Göteborg and Stettin at \$19 to pressure the British lines.²⁷³ This resulted in an agreement between the HAPAG and the British lines. The Hamburg America Line withdrew its direct Scandinavian service while the British lines agreed to limit their share of the traffic going through Hamburg to 35 percent. Price difference between indirect and direct routes could not exceed five marks, to the advantage of the British lines. This was controlled by a Clearing House in Hamburg (Murken, 1922, 19; Otmüller-Wezel, 1986, 195). Yet all the efforts to get the lines on the same wavelength fell to pieces when in August 1886 the Red Star Line dropped out of the New York Continental Conference triggering a rate war which would last eight months.

4.1.4) The dependence of stability of other conferences

The Continental Conference was renewed in accordance with the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference, for whose members the agents were

²⁷⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, meeting May 25 1885, minute 38 and meeting January 25 1886, minutes 164-166.

²⁷¹ HAPAG quoted 25\$ for prepaid tickets at the time which gave the English Lines a differential of 7\$ using this system. *Ibid.*, meeting March 29 1886, minute 197.

²⁷² The HAPAG reached an agreement with the migrant houses in Hamburg operating for British Lines in December 1886. The HAPAG agreed to stop its direct Scandinavian service while the British Lines committed to limit their outtake of the traffic going through Hamburg to 35 percent. A clearing house was established to supervise the divide the traffic accordingly (Otmüller-Wezel, 1986, 195-196).

²⁷³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, meeting June 26 1886, minute 250.

allowed to book. Yet the Harmony between British and Continental lines was still far from being reached. City rules stayed out and the commission over the counter persisted²⁷⁴. The British kept paying extra commissions, quoting low rates to the continent and waited for the NGL to raise their Scandinavian rates. The NGL for their part waited for the British lines to raise the continental rates before changing theirs. The HAL and HAPAG urged to lower the rates to meet the British competition. The deadlock could only be broken after several notices of withdrawal and a two week period where regulations were lifted. In the end it took another six months before the British lines finally raised their continental rates²⁷⁵. All preparations were made to enforce city rules in New York. Only the consent of the Mediterranean Conference was needed to apply them, yet the conference fell apart due to internal tensions²⁷⁶. The improved collaboration with the British lines allowed lowering the commission to \$2 for continental business and price changes were mutually discussed. Yet the increasing tension among the British lines, especially between the White Star and Cunard Line led to a rate war on the Scandinavian market. Net Ocean Rates to and from Scandinavian points fell as low as \$12 and commissions of \$6 were paid out. The German lines gave guarantees that these would not be misused for continentals to prevent the war from spreading²⁷⁷. The situation on the Mediterranean market also remained fairly unstable and treats were made to let it spread to the continental business to pressure some members sitting in both to concessions. However, this did not happen and when the Italian government imposed a refutation on its citizens to migrate directly from national ports the situation changed completely²⁷⁸.

²⁷⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, circular April 14 1887.

²⁷⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563; meeting May 31, minute 31; meeting June 26, minute 50; meeting August 15, minute 61, meeting September 6 and 20 1887 minutes 64, 69, 70.

²⁷⁶ Fabre Line and Florio Rubathino Line refused to reorganize after the Red Star Line's condemnation by the Arbitrator for faltering with the agreements. It put an end to the idea of pooling the Mediterranean market. This was to the great regret of Van den Toorn who saw a unique opportunity to get rid off the Italian agents who, to his opinion were even less trustworthy than other agents. Van den Toorn had hoped to open Joint Offices where all lines were represented by an independent agent and whose books had to be accessible to all lines at all times. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563; meeting October 25 1887, minute 77; meeting January 31 1888, minute 165. Ibid. 221, Letters of Van den Toorn January 3 and 20 1888.

²⁷⁷ Ibid. 563, meeting July 16 1889, minute 165; meeting October 2, minute 370; meeting December 2 and 23 minutes 375-379, 382. Ibid. 221 and 222, Letters October, 11, 15 1889; January 21 1890 and December 10 1891.

²⁷⁸ Both the RSL and CGT threatened to step out of the continental conference if they did not get their way on the Mediterranean market but were eventually not executed. Once the law prevented them

The external problems seriously hampered the working of the Continental Conference. Price agreements and measures to control the agent network could only be implemented by forcing the outside continental lines to join, as was the case with the French Line. Moreover, the foothold of the British lines in Hamburg on the continent made the conference dependent on the goodwill of these to raise prices and implement measures to control the agents. Also continental market was sensitive to unrests in other sub-markets of the North Atlantic traffic. Rate wars easily spread or at least forced the lines to lower their rates avoiding continental passengers from taking alternative routes. Finally, the lack of control over migrant brokers and agents on both sides of the Atlantic posed another threat, especially when Hamburg migrant brokers started opening branch offices in New York selling orders at cheaper European cash rates corrupting the American prepaid market. The impotence of shipping companies in imposing themselves on the agents also undermined internal cohesion.

4.2.) The internal pressures

4.2.1) Internal mistrust, duration of agreements and constant renegotiations

The mistrust between the members who, for a long time, considered each other as their number one rivals constantly weighed on the Continental Conference. The underlying suspicions are reflected by the period for which the agreements were concluded. During the first five years the agreements were never renewed for longer than seven months²⁷⁹. Sometimes the negotiations to renew, during which the old agreements usually still stood took longer than the agreement itself. The differentials between the lines were always open to renegotiations. Especially since fixed prices moved the competition to improve the quality of service. During the first five years the Dutch Line

from booking passengers the companies used their agent-network to circumvent the laws and continued transporting Italians via Marseille GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563; meeting October 2 1891, minute 370; GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letters September 10, October 3, 17 and November 19 1890.

²⁷⁹ Only at the end of 1889 the agreements were renewed for a year to December 31 1890. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221 Letter December 11 1889.

in particular greatly improved their fleet.²⁸⁰ The RSL continuously pushed for initial differentials, which were set on speed and quality of service, to be adapted accordingly.²⁸¹ These tensions quickly led the conference into its first crisis. Hardly a year after its founding the conference fell apart. The RSL accused the members of perusing an aggressive policy against them in Europe, alienating the agents from them.²⁸² Failing to obtain its expected share the RSL refused to renew the agreement triggering a rate war, plummeting prepaid fares by \$10. The HAL followed notifying its agents that it would meet any new reduction as far as possible to maintain the differential. Conference agents were at liberty to dispose of their commission as deemed proper yet had to discontinue selling tickets of the RSL or send back the ticket books of the conference lines. The limit on the number of agents in New York was lifted.²⁸³ This rate war to force RSL back in, lasted eight months during which agents were allowed to disregard many regulations. If they did violate the ones still standing fines were less severe. Agents caught selling tickets for the RSL first received a warning before being disqualified, to prevent as many agents as possible from giving up the conference agency. With the new agreement a circular was sent to remind the agents of the regulations adding some new ones. Among these was the increased cancellations fees to ten percent and fixed commission were replaced by ten percent on the ticket. Among these were the increase of cancellation fees to ten percent and the replacement of fixed commissions with commissions of ten percent of the price of the ticket. The latter could have moved the agents and ship-owners towards a common interest in raising prices. But the smaller lines feared that the percentage basis would stimulate the sale of the more expensive services of the bigger lines. Their protests eventually led to the reintroduction of fixed commissions. This was only one disadvantage of the lack of homogeneity of product.

²⁸⁰ Between 1886 and 1889 the HAL bought no less than seven second hand ships, totaling 27.000 tons, among them the Arabic, Baltic and the Republic of the White Star Line which enjoyed a good reputation with the traveling public.

²⁸¹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563; meeting December 11 1888, minute 214; meeting June 13 1889, minute 273. Eventually the HAL gave in to increase their rates and to decrease their differential by 50 cents. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221 October 11 1889.

²⁸² GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting July 26 1886, minute 258.

²⁸³ *Ibid.* 563, July 26, minute 258, August 2 1886, minutes 265-269 and *Ibid.* 767, Circular to agents August 3 1886.

4.2.2) The lack of homogeneity of product: various services, destinations at differential rates

The working of the cartel was further complicated because some lines offered slow and fast services and also to different ports of arrival such as, Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York at different rates. Negotiations whether to include new services of members in the conference added to the internal tensions. For example, the HAL opened a Baltimore service; to fight the increasing competition for freight between Rotterdam and the US; for cheaper passenger and freight railroad rates to and from the West from that port; and for the more lenient application of laws regarding the landing of migrants²⁸⁴. However, the Dutch Line was also the only company with just one destination and no variety in standard of service. It was a well known practice that companies sometimes booked passengers at regular service to be transported on express steamers, or passengers were booked at lower Philadelphia and Baltimore rates but landed in New York. Although this was against the conference rules it was very difficult to prove this abuse. Companies gave these facilities to their most reliable and important agents, who, to avoid fines and disqualification, used the greatest secrecy. As passengers could hardly ever be convinced to give affidavits about fraud, the lines hired private detectives when they suspected a member of evading the regulations on a large scale. They represented themselves as clients yet all kinds of tricks were used to prevent them from getting their hands on evidence.²⁸⁵ To prove cheating with upgraded services, the detectives had to actually travel on these tickets. It seemed to have been the Dutch Line's policy where the violations of the agreement were too difficult to prove, to make sure to be able to tamper with them as well, explaining the opening of the Baltimore service. The NGL, which managed a service to Baltimore from 1867, had recently seen the HAPAG opening a line to the port and was determined to block out new competition. In theory the exclusion of HAL's Baltimore service out of the conference meant that conference agents were not allowed to book for that service.²⁸⁶ The NGL visited many agencies stressing that if they booked for the Dutch Baltimore service they would be disqualified. Yet, in

²⁸⁴ In 1890 for instance rates from Baltimore to the West differed on average \$1.94 and from Philadelphia \$1.24. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221 Letter December 20 1890.

²⁸⁵ At some stage the HAL had to hire an extra bookkeeper to cover up the violations of the agreements. *Ibid.*, 222, Letter August 21 1891.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Letters March 17, June 12, July 22 and September 25 1891.

practice by paying extra commission the HAL found many agents willing to take the risk of being fined or disqualified, since they had means to prevent other lines to obtain proofs of the violation. The non-inclusion permitted the HAL to quote low rates and pay higher commissions attracting a fair share of passengers.²⁸⁷

4.2.3) Moving the competition from ocean rates to railroad rates

Fixed ocean rates further moved the competition to railroad rates as rail and ocean passage were often sold together. The hardly negotiated differentials on ocean rates could easily be cancelled out by railroad fares. Trying to fix through rates the conference secretary required the lines to hand in lists of actual inland fares obtained from inland transport companies at both sides of the Atlantic. Any cut on these was considered a conference violation, yet again proving this appeared very hard. The lines constantly negotiated with railroads to obtain special rates in exchange for their business. Initially, on the American soil a fierce competition between the railroad lines was prevalent. All kinds of reductions could be obtained. The rate wars also pushed the railroads to cooperate establishing the Immigrant Clearing House, coordinating the migrant business in the territory between New York and Chicago in 1887.²⁸⁸ It allowed them to increase the rates and cut on the commissions granted to steamship companies and migration agents for the sale of railroad tickets in connection with ocean passage. Plans of steamship lines for the opening of Joint Railroad Offices to regain control over the railroad business never materialized. Secret reductions and special commissions still existed, but these were far less significant than during rate wars (Feys, 2007).²⁸⁹

The European inland tariff caused greater instability. Particularly the low inland tariff of the Dutch Line had a demoralizing effect. The Dutch railway and the Rhine

²⁸⁷ Many new services were opened were eventually included in the conference such as the HAPAG, Union service specializing in migrant and freight transport, HAPAG express service, the Stettin Line and Baltimore Line which were all accepted. Their Hansa Line to Montreal however was blocked out. The introduction Lloyd ships built as the Union steamers, for migrant and freight transport only also led to intense discussions on what rates it would include. In the end this service both to Baltimore and New York would be taken up in the conference under the Roland Line.

²⁸⁸ The Immigrant clearing House regulated the traffic between New York and Chicago. Railroads in the West organized later on.

²⁸⁹ But that the problems still persisted is illustrated through the establishment of a committee appointed to put an end to rate cuts on railroad tickets sold in connection with eastbound ocean passage GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, Meeting, December 22, 30 1890, minute 384, 390.

steamboat companies recalculated the fares in 1887 giving the HAL an important differential on inland transport. The other members questioned the validity of the rates and brought the case to the arbitrator. The RSL claimed to be losing important amounts of business and started quoting the same inland tariff as the Dutch Line adding 80 cents representing the cost from Rotterdam to Antwerp.²⁹⁰ It ignored the rule imposing lines to quote the actual tariff obtained. The HAPAG soon followed.²⁹¹ The RSL threatened to leave the conference and brought the case to the arbitrator. Tensions increased when the arbitrator ruled in favor of the HAL.²⁹² The RSL kept on using the same tariff as the HAL who denounced the abuse.²⁹³ The Dutch Line attributed the low rates due to the geographical advantage of Rotterdam which it was not prepared to give up. It believed the matter to be important enough to risk war.²⁹⁴ The RSL demanded the permission to quote equal inland fare as the HAL or a decrease of the differential of the ocean rate to extend the agreements. In the end, the Antwerp-based company obtained the right to lower its ocean rates by fifty cents.²⁹⁵ However, the French Line claimed that the situation was no longer sustainable and demanded adaptations of differentials. It had calculated that the average differential, railroad and ocean rate included to thirty five common points in Europe amounted to \$9.25 in favor of RSL and \$11.35 in favor of HAL.²⁹⁶ A special sub-committee was formed to tackle the problems on European inland fares by establishing a list of maximum 300 points where passengers could be booked through at well established rates. Yet, the formation of the list was delayed by Austrian and German Railroads which were about to issue new reductions.²⁹⁷ The French Line lost its patience and dropped out of the conference. The HAL convinced the French to rejoin by reducing differentials to French, Swiss and Northern Italian points for through rates to \$2 and allowed RSL to use their rates to these points.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, meeting May 31, minute 32, meeting November 17, minute 87 and meeting December 27 1887, minute 104.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, meeting April 24 1888, minute 143.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, meeting January 31 1888, minute 109.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, meeting July 7 1888, minute 174-176.

²⁹⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221, Letters June 16 and 22 1888.

²⁹⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 563, meeting January 22 1889, minute 224.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, meeting June 27 1889, minute 272-276.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, meeting February 27 1890, minute 329 and meeting December 30 1890, minute 390.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, meeting May 21, minute 432 and meeting July 1 1891, minute 449.

4.2.4) The take-over of the pre-paid market by migrant brokers

The most important internal pressure was the competition between the lines to tie migrant brokers by giving them special facilities. It allowed the predominantly Jewish entrepreneurs to completely demoralize the prepaid market out of Hamburg through their own orders with the line's consent. The pool agreement for the Hamburg traffic between HAPAG and the British lines did not make an end to the practice. Repeatedly, the New York head-agents of the shipping companies urged their directors to raise the cash rate or allow them to lower the prepaid rate to fight these abuses.²⁹⁹ As long as migrant agents could offer cheaper prices for the crossing than the lines themselves it would be impossible to introduce 'city rules'.³⁰⁰ Migrant broker, Richard, acting as passage-agent for the HAPAG said that only an advance in cash rates could prevent their withdrawal.³⁰¹ Although being against the conference rules it was a public secret that the HAPAG concluded special arrangements with some brokers using their own orders to counter the competition of the British lines in its homeport. Because of this rivalry the practice quickly propagated and other Continental lines made arrangements through the branch offices in New York to get their hands on the order business. Instead of imposing 'city rules' closing the gap between shipping companies and clients, the discord between the lines allowed these brokers to take over the control of ocean passage sales. Despite raising European cash rates by 10 marks the French Line insisted on a decrease in the prepaid rate by an additional \$3,5. Their sale of prepaid tickets had practically come to a standstill and they threatened to leave the conference. Their orientation towards the Swiss, Austrian and Italian market led to a neglect of the migrant flow from the east. While the British and the other Continental lines developed relations with the Hamburg migrant brokers enabling them to get their hands on the order business, the French Line did not.³⁰²

²⁹⁹ Unfortunately no price series of European cash rates are at hand but additional commission and the price difference must have balanced around four to five dollars, based on the repeated calls of the agents to raise the cash rate by ten to fifteen Marks or cut on the Prepaid by two to three dollars. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221-223, Letters of Van den Toorn.

³⁰⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting October 25 1887, minute 72; meeting June 16 1888, minute 165.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, meeting February 28 1888, minute 127.

³⁰² Decision on lowering the prepaid rates was continuously deferred during the next four months after which the French Line withdrew its claim. It is unclear if the French obtained concessions on the Swiss and Italian territory or elsewhere from the other Continental Lines that were against lowering the

Through the order-system Jewish migrant brokers undercut American prepaid price by \$4 to \$5. They drove migrant agents selling regular prepaid tickets out of business. Therefore many agents started selling the brokers' orders instead of regular tickets. Occasionally the agents were caught cheating. Offenders paid the fine protesting the pending disqualification for a subsequent offence claiming that the conference gave no protection to do regular business. Occasionally, the brokers were caught violating the conference rules. First time offenders were fined and threatened with disqualification. However, they defended themselves claiming that as long as tickets could be sold over the counter by outsiders without liability and responsibility to the Conference for violation of the rules, they had no choice but to follow suit with abuses to stay in business³⁰³. The eight month negotiations to prolong the agreements in 1889 allowed the Hamburg brokers to increase their grip on the market. The practice of drawing orders spread to the bigger American cities including Baltimore, Philadelphia, Chicago, Saint Louis and Milwaukee. As observed by Van den Toorn the competition between the lines contributed to the demoralization. Instead of standing up for themselves the lines let the control over the business slip away into the hands of Jewish brokers.³⁰⁴ The Hamburg brokers started opening offices in Bremen and would later do the same in Rotterdam and Antwerp. The spreading out of the system indirectly resulted from the Hamburg pool dividing the traffic between HAPAG and British lines. To increase their business the Hamburg brokers started to forward migrants through Bremen, Rotterdam and Antwerp which did not fall under the agreement. Also, the control of the cash-order system in the US allowed them to establish contacts with new shipping companies.

Albert Ballin's plan to control the indirect traffic through Hamburg backfired and lead to new routes of indirect migration via Hamburg. The HAPAG-manager threatened letting parts of his fleet call at Rotterdam.³⁰⁵ The HAPAG demanded that the HAL and RSL closed their Hamburg agency under L. Scharlach and S. Jarmulowski

rates. However, they did not get their hands on order business GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter November 19 1889.

³⁰³ The bigger agents claimed that small agents tried to increase their sales through low rates by cutting the commission to 25 cents. *Ibid.*, meeting 29 August 1889, minutes 284-285.

³⁰⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter of November 19 1889.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Letter January 31 1890

respectively.³⁰⁶ Both companies were prepared to withdraw the authority of the brokers to draw orders for them out of Hamburg, on the condition that HAPAG stopped giving the same facilities to brokers not belonging to the Hamburg Pool and that NGL prevented F. Missler from doing the same via Bremen.³⁰⁷ With these facilities, that companies gave to increase their market share, all sorts of facilities in violation of the conference agreements ranging from faltering with upgraded service, to not charging cancellation fees, paying extra commission, allowing changing names on the ticket, hiring subagents, dividing the commission or offering part of it as a reduction to the buyer.

To avoid being caught, Scharlach avoided that the purchaser never received actual documents that may be used against him in conference meetings. Instead of receiving the receipt attached to the ticket, an outsider issued a proof of payment. The originals were sent to the houses in Bremen or Hamburg to prevent conference members from getting their hands on legal proofs. The practice was so embedded that New York head agents of the shipping lines cabled the home offices asking the prepaid prices to be lowered at the same level as cash rates.³⁰⁸ The NGL opposed the decrease whereupon all other members gave notice of withdrawal. A reduction of \$2 followed to bring prepaid rates closer to cash rates.³⁰⁹ The difference remained \$2.5 which was still enough margin for the abuses to continue.³¹⁰ The HAPAG defended their abuses with the excuse that they had to follow the prices quoted by the British lines in Hamburg. As a result Scharlach and Jarmulowski were reinstated by the RSL and HAL.³¹¹ Much to his dislike, Ballin was forced to allow both lines in the Hamburg pool.³¹² The tensions between the lines greatly increased while

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Letter October 2 1889 and meeting September 17 1889, minute 291.

³⁰⁷ The outside pool agents mentioned were C. Seligman, M. Flateau, C. Stockel, K. Weinbereger and Landav, GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting October 10 1889, minute 298.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, meeting January 23, minute 317 and meeting February 27 1890, minute 328.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, meetings March 10 1890, April 10, May and 10 1890.

³¹⁰ The European cash rate stayed at 60 Mark, which at the contemporary exchange rate used by the companies of 4,2 Mark to \$1 brings it at \$14,1 while the prepaid net rate was \$17 or 72,1 Mark. According to Murken lines started making profit on migrants when selling above 40 to 45 Marks (Murken, 1922).

³¹¹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter July 30, August 19 and September 10 1890.

³¹² HAPAG tried to intimidate the Dutch Line by threatening again to use Rotterdam as a port of call. As a countermeasure the HAL made preparations to include Hamburg in its sailings. RSL and HAL the former eternal rivals joined forces to strengthen their negotiating position against the German Line. By the admission in the pool lines had to stop giving extra commission to their Hamburg agency but were assured a fixed number of passengers or compensation if the number was not attained. The number of passengers would decrease but they would be booked at a better price. Because of the renegotiations the HAPAG saw its share of the traffic through Hamburg decrease from 65 to 57,8 percent. As observed by van den Toorn:

the prices for the transport remained low. It was sensed that a rate war was unavoidable unless the members came to an agreement to pool the continental traffic.


4.3) An evaluation of the first seven years of the Continental Conference

If the success of a conference has to be judged on the ability to detect and to discourage cheating, then the Continental Conference failed. Instead of becoming more transparent the transactions became even more corrupt. As the policy of the Dutch company illustrates, where the violations of the agreement were too difficult to prove, they made sure to be able to tamper with rules as well. This logic is also to be found behind the 'game theory', underlining the conditional cooperation between firms wherein as soon as one acts opportunistically the others will follow reducing their mutual support (Boyce 2001, 8). Even the hiring of private detectives was not enough to efficiently verify cheating. Relying on agents denouncing colleagues also proved to be ineffective. Most of the proofs of cheating was collected by companies' personnel and detectives, and only sporadically by migrant agents. Cheating seems to have been so widespread that most agents were not irreproachable taking away the incentive to denounce the practice. Shipping companies were unable to implement the rules which had to eliminate differential treatment of customers by the migrant agents.

Neither could they prevent themselves from giving some brokers facilities and others not. When violations were recorded the conference failed to use retaliation, deterring reoccurrence. Fines were not high enough while the threat of disqualification was hollowed by the fear that agents could do more damage by working for non-members. This was the situation with Scharlach who suffered two disqualifications, yet both times he fought his way back in. As observed by van den Toorn, when lines were caught cheating, apart from slightly affecting the negotiation position when agreements had to be renewed and having to pay a moderate fine, companies easily got off the hook. Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that the companies failed to raise gross prices, which included the commission- as shown in the graph 1. As argued above, the

"the Hamburg pool is an excellent means of putting Ballin under pressure." GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letters of Van den Toorn June 8, July 14 and September 12 1891.

prices only reflect part of the reality which was worse for the profits of the companies than the graph suggests. Secret commissions and reductions on railroad rates cut deep into the companies' profits while investments in the fleet increased. This occurred to the advantage of the agents and especially the migrants who benefited of improved services at low prices. Yet, the conference also produced positive results. After the rate war during the second half of 1886 the conference managed to prevent open rate wars from reoccurring on the continental market. It also brought the four core members HAL, RSL, HAPAG and NGL closer together, and proved that the French could be forced in and strengthened their negotiation position with the British lines. These elements were essential for the successful formation of the subsequent pool-agreements.



5) Pooling the traffic, the tonnage clause and the impact on the Conference Agreements

Fixing market shares is the most efficient of all methods of combating secret price cutting (Stigler 1961, 44-61). The initial years of the continental conference convinced the members of the necessity thereof to cut the edge off the competition - to control both agent-networks as well as transport fares. Albert Ballin, manager of the HAPAG who

suffered the most of the instability became the driving force behind the expansion of agreements. Internally core members divided the market into shares and used schemes of compensation to balance shortages or excesses. To reduce external price cuttings agreements were made with other lines to geographically divide the North-Atlantic market. Although simultaneously the American anti-trust movement gained momentum, shipping lines felt protected by the knowledge that American jurisdiction did not extend over international waters. This belief vanished midway the 1890s yet did not affect conference negotiations during the period analyzed here.

5.1) The formation of the Nord-Atlantischer Dampfer-Linien Verband

The negotiations for a westbound pool started at a secret meeting between the RSL, HAL, NGL and HAPAG early in 1890. The French made it clear not to be interested in joining. This idea was met by considering France, Switzerland and Italy as special territory organized on the basis of a money-pool.³¹³ The situation in Hamburg made the inclusion of the British lines highly desirable if not indispensable. Market shares were based on the continental steerage passengers carried in the previous decade from ports north of Cadiz to the US and Canada giving the HAL 8%, RSL 13,5%, NGL 39,7% and HAPAG 24,8%. The British lines with whom a separate contract was negotiated, received 14%. The percentage participation could be altered depending on the changes in tonnage of vessels employed for transport of steerage passengers of each company by either more frequent use or introduction of new vessels. Companies that exceeded their percentage needed to compensate the lines which were short at a rate of 60 marks per passenger. To limit these compensations members with a plus during the year would raise their rates to allow companies that were short on their share to book passengers at more profitable prices instead of having to lower theirs.

Gross rates and agent commission were fixed; anywhere between 6 and 20 Marks in Europe, \$2 to \$5 in the US. Members agreed that prepaid gross rates had to, as much

³¹³ RSL, HAL and HAPAG organized the territory through a money-pool where all lines chipped in a fixed amount per passenger transported from these territories which was then divided in shares at the end of the year. The NGL decided to stay out of this agreement. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter January 29 1892.

as practicable be equal to European cash rates. All agents receiving more than two had to be reported to the secretary. No commission was allowed on the inland European transport and tariffs to a maximum of 300 points were fixed. All members deposited high bonds as detriment for lines to drop out of the agreement. Disputes would be brought forward to an arbitrator. The contract was valid for four years, yet alterations could be proposed. If alterations proposed by two members or more were objected to, then these companies had the right to withdraw from the agreement.³¹⁴

Negotiations among the four Continental lines went smooth yet there was a great anticipation about the outcome of it. As observed by Van den Toorn: *“No one knows what the pool will bring and why HAPAG was so compliant with the NGL. Possibly it is a conspiracy to destroy us and the RSL, however I’d rather believe that both urgently need money and want to clear out the steerage business from innumerable abuses, being weighed down by the restless actions of agents, or should we say parasites”*.³¹⁵ The agreement showed that the Continental lines learned from the weaknesses of the previous agreements. The quotas warranted that rates would no longer be cut to obtain a larger market share. Linking prepaid with cash rates had to put an end to the order-system. Work was put into fixing rates for inland travel. Furthermore, the Baltimore line of the HAL was admitted. While passengers who RSL and HAL drew from Hamburg were no longer a loss to HAPAG, since they were calculated in the pool. The duration of four years without notice had to put an end to continuous renegotiations and constant threats of withdrawal.³¹⁶ Outside competition from French and British lines was neutralized.³¹⁷ Despite keeping out of the pool, the French Line remained in the New York Conference abiding to the rules and adapting the rates in accordance with the members’ interest.³¹⁸

³¹⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 580, ‘Nord-Atlantische Dampfer-Linien Verband’ Copy of the contract made in Hamburg January 19 1892.

³¹⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Letter December 20 1891.

³¹⁶ The initial plan was to conclude an agreement of 10 years with three years notice. It was then suggested for five years without notice.

³¹⁷ Despite the passing of the Anti-Trust Act, 2-7-1890 the lines were not expecting any difficulties from the American government. The anti-immigration feelings were rising in the US while the many European governments were looking for ways to restrict the exodus. An agreement which would increase the price for the passage, so was believed would be welcomed on both sides of the Atlantic. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Letter September 12 1891.

³¹⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting April 1 1892, minute 537.

5.2) The British-Jewish Hamburg Connection: the conference's Achilles Heel

Nonetheless internal division among the members of the British Conference, which by then numbered thirteen members, delayed the signing of the contract. The Continental lines had an important ally among the British with the American Line. Both RSL and American Line formed part of the International Navigation Company.³¹⁹ The American concern, having interests in both the pool and the British Conference served as platform for the negotiations. Although according to van den Toorn the cooperation of the British lines was bought dearly, the distrust mainly of the Cunard Line towards the German lines delayed the signing of the agreements. The verbal agreement which had to be enforced on February the first 1892 remained pending. Two months later a three month trial period was adopted without the National and Cunard Line.³²⁰ Rates were jointly increased to unprecedented levels. Yet, the vulnerability of the HAPAG became once again painfully clear when the Cunard and National lines quoted respectfully \$19 and \$15 through Hamburg, while the German Line's lowest rate came in at \$25. The Hamburg Line secretly paid \$3.5 extra commission to the agents in the US to reach their pool share.³²¹

Whatever scheme Ballin put together to increase the profits for his shipping company it ended up in everyone's pocket but his. He concluded special agreements to shut out the Hamburg brokers with agents on the Prussian-Russian border and with the Jewish Committee of Berlin through which the majority of the Jewish passengers passed on their way to the New World. The Hamburg brokers even feared that he was pressuring the German government to pass legislations putting an end to their business.³²² A new three year pool agreement with Hamburg Agents Association was concluded which set minimum rates for all lines served by these agents. Fixed commissions on cash passengers were pooled by the agent association. A clearing house controlled all prepaid

³¹⁹ In this text when mentioning the British lines, it refers to the lines managing a service from the British continent and thus includes the American Line from 1885 onwards. With the takeover of the Inman Line in 1886 the line greatly improved its reputation on English soil.

³²⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting April 1 1892, minute 541 and *Ibid.* 222, Letter May 11 1892.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 222, Letter May 27 1892.

³²² *Ibid.*, Letter July 1 and 15 1891. After the cholera outbreak the German government built control stations at the borders and gave the management of these to the German Lines. This proved a useful means of directing migrants to the German ports (Wüstenbecker, 2003, 234).

tickets on their authenticity and validity preventing evasion from the pool through order-tickets. HAPAG could also book passengers through a limited amount of Hamburg migrant brokers who remained outside of the association but the same prices and commissions had to be offered to both at all times.³²³ Van den Toorn reported that apart from secret extra commissions which corrupted the business in the US, especially because of the lack of an eastbound-agreement, the pool was working very well.³²⁴ When everything seemed to be falling into its place, cholera broke out in Hamburg disrupting the traffic for six months.

As a consequence, the traffic through Hamburg came to a standstill and many Hamburg brokers moved to Rotterdam and Antwerp.³²⁵ But due to the American quarantine measures all lines agreed to suspend the traffic until March 1893. When business took up again the pool in both directions was prolonged until the end of 1893. Despite the troubles HAPAG experienced with these brokers the HAL rather saw them settle in Rotterdam rather than in Antwerp.³²⁶ Also, in case the pool fell apart the brokers were an asset in assuring part of the migrant flow to Rotterdam. This illustrates the power that migrant brokers had in directing the migrants via certain routes even if it meant extra travel or extra costs. As Murken put it, some migrant brokers were more powerful than ship owners and the competitions between shipping companies was strongly intensified by the agent-network (Murken, 1922, 19).

³²³ The Hamburg brokers agreed to quote a difference of no more than two marks below the price of direct Union steamers. Also the fares to embarkation ports such as Liverpool, Southampton or Glasgow through Hull Grimsby, London or West Hartlepool were fixed at 26 marks (17,5M for the ocean transport and 8,5M for inland transport). GAR, HAL, 318.04, 580, Contract between HAPAG and 'Vereinigung Hamburgischer Passagier-Expedienten' June 1 1892.

³²⁴ An eastbound-pool between the members of the NDLV would eventually be established in November 1892 on the same principals as the westbound pool. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Letters June 22, July 12 and August 5 1892.

³²⁵ Spiro & Co, L. Scharlach & Co and Karlberg & Co opened offices in Rotterdam.

³²⁶ Initially the directors of the HAL opposed the traffic via Hamburg and Bremen through the Hamburg agents. They much rather attract the migrants directly to Rotterdam. The directors feared that the indirect expedition would be detrimental to the Dutch port and turn to the advantage of HAPAG which was expected to find a way to cut short the Hamburg agents. Moreover, the agents with their boarding houses and other interests in Hamburg were not expected to be willing to divert the traffic directly to Rotterdam. Yet the connections in Hamburg had proven a very efficient means of pressuring Ballin. The establishment of these agents exposed the HAL to increase of indirect migration to England through the port and the abuses which HAPAG fruitlessly had tried to control. Yet they preferred those risks rather than seeing the flow directed through Antwerp.

The pool did not put an end to this. Before long, the agents corrupted the traffic in Rotterdam. HAL gave Scharlach a special rebate of ten marks on cash rates, which added to higher commissions in Europe allowed him to undercut the prepaid tickets by \$5. Scharlach was also at liberty to alter the name on the ticket, omit the price and was exempt from paying cancellation fees. This allowed him to greatly speculate writing out many orders when he expected prices to increase. Also, if he obtained better conditions from the British lines HAL passengers could easily be cancelled and transferred to British lines. Van den Toorn warned that Scharlach controlled their sales in America. Other agents sold order tickets through him and alienated themselves from the company.³²⁷ In the meantime, HAPAG decided to take the passage agency in New York into its own hands. Richard was cast aside. He joined forces with Scharlach and with their long established contacts in the US represented a real threat; especially since Richard was out for vengeance and approached the British lines who had not renewed the pool agreement.³²⁸ Van den Toorn blamed the latter for lack of cooperation to put an end to the abuses: *Not only do they (brokers) corrupt the inland, prepaid and cash rates or alienate the agents from us; they also blacken our reputation by mistreating the passengers.*³²⁹ The Dutch authorities started applying stricter border controls because of the increasing arrivals of poor migrants needing assistance. The American authorities were also complaining about the poor quality of migrants arriving with HAL ships. Under these growing pressures the company decided to withdraw all facilities from Scharlach and retake complete control of the business.³³⁰ Richard and Scharlach took matters in into their own hands for their part by chartering a ship, the *Red Sea*, taking care of the expedition themselves.³³¹ This called for drastic measures. The lines initiated long talks to regain control of the passage business in the US.

5.3) Remaining internal and external pressures and the outbreak of a general rate war

³²⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Letters of Van den Toorn March 17, 27 and May 29 1893.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, Letters March 27 and April 7 1893.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, Letter May 29 1893.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, Letter July 14 1893.

³³¹ The ship arrived with many sick and was quarantined creating important costs. An estimated forty passengers were deported on the shipowner's expenses, as the American law prescribed. This experience appeared to have deterred the agents to renew another attempt. *Ibid.*, Letter July 19 1893.

Despite failing to neutralize the external pressures, the NDLV did improve cohesion among the members as joint action to regulate aspects of the passenger business became more common. Yet two aspects of the agreement still caused a lot of friction. First because of the tonnage clause the lines expanded their fleet, decreasing the capacity utilization (Murken, 1922, 80-86; Sicotte, 1997, 152-153).³³² It augmented the number of services such the NGL Roland Line carrying freight and steerage passengers only at lower rates inciting abuses. HAPAG converted sections of cattle steamers to carry the minimum amount of migrants. To make the tonnage count for the recalculation of the market share, companies needed to book fifty passengers westbound and fifteen eastbound. When it was feared that the quota was not going to be met, passengers could obtain 'last minute deals'. HAL secretly booked passengers as low as 5\$ net, while HAPAG even transported some for free. Instead of reducing overcapacity, the conference stimulated it with this clause and incited lines to cut rates.³³³

A second pressure point was that the lines only signed a one-year instead of four-year contract due to the exclusion of all the British lines. This caused long annual discussions about the shares. During the initial years of the pool the members did not fully trust in the fixed shares and it was felt that when a member fell short too often, it could result in a reduction of the quota. Therefore lines paid extra commissions to make sure that the quotas were filled if not surpassed. This practice was reinforced because the rate agreements with British lines did not decrease the keen rivalry and violations persisted. HAL paid \$3,848 extra commission the first nine months of 1892; another \$9,179 from March till July 1893 and the amount reached \$12,739 during the following six months.³³⁴ The price for the passage augmented but so did the commissions. These commissions were often returned to the passengers to enable the agents to increase their sales. This practice together with the order-system makes one wonder about the extent to

| ³³² | Westbound | Joint NDLV tonnage | Passengers | # Passengers per 1000 tons |
|----------------|-----------|--------------------|------------|----------------------------|
| | 1892 | 1 505 209 | 214 753 | 143 |
| | 1893 | 2 123 899 | 211 656 | 99 |
| | 1894 | 2 051 720 | 84 610 | 41 |
| | 1895 | 2 114 212 | 127 111 | 60 |

³³³ The members of the pool were quick to realize this as well. The increase of number of passengers attributed to an increase in tonnage would first be lowered in 1895 to finally being cancelled in 1899.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, Letters March 20 and July 14 1893.

which the quoted gross rates for prepaid tickets reflect the increase in costs for the passenger.

The financial crisis of 1893 made the migrant rates westbound drop. Tensions between the British and Continental lines became more obvious with the collapsed market. As van den Toorn reported back from the continental conference; *should the competition of the English lines become too strong, it was decided to send some express steamers to English ports to keep them on their Island.*³³⁵ Yet an agreement was anticipated and the Continental lines felt strong enough to introduce 'city rules' for the eastbound traffic, limiting the sale of tickets in New York to joint offices before the signing of contracts.³³⁶ On the initiative of the Continental Conference this was expanded to prepaid tickets as well. To stay in the business the city agents made great efforts to book for British lines. While van den Toorn was confident that the short term loss would largely be compensated by the long term gain of putting an end to the abuses and allowing the inland agencies to increase their sales.

At a meeting in Cologne, another attempt was made to convince the British lines to join the pool, since rate agreements had proven to be unsustainable.³³⁷ The pool lines gave the British lines two weeks to reflect on the proposal. In the meantime, they decided to attack them in Libau, Russia to force an agreement. The British lines did a counterproposal but again disagreement among themselves obstructed it. In particular the duration was put forward as being the main objection by Boumphrey, director of the Cunard Line.³³⁸ All the agents in New York had to be reinstated and extra commissions were paid out.³³⁹ The Continental lines opened a regular service to Queenstown,

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, Letter December 22 1893.

³³⁶ G.A.R., H.A.L., 318.04, 563, meeting January 4 1894, minutes 669-672.

³³⁷ The offer consisted of 12 % of the continental traffic, prices not to be lower than the lowest price quoted by a pool member, no extra commissions, the compensation rate to be 60 Mark. In return they proposed an agreement for the Scandinavian market and the withdrawal for steerage passengers from Great Brittan and Ireland. A month later the counter proposal was made to withdraw both from British and Scandinavian market in exchange for 6% of continental market. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 223, Letters March 10 1893 and January 18 1894.

³³⁸ Boumphrey said: "not be prepared to put the Cunard Line at the mercy of Ballin for three years". He claimed to be willing to agree for a year while the continental wanted at least three years. *Ibid.*, 226, Letter April 20 1894.

³³⁹ That the market plummeted is best illustrated by the fact that the British lines transported only 200 direct passengers from the British Isles during the first quarter of 1894. Thanks to the introduction of city rules they were able to secure a good share of indirect continentals. *Ibid.*, 223, Letters, April 2, 11 1894 and *Ibid.*, 563, meetings March 30 and April 4-1894, minutes 717-739.

alternating sailings on the eastbound route while sailings to and from Southampton would be increased. The pool members considered the situation as a good barometer to see the extent to which the International Navigation Company would defend the interests of the Red Star Line against the ones of the American Line.³⁴⁰ A rate of \$10 was agreed to for the service to the Irish port while the British lines used the migrant brokers in Rotterdam to undercut the continental fares by orders at \$15 from Rotterdam to New York.³⁴¹ The war also spread to the Mediterranean and Scandinavian market.³⁴²

Meanwhile, the Continental lines were aware that they could not hit the British lines as hard as the other way around. Englishmen were believed by the Continental lines to be too tied to their own national lines to board foreign ships. Moreover, the Board of Trade hindered the Continental lines from boarding steerage passengers from English ports on the westbound route.³⁴³ An agreement with the American Line, joining the fight against the British lines, allowed the pool members to attack the British at the heart of their business.³⁴⁴ German express steamers, with a rate of \$14 to London were pretty full, yet the chaos among the agents made it impossible to prevent continentals from boarding the ship to then buy a \$3 ticket from London to the continent.³⁴⁵ The Continental lines initially responded with extra commissions instead of lowering the rates. This had the advantage of binding agents to the lines and prevented agents and brokers from speculating, writing out prepaid blanks in bulk to use them when the prices increased.³⁴⁶ However, the measure did not prove effective because prepaid sales of the Continental lines halved since the introduction of low rates by the British lines. A drastic cut of \$8 on prepaid and a similar one on eastbound rates followed.³⁴⁷ The pool was about to

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 223, Letter April 10 1894.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Letter April 24 1894.

³⁴² In the meantime major continental and British lines had opened direct services from Italy to catch a share of the booming market. After the reluctance of the British lines to join the pool, the HAPAG reopened the direct Scandinavian service under the Scandia Line.

³⁴³ The British Board of trade helped their national lines by strictly enforcing the rules regarding the space per steerage passenger on foreign lines. The British way of measuring differed from German laws and its strict enforcement significantly lowered the number of passengers that could be carried by German Express steamers. *Ibid.*, 223, Letters December 22 1893; August 2 and 24 1894.

³⁴⁴ Agreement reached at a conference in Cologne. *Ibid.*, Letter April 27 1894.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Letter May 11 1894.

³⁴⁶ The Red Star Line stuck the longest to the policy of extra commissions going up to 7 dollar commission on a 21dollar ticket, or one third of the ticket price. *Ibid.*, Letter September 5 1894.

³⁴⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, meeting July 26 1894, minutes 775-777.

diamantle since its purpose of increasing incomes was totally impossible and hence useless with current prices.³⁴⁸

Negotiations with the British lines resumed in 1895. It was agreed to jointly raise the rates while negotiations continued. The strategies set out by the pool where members with a plus raised their rates to allow companies that were short to book passengers at good prices instead of having to lower theirs started to be implemented. Reports of agents still tampering with orders persisted, but the negotiations and the previous introduction of joint offices made them realize that they risked going out of the business. The most important agents established the New York City Agents Association presided by A. Falck, which tried to come to terms with the shipping companies.³⁴⁹ This was also stimulated because of an agreement between the HAPAG and the English lines which allegedly allowed the controlling of the number of passengers going through Hamburg.³⁵⁰ Agents agreed to abide to all conference rules and to stop drawing orders on European houses in exchange for a guarantee of a minimum amount of business.³⁵¹ The CGT joined the agreement with the New York agents.³⁵² In the meantime, the long awaited pool-agreement with the British lines materialized. The Continental lines withdrew from the British and Scandinavian market while the British lines' share of the continental traffic was limited to six percent and their minimum rates had to at least equal the lowest fare of continental regular or express services.³⁵³

³⁴⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 223, Letter December 10 1894.


³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 223, Letter June 15 1895.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 223, Letter April 24 1895.

³⁵¹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, Meeting June 19, minute 843, meeting August 13, minutes 861-871 and meeting September 4 1895, minute 875.

³⁵² However, outside migrant agents would pose a constant threat of demoralizing the business again if a new line on the North Atlantic route was to be established.

³⁵³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, 223, Letter September 15 1895.



At last an agreement involving British and Continental lines allowed concluding loyalty agreements with the agents and brokers; which had important repercussions on transatlantic ocean fares. As the graph below illustrates the pool agreement allowed Continental lines to significantly increase the prepaid prices in 1892. However, discord among the British lines delayed further increases and forced the companies to pay out high commissions, thus cutting into their profits. When the market collapsed tensions increased resulting in a rate war. Negotiations resumed in March 1895 during which prices were increased. When all lines signed the agreement prices were raised again reaching unprecedented levels. Compared to 1885, prepaid prices of the Holland America Line doubled going from \$17 to \$34. The agreement would set new standards for fixing ocean fares for the following two decades.

6) Steerage price formation and shipping conferences on the North Atlantic: a complex story

The widespread migrant agent-network on both sides of the Atlantic clearly undermined the shipowners' ability to fix prices for transatlantic transport. Agents favored an unstable market because the keener the competition between the lines, the higher their commissions and the more facilities they obtained to increase their sales. The

lack of common interest between migrant agents and shipowners forced the latter to rely on conference rules to police the former. Shipping conferences regulating passenger transport were just as much horizontal combinations regulating the competition between shipping companies as they were a means of vertical integration to gain control over the agent-network. The analysis of the New York Continental lines illustrates that it took the members a decade to find a workable equilibrium.

A lasting agreement could only be concluded once the members neutralized the competition of outside Continental lines in their homeports. Yet the distrust between the members prevented them from making longstanding arrangements. The constant renegotiations on ocean rate differentials and the fact that fixed rates moved the competition even more towards improved and new services, railroad rates and tying migrant brokers and agents to a line, impeded the conference from relieving the internal pressures between the lines. Price agreements for the prepaid market in the US were further demoralized by the lower European cash rates. Hamburg migration brokers opened branch offices across the Atlantic to undercut prepaid rates by drawing orders on their European offices. The competition of British lines impeded the Continental lines of getting control on the agent-network. This competition culminated in Hamburg where most of the indirect continental migrants via England traveled through. All kinds of facilities violating the agreements were given by the shipping companies to the brokers in order to remain competitive.

The rivalry between the lines drove the market of prepaid tickets into the hands of some Hamburg migrant brokers. The chaos which spread from Hamburg explains why Ballin was the driving power behind the conference agreements. Instead of making the market more transparent all kinds of abuses covering up price cuts expanded during the first seven years of the Continental Conference. Cheating on conference agreements was too difficult to detect and no effective means were put into place to deter lines and agents from doing so. The only solution was to divide the market into shares. The establishment of the NDLV, pooling the continental traffic decidedly improved the harmony among the Continental lines. The increased collaboration helped to augment the pressures on the British lines to reach a compromise. Eventually, the agreement involved arrangements for the three sub-markets of European migration; the British-Scandinavian, the

Mediterranean-Oriental and the Continental market. Experience had shown that a rate war on one of the sub-market easily spread, disrupting the whole market. By geographically dividing the North-Atlantic market the Continental lines tried to protect themselves from external price cuts. With no lines left to play off against each other the New York migrant agents feared being cut off the business and organized themselves to come to terms with the shipping companies. The harmony between the lines gave the long awaited possibility of obtaining loyalty from the migrant brokers and agents.

The agreement had an immediate impact on the cost of prepaid tickets. Over the previous ten years the purchaser often received a discount on the gross rate of the ticket from the migrant agents. They cut their commission in order to sell as many tickets as possible, which were used to attract clients for other business. The increased gross prices during the first two years after the formation of the NDLV was followed by an increase in commission which when given as a discount to the purchaser of a prepaid ticket cancelled out the increase of the costs of migration. Moreover, the prepaid market was often flooded by orders sold at lower European cash rates. The improvements of the fleet and the services offered by the Holland America Line could not be charged to the purchaser. Also, the competition between the shipping companies to a great extent determined both prices for the ocean passage as for the inland transport. For the period analyzed here, shipping companies went to great lengths to reduce the inland transport and even sold it below costs at times to ensure a market share. Only when the harmony between all lines was established, did the cost for the migrant to cross the Atlantic substantially increase. Before the agreement, net prices of migration with the HAL roughly balanced between \$15 and \$20, when excluding the low points of \$10 during rate wars. In 1896 it peaked at \$32. In short, the net price of migrant passage sold in the U.S. remained low because of an unstable market corrupted by the agent-network during the decade from 1885 to 1895. The subsequent evolution up to 1914 will be discussed in part III.

Chapter IV: The nationalization of American migration policies: the influence of shipping companies in immigration legislation and enforcement thereof 1870-1895

During and after the Civil War the tendency of the federal government to regulate immigration matters increased. Federal laws encouraging immigration during the conflict

quickly made way for the growing pressures to reduce the influx. Two barriers preventing the state from taking control disappeared during this period. First, the notion that anti-immigration measures undermined the international relations based on reciprocity between countries were slowly replaced by the conviction that it was the state's own right to control immigration and emigration matters. Without denying the natural right of migration, the state's primary obligation was to protect her own citizens and institutions. Secondly, decisions of the Supreme Court moved the immigration matters from state to federal authority. State Immigration laws which were often undermined due to port competition for the migrant trade could now be made uniform.

Two main pressure groups were established advocating increased controls. One hand Labor Unions, which with the raise of the Knights of Labor and subsequently the American Federation of Labor lobbied to make an end to unrestricted labor import. Unions claimed employers misused immigrants to brake up strikes and keep down the wages.³⁵⁴ On the other hand, two breeding places of renewed nativism in California and Massachusetts pushed for far reaching restrictions claiming that the ethnic composition of the migrant stream consisting of Chinese, Southern and the Eastern Europeans posed a threat for the American institutions and citizenship. These were not only based on eugenic beliefs, and were also linked to the increasing return rates and hence lack of intention of becoming Americans. On the other side, of the spectrum foreign communities established in the US lobbied against restrictions. The influence of the Jewish lobby, especially has been uncovered by historians who along together with business interests were considered the principal defenders of a liberal policy. Politicians, both democrats as republicans were to a great extent influenced by the importance of the immigrant vote balanced against the native labor vote. Western and aouthern States neededing workers for industries and agriculture, and some seaboard states, especially New York having important interests in the migrant trade, generally opposed restrictions while California, eastern and northern states advocated these.

³⁵⁴ Researchers demonstrated that the image of migrants as strike-breakers and job-robbers was largely exaggerated by unions because the migrants tend to concentrate in low-level segments of the labor markets shunned by the residents. Segments of where both competed caused conflicts only when migrants undercut the wages or introduced new technology yet these were rather exceptions to the rule (Hoeder 1991, 90-96; 2002, 9).

A much neglected actor in the whole debate is the shipping lobby. Although Zolberg and Jones stressed the importance of the shipping lobby in American laws regulating the migrant transport, they neglect to acknowledging their role in opposing immigration restrictions (Jones, 1976, 1989, 1992 and Zolberg 1992, 2003, 2006). Moreover, most studies analyzing immigration policies have focused on the laws passed in Congress, but have paid little to their enforcement by immigrant control stations and consuls abroad. This chapter tries to shed more light on how the laws were implemented and especially how shipping companies tried to protect their main source of revenue by circumventing restrictive measures and prevent far reaching limitations from being enacted or enforced. What did the companies do to ensure the right of entry for their passengers? Also, the reaction of European governments towards American immigrant regulations will be touched on. What did they do to defend the interests of nationals being held at the gates or of national shipping companies whose success depended on the migrant trade?

1) The Civil War and proactive measures to attract migrants

Ten years after the diplomatic conflict between the US and Belgium for sending over paupers, beggars and convicts, the American Secretary of State William Seward himself financed the crossing of Belgian detainees of beggar workhouses. The Civil War created an important shortage of laborers and farmers pushing employers and land-speculators to intensify their recruiting activities in Europe. Yet, these were insufficient in filling the gap and forced the American authorities to intervene. A first measure consisted of the re-enactment of the Homestead Act in 1862 offering 160 acres of land to citizens and aliens who committed to work it for at least five years. Seward coordinated a vast propaganda campaign to promote the Act in Europe, through the diplomatic corps. In a circular addressed to the US consuls, he also stressed the unique opportunity the country offered for unemployed European workers. To make the opportunities known to the public some consuls even hired full time agents to attract prospective settlers (Balace, 1969, 2 and Tichenor, 2002, 66).

Due to the heavy inflation caused by the war, strikes broke out among labourers escaping military duties. As was the case with Belgian mine workers, recruiting agents lured them to the US under the pretence of high wages. Upon arrival they quickly found out that the inflation had reduced the salaries by 40 to 60 percent. Letters of defrauded migrants and disappointed returnees eventually had an adverse impact on migration (Feys, 2003, 100-104). Nevertheless, the combined efforts of the government and recruiters managed to put an end to the downward spiral of migration in 1863. On the West coast, especially for the completion of the transcontinental railroad connection, Chinese merchant associations and the Pacific Steamship Company formed a partnership to import Chinese workers on a large scale. Seward convinced the Chinese authorities not to obstruct this coolie trade, where labourers paid off the transport costs with the first money earned in the new world.

The lobbying efforts in Washington of the Secretary of State also resulted in an 'Act to encourage Immigration' in 1864. Seward had set up a scheme where the authorities provided employers who advanced the money for the crossing, the legal means to enforce the contracts binding both parties. The failure of land-speculators and employers to enforce the contracts in the past had prevented the adoption of this system on a large scale. The period of indentured labour was limited to one year. The American Emigration Company coordinated the initiative and received support from the consular corps to tap into from the European labour market. But it could not raise the necessary funds to organize the move on the scale it intended. The company for instance also planned to own and operate steamships to organize the transport of recruits. The initiative closely resembled the Redemptioner-system and received internal opposition for differing little from the slave trade, the cause for the ongoing war. The American workforce also started to unionize opposing the scheme. The activities of the American Emigrant Company remained limited to arranging the transport and differed little of other middlemen such as railroad and shipping companies (Tichenor, 2002, 65-67 and Zolberg, 2006, 166-173).

In Europe a growing number of governments started to look with apprehension on the movement of nationals across the Atlantic and did not necessarily welcome the initiatives of the American government (Dovering, 1963, 463-470). Especially with the

parallel recruitments taking place in Europe for the federal army rumours spread that workers were forced to join the federal troops upon arrival.³⁵⁵ For instance the agent L. Dochez, who recruited the above aforementioned mine-workers, also advertised the following:

“In America they look for 800, single, voluntary emigrants between 21 and 40 years of age to emigrate to the United States of America. It is of no use to present one’s self without the certificate of militia. Address yourselves to L. Dochez, bureau of emigration, number 2, Brabant Street, Brussels.”³⁵⁶

In collaboration with the notorious Antwerp migrant broker Adolphe Strauss, Dochez contacted the governors of different provinces and mayors of important cities to reinstate an old practice, namely the release of detainees from beggar workhouses to ship them to the US. This time, the crossing was not paid for by the Belgian, but by the American authorities. Again, the practice caused a diplomatic conflict between both nations, and now it was the Belgian authorities who protested against the practice. An investigation revealed that recruits had been deceived, believing they would be engaged in work, but when they landed in the US they filled the ranks of the federal troops.³⁵⁷ The scandal put an end to the recruitments of the federal government in Belgium and compromised the attempts to lure Belgian workers to the country (Balace, 1969, 1-24 and Feys, 2007, 100-108). With the end of the Civil War, migration picked up again while the internal opposition against the active immigration policy grew strong. In 1868, Congress repealed the law putting an end to the policy of encouraging immigration which would be replaced by laws restricting the movement.

³⁵⁵ The 1862 circular of Seward also suggested that poor and unemployed Europeans could join the federal army. This kind of recruitment mainly took place in Ireland and Germany. Officially the American federal government only engaged volunteers. However questions were raised as to the voluntary nature of the recruitment. Some stories claimed that men who went to America to work, were forced to join the federal army. The recruitment in Belgium happened with the consent of the American legation in Brussels. Activities increased in 1864 as numerous soldiers who had entered the army in 1861 were discharged after their three year service. A blockade of the German ports forced him to ship his recruits through Antwerp. This took place on the ‘*Bellona*’ and the ‘*Guerland*’ on the 6th and 15th of June. About sixty Belgians also embarked on the *Bellona*. The notorious migrant broker Adolphe Strauss organized the shipping (Balace, 1969, 15).

³⁵⁶ Letter from Rogier to Tesch July 7 1864: Advertisement published in L’Etoile April 7 1864, BGRA, I 160: Archives du Ministère de la Justice: Administration de la sûreté publique du Régime français à 1914, nr.154, Enrôlements et recrutements de Belges pour l’étranger.

³⁵⁷ Balace estimated that 300 Belgians joined the ranks of the federal army that way (Balace, 1969, 19).

2) Reaching an international consensus on migrant transport legislation: From the Emigrant ship Convention to the Passenger Act of 1882

2.1) The Emigrant Ship Convention

Judicial decisions following law suits concerning infringements of the capacity requirements of the 1855 Passenger Act exposed its shortcomings. The first case was won by shipowners based on the fact that the law only applied to passengers from the US, and not to migrants who landed on American territory. Subsequent cases were won on the basis of the same argument. The arrival of various ships with high death rates in 1867 and 1868 renewed the interest of the American authorities in the problem.³⁵⁸ New lawsuits followed, yet this time shipowners won the case based on the argument that laws applied to sailing ships only, and not to steamships, which started to monopolize the migrant trade.

In the meantime, the British Minister at Washington, Edward Thornton intervened to protect the interest of the national merchant marine. Together with his colleague in the North German Confederation, Baron Gerolt, the British envoy proposed that the American authorities to assimilate the existing passenger laws of the three countries. The American secretary of State, Hamilton Fish welcomed the initiative and addressed all maritime powers involved in the migrant trade along with those already mentioned; France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. Fish tried to organize an emigrant ship convention producing uniform regulations for emigrant vessels and to establish international courts in the American ports of arrival to prosecute for abuses that occurred on the high seas. This had to solve the dual problem of American courts on one hand lacking the jurisdiction over foreign flagged ships, while on the other foreign courts lacked the witnesses to effectively exercise their jurisdiction over national ships.

The composition and functions of the 'Emigrant Courts' constituted the main obstacle during the negotiations. Mixed tribunals with foreign representation through the

³⁵⁸ The case of '*Guiseppe Baccarich*' discussed in chapter one was followed by the *Lord Brougham* arriving in New York with 75 deceased out of 383 passengers and shortly after by the *Leibnitz* losing 105 out of the 544 passengers. Both ships had sailed from Hamburg. Just as in Belgium, German authorities appointed a special committee to investigate regulations regarding migrant transport in both Bremen and Hamburg. Bismarck took advantage of the negative report to place emigration under federal supervision (Jones, 1976, 180-183).

consuls were unconstitutional in the US while foreign authorities refused the concession of jurisdiction of their ships to a court where they were not represented. The Bremen Chamber of Commerce vigorously fought the idea and received support from Baron Gerolt, as shareholder of the North German Lloyd. Gray Hill, secretary of the Liverpool-based North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference opposed the establishment of international courts in American hands. Hill feared an abuse of power because of the American jealousy about the ascendancy of the British merchant marine. The conference criticized other measures proposed by Fish for unnecessarily increasing the migrant fares (Jones, 1989, 326-330 and 1976, 178-204).

Belgian authorities followed suit protecting the interests of Antwerp merchants involved in the transatlantic migrant traffic. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vander Stichelen asked the Department of Justice to show their good will and to cooperate as much as possible. After the 'Guiseppe Baccarcich' case he wanted to avoid a new wave of criticism against Antwerp. Any risks which might have repercussions on the emigration movement through Antwerp had to be avoided.³⁵⁹ The project of establishing such courts dragged on for six years. By dragging out the negotiations the shipping lobby successfully prevented new American Passenger Acts from being passed. Yet, the shipping lobby only postponed new legislation. Building further on the efforts to reach international regulations the American Congress finally revised the Passenger act in 1882 in accordance to German and British laws.

2.2) The 1882 Passenger Act

In 1875 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the case *Henderson versus Mayor of New York* that the practice of levying commutation fees as a substitute for head tax usurped the power of Congress regulating foreign commerce and hence to be unconstitutional (Ueda, 1992, 42-43). The State of New York therefore lost an important source of revenue on which it relied to finance the maintenance of landing facilities for

³⁵⁹ ABMFA, Emigration, 2020, IX, Emigration 1870-1895, Letter of Vander Stichelen to Tesch, January 5 1870.

migrants.³⁶⁰ Seaboard states' efforts to receive federal compensation during the years that followed remained unsuccessful. With the new significant influx of migrants arriving in the US in the early 1880s New York threatened to close down Castle Garden bringing migrant legislation back on the American agenda.

In 1882, Congress first passed a Chinese Exclusion Act in response to the constant petitions of the Californian anti-immigration lobby, which barred the importation of Chinese laborers for the next decade. Subsequently, the federal government passed laws excluding convicts, lunatics, idiots and persons likely to become a public charge which up to then had been under the authority of states. These acts launched a new era in American immigrant legislation where the federal government started taking control over immigration matters and the first distinctions based on race and nationality made their entry way into migrant policies (Bennet, 1963, 15-17. Torpey, 2004, 97, Jones, 1992, 214-215, Zolberg, 2006, 185-189).

The intense activity in Congress regarding migration issues also resulted in a new Passenger Bill that same year. The law was modeled chiefly on German and British passenger acts. Yet, once again the shipping lobby, represented by former celebrated senator Roscoe Conkling induced President Arthur to veto the measure until it was adapted to their likings. For instance, the provision providing that deportation of people likely to become a public charge to occur at the expense of the shipping companies was omitted (Jones, 1989, 329; Zolberg, 2006, 193). The passenger act of 17th of August 1882 imposed new requirements for migrant ships regarding bunk space, separation of men and women, light and ventilation, hygiene, food supplies, physicians and hospitals on board, et al. A head tax of 50 cent was levied on all third-class passengers. Most importantly, the controls on the compliance with the laws of ships arriving in New York intensified. Jones claimed that again the laws failed to be applied, yet the consular correspondence of the Dutch envoy at Washington proves that the authorities did enforce the acts triggering a debate on sovereignty between European States and the US. Moreover it shows that the idea of an international convention to regulate migrant transport was not fully abandoned (Jones, 1989, 329).

³⁶⁰ The competition between the seaboard states to attract the traffic had reduced the commutation fees in the 1870's. The state of Massachusetts even cancelled it to be more competitive with New York.

The Royal Netherlands Steamship Company, also known as the Amsterdam-Line, complained about the negative influence these laws had on their business. Moreover, they questioned the American jurisdiction over foreign ships. The envoy in Washington, Weckherlin underlined that little could be done against these laws. They were conceived of to protect the well being of the needy, so fighting these ideals was difficult. The argument could be made that Dutch ships on the ocean were not obliged to follow American laws, however it was equally true that nothing defended the American authorities from refusing ships to their ports that did not respect their laws.³⁶¹ The HAL, be it more diplomatically than the Amsterdam Line, also pointed to the conflictive character of some of the new requirements in comparison with the Dutch laws. They called for an international agreement regarding the matter with all countries concerned.

The Emigration Supervision Committee of Rotterdam and Amsterdam analyzed the new proposals and compared them with the existing Dutch laws. They wrote out a report on the discordance with the Dutch laws and negative influence that this might have on the protection of the migrant. But, they concluded that the US legislation would always have an important influence on the traffic coming from Europe, which was not undesirable. This protected the migrant from the self-interest of businessmen and had a unifying effect on the legislation of the countries dealing with migrant transport. They urged unification by preserving the freedom of sailing under the national colors through an international convention. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had ordered the envoy in Washington to make sure that these remarks would be spread to all the members of Congress before the law was voted on for a second time.

However, the communication arrived too late.³⁶² Under influence of the German and English passenger liners, the governments of both countries presented a joint resolution to adapt these laws to theirs without consulting the smaller countries concerned.³⁶³ A congressional commission had been appointed for the unification of

³⁶¹ NA, 2.05.13, Gezantschap te Washington. Nr 210 Ingekomen brieven en uitgaande minuten over het vervoer van Landverhuizers, Letter from the HAL directors to MFA April 12 1884, Letter from envoy Weckherlin to MFA May 4 1882.

³⁶² *Ibid.* Letter from MFA to Weckherlin 14-8-1882 with reports of Supervision Committee of Rotterdam June 29 1882 and Amsterdam July 3 1882.

³⁶³ *Ibid.* Letter from Weckherlin to M.F.A. February 16 1883.

British, German and American laws.³⁶⁴ The envoy proposed that the Dutch government organized an international convention to get these laws adapted to the legislation of all countries involved.³⁶⁵ However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs refused claiming that it might lead to the impression that the Netherlands tried to organize a convention with the European countries against the United States. According to him, it was up to the US to invite all the countries concerned.³⁶⁶ The envoy insisted on making contact with Great-Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Belgium and Denmark. Although Sweden had numbered high emigration rates, they had no national shipping line.³⁶⁷ The envoy advised against inviting Sweden since the government was trying to reduce emigration and would use all means available to make emigration as expensive as possible. Weckherlin wanted to take the initiative, by motivating his colleagues to obtain the collaboration of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs.³⁶⁸

Building on the initiative of the late 1860s the head-agent of the CGT had already raised the matter of an international convention with the authorities in Paris, and word came from Rome that the Italian government was not really pleased with the new laws either.³⁶⁹ The Belgian envoy favored the intervention of his Dutch colleague, yet he could not actively help because his superiors failed to give clear instructions on how to proceed.³⁷⁰ The Dutch and French envoys sent letters to the American Department of State with the request to invite all countries involved.³⁷¹ Weckherlin met with the Secretary of State Frelinghuysen regarding the agreement between the US, Germany and Great-Britain. Frelinghuysen suggested that he could not take any initiative to involve the other countries because the Republicans had gained the majority in the House of Representatives. If the invitation came from a European country, than he would be more than willing to collaborate. Frelinghuysen wrote to the minister of Foreign Affairs in

³⁶⁴ ABMFA, Emigration, 2959 I, US migration laws 1882-1898, Letter February 16 1893.

³⁶⁵ NA, 2.o5.13, Letter from Weckherlin to MFA February 16 1883.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.* Letter from MFA to Weckherlin March 16 1883.

³⁶⁷ Sweden was one of the few European countries that up to 1883 passed migrant passage acts obstructing the development of the merchant marine under the national flag rather than stimulating it. The authorities repealed the laws attributing space requirements which were double that of British ships only in 1893, too late to recover the backlog on foreign competitors (Lovoll, 1999, 1-48).

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.* Letter from Weckherlin to MFA March 30 1883 and April 18 1883.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.* Letter from Weckherlin to MFA May 19 1883.

³⁷⁰ ABMFA, 2959 I, Correspondence from February 16 1883 until July 28 1883.

³⁷¹ NA, 2.o5.13, Letter from Weckherlin to M.F.A February 28 1883 and March 14 1883.

Italy, France, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden to find out what they would think of a convention jointly organized by the Dutch and American authorities.³⁷² Italy and Belgium reacted positively, Denmark agreed to cooperate if others did, Great Britain wanted to wait and see what impact the new regulations would have while the others had not yet replied.³⁷³ Due to a lack of interest the Dutch authorities abandoned the idea.

As was seen in previous chapters, consuls played a crucial role in establishing contacts with local authorities and merchant communities to promote trade relations with shipping enterprises based in their homelands. Especially in new markets, where uncertainties and hence transaction costs were considerable, consuls played a vital role. During the early years of transatlantic shipping emissaries actively promoted the opening of new lines to national ports. Once the line was inaugurated shipping agents took over the responsibilities of producing reliable information on business opportunities, market fluctuations and competition, as well as defending the interests of the home port and company. The transition was often gradual, consuls sometimes being appointed as initial head-agents of the line which was true for Antwerp and Rotterdam lines.

Although the direct ties between steam shipping companies and diplomats diminished, their role in defending the commercial interest of the merchant marine with foreign authorities remained intact. In the case of the HAL, the Dutch emissaries assisted in introducing the newly arrived HAL personnel in the American merchant community. They defended the reputation of companies sailing under the Dutch flag and lobbied with the authorities against laws and treaties obstructing trade between the countries such as the Immigrant Passenger Act. Issues on granting more space to migrants on board of ships translated in a loss of revenues for shipping companies. The main problem for shipping companies with the American law was that the penalties for having too many passengers on board did not only consist of a fine per passenger, but also of a possible prison sentence for the captain. Effective sentences were never served by the captains but the trials cost the companies a serious amount of money. Moreover, these procedures could cause delays of departure.

³⁷² *Ibid.* Letter from Weckherlin to MFA May 20 1883 and June 18 1883.

³⁷³ *Ibid.* Letter from Weckherlin to MFA May 5 and 19 1883.

Especially the RNSC had a lot of problems with these laws as the ‘*Survey* case’ illustrates. The company kept on embarking a number of passengers based on the Dutch legislation. It questioned the jurisdiction of the American authorities because the embarkation in Amsterdam occurred according to the laws enforced in that port. The *Survey* had been chartered, sailed under the British flag and was under the command of a British captain. Weckherlin advised against an intervention of the consul general, and let a lawyer handle the case. The envoy believed that if Toelaar, head agent in New York for the RNSC proved he acted in accordance with the Dutch legislation, the court would offer a settlement. The British consul general shared in his opinion. Weckherlin however tried to avoid a trial, safeguarding Toelaar from a slur, but in the meantime he hoped it would serve as a warning for the company. The Dutch envoy could not intervene directly because the *Survey* sailed under the British flag, but he tried to pull some strings indirectly. Toelaer received support from the Supervision Committee of Amsterdam and also from the American consul at the home port. The head-agent and the captain Bacon were released on bail of \$5000. Shortly after another RNSC ship, the *Nemsis* arrived with twenty deceased individuals, while the HAL’s ship, *Edam*, sank.

The German and American newspapers published articles bringing the Dutch lines into disrepute. The emissaries launched a propaganda campaign in the American press to defend the reputation of the Dutch companies. The media attention worked to the disadvantage of the companies in the ‘*Survey-case*’ which initially was not going to be pursued, and then suddenly the authorities set a date for trial. The envoy took charge of the case pleading with the district attorney and hence becoming officially involved. He decided not to plead the case based on the argument that the company respected the Dutch laws those being just as lawful as the American laws. Weckherlin feared that this line of argumentation would lead to a very long trial harming the reputation of the line. The consul pleaded the case that the company had assumed that the laws were only applicable on sailing ships, and not on steamships, to play down the criminal intent.³⁷⁴

The source did not reveal the verdict yet the *Survey* case reflects how the jurisdiction of migrant ships remained a delicate topic. Not being able to reach an international convention the American authorities went ahead to impose its will on

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.* Correspondence between Weckherlin and MFA from April 24 and August 20 1883.

foreign ships through federal legislation. To avoid international repercussions the government consulted the biggest maritime nations concerned, Germany and Great Britain. The US knew that with their approval the other smaller maritime nations would follow suit. The Secretary of State welcomed the initiative of the Dutch authorities to re-launch the negotiations of an international convention yet the Americans no longer took a leading role. The federal government now being empowered to pass legislation regarding immigration matters in general, gradually expanded its control on the incoming flow and how they were transported. Americans no longer feared protests based on the argument that they had no jurisdiction on foreign ships. The established notions of reciprocity between nations regarding shipping and migration matters slowly made way for the conviction that these issues belonged to the national authority and had to be imposed to preserve and enhance sovereignty. With all migration matters falling under federal authority the shipping lobby also lost the opportunity of fighting laws in the Supreme Court for being unconstitutional. Washington now became the place of predilection for passenger liners to defend their interests.

3) The labour Unions as a lobby group and the ‘Alien contract labour law’

3.1) Labour organizations and the new wave of migrant sojourners

Labour Unions formed another interest group trying to influence the migration policies of Congress. The openness of the ‘Knights of Labour’ uniting workers of different trades without discriminating on racial, religious or gender bases allowed the union to quickly expand its membership. Midway through the 1880s the union numbered more than 100,000 members allowing the organization to become an important actor in American political and economic spheres fighting the growing influence of the corporate lobby in Washington.³⁷⁵ The rise of big corporations with their monopolistic tendencies widened the gap between employers and employees. Calls for legislation limiting the

³⁷⁵ F. NOTEBOHM, "Rapport sur la situation des ouvriers aux Etats-Unis", Stockholm, 1905, p. 36-37, ABMFA, , Question ouvrières, 3284, Etats-Unis 1885-1912.

power and formation of trusts intensified as illustrated by Terence Powderly, master workman of the Knights of Labour:

“our railroads enjoy privileges which gives their owners a power which the Emperor of Russia does not possess and that power is being directed towards the complete overthrow of our Republican form of government. Our factories, great and small, our water privileges are being cornered under the sway of the “Trust”.
...As a nation we must within the next ten years completely divest the railroads and other corporations of their autocratic power (Powderly, 1888, 170).”

Labour organizations spread the notion that American employers artificially swelled the migration movement, increasing the competition among workers to lower wages. They also suspected employers of importing work forces as strike breakers undermining the union’s position towards employers.

Especially skilled labourers, such as glassworkers, organized themselves to obtain the best work conditions possible. Some Belgian glass workers had migrated to the US during the 1870s and created a link with the Belgian glass industry located around Charleroi. Employers tried to attract Belgian workers while the Knights of Labour established contacts with the Belgian Union Verrière, expanding the solidarity among workers across national borders. The unions mutually supported each other financially in times of strike. By giving support to foreign unions and even by establishing new ones overseas, the Knights of Labour hoped to increase the wages in Europe. This network expanded to glass workers in Germany, France and England creating a Universal Federation to control the transatlantic labour market. Ideally, the union believed that this would neutralize the migration movement between both continents; seeing the wage gap as main incentive for many European labourers to make the move. Yet during the 1890s established craft solidarity became splintered and Belgian unions even made secret arrangements with American employers to send over strike breakers. Ellis Island inspectors kept an eye open for Belgian glassworkers because by then a law had been passed barring the entry to migrants who had made arrangements for work before their arrival (Feys, 2003, 134-140; Goyens, 1982, 28-34 and Fones-Wolf, 2002, 63-68 and 2004, 300-308).

These kinds of translational networks for skilled migrants were exceptional and did by no means apply to the bulk of unskilled labourers landing at New York. The

constant flow of unskilled workers allowed the employers to contract strike breakers at the port of arrival. Yet, demands for legislation to restrict importation of contract labour from Europe were first voiced by glassworkers and cigar makers and then taken over by the Knights of Labour. These materialized in 1885, prohibiting the importation of aliens to perform labour in the US exempting skilled workers for new industries, professional actors, lecturers, singers, domestic workers, relatives and personal friends (Jones, 1992, 215 and Zolberg, 2006, 194). The last two categories point to the influence of the shipping companies protecting their prepaid market. Employers caught contracting emigrants before their arrival risked a fine of up to \$500.

The Congressional debates leading to the law reveal the rising sentiment against new arrivals from Southern and Eastern Europe, labelled as 'pauper labor'. Martin Foran who introduced the law and Powderly voiced the criticism which would dominate the immigration policy debates for the next three decades. The new wave of Hungarians and Italians consisted mainly of single men coming to save as much as possible, therefore accepting living and working in degrading conditions, in order to return home after some years- having no intention whatsoever of becoming American citizens. Many of the American trade unions had been pioneered by migrants and except for the Contract Labour Law they initially showed little intention to demand far reaching restrictive measures. However, the new wave of migrant sojourners from Eastern and Southern Europe did not show the same tendency to join unions. The difficulty in mobilizing the new workforce pushed the existing unions to retract and to increase the barriers for new entrants further alienating both parties. As the Contract labour law proved very hard to enforce the labour movement started to press to restrict the immigration movement altogether (Feys, 2003, 139, 207; Higham, 1955, 112-113; Jones, 1992, 188-190 and Zolberg, 2006, 194-196). The American Federation of Labour only followed suit midway through the 1890s, while Powderly as spokesmen of the Knights of Labour, openly did this during the 1880s³⁷⁶:

³⁷⁶ Scholars such Higham and Tichenor have generally dated the support of labor unions for immigrant restrictions midway the 1890's. The statements of Powderly refute the conception as formulated by Tichenor that the Knights of Labor hardly made any difference between new and old immigration; *Due to its international orientation the union sought to enhance the solidarity among workers regardless of nationality and thus expressed no desire for sweeping restrictions* (Tichenor, 2002, 72). For Powderly international solidarity seemed to have reached its limits in the 1880's. The idea of Americans for

“It is still dangerous to say anything concerning the restriction of immigration for fear of being charged with Know-Nothingism. Whatever Know Nothingism meant in former years, the man who advocates restriction of immigration today is a patriot who loves his country better than the opinion of demagogues, or of those who will not speak the truth, because it may temporarily affect their interest (Powderly 1888, 166).

To limit the entrance of the new stock which he labelled as ‘semi-barbarous’ Powderly advocated consular controls on the character and intentions of the migrants before issuing consular certificates needed for landing on US shores. These only had to be granted to migrants intending to become American citizens.

3.2) The European reaction to the Alien Contract Labour Law

The Contract Labour Law remained a dead letter until the amendments of 1887, putting the Secretary of State in charge of its enforcement and providing that violators be sent back on arrival (Hutchinson, 1980, 91). The delayed reaction of the Belgian authorities to the Bill and the fact that this instance saw the first passengers return to Antwerp accused of violating a law dating back to 1887, corroborate this. When being informed of the law the Belgian minister of Foreign Affaires Joseph de Chimay wrote a letter to all the provincial governors ordering them to make this measure known to the public.³⁷⁷ Charles Mali asked the minister what procedure he should follow when a compatriot filed a complaint against his extradition. The consul noted that the law conflicted with the ‘treaty of commerce and navigation’ signed on the 8th of March 1875. However he pointed out that it wasn’t the first time that American authorities passed immigration laws which went against treaties and agreements. The consul informed

Americans started to sink in. The immigration began to affect the American quality of life, hence the influx needed to be reduced to prevent that the same living and working conditions prevailing in Europe infiltrated into the US, according to Powderly. To what extent have the ideas of the spokesman of the Knight of Labor contributed to the decline of the union? Did it have any affect on the growth of the AFL refraining to take a restrictionists stand until 1897?

³⁷⁷ ABMFA, 2961, part I, Ouvriers Belges aux Etats-Unis (1883-1908) Letter from MFA Joseph de Chimay to the governors January 1 1888.

Chimay that the law had triggered an international protest but that so far no country had undertaken diplomatic actions.³⁷⁸

Shortly after receiving the letter the maritime police informed the minister of the arrest of a group of Ottomans for vagrancy in the streets of Antwerp. They were the first to be sent back to Antwerp on the basis of the 'Alien Contract labour law'. The city of Antwerp and the national authorities risked getting stuck with many foreigners, who being without means became dependent on the authorities. Chimay considered lodging an official protest against the American law. First the minister wrote his colleague in the Department of Justice, Van Begerem, to see what measures could be taken to prevent emigrants of getting stranded in Antwerp.³⁷⁹ Chimay was determined to take action. He wrote to the ministers of foreign affairs of ten other countries to find out what their intentions were regarding the law.³⁸⁰ The replies show that most countries had no intention of opposing it. The German minister made it clear that he did not plan to protest against the measure. He considered the emigration of compatriots to be detrimental to the country and thus he favoured the measure. His Russian colleague shared this point of view. Moreover, he stressed that Russia had no intention of interfering with other countries' legislation. Other nations like Portugal and Great-Britain informed Chimay that they had no objections to the law. These countries preferred to direct the emigration movement to their own colonies. The ministers of Norway and Sweden stated that they preferred to keep their compatriots within their borders considering the vast lands that needed to be cultivated. Finally, the Swiss minister said that his government intended to remain neutral regarding the issue. Swiss authorities wanted to refrain from stimulating emigration, but at the same time wanted to protect the emigrants from people who tried to make profits of them.

Due to the lack of support from his foreign colleagues, Chimay decided to abandon the idea of filing an official protest against the law. In the meantime Mali informed the minister that the case had already been taken to the Supreme Court under claims that the law was unconstitutional, yet the court rejected the complaint. Mali advised Chimay to fully inform the population about this new law:

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.* Letter from H. Mali to Chimay February 6 1888.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.* Letter from Chimay to Van Begerem February 8 1888,

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.* Letter from Chimay to the ministers of Internal Affairs J. Thonissen February 20 1888.

“we would not dare to advise our labourers to come here without a bond or a support assuring them work, but it is important to inform the emigrants to keep this silent if they do not want to experience difficulties upon their arrival in New York.”³⁸¹

The Contract Labour Law created a ‘catch 22’ in the American migrant legislation requiring new arrivals on one hand to prove that they were not to be likely of become a public charge, while on the other hand they could not make arrangements for work before entering the US. Yet, both shipping companies and Belgian government authorities, through the emigration commissioner in Antwerp informed the migrants of the right answers in order to get through the interrogations granting access to the US.

The answers received by Chimay from his foreign colleagues reflect the position of some European countries which, with exception of Portugal and Russia had a long tradition of migration to the US. Although most countries more or less followed a non-intervention policy, they tended to discourage rather than encourage migration. Belgian authorities still leaned more towards encouraging a movement which had failed to materialize earlier and was only starting to develop. It shared this characteristic with other nations such as Italy where the US bound movement was in its initial phase. With the second industrial revolution, outbreaks of the social unrest had become more frequent. Belgian authorities considered emigration as a possible security valve to temper protests in large industrial centres during crisis times. American laws obstructing this security valve did not seem to have pleased Belgian officials. Another reason for Chimay’s protests was that the laws affected the commercial interests of the port of Antwerp and the cities’ welfare funds. Migrants sent back to Antwerp threatened to become a significant burden on the Belgian authorities. Deported subjects roaming around the port could also affect the reputation of Antwerp as migrant gateway to the US. Therefore, the reputation of the Red Star Line in controlling the large share of the migrant trade through the port was also at stake.

3.3) The conflict of interest between Labour Unions and shipping companies

³⁸¹ *Ibid.* Letters from H. Mali to Chimay March 11888 and August 29 1889.

The increasing influence gained by trade unions in the US affected the shipping companies on two fronts, first as employers and second as a lobby group defending opposed interests regarding migrant legislation. Midway through the 1880s under pressure from the Knights of Labor, New York longshoremen went on strike demanding better working condition and higher wages. The Union spread the action to coal handlers to increase the pressure on the shipping firms. Van den Toorn, found it hard to estimate how long they could hold it out, yet according to the head-agent, funds supporting the longshoremen flowed in from everywhere; from the various branches of the Knights of Labor, from politicians out for votes, from small commercial ententes which were forced to contribute and landlords stopped charging rent during the strike, knowing they would not receive their rents in any case. The biggest problem was the support they received from the popular press stigmatizing non-union men as scabs. Aware of the importance of the press in gaining support of the public opinion against the strikers, shipping companies joined forces starting a lobby campaign in the popular press.³⁸²

The passenger liners had the big advantages of landing immigrants seeking jobs en masse on a daily basis. The high concentration of newly arrived in the port made it easy for shipping lines to contract an alternative workforce to break up the strikes. Occasionally, the Holland America Line even embarked extra personnel in Rotterdam to unload and load the ships. Close collaboration between the shipping firms was a key to hold their dominant position. If one company gave in to the demands it weakened the stand of all shipping firms. There existed an important internal rivalry among the lines yet the collaboration through shipping conferences defending matters of common interest stimulated cohesion. Shipping companies remained unaffected by the pressure of unions. It was only in 1910 that HAL gave in under the increasing public pressure, and gave the longshoremen a pay increase. The company considered the claims to be justified since longshoremen had not received a pay raise for thirty years!³⁸³

The divergent interests regarding migrant legislation divided both pressure groups once more. In this battle, the shipping companies again took the upper hand. The

³⁸² The INC did not take part in these joined efforts since the strike drove the trade to neighboring ports such as Philadelphia. As will be seen below the owners of the Red Star Line and American Line defended converse interests than foreign shipping lines in US forming a separate lobby group.

³⁸³ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, correspondence between January 19 1887 until November 11 1887.

Contract Labor Law proved a pyrrhic victory for the unions and illustrates the gap between passing a law and enforcing it. Castle Garden and Ellis Island authorities were by far the most important filter for incoming migrants. The control stations remained under the New York State authority until 1891, when it moved under federal supervision. This transition did little to alter the bad reputation of the control stations. Van den Toorn often complained about the corrupt, despotic and arbitrary management. Frequent scandals reported by the popular press corroborate this view. Positions at the control stations were often used as rewards for political favors and not so much based on the capacities of the appointees.³⁸⁴ The superintendent of the control station was selected by the President after 1891 and tended to change more frequently than the time spent by the latter in office. As immigration laws passed in Congress left a great margin of interpretation on their enforcement, migration policies depended largely of the zeal of immigration inspectors. These were easily influenced by external pressures; especially when elections were looming, the controls became stricter, as was reported by Van den Toorn:

“The government here is completely corrupted, to an extent which is hard to imagine for a European. Just as the examination procedure of passengers. Immigrants are often sent back with no valid reason but for the sole purpose of pleasing the labor party for upcoming elections.”³⁸⁵

Van den Toorn felt powerless, but tried to be on good terms with immigration officials by giving them all sorts of incentives hoping that passengers of other shipping companies would be sent back instead.

Yet, the shipping companies also used the venality of immigration inspectors to their advantage. One of the top priorities of the Holland America Line when opening their office in New York was to appoint a person of trust at Castle Garden. This person had to create goodwill for the company among the inspectors and assisted the passengers during the landing. The enforcement of the Contract Labour Law proved the importance of good contacts at the control station. Van den Toorn reported that initially protests against the deportation of people suspected of violating the law had little effect. Yet early in 1888 the head-agent prevented the deportation of eighteen Syrians arriving on the

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Letter December 26 1886 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 221-226, Letter July 7 1891.

³⁸⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 222, Letter March 8 1892.

Schiedam. An old acquaintance, Captain Heinzmann had been nominated as inspector of Ellis Island which gave him some power in these matters. Van den Toorn gave him some non-specified presents on top of free passage third-class for his cousin, which was enough to obtain the right of landing for the Syrians. Van den Toorn tried to remain in good favor with Heinzmann but asked Rotterdam to use the greatest care when embarking Arabs, Turks, Syrians and Polish Jews.³⁸⁶ Once the ship arrived in New York little could be done because an inspector specialized in detecting contract labor immediately mingled with the passengers when reaching quarantine.

The head-agent underlined the importance of the purser of the ship in preparing migrants for the interrogations. They also contributed by controlling the passenger manifests which with the law of 1891 contained some specific questions to track down contract labor. For instance, Van den Toorn praised the purser of the *Amsterdam* for preventing difficulties with the landing of a group of twenty five who had given up the same address of someone in Hazelton as final destination. Based on this kind of information, inspectors investigated possible violations of the Contract Labor law. By changing the addresses the purser avoided this.³⁸⁷ Yet the head agent reminded the pursers to use the greatest secrecy. The *New York Herald*, *New York World* and *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung* reported that the purser of the *Amsterdam* boasted about the fact that no passenger of this ship had ever been sent back for violating the Contract Labor Law. The newspapers accused the purser of forcing passengers to claim that they had paid for their passage themselves, possessed \$30 or more and not to have made any prior arrangements for work. This kind negative publicity had to be avoided at all costs and the purser needed to limit his efforts to people running a risk, not to all passengers on board.³⁸⁸

Yet the preparations for the interrogations started with the subagents in Europe informing the migrants about the American laws. The directors of the Holland America Line praised the efforts of the company's office in Vienna for preparing their passengers to evade the Contract Labor Laws. It proved very hard for the HAL personal in

³⁸⁶ The HAL also maintained good contacts with Heinzmann's successor responsible for Syrian, Arab and Egyptian immigrants, Mr Arkedy. In exchange for three second class tickets for his children, the inspector facilitated the landing of 70 Syrians. *Ibid.* Letters February 8 1888 September 8 1896.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.* Letter March 2 1894.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.* Letters June 15 and July 13 1894.

Rotterdam, screening the passengers of high risks, to establish the truth about contract labor violators sent through the Vienna Office.³⁸⁹

These efforts, combined with the sale of prepaid tickets to third parties other than relatives or friends which were worked off by the migrants after their arrival, underlines the importance of shipping companies in circumventing Contract Labor Laws. These violations proved to be very difficult for American authorities. With the law, employers avoided written work agreements; hence authorities very much relied on obtaining confessions during the interrogations at the control stations. Shipping companies made sure that passengers knew the right answers to avoid deportations. Yet the interrogations of suspects by the immigration inspectors proved to be more than just answering a few straight forward questions.

In the case against Belgian glassworkers, one of the accused Jean-Baptiste Saint testified that the translator at the interrogation Mr. Palmeri confessed that they were told to state that they had work. Palmeri had told them that they would be sent back otherwise and did not deny this in court. The glassworkers were then forced to sign a declaration which had been drawn up before their arrival in English and hence they could not read it. The chief inspector of the Immigration Commission admitted to have been on the look out for Belgian glassworkers. Through their contacts in Charleroi, the Knights of Labor had passed on a list with names of glassworkers.³⁹⁰ The case illustrates that when the Immigration Commission lacked the proofs they could fabricate evidence by intimidating passengers. The accused owed their right of passage to the intervention of the Belgian consul Charles Mali. The Belgian diplomat went great lengths to obtain the right of landing of compatriots, be it glassworkers, diamond cutters, cigar makers, etc. (Feys, 2003, 134-148).

The British consul also fought unjust deportation while van den Toorn mentioned the lack of interest of Austrian-Hungarian diplomats, reflecting this nation's tendency to restrict migration.³⁹¹ Hence besides shipping companies, diplomats from some European

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.* Letter March 14 1894.

³⁹⁰ ABMFA, 2961, part I, Report about the trial against the Belgian glassworkers (126 pages), attached to a letter from Mali to Chimay August 19 1890.

³⁹¹ As was the case of seven English passengers which had been sent back with the *Obdam*. The HAL had refused to pay the 1000 dollar bond to keep them in the US while the British consul was taking steps to fight the injustice. If the consul obtained the right of landing of the seven passengers van den Toorn

authorities also fought deportations by immigrants. The efforts or lack thereof, of governments through their consular corps to protect the interests of citizens and to retain ties with the home country, as Donna Gabbaccia denoted for the Italian case, is an area which has not yet been fully explored by international migration historians (Gabbaccia, 1999, 1125).

4) The resurgence of the nativist movement and its opponents: the Immigration Restriction League versus the Pro-Immigration League

4.1) Intellectualizing the restrictive movement up to the foundation of the Immigration Restrictive League

The debates on the Foran Act reflect a new tide of nativism which was growing at the time. The Haymarket bombing in Chicago in May 1886 fueled the movement because of the association in the US of radical movements and the foreign born population. The foreign-born anarchists convicted for the affair symbolized the imported radicalism, through immigration, undermining the foundations of the American society. The political reaction soon followed with the foundation of the nativist American Party in California demanding immigration restrictions. In the years that followed more than fifty proposals limiting the influx were proposed in Congress. The topic also became a concern among the intellectual community as the essay contest “The Evil Effects of the Unrestricted Immigration” sponsored by the American Economic Association illustrates. The winner, Edward Bemis, launched the idea of a literacy test as the best solution for the immigrant problem. The measure would drastically reduce the influx from Eastern and Southern Europe while leaving the flow coming from traditional out-migration regions practically unaffected (Hutchinson, 1980, 89-95; Just, 1989, 191-196; Jones, 1992, 214-218; Zolberg, 2006, 199-211).

Concurrently three articles by Richard Mayo Smith appeared *Control of Immigration I, II and III* which attempted to give scientific arguments for restrictions. Smith argued that; (1) the movement started to have undesirable consequences, (2) immigrants were not of the same character as they used to, no longer representing a

suggested resending the lot on the next sailing for free. This would create goodwill with the English diplomat and result in positive publicity for the British market. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 221, Letter May 24 1889. Whereas the apathy of the Austrian-Hungarian is mentioned in: *Ibid.* 222, March 9 1892.

desirable element for the community to acquire, (3) the country no longer needed it for its development. The social scientist also motivated the restrictions by discussing the right of migration and its possible effect on international relations. Finally, he suggested means to administer restrictions with focus on means of control and enforcement (Smith, 1888, part I 48-49). Using statistical evidence Smith claimed that the exponential growth of immigration increased the percentage of foreign-born population whose assimilation as an American citizen could no longer be guaranteed. The high percentage of criminals and illiterates among the foreign born lowered the political capacity of communities to govern themselves putting stress on the American institutions. The problem was as much one of quantity as of quality. The evolution in the transport sector had decreased the cost and risks of the move taking away the natural barrier guaranteeing that only the thriftiest made the crossing, keeping the lowest class at home. Remittances and government assistance further reduced the barriers. Also, the new wave of migrants; such as Hungarian Slovaks, showed strikingly inferior features while Italians easily conformed with living in overly crowded conditions on a diet of stale bread, stale fruit and stale beer until they save enough money to go home again (Smith, 1888, part I, 52-75).³⁹²

In his second article, Smith questioned the economical benefits of immigration pointing to the fact that through remittances and return migrants the capital exported from the US increasingly exceeded the import. Also, because immigration reduced wages and the living standards they had a negative influence on the birth rates of Americans which would increase if the influx stopped. Furthermore, the author claimed that the country had passed the pioneering phase, hence the need for unskilled labor decreased. Machinery offered alternatives and the call for the West was no longer valid since most of the new arrivals concentrated in urban centers (Smith, 1888, part II, 197-224). Smith stressed that the state needed to give priority to its own citizens before its duty of helping the humanity at large. He did not foresee any diplomatic repercussion in questioning the natural right of migration from Europe where most nations would even welcome such measures. The lack of official protests against the previous federal restrictions were considered as implicit approvals of nations who themselves considered it to be the state's right to

³⁹² According to Smith the quality of migrants deteriorated also from traditional out-migration regions. Other than Bemis he did not focus all that much on the distinction between the so called 'old' and 'new' migration.

control migration and would gladly see the precedent established to restrict immigration. The reaction from various European ministers of foreign affairs to Chimay's intent of protesting against the Contract Labor law, seemed to confirm Smith's assessment.

In contrast to Bemis Smith did not propose any measures directed specifically against the new tide of migrants, nor did he propose any other innovative measures. He did not advocate wholesale restrictions considering it impossible to prevent people from sending for their relatives or friends. Also, destroying without due notice the vast interests bound up with the business of transportation would have negative repercussions on the American trade. He pleaded for a gradual decrease through a very rigid enforcement of the current laws, barring; criminals, anarchists, those unable to support for themselves, those receiving assistance by states from charity institutions, or those violating the Contract Labor law. Another measure was stimulating European governments to strictly regulate the migrant transport business, lowering the high profits generated by the traffic which would decrease the activity of parties involved unnaturally swelling the flow. Means of discouraging European governments and shipping companies from shipping those from the excluded classes had to be imposed.

Smith proposed using consuls as the initial control agents, forcing migrants to obtain a certificate of good character, with means to support themselves and enough skills to rely on to make a fresh start in the US. This information had to be gathered in collaboration with foreign authorities and shipping companies. Bemis also favored this kind of remote control which was already in use to check the Chinese immigration, suggesting that consuls at the port of embarkation carried out the literacy test. To increase the responsibility of shipping lines in this process of sorting the good from the bad, authorities needed to require security bonds from these companies. Finally, as the new tide of migrants did not show the same will, as earlier migrants had to become American citizens or to take friendly dispositions towards the authorities, requirements for naturalization had to be raised (Smith, 1888, part III, 409-425 and Zolberg, 2006, 211).

The American Protection Association, founded in 1887 and boasting a membership of two million members by the mid-1890s underline the growing concerns to defend 'American values' (King, 2000, 52). Bemis and Mayo's ideas constituted a platform on which the calls for restriction during the next three decades were based.

They quickly found their way to Congress where Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who earned Harvard's first PhD in political science, advocated general restrictions and the literacy test in particular (Zolberg, 2006, 200). Immigration issues were a hot topic when political science started to develop. In Massachusetts, together with California, which was 'the' breeding place for the nativist lobby a group, of young Harvard intellectuals; Charles Warren, Robert D. Ward and Prescott F. Hall institutionalized the movement by founding the Immigration Restriction League in 1894. Efforts by the league focused on advocating measures to restrict the influx of Southern and Eastern Europeans based on increasingly open eugenic motives portraying them as physically and mentally inferior. The movement took over the literacy test as most adequate means for reaching that goal. The influence of the restrictionist movement has however too often been boiled down to their failure in imposing the literacy test prior to 1917. Yet as Smith's articles reflect, there was a growing awareness of the urgent need for means to enforce the laws already enacted, rather than passing new ones. With the movement, the pressures on Castle Garden and Ellis Island authorities increased and infiltrated the control policies. The next federal laws to be passed focused on the enforcement of existing laws which gave immigration inspectors enough leeway to center their efforts on migrants coming from certain regions.

4.2) The passage of Immigration Inspection under federal supervision.

4.2.1) The Immigrant Bills of 1891, 1893 and their implementation

To process the increasing proposals of immigrant legislation and study the working of the existing laws the Senate had established a standing Committee on Immigration and the House appointed a select Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (Hutchinson, 1981, 98). In February 1891, Congress passed a new Immigration Act placing the regulation of immigration under the authority of the Secretary of Treasury, which appointed a new Superintendent of Immigration within the department.³⁹³ He was responsible for the enforcement of the previous laws, and passed

³⁹³ In 1895 the appointment of Superintendent of immigration was changed to Commissioner General of Immigration. The appointment of Commissioners of Immigration at various ports moved under the President's authority.

new provisions which increased the supervision; this included the opening of twenty-four new border controls stations, including Mexico and Canada (Torpey, 2004, 96). A Congressional investigation, known as the Ford committee, had shown how easily migrants from the excluded classes used Canada as a loophole to get in (Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol 39, 37).

The immigrant control thus moved from state board control to federal inspection assisted by the Marine Hospital Service. The Inspection Board decisions on admissibility were final, only subject to administrative appeal to the Secretary of Treasury. Polygamists and persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease were added to the list of excluded categories. It obligated that the shipping companies medically inspect, disinfect and vaccinate the migrants from where they left (Kraut, 112, 2006). The law prohibited advertisements containing promises of employment, except from state immigration agencies. Steamship companies had to refrain from soliciting immigrants, limiting the advertisements to rates, facilities and dates of sailing. They also needed to provide passenger manifests with names, nationality, the last residence and the destination of the passenger, upon arrival. Deportation would from then on be charged to the ship-owners and this could happen up to a year after arrival. For instance, migrants becoming a public charge within their first year in the US could be sent back. Lodge suggested the literacy test for the first time in Congress during these debates yet it was not considered (Bennet, 1963, 21-23 and Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 39, 35-48).

As the Dillingham Commission rightly concluded the purpose of the bill was to improve the selection of immigrants, not so much to pass new restrictions. The law of 1893 added some provisions, including putting an end to the common practice of paying a bond to obtain the right of landing of people suspected of becoming a public charge.³⁹⁴ This could now only be obtained through the explicit approval by the Secretary of Treasury. Shipping companies had to make sure that their agents in Europe posted the American laws in their offices and informed prospective migrants about them. Also, the procedure of investigation was adapted, where all suspects became subject of a special

³⁹⁴ The New York State laws of 1849 set these bonds at 300 dollars raised it to 500 dollars two years later. Hence it seems unlikely that the many passengers were landed this way unless the price was lowered over time or some kind of credit system could be obtained to do so (Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 39, 775).

inquiry conducted by four inspectors. A favorable decision of three of them was needed to obtain the right of landing. It included a provision forcing captains to hand over a complete passenger list signed and sworn in by the US consul at the port of embarkation, certifying that after a personal examination of all passengers he did not detect any of the banned classes. The law also added many questions to the manifests.³⁹⁵ Finally shortly after, the head tax increased to \$1 to cover the extra expenses for the inspections (Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 39, 39).³⁹⁶

But laws, for instance, did not specify the criteria to which migrants had to comply so as to avoid falling under the category ‘likely to become a public charge’. A meeting in 1891 of the New York head agents of the shipping lines with the Superintendent of Immigration, John Weber, illustrates that these criteria depended on the nationality of the migrants. Van den Toorn reported the following statements of the former Congressman to the board of directors:

“The best way to fight the increasing agitation against immigration in the US is by tightening controls at the port of embarkation on the ‘desirability’ of the migrants. ‘Desirability’ is a question of mentality and nationality which do not fit in the US; French, Belgians, Dutch, Germans, English Scandinavians etc are desirable; Italians, Russian Jews, Arabs, Slovaks, etc are undesirable. The major discussion topic is to find out what criteria could be used to define ‘pauper’ which varies in each country. In America strong and healthy individuals willing to work yet arriving without means are not considered as likely to become a public charge. However, people with means but with a reputation to throw it away -- a shabby fellow, is. If a migrant becomes ill and becomes a public charge he will not be sent back if he had no predisposition of catching the disease prior to arrival, otherwise he will. Also the nationality is an important factor; English speakers stand a better chance. Idiots should be turned away yet when traveling with relatives this is not applied. Same goes for disabled although we rather not have them. Servants following a farmer would have to be considered in violation with the contract labor law. In short Weber has warned us that laws would be strictly applied and that we’d better sharpen our controls at the port of embarkation.”³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ It contained the full name, age, sex, whether married or not, occupation, able to read or write, nationality, last residence, seaport of landing, final destination, whether in possession of a ticket to that destination, who paid his passage, whether in possession of money, and if so whether if it was over 30\$, whether if going to join a relative, and if so his name and address, whether ever before in the US, whether ever before in prison or an almshouse, whether under contract to perform labor and what was the immigrant’s health, mentally and physically, if so whether deformed or crippled.

³⁹⁶ On top of that the shipping lines had to pay for the maintenance of detained passengers waiting for Special Inquiry or to be sent back. These cost remained very limited, depending on the number detained and hence as Senner put it “on the quality of the migrant”. The cost per capita amounted for the White Star Line to 0,02 cent, Cunard 0,05c NGL 0,06c and HAL 0,09c. Ibid. Letter July 26 1894.

³⁹⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage 221, Letter of October 8 1891.

The advice of Weber illustrates the ambiguity of the definition of likely to become a public charge and how this was used to apply stricter controls to the ‘undesirable classes’ of migrants.

4.2.2) Assisted migration and Paupers: the efforts of the shipping companies to make them look not so likely to become a public charge

Shipping companies used all possible means to obtain the right of passage for clients being detained by immigration inspectors. If passengers had acquaintances in the US these were contacted to see if they could pose a bond for them. This was the case for ten Galicians who had friends in Shanondock. Van den Toorn obtained a delay of deportation to track down these friends. He proposed paying for the railroad transport to Shanondock if the friends posed bond, yet they refused. The head-agent stressed the importance of sending full information of passengers running a risk, so that acquaintances could be contacted prior to their landing. Booking them through to their final destination also helped their cause. Van den Toorn refuted the claims that passengers would have had more chances of obtaining the permission to land if they were traveling with another line. All lines suffered an augmentation in deportations due to the overzealous actions of Castle Garden inspectors applying a law which has not yet been enacted.³⁹⁸

Besides family or friends, charity and immigration association also paid bonds for the landing of passengers. The Hebrew Charity Society of London for instance, took care of banned Jews from Russia. They collected money to pay for the passage to the US and also posed bond, when needed, to guarantee their landing.³⁹⁹ In every European migration port and major transit points, Jewish Charitable Associations assisting Jews on their way to the US were founded. As a result of their contacts with Hamburg migrant brokers, the HAL received many Russian Jews. Some were assisted by the Jewish Committee of Charlottenburg, Berlin. In order to avoid problems with the passage of the laws in 1891, prohibiting the entry of passengers who were assisted in coming, they were sent over on

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.* Letter February 1 1889.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.* Letter September 29 1890.

the service via Baltimore. The inspections in Baltimore were known to be less strict than in New York. Baltimore port authorities encouraged the inspectors to be lenient hoping to attract more traffic. The practice of bonds was drastically reduced by 1892, when immigration authorities practically put an end to its use. Although the brothers of J. Pasmovska were found willing to pose bond for their sister, the authorities no longer accepted the practice. The directors advised Van den Toorn that they would try to rebook this lady for Baltimore and asked him to contact the brothers to pick her up on arrival.⁴⁰⁰

The Russian Jews were often labeled by New York migrant inspectors as ‘the worse kind’, meaning without means and in poor health. The cholera outbreak in Hamburg attributed by contemporaries to the Russian migrant traffic did little to improve that reputation. Steerage traffic came to a full standstill for some months and when it picked up again Russians remained excluded because reports on cholera in the region persisted. Yet shipping companies were eager to maximize the capacity after months of inactivity. Van den Toorn reported that HAPAG and NGL evaded the restrictions, but feared being caught by the American authorities.⁴⁰¹ HAL soon followed suit sending a circular to the American agents stating that the company could not assist passengers, given the circumstances, with their travels to Rotterdam. Russian migrants had to make their way to Rotterdam on their own where the prepaid ticket awaited them. Yet the lawyer of “*our dear friends of the Red Star Line*” Mr. Neill leaked the circular to the authorities. Van den Toorn cancelled all tickets and had to deploy great efforts in convincing the authorities not to make a case of it.⁴⁰²

A year later when the Russian traffic had picked up again the company came into disrepute once more. Articles about the sending of Russian Jews on HAL ships assisted by the Jewish Charity Association of Rotterdam, Montefiore, appeared in the New York press. Van den Toorn feared the reaction of Joseph H. Senner, Ellis Island Commissioner of Immigration, since he had the reputation of blowing up such sensational news in the press to bring steamship lines, charity institutions and European governments into

⁴⁰⁰ The reason for the refusal was that she arrived alone with her child. An investigation had pointed out that the man she had given up as her husband was living with another woman. *Ibid.* Letter March 8 1892.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.* Letter March 27 1893.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.* Letter April 7 1893.

disrepute.⁴⁰³ The head-agent refuted the accusations in the press and claimed that such passengers migrated indirectly through England.⁴⁰⁴ Internal correspondence proved that eighty passengers embarked on the *Spaarndam* at the expense of the Montifiore, some had received a reduction, other free lodging at the Holland America Line Hotel.⁴⁰⁵ An investigation pointed out that the American health inspector Woodward sneaked into the hotel and on board of the *Spaarndam* to obtain the information, which he leaked to the New York newspapers.⁴⁰⁶ Except for stricter controls, the incident had no further consequences for the HAL.

On that side of the Atlantic, with New York being the most rapidly growing 'Jewish City' at the time, numerous Hebrew associations assisting new arrivals were founded. The Jewish community formed an important lobby group whose influence can be noted both in migrant legislation and the application thereof. For instance, Van den Toorn stated that of the twenty five detained passengers of the *Edam* only two were eventually sent back as a result of help from Jewish Charity institutions. The major problem was that the passengers did not have a penny to their name, nor a railroad ticket inland. Van den Toorn stressed the importance of agents making sure that Russian passengers had at least a minimum of money on arrival, be it only to reach their final destination. Furthermore, Jewish passengers often mistrusted manifests and interrogators lying on the amount they own fearing that it may be taken from them. The passengers needed to be better informed about this.⁴⁰⁷ The landing of migrants was also greatly facilitated if the captains and doctors made sure passengers washed themselves thoroughly before arrival something which should always be done.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰³ The quote taken from a New York newspaper sounded as follows: "Word has been received by Dr. Senner, Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island that as a preparation for winter, the municipal authorities of European cities, particularly those of Belgium, are gathering together their paupers and sending them over here, prepaying their fares. In this they are largely assisted by the charity institutions" GAR HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 113, November 24 1893.

⁴⁰⁴ GAR HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 222, Letter December 4 1893.

⁴⁰⁵ The practice of shipping companies to quote special charity rates 30 to 50% below the regular fare was common at the time. These were granted to consuls and charity institutions under special conditions for passengers they assisted. Every separate case had to be reported to the secretary of the Continental Conference to avoid abuses. Hebrew Charity Associations were excluded by 1895 because of the many abuses.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.* Letter December 8 1893.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.* Letters December 7 and 11 1894.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.* Letters December 24 1894 and January 3 1895.

With the financial crisis midway the 1890s the agitation against immigration persisted after the cholera scare. One of the agitators was Superintendent of Immigration Stump, who published articles to influence the public opinion and through excessive controls at Ellis Island. Van den Toorn illustrated this when he stated that with the arrival of the *Amsterdam*, 138 out of the 230 passengers were detained. Most of them were not paupers but instead waited to be picked up by family or friends or were being sent railroad tickets and money transfers to continue their journey. But, it did increase the maintenance bill for detainees charged to shipping companies. In the end only two to six were deported.⁴⁰⁹

However, the cost of deportation also started to weigh heavily on the company's expenses because of the stricter controls. The directors decided to provisionally stop taking Russian prepaid passengers, for whom the railroad transport from the German border control stations such as Oldenzaal to Rotterdam was not paid for. Many relied on charity institutions to defray the cost. The company needed to cover their hotel expenses at Rotterdam; they created extra dietary problems and Dutch authorities disapproved of their passage in the country and they were the kind of passengers most likely to be deported. The biggest problem for the companies was the lack of fixed criteria established by law. The most frequent reason for deportation was 'no money', yet no American law specified this to be a valid reason. Hence, shipping companies had no right to refuse passengers for that reason and risked numerous lawsuits if they did.⁴¹⁰ Therefore, the HAL tried to recoup the costs for deportations from the agents or purchasers of the ticket. An extra clause was added on prepaid tickets putting the responsibility for these expenses and eventual extra hospitalization costs on the purchasers of the ticket.⁴¹¹

The federal legislation of 1891 provided means to American authorities of selecting immigrants, although not explicitly, based on race and nationality. The focus here went to Jews because of the popularity of the Dutch company among this class of passengers. Yet Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, Italians, Arabs, Syrians etc. were all subject to stricter controls. By augmenting deportations and, hence increasing the transport cost

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.* Letter of January 3 1895.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.* Letter of January 17 1896.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.* Letters February 4 and May 19 1896.

of such passengers, the authorities hoped to discourage shipping companies from bringing over the 'undesirable classes'. The American authorities were also aware of the deterrent effect of deported passengers on members of their home community considering migration. But, the many loopholes, such as sending them to other ports or in second-class and the assistance of consuls, charity institutions of all sorts to obtain the right of passage, helped in keeping forced returns at a minimum.

4.2.3) "John Smith's followers travel second class": Guion and Holland America Line's special service to Utah

The laws did not deter shipping companies from bringing in passengers from the excluded classes. The organized transport of Mormons in second-class on board of HAL and the British Guion Line ships clearly illustrate this. The clause barring polygamists from entry tried to put an end to the recruitment of John Smith's followers in Europe. Yet, the religious movement had no objections paying the extra \$10 to allow members to travel in second class, which allowed them to avoid immigrant inspection at Ellis Island. Shortly after the passage of the law Van den Toorn concluded a special agreement with the migrant agent Spence of Salt Lake City. The head agent gave Spence a reduction on second-class rates in order to appropriate part of the Mormon business, which till then was exclusively entrusted to the Guion Line. Preachers accompanying the groups received precise instructions. In cases where the authorities detected the passengers, Van den Toorn doubted that they could claim legal motives to refuse their landing since they had traveled in second class. Moreover, other than the Guion Line transporting groups of 300 to 400, the HAL agreed to take small parties of 25 to 40 which would not stand out as much.⁴¹²

Spence also obtained special railroad rates to Utah and monopolized the Mormon transport. Railroad companies violated the interstate commerce laws with these reductions, but like the shipping companies the keen competition for the business forced them to do this. Instead of fearing that the American authorities would find out, the HAL directors were much more preoccupied by the possibility that the RSL might uncover the practice. This violation of the Conference Agreement by cutting rates could affect other

⁴¹² *Ibid.* Letter July 1 1891.

business, increase mistrust and stimulate cheating among the lines. Van den Toorn assured the board of using the greatest secrecy in the correspondence, bookkeeping and bookings preventing the RSL or the American authorities from finding out. If the directors stopped the business which had been very hard to obtain, the opportunity to book for the Mormon association would be gone for good and with that the market for Colorado, Idaho and Utah, according to Van den Toorn.⁴¹³ Despite the arguments the board decided against continuing the special agreements with Spence. When the Guion Line was forced out of business in 1893 van den Toorn regained the confidence of Spence. The directors gave the go-ahead after finding out that the Red Star Line was cheating with its second-class rates.⁴¹⁴ A year later, Spence wanted to increase the business with the HAL. He was convinced that the well-established migration pattern of the Mormons through England could be diverted to Rotterdam.⁴¹⁵ Yet, the Conference agreements among the Continental lines for second-class business setting the compensation price at 140 marks no longer made it profitable for the Dutch company to give reductions. Spence was more than welcome to continue using their services, but only at full prices. Spence transferred his business to the Anchor Line from which he obtained special second cabin rates.⁴¹⁶

The Mormon traffic illustrates that the exemption of inspection of second-class passengers created an important loophole for illegal migrants. Shipping companies feared little from the American authorities taking advantage of extra business opportunities American laws created. Conference agreements, instead of American legislation, deterred the company from taking on the business. When Joseph Senner took charge of Ellis Island, he made closing these loopholes a main priority. Yet the traveling public, consisting mainly of Americans, heavily protested against passing immigrant controls for second-class and with success.⁴¹⁷ Commissioner Williams later managed to introduce a screening process of second-class passengers on board, sending suspicious individuals to Ellis Island for further control. Inspectors only referred a small percentage of second-cabin passengers to the control station. The commodity and higher probabilities of

⁴¹³ *Ibid.* Letter March 3 1892.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.* January 16 and March 4 1893.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.* Letter April 11 1894.

⁴¹⁶ The route through Canada also served as a back door. *Ibid.* Letters May 14, 18 and 25 1897.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.* Letter December 24 1895.

landing was especially appreciated by the growing class of repeat migrants for whom shipping companies introduced mixed tickets consisting of third-class eastbound passage to Europe and second-class westbound return to the US.

Keeling rightly pointed to the business logic behind the expansion of second cabin passage being one of improving capacity utilization of passenger ships. However, he underestimated the importance of the tightening immigrant inspections at American control stations spurring its development. (Keeling, 1999a, 202-204). The use of second cabin as a means to evade controls was not limited to individual cases; as the Mormon migration illustrates, it could happen on an organized scale. Also, the commodity of not having to go through Ellis Island encouraged perfectly legal passengers, without any intent of evading the law, to travel second class, further spurring development of this class of business. Mixed tickets seem to indicate that repeat migrants, in particular, who a priori would run little risk of being debarred, preferred to pay a little extra to avoid repeating the hurtful and often degrading inspection experience. The security it offered, of avoiding debarment, for people buying prepaid tickets for family members to join them, certainly also played a role. How big remains impossible to measure.

4.2.4) The impositions of Remote Control: from temporary consular and medical inspections to putting the responsibility on steamship companies

The idea of empowering consuls to regulate migration at the point of departure through a visa system or controls at the port of embarkation can be traced back to as early as 1838 (Neuman, 2003, 108 and Zolberg, 2003, 205). That the proposition came from a diplomat, Friederich List consul at Leipzig, is unsurprising. This would have increased their influence and given them new means to enrich themselves. With the introduction of the spoil-system in 1828 by President Andrew Jackson, consular post became rewards for political supporters of the party that had won the presidential election. Merchant-consuls, who often served for long periods, were replaced by salaried and often incompetent consuls, that were rotated. Only with Roosevelt was the spoils-system abandoned and it was replaced by a professionalized corps (Krabbendam, 2005, 167-181 and Kennedy, 1992).

In the meantime, many consuls tried to use their position to enrich themselves as much as possible. The List's suggestion was first picked up to regulate the re-entry of Chinese laborers once the exclusion act was passed, by introducing documents requiring a visa of the consul. An increasing number of contemporaries also wanted to expand this early form of remote border control to Europe (Torpey, 2004, 91; Zeidel, 2005, 15; Zolberg, 2006, 211). Beginning of the 1890s, bills providing for inspection by US consuls abroad were introduced in Congress, but shipping companies tried to avoid this at all costs (Hutchinson, 1981, 98-112).⁴¹⁸ In 1891, the Treasury Secretary appointed a commission chaired by the Commissioner of Immigration, Weber, to investigate the causes for immigration in Europe and to analyze the cost and feasibility of a consular certification system (Zeidel, 2005, 16-17). Weber rejected the idea, claiming it to be an impracticable, useless and costly venture for the American tax payer; of at least \$500,000 annually. Instead he proposed perfecting the existing statutes, to rigidly apply them at the points of entry and;

“place the expense of all returned migrants upon steamship companies whom self-interest will force to look for reimbursement to their sub-agents who have a personal knowledge of the qualification of the intending immigrants, better than anyone else, and who would have a direct pecuniary concern in the return of a defective; make sub-agents in this country responsible for the sale of prepaid tickets, estimated to be nearly 60 percent of the whole; than up to the time of acquiring citizenship hold all aliens liable to compulsory return” (Weber, 1892, 429).

Weber, was in contrast to another member of the commission and immigration official, Herman Schulteis, who accused the shipping companies of deliberately facilitating the entry of the excluded classes. He pointed to the report of another commission member, Joseph Powderly, whose interpreter on board of the Anchor Line vessel from Genoa to New York confided that he had traveled to the US four times already that year, in the capacity of assistant interpreter, and that he was paid as steward on the books, whose duty was to instruct the passengers as what to say to go through the American inspectios.

In response to a circular sent to consuls, inquiring as to their opinion about the involvement of the shipping companies as instigators of the movement and the feasibility of controls in Europe, most replied negatively. Schulteis blamed these adverse results on

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.* Letter October 6 1891.

the fact that most of the consuls were involved in the business or had been corrupted by the lines. He did not believe in the system suggested by Weber and urged for a system of inspections in Europe (Schulteis, 1893, 41-43 and Just, 1986, 244). John Noble supported Schulteis point of view and was convinced that if the legal qualification be made simple and precise, a plan of consular certificates was perfectly feasible (Noble, 1892, 238-239). The arrival of passengers affected by cholera in New York on board of HAPAG ships increased the pressure for some kind of inspection on European soil.

Although the cause of the outbreak of cholera in Hamburg is still a subject of debate, contemporaries quickly blamed Russian Jewish migrants.⁴¹⁹ The stir in the US press against this class of passengers -for being in poor health- had started a year earlier. Van den Toorn reported that due to a typhus scare, Russians were transferred to Hoffman Island where they underwent stricter controls. He suspected that the authorities were doing this in order to discourage new arrivals of Russian Jews, apparently with success because the NGL and RSL temporarily refused the transport such passengers to avoid difficulties on arrival. Just as the HAPAG, Van den Toorn advised his directors by telegraph to: “*have Russians inspected by Dutch doctor, luggage fumigated, doctor certificate legalized by the American consul must accompany the passenger*”.⁴²⁰ Hence, some kind of consular inspection at the port of embarkation existed for certain class of passengers coming from regions infected by contagious diseases.

Companies tolerated and even collaborated with this but wanted to avoid the general adoption of this practice at all cost.⁴²¹ Yet the American authorities used the commotion caused by the cholera scare in 1892 to impose controls on European soil. First, a three week quarantine period on ships coming from Hamburg was imposed while other companies depended on the goodwill of health inspectors. The HAL enjoyed preferential treatment due to the certificate of inspection and disinfection issued by the American consul prior to each departure. The company also worked with American doctors on ships which facilitated communication with the health inspectors. This,

⁴¹⁹ There are various theories about the origins of the cholera outbreak in Hamburg. Some claim that it was imported through ships from Le Havre where the disease had been noted months before. Yet most contemporaries blamed the Russian Jews (Würstenbecker, 2003, 227).

⁴²⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 222, Letter February 16 1892.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.* Letter October 6th 1891.

combined with the efforts of Glavis the lobbyist at Washington, limited the quarantine for HAL ships to from three to five days.⁴²²

However, the disease fueled the agitation for restrictions. Van den Toorn feared that far reaching measures would be passed, as a result of the upcoming presidential elections. Long quarantine periods, of up to twenty days, were imposed forcing the shipping companies to suspend migrant transport while awaiting new immigration laws. Van den Toorn did not expect the laws to prohibit immigration completely, since it infringed upon all the treaties with European countries, who would protest against this. The head agent feared less defined barriers impeding European countries to exercise political pressure against restrictions.⁴²³ He also warned about the increasing susceptibility of American authorities towards diplomatic protests regarding migration matters.⁴²⁴

The President considered a one year suspension of immigration as proposed by Senator W. Chandler, chairman of the Committee on Immigration not to run contrary to treaty stipulations. Chandler stated that the time for restrictions had come and that a one year suspension would give Congress time to pass adequate legislation.⁴²⁵ But, he confided in the *New York Times*, that the greatest difficulty in passing such measures was the opposition of steamship companies. Several senators noted increased activity of the companies at Washington to be powerfully represented in the lobbies during the next sessions of Congress.⁴²⁶ The bill of February 1893 was not so radical, yet it empowered the newly elected President Cleveland to prohibit immigration from regions infected by contagious diseases, for as long as he deemed necessary. Later on, in his Presidential message of 1893, he stated that regarding a new treaty signed with Turkey that “*the right to exclude any or all classes of aliens is an attribute of sovereignty*” (Hutchinson, 1981,

⁴²² The Dutch seemed to have been the only line to hire exclusively American doctors for their ships. Van den Toorn spoke very highly of Glavis during the cholera scare preventing the crisis to GAR HAL 318.02 General Correspondence, 112-121, between August 29 1892 and March 5 1893.

⁴²³ *Ibid.* Letter December 6 1892.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.* Letter June 2 1893

⁴²⁵ The suspension was also considered necessary to safeguard the success of the World Fair organized later that year in Chicago. It was feared that the transport of steerages with the ongoing cholera threats would scare off European cabin passengers to sail over (Chandler, 1893, 3).

⁴²⁶ NYT, “Total Restriction Talk” December 1 1892.

109-110). This reflects how the US authorities increasingly considered immigrant legislation to be a national rather than an international matter.

Despite the new law, new immigration bills including, consular inspection and the feasibility of property and educational tests were discussed in Congress.⁴²⁷ This culminated in the Stone Bill of 1894 which passed the House but not the Senate where the Democrat majority opposed it (Higham, 1955, 101). Both the State and Treasury Secretary believed that the consular corps was understaffed to carry out the inspections. They did not oppose the idea, but they did not consider it feasible, preferring to put the responsibility for refusing excludables on the transportation companies- with the acts of 1891 and 1893. By doing so, they also avoided international complications for granting consuls authority over foreign citizens on non-American soil (Hutchinson, 1981, 112). Increasing the pressure on steamship companies by charging all maintenance, detainee, and deportation costs of undesirables, which were later reinforced through a fine system, became 'the' regulatory policy. As suggested by J. Weber it was believed that companies would recuperate the costs from sub-agents who would be more inclined to make sure their clients did not belong to the excludable class.

The pressures of extending control on European soil did result in the sending of American health inspectors to the port of embarkation. New York state quarantine laws passed in the wake of the cholera scare stipulated that all passengers coming from infected regions had to be detained for five days at the port of embarkation under supervision of the consul and a physician designated by him, preferably a member of the US marine hospital staff. All their baggage items needed to be disinfected by steam. These measures were completed by federal quarantine regulations requiring a 'Bill of Health' and 'Certificate of Disinfection' for such passengers. The US consul also certified the passenger manifests in which captains took an oath that after a personal examination of all passengers they did not detect any of the banned classes.⁴²⁸ When the

⁴²⁷ The Oates bill presented in Congress February 14 1891 pleaded for far reaching consular inspections. During the next sessions in Congress similar proposals imposing consular certificates were considered. In 1894 the Stone bill, imposing consular certificates proving that the migrant did not belong to the excluded classes passed the House, yet not the Senate. In 1895 Stone reentered his bill but to no avail because the Lodge bill based on the literacy test received all the attention in the House Immigration Committee.

⁴²⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 222, Letters April 20 and 24 1893.

steerage traffic picked up again in March 1893 from which Russians remained excluded for another couple of months, these measures were implemented.

The HAL complained to the American authorities about the arbitrariness of their enforcement. The American consul at Rotterdam, Gardner, overcharged the company for issuing the certificates while the appointed Doctor Woodward displayed an exaggerated zeal in controlling the passengers on diseases according to the Dutch company.⁴²⁹ The shipping lines had offered to build special quarantine and disinfection facilities at New York so that all companies would be screened on the same bases, but the local authorities opposed the idea. The HAL claimed that charges were higher and that controls were stricter in Rotterdam compared to Antwerp.⁴³⁰ Based on the news regarding some isolated cholera cases in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Doctor Woodward considered the region to be infected and hence imposed five day quarantine on Austrian and Hungarian steerage passengers. Doctors in Antwerp and Bremen did not, generating extra costs and an important temporary competitive handicap on that market for the HAL.⁴³¹

American consuls, on their part, did not want the health situation in Europe to change since the new measures produced important extra revenue. Yet reports on abuses in other ports quickly reached Washington leading to an investigation on the matter. Some consuls were found guilty of overcharging the companies, and with weak connections to the White House, some like Gardner in Rotterdam, were discharged.⁴³² Despite the excessive charges, Gardner maintained good relations with the Dutch company. The consul planned to take up his old job as journalist in the US again and promised to use his influence in the Senate and State Department to put an end to the controls at the port of embarkation. Gardner voiced the main objections that besides the arbitrariness of the medical decisions, the measure ran contrary to the agreements of international courtesy; rejected passengers in Europe had no possibility to appeal; and

⁴²⁹ Initially the American authorities did not fix a rate for the certificates which was later set at 2,5\$ for the Health Bill and the same amount for the Certificate of disinfection. This included all costs for the inspection and disinfection service. Furthermore the consul received 2,5\$ for certifying the official oath of the captain and ship doctors for not deliberately embarking people of the excluded class. Finally the consul received 25 cents per passenger manifests certified by him. These contained 30 passengers per manifest. When the number of manifests exceeded ten, only 10 cents was charged per additional one. *Ibid.* Letter April 24 1893.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.* Letter April 21 1893.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.* Letter August 22 1893.

⁴³² *Ibid.* Letter May 19 1893.

that doctors were inclined to refuse more than they should to justify their function⁴³³. Meanwhile, as other steam shipping lines refused to engage in the lobbying costs of Gardner, his activities were short-lived.⁴³⁴

By the end of the year, Russian still needed to remain five days at the port of embarkation for observation. The American doctors tried to find a uniform way to act yet it was to no avail. Due to the massive complaints and abuses both the consular and inspections of health officers were abolished by the end of 1893.⁴³⁵ The experience obstructed the attempts of Congressman Stone to pass federal laws imposing controls on European rather than American soil through consuls or special inspectors. Glavis reminded Congressman of the insurmountable practical difficulties such as the multitude of languages in which inspectors should be able to make the interrogations. Empowering such inspectors on foreign soil went against all international laws and treaties. However, to him what was infinitely worse; *“it will make the US morally responsible for the many sets of cruelty and injustice, for migrants unrightfully rejected access to the land of the free, not by laws of the US but by the decision of an US inspector.”*⁴³⁶

Other than the case in New York with the Board of Special Inquiry, the previous experience with health inspectors had shown that no appeals were possible. Besides spreading this information, Glavis also provided some Congressmen with texts proposing amendments to laws which safeguarded the interests of steamship companies. In this case as in others, Van den Toorn attributed last minute amendments to the efforts of the lobbyist. The obstacles blocked the adoption of this remote border control system by Congress where the literacy test gained grounds, as a more adequate means.

The American authorities were not alone in taking new measures in the wake of the cholera scare. Hamburg authorities pleaded with the German government to tighten controls at the borders because of the increasing influx of poor Jews with the new pogroms in early 1891. Their idea of imposing medical controls along the Prussian-Russian border would only materialize on an organized scale after the outbreak. Attempts to keep out the Russian Jews out of German territory during the epidemic failed, causing

⁴³³ *Ibid.* Letter August 12 1893.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.* Letter October 16 and 17 1893 and 318.02, General Correspondence, September 11 1893.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.* Letter November 11 and December 22 1893.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.* Letter August 8 1894.

a sharp rise in illegal crossings. Furthermore, blocking the traffic harmed the national economic interests of shipping and railroad companies. To protect their interests the NGL and HAPAG proposed financing and managing border control stations, where health inspections and baggage disinfection would take place. Also, passengers could be screened as to whether they complied with the American requirements of entry and if they had enough financial means. By the end of 1894 stations in Bajohren, Eydtkuhnen, Prostken, Illowo and Ottlotschin were opened (Würstenbecker, 2003, 224-234).

With these stations the German authorities gave their national shipping lines a very effective tool in diverting the migrant traffic to Hamburg and Bremen, to the detriment of foreign competitors such as the HAL. Matters got even worse for the Dutch company when law in 1897 prohibited migrant agents from representing the Dutch company on German soil. This illustrates that towards the turn of the century the US did not stand alone in considering migrant control and transport as being more a national than an international issue. This tendency grew in Europe as well, and would be reinforced over the decades to follow.

4.3) The Shipping Lobby

The agitation for laws restricting migration and the measures to enforce the existing ones increased the need for a person specialized in defending the shipping interest in court and in Washington. Van den Toorn deplored the fact that European governments had forfeited the pressure on the US by reaching an international agreement regarding migrant transport. The help of Dutch diplomats was no longer called upon when the controls regarding space requirements intensified in 1887. Fighting the charges for excess passengers by questioning the jurisdiction of American authorities on Dutch vessels complying with their own national laws, ceased to be used as defense strategy. Lawyers needed to be hired to defend the company in court and before the Treasury department, incurring a lot of extra expenses. For instance, the authorities fined the HAL \$2900 because the *Edam* carried fifty-eight excess passengers.⁴³⁷ Van den Toorn also

⁴³⁷ The fine for every excess passenger was set at 50 dollars by the New York State Laws in 1847. The federal authorities took over that sum in the Passenger Act of 1882.

needed to pay \$2500 in bail for the release of captain Taat who had been arrested for the infraction.⁴³⁸ The head-agent reassured the directors that by making arrangements with the District Attorney, as other companies did, the fine would be dropped.

But, the lawyer's fees started to weigh heavily on the company's budget. Despite the efforts in Rotterdam to refit the ships to the American laws, some vessels still arrived with excess passengers during peak periods, like the *Edam*, *Schiedam* and *Zaandam* in the spring of 1888. Van den Toorn complained about the scandalous treatment of foreign shipping lines by corrupted immigrant inspectors who even forged reports. Besides the legal costs the captains also needed to appear in court causing extra logistical problems for the company. Instead of entrusting the cases to their lawyer Joachimsen and Governor Abbet, Van den Toorn hired George O. Glavis. He described the attorney having offices in the *Washington Post* building as: "*the lobbyist of the Conference Lines knowing all the inside tracks*". Glavis charged less and could pull more strings⁴³⁹. He became the spokesman in Washington for three of the core-members of the New York Continental Conference; HAL, NGL and HAPAG. The other core member, the RSL kept out because the divergent interests of the American owners in US migration and maritime policies were incompatible.⁴⁴⁰ As Van den Toorn stressed; "*the lobbying efforts had to be kept secret from the INC that was working on a scheme to obtain support of the American government to the detriment of foreign lines.*"⁴⁴¹ Glavis also lobbied for other shipping lines, some of which only carried cargo as long as it did not conflict with the core-members' interests.⁴⁴²

The founders of the International Navigation Company assumed that the US Congress would support their undertaking to reposition the American flag on the North

⁴³⁸ The law also established that captains risked up to six months imprisonment for breaking the law. This was never enforced yet Van den Toorn stressed that paying bail, appearing in court, hire lawyers and further proceedings were time consuming.

⁴³⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, Letters May 24 1887, April 10, June 26 and September 7 1888.

⁴⁴⁰ A second lobbyist mentioned in the source is Mr. Sandford representing the British Lines. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage, 222, Letter October 24 1892.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.* Letter October 16 1893.

⁴⁴² In 1893 Glavis renegotiated his salary with the shipping lines. He proposed a fixed salary of 9000 dollars including expenses, excluding his lawyer fees when representing lines in court. Of the amount 25% would be paid by the cargo lines, 75% by the passenger liners. The latter divided the share in proportion to the number of passengers carried. For the HAL the cost balanced between 750 and 800 dollars which seemed reasonable to van den Toorn. *Ibid.* Letter October 16 1893.

Atlantic in 1872. More than a decade after the government had stopped giving direct subsidies to transatlantic steamship companies, the entrepreneurs sent a delegation to Washington lobbying for a lucrative mail subsidy. They received the support of the Secretary of Treasury, the postmaster general and the secretary of the Navy, yet the Ship-subsidy Bill drawn up by the owners was not considered by Congress (Flayhart, 2000, 31-36). The US maritime policy protected its shipbuilders, by preventing foreign ships from registering under the American flag. Yet by doing this, it abandoned American shipowners by forcing them to buy national ships and letting them operate by nationals at higher costs. Moreover, the US authorities did not associate their military needs to the developments of the merchant marine as much as European governments did. This policy contributed to the further decline of the merchant marine, which right before the Civil War transported two-thirds of the import and export, decreasing to one-third in 1866 and to sixteen percent in 1881 (Safford, 1985, 58-59).⁴⁴³

The lack of support for the American Line and the Red Star Line in the 1870s illustrated the indifference of Congress towards American shipowners. They did not receive any subsidies or any preferential treatment against foreign competitors. The Postmaster gave the American mail to the fastest line regardless whether the ship was operated by nationals or not.⁴⁴⁴ However, Griscom, the manager of the INC, never really gave up on the idea and his efforts intensified in 1887 when the British government cancelled the mail subsidies given to the Inman Line shortly after it had been taken over by the International Navigation Company (Flayhart, 2000, 126-27). That same year the Belgian authorities reduced their annual subsidy by \$50,000 bringing it back to \$77,000.⁴⁴⁵ Van den Toorn reported that the INC tried to take advantage of the growing American sentiment, agitating in the press to gain support for a ships-subsidy bill in order to pass the company's Belgian and British ships under the American flag.⁴⁴⁶ Senator

⁴⁴³ After the Civil War the American authorities blocked out the re-entry of all vessels who had registered under foreign flags during the war (Safford, 1985, 61).

⁴⁴⁴ BGRA, 4056, Letter of the Belgian envoy in Washington to MFA early 1877.

⁴⁴⁵ BGRA, 4054 and 4059, Convention for a service to New York March 10 1887. Griscom spent several months in Belgium to renegotiate the contract. Especially the fact that the Belgian authorities no longer considered *Vaderland*, *Zeeland* and *Nederland* to be suitable and fast enough to carry mails caused difficulties. The RSL feared that questions would then be raised about the seaworthiness of the ships in the press which would harm the reputation of the company. In the end the ships were allowed to act only as substitutes for other ships.

⁴⁴⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, Letter April 10 1888.

William Frye became the leading proponent of government aid to the merchant marine, placing two law proposals before Congress resulting in the Postal Aid Act of 1891. The bill, the first piece of legislation aiding the merchant marine in 32 years, allowed the Postmaster General to conclude contracts with American citizens running a line with American built, owned and officered ships.⁴⁴⁷ The Navy supervised the construction of these vessels to guarantee usefulness for military purposes (Flayhart, 2000, 133-134).

Yet, no applications followed since the subsidy did not compensate the extra costs which American built and officered ships produced while the foreign flagged ships of the INC did not qualify. According to van den Toorn, an imminent war with Chili was staged by the Navy and the Republicans to influence both the upcoming presidential election so as to get a special law passed, allowing the newest British steamers of the American Line to register under the Stars and Stripes.⁴⁴⁸ In return Griscom committed to constructing two equivalents- of the *City of Paris* and *City of New York* in the US. After lobbying for 20 years the INC finally obtained a subsidy of \$25,000 to \$40,000 per crossing for their first class steamers. Simultaneously, Griscom renegotiated the RSL contract with the Belgian authorities. The government withdrew the direct subsidy, yet it continued to give full 'moral' support, facilitating the company's business as much as possible.⁴⁴⁹ Only half of the fleet had to remain under the Belgian flag while the contract of indefinite term could be ended by either party with three months notice. On one hand this gave Griscom the freedom to increase the lobbying efforts in Congress to also obtain subsidies for RSL ships. While on the other hand the INC manager could now threaten to move the line to a rival port, as a means of acquiring favors from the Belgian authorities.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁷ The sum of the subsidy depended on the size and speed of ships. The bill passed the house only after introducing an amendment reducing the amount of the subsidy by one third.

⁴⁴⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, Letters January 29 and May 6 1892.

⁴⁴⁹ The Belgian authorities still had a say in sailing dates and port of call used by the RSL. The steamship company retained the exclusive right to carry mails unless another firm offered a faster service from Antwerp. Two Belgian officials per sailing traveling on State mission could travel 1st class free of charge except for the catering expenses. Extradited nationals, Belgian sailors in distress, and paupers not exceeding ten per ship would be transported for free, except catering expenses. The government took up the patronage of the company, keeping its title of Belgian Royal Mail Steamers. Reductions on railroad fares, the use of train stations as selling points and special connections to Paris, Basel and Cologne were guaranteed. BGRA, 4068, Contract between RSL and Belgian government 1892.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Letters August 12 and November 21 1892 and Report 1893. This was done to pressure the Belgian authorities to improve the infrastructure in Antwerp, building a dry dock for the line's bigger ships, enlarging and deepening the Westerschelde to allow their access to the port, buying new icebreakers, etc. The authorities quickly gave in to these demands.

The foreign lines which controlled the majority of the North Atlantic traffic feared that the renewed interest of the American Congress for the merchant marine could result in measures hindering their business interests. Through their lobbyist at Washington they influenced Congressmen to oppose laws favoring American over foreign ships for passenger and cargo trade. Van den Toorn mentioned various proposals circulating in Congress going from; (1) attributing special transfer facilities to American ships enabling the INC to monopolize the express goods coming from Europe, (2) differential tariffs to be levied on all goods arriving with foreign ships (3) increase the head-tax for passengers landed by foreign ships to \$10.⁴⁵¹ The tendency of passing measures regulating the migrant transport, which favored the national merchant marine over foreign competitors, was gaining grounds in Europe as the German border control stations in the hands of HAPAG and NGL illustrated. Yet no European government was in the position to favor its merchant marine by such measures as much as the American government.⁴⁵² Avoiding this was a condition *sine qua non* for foreign lines, which explains the division of the shipping lobby in the US.

Both fought immigration restrictions, but by using different lobbyists. The impact of the lobby is hard to measure, yet the shipping companies used various strategies to have their voice heard. For instance, when during the 1890s the agitation for immigration restrictions led to various congressional missions to investigate the matter in Europe, they made sure that someone defending their interests traveled along too. This was the case too during the mission led by Weber, investigating among other things, the role of shipping companies as instigators of the migrant flow. Mr. Semsey of the Hungarian Association of New York accompanied Weber and needed to cancel his previously planned trip as a delegate of an association aimed at stimulating migration. Van den Toorn reassured the directors that their Hungarian employee by knowing Semsey quite well, made sure that their interests would be protected.⁴⁵³ General Spaulding, assistant of

⁴⁵¹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter May 23 1896.

⁴⁵² In case the American authorities would have passed laws favoring the American merchant marine could have driven many foreign steamship lines with other routes and possibly with them part of the transatlantic migrant traffic.

⁴⁵³ The HAL employee also gave Mr. Mucs of the Hungarian Association a free passage round trip to ensure that HAL prepaid passengers would not encounter any troubles at the border control stations. Mucs also wanted get more uniformity into the travel route of migrants making the crossing through the

the Secretary of Treasury was next to travel on official mission to Europe. It was none other other than the lobbyist from the Continental lines, Glavis, that accompanied Spauldin; who had to report on new laws that might be promulgated regarding passenger traffic.⁴⁵⁴ By making sure someone defending the shipping interests traveled along on those missions serving to promulgate new laws, it was one way of influencing the information flows on migration which found their way to Congress and the popular press.

Another way used by the Conference lines was by appointing a commission screening the American press by separating newspapers agitating against foreign shipping lines and migration from those defending their interests. The commission hired a journalist to respond to the hostile articles in the press, and to write and collect propaganda to distribute to the agents via the travelers of the company.⁴⁵⁵ The travellers needed to investigate the opponents inland that could possibly be won over.⁴⁵⁶ About the effectiveness of the campaigns Van den Toorn reported the following when, during the cholera scare, the Chandler bill prohibiting immigration was discussed in Congress:

“...the bill stands a chance to pass the Senate (majority Republicans) yet not the House. The Eastern gutter press predicts that the law will pass while more serious papers don't mention it. The secret agitation of the shipping lines out of Washington targeting the western voters through local western papers triggered an important wave of protest against restrictions. Western Senators and Representatives will not dare to vote in favor of the Chandler Bill unless a new wave of cholera brakes out again.”⁴⁵⁷

With the foundation of the Immigration Restrictive League, the shipping lobby redoubled its efforts. From 1895 onwards the Dutch and German lines of the Continental Conference paid two Washington journalists, who worked as correspondents for various prominent American newspapers, \$80 per week to agitate in favor of migration. Two years later the conference established the Immigration Protective League, which

organization and promised to direct as many as possible via Rotterdam GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121 Letter of van den Toorn July 7 1891.

⁴⁵⁴ On their return from Bremen Glavis introduced Van den Toorn to Spaulding to reinforce the contacts between the Treasury Department and the shipping line. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, Letter July 6 1892 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter July 28 1892.

⁴⁵⁵ Travelers are employees of the shipping companies who traveled across the US visiting agents controlling their sales, promoting the lines and reporting on the movements of the local markets.

⁴⁵⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 222, Letter October 26 1892.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 222, Letter January 5 1893.

coordinated the lobbying campaigns in the American press. The involvement of the shipping lines had to remain secret and therefore they hired Joseph H. Senner, former editor of the *New York Staatszeitung* and former Commissioner of Immigration at New York to head the league. During his term as commissioner he was known for bringing the shipping lines into disrepute (see 4.2.2.) and hence was the ideal person to counter suspicions of the shipping lines' participation. He traveled around the country to recruit members and established offices all over the US. His salary was \$500 a month, plus costs.⁴⁵⁸

Finally, another way to create goodwill for the shipping interests among politicians was by financial contributions to party campaigns of Republicans and Democrats during elections. In 1894, for instance when it seemed likely that Republicans would take control of the House, Senate and the White House, the HAL decided to fund their election campaign. Van den Toorn reported that other lines, such as the NGL, did the same and by contributing \$250 during the campaign much more could be obtained than with \$5000 once they were in office.⁴⁵⁹ During the presidential elections two years later NGL, HAPAG and HAL channeled \$5000 through Glavis to both the Republican and Democrat campaign funds. This was needed to prevent the passage of a differential tariff discriminating foreign lines, and other laws, hindering their business interests.⁴⁶⁰

5) Corporate liberalism and the progressive era: The rise of the 'Third House' or the 'Assistant Government' regarding immigration issues

Steam shipping companies were important actors in shaping, enforcing and circumventing migrant legislation in the Atlantic World. When the American federal authorities took control of immigrant legislation during the 1880s the tendency to consider migration primary as a national, rather than international matter had set in on both sides of the Atlantic. Shipping companies used all schemes possible to protect their main source of revenue, the third-class migrant transport from restrictions. This ranged from; pro-immigration propaganda campaigns in the US press to influence public opinion; engaging lobbyists at Washington to influence Congressmen and migrant

⁴⁵⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, Letter November 16 1897.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Letter October 3 1894.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.* Letter April 3 1896.

legislation; preparing passengers for the interrogations at control stations; directing passengers with high risks via alternative routes such as Baltimore or Canada where controls were more lenient than New York or to second-class to avoid inspections etc. Shipping companies were a key actor in the implementation of the immigration laws, especially with the growing tendency of American immigration control stations to put the responsibility of keeping the 'undesired' classes out, on the shipping lines.

Previous studies on American immigrant policies have too often focused on Congressional debates and the laws it enacted, yet studies analyzing how the laws and policies are almost completely absent. Based on the failure of passing the literacy test many studies claim that the anti-immigration movement, as represented by the Immigration Restriction League, was unsuccessful in influencing migration policies based on eugenic theories. Yet, as argued here, eugenic prejudices towards the 'new' migrant wave found their way into immigration policies and control stations at the end of the 1880s. The main problem was not defining who was desirable or not, but more it was finding adequate means to adopt and implement policies to block the entry of 'undesirables'- meaning according to the Superintendent of Ellis Island, Weber, Italians, Russian Jews, Arabs, Slovaks, etc. Finding applicable means to reduce the 'new' migration flow, especially through the literacy dominated congressional immigration debates from 1890 to 1924. It became one of the topics of social reform during the progressive era during which the close ties between business interests and government authorities were consolidated, despite being contested.

Besides, internal discord among different American States regarding immigration policies, the lobby of employers, migrant communities and steam-shipping companies help in explaining why it took so long for the literacy test to be passed. The various interests groups involved extended their influence as a result of the the institutional changes, increased bureaucracy and the decreasing influence of party politics during this period. Congress acquired a growing amount of responsibilities and gradually started to rely on lobbyists to collect information. By the turn of the century, lobbyists had invaded Washington, becoming the main source of information for Congressmen and Committees to decide on what and how to vote. For exceptional issues special investigation commissions received appropriations to collect scientific information and recommend

legislation. The newly set up Senate and House Immigration Committees processed the bills and destroy them by keeping them in the committee; but when they reported those cases it usually formed the basis for action on the floor. Because of their influence these committees became the battlefield of restrictionist and pro-immigration lobbyists. Both sides stirred up constituents to put pressure on legislators, through mail or press campaigns, and supported the latter in election campaigns. How this battle between lobbyists free from legal restrictions and centering on the literacy test intensified during the following decades will be discussed in the following chapters (Clemens, 1997; Filne, 1970, 20-34 Kolko, 1963; Logan and Patten, 1929, 56-60; McCormick 1981, 247-274, Tichenor, 2002).

However, in the meantime at controls stations the vague legislation at hand allowed the immigrant inspectors to start selecting migrants based on their origins. Under the excuse of health reasons, immigrant inspectors tried to send contract laborers or those 'likely to become a public charge' back as much as possible when economic or political pressure called for it. The impact on the immigrant flow of this policy remained, at first glance relatively small, yet the remote border control measures improved in the subsequent period debarring a growing number of newcomers. As a result of the efforts of shipping companies the impact remained fairly limited.

Part III: The consolidation of transatlantic shipping companies and their efforts to protect the steerage market during the Progressive Era

Conference agreements boomed in the shipping industry at the end of the nineteenth century. At the brink of WOI, over a hundred agreements and consolidations regulated the foreign and domestic waterborne commerce in the US (Huebner, 1914, 75). As contemporaries noted, despite the booming market only a few new passenger lines got were established on the North Atlantic passenger traffic after 1890 and the ones that kept afloat played no important part in the general expansion of the trade (Gottheil, 1914, 49). This chapter analyzes the apparent success of the North-Atlantic passenger conferences in raising prices, stabilizing the market and closing down the points of entry for new companies. Most of the studies on shipping cartels have dealt with freight traffic; very few have looked at passenger traffic. Yet, as Keeling noted, it was not freight, but

passenger transport, especially that of migrants constituted the main source of revenue of the large shipping companies that dominated the North-Atlantic, the biggest international shipping market (Keeling, 1999b, 40). It was not shippers, but migrant agents, who continued to supply these companies with steerage passengers, a market feature which so far has remained untouched by maritime historians.

How shipping companies rationalized the migrant agent-network through conference agreements and its impact on migration patterns will be analyzed in Chapter II. Of interest in this first chapter are the internal and external pressures on the continental market, as experienced by the Holland America Line. To what extent did the evolving internal agreements manage to neutralize the competition between the members? How did other sub-markets, new passenger lines and increased government interference influence the organization of the continental traffic? Focus remains on the US market of passage sales. For a long time, shipping cartels managed to remain outside the attention of the anti-trust movement, which was initiated by the Sherman Anti-trust act and raged throughout the Progressive Era. It allowed the passenger liners to quickly expand conference agreements to other segments of the business, as those regulating the westbound steerage market proved successful. This chapter analyzes the role of the Continental lines as a driving force behind the rapid development of the conference system through which they tried to reduce the external pressures. They also adapted some clauses within the continental pool-agreement to even out the internal pressures.

The continuous trend towards consolidation and the legal uncertainty engendered by American legislation favored the formation of mergers which also affected the shipping world. The attempt of J.P. Morgan to expand his business philosophy of vertical integration to the shipping industry with the establishment of the IMM, and its impact on the North Atlantic steerage market, will be discussed. In the meantime the steerage traffic increased but it was very uneven in the various sub-markets through which the traffic was organized. It will be shown how the Continental lines neutralized, the pressures on one hand of the British lines the pressure to enlarge their continental share, and on the other hand the drive of various governments trying to exploit the increasing continental migration flow to stimulate their merchant marine. How successful was the continental conference in preventing established and new companies from enlarging or acquiring a

market share? What were the barriers of entry into the conference? To what extent did the American anti-trust threat influence the strategies used to fight new lines and to force entry? How did it affect the internal relations among the NDLV pool members? What was the impact of all this on the steerage rates?

In the end because of the foreign control over most of the traffic, the secrecy of the agreements, and accumulating tensions on the migration issue during the Progressive Era the anti-trust campaign, caught up with the shipping industry. The strategies used by the shipping lines to defend the existence of the conference system during the federal investigation sheds some light on the growing fusion between public opinion, business interests, legislators and academics during this period. This trend will come forward much more when discussing the impact of shipping companies on the enactment of immigration laws and the implementation thereof in Chapter III and IV.

Chapter I: Consolidation, success and failures of passenger conferences during the Anti-Trust Era: 1896-1914

1) Expansion and consolidation of the North-Atlantic continental conference agreements between 1896 and 1904.

1.1) Releasing the competitive pressures in other trade departments

The agreement between the British, Mediterranean and Continental Conferences for third-class westbound passage constituted a landmark for tightening the cartel organizations competing for the North Atlantic traffic. Yet, the lack of agreements on eastbound third-class, first- and second-cabin passage still left a lot issues unresolved. The competition for these passengers could quickly build up tensions between the lines undermining the third-class westbound agreements. To ease these pressures the various conferences negotiated agreements regulating the entire North Atlantic passenger traffic. Freight traffic posed less problems between the conferences since it wasn't profitable for British lines to make the detour of calling at continental ports for goods, while German lines calling at English ports only took or delivered mail and cabin passengers.

Internally the members of the NDLV, spurred by the success of the pool agreement for third-class passenger traffic, fixed minimum rates for freights and pooled

the revenues.⁴⁶¹ It allowed the passenger lines to face the stronger outside competition for freight than for passenger transport. Most of the refined goods found their way to passenger liners because of their superior speed and service, yet for other cargo, specialized freight lines and more flexible tramp ships competed for a share of the traffic. No agreement could be reached for the eastbound leg of the trip.⁴⁶² Consisting mainly of raw materials and cereals, the eastbound market fluctuated much more and impeded the implementation of fixed minimum rates (Gottheil, 1914, 49; Huebner, 1914, 77; Murken, 1922, 119-141; Smith, 1906, 249-253). The rise of cruise business during the 1890s and the growing attendance of transatlantic visitors at World Fairs organized in Europe, reflects the fast growing transatlantic tourism which consisted mainly of Americans (Cornelis, 1993, 57-64; appendix).

Migrants quickly took over a large part of the second cabin compartment. The price difference with third-class averaged about \$10, a margin which became fixed with the NDLV agreements. As seen before, the exemption of inspection at the port of arrival represented a strong argument for migrants to travel in second-class. Statistics of the first decade of HAL's second-cabin traffic illustrate how the rates followed the increasing demand for the service. The parallel evolution of tightening controls at the American Gate also contributed to this evolution.⁴⁶³

Table II: Total passengers and average net prices of the HAL 2nd Class traffic 1885-1895⁴⁶⁴

| Year | Passengers | Average price in Guilders | Conversion to dollars |
|------|------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1886 | 1374 | 63,3 | 25,3 |
| 1887 | 1606 | 63,9 | 25,5 |
| 1888 | 1919 | 65,1 | 26 |
| 1889 | 2106 | 62,2 | 24,9 |
| 1890 | 2553 | 63,4 | 25,4 |
| 1891 | 2877 | 67,5 | 27 |

⁴⁶¹ The percentages as divided between the Lines in 1894, based on the figures of the three preceding years: HAPAG, 37,75; HAL, 18; NGL, 23,75 and RSL 20,50. Murken estimated that the Lines attracted approximately 85 to 90 % of the total traffic from their home ports (Murken, 1922, 127).

⁴⁶² The only exception being the traffic between the US and the Baltic for which the HAPAG created the Baltic Pool (Murken, 1922, 140).

⁴⁶³ The correspondence of the New York head agent corroborates this, yet the suspension of steerage traffic following the cholera scare in 1892 artificially swelled the figures for 1892 and 1893. The numbers plummeted with the subsequent recession.

⁴⁶⁴ The source did not specify whether these were net or gross prices. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter September 15 1896.

| | | | |
|------|------|------|------|
| 1892 | 3448 | 81,3 | 32,6 |
| 1893 | 4202 | 92,6 | 37 |
| 1894 | 1561 | 93,7 | 37,5 |
| 1895 | 1241 | 94,3 | 37,7 |

The competition for tourist passengers between the Continental and British lines was keener than for steerage. Tourists had less financial restrictions, proved much more sensitive to technological innovations and their routes were less defined. Attempts by of the Continental lines to pool the traffic without parallel agreements with the British lines therefore quickly failed. In the wake of the third class westbound agreement, the British and Continental lines concluded minimum rate agreements midway through 1896. It included the fixed differential of \$10 between second- and third-class for all steamship lines to reduce the interference with each other.⁴⁶⁵ The large number of subdivisions within first- and second-class accommodations and constant changes therein, prevented lasting rate agreements. Yet through constant renegotiations the main actors of the North Atlantic cabin passenger traffic managed to neutralize the competition (Murken, 1922, 90-118). In the meantime, due to the large overcapacity and the lack of agreements for eastbound steerage traffic with the British lines, return migrants paid approximately \$10 less to go back home than to reach the US on the same ship.

1.2) Rising the Eastbound steerage rates to Westbound levels

Van den Toorn repeatedly expressed his frustrations, stating that there shouldn't be any reason for eastbound rates to be lower than those westbound. He urged the directors to negotiate an agreement setting equal rates in both directions. The lack of agreements with the British lines obstructed the efficiency of the eastbound pool concluded between the NDLV members.⁴⁶⁶ Out of fear of losing continental passengers to the British lines, the rates could not be raised as the Continental lines had hoped for. It

⁴⁶⁵ According to the initial NDLV pool agreements (art 21) the lowest cabin rate had to be at least 50% higher than the steerage rate of the same Line and at least 30 Marks higher than the highest steerage rate of any of the other lines. Yet the Lines never managed to implement these large differentials. When the British Lines joined the agreement the differential was set at 50 Marks westbound and 10 dollars eastbound. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 580, NDLV agreement January 1892 and meeting December 12 1895, minute 182.

⁴⁶⁶ The eastbound pool started on November 1 1892. *Ibid.*, NDLV meeting December 12 1892, minute 53.

also impeded the working of the pool whereby lines exceeding their quota raised their prices, allowing the ones with a minus to fill up their quotas at higher rates.⁴⁶⁷ The negotiations did not lead to the formation of a pool but only to rate agreements. The bigger lines; Cunard, American and White Star Line agreed not to quote lower, through rates to the continent, than the express services of the HAPAG and NGL, while the British slow lines committed not to go below the lowest fare quoted by Continental lines (Murken, 1922, 63).

Despite the contract, the lines remained relatively restricted in setting the prices according to the pool ideology. The gap with the westbound rates hardly decreased as the agreement did little to reduce the competitive pressures. At the end of 1896 the Continental lines estimated that the British lines acquired nearly 10% of the eastbound continental market. It forced the German lines to reduce their rates for the regular service (see appendix).⁴⁶⁸ With the lower railroad rates from Hamburg and Bremen to the East, the Rotterdam route became more expensive creating a minus for the HAL in the continental eastbound pool. Yet, if the HAL reduced their prices to catch up with the German lines' plus, the slow British lines would follow allowing them to attract passengers who would be lost for the continental pool. In the interest of the pool, the Dutch company maintained its rates accepting the compensation for their minus paid by the German lines at the end of the year. Financially this option resulted in being more profitable for the HAL, yet in the long run it threatened to drive the company out of the eastbound market.⁴⁶⁹ It wanted to temporarily cut in the interior railroad rates from Rotterdam to reduce their minus without lowering the ocean passage fare, but the other lines opposed the idea.

The Dutch company needed to await a more specific rate agreement between British and Continental lines, containing differentiations per continental port instead of covering the whole continental range. This specification prevented slow British lines


⁴⁶⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters September 11, 15, 16 18 and October 27 1896.

⁴⁶⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter July 30 1897.

⁴⁶⁹ In 1896 the compensation came to twenty dollars while the HAL quoted 25 dollars eastbound. The cost per steerage passenger being estimated at ten dollars left an approximate financial gain of five dollars. The compensation had gradually increased from 10 dollars in 1892, to 15 the following year. The subsequent rate war temporarily obstructed the upward trend. *Ibid.* Letters September 18 1896 and July 30 1897 and NDLV meetings February 16 1893, minute 59 and December 18 1893, minute 95.

from quoting HAL rates to Hamburg, still the continental port of predilection of the British lines.⁴⁷⁰ The British lines seemed unable to direct part of the eastbound stream through Rotterdam. With this adaptation, the Continental lines could reintroduce the differentials on ocean passage between each other enabling the HAL to fill its quota. Yet, the interdependency between steerage and second cabin rates prevented the shipping companies from raising the eastbound prices at westbound levels. The New York head-agent of the HAL reported constant disputes between the German lines on second cabin rates. Only midway through 1901 did all the lines reach a consensus agreeing to jointly raise eastbound rates with \$2.⁴⁷¹ Gradually the eastbound rates closed the gap with westbound fares. It fully materialized after the rate war with the Cunrad Line when the French line could finally be convinced of joining the NDLV-pool.

Graph 1: HAL Price evolutions west and eastbound steerage passage 1885-1905



1.3) The NDLV-headaches caused by the solitary course of the CGT

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 580, Agreement between the British Lines and NDLV June 7 1898.

⁴⁷¹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters February 6 1900; July 3 and 16 1901.

As seen in the previous section the Northern Italy, France, Switzerland, and the Orient (Asia, Africa, Turkey and Greece) had been declared as exempted territories because of the French line's refusal to join the pool agreements. The RSL, HAPAG and HAL formed a money pool for these regions quoting special rates to meet the CGT's competition.⁴⁷² The collaboration between both parties improved over the years. The CGT joined the New York continental conference to gain control over the agents and raise rates, however despite the agreements it continued its individual course violating the rules whenever the company judged that opportunistic behavior might grant greater returns. It centered its efforts on afore mentioned exempted territories, rather than the eastern European market. Through Marseille and the feeder service from the Messageries Maritime, the CGT gained a strong foothold on the new oriental market. To do this it often quoted special rates, like for instance when tensions between the Ottoman Empire and Greece were strong in 1897, making special arrangements with the Greek consul in the US to transport nationals wanting to defend their home country. The line also cut into the railroad rates and continued to give special facilities to some migrant brokers, such as Fugazi, Zotti & Company and Zwilchenbart & Company paying out extra commissions and allowing them to use cash-orders instead of prepaids (see chapter II).⁴⁷³

The competition for exempted territories made traveling to or from some places in Alsace, Lorraine and Switzerland cheaper than Rotterdam. When the CGT started seeking expansion to the east, the need for an agreement became more pressing. Rates to South Austria also needed to be lowered making it more and more difficult for the NDLV-lines to prevent these prices from affecting other destinations of continental market. Passengers living in the neighborhood of Vienna could take advantage of the low South Austrian rate, as they were forwarded via that city.⁴⁷⁴ Further east however the CGT encountered much more difficulties to penetrate the market which an agent of the French line had labeled as 'holy northern pool territory'. Taking Russians through ports

⁴⁷² GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 580, NDLV, meeting February 19, 1892, minute 9.

⁴⁷³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters May 14, 25, June 25, July 6 1897; February 25 1898; March 31 and April 4 1899.

⁴⁷⁴ Midway 1901 prepaid tickets from Rotterdam cost 34 dollars while from Basel, Bern and Innsbruck, including the inland fare the passage amounted to 32,65, 33,15 and 30,95 dollars respectively. *Ibid.* Letters June 22, September 13 1901; March 25 1902.

other than Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremen or Rotterdam seemed impossible to him.⁴⁷⁵ Therefore, the French line finally decided to join the westbound pool in 1903. The company's share was set at 11.7%. It was based on the passengers carried from 1900 until 1902 and was divided into on one hand continental passengers and on the other hand Italian and Oriental passengers. Satisfied with the outcome, the CGT joined the eastbound pool the following year based on same principals acquiring 15.21% of the total traffic. Finally, all the principal Continental lines within the Hamburg-Le Havre range were united in the NDLV pool agreement.⁴⁷⁶

1.4) The vendetta of C. B. Richard & Co: Anti-Trust laws and interference from the Mediterranean

The growing Mediterranean traffic attracted new companies to the Italian shores. The HAL considered opening a direct service to Italy with their oldest steamers, *Didam* and *Dubbedam*. Yet, the inability of getting their hands on goods for the Mediterranean route making the trip profitable proved too difficult. Also, accidents with both ships especially the *Dubbedam* earning the knick name 'Troubledam', continuously harmed the company's reputation. The HAL therefore gave up on the idea, but many others did not.⁴⁷⁷ With their larger fleets, the German lines could more easily react to new market opportunities and opened direct services to Italy. Through the pool agreement of 1896 they managed to exclude the British lines, except for the Anchor Line from the booming market. Nonetheless, the NGL and HAPAG could not prevent new lines from penetrating the market.

One of these new ventures, the Atlantic Line, was announced by Oscar Richard, manager of C. B. Richard. The former passage agent of the HAPAG took on the head-agency in New York.⁴⁷⁸ The HAPAG had every intention of making Richard's attempt fail, but a new interpretation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act by the Supreme Court in the 1897 Trans-Missouri Case, made the German line reconsider its strategies. The court

⁴⁷⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 115, November 21 1900.

⁴⁷⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 580, Agreement G and L between NDLV and CGT of 1903 and 1904 respectively.

⁴⁷⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters September 26 and October 16 1891.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Letter July 8 1896.

ruling declared all combinations regulating commerce, keeping prices high and stable to be unlawful. The verdict created a shock effect among the American business community. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 expressed the growing fears of the public towards the ascendancy of big business which threatened to undermine the country's liberal ideals. Aiming at preventing the formation of business combinations that could acquire a monopoly the Act declared 'restraints of trade' in the form of trusts to be illegal. Congress acknowledged the need for reasonable restraints, in some cases, yet it failed to specify when and how to implement the act, leaving the interpretation of the law to court rulings. The interpretation of the Supreme Court in 1897 declared all restraints of trade, regardless of whether they were reasonable or not, to be illegal (Bittlingmayer, 1996, 375-378; Blackford and Kerr, 1986, 222-224; Chandler, 1977, 172; Weinstein, 1968, 66-68).

All traffic associations, including the shipping conference system, seemed to be called into question. As van den Toorn noted they now seemed liable for prosecution by Richard's Atlantic Line or by any agent falling under the conference authority. During the next two decades, the conference lines regularly conferred with their lawyers to determine the legality of their actions and how to circumvent anti-trust laws. Out of fear that the conference system be declared unlawful, the shipping companies often adapted their policies, especially towards new entrants trying to penetrate the market. New companies, such as the Prince Line used the legislation to force their way into the conference. The Prince Line substituted the unsuccessful Atlantic Line in 1897 providing a direct service between Naples and New York.⁴⁷⁹ Richard also represented this line in the US and used the press to fight the competition of the Mediterranean Conference. This competition was fueled by the personal vendetta between Richard and his former associate and head-agent of HAPAG, Emil Boas. Richard accused the conference of blocking out the Prince Line in the *Journal of Commerce*. He challenged the right of conference lines to prohibit its agents from selling tickets of non-conference members. Following the attack, the conference lines met to discuss the issue. Van den Toorn

⁴⁷⁹ The Atlantic Line operating from Genoa did not manage to establish a regular service. Ships often waited in ports for cargo while the prohibition of conference agents to work for the line hindered the bookings and expedition of passengers. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter May 15 1897.

suggested that the best way to solve the problem was to accept the Prince Line in the conference. Despite Boas' strong opposition Richard obtained an initial victory, as shortly after the Mediterranean Lines took up the Prince Line into the conference, allocating a percentage of the traffic to the company and allowing it to be represented by its agents.⁴⁸⁰

The British Dominion Line used the same strategy two years later to get the clause abolished which blocked the British lines from the westbound Mediterranean market.⁴⁸¹ The British lines quickly realized their misjudgments on future market growth of the subdivisions of North Atlantic passenger traffic after signing the 1896 agreement. Having settled predominantly for the receding British-Scandinavian market, they were left with little to no *marge de manœuvre* on the rapidly growing Continental and Mediterranean markets. Therefore other British lines quickly followed into the opening Dominion Line created to get a share of the Mediterranean market. They joined various new Italian lines which gained access to the conference due to protective measures imposed by the Italian government guaranteeing the national companies a nice slice of the profitable cake (Molinari, 2002, 240).⁴⁸²

The constant expansion of the conference kept down the rates, which had already started off below continental fares, partly due to the inferior ships used on that route. As the rate difference increased, a growing number of continental passengers were booked through Italian ports. To prevent the Mediterranean from affecting the continental market, prices to the Mediterranean needed to be increased. Conference agreements remained the best way of doing this and gradually the prices to and from the Mediterranean increased, but the differential with the continental fares never

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Letters March 27, April 6 1897; October 25 1898 and Journal of Commerce "Rival Mediterranean Lines: Prince Line charges Competitors with Conspiracy" October 22 1898.

⁴⁸¹ The Dominion Line opened a service to Boston in 1901. It used the same arguments as the Prince Line to denounce the conference practices of neutralizing competition in the Boston Herald. To get local support for its case it also portrayed the conference system as a scheme of the port of New York interests against to counter the competition of other Atlantic ports.

⁴⁸² The Mediterranean Conference which when Prince Line entered included Navigazione Italiana, HAPAG, NGL, Bordeaux Line, Fabre Line, CGT, Anchor Line, HAL and RSL expanded as follows: (1901) La Veloce; (1902) Dominion Line; (1904) Austro-Americana, Compagnia Transatlantica, Cunard Line, White Star Line; (1905) Lloyd Italiano, American Line; (1907) Hellenic Line, Sicula Americana, Italo-New York Line, Lloyd Sabauda and (1909) National Greek Line.

disappeared.⁴⁸³ The Italian law of 1901 gave the authority to the commissioner of migration to have a say in the setting of the steerage prices (Murken, 1922, 73). Despite the differential, and because of the improving collaboration between the conferences, special measures could be introduced to prevent continentals from traveling at lower Italian rates (see chapter II, 2.4).

1.5) Remaining Internal pressures among NDLV members

Besides the afore-mentioned external pressures, the NDLV-members still faced internal tensions centering on the tonnage clause, the German boarder control stations and the quality of the passengers. The NDLV agreements contained a clause stipulating that the quotas could be adapted according to alterations in tonnage. The agreements stated that the aim of the conference was to reduce competition and that the companies would respect the percentages, however one could not take away the right of a company to expand their fleet or increase their frequency of navigation. Seventy percent of each increase of 1000 tons towards the reference year 1890 was counted for the line that in return was allotted a certain number of steerage passengers. To make the tonnage count a minimum number of passengers needed to be aboard. As seen before, the clause pushed the lines to at times cut their rates when the minimum could not be reached through regular bookings. Moreover, it obstructed the pool idea of having members with a plus increase their prices allowing members with a minus to book at more profitable rates. Companies with a plus were reluctant to raise their prices to avoid their tonnage not being counted for because of lack of passengers.

It also generated a keen competition to increase the tonnage on the route.⁴⁸⁴ The math done by Murken showed that tonnage increased by 51 percent, in comparison with 1890, during the first six years of the pool. Together with the decreasing migration during these years the number of passengers transported per 1000 tons dropped from 119 to a mere 38. The tonnage clause allowed the HAPAG to increase its share (WB + 1,84; EB + 5,18) to the detriment of the NGL (WB, -1,59; EB, -3,21) and RSL (WB, -0,79; EB -

⁴⁸³ Murken quotes an average difference of 25 francs (Murken, 1922, 63). After the rate war triggered by the Cunard Line the augmentation of Mediterranean prices closed the gap a little with continental fares, yet the fares never reached the same level.

⁴⁸⁴ Letters October 2 1896, June 6, September 9, 1897

1,11) while the HAL (WB +0,54; EB, -0,86) managed to contain its position. Especially, the relations between the German lines suffered as HAPAG closed the gap on the NGL. During the renegotiations of the pool agreements in 1898 the NGL only wanted to extend its participation on the condition that the tonnage clause was excluded. After long discussions as to what bases the new fixed percentages should be based upon, the lines reached the following compromise; again as compared to the reference year of 1890 (Murken, 1922, 80-86).⁴⁸⁵

| | WB 1899 | WB1890 +/- | EB 1899 | EB 1890 +/- |
|-------|----------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| HAPAG | 30,71 | 0,95+ | 26,47 | 8+ |
| HAL | 9,78 | 0,45+ | 13,32 | -3 |
| NGL | 44,14 | -1,4 | 41,53 | -2 |
| RSL | 15,37 | 0 | 18,68 | -2 |

The percentages remained unchanged, with the exception of a slight concession (WB 0.5%; EB, 1%) of the NGL towards the HAPAG in 1908. The fixed quotas relieved the tensions only to become a reason for internal discord again during the renegotiations of 1913. With the end of the tonnage clause, the German lines abandoned their specialized freight and third-class services known as the Roland and Union Line.

Another point of tension that remained unsolved was the competition for cheap railroad fares. In the US the Interstate Commerce Commission supervised the rates while a railroad clearing house at Ellis Island divided the traffic under the railroads and assisted passengers to their inland destinations. The commission reduced the competition between railroads, allowing them to strengthen their position towards the steamship lines. Because of the improved collaboration between American railroads, shipping companies no longer managed to obtain competitive advantages on inland passenger rates. Some railroads reduced, or even withdrew the payment of commission on inland tickets sold by migrant

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| Westbound | joint NDLV tonnage | Passengers | # passengers per 1000 tons |
|-----------|--------------------|------------|----------------------------|
| 1890 | 1775 839 | 210 598 | 119 |
| 1892 | 1505 209 | 214 753 | 143 |
| 1893 | 2123 899 | 211 656 | 99 |
| 1894 | 2051 720 | 84 610 | 41 |
| 1895 | 2114 212 | 127 111 | 60 |
| 1896 | 2383 881 | 129 554 | 54 |
| 1897 | 2480 718 | 83 699 | 34 |
| 1898 | 2686 050 | 102 886 | 38 |

agents in connection with steamship tickets. The railroads withdrew facilities given to traveling representatives of the steamship lines for some time. Moreover, the railroad migrant tariffs increased and were also called into question at some stage. The concord between the railroads suffered various crisis before 1914, yet the Interstate Commerce Commission prevented steamship companies from exploiting this in their favor as they did in the past.

In Europe, railroad fares and transit facilities resulted were much harder to regulate. The long-awaited list reducing the common points to and from where the lines provided through booking facilities from 12,000 to 300 destinations did not alleviate the tensions between the lines generated by the inland fare. By taking care of forwarding passengers from these points the NDLV-lines wanted to curtail the influence of the expedients on the migrant traffic. Yet, to most of the points the HAL lacked the means to arrange the through booking properly. Often, the company could only send money to the passenger who had to buy the train ticket to one of the main transit points himself. Because of the bad service prepaid through-bookings dropped spectacularly from an average of 65 percent (1888-1892) to 25 percent (1893-1896). Other pool members showed similar figures. Van den Toorn suggested limiting the through-booking facilities to major transit points instead of taking responsibility for transportation to places on which the company neither had control nor supervision. The biggest problem was making sure the luggage followed to these points. If all lines followed suit they could maybe put an end to the continuous rate cutting and instead establish prices on a fair kilometer bases. The original plan of the NDLV-members of quoting uniform fares to the common points had never materialized. Because of the geographical advantages of Hamburg and Bremen for passengers from Northern Germany, Russia and Galicia; RSL and HAL sold railroad tickets to and from the home port below cost. This competition kept the prices inland down until HAL, after several refusals by the RSL to significantly increase theirs, introduced a new reduction at the turn of the century. Afterwards, the rates finally seemed to have stabilized and complaints about the expedition of passengers diminished (see table I and annex 5).⁴⁸⁶ The NDLV members finally seemed to have settled for the

⁴⁸⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226; Letters August 1; September 1 1897; February 4; March 23 1898; September 28; July 16 1899; June 6 1902; January 1 1903.

differentials from their respective ports to the main transit points, as given in tables 3 and 4.

Table III: HAL rate evolution in dollars to and from some important transit points⁴⁸⁷

| Destination | 1893 | 1895 | 1900 | 1907/09 |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| Agram | 14,15 | 11,5 | 8,4 | 8,4 |
| Budapest | 11,95 | 8,78 | 7,55 | 7,55 |
| Chur | | 6,03 | | 6,7 |
| Debreczin | 13,6 | 10,18 | | 9 |
| Kaschau | 13,6 | 7,9 | 7,9 | 7,55 |
| Oderberg | 5,87 | | 5,6 | 5,6 |
| Oswieczim | 6,07 | | 5,7 | 5,7 |
| Prag | 8,95 | 7,55 | | 4,6 |
| Szegedin | 13,6 | 11,2 | | 8,75 |
| Temesvar | 13,6 | 11,6 | | 9,15 |
| Triest | 12,2 | 11,25 | 9,55 | 9,35 |
| Wien | 7,18 | 7,18 | 6 | 6 |

Table IV: Continental lines' inland fare to and from main eastern European transit points in 1902⁴⁸⁸

| | CGT | RSL | HAPAG | NGL | HAL |
|-----------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| Agram | 13,55 | 9,6 | 7,4 | 8 | 8,4 |
| Budapest | 12,6 | 8,05 | 5,8 | 6,85 | 7,55 |
| Fiume | 12 | 9,9 | 7,3 | 9,05 | 8,4 |
| Innsbruck | 8,8 | 6,9 | 6,2 | 6,35 | 5,95 |
| Karlstadt | 14,95 | 9,85 | 7 | 8 | 8,4 |
| Laibach | 11,7 | 8,6 | 6,8 | 7,4 | 8,5 |
| Oderberg | 12,25 | 6,05 | 3,9 | 4,1 | 5,6 |
| Oswieczim | 12,45 | 6,3 | 4 | 4,25 | 5,7 |
| Triest | 12 | 9,7 | 7,9 | 8,45 | 9,35 |
| Vienna | 9 | 6,5 | 4,65 | 5,3 | 6 |

With both prices and quotas fixed, the competition moved even more towards to quality of service and the quality of passengers transported. The quality of service did not

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Letters August 24 1894; December 6 1895; February 6 1900; Circular Zotti October 1905; HAL rate sheet April 12 1907; Uranium Line that rate sheet November 29 1909, the company quoted the same rates as HAL.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Letter July 15 1902.

limit itself to the ocean leg of the trip but extended from the place of departure to the final destination, as companies assisted the passengers whenever possible. Arrangements ensuring a fluid transit to and from and to the ports constituted an important part of that service. Special assistance and facilities at key transit points helped the passengers on their way. The HAL not only opened offices at key transit points but also built a hotel in Leipzig for that purpose. This was the company's second hotel, after opening one also in Rotterdam. By providing cheap lodging at the port the company, not only tried to reduce the costs of migrating via Rotterdam but above all wanted to protect its clients from scalpers making a living off defrauding migrants. The HAL took up the responsibility of defending the reputation of the migrant route which, to some extent, had been looked after by the Dutch authorities.

On board more and more companies adapted their steerage accommodation to second-class standards. HAL converted its steerage dormitories into closed staterooms fitting a maximum of six passengers, by the turn of the century. It gave the passengers more space and privacy while the sanitary conditions and ventilations also improved to ensure a pleasant crossing. The company put a lot of stress on the good treatment of the passengers by the personnel. About thirty people attended the third-class passengers during their crossing. They cleaned the steerage compartments on a regular basis and served the food in ever more spacious dining rooms. In these, the HAL also started to provide some entertainment for steerage passengers. They made sure that food was abundant and of good quality.⁴⁸⁹ Occasional stories of starving, weakened migrants arriving in New York because of malnutrition at sea during the sailing ship era totally disappeared from the sensational press, with the introduction of steam. For many steerage passengers, the quality and quantity of the menu on board exceeded the rations they had at home.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁹ The cost of the food over the years fluctuated. The document did not specify the currency yet by comparing the price evolution for catering at Ellis Island it seems likely that the figures reflect the daily cost per passenger in dollars. During the 1880's prices decreased from 0,5 to 0,4 and reaching 0,35 at the beginning of 1890's. Midway the 1890's it increased again to 0,4 to reach a low point of 0,3 at the turn of the century. From 1907 onwards it stabilized at 0,4. GAR, HAL, 318.16 Museum, 53, Staten van voedingskosten van passagiers 1883-1919.

⁴⁹⁰ What follows is an example of a menu on board of a slow steamer of a well established steamship line: Breakfast consisted daily of; cereal, coffee, white bread and either butter or prune jam. In the afternoon coffee and dried bread. On Sundays this was changed to chocolate and coffee cake. The day by day menu of dinners and suppers consisted of: Day 1: Dinner: macaroni soup, boiled beef, potatoes,

Even in the first half of the nineteenth century, interests involved in the migrant business were well aware of the importance of a good reputation of a migrant route. In a migratory system dominated by chain migration patterns where word of mouth played a crucial role at the hour in deciding if when, and how to travel. Steam shipping reinforced these patterns by allowing seasonal repeat migration to develop. A good service allowed the company to attract regular customers. Both, the increased competition between steam-shipping companies and transatlantic migration patterns favored an improved service which as the HAL promoted itself centered on ‘good treatment, good food, comfort and convenience’.⁴⁹¹

The quality of the passengers depended both on the means of the migrants and the likelihood of being deported- in which ethnic background played an important role. The US authorities’ preferences towards the migrants from certain ethnic groups were reflected by shipping companies. Jews, especially those from Russia, enjoyed the worst reputation among the continental passengers. Many Jews, often forced to flee because of political repression, lacked the means to migrate and relied on the assistance of all sorts of aid societies.⁴⁹² These passengers spent less in the port and on the ship and frequently could not even afford board and lodging before embarking. As the American authorities refined the clause ‘likely to become a public charge’ using \$10 and later \$25 as

white bread. Supper: stew of meat, potatoes, black bread, butter and tea. Day 2: Dinner; Lentil soup, boiled fish, potatoes, gravy, white bread. Supper: hash potatoes, dill pancake, tea, black bread, and butter. Day 3: Dinner: stewed liver, gravy, potatoes, stewed rice with dried apples and raisins, white bread. Supper: Boiled fish, potatoes, gravy, tea, black bread, and butter. Day 4: Dinner: salt pork, potatoes, string beans, white bread. Supper: Sausage, potatoes, tea, black bread, butter. Day 5: Dinner: soup meat, stewed leftovers of roasts, potatoes, white bread. Supper: Sauerkraut with leftovers, potatoes, tea, black bread, and butter. Day 6: Dinner: sausage, potatoes, a vegetable mixture, white bread. Supper: pickled herring, potatoes, tea, black bread. Day 7: Dinner: soup, corned beef, potatoes, white bread. Supper: Mutton stew, cabbage, potatoes, tea, black bread, butter. Day 8: Dinner: macaroni soup, meat with gravy, potatoes, lentils, raisin bread. Supper: Potatoes, with meat gravy, tea, black bread, butter. Day 9: Dinner: Pea soup, either herring or meat with gravy, potatoes, cabbage, bread. Supper: Canned fish, potatoes, tea, black bread, butter. Day 10: Dinner: Vegetable soup, leftovers of roast, potatoes, white bread. Supper: Hash potatoes, pickle, tea, black bread. Day 11: Dinner: Soup, salt pork, potatoes, cabbage, bread, Supper: sausages, potatoes, tea, black bread, butter. Day 12: Dinner: Soup, beef, potatoes, string beans, white bread. Supper: boiled eggs, fried potatoes, bread (Dillingham Commission Reports, 1911, vol 37, 24).

⁴⁹¹ GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 49-58, 97, 160 and 190, Letter February 1 1914.

⁴⁹² The average amount of money shown by European immigrants admitted to the United States per ethnicity during the six fiscal years ending June 30, 1909 was as follows; the French showing the highest with \$60,27; the Lithuanians the lowest with \$11,01 per capita. Among the races showing the largest number of immigrants and the smallest amount of money per capita were the Polish with an average of \$11,70; the Hebrew \$13,93 and South Italian, \$14,38 (Dillingham Commission Reports, 1911, vol. 4, 39).

prerequisite for entry, the financial means of the passenger gained importance. Therefore, especially the NGL and RSL were known to center their efforts on the Austrian-Hungarian rather than the Russian market.

For economic rather than anti-Semitic reasons RSL introduced discriminatory prices for Jews midway the 1890s while setting up a big propaganda campaign in Austria. The express steamers *Saint Paul* and *Saint Louis* of RSL's sister company, the American Line were put on the Antwerp-New York route for that purpose. The measures coincided with the end of the 'Wiener cartel' - which had operated between RSL and HAL (1892-1895). The 'small' lines had joined efforts for the business transiting through Vienna as a precaution against the 'big' lines underlining their mistrust towards the true intentions of the German companies with the NDLV-pool. The cartel divided the cash business contracted through Vienna into 44% for the HAL and 56% for the RSL. Yet nine months after terminating the agreement the RSL managed to acquire 69.5% of the total business, including prepaid ticket holders going through the Austrian capital. The Dutch company disapproved of the policy of discriminating against certain markets to specialize in another. It pointed to the recently established Oesterreichs Colonial Gesellschaft aiming at improving foreign trade relations and assisting emigrants from the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Depending on the state support given to the organization, it could have a very disrupting effect on the Austrian-Hungarian market, increasing the importance of having a strong foothold in Russia.⁴⁹³ Debates followed between the pool members, establishing that discriminatory prices were against the spirit of the pool. Instead the HAL introduced special prices for Russian passengers, charging an extra \$2 per ticket which however also included board and lodging at transit points and at the port of embarkation. The line often went to great lengths to get the board and lodging charges paid for by the passengers. If unable to get the money in Leipzig or Rotterdam, it withheld the passenger's luggage in Rotterdam only to forward it when the New York office managed to cash the unpaid bills. The other lines soon copied the strategy of the HAL. Gradually, the custom spread to other ethnic groups, such as Rumanians, Austrians and Hungarians.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹³ RSL and HAL also concluded a similar arrangement for the Benelux. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters September 15 1896 and July 13 1899 and *Ibid*, 235, Wiener Cartel, correspondence 1892-1896.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Letters August 6 1897; July 28 1898; February 15 1899; January 16 1907.

Another point of conflict between the lines remained the German boarder control stations under the management of the HAPAG and NGL. It proved an important tool in filtering migrants and it shows that the RSL did not stand alone in selecting the passengers based on their quality. Some agents reported problems with the expedition of HAL passengers at the border, because German lines tried to rebook them through Hamburg or Bremen.⁴⁹⁵ The HAL repeatedly complained that agents on the frontier discriminated very much in favor of the HAPAG and NGL. All the so called 'Anschluss' migrants, without tickets accompanying friends or relatives who had their passage already booked, were always directed to Bremen or Hamburg. People who did not yet have a ticket had to buy one to cross the border.

As it shared in the cost of exploitation of the stations the HAL believed to be entitled to a part of the 'Anschluss'. To the HAL's great frustration it frequently occurred that passengers booked for the HAPAG who were refused by the company at the control station, because of the probability of being debarred at Ellis Island, were rebooked for the HAL. In this way the passenger was not lost for the pool, while the German line did not take the risk of defraying possible extra costs in case of deportation.⁴⁹⁶ Except voicing a complaint from time to time, there was not much the HAL could do about it. Its biggest fear was that the stations would be used as the original decree had foreseen, allowing only the passengers traveling with German companies to cross the borders. The company prepared alternative routes through Libau and Austria, but just before WOI broke out, German authorities blocked the transit of HAL passengers. Up to then the Dutch line received support from the German railroads that profited from the companies' transit business and helped in safeguarding their common interest.⁴⁹⁷

1.6) Price evolutions

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Letter July 18 1896

⁴⁹⁶ For instance returned *New-Amsterdam* passengers Helena Malakowski, H. Liszkauskas and Agahtha Lauschanot on account of Trachoma, initially held HAPAG tickets but they were refused at the frontier and provided with HAL tickets. Same goes for the family Krukonis, consisting of four members of whom a child of nine had Trachoma. It was sent back with his mother while the father and the other member of the family were discharged and remained in the US. *Ibid.*, Letter January 6 1901.

⁴⁹⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 1, correspondence with Berlin agent Katz 1898-1903 and *Ibid*, 318.02, General Correspondence, 121-121, Letter June 23 1914.


The long fought for westbound steerage agreement between the British and Continental lines served as a platform to consolidate the North Atlantic transport business on various levels. Rate agreements between the conferences for cabin passage soon followed, preventing the competition from these markets to affect the westbound steerage rates. Especially because of the interdependence between second- and third-class passage competition, as for the former could easily destabilize the latter. Finding a workable equilibrium for the eastbound steerage market was a lot more difficult due to the large overcapacity, the concentration of the lines in the same port and the divergent return migration patterns of the various ethnicities stimulating interference between the sub-markets.


This keen competition for the eastbound market prevented the rates from following the same upward evolution as westbound rates. Despite extending the pool agreements to the eastbound market, the Continental lines did not manage to protect the return rates as well as the westbound rates. Rate wars underline this greater susceptibility to competitive pressures of return fares falling lower and more rapidly than prepaids. Nevertheless, despite the lack of a pool, but through simple rate agreements with the British lines and by convincing the CGT to join the NDLV-pool, returning to Europe gradually became as expensive as going to the New World. By consolidating the pool with the French line the NDLV finally included the principal Continental lines. The agreements with the CGT that targeted both the Continental and Mediterranean passengers also improved the stability of the latter market which was needed to prevent low rates of one sub-market from affecting the other.

The expansion of conference agreements reduced the external pressures on the NDLV pool which in the meantime were consolidated. By striking out the tonnage clause the members put an end to the excessive competition of introducing new material. Also, the intensified pressure that fixed ocean rates had generated on inland railroad fares stabilized, both in the US due to increased government control and in Europe through mutual agreement to cut the losses on railroad fares. As the graphs on eastbound and prepaid passage for these years illustrate, the consolidation allowed the lines to stabilize the gross rates for the North-Atlantic ocean passage and to adapt the prices according to the common pool interests. Whereas previously, rates of all companies followed the same

evolution, they now started to diverge more frequently reflecting the adaptations according to their plus or minus in the pool quotas.

As migration picked up again following the recession of the mid-1890s, all the conference lines greatly benefited from the stability booking passengers at much more profitable rates. The increased cost of the passenger was compensated by the improved service to which the competition moved to ever more. Yet, as to how far the agreements constituted a monopoly artificially inflating the prices threatened to become a matter of public concern. The American trust-busting climate gained momentum putting the legality of the conference system in jeopardy. This threat influenced both the attitude of conference members towards new entrants and the strategies used by the shipping lines to expand the consolidation.





2) Taking horizontal combinations a step further: The IMM Merger

The Trans-Missouri verdict had a boomerang effect, as it pushed many cartel type agreements to evolve into great corporate consolidation by way of merger. Looser agreements, by way of pools or cartels, became much more vulnerable before federal courts (Weinstein, 1968, 67-68). The shipping industry did not escape this tendency, but as noted by Chandler economic rather than legal reasons led to the administrative centralizations (Chandler, 1977, 334). J.P. Morgan's attempt to introduce the rationalization, which had proved successful for railroads into the shipping industry, led to the foundation of the International Mercantile Marine Company, the world's largest shipping venture in 1902 (Navin, 1955, 291). The HAL which had been feeling increasing outside pressures of being taken over, formed part of the merger.

2.1) The HAL at crossroads

Van den Toorn reported as early as 1898 on a syndicate which had been formed in New York to take over the HAL.⁴⁹⁸ Johan Wierdsma immediately adapted the statutes of the company stipulating that the consent of 90% of the share holders would be required to alter the Dutch character of the line (Wentholt, 1973, 118). The Vanderbilts, owners of the New York Central and Hudson Railroad Company were behind the takeover. The Pacific Mail Co and Grace & Company managing a line to Chili also formed part of the syndicate. The reason for the increased interest in steamship lines was the speculation on important subsidies of the American government, which following the Spanish-American War had been exposed to the shortcomings of the national fleet (see Chapter III). Another event which may have spurred the plans of New York interests for the takeover was the establishment in 1896 of the Joint Traffic Association, a joint effort of eastern ports and railroads to pierce through the New York dominance by offering high differentials for the inland traffic. It successfully pushed the exports through New York further down the downward spiral.⁴⁹⁹ Moreover, nothing guaranteed that Griscom's INC would not redirect its course to Philadelphia, as the initiators intended to route the company, once the subsidies had been acquired.

The negotiator of the New York syndicate, O. Hatfield presented the scheme as part of a vertical integration project similar to the one launched by PRR with the establishment of the RSL and the American Line, in order to further rationalize freight and passenger transport on the North Atlantic. The syndicate would take over the commands, yet the Dutch character of the company and a large part of the personnel would be retained. Buying a way into the market by taking over a small firm, was often much cheaper than starting a new line and fighting a way into it. Van den Toorn favored a far reaching collaboration with the prestigious concern yet his primary concern, was to dissuade the Vanderbilts from starting a direct competition with the HAL.

⁴⁹⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters September 23 and October 13 1898.

⁴⁹⁹ Another measure taken by New York port interests, although contrary to the New York railroad interests, to counter the competition of Atlantic ports consisted of renovating the Erie Canal around the turn of the century. With funds partly supplied by the shipping companies a big propaganda campaign was organized in the State to gain support from the public for the approval of the appropriation bill. *Ibid.*, Letters December 17 1897; January 25 1898; September 18, November 6 1903.

Besides the Vanderbilts, Ballin's move to get his hands on the statutes of the HAL through an intermediary, rather than requesting it directly, also raised suspicions about his intentions of buying out the line. It certainly fitted into his expansion policy which by that time had earned the HAPAG the status of biggest shipping company worldwide. As Boyce noted, the conference agreements favored expansion by merger. HAPAG had used this strategy early on by taking over the smaller competitors in its home port. This way, the German line prevented them from cutting rates, giving North Atlantic conference agreements greater stability and allowing the company to explore opportunities on other markets. Fast growing companies, such as HAPAG often opted to acquire small companies on new routes to prevent reprisals on its core services. Yet by pooling its North Atlantic core service, the takeover of one of its members became the most logical way of increasing its share, without per se putting the thoughly fought and fragile equilibrium at risk (Boyce, 1995, 105; Broeze, 1993, 419; Murken, 1922, 165; Vale, 1984, 68).⁵⁰⁰

Yet the HAL, having no interest in consolidating with the Vanderbilts who only seemed to be speculating on the passage of a ship subsidy bill and being even less prepared to fall into the hands of a direct rival, took further steps to prevent a takeover. As Van den Toorn stated:

“We are at a turning point. If we want to play with the big guys we need a lot of capital and a lot of tonnage. It is important not to divide our fleet on various routes, increasing our vulnerability to be driven out. The line Rotterdam /Amsterdam – New York is a magnificent route, and there isn't any destination other than New York where so much money can be earned.”⁵⁰¹


The company increased its capital with 2 million guilders and managed to place most of it with an Amsterdam financier. With the move, the directors hoped to create goodwill among Amsterdam merchants and strengthen the national character of the company to retain its autonomy. The capital was used to invest in the fleet which at the time could not prevent a big line using first class material to out-compete them on the New York-Rotterdam/Amsterdam Line, according to Van den Toorn. He estimated that five twin-screw steamers for Rotterdam and three big freight ships for Amsterdam would guarantee

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Letters November 22 and 25 1898

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Letter December 18 1898.

its position.⁵⁰² Between 1897 and 1901 the HAL doubled its carrying capacity expanding the fleet to van den Toorn's recommendations. With the new tonnage the HAL acquired the status of a first-class steamship company, allowing the line to quadruple its Cabin business during the following decade (see graph). But, this could not prevent the passage of 51 % of HAL's shares into the hands of its rival pool members (Vale, 1984, 85-87).

Graph of HAL Cabin passage between 1899 and 1913⁵⁰³



2.2) The formation of the IMM

Simultaneous to with Vanderbilt's attempt to take over the HAL, Clement Griscom, the principal lobbyist for ship subsidies, sought fresh capital to expand the American Line as he felt confident that his efforts were finally going to bear fruit. His search led him to J.P. Morgan. By the end of the following year Griscom, Morgan and

⁵⁰² At the time the HAL reopened its service to Buenos Aires while it still chartered freight ships for the Amsterdam – New York route. Shortly after, the company discontinued the service to Buenos Aires. It placed orders for three new freight ships, the *Amsteldyk*, *Sloterdyk* and *Soesdyk* for the Amsterdam route and also for three new twin-screw passenger ships *Noordam* and *Ryndam* with Harland and Wolf and Potsdam with Blohm & Voss. *Ibid.*, Letters February 15 1901; January 17, 24, 30 and February 28 1899.

⁵⁰³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 578, Conference Statistics 1899-1914.

Bernard Baker, owner of the Atlantic Line, the only other American flagged service on the North Atlantic agreed to merge the American companies while entering into negotiations with European lines to participate (Vale 1984, 55-57). The American syndicate contacted Lord William Pirrie, manager of the shipyard Harland & Wolf which had built numerous ships for various lines on the North Atlantic.⁵⁰⁴ With his contacts, Pirrie proved a very valuable inside man to explore and negotiate the possibilities of expanding the merger in Europe. By 1902, the combination had bought up the freight carrying Leyland Line, and had acquired a controlling interest in the White Star and Dominion Line, which formed a community of interest with the American, Red Star and Atlantic Transport Line.

In the meantime, the German lines negotiated a profit sharing agreement with IMM. With the agreement of the principal continental initiator, Albert Ballin protected his shipping company from possible repercussions of the major American railroads having terminuses on the Atlantic, which Morgan and his associates controlled. The architect of the expansion of the conference system on the North Atlantic surely also wanted to safeguard and strengthen if possible the long fought for equilibrium which started to pay out its dividends.⁵⁰⁵ The merger could, in many ways, be considered as a logical consequence and expansion of the conference agreements. That the most important part of the agreement between the IMM and the German lines consisted of stipulations regarding the continuation, renewal and changes of the pool agreements corroborates this (Murken, 1922, 199). Ballin dragged in the NGL and HAL into the combination yet he underlined that IMM on their part needed to neutralize the Cunard Line to remove any cause of friction.

The failure of the IMM to do so eventually destabilized the entire North Atlantic passenger market rather than consolidating it. The conflict between the Cunard Line and the IMM dragged the lines into a rate war. Its effect on the price for the transatlantic

⁵⁰⁴ The success of the WSL had for a great part relied on the ships provided by Harland & Wolf ever since its establishment. The shipbuilders soon attracted other clients involved in the North Atlantic passenger trade such as HAPAG, Dominion and HAL. Pirrie's close involvement in the merger was motivated by the lucrative building contracts he would secure by the IMM combine. The bigger it became, the better the prospects.

⁵⁰⁵ And this quite literally too as during the five years preceding the agreement and succeeding the economic recession of the 1890's the HAPAG averaged a dividend of 7,6 % and the NGL of 6,8% (Murken, 1922, 190).

crossing and the working of the NDLV pool will be analyzed in point 3. This non-inclusion of the Cunard; the failure to obtain the taken for granted subsidies from the American government; the royal bonuses paid to the executives bringing about the merger and the huge overcapitalization of the combine; all led to well documented collapse of Morgan's attempt to expand his business philosophy to the shipping industry. Vertical integration, primordial for a merger's success according to Chandler, did not follow the horizontal combination as the IMM remained a federation of autonomous lines (Chandler 189-192; Murken, 1922, 145-239; Navin, 1955, 291-328; Vale, 1984). This questionable need for vertical integration in the migrant business will be discussed in the following chapter. Of particular interest here is its impact on the equilibrium between the main Continental lines and the working of the Holland America Line.

2.3) The HAL and 'foreign control'

HAPAG made the control over the HAL, a condition of entering an agreement with the IMM. The HAL had gradually become a respected rival with first-class ships, while from its homeport of Rotterdam it attracted from the same hinterland as the German lines. The Dutch company could easily undercut the German Lines if it wasn't tied to the same agreement and it would have greatly undermined the working of the pool-agreement. Pirrie, the Dutch line's shipbuilder led the negotiations in the name of the IMM to acquire a controlling interest of 51% of the Dutch company. As Broeze pointed the HAL didn't have to join the combination, at least not by way of selling out more than half of its shares (Broeze, 1996, 107).

The directors were well aware that Morgan would not dispose of the capital to buy out the German companies, even if these allowed him to. The interests between the IMM and the Continental lines would have to be consolidated through a traffic agreement and as Van den Toorn put it; "*making part of such agreement was a matter of life or death for the line*". The HAL director who represented the company during the negotiations in New York repeatedly underlined the line's eagerness to take part in the agreement. The board of directors feared that if it remained outside the combine, its participants would try to drive the company out of the North-Atlantic. With Morgan's

connections to the American railroads on one hand and on the other hand the lack of concession in Germany and the control of the German lines, on the other; over the boarder control stations through which the biggest part of HAL's passenger business transited, the company was in a weak position (Murken, 1922, 206).

The directors stressed the importance of conveying to the members of the combine that the company enjoyed the support of the city of Rotterdam, the Dutch Government and Dutch railways, without which a company like theirs could not be established in the Netherlands. In short, it wanted to convince the IMM initiators that the line could not be bypassed by the combine, in order to obtain a decent proposal.⁵⁰⁶ Moreover, the pool agreements entering their second decade had produced very satisfying results. The directors were well aware that the weaker, small members profited more from the pool than stronger, big members. Forming part of a consolidation guaranteeing the continuation of the pool was a logical business strategy. The only question remained was at what price?

The directors finally agreed to transfer 51% of the shares to the combine through Pirrie. To convince the shareholders, the directors did not want the takeover to be linked to Morgan -only to Harland & Wolf- hoping that the news on the IMM remained secret for a little while longer.⁵⁰⁷ Something else that the directors made sure did not leak to the shareholders was the royal bonus and salary increases they received upon signing the contract (Broeze, 1996, 112). To enable the takeover, the capital of the company was increased by four million, increasing it to twelve million guilders. Conversely to the royally paid shareholders of the Leyland and White Star Line, the IMM managed to buy the HAL shares only a little over the market value. Some months later the IMM transferred half of their shares in the HAL to the German lines. Wierdsma asked; why the IMM gave up their control and denounced the hypocrisy of the German companies, which during the negotiations had been used as a blocking issue by the HAL against the combine; while in the meantime the German companies had concluded other arrangements behind their backs. As he posed: "*surely our sympathy for Wiegand and Ballin will not grow bigger because of it, yet what we need to do now is to tune the*

⁵⁰⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters January 3 and 10 1902.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Letter April 22 1902.

German companies to our interests which also have become theirs".⁵⁰⁸ The division of the shares gave the directors of HAL more freedom than originally thought. The true extent of this foreign control has been the object of debate. Broeze refuted the common conception in Dutch historiography that the company, remaining under the Dutch flag retained full entrepreneurial control. The contract of the takeover stipulated that HAL's policy would be in accordance with the general directions of the Board of Committee of the IMM consolidation; meaning that the company would respect the geographic delimitations and the quota's for steerage and westbound freight traffic as established by the pool agreements. As long as this was respected the powers of the HAL directors remained intact. For capital increases, for opening of new services and amalgamating with other companies, the HAL would need to acquire the permission of the Joint Committee. Based on this clause; the strict conditions imposed by the HAPAG on the opening of the HAL service to Savannah in 1911; and restrictions on expanding to other routes where German lines sailed when the HAL bought back their shares during WOI; Broeze too quickly jumped to conclusion that the Dutch line got trapped in Ballin's 'Welpolitik' (Broeze, 1996, 113-117).

Conversely, as Murken denoted the clause attributing a say to the Joint Committee in HAL's policies remained a dead letter, while during this period, the company rapidly expanded its operations, neutralizing every competition that established itself on the Rotterdam–US Atlantic route (Murken, 1922, 207-208). This evolution is particularly noticeable for the cargo trade, which at the turn of the century went through an important crisis. The HAL first forced the Holland Boston Line (1900-1905) out of business. The competition from the Cosmopolitan Line, running a service from Philadelphia and managed by Peter Wright and Sons proved to be tenacious. Yet, when the HAL opened a direct competing service from that port, the Cosmopolitan Line had to give in and was taken over by the HAL in 1909. That same year ships of another long standing rival, the Neptune Line operating from Baltimore came under control of the HAL. Two years later it took over the Burg Line's service between Rotterdam and Savannah. By completing these with their own services from Newport News (1899) and

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Letter October 14 1902.

Boston (1910) the company gained control over the cargo traffic between Rotterdam and the Atlantic coast (Gottheil, 1914, 60-61).

As for the passenger business, the HAL managed to contain the competition of the Russian Volunteer Fleet and Uranium Line (see point 4). The failure of Ballin to contain the company's growth is best illustrated by the new capital injection in 1907. As underlined by J. Wierdsma, officially and by contract the company only had a binding agreement with Pirrie's Harland & Wolf to whom they sold the shares too. The director of the HAL explained his views to Pirrie:

“Of course there is some difference in the relations between our company and your firm as compared to the German lines, our agreement having been closed with you – and it is for this reason that, whilst it gave us great pleasure to discuss our plans with your lordship, we did not feel at liberty to take the matter up ourselves with our German friends as we have no occasion to inform all our other shareholders of it.”⁵⁰⁹

Together with the takeover Pirrie, concluded an exclusivity contract with the HAL for the building of new HAL steamers and therefore had every reason to support the capital increase destined to modernize the fleet. Ballin protested pointing to the article that important matters of policy needed to be approved by the Board of Committee of the consolidation. The HAPAG manager objected to the increase which would only serve to “*built ships which were calculated to greatly injure the German Companies.*” He did not understand why Ismay supported this, while it hurt his interests with the RSL as much as those of the German companies. However, Wierdsma reassured Pirrie that according to the bylaws the HAL did not need the approval of 75% of the shareholders to increase its capital, and hence did not need to confer with the German lines. Moreover, with article 1 of the contract with Harland & Wolf the company had covered its back by stipulating that the HAL would seek to bring its capital from 8 to 20 million by 1911. Therefore, instead of increasing capital the Dutch line simply issued a certain series of pre-authorized capital.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt Archive, 8-2 and 8-3, Morgan Trust, Correspondence between J. Wierdsma and W. Pirrie, July 20 1907.

⁵¹⁰ The by-laws provided that the issue of new capital could be decided by the board of directors and the managing directors with the right on Pirrie's part to object to such issue the HAL failed to give every share holder an opportunity of subscribing on equal terms for every such new issue in proportion to his holding.

Wierdsma refuted the fact that the HAL sought to harm the interests of its pool partners by building new ships which ensured increased comfort to the passengers, combined with a large cargo capacity without competing for the fastest crossing. The HAL directors stressed that they intended to preserve the good relations they maintained with Ballin. The fact that Ballin was made godfather of Henri Reuchlin, son and grandson of the respective HAL directors Johan and Otto, underlines that the working relationship between the steamship managers reached far beyond business levels. The three monthly pool and other conference meetings in various European localities greatly improved the *esprit de corps* among managers of passenger liners, which largely exceeded the local boundaries of one port. As noted by Greenhill, the success of shipping conferences depended on the personalities leading those and that the sense of group loyalty could be as important as industry characteristics (Greenhill, 1998, 66-67). The leading capacities of Albert Ballin ensured the success of the continental conference which earned him a lot of respect. The HAL directors acknowledged this, but always remained suspicious of the true intentions of the man whose motto was “*Mein Feld ist die Welt*”. They gladly cooperated with the consolidation efforts from which the company prospered but had no intention of becoming absorbed by HAPAG.

The American panic of 1907 eventually prevented the capital increase because many Amsterdam bankers had their money invested in the falling American stocks. However the HAL continued to refuse to acknowledge the Board of Committee in its decisions on expanding the line. It repeated that it had no intention of passing on inside information about the company and went ahead placing the order for a new ship *Rotterdam IV* which joined the fleet in 1909. With its 24,000 tons it was the seventh largest ‘floating palace’ on the North Atlantic. The positive results inspired the HAL to place another order with Harland & Wolf for another vessel with a gross tonnage of 32,000 in 1912. Unable to steer the company as Ballin had hoped the German lines resold their shares to the HAL in 1915.⁵¹¹ In the meantime, the Dutch company had used its entrepreneurial freedom to largely expand its activities and it made more profits than any other line involved in the IMM merger. Between 1903 and 1913 the HAL averaged

⁵¹¹ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt Archive, 8-2 and 8-3, Morgan Trust, Correspondence between J. Wierdsma and W. Pirrie, July 18, 20, 24, 26; August 1 1907; July 20, 25 1908; October 13 1910; February 14 and 22 1914.

annual dividends of 11% leaving the other members (HAPAG, 7.6%; NGL, 4.7%; and IMM, 0%) far behind (Murken, 1922, 206).

3) The non-inclusion of the Cunard Line in the IMM and the revival of the British pioneer

3.1) The reaction of the British authorities towards the IMM combine

Another company which greatly profited from the establishment of the IMM was the Cunard Line. During the IMM formation the British pioneer was renegotiating the subsidy contract with the British admiralty. These negotiations were greatly influenced once the press reported on the passage under American control of the Leyland, Dominion and White Star Line. Although the British maritime supremacy remained unquestionable around the turn of the century, with two thirds of the world's ships being built in Britain and half of the global steamship tonnage sailing under the Union Jack, the rapid ascendancy of the German fleet and the IMM formation alarmed the British public and authorities. Proportionally, the British tonnage acquired by Morgan amounting to 300,000 out of a total of 12,000,000 should not at first sight have been a matter of concern. Yet, the quality of the tonnage on the North Atlantic which retained its status of most prestigious and competitive route on the globe superseded by far that of ships used elsewhere. Technological innovation and speed records, both of crucial importance for naval purposes were still established on the North Atlantic. British companies had dominated this competition since the introduction of steam.

But, in 1897 the German companies determinedly attacked British supremacy by taking the 'Blue Ribbon' for the fastest crossing to the European mainland- where it would stay for a decade. The IMM made an offer to the Cunard Line's board of directors to buy a controlling part of 55 % of the steamship company's shares. As the British press noted, if the pioneering pride went into the offer, four-fifths of the country's finest steamers would fall under American control, while making it practically impossible for any capitalist to compete with such immense combination. With the pending American ship-subsidy bills the tonnage could soon be sailing under the 'Stars and Stripes'.

Preventing this, when jingoism was prominent in many places around the world became an urgent matter of national security.

The Cunard Line used this situation to regain the driver's seat on the North Atlantic. The British admiralty renewed negotiations both with Lord Inverclyde, manager of the company to ensure it retained its independence and with the IMM to prevent the merger from transferring the acquired fleet, part of which it had on its reserve list, under another flag. Without American ship-subsidies the IMM seemed unable to produce the same financial effort as for the WSL, while other investors also showed interest in taking over the shipping line. With the authorities also intervening in the matter, Cunard set high demands while negotiating favorable terms with the admiralty. The inside information on the IMM formation obtained through their New York head-agent, Vernon Brown allowed the company to play out the situation to its favor. Some months later, the line obtained a cheap loan for the building of two fast steamers which would re-conquer the 'bleu ribbon'. In addition, the admiralty drastically increased its support to the line which rose from a yearly subsidy of approximately 20,000 to 150,000 pounds while the Postmaster maintained the annual mail-subsidy at 68,000 pounds. In exchange, the shipping company pledged not to sell a controlling part of its shares to foreign interests retaining its full British character.

To Cunard's frustration the authorities took a year to make the contract official, announcing it simultaneously with the agreement reached with the IMM in July 1903. In spite of the favors granted to the Cunard Line, Morgan also came to terms with the British authorities to avoid the withdrawal of the existing subsidies to the WSL and prevent other discrimination against the IMM regarding naval and mail subsidies. The fact that the expected support of the American authorities became less and less likely made some kind of arrangement with the British authorities of crucial importance for Morgan. The investment banker gave guarantees that; the that the majority of the directors of the British companies of the IMM would remain, no ship of these companies would pass under foreign registry without the approval of the Board of trade, ships be manned by British sailors and that half of the future tonnage be registered under the Union Jack (Boyce, 1995, 100-102; Hyde, 1975, 142-148; Murken, 1922, 223-230; Vale, 1984, 103-181).

This agreement took away much of the IMM's incentives to press for concessions from the US authorities for American flagged ships while it obstructed a far reaching rationalization of the administrations of the various IMM lines. Once made official, both parties finally knew where they stood and could prepare for a face off which the Cunard Line implicitly announced by giving notice of withdrawal out of the British and Continental agreements in May 1903. With the increased subsidies and two blue ribbon steamers under construction the Cunard Line felt confident in starting a fight for a bigger slice of the Mediterranean and Continental markets. In 1902 its share only amounted to 0 and 0.38% respectively while its own market stagnated. To reassess the potential in attracting business of the various companies, a rate war seemed inevitable before establishing a new equilibrium.

3.2) Cunard Line's withdrawal and its effect on the Continental Market

Freed from the conference obligations the Cunard Line immediately sought to increase its market share in all sectors of the North Atlantic Passenger market. On the continental market, the company lowered its rates from Hamburg and Antwerp. The Continental lines took no immediate action against the minor reduction. To improve its competitive position on the American market the British line lured away the secretary of the New York Conferences, Lawson Sandford with a big salary to lead the passage and freight department of their Mediterranean service. Through the appointment Cunard acquired considerable and valuable information about his rivals.⁵¹² An even bigger blow to the Continental lines was the agreement concluded between the British line and the Hungarian government for the transportation of Hungarian migrants.

⁵¹² With the establishment of the Atlantic Conference Sandford returned to his position as Conference Secretary. Another similar appointment took place in 1911 when Hermann Winter joined the passage department of the Cunard Line. Working his way up in the New York passage department of the NGL he promoted to join the passage department in Bremen. Yet the New York head-agent of Cunard Line informed his superiors that he had difficulties to adapt in Bremen urging them to make him an offer. Cunard beat HAPAG and especially HAL to the punch. The HAL was looking for people to reinforce its New York staff which wasn't very well up to work. Winter could be very valuable for the upcoming conference negotiations by supply inside information on the NGL strategies. Within the week he signed a contract with the British Line. The price of the transaction, an annual salary of 7500 dollars seemed well worth its investment. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters 23 June and October 30 1903 and CLA, Chairman Correspondence, C 1, 63, Letters April 22, 25, 28 1911.

Following the European trend, the Hungarian Emigration Commissioner, Ludwig Levay, pursued the idea of using the emigration of nationals to launch a national line from Fiume to New York, at the beginning of the twentieth century. Levay suggested using passports as a means to obligate nationals to travel through Fiume. Yet, the emigration commissioner failed to convince national shipping interest to set up such line on the highly competitive North Atlantic. Subsequently, he negotiated with HAPAG and NGL. The German lines also refused because the route proposed was unprofitable being 1200 sea miles longer than through Bremen or Hamburg and showing little prospects for cabin passengers and freight transport. The members of the North Atlantic passenger Conference signed a clause not to accept a concession of the Hungarian authorities prior to approval of all the members. When the Cunard Line stepped out of the conference the Hungarian government finally found an interested party who seized the opportunity to increase its share of continental passengers. By the end of 1903, the British line organized some sailings from the port, which became a regular service when the government authorities guaranteed to compensate the line if it was unable to direct 30,000 citizens via Fiume.

The Austria-Americana, managing a freight service from neighboring Trieste to the US seized the opportunity to launch itself on the passenger market. In contrast to the booming passenger trade, freight transport entered an important crisis in 1902. It sought support from the Austrian government and the Cunard Line to diversify its service. The former showed interest in developing its merchant marine, but the latter fearing it may upset their agreement with the Hungarian government declined. The initiators then turned to the German lines, while in the meantime, starting its operations and appointing Oscar Richard as head-agent in New York. The location on the Adriatic allowed them to attract both mediterranean and continental passengers. Attempts to reach rate agreements with the line without accepting it to the pool failed. This created the difficult situation of fighting for a line whose representative in New York had participated in the Mediterranean conference as head-agent of the Prince Line.⁵¹³ Fearing a similar scenario as in Hungary, the German companies chose to support the initiative by supplying an

⁵¹³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters April 15, May 10, 13 and October 4 1904.

important part of the capital. Yet, even by doing this it could not prevent the Austria-Americana from working against their own interests, something Richard gladly contributed to (Murken, 1922, 247-262).

The Austrian-Hungarian migrants who traditionally made the crossing through northern ports now had two alternatives through the Adriatic. The competition from the Cunard Line forced the Continental lines to reduce their rates for the Hungarian and Croatian market on a basis of \$29.5 for express services and \$24.5 for regular transit. But, Wierdsma reported that it affected the whole market since other nationalities anticipated the rate war to spread and therefore waited to buy tickets. Newspaper articles fueled this speculation by reporting that the cuts in Hungary, Croatia and Scandinavia would soon spread to the Mediterranean where the Cunard wanted to gain foothold while the German lines contemplated to reopen a Scandinavian service. The press predicted that rates would soon reach \$10 again.⁵¹⁴ The atmosphere between the lines was still one of contention during the spring of 1904. The British lines of the IMM interest group fought the Cunard for the British-Scandinavian market while the Continental lines managed to prevent the rate cuts from spreading outside the Austrian-Hungarian borders. In the US the Continental lines did not yet prohibit the agents from booking on the Cunard Line, to prevent the conflict from escalating to first- and second-class business. The situation deteriorated as the Cunard cut in the Mediterranean rates while the Continental lines advertised low rates for British passengers to New York via the mainland. More and more cases of confiscated continental tickets by the Hungarian police forcing nationals to travel via Fiume strongly affected the sales in the region.

Just before the summer the much announced general rate war by the American press broke out on the eastbound market yet for the westbound continental market the NDLV lines managed to resist the pressures from low Mediterranean, British and Austrian-Hungarian rates.⁵¹⁵ Even when in September Wierdsma sent alarming reports that the low British cash rates greatly affected the Russian prepaid market, which was invaded by \$10 cash orders from Libau via English ports, the NDLV lines refrained from spreading the reduction to the whole continental market, for the duration of the rate war-

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Letter March 25 1904 *Mail and Express*, "10\$ Ocean rate may soon come".

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Letters April 15, May 20, 27 and June 15 1904

which ended in November 1904. While little could be done to counter the feeder services from Libau, the German lines successfully managed to divert Russian Cunard passengers at border control stations. In the meantime, the diplomatic pressures of the countries having interests in the migrant trade forced the Hungarian authorities to lift the barriers on emigration of nationals through northern ports.

Compared to the rate war midway through the 1890s, where the Continental lines totally depended on the British lines to set the continental rates, they now managed to contain the rate war to certain sub-markets, while keeping the rates of where they had a strong foothold on profitable levels. While the British lines fought each other on the British-Scandinavian market and even transported continentals below cost, the Cunard Line could not drag the Continental lines into a general price war. The NDLV lines continuously adapted the rates in competitive areas to limit the impact of the conflict on their total earnings. The following table shows the number of HAL prepaid bookings at special rates in these areas per month. It does not specify the area for to which the various rates applied during the rate war however the correspondence reveals that the competition centered on the Hungarian and Croatian prepaids and to a lesser extent in Romania, Bulgaria, Crain, Serbia, Istria, Dalmatia and other parts of Austria where special rates were quoted.⁵¹⁶

Table V: Prepaid tickets sold at special rates during rate war 1904

| | 24,5\$ | 19\$ | 12\$ | 21\$ | 26,5\$ | 10\$ |
|------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| April | 257 | | | | | |
| May | 165 | | | | | |
| June | 69 | 84 | | | | |
| July | 3 | 234 | | | | |
| August | 1 | 224 | | | | |
| September | 102 | 332 | 8 | | | |
| October | 196 | 145 | 138 | 33 | 93 | 183 |
| November | | | | 59 | 186 | 498 |

Everywhere else the HAL maintained gross rates of \$31.5 for continentals and \$33.5 for Russians, including board and lodging. The increased control on the continental market allowed the HAL to report satisfying results for prepaid sales which had increased in

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Letters August 29, September 1, 7, 9, 16 and 27 1904.

1904 at an average net price of \$29.71 only a good four dollars less than in 1903. The average eastbound rates dropped from \$30.23 in 1903 to \$21 in 1904 and this illustrates that the eastbound route remained much more sensitive to outside competition.⁵¹⁷

Table VI: HAL Rates changes east and westbound in 1904

| | Eastbound | Westbound |
|--------|------------------|------------------|
| 1 jan | 32 | 34 |
| 21 Jun | 20 | 34 |
| 28 Jun | 17 | 31,5 |
| 16 Sep | 20 | 31,5 |
| 14 Nov | 33 | 33 |

However, the effectiveness by which the NDLV lines contained westbound predatory pricing to certain regions contrasted with its incapacity of blocking the new lines from entry into the continental pool; in 1904 the Austro-American, Cunard and Canadian Pacific Line all managed to acquire a share. The Continental lines wanted to prolong the war yet the British lines competing on all fronts with the Cunard Line recorded much higher losses. Murken estimated that the shipping companies dumped approximately 5 million dollars into the ocean during the rate war. The HAL and NGL paid out a dividend of 2.5 and 2% respectively while the Cunard and IMM passed dividends. The IMM showed a deficit of \$2,039,149 and put pressure on the Continental lines to get to an agreement (Murken, 1922, 278).

Since the 1880s, the conference and subsequent pool agreements had gradually neutralized the competition among the Continental lines, allowing them to monopolize the traffic through their port, to gain control over the migrant-agent network and to secure cooperation from the British lines. In doing so, it successfully drove some companies out of the market, while it prevented new lines from establishing themselves on the continental route. Except for the loyalty contracts with migrant-agents, no specific clauses of the agreements referred to blocking out new entrants, yet the members initially had no intention of enlarging the select group. North Atlantic Passenger conferences were of the ‘closed type’ admitting new members only after mutual consent of the existing members (Deakin and Seward, 1973, 1; Stevens, 1914, 126).

The high cost required to enter the specialized passenger service on the very competitive North Atlantic seemed to have worked as a deterrent for new initiatives. On

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.* Letter February 14 1904.

rare occasions, some entrepreneurs took the risk, such as the North Atlantic Transport Company to Rotterdam, yet they then faced the competition of NDLV members not refraining from using fighting ships (see point 4). By scheduling a fighting ship as close as possible to the new entrant's sailing; the conference cut the rates preventing the rival from making profitable crossings and forcing the entrant out of the market (Sjöström, 2004, 96). Fiona Scott-Morton analyzed the likelihood of using predatory pricing by British cargo shipping, pointing out that a lot depended on the new entrant during this era. Especially the age of the firm, its financial resources, experience and the customer base influenced whether and how the conference would fight the entrant. Government subsidies affected the share of the entrant into a conference but not whether it would fight it or not (Scott-Martin, 1997, 679-683).

In the migrant transport sector these subsidies and government support played a much bigger role, which the events of 1904 clearly illustrate. First, companies enjoying financial support from the government were likely to uphold cut-rate competition longer. When this financial support was given to a powerful hundred million dollar company, such as the Canadian Pacific Railroad Company, it was obvious that the CPR could not be fought off through predatory pricing. Moreover, by extending its activities to ocean carrying trade enabled the railroad company to damage the Continental lines in the American as in the Canadian markets, through comprehensive rate policies. By supporting the takeover of the Beaver Line and some other steamers, the Canadian government reacted to the formation of its neighbor's IMM combine, allowing the CPR to open services to both Antwerp and Liverpool. Ballin entered immediate negotiations and without engaging in a rate war both parties came to an agreement through which the Canadian Giant acquired 5.429% of the NDLV core members' westbound traffic in early 1904 (Boyce, 1995, 117; Murken, 1922, 241-245).

A second factor of much bigger importance was the growing tendency of national governments to use the migrant stream to support its merchant marine making it much harder for the companies to block out new entrants. The Continental lines transported migrants from or to the countries which supported new initiatives under the national flag in 1904. Hence, when obstructing or fighting these new rivals, the government could take measures to exclude the Continental lines from a sub-market, as illustrated by the

Hungarian case. Possibly this also influenced the acceptance of the CPR in the pool, it definitely did this in case of the Austro-Americana. The main reason for the German Lines taking a controlling share of the Austro-Americana which facilitated its subsequent entry to the pool was to dissuade the Austrian authorities from following their neighbor's example. The Austria Americana obtained a quota of 4% of the westbound continentals transported by their company, the NDLV core members and the CGT.

Because of their long standing experience, shipping companies remained better equipped to direct migration, than the national authorities still in the experimental stages of migration control. Through the migrant-agent network the pool lines still managed to attract seventy-five percent of Hungarians illegally to northern ports. The Hungarian policy proved a total failure as it led to the opening of a line under the Austrian flag while its service from Fiume remained British. Moreover, instead of reducing migration the increased competition and rate war accelerated the movement. The diplomatic protests of the various countries with migration ports illustrates that migration was still considered a trade issue. The NDLV Lines regained permission to work on Hungarian territory yet it could not prevent the Cunard Line from increasing its footing in the continental market. By the end of the year, the lines reached a provisional agreement in Berlin whereby the NDLV recognized the contract between Cunard Line and Hungarian government granting it 32,500 continental passengers for its Fiume service for a five year period. This amounted to a share of 6 to 8 % of the continental traffic during the agreement (Murken, 1922, 261, 275). By the end of 1904, the NDLV pool had to tolerate three new competitors on the continental market, strongly affecting its supposed superiority status and deterring entrants. New challengers for the Russian market soon followed.

4) The attacks of the Russian Volunteer Fleet and the Uranium Line on the 'holy pool territory'

4.1) The Russian Volunteer Fleet and the first test cases against shipping cartels

Due to discord among the lines about the British share of the continental traffic, the Berlin agreement failed to be ratified. Cunard had drastically increased its market share of continentals from 0.38% (1902), to 1.4 % (1903) and 7.48% (1904), excluding the Fiume passengers. Re-signing an agreement where it needed to divide a 6% share

with the other British lines was not negotiable. The Cunard Line accepted entering the continental conference regulating the agents and fixing prices, but it did not enter a pooling agreement. The enormous surge of Russian migration following the Russian-Japanese War in 1905 made the British lines even more reluctant to join an agreement limiting its share of the continentals. In 1905 the Cunard Line booked 2.34% of the continental traffic via Liverpool and another 39,626 steerage passengers through Fiume. The other British Lines increased their share from 4.91% in 1904 to 7.99% the following year. The Continental lines looked for means to limit the penetration yet a new rate war failed to occur. With the big immigrant influx superseding the million mark in the US, market forces neutralized conference strategies. The prices remained high despite the lack of agreement (Muken, 1922, 283-296).

The negotiations dragged on in 1906 and were further complicated by the establishment of the Russian Volunteer Fleet (RVF). The RVF represented the downside of the Russian-Japanese War for the Continental lines. The heavily subsidized, company operated by military officials, had transported troops to the Far East before redirecting its fast steamers to New York from Libau, via Rotterdam. At Libau, the company found a well-established network of migrant brokers and agents which had been supplying various shipping companies through feeder services over the years. The RVF gave them the long awaited opportunity to increase the business through the port; obstructing Ballin's attempts to include the company prior to opening its service in the NDLV pool. Little collaboration could be expected from their head-agent in New York, the inevitable Oscar Richard. He announced the service as the fastest and cheapest from Russia, offering the major advantage of being direct, avoiding the often humiliating experience at the boarder control stations.⁵¹⁸

According to Richard, passengers traveling with RVF no longer needed to go through the time consuming process of applying for passports to their district governors, but obtained one through the Russian Minister of Interior at Libau. The rates to and from the Russian port amounted to \$87 first class, \$47 third cabin and \$37 for a steerage berth whereas rates to and from Rotterdam were set at \$70, \$37 and \$30 respectively.

⁵¹⁸ For unpleasant accounts on the experience of Jewish passengers at these control stations see (Brinkman, 2004 and Just, 1986; DC reports, vol. 4, 1911)

Moreover Richard also underlined that inland fares to and from any Russian destinations were much cheaper from Libau than any other European port. He invited more than two hundred guests for a dinner aboard the *Smolensk* to promote the line among shippers and migrant agents. Wierdsma urged the lowering of their rates showing differentials of \$10 to \$12 to avoid a large number of cancellations. The WSL and Cunard Line both lowered their rates to the continent to the same levels that of the RVF.⁵¹⁹

Instead of appointing fighting ships, the NDLV established a fighting line. The HAPAG transferred two of its steamers to the Russian East Asiatic Company, in which it had acquired a controlling interest, on the route at the same rates as the RVF. Boas took charge of the fighting line in New York, preparing for a new battle with his former associate.⁵²⁰ The NDLV members shared the costs and the probable losses since the route offered little prospects for freight and even less for cabin class passengers. To fill this gap the RVF called at Rotterdam. The pool members also started a feeder service from the Russian port to the continental migrant gateways and gave special rates and extra commission to obtain the business of one of the principal Libau migrant broker Freyberg. These were two measures to counter the British lines that attracted passengers from Libau. But, because it reinforced the flow through the route, that the pool lines eventually wanted to abolish, the measures were quickly dropped. Instead, the lines fully opted for special rates from the boarder control stations (Murken, 1922, 297-301).

The growing fusion between company and pool interests is reflected by the HAL's permission given to the Russian East Asiatic to also call at Rotterdam. The HAL directors seemed to be well aware of the dangers of allowing a company into their homeport, even from a 'friendly line'. While, at the opening of the RVF the Dutch line had accumulated a big plus in the westbound pool. Reducing their rates would have forced the other pool members to quote even lower. Hence, in the interest of the pool the HAL maintained its rates; let the NGL and HAPAG lower theirs to make up for their minus and in the meantime allowed the Russian East Asiatic Line to call at Rotterdam until HAL's pool status permitted the quotation of competitive rates again. The directors doubted however that Russian companies, even with image building efforts such as

⁵¹⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters June 22, 30; July 10 and 11 1906 and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters July 27 and 30 1906.

⁵²⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter June 30 1906.

advertising kosher food, could become popular among Russian passengers.⁵²¹ Regarding freight to and from Rotterdam the company did not foresee any difficulties in driving out the RVF by retaining the fidelity of the shippers who would not miss the opportunity to call for lower rates. The Dutch line expressed its satisfaction on the expediency by which the measures had been decided upon. Previous experience had shown the importance of prompt action, preventing the line from getting a foothold in the market which always proved of crucial importance in future negotiations, to either convince the line to look for other horizons or to limit the entrants' share.⁵²²

Richard had every intention of proving the HAL directors wrong. He launched a vast propaganda campaign in the Jewish dailies such as the *Jewish truth*, *Jewish Abend Post* and *Jewish Daily News* in which he called into question the continental services. The NDLV members immediately countered this action by adding these to the list of newspapers in which they advertised. The companies doubted whether to strictly implement the conference rule prohibiting agents to book for non-conference lines. The fear of risking a law suit for violating the Sherman-anti trust act remained. Even during the rate war with the Cunard Line the lines refrained from imposing the rule for the same reasons. This was the case despite the reassurance of the shipping conference lawyers that when companies ordered the implementation of the clause separately, instead of using a joint circular, they left the Cunard Line without any legal base to defend their case. Fearing that the company might use the measure to gain sympathy from public opinion and obtain new favors from the British government, the lines did not withdraw the right from their agents to book for Cunard.

Controls of the books of various controls of east-side agents showed that they remained loyal but Wierdsma would did not believe it would stay that way. Reports from HAL travelers showed that the RVF massively distributed posters and ticket books to conference agents and that not everyone had resisted the temptation of booking for the line. The HAL travelers ordered the agents such as Mr. Cooper of Denver, to return the ticket books to the sender. Mr. Cooper did not object but inquired as to why someone like

⁵²¹ The Line was not the first to do so. HAPAG and at least one other English Line also served kosher food at the time. By 1912 RSL and NGL followed, yet despite being very popular among the Russian Jews the Dutch Line never did. GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, Letter April 22 1912.

⁵²² GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter July 12 and 17 1906.

Richard who represented the Prince Line in the Mediterranean conference also obtained permission to represent the RVF.⁵²³ Cooper exposed one of the weaknesses of the conference, its incapacity of driving well established migrant brokers such as Richard out of business. The lines had allowed the Prince Line into the conference because of Richard's threat of suing the companies for violating the anti-trust acts.

The conference members hoped to neutralize his disturbing impact on the Mediterranean market's stability by including him, despite his often 'unreasonable' demands which obstructed adaptations or renewals of Mediterranean agreements. In the meantime he systematically accepted the head-agency of every new line which tried to penetrate the North Atlantic passenger market; sometimes with success, such as the Lloyd Italiano and Austro-Americana sometimes not, as with the Atlantic or Scandinavian-American Line.⁵²⁴ The situation also limited Richard's actions who denounced the boycotting of non-conference lines through the agent-network in the press, yet as a member of the Mediterranean Conference refrained from engaging in a lawsuit where he may have to appear both as plaintiff and accused. Wierdsma reported that Lloyd Italiano and Prince Line tried to make the Mediterranean Conference fall apart, suspecting Richard to prepare judicial procedures against the conference system.⁵²⁵ Therefore the board of directors formulated the following policy in regards to strictly applying conference rules to agents on both sides of the continent:

Similar matters, if brought before a court, may lead to further investigation of the present methods employed by the steamship companies, which in many respects would cause unsatisfactory results. The course followed by the steamship companies to maintain control of the agents under their supervision is in many ways very arbitrary, and although for the Steamship Companies perfectly justifiable may be condemned if brought before an investigation. Proceed slowly!"⁵²⁶

⁵²³ *Ibid.*, Letters June 17; October 21 1904; June 15; August 17; September 28; October 18, 20, 25, 26 and 27 1906.

⁵²⁴ The Scandinavian American Line was established in 1904 and harmed the continental lines because the company also tapped Russian passengers through Libau. Members of the Mediterranean conference accepted the Lloyd Italiano without a fight because the Genoese entrepreneur and driving force of the former Florio Rubathino, Mr. Paiggio were behind the scheme.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, Letters September 16 1896; April 12 1904; April 4; June 2, 9 1905; September 13 and October 1906.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, Letter September 7 1906.

By the end of the year, the New York head agents started to send alarming messages that the RVF had corrupted the market and had gained ground. By hiring an ‘army’ of two hundred peddlers, which he placed under bond and allowed them to sell tickets on installments plan giving three months credit, Richard threatened to ruin the efforts of the conference lines to discipline the agents. Especially because the Russian East-Asiatic Company was forced to discontinue its service, the conference lines no longer gave an alternative to its agents to remain competitive with non-conference RVF agents offering lower rates and offering better facilities. The fighting steamers appointed by the NDLV Lines did not stop the RVF’s rising popularity. In the meantime, the British lines continued to stimulate the development of Libau as a migrant gateway to the detriment of the Continental lines.⁵²⁷

The NDLV attempted to reopen negotiations with the Russian company, yet it did not yield. In the meantime, the trust-busting climate in the US had reached the shipping industry. In the case of H. Thomson et al, versus Union Castle Steam Company et al., the court pronounced for the first time as to whether conference agreements violated the Sherman act.⁵²⁸ Judge C. Hough did not see any infraction of the federal law by the conference. The only aspect that raised some doubts was the use of “fighting steamers” yet Howe saw it that these steamers instead of: “*restraining trade commerce and stifling up competition, in and of themselves constituted a violent competition*”.⁵²⁹ A second case soon followed. This time the Cosmopolitan Lines denounced the HAPAG before the Interstate Commerce Commission for pooling and maintaining monopolies in restraint of trade. The former general agents of the American Line, maintaining a freight line between Philadelphia and Rotterdam, questioned the legality of the Baltic pool. The cases inspired Richard to hire the prominent law firm Kurzman & Frankenheimer to start action against the conference for their Clause 9 stipulating that: “*agents are prohibited from booking passengers for any steamer, except those of the lines, members of the Continental, Mediterranean or North-Atlantic passenger Conference.*” Harrington

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, Letter September 18; December 21 and 31 1906.

⁵²⁸ Union castle steamer ran a service between South Africa and New York on which it organized the trade through conference agreements.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, Letter January 16 1907 Copy of Court decision H. Thomson G. Feddersin VS Union Castle St Co, C Cayser et al.

Putnam, Judge Choate and ex-Senator John Spooner (R-Wi) took charge of the defending the last two cases, thoroughly convinced of the legality of the Clause 9.⁵³⁰

In the meantime, the Russian East-Asiatic steamers fell under control of the RFLV owners who reopened the service by appointing E Johnson & Company as New York head-agents. The appointment of the well established migrant broker specialized in the British-Scandinavian market suddenly threatened the English Libau interests. The continental and British lines disqualified him, yet the Cunard Line did not follow suit fearing that the North Western Scandinavian business under Johnson's control would go to the Canadian Pacific Line. An investigation on the New York eastside agents in September 1907 revealed that solicitations for prepaids via Libau had superseded other European ports. This had happened because of the protection given by the Russian government to the national lines; the low rates giving them differentials of \$7 to Rotterdam, \$6 to Antwerp and \$5 to German ports, paying commission of \$3 to \$4, the good service, and the immunity given by the Cunard Line to some agents to book for the RFLV. To maintain the loyalty of the agents the HAL new head-agent

Adrian Gips suggested forcing the Russian lines into the pool, to allow some agents to book for these lines under certain conditions, or to introduce very competitive rates for passengers going via Libau. The NGL saw it that the excessive demands of the Russian lines cancelled out the first option. The German line pushed for the cheapest second solution having less direct interest in the business never having catered much for the Russian business. Yet HAL and HAPAG believed that it exposed the weakness of the lines towards the agents and leaving them at their mercy. The Dutch Line instead favored the costly option of lowering the rates from Libau and border control stations and appointing a fighting line -either from Antwerp or Rotterdam- which would systematically undercut the RFLV's rates, with costs to be divided among pool members. Even without the collaboration of all the pool partners, Gips suggested immediate action as HAL's percentage of the Russian business was so large that the company at the very least could afford to loose their hold on the business.⁵³¹


⁵³⁰*Ibid.*, Letters April 27; June 4; October 18 and December 3 1907, Complaint before Interstate Commerce Commission, *Cosmopolitan Line vs. HAPAG*.

⁵³¹*Ibid.*, Letters February 17; May 10, 14; June 6, 21; September 20; October 28 and November 1 1907.

4.2) Price fluctuations 1903-1908 and the foundation of the Atlantic Conference

Despite the accumulating external pressures due to the lack of a new agreement with the British Lines and the foundation of various new lines the HAL managed to maintain high rates. Comparing HAL average rates for the westbound traffic from Rotterdam to those of the Cunard Line to Liverpool indicates the success of the price policies of the continental pool.

Graph 4: HAL and Cunard trimestrial average rates in dollars for the total steerage Westbound Traffic 1903-08⁵³²



But, how long this success could last became questionable as the growing external pressures also accompanied with increased internal tensions between the NDLV pool members. The profit-sharing agreement between IMM and the German lines quickly put some strain on the collaboration, as the former failed to be profitable, forcing the latter to pay important annual compensations. The relations deteriorated when Griscom was forced to take a step down and Bruce Ismay of the WSL replaced him as president of the IMM. As manager of both the RSL and American Line, Griscom had often acted as


⁵³² Drew Keeling calculated these rates based on passenger revenues and equivalent adult passengers of both companies (Keeling, 2007, 164-165). Head taxes may have influenced the discrepancy by two dollars before 1907 yet afterwards all lines agreed to collect it separately when the US authorities raised it from 2 to 4 dollars. The price charged of four to six dollars from Liverpool to the continent further explains the big gap between the averages of both companies although the real cost to the continental lines to cover the extra distance must have been much less. Yet of importance here is HAL's superiority over Cunard in containing price fluctuations and increasing rates.

mediator between British and Continental lines, knowing how to balance the interests of both markets. However, Ismay clearly let the interest of WSL the only profit-making unit of the IMM, prevail over these of the other partners and this was to the detriment of the Continental lines. The capital increase of the HAL also illustrated the differences between the IMM and the German lines; the latter objecting to it, the former not. The rivalry among the German Lines added to the tensions between the pool members. Conflicts for the South-American trade, and the cruise business, threatened to spread towards the North Atlantic (Flayhart, 2000, 350-352; Murken, 1911, 308-316; Nathan, 1935, 16-28).

The continuous high demand for steerage berths neutralized the unresolved differences between the lines, preventing these from greatly affecting the ocean fares. Yet when the market forces sustaining the ocean fares collapsed during the panic of 1907 the tensions between the lines quickly surfaced pressuring down the rates (see graph 4). The depressed market conditions stimulated shipping companies to force a compromise with aggressive strategies before establishing a new equilibrium. Disagreements on the differential between WSL and the new Cunard steamers *Lusitania* and *Mauretania* sank the British-Scandinavian market into a rate war. By the end of the month, the rates had practically halved reaching \$17. To force the IMM to yield to the Cunard Line, it also cut the freight rates in half, harming many lines of the IMM-combine that had much larger interests in the freight carrying. The conflict affected the continental business, especially with Cunard Line advertising that continental ports could be reached for an additional \$3.5. The British company also used the rates for the Mediterranean destabilizing of the market. Shortly after, the rate war spread to that region where eastbound passages were practically sold at cost, reaching gross rates of \$12. The events forced the Continental lines to lower their rates, but in the meantime they had started taking measures to release the pressures on the NDLV-pool and contain the conflict.⁵³³

Graph 5: HAL Prepaid and Return rates 1902-1908

⁵³³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters January 10, 17, 31; April 3, 10, 15 1908; GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters January 15 and 20 1908 and CLA, Chairmen Correspondence, C 1, 63, letter July 7 1910.



Midway through 1907 the IMM and NDLV-lines concluded a pre-agreement for a pool including the British Scandinavian and Continental steerage business, both west (NDLV 68,35% / IMM 31,65%) and eastbound (NDLV 57%/ IMM 43%). The Allan and Anchor Line joined the agreement, which only left the Cunard Line to be convinced. Yet the HAPAG made the agreement pending the resolution of the conflict it had with the NGL. This materialized six months later when the NGL conceded 0.5%WB and 1%EB of its quota to the HAPAG in exchange for concessions on the freight market and both committed not to stick to the NDLV agreement- at least until 1912. A weeklong meeting between the managing directors of the lines in London produced a new equilibrium between the British and Continental lines in February 1908. The Atlantic Conference pooled the British-Scandinavian and continental steerage traffic as follows:

| | WB | EB |
|----------|-------|-------|
| HAPAG | 19,61 | 12,35 |
| NGL | 26,53 | 18,79 |
| HAL | 6,63 | 6,1 |
| RSL | 9,71 | 8,56 |
| Anchor | 3,4 | 3,93 |
| Cunard | 13,75 | 15,12 |
| American | 6,68 | 8,72 |
| WSL | 8,6 | 15,49 |
| Dominion | 4,47 | 1,5 |

| | | |
|-------|------|------|
| Allan | 0,62 | 4,95 |
| CPR | | 4,49 |

With the new agreement the British lines acquired 11.9% of the westbound continental traffic excluding the Cunard service to Fiume that increased its share from 32,500 to 50,000 passengers; another 6.7 % of the traffic (Murken, 1922, 313-343).⁵³⁴ When adding the continentals that the CPR (3.9%), Austria-Americana (2.1%) and the Russian lines (4.3%) acquired, the Continental lines saw their market share greatly reduced over the last five years. Yet, during that same period, despite conceding these approximate shares to British lines and new entrants the RSL, NGL, HAPAG and HAL doubled the number of continental steerage travelers who landed in New York. Hence, if the traffic retained its levels the prospects of the NDLV-lines remained very positive. Maybe the NDLV paid a high price, but with the continental market expanding while the British-Scandinavian market had already attained its climax this concession seemed inevitable to prevent a costly global rate war, whose outcome was unpredictable and likely to have forced the Continental lines to concede a share anyway. By that time, the statistics of steerage passengers landing in New York showed their irrefutable dominance over the steerage market:

Table VII: Steerage passengers landed in New York by the various group of lines⁵³⁵

| Year | Continental lines | British-Scandinavian lines | Mediterranean lines | Total |
|------|-------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|---------|
| 1906 | 410995 | 179278 | 371883 | 964062 |
| 1907 | 485230 | 183523 | 395485 | 1066145 |
| 1908 | 145330 | 82883 | 90579 | 318792 |
| 1909 | 329388 | 131483 | 329083 | 791863 |

The relative ease with which government supported lines had managed to penetrate the booming market indicate that rates wars were avoided when the market was booming.. With the Atlantic Conference, the Continental lines not only ensured steerage bookings at profitable rates, while the same was achieved for first and second cabin passengers

⁵³⁴ The pool lines engaged long negotiations with the Hungarian government to establish the Hungarian American Line under the national flag and kick out the Cunard from Fiume. They also offered to compensate the Hungarian authorities through a head tax for each Hungarian passenger traveling through northern ports, which was similar to measure existing in Italy. Both financially and politically the offer contained numerous advantages for the both parties yet Cunard's demands to buy out the contract proved insurmountable (Murken, 298-299).

⁵³⁵ CLA, Chairmen Correspondence, C 1, 214, Letter October 11 1916.

through rate agreements. If the NDLV-lines managed to contain the competition of the Libau lines the whole continental market would at last be in equilibrium again.

4.3) The continued fight for the Russian market and the Mediterranean Pool

Immediately after the foundation of the Atlantic Conference the NDLV lines took measures to force the Russian competition in the agreement or out of business. The establishment of another line on the Hamburg-Rotterdam-New York route underlined the urgency for action. The New York-Continental Line announced rates of \$23 to and from Rotterdam through their New York head-agent, Oscar Richard in March 1908. At that time the other Russian lines quoted \$24. The lines organized fighting steamers eastbound at the same rates or lower. These were appointed by a vote of majority by the North Atlantic and Continental Conference in New York according to the quotas in the pool and the sailing dates of the non-conference lines. The committee also appointed another steamer which in case of excess would transport the overbookings. The members shared the expenses. The lines postponed the announcement of the fighting steamer as long as possible as the bulk of eastbound steerage bookings occurred within 10 days prior to the sailing, hence when publishing the fares too early the steamer could be overbooked at a time when its effect was most needed. The lines usually announced the fighting steamers a week to three days prior to the sailing. The companies strictly implemented the rule prohibiting agents to book for non-conference lines.

The outside lines continuously sent ticket books and propaganda material to tempt conference agents to work for them. They also paid more commission than the conference lines, \$3 instead of \$2. The Russian East Asiatic Line even copied the advertisements and rate sheets of the HAL. With the westbound traffic reaching a near standstill, because of the panic and the competitive eastbound rates, the profits of the Russian lines which greatly depended on steerage business vanished into thin air. The pressures weighed on the outside lines forcing the RVF to suspend its sailings from April onwards and the REA to start negotiations with the NDLV pool.⁵³⁶

⁵³⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters February 9; March 8, 26, 27; April 8, 14; May, 28; June 5, 8; July 17; August 18, 21, 28 and September 4 1908.

The line finally agreed to join the Atlantic Conference acquiring of the 2.5% westbound and 3% eastbound of the joint traffic. It committed, just as the Continental lines did not to transport Finns or Scandinavians. The company changed its name to Russian American Line and further agreed not call at any Scandinavian, British or Continental port, except for Rotterdam on the eastbound leg of the trip. With the support of the Russian authorities preparing a law exempting RAM passengers of passport charges and containing special railroad fares the line pressured the pool to double its share. The NDLV eventually gave in to avoid similar scenarios as to Italy and Hungary (Gottheil, 1914, 60-61; Huebner, 1914, 78; Murken, 1922, 351-353).

The lines than concentrated their energy on a new agreement for the Mediterranean market. The Italian policies to stimulate the national marine through the migrant traffic proved successful, but it undermined the conference agreements. The Italian authorities fixed westbound rates in consultation with shipping companies, while a Mediterranean conference in New York set the eastbound fares. The only Italian shipping company on the North Atlantic in 1900 was joined by six new ones by 1905. During the following three years these shipping lines built 35 new vessels mainly on Italian shipyards representing a brute tonnage capacity increase of 242,000 tons. Confident that the ascendancy could be pressed further, the Italian lines gave notice of the Mediterranean conference plunging the market into a rate war. The interference of the Italian government prevented the negotiations for a pool agreement dating back to 1901 to bare fruit. However, with the rate wars and the crisis of 1908 the companies started having cash flow problems forcing companies to come to an agreement. With the threat that the Italian authorities might block the entry of foreign companies the Italian lines acquired half of the direct Italian steerage traffic (49.13 WB and 49.49 EB). The foreign direct lines settled for the rest while parallel agreements were concluded to divide the indirect traffic Italian and Oriental traffic. The direct lines, conceded to not transporting any continental passengers, while all lines agreed not to abuse the rates for other markets. Inspired by the Italian success, Greek authorities helped national lines to acquire a slice of the cake soon after (Murken, 1922, 360-412) Peace on the Mediterranean was bought dearly but the long awaited two year agreement enabled the foreign lines to book passengers at profitable rates and to prevent the market from affecting other interests.

In the meantime, the New York Continental Line needed to lay up its ships because of financial difficulties. The company failed to obtain the concession to land or embark passengers at German ports neither to do any passage business of any type. In contrast to other European countries, Dutch authorities had not adapted their migrant transport legislation to favor national lines against foreign competitors. The laws of 1861 did not impose any barriers to the New York Continental Line calling at Rotterdam. Yet without German concessions, the company needed to forward Eastern European westbound passengers to the Dutch port via Austria and Switzerland. Despite the low rates and high commission the line only managed to book 278 westbound passengers for its six sailings in 1908, eastbound, it contracted 2,789 passengers. The German speculators tried to force Ballin to buy out the line persevered in 1909 under the North-West Transport Line.

It now fully targeted the Russian market managing to attract 9,505 westbound and 3,341 eastbound passengers. A small special committee with representatives of the NDLV lines decided for each sailing as to whether it was opportune to appoint a fighting steamer or not. The committee systematically appointed a fighting steamer from June onwards, as the traffic picked up again, rates but so did the extra commissions given by the rival line. The outside line often postponed the sailing date once the conference lines named the fighting steamer, forcing them to reappoint a second fighting steamer. It cost the conference members a great deal of money but it seemed well spent as the North-West Transport Line failed to make profits.⁵³⁷

Nevertheless, the market share acquired by the outside line spiked the interest of a purchaser. The Canadian Northern Railway copied its, rival, CPR and extended its services to seaborne commerce. Under the name of Uranium Line, the steamers also called at Halifax, becoming an even bigger threat as the losses on the ocean passage now could be compensated by profits on railroad tickets. The measures to drive out the company of the North Atlantic remained the same. The conference lines appointed some of the most successful Uranium Line agents, yet new ones immediately filled the gap—showing according to New York head-agents that bookings depended much more on the

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, Letters March 19; April 16, 27; May 16, 20; June 4, 11, 17, 25; July 9; August 3, 17, 20; September 29; October 8, 22; November 5, 12, 17; December 10, 21 and 28 1909.

rates of a line rather than the agents it hired. Enlarging the agent-corps did not increase the bookings, but only divided the business which encouraged abuse and hampered control. Despite these efforts the Uranium Line successfully managed to sustain its position slowly corrupting the agent network in the US and testing the solidarity between the lines.⁵³⁸ Midway through 1911 the British lines gave notice of the 'fighting steamers agreement' because the costly measures produced little result, prevented the British lines from getting their proper share of the eastbound continental traffic and exposed the companies to possible sanctions of the American authorities. The Uranium Line increased its eastbound carryings to 10,016 in 1910 and 13,286 in 1911 despite the fighting steamers.⁵³⁹ Ten months later the HAPAG also withdrew its support to fight the Uranium Line.

Gips deplored the decision underlining the principal reason for appointing fighting steamers, namely to protect their migrant agents. Giving up fighting steamers would make it very difficult for conference agents to remain competitive with Uranium Line agents quoting low rates. It would quickly undermine the conference agreements regulating the agent's activities and demoralize the discipline in place. Therefore, the New York head-agent urged to stick to the practice independently as much as possible. The Atlantic conference lines finally reached a compromise limiting the fighting rates to Eastern states. Van Doorn, the new New York head-agent, reported that Chicago agents not only had to compete with low rates of the Uranium Line but also with eastern conference agents who obtained a differential of \$10 to \$12 for conference vessels appointed as fighting steamer. The conference failed to drive out the outside line. For the first time the HAL had to tolerate a competitive line in its homeport which according to the company damaged the reputation of the migrant route through Rotterdam. This failure reflects the weakness of a disintegrating conference system whose existence was also threatened by an ongoing government investigation.⁵⁴⁰

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.* Letters January 11, 18, 25; February 1, 11, 15; March 11; April 6, 8, 19; June 10, 24; July 15, August 4; September 23; October 21; November 5 and 18 1910.

⁵³⁹ Uranium Line steerage passengers: 1910 WB 19642, EB 10016; 1911 WB 5846, EB 13286; 1912 WB 13938, EB 10836; 1913 10046, EB 4316; 1914 WB 1171, EB 2404. *Ibid.* Letter June 30; GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 578 Passengers Statistics GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters June 23 1911; February 24 1914 and CLA, Chairmen Correspondence, C 1, 63, Letter May 13 1911.

⁵⁴⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 49-58, Letters April 19; September 25 1912.

5) The Anti-trust storm reaches the shipping cartels

5.1) Impacts of the uncertain legal situation of shipping conferences in the US

The Uranium Line initiated a new lawsuit against the conference beginning of 1911 at the US Circuit Court in New York. Following the complaint by Peter Wright the Interstate Commerce Commission had declared itself incompetent for seaborne trade while Richard's complaint seems to have been settled outside court walls. The panic of 1907 had taken the wind out of the sails of the American Anti-trust movement, only to come back with force once the Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco Company, creating a lot of insecurity in the American business community (Seager, 1911, 611-614). Towards the end of his term President Taft and his Attorney general George Wickersham tightened the anti-trust policies, announcing in September 1911 that hundreds of corporations would be prosecuted and that some corporate officials would serve time (Bittlingmayer, 1996, 386-388; Weinstein, 1968, 78-85).

This time the 'shipping trust' did not escape federal investigation as the Congress passed the Humphrey resolution granting an appropriation of \$25,000 to Joshua Alexander, chairman of the house merchant marine Committee for the formation of a special committee. The 'Alexander Committee' needed to examine whether; pooling, rebating and special agreements regarding overseas and coastal shipping, the relationship between steamship and railroad companies, especially the way in which railroad ownerships affected the competition between water and rail routes were not in violation with international agreements and US laws.⁵⁴¹ The failure of the IMM had generated patriotic frustrations reviving attacks on the foreign shipping companies for obstructing the development of the national merchant marine.

Representative E. Humphrey's voiced these in the House attacking Albert Ballin in particular for dictating how and on what terms the nation transported its commerce. Already in 1910, these nearly led to an overall investigation of steamship conference

⁵⁴¹ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters December 18 1911; January 18; March 4, 5; April 6, 12 and June 18 1912.

activities. After a letter book of Gips had fallen into the wrong hands, some fragments of the correspondence were leaked to the press with details on the use of fighting steamers and on freight rebates received from railroads, a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Shortly later the House appointed a committee to investigate the aggressive lobbying activities used on the ship-subsidy question and considered to take the whole conference system into consideration. The lines prepared a protest through the European ambassadors in Washington claiming that American authorities had no jurisdiction on agreements concluded outside its territory and which were in accordance to the German, British and French Laws. Testing conference agreements for violating the Sherman Anti Trust Acts would represent an unreasonable interference with international commercial relations.⁵⁴² The Dutch ambassador in Washington intervened convincing the State Attorney General to put a halt to the prosecution instituted against Gips preventing the HAL agent from a likely severe sentence for acting against the Sherman Act.

Congress temporarily refrained from investigating shipping cartels, yet the actions of the American government started to divide the conference lines on a number of joint activities such as the previously discussed fighting steamers and lobbying strategies. The following advice of Lucius Beers, lawyer of the steamship lines on lobbying campaigns reflect the contemporary climate:

“Part of the educational fund has been used for the personal compensation of an individual who is connected with a political organization which for party purposes, interests itself in certain public questions such as immigration. He has devoted some attention to educate the public on the subject, but an important part of his service to the Lines seems to have been to apply directly to influential officials in Congress and in the administration for the purpose of preventing the passage of certain immigration bills. In the present state of public opinion on immigration and influence of corporations upon legislation, I think the risks involved in continuing his employment outweighs the benefits. Not that this is illegal yet the consequences of the public opinion against foreign lines if this comes to light would be enormous. It would influence the attitude of Congress and probably also of Courts against foreign lines.”⁵⁴³

⁵⁴² In his attack against the ‘greatest and most powerful trust of today’ Humphrey did not forget to underline: *this is the Herr Ballin whose company voluntarily withdrew two of its fastest and best steamers and sold them to Spain, to sink, destroy and burn American Commerce*. Cunard Line Archives, Chairman Correspondence, C 1, 11 and 63, Letters September 13 1909; March 11; 15 June 17 1910 and NYT “Humphrey attacks steamship lines” June 17 1910.

⁵⁴³ CLA, Chairman Correspondence, C1, 63 Letter October 10 1910.

The Cunard Line followed the advice, the German lines did not. The latter repeatedly asked the former to reconsider and renew for instance its financial support to the National Liberal Immigration League. Cunard refused and felt relieved to have given up its support to the educational fund and fighting steamers when Wickersham pronounced his clear intentions of investigating shipping lines and even more so when the Alexander Committee was formed.⁵⁴⁴ These activities of the shipping cartel were the most compromising features of the conference agreements. Immediately after the formation HAPAG gave notice of the 'fighting steamer agreement'.

The fear that corporate officials risked actual prison sentence seemed very real among the New York head-agents. They all received a subpoena of the D.A. creating a lot of mistrust about what information each agent passed through to the authorities and if one would compromise the others to save their skin. The concurrent sinking of the *Titanic* increased the tensions and dramatically reinforced the feeling against the foreign lines.⁵⁴⁵ The shipwreck shattered the belief that the floating gigantic palaces were unsinkable and dented the blind optimism in technological progress.⁵⁴⁶ It also symbolized and accentuated the crisis that the shipping conference system was going through. Because of the increased number of interested parties and the numerous parallel agreements regulating the North Atlantic Passenger traffic the managing directors of the lines spent most of their time between 1910 and 1914 renegotiating agreements that could impossibly fully satisfy all members. Despite the crisis the lines jointly agreed to fight for their right to conclude rate and pool agreements.

Under impulse of the German lines, shipping companies launched a \$70,000 year long propaganda campaign. They hired literary talent producing newspaper articles to educate the public on the need for conference agreement and create a public sentiment in favor of these. If successful the lines felt confident Congress would not be able to pass

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Letter October 28 November 18 1911.

⁵⁴⁵ HAL director Johan Reuchlin did not survive the tragedy while owner Bruce Ismay managed to reach the American shore alive where he was heavily criticized in the press. The HAL reproached the IMM president for not making sure that Reuchlin came out of it a live, especially considering the very long and solid working relations between both companies. In the US a special Congress commission investigated the matter for possible neglect. The IMM president resigned some months later.

⁵⁴⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters April 19 and 22 1902.

legislation in opposite way.⁵⁴⁷ The use of fighting steamers against the Uranium Line resumed while the lobby campaigns against unfavorable immigration laws continued. Yet, the pending investigation put a lot of strain on some New York head-agents driving Gustav Schwab (NGL) to commit suicide and Emil Boas (HAPAG) to have a nervous breakdown with fatal consequences.⁵⁴⁸ The conclusions of the Alexander Committee proved however that such panic was unwarranted for.

5.2) The defense of shipping cartels and conclusions of the Alexander Committee

For the first six months Alexander gathered information through District Attorney's assistant, Wise, who traveled to Europe meeting with shipping directors, by summoning representatives of shipping companies and through correspondence with interested parties, such as shippers, manufacturing firms, producers, railroads etc. This was followed by public hearings, during the first two months of 1913. A typical feature of the congressional investigations held during the Progressive Era was the assistance of expert academics which Alexander found in the person of S. Huebner, Professor of Insurance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania. Both men led the investigation. In the meantime, the shipping companies decided on a joint line of action.

A judgment of the circuit court against the lines would be automatically appealed to the Supreme Court to buy time. The directors contemplated bringing the suit to an early conclusion by accepting judgment on the fighting ship question. The man on the street could accept the decision of lines not to compete, but all condemned conspiracies of big corporations to put smaller lines out of business. For its part, the government which was often taunted by its enemies for the futility of the loudly trumpeted anti-trust suits, was likely to welcome the idea of making a little political capital of a quick settlement which they could claim as a victory. In short, giving up fighting steamers, whose advantages were questionable, could save a lot of expense and anxiety.

⁵⁴⁷ The cost were divided as follows: Trans-Atlantic Lines 60%, Long voyage lines 25% and Caribbean and West-Indian group 15% of the expenses which shouldn't exceed 6000 dollars a month. *Ibid.* Letter April 26 1913 and CLA, Chairmen correspondence, C1, 63, Letters April 25 and July 7, 15 1913.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.* C1, 7 and 63, Letters May 10 1912 and December 30 1913.

However, in the end the lines decided to defend to whole case on its merit, including the fighting ship question since it had been an inherent part of the policy of the conference lines from the very start.⁵⁴⁹ The secrecy of conference agreements had created a lot of suspicion around shipping cartels. Shipping companies decided that the time had come to defend the legitimacy of the system and laid their cards on the table, providing all the information the commission requested. For instance, on Huebner's request, the conference secretary Johann Peters provided a copy of all the agreements under his supervision. Practically during the public hearings, the steamship companies realized the benefits of this strategy.⁵⁵⁰ The shipping lobbyist at Washington, Claude Bennett reported that the testimonies of steamship men at the hearings did a lot in clarifying up misinformation gathered by the committee, stating that the Alexander Committee made slow progress but that its intentions in the main were good. The hearings greatly improved the relations between the steamship men and the committee members. As a result, the steamship lines formed a special committee, headed by Paul Gottheil, providing the legislators with all sorts of documents and advice for their final report, which would contain recommendations for future legislation. Aware of the sensibility of the public opinion regarding the close relations between corporations and legislators this took place in a very discreet manner.⁵⁵¹

In addition, the "Special Committee of Steamship Lines engaged in Foreign Trade" launched the afore-mentioned 'open, direct and strictly honest' propaganda campaign to educate the public and to refute the common prejudices that politicians and newspaper editors had spread on shipping cartels.⁵⁵² With press reports on the public

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid. C1, 7 and 63, Letters May 10; July 13; August 21; September 5 1912.

⁵⁵⁰ The Americans W. Sickel and P. Franklin respective vice-presidents of the HAPAG and IMM illuminate the North Atlantic conference agreements during these hearings. Sickel replaced Gustav Schwab in New York. According to Merck, Sickel did not even speak German. Yet that Ballin attached little importance to patriotic sentiments at the hour of hiring personnel had already been clear when he appointed the Englishman R. Cortis, former agent of the WSL to replace the retiring Kunhardt & Co as General agent of the HAPAG in New York. The advantages of appointing the right man at the right primed over the indignation of German-American business community of choosing a non-German. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter September 21 1888 and daily reports on the hearing by C. Bennett January and February 1913. Hamburg Staatsarchiv, HAPAG, 622-1, Erinnerungen Merck.

⁵⁵¹ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters Gottheil to Alexander, March 10; June 18; September 4 and 5 1913.

⁵⁵² Paul Gottheil worked for the brokerage firm Funch Edye & Co. As seen previously the firm acted as shipping brokers for HAPAG, HAL and others. The special committee consisted of W. Sickel (HAPAG), P. Franklin (IMM), P. Gottheil (Funch Edye & Co), H. Barber (Barber & Co), W. Boyd (Holder,

hearings, public sentiment surrounding shipping lines had already started to shift. The campaign had to stimulate this tendency and it needed to be open and direct because most of the negative perceptions of the great corporations in the US stemmed from the belief in secret manipulations by legislators and press. The close relations between Gottheil, Alexander and Huebner proved that these suspicions were not totally unfounded. The prejudices were based on the assumption that cartels neutralized the market forces which guaranteed the public reasonable prices, based on offer and demand. Instead cartels artificially increased rates just to the limit, and not destroy their business. Furthermore, the idea prevailed that foreign shipping conferences prevented the entry of new companies, which as Humphreys propagated, obstructed the development of the American merchant marine.

The propaganda campaign refuted these allegations and pointed to the benefits of the conference agreements for the American public, using contemporary events to highlight its importance. Shipping companies underlined that the *raison d'être* of conferences was one of self-preservation against ruinous price competition. It allowed the companies to fix stable, yet reasonable, prices for freight and passenger traffic. This stability allowed the shift of the competition on services rendered to passengers and shippers. They stressed the fact that conferences facilitated far reaching progress in comfort, quality and safety of steerage transport. It also enabled a strict observance of the American government statutes, with reference to regulation of service and of the implementation of US immigration Laws. Due to the international character of seaborne trade, the shipping lines strongly objected to the on-going idea of establishing a commission supervising the foreign trade comparable to the Interstate Commerce Commission controlling the railroad rates. It would greatly harm the ocean trade to and from the US. Shipping conferences offered the best alternative and the consequences of making them illegal could not be overlooked. Continuous rate wars for the North Atlantic Passenger traffic would follow suit. These had a negative impact on the maintenance of the ships and security of the passengers. The shipping companies even used the

Weir & Boyd) and A. Outerbridge (Outerbridge & Co and Quebec Line). Boyd and Barber managed services to South-America.

arguments of the Immigration Restriction League, pointing out that low rates stimulated the flow of undesirable migrants.

To deconstruct the David against Goliath image, steamship men stressed that conferences protected, above all, the interests of small and weaker members which would be the first to suffer if these no longer existed. They refuted the accusation that new companies did not stand a chance against the cartel, insisting that any experienced manager with reasonable capital would not be fought of for long. Fighting steamers generally affected the business too much to allow its use in the long term. Bernard Baker took the stand in order to disprove the allegation that the conference agreements represented a foreign conspiracy against American shipping interests. He testified on his efforts to raise capital in the US for a shipping company to trade through the Panama Canal under the American flag, which became impossible because of the strong opposition of the transcontinental railroads. About to abandon the idea, Baker received support from Albert Ballin, who was willing to provide the capital for the project under the American flag and inviting American capitalist to join in. Instead of obstructing the American merchant marine Baker testified that Ballin was one of its sole sponsors. The conclusions of the Alexander Committee indicate that the shipping companies were quite convincing (Franklin, 1914, 155-163; Sickel, 1914, 143-154; Huebner, 1914; 243-252).⁵⁵³

As Daniel Marx denoted, the conclusions of the Alexander Committee closely resembled the ones reached by the British Royal Commission on the same topic in 1906. It recognized that shipping conferences increased the security of capital invested in the shipping industry allowing it to greatly improve the quality and regularity of service. Conference agreements enabled the members to rationalize their service scheduling sailing dates and ports of call with each other, eliminating wasteful competition. The stability of rates it provided was appreciated by shippers, a majority of whom supported the system which favored the development of trade. The Committee did not find the rates fixed by the shipping rings to be excessive, but instead found them to be reasonable. The Alexander committee also concluded that it prevented weaker lines from being

⁵⁵³ CLA, Chairmen correspondence, C1, 7 and 63; Letters May 15; June 5; August 21; September 5, 19 1912 April 25 and July 7 1913 and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, daily reports on the hearing by C. Bennett January and February 1913.

eliminated from various trades, something the British investigators had the good judgment of omitting, according to Marx.

On the other hand, the committee criticized the monopolistic nature of the system and the secrecy of its operations, fortifying suspicions of excessive use of deferred rebates. Yet, the advantages outweighed the disadvantages and therefore it advised against prohibiting rate and pool agreements which would lead to a dangerous competition affecting the trade in general. Against the will of shipping companies, it advised to placing the agreements and rate fixing under the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which should be empowered to cancel any agreement it found discriminatory or detrimental to US commerce. Finally, it suggested prohibiting the use of deferred rebates and fighting ships. The recommendations of the Alexander Committee formed the basis of the Shipping Act of 1916 (Marx, 1953, 57-67; Huebner, 1914, 243-263).


By the end of 1914, Lucius Beers reported that all charges were dropped against the shipping companies, except for the one regarding fighting steamers. Passenger lines could continue their business as usual. The Shipping Act created a Shipping Board to supervise the agreements, rates and revive the merchant marine. The Board quickly realized its limitations to regulate rates and agreements for foreign seaborne trade. It lacked the international authority to do so, while acting unilaterally would cause sovereignty conflicts whose consequences were hard to predict. Regarding their efforts to revive the merchant marine, these would only receive political backing with the New Deal (Marx, 1953, 127-136). Till that point in time foreign shipping cartels remained the masters of the North Atlantic.

6) The success story of the continental passenger conference

Similar to the bulk of academic research, most of the attention of the Alexander Committee went to freight traffic. They interviewed two thousand shippers on the working of the conference, yet they failed to solicit the opinion of migrant brokers and agents. As was shown previously, the need to discipline the agent-network was one of the main incentives of shipping companies for collusion because without it, stabilizing rates

resulted was impossible. The following chapter will analyze their success in doing this between 1896 and 1914. But it is important to remember the interdependence between the achievements of the continental conference to neutralize the internal and external pressures, as discussed here, and its ability to control the agent-network. The success story of passenger conferences greatly contrasts with the claimed ineffectiveness of the pre-world war one conference system, as attributed by scholars such as Bastin, Deakin, Greenhill or Marx (Bastin, 1971; Deakin, 1973; Greenhill, 1998; Marx, 1953; North; 1958). To quote Greenhill; “*even in the case of shipping conferences which appear to have lasted some time, their effectiveness in overcoming market forces and in promoting joint-profit maximization, may in fact have been negligible* (Greenhill, 1998, 71).” This conclusion is largely due to the sole focus of research on freight conferences. The downward spiral of freight rates during the second half of the nineteenth century- which reached their lowest point around 1900 only to rise slowly a decade later- and the decreasing profits of the industry sustained these theories. As Keeling rightly noted the passenger business presents a totally different picture which the gross rates of prepaid and return steerage tickets of the HAL clearly illustrate (Keeling, 1999a).

Graph 6: HAL prepaid and return rates 1885-1914



The cornerstone of this success story is the continental pool agreement for westbound steerage passengers of 1892. This profit sharing agreement greatly improved the cohesion between the continental members, allowing them to subsequently strike out the tonnage clause and to fix through rates, eliminating the two most important pressure points, which remained. The rivalry fueled by personal antipathy and family pride between White Star and Cunard Line obstructed any scheme involving pooling or sharing out passenger revenues between British companies. The Britain-US route remained very competitive and chaotic and stood in strong contrast to the Continental-US route where pool agreements led to the culmination of a series of consolidations (Hyde, 1975, 102-103; Murken, 1922, 223, Smith, 1906, 260).

This internal division favored the ascendancy of Continental lines on the North Atlantic steerage market. By forcing the British companies to join the continental pool, the NDLV lines put an end to the principal external pressure corrupting the continental market. It used the seven years during which the agreements held to increase the concord on other segments of passenger liner's business, reinforce the ties with the Mediterranean market and finding ways to police the agent-network. The price evolution of the HAL,

which is representative of all the NDLV members, show that the inclusion of the British lines allowed a marked increase of the rates. These reached very profitable levels, considering that companies estimated that the cost per steerage passenger remained under \$10; especially because the market stability after 1896 put an end to the extravagant extra commissions paid to migrant brokers and agents which in the past ranged from \$3 to \$9.

With some exceptions the commission now remained fixed at \$2 and it did so until 1914. Also, agreements on through rates put an end to the continuous price cutting on railroad fares which affected the profits made on the ocean leg of the voyage. Hence, the higher fares after 1896 largely underrate the increase in profits the companies made on steerage transport. Another notable improvement was that it allowed the lines to adapt their rates according to their pool quotas. Lines with a plus would often increase the rates to encourage passengers to book with other pool members with a minus. It allowed these companies to fill their quotas without lowering their rates and maximizing their profits. These fluctuations underestimate the relative rate stability that characterized this period. Finally, the agreement between the lines also gradually allowed to rise of the eastbound rates to westbound levels, despite the much more intense competition due to the fact that nearly all companies arrived in New York and thus shared the same hinterland for a rapidly increasing yet smaller market compared to the westbound traffic- creating an important overcapacity.

The failure of the IMM to include the Cunard Line reopened old wounds. The British line exploited the situation to obtain favors from its government to regain some of its lost prestige and enlarge its share of the continental market. It successfully penetrated the continental market, via the Adriatic side door with the support of the Hungarian government. That same year, CPR and Austro-Americana obtained a share. One could argue that this illustrates the weakness of the NDLV in controlling its market. Yet, on the other hand it must be noted that this market was both booming and gradually moving away from the homeports of the NDLV lines. The achievement of these companies to control such a vast hinterland, reaching as far Bayreuth and deep parts of Russia through the Hamburg-Le Havre, range must not be underestimated. This is especially when considering that for Russian shipping lines also had to compete with the simultaneous eastward migration movement to Siberia (Hoerder, 1994, 108). Directing relocaters from

a vast continent to the US, via from the Hamburg-Le Havre range, while preventing new routes from developing.

The strategy of the NDLV to prevent newcomers from demoralizing the market, especially those backed by their governments and thus more likely to resist ruinous competition for a longer period, was to tie them to the pool rather than to fight them off. Moreover, since they transported migrants to and from nations that backed the new initiatives they did not want stimulate these governments from taking measures to exclude them from these markets; particularly since the market grew fast enough to increase their numbers despite ceding small shares. Also, the enormous financial loss to start a rate war when the demand for steerage berths was high would not necessarily have pleased the shareholders. Rather than proving its weakness, the conflict with Cunard underlines the increased control of the NDLV lines on the continental market. Apart from the mistake of rejecting the request of the Hungarian government to take charge of the Fiume service, and leaving the opportunity to Cunard to get a foothold on the continent, the inability of the Hungarian government to obstruct the nationals from migrating through northern ports underline the influence of Continental lines in routing relocaters.

But the capacity to contain the rate war to specific regions and not the whole continent as the British line intended, demonstrates their power. While Cunard Line held average prices at cost price during the rate war, the HAL made average profits of \$15 per ticket. Between 1905 and 1908 Cunard limited its commitment to rate agreements while trying to increase its continental share through Libau. Its perseverance paid off as it obtained a larger continental share once it re-joined the pool. It came at a cost, as their average rates during those years remained low, and they were only able to significantly increase them when they formed part of the Atlantic Conference agreement (see Graph 4). Except for a very temporary drop of in the eastbound rates the Continental lines managed to maintain stable rates.

The competition with the RVF, REA and Uranium Line further illustrate the refined defense mechanism used by the Continental lines to protect their market. Even before the opening of the RVF service, Ballin tried to include the government managed line in the pool. When that became impossible the NDLV members started a fighting line instead of appointing fighting steamers. The reason for the more drastic measures was on

one hand due to the importance of the Russian market, especially for the HAL and HAPAG, and on the other hand because the line called at Rotterdam and hence was undermining one of the members at its homeport. The fact that HAL allowed the fighting line to also call at Rotterdam, and that it refrained from lowering its rates to respond to the competition of the RVF until the members reached their quotas at profitable rates, stresses the increased cohesion.

One of the weaknesses the RVF aptly exploited was the fragile equilibrium between the migrant agent-network and the shipping companies. Outside lines went to great lengths to corrupt conference agents. Brokers, with a sense of personal vendetta like Richard, willingly assisted in destabilizing the agent-network. The inability of shipping lines to drive out brokers such as Richards constituted the achilles' heel of the conference system during this period. They knew the weak points of the system and did not refrain from exploiting the anti-trust threat to deter the conference lines from fighting outside lines. Yet again market forces greatly influenced the fighting strategies. The RVF opened its service when the transatlantic migration reached unprecedented levels. As Fiona Scott-Morton observed, trade growth on a route negatively affects the probability of a price war (Scott-Morton, 1997, 699). Not only were the measures to fight off outside lines very costly during such periods, but they also had less effect because of high demand made it harder to prevent outside lines from booking passengers. Even when the REA fell into the hands of the RVF, the high profits seemed to reduce the activity from outside competition, especially of members who had fewer interests in the sub-market where the pool was being attacked.

When the market plummeted, this totally changed. When analyzing the Liverpool conference Robin Bastin labeled it as a 'very inadequate rate defense mechanism'; being at its weakest when business was bad, while by the time the lines reached a new agreement trade was already improving anyway (Bastin, 1971, 104). But, Ballin confided to Pirrie during renegotiations that: "*I would much rather fight in a year when business is, in any case not good, than put it off to a year that is full of prosperity.*"⁵⁵⁴ The business logic behind the eruption of rate wars during slumps was to reduce its impact on

⁵⁵⁴ CLA, Chairmen correspondence, C1, 49, Ismay, Letter May 13 1911.

company profits while stronger lines were better armed to go through these slumps than weaker ones.

Of crucial importance here -yet that the scope of this study does not permit fully examining it- is that well-established passenger lines controlled cabin, freight and steerage traffic while new lines, such as RVF usually predominantly relied on steerage traffic. Cabin passengers were much more sensitive to the prestige of a company which took some time for a newly established line to acquire. The impact of economic downturns on cabin passengers was also smaller than steerage, giving the lines revenues the outside lines did not have. Brokers often tied by loyalty contracts and deferred rebates also took some convincing before risking their relations with the established lines. The many outside migrant agents offered more opportunities to penetrate the market. Also, the RVF only drew revenues from the North Atlantic while HAPAG touched nearly 300 ports covering eighty different services worldwide. In short, for shipping companies slumps represented the ideal opportunity to flex their muscles before renegotiating new agreement and forcing outside companies to comply with it or to go out of business. Moreover, the NDLV had the scope to allow the RVF into the pool, further explaining its permissive attitude towards the line's attempts to acquire a foothold in the market. The joint pressures of the Atlantic Conference members through fighting steamers and the crisis, forced the RVF to join the pool. This allowed the conference lines to quote profitable rates, despite the crisis and the outside competition.

The NDLV showed less tolerance towards the Uranium Line. Without the backing of national authorities, being speculative in nature and trying to get into Hamburg and Rotterdam, the lines never stopped fighting the line. Only when it was taken over by Canadian railroad interests did the pool consider some kind of negotiations, but it seemed ill prepared to allow a line to establish itself at one of the homeports of the members. Even the threat of an ongoing lawsuit against the conference agreements and use of fighting steamer failed to stop the NDLV members. The entrant picked Rotterdam because the Dutch authorities offered little protection against foreign competitors and no doubt also because next to the German giants and the RSL, which formed part of the IMM combine, it represented the weakest link in the NDLV pool. The directors' decision of a large capital increase allowed the company to enter the twentieth century with new

first-class steamers, enabling it to play with the 'big guys' and protecting itself from a possible takeover. It failed to prevent a large part of its shares from falling into the other pool members' hands, yet the directors retained the managing control by protecting the company of the German lines' attempts to slow down its growth.

In the meantime, the HAL prospered as no other Continental line had, from the continuous consolidation efforts in getting assistance to fight competition in his homeport while paying out the highest dividends of the North Atlantic passenger lines. For more than two decades, the continental pool and the side agreements that grew out of it, greatly improved the market and price stability reducing the competitive pressures for the migrant trade. Yet, as the original agreement underlined, the aim was to reduce competition, not eliminate it. As Frank Broeze and Kurt Nathan underlined even for the driving force behind the agreements, Albert Ballin, these were not objectives but means to be used by the company to strengthen its position. Very much aware that weaker lines reaped the greatest profits from his efforts, Ballin decided to flex his muscles to claim a bigger share of the market, most especially from the NGL (Broeze, 1991, 11 and 1993 420; Greenhill, 1998, 64, 73; Nathan, 1935, 4-12). WOI disrupted his plans, and while the conflict would totally change the dynamics which governed the transatlantic steerage market.

As Gordon Boyce observed, the strength of internal ties not only depended on relations among shipping companies but also between conference members and other agents such merchants, agents and government (Boyce, 1995, p 113). Because of their military importance, shipping companies usually maintained close relations with their national governments. But, as pioneering global companies, their relations with authorities reached much further than their national governments. The sovereignty vacuum over the international waters offered a lot of protection to the freedom of organizing their trade. Yet, as national administrations gained control and responsibility over an increasing number of issues it became an important external threat, not only to the conference system, but even more so for the migrant trade. The joint action of the conference lines to defend the legality of the system, in light of the federal investigation, are only a small indication of the joint efforts of the shipping companies to prevent the passage and enforcement of American maritime and migration laws which could harm

the steerage trade during the Progressive Era. Volume LV of the *Annals of the American Academy and Social Science*, entitled *Government Regulation of Water Transportation*, compiled by the shipping representatives and academic members of the Alexander Committee explained and defended the need for shipping conferences for the broader public. This characterizes the increasing connections between corporations and legislators; the growing importance of public opinion and acting according to 'public interests' and the growing significance of scientific opinions to suggest or assess policies. How this affected American maritime and migration laws will be discussed in chapter III and IV, but the relations between shipping companies and migrant agents need to be discussed first.

Chapter II: The rise of Immigrant Banks: The sale of prepaid and return tickets through the American migrant agent network 1896-1914

To date, business history has focused a lot more on big business managerial corporations than on smaller entrepreneurial firms. With the focus on the Holland America Line this study does not escape criticism. Yet, this big business only attained its scale as a result of the network of many smaller entrepreneurs supplying passengers to the shipping companies (Boyce, 1995, 3) The concentration of migrants in ethnic communities generated demands for specific products and services which created opportunities for uniquely qualified immigrant entrepreneurs to fill these (Massy, 1999, 39, Hoerder, 2002, 17). Of crucial importance was the sale of ocean passage tickets and banking services for these entrepreneurs whose ethnic diversity increased as the migration fever spread to Southern and Eastern Europe. As Delheim noted the role of ethnicity has received limited attention despite its influence on business activities and the formation of the American business community (Delheim, 2004, 229-231).

This was especially the case for migrant business as will be illustrated by the analysis of the immigrant-banking boom in the US at the end of the nineteenth Century. Ethnic ties played an important role for newcomers who often found in immigrant bankers emissaries '*to America within America*'. The phenomenon of immigrant banks has been largely overlooked by historians, as noted by Day; the first to present a systematic cross-ethnic analysis describing the general features of these financial

institutions (Day, 2002, 77-78).⁵⁵⁵ Migrants using short term deposits as part of their migration strategies represented a large segment of the saving banks' initial clientele (Wadhvani, 2002, 43). But because migrant entrepreneurs were often kept from playing an active role in local banks managed by natives, they opened their own. Sharing the same background helped them considerably in earning the trust and goodwill of migrants (Bodnar, 1985, 131-132).

These immigrant banks deserve more attention, especially since ethnic banking is back in vogue. Some scholars have observed the growing phenomenon of ethnic banking; how on a micro level modern banks use culture and ethnicity for both client orientation and market differentiation. For instance, the Spanish-American community has become a very competitive market for banks in the US offering specialized services in which ethnic ties provide a strategic advantage. Language is crucial (Armstrong and Haiss, 2007, 1-3). Yet what is true today was even more so a century ago. Immigrant banks mushroomed as transatlantic migration became less permanent and savings became the primary goal of the move (Hourwich, 1911, 632; Piore, 1979, 56; Wyman, 1993, 59). The private banks, of various scales, spread nationwide wherever migrant communities established themselves. Banking generally only represented a part of their commerce and often entrepreneurs in small towns rolled in the business rather accidentally through other activities. The lack of legislation regulating these 'unincorporated banks' prior to 1914 enhanced their rapid dissemination. Language skills and specialized services, especially administrative ones, allowed immigrant bankers to tie certain ethnic clientele. Especially the first generation migrants greatly depended on close and personal relations before entrusting their hard earned savings. As the market expanded, the American bankers tried to get their hands on the business by investing in the foreign departments of their banks to provide similar services, something American banks are rediscovering today. Indispensable facets of immigrant banking business consisted of money transfers or other means to send back remittances and the sale of ocean passage tickets. The former is still an important facet of ethnic banking, today the latter is not, at least not yet (Armstrong and Haiss, 2007, 10-11; Born, 1977, 176; Reports of the Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 37, 203-355).

⁵⁵⁵ For an overview on the sparse historiography about immigrant banks see: (Day, 2002, 65).

Immigrant bankers represent a key link in the migration process, connecting the individual migrant to shipping companies and national authorities. They are the middlemen on, what Hoerder labeled the meso-level of mediating networks and interacting segments linking individuals to world-systems (Hoerder, 1996, 84). The management of local markets through a multi-ethnic migrant agent network constituted a challenging endeavor for maritime enterprise where, as Boyce underlined, social and cultural affiliation had always played an important role in generating mutual trust between principals and agents (Boyce, 2001, 4-5). In 1897, there were 2625 official immigrant savings banks spread of 146 American cities. New York City showed the highest concentration of these (Cinel, 1991, 31; Greber, 2006, 237). To these, numerous unofficial ones must be added. By further analyzing the relation between the shipping companies and the agent network some new facets of the turn of the century immigrant banking, and the importance of ethnicity will come to light.

The introduction of steam-shipping had not only made it easier for migrants to cross the Atlantic but also for merchants involved in the migrant business. As discussed earlier, migrant brokers opened branch offices in New York allowing some Jewish brokers to nearly takeover control of the prepaid market. For this successful strategy, brokers entrusted the management of New York offices preferably to family members in order to neutralize the principal-agent problems. If this was impossible they recruited a person of trust almost exclusively from the same ethnic group. Trust was essential in the migrant business, where the distance and the lack of effective international juridical means to offer protection from abuse, reinforced the principal-agent problems. Family and ethnic ties proved to be the best remedy against opportunistic behavior and in obtaining reliable information.

Similar policies were adopted by the HAL who, after the start-up phase of recruiting locals in the US sent an increasing number of personnel from Rotterdam for various functions. The Dutch line preferred to recruit nationals who had familiarized themselves with the company's philosophy in the home-country, trusting them much more than foreigners recruited abroad. For the HAL, personnel with overseas experience usually formed part of the process in climbing up the company hierarchy, which was still

dominated by family ties, but was opening up for successful managers.⁵⁵⁶ After Cazaux van Staphorst, all the New York head-agents returned to join the board of directors at some point before 1914. As distances between both worlds grew less directors and head-agents made the crossing more frequently to discuss important issues and to reinforce business relations, which letters and telegraphs did not fully permit. It also allowed the directors to retain their predominant position in the decision-making process, delegating only a minimum of responsibilities to their American representatives and hence not partaking in the managerial revolution that was taking place in the US (Chandler, 1977, 189-192; Gottheil, 1914, 74).

In the meantime, while solidifying the internal business structure, the efforts to improve the collaboration between the lines resulted in a general agreement involving all the principal North Atlantic Lines. It allowed the HAL to strengthen the ties with the US migrant-agent network. The relations had reached a low point during the rate war of 1894 as Jewish migrant brokers had positioned themselves between the two. How did the company regain control? What was the impact of the change in migrant origin on the agent-network? How important were ethnic ties in the migrant business? Who were these migrant bankers and what did their activities consist of? How did the American banking world react to their ascendancy? To answer these questions the continental conference minutes of the Standing Complaint Committee, correspondence of the New York head-agent of the HAL, sporadic reports of HAL travelers visiting the migrant bankers and the volume of the Dillingham commissions on immigrant banks are used.

1) The foundation of the New York City Agents Association

When the British and Continental lines finished the negotiations on the conference agreements, some of the biggest brokers formed an association to reorganize the business in New York. The New York City Agents Association (NYCAA) came to life when the British lines, close to an agreement with the Continental lines, decided to

⁵⁵⁶ The following New York head agents joined the board of directors; W. Van den Toorn (1899-1906), J. R. Wierdsma (1906-1936) and A. Gips (1912-1933). To those three the following completed the board before WOI; W. van der Hoeven (1873-1884); A. Plate (1874-1880), J.V. Wierdsma (1881-1916) O. Reuchlin (1873-1919), J. Reuchlin (1906-1912). The list underlines the predominance of the Wierdsma and Reuchlin families (Wentholt, 1977, 14-15).

drastically reduce the number of agents and stopped paying commissions to runners.⁵⁵⁷ The first continental conference of 1885 prohibiting the use of sub-agents and limiting the sale of tickets to the agent's office, in theory, reduced all brokers to simple agents, yet in practice this could never be implemented. A clear hierarchy within the agent-network persisted in which some agencies at the biggest Atlantic ports and inland cities attracted the bulk of the business. The niche created by the price difference between cash and prepaid tickets engendered the order-system, reinforcing this hierarchy. Especially Hamburg brokers, predominantly Jewish, opened branch offices on both sides of the Atlantic delocalizing the market. Due to the lack of control by the shipping lines and the keen competition between the brokers a wide network of small agents, runners, and peddlers spread nationwide. This proliferation also affected the brokers' profits. The agreement between the shipping lines forced the brokers, who feared the establishment of joint tickets offices managed by the lines, to unite in various city agents' associations to draw up terms with the companies. In New York, 'capital of ocean passage sales', president, A. Falck, and the Secretary, M. Rosett, of the NYCAA, took the initiative by urging the Continental lines to follow the example of the British lines. They saw an opportunity to concentrate the business in a limited number of hands while the reduced numbers made the network for the Continental lines more manageable and offered an opportunity to make an end to the order business.⁵⁵⁸ How did it affect ocean passage sales?

The agreements caused a big shake up in the migrant business. A lot of European correspondents to the New York agents could no longer forward the passengers at special cash rates formerly obtained by the companies. Some correspondents refused to honor the orders drawn on them, obligating the New York agents to rebook the passenger as a regular prepaid. It put some agents in serious trouble as van den Toorn reported on the 'Banking, Passage and Exchange office' of Max Kobre:

"As all agents he entrusted until recently his money and passage business with an expedient in Europe, in his case Karlsberg & Co in Rotterdam. Just as all bigger prepaid agents he drew orders on expedients and left it up to the Karlsberg how to

⁵⁵⁷ The agents in Chicago soon followed. An agent association in Minneapolis and Saint Louis was established in 1897 GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564 Min 238 July 16 1897.

⁵⁵⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters June 14, August 6, 23, September 5 1895.

forward passengers, unless Kobre specified a route. Yet against Kobre's advice Karlsberg sent most of his passengers indirectly through England upon which the New York agent decided to withdraw the money order business, worth 30.000 to 40.000 a month. Karlsberg then refused to continue forwarding Kobre's passenger despite having received the remittance covering the crossing leaving them stranded in Bentheim and Rotterdam."⁵⁵⁹

The incident greatly harmed Kobre's reputation; who tried to rebook the passengers at own cost. In the meantime Karlsberg sent an assistant to explore the opportunities of opening a branch office in New York, yet the contacts with Spiro and Scharlach still guaranteed him enough business. The relation between Karlsberg and Kobre highlights the high risks attached to the business, the importance of strong trust relations between the European correspondent and the New York agent and the increased mobility of merchants. A lot of European houses offered the possibility to New York agents of drawing orders on them as a means to expand their market, yet a lot of the biggest brokers kept the business within the family; like for instance Jarmulowsky, Scharlach, Missler, Falck etc. The incident also reveals that shipping companies had lost control over the routing of passengers drawn on European expedients. The latter contacted the passengers and arranged their inland trip to the port of embarkation. On arrival the expedients booked them as they pleased.

The truce between shipping lines allowed the re-imposition of the use of prepaid tickets instead of orders. The old conference rules tying the agents to exclusive patronage were reintroduced. Agents drawing orders or violating other rules risked disqualification. Parallel agreements with the British-Scandinavian and Mediterranean conferences stated that any agent disqualified for violating rules common to every conference would have to send back the ticket books of all conference lines. Only some smaller lines remained outside of these conference agreements, meaning that disqualification practically excluded them from ocean passage sale, a crucial aspect of the immigrant banking business. By limiting the concessions authorizing someone to act as an official agent the NYCAA received enough guarantees to secure a fair share of the business. Members needed to deposit a \$250 bond. To control the abidance to the conference rules the Continental lines, including the French line, established a Standing Complaint Committee

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Letter September 19 1895.

in New York for the East and in Chicago for the West. The lines relied on one hand on a self-denouncing system among the members of the NYCAA, and on other hand hired private detectives controlling the agents. The use of numbered prepaid tickets instead of orders made it much easier to trace the abuses. Van den Toorn reported that the agreement had a very positive effect, yet he realized that abuses would never totally disappear. Little could be done to impede the smaller outside agents to corrupt the business forcing official agents to follow suit.⁵⁶⁰ What follows is an analysis of most important reoccurring abuses presented to the New York Complaint Committee.

2) The implementation and violation of the conference rules: the relations between shipping companies and the agent-network

2.1) The credit-system and sale of tickets through peddlers

At the first meeting between the agents and the lines, Falck strongly recommended striking out the clause prohibiting the sale of tickets on credit. The custom was so common that it seemed hardly conceivable to put an end to the practice. The lines refused, fearing that giving credit stimulated excessive competition, just what they sought to prevent.⁵⁶¹ Yet, especially among the East Side Jewish agents the practice of selling tickets on installments through peddlers was well-established.⁵⁶² Peddling was a common employment for newly arrived Jews who willingly added the sale of ocean tickets to their trades (Supple, 1957, 143 -178; Olegario, 1999, 161-189 and Kahan, 1978, 235-258). Nearly seventy five percent of the two million Jews who arrived in the US between 1881 and 1914 remained in New York. They came from Hungry, Galicia, and Romania but above all from Russia where nearly three quarters of the Jewish community originated from (Binder and Reimers, 1995, 114-115). This concentration explains the important numbers of Jews involved in the New York immigrant banking business.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.* Letter October 18 1897 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, minutes 1-138 of the Standing Complaint Committee, September 26 1895 till December 6 1896.

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.* Minute 6, September 26 1895.

⁵⁶² Selling tickets through traveling salesmen was not limited to Jewish agents. For example agents E. Johnson and Paulson & Co who were particularly active on the Scandinavian market were renowned for doing a lot of business that way. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter July 23 1901.

Their sales did not limit themselves to co-religionists but also extended to other ethnic groups. Just as Italian immigrant banker/employer agencies dominated the Mediterranean market, so did the Jewish immigrant bankers for the Continental market in New York where an important share of the American sales was transacted. By introducing new selling methods, such as cheaper cash-orders, which they spread through peddlers they managed to pierce through the ethnic barriers common to immigrant banking. Other ethnic groups were underrepresented or even totally absent but in other parts of the US the ethnicity of the banker still strongly depended on the origins of the communities living in certain districts and settlements. The competition between the lines had enabled the rise of the Jewish immigrant brokers, much to the dislike of the HAL. The shipping company continued to mistrust migrant broker and agents, especially the Jewish ones. Two years after the agreement with the British lines Van den Toorn reported that abuses had greatly reduced, yet Jewish agents continued to corrupt the business. He described agent A. Kass, a former employee of Bruno Weinberger, as: “*typical sly, mean Jewish usurer using every possible trick to enrich himself.*”⁵⁶³ Because of them, selling on installments through peddlers proved impossible to eradicate.

The Standing Complaint Committee occasionally fined agents for those reasons, while Thomas Fitchie, in charge of Ellis Island complained about a growing number of passengers arriving not only without funds but with debts needing to pay off the ticket bought on installments. After being caught, the Markel Brothers stated in their defense that some East-side agents did most of their business that way, leaving them no choice but to follow suit. The Continental lines sent out the Pinkerton detectives on a wide-range investigation catching Kass, Kobre, Scharlach, S. Jarmulowsky, Barasch, Markel Brothers, Falck, Zweigel and Germansky. The surcharge for buying on installments averaged at around one third of the ticket. Usually they required a down payment of \$5 to \$10 followed by weekly installments of one dollar.⁵⁶⁴ Fines imposed did little to deter the agents. As Rosett pointed out, it remained an open secret that East-side agents

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.* Letter September 17 1897.

⁵⁶⁴ Van den Toorn gives the example of Goldberg paying 59,5 dollars for her passage and that of her child from Antwerp to New York while the gross rate charged by the lines amounted to 44,25 dollars. *Ibid.*, Letter July 8 1899. Same margin was used by S. Barash and by Kobre selling through Forsyth GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, minute 122 October 22 1896, 541 August 15 1900. S. Frank paid 41 dollars instead of 33 *Ibid.*, minute 765, 28 February 1903.

conducted most of their business that way. A circular threatening with \$500 fines and a six months suspension created a shock-effect. It revealed that some agents had up to \$15,000 outstanding for peddler tickets. They petitioned the lines to reconsider, stating that it would drive the business to Europe:

“They explained that the low rates made by some of the English lines would be an inducement for agents to cover the prepaid business through cash transactions on the other side and that the peddler although doing the business himself on installment, would advise through agents the entire cash amount by money order to the correspondent in Europe. Some of the agents went as far as claiming that about 80 percent of their business was transacted through peddlers. They would prefer to give up the Continental agencies and make use of Anweisungen. Agents agreed to place the peddler business under our control in exchange we withdrew measures stipulated in said circular. Outside New York peddlers can not be tolerated and the rules there still stand. The agents will in the future be responsible for all cancellations either by cable or letter, in other words when a prepaid passenger should be on his way to Rotterdam and the peddler not being paid by the purchaser of the ticket would request the agent to cancel the same, who in turn notifies us, you will have the right to forward the passenger, the agent being required to take the full responsibility. Very pleased with the working of this rule, since one of the greatest abuses of the peddler system was the many cancellations of tickets, resulting in great hardship to the passengers not knowing that the ticket was bought in void, sacrificing home and work, suffering thus distress and misery.”

The agents also committed to stop selling through unauthorized agents and breaking off their order business connections in Libau, Wilna, Brest Litowsk and Bialystock. At the time, the Cunard Line had just broken away from the conference agreements; hence consolidating the working relations with the agents was of crucial importance.⁵⁶⁵ The agreement gave official recognition to peddlers who gained influence. Keen competition broke out between the East-side agents to tie these traveling salesmen to their agency. The British lines disqualified M. L. Jarmulowsky for using illicit means in doing so and the conference lines had to follow suit. Yet the peddlers formed a union to fight his disqualification at the Standing Complaint Committee, and with success. From then on, peddlers appointed a representative to defend their interests at the meetings.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Minute 334, April 13 1898; 415, 417 December 20 1898; 421-432 February 23 1899; 770 February 5 1903 and 777 March 26 1903.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Minutes 801-817 Meetings July 2 and August 3 1903.

Shipping Companies were unable to restrict the practice to East-side New York. The HAL quickly conceded the permission of selling tickets on credit to other New York agents. Reports on other regions show that the practice spread nationwide. This was stimulated by the growing interest of American banks for the business. With the increased competition for migrant savings, Pittsburgh banks employed canvassers soliciting deposits for steamship tickets as a way to attract new clients.⁵⁶⁷ Baltimore Agent A. Robson even openly advertised the sale of tickets on installments. The Continental lines sent out a circular urging the agents to keep their steamship ticket and loaning banking business separate. The custom of buying tickets on credit propagated with the growing entanglement of banking and ocean passage sales.

The increased competition for the Russian market with the opening in 1906 of direct services from Libau -by the conference members WSL, Russian East Asiatic and Anchor Line and the non-conference Cunard Line and Russian Volunteer Fleet (RVF)-corrupted the business managed by East-side agents. As the RVF also called at Rotterdam it infringed on the core business of HAL. The head-agent of the new line, C.B. Richard, hired an army of two hundred peddlers and runners quoting lower rates. To prevent the situation from getting out of hand the Continental lines tried to revoke the concession of working with peddlers. The implementation needed to be postponed several times to give the agents time to clear up their business and because of the growing popularity of the RVF. Conference agents quickly lost ground, both on the money transfer and ocean passage sales market. Instead of getting facilities revoked they asked for more protection, especially lower rates, to remain competitive. The conference lines eventually needed to give in to the agents not only allowing them to continue the peddler business but also granting permission to some East-side agents to temporarily book for the RVF.⁵⁶⁸

The events underline the weak position of the conference lines towards outside companies and their agents. Any company trying to penetrate the market made it very hard for shipping companies to discipline their agents. A strict implementation of the

⁵⁶⁷ The shipping companies did not oppose agents to accept deposits on eastbound steerage passengers on account of passage tickets and made official by taking it up in the conference rules. *Ibid.* min 456 October 24 1899.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.* Min 849 April 24 1904; 891 October 27 1904; 911, 923 May 11 1905; 1015-1047 January 17 until August 5 1907. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters February 14 1904; December 30 1906; September 10 and October 26 1907.

conference rules in periods of increased competition weakened the position of their agents. But even without the pressure of outside rivals the shipping companies were unable to prevent agents of selling tickets through peddlers on installments. The concession granted to the East-side Jewish agents allowed them to improve the regulation of the peddler business, especially to the benefit of the migrants. Yet, they proved unable to restrict it to New York. The growing number of canvassers, peddlers and runners stimulated the excessive competition which they tried to contain.

2.2) The problem of outside agents

Because of the limitation of the number of agents a significant number found themselves shut out of the market in 1895. However, the contacts through which they previously sold tickets did not disappear overnight. Most outsiders fruitlessly applied to obtain the concession from the conference lines. In the meantime, they sought other ways of getting their hands on ocean passage sales, which Day describes as: “*the most common service and the most powerful anchor of private ethnic bankers*” (Day, 2002, 67). Two options were available; representing one of the few remaining non-conference lines or selling illegally for conference lines as a sub-agent of authorized European or American agents. The agency of Pollowe, Mogilewsky and Werner reflects the creative means by which ethnic bankers sold ocean passage.

The associates started off as clerks in St Louis Scharlach & Company, but decided to start out on their own when their employer moved from 391 to 362 Grand Street, New York. Behind Scharlach’s back they arranged to take over the old building, opening a banking, exchange and passage office called the Austro-Russian Bank. The experience acquired under Scharlach, and their prime location, served as guarantees for success. The only problem remaining was getting hold of ticket books. Quite naturally they needed to deal with Scharlach’s vendetta. He made sure that no line hired them as agents, except for the dissident Atlantic Line, managed by C. Richard, who was still supporting any initiative harming HAPAG’s interests. Yet, the agents found it difficult to route Eastern Europeans through Genoa, the homeport of the Atlantic Line. Scharlach gathered testimonies of unsatisfied customers on the disadvantages of the long journey through

Genoa and passed these on to local newspapers. The Austro-Russian Bank also sold orders drawn on European houses yet only the concession as conference agents presented the desired growth opportunities.

Pollowe took some correspondence between Scharlach's New York and Hamburg offices to the head-agents of HAL and HAPAG revealing significant abuse of the conference rules. Other outside agents also used this strategy of supplying inside information, as a means of buying their way into the select club of conference agents.⁵⁶⁹ This helped the situation, but the line's most important criteria for acceptance was the amount of new business the agents could contribute to the pool. Building up that business proved to be a gradual process. While awaiting their appointment the Austro-Russian bank started to conduct business for the authorized agent

A. Kass. Many official agents could not resist using the networks of outside agents to increase their sales. The unauthorized agents were rewarded with clients, for money exchange sent his way, or a share of the commission. Selling prepaids for Kass and drawing orders on the correspondents Hermer & Knie (Libau) and Haimsohn & Co (London) which allowed them to undercut prepaids by \$2, the Austro-Hungarian Bank started to make a name for itself. The possibility of selling on installments, the exemption of paying cancellation fees and not needing to remit the money until the arrival of the passenger instead of on purchase gave non-conference agents important competitive advantages. The Austro-Russian Bank no longer seemed sure to want to join the select club, while complaints of conference agents grew stronger. In the meantime, Scharlach tried to convince Austro-Bank-passengers who traveled with the Beaver Line via Canada, but had booked for direct passage, to sue his former employees. Despite his efforts to obstruct their business Pollowe, Mogilewsky and Werner rapidly expanded their business.

In violation with the agreements the French line, in trying to get a foothold into Russia, secretly accepted passengers from the agents. When caught, the agents lost that

⁵⁶⁹ For instance Harry Oppenheim, a former clerk of Kobre, supplied the names of the European correspondents working for the Beaver Line; Knie Falck & Co, O. Ramler, (Libau), E. Kriskowsky, L. Gerschenowitz, (Wilna) L. Nierenberg (Brest-Litowsky), I. Kahan (London), P. Canon (Antwerp) and Freyberg (Rotterdam). He offered to fully disclose the methods and connections of the Beaver Line in exchange for the conference agency. The information did not immediately lead to his appointment, yet he eventually managed to create enough goodwill. *Ibid.*, Letters August 28, September 10 1901, and September 12 1907.

business but were still doing well by working for the Beaver Line. The British line did not renew its membership of the North Atlantic Passenger Conference, seeing a lot more opportunities to increase its market share by remaining outside the agreements tapping off continental passengers. As long as the Beaver Line refused to join, little could be done to prevent outside and unscrupulous official agents from booking for the line. To force the Beaver Line back into the agreement and to prevent the CGT from moving into the Russian market, the Continental lines appointed the Austro-Russian Banks as official agents; on the condition they posed bond with a survey company amounting to a \$1000.⁵⁷⁰ The Austro-Russian Bank quickly became one of the biggest continental agents of the city. The agency survived the deaths of Pollowe and Mogilewsky because their widows maintained their interests. Yet, like many other immigrant banks the 'shipping agency, foreign money exchange and private bank' failed during the economic crisis of 1908 (Day, 2002, 76).

The Austro-Russian Bank is a representative example of how other banks, such as the Hungarian agents Lengyel, Kraus & Company tried to work their way up. Kraus started off as clerk at Falck & Company but joined Lengyel, owner of the newspaper *Magyar Trasulat* to launch themselves in immigrant banking.⁵⁷¹ Not making the shortlist of conference agents, they sought alternative ways to contract business. Other than Pollowe, Mogilewsky and Werner, Kraus remained on good terms with his former employer. Agents usually built up expertise as clerks, before starting out on their own, yet doing that in the building of the former employer was quite exceptional. The Complaint Committee caught Falck, on various occasions selling through Lengyel, Kraus & Company. Falck paid his fines but never gave up his ties with the agency. The perseverance of the Hungarian immigrant bank in drawing orders on European houses and selling for various authorized agents eventually paid off. Yet, changing the business practices from illegitimately contracting passengers to working as conference agents,

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Letters May 7, 18, June 28, September 17, October 29 1897, January 21, April 1 1898, October 27, December 30 1899 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min 444, October 24 1899.

⁵⁷¹ Not all of them remained in the US to move up. Some returned to the home country starting an agency there to work as correspondents for contacts they established in the New World. For instance C. H. Nekritz returned to Russia establishing an office in Slutz. When soliciting for the agency of the HAL the Dutch company obtained information on him through Max Kobre for whom he used to work in New York. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter February 2 1901.

proved a difficult process for Lengyel & Kraus. They were caught sending 10,000 circulars to potential clients and correspondents across the country, advertising the possibility of buying tickets on installments. They also continued the cattleman business (see below).

Because of the repeated abuses, their appointment was short-lived and they were forced back into their old ways of doing passage business.⁵⁷² Like the situation with peddlers, the lines could do little to prevent outside agents from getting their hands on shipping tickets. Especially their business through orders on European houses led to abuse. Sometimes, passengers got stuck in Rotterdam without a valid ticket because the American agent did not remit the full amount to the correspondent in Europe. The New York office of the HAL usually tried to track down the unauthorized agent responsible for the sale and urge him to remit the money deposited with him. If that failed to work they asked authorized agents, more aware of the inside tracks, for assistance. In the majority of these cases, this left the defrauded purchaser with the choice of either paying for a new ticket or seeing his family or friends being sent back home. The purchaser usually chose the first option. It meant losing the money to the so-called agents because when the purchaser addressed the court for redress, in the majority of the cases, it was not upheld as the party to which he paid the money could show that passengers arrived via the port over which the order had been drawn. The assistance provided by the HAL gave these agents a stronger foothold, yet by taking no action the business would be diverted elsewhere. In 1906 the company considered discontinuing the practice.⁵⁷³

Limiting the armada of middlemen between the company and the purchasers of third-class ocean passage remained a very difficult task. When considering firstly, the geographic expansion of business activities across the US; secondly the growing ethnic diversity and thirdly the increase of passengers transported, the HAL succeeded in limiting the number of authorized agents totaling 1,400 in 1884, 2,000 in 1893 and 1,700 in 1906.⁵⁷⁴ Also, in New York the Continental lines managed to contain the number of

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, Letters March 30 1898 October 24, November 11 and December 12 1899 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min 453-77, August 23 1900.

⁵⁷³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters August 2 and September 7 1906.

⁵⁷⁴ Based on the amount of circulars printed to be sent to the agents containing an update of the conference rules an approximation can be given of other companies. In 1905 the HAL printed 2500 circulars while Gips stated a year later of numbering 1700 agents. The other companies mentioned printed

agents notwithstanding the numerous applications (see appendix 6). Some of these were hard to refuse such as, Joseph Senner as president of the Austrian-Hungarian Immigrant Home. Senner had provided great services to the lines, both as manager of Ellis Island and as president of the Pro-Immigration League. In spite of this, the lines politely refused on two occasions, fearing that his appointment could destabilize the Austrian-Hungarian market.⁵⁷⁵

The companies even refused the application of the Transatlantic Trust Company opened by Hungarian government. Again the companies wanted to protect their Hungarian agents from this attempt by the Hungarian authorities to take full control over the steam-shipping, money transfer and exchange business between the countries. While favoring concentration of the business, shipping lines did not want migrant banks to control too much business either; and probably for the same reason the American Express Company did not make the cut. The company had managed to obtain the concession to do all the money transfers from Ellis Island. Subsequently, American Express lobbied in Albany to convince New York State representatives of withdrawing the right of steamship companies to draw money orders, drafts and sign out traveler-cheques.⁵⁷⁶ If they were unable to get their hands on the ocean passage sales, then it would prevent the lines of getting theirs on banking business.

What the lines could not control was the number of unauthorized agents. The increasing transatlantic dimension of the middlemen network opened up new opportunities for the agents, especially because price difference between both continents persisted allowing the order business to continue.

2.3) The circulation of European cash orders in the US

the following amount of which the figures of the HAL give an indication how much these overestimate the actual number; Cunard 5400, Austria-Americana 750, CGT 2000, RSL 4000, HAPAG 4500 NGL 4000, NGL Baltimore 1000. *Ibid.*, November 25 1893 and December 10 1906; GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min, 930 August 10 1905.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, min 688 October 31 1901 and 780 April 30 1903.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, min 615, March 9 1901. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter July 1 1908 and GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 48-59, Letters September 19, October 18 1912 and March 7 1913.

Despite the threat of disqualification for drawing orders, the lines seemed unable to prevent their agents from taking that risk. Within the first year of the agreement S. Baros got caught and was fined a \$100 for drawing an order on Karlsberg & Company. Van den Toorn suspected Kobre and Scharlach of doing the same on other European correspondents, but he lacked proofs. However, evidence of this was supplied by Pollowe showing that Scharlach did most of his through orders and also that a number of passengers booked for HAL and HAPAG were rerouted through England. One of Scharlach's clients, A. Hauptmann even made his way to the Complaint Committee testifying that the three passengers he had bought tickets for on installments arrived through Canada instead of directly through New York. The committee imposed a \$150 fine together with a warning of disqualification on the next breach. They showed less clemency for Kobre; who was caught for sending Russian passengers from Libau to England, to Canada and then to New York through the Beaver Line. With the detectives sent out by the lines, agents no longer used their own orders or advice slips, but used receipts of regular money transfers. The correspondent then forwarded the passenger according to the amount received. Kobre refused to grant the lines access to his books, upon which, in deliberation with the English lines the committee disqualified him. A month later, Kobre, on the verge of bankruptcy, was reinstated after paying a \$160 fine. The lines feared that with his contacts in Libau and London he could pull away a lot business from the pool if by associating himself with the Austro-Russian bank. The practice was not limited to the East-side agents. M Rosett, the biggest Hungarian broker and Zwilchenbart, Grasser & Company the number one Swiss agency of in the city, also used their European offices to transport their prepaid clients as cash passengers.⁵⁷⁷

Van den Toorn endlessly repeated his requests to set equal prices and commissions on both sides of the Atlantic. A profit margin of 60 cents was enough for brokers to use orders instead of prepaids. Especially the higher commissions paid out in Europe, usually 15 marks compared to \$2 in the US created the discrepancy. The HAL head-agent also complained that the rate of exchange used had always been too high for order business, suggesting using \$0.24 to the mark instead of \$0.245. In 1898, the combined differences reached \$2 again, despite quoting equal gross rates. Yet, if setting

⁵⁷⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter January 6 1900.

equal prices seemed impossible, van den Toorn urged the directors in Rotterdam to make European houses liable for disqualification if they maintained connections for drawing orders with parties in the US.⁵⁷⁸ What had started as a local phenomenon in Hamburg quickly spread to other European ports and major inland transit points. The HAL resolutely tried to eradicate the practice from its home port and also in Eastern Europe by boycotting expedients in that area together with the RSL.⁵⁷⁹

However, the British Beaver Line hampered the efforts, diverting part of the continental traffic through Karlsberg at Rotterdam for their Canadian service. Although being part of the North Atlantic Passenger Conference the line took the risk to increase its share of the continental market without validating them for the pool. The main problem for the lines was to get their hands on proofs of these well masked practices. Even for private detectives it was hard to track down people, because of the frequent use of false names and the lack of conclusive means to identify passengers.⁵⁸⁰ Once the Beaver Line withdrew from the agreements these proofs no longer mattered. Pressures to force the line back in were in vain. Through the order system, the British line continuously created problems for the Continental lines in the US. Following the numerous cancellations of Roumanian prepaid Jewish passenger, the HAL also found out that the line gave special rates to Baron Hirsch to attract the business of the Hebrew charity associations in Canada. Genken Wierdsma urged to finding a way to get rid of the line. Shortly after, the CPR took over the British shipping company.⁵⁸¹ This did not solve the problem as outside agents and even conference agents continued to use orders, and new rival lines kept on popping up.

Only after the panic of 1907, which sent a shock wave through the transatlantic migrant agent network, did the practice seemingly come to an end. The source is not conclusive hence no answers can be given either on how or why orders which had disrupted the American market during the previous two decades no longer posed

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Letters June 14 1895; July 31 1896; May 7, 14, 25 September 17, October 15 1897, April 4 1899; March 20 1900 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, Minutes 188, 194, 195 and 215 May 5 and 11 1897; min 329 March 30 1898.

⁵⁷⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters March 2 and 23 1897.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Letters May 21, June 2, 11, September 21 and 28 1897.

⁵⁸¹ CPR took over the Beaver Line in 1903. *Ibid.*, Letters February 14 1901, August 2, and September 7 1906 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, Min 699, February 10 1902.

problems.⁵⁸² And yet, the biggest mystery remains why the lines which apparently could have easily put an end to it by setting equal rates and commissions on both sides of the Atlantic never did so during that period. Why did the directors allow European brokers to compete for the American market from the old continent? More research is needed on the organization of the European market of ocean passage sales to shed more light on this. No clear organizational benefits, or important financial gains, are apparent from the American side of the transatlantic market, quite on the contrary. Even the agreement between the lines in 1896, putting an end to the excessive competition which had generated the order-system in the first place, ceased to halt the practice. Only after 1908 do references to the order system completely disappear, indicating that with the Atlantic Conference agreement the lines took measures to finally put an end to this system. Yet not only the price difference between Europe and the US upset the American market, so too did the price divergence between the Continental and Mediterranean market.

2.4) Interference of the Mediterranean market: the case study of Zotti & Co

The same conditions as on the Continental market existed on Mediterranean market, where agents in Europe received a 20 lire commission and their American counterparts only \$2.⁵⁸³ As van den Toorn deplored: *“We have always failed to see why agents on your side should have higher commissions than here, especially in the case of Italian agents, who we well know have always endeavored to do crooked business some way. It is a pity that such considerable difference should exist.”*⁵⁸⁴ An additional problem was that the booming Mediterranean business attracted a lot of new lines trying to get a market share. In that battle, the Italian government made sure the national lines got a decent share of the market. The forces at play on the new market made it less stable than the older British-Scandinavian and Continental market. The unstable market and the fact that the shipping companies used their oldest ships on that route all contributed to lower prices compared to the continental fares. Notwithstanding the route being much longer,

⁵⁸² The minutes of the complaint committee are not preserved beyond 1907. Yet in the correspondence of the New York passage agency the subject no longer pops up whereas previously it was a popular topic.

⁵⁸³ The exchange rate for the lire to the dollar at the time was 0,193 dollars to 1 Lire.

⁵⁸⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter April 25 1899.

the cheapest of Mediterranean lines; Fabre and Anchor Line quoted gross prepaid rates from Naples from anywhere between \$16 and \$21 and eastbound between \$14 and \$17 from February 1897 until February 1899.⁵⁸⁵ During the same period, the HAL, at that time still the cheapest Continental line quoted gross rates fluctuating between \$27 and \$31.5 for prepaids and from \$25 to \$27 eastbound.⁵⁸⁶ A gentlemen's agreement existed between the lines so that the special Italian and Oriental rates only be used for those ethnic groups. Therefore, Croats considered as continentals could not be routed through Italian ports and needed to pay quite a bit more than their neighbors across the Adriatic. This opened up opportunities for scalpers such as Frank Zotti to move into to the passage business sales.

The owner-editor of the *Narodni List* quickly made a name for himself controlling a good part of the Croatian and Dalmatian eastbound business.⁵⁸⁷ Being outside of the conference agents Zotti had to get tickets through conference agents at first. Yet, because of his growing influence, Wierdsma granted him the permission to secretly book for the HAL in exchange for the regular commission. Being unable to prove that CGT and NGL preceded him, the head-agent decided to follow suit to prevent getting shut out of that market. Wierdsma asked the directors in Rotterdam to start corresponding with Mr. Kuijic in Susak, Croatia. He received the address of Zotti claiming Kuijic controlled a lot of the westbound cash business, which could be directed to Rotterdam. Yet Zotti soon moved into the westbound market, establishing contacts with European correspondents such as E. Charvoz and J. Desiré of Modane. Through special arrangements with the CGT he also started booking eastbound Croatian passengers through Genoa instead of Le Havre and forwarding them through his connections in Modane to Karlstadt.⁵⁸⁸ The collaboration between Zotti and HAL was short-lived as the Dutch company only

⁵⁸⁵ Rates to and from other Italian ports and Marseille cost 2 dollars more. GAR, HAL, 318.03 Passage Department, 565, Telegrams with rates from 1896 – 1905.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁷ The *Narodni List* also circulated in Dalmatia, being one of the most popular newspapers in South-Austria. The issue in the home country tended to highlight the positive aspects of emigration. If both papers actually worked together, remains to be explored. Antić correctly noted that newspapers still have a lot to reveal as a secondary source for research on migration (Antić, 2001, 25-35). This study highlights that a thorough check on the background of the editors can be useful to determine whether the paper may be biased because of the editor's connections to the migrant transport business.

⁵⁸⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter January 2 and February 10 1901 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, Min 731 July 31 1902.

accepted to route passengers via Rotterdam and not through Modane. To counter Zotti the pool lines warned travelers heading to South Austria against the scalper, organizing a wide advertising campaign through their recently appointed Dalmatian agent Frank Sakser proprietor-editor of the *Glas Naroda*.⁵⁸⁹ As a result of the CGT, the broker continued his ascendancy. The French line participated in the continental conference on a gentlemen's agreement yet never joined the pool. Not fully bonded by the agreements, or by the interests in the pool CGT had a lot to gain by moving its way up into the South-Austrian market. The New York head agents sent alarms as to the amount of business Zotti defrauded from the pool, urging the directors to put an end to his connections with CGT.

A breakthrough materialized in 1903 when the disruptive French line could finally be convinced of joining the pool. Zotti took one of the first steamships to Paris to negotiate new arrangements for his business. But telegrams from all the New York head agents beat him to the punch. By the time he set foot in the head quarters of the CGT the pool lines had made sure the French line did not forget its commitments to the Westbound-pool. The next step consisted of getting them into the eastbound-pool. Wierdsma noted that CGT used all means possible to increase its share, before starting the negotiations. The French had always allowed unauthorized agents to bring in business either through Zotti or directly. The same had been done for the westbound agreement, the percentage; allocated to the line was based on the passengers transported during the years 1900-1902. Zotti, gladly helped using the special Italian rates in forwarding Agram passengers through Genoa. Even on the westbound route he still booked for the CGT using special rates. It proved that his trip to Paris did not turn out to be a mere 'city-trip' after all.⁵⁹⁰

Finding no solution to contain Zotti the lines appointed him as conference agent. The Croatian editor accepted, but immediately made it apparent that he had no intention of abiding by the rules. Disqualification followed, but with his wide network of sub-agents managed from his offices in Pittsburgh and New York the lines hoped that the

⁵⁸⁹ Sakser later also opened an office in Cleveland. *Ibid.*, Letter December 1 1899 February 19 1904, min 679 October 31 1901.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Letters April 24, May 1 1903 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min, 795 May 12 1903 and Agreement G between NDLV and CGT 1903.

CGT could make him change his mind.⁵⁹¹ Cunard's rejection of prolonging the agreements, and the opening of a direct line to that region from Fiume, and subsequently from Trieste, served to complicate the matters. The CGT refused to stop its collaboration with Zotti because of the increased competition in the area. In the meantime, Wierdsma complained that the special rate of the CGT allowed Zotti to quote \$5 below the normal rates. His fares drove the regular continental agents out of business in Pittsburgh. Rumor had it that Zotti concluded a five year deal with Tattet, dealing directly with him in Paris, and bypassing the New York head-agency of Treyvoux. While trying to escape the impasse, Wierdsma started accepting business from Zotti again at regular rates, paying commission at the end of the year so as to leave no proof for the other lines. In less than four months he sold six hundred tickets for the HAL.⁵⁹²

The lines reached an agreement for the eastbound pool in the spring of 1904. It contained a clause allowing Continental lines to control the CGT and American Line passengers before embarkation, as these companies did not have separate ships serving their Continental and Mediterranean service. As both traveled on the same ship, controls on the dock was the only way to verify if the lines booked eastbound continentals at special Italian rates. The lines made sure to closely monitor brokers known for abusing these rates.⁵⁹³ The rate war with the Cunard Line postponed its implementation when the renegotiations established a new equilibrium at the various conferences a year later. Conference agents received a circular stipulating that: "*only bona fide Italian and Oriental passengers could be booked through Italian ports, no Austrians, Germans, Hungarians, Dalmatians, Croats, Galician, Russians or Slovenians.*"⁵⁹⁴ Apparently, CGT no longer foresaw any room for Zotti in this new equilibrium. In his newspaper Zotti strongly lashed out at the French line using the circular to denounce the price discrimination:

"Imposition upon Common sense and against the Law! A Frenchman bound for home has to pay 34 dollars for Le Havre and 36,5\$ for Paris with a CGT steamer

⁵⁹¹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter December 14 1903 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min 825 November 11, min 829 December 17 1903.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.* Min 842 February 3 1904 and Letters December 14 1903 and January 8 1904.

⁵⁹³ These were Zotti, Bertini and Sakser (NY); First National Bank and Louis Moeser (St. Louis), Fugazi en Zapatini (San Fransico). *Ibid.* Letter April 29 1904; min. 860, April 28 1904 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 242, Agreement L between NDLV and CGT 1904.

⁵⁹⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Circular May 25 1905.

while an Italian on the same ship pays 20\$ for Genoa or Naples. In other words the French Line contracts to transport an Italian on one of their steamers from New York to Havre on one of their boats, from Havre to Marseille by rail, and from Marseille to Naples by boat for the sum of twenty dollars and a Frenchman himself must pay fourteen dollars more for his transport only to Havre. While the rate from New York to Milan is only 21,75\$ and another 5\$ to Trieste by rail the French rate to Trieste is 45,55 dollars. The passenger is overcharged 18, 80 dollars by the French Line.⁵⁹⁵

No law in this country allows asking a certain price for one passenger while charging a much higher one for another. Such discrimination has been going on for years unnoticed and must stop! We invoke the American press, as always to right wrongs, to investigate the matter affecting the poorest class of American citizens, greatest sufferers and with no protection against the monopoly of such big Line.”⁵⁹⁶

Zotti showed the way to right wrongs by hiring a lawyer forcing the French line to board eight Croatians at the Italian rate. All lines immediately broke away from Zotti as the conference agreements stipulated that all ticket books and advertisements were to be withdrawn from papers that attacked a member.⁵⁹⁷ The HAL, which even paid extra commission to the broker at the time, followed suit. As an alternative for the region shipping companies had Sakser as official agent, yet he did not display the same zeal as Zotti. He opened two branch offices in Pittsburgh and in Chicago, where together with his offices on Greenwich Street and in the Bowling Green Building, New York, he did: “a tremendous banking and money order business.”⁵⁹⁸ For the passage business, the entrepreneur decided to take matters into his own hands by founding the Frank Zotti Steamship Company. He bought and restored a former HAL-ship the *Obdam* and christened it *Brooklyn*. Wierdsma admitted that Zotti would have no problems filing the ships, “yet there is a big difference between opening a line and running one.” No matter

⁵⁹⁵ The big difference must have been unusual and caused by the fact that the conference lines had already come to an agreement and raised their rates while the Mediterranean Lines still negotiated using low prices to exercise pressure. Also in the Mediterranean conference were gradually raised. When they came to an agreement on July 25 the CGT quoted 34 dollars to Naples and 35,75 to Milan while Fabre and Anchor offered passage between 28 and 32 dollars nearly doubling their rates used at the end of the 19th Century. *Ibid.* Letter July 25 1905.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.* Narodni List “CGT (French Line) Overcharging and discriminating against steerage pass” June 5 1905.

⁵⁹⁷ The HAL did not maintain this, allowing Zotti to book through the company at regular rates and commission. *Ibid.* Letters June 9 and September 14 1905

⁵⁹⁸ The rent alone for his prime location in Pittsburgh on Smithfield Street cost 8000 dollars a year. In Chicago he moved in the former offices of the American Line on the corner of Washington and Dearborn Street whereas his offices in lower Manhattan didn’t come cheap either. *Ibid.*

how much support Zotti could mobilize, the head-agent did not consider him capable of maintaining a regular service. Anticipating his failure, Wierdsma recommended keeping doing business with him as he would need to get rid of his bookings when that happened. Despite the rumors Wierdsma praised him for being reliable, prompt and honest. If the relations were discontinued the business would be lost for the pool and go to the Cunard and Italian lines.

Wierdsma's insights proved to be quite accurate. The Italian authorities refused to give him a license, preventing him from calling at Italian ports. Not even a year after the maiden voyage of the *Brooklyn*, Zotti had sold the ship and flirting with bankruptcy, anxiously tried to obtain the agency of the conference lines. While all the other lines preferred to have the disturbing element under control and urged for his reappointment as conference agent, the CGT categorically refused to let him back in. Wierdsma blamed the personal antagonism of the CGT, interfering with business interest, driving Zotti to the RVF. The issue dragged on creating serious tensions between the lines. Cunard decided to reappoint him, without the consent of the CGT upon which the French line declared that it would no longer to consult the conference when appointing its agents. Disagreements hindered the disciplining of agents. With the impasse dragging on Zotti lost patience. As General Agent of the RVF and editor of a new newspaper, *Rail & Sail*, he lashed out at the conference lines once again. Zotti survived the economic downturn but never regained his preeminence over the South-Austrian market.⁵⁹⁹

Zotti demonstrates that shipping companies still strongly depended on migrant brokers to direct business from the sub-markets. This was not only the case for new booming markets such as the South Austrian, but also for older markets such as the Swiss where Zwilchenbart Gasser & Company dominated. Owning a newspaper proved to be an important asset in attracting migrant business. Both Zotti and Sakser advertised their business and tried to gain the trust of their co-ethnics through their newspapers.⁶⁰⁰ Much information spread through the American foreign language press on the situation in the

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.* Letters September 14 and December 8 1905 January 9, September 9, October 26, December 12, 1906, 6 July, September 13 1907 April 16 1909 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min. 1030, July 7 1907.

⁶⁰⁰ For instance, the HAL gave exclusivity for oriental business to John Boras, proprietor of the *Forward*, a Greek newspaper in which a lot of advertisements for the HAL appeared without charge. *Ibid.* Letter February 14 1901.

home country, and also on how to return or have friends and family to travel over. Migrant brokers and agents greatly influenced the routing of the migrants, tempting shipping lines to break the conference rules through special incentives. Giving enticements proved much easier than taking them back. Zotti's attack of the CGT illustrates the importance of remaining on good terms. Yet, no matter how much business the middleman managed to control it proved impossible to bypass the shipping companies. His attempt to do so clamorously failed, just as that of the Hamburg brokers during the 1890s. The substantial rate differences between Continental and Mediterranean passage indicate that through shipping conferences the lines gradually extended their control over the North-Atlantic transport market; it is not so much the fact that brokers defrauded the lines by routing continentals at special Italian rates that is striking, but rather that shipping lines managed to contain the abuse and maintain the price discrimination.

2.5) From Cattlemen passages to delimiting the business area

Besides the order-system, selling on credit, unauthorized agents and price difference between various markets many other practices used by the brokers and agents undermined the strict implementation of conference rules. For instance, cattlemen booking advertised the possibility of returning on a workmanship at cost of only \$6 to \$8. With the growing return movement, shipping companies took advantage of migrants willing to work their way over and even to pay a small amount to do so. Passenger liners themselves used the practice, hiring return migrants with little means and collaborated with three agencies to supply them with workforce for the return leg of the trip.⁶⁰¹ Especially for cattle transport, men were recruited because of the imposition of the Department of Agriculture of a certain number of so-called 'cattlemen' per animals carried.⁶⁰² These agencies started posing problems when they launched aggressive,

⁶⁰¹ The name of the firms: Jacobs (Canal Street), International Shipping Company (Clinton Street) and Johnson (Hoboken).

⁶⁰² Most of the passenger liners also managed cargo services such as the HAL with the -dyk ships. It seems that cattle transport was done as much as possible with these ships, yet combining cattle and passenger transport on the same ship was not uncommon. Lines quoted special rates for these ships, usually a dollar less than the regular price.

misrepresentative advertising campaigns luring away eastbound passengers away from the migrant agents. Allegedly, the agencies even forced some people into accepting a cattlemen position while all they wanted were eastbound tickets. By sharing their commission with migrant agents, cattlemen agencies spread their network for contracting candidates. An estimated 3,000 to 5,000 people left as emergency workers on board of ships from New York alone. As the problems persisted, despite various warnings to the cattlemen agencies, conference lines opened a joint-agency to recruit personnel.⁶⁰³

After the 1896 agreement, price cuts on the tickets still persisted yet these were much smaller, ranging from 50 cent to \$1 and were less common. The lines were in large part responsible for the decrease. With the agreements, the shipping companies reduced the practice of paying extra commissions to the most loyal agents. This strategy was cheaper and more effective in increasing the market share, than lowering the rates. Yet, van den Toorn reported that the system of having lines with a plus in the pool raise their rates so that the ones with a minus could catch up without decreasing theirs improved. Incentives to agents, such as reduction on ocean passage when they traveled overseas, dinners onboard of new steamers, reduction on railroad transport, free board and lodging still occurred, yet not as frequently. As soon as the outside competition increased, the old habits increased again.

During the rate war with Cunard the HAL exempted Kobre, Kass and the Austro-Russian Bank from paying the extra \$2 charged to Russians to cover board and lodging expenses before embarking. The last two agencies had been appointed by the 'Kischeneff Relief Committee', known as the Central Relief Committee consisting of prominent New York Jews, to issue prepaid tickets for Russians who needed assistance and whose relatives were unable to pay in full for the passage. Applicants paid \$10 to the agents while the Committee paid the balance.⁶⁰⁴ The agents had managed to send all passengers through HAPAG and HAL, yet the pressures of Cunard, Anchor and Allan Lines underselling the Continental lines by \$6.5 were being felt. As the relief committee's

⁶⁰³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min. 496, February 5; 573 October 4 1900; 773, March 3; 778 April 30 1903; 955 June 14 and 1002 December 20 1906.

⁶⁰⁴ The HAL also made special arrangements with 'Montifiore' the Rotterdam Hebrew charity organization to make sure the English Lines quoting lower rates would not lure away that business from them. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter August 30 1903.

priority was to help as many as possible it based the balance on the lowest rates available. Wierdsma reassured the directors that the control over the East-side agents ensured their loyalty in the competition with Cunard. To safeguard the relief committee's business for the HAL and HAPAG the agents convinced the applicants, whenever possible, to pay the extra charge for routing their family through these lines. The exemption of the board and lodging charge facilitated that task.

On rare occasions, the HAL still resorted to the plain form of extra commission granting, for instance, two more dollars to Zotti when fighting the competition of the RVF. Compared to the earlier period prior to the agreements with the British lines, when an extra commission of \$2 was common and at times reached \$5, the following two decades the abuse of extra commissions greatly diminished. This implied that the margin for agents to cut the rates also became much smaller, limiting the abuses. And, at the same time when given to an agent, extra commissions proved much more effective to increase his business.⁶⁰⁵

The denouncement system also improved with the organization of the New York City Agents Association. Most especially the secretary, M. Rosett, initially vigorously controlled the adherence of the agents to the conference rules. Agents increasingly denounced each other backed by test tickets and affidavits of the purchasers. Yet sometimes the agent's reason for denouncing was not so much to protect his business from illicit practices but more to take over the business of a rival. In this process, the personal connections within the community of migrant agents and shipping agents played an important role; as for instance the complaint of Hugo Lederer against H. Schnitzer of the Hungarian Association illustrates. Both of these individuals had offices right across each other, on Avenue B, creating a lot of tensions. Emil Lederer, head of steerage business of the HAPAG helped his brother after-hours, and so did his nephew Arthur Lederer, member of the passage department for the RSL.⁶⁰⁶ Emil and Arthur represented

⁶⁰⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min of Complain Committee 1-1052. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters February 2 1902, November 20 1907. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters Letter January 12, May 27 1898; May 21, June 24 1902, March 25, April 1, 24 1904; January 4, February 10 and December 20 1905.

⁶⁰⁶ Emil Lederer started his career in the migrant business as traveler for the HAL, yet in 1895 the HAPAG lured him away to take charge of the steerage department. The competition for good personnel often created tensions between the lines. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter July 8 1895.

their respective companies at the Standing Complaint Committee and took of advantage of the absence of Mr. Nyland by representing the HAL, to disqualify Schnitzer for no valid reason. When Nyland returned from Europe, he managed, together with the NGL to reverse the decision off the Standing Complaint Committee. To put an end to the excessive rivalry Schnitzer moved to Washington Street.

Cases like these were exceptional and shipping companies generally welcomed the developing practice of agents denouncing each other, because doing it themselves remained a very delicate issue. For instance, Van den Toorn hesitated in denouncing Rosett when he caught him cutting rates by drawing orders for the European inland transport in connection with NGL steamship tickets. He acknowledged the importance of strictly disciplining the agents, yet he saw it also that the company ought not always be the first in taking the initiative. It would not only greatly harm the popularity of the line with one of the biggest brokers of city, but also with all the other New York agents. Therefore, when signs of widespread abuse surfaced, the lines took the strategy of jointly hiring Pinkerton detectives to share the responsibility. It proved to be an efficient way to discipline the agents.⁶⁰⁷

American agents sometimes expanded their sales territory overseas recruiting passenger directly or through an intermediate at the source. They usually contacted companies beforehand to obtain the commission on these sales and to obtain special favors, if possible. For instance, Wierdsma gave free steerage passage and a letter of introduction to H. Bier, father of a renowned Californian, who was traveling to the lower Wolga region in Russia where German Mennonites and Lutherans were concentrated. Bier wanted to convince fifty families to travel back with him to Nebraska and California. The letter of introduction served to arrange the commission issue and obtain information from the board of directors in Rotterdam on how to proceed to avoid problems with the passport issue and the different difficulties which beset Russians in crossing the frontier.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, min of Complain Committee 1-1052 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters February 2, July 9, 20 1897.

⁶⁰⁸ Same story for instance for Agent Klay of Rock Valley, Iowa. *Ibid.* Letters May 19 1902 and May 8 1906.

Yet, the easiest way remained to staying put and relying on chain-migration networks to do the work. Delimiting the territory of these agents in the US remained a difficult issue. Conference rules restricted the sales of tickets to their officially appointed office, yet as discussed previously eradicating the use of runners, peddlers and unauthorized agents used by the brokers to expand their territory proved difficult. New York agents did a lot of business through correspondence. They frequently sent out circulars advertising their agency to potential clients. Most of these brokers also opened a branch office in and outside of New York, and sometimes with the help of the steam shipping companies.⁶⁰⁹ The HAL temporarily gave A. Kass \$1 extra commission when opening a branch office in Philadelphia to enable him to move into the market. The reason to delimit the territory was to prevent excessive competition, but as Gips noted, it tended to discourage activity of efficient agents while contributing to the inefficiency of established agents. He did not believe that the energetic attempts to attract business of an agent outside his area should be restricted, even if it interfered with a local agent. According to Gips, the latter had the advantage of being on the spot and thus he should have no problem taking on the competition. If he failed, it proved his inefficiency. As long as the New York agents observed the through booking rule, obligating the agents to sell a railroad ticket to the final destination along with the prepaid passage, the lines seemed to tolerate the practice.

Most of the eastbound passengers kept on buying their tickets in New York shortly before the departure of the steamer, making it hard for companies to estimate the spare capacity long beforehand and to try to fill it with something else. Return migrants made their way to one of the New York agents with whom they corresponded beforehand, in order to limit their stay in New York as much as possible. As lines sought to restrict the armada of agents to enhance control over them, concentration of the business was likely to be preferred at the place where the lines had their head-quarters. It

⁶⁰⁹ Rosett had various in New York and one in Youngstown Ohio, but complaints kept on flowing in of using subagents in other territories. As has been mentioned Zotti opened branches in Chicago and Pittsburgh, Kass one in Philadelphia, ...

explains why an important part of the American ticket sale kept on being transacted through New York agents.⁶¹⁰

Overall, the control over the agents greatly improved even though it was never big enough to allow a strict implementation of the rules. The relative harmony among the lines drastically reduced the brokers and agents' opportunities to play the companies against each other and to corrupt the business. This harmony was never complete, always leaving room for opportunistic behavior, yet the opening of joint offices underline the improved collaboration between the lines.

3) Joint Ticket Offices

To put an end to the numerous abuses midway through the 1890s the shipping companies had tried to cut out the middlemen by restricting the sale of ocean passage tickets in New York to the offices of the shipping companies. The drastic measure of vertical integration clamorously failed yet it underscored the desire of the lines to concentrate the business. To do so, they continued opening new company offices in the biggest cities and key transit points on both sides of the Atlantic during the following decades. As the collaboration between the companies improved, an increasing number of lines decided to rationalize by merging their offices to reduce the costs.

When opening new offices at key locations companies partly recouped the extra costs by increasing the direct bookings for steerage and cabin passengers. If established in cities where a general agent managed the business, the company took over his tasks of coordinating the agent-network in the area, keeping the one dollar extra commission paid on each ticket for themselves. Smaller companies, such as the HAL, trailed the bigger companies in doing this. Yet, the opening of new offices of rival lines created opportunities to hire the former general agents of competitors who were forced to take a step down. Often having a wider network of sub-agents than the general agents of the HAL, and keen to retain as much business as possible, these new general agents proved to be an asset to the HAL. In Boston, for instance they hired F. Houghton & Company a general agent for the New England states. The former general agents of the RSL and

⁶¹⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter April 21 1904 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min 502, February 5 1900; min 663 September 5 1901.

WSL were relegated to regular agents, when the INC decided to only have one representative for both the RSL and American Line in the area. He received the same financial responsibilities as Thomas Cook & Son (San Francisco) and Bartlett Catrow (Philadelphia). He received \$2 per cabin and \$1 per steerage passenger booked in his area. The HAL transferred an annual contribution of \$500 for advertisements, telegram, postage and other expenses.

However, not all general passenger agents received the same conditions. The foreign department of the International Bank in Saint Louis received 2.5 percent commission on first-class tickets, \$1.5 on second-cabin and one \$1 on third-class. The HAL gave them \$100 for expenses. The Dutch line mistrusted the bank however and looked for a substitute. Van den Toorn suggested appointing R. Bain, the general agent of the WSL and representative of Thomas Cook. The business of the WSL was not in conflict with that of the HAL and the collaboration with a first-class steamship line would add to the company's prestige. At a meeting in New York, Van den Toorn reached an agreement with Bruce Ismay, the manager of the line who welcomed the opportunity to reduce the costs of the office adding up to \$8000 a year. Cook covered \$1000, the HAL \$1500 and WSL the rest -including the general passenger agent's commission. The Dutch line budgeted \$350 for advertising expenses. Van den Toorn wanted to appoint many WSL sub-agents for the HAL in the region including Missouri, Arkansas, Texas and Louisiana. Frequent visits of the HAL-travelers were planned to stimulate the agents in these states Moreover, the collaboration offered the opportunity to start business in the unexploited Indian territory and Oklahoma, which showed promising perspectives. Many Germans lived in the Southwest yet they had not drawn much business from the area. Moreover, van den Toorn believed that the agreement could be a stepping stone to a more intense collaboration similar to the one existing between RSL and AL honoring each other's tickets. The agreement was valid for a year and could be ended with three months notice.⁶¹¹

With the joint general agency both firms extended their collaboration, which had started a decade earlier, when the Dutch line started buying the old steamers from the British line for their service. The HAL opted to follow the WSL policy centering its

⁶¹¹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters April 1, November 25 1898.

efforts on service rather than speed.⁶¹² In the meantime, the HAL had allowed their own ships to be built by Harland & Wolf, the same shipbuilders as the WSL vessels, yet the good relations between the lines remained.⁶¹³ The fact that Genken Wierdsma, son of the HAL director and later general agent of New York, did an apprenticeship at the British company in Liverpool, under Ismay, underlines this.⁶¹⁴ The joint agency proved to be successful and they extended the practice to the northwestern territories. However, to gain a solid footing in the territories west of Chicago, Van den Toorn appointed a traveler, Van der Stadt to cover Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado and Kansas. He considered it of the greatest importance that for the next few years the territory would be continuously visited in order to appoint the right kind of agents and encourage them to book for the HAL. Frequent visits to Bain were also necessary to put some pressure on him; otherwise most of his bookings went to the WSL.⁶¹⁵

The IMM took the rationalization of the business administration a step further. The members of the combine made an agreement on the interchangeability of the cabin-class tickets, giving the demanding tourists more flexibility to organize their trip.⁶¹⁶ These could be exchanged at the growing number of joint offices which opened on both sides of the Atlantic. Instead of appointing commission based general agents, the combine encouraged the practice of appointing salaried managers to run the offices. P. Wright pressured the HAL to join, yet Wierdsma was reluctant to take him on. Giving up the offices in New York and Chicago was out of the question, but even in other places, such as Boston the head-agent felt inclined to work with their own agents. Through these

⁶¹² In 1888 they started with buying the *Baltic* and the *Republic* followed by the *Arabic*. From 1895 onwards as the reputation of the Line grew the company started building their own ships. If wanted to continue their growth they could not permit to become the known as the line that polished up the scrap boats of its rivals. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Directors, 265, Correspondence Wierdsma, Letter October 14 1888 and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters October 5 1888, October 29 1889, September 10 1895.

⁶¹³ As Van den Toorn put in 1898: "with our new material we no longer lag behind the other lines so even during slumps we now manage to remain competitive". GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt archief, A 12, 1-2, annual report 1898.

⁶¹⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, Letter April 28 1891.

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.* Letter June 3 1901 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters February 2 and April 19, 1901.

⁶¹⁶ Members to the agreement committed to exchange cabin tickets for all their steamers without extra payment as long as the price of the ticket isn't lower than the minimum cabin rate of said steamer. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letter February 20, April 17 1903.

these three offices, the company secured 95% of their bookings.⁶¹⁷ The Dutch line agreed for a trial period in St Louis, Minneapolis, San Francisco and New Orleans where the companies divided the costs of exploitation according to the business received through the joint offices.⁶¹⁸ Joint advertisements in leading newspapers in these regions also represented an effective strategy to cut costs and quickly spread to other places such as Buffalo and Baltimore. All parties to the agreement could pull out without notice.

Although it allowed them to also save on commission, Wierdsma doubted as to whether it was worth the risk of losing a big part of the business to the RSL or other joint office members. Especially in New England, from where they drew a lot more business than the RSL, they feared losing bookings. When the initial results, except for those in Minnesota, proved relatively satisfying, the HAL agreed to concede for Boston as well. As part of a compromise they retained F. Houghton as their general agent, yet he moved to the IMM buildings where Maynard & Child managed the business for the combine no longer on commission, but instead on a salary basis. Both could book for all the lines. Montreal and Toronto, which had initially remained under the management of a separate general agent, soon followed suit. As the business expanded further west, the lines opened another joint office in Winnipeg.⁶¹⁹ The IMM pressured the HAL to move in their Chicago office, yet the New York head-agent made it clear of having no intentions whatsoever to give up the control over their Chicago and New York offices through which they did the bulk of the bookings.

⁶¹⁷ As the HAL depended largely on the Russian passengers, many of whom remained in New York these percentages are likely to have been higher than for steamship lines tapping from other ethnic markets showing greater tendencies to spread throughout the country. Nevertheless for all the steamship companies alike American ocean passage sales concentrated in New York and Chicago throughout the period.

⁶¹⁸ The territory was divided as follows: Toronto, the Province of Ontario; Montreal, the rest of Canada; San Francisco, Oregon, California, Nevada and southern part of Idaho; St Louis, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Indian territory and territory of Arizona, Oklahoma and New Mexico; Minneapolis, north and South Dakota, Washington, Minnesota, Montana, Northern part of Wisconsin and Idaho, upper peninsular of Michigan; Chicago, all the territory reporting to Minneapolis plus, southern part of Wisconsin states of Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and parts of Michigan and Indiana; Boston included the maritime provinces, New Brunswick, Prince Edwards Islands, Nova Scotia and parts of New England still to be determined. *Ibid.*, Letter February 17 1902.

⁶¹⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letter January 27, February 20, March 24, December 8 1903, December 8 1904, December 12, 15 1905; December 7, 14 1906; December 16 1907; December 18 1908; August 20 1910; January 14 1911 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter January 4, 1904 March 14 1911.

The percentage of the other outside offices remained low, yet as noted by Wierdsma small things can add up to big differences. When the IMM suggested opening a new joint office in Pittsburgh, the HAL politely declined any interest. After the initial stage of encouraging results, the enthusiasm for the joint offices rapidly ran sour as the bookings decreased. By 1913, the HAL withdrew from the Minneapolis and Boston joint offices opening their own and appointed David Brattstrom & Company as general agent in Seattle for the states of Idaho, Washington and Oregon.⁶²⁰

The joint offices proved effective in reducing the costs of exploitation, yet the number of bookings ebbed which increased the mistrust of the Dutch line of IMM of them using the joint agencies to gradually take over their market share. The apprehension in getting a fair representation for the line at those offices always prevailed. Morgan clearly attempted to introduce the same business structures that proved successful for railroads and steal enterprises into steam shipping. Instead of working with commission based general agents he appointed salaried ‘managers’, such as Maynard & Child in Boston, to supervise a subdivision of the business. Yet the HAL and the German lines, with which the IMM made separate agreements, could never be convinced to fully centralize the administration for the American market and even less so on the European continent. Even the lines forming part of the IMM merger remained a federation of the autonomous lines. Contrary to railroads the gains from administrative coordination were far less significant in shipping (Chandler, 1977, 189-192). The horizontal combination of the shipping companies increased over the years, but never enough to allow a far-reaching vertical integration to take place and cut off the various layers of middlemen from the ocean passage trade. As the importance of the steamship tickets sales for banking business increased, the ‘bigger’ commercial banks and trusts moved in the market previously controlled by unincorporated ‘smaller’ immigrant banks.

4) Immigrant banks vs. American banks: their profile, marketing strategies, banking methods and legislation

⁶²⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 49-58, Letters December 6 1912 and February 21 1913 GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, March 14 1911; April 4, 10, June 6 1913

Migrants contributed to the rapid growth of saving banks during the nineteenth century. Research showed that fifty percent of the new accounts at the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society were opened by foreign-born, who at the same time represented a much smaller proportion of the city population. But, the financial institution did not fully value these new clients, at first, especially because of the way they used their accounts. Migrants opened accounts for short term target accumulation as part of their migration strategy, either moving elsewhere in the US or returning home. For the increasingly mobile migrant community, these accounts met their liquidity needs. Migrants effectuated more transactions and closed their account more rapidly than natives. Among the various ethnicities, new migrants built up their balances and closed their account more quickly than the old-stock migrants. With a few exceptions, savings institutions were generally hostile to short-term saving depositors. Partly due to legal constraints, these banks reinvested in long term placements. Short term migrant-deposit accounts, which could be demanded on short notice threatened the stability of the institutions. The Philadelphia Saving Fund Society's attempts to change migrants' use of their accounts proved unsuccessful. As they also required a lot of paperwork in return for small earnings, savings banks made no special efforts to attract migrants and often were unwelcoming and unaccommodating for them. They did little to invest in language skills and did not provide special assistance which migrants required (Dillingham Reports, vol 37, 1911, 215-216; Alter et al, 1994, 735-767 and Wadhvani, 2002, 46-62). Therefore migrants predominantly turned to the immigrant banks.

4.1) The profile of the Immigrant banker or Migrant agent

Due to lack of first hand material from immigrant banks research has been constricted to the use of volume 37 of the Dillingham Commission Reports in the analysis. To complement and test the findings of the Dillingham Commission wherever possible, sporadic reports of HAL travelers on the agent-network in certain regions from 1904 to 1913 are used. Shipping companies appointed these 'travelers' to promote the line among the agents. They also controlled whether migrant agents and brokers observed the conference rules and if the company received a fair share of the business. Travelers

pressured the agents that failed to produce satisfying results to increase their bookings or to replace them by other agents. Their reports also served to evaluate the local market conditions and future business perspectives. Whenever possible, travelers also tried to encourage migration directly. For instance, when strikes broke out in coal mines Schleissner traveled to the region to ensure bookings. Or, when visiting the Dutch colonies in California the HAL traveler Mr. Van der Laan tried to stimulate the residents to write home to convince people to follow in their footsteps.⁶²¹ When doing this, travelers used many precautions not to leave any traces of the company's direct involvement. The reports of these travelers allow for refining the activities and profile of immigrant bankers as outlined by the Dillingham Commission. The commission's report was influenced by the economic crisis preceding the investigation and by the nativists' prejudices towards the new immigrants. The commission described immigrant-banks, which were predominantly located in new immigrant communities, as follows:

“These banks bear little resemblance to regular banking institutions. They are without real capital have little or no legal responsibility, and for the most part are entirely without legal control. Immigrant bankers, as a rule, are also steamship-ticket agents, and usually conduct some other business as well. Consequently the "banks" are, for the most part, located in groceries, saloons, or other establishments which are natural gathering places for immigrants.

Besides handling the savings of his patrons, the immigrant banker performs for them many necessary services. He writes their letters receives their mail and is their general adviser in what to them are important affairs. The ability and willingness of the banker to render such services naturally gives him an advantage over regular banking institutions, which would not, and, in fact, could not, attend to such matters. In this way immigrant banks and immigrant bankers are important factors in the life of the newer immigrants (Report of Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 37, 204).”

According to the Dillingham Commission, the predominant feature of the immigrant banking consisted of its interdependency with selling steamship tickets. Of the 116 banks the commission investigated, 94% combined both. Migrant trusted their money with steamship-agents with the same ethnic background, representing well known lines rather than American banking institutions. They did this for safekeeping rather than investments, not expecting any interests on it. Because of this, trust steamship agents quickly accumulated capital and developed banking functions. The steamship agency was

⁶²¹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letters November 26 1897, May 22 1902.

the most general antecedent of the immigrant bank. Providing banking services allowed most agents to quickly expand their business.⁶²² The Dillingham Commission described these representatives as, intelligent men possessing considerable influence in immigrant communities, that with their good command of English could provide essential services to newly arrived, illiterate immigrants. Involvement in the local church or ethnic societies of all sorts increased their prestige in the community.⁶²³ Sharing ethnic ties with patrons was essential. Sometimes these ties needed to go as far back as the province of origin, yet most bankers' potential to draw clients depended on their language skills. Compatriots represented the easiest targets but the longer the banker stayed in business, the easier it became to break through ethnic barriers. The location of the office in official buildings for instance helped with this.⁶²⁴ But, the longer the immigrant remained in the US, the less importance he attached to ethnic ties. Besides ocean passage sales and migrant banking the majority of these entrepreneurs also carried out some other type of related business. Out of a sample taken, banks combined one or more of the following; notaries office (40), real estate, rental, insurance and collecting agencies (27), saloon keepers (21), grocers, butchers, and fruit venders (14), labor agencies (13), book, jewelry and foreign novelty stores (12); postal substations (11), general merchants (9), boarding bosses (8), wholesalers and importers (7), barbers (2), printers (2), pool-room keepers (2), furniture dealer (1) and one undertaker. Eighty percent of these banks were not only privately, but also individually and locally, owned. Only a dozen New York banks had branches in the interior. Others rarely did, except in some cases, but always in the vicinity of the main office. The Commission underlined that the conference rules restricting the agents' sale of steamship tickets to the office he had been appointed to, limited the propagation of

⁶²² For instance in Youngstown Ohio a leading iron and steel center one of the five HAL agents in the city G. Hamory managed to rapidly increase his business by adding a savings department to his steamship ticket office. *Ibid.* Letter October 18 1906

⁶²³ A young lawyer, Frank Burszynski owed his appointment as a HAL agent because of his presidency of several polish societies and recent election as member of the Polish Assembly of his district in Buffalo. A Rusin thanked his appointment in Syracuse being the brother of and living together with the priest of the Polish Roman Catholic Church. Rusin claimed that 5000 Poles were connected to the church which assured him a good base to draw from. Sometimes the link was even more direct as the appointment of V. Alexand, Russian priest of the local church in Ansonia illustrates. *Ibid.* Letter November 2 1906 February 9 1909.

⁶²⁴ The HAL agents Westerhoff and Peolstra who controlled the Dutch business in Patterson, New Jersey reported that the opening a branch office in the Post Office building of city allowed them to establish contacts with Poles and Russians. In two they sold twelve tickets to Poles opening promising perspectives. *Ibid.* Letter July 29 1910.

branch offices. It classified the immigrant banks into three types. The first, a minority, consisted of state incorporated banks, highly organized and thoroughly responsible. Second, the majority investigated by the commission were steamship, labor and real estate agencies advertising banking services without legal authorization. A third predominant type consisted of grocers, saloon keepers, boarding bosses etc. for whom banking activities were incidental and conducted in a very irresponsible way. In some cases these classes overlapped somewhat (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 206-214, 222-226). What the Commission did not underline is that most banks of the second and third category were run as a family business. Sons, daughters and women played an important role assisting in, or even managing, the business.⁶²⁵

4.2) The variety of extra services offered

The variety of parallel business activities immigrant bankers combined reflects the number of extra services rendered to newcomers and explains why they attracted immigrants. Directly or indirectly immigrants often secured work through these banks on which they could rely for credit, when they were in-between jobs. Especially Greeks and Italians known for their 'padrone' system combined immigrant banking with labor agencies, much more than Slavs and Jews (Day, 2002, 72). Many unskilled migrants filled seasonal occupations and needed to survive bleak periods. The agents were also an important link with the fatherland by managing the correspondence of their patrons. As legal advisers and notaries they assisted them in settling disputes and irregularities, both at home and in the US. He obtained all sorts of legal documents such as birth, death, marriage or leave of absences for military service certificates, settled wage, heritage and property issues, etc. For instance, when traveling through Pennsylvania, Henry

⁶²⁵ Agent Rainke of Frankford was hardly ever home leaving the business to his wife. After the death of Mr. Roth of Roth, Firestone & Co in Mckeesport his sons and son in law took over the business. J. Klauck, the biggest agent in Buffalo received assistance of his son and two daughters. In the same city the daughter of F. Grosky managed the business, yet when she remarried the and left her parents, sales rapidly decreased. Mrs. De Booy assured that all the Dutch business of the surroundings of Kenosha went through the HAL. Mrs Dejaegher of Moline, a small industrial center for Agricultural implements dealt with the Belgians. Finally traveler C. Van de Stadt labeled Mrs. J. Chemma as best HAL-agent of South Chicago. Wisconsin went to the HAL. *Ibid.* Letters September 28 October 18, November 2 1906, July 24, 30 1907 and April 4 1908.

Schleissner reported that agents frantically helped their patrons to obtain their naturalization papers before the more restrictive laws went into effect.⁶²⁶ Through shipping companies and the network of migrant agents on both sides of the Atlantic the information on immigration and naturalization regulations quickly spread, allowing migrants to be very responsive to these.⁶²⁷ Furthermore, these mediators often carried a line of novelty products from the home country which strongly appealed to the newcomers. Through the services, they developed a paternalistic attitude which was especially pronounced among boarding bosses (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 206-214, 222-226).

The newly arrived, working in industrial communities, usually relied on the 'boarding boss' system for accommodation. This group household offered washing, cooking and lodging for \$2 to \$3 a month. Willing to be crowded into a room, which only served for sleeping purposes, allowed them to reduce the cost per capita. Moreover, by buying food and preparing it in groups immigrants kept monthly living expenses below \$15. The Commission analyzed the average annual wage of more than 22,000 immigrants, eighteen years of age or older, which amounted to \$455 (Lauck, 1912, 207).⁶²⁸ An unskilled newcomer, right of the boat earned less than this average of \$38 a month, yet by denying himself many comforts thrifty migrants managed to save relatively quickly (Hourwich, 1911, 632-633). As a Croatian boarding boss testified to the Commission his boarders deposited ten to \$20 a month with him. A Bulgarian banker even mentions \$30 (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 242, 316). As Eva Morawska showed at the turn of the century Southern and Eastern laborers managed to save 60 to 70 percent of their monthly earnings (Morawska, 1991, 280). Finally, the greater accessibility of immigrant banks, as opposed to American banks both because of the more familiar

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.* Letter September 28 1906.

⁶²⁷ The responsiveness to migrant regulation and impact on chain migration patterns has been underlined by G. Jasso and M. Rosenzweig for later periods (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1987, 1212-1244).

⁶²⁸ Lauck was a member of the Dillingham commission. The collection of German migrant letters shows that boarding houses offered good housing alternatives for migrants seeking opportunities outside their family network throughout the nineteenth century. Prices for board and lodging are sparse but they do not indicate great fluctuations. In 1855 Martin Weitz paid 9 dollars for a German boarding house in Rockville, Ct. Matthias Dorgathen mentions 14 to 15 dollars in mine districts in 1881 (Kamphoefner, et. al., 1991, 344, 428). Abbott's estimates of unskilled laborers' daily wages in 1905 fluctuated between 1,37\$ and 1,57\$ in 1890 (Abbott. 1905, 358).

environment and the longer opening hours all contributed to the competitive advantage of the former. Advertising campaigns made sure it stayed that way.

4.3) Advertisements

Advertising campaigns of the HAL mainly focused on promoting the cabin class passage.⁶²⁹ These advertisements added prestige to the line, which indirectly positively influenced third-class bookings. Various excursions and special rates for conferences also contributed to the reputation of the line among all classes of passengers; like the Knights Templar or Magyar excursion; the Young men's Christian Association conference in Basel; and the Americanists conference in New York.⁶³⁰ Reports on these gave the company extra publicity in the press and helped in building a reputation among certain target groups. Schleissner reported that the daily articles published by Mr Kohany, HAL-agent and editor of the *Szabadsag*, some of which were taken over by the Austrian-Hungarian press in Europe, greatly contributed to the increase in popularity of the line among the Hungarian community.⁶³¹

The company only promoted steerage passage explicitly on rare occasions. For instance, to counter the attacks of Zotti or with the increased competition for the Jewish market caused by the RVF, they placed ads in the four biggest Hebrew dailies in New York. Conference agreements between the lines regulated the ads in the foreign language press to neutralize excessive campaigns caused by competition. The members handed a list of the papers they advertised to the secretary. Any line could freely advertise in any of these papers. If they wanted to enlarge the list, the secretary needed to be informed. When one company published in a certain paper, others usually followed- especially if the owner also acted as migrant agent for the lines. This way of creating goodwill with

⁶²⁹ Same goes for other companies. M. Merck, director of the HAPAG (1896-1919) recalled in his memoirs that Ballin attached enormous importance to advertising. He established a 'literary department' led by K. Thiess and K. Himer who constantly provided the German and foreign press with praising articles about the company. According to Merck you couldn't open a German newspaper without bumping into HAPAG somewhere before WOI. They also drew brochures. All the other advertising material ranging from rate sheets, posters, pamphlets etc were looked after by the separate printing office. Hamburg Staatsarchiv, HAPAG, 622-1, Erinnerungen Merck.

⁶³⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letters November 2 1897; January 14 1898; April 24 1902; May 15 1906.

⁶³¹ *Ibid.* Letter October 26 1906.

agents to favor bookings for a certain line was a hidden form of extra commission which the conference agreements tried neutralize. In 1908 it was decided that; “*no lines should advertise in any publication of any sort published directly or indirectly by agents.*”⁶³² The rules also stipulated that papers attacking a line would lose support from all the members. Yet generally migrant brokers and agents took responsibility for advertising their business, including the sales of passage tickets and the steamship lines they represented. Through the general agents, steamship lines provided the agents with handbooks, illustrated publications, pocket books, agenda’s, show-cards, posters, steel plates, pamphlets, guides, almanacs, time and rate sheets, etc. Up to 1907, the HAL directors still printed most of these materials in various languages in Rotterdam, despite the repeated requests of the New York head-agent to give him *carte blanche* on these matters.

If migrant agents advertised through means other than the materials provided such as newspaper ads, they did this at their own cost. Many agents printed their own booklets, rate sheets etc. Conference rules stipulated that agents could not make any comparisons between the lines in their ads. Also, when advertising, all the names of the lines represented needed to be included (Stevens, 1914, 125).⁶³³ That many agents also published their own newspaper, did not escape the attention of the Dillingham Commission. They strongly opposed the combination of banks, employment and steamship agencies with foreign language press, accusing the banks of using the newspapers to delay the Americanization process in order to protect their source of income. Advertisements aimed at stimulating migration, underlining favorable labor conditions, and offering to advance the money for the ocean passage. One ad required only \$3 of an advance payment. Agents also sent mailing packages of printed matter to their regular and prospective customers containing the following: a general paternalist circular offering free advice in all matters to gain confidence of countrymen, a second circular explaining how to transfer money back home through the bank, a third including a money-forwarding rate list, an address book to fill out the names and addresses of countrymen living in his locality, transmission slips for deposits and withdrawals, post-

⁶³² GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Department, 49-58, Letter April 4 1912.

⁶³³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 564, min. 598, October 4 1900 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letter December 7, 10 1906.

office money-order application blanks, business cards, a steamship-ticket poster, a sailing list, return addressed cards and envelopes.⁶³⁴ Their offices were decorated with numerous posters of steamship lines, even if they did not represent them, to attract the clients for other businesses (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 228-231).

This way of advertising through correspondence helps in explaining how 95 percent of the bookings occurred through Chicago, Boston and New York. With this form of direct marketing, keeping address lists of former and potential clients was of capital importance for migrant agents. As discussed before, the unauthorized Hungarian agents Lengyel, Kraus & Company had a list of at least 10,000 such clients. We can only guess as to how big the lists of well-established migrant brokers were. Spreading little address books was one way of enlarging the list, but surely newspapers acquired through subscription also greatly helped. The importance is illustrated by the reluctance of the HAL to appoint the Olin Brothers as conference agents in their fight against the Uranium Line. The agents were cousins of the conference agent, A. Mandel, who gave them a training in banking and passage business. Yet, they left, on the first possible opportunity, with his address lists through which they artificially accumulated business to the detriment of Mandel. The HAL decided to stay loyal to Mandel, who had given the line on average \$50,000 worth of business annually, over a decade. Along with the use of peddlers and runners, sending circulars based on a meticulously well-kept database of potential clients represented the two most important ways for migrant agents to attract customers.⁶³⁵

4.4) Banking methods

⁶³⁴ The HAL started doing this directly on a large scale for their cabin business in January 1907. Besides newspaper ads the Dutch Line sent 12000 special individual circulars to selected physicians, college professors, art teachers, school teachers and principals receiving good incomes, artists, selected dress makers, milliners, and wealthy subordinates in Connecticut, New Jersey and New York States including the first cabin rates and sailings. Further about 10.000 circulars in German addressed to selected German tradesmen covering greater New York and Jersey towns enclosing second cabin pamphlets with rates and sailings. They further distributed 5000 of each in Chicago, 7500 in Boston, 2500 in San Francisco and 5000 in St. Louis and Kansas. In the meantime they had also started printing their own 'Holland America Line Monthly' for the same purposes with apparent success. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226 Letter December 13 1906.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.* Letter June 15 1911. An investigation into the runners and peddlers in New York State estimated their number at *probably* 5000 to 6000 and *at least* 3000 (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 228).

The four main banking services offered were deposits, loans, money exchange and remittances. Other than savings banks, only a minority of the immigrant banks paid interests on deposits. Patrons deposited the money for safekeeping, until enough was accumulated for a remittance or the purchase of a steamship ticket. Deposits were even for shorter terms than in savings banks. Migrants rarely left their money for longer than a year, three months being the average. One hundred dollars appeared to be the limit of accumulation of savings money. Because of the lack of control on these banks often their bookkeeping practices remained basic while they could dispose of the money entrusted to them as they wished. The migrant enjoyed very little protection against abuses. As proof of his deposit, he usually only received a receipt. Immigrant bankers reinvested the money in their own business; redeposited it at 2 to 4 percent interest, with regular banks or invested in real estate and stock. Nevertheless, banks claimed that all deposits were subject to immediate withdrawal on demand. This was usually done only when returning to Europe. When moving somewhere else in the US, migrants often continued using the same bank through correspondence. Therefore, New York bankers located at the main port of arrival found themselves in a privileged position to bind the newcomers to their business. It explains the much higher concentration of immigrant banks in that state than any other.⁶³⁶

These unofficial financial institutions also offered loans. The most common form consisted in advancing the money for steamship tickets, and in a few cases for a remittance home or food supplies. The banker required no security for the transaction, it being of personal and private nature. Only the biggest banks made loans against an interest of 5 to 7 percent, but these were exceptional. Most of the money exchange business occurred in New York. Prepaid passengers exchanged their money before continuing their journey inland, while return passengers did not convert their dollars to another currency before reaching the port of departure (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 237-258).

⁶³⁶ In New York State a special commission estimated their number around 1000. Not including bankers of class such as grocers, shopkeepers, barbers etc. the Dillingham Commission counted 575 immigrant banks in Illinois, 410 in Pennsylvania, 175 in Massachusetts, Ohio 150, New Jersey 80, Wisconsin 60, Connecticut 65, and other states approximately 50 (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 213).

For deposits, exchanges, ticket sales and loans, immigrant banks acted autonomously, yet for transmitting money to Europe, the most important transaction of their business, they relied on other institutions. A number of large banking houses in New York City dominated the remittance business because of their extended network of foreign correspondents, through which they offered immigrant banks ready facilities for transmission to small European towns. This way the small bank did not need to maintain balances or clearing reserves abroad. They provided immigrant banks with printed money-order forms, allowing them to use their name and reputation yet without taking any responsibility for their actions, seeing them as mere correspondents, not as agents. The system used for prepaids also applied to money orders, consisting of a stub to be retained by the immigrant bank as a record, an advice or direction slip to be returned to the banking house, an advice slip to be sent to the payee, and a receipt for the purchaser. To attract this business, New York banking houses and some steamship companies involved in foreign exchange advertised in newspapers, employed solicitors and sent circulars. The estimate of the Dillingham Commission for 1907 indicates the importance of this business. Migrants remitted approximately 275 million dollars to Europe, half of which went through immigrant banks. This amount equals 20 % of the net annual growth in the individual deposits in all American banks and trust companies combined for that same year. Banks involved earned a commission of anywhere between one to three percent (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 260-284; Wadhvani, 2002, 48).

The Dillingham Commission did not mention the names of their subjects of study but specified that an Italian shipping company also engaged in the money transfer market. As seen previously, even during the 1890s some shipping lines launched themselves in the money transfer market. Less for financial gain they used the market to counter the competition of migrant brokers and as a marketing strategy to contact potential clients and to anticipate laws prohibiting the sale of prepaid tickets. Some migrants still preferred to transfer money rather than sending a prepaid ticket. By offering that possibility the lines hoped to influence their route along with doing the transfer. It may be a mere coincidence; however it is worthwhile to note that the average remittance in 1907

amounted to \$35.18, approximately the equivalent amount of a steamship ticket.⁶³⁷ The HAL also experimented with transfers during the 1890s yet quickly abandoned the project. The Vienna office of the company pushed re-entering that business in 1908 and 1914 as a means to increase the third-class business, yet New York strongly objected:

“Opening a money transfer department would never become sufficiently important to compensate all the trouble and responsibility attached to it. We can’t merely advise agents that we will accept money for transmission to addresses on the other side, but in view of the care, accuracy and promptness that the business requires we would have to establish a full-fledged money department. HAPAG some years ago maintained a money sending department for a time, but did away with it due to unsatisfactory results. The RSL still maintains such department more as a part of the IMM traveler cheques and money order branch, than as a typical RSL institution. The RSL have their money order business in the hands of most of their agents, and handle enough business to pay two experienced clerks employed constantly at the department. There is positively no financial profit in it, as the competition with other money order firms and the post offices, forces the exchange rate to the lowest level, while on the other hand they run the additional risks if an agents remains in default or fails to lose the money not only for the outstanding tickets but also of the money orders. Yet RSL does believe that it helps the business in a general way and the Antwerp offices cherishes the idea that it allows them to collect addresses, giving the opportunity to get in touch with them and secure whatever cash business, connected with it, but the sale of prepaids does not seem to profit from that. In regards to draw up a database with interesting addresses we could obtain this by having the purser collect these from all eastbound passengers whereto they are returning in Europe. But if you want us to experiment to increase the cash business on your side, more than willing to do so.”⁶³⁸

This fragment illustrates the far-reaching connections between shipping and banking worlds. Despite the fierce competition of important New York banking houses, the IMM managed to maintain its position on the money transfer market and this was to the great consternation of the American Express Company. Not all lines agreed on the profitability and advantages of the system. That the IMM persisted sits well with the business philosophy of financiers, who pursued vertical integration through direct marketing.

4.5) Legislation

⁶³⁷ The average per nationality amounted to 28,5 dollars for Italians, Greeks 37, Hungarians 30, Hebrew 33, Poles 36, Croats 42 and Bulgarians 68 (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 277).

⁶³⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.03 Passage Department, 168, Letter April 2 1914.

The panic of 1907/8 exposed the weaknesses of the system. Escaping any legal supervision, most immigrant banks started out without much capital and maintained little reserve. Without restrictions on how to reinvest the money, a lot of bankers found themselves unable to meet the liquidity demands of the great number of people jointly withdrawing their deposits. A lot of the bankers did not hold out and many others absconded; while no laws existed which prevented them from doing this. The panic demonstrated that the speculative banks' assets fell largely short of their liabilities. Gips reported that, especially the Jewish banks on the Eastside and in Brooklyn crashed, some of which he did not expect to. As the line had developed the habit of holding their agents under bond and only handing out books of five or ten steamship tickets at a time, they were covered for losses.⁶³⁹ The immigrants, on the contrary, had no protection. The Commission underlined that most of the immigrant banks were honestly conducted and pointed to the fact the better managed ones continued to lend out money during the panic, while American Banks no longer could. Yet, the lack of any legal base to support the whole system made it impossible for the migrant to pin down the responsibility on someone in case of abuses while the situation of 1907/08 and subsequent failures showed the urgent need to regulate the business, according to the Dillingham Commission (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 248, 305-314).

In many states, laws regulating private banking existed, yet nearly all lacked the means to implement them. Only New Jersey (1907), Massachusetts (1905), New York (1907) and Ohio (1908) passed laws specifically for immigrant banking.⁶⁴⁰ They proved effective in the first two states, yet not so much in last two which failed to include measures for supervision. In general, they stipulated that if steamship or labor agents still wanted to combine their business with banking they needed to obtain a certificate from the authorities and file a bond up to \$20,000. The bond needed to be executed by two sureties, owners of real estate. The four states set fines for people doing banking business in violation of these laws. Out of fear of harming the American private banking interests, authorities were reluctant to pass a more restrictive and effective system. The crisis of

⁶³⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 211-226, Letters September 10 1897; March 10 1908.

⁶⁴⁰ Surprisingly the commission forgot to mention Connecticut. The State passed a law requiring agents handling money orders to place a bond of 10.000\$. It forced some agents like Herman Baurer of Union City both out of the money order and steamship ticket business. *Ibid.* Letter February 9 1908.

this time eventually convinced the last skeptical group, the New Yorkers, to follow the Dillingham Commission's advice. It recommended: (1) to collect a fee for licenses only to be issued after a control of the banking books and proof of property ownership of certain value, (2) a guarantee in cash to be deposited with the State, (3) frequent examination of the books and (4) requiring the maintenance a certain percentage of the money received in reserve. With the amendment of the statute of Private Banking on May 23 1910 only banks meeting these requirements could label themselves as such. Simultaneously, the state amended the Wells laws of 1907, regulating ticket agents requiring licenses to sell 'transportation tickets or orders for transportation to or from foreign countries'. This license needed to be obtained annually from the comptroller, upon proof of good moral character, for a fee \$25. A surety bond of \$1000 to \$2000 needed to be filed. When found guilty of fraud, misrepresentation or failing to account for any moneys paid in connection with the sale of tickets, or orders for transportation by steamship, the comptroller could revoke the license. People doing such business without a license were guilty of a misdemeanor. Pennsylvania soon followed suit (Day, 2002, 75; DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 317-333, 349-357).⁶⁴¹

Seventy five years after impositions regulating migrant agents and brokers began being introduced in Europe, American authorities undertook a similar initiative. The need to regulate the banking business, which had developed around the sales of ocean passage, led to the passage of these laws. Steamship companies welcomed the authorities' support, increasing the supervision on their sales.⁶⁴² Why it took so long for a country, which even during the 1840s pressured European governments to prevent abuses on the sales of steamship and American railroad tickets, to effectively regulate ticket sales at home is remarkable. The abuses were not really affecting nationals, however, the lack of pressure from the predominantly foreign business interests involved certainly played a role; yet further research is needed to explain the lacunae.

4.6) The elaboration of foreign departments of commercial banks and trusts

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.* Letters December 6 and 12 1911 and NYT "Immigrants' Savings" May 26 1910.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.* Letter August 30 1907.

Especially, American banks managing a foreign department urged for strict regulations to enable them to move in the market more rapidly. As the reports of the HAL travelers confirms, a growing number of American trusts, commercial and savings banks started targeting migrants at the turn of the century. They opened foreign departments staffed by managers and clerks from the targeted ethnic clienteles. The Philadelphia Saving Fund Society for instance started off by hiring a clerk assisting migrants with their money transfers overseas. By 1916 it ran a foreign department with clerks able to assist migrants in fifteen different languages. It adapted their investment policies on a more short term basis to meet with the demands of this market (Day, 2002, 70; DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 316; Wadhvani, 2002, 60-61). Their efforts concentrated in big cities and industrial centers, whereas in rural areas immigrant banks retained their position. For example, in Newcastle where the tin plate industry employed 8000 men at an average wage of \$1.9 a day, the Lawrence Savings & Trust Company acted as HAL agents. As the factories still needed more workers, the foreign department asked for extra copies of the third-class booklet, which they found very useful to increase their sales.⁶⁴³ Yet the sales of ocean passage did not only attract the lower class of immigrant laborers, but also the booming traveling public of Americans and ‘old-stock’ migrants. The names of the steamship-agents in Cincinnati illustrate both the growing importance of bigger banks in the business and that ethnic identification remained important for well established migrant communities. Traveler C. Van de Stadt labeled it as ‘German City’ where steamship business was entirely in the hands of the banks’ foreign offices. The First National Bank, German National Bank, Western German Bank, Atlas National Bank and Brightson German Bank strongly competed for the cabin-class passengers, even organizing their own excursions.⁶⁴⁴ The Dillingham Commission also documented this evolution pointing to Pittsburgh where national and state banks had absorbed the immigrant bank’s business in less than a decade. Their foreign departments were primarily directed to the sale of steamship tickets and handling of remittances. Their aggressive marketing strategies included advertising in foreign newspapers; sending broadcast circulars, pamphlets; all printed in different languages; the employment of

⁶⁴³ *Ibid.* Letter October 18 1906.

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Letter October 26 1906, June 5 1909.

solicitors traveling the country; and the opening of branch offices. All these measures contributed to their rapid ascendancy (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 219-220). Traveler Nyland stated that First National Bank in Pittsburgh had a foreign department with a working force of about 40 people. It quickly positioned itself as the most important factor for steamship business in that city, controlling sixty percent of the first-class business.⁶⁴⁵ This illustrates how serious American banks became about acquiring the business. It explains why some banks' foreign departments, like the Provident Savings Bank and Trust Company founded in 1902 developed into one of the largest American traveling agencies still operating as a subsidiary of the bank in the 1970s and selling trips worldwide up to this date (Born, 1977, 178). Yet national banks' dependency on the goodwill of the steamship companies to obtain their agencies put them in a weak position. As the manager of the foreign department of a leading banking house declared at the Dillingham Commission:

“The steamship and immigrant banking business are almost inseparable. As a matter of fact, the sale of foreign exchange follows upon the establishment of a steamship agency and rarely comes before. In view of this important relation it would appear that the steamship companies are entirely too free in the manner in which they establish agencies. A public suggestion to that effect might be a healthy one (DC Reports, 1911, vol. 37, 318).”

It explains the frustration of the American Express Company which must have been shared by many others pressing the State authorities to pass laws regulating the steamship ticket sales and immigrant banking. An increasing number of states did. The bonds made it harder for smaller agents to remain in the business, driving it into arms of the bigger concerns. But, sometimes these laws backfired. Because of a misinterpretation of the valuation for securities, assets and reserves new legislation passed in Pennsylvania the First National Bank was forced to close its doors to the great surprise of all the steamship lines. Yet , most of the outstanding business was already covered and they immediately appointed Mr. Rovensky, manager of the steamship department in the failed bank, who with his chief assistant W. Frank and W. McCormick had at once entered into a partnership under the name The National Steamship Agency of Pittsburgh. They swiftly moved up in the market by continuing the passenger business of their former employer

⁶⁴⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.03 Passage Department, 97, Letter February 21 1913.

and taking care of all bookings made by the First National Bank, still in process. While trying to restrict the numbers of representatives the pressures of obtaining the agency increased given the growing importance of passage sale in the banking world. Steamship companies never had any trouble in finding someone to fill the gap when an agent failed and retained the freedom of appointing whoever they wanted, despite the pressures of the American banking world.

5) Migrant agents/bankers: essential guides in the transatlantic migration process and barriers to vertical business integration

Apart from financial services such as money transfers, money exchanges, safeguarding earnings and giving credit immigrant bankers became, as Day put it: *“in a larger sense the economic and social gatekeepers of the American dream, whether that dream was bringing over family and friends from the old country, buying a property, getting a job, saving money or simply finding a place to live. They were central actors in the social networks that coordinated the process of immigrant relocation”* (Day, 2002, 67). The many business opportunities created by mass migration allowed established entrepreneurs to prosper from the relocation of co-ethnics. The sale of ocean passage tickets and basic banking operations played a central role in this ‘migrant business market’. The fact that American financial institutions initially showed little interest in attracting the migrant clientele because of their short term target accumulation, favored the development of an unofficial banking network based on ethnic ties. They escaped the supervision of state authorities, who only started to take interest in the matter because of the crisis of 1907 and the increasing interests of American banks to take over what they realized to be a lucrative market. The sale of ocean passage tickets was an essential element to penetrate this market and therefore a keen struggle to acquire the agency of steamship companies broke out.

The keen competition between the passenger lines during the 1880s stimulated the proliferation of migrant agents, making it relatively easy to get one’s hands on ticket books. Yet, with the increasing number of migrant agents, the shipping companies gradually lost control over their business. Organizing the network of migrant agents had been one of the main incentives for passenger lines to collude in shipping conferences.

However, the many rules and regulations to discipline the agents remained inconsequential as long as shipping companies failed to find an effective way to deter the lines from cheating on these agreements. Pooling the traffic represented the cornerstone, relieving the competitive pressures between the Continental lines, allowing them to pursue their common interest. By forcing the British lines to join the pool agreement, passenger lines increased their grip on the agent-network and finally started using the keen competition to obtain the shipping agency to their advantage. The Continental lines reduced the number of agents, withdrew the special facilities to tie certain agents to the company and stopped paying extra commissions- which greatly restricted the opportunities to tamper with the rules. They set up a special committee taking charge of the implementation and abuse of the conference regulations. To do this the committee relied on private detectives and the internal denouncements system.

These agents who needed the sale of ocean passage to attract clients and to develop other aspects of their migrant business started to be much more cooperative. With the harmony among the lines and the exclusive patronage system, loosing the conference agency meant loosing the access to ocean passage tickets since practically all passenger lines joined the agreement. Bit by bit the lines neutralized the conference violations which had destabilized the American market. The practice of drawing orders on European agents did not fully disappear because the higher commission and exchange rate still made it profitable for agents to sell these tickets instead of prepaids. As this occurred on a much smaller scale it no longer had the disruptive effect on the market as before 1896. By 1908, European cash orders seemed to have disappeared. With the commission fixed at \$2, no longer resorting to extra commission and fixing the railroad rates on both sides of the Atlantic agents were left with little opportunity to cut into transatlantic fares. Occasional rate cuts did not exceed \$1, significantly limiting the competitive advantage of migrant agents of using these in increasing their market share.

The lines managed to reduce the 'army' of peddlers and runners yet not to eliminate them. Some practices were so well-established such as selling tickets on installments through peddlers, that these seemed impossible to eradicate. To contain the situation the lines temporarily recognized a certain number of peddlers. Agents kept on using every window of opportunity to increase their business as the cattlemen bookings

illustrate. The ability of the Continental lines to prevent the low Mediterranean rates from significantly affecting the continental market illustrate the increased influence on the agents, yet at the same time it shows that lines could not permanently resist the strains. Moreover, strictly imposing conference rules such as prohibiting the agents to book continentals at Italian rates exposed the lines to accusations of violating the Anti-trust Act. Due to the importance of shipping business for immigrant banks the system also suffered from continuous pressures from outside agents. The lines could not prevent them from getting their hands on passage books through conference agents willingly taking the risks of being fined to increase their sales. In short, the situation was much more one of containment than control; the fragility of which was exposed whenever an outside line tried to penetrate the market. New lines never encountered problems to find agents who failed in obtaining a conference license to work for them. The low rates and higher commissions paid out allowed them to quickly acquire a market share for new lines that did not refrain from tempting and often with success conference agents booked for them. Exclusive patronage was difficult to maintain, especially in rural areas where the control was limited to scarce visits of company travellers. But again the situation never got out of hand, even when the lines gave up the fighting line against the RVF offering no alternatives to the agents to counter the very competitive rates. Shipping lines often overlooked some abuse, as long as the majority of the business kept on going their way, and because strictly implementing the conference rules would have cost a lot of money.⁶⁴⁶

It is noticeable that even the conflict with the Cunard Line did not corrupt the agent network, which had become much more loyal than prior to 1896. It underlines the market stability that the conference system established on the overseas passenger trade. As noted by Keeling these horizontal combinations were much more successful than similar entities attempted by American railroads in the 1870s and 80s (Keeling, 1999a, 198). Early railroading and overseas shipping companies encountered a lot of similar problems regarding to the principal-agent relations and delegating power. Moreover, both worlds have always been closely inter-related, yet as Chandler underlined the sheer volume of the railroads' economic operations greatly surpassed those of any other

⁶⁴⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.04 Passage Department, 221-226, Letter September 7 1906.

industry leading to its pioneering impact on business organization (Chandler, 1988, 215-218). However, apart from the business volume, other differences, such as the success of shipping conferences and the organizational features of the ocean passage trade, may explain why the merger movement in the shipping world only represented a '*pale imitation*' of what occurred in the railroad industry.

Maybe one of the reasons that the IMM also failed is that there was so little to rationalize. The way the shipping companies had organized the sale of ocean passage tickets was so cheap that only small benefits could be drawn from vertical integration. Why would a company want to integrate forward into marketing in a system where agents; (1) battled to sell the product, (2) advertised in local newspapers, hired canvassers and sent personal circulars at costs to promote the product, (3) provided offices nationwide at the heart of where the demand for the product centered, (4) provided market specific language skills and ethnic ties, (5) over which the company had no direct responsibility, and who had a bond protecting them from eventual losses (6) supplied information on rival lines and fellow salesmen, and all this for the modest commission of \$2 which more or less represented a mere ten percent of the profit made per ticket? Another dollar commission ensured that the network was supervised by general agent who took charge of the control and efficiency of the network for the shipping company. The financial benefits of opening joint offices, ran by salaried managers, in this system were negligible and certainly did not outweigh the organizational difficulties of guaranteeing equal returns for all lines- a problem which did not exist with general agents working under exclusive patronage.

Moreover, railroad agreements suffered much more from government pressures while shipping companies were spared these until much later. This freedom allowed the passenger lines to continuously improve the conference agreements governing their business over time. Other than American railroad magnates it allowed shipowners, predominantly Europeans, to retain most of the decision-making in 'family' hands limiting the need to delegate power to salaried managers. The rise of managing directors also took place in Europe, be at different paces from country to country and sector to sector; from which the shipping world did not escape this, as the ascendancy of Albert

Ballin clearly illustrates. But, families ties kept on dominating the pre-WOI European business world (Cassis, 2001, 63-88).

Chapter III: The ‘visible hand’ of the shipping lobby on US maritime and migration policies: the ship-subsidy and educational bills 1895-1905

As Claudia Goldin appropriately observed: “*The perplexing part of the legislative history of the US immigration restriction is its timing. More astonishing than the closing of the door in 1921 is that it remained open despite twenty five years of assault during which 17 million immigrants from among the poorest nations in Europe found refuge in America*” (Goldin, 1994, 223). The calls for restriction during this period focused on the passage of the literacy test, which was first suggested in academic circles and later picked up by Massachusetts Senator Henry C. Lodge. The most ardent defender of the measure in Congress first introduced it in 1896, constituting an important reorientation moment in US migration policy (Bemis, 1888 and Lodge, 1891, 27-36; Zolberg, 1996, 307). Goldin analyzed the influence of the foreign-born population in each state, the economic fluctuations and the actions of the various interest groups on the voting behavior of Congressmen on the literacy test- which was voted on seventeen occasions and vetoed three times before becoming law in 1917. The pressure groups discussed are the labor unions, capitalists, immigrants and agriculturalists of rural America, forming coalitions of strange bedfellows, cutting across party lines. Goldin ascribes the absence of radical restrictions before the outbreak of the War to shifting political interests, generally favorable economic times and sheer luck (Goldin, 1994, 252).

Yet, because of the lack of differentiation within the capitalists group Goldin overlooked an important sub-lobby faction which played a key role in opposing restrictive measures. As noted by Prescott Hall, secretary of the Immigration Restriction League: “*This test has already been adopted by the commonwealth of Australia and by British Colombia, and would have certainly been adopted here long since but for the opposition of the transportation companies*” (Hall, 1904, 183). Although the role of steamship companies in obstructing immigration restrictions from being adopted may have been exaggerated by the IRL, previous chapters pointed to the increased organization of passenger liners in cartels, enhancing the collaboration in defending

common interests. This happened while party politics declined and important institutional changes materialized, offering new means to interest groups to influence policies (Clemens, 1997; Kolko, 1963; Tichenor, 2002). Public opinion gained importance, hence mobilizing it became an integrated part of the shipping lobbies' strategies. How the lines reacted to the institutional changes, mobilized the public opinion and organized their lobby campaigns will be discussed here. This will be looked at, not only in the context of the establishment of the Immigration Protective League, but also the hiring of lobbyists to extend their influence among Congressmen. The latter increasingly relied on them both to obtain information on how to vote on bills and to formulate arguments to defend or oppose bills (Logan and Patten, 1929, 55-57; Clemens, 1997, 30).

The impact of these companies on the passage of immigration laws, and the implementation thereof, will be further discussed. Despite the non-passage of the literacy test, the racist approach gained grounds in American legislation and the selection process. The introduction of the 'list of races and people' in 1898 further differentiated the growing European immigration influx into various degrees of whiteness (Weil, 2003, 273). As the percentage of migrants from southern and eastern Europe surpassed the old stock of Northern and Western Europe, calls to restrict the influx based on the racist belief that the new wave threatened the integrity of the American race and institutions became more prevalent.⁶⁴⁷ During the Progressive Era more and more commissions were formed to investigate the true nature of the 'immigration problem' culminating with the formation of the Dillingham Commission (Zeidel, 2005). In the meantime no restrictions were adopted in Washington yet the racist ideology infiltrated controls stations, which was reflected by their interpretation and implementation of the existing laws.

Maybe even more astonishing than the tardy restrictions of immigration is that maritime policies, preventing the decline of the American merchant marine, were only adopted with the New Deal of President Roosevelt. Neither the Spanish-American War nor the formation of the International Merchant Marine Combine, by J.P. Morgan, moved Congress to alter the passive policy and revive the fleet under the Stars and Stripes. This failed to occur despite the presence of two Presidents, who openly defended a subsidy

⁶⁴⁷ In 1895, 54.7 percent of arrivals came from northern and western Europe and 43.2 percent from southern and eastern Europe. These numbers reversed in 1896 with 57 percent coming from Southern and Eastern Europe and 40 percent from northern Europe (Lund, 1994).

policy and who were backed by the Republican Party that openly supported subsidies (Vale, 1984, 51). The foreign flag dominated the lucrative migrant trade and went great lengths to keep it that way. The issue set up the foreign lines against the US International Navigation Company did not undermine the working of the cartel agreements.

The foreign control over the traffic reinforced the mistrust of American immigration inspectors and public opinion against steam shipping companies. The policy of putting the responsibility of placing ‘undesirables’ out of the country by rising the costs and fines for their deportation was reinforced. Yet this did not affect the dividends paid out by the companies whose market of selling ocean passage steadily shifted from the old to the new world, with the growing prepaid and return ticket market. Indeed the period discussed here, is characterized by what failed to happen rather than what did. To what extent the foreign shipping lobby is responsible for this will be analyzed here through the reports of the New York agent of the Holland America Line on immigration and maritime legislation.

1) The immigration problem: ‘Tant de bruit pour une omelette’ or ‘a great and perilous threat for the very fabric of the American race’?

1.1) ‘Literates Only’: The Educational bill as a means to sift European immigrants according to various degrees of whiteness

Early 1896 van der Toorn informed the HAL directors that a law based on the report of the immigration commission formed by Senner, Stump and Edward McSweeney was being considered in Congress. All immigrants older than 14 years would have to be able to read five lines of the US constitution in their own language. As the head agent underlined: *“knowing that more than 20% of last years’ arrivals would not have passed this test says it all. Most illiterates are transported by the Continental Lines. I therefore urgently recommend that the three pool-lines organize a propaganda campaign against this law.”*⁶⁴⁸ Most of the British lines whose market mainly consisted of literate Scandinavians, Irish and British passengers saw little harm in the test and fended off

⁶⁴⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, Letter January 28 1896.

contributing to the lobbying costs.⁶⁴⁹ The American owned RSL and American Line in trying to obtain advantages over foreign shipping lines from Congress worked with different lobbyists. Even the NGL hesitated, fearing that the lobbying costs with the hiring of two influential journalists -countering the agitation of the Immigration Restriction League in 1895 and the yearly salary of the lobbyist G. Glavis amounting to \$9,000- would weigh too heavily on the budget. Conversely the HAPAG and HAL representatives in New York urged Glavis to agitate against it, especially in the South and the West where migrants were desired. He also needed to introduce amendments that would weaken the bill by limiting the test to women.⁶⁵⁰

As noted by Freeman; “*immigration tends to produce concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, giving those who benefit from immigration greater incentives to organize than persons who bare its costs* (Freeman, 1995, 894).” The previous chapters illustrate the growing activity of the shipping and corporate lobby advocating liberal policies throughout the nineteenth century. The organization of restrictionists on the other hand lacked continuity and was too tied up in party politics, as was the case for example for the Know Nothing Party or American Protective Association. The Immigration Restriction League, on the contrary, transcended party politics creating a solid and lasting platform for restrictionist using direct means to influence policymakers. The IRL drew together a group of upper class academics, businessmen and politicians who considered the growing influx of new immigrants as a threat to the Anglo Saxon character of the nation’s population (Tichenor, 2002, 16-17, 76). Using scientific arguments, the movement increasingly openly expressed its xenophobic sentiments against the influx of Italians, Slavs and Jews. It claimed that the US could no longer safely assimilate the mass of ‘ignorant and debased human beings’ coming from those sources.

Building further on the arguments of Bemis and Mayo Smith, the league’s message was that with the disappearance of the American frontier, immigrants increasingly concentrated in city slums. They formed ghettos, according to ethnic groups, preventing the assimilation process. Moreover, many of these migrants were birds of passage with no intention of becoming American citizens. They kept wages down and

⁶⁴⁹ The Dillingham Commission calculated that between 1899 and 1909 35,6% of the new immigrants would have been excluded but only 2,7% of the old stock (Hoyt, 1916, 447).

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.* Letters July 17 1895 and February 14 1896.

had a deteriorating effect on working and living conditions. The IRL also picked up Francis Walker's argument that immigration had a negative impact on the natural growth of the American population. Furthermore, the movement used statistics to prove that the foreign-born population showed a greater tendency towards criminality and pauperism. More problematic was the importation of organized crime movements from new European countries, like the mafia. Events such as the lynching of eleven Italians in New Orleans were used to prove the dangerous consequences of this and stigmatized certain ethnic groups as criminals.⁶⁵¹ New immigrants corrupted the American institutions. The natural barrier of selecting desirables from undesirables, during the era of sailship had disappeared with the introduction of steam- by lowering the costs while increasing the quality of the transport. The immigrants from new regions showed inferior physical and mental capacities compared to the traditional migrant regions, bringing in less money, being of a poorer health and a great part of who were illiterate. Therefore, when the imposition of consular certificate system proved unfeasible, restrictionist quickly adopted the literacy test over a physical, race or economical test as the preferred measure to limit the influx (Chandler, 1893, 1-8; Hall 1897, 393-402, 1904, Lodge 1891, Noble, 1892 232-241).

Although not so innovative regarding the arguments as to why and by what means to restrict immigration, the IRL's main contribution was the use of new strategies to obtain policy changes. These consisted of using social science research, mass publicity and the hiring of a lobbyist in Washington to directly influence the national policymakers. A year after its foundation the League counted 531 members, recruited from among the elite and thus securing the much needed funds for the lobby campaigns. The members gave speeches for all sorts of associations, and distributed propaganda leaflets throughout the country to gain public support for the literacy test. A screening of the American press by the IRL had shown that about 300 newspapers supported restrictionist ideas. The League provided them with articles which were also sent to other newspapers to spread their ideals. The following year the list of newspapers receiving and publishing their materials had increased to 500. The IRL also closely followed the

⁶⁵¹ In 1891 eleven Italians, suspected of the murder of a local policeman were lynched to death by a mob of Americans who had broken into prison. I caused a big uproar in the press and used by restrictionist as an alarm bell for new immigration laws (Noble 1892, 232-243 and Lodge, 1891, 602-612).

academic debate on the issue and promptly reacted to articles advocating liberal policies.⁶⁵² The movement's close ties with the academic world contributed to the extensive use of scientific arguments to motivate their claims. To strengthen its ties in political spheres it opened an office in Washington headed by James Patten, a Harvard lawyer. With this appointment the restrictionist movement finally had a lobbyist creating a counterpoise to the transport and corporate lobby. Patten collaborated with Congress members, who favored the cause, trying to increase political endorsement by distributing memoranda to all Congress members and monitoring bureaucratic developments. The establishment of the Committees on Immigration in both houses of congress in 1890 created institutions drafting reform legislation which were open to formal input from immigration activists and experts from both sides of the spectrum. With outspoken restrictionist members such as Representative Samuel McCall and Senators Lodge and Chandler, the IRL had an excellent mouthpiece with whom Patten wrote amendments and devised plans of campaign (Zeidel, 2005, 17 and Higham, 1955, 103-107, Tichenor 76-81).

The economic recession between 1893 and 1897 facilitated the IRL's attempts to gain public support for the literacy test, while the sweeping victory of the Republicans during the 1894 elections increased the anti-immigration vibes in Congress.⁶⁵³ Lodge and McCall introduced and took charge of the educational bill drawn up by the League in the Senate and House. By the end of 1896, the test passed in Congress with an overwhelming majority. An amendment added a provision making it illegal for aliens, except Canadians and Americans, to enter the US to work while maintaining a home in another country (Hutchinson, 1981, 112-116). This measure to block out the birds of passage coming from Europe reflects the increasing influence of the labor unions in Congress. The pro-immigration lobby seemed to have lost its influence. Van den Toorn expressed his fears that it was likely to become a law; *American politics are hard to predict because Congress, at least the Senate, at times looks more like a lunatic asylum than a*

⁶⁵² As articles appeared in the North American Review reflect, Hall and Ward promptly wrote replies fighting the arguments of liberalists. See for example Hall's "Immigration and the Educational test" as a reaction to Crowell's "Should Immigration be restricted" (1896); Hall's "Italian Migration" versus Senner's "Immigration from Italy" (1897) or Ward's "Restriction of Immigration" versus O. Austin's "Is the new Immigration dangerous to this Country?" (1904).

⁶⁵³ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, Letter January 25 1895.

*deliberating institution. Cleveland is likely to approve the law shortly.*⁶⁵⁴ The bills were sent to a conference committee to harmonize them and the final draft included even more drastic measures than what had been proposed.

In the meantime, the influential German press launched a lobby campaign against the law which was followed by the other foreign language newspapers. With the presidential elections pending it did not leave Congressmen unaffected (Higham, 1955, 104). Glavis continued his efforts in Washington to prevent its passage and confidentially reassured Van den Toorn that President Cleveland would veto the bill if it seemed unlikely that it would be overridden by Congress.⁶⁵⁵ A week later the lobbyist reported that the bill which came out of the conference committee only passed the House by a margin of fourteen votes.⁶⁵⁶ Yet his efforts had been compromised by a cable of the NGL that fell into the hands of Lodge revealing the German steamship company's involvement in opposing the bill in Washington.⁶⁵⁷ Van den Toorn reported as a result of the work of Glavis and friends the law would not have passed, or at least would have been stripped of objectionable features, had the NGL not been so clumsy.⁶⁵⁸ To Glavis' regret the bill was sent back to the conference committee. He had the guarantee of a veto against the bill as it stood and hoped that Lodge would not strip the law of the objectionable features. The lobbyist received the 'powerful' help of Senator Arthur Gorman against the bill (D-Ma).⁶⁵⁹

In the House their inside man was chairman of the Immigration Committee Richard Bartholdt (R-Mi). However, he became increasingly isolated being the only

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.* Letter December 22 1896.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.* Letter January 17 1897.

⁶⁵⁶ The bill with amendments had passed the House on May 10 1896 by a vote of 195 to 26, while the rewritten bill passed on January 27 with 131 to 117, 102 members not voting. The bill was resent to conference adapting it to the original version and passed the House on February 9 by 217 to 36 (Hutchinson, 1981, 119-121).

⁶⁵⁷ This telegram of the NGL to unknown people, yet likely German associations throughout the US: The immigration law will be considered in the House of Representatives next Wednesday; telegraph your House delegate on our costs that you protest against the foreseen restrictions requesting him to vote against it, whereby you mention that a positive vote on the law from his side will result the Representatives defeat during the next elections (Just, 1988, 224).

⁶⁵⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, January 29 1897.

⁶⁵⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, February 5 1897. Senator Gorman proposal of tariff revisions in 1894 raised plenty of dust. The New York Times described him as *not a Democrat, not a Republican and only in legal form a Senator being in reality simply an agent of the Sugar Trust and the iron and coal interests of the country*. Maybe the Times could have added steamship interest to the list. See New York Times, "To meet Gorman" July 19 1894.

member to give a negative advice on the bill in January. For reasons unknown to Glavis, Bartholdt was forced to sign the subsequent report on the bill, making it unanimous. The new version now passed the House with a big majority and the veto was at stake.⁶⁶⁰ Glavis found more support in the Senate where it passed by a small margin. He felt confident that it would be vetoed and would not be overridden, especially since the economic conditions improved, decreasing the pressure for restrictions.⁶⁶¹ Cleveland eventually vetoed the bill reproving its hypocrite un-American character and although the House overrode it, the Senate took no further action, meaning that they would have to start from scratch during the next session.⁶⁶²

Glavis awaited the appointment of the new chairman of the House Immigration Committee to go to New York and to introduce him to the representatives of the steamship lines. He welcomed Boas' initiative to establish an organization representing the various religious and ethnic groups to fight the IRL on humanitarian grounds and the lines' decision to exert more influence on the western senators. The lobbyist hoped to have some peace for the summer, yet the IRL made it clear that he could not rest before the enactment of a literacy test. They believed that the next President would be more receptive their demands. Glavis mentioned that he had: *some friends at his house, among them several senators and members of the Immigration Committee including Senator Faulkner. Promises were given that nothing would be done regarding immigration during the extra session.*⁶⁶³ Van den Toorn praised Glavis for his excellent maneuvering and trustworthy predictions in the matter.⁶⁶⁴ But with the Republican ticket having won the elections the educational bill would be hard to prevent.

Glavis doubted as to whether to continue the radical opposition and to run the risk of having stringent measures adopted or to collaborate with the advocates and weaken the test as much as possible. He proposed trying to exclude women, direct family of

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.* Letters February 8 and 12 1897; NYT, "Immigration bill: Agreed to by all conferees except one", January 22 1897.

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.* Letters February 18, 25 and March 7 1897 and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, February 26 1897.

⁶⁶² In the final version the amendment excluding birds of passage made no exception for Canadians. This gave President Cleveland, not wanting to trouble the relations with the northern neighbors another good argument to oppose the bill (Higham, 1955, 105).

⁶⁶³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters February 18, March 7 and 12 1897.

⁶⁶⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, Letter March 5 1897.

admissible migrants and men under twenty one. Glavis asked each of the pool members to calculate the effect the current test would have on their traffic, especially for Italians, Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Hungarians, Bohemians, Poles and 'last but not least Russian Jews' who restrictionist wanted to exclude The HAL supported the strategy, but although literacy was on the increase in Europe nearly forty percent of its Austrian-Hungarian and Russian passengers would be excluded.⁶⁶⁵ Considering also that collaborating gave no guarantees of a stricter test being adopted afterwards, the companies decided that prevention was better than cure.

1.2) The Immigration Protective League: Shipping companies' involvement in the organized protest of various ethnic and nationality groups

The near passage of the bill called for extra measures to oppose the restrictionists before Congress reconvened. In the meantime, the new president McKinley had appointed Terence Powderly as Commissioner General of Immigration; while the chairman of the House Immigration Committee favoring liberal policies, Richard Bartholdt had been replaced by a restrictionist. As van den Toorn reported:

“Nothing good can be expected of both men. Hoping that the ameliorating economic conditions will turn the public opinion in favor of immigration, to influence it and go up against the IRL, the HAPAG and NGL elaborated a plan to establish a Pro-Immigration League. Dr. Senner, journalist and former Commissioner of Immigration of New York has been appointed to lead the League and set up branches nationwide. He will travel throughout the country, hold lectures and recruit members, especially in the West. The membership fee of one dollar will be let off to recruit as many as possible. To cover up their involvement the League will distance itself completely of the steamship lines and even create the impression to oppose us. The expenses of Senner have to be defrayed and he reached an agreement with the German Lines who will pay him 500\$ a month from October first till April first and that for the subsequent twelve months his salary would amount to 2000\$ plus expenses which can not surpass 3000\$. Hence the cost for the next 18 months would not exceed 8000 dollars. The Germans asked to contribute, yet not to mention it to any other lines out of fear that it may leak out.”⁶⁶⁶

This letter indicates that it was the joint efforts of three steamship lines, instead of associations representing various ethnic and nationality groups, which formed the

⁶⁶⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters April 3, 9, 15 and May 1 1897.

⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.* Letter November 16 1897.

cornerstone of the Immigration Protective League.⁶⁶⁷ Being unable to openly oppose legislation, shipping companies established contacts with various ethnic groups to voice their claims. Although the literacy test would hardly affect the German immigrants, quite naturally the German lines first turned to the German speaking community; not only because its close affiliation with it but also because the weight this community had on American politics. The influence that the HAPAG and NGL had built up among the German speaking community in the US over fifty years, as the main carriers of goods and passengers between both countries, can not be overlooked. This explains why the strongest protest against the bill originated from an ethnic community which would have suffered much less from the test than Slavs and Italians.⁶⁶⁸

Due to the later arrival, the latter communities lacked the organization and political power required for a successful campaign.⁶⁶⁹ However, slowly but surely, the new communities, especially the Jewish one joined the movement. As a result of the long record of service in the migrant business these shipping companies developed strong ties through their migrant agent network with the immigrant communities and associations, defending the interests of the various ethnic groups nationwide. These connections would increasingly be used to agitate for liberal policies. Another marked advantage of the steamship lobby over the IRL was the close ties between shipping companies and American newspapers, because of their constant advertising campaigns. As Hall noted a part of the press is: “*more or less muzzled by steamship advertising*” (Hall, 1913, 748). As was seen previously, shipping conferences agreed to withdraw all advertisements from newspapers attacking the lines. The amount these annual revenues from the Holland America Line amounted to is shown in (appendix 7). Moreover, many of the foreign newspaper editors worked as migrant agents for these companies. Hence, the conflict of

⁶⁶⁷ See Highman, 1955, 107; Tichenor, 2002, 81; Zeidel, 2005, 12 and Zolberg, 2006, 222.

⁶⁶⁸ As the NYT reported most of the associations supporting the League were German yet others nationalities were interested. The societies mentioned were the North American Gymnastic Union, German Roman Catholic Society of North America, the Arion, the United Singers of Brooklyn, the German Catholic Central Union of Michigan, and many others across the nation. The prominent figures leading the League were: W. Bourke Cockran, the president; J. Senner, the secretary and Oscar Straus. See NYT “To Protect Immigration: a protective League a million strong to oppose the Lodge Bill”, January 7 1898.

⁶⁶⁹ From their side British lines although initially giving the impression not to fear the educational bill also lobbied against it. As pointed by Flayhart Vernon brown, head-agent of the Cunard Line managed an ‘educational fund’ for lobbying purposes at Washington and creating favorable working relationships with some of the New York newspapers and journalists (Flayhart, 2000, 328).

interest of a good part of the American press favored the pro-immigration lobby to create goodwill among the public opinion.

To lead the Immigration Protective League the lines appointed Austrian-born Joseph Senner. As a foreign-born journal editor, who had headed Ellis Island over the four years prior, and whose report on the immigration question was used to introduce the literacy test in Congress, Senner had the perfect profile to lead the propaganda campaign against it.⁶⁷⁰ During his term as Commissioner of Immigration, his strict application of the laws initially created discontent with the lines, yet afterwards the relation between the lines and the commissioner improved, as his engagement clearly illustrates. Senner published various articles on immigration, reflecting his views before his appointment. Initially, just as his predecessor Weber had done, he did not press for any restrictions. He also praised the deterring effect the laws of 1891 and 1893 had on the decreasing influx of undesirables, by putting the financial responsibility for them on the shipping companies. Especially the clause referring to ‘persons likely to become a public charge’ afforded: “*great opportunity to use the greatest discretion and good judgment not only as to the individual seeking admission, but also bearing in mind the general conditions of this country*” (Senner, 1894, 499).

In the midst of the agitation by the IRL against the ‘new’ migrants, the Immigration Commissioner defended the Italian migrants. With quantitative and qualitative data he refuted the notion of their rapidly increasing numbers and their inability to assimilate.⁶⁷¹ He blamed restrictionists and the popular press for making; “*Tant de bruit pour une omelette!*” (Senner, 1896, 655). Senner shared the notion evoked by Eugene Schutler reacting to the depiction of Italians as semi-barbarians by Powderly; “*they are a desirable element to fuse with our motley population bringing to us the*

⁶⁷⁰ Joseph Senner studied law in Vienna after which he moved to New York to become the foreign editor of the ‘New-York Staats-Zeitung’ in 1880. He became president of the national organization of the German-American journalists and the German Social Scientific Society. He also was for a moment vice-president of the Liedekranz. He had supported the Democratic bill of Cleveland campaigning for him in the mid-west. See NYT, “New Commissioner of Immigration” March 29 1893. Senner’s connection with the ‘New-York Staats-Zeitung’ facilitated the support of the paper the shipping line’s cause just as the fact that the HAPAG New York agent, Emil Boas was married to daughter of the newspaper’s owner. This anecdotal evidence illustrates the close ties among the German speaking community in the US. Hamburg Staatsarchiv, HAPAG, 622-1, Erinnerungen Merck.

⁶⁷¹ Senner started to collect statistical information on who had been in the US before and who were joining direct family per nationality. From 1896 onwards this was expanded to all immigrant control stations.

logical qualities of the Latin race, and they show in the long run the effect of an experience which no other people in Europe has had – of over two thousand years of civilization” (Schuyler, 1889, 495). In the conviction that the American society had the power to assimilate all people, regardless of race, they were joined by Richard Mayo Smith. The social scientist had previously expressed his doubts on the benefits of immigration for the American society, but now he advocated a nationality based on unity of institutions, social habits and ideals instead of unity of blood (Mayo-Smith, 1894, 426-444 and 649-670). The commissioner tended to favor a moderate educational test, fearing that too big an inflow of the immigration would lower the standards of living and wages, yet people joining immediate family had to be exempt from it. However, he did not believe that the country could risk excluding desirables, whom it would still need for a long time to come, while the existing laws managed to exclude a majority of undesirables.⁶⁷² A new test of eligibility was considered unnecessary, but a better distribution of the migrants, according to their skills and to the localities where they were especially needed. He therefore recommended the establishment of a national Clearing House at Ellis Island, with a branch office inland, as the solution to increase the benefits and to prevent the possible dangers of immigration (Senner, 1894, 493-499; 1896, 648-657 and 1897 1-17).

In the article in the *New York Times* announcing the establishment of the League, Senner openly stated that the purpose of the association was to oppose the Lodge bill. He used the same arguments as in his previous articles with special attention to obtaining political support from Western and Southern States, stressing that immigration was a national question; “*Western and the Southern States where immigrants were largely needed for their further development had equal rights to decide on the policy as the East.*”⁶⁷³ Yet with the IRL, Senner faced a well run adversary to campaign against. Hall got his hands on correspondence from Senner to various German associations, in which

⁶⁷² To prove that the existing laws sifted the desirables from the undesirables the commissioner pointed at one hand to the increasing percentage of debarred over the last five fiscal years: 1891-92, (1727 of the 445 987), 92/93 (817 of the 343 422) 93/94 (2022 of the 219 046) 94/95 (2077 of the 190 928) and 95/96 2512 of the 263709. While on the other hand the number of deported sent back for becoming a public charge within the first year of arrival were rapidly declining from 637 in 92, 577 in 93, 417 in 94 177 in 95 and 238 in 96. For Senner this proved that the controls were baring fruit (Senner, 1897, 7).

⁶⁷³ NYT, January 7 1898 “To Protect Immigration: a protective League a million strong to oppose the Lodge Bill”.

he warned that a strong Anglo-Saxon movement pushed for the literacy test whose true intention aimed at suspending migration and ruining the German element politically and economically. Hall claimed that the support for the IPL was based on misrepresentations of the bill and by misleading the German community into believing that the future of German schools, language, churches and newspapers in America were at stake. The IRL released a circular denouncing Senner's hypocrisy, and highlighted on it some quotations from his article published right before his appointment with to the IPL; in which he advocated a moderate form of the test and claimed to have practically introduced it on Ellis Island without being forced by law.⁶⁷⁴ Hall concluded that the flood of protest in to newspapers and congress against the bill, which had been nearly absent in the past two years, could only come from an outside influence.⁶⁷⁵

Yet, this influence could not prevent the Lodge bill from passing the Senate on January 17 1898. Restrictionists hoped that the House, which had approved the bill twice before with a seizure would quickly act on it and with the Republican president McKinley in power a second veto scenario was not anticipated. Yet, McKinley's rise to power was partly due to his tolerant stance towards Catholics and the foreign-born, an electoral support which he did not want to lose (Tichenor, 72-73). Van den Toorn reported that after the passage of the law in the Senate the President called a meeting with the Republican members of the House Immigration Committee urging them to go slow on the matter. According to Glavis no immigration laws would be considered in the House. In the event that this was confirmed, van den Toorn intended to ask him how far it could be useful to start agitating for alterations of the existing laws, regarding persons likely to become a public charge, contract laborers and those carrying loathsome diseases. The HAL agent complained about the autocratic power of immigration officials, because the laws did not clearly delimit these categories of excludables.⁶⁷⁶ The IRL did not give

⁶⁷⁴ In the article Senner repeated that his support for the bill was based on the fact that too many illiterates would lower the standard of living and wages, exempting people joining direct family. By saying that he practically introduced the bill in 1896 he probably alludes to the fact that under the pretext of 'likely to become a public charge' he started sending back some illiterates which he believed to be undesirable (Senner, 1897, 15).

⁶⁷⁵ Harvard Open Collection Program: Immigration to the United States 1789 -1939. IRL circular January 24 1898; "The surprising circular of the Immigration Protective League: purpose and operation of the Lodge bill greatly misrepresented" and (Senner, 1897, 15).

⁶⁷⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence 112-121, January 25 1898.

up as easily. Glavis reported that they pressed to report the bill in the house on March 15. As the tendency among the Congressmen seemed to be to postpone the bill he did not foresee any problems in obstructing the IRL's attempt.⁶⁷⁷ Two months later, another attempt failed to materialize.⁶⁷⁸ By then, the Spanish-American War had broken out shifting Congress's priorities.

2) The merchant marine problem: The rise of American jingoism and the need for a strong national fleet to back it up

2.1) The American versus Foreign shipping lobby

Due to the passage of the Postal Aid Act the first-class steamers *City of Paris* and *City of New York* passed from the British to the American registry, while two more were ordered on American shipyards. The patriotic celebrations for the formal passage of the *City of New York* to being under the American flag and the launching of the *Saint Louis* and *Saint Paul* reflect the emergent feelings of Americanism at the close of the nineteenth century (Flayhart, 2000, 173-193). The ships gave some more credibility to the American jingoist pretences, yet the naval power still lagged far behind many other maritime nations. Using this, the International Navigation Company continuously tried to obtain measures either to their advantage or to the disadvantage of its foreign rivals. Such was the case with the lobby efforts of the INC for the abolishment of the exemption of tariffs based on the treaties between 'most favored nation' of German and Dutch rivals. Van den Toorn traveled to Washington to make arrangements with the Glavis and Weckherlin, the Dutch envoy to lobby against it. The issue received consideration in Congress because of new tariffs adopted by the German government obstructing American imports. Hence, the commotion was especially directed against Germany yet van den Toorn got his hands on evidence proving that INC strongly agitated the matter also trying to make them reconsider the treaty with the Netherlands.

According to the HAL agent, Griscom was generously distributing free passages to Congress members and their families while complaining that they continuously trailed

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid.* Letter March 11 1898.

⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid.* Letter May 13 1898.

behind other lines. He organized dinners with Congressmen pointing to the disadvantage of American ships compared to German and Dutch lines because of the lack of such agreement between the US and Britain. Van den Toorn met with the Minister of Agriculture to point to repercussions tonnage dues could have on American exports to the Netherlands. He then asked the Standard Oil Company for assistance. The company, which ran a line of oil tankers, and was directly concerned by the issue, was represented on the board of directors. That Standard Oil Company had an important influence on the American Line became apparent by a visit of James Wright, the vice president of the INC, the very next day during which he reassured van den Toorn that the company would never do something to harm the pool members. Nonetheless, assistance to the American line's lobbyist to oppose the bill was refused, quite logically according to van den Toorn since he introduced it. The NGL did not consider it worth opposing new tariffs since it only meant an extra cost of \$20,000 to \$30,000 a year, while HAPAG's Albert Ballin on the other side of the Atlantic pressured the German authorities to reconsider their tariffs. In earlier cases which were similar, Glavis earned a commission of 25 to 50 percent on taxes he recuperated based on the 'most favored nation' resolution. This time, the Dutch company refused, claiming he was earning enough as it was.⁶⁷⁹ As a result, on two occasions Glavis failed to intervene for the company and the new tariff bill passed the House.

Together with the HAPAG agent, Emil Boas, Van den Toorn immediately traveled to Washington to meet with Senators. From one of them, Senator Stephen Elkins (WV-R) he expected pressure to buy coal from his mines in exchange for his support. Their efforts led to a redraft of the report of the bill in the Senate committee yet they lost their most important ally, Senator Murphy, due to scarlet fever. To ensure success, Glavis proposed contributing to the campaign fund of both parties. The steamship agents agreed to pay \$5000 in cash if the committee made a majority report with negative advice on the bill. However, Glavis could not guarantee that no minority report favoring it would be introduced. If the law was not reported or did not pass another \$3000 would be transferred for the upcoming campaign in September. The costs were divided, based on the pool participations and with the NGL agreeing to contribute to it amounted to \$735

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid.* Letters January 21, February 14 and 28 1896.

for the HAL, \$2085 for the HAPAG and \$2180 for NGL. Van den Toorn admitted that it created a dangerous precedent but fortunately the personnel of political parties changed a lot.⁶⁸⁰ The scheme worked fine until the German government decided to introduce new tariffs obstructing American imports, upon which President Cleveland immediately abolished the exemption of tonnage dues for German ships.⁶⁸¹ The Holland America Line managed to keep its privilege as ‘most favorite nation’.

This tariff issue illustrates the venal atmosphere reigning in Washington where the voting behavior of Congressmen was easily influenced by their own financial interest, as illustrated by Senator Elkins. Apparently, reports of Congressional committees were also up for sale to replenish the campaign funds for upcoming elections. Through the intermediacy of a good lobbyist, a lot could be obtained. The issue also underlines the limitations of the Continental Conference in harmonizing the common interest of its members. The lines tried to obtain benefits from their national governments to gain competitive advantages against one another, which created continuous tensions. As Van den Toorn’s comment on Griscom illustrates; “*he is a hypocrite and a continuous threat for all European Lines.*”⁶⁸² The HAL depended on German legislation for the transit of its passengers, and on American legislation to land them, while other members did not depend in any way on Dutch policies which put the company in a weak position.

In Europe, the HAL joined forces with the INC to protest against German regulations obstructing their business, while in the US it allied with the German lines against the INC. The Dutch company proved to be very loyal to the German lines in the US. During the commotion surrounding the tonnage tax and tariffs, van den Toorn reported that the INC managed to pass a law to expedite the delivery of imported parcels with value less than \$500 giving it control over this business. He immediately contacted Weckherlin and Planten to obtain the same rights as the American ships based on the

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.* Letters March 24 and April 3 1896.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.* Letter December 4 1896.

⁶⁸² Despite his hard feelings towards Griscom van den Toorn used all means to keep a good modus vivendi with him. When the American Line ship Saint Louis saved all passengers of the sinking Veendam he urged to get a decoration for him from the Dutch authorities. Weckherlin was not so convinced with the idea of decorating a man who had monopolized the express package business and had tried to rob the country from its “most favored nation” status. Yet van den Toorn claimed that the decoration would just help obtaining the favor of Griscom in these matters. Moreover the HAL would badly need his support at the next pool meeting and this could help. A few days later a ceremony was held on the deck of the *Spaarndam*. See *Ibid.* Letters November 25 1897, March 11 and 15 1898.

treaty of 1852. Even though it did not really affect their business, they protested for two reasons: first because of the moral effect it had on the American Line in fighting for every single facility they lobbied for, second to allow the German companies who could not rely on such a treaty to obtain the same rights as on the basis of ‘most favored nation’.⁶⁸³ Fortunately, the HAL could rely on big American corporations, such as the Standard Oil Company, who had little interest in seeing the competition between foreign and national carriers being reduced. However, growing nationalistic tendencies, during the 1890s, on both sides of the Atlantic started to pose a threat for the further existence of the line. Not only did it fear laws impeding its business, it also had to fend off various German, British and American attempts to take over the line.

2.2) The Spanish-American War

As Van den Toorn observed; “*it looks like that at the close of the nineteenth century everyone is looking for a fight.*”⁶⁸⁴ The increasing international tensions caused jingoism to supersede nativism as the most aggressive expression of late nineteenth-century nationalism in the US. Yet, as Sheryl Shanks observed, defending and controlling the borders fused into the issue of American sovereignty, into which immigration restrictionists would increasingly appeal to defend their cause (Shanks, 2001, 39). In the wake of the New Orleans lynching of Italians, diplomatic tensions between the US and Italy almost led to an armed conflict. A near conflict with Chili and Great Britain followed for seemingly unimportant motives (Higham, 1955, 75-76). Spain was next in line and as van den Toorn stated regarding the Cuba crisis:

“I believe that the odds for a war between both countries are very plausible if Spain does not act more wisely than the U.S. Congress. The Americans take a pleasure in interfering with matters that do not concern them. If it wouldn’t have such negative consequences for us if wouldn’t mind someone to teach them a serious lesson. Since the US acquired some war-vessels the ‘war party’ has been

⁶⁸³ Despite Weckherlin’s zeal and van den Toorn’s efforts to mobilize the various American express companies against the law it was adopted in 1897. The American Line who first tried to get the sole privileges together with the Adams Express company (PRR) came to an arrangement with the three biggest American express companies breaking down our opposition. Weckherlin feared that the treaty would not allow him to obtain the privileges but was going to do further archive research to investigate the matter. *Ibid.* Letters June 16 1896, March 5 and 18 1897.

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Letters June 16 1896, March 5 and 18 1897 and 25 February 1898.

reinforced and if a second or third rate opponent can be found I am afraid a conflict will brake out.”⁶⁸⁵

In this context, the Republican Party made the revival of the merchant marine an electoral promise during the 1897 electoral campaign. In the previous session, Senator Elkins had introduced a differential bill imposing an extra duty of 10 percent *ad valorem* on all goods and merchandise imported on non-American ships. This indicates that HAL refused his ‘offer’ of buying coal from his mines. Simultaneously, another bill had been introduced proposing to charge \$10 ‘head money’ for every migrant landed by foreign ships.⁶⁸⁶ But, these proposals entailed having thirty three treaties with other nations robbed of their reciprocity clause. Out of fear of retaliation, the Commissioner of Navigation, Eugene Chamberlin, a rigorous supported of the revival, did not support the bills.⁶⁸⁷ The new tariff introduced later that year did not contain such provisions.⁶⁸⁸

Advocates of the revival needed to find other means and these were discussed in Washington. Glavis reported on a ‘kind of love feast’ held in the Senate committee room of Commerce, attended by representatives of American shipping interests among whom were Griscom, C.H. Cramp, A. Vanderbilt, Senators Mark Hannah (Oh-R), William Frye (Ma-R), Gerorge Perkins (Ca-R), Lodge and their ‘mutual friend’ Elkins. The basis of the discussion was a plank in the republican national platform to substitute discriminating duties by bounties in the way of mail subsidies or on tonnage favoring American ships.⁶⁸⁹ The foreign shipping lobby indirectly tried to obstruct the movement by putting free trade advocates in key positions. However, their attempts to have Chamberlin replaced failed. As Glavis noted: “*I am sorry to say that Mr. Chamberlin is still Commissioner of*

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Letter November 22 1896.

⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Letters March 24 and June 19 1896.

⁶⁸⁷ NYT, “Opposed to Elkins Bill: The Commissioner Chamberlin says it would provoke retaliations” December 10 1896.

⁶⁸⁸ Again the HAL agents praised Glavis and Weckherlin’s efforts in influencing the tariffs according to Dutch interests. Although the majority of the tariffs were on the increase he mentioned a lowering on wine tobacco and herring coming from Sumatra while flower bulbs were put on the duty free list. A final revision however included a charge of 25% on the flower bulbs while the increase on cheese, vegetables, sugar and chocolate would no doubt affect the trade with the Netherlands. *Ibid.* Letters May 7 and July 23 1897.

⁶⁸⁹ The complete list of people present at the meeting E.C Bliss (Red D Line), H. Booth (Ward Line) W.P. Clyde (Clyde shipping Co), F. Firth and C.H. Keep (Lake carriers association), C.P. Huntington (shipbuilder), T.W Hyde (shipbuilder), S. Sewell (shipbuilder) GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter April 19 1897 and NYT, “For the Merchant Marine” April 8 1897.

*Navigation. I have tried my best to get him out, but he is evidently too useful to our dear friends of the American Line.*⁶⁹⁰

But, despite electoral promises, the continuous lobby efforts of Griscom and the build up towards a military conflict saw no change into the American maritime policy. The Spanish-American conflict laid the shortcomings of the American maritime force bare. A year and half after his prediction on the outbreak of a war, the HAL agent noted that the will was there, but that the materials were lacking to engage in it.⁶⁹¹ During the spring of 1898, the American Navy informed itself of prices and the availability of steamships from foreign companies. Due to the urgency, foreign lines had a unique opportunity of selling their ships at a very good price and of modernizing their fleet. The HAL joined in the fierce competition which broke out between the foreign lines, offering the *Amsterdam*, *Obdam* and *Edam*. To abide by the Dutch neutrality provisions, the ships had to be in the US before the outbreak of the war. Initially, the American Navy tried to rely, as much as possible on the steamers of the American Line and American coastal ships, yet during the war it became apparent that these were insufficient.⁶⁹²

They bought seven steamers from the American-owned Atlantic Transport Line and the *Obdam* of the Holland America Line.⁶⁹³ In consultation with the Dutch authorities, the company sold the ship through a third-party to circumvent the neutrality provisions.⁶⁹⁴ When the New York press enquired about the possible violation of neutrality, van den Toorn clearly disassociated the company from the sale: “*so careful are we to observe our duties as neutrals, that shortly before the war, when we saw it was imminent, we refused to sell to the Spanish government, which wished to purchase ships from us.*”⁶⁹⁵ With his statement, the HAL agent referred to the sale of ships to Spain by

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid.* Letter December 1 1897.

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid.* Letter March 7 1897.

⁶⁹² Foreign ships were excluded from the US coastal shipping because of privileges awarded to American ships. *Ibid.* Letters April 15, 19 and 21 1897.

⁶⁹³ The Atlantic Transport Line was founded by Baltimore merchant Bernard Baker in collaboration with the PRR and Baltimore Ohio Railroad. It ran a line between Liverpool and Baltimore, branching off to New York in 1891 when it started a passenger service. The Atlantic Line and the INC were the two larger American owned liner services on the North Atlantic (Flayhart, 2000, 277 and Vale, 1984, 33-35) The Navy clearly adopted a policy of doing business with nationals first.

⁶⁹⁴ The sale was arranged by Glavis again underlining his importance for the HAL. The HAL received 230.000 dollars net for its old steamer after deducting Glavis' commission of 20.000 dollars. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters 1, 10, 21 and 27 June 1897.

⁶⁹⁵ New York Evening Post, *s.t.*, June 25 1898.

NGL and HAPAG. This sale greatly added to the growing anti-German sentiment in Washington and in public opinion. The Dutch hoped to capitalize on these feelings to attract more of the American traveling public.

2.3) The American Ship-Subsidy Bill

With the end of the conflict, the US came into possession of Cuba and Philippines- increasing the importance of expanding the merchant marine under the ‘Stars and Stripes’. This created the ideal circumstances for Griscom, whose ships had rendered great services during the war, to push for a ship subsidy bill. Rumors circulated that it was a matter of life and death for the American Line. The company failed to pay out dividends for seven year in a row after the passage of the Postal Aid Bill and it urgently needed capital to modernize the fleet.⁶⁹⁶ Despite the bad results Griscom found his much needed sponsor in J.P. Morgan who was convinced that Congress was about to grant important subsidies to the line. The financier had an ambitious plan of buying his way into the steel and shipping industry to create a vertical merger expanding across the Atlantic (Flayhart, 2000 259-291, Navin, 1955, 302; Vale, 1984, 44). A growing number of capitalists started to speculate on the passage of the ship-subsidy bill as the previously discussed interests of the Vanderbilts to take over the HAL illustrated. The speculators supported Griscom’s efforts for the ship subsidy bill. If these would pass the law providing for the transfer to the American registry of the *City of New York* and *City of Paris* would be used. This meant that the Vanderbilts would need to construct the equivalent of the Dutch fleet on American shipyards. Representative Payne and Senator Frye introduced bills in the House and Senate respectively, under which the syndicate, if

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.* Letter, August 23 1898. After the economic crisis and the conclusion of conference agreements on the North Atlantic the passenger business boomed and so did the profits of the passenger liners. Conversely to other companies the America Line paid out little to no dividends, underling the unprofitability of an American registered line on the North Atlantic. Griscom repeatedly claimed in Senate that the subsidy did not compensate the extra cost of sailing under the ‘Stars and Stripes’. To meet the speed requirements of the Postal Contract ships were often pushed to the limit leading to various breakdowns and shipwrecks forcing Grisom to consider discontinuing the service (Flayhart, 2000, 289-315 and Vale, 1984).

it succeeded in taking over the HAL, could benefit from a yearly subsidy of one million dollars.⁶⁹⁷

The HAL directors were not very enthusiastic about the bid and ordered Van den Toorn to agitate against the ship subsidy bill. The NGL again showed little interest for the matter while HAPAG, as usual, actively contributed. Senner had to gain support of public opinion through the popular press, yet more was needed. However, the unexpected death of Glavis had created an important vacuum in Washington which proved hard to fill. Bruce Ismay of the White Star Line came over to New York to discuss the appointment of his successor with the head agents of the principal passenger liners concerned.⁶⁹⁸ The British lines also wanted to avoid, at all costs, the passage of the bill. As was the case with the opposition of immigration laws, the shipping lines needed a cover to voice their protests, because for some Congressmen, finding out that foreign shipping companies were plotting against the bill, would be the reason to vote for it.

To lead the lobby campaign in both the press and Congress the German and Dutch lines appointed John de Witt Warner, member of the Reform Club. J. Wierdsma, in replacing van den Toorn who returned to Rotterdam to join the board of directors, reported that the efforts of the lines paid off, with the majority of the newspapers opposing the bill and a good number of Congressmen gave speeches against it.⁶⁹⁹ Boas and Wierdsma involved Mr. Gottheil⁷⁰⁰ and Mr. van den Bergh, vice president of the Nashville Railroad Company in their campaign. If the subsidies were granted the two biggest Eastern railroads could acquire an important advantage over southern and Western railroads. Van den Bergh received a list of arguments to stir up the idea that the bill was a new scheme of an eastern industrialist to extend their control on southern and western states.⁷⁰¹ Warner made sure that amendments weakening the bills infiltrated Congress to prevent action on it. Under the guise of the Reform Club he published

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.* Letters January 11 and 24 1899.

⁶⁹⁸ Most of the lobbying activities of Glavis for the HAL usually occurred in collaboration with the German Lines. The source does not reveal direct involvement of the British Lines. Nevertheless Glavis was clearly also on the payroll of the British Lines. Apart from the different international treaties the British and Continental lines' interests usually coincided.

⁶⁹⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters February 17 and 21 1899.

⁷⁰⁰ Neither the first name nor his function is mentioned. Possibly it alludes to Paul Gotheill, the subsequent president of Funch Edye & Co.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.* Letter December 22 1899.

articles in journals, magazines and newspapers. Warner also scorned the annual conferences of labor unions, manufacturers etc. to gain their support. He approached Congressmen personally and found strong allies in Senators A. Clay, Teller, Tillman and especially Jones. He provided them with arguments, which during a filibustering session opposing action on the bill by the Senate, came in handy. Especially the fact that the bill formed part of a scheme to place all transportation facilities under one central control was underlined. Only favored interests advocated the bill and would to allow; “*a select coterie of ship owners to loot the Treasury.*”⁷⁰²

The lobbyist also spread anti-subsidy propaganda to all the members through the Congressional Information Bureau. Founded in 1897, by the lobbyist Claude N. Bennett, the bureau published a daily newsletter concerning activities of the US Congress relating to immigration and the steamship industry. Bennett also prepared data for congressmen on these issues.⁷⁰³ Warner hired one of his employees to spread arguments against subsidies. Wierdsma was happy about the results as well as the moderate costs of the campaign. However, at the end of 1900, HAPAG and NGL stopped financing Warner.⁷⁰⁴ Boas did not believe that the bill would pass the next session and he doubted that Warner’s waning influence in Washington could prevent it if necessary.⁷⁰⁵ Another reason may be that the German companies started their negotiations with the combine and perhaps they did not want to compromise these talks.⁷⁰⁶ Following the advice of their lawyer in Washington, Mr. Putnam, the HAL financed the campaign alone. It did so up to 1902, signing Warner off with an extra bonus to make sure he would not leak their involvement to the press. That same year Marcus Hannah, chairman of the Republican

⁷⁰² *Ibid.* Letters April 16 1900 and December 23 1901; NYT “The Shipsubsidy Bill: Senator Clay does not think it will pass this session” January 1, “Opposed to the Shipsubsidy bill: Reform Club issues a statement making great charges”, January 24 “Protests against the Shipsubsidy bill” January 29 “Against the Shipsubsidy bill” January 31, “Night session on the Shipsubsidy bill” February 6, “Ship Subsidies opposed by the Reform Club” November 21 1901.

⁷⁰³ The Congressional Information Bureau still exists today and I want to thank the current president Bob Cazalas for providing useful information on the organization. See also (Marquis Who’s Who, 1966, vol. I, 84).

⁷⁰⁴ After nearly two years of campaigning the cost of Warner’s efforts amounted roughly to 1700 dollars each. *Ibid.* Letters March 7 April 16 and 17 1900.

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.* letters November 16 1900 November 22 1901 December 23 1901.

⁷⁰⁶ Traces of negotiations which led to the later agreement between the IMM and German Lines go back to at least early 1901. With the combine the fragile equilibrium regulating the North Atlantic traffic through shipping conferences was at stake. The architect of this equilibrium, Albert Ballin tried to preserve it and make sure that the interest of his company would not be jeopardized by the merger.

Party, introduced a ship subsidy bill which passed the Senate with a vote of 42 against 31. Among the opponents were six influential members of the Republican Party raising Wierdsma's hopes that the House would not consider the bill.⁷⁰⁷

In the meantime, Morgan's plans to move his way into the North Atlantic shipping business developed into organizing a trust to monopolize the trade.⁷⁰⁸ His scheme generated a lot of feelings of apprehension on the both side of the Atlantic. No shipping company seemed completely safe from seeing its stocks falling into the hands of American investors. Both in England and Germany, this evolution was regarded as a threat to the national security.⁷⁰⁹ The negotiations involving many of the established steamship companies needed to remain secret not to compromise the passage of the bill, yet the interests involved attracted the attention of the international press where sporadic information on the combine found its way into the press.⁷¹⁰ The basic agreement of the IMMCO was signed on February 4th leaving Morgan sixty days to start the acquisitions or to cancel the whole thing. Hannah and Morgan's celebration lunch after the passage of the bill in Senate, proved to be premature. Morgan stayed in Washington using all possible means to get the bill approved by the House before mid-April. (Flayhart, 2000, 338-342; Navin, 1953, 316).

As Senator Vest clearly underlined, the Democrat Party had taken a clear stand against the bill. Instead of subsidies Vest favored a 'free ship policy' allowing all American owned foreign ships to be put in the American registry but denying them eligibility for both subsidies already approved and the privileges to enter coastal shipping.⁷¹¹ Democrats only played a secondary role because the Republican Party supporting the bill held the majority in both House and Senate. Yet the vote in Senate

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.* Letter March 14 1902.

⁷⁰⁸ It included American, Red Star, White Star, Atlantic Transport, Leyland and Dominion Line.

⁷⁰⁹ See (Vale 1984) and NYT, "American competition agitates Germany: Fear that Congress may press the ship subsidy bill" October 15, "American Interests in German Steamships" November 17 1901, "The Shipsubsidy bill; London times says the measure if passed would be a very serious attack on British shipowners" February 20 1902.

⁷¹⁰ As for example an article of the New York Evening Post of November 22 1901 illustrates when rumors started circulating about the takeover of the White Star Line: "*one of the reasons for this secrecy is the plan that has been brewing to induce the Us Government to make an annual contribution to the profits of such combination. To achieve this, the component of American companies must continue to act in the role of infant industries until the Ship-Subsidy bill has passed. Capitalists are much less to blame for the scheme than politicians who tell them that there is a large surplus in the treasury to be applied for such.*"

⁷¹¹ NYT "Ship-Subsidy bill may Fail: All House Democrats and some Republicans oppose the measure" January 24 1900 and "Fight on the Ship Subsidy Bill" January 22 1902.

showed that the party did not manage to close its ranks on the subject. Especially Western Republicans voiced their discontent and feared electoral repercussions in the fall if the bill was passed.

The fierce struggle concerning the Cuban tariff question had increased the division between Eastern and Western members of the party.⁷¹² Following the conflict over the Cuban tariff the *New York Times* reported; “*there is very general disinclination to risk a further split over the ship subsidy bill.*”⁷¹³ Information on Morgan’s shipping combine appeared in the press during the negotiations but it was only when the contract was made official that the enormity of the trust of \$170,000,000 became apparent to the American public. Defending the idea of granting taxpayers’ money to that trust, as the main beneficiary of the bill, became increasingly difficult. Tycoons could not count on the sympathy of the public opinion and more and more questions were raised about both the economic effects and the legitimacy of trusts (Neuman, 1998, 321). In various speeches, President Roosevelt even suggested to changing the constitution to put restraints on trusts and combinations. As the *New York Times* observed;

“It is, we think, increasingly improbable that after having signed a bill authorizing the Attorney General to take the trust bull by the horns, President Roosevelt would sign another bill instructing the Secretary of Treasury to increase the animal’s ration.”⁷¹⁴

The events strengthened the Republican opposition. Griscom, Charles Cramp and Morgan’s attempts to distance themselves from the pro-subsidy lobby and disassociate the bill from the combine were to no avail.⁷¹⁵ Charles Grosvenor (Oh-R), chairman of the

⁷¹² The Cuban tariff question regarded tariff reductions and the signing of a reciprocity treaty to stimulate the economy on the Island. Eastern chambers of commerce pleaded in favor while southern and western tobacco and sugar producers opposed it.

⁷¹³ NYT “Ship Subsidies opposed by the Reform Club” November 21, “No Ship-Subsidy Bill likely to pass” November 24 1901, “Favorable report on the Ship-Subsidy bill” January 17, “The Ship-Subsidy bill” March 5, “Facts about the Ship-Subsidy bill” March 8, “Mail Pay and Ship-Subsidy” March 11, “Mr. Depew Defends the Ship-Subsidy bill” March 12, “The Ship-Subsidy bill” March 13, “The Ship-Subsidy debate” March 14, “Republicans divided on the Ship-Subsidy bill” March 15, “Ship-Subsidy bill passes the Senate” March 18, “Ship-Subsidy an issue” March 21, “The West and the Ship-Subsidy bill” April 7, “Ship-Subsidy’s fate part I” April 18, “Ship subsidy’s fate” April 20, “Ship subsidy Bill views” April 21, “Ship-subsidy and the Tariff” November 26, “Ship-Subsidy Bill shelved” December 7 1902, “Ship Subsidy Bill: Congressman Belmont’s view” February 19, “Ship-subsidy bill again; senator Hannah is trying to force action” February 19 1903.

⁷¹⁴ NYT “Ship-subsidy and the Tariff” November 26 1902.

⁷¹⁵ Shipbuilder Cramp had delivered the *St. Louis* and *St Paul* to the American Line. If the bill passed he would receive significant new orders from the IMM.

House Committee on merchant marine and fisheries and outspoken advocate of the bill did not find an opportunity to enact it. Even before the announcement of the combine he met with the opposition of David B. Henderson, speaker of the House from Iowa. Two Senators from his state, with whom he shared their point view, had voted against the law. Since other pressing matters, such as the bill codifying immigration laws, needed to be discussed during the session he disposed of a good excuse to kill the bill. Waiting in vain for a good moment to report on the bill the chairman postponed a vote on it in the committee until the end of the session. The majority voted not to report on the bill and killed it.⁷¹⁶ With it, Griscom and Morgan's aspirations to build out a fleet under the national flag received a terrible knock. Foreign flagged ships would continue to bring in the increasing number of immigrants to the American shores.

3) From Washington to New York, from theory to practice: The immigration policies as implemented at Ellis Island

While at Washington fierce debates were held for further restrictions, the New York Commissioners of Immigration seemed quite happy with the laws of 1891 and 1893 as means to stem the influx (Weber, 1892, 424-438 and Senner, 1894, 494-499 and 1897, 1-19). Especially the clause 'likely to become a public charge' allowed the inspectors to send back immigrants they believed to be undesirable, without too much burden of proof; this was not as easy in the case of 'contract laborers' for instance.⁷¹⁷ Although the nativist movement failed to pass the literacy test, the racialist approach of sifting desirables from undesirables filtered in at very early stages among gate keepers.⁷¹⁸ A further step in this policy was taken with the creation of a 'list of races and people' by the Immigration Bureau classifying new arrivals not only by country of origin but also explicitly on ethnic backgrounds (Weil, 2003, 273).⁷¹⁹

⁷¹⁶ Six republicans voted to report the bill but opposition of six democrats and four western Republicans killed the bill. NYT "Kills Ship Subsidy Bill" February 24 1903.

⁷¹⁷ This policy still stood forty later when president Hoover reassured Congress that there was no need for new immigration laws restricting immigration to the remedy raising unemployment rates during the economic recession. By a strict enforcement of the 'likely to become a public charge' clause the movement could easily be reduced (Zolberg, 1999, 75).

⁷¹⁸ See the quotation of Weber of 1891 Part II chapter IV.

⁷¹⁹ The list of races remained in effect from the July 1 1898 until 1952 and included: African (black), Armenian, Bohemian, Moravian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Chinese, Croatian and

During his term, Senner displayed rigorous activity in keeping statistics with detailed information of all third-class arrivals based on the passenger manifests.⁷²⁰ This tradition was upheld and elaborated when Powderly took charge of the Immigration Bureau as Commissioner General of Immigration. With the Progressive Era looming this data would frequently be used and abused by both the pro- and anti-immigration lobby. While both sides fought a legislative battle in Washington immigration officials optimized the controls at the port of entry by increasing the financial burdens on shipping companies to deter the arrivals of excludables. To what extent the interpretation of the laws were abused to discriminate some races depended in a large part on the Immigration Commissioner in charge at Ellis Island and on outside pressures. The Commissioner General of Immigration in Washington on his part, had the means to improve existing controls as well as presenting recommendations for new legislation to enhance the selection. What follows is an analysis of the policies applied by the duos of the Ellis Island Immigration Commissioner and the Commissioner of Immigration in charge, between 1897 and 1905.

3.1) Powderly – Fitchie: The era of strengthened health inspections but also of mismanagement at Ellis Island

With the appointment of Terence Powderly and Thomas Fitchie as Commissioner of Immigration of New York, steamship lines feared the strict implementation of the existing laws at American control stations and increased pressure for restrictive measures. First because new commissioners usually strictly applied the laws to the letter at the start and second because Powderly had repeatedly voiced his support for restrictions. Yet, in his yearly reports he never recommended the literacy test or any other restrictive measure. Neither did Thomas Fitchie nor his assistant Edward McSweeney who even opposed the test.⁷²¹ The main recommendations of Powderly were limited to; increasing

Slovenian, Cuban, Dalmatian, Bosnian and Herzegovian, Dutch and Flemish, East Indian, English, Filipino, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Irish, Italian (north), Italian (south), Japanese, Korean, Lithuanian, Magyar, Mexican, Pacific Islander, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Ruthenian (Russnik), Scandinavian (Norwegians, Danes and Swedes) (Weil, 2003, 273).

⁷²⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter November 15 1895.

⁷²¹ See testimony of both gentlemen before the industrial commission investigating the immigration problem. Powderly opposed both the educational and property test. The industrial commission

the authority of his bureau to investigate contract labor violations, upping the head tax to \$2 and reinforcing the health inspections.⁷²²

Steamship companies had expected more difficulties from Powderly, yet they wanted to avoid an augmentation of the head tax- not so much because it increased the price of the crossing, but because it would create an enormous fund from which different appropriations could be made and thus could facilitate the adoption of new restrictive measures.⁷²³ With the intensified health controls becoming a heavy burden on the lines, funds for immigration commissioners implementing these controls needed to be kept as low as possible. The two diseases that created the biggest problems were favus and trachoma. The former is a chronic contagious skin disease especially of the scalp, while the latter is a contagious infection of the eye. Favus had been considered a dangerous disease since the passage of the 1891 law, while trachoma only made the list in 1897 when an investigation by the US Public Health and Marine Hospital service showed that the disease spread rapidly. It was associated with the growing influx of eastern and southern European migrants who had to be checked (Abbott, 1924, 70-72 and Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 37). The reports on trachoma moved Powderly to put improved health inspections on top of his priority list. The percentage of those who were denied admission for medical reasons rapidly increased (Kraut, 114, 2006).

3.1.1) The imposition of an effective system to keep out contagious and loathsome diseases

Favus was easy to identify and was specially widespread among young immigrants. Therefore, it particularly affected migrating families who ran the risk of being separated at control stations. The cholera scare had put health inspections on the agenda of the American authorities. During the temporary appointment of American health inspectors in Europe the impact of strict controls were felt for the first time by shipping companies. In Rotterdam, Doctor Woodward withheld thirty to fifty passengers a day for favus or other skin diseases. The company isolated them but sometimes after

decided to base their report on Powderly's views. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters August 1 and 7 1899.

⁷²² GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters November 22 1898, October 31 1899 and November 22 1901.

⁷²³ *Ibid.* Letters November 22 1898 and December 6 1901.

weeks of special treatment some still were rejected. It was not only Russians, but also Dutch families who were afflicted by the disease, which often placed them in a dilemma when detected at Ellis Island; separation of the family or collective return meaning financial ruin. It was therefore important not to let the family come over until every member was cured. The Holland America Line hired a dermatologist at the port of embarkation and started sending back cash passengers with a serious affliction. In some cases, like for instance when the head of the family sent prepaid tickets but one of the members showed only the initial symptoms, but stood a chance of passing through the Canadian controls, the company booked them that way.⁷²⁴

Yet, the separation of families also caused uneasiness and embarrassment among the American inspectors (Powderly, 1902, 58). To prevent this, the whole family was often transferred to the Ellis Island Hospital until the disease no longer represented a risk of contagion. This depended, from case to case. The norm used by the health inspectors was that only one member younger than 15 could be afflicted, otherwise deportation followed. The maintenance costs were charged to the shipping company that landed the family. Van den Toorn tried to recoup the costs from the family, friends or the passengers themselves whenever possible but met with little success.⁷²⁵ The expenses for medical treatment of prepaid passengers at Rotterdam proved impossible to recuperate. Shipping companies tried to put the legal responsibility for the increasing deportation and maintenance costs on the purchaser of the tickets. The HAL inserted a clause on the prepaid ticket stating that: “*diseased persons and those unable to support themselves for any cause whatever are barred by the law from landing and may be sent back by the immigration authorities and if so returned, the purchaser of the pre-paid ticket agrees herewith to pay for the passage back and expenses*”. The HAL directors were not sure as to whether it would have any legality in courts.⁷²⁶

When Powderly took charge, the deportations for health reasons increased significantly. Because of the fire that burnt down the control station at Ellis Island, contaminated migrants were transferred to city hospitals increasing the maintenance cost

⁷²⁴ *Ibid.* Letters June 2 and July 31 1893

⁷²⁵ *Ibid.* Letters October 18 1894 and December 24 1895.

⁷²⁶ Shipping companies discussed the adaptations to the tickets during conference meetings and received legal advice on it from their lawyers. *Ibid.* Letters May 19 1896 and February 5 1897.

from one to \$2 per day.⁷²⁷ The treatment could take as long as six months. For the period April through November 1897, fourteen HAL passengers had been cured in American hospitals costing \$540, excluding the maintenance costs of accompanying family members. Of these, van den Toorn only managed to recoup \$50 in cash and to obtain another bond for \$50. Most of the detained prepaid passengers were between 15 and 20 years, who normally should have been deported. Through Glavis, the shipping companies called for clear directives in choosing a line of action.

The HAL wanted to send back all suspicious cases in Rotterdam but since it was not acting under American authority the company ran the risk of being sued by the purchaser of the ticket.⁷²⁸ The American authorities declined various requests of the HAL to take responsibility for the consequences of refusing transportation of afflicted passengers in Rotterdam. Therefore, the HAL decided to allow the diseased to travel to the US anyway. If refused, Van den Toorn needed to deport them straight away, unless he had the assurance of recouping the maintenance cost in the US. Yet, the decision to detain or deport the passengers laid in the hands of the immigration inspectors. Inspectors received a lot of critique in the press for separating families and were often more inclined to detain instead of deporting diseased persons who were under twenty one years. The companies tried to obtain the right to decide about their passengers, for whom they were financially responsible. The HAL considered it dreadful to deport favus patients, but since most of them were Russian Jews, the group of passengers who initiated the majority of legal proceedings against the line, the company showed little sympathy for their cause.⁷²⁹ In theory, a relative or guardian accompanying them or someone already in the US should return to the place of departure with the sick child, yet because of the

⁷²⁷ The rates were than adapted as follows: Care of contagious diseases other than the ones cured at the hospital of the Health Department adults and children one dollar per day, care of contagious diseases cured at the hospital of the Health Department adults and children 2 dollars per day, care of sick immigrants, none-contagious cases adults 90 cents, children under twelve 50 cents per day, burial of deceased immigrants of contagious cases 14 dollars of non-contagious diseases 23,75 dollars and transportation of sick immigrants 3 dollars each *Ibid.* Letter June 23 1898.

⁷²⁸ This was especially so for passengers traveling on prepaid tickets. Not only could cash passengers more easily be refused they often also obtained a guarantee covering the costs in case of deportation.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.* Letter October 12, 26, November 9, 19, 30 and December 17 1897.

difficulty in implementing this in practice they were often classified as ‘likely to become a public charge’.⁷³⁰

The shipping lines planned to fight the classification of favus as a dangerous and contagious disease. But, because Powderly showed so much zeal for the matter, the lines postponed the protest. They feared a radicalization of Powderly’s measures; he who tried to add the diseased children from naturalized Americans to the list of excludables, but who was met with significant protest. The children of immigrants who were in the process of applying for citizenship did not enjoy that privilege. Powderly also considered using the clause imposing fines of up to a \$1000 on shipping lines for bringing in passengers belonging to the prohibited classes.

New York head-agents telegraphed the European directors to urgently limit the arrivals of diseased migrants to avoid new harmful measures. The directors sent out the message to the main transit points at the German-Russian border and Vienna to send back all favus patients; cash and prepaid passengers alike. The lawyers assured the shipping companies that the clause prohibiting the import of excludables would cover them in trials accusing them of breach of contract. In the meantime, the company rehired the dermatologist that had been working under Doctor Woodward during the enforcement of the New York quarantine regulations abroad.⁷³¹ The following table shows the evolution of the percentage of aliens debarred because of loathsome and dangerous contagious diseases reflects the effectiveness of Powderly’s policies:

Table VII: Debarred aliens at US points of entry and their cause for the fiscal years 1892 to 1910⁷³²

| | Immigrants admitted | Aliens Debarred | Ratio | loathsome & other physical contagious diseases | or mental defects | Paupers and LPC | Contract laborers | Other |
|------|------------------------|--------------------|----------|--|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-------|
| 1892 | 579.663 | 2164 | 1 to 268 | 3.7 | 1.0 | 46.3 | 43.1 | 6.0 |
| 1893 | 439.730 | 1053 | 1 to 418 | 7.7 | 1.0 | 40.9 | 49.2 | 1.1 |
| 1894 | 285.631 | 1389 | 1 to 206 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 57.7 | 39.8 | 0.7 |
| 1895 | 258.236 | 2419 | 1 to 107 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 70.9 | 28.7 | 0.2 |
| 1896 | 343.267 | 2799 | 1 to 123 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 71.8 | 27.7 | 0.0 |

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.* Letter December 17 1897.

⁷³¹ *Ibid.* Letters January 15 1898 February 9.

⁷³² These figures are taken from the annual reports of the commissioner general of Immigration and apply to the fiscal years starting from July 1 1891 to June 10 1892 (Dillingham Commission Reports, vol. 4, Emigration Conditions in Europe, 1911, 73).

| | | | | | | | | |
|------|-----------|-------|----------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1897 | 230.832 | 1617 | 1 to 143 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 79.0 | 20.3 | 0.2 |
| 1898 | 229.299 | 3030 | 1 to 76 | 8.5 | 0.4 | 74.6 | 13.8 | 2.7 |
| 1899 | 311.715 | 3798 | 1 to 82 | 9.2 | 0.5 | 68.4 | 19.5 | 2.4 |
| 1900 | 448.572 | 4246 | 1 to 106 | 9.3 | 0.8 | 70.0 | 19.6 | 0.3 |
| 1901 | 487.918 | 3516 | 1 to 139 | 8.8 | 0.6 | 79.6 | 9.3 | 1.7 |
| 1902 | 648.743 | 4974 | 1 to 130 | 14.3 | 0.7 | 79.3 | 5.5 | 0.2 |
| 1903 | 857.046 | 8769 | 1 to 98 | 20.2 | 0.3 | 66.3 | 12.4 | 0.8 |
| 1904 | 812.879 | 7994 | 1 to 102 | 19.5 | 0.6 | 60.0 | 18.8 | 1.1 |
| 1905 | 1.026.499 | 11879 | 1 to 86 | 18.5 | 1.1 | 66.5 | 9.8 | 4.1 |
| 1906 | 1.100.735 | 12432 | 1 to 89 | 18.3 | 1.9 | 56.9 | 18.6 | 4.4 |
| 1907 | 1.285.349 | 13064 | 1 to 98 | 29.3 | 1.7 | 52.6 | 11.0 | 5.5 |
| 1908 | 782.870 | 10902 | 1 to 72 | 26.6 | 11.4 | 34.0 | 17.7 | 10.2 |
| 1909 | 751.786 | 10411 | 1 to 72 | 22.9 | 7.0 | 42.3 | 11.3 | 16.6 |
| 1910 | 1.041.570 | 24270 | 1 to 43 | 12.9 | 2.8 | 65.6 | 7.4 | 11.3 |

Because it was much easier to send back migrants under the pretence of likely to become a public charge, this category includes an unknown number of excludables belonging to the other classes.⁷³³ Yet, the spectacular increase of debarred diseased aliens from 1898 onwards illustrates the impact of Powderly's health policies. No specific data is available for what diseases the aliens were sent back, but the HAL correspondence indicates Favus as main cause. The HAL agent reported a few cases of trachoma in this period. The tendency reversed in the following years and is corroborated by the data collected by the Dillingham Commission. The data for the subsequent period also shows that health reasons were responsible for the great majority of debarred migrants in Europe, a number which exceeded the total number of deported aliens from American ports.⁷³⁴ Powderly laid the foundation of this evolution by increasing the financial burden on shipping companies for landing diseased migrants and threatening the imposition of fines. This policy would be further developed by his successors.

3.1.2) The era of corruption, blackmailing and physical abuses at Ellis Island

⁷³³ This seems to be true especially for the period 1893-1897 during which Senner was in charge of Ellis Island. He had openly admitted of using this clause to send back any migrant whom the inspectors considered unfit (Senner, 1897, 16).

⁷³⁴ During the fiscal year of 1907 German control stations at the Austrian and Russian borders refused 11.814 passengers out of 455.916. Of these 9.916 were denied access because of medical reasons while during that same period a total number of 13.064 passengers were refused entry at US landing stations. Furthermore between December 1st 1906 and December 31 1907 another 3.178 passengers did not pass the controls at the port of Bremen, another 2.694 in Hamburg and 340 at Le Havre nearly all exclusively because of health reasons (Dillingham Commission, 1911, vol. 4, 96-102).

It remarkable to note that the efforts of the labor leader who pushed for the passage of the contract labor law focused on debarring diseased aliens rather than contract laborers. Surprisingly, the deportations of contract laborers even decreased during his service as Commissioner General of Immigration. Powderly did introduce some other measures, such as keeping statistics based on ethnic origins and new questions were asked by immigration inspectors upon arrival, to further define the ethnic and religious background of immigrants.⁷³⁵ He also started to fine shipping companies \$10 for each omission or error on passenger manifests. This improved the quality of the manifests used during interrogations and for statistical data on immigration.⁷³⁶

Just like Senner, he tried to extend the use of passenger manifests and some form of inspection of first- and second-class passengers, on their arrival. The commissioners wanted to put an end to the loophole for better off excludables avoiding inspections by traveling in cabin class. The passenger advisory committee of the conference lines immediately pointed to the drawbacks of such measure; “*What would American Congressmen think if upon arrival they were asked whether they were polygamists, beggars or had been in prison before?*” At the same time, asking these questions of cabin passengers was just not done. Powderly weakened the measure by excluding Americans and from tourists of these obligations and in the end revoked the possibility of executing the interrogations and completing manifests for cabin passengers.⁷³⁷

Powderly’s actions were limited by two factors; the first was modest interests in immigration issues in Washington and secondly there was a very passive Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island. The shipping conference closely monitored the movements regarding immigrant legislation in Washington, yet due to the lack of introduction of definite propositions for immigration bills, no definite action was taken by the shipping lobby.⁷³⁸ One of the reasons for the inactivity was the passage of a bill introduced by Bartholdt appointing a non-partisan commission to investigate and recommend legislation to meet ‘the problems presented by labor, agriculture and capital’. Three years

⁷³⁵ The Barge office added four new questions upon arrival; (1) Nativity, country and province, (2) mother tongue, language or dialect, (3) subject of which country and (4) Religion. Letter July 8 1899.

⁷³⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter February 21 1901.

⁷³⁷ *Ibid.* Letters November 7, 20 and December 20 1898.

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.* Letter December 12 1901.

elapsed between the passage of the bill and the completion of the report of the Industrial Commission (Hutchinson, 1981, 124-125; Zeidel, 2005, 20).

It would not be the last time that anti-restrictionists used the commissions to prevent restrictive bills from being passed and to freeze immigration debates during the next sessions of Congress. Moreover, the victory in the Spanish-American War and the growing economy removed the 'immigration problem' from the public eye. Congressmen showed no intention of changing this; neither did the Commissioner of Immigration, Thomas Fitchie who, conversely to his predecessors and successors, remained in the background in the immigration debate and showed little initiative in innovating inspection procedures at Ellis Island. Fitchie partly deplored the debarring of contract laborers, describing them as '*immigrants of the best kind*'- much better than the many penniless newcomers who were often left with no other choice than to accept jobs for terrible wages.⁷³⁹ Possibly this explains for some part in the drop in deportations of contract laborers under Fitchie and Powderly. The Ellis Island commissioner displayed little sympathy for the new wave of immigrants. Especially for the growing number of Italians the examination was, as a rule, very strict.⁷⁴⁰ Fitchie's assistant, Mc Sweeny pleaded for a law denying the entry of 'birds of passage' from those regions.⁷⁴¹

Fitchie's leadership was characterized by the constant rumors of bribery, incompetence and brutality at Ellis Island. Both Powderly and the Secretary of Treasury led internal investigations.⁷⁴² The scandal of the *Gascogne* eventually led to a reorganization of the personnel at the control station. The steward of the French line vessel, Ernesto Sapelli was caught bribing an inspector to give citizen certificates to nine Italian passengers. This document made immigrants exempt of controls. An investigation showed that citizen certificates had been issued with no record made on the stubs of the books from which they had been torn, a practice which had been going on for months.⁷⁴³

⁷³⁹ NYT "Immigration of Aliens" September 27 1900.

⁷⁴⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter June 20 1901

⁷⁴¹ NYT "Immigration law flaws" July 25 1899.

⁷⁴² GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter April 17 1900. NYT "Powderly is investigating" March 10 1899, "Abused at Barge Office" June 6 and "For abusing immigrants" August 31 1900.

⁷⁴³ NYT "La Gascogne Steward accused of bribery" August 21 and "Immigration frauds" August 28 1901.

Fitchie's successor, William Williams, wrote a devastating report on the abuses at Ellis Island ranging from immigrants being rudely hustled; overcharged for their food; deliberately upholding immigrants carrying above average sums by the board of special inquiry to extort money; and the inefficient working of the board failing to debar many who had been declared unfit by the medical inspectors, etc.⁷⁴⁴ Some shipping companies also complained about preferential treatment of befriended lines of the Immigration Commissioners.⁷⁴⁵ The shipping lines tried to use the venality of immigrant inspectors to their advantage. When the newly appointed Greek and Arab interpreter at the control station Mr. Seraphic asked the HAL what they could do for his brother in Asia-minor the company did not hesitate to offer him free cabin passage. Charged with the registration of the immigrants and often appearing on the Board of Special Inquiry, Mr. Seraphic could render great services to the company.⁷⁴⁶ Because of the abuses of the positions Powderly and Fitchie, became unsustainable. President Roosevelt replaced them with Frank Sargent and William Williams.

3.2) Sargent – Williams: Implementing the law by the letter

3.2.1) The iron fist of William Williams and the clean sweep of Ellis Island

Williams made a clean sweep at Ellis Island and led the landing station with an iron fist. Soon after his appointment, the HAL agent Wierdsma predicted a clash between the shipping lines and Williams, who as a lawyer, had surrounded himself with colleagues to strictly implement the law by the letter. Immediately, the lines reported a marked increase in deportations. Especially, older migrants needed to present a strong case not to be sent back if they were considered as likely to become a public charge. As Wierdsma reported for people older than 45 years, having family ties in the US practically became a condition for admission:

“In case said immigrants have a close relation in this country namely parents, brothers or sisters danger is less great, but they may be physically able, may have money and railroad tickets to destination, without relatives, in which case they

⁷⁴⁴ NYT, “Immigration abuses officially charged”, November 28 1901.

⁷⁴⁵ NYT, “Commissioner Fitchie soon to be removed” December 21 1901.

⁷⁴⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter April 24 1901.

exceed the above mentioned age under the present system, the are very likely to be debarred. Commissioner is of the opinion that immigrants of said age are not very desirable. Naturally an appeal can be taken but a re-hearing is not likely to be granted except with very strong arguments. It is rumored that this action towards the 45+ is caused by chief clerk Mr. Lederhjelger to create a bad feeling between the lines and the new commissioner in order to show them that the former immigrant authorities administered the laws to much great satisfaction than present incubements.”⁷⁴⁷

As the letter indicates, the strict controls were probably also a kind of retaliation by the Ellis Island personnel against the shipping lines for their lack of support for the previous administration when the scandals broke out.⁷⁴⁸ Again, immigration authorities targeted Italians. The HAL transported few Italians, but for example out of the 16 passengers of the *Noordam* withheld for this reasons all but one Russian and one Hungarian came from Italy. Some of the debarred had already been in the US and returned with their son.⁷⁴⁹ Williams also reinforced the controls for contract laborers and those carrying loathsome diseases.⁷⁵⁰ The number of families detained at hospitals at 2\$ a day, regardless of age, drastically increased. Williams tried to find a way to fine the lines for such cases but in the interim they swelled medical bills in order to penalize the lines.⁷⁵¹ He also consequently fined the lines for every little omission or mistake on

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Letter May 13 1902.

⁷⁴⁸ The name of Mr. Lederhilger was mentioned in newspapers as one of the persons involved in the abuses and likely to be discharged during the investigation of 1900. Yet the chief clerk remained in position until Williams finally fired him in September 1902. *Ibid.* Letter September 29 1902.

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.* Letters May 16 and June 20 1902.

⁷⁵⁰ Wierdsma reported on eight Austrians miners arriving with *Statendam* sent back because of a misinterpretation of the Contract Labor law. He asked for a re-hearing and would appeal the case if necessary. In a letter to the North Atlantic Passenger conference Williams accused the doctors of the *Calabria* and *Gascogne* either of being incompetent or of criminal intent for trying to circumvent the American laws for the landing of three obvious cases of Favus. *Ibid.* Letters May 23 June 4, 22 July 11 and 13 1902.

⁷⁵¹ For example the health inspectors detected trachoma on one of the two sons traveling with Mrs. Elterman on April 21 1902. The family appealed the deportation and was transferred to the hospital. July 9th they mother and her child were still at the hospital New York while the healthy child had joined his father. The diseased had little chance of being cured within any reasonable time and the medical bill swelled to 240 dollars. The company tried to recoup the costs on the family but without success. The appeal showing little progress Wierdsma finally obtained the permission to deport the mother and child on August 29th. The HAL needed to cover the cost of deportation and the medical of approximately 400 dollars *Ibid.* Letters July 9, 12, 14, August 1, 22 and 29 1902. Other lines such as the Prince Line experienced the same. When the Prince Line could not recoup the cost on the father in the US it asked permission to deport Antonia Franzina and her two children. Williams strongly opposed stating: “*There was not the slightest excuse for your bringing here this diseased women and having done so the law rightly places on you the expenses for*

passenger manifests.⁷⁵² The immigration commissioner also intended to impose the use of manifests for cabin passengers. He strongly criticized the practice of upgrading steerage passengers who might have been debarred, to second-class during to voyage and warned that all such cases would be transferred to Ellis Island.⁷⁵³

At each arrival the chief clerk of the HAL steerage department and his assistants screened the passengers at the dock, accompanying them to Ellis Island. They collected information on those most likely to be detained first, then contacted relatives and friends, if they had any. The clerks also helped them, wherever possible, when they were before the Board of Special Inquiry where the company filed appeals on behalf of the passengers when possible.⁷⁵⁴ Yet, it was clear that Williams intended to send back a record number of passengers, for whatever reason. The head agent of the HAL believed that the situation called for joint secret action of all the lines in Washington. The conference lines had established a special 'Ellis Island Committee' to deal with such matters. The committee sent a report and letters of the shipping companies' lawyers to Williams to convince him that a strict application of laws was impossible.

In the meantime, the lines had received confidential information that the Washington administration did not favor the direct action of Ellis Island, which might disturb the existing friendly relations between the treasury department and the steamship lines.⁷⁵⁵ The conversations with Mr Ingen, chief counsel in Washington, were promising. Williams also stressed that he only intended to impose a manifest for second-class passengers. Relations between the lines and Williams slowly improved. Meanwhile newspapers were filled with stories of deportations and family separations. The *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung* knew that Williams' policy would soon lead to his dismissal. Wierdsma was less optimistic and did not believe that he would resign until high standards of inspections were put into place at Ellis Island. With the far reaching abuses which had nestled themselves in the control station the HAL agent estimated that it would take at least another year before Williams could think of leaving. But, in the meantime

caring for her. It is a matter of indifference to the Government how much your illegal action may cost you"
Ibid. Letter October 12 1902.

⁷⁵² These quickly added up. HAPAG paid 540 dollars for the last ship arriving at Ellis Island, Anchor Line 180, Fabre Line 150 and White Star Line 110 dollars. Letter June 6 1902.

⁷⁵³ *Ibid.* Letters May 30 and June 13 1902.

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.* Letter June 4 1902.

⁷⁵⁵ *Ibid.* Letter June 10 1902.

the reported stories started to affect the bookings. Agents reported a great drop in their sales, out of fear of seeing the passengers being refused at the gates.⁷⁵⁶ Besides the press, Congress also renewed its interest for the immigrant influx and its selection process which eventually led to a new immigration law in early 1903.

3.2.2) A quick loop back to Washington: The Immigrant Act of March 3 1903

The completion of the nineteen volume report of the Industrial Commission put immigration legislation back on the congressional agenda. It coincided with the ascendance of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency, who in his message stressed the need for new immigration laws containing provisions to exclude anarchists, illiterates and persons failing to meet certain economic standards. This moment marks the beginning of the Progressive Era in which pragmatic and fair solutions were sought for the evils that plagued the industrial society. Problems such as immigration were subjected to expert inquiry which had to enable Congress to formulate adequate legislation. The Industrial Committee, consisting of ten congressmen and nine presidential appointees recommended the following revisions of the immigration laws; augmenting the head tax to \$3, improving the inspection on land borders, inspecting of cabin passengers, exclusion of the anarchists, prolonging the Chinese exclusion, extending the period of deportability to five years after entry; prohibiting shipping companies from advertising foreign traffic and fining \$100 per passenger who landed with a loathsome or contagious disease. The influence of Powderly, who was used as key witness by the Committee, is noticeable. Besides Powderly, testimonies of Egisto Rossi, the chief of the Italian Immigration Bureau, and P. Hall of the IRL, made up the bulk of the Committee's immigration report. Despite the efforts by Hall, only two members supported the literacy test (Hutchinson, 1981, 127-128; Tichenor, 2002 122-123 and Zeidel, 2005, 20-21).

A. S. Anderson advised the shipping lines to prepare for a fight in Washington and he urged the lines to gather all possible arguments or proof in combating new

⁷⁵⁶*Ibid.* Letter August 22 1902 and January 6 1903. Articles are mentioned of the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, New York Herald and the Jewish papers of New York but are no longer attached to the letter in the archives.

measures.⁷⁵⁷ The manager of the Philadelphia passage business of the American Line substituted Glavis as a lobbyist against immigration restrictions for the passenger lines. His appointment indicates a closer collaboration between the shipping companies. The HAL no longer took action against restrictions in deliberation with the German lines.⁷⁵⁸ The conference lines appointed special sub-committees usually consisting of one representative of the three conferences by which the passenger market was divided; the British-Scandinavian Continental and Mediterranean. With working groups such as the 'Ellis Island', 'Railroad', 'Immigration inspection' and 'Immigration law' committees the passenger lines increased the efficiency of defending common interests. The lines appointed Emil Boas (HAPAG) to represent the Continental lines, Gustav Schwab (NGL) for the Mediterranean and John Lee (WSL) for the British lines to fight the various undesirable laws which had been introduced, some providing for health inspection at ports of embarkation, other to increase the head tax or imposing a literacy test. Given the delicate nature of the committee the lines decided not to record minutes of the meetings.⁷⁵⁹ Claude Bennett of the Congressional Information Bureau provided detailed reports on the debates held in the Immigration Committees and in Congress. He obtained inside information from congressional members confiding with their opinion regarding immigration issues; allowing the shipping companies to better coordinate their lobby efforts.

During the hearings on the desirability of the educational test held by the House Committee of Immigration and Naturalization, Hall blamed the shipping companies for the non-passage of the bill during the 54th congressional session. He claimed that the stock of the NGL had dropped by three percent when the bill was passed in Congress.⁷⁶⁰ Also, in his scientific publications the IRL leader blamed the visible hand of shipping companies even more for preventing the passage of immigration restrictions in

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.* Letters November 25 and December 6 1901.

⁷⁵⁸ Shortly after the German lines and the HAL concluded an agreement with the IMM shipping combine further tying the interests of these shipping lines. However on the question of ship subsidies and discriminating duties the lines remained opponents in Washington.

⁷⁵⁹ In 1896 Van den Toorn was appointed to preside the Immigrant inspection committee in which all the lines on the North Atlantic were represented to formulate the complaints against certain laws of inspection. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter July 17 1896 and 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letter January 3 1902.

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid.* Letter of Bennett to HAL January 15 1902

Washington (Hall, 1904, 173).⁷⁶¹ The Immigration Protective League had in the meantime disappeared off the scene as pressures for restrictions decreased during the investigation of the Industrial Commission.⁷⁶² The influence is hard to measure yet clearly the shipping lobby was the IRL's main opponent in Washington. After defending the adoption of the fine-system for bringing in diseased, at a committee hearing the attorney of the Bureau of Immigration, Mr. Campbell was approached by Paul Hilken (NGL) and Mr. Anderson. The steamship men made Campbell admit that his proposition contained flaws and he ended up asking Anderson to draw up an amendment which he would bring in front of the committee. The companies even convinced McSweeney to testify against the bill, yet the committee objected, finding that a subordinate of a Department could not criticize a bill drawn up by his superiors. In the meantime, the 'Immigration Law committee' of the conference lines mobilized the railroad companies that shared common interest in the immigrant question to oppose the bill.⁷⁶³ The railroads appointed Hugh Fuller, general passage agent of the Chesapeake Ohio RR. to voice their claims.⁷⁶⁴ The house committee, chaired by William Shattuc (Oh-R), reported on a bill along similar lines as those suggested by the shipping companies. Yet Shattuc could not prevent the important movement pushing for a literacy test and to introduce an amendment in the House.⁷⁶⁵ It was inserted into the bill by a vote of 86 to 7, and it passed the House on May 27 (Hutchinson, 1981, 132).

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid.* Letter Bennett to HAL January 15 1902.

⁷⁶² When exactly the Immigration Protective League ceased to exist remains unclear but the initiative was short-lived. As soon as the shipping lines judged that pressures no longer warranted the expenditures the League the lines stopped financing it. Senner then became the President of the Austrian Association of New York. He still appeared every now and again to defend the shipping interests as for instance at the National Civic Federation meetings on migration or to guide around Franz Kaltenbrunn an Austrian commissioner investigating the situation in the US to advise the Austrian Reichstag working on a new immigration bill. See (Just, 1989, 240) NYT "Watchorn asks envoy from Austria to help him" April 26 and "Immigration the topic of the Civic Federation" June 20 1905.

⁷⁶³ The bill contained a clause putting the responsibility both of the character of the aliens coming from Canada and of their inspection on the railroad companies. Another clause tried to put an end to the temporary migration of Canadians in the US. Especially the New England territories where many Canadians worked would be affected by the measure. Railroads in that region would loose an important business transporting these.

⁷⁶⁴ Especially the big Railroads of the East supported the shipping companies whereas the western railroads initially hesitated. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters January 28, 29 February 3, 8, May 7 and July 11 1902.

⁷⁶⁵ Shattuc opposed the literacy test, considered the imposition of fines for bringing in diseased to be unjust and favored steamship advertisements promoting the US as a place for immigrants abroad. Shattuc assured Bennett that the House committee would not come to a vote on the educational test. To

The anti-restrictionists first tried to delay the actions of the Senate Immigration Committee as the congressional session came to a close. Railroads postponed their petitions from being heard until the last minute to gain time. However, the committee reported the bill but many senators who still wanted consideration for their 'pet projects' and deferred consideration for the bill. The congressional elections which followed the next short session further stalled discussions on the bill. This gave the shipping lines the time to reorganize their opposition. Schwab prepared pamphlets, pointing to the objectionable features of the bill, to be distributed among Senators.⁷⁶⁶

Senator Elkins, Anderson, S.C. Neal, legal counsel of the IMM, representing the steamship companies, and Judge Fayson, J. Hill and Mr. Dudley, on behalf of the railroads, opposed the bill when the hearings reopened at the end of the year. Both however lacked in having a person of influence on the Immigration Committee to obstruct the passage of the bill. Despite the heavy pressure by interests opposed to the bill the chairman of the Immigration Committee, Senator Boies Penrose (Pen-R), championed the bill defying major corporations from his home state such as PRR and the IMMCO. In this, he received the strong support of committee members Lodge and Charles Fairbanks (Ind-R). They kept the hearings short and quickly reported the bill so that even if opponents overloaded it with amendments in the Senate, there was still time to prevent it from going over to the next session. But, as Bennett reported, a lot of hard work had been done by the railroad people, manufacturers and employers to convince the Senators individually to vote against the bill. For instance the zeal of Fairbanks had greatly diminished since the actions of the Topeka and Santa Fe Railroads. Bennett suggested to Lodge omitting the educational test, yet the Massachusetts Senator, although aware that the clause jeopardized the whole bill, did not want it out. Senator A. Clay (Geo, D)

gain time he considered the literacy test apart in an effort to shelve it. He planned to hold a secret vote, preventing the voting behavior from leaking to the public. Committee members would then feel more inclined to vote against it. This had to prevent the matter from being discussed in the House. Yet he failed to stop Representatives Watson (In-R) and Underwood (Al-D) from discussing the test in the House and introducing an amendment containing the test. Watson suggested excluding the Italians like the Chinese and blamed Hungarians and Russian Jews of filling up American jails and almshouses. He knew that test stood a better chance to pass when attached to the immigration bill than when discussed apart. Efforts of Grosvenor (Oh-R) and Kleberg (Tx-D) to block the amendment failed. *Ibid.* letters January 15 and 29, April 1 and May 19 1902 and NYT "Steamship Lines will fight the immigration bill" December 7 1901, "Immigration Bill taken up" May 22 and "Hungarian Citizens" May 25 1902.

⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid.* Letters June 17, 24 July 11 and 12 1902.

opposed the test, a feeling shared by many senators. Representatives from American Line and PRR pressured Senator Mathew Quay who would try to prevent consideration by stretching the debates on the Statehood Bill (Penn-R).

In the meantime, the American Federation of Labor called off its legislative strike not believing the bill would pass the session. Senators Gallinger (NH, R), W. Mason (Ill-R) and J.B. Foraker (Oh-R) also joined the opposition, making it likely for the bill to go over. Just before the session came to a close Fairbanks unexpectedly brought up the bill.⁷⁶⁷ Senator Elkins had assured that he would call the whole bill in its entirety, to be considered and the report to be read which would have defeated it. But, the opposition was disarmed by the acceptance of any amendments they proposed. The educational test was stroke out, John Dryden (NJ-R) reduced the head tax to \$2, and the contract labor provisions, which would have moved the application to being under the Commission of Immigration instead of the Department of Treasury was taken out to prevent obstructions of Canadian immigrants.⁷⁶⁸

Yet, both sides knew that the House would try to defend its version, calling for a Conference Committee where these amendments could be reinserted. With a President who had advocated the literacy test, the liberal immigration lobby could not count on a veto as it had in 1897; hence they looked for guarantees from the conferees. Conference committee member Shattuc committed to strongly oppose any attempts to attach the literacy test.⁷⁶⁹ When Senator Elkins failed to kill the bill he required the Senators, Lodge, Fairbanks and McLaurin (Mis-D), likely to serve as conferees in the case of differences with the House, to pledge not to recede from the amendments, striking out the literacy test and freely allowing Canadian migrants to New England. Despite protests, Elkins' persistence made the conferees to give into the pressures. In case they violated it, Elkins and Gallinger were prepared to defeat the bill by filibustering it.⁷⁷⁰

However, this did not prove to be necessary. The novelties of the bill were; exclusion of anarchists, prostitutes, the insane and epileptics, an increase of the head-tax to 2\$, a fine system of \$100 for passengers who landed with contagious and loathsome

⁷⁶⁷ *Ibid.* Letters December 3, 5, 8, 9, 13 1902, January 7 10, 16, 19, 24, 27 and 31 1903.

⁷⁶⁸ *Ibid.* Letters February 27 and 28 1903.

⁷⁶⁹ *Ibid.* Letter January 10 1903.

⁷⁷⁰ *Ibid.* Letter February 28 1903 and NYT "Immigration Bill Passed, Educational clause out" March 1 1903.

diseases, and whose illness should have been detected at the port of embarkation, enlarging the definition of the contract labor, prohibition of promises of employment in US through advertisements in foreign publications, regulations for escorts of physically handicapped and minor debarred aliens, extension of the period of deportability of aliens unlawfully in the US to three years and of immigrants becoming a public charge from one to two years.

As Shattuc put it: “*its passage is the best thing that could have happened to the shipping companies’ interests because it prevents the passage of a measure by the next Congress which would have been much more objectionable to them.*”⁷⁷¹ To diminish the influence of the senators who championed the bill, the shipping lines supported a movement to replace Senator Penrose by Dryden or William Dillingham (Ve-R) as chairman of the Immigration Committee; to decrease the probability of strict immigration laws. Before his substitution Penrose passed a bill that transferred the jurisdiction over immigration laws from the Secretary of Treasury to the Department of Commerce and Labor, which is where the Bureau of Immigration and the Commissioner General of Immigration had moved to.⁷⁷²

3.3.3) The implementation of the law by the Commissioner General of Immigration F. Sargent and the Ellis Island immigration commissioner W. Williams

The successor to Powderly, Frank Sargent, also had a labor union background as a former Grandmaster of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and his appointment was generally seen as a change for the worse by the shipping companies. His views on immigration diverged little from his predecessor, and he supported the aspects of the bill that had been written up by Powderly. Sargent managed to insert a clause into the law allowing him to dispatch officials across the Atlantic to investigate any irregular schemes directing migrants to the US.⁷⁷³ He initially favored the literacy test, yet when it

⁷⁷¹ *Ibid.* Letter March 4 1903.

⁷⁷² *Ibid.* Letters February 6 and March 4 1903.

⁷⁷³ He appointed Marcus Braun, a Hungarian by birth, as special Immigration officer for European ports to report how undesired migration can be stopped from the interior and European ports. These investigations needed to uncover schemes like that of the Rumanian authorities which resulted in a virtual expatriation of their Jewish subjects to the US *Ibid.* Letter October 18 1902.

endangered the passage of the bill he withdrew his support.⁷⁷⁴ The Commissioner General of Immigration did not hide his antipathy for the new immigrants stating that; “*the very undesirable class from Southern and Eastern Europe which had taken the place of the Teutons and the Celts*” (Sargent, 1904, 155).

His absolute priority was not so much the literacy test but more to find ways of assuring a better distribution of the aliens congested in cities to where labor was needed. He wanted the Bureau of Immigration to furnish information to all desirable migrants, directing them to the localities where their skills could best be used. He planned to organize an exhibition hall at Ellis Island showing all the industrial resources in each state. Sargent also pressed for the building of a hospital at Ellis Island instead of spreading the diseased around the New York hospitals; and he had success in this endeavor. The procedures for deportation were adapted. Henceforth no appeal would be considered after someone had been transferred from the Immigrant station for deportation. Also, at the second hearing of the board of Special Inquiry, friends and relatives would not be allowed and new evidence could no longer be brought forward during the appeal. Representatives of steamship lines could not be present at the first hearings, but got permission to be there do so during the appeal.⁷⁷⁵ The dialogue between Sargent, Williams and the shipping lines seemed to improve until the stricter implementation of the new laws midway through 1903.

Williams initially only sporadically used the \$100 fine to bring over migrants with dangerous diseases. Because of Powderly’s focus on health inspections, shipping lines had greatly intensified controls at the port of embarkation, improving their relations with the US health department. The new outbreak of bubonic plague in 1899 in Europe illustrated this. The temporary reappointed of health inspectors to supervise quarantine and controls at ports of embarkation occurred a lot smoother than in 1893.⁷⁷⁶ Contrary to the first experience with American inspectors, the HAL reported no complaints and willingly complied with new requirements such as the acquisition of new disinfection

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid.* Letters May 17, July 12, October 18 1902 and February 13 1903.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid.* Letters January 3, September 5 and October 29 1902 and NYT “Little State fares for the immigrants” March 23 1905.

⁷⁷⁶ Antwerp and the Red Star Line constitute one notable exception to this. After the experience of 1893 the Belgian government refused to delegate any authority to American officials during the inspection of immigrants.

apparatus, vaccinations of passengers, etc. With trachoma pushing back favus as the main cause for rejection the company hired an eye-specialist. Over the years the Dutch line built up good relations with A. Dotty, chief health officer of the port of New York; giving free ocean passages to his brother's family and warmly welcoming him at Rotterdam when inspecting ports in Europe.⁷⁷⁷

The company managed to greatly improve the reputation of the line among immigrant inspectors. Taking this into account, Williams initially only imposed a \$10 fine for wrongly manifesting diseased migrants as being healthy. Yet, as the number of trachoma passengers landed by the HAL increased, the line's reputation quickly deteriorated. Williams' forbearance towards the line vanished, imposing the \$100 fine for passengers with advanced-stage diseases that should have been detected at Rotterdam. The New York head-agents reported that the controls at Ellis Island intensified reducing the number of passengers inspected by two doctors at Ellis Island from five to four hundred per hour. The law did not foresee an appeal against their decision yet Wierdsma advised not challenging them. It would increase their expenditures for detainees and set the inspectors against the line.

This fear hindered joint action of the lines on this matter. Costs quickly added up, as illustrated by the fine of \$1000 imposed after the arrival of the *Statendam* later returning with forty eight deported passengers; thirty seven for trachoma eleven others accompanying them. Wierdsma urged for stricter controls at Rotterdam suggesting to adopt HAPAG's reward system of five marks for each case of trachoma spotted by its medical team at Hamburg.⁷⁷⁸ Headed by Cortis of the White Star Line, the Ellis Island Committee of the shipping lines asked Sargent to reappoint American doctors at the port of embarkation as a means to make an end to the fines. However, Sargent feared protests from European governments. Wierdsma strongly opposed a permanent presence of inspectors in Rotterdam and asked the directors to urge the Dutch authorities of to protest

⁷⁷⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters October 10, November 27 1899, January 29 April 6 1900 and July 7 1901.

⁷⁷⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters April 21, May 18, June 8, 9 15, 26 and 30 1903

against the measure.⁷⁷⁹ In the meantime, the company hired an extra doctor using new methods; succeeding in decreasing the arrival of passengers affected by trachoma.

While the remote control system for diseased passengers started to function very well, the contract labor law remained a dead letter. As a former labor union man, Sargent in collaboration with Williams, tried to remedy this. This led to the discharge of Mr. Van Ingen who had advocated a liberal interpretation of the contract labor law, opposing the bringing into practice of new applications of the law. With his dismissal the lines saw an important ally in this matter leave the Bureau of Immigration in Washington.⁷⁸⁰

Williams started to center his efforts on specific reoccurring contract labor abuses. For instance, to reduce the increasing arrival of young Greek bootblacks making their way through a padrone system, Williams started to deport all Greek passengers who were between eleven and eighteen, who had no direct families in the US - uncles or cousins with limited means did not help. Being minors, Williams could not deport them for violation of contract laborers yet he used the 'likely to become charge' (LPC) clause to do so.⁷⁸¹ Groups of passengers manifesting the same final destination, such as a group of thirty one Italians booked to Uniontown, Pennsylvania, were sent back not as LPC's, but as contract laborers enabling immigrant authorities to underline their efforts against contract labor in statistical reports and in newspapers.⁷⁸²

But, as Wierdsma pointed out, had it not been for the negligence of the HAL purser, this would have never happened. Shipping lines usually displayed great care in preventing passengers and manifests from raising the suspicions of being contract

⁷⁷⁹ The advantages of the system consisted of putting an end to the fines and being relieved from the costs of medical inspections at the port of embarkation. Anchor WSL and NGL supported the idea. Yet the decision of the doctor was final and with the bad experience of 1893 in mind the HAL pointed to danger of depending on the personal interpretation of such doctor. Moreover, it would only stimulate further interference of American authorities. *Ibid.* Letters July 24 August 28 1903.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.* Letter June 22 1903.

⁷⁸¹ Out of the 810 Greeks landed by the HAL in April 65 were deported for these reasons. CGT and HAPAG sometimes numbered 60 to 70 of these cases per ship. In the statistics showing the reasons for deportation contract laborers had dropped from 49% of the cases in 1893 to an all time low 5.5% in 1902. The two following years the figure increased with 13% while the number sent back as LPC decreased. See Table I and *Ibid.* Letter April 24 1903.

⁷⁸² Another example is for instance the deportation of forty Welsh coal miners on their way to Ellsworth Coal Co, Pennsylvania claiming that these were induced to come by Welsh agents of the company. The strict policy also prevented a million dollar project of Duke de Litta Visconti Arese to bring in Italian laborers for the development of the silk industry in California. Former attempts to stimulate this industry had always failed. Usually laborers for new industries were exempted from the contract labor provisions. *Ibid.* Letter October 20 1903.

laborers.⁷⁸³ When competing for a share of the booming Bulgarian market the head agent underlined the great care to be used in preventing their deportation as contract laborers. Ellis Island targeted this group yet Wierdsma managed to release fifteen Bulgarian passengers of the *Noordam* from detention. HAPAG had less luck with thirty seven Bulgarians being deported because one of them carried a newspaper ad from their European migrant agent promising to arrange work for his customers.⁷⁸⁴

Williams also set new standards for defining LPC's. He introduced the policy of detaining all passengers, even skilled, able and healthy ones possessing less than \$10. He considered the sum as a minimum for new arrivals to get by during the initial days, while looking for a job or joining trying to join family and friends. Hence prepaid passengers booked through to final destination, who formerly never encountered any problems at Ellis Island, were now being detained until family or friends wired money to the landing station, the amount of which could easily supersede the minimum if inspectors deemed necessary. It created a lot of extra work for the companies. Beginning in June 1904 Wierdsma reported that for the last two steamers that had arrived, sixty agents needed to be contacted to trace back family and friends to wire money. The company sent out a circular to its agents requesting them to strongly recommend purchasers of prepaids to also provide the passenger with \$10 besides the ticket to final destination.⁷⁸⁵

The number of deportations increased yet so did the total immigrant influx. Proportionally, less aliens were expelled by Williams and Sargent than under Fitchie and Powderly. Yet, the number of debarred for medical reason further increased and with the fine system this constituted a serious burden on the shipping companies.⁷⁸⁶ By the beginning of 1905, the companies had reached boiling point and they held a special meeting to consider joint measures. However, simultaneously the New York press reported on the resignation of Williams.⁷⁸⁷ The zeal of the Ellis Island manager had not only led to the discontent of steamship lines. The foreign press also heavily criticized his administration and politicians were not indifferent to the political repercussion the press

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.* Letter September 22 1903

⁷⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Letter March 24 and April 12 1904.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Letters May 23, 28, 31 and June 3 1904.

⁷⁸⁶ See Table I.

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid.* Letters January 13 and 20 1905.

could produce. It moved Roosevelt to visit Ellis Island and to appoint a special inquiry to investigate claims of irregularities under Williams by the foreign press.

The inquiry did not reveal any scandals and on the contrary the *New York Times* praised the commissioner for clearing the control station of abuses, ensuring a humane treatment of new arrivals and sifting out the male-fide personal and missionary associations of the place. In this article, Williams declared the immigration laws to be inadequate to reduce the increasing flow of undesired migrants by lowering the American living standards while being: “*unfitted mentally and morally for good citizenship. American legislators could easily solve this problem yet they need a clear signal of the population that such is desired. Aliens have no inherent right whatever to come here and we need to keep out those who do not meet certain economic and physical standards*”.⁷⁸⁸

Apparently this signal failed to materialize and politicians in the meantime preferred to oppose restrictive policies and controls, so as not to upset their electorate which they tried to keep as broad as possible. Even the outspoken restrictionist President Roosevelt altered his views on the immigration question for the same reasons. With his publicity stunt of visiting Ellis Island ordering an inquiry he courted the foreign-born vote for the upcoming elections in 1904 and 1905. The patronage appointment, a practice which Williams had tried to eradicate, of Joseph Murray as Chief-Assistant served as a check on the Commissioner. Williams instead gave in to the pressures and resigned. The President replaced him by Robert Watchorn of who he expected a less controversial lead (Tichenor, 2002, 134-135).

4) Setting-up the foundations of the global wall against poor immigrants

As Zolberg pointed the Chinese exclusion acts and laws regulating the European influx from the 1880s onwards were; “*the first stones of a global wall erected by the rich industrial states to protect themselves from the “invasion” by the world’s poor*” (Zolberg, 1999, 73). But, that this wall blocking the entry of Europeans took so long to be

⁷⁸⁸ NYT “Roosevelt starts special Ellis Island Inquiry” March 19 1903; “Williams Out” January 15, “Four years of progress at Ellis Island” February 12 1905.

erected is for a great part because of the shipping lobby. The rising nativist movement did not facilitate their efforts.

As Williamson and Hatton pointed out, the economic convergence between the US and the European countries supplying migrants since the sail-ship era, slowed down movement from these areas (Williamson and Hatton; 1998). While shipping companies saw their traditional markets dry up, they sought and found new ones in Eastern and Southern Europe. By 1896, the influx from new immigrant regions surpassed that of the old stock. The following years, the flow swelled, constantly beating new records of arrivals (see appendix 2). Yet, the change of origin of European migrants triggered a new wave of nativism, gaining intensity as the movement increased. With the foundation of the Immigration Restriction League the movement acquired political power using new strategies to influence policymakers and public opinion. It gave the nativists a lasting lobby platform, transcending party politics, forming a counterpoise to the advocates of liberal policies in Washington.

The pro-immigration lobby was already well established by then, confirming Gary Freeman's theory of diffuse costs and concentrated benefits explaining the lag of restrictionists on liberals to organize themselves (Freeman, 1995). Yet, so far for if this period this has not been overlooked, it was at least underestimated by migration historians often dating a well organized pro-immigration platform after the foundation of the IRL with the protest of associations representing the different ethnic and nationality groups.⁷⁸⁹ The fact that initially predominantly German and Irish associations protested against a literacy test, which would hardly have any effect on their movements and not the targeted Jewish, Italians or Slavs, remained unexplained.

This lacuna can be clarified by another difference between the lobbies on both sides of the spectrum. On one hand restrictionists, who despite taking longer to organize, shared the same arguments such as protecting the integrity of national institutions, employment and living standards of citizens. Labor unions or xenophobic associations, the driving force in this case, had little or no reasons to hide their direct involvement

⁷⁸⁹ See for instance Higham: "*Of all the groups who, through confidence or conviction helped to turnback the tide of nativism, none was as resolute as the immigrants themselves*" (Higham, 1955, 123). Or Jones: "*Business interests were depicted as the chief defenders of an open gate policy. But this became only true after about 1905. ...but the most strenuous opposition came from the immigrants themselves*" (Jones, 1992, 219,224).

defending these 'noble ideals' in convincing politicians and public opinion. On the other hand liberals, here led by the shipping lobby protecting their main source of revenue defended, just as employers and capitalists, solely their economic benefits. Therefore, they needed to base their arguments on common interests that immigration benefited the economy, contributed to the industrial development and the American wealth in which the population participated. Yet immigrants, industrial development and wealth were geographically unfairly divided; with the South and West lagging behind the North and East. Shipping companies played out the disequilibrium and the historical tensions between North and South. Their lobby campaigns concentrated on Western and Southern states where they stressed the need for immigrants in order to catch up. Yet especially shipping companies had to cover up their involvement in lobby campaigns so as not to jeopardize their aims. To gain favor of the public opinion and pressure politicians they had to find someone else to voice their claims. Because of this secrecy we know little on the strategies of the pro-immigration lobby and a lot more of restrictionists, leading to a neglect of the former while overemphasizing the latter in research.

The activities of the shipping companies reveal important insights. The two constant actors in the immigration debate, known for its strange-bedfellow coalitions were the shipping lobby and IRL. Views of employers, capitalists, labor unions, and Congressmen of various regions changed overtime. Up to the foundation of the IRL, the shipping companies' close connections with the press through advertising and temporary hiring of journalists seemed sufficient to manipulate public opinion. Yet the pressures of the IRL forced them to organize a well structured counterpoise that could openly voice pro immigration arguments. The German shipping companies used their close ties with the important German-American community to agitate against restrictions. By establishing the Immigration Protective League they institutionalized the movement which they sought to expand among other foreign born communities. The electoral importance of these communities did not leave politicians unaffected. Through lobbyists in Washington shipping companies tried to make Congressmen aware of the importance of immigration, not only for the country, but also for their political careers. In Congress their strategy against restrictive laws existed to various degrees; first to avoid consideration for the issue and then by trying to obtain enough support to vote against

restrictions. If that proved impossible they used numerous strategies to delay action on it, for as long as possible, so as to kill the bill. If the pressures proved too big they sometimes collaborated to pass a bill, yet not without introducing amendments adjusting it as much as possible to the shipping interests.

These interests were predominantly in the hands of foreign companies which also lobbied against maritime policies attributing competitive advantages to American shipping companies for the migrant trade. The International Navigation Company representing the only American passenger liner involved constantly and used its influence the other way around. Just like the IRL, they tried to take advantage of the favorable international climate to achieve their goals. The tendencies in countries such as France and Germany to view immigration more and more as a domestic question rather than an international one reinforced the trend of regulating the movement unilaterally.

The rise of nationalism worldwide at the turn of the century clearly manifested itself in the US through the decreasing loyalty towards international treaties, changing tariff policies, the foundation of the IRL and rising jingoism leading to the Spanish-American War. The power of the nation was measured by its naval force in which the merchant marine played an important part. The war had put the decline of the American merchant marine high up on the political agenda. Subsidies, differential tariffs or measures favoring the American flag for migrant transport were brought forward. Similar measures had been adopted by the European governments, yet surprisingly the US although in a privileged position as receiving country did not. Again using the utmost secrecy, foreign lines used their influence in Washington and sponsored the Reform Club to oppose the subsidies. Previous experience with the large subsidies had not proven successful. Moreover, using tax payers' money to finance big business was not a popular decision to take with the rising antitrust sentiments. The leak on the formation of the IMM combine to the popular press ended the hopes of the ship-subsidy bill advocates. The combine also linked the interests of the American Line with that of foreign lines decreasing the pressures of the former to obtain competitive advantages shedding more light on why the European trend was not followed by the Americans.

But, the shipping companies could not prevent the authorities from improving their selection procedures at control stations where racist ideologies gained ground. The

development of new policies highly depended on the Commissioner General of Immigration and the Immigration Commissioner of Ellis Island. The ambiguity regarding the clause ‘likely to become a public charge’ continued to provide immigrant inspectors with a means to increase deportations under that excuse, if the situation called for it. As permanent remote controls carried out by consuls and American health inspectors proved to be practically and diplomatically unworkable, the authorities put the responsibility for those more and more on transport companies. Powderly laid the basis for an effective remote control system to keep out passengers with dangerous and loathsome diseases. By increasing the maintenance costs and by introducing fines for bringing in these types of passengers medical, inspections of shipping lines at European border control stations and at ports of embarkation markedly improved. Stricter border controls with Canada and the examination of second cabin passengers needed to close down the loopholes in the system.

Yet, as the controls became stricter, the efforts of the shipping lines to guarantee the landing of their passengers expanded. Their importance, first as a link in chain migration patterns tracking down family and friends in the US to guarantee the right of passage of detainees, and second as a link between the immigrant and the state in fighting deportations increased. The number of deportations and the loopholes at the control stations depended a lot on the Immigration commissioner in charge. However, both extremes of lax and rigid rule were not appreciated by politicians appointing the Ellis personnel. Presidents usually preferred to keep Ellis Island out of the public eye for electoral reasons.

Although drastic restrictive laws blocking the entry of the European poor did not materialize, American authorities passed legislation further refining the selection procedure and measures improving the control system. By the time Congress finally enacted the literacy test and quota act to erect a restrictive wall, immigrant inspectors had laid the foundations to build it rapidly and to manage it efficiently.

Chapter IV: The Dillingham Commission and Immigration Legislation: between Progressivism and Corporate Liberalism

With his influential book *Races of Europe* W. Z. Ripley imported the division of the white race in 'Teutonic', 'Alpine' and 'Mediterranean' from scholars in Europe. This classification attributed superior racial features to old stock immigrants in comparison to the more primitive immigrants from eastern and southern Europe (Ripley, 1898). Ripley gave scientific arguments on which the Immigration Restriction League developed their most powerful ideological weapon culminating in Grant's *The passing of the Great Race*; namely that due to the absence of immigration restrictions the country was committing racial suicide (Alexander, 1960, 73-90; Grant, 1916; Higham, 1956, 224). Despite Boas' refutation of this threat, the Dillingham Commission compiled a *Dictionary of Races* based on Ripley's division, using it to advise immigration restrictions blocking the entry of the 'primitive' races (Dillingham Commission Reports, Vol. I, II, V and XXXVIII).

Yet, the Harvard Economist did not support these conclusions believing that racial qualities could be transformed by the American environment and pleading for an active program of social betterment. To enhance the assimilation of immigrant children Ripley urged for a healthy environment, better schools and libraries and an adaptation of the factory laws to the school laws, protecting the child from greedy employers or parents. For immigrant adults, the government needed to guarantee decent affordable housing, easy access to trade unions, and social security against sickness and old age (Ripley, 1908, 130-138). These reforms suggested by Ripley illustrate the concerns of the progressives to protect the population from the changing socio-economic conditions generated by industrialization and the rise of big business. Some considered immigration restrictions to be part of these increasing the pressures on the government to intervene, leading to the formation of the Dillingham Commission. The growing importance of scientific expertise in policy-making remains an undisputed characteristic of the Progressive Era. The influence of the Dillingham Commission on the subsequent immigration policy is widely recognized by scholars, yet the backlog to implement its conclusions remains unclear due to the lack of integration of business interests concerned by the issue.

As Gabriel Kolko, Martin Sklar and James Weinstein noted, with the rising corporate liberalism or political capitalism during the Progressive Era big business played an important role in shaping government policies, trying to make them coincide with the

public interest (Kolko, 1963, 1964; Weinstein, 1968; Sklar, 1988, 1992). Conversely to the railroads, shipping companies managed to find an equilibrium by concluding conference agreements mitigating the vigorous competition from 1896 onwards. Also, the market being international rather than domestic and predominantly in foreign hands explains the particular relation of the migrant transport sector with the US government. Internally, foreign shipping companies opposed any measures giving competitive advantages to American shipping interests, while both jointly tried to prevent the passage of restrictive immigration laws in Washington. The foreign lines tried to obtain competitive advantages in Europe, but obstructed any intervention by the American authorities both in regulating the market and in restricting immigration. The success of the foreign shipping lobby -discussed in previous chapters- up to 1905 will be further analyzed up to 1914.

The mobilization of foreign-born communities to protest against checks on the influx remained a corner stone of the lobby's successful strategy. During this period, the voice of new immigrant groups gained importance while associations representing the old stock continued to support the cause. The struggle of the 'in-betweens' to get recognition of equality with their predecessors from northern and western Europe intensified. David Roediger described the process by which new immigrants became 'white ethnics'. At the turn of the century, when race and ethnicity were often used as synonyms by race theorists entangling biological and cultural aspects the 'in-betweens' still had a long way before achieving a 'white status' (Roediger, 2005). Even at the gates there was a clear differentiation in the selection procedure in which the views of the presidential appointee running Ellis Island played an important role. The analysis of the impact of the Immigration Commissioner's interpretation and implementation of immigration laws as in previous chapters will be continued. Although there were clearly various degrees of whiteness, Thomas Guglielmo rightly pointed that their belonging to the white race was granted on arrival and hardly ever questioned. This gave the newcomers unrestricted access to citizenship allowing them to achieve political influence and climb up the 'socio-ethnic' ladder (Guglielmo, 2003, 28-30). As Desmond King underlined the 'whiteness' of American identity was constructed sociologically and historically (King, 2000, 23). In this process, the importance of common interests and strategies used by new immigrant

groups, employers and shipping companies to keep open the gates to the New World up to WOI, will be discussed.

1) The fragile equilibrium of shipping cartels and its impact on maritime and migration policies

1.1) The failed attempt of the Hungarian government to control emigration

As seen in chapter I, the formation of the IMM disrupted the stability of the North Atlantic passenger market. The growing involvement of governments in the migrant transport market, giving competitive advantages to certain lines, undermined the cartel agreements between the lines. The Cunard Line played out the growing nationalism in the homecountry that feared losing its dominant position at sea, to obtain royal subsidies (Vale, 1976 and 1984). More surprisingly was that in its battle against the North Atlantic Passenger Conference it managed to conclude an agreement with the Hungarian government which agreed to encourage migrants to travel with the English company if it opened a direct line from Fiume. If it failed to divert 30,000 citizens through Fiume, the government committed to pay out a compensation of \$20 per passenger short of that quota. The law was in the first place conceived by the authorities to put a check on the emigration of nationals and on the long run to stimulate its own merchant marine (Murken, 1922, 241-281).

Yet, the IMM lobby did not hesitate in misrepresenting the intentions of the law in the American press in a new bid to obtain competitive advantages. Especially the compensation clause rose suspicions in the US, fearing that Hungarian authorities would be inclined to stimulate emigration in order to avoid paying compensations. In Washington, Senator Dillingham worked on a bill excluding immigrants 'encouraged by any government with a steam-shiping company'. Representative Serene Payne (NY-R) drew attention not only to the Hungarian law but also to the German, Italian and French laws favoring the national lines and suggested imposing a \$30 tax on immigrants coming in on with foreign vessels. B. Penrose and H. Lodge defended the idea in the Senate. As the congressional session came to a close, A. Anderson, S. Neal and J. Wright pleaded in favor of the bill at the House Immigration Commission trying to get it quickly adopted

without debate. Yet, as the *Washington Post* reported, the bill was defeated not by the work of the Hungarian consul but because of the foreign shipping lobby pressuring various house conferees who forced the Senate to recede as part of the compromise for the Chinese exclusion bill.⁷⁹⁰ Under the American pressure and out of fear that passengers may be excluded on the bases of violating the ‘contract labor law’, the Hungarian government stroke the compensation clause out of the agreement (Murken, 1922, 254).

But, the agreement triggered a rate war for the Hungarian market which spread to Austria. The authorities seeking to restrict emigration soon realized that the competitive forces for the migrant transport business produced adverse effects. The conference lines moved the diplomatic representatives of their home-country to denounce the Hungarian policies for infringing international agreements. The lines also obtained the support of the *Szabadszag*, the biggest Hungarian newspaper in the US to increase the pressures from abroad. In return, the steamship lines rewarded the paper with lush advertising campaigns. In the end, the Minister-President, Istvan Tisza, gave in by lifting the barriers for nationals traveling with non-Cunard Line tickets to reach northern ports. The lines did not make this news known to the public, in order not to weaken the consular protests of various countries demanding the same conditions for their national lines as those granted to Cunard Line.⁷⁹¹

After six months, the lines came to an agreement. In the meantime, the Austrian government reviewed its emigration laws and the German lines helped in establishing the Austria-Americana; offering a direct service from Trieste to New York under their control to avoid a similar scenario as Fiume. Because of the lack of collaboration of the Austrian authorities to enforce the passport requirement on Hungarian citizens to cross the borders and means offered by migrant agents to circumvent controls, 75 percent of the Hungarian migrants continued to use northern ports. The Hungarian policy turned out to be a complete failure neither restricting nor efficiently directing the movement of nationals. Moreover, the ten year contract with Cunard Line prevented the establishment

⁷⁹⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters, April 19, 20 and 22 1904 and The Washington Post, “Lodge bill defeated”, April 30 1904.

⁷⁹¹ The Continental Lines also bought 3000 copies of the *Szabadszag* calendar at 50 cents each to demonstrate their appreciation for the support in the campaign against the Hungarian government. *Ibid.* Letters October 21, November 4 and 10, December 27 1904.

of a national line while it led to the founding of a rival Austrian Line (Murken, 1922, 261-281).

1.2) The last convulsions of the American pro ship-subsidy lobby

The Hungarian polices put measures to revive the American merchant marine back on the political agenda. President Roosevelt favored state intervention and appointed a special commission to investigate the issue.⁷⁹² The American shipping lobby suggested direct subsidies and discriminating duties once more. The navy pointed to the shortage of American seamen and the naval reserve, while other nations took advantage of the absence of the American flag on international waters to develop theirs. The Spanish-American War had illustrated that if a conflict broke out with a 'first class nation' they stood no chance.⁷⁹³ Despite this threat, the commission did not reach a unanimous agreement on their recommendations to which the democrats attached a minority report. Based on their recommendations a bill was introduced in Congress. For the North Atlantic it was so moderate -containing only minor discriminatory duties- that G. Schwab, E. Boas and R. Wierdsma did not see a way to take joint action against the bill.⁷⁹⁴

Because of the 'most favored nation clause' the HAL's interests remained unaffected. However, the American shipping lobby managed to introduce an amendment canceling out the privilege for the Netherlands and including direct subsidies. After consulting on their strategy with their lawyer, Putnam, the Dutch envoy in Washington R. de Marees van Swinderen, defended the company's interests in Congress. Claude Bennet provided important inside information on the opinion of various Congressmen on the subject.⁷⁹⁵ Van Swinderen met with the speaker of the House Joe Cannon (R-Ill) who opposed any form of direct subsidy, and especially the amendment granting an extra

⁷⁹² *Ibid.* Letters January 19 1904.

⁷⁹³ *Ibid.* Letters November 21, 25 and 29 1904.

⁷⁹⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters January 10, 18 and February 10 1905.

⁷⁹⁵ For his efforts against the Frye bill the HAL rewarded Bennett with an extra 259 dollars. *Ibid.* Letter July 6 1906.

\$250,000 a year to the American Line.⁷⁹⁶ Cannon therefore used his power to appoint anti-subsidy conferees representing the House to mold the bill to his liking and with success. To stand a chance in the anti-trust climate, the subsidy amendment for the American Line was stricken out; as was the measure to lift the most favored nation privileges of Denmark and the Netherlands. The Commissioner of Navigation, Chamberlin, was again behind the scheme which failed because of the continuous lobby efforts of C. Bennett and van Swinderen.⁷⁹⁷

In times during which the value of international treaties began to plummet and unilateral decisions thrived, the Dutch envoy managed to safeguard the agreement. However, together with the rising nationalism, globalization created a growing need for a body governing international issues. The Inter-parliamentary Union for international Arbitration tried to answer that by meeting in Brussels in 1905 to form a United Parliament of the World with natural right to deal with authority on all questions which fell outside the jurisdiction of any nation and which were by their very nature international. An American invitation for the Congress attributed a prominent role to the US in this process; *“Since all nations are looking at the President of the United States to bring peace between belligerent countries, such as Russia and Japan at present, the inter-parliamentary Union is the best way to achieve this. If through this international law-making body the conflict comes to an end it can be made the last great war in history”*.⁷⁹⁸ The ascendancy of nationalism obstructed this international optimism. The law of 1907 included a clause giving the President authority to organize an international meeting to regulate immigration issues transcending national jurisdictions. Yet, no President used the privilege and European countries took no initiative to reach international agreements either further delimiting migration as a national issue.

Other countries such as Russia, Sweden and Greece later followed the European trend using the migrant flow to stimulate the merchant marine. The US never did and only adapted its policies reviving the fleet under the ‘Stars and Stripes’ with the New Deal. After this last surge of the pro-subsidy lobby, following the Hungarian emigration

⁷⁹⁶ Shortly before, the American Line renewed a ten-year contract for postal subsidies amounting to 700,000 dollars a year.

⁷⁹⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121 and Passage Department 221-226, Letters December 13, 14 1905, January 30 March 23, May 25 and June 2 1906.

⁷⁹⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter June 23 1905.

law, the IMM gave up all hopes to obtain favors from the American authorities. The profit sharing agreements with German lines, and the fact that most of the IMM ships sailed under a foreign flag, also made these less attractive for the shipping giant. Only a far reaching concession of the authorities would be worth transferring the fleet under the national flag and breaking up the contract with the German lines. Giving tax payers' money as subsidies to a trust, in times when big businesses were increasingly projected as the number one public enemy, would have been a politically unpopular decision. The public outbursts of 1905-1906 denouncing corruption of politicians by business did not help the IMM's cause (McCormick, 1981, 259-274).

Yet, there were many other ways to favor the national lines, such as discriminating head-taxes. The reasons for not adopting these remain less clear. Part of the reason must be the fear of repercussions by nations involved on the North-Atlantic migrant trade, which were quite numerous. Secondly foreign shipping companies being in the business for up to sixty years had well-established business interests in the US expanding their influence well into the corridors of the Capitol. In a time during which many other domestic industries obtained competitive advantages from the state, the American shipping industry did not. The foreign shipping lobby made sure it stayed that way, but after 1905, as C. Bennett reported that Congressmen defeated ship-subsidies based on general principle, rather than specific interests- making organized opposition superfluous the following years. By 1910, renewed lobby efforts surfaced to revive the merchant marine once the IMM were seen as being unable to do. Taft expressed his concern that predominantly foreign lines reaped the profits from transporting the growing American exports in his Presidential message in 1911. Republicans favored direct subsidies, while Democrats preferred differential duties, but the movement never acquired sufficient congressional backing to force a breakthrough.⁷⁹⁹

2) The Southern States: from liberals to restrictionists

2.1) Go West, Go South! with a little help from the shipping companies

⁷⁹⁹ The theme only came up again to support lines to South America or Asia but not for the North Atlantic. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter June 9 1909; December 7 1911.

The economic recovery following the recession of the 1890s eased the pressures to restrict immigration somewhat, yet as the influx followed the curb of the economic upswing it never disappeared from the public debates. The concentration in the northern and eastern industrial centers and big cities raised issues on integration and assimilation while immigrants did not seem to reach the sparsely populated western and especially southern parts of the country where they were believed to be needed most. Already during the 1890s immigrant officials suggested government measures for a better distribution of the newcomers (Senner, 1896, 657). Both Commissioners General of Immigration, Powderly and Sargent, saw at some point an alternative in distribution instead of restriction (Sargent, 1904, 152-158). Gradually, Southern States established immigration recruiting bureaus yet the federal government lingered in providing support. The census of 1900 showed that only 620,000 foreign born lived in the South, a mere six percent of the total immigrant population (Fleming, 1905, 277).

Shipping companies willingly helped organizing these state initiatives and propagated ideas of better distribution and the need for migrants in the South as a strategy to prevent restrictions. As Goldin noted, Southern congressmen had, except for New York representatives proven to be the most loyal supporters of liberal policies during the 1897 literacy test debates (Goldin, 1994, 231). The shipping companies wanted to keep it that way. As a report of the Committee of Immigration Legislation reveals:

“on lines favored by your committee a corporation has been established to carry on the work in the states of Virginia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and North Carolina and a considerable amount of families have been located by the corporation which has been offered several 100.000 acres of land in various parts of the south. The Italian government has sent an agent to this country to cooperate with the corporation and the US government has also promised support, the President, the secretary of Commerce and Labor and the Commissioner General of Immigration favoring the work which is a first step in carrying out a policy of distribution which should get more consideration at the National legislature over the winter.

The lobby efforts of the committee of the last two years should be carried on. It is particularly desirable that the sentiment in the south be directed to the desirability of Immigration as upon the sentiment in the south will no doubt depend on the result in Immigration legislation. Therefore the committee requests to renew its

funds not exceeding 15.000 dollars to continue its activities which end on October first.”⁸⁰⁰

From 1903 onwards, seven southern states organized or reactivated immigration bureaus distributing propaganda, organizing conventions and sending recruiting agents to Europe (Higham, 1955, 114). The visible hand of steamship companies in this was quite important. In collaboration with railroads, they organized special sailings for settlers in rural areas enjoying reduced railroad tariffs known as the ‘colonist rate’ between the end of February and beginning of May.⁸⁰¹ Furthermore, southern railroads had started to offer special cheap tickets to homeseekers, which gave them twenty days to stop off as many times as they wanted to explore the opportunities in the South and Southwest. Each railroad had an immigration newspaper which it distributed in the US, Canada and Europe. These excursions organized by the railroad and migrant agents in the North and the West gave enticements to attract immigrants to the South (Fleming, 1905, 286-287). Southern State authorities contributed to this and among the southern states South Carolina was probably the most pro-active.

2.2) South Carolina and its Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Immigration

At the end of 1904, the legislature of South Carolina created the Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Immigration (DACI) to stimulate industrial development. By disseminating information the DACI needed to attract investors and immigrants. The commissioner, E. Watson, was empowered to conclude agreements with steamship lines and migrant agents in the US and in Europe to lure immigrants. State appropriations and contributions from citizens of the state funded the campaign.⁸⁰² The DACI had a pronounced preference to recruiting from northern or western European countries, yet laws in France and Germany prohibited recruiting activities. It directed Watson to Belgium where contrary to many other European countries, still tolerated schemes to instigate emigration.

⁸⁰⁰ Report of the Committee of Immigration Legislation signed by G. Schwab, E. Boas and J. Wright. *Ibid.* October 18 and Letter October 26 1905.

⁸⁰¹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter January 10 1908.

⁸⁰² *Ibid.*, Letter June 18 1906.

The Belgian government exercised a liberal policy towards the emigration of nationals, tending more towards stimulating rather than restricting the movement during the long nineteenth Century. Emigration was generally considered as a security valve for overpopulation and economic crisis, while the Belgian communities abroad could open up new markets creating trade opportunities. Yet, the policy did not result in mass transatlantic migration. When in 1888, the Argentinean government proposed subsidize the transport of poor volunteers, the Belgian authorities willingly granted permission to recruit on its soil. But after reports on abuses the concession was quickly withdrawn and authorities decided to prohibit the transport of emigrants paid for by anyone else but themselves. Watson managed to convince the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. de Favereau to make an exception, similar to the one awarded to the Canadian government agent Treau de Coeili (Feys, 2003, 183-195).⁸⁰³

Watson appointed Oscar Van der Meersch as official delegate of South Carolina to recruit workers from Belgium and the Netherlands. He distributed pamphlets and advertised in newspapers that South Carolina was looking for 10,000 farmers and 25,000 laborers. The announcement stressed that farmers did not require any starting capital to apply. Everything they needed, including transport would be advanced by the state authorities. Furthermore, the laborers did not need to be skilled. Training would be provided on site.⁸⁰⁴ The DACI planned on paying the passage for a couple of thousands of families, relying on chain migration patterns to develop triggering a natural movement financing itself. Yet, only a small number of Belgians reacted to those announcements. Four groups of migrants, not exceeding five hundred in number and predominantly Belgian left for South Carolina on board of NGL ships instead of the Belgian RSL.

The German company had opened a line to Galveston and could easily call at Charleston on its way. It allowed the company to explore the potential of that port and to draw what could become a constant flow of passengers for this service.⁸⁰⁵ In his

⁸⁰³ Watson obtained the permission only after giving the guarantee to pay for the return passage of dissatisfied migrants. This way the Belgian government protected itself from protests in the national press of neglecting the welfare of citizens in case of failure and against the increasing repatriation costs which started to weigh on the budget (Feys, 2003).

⁸⁰⁴ Pamphlet distributed by Oscar Van der Meersch 10/11/06, ABMFA, Emigration, 2960, *Rapports consulaires sur les possibilités d'émigration en général et par états*.

⁸⁰⁵ Already in 1895 the president of the Gulf Railroad Co approached the HAL to open a line to the Gulfports. Van den Toorn's preference went to New Orleans rather than Galveston yet doubted

presidential message, the president had stressed the need for a better division of immigrants and even suggested closing the northern ports for a while to let the south catch up.⁸⁰⁶ Even if this measure was inconceivable, shipping companies liked to explore new market opportunities. Moreover, the pressures on the dominant position of the port of New York increased (Heffer, 1986). Except for immigrants, direct steamship lines between Europe and Southern States would also contribute to the industrial development of the South. Even before the Civil War, southern States had been trying to emancipate themselves from the dependency of North Atlantic ports as a go-between for the trade with Europe. Diverting part of the immigrant flow from New York would be a crucial step in that direction. As noted by Mr. Zangwill in promoting the port of Galveston, cotton and grain which used to go through New York started to seek out southern routes, but imports were harder to divert.⁸⁰⁷

Therefore the immigration agents of the southern railways conferred with Sargent to secure better landing facilities to receive immigrants at southern ports. Instead the Commissioner General of Immigration proposed establishing an information bureau at Ellis Island to direct the migrants to the South. Yet, the southern representatives suspected that the bureau was sending inferior newcomers southwards, and relieving the congested northern cities of its undesirable elements not taking the needs of the South into account. Moreover, it did not believe that northern interest would support the development of South Carolina cotton industry to the detriment of New England cotton manufacturers (Fleming, 1905, 290). The mistrust was not unfounded. Established interests at the port of New York had no intentions of allowing southern ports to divert

seriously that market conditions warranted the opening of a line; *credits are sparse, climate and the Negro population scare off immigrants* GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter June 11 1895.

⁸⁰⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters November 9 and December 6 1905.

⁸⁰⁷ The Louisiana Immigration League established in 1906 blamed the Western Railroads for diverting the south-bound flow. It also stated that New Orleans would have been an important immigration port if Atlantic had not obstructed its natural development. The League promoted the construction of a modern immigrant landing station and the necessary port infrastructure enabling the port to welcome major European steamship lines. The *Time Democrat* "Immigration to Louisiana" April 6 1905. In 1906 the Austro-American opened a temporary direct service to New Orleans. The Italian Line, 'Navigazione' also organized two direct voyages a year, yet a direct liner service did not materialize. These sporadic voyages in winter, the low season for passenger lines when usually some ships were laid up or used for the developing cruise business, indicate that passengers were recruited by state or land-agents for these sailing. Some shipping companies welcomed this market opportunity collaborating with these direct transports. See also (Fleming, 1905, 293) The *New York Times* "Immigration Currents" January 4 1907.

part of the lucrative migrant transport market. Wierdsma reported on a special meeting in New York of railroads and steamship lines to discuss and oppose the competition of gulfports.⁸⁰⁸ If the port was loosing its grip on exports it was prepared to go great lengths to preserve the control on imports warranting its dominant position.

The recruiting efforts of South Carolina received a lot of attention from the national Immigration Bureau, which in 1904, had moved to the Department of Commerce and Labor. Roosevelt appointed Oscar Straus to lead the Department.⁸⁰⁹ Straus was a prominent Jewish pro-immigration advocate- as his involvement in the Immigration Protective League and presidency of the Jewish American Committee underlines. Together with Sargent, he strongly supported Watson's initiative hoping to export his formula to other southern states. But, not everyone reacted with the same enthusiasm. The American Federation of Labor challenged the scheme for violating the contract labor agreements.⁸¹⁰ Straus refuted this, claiming that the laws although not explicitly mentioned made exception for State authorities to recruit labor according to their needs. However, abuses by similar bureaus in North Carolina and Georgia -recruiting under false representations and directly for employers in the region- meant that the protests of the AFL against Watson intensified. They received the support of the Immigration Restriction League which simultaneously organized a new campaign to pass the literacy test.

3) The Immigration Problem revisited: the formation of the Dillingham Commission as a last resort to prevent a literacy test

3.1) Increasing agitation in the popular press and academic journals

At the beginning of 1905, Wierdsma reported on new campaigns by the 'yellow press' to convince the public of the need for restrictions blaming European governments and steamship companies to dump the 'riff raff' of the population, artificially swelling the

⁸⁰⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter February 10 1905.

⁸⁰⁹ With Straus' appointment, the first Jewish cabinet member, Roosevelt further solicited the favor of foreign born voters to counter Hearst's bid for the governorship of New York (Zolberg, 2006, 230).

⁸¹⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters November 16 and December 19 1906.

movement. Especially the *New York World* and *New York Herald* strongly opposed immigration. To ease the pressures, Watchorn asked the steamship lines to provide him statistics of refused passengers in Europe. Yet the campaign backfired leading to an extensive pro-immigration campaign in other New York papers. Even the by Wierdsma labeled 'loud and undesirable' *New York Evening Journal* stressed that European governments tried to restrict emigration more and more because; "only the best citizens made their way to the New World shaping the character of the American people." It accused the papers of hypocrisy pointing out that of the owner of the *New York World* and founder and father of the present owner of the *New York Herald*, were both immigrants.⁸¹¹ The same applied to the AFL leader, Samuel Gompers, who advocated closing the gates through which he came. Being an immigrant or of immigrant descent, did not necessarily mean one supported liberal immigration policies.

More importantly, the attacks of the *New York Herald* on the interests of the shipping companies seem to refute the influence of steamship advertisements on a newspaper's stance towards the immigration issue. As appendix 7 shows the Holland America Line spent more on advertising in the *New York Herald* than in any other American newspaper. As steamship lines usually advertised in the same newspapers in proportional amounts, it can be assumed that same goes for the other lines.⁸¹² However, the companies did not reduce their advertisements following these attacks, as conference agreements stipulated, indicating that the influence on big newspapers did not reach as far as the IRL had claimed. Other lobby groups went much further to monitor the press, like for instance, the 'Propriety Medicine Association of America' in its fight against the Pure

⁸¹¹ The pro-immigration stance of Hearst's *New York Evening Journal* fits in the owner's bid for New York's governorship. While James Bennett Jr. spent most of his time in Paris where he was raised explaining why he attached less importance than his father in advocating liberal immigration policies (See Crouthamel, 1989, 97; Higham, 1955, 127; Kluger, 1986, 183; Tichenor, 2002, 115) and GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters May 9 and June 9 1905 and The *New York Evening Journal* "The Immigration problem is Serious, but for the Foreign Countries not us" June 8 1905 and The *New York Times* "Immigration Record will be broken this year" March 11 1906.

⁸¹² The *Herald* became the biggest paper in the US during the 1840's and held its position until midway the 1880's when a decline set in. Despite falling behind the *World*, *Evening Journal* and later the *Times* in circulation numbers the paper kept on heading the list of the advertisement expenditures of the Holland America Line. Steamship lines were not only good clients of the *Herald* in New York but also of its Paris paper. When the *Herald* in Paris doubled its rates for advertisements the steamship lines concluded a joint-agreement using a specific format equal to all to reduce the advertisement costs. GAR, HAL, 318.01, Directors, 1174, 23, Advertisements in the NY *Herald Paris*, Letter July 3 1903; (see appendix 7 and (Kluger 1986).

Food Bill in 1906. The patent medicine makers included a clause in their advertisement contract, making it void if any law prohibiting the sale or manufacture of proprietary medicine was passed in the state where the paper circulated (Logan and Patten, 1929, 6-7).⁸¹³

The immigration issue remained in the public discourse as the first National Conference on Immigration organized at Madison Square Garden under the auspices of the National Civic Federation, illustrates. It did not manage to get labor and business interest in one line on the immigration issue, but it created an 'Immigration Department' to work on it (Weinstein, 1968, 26-27).⁸¹⁴ Scientific Journals also dedicated a lot of attention to the topic. O. Austin, Roland Falkner and Kate Claghorn refuted the undesirability of 'new' immigrants. Based on statistical research, Claghorn contested the idea as the second generation of new migrants showed more tendencies towards pauperism than the old stock. Moreover, the second generation of unskilled illiterate immigrants was usually better off than the kin of skilled-literate newcomers, hence restrictions based on an educational test would have no effect on the growth of pauperism (Claghorn, 1904, 187-205).

Using data from the census, both Austin and Falkner pointed that although in absolute numbers the influx grew, the percentage of immigrants in the total population decreased. Also, new immigrants showed lower dependency rates of welfare than the old stock yet. Faulkner deplored the higher return rates, but contested the inferiority of the new migrants and their inability to integrate. Austin, chief of the statistic bureau of the Department of Commerce and labor concluded also that the so-called 'objectionable' class of migrants contributed to the wealth of the nation which had not lost its power to assimilate newcomers (Falkner, 1904, 32-49 and Austin, 1904, 558-570). John Trenor, chairman of the Committee on Immigration, sponsored by the National Board of Trade

⁸¹³ The association monitored the state legislators' activities and urged the papers to agitate against unfavorable legislation referring to the contract whenever needed. As one of the most prominent American advertiser appearing in an estimated 15.000 newspapers indicate the power of this lobby group (Logan and Patten, 1929, 7).

⁸¹⁴ Wierdsma reported that the issue remained a hot topic for the press. Letter December 8 1905. At the conference the immigration problem in relation to industrial and social conditions were discussed. Also the working of current and the need for new legislation were discussed. It united all parties pro and contra concerned for two days in which a collective visit to Ellis Island was scheduled. The New York Times "Immigration Conference musters 500 Delegates" December 7 1905.

shared these beliefs and also argued that the foreign-born did not show greater criminal tendencies than natives. It was not an arbitrary educational test that was needed- better distribution policies had to be adopted (Trenor, 1904, 223-236).

Conversely, the IRL pointed to the urgent need for restrictions in which the race discourse gained prominence. Based on the Darwin's 'survival of the fittest' theory, and that by way of artificial selection better breeds of animals and plants could be obtained, Hall stated that the US was in a privileged position to apply this to humans through immigration controls. Instead Hall reproached, the authorities left this selection and control entirely to shipping companies. The migration movement from southern and eastern Europe was not natural, but was artificially instigated by steamship companies which selected the worst kind of individuals. An educational test would have long been adopted was it not for the transportation companies. Ward, reacting to Austin's article in the *North American Review* pointed that blame at the shipping companies (Hall, 1904, 169-184 and Ward, 1904, 226-236). The IRL seemed well aware of who they were up against to get the educational bill passed in Congress.

3.2) The House taken hostage by some anti-restrictionists

The agitation did not leave Congressmen unaffected. Bills containing a literacy test, measures for a better division of migrants or radical augmentation of the head tax were introduced. Senator W. Dillingham (R-VT), chairman of the Senate Immigration Committee worked on a moderate bill taking the various propositions into account.⁸¹⁵ Neal and Anderson, for the steamship lines, and Patten, for the IRL, appeared before the House and Senate Immigration Committees. Both sides tried win over congress members for their cause. C. Bennett reported that conversely to the Senate, the House committee favored big changes; however the speaker of the House did not share the committee's views. Nevertheless, the Dillingham bill to which Lodge added an amendment containing a literacy test swiftly passed the Senate. Augustus Gardner (Mass-R), Lodge's son-in-law and chief sponsor of restrictions in the House Committee, reported a radical bill

⁸¹⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters December 14 1905, January 10 and February 24 1906.

containing an educational test, an increase in head tax and the obligation of the possession of a certain sum of money.

Yet, committee members William Bennet (R-NY) and Jacob Ruppert Jr. (D-NY) attached a minority report to the bill, together with a copy of President Cleveland's message against the educational test when vetoing it in 1897. The Speaker, Joe Cannon, intended to find all sorts of other priority issues to avoid consideration for the bill.⁸¹⁶ Yet also the President felt the need for the passage of some kind of immigration law, asking the opponents to collaborate with the passage of a bill. Advocates tried to bring up the bill under a special rule to get it considered and reworked dropping the most drastic features such as the sum required on arrival and moderating the literacy test. The Speaker seemed likely to give in if this happened, hence C. Bennett warned the lines that the bill would likely pass in that session. Everything that could be done against it needed to happen fast. Any influence on the President was welcome and therefore Representative Edward Morrell (Pen-R) accompanied a delegation of the Philadelphia Italian Society on a Presidential visit to voice their arguments against the educational test. R. Bartholdt did the same with the German-American Alliance. He planned to propose, as a substitute for the educational test, that a committee be appointed to investigate the whole subject of immigration when the bill came up.⁸¹⁷

Some days later, a delegation led by Joseph Barondess representing the federation of Jewish organizations in New York State and the Jewish Trade union traveled to Washington. David Robinson of the Southern Immigration Commission followed in their tracks, just as Mark Katz of the National Liberal Immigration League had. They all came to protest against the bill and were taken around by William Bennet. They interviewed the Speaker the Commissioner General of Immigration and the President. C. Bennett

⁸¹⁶ The power of the Speaker on the decisions of the House had increased with the revision of the House rules during the 1890's consolidating the control of the majority party leadership. The speakership reached its apogee under Joe Cannon (1903-1911) who despised organized labor and was known for his pro-business sympathies. Fed up with his tyranny a majority of Representatives stripped him of his powers in 1910 (Tichenor, 2002, 116 Higham 1955, 128).

⁸¹⁷ Already in January 1906 Congressmen Benjamin Howell (NJ-R) and Joseph Goulden (NY-D) met with Cannon to discuss the idea of an investigation commission (Zeidel, 2005, 31). Both congressmen defending the economic interest of America's biggest port tried to anticipate the restrictionists attempts to block out part of the lucrative business on which the dominant position of New York was partly based. Yet the speaker allegedly categorically refused at the time, while six months later he strongly supported the idea.

noted that the influence of the foreign communities was being felt among Congressmen who started to doubt whether it would be wise to press for the bill. At the most critical moment, Bennet helped in organizing a mass meeting under the auspices of 'New Immigrants' Protective League' where all organization jointly voiced their protest against the bill.⁸¹⁸

As noted by Zeidel, surprisingly not the traditional anti-restrictionist such as Bartholdt or the Jewish Democrat Adolph Sabath (Ill-D) led the charge in the House against the bill but multigenerational American Republicans, J. Cannon (Ill-R), C. Grosvenor (Oh-R) and James Watson (In-R). Their actions were linked to pressures from President Roosevelt, not wanting to openly expose his opinion on the literacy test (Zeidel, 2005, 27-32). But what has been overlooked to date is that most of the actors can be linked to shipping interests. Grosvenor had been one of the leading advocates of the ship subsidy bill, and maintained close ties with the American shipping interests. During the literacy test debates in 1902 he had already tried to block out an amendment containing the literacy test. That amendment had been introduced by Watson himself who at the time suggested to: "*exclude the Italians like the Chinese and blaming Hungarians and Russian Jews of filling up American jails and almshouses.*" The reason for his radical change of heart cannot be linked to shipping companies and seems to confirm Zeidel's hypothesis.⁸¹⁹ C. Bennett mentions Watson as, Cannon's legislative assistant, who he controlled and appointed to the chair.⁸²⁰ Conversely to Grosvenor, Cannon opposed ship subsidies but likewise had been approached by shipping interests of foreign origin. The same applied to William Bennet who, like all the preceding Congressmen from his state, defended the commercial interests derived from the migrant transport contributing to the dominant position of the port of New York- and for whom the high concentration of the

⁸¹⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters March 6, 8 May 22, 23 June 6, 9, 12 15, 1906 and GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters June 25 July 3 1906 and NYT, "For Fair Immigration Law" June 10 1906.

⁸¹⁹ See chapter III. To make his behavior even more incoherent Watson reintroduced an immigration bill at the end of 1907. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter December 14 1907. Hence there must have been strong external pressures on him to repudiate his anti-immigration ideas in 1906. As W. Bennet later declared if Watson, the presiding chair of the House had conceded to Gardner's protest declaring the amendment substituting the literacy test by an investigation commission as nor germane to the bill, nothing could than have prevented the passage of the literacy test (Zeidel, 2005, 30).

⁸²⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter June 25 1906.

foreign-born in the state also had strong electoral reasons to oppose restrictions. Their joint efforts managed to defeat the literacy test and motion for an investigative commission.

That the bill even made it to the House floor to be considered with the opposition of key members regulating the procedures was a major achievement for the restrictionists. Yet Cannon set floor rules designed to prevent the passage of the literacy test. Grosvenor proposed an amendment substituting the literacy test by an investigative commission during the closing minutes of the debate. Watson, the presiding chair, refused to consider the amendment as not being germane to the bill, as claimed by literacy test advocates and he called for a vote. There it was defeated by a small majority, but W. Bennet and Cannon managed to obtain renewed consideration through a role-call vote approved by Watson. In the chaos which ensued, Cannon worked the floor as a trojan horse forcing some of his party members to redress the vote in favor of the amendment.⁸²¹ The new bill containing the substitution of the literacy test by a new commission and without mention of the increase of the head-tax swiftly passed the House. To avoid the literacy test of being reintroduced in the conference committee, Cannon appointed Bennet, Ruppert and Benjamin Howell (NJ-R)- all three, not coincidentally, represented the interests of the world's biggest migrant hub. Conversely, Senate conferees Dillingham, Lodge and Anslem McLaurin (D-Mi) backed the test blocking the debates in the conference committee for eight months (Tichenor, 2002, 125-129 and Zeidel, 2005, 28-34).

3.3) The minority wins again

Restrictionists, for whom the perspectives to pass the test had never looked so bright, fumed at the idea of another commission preventing of consideration for the coming years. The pro-immigration camp celebrated; yet only moderately being aware

⁸²¹ They argued that the voting procedure by simple division, meaning that the chair counted the pro and contra votes by having the representatives stand up, was not sufficient. The new 'teller vote' forced representatives to pass through official tellers stationed in the well of the House where they were confronted personally with Cannon (Tichenor, 2002, 126) and *Ibid.* footnote 30.

that they still had a long way to go, as Wierdsma reported about the work of G. Schwab and E. Boas of the Committee of Immigration Legislation against the bill:

Thanks to the pressure on the Speaker and House Representative Ruppert the immigration bill has not been approved in its original form. Schwab warns to be very confidential with this information because if it leaked out that steamship lines are involved it would backfire against us. Rumor goes that advocates of the law hired private detectives to trace this. Due to the importance of the law the committee asks for more funds to fight it. So far all lines except Cunard spent 15.000 dollars on the campaign and the German Lines would like to increase it to 60.000 dollars based on a contribution of 10 cents per passenger transported in 1905. Do you agree? The committee is trying to involve Cunard that is contending to conduct their own campaign. The IMM has their personal representatives at Washington but is prepared to contribute.⁸²²

The shipping companies used the same strategies as in 1897; forging key alliances in Washington to obstruct restrictive measures while mobilizing the various foreign-born groups to intimidate politicians with the 'ethnic' vote. The shipping lobby, jointly with big businessmen such as Andrew Carnegie, financed the foundation of the National Liberal Immigration League (NLIL). Initially, a predominantly a Jewish initiative, organized by Nissim Behar and presided by the Republican Party member Edward Lauterbach, it was soon broadened to include representatives from German and Irish ethnic organizations. Through mass meetings and press campaigns it spread propaganda to mold public opinion, while the organization tried to influence Congressmen through their lobbyist James Curley. They underlined the importance of immigrants for the American economy and challenged the undesirability of immigrants from South and Eastern Europe, as long as these were distributed where work could be found (Zolberg, 2006, 221 and Just, 1986, 200).

Shortly later, the Catholic Ancient Order of Hibernians and German American Alliance, representing more than a million and a half members, agreed to jointly fight all immigration restrictions (Higham, 1955, 123). Then, in November 1906, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) was established to preserve the religious freedom and prevent restriction- it also actively participated in the pro-immigration debate. With Oscar Straus, Louis Marshall and Jacob Schiff it had three influential Republicans on board. Conversely to the NLIL's aggressive strategies of defending the immigrant cause, the

⁸²² GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter July 3 1906.

AJC used its influence discreetly in the corridors of Capitol Hill (Zolberg, 2006, 222 and Just, 1988, 210). The low return rates of the Jewish community, compared to the other new immigrant ethnic groups, probably explains their leading role in defending the interest of the entire movement.⁸²³

Because of the economic downturn and subsequent social unrest midway through the 1890s employer organizations had remained absent from the pro-immigration campaigns, but came back strongly at the turn of the century. The National Board of Trade and the National Association of Manufacturers organized pro-immigration campaigns of their own, opposing the literacy test. Especially the latter, established in 1907, proved to be very active by creating an immigration committee and hiring James Emery as lobbyist, fighting new restrictions and pleading for a relaxation of the immigration controls in effect.⁸²⁴ Within the National Civic Federation, founded in 1900 on the principle of the tripartite uniting business, public and labor but dominated by big businessmen, the latter tried to pressure labor unions to abandon their restrictionist claims. The establishment of this corporatist body by M. Hannah, and to which J.P. Morgan and partners also collaborated, denotes the influence of the shipping industry in this organization. Yet, the AFL leader and vice president of the NCF, Gompers, did not give in and on the contrary radicalized its restrictive stance, supporting the literacy test (Higham, 1955, 115-116; Logan and Patten, 1929, 8; Weinsten, 1968, 7-39 and Zolberg, 2006, 218-229).

The AFL and IRL kept on collaborating for restrictions. With his article *Pending Immigration bills*, Ward still hoped to redress the situation. He denounced the idea of yet another commission as scheme; *“from those who are selfishly interested in having*

⁸²³ Little is known on the other nationalities. Higham mentions the Hungarian Republican Club of New York building up federal patronage at the time. There was also the Polish editor Louis Hammerling influencing foreign language newspapers for the Republican Party through his advertising agency ‘American Association of Foreign Language Newspapers’ (Higham 1955, 126). Italians also organized to defend their interest. The Vatican supported the Italian emigration movement and also the Italian government sent an agent Egisto Rossi founding an Italian Immigration Bureau to protect nationals overseas. Rossi became a key witness for immigration issues during the investigation of the Industrial Commission. Further research needs to shed more light on their impact.

⁸²⁴ The association formed the National Council for Industrial Defense numbering 250 member associations throughout the country with the sole purpose of effectually influence state and federal legislation. It established a legislative bureau, a legal bureau and bureau of publicity and education centralizing and coordinating the efforts. The associations in the interior needed to ensure that the ‘right minded’ legislators would be elected. In Washington the association made sure that these ‘right minded’ men took part in House and Senate Committees to defend their interests (Logan and Patten, 1929, 8-9).

conditions continue as at present.” The literacy test had passed the House on four and the Senate on three different occasions needing no further investigation on the need for the measure. The IRL leader insisted that the increase in head-tax be reinserted, allowing the improvement of landing facilities and inspections. Also, the assisted immigration through prepaid tickets needed to be restrained. The President of the board of health of New York, Thomas Darlington warned for the dangers of becoming a ‘degenerate nation’. To prevent this he urged; “*we must act, decision is needed now*” (Ward, 1906, 1121-1133 and Darlington, 1906, 1262-1271).

The threat of a serious diplomatic conflict with Japan broke the deadlock between the House and Senate conferees to report on the bill. Segregation excluding Asians from San Francisco schools had upset the Japanese authorities. With their victory in the Russian-Japanese war, Roosevelt did not want to go lightly on the issue. He obtained the exemption of Japanese in exchange for an amendment in the immigration laws which would, although without referring to them explicitly, ban the Japanese from the continental US (Tichenor, 2002, 127 and Zeidel, 2005, 32). To enact it, conferees needed to reach an agreement on the pending immigration bill. House conferees had the upper hand being in a position to defeat any bill by holding out against the Senate leaving it with the choice to yield or have no bill at all.⁸²⁵

The compromise consisted in dropping the literacy test and raising the head tax to \$4. It provided that the \$100 fine system be extended to passengers with tuberculosis, feeble-minded, imbeciles and epileptics. It added aliens with mental or physical defaults which may affect the ability of such aliens to earn a living to the excludable classes. The same restrictions were applied to children under 16 years of age unaccompanied by one or both of their parents. The period of deportability for illegal aliens and immigrants becoming a public charge was extended to three years. For ill and minor passengers an attendant would be appointed at the expense of shipping companies. It gave the authority to the President to call an international conference on immigration. The laws introduced manifests for outgoing aliens and approved the appointment of an investigation commission. Furthermore, the Commissioner General of Immigration received the

⁸²⁵ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters December 12 1906 and January 26 1907.

authority to establish a division of information to promote the distribution of aliens. Besides the last minute amendment concerning Japanese migration, another one from Oscar Straus was introduced concerning the Passenger Act of 1882 and increasing the minimum deck space requirement per passenger by twenty five percent (Hutchinson, 1981, 142).⁸²⁶

According to C. Bennett; Lawson Sandford, Hartfield and Neal did excellent diplomatic work against the new space requirements. Yet the urgency with which Roosevelt wanted to pass the bill to avoid an escalation of the diplomatic conflict with Japan, did not allow these men to have the amendment dropped. Instead, the date of implementation was postponed to January 1st 1909. The requirements predominantly affected older ships on the Mediterranean route.⁸²⁷

Ward was very skeptical about the new law. The increase in space requirements and of the head tax would not alter the; “*unenviable position of being about the cheapest place for Europeans to emigrate to.*”⁸²⁸ The extension of the excludable classes was largely nullified by giving the Secretary of Commerce and Labor authority to admit physically defected and unaccompanied minor aliens under bond. Moreover, failing to extend the fine system on shipping companies for each rejected immigrant weakened the controls in Europe, according to Ward. The system seemed arranged for the accommodation of the ship-owners whereby he mentioned the statement out the Congressional records from General Shattuc, chairman of the House committee of immigration at a hearing of the Senate Committee. On observations made by Anderson, passenger manager of the American Line, on the Immigration Act March 3rd 1903 Shattuc replied: “*He wrote most of the bill. He ought to be satisfied with it.*” Implicitly he blamed shipping companies for the lack of radical restrictive measures in the new law (Ward, 1907, 587-593).

Yet, the restrictionist did obtain a small but important victory. The House Immigration Commission brought the recruiting practices in South Carolina before the

⁸²⁶ *Ibid.* Letter February 15 1907.

⁸²⁷ Of the 175 ships landing passengers in the Us in 1906 only 75 need to make adaptations to conform to the new regulations. *Ibid.* Letters February 13, 17 and 28 1907.

⁸²⁸ Already in 1893 Schulteis reported that a trip from Italy to New York cost a bout 8 dollars less than to Brazil. Therefore, he deducted that the US attracted to poorest and least desirable migrants (Schulteis, 1893, 42).

Attorney General Bonaparte who overruled Straus' decision, declaring the activities to be illegal because of the close involvement of private companies.⁸²⁹ The decision put an end to the recruiting campaigns of South Carolina and also hindered those of other southern states.⁸³⁰ To compensate for their loss the authorities established a new branch of the Bureau of Immigration, the Division of Information headed by Powderly responsible for a better distribution of the immigrants. The former labor leader became a strong advocate of liberal immigration policies and a true ally of the shipping companies. They closely collaborated in spreading the information on work and settlers opportunities nationwide both in Europe, on board of ships and in the US in the native language of the various migrant communities.⁸³¹ The AFL accused Powderly of enticing migration and pressured Congress to close down the bureau. It delimited Powderly's activities to farm laborers and domestics but managed to keep a position at the Bureau of Immigration until 1921.⁸³²

Yet in the meantime IRL's ideas gained ground in the South and among Southern Congressmen through anti-immigrant publicity campaigns in local journals and through Patten's lobby efforts in Washington. After the decision of Congress on South Carolina the South leaned more and more towards restrictions resulting in state resolutions aimed at excluding Russian Jews and Italians. The census of 1910 showed that despite the efforts to divert immigrants, the foreign-born population in the South had decreased to

⁸²⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter February 28 1907. The final decision fell later. At a meeting at the White House South Carolina representatives received guarantees of the Attorney General, Straus, and Roosevelt that as long as no written contract promising work was used the scheme could go on. See New York Times "South can import the labor it needs" March 12 1907.

⁸³⁰ The State of Louisiana sent a delegate to Belgium during the summer of 1907 with the same intentions as Watson. However, the Belgian authorities refused to confer the same preferential treatment to him because of the reviewing of the immigration laws (Feys, 2003).

⁸³¹ By September Powderly's collected information on job opportunities with wages varying from 1,25 tot 3,75 dollars per day. He also provided information on rent, cost of fuel, household expenses, education facilities etc. The bureau centralized information on settling and land prices. Gradually branch offices were opened in the biggest cities of the country publishing reports in foreign language newspapers. The 'Sons of American Revolution' collaborated with Powderly also spreading information on the American way of life. By January 1909 the bureau had successfully assisted 2582 families directly. From 1911 onwards Powderly organized annual 'Convention of Immigration' uniting immigration officials of thirty different states to increase the coordination of migrant distribution. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters June 6, July 7, August 7, September 16, 21, 1907, December 2 1908, January 7, February 13, June 13, 14 1909; November 17 1911.

⁸³² Arthur Holder the AFL lobbyist at Washington tried to silence Powderly's pro-immigration speeches advocating that the US thanked its wealth to migrants who were still needed for the development of the South. The Hayes Bill containing a 10 dollar head tax and literacy test also included a clause ending the activities of the division of information. Everis Hayes (R-Ca) however was a strong supporter of the Information Bureau. It confirmed the rumors that the bill had been written by the AFL. It underlines the influence of the labor union in the corridors of the Capitol. Letter November 11 1909, February 22 1910.

500,000 (Tichenor, 2002, 119-121). After losing support from western states, shipping companies also lost the battle for southern states making it increasingly difficult to find allies in Washington willing to obstruct restrictions. But, with the estimate that the Dillingham Commission would need to operate for three years to complete its investigation their business was still protected for a while.

4) In the meantime at Ellis Island...

4.1) Closing back doors and intensifying health checks

The New York head-agents had a great sigh of relief at the announcement of Williams' resignation in 1905. Robert Watchorn, a former labor leader, was no stranger to the lines. As Immigration Commissioner of Montreal, who improved the Canadian-American boarder controls, he had built up a reputation as an honest and righteous man. His views on the desirability of migration differed substantially of Williams's; believing that every legal migrant, irrespective of race or nationality, contributed to the wealth of the country.⁸³³ But Wierdsma tempered the enthusiasm fearing that Watchorn would not make the life of shipping companies any easier as soon as he realized the true extent of his powers. What was good was that he did not see Ellis Island serving as a hotel, but instead he saw it as a place of inspection which gave priority to landing the migrants on the same day of arrival and only detaining passengers if absolutely necessary. Registration procedures improved speeding up the arrival of migrants. The HAL head agent gladly reported that maintenance bills immediately decreased.⁸³⁴ Watchorn added some personal touches, but in general his policy, even though it was less dominated by racial prejudices, it built further on the work of his predecessors.

He continued Williams' efforts in closing the back doors to dodge inspections. Williams had partly managed to close the loophole created by second-class passage.

⁸³³ NYT "Immigration Record will be broken this year" March 11, "Getting better Immigrants" May 3, "Immigration is Wealth says Robert Watchorn" November 19 1906.

⁸³⁴ Watchorn signed a new catering contract decreasing the cost for three meals a day from 30 to 24.5 cents. Maintenance cost decreased from 15.3 cents per capita in March 1904 to 11.8 cents March 1905 and from 12.8 cents and 8.8 cents. The letter does not specify whether this was just for meals or for the total maintenance costs. In 1908 Watchorn renegotiated the catering contract reducing the price to 22 cents for three meals. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters April 14 June 2 1905 and NYT "President Angers Knox" January 19 1905.

Despite the opposition of the steamship lines at the end of 1902, inspectors boarded ships in quarantine to screen the second-class passengers. If deemed necessary, inspectors sent suspicious cases for further examination at Ellis Island. Watchorn improved the ‘casual inspections’ of cabin-passengers by enlarging the inspection team with surgeons.⁸³⁵ In 1905, twelve percent of the immigrant aliens landing in New York traveled second-class, underling the importance alternative means of entry. But inspectors sent only three percent of these to Ellis Island, leading to the deportation of a mere 0.1 percent of second cabin passengers. The deportation ratio of steerage passengers for the same period was ten times higher. These figures indicates that it had put an end to the guarantee of getting through by paying an extra \$10 and traveling second-class, yet controls for second-cabin remained less extensive and still gave these passengers much better chances of passing through the entry procedures.⁸³⁶

The new commissioner also tried to eliminate the abuses with American citizenship papers. He wanted to attain more uniformity in these papers, and urged the shipping companies to strictly control the documents of all passengers that declared them to be American citizens. Many claimed citizenship based on their papers of intention yet, Watchorn stressed that these were insufficient. To detect the abuses the Commissioner of Immigration considered obligating all American citizens traveling third-class to go through Ellis Island.⁸³⁷ Protests prevented the implementation of the measure and the diversity of papers and regulations regarding citizenship from state to state persisted, making it hard for inspectors to detect false papers. The big influx of immigrants arriving during the initial months of his appointment made the commissioner doubt his liberal convictions.⁸³⁸

He started to implement the laws strictly driving Wierdsma to the verge of despair, reporting that the situation had become worse than under Williams. Deportations

⁸³⁵ *Ibid.* Letters June 4, October 17 1902 and March 20 1903. New York Times November 1 1905 “Cabin passengers to be inspected too”

⁸³⁶ Of the 821 169 immigrants arriving at New York, 98 428 (12%) traveled second class of whom 2882 (2,9%) were sent t o Ellis Island for further investigation leading to the deportation of 102 (0.1%) excludables. That same year of the 722.741 steerage passengers 7078 or 0.98% were sent back. NYT “Immigration Record will be broken this year” March 11 1906.

⁸³⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters April 12, 13 1905 and NYT, “We naturalized the Kaiser” October 12 1905.

⁸³⁸ NYT “Sargent sees danger in the continuing influx of immigrants” May 25 1905.

and fines for loathsome and contagious diseases increased, despite renewed efforts of doctor Haas at Rotterdam to improve controls by issuing special doctor certificates for the passengers he had inspected. Under Watchorn, deportations for medical reasons reached unprecedented numbers, swelling the medical bills of the steamship lines.⁸³⁹ The lines often contested the fines imposed by immigration authorities and let their lawyers, Lucius Beers and William Choate, handle these. They advised the HAL to pay the fines under protest, hoping to recoup the money in court whenever an opportunity to fight the constitutionality or arbitrary implementation of these presented themselves.⁸⁴⁰ The relatively low sums collected by the American authorities for these violations, on all shipping companies, indicate that these efforts were not in vain.⁸⁴¹ It shows that the relations between shipping companies and control stations, only imposing fines for flagrant neglect, were not so bad after all.

At the time, the shipping lines were engaged in a lawsuit, contesting the decision of Straus and Watchorn to apply the provisions for the unrighteous landing of immigrants on sailors who deserted ships while in anchored in American harbors. The first immigration laws placed the responsibility on the captain of the ship to prevent the landing of any passengers beforehand, passing through inspections. If passengers managed to escape the ship before, captains risked imprisonment and fines between \$100 and \$1000. The stewards' responsibility for the passengers did not stop once they left the

⁸³⁹ The profitability to care for detained diseased aliens triggered a keen competition between the New York hospitals to attract the business. Powderly and Williams had increased these costs hoping they would function as deterrent for the shipping lines to bring over diseased. Williams standardized the business by concluding an agreement with the Long Island College Hospital treating adults at 1.5 and children under twelve at 1 dollar per day. Rates for patients with contagious diseases needing isolation amounted to 2 dollars per day while the insane varied from 3 to 5 dollars per day. Under Watchorn the lines re-obtained the right to make their own arrangements with hospitals for clients affected by measles and chicken pox. HAL concluded a special agreement with Saint Mary's Hospital treating their clients at charity rates. Yet on July 1 1906 Watchorn withdrew that privilege increasing the medical bills again. At some point the Atlantic lines considered hiring a doctor to follow up all the patients spread around in the different hospitals to prevent these from unnecessarily keeping the patients to artificially swell the bills. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters November 24 1903, October 19 1906 and September 18 1908.

⁸⁴⁰ The discrepancy between the decisions of specialist in Rotterdam and New York pushed the HAL to hire external specialists to refute Ellis Island health inspectors' diagnose. The HAL used the external opinions to defend the reputation of their Rotterdam doctors and also to pressure the authorities to drop fines or loosen controls. The affidavits could later serve whenever the lines found it opportune to take the matter to trail. *Ibid.* Letter June 30, August 11 and 15 1905 August 17 September 24 1906 (See table chapter III).

⁸⁴¹ The Dillingham Commission mentions figures per fiscal year: 1904 28400, 1905 27 300, 1906 24 300, 1907 37 200, 1908 26 700, 1909 27 400 and 1910 29 900 (Dillingham Commission, vol. IV, 1911).

boat; this only occurred when they reached Ellis Island. But apparently no great barriers existed to preventing passengers from escaping. Up to 1903, only a rope separated steerage from cabin passengers during their landing on the docks. Only after the escape of a Greek passenger jumping the rope and mingling with the second-class passengers did the HAL increase its security measures. The Dutch line constructed a movable fence and put a guard at the gate making escapes on the dock nearly impossible, according to Wierdsma. The federal government spread a 'wanted' notice for the passenger, but due to the good relations with Ellis Island no fines were imposed. But, the leniency towards such cases ebbed away under Watchorn, extending the measures to deserted seaman. Authorities suspected excludable aliens of taking service as seaman to avoid controls.⁸⁴² The British line fought the \$500 fine imposed for the desertion of Taylor in court. All the lines contributed to the legal expenses which was usual when a test case went to trial in the interest of all the companies. After a long, drawn out procedure, the Supreme Court judged in favor of the lines.⁸⁴³

4.2) Refining the Deportation procedures

The rigid policy of Watchorn resulted in an increased deportation ratio fluctuating between 1 and 1.5 percent over the four years. Another indication of Watchorn's concern to implement the letter of the laws was the renewed attention to the observance of the 1882 space requirements, eventually leading to the amendment of the 1907 immigration law.⁸⁴⁴ He also sent an increasing number of officials overseas to monitor the actions of shipping companies at sea and in Europe. However, most of the time the head-agents obtained the name of the investigators before their departure and it allowed them to warn the home port of their arrival, making sure they received 'special treatment'.⁸⁴⁵ The most typical characteristic of Watchorn's rule was the elaboration of deportation procedures.

⁸⁴² Allegedly the Greek Line registered some passengers as personnel members allowing them to land without passing through Ellis Island. NYT, "May discipline Greek Line" December 22 1910.

⁸⁴³ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters April 21 1903, May 22 1906, October 25 and December 27 1907.

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Letter August 22 1905 and January 3 1906.

⁸⁴⁵ As for instance doctor Stoner traveling with wife and kids on inspection mission or Mr. Semsey, chairman of the board of Special Inquiry and Mr. Dobler superintendent at Ellis Island. *Ibid.* Letters June 1 and August 21 1906.

The interpretation of the deportation laws led to various lawsuits especially to establish the responsibility for the costs these created. Immigration authorities tried to put the financial responsibility, as much as possible, on the shipping companies while the lines claimed that these costs should to be covered by the Immigrant Fund or by the family of the deported.⁸⁴⁶

In the case that someone needed to be deported, the HAL retraced the agent who booked their passage. For instance, when they received notice that Lowre Koterman had been taken up to the insane hospital in Dixmont, they sent a local agent to obtain his release and return him with two other passengers booked by Mawek & Company of Agram. This way, the HAL tried avoiding the appointment of an attendant at their cost, as stipulated by the laws of 1907. The costs were considerable as they included an eastbound third-class, westbound second-class ticket for the attendant, \$2 compensation a day, plus incidental expenses.⁸⁴⁷ Koterman was provided with third-class ocean passage and fourth-class railroad tickets to Agram. The agent was then contacted to make sure his clients reached their final destination.⁸⁴⁸ But, the rigid implementation of the attendant clause caused much discontent among the lines. The expenses for the so-called 'leisure trips' of unqualified attendants could not always be avoided and quickly accumulated while the medical personal on ships were perfectly qualified to attend these patients during the voyage, according to the lines.

The shipping lines' Ellis Island Committee contested the need for attendants. They questioned the right of American authorities to claim second-class instead of third-class accommodation. The lines also demanded that information on personality and qualifications of attendants be secured. Finally, their lawyers did not believe that the lines

⁸⁴⁶ The law of 1903 stipulated that each alien that should come to the US in violation of the law or who should be found a public charge from causes existing prior to the landing shall be deported home, at any time within two years after arrival, at the expense, including half of the inland transportation to the port of embarkation of the person bringing such alien in the US or if this cannot be done, at the expense of the Immigrant Fund. Watchorn and Sargent tried to recuperate the full inland fare as the costs of maintenance during the voyage to the port from shipping companies. Hermann Winter and L. Sandford leading the Ellis Island Committee of the lines successfully countered these attempts. *Ibid.* Letter July 1 and 7 1905.

⁸⁴⁷ In other cases the company let a relative accompany the 'aliens helpless from sickness, mental or physical disability or infancy' avoiding the payment of compensation and often also of westbound return passage. The HAL agreed to deport H. Wieser becoming a public charge in State Hospital of Manhattan after six months and provided his wife and daughter with return tickets to their final destination without further obligations. Same goes for Mr. Alman who returned with his wife. *Ibid.* Letters July 13 1907 and September 12 1907.

⁸⁴⁸ *Ibid.* Letter May 24 1907.

should pay for the European inland transportation of the attendant because rules and regulations of the foreign countries regarding the forwarding of deported aliens to their homes applied there. In the Netherlands, an elaborate procedure existed. Upon arrival the HAL transferred the alien to the city hospital of Rotterdam for observation to determine whether the patient was in condition to continue his journey. If so, the HAL contacted a family member to personally, or by appointment of a delegate, pick up the alien in Rotterdam and accompany him back home. Wherever permitted by foreign governments, the HAL appointed an employee of the company as attendant. If the alien, upon arrival, was not declared fit to continue the journey the HAL transferred the alien to the State Asylum where the Dutch authorities took charge of him and contacted the responsible government member to arrange the transportation.⁸⁴⁹

Straus, Watchorn and Sargent did not let the matter escalate to the courtroom and conceded.⁸⁵⁰ Yet, for each deportee needing assistance, the lines had to produce two reports; one about the voyage at sea, which need to be certified by the American consul, and a second on the trip to final destination with a proof of arrival. Wherever possible, the company tried to recoup the costs from the family. But, the New York head-agent urged caution to avoid difficulties with the American authorities. Wierdsma asked to pay for the railroad ticket for Leib Zweifler, if his father who picked him up in Rotterdam, demanded it.⁸⁵¹ The directors were not pleased about the interference of the American authorities, outside their jurisdiction, on Dutch soil. However, as Wierdsma pointed out the compromise on deportations came about on the request of the steamship lines. Hence, protesting against it was difficult, especially with the growing hostile attitude in Washington towards foreign shipping companies.⁸⁵²

As Wierdsma had predicted, Watchorn did not make the life of shipping companies any easier. During his rule, he imposed special five-day quarantine and luggage disinfection measures for Russian passengers on three occasions because of

⁸⁴⁹ Some tried to abuse the regulation at Rotterdam claiming to be deported in order to obtain free inland transport back home. The Dutch government passed a law prohibiting company agents to accompany insane aliens to the final destinations and took charge of them. It freed the company from the expenses. *Ibid.* Letters February 2 1908 September 27 1912 and February 22 1913.

⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid.* Letters July 19, August 8, 14, 20, 28 September 3, October 18, 23, 24, 25 November 11, 22, and December 3 1907; NYT "Find Fault with deportation Rule" September 25 1907.

⁸⁵¹ *Ibid.* Letter November 17 1908.

⁸⁵² *Ibid.* Letter December 16 1908.

cholera outbreaks.⁸⁵³ Although he clearly declared himself in favor of European immigration, even from southern and eastern Europe, deportations increased. He blamed both the people in America sending for immigrants with lack of assistance after arrival, and the shipping lines, for this. He pleaded for an expansion the fine system and made shipping companies refund the westbound tickets of the deported. On the efforts of the South to divert part of the flow by providing information at Ellis Island, the commissioner was very skeptical. According to Watchorn, more than 99 percent of the arriving aliens knew where they were going; “*American wages are the honey pot that brings in the alien flies*”. Hence, the South needed to offer better wages or to wait until the immigrant’s first experience turned sour and then attract him.⁸⁵⁴ Watchorn continued the policy of increasing the financial burdens on shipping companies as the best deterrent to limit the number of excludables from coming overseas.

His strict interpretation of immigration laws and his liberal views on immigration earned Watchorn many powerful critics who accused him of abusing his position. James Reynolds of the IRL even wanted to bring him to trial. The League criticized the Dillingham Commission for not including Ellis Island in their investigation, claiming that Watchorn was incompetent and corrupt. Due to the agitation, Roosevelt did not succeed in reappointing him during his final days in office, leaving the decision to his successor, President Taft. The shipping companies supported the commissioner but failed to convince the new President; as the speeches of G. Schwab and Congressman Bennet at Watchorn’s farewell dinner underline. Some months prior the pro-immigration lobby had seen their ally, Oscar Straus, being substituted by Charles Nagel as Secretary of Labor and Commerce. Nagel advised against the reappointment of Watchorn and favored someone leading with an iron rule. He therefore supported Taft’s candidate, a Yale man and personal friend of the President William Williams.⁸⁵⁵ Daniel Keefe, vice-president of

⁸⁵³ From September 1905 until June 1906; October 1907 until the beginning of 1908 and again on September 1908 these measures were implemented. *Ibid.* Letters September 2 1905, June 15 1906, September 16, December 3 1907, September 21 and 29 1908.

⁸⁵⁴ NYT “Immigration Record will be broken this year” March 11, “Says South must offer more to get migrants” June 6 and “Immigration is Wealth says Robert Watchorn” November 19 1906.

⁸⁵⁵ NYT “Reynolds investigates Ellis Island Affaires” September 16 1906; “Recalls Watchorn’s name” January 6; “Straus upholds Watchorn” January 9; “Watchorn exonerated” March 2; “Watchorn resigns, Forced out he says” April 25; “Williams regains Immigration Office” May 19; “Watchorn praised as ideal Gateman” June 19 1909 and (Zeidel, 2005, 118).

the AFL and a more outspoken restrictionist than Sargent took up the position as Commissioner General of Immigration after the latter's death. With these substitutions, the pro-immigration lobby saw two prominent allies in the persons of Strauss and Watchorn disappear from key positions in the immigration system. Generally, the new appointees represented a clear shift towards restrictions through which the IRL scored an important victory on the shipping lobby. In the meantime, the Dillingham commission worked diligently with its report.

5) From the Dillingham Commission to the Dillingham-Burnett bill

The core of the Dillingham commission, named after the Vermont senator who led the investigation, consisted of the House and Senate conferees; who were responsible for the stalemate preceding the approval of the law which led to the commission. One important exception was the absence of Congressman Ruppert.⁸⁵⁶ The defender of the shipping lobby's interest did not partake in the subsequent elections. The fervent restrictionist, John Burnett (Al-D), took his position shifting the balance in favor of the anti-immigration lobby. The president appointed three other commissioners to complement the six congressmen. The interference of Lodge and W. Bennet in the selection of these underlined the opposing sides of the spectrum that both congressmen represented. Bennet prevented the appointment of James Patten, the IRL lobbyist while Lodge opposed the application of South Carolina governor, Earl Hayward, a pro-immigration industrialist who supported the active recruiting policies of his state. They eventually settled for Charles Neill, Jeremiah Jenks and William Wheeler who were all less opinionated on the issue. While Lodge wanted the commission's work to focus solely on the issues in the US, Bennet insisted on investigating the matter in Europe also (Zeidel, 2005, 48-53). Lodge probably wanted to keep the investigation as brief as possible, enabling rapid consideration for new bills in Congress, while Bennet tried to

⁸⁵⁶ Shortly later Senator McLaurin was unable to accept his appointment and substituted by Asbury Latimer (SC-D) who died a year later allowing A. McLaurin to take his spot until he passed away in 1909. Senator Leroy Percy (Mis-D) replaced him. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letters January 19, February 23 and 25 1907 and (Hutchins, 1981, 143).

slow down the process knowing that the interests he represented were best served when the situation remained unchanged.

5.1) The European Tour

Despite the fact that Powderly had just returned from a special mission to Italy and that a delegation of four Congressmen; John Williams (D-Mi), Theodore Burton (R-Oh), Henry Goldfogle (D-NY) and R Bartholdt had traveled through Europe to investigate migrant issues in the summer of 1906, Bennet managed to include Europe on the Dillingham Commission's agenda.⁸⁵⁷ Seven members of the commission sailed for Europe to find out whether European governments used the US as a dumping ground for their criminals and paupers, with the help of shipping companies who might evade evading the US immigration laws and artificially swell migration. Southern and Eastern Europe, in particular, received a lot of attention. James Whelpley had recently published a sharp historical analysis of the migration legislation and policies of various European countries. He observed the shift, from an uncontrolled movement regulated only by migration laws in certain countries and attracting the trade to national ports, towards growing tendencies to restrict emigration. Whelpley noted that the tendencies in Europe were most favorable to the US, restraining transportation interests from inciting migration and regulating the overseas traffic according to American immigration laws (Whelpley, 1905). The commissioners returned impressed by the attempts of the different European countries to regulate migration and could only endorse Whelpley's views.⁸⁵⁸ In volume four, *Emigration conditions in Europe*, the commissioners concluded that the emigration movement was natural, mainly a result of economic conditions and that ticket agents, tied down by numerous laws only played a minor role as instigators. Moreover, they found no evidence of schemes supported by the authorities to send paupers and criminals to the US. Conversely, some countries including Italy tried to prevent the emigration of criminals. The natural barriers to emigrate had maybe deteriorated by a small amount, yet it still proved a difficult and courageous undertaking. Therefore, it was not the lower

⁸⁵⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121; Letter s.d. 1906 Letters November 11 1906 and May 3 1907 and NYT "Williams sails to Europe" June 15 1906.

⁸⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Letters November 7 1907 and March 20 1908.

class of European who reached the American shores yet; *“whether desirable or not migrants still represented the stronger and better element of the particular class from which it was drawn.”* The numerous emigration associations informed the migrants and protected them from abuses but the commission found no proof of financial assistance in crossing of the poor. After the extensive overview of inspection procedures at boarder stations and European migration ports, the commissioners underlined that examinations on the physical condition of migrants conducted abroad were; *“good, effective and of greatest importance, a fact which the commission believed was not always fully realized by students of the immigration problem in the US.”*

The execution and involvement of American officials in these controls varied from port to port.⁸⁵⁹ In Rotterdam, inland migrant agents forwarded the passengers from Eastern Europe to the port making sure they arrived four to five days before the departure of the steamer on which they expected to sail. Migrants from nearby points arrived one day prior to the crossing. At the railroad station, runners from the HAL welcomed the passengers and guided them to the company’s specially built hotel. Instead of large dormitories, which were found in the majority of similar buildings in other ports the sleeping quarters were divided into small rooms- similar to the steerage staterooms on HAL ships. During their stay, the company’s medical staff -consisting of two physicians and two eye experts- had plenty of time to check the migrants, many of whom had already passed examinations at German border control stations. The final examination occurred three to six hours before departure. It was attended by the American consul general, a doctor appointed by him, the ship’s doctor, an official of the Dutch emigration committee and a Rotterdam police officer on the watch for fugitives. From January first 1904 until September 1908, the examiners returned 2,523 passengers but an even greater number of HAL clients never made it pass the eastern controls stations.

The procedures in Rotterdam resembled the ones used at other ports but big differences existed regarding the authority granted to American officials. On one hand with Naples leading as the European port with the number of emigrants embarking for the US, the final medical inspection was left entirely to two surgeons from the US Public

⁸⁵⁹ The commission reported on the ports of Antwerp, Boulogne sur Mer, Glasgow, Liverpool, Londonderry, Queenstown, Southampton, Cherbourg, Christiana, Copenhagen, Fiume, Bremen, Hamburg, Le Havre, Libau, Marseille, Patras, Piraeus, Rotterdam, Trieste, Naples, Palermo, Messina and Genoa.

Health and Marine Hospital service, assisted by the ship's doctor, a representative of the Italian emigration commission, a surgeon appointed by the nation government and Italian policemen. The delegation of authority made the presence of the American consul redundant. When the American doctors approved their passage, the police officers checked their passports.⁸⁶⁰ The American health inspectors vaccinated all the steerage passengers prior to embarkation. They also supervised the inspection and disinfection of the baggage in a well-equipped plant operated by seven assistant examiners. Inspectors rejected 10,222 steerage passengers from December 1 1906 first until December 31 1907. On the other hand, Belgian authorities did not tolerate any interference by foreign officials in Antwerp preventing American consuls from performing their duties. Health inspectors from the Marine hospital, dispatched to supervise special quarantine regulations during cholera scares, were only welcome as mere spectators. A Belgian Commission of Emigration supervised the careful examinations. Despite the lack of involvement of American officials, Antwerp, together with Fiume and Queenstown had the best deportation records at US ports; significantly lower than neighboring ports Rotterdam, Bremen and Hamburg, and also lower than Naples, Messina and Palermo which were under American control.⁸⁶¹

Pressures to implement American inspections at foreign ports had never totally disappeared after the late 1880s and the Commissioners General of Immigration, Sargent, repeatedly urged for these in his yearly reports. Yet, with the remote control system in place, inspectors only had to debar 0.36 percent of the total influx for these reasons. The rejections at Naples, and German border stations, for the fiscal year of 1907 amounted to 5.5 and 2.2 percent respectively. For the commissioners, these figures proved that the inspections at the ports were thoroughly effective. Moreover, the comparison between Antwerp and Naples showed that American control did not guarantee better records. Hence, the commission did not see any reason why they would take over these inspections, and create additional costs for the American authorities (Dillingham Commission, vol. IV, 1911). The overall conclusion of the overseas adventure was very

⁸⁶⁰ Only in some countries the use of passports was imposed. Yet since these were not compulsory to enter the US, many ports did not require their passengers to carry one.

⁸⁶¹ The numbers rejected for diseases at US ports from January until September 1907; Antwerp 0.18, Rotterdam, 0.36, Hamburg, 0.32, Bremen 0.61, Palermo 0.47, Messina 0.34 and Naples 0.36.

positive and as Zeidel summarized; “*if there was an immigration problem, the commission did not find the roots of it in Europe*” (Zeidel, 2004, 68).

5.2) Are there limits to the assimilating powers of the American Melting Pot?

As Claude Bennet observed; “*the commission considers the questions of assimilation of even greater importance than the methods employed in bringing them to this country.*”⁸⁶² The bulk of the research centered on the social, political and economic effects of immigration in the US. How did each ethnic group influence employment, wages, living and working conditions of the native born? What was their relation to trade unions? How many criminals and paupers did the various ethnic groups number? How did they assimilate or Americanize? Were ethnic groups from southern and eastern Europe inferior and to what extent could they generate a racial suicide? How did transport companies affect the movement? How had immigration been regulated in the past and abroad? To answer these questions, the commission subdivided the work into sixteen committees employing, at some point, three hundred people. This underlines the zeal with which the commissioners tried to collect accurate and scientific information on which recommendations for new immigrant laws could be based (Zeidel, 2004, 77-80).

Yet, some congressmen refused to await the conclusion, and continued proposing new bills containing an educational test and increased head taxes. While these were very unlikely to be passed, or even being considered, it kept the issue on the agenda. In the meantime, the shipping lobby tried to alter the amendment regarding space requirements; they wanted to revert back to old norms which had been in place before its enforcement in 1909. The efforts of P. Franklin (vice-president of IMM), Thorndike Spalding (representative of WSL), Sandford, Neal and W. Chamberlin, Commissioner of Navigation, who had written section 42 in 1907, paid off. Straus proved willing to include their suggestions and take the existing laws of the various European countries involved into account. Lodge did not believe the adaptations to space requirements would affect the immigration influx and gave in to the steamship lines. He submitted the amendment of section 42 of the 1907 immigration bill, as prepared by Franklin. It swiftly

⁸⁶² GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter September 18 1908.

passed the Senate yet the House restrictionists, such as Gardner and Burnett, re-imposed increased space provisions sending the bill back to the conferees. Claude Bennet reported that the representatives favoring the bill, except for William Bennet, had not fought the measure as aggressively as they could have to get the Senate bill through the House.

In the meantime, echoes on the findings of the full-scale investigations on steerage conditions led by W. Bennet leaked to the press. These varied a lot, according to the route and the year of construction of the steamer. On the Continental and British-Scandinavian routes an increasing number of steamers accommodated steerage passengers in small state-rooms, instead of large dormitories. The Mediterranean route remained predominantly served by older ships. Stories of horrendous traveling conditions leaked to the press, leading to an attack against the shipping lines in Congress by Representative Adolphe Sabath (Ill-D). That the issue remained in the public eye did not help the shipping lobby in their efforts to amend section 42. The agitation even moved Behar of the NLIL to travel third-class on board of the *Rotterdam* to experience the steerage conditions first hand.⁸⁶³ The managing director of the NLIL expressed his satisfaction as to the conditions yet it didn't help in reversing the tide against the shipping lobby. They succeeded in striking the amendment providing for commodious toilets, lavatories dining, smoking and lounging rooms, yet the space requirements which they had managed to bring back to 15 square feet actual sleeping space was changed again to 18 for the passenger decks below the waterline and from 12 to 15 for the others. The new standards not only affected older ships on the Mediterranean route but it also had an impact on the other routes, especially those of the German lines.⁸⁶⁴ Despite reducing the capacity, and hence increasing the cost for shipping companies, the prices remained unchanged (see appendix 3). This confirms Lodge's apprehension that the bill would not have any restrictive influence on migration.

⁸⁶³ Steerage conditions on HAL ships belonged to the best on the North Atlantic. Moreover, aware of the presence of Behar on board the purser received strict orders to arrange for an impeccable crossing and keep a detailed report on Behar's movements. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226, Letters Augusts 11 and 14 1908.

⁸⁶⁴ Much depended on the promenade deck of the ships. For HAL the changes had not a radical impact yet they did for German lines. For the Barbarossa and Kaiser type ships it decrease the capacity by 40 percent GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters 1907 Letter May 3 June 21 and December 12 1907 February 28, December 19, 28 1908, January 5, 6 December 15 1909. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter January 18 February 14, 18, 24 March 20 April 13, 14, 16 1908 and (Dillingham Commission, vol., 37, 1911; Hall, 1913, 741).

Meanwhile, the shipping companies tried to influence the Dillingham Commission. The pro and anti-immigration lobby shared the belief that the report would serve as 'the' document to study the immigration problems influencing migration policies for years to come. The Italian lines joined in support of the Immigration Legislation Committee by contributing 10 cents per westbound passenger. Franklin, Boas and Schwab who conferred the lobbying plans with their lawyers Lucius Beers, Judge Choate and Representative Bartholdt no longer reported on their strategies to limit the chances of a leak to the press. A letter book of HAL agent, Gips, compromising the conference agreements had fallen in the hands of the American authorities. Also documents leaked to the press proving that the Merchant Marine League hired private detectives to research the private lives of congressmen opposing ship-subsidies. It pushed the House to appoint a special committee to investigate the legality of; shipping lobby practices of hiring journalists to manipulate public opinion; employing lobbyist to solicit congressmen; making campaign contributions to political organizations; and to influencing elections' of members.

The investigation, the private detectives hired by the IRL, and the increasing hostility towards trusts and foreign shipping lines drove the committee to this decision. The threat that the investigation may uncover their 'educational business' activities which included running a newspaper to educate the public, funding various Hebrew Societies and influencing congressmen through lobbyists, made the lines consider transferring the coordination of the lobby campaigns against restriction to Europe. Furthermore, the IMM and Cunard Line withdrew their contributions believing it to be safer to act on their own. Apart from the confession of Jerome Willburn, member of the Washington branch of the Associated Press, who admitted being employed by Albert Ballin to report according to the steamship company's interests, the investigators found little that compromised the foreign lines. Two years later, the whole conference became the object of a special investigation with the formation of the Alexander Committee making the lines even more cautious. But, while the shipping lobby seemed to disintegrate a little, the pressure of organizations representing the various ethnic groups, especially the Jewish ones, began to

work. Mistrusting the findings of the Dillingham commission, the American Jewish Committee sponsored their own research led by Isaac Hourwich.⁸⁶⁵

On the other side of the spectrum the IRL also tried to monitor the investigation closely and to influence the commissioners on every possible occasion. They looked for a means to discredit W. Bennet, their biggest enemy on the commission, by circulating pamphlets such as ‘*Congressman Bennet Not a Progressive*’ and ‘*Jews’ attention*’, yet with little result (Zeidel, 2004, 118). The Commission tried to fend itself from outside influences. It held no public hearings, trusting solely their own staff to collect the information. As long as the investigation proceeded, the commissioners could not be tempted into giving preliminary conclusions. They resisted the pressures of Congress to present a preliminary report in 1909. The refusal pushed Lee Overmann (NC-D) to draft a bill increasing the head tax to \$12, and augmenting the pressure on the Commission to finish its report. Also, critics in the press on expenditures and the length of the investigation mounted. When the commission realized that not even half of their work could be fit in published volumes before being dissolved on March 1st 1910, it gave in reporting on completed aspects of the investigation so as to obtain more funds and an extension of nine months to finish the work. Especially Representatives Robert Macon (AR-D) and Burnett of the Commission opposed any further delay, with arguments supplied by Patten, assuming it as being a maneuver to hold off the passage of a restriction bill during an election year.⁸⁶⁶

The press eagerly published reports on the findings of the Commission yet what everybody wanted to know was its recommendations for new legislation, above all would it recommend a literacy test or not? Commissioners remained secretive about their

⁸⁶⁵ The “American Flag” which promoted the American Merchant Marine was accused of sending money to a resident of Crookston where Representative Halvor Steenerson (Minn-R) resided to obtain information on the private affairs of the Congressman, especially as to his travel and trips abroad during the last five years. Once obtained the person published it in the press and contacted the member to verify his action on the ship-subsidy bill threatening to publish more defamatory information and write letters to citizens in the Ninth District. The American Merchant Marine League was also accused of hiring journalist to manipulate public opinion, lobbyists to solicit members and paying campaign contributions for political parties to influence elections of members. The League stated that foreign shipping interests instigated keen lobby campaigns and the House decided to investigate the matter. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter December 28 1908, December 30 1910; CLA, Chairman Correspondence C1, 11, 41, 63 and 69 Letters September 13, December 12, 15 1909; January 2; March 3, 11, 15, 23; June 17 and August 3 1910 (Tichenor, 2002, 129-134).

⁸⁶⁶ *Ibid.* Letters December 9 1908, January 6 April 26, 27 June 15 November 18, December 15, 16 1909 January 25, February 3 and 10 1910.

conclusions. Not even C. Bennett or James Patten managed to get conclusive information on the recommendations, creating some anxiety on both sides. The IRL consistent inside man, Senator Lodge, brought no relief for Patten- there was a fear that Lodge would not even endorse the test. Instead, Burnett became their number one man of trust to pressure the commission (Zeidel, 2004, 112). It seemed that the majority of the commissioners turned against the educational test. Therefore Patten and Arthur Holder of AFL, lobbied to get consideration in the House before the publication of the conclusions for the Hayes-bill prepared by them -including a head tax of \$10 and an educational test- but to no avail. It was only at the end that commissioners held public hearings, before presenting their conclusions.⁸⁶⁷ Three and a half years after its establishment, the Dillingham Commission finally revealed its secrets

5.3) “The reading and writing test as the most feasible single method of restricting undesirable migration”^{868,}

Despite the findings that neither shipping companies nor European authorities artificially swelled immigration, and that regardless of origin second generation immigrants merged into an American ideal type, as Franz Boas cousin of the HAPAG head agent Emil Boas demonstrated, the Commission recommended far reaching restrictions of unskilled labor.⁸⁶⁹ Based on intensive research of immigrants in industries and cities, the Commission concluded that because of the ever-increasing influx wages, and living conditions in the US would deteriorate. While not questioning the benefits migrants still represented for the American economy, the country could no longer safely assimilate the incoming masses responsible for many social and political problems. Especially temporary migration had a disruptive impact. They therefore suggested a wide range of measures to limit the influx varying from; quotas limiting the numbers of entry by race, exclusion of unskilled labourers unaccompanied by wives and children by using discriminating head taxes, limitation of the number of immigrants arriving at one port or

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.* Letter February 8, 22 and October 1910.

⁸⁶⁸ See Reports of Dillingham Commission, vol. 1, 1911.

⁸⁶⁹ Hall did not hesitate to use the family link of the anthropologist to the shipping company and his appointment by Congressman Bennet to refute his conclusions claiming these to be corrupted (King, 2000, 70).

increasing the amount of money required on entry. And all of the commissioners, bar one, recommended a reading and writing test as; “*most feasible single method of restricting undesirable migration.*” W. Bennet refused to endorse the test underlining that the investigation had proved that new immigrants were; less addicted to intoxication, less dependent on charity than old immigrants and that they numbered no more criminals than the native born. He did not deny the need for some check on unskilled immigrants, yet the educational test was by far the less appropriate one.⁸⁷⁰

James Patten could not suppress his enthusiasm for the Commissions’ work, ordering ten thousand copies of the full forty one volume report and twenty thousand copies of ‘summary of findings’, more than ten times the number printed by the government (Tichenor, 2002, 131). Patten’s optimism received another boost with W. Bennet’s defeat for re-election in November 1910.⁸⁷¹ That same year James Clark (Mi-D) substituted Cannon as Speaker, yet the position had been stripped of its powers and transferred to the committees- preventing a scenario as in that of 1906 to reoccur. With the added support of the Dillingham Commission, the enactment of an educational bill seemed like a mere formality. Yet, as C. Bennett reported, the test had a lot of positive opponents. Not all the volumes had been published yet and it would take some time to go through the full report. Hence, no action was likely during the ongoing session coming to a close giving the liberals some time to organize. The NLIL led the way taking immediate steps to protest against the measures. However, restrictionist anticipating the results of the Commission for years managed to get consideration for an educational test in the House Committee. With a vote of six against four the bill was sent to the Congress only a month after the Commission’s report. Yet it did not manage to be considered before the close of the 61st session in March 1911. In the Senate, Dillingham worked on his own general bill, including a literacy test which he handed in right before the ending of the first extra sitting of the 62nd session of Congress. Yet Burnett confided to C. Bennett that he suspected the Dillingham bill of being a manoeuvre to oppose restrictions from

⁸⁷⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter December 5 1910. See (Dillingham Commission, vol. I-XCII, 1911 and Zeidel, 2004, 101-114).

⁸⁷¹ At the beginning of 1910 rumors circulated that he may have a run at the New York governorship. A dinner organized in his honor for the services rendered to the immigrant cause in New York’s Little Hungary shows the unconditional support of the foreign born community to his candidacy. Apparently that proved insufficient. NYT “Boom Bennet for Governor” March 15 1910.

passing. Instead of a general law, smaller bills treating each a separate aspect stood a much better chance. As C. Bennett underlined, during a Presidential election year such kind of bill was very unlikely of being passed.⁸⁷²

In the meantime, the various ethnic groups organized to get their voice heard at the hearings of the House Immigration Committee. Representatives of the AJC, Union committee of Hebrew Congregation, Independent Order of B'nai B'rith, Independent Order B'rith Abraham, National German American Alliance, Italian Settlement and Aid Societies of Philadelphia all pleaded against the educational test. Editors of foreign newspapers led by Louis Hammerling, president of the American Association of Foreign Newspapers claiming to represent 490 papers in 29 different languages having a circulation of 6,800,000 also argued against restrictions. According to Bennet, the speech by Cyrus Sulzberger, in particular, contained strong arguments, based on the work of Hourwich, refuting the dangers of temporary migration as posed by professors J. Jenks and W. Lauck in *The Immigration Problem*. Birds of passage worked as a security valve for immigration, as the return movement following the economic crisis of 1907 illustrated. Because of these patterns, immigration adapted more aptly to the fluctuations of American labor demands, preventing the congestion of large unemployed contingent in cities during economic downturns. Isaac Hourwich's *Immigration and Labor*, sponsored by the AJC, represents an impressively prompt scientific refutation of the Dillingham Commission's conclusions by using, predominantly, their empirical data.⁸⁷³ Hourwich criticized the commission for lack of historical perspective. He denounced the advanced conceptual dichotomy of 'old versus new' immigration, for being based on racial prejudice and underlined the economic powers at work even out the economic, social and political problems, in the long run. The use of Hourwich's work by Sulzberger illustrates the growing fusion of scientific research, agenda's of various interests groups and policymaking marking the Progressive Era (Hourwich, 1911 and 1912; Jenks and Lauck, 1912; Berkowitz 2003, 260-261; Tichenor, 2002, 132).

⁸⁷² GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter December 9 1910, January 13, Augustus 7, 28, 1911.

⁸⁷³ Isaac Hourwich worked as a government statistician at Washington giving him access to lot of data which he used in his book. Prior to his career as government official he co-founded the first unit of the Social Democratic Party in New York and strongly advocated liberal immigration policies as a corner stone of class solidarity at the International Socialist Congresses (Berkowitz, 2003, 260-261).

Associations representing the old immigrant groups continued to give their full support to obstructing restrictive policies. J. Koeble of National German American Alliance, speaking, as he claimed for two million German voters, also condemned the inhumane practices at Ellis Island in putting too much power in the hands of immigrant inspectors. The hearings at the Congressional Committees gave the different organizations a good opportunity to underline the importance of the foreign-born vote for the up-coming elections. Some days later, the Democratic Congressional Committee convened to discuss the support of more liberal immigration laws to secure foreign votes for the Democratic ticket.⁸⁷⁴ They needed a scheme to counter the previously successful Republican campaigns attracting a growing number of that electorate. The Cunard Line sent arguments and amendments to Senator James O’Gorman (NY, D) to block or adapt the immigration bill and attack it in the House if need be.⁸⁷⁵ The pressures could not stop Dillingham Bill from passing the Senate, however President Taft in full campaign for re-election openly declared a veto on any law containing a literacy test. W. Bennet had arranged meetings with prominent members of the New York foreign-born community underlining their electoral importance, while the secretary of the department of Commerce and Labor provided him with arguments against restrictions. For his presidential campaign, he recruited Hammerling to make sure this message came across to the foreign-born voters (Tichenor, 2002, 135, Zeidel. 2004, 124).⁸⁷⁶

At the same time the IRL kept on spreading the notion of racial suicide and the need for selections based on eugenic principles underlining that; “*there were much more stringent regulations to import cattle, sheep, hogs, dogs and horses than human beings.*” The steady opposition of foreign newspapers, foreign communities and foreign shipping lines in the US obstructed appropriate selections of the mothers and fathers of future American children (Hall, 1912, 94-102 and Ward, 1910, 56-57). Conversely, the shipping companies could not explicitly protest against the educational test, yet they opposed the pending bills for other reasons. Represented by Beers, Robert Walker (CL), E. Wortman (NGL), Emil Lederer and Edward Sandford (HAPAG) the lines objected to the measures

⁸⁷⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97, 160 and 190; Letters January 11, 12, 16, May 7 1912 and NYT “Many opponents to Dillingham Bill” May 8 1912.

⁸⁷⁵ CLA, Chairmen Correspondence, C 1, 63, Letter March 8 1912.

⁸⁷⁶ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter April 23 1912 and NYT “Nagel denounces the Literacy Test” January 25 1913.

for increasing their financial responsibility for maintenance and hospital bills which should be covered by the Immigrant Fund. Head-taxes replenishing these funds were amply sufficient seeing no need to augment it to \$5 as the Dillingham Bill, which had passed the Senate, recommended.

During the debates on the bill in the House Committee, an old acquaintance of the committee members reappeared. William Bennet, representing the Italian lines and various ethnic groups, tore the Dillingham bill to pieces. The former Congressman pointed out that an augmentation of head taxes would make it harder for families to make the crossing. He also denounced the 'LPC' clause for putting immigration inspectors in the 'place of God Almighty'. In the meantime Sabath tried to get a motion voted on the Dillingham Bill in the house committee, preventing the passage of the bill during the ongoing session and hence purging it. Yet, the Illinois representative lost by one vote. He then placed his distribution and steerage bills as the regular order of business to delay the Dillingham Bill to the next session. The speaker Clark gave valuable assistance in obstructing the bill. The lengthy petitions against it kept pouring in, while the committee members did not seem to agree on the amendments to the bill. C. Bennett concluded that therefore consideration for the bill was likely to be postponed. However, the advocates inserted the Burnett educational test in the Dillingham Bill under the same name making it possible to pass it both in the House and Senate in a short time. The only way for the opponents to still reach the bill was by filibustering it under 'call for committees'. Yet, the disagreement between the conferees on some amendments hindered an agreement to report the bill before the adjournment of the long sitting of 62nd Congress in August. The last chance for the advocates to pass the bill was during the final short session between December 1912 and March 1913 when Congress reconvened.⁸⁷⁷

In the House a Burnett bill containing an educational test was swiftly approved by a big majority. Party lines were utterly broken during the vote, as the coalition leading the campaign between the Republican Gardner and Democrat Burnett illustrates. H. Goldfogle Joseph Moore, (Penn-R) and James Curley (Mass-D) leading the opposition did not succeed in turning the tide. Senate approved the adaptations of the House, which

⁸⁷⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97, 160 and 190; Letters January 21 May 7, 21 and June 4 1912

resulted in the Dillingham-Burnet Bill. The Senators opposing the bill and filibustered it by continuously sending it back for every little mistake they detected. But, Bennet reported that the IRL engaged in a massive campaign advocating the bill. It was very unlikely for Senators to prevent its passage leaving Taft's veto as the last hope. Taft kept his word.⁸⁷⁸ Some days later, the Republican Senate overrode his veto with a sweeping margin of 72 to 18 but the Democratic House with 213 votes against 114 failed to do so by a small margin. More than two years after the Dillingham Commission's recommendations to restrict immigration the 62nd session came to an end sending the anti-immigration lobby back to the start (Hutchinson, 1981, 154; Tichenor, 2002, 137).⁸⁷⁹

The next session, Dillingham and Burnett rewrote new drafts to prevent the newly elected democratic President Woodrow Wilson from pushing the immigration reform off the agenda. Although deep down he probably favored the test, the President had also promised the foreign-born opposition to such a bill. Dillingham now tried to impose quotas on entry per nationality, instead of an educational test. The shipping closed their ranks again with the Cunard Line re-entering the joint lobby efforts on the condition that the committee restricted its activities to legal means. The budget to fight the immigration laws increased.⁸⁸⁰ At a meeting with representatives of all the lines and L. Beers to discuss the appropriate course of action against the new bills they came to the following decision:

“Former congressman W.S. Bennet, who successfully defeated the Burnet bill last year, will be send to Washington again for an undetermined period of time. He will keep us informed on the House and Senate Immigration Committees and openly represent us whenever needed proposing measures serving the interests of the steamship lines. Mr. Neal, legal representative of the American Line will assist him. Bennet's salary will be paid pro ratio based on the number of passengers carried by all the lines. According to Bennet there are five House committee members favoring and five opposing the bill while three others are still undecided. Hence there is chance to defeat the bill in the committee already, yet the economic downturn is not an ally. On the House floor Bennet counts on the support of the sixty five catholic Representatives to counter the agitation of the

⁸⁷⁸ The night before the constitutional limitation of ten days expired, Taft had to act on the Immigration Bill and invited W. Williams, S. Gompers, R. Barthodlt, W. Bennet and C. Nagel. According to the NYT the last three favored a veto; Williams abstained from advocating the test only getting support of Gompers. NYT “Immigration Bill in Doubt” February 14 1913.

⁸⁷⁹ GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97, 160 and 190; Letters 17, 18 December 1912, January 17, 21, February 4, 13, 15, 18, 20 1913.

⁸⁸⁰ *Ibid.* Letter June 2, 13, 19, November 11 December 5 1913.

Labor unions. Because of the dangers of a secret investigation on the shipping lobby the lines decided to no longer maintain a particular fund against restrictive measures⁸⁸¹.”

As the earlier support for the cause from Western and Southern Congressmen faded the shipping lobby now forged alliances with catholic House Representatives fearing the rise of an anti-religious Socialist movement. The appointment of W. Bennet underlines the commitment of the lines to keeping the gates at Ellis Island wide open. The ties with the prominent member of the Dillingham Commission makes one wonder to when they actually date back and to what extent it may have influenced his work on the Commission. Besides contributing to the joint lobby efforts, the HAL also agreed to help NLIL which encountered financial difficulties in continuing its activities. Gips, praised Behar for his support for liberal migration policies both in the US and in Europe and advised contributing through Europe instead of the New York office to avoid scandals.⁸⁸² In the meantime, the gradual takeover of Capitol Hill by lobbyists had started to raise apprehension among Congressmen, pushing President Wilson to appoint two commissions to investigate lobbying activities.

The accumulating tensions in Europe also stimulated governments on the old continent to restrict the movement. The Russian authorities contemplated a law to control foreign mail and confiscate all prepaid tickets or letters enticing emigration. Yet the new New York head agent was not particularly alarmed by the news: “*luckily drafting a law is one thing, enacting and enforcing it still another.*”⁸⁸³ American contemporary restrictionist would have bitterly corroborated this view. The House and the Senate approved a literacy bill once more in 1915 with a vote of 253 to 126 and 50 to 7 respectively, yet President Wilson vetoed the test. Only four votes in the House failed to override it (Tichenor, 2002, 136-138). His second veto against the test two years later did not survive the increasing pressures for restrictions. The Great War totally disrupted the European mass migration movement which had started a century prior. The passage of

⁸⁸¹ *Ibid.* Letter December 12 1913.

⁸⁸² Since its beginnings the NLIL had received funds from the steamship lines. However the financial support from the lines leaked to the American forcing the NLIL to discontinue its activities in 1915. *Ibid* Letter November 3 1913 and (Hall, 1913, 739; Higham, 1955, 132 and Zolberg, 2006, 218).

⁸⁸³ GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97, 160 and 190; Letter, August 18 1913.

the literacy test and the quota acts made sure that the flow could not regain the same intensity after the signing of the peace agreements at Versailles. To what extent these laws were enacted because of the war's devastating effect on the organization of the North Atlantic shipping-cartel, and the subsequent weakening influence of its visible hand safeguarding the unrestricted movement of its main source of revenue on both sides of the Atlantic, remains to be seen.

6) Beware of the Gatekeeper: Williams' second term at the Island of Tears

6.1) The 'financial test': raising the entrance fees to the New World

At Ellis Island Williams tried to implement what Congress failed to enact; raising the barriers of entry for the increasing influx of what he considered 'low-grade immigrants' meaning the poor illiterate from Southern and Eastern Europe. He started off by stating that every migrant arriving at New York with less than \$25 in addition to the railroad ticket would be considered as 'likely to become a public charge'. His declaration caused a lot of commotion among shipping lines; arranging an emergency meeting with the Commissioner. Williams showed no intention of budging an inch, continuing the strict enforcement of the \$25 rule with special attention for prepaid tickets which he considered assisted passengers. Gips accused Williams of targeting the Jews with his policy. He sent out circulars to the migrant agents urging them send at least \$10 along with the prepaid ticket, followed shortly later by a new circular advising to raise that amount to \$25. Ballin urged the lines to file a joint protest yet the New York head-agents believed a direct intervention to be dangerous and unwise, favoring an indirect protest through the NLIL. They managed to pass about forty percent of the passengers who did not possess \$25, especially those giving a bona fide address of family in the US. As Gips noted, Ellis Island did not dispose of the appropriate facilities to control all the newcomers nor to detain them in such large numbers. To give the rejected a fair chance

Williams allowed the shipping lines to look at the Minutes of the board of Special Inquiry to prepare an appeal.⁸⁸⁴

In the meantime, the lines hired a lawyer to investigate discrimination against prepaid passengers. Tensions built up by the time *Potsdam* arrived at New York mid-July 1909 with 679 third-class passengers. Three hundred and four passengers were preliminary detained, 186 of those awaited extra money while 118 others were transferred to the Board of Special Inquiry. Although the bulk of these passengers eventually obtained the right of landing, the detention periods varying from days to weeks caused enormous congestion at the control station. Williams iron rule led to a spectacular increase of deportations which in the first week of July nearly reached six percent.⁸⁸⁵ Ships started to leave Ellis Island with an important contingent of rejected passengers who did not always peacefully accept their faith. The press reported that the control station stood on a verge of a mutiny. Williams blamed the shipping companies, especially the smaller ones such as the Uranium Line pointing to the fact that out of the 231 passengers of the *Volturno* 169 arrived with less than \$10, 90 of whom less than \$5.

The agitation against Williams escalated and W. Bennet voiced the complaints of the Jewish community to President Taft. Max Kohler of the AJC used the exclusion under the \$25 measure of four co-religionists to make a test case under writ of *habeas corpus* at the US Circuit Court.⁸⁸⁶ Judge Hand accepted the case of the four men yet limited the scope of the inquiry declaring himself not to be in a position to judge on the good faith of the immigrant inspectors. The judge ruled in favor of the deported. In the meantime Williams had released them hoping to prevent Kohler from pressing the matter even further and use it as test case to abolish the \$25 rule. By the end of July Gips reported that Williams gave in to the pressures, relaxing the \$25 somewhat.⁸⁸⁷ Six

⁸⁸⁴ To handle the spectacular increase of appeals Williams established an intermediate court in New York to prevent congestions at the Department of Commerce and Labor in Washington.

⁸⁸⁵ 582 out of the 10,179 arrivals

⁸⁸⁶ Kohler denounced Williams with a circular he sent to all the immigrant inspectors and members of the board of special inquiry asking them to put an end to the practice of certain shipping companies landing immigrants whose funds are insufficient to support them until they found a job. Williams asked to implement the 25 dollar rule in the absence of a statutory provision. According to Kohler this proved that Williams seriously exceeded his powers.

⁸⁸⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226; Letters June 21, July 1, 2, 9, 16, 1909 and NYT, "Put up the Bars on Immigration" June 5; "Our shores barred against foreign Outcasts" July 10; "Legal Test against Deported Aliens" July 12; "Trouble feared from the excluded" July 14; "Protest made

months later however, the HAL head-agent complained that Williams reinforced the \$25 rule more strictly than ever before. The inspectors refused to consider money wired to Ellis Island by distant relationships or friends after arrival, still making exception for immediate family.

The strictness of the application of the rule continued to vary the following years. Passengers with direct family ties in America remained exempt of the so called ‘financial test’. The lines considered compelling the passengers to possess the said amount before embarking, especially cash passengers, who generally had weaker ties in the US than prepaid passengers and who ran higher risks of being deported.⁸⁸⁸ The passenger manifests of the arrivals in 1912 reflect the importance of these ties with eighty percent claiming to be joining family, fourteen friends and only six percent mentioning no point of reference at all (Kohler, 1914, 99). Because of Williams’ \$25 rule, the number of passengers detained at Ellis Island reached twenty percent while under his management the Board of Special Inquiry debarred two percent of the newcomers. In comparison, Watchorn only detained seven percent for further inquiry, excluding slightly over one percent of the newcomers.

Williams’ policy created serious congestion during peak season. The commissioner repeatedly requested an appropriation to enlarge Ellis Island’s infrastructure but Taft always refused. The President did not want to encourage New York’s dominant position for the migrant trade even more hoping part of it would divert to Southern ports, yet this hope was idle.⁸⁸⁹ The indirect impact of Williams’ policies as a

to Taft” and “Williams accused if terrorizing men” July 16; “Williams to explain his test in court”, July 17; “Detained Russians permitted to land” July 22; “Obeying Law at Ellis Island” July 26; “Able-bodied Immigrants” July 27; “Immigration Laws” July 28; “Sustains Williams in barring Aliens”; July 30 1909.

⁸⁸⁸ GAR, HAL, 318.03, Passage Office New York, 48-58, 97, 160 and 190; Letters February 1 and March 1 April 15 1910, September 11, November 3, December 5, 23 1913.

⁸⁸⁹ When conducting an investigation of Ellis Island in 1906 Reynolds stated that about seven percent were detained. During the fiscal year 1911 749,642 immigrants arrived at Ellis Island. The inspectors admitted 603,384 of them on the first control. The other 146,258 were held for special Inquiry. The board ordered the deportation of 14,500 people but the statistics do not indicate their race or nationality. For the fiscal year 1913 1,197,892 immigrants arrived of whom 19,938 were sent back. NYT “Reynolds investigates Ellis Island Affaires” September 16 1906; “Taft wants more ports to get Aliens” October 19; “Ports for incoming Aliens” October 20 1910; “Turned back 14,500 last year” November 3; “Undesirable Immigrants” November 14 1911; “Straus sees peril in W.B. Wilson Plan” January 20 1914.

deterrent for migration is much harder to establish. Yet travellers of the HAL reported that the strict implementation of the laws had a demoralizing effect on the bookings.⁸⁹⁰

6.2) See you in Court: place of predilection where Williams and shipping companies met

To reduce interference of charity and missionary organizations fighting deportations Williams barred a good number of representatives of these organizations from Ellis Island. He was backed by the investigation of the Dillingham Commission reporting on the dubious character of some of these institutions in abusing the immigrants. Williams temporarily stopped the practice of discharging to homes posing bonds for persons who had no money. Williams' policies backed by Nagel represented a complete turnaround from the approach of Straus and Watchorn. The latter never imposed financial requirements except as a means to reach their final destination. Strauss frequently overruled deportation decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry and even administered a special fund to support those without means who could not get assistance from other institutions guaranteeing the landing of as many passengers as possible (Dillingham Commission, vol XXXVII, 1911; Pitkin, 1974, 42, Tichenor, 2002, 122).⁸⁹¹

With their lawyers, shipping companies sought ways to mitigate the financial repercussions of Williams' reinstatement. The shipping lines first stopped paying the medical bills for the treatment of diseases, which were not included on the list of inadmissible for entry, such as the scarlet fever and measles; claiming that these should be financed with the Immigrant Fund. By the end of the year, Williams ran out of funds to cover these which amounted to \$40,000.⁸⁹² The lines had always defrayed these costs, hence the commissioner decided to force them to continue to do so. He carried out preliminary controls for these diseases on board of the ship and to prevent their transfer to Ellis Island. If shipping companies used section 16 of the Immigration to force their landing he threatened to send all steerage and cabin passengers to Ellis Island. To avoid

⁸⁹⁰ GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department 221-226, Letter February 2 1911.

⁸⁹¹ NYT "Ousts Aid Societies from Ellis Island" August 11; "To Rid Ellis Island of Bogus Charities" August 12; "Third Home Ousted from Ellis Island" August 13; "Barred From Ellis Island" August 29 1909.

⁸⁹² The costs for the treatment of measles for instance varied from 1.5 to 2 dollars per day depending on the hospital that cared for the patients. With the treatment taking on average 4 to 5 weeks, the average expense amounted to 55 dollars.

costly delays and prevent the conflict from escalating the lines paid the bills again. Yet despite the commissioner's continuous letters, the companies refused to reimburse the unsettled bills. For two years, Williams threatened with all sorts of measures yet he did not want to take it to court fearing he may lose the case. But, the commissioner lost his patience and dragged the lines to court. The judge ruled in favor of the HAL causing a lot of excitement among the lines. All of the sudden the payment of all the food and maintenance by the lines also seemed unsure. The Department of Justice appealed the decision, putting off the HAL's claim of \$30,000 in maintenance fees. This provisional victory was preceded by another verdict in their favor, declaring that the White Slave trade Act of 1910 had no retroactive power. It exempted the lines from defraying the costs of people ordered to be deported for violating the act and having resided longer than three years in the country.⁸⁹³

Not all court rulings were in favor of the lines. The lines lost a test case seeking to exempt children of naturalized immigrants from exclusion under the contagious and loathsome disease clause. Some companies brought up the idea again to include insurances covering the cost for eventual deportation. But even in 1906 the HAL had sent circulars to agents that such insurances were a violation to the immigration laws. The law of 1907 specifically included that; *"no charge for the return of any alien to be deported or any security should be taken for payment of said charge; any violation would be deemed as misdemeanor."* The Supreme Court also ruled that debarred passengers possessing a return ticket needed to be reimbursed for the return ticket and deported at cost of the shipping line. This eliminated the opportunity of forcing high risk passengers from buying a return ticket as well. The court activity underlines the growing tensions between Williams and the shipping companies. The lines also started to refuse payments of food and lodging bills, denouncing the commissioner for overcharging them. When asking for explanations on the bills, Williams declared not to have time for these and that; *"the steamship companies should not take cases to court because what he said was law."*

⁸⁹³ Congress passed the White Slave Trade Act to fight the abuses with immigrant prostitutes. For the first time there was no time limit on deportation for those breaking this law. GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letters September 21 and October 20, November 19 December 21 1909, December 17 1910, February 10 1911, 21 June July 12 1912, May 19, June 6, July 18, November 30, 1913. NYT, "Liners must take care of the Alien Sick" December 20 1909; "To test the law deporting aliens" September 10 1910.

His authoritarian rule earned him the title of ‘Czar of Ellis Island’, making for himself a lot of enemies among the foreign-born communities. Williams still believed that the ‘inferior’ immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, which drove away ‘good’ immigrants from Northern Europe, to other destinations. Clearly, in his eyes new immigrants were not as white on arrival as the old stock, an argument he repeatedly used to justify his racist selections. Jewish organizations accused him of abusing the clause, by excluding people physically unable to earn a living and to discriminating against Jews through special physical tests. Williams also experimented with the Binet-Simon test to track down feeble-mindedness.⁸⁹⁴ M. Braun and L. Hammerling established the American Immigration Society advocating new immigration laws and proper administration, protesting against the unrighteous deportations. Taft received them together with a delegation of thirty prominent figures of the foreign language press coming from across the country whose transport was partly paid for by the shipping companies. They remonstrated against Williams’ policies, backed by the National German Alliance questioning the sanity of presidential appointee and demanding his removal. Representative William Sulzer (NY-D) voiced their claims at Capitol Hill obtaining a parliamentary investigation on the procedures at Ellis Island.

Burnett fervently defended the commissioner blaming the steamship companies for the attacks:

“you can find steamship runners all over Europe seeking to induce the worst in the land to come. Whenever these shipping companies do not like a member of Congress, there is no mistaking it. I have felt their force in their last campaign. They will send their emissaries all through the country for the purpose of crushing any man who gets in their way. They do it in a secretive insidious manner. I have no doubt they are trying to crush Mr. Williams in his effort to do right.”⁸⁹⁵

The investigation did not yield any grounds on which to dismiss the commissioner leaving the pro-immigration lobby with no other choice than to await the end of his term to have him replaced. The first to come up for reappointment was Keefe; yet after a scandal of accepting free tickets for his family from railroad and steamship companies

⁸⁹⁴ It tested the ability to repeat numbers, keenness of observation, native ingenuity, ability to point out absurdities in oral test questions etc. If applied thoroughly seven percent of the new entrants would have been debarred in 1912 (Hoyt, 1916 460-62).

⁸⁹⁵ NYT “Names Please, says Ellis island boss” October 9 1911.

Nagel forced him to resign.⁸⁹⁶ The shipping lobbyists worked hard to prevent the appointment of the labour-friendly Anthony Caminetti as Commissioner General of Immigration, but without success. Shortly after, Williams resigned to go back to his law firm. Byron Uhl Williams' assistant took over temporarily as acting commissioner and it took Wilson another year before appointing Frederic C. Howe to take over. In the meantime W. Wilson substituted Nagel as secretary of the Department of Commerce of labour. With the personnel change in the key position of the immigrant administration the tensions with the shipping companies appeased somewhat. The calm before storm as it turned out.⁸⁹⁷

7) Conclusion: The successful campaign of the shipping lobby in opposing racist immigration restrictions

Based on an econometric analysis of American immigration policies Williamson and Hatton concluded; *“that racism and xenophobia did not seem to have been at work in driving the evolution of policy towards potential European Migrants and that eugenics motives never borne out at the end of the first global century.”* Labor market conditions, and the declining quality, rather than the increasing quantity, caused the transition to restrictive policies. They also point to the correlation of economic downturns and renewed attention for immigration restrictions in Congress and stricter enforcement of the existing immigration laws. Higham also noted a collapse of nativism with the economic recovery after 1898, and resurging in 1905 (Williamson and Hatton, 2004, 27; 2006, 161-67, 174-177 and Higham, 1955, 110, 158). Yet, the evidence presented here for the period 1880-1914 does not corroborate fluctuations in nativism or their supposed insignificant role.

⁸⁹⁶ This was a violation of the 1906 Interstate Commerce Law, NYT “Asks Keefe dismissal” February 22 1913.

⁸⁹⁷ GAR, HAL, 318.02, General Correspondence, 112-121, Letter August 20, November 15 1910 January 6 April 15, July 11 1911 February, 23 1912, May 8, 19, June 6 1913 and NYT “Jews complain of deportation November 14 1909; “Tragedies of our inexorable Immigration Laws” June 12; “Wants more liberal immigration laws” December 25 1910; “Commissioner Williams analyzes Immigration Evils January 15; “New Society seeks Immigration Reform” January 15; “Says we are unfair to desirable immigrants” April 23; “Needs of Ellis Island” July 11; “Protest at hardship of immigration rule” October 8; “Names Please, Ellis Island Boss Says” October 9; “Turned back, 14500 aliens last year” November 11 1911; “Lines refuse to pay Ellis Island Bills September 1 1912; “Czar of Ellis Island” July 13 1912.

Conversely, the movement grew from the 1880s onwards to become institutionalized in 1894 with the foundation of the Immigration Restriction League. The so-called collapse, as noted by Higham, was caused by the investigation of the Industrial Commission- just as the Dillingham Commission impeded any action on the immigration legislation in Congress. From its foundation to the passage of the literacy test in 1917 the IRL remained the driving force behind the restrictionist movement and never gave up the influencing Congress and public opinion. The movement pleaded more and more openly to implement eugenics' selection criteria to protect the 'Teutonic Americans' from racial suicide caused by the growing influx of the inferior Mediterranean immigrants. Nativists correlated the receding quality of the migrants' labor skills with racial characteristics linking social, political and economic arguments for restrictions. The growing influx and the economic downturns helped in placing their arguments higher on the political agenda, but did not determine policy changes.⁸⁹⁸ The IRL made sure the issue never left the public debate, even during economic upswings. Based on scientific research, they published in academic journals and popular press convincing an ever greater part of the population and politicians of the need for restrictions. As Tichenor mentioned, the fragmentation of power and changing institutional structures in the American governmental system gave interest groups constant openings for direct advocacy through lobbyists at Washington.

The shipping lobby proved more successful than the IRL in using these openings to prevent the enactment of restrictions despite, an ever decreasing pro-immigration platform in Congress. The influence of the shipping lobby goes back to the beginning of the long nineteenth century making it the oldest, most constant and influential interest group in the immigration debate known for its strange-bedfellow coalitions. Divided in American and foreign interests, it pursued different agenda regarding the involvement of the government to regulate the competition for the trade in which the dominant foreign arm successfully obstructed attempts of the American shipowners to obtain competitive advantages. Regarding immigration restrictions both advocated a *laissez faire* policy joining forces after the establishment of the IRL. During the Progressive Era, they

⁸⁹⁸ As Tichenor argued between 1880's and 1930's economic downturns failed to produce policy changes while Congress enacted restrictive immigration laws when economic conditions were fairly healthy (Tichenor, 2002 19-23).

instigated opposition first by playing out the internal political tensions between the Southern and Western States versus Eastern and Northern States; second by mobilizing several old stock and subsequently new migrant groups against the Anglo-Saxon nativist threat; third by forging alliances with employer organizations. The shipping lobby proved to be more responsive to the shifts in power balances both within and between national governing institutions.

It used the increasing tendency of appointing scientifically-supported investigation commissions for policymaking as a tool to delay action on immigration and they positioned inside men on these. It also made sure that their interests were represented in standing immigration committees to adapt the bills to their likings or prevent them from being reported. Apart from the lobbyists in Washington they hired the manager of the Congressional Information Bureau to spread favorable information among congressmen and to obtain inside informed on every action taken regarding immigration and maritime issues. With the important legislative powers designated to the House Speaker who collaborated with shipping lobby sharing the same views on immigration restriction, they prevented the enactment of bills when the great majority of Representatives favored these. As a last resort, shipping companies relied on the veto of the President who became increasingly susceptible to the electoral importance of the foreign born vote. By establishing, financing and mobilizing associations representing the various ethnic groups the shipping companies made sure it stayed that way. The rising popular press also played a significant role. Shipping companies hired journalists to counter restrictionist propaganda. They received the unconditional support of the foreign language press, whose editors often acted as migrant agents and profited of shipping advertisements being directly interested in the migrant trade.

The shipping companies also displayed an enormous zeal in adapting the implementation of the existing laws to their interests. As the immigration control system developed a lot of power fell into the hands of the Immigration Commissioners and their superiors; the Commissioner General of Immigration and the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor. Shipping companies tried to have a voice in these presidential appointments because the ambiguity of the laws left a lot of room for personal interpretations on how to implement these. It allowed them to impose stricter controls

when economic or political pressures called for it. Often commissioners introduced new measures, such as preventing the traffic of young bootblackers or the financial test- which only became law afterwards. As the remote control policy gained ground the officials put more and more responsibility on the shipping companies to keep out 'undesirables'. Who fell under that category depended a lot on the personal views of the Immigrant Commissioner at Ellis Island- where today more than a hundred million US residents can trace back their heritage.

Apart from Williams and Weber, the heads of Ellis Island tended not to share strong racist restrictionist ideologies yet all contributed in optimizing the controls and closing the backdoors. It led to efficient health controls, elaborate deportation procedures, bigger appropriations to implement the laws, etc. The imposition of new measures usually happened in dialogue with shipping companies. The number of deportations increased but the barriers of entry remained relatively low and shipping companies went to great lengths to guarantee the right of landing of their passengers using both licit and illicit means. When radical commissioners, such as Williams, proved unwilling to moderate their views to the liking of shipping companies and foreign-born communities, they built up pressure to make him give in, or to obtain his removal. The interference of the shipping lobby both in enacting and implementing immigration policies explains why between 1897 and 1914 approximately ten million immigrants from South and Eastern Europe, by many considered as inferior, legally passed through the gates.

Conclusion:

By approaching the nineteenth century transatlantic mass migration movement in the first place, as a trade, adds to our understanding about; (1) business structures sustaining chain migration patterns, (2) the structural development of passenger lines into large cartels turning migrant transport into big business and (3) the origins and early development of migration laws and enforcement methods to regulate their movement. Placing one of the remaining missing pieces of the puzzle -the steam shipping companies- at the heart of the European mass migration story underlines their pivotal role in enabling, facilitating and stimulating the process.

Transatlantic business networks were entangled in the transnational chain migration networks through which a majority of the migrants moved. Migrant agents and brokers, especially those selling prepaid and return passages in the US, represent key 'meso' level figures connecting both. The focus on the American market underlines the importance of established immigrant entrepreneurs in ethnic enclaves within this process. Sharing the same background put them in a privileged position to gain trust of co-ethnics who depended on them for key services to fulfill their migration strategies. Selling railroad and ocean passage tickets to return home or send for friends, relatives or other third parties constituted one of these. Through prepaid tickets the agent connected the purchaser with the shipping company and local agents in Europe organizing the crossing of the passenger. Organizing meant arranging the inland transport to the port of embarkation and supplying information on how to bypass eventual barriers. At these barriers and key transit points, other agents provided assistance to ensure a smooth transition synchronizing the arrival at the port of embarkation with the departures of shipping companies.

These middlemen provided means facilitating the passage of migrants traveling along these chains, yet especially in Europe they also assisted people traveling outside of these. The analysis of the American market does not escape Dudley Baines critique of the predominant use of sources which inherently tend to overemphasize the importance of the friends and relatives effect (Baines, 1991, 48). Future research on the organization of the European market should complete some indications presented here on the role of migrant agents as distributors of information on; (1) opportunities abroad supplied by consuls, labor agents, landspeculators, new world employers, state agencies, etc., (2) ways to reach and finance the destinations, and (3) on laws regulating the passage and possibilities to circumvent them. This would complete the picture of the entanglements between business and migration closing the gap to the level where migrant decisions are taken both in and outside the chains. Businessmen increase their sales by influencing decisions to buy their product and to do so migrant agents resorted to all the modern advertising techniques available.

Not so much the financial gain on ticket sales but much more the crucial importance of this migrant service to develop and attract other business opportunities,

made this product so attractive to migrant entrepreneurs in the US. To contract clients they used the booming popular press in which they often had interests promoting the ocean passage sales directly through advertisements and indirectly by reporting on the conditions in the home country. Personal contacts were fundamental to enlarge and gain the confidence of their customer base. Therefore migrant agents and brokers also resorted to forms of direct marketing through letters containing promotional material and by hiring canvassers and peddlers. The variety of services offered by immigrant agents also brought them in direct contact as grosser, notaries, real estate agents, boarding bosses, saloon keepers, labor agents, etc. In sum agents not only helped migrants cross the ocean, they often also provided them with a job, a place to stay, land to start a new beginning, legal documents to do so, products and news from back home.

The number of these services rendered varied from agent to agent, yet another category that they never failed to offer besides the sale of steamship tickets were migrant specific banking transactions such as managing deposits, money exchanges, loans and international money transfers. The close ties between banking and ocean passage sales spurred the sale of tickets on credit. On what scale this happened remains unclear, yet that it was institutionalized and that steamship companies seemed unable to put an end to this indicates that it was well established. The source doesn't reveal either if entrepreneurs combining banking with steamship and labor agencies advanced the money themselves. The combinations of the three seemed more common on the Mediterranean than on the Continental market yet sometimes employers and padrones financed the crossing instead of friends or relatives. Using first hand sources of immigrant banks, and hopefully the many names mentioned may lead to these, should shed more light on what scale this happened and give a more detailed account of the techniques employed of these agents to increase their clientele. Charity and philanthropic organizations financing the move also provided an efficient way of securing business for these agents although part of the organizations dealt directly with the companies.

Until the turn of the century, these migrant entrepreneurs practically had a free hand on the market because American banking institutions failed to see any advantage in the short term deposits and remittance market. When they did, they invested heavily in foreign departments to attract the migrant clientele. Only with their ascendancy did some

states pass laws regulating the activities of migrant agents, something which the European authorities had done a long time before. Future investigation needs to indicate to what extent the American banking lobby pressed for these laws to drive the many unofficial immigrant banks out of the market, just as they tried to put an end to the power of shipping companies in freely choosing to whom they attributed ticket books for ocean passage.

The importance of these middlemen, on both sides of the Atlantic, lifting psychological barriers, reducing risks and financial restraints of the move, brought the New World much closer in the mental maps of Europeans and have not yet received the attention they deserve. Migrant agents constituted a vital link in the chain migration pattern, but also for the ones traveling outside of these. Therefore, for passenger lines controlling the agent-network was essential to regulate the competition for the trade.

The commercial importance of the migrant trade triggered keen competition between migrant brokers, shipping companies and ports to attract the flow dating back to the sailing ship era when the fundamentals of the organization of the trade were laid out. As the scene where technological innovations were first introduced, passenger lines on the North Atlantic first felt the impact of increased investments and risks on the structure of the company. The organization in joint stock companies allowed the lines to sustain the required growth. The specialization of the migrant trade controlled by steam driven liner services completely drove tramp ships out of the trade. Nevertheless, the competitive tensions between the companies remained high as new entrants tried to acquire a slice of the cake, while existing ones tried to increase theirs. The battle between the lines resulted profitable for migrant agents because it increased their commission. Yet, especially purchasers of ocean passage benefited from the situation since it pressured down the rates while often the extra commission ended in their pockets because the equally keen competition among agents pushed them to use return it to the client.

To neutralize these pressures the Holland America Line rationalized the organization of the business both through vertical integration and horizontal combination. The company took the passage business which previously was managed by migrant brokers into own hands, cutting down on the commission and trying to increase its grip

on the agent-network. The HAL also opened new inland offices at key points at both sides of the Atlantic. Simultaneously it entered the Continental Conference, a cartel agreement between the main Continental lines that sought to; reduce the competition between the members, fend off the continental market from external pressures of outside lines and impose regulations on the migrant agents. The ultimate goal was to put an end to the constant rate wars and allow the lines to set stable and more profitable rates. Gradually the firms collaborated towards a workable equilibrium; firstly by neutralizing rivals at their homeports; secondly by reinforcing the internal ties to defy the dominance of the British lines which had introduced the conference system in the shipping industry. This rivalry polarized the North Atlantic Passenger Market into three sub-markets; the British-Scandinavian, Continental and Mediterranean.

By concluding profit-sharing pool-agreements dividing the steerage market in quotas the Continental lines set the cornerstone both to take the ascendancy over the British lines and to acquire control on the steerage rates. Market specific features of passenger transport spurred collusion between the lines. Conversely to freight traffic where shipping brokers collaborated to obtain stable rates, migrant brokers prospered and managed to increase their grip on the trade as long as the market remained instable. The HAL saw its efforts to move forward into the market cancelled out by migrant brokers who played out the rivalry between the shipping companies to take control of ocean passage sales. This went as far as bypassing shipping lines altogether, reintroducing tramp ships in the passenger business. The financial strains of this situation forced the British and Continental lines to collude. The latter showed much greater unity thanks to the pool agreements than the former lacking these. This affected the positions at the negotiation table where lines frequently met to re-confer the agreements.

By forcing the British lines into the Continental pool in 1896, Continental lines finally managed to impose the rules to discipline the migrant brokers and agents who lost the possibility of playing out the companies against each other. It allowed them to reduce the commission and significantly increase the rates which could now be adapted to the pool-logic maximizing the profits. The continental pool members used the subsequent market stability to consolidate and expand the harmony to freight and cabin business. Also internally by fixing through rates and striking out the tonnage clause competitive

pressures were further reduced. The far-reaching collaboration enabled the lines within the Hamburg-Le Havre range to firmly control the growing continental market moving eastwards and resist the many external pressures from affecting it. While freight rates plummeted, passenger fares peaked as the market boomed entering the twentieth century. The success attracted the interest of new entrepreneurs such as, JP Morgan, who tried to lift the consolidation to a higher level by way of merger. Instead the IMM combine made an end to the fragile equilibrium among the British lines undermining the whole North Atlantic passenger market. By containing the attacks of the Cunard Line to certain regions preventing a general rate reduction, the Continental lines displayed the control which they had achieved over the continental market.

The continuous high demand for steerage berths on the continent helped their cause yet at the same time it incited a growing number of nations to develop the merchant marine through the movement as national tendencies built up. The pool members tried to avoid conflicts with new lines that received government support in countries either where they tapped from or delivered migrants to. Authorities started taking a more pronounced stance towards migratory movements and increased bureaucratization provided means to apply these, something the Hungarian case had clearly illustrated. Rather than risking both the implementation of new barriers on their trade and a costly rate war, the Continental lines preferred to cede a small slice of the cake to entrants rather than fighting them as happened with the Austria-Americana and Canadian Pacific. Sometimes dialogue was not sufficient to convince the entrant as the Russian case showed. When market conditions permitted predatory pricing strategies forced dissident outsiders either out of business or into the agreement. Although gradually the Continental lines saw their share of the continental market being reduced, the increasing number of passengers allowed them to retain a high volume of sales with a high profit margin. The complexity of the continental agreements allowed higher rates to be quoted than on the Mediterranean and British-Scandinavian markets and in the meantime prevented that these sub-markets affected the organization of the continental business. The unity among the pool members allowed the lines to gain loyalty from the migrant-agent network despite external pressures trying to corrupt them. The conference agency was too important for the general development of the migrant entrepreneurs' business to risk

loosing it. Notable exceptions remained and abuses never disappeared yet these were contained.

The success of the pre-world war one continental passenger conference in maintaining high and profitable rates greatly contrasts with similar agreements both for cargo carriers on the same route and for American railroads during the 1870 and 80s. This success and the cheap market specific organization of ticket sales through migrant agents may explain why so little vertical integration occurred in this business sector. Yet whether therefore steamship lines had the least impact on the development of 'modern business enterprise', as Chandler claimed is debatable (Chandler, 1977, 189). Only pointing to the obvious fact that shipping conferences are still the most common form to organize international seaborne trade indicates that the managerial revolution was maybe not the only response to changing business conditions. The American anti-trust storm eventually also reached the North-Atlantic shipping industry, yet the lobby successfully fought for the existence of the conference system. The delicate sovereignty issue of governing international waters allowed the lines to minimize government intervention and take advantage of the authority vacuum caused by globalization many decades before other industries could. Through the migrant agent network is also used and developed innovating direct and indirect marketing strategies. Future research analyzing the full scope of how these companies managed to combine cabin, steerage, delicate goods, cargo and mail business on the same ship, together with other services worldwide, should reveal the true impact of these companies on the organization and development of 'modern global business'.

The direct impacts of the conference agreements on the migrant are various. The division in various markets and sub-markets greatly defined the routes through which migrants from certain regions moved. Initially these inland routes became cheaper as fixing rates for ocean passage increased the pressures on inland fares. Only when through rates were fixed did the downward spiral come to an end. The competition also moved towards the service offered at important transit places, the port of embarkation, on board and on arrival. The companies started taking full responsibility to protect the migrant from unpleasant experiences throughout the journey. The HAL turned the once

unaccommodating, risky trip into a well organized and relatively safe venture opening its own hotels and replacing bunk spaced steerage accommodation by a cheap version of second class state rooms. The passenger liners could not yet offer a door to door service yet the competition for the business spurred the integration of a transatlantic transport network. Finally, analyzing the HAL gross prices before and after the pool agreement shows that these nearly doubled over the period. This underestimates the true financial impact for the purchaser as the commissions which were often returned to him also diminished. How to measure the impact of this remains a hard nut to crack.

The absence of correlation between migratory movements and third class ocean passage fares in this study reflects the skepticism of whether one should be looked for. Based on the fact that rate wars failed to redress the downward spiral of migration during economic recessions previous studies have tended to conclude that companies failed to accelerate the movement through price policies. Yet shipping companies used recessions to settle tensions and renegotiate agreements to limit financial losses of rate wars, having no direct intention in trying to encourage migration. Nothing indicates that shipping companies used price policies to stimulate flows, as big fluctuations were determined by economic forces far beyond their reach. The influence of shipping companies is much more on the organizational level greatly reducing the risks of the journey, spreading constant propaganda on how to reach the New World and bringing it much closer in the mental maps of Europeans.

As the migration fever spread on the old continent, the competition between shipping companies ensured that new markets were supplied with means to fulfill the migratory wish. Aware of the potential of chain migration patterns, the shipping industry developed the market of prepaid and return tickets reinforcing these and lowering the financial barriers of the move. The sale of tickets on credit also makes it hard to measure the influence of prices on flows as the move could be worked off in the New World by relatives or migrants themselves. Moreover, the price of ocean passage was only a part of the total cost of the move. The competition between the shipping companies reduced other costs such as loss of wages during the move and inland transport. Also other factors such as the long trend annual earnings should be taken into account, yet sharing the opinion of Williamson, Hatton and Hvidt the price of ocean passages are unlikely to have

caused many variations in the migrant flows, even if these doubled between 1885 and 1914 (Hvidt, 1975; Williamson and Hatton, 1998, 14-16). The apparent lack of impact on the flows and deportations of Williams' measures to possess \$10 and later \$25 as a requirement for entry also seem to point that way. The importance of the shipping companies is much more based; on one hand on the quality of service and means offered which sustained the gradual growth of the movement, and on the other hand their efforts to prevent the enactment of legal barriers restricting migration and providing means to circumvent the ones that did.

Shipping companies went great lengths to protect their trade and because national governments for a long time also in the first place considered migration as such, explains why laws regulating the transport preceded those regulating the entry and exit of citizens and aliens. The initial reluctance of taking unilateral decisions regulating trade explains the efforts of reaching international agreements to standardize the transport. Yet issues of jurisdiction prevented a consensus between countries with emigration gateways which tried to minimize regulations to prevent these from obstructing the trade, while receiving countries tried to maximize these to start controlling quantity and quality of new arrivals through these. The visible hand of shipping companies was very active throughout the long nineteenth century, adapting itself to the institutional changes to help shaping these according to their interests. As nations gradually considered the movements of citizens and aliens as a matter affecting national sovereignty; no longer whether to exclude, yet much more who and how many became the dominating issue in receiving countries. To develop on measures how to exclude the authorities increasingly relied on the shipping companies increasing its pivotal role between the migrant and the state.

In Europe legislation continued to center more upon directing the movement to national ports and companies rather than regulating the flows. As nationalist tendencies and bureaucratization augmented, countries did so more openly and efficiently. Facing an increasing number of restrictions to carry out its business in regions through which migrants transited or from which they tapped them from, the Holland America Line increasingly relied on the American prepaid market where it could freely contract passengers. Prepaid tickets offered efficient means to the company to circumvent laws impeding their sales in Europe and laws restricting the emigration movement altogether.

To maintain this freedom on American soil the company joined forces with other foreign passenger lines opposing any attempts to revive the American merchant marine.

The American laws regulating the shipping industry disadvantaged national ship-owners on long distance routes making it very difficult to be competitive with foreign lines on the North Atlantic. The American Line was the only company sailing the Stars and Stripes but continuously struggled to be profitable and therefore never ceased to campaign for compensations either through direct subsidies or through discriminating duties and head taxes. Especially during the 1890s when American jingoism reached a climax, underlining the lack of material to back up its imperial pretence, the company managed to build up important support for its case. Yet despite the efforts to gain the favor of the American public, managing to obtain the support of the Republican Party, the Commissioner of Navigation, and the majority of Congressmen at Washington, significant measures to revive the merchant marine did not materialize until the New Deal. Foreign shipping interests used similar arms to fight the scheme which would strengthen the competitive position of the American Line and could easily lead to the passage of analogous measures as in Europe directing the migrant stream to national ships. It depicted the scheme as a scandalous effort of big business to loot the treasury, an argument which during the Progressive Era when public opinion turned against corporations for monopolizing business and corrupting politics. The efforts seem to have been fruitful.

This argument gained strength when J.P. Morgan anticipating the passage of subsidy laws worked on the IMM merger. Once this became known to the public, it resulted impossible for Congress to consider granting subsidies to a gigantic corporation without loosing its credibility in the anti-trust battle. Without subsidies most of the IMM ships remained under a foreign flag, and therefore the combine stopped pressing for advantages for their American vessels. Foreign shipping cartels retained control over migrant transport, yet nationalistic resentment and the Anti-trust movement represented a continuous threat to the established equilibrium between the lines. This threat eventually materialized in federal prosecution, yet the long established shipping lobby knowing the inside tracks on how to bring public opinion and politics in line with their interests successfully fought for the legality of the conference system, limiting government

interference in their business to a minimum. Conversely, a lot of contemporary American companies sought the assistance of the federal authorities to lift the barriers to the development of a national market which the diverse state legislations posed. With the lack of regulations for the migrant business in the US shipping companies did not face this problem. To protect their international business the only assistance these multinationals sought from US authorities was to leave the gates as wide open as possible.

Conversely, the federal authorities worked on ways to increase their grip on immigrant legislation and enforcement thereof. The shift from state to federal control of immigration policies and the growing tendency to consider it a national rather than an international issue during the 1880s constitute a turning point for global migration policies and controls. This transition materialized in an international climate in which nation-building processes spurred the urge to take unilateral decisions. Doing so on the topic of migration remained a delicate issue in the Atlantic World yet as it took a central role in this nation building process the pressures to intervene accumulated. Shipping companies played a crucial role in relieving these pressures. To consolidate their influence in Washington they appointed lobbyists who kept them informed on the views and activities of Congressmen regarding migration and maritime issues. Based on this information, the shipping companies developed strategies to protect their main source of revenue. As party politics became less outspoken and with the growing importance of public opinion during the Progressive Era, the popular press became together with the corridors of Capitol Hill 'the' scene to fight this battle. Typical for the era, this needed to be backed by scientific arguments while their own involvement needed to be covered up as the popular feelings against corporations mounted.

Because of the institutional changes the lobbyist gained importance as middlemen between politicians and corporations. Through these the shipping lobby; positioned inside men in special investigation committees supplying recommendations on immigration policies, contributed to party campaign funds of both Democrats and Republicans, generously distributed gifts and free transatlantic cabin passages, organized fancy dinners, etc. creating goodwill for their cause among Congressmen. It facilitated the lobbyists' task to organize the opposition against immigration bills in Congress. If this opposition

was not big enough to prevent consideration for it, they used all possible means to delay action on immigration bills and introduced amendments reducing the impact on their business to a minimum. The list of excludables gradually expanded yet without greatly affecting the flows. Pressures increased when the Immigration Restriction League institutionalized the rising nativist movement calling to stop the undesirable and inassimilable new immigrant wave. With the IRL the shipping lobby faced an organized counterpoise at Washington while the association increasingly moved the battle scene to the public sphere. Lobbyists and journalists no longer sufficed to safeguard their interests which they only managed to safeguard right before the turn of the century by exploiting and amplifying the conflict of interests between coastal states and the interior.

The shipping lobby therefore sought means to enlarge the interest group fighting restrictions. By founding the Immigration Protective League they mobilized the old and new migrant communities although the IRL only targeted the latter. As politicians became more and more sensitive to the 'migrant' vote, it proved a very effective strategy to pressure them. Despite the fact that the Congressional base favoring liberal policies grew smaller the influence on people holding key positions the interest group continuously frustrated the IRL's efforts. The only congressmen giving their unconditional support over time regardless of party affiliation came from New York, not only because of the big migrant community, but also because of the crucial importance of the migrant trade in upholding the port's dominant position. Because of the increased collaboration between the shipping companies the separate efforts to oppose restrictions were merged and optimized. As driving force behind the often changing composition of the interest group opposing restrictions, the shipping lobby managed to delay far-reaching, racially inspired restrictive measures such as the literacy test for more than two decades. We can only guess about the probable impact of the test, because a lot depended on how the laws on paper were put into practice at the gates where the visible hand of the shipping companies was also industriously at work.

By withdrawing the enforcement of the laws from the local level, the rigorosity of which was often influenced by port competition, the Federal Government tried to standardize the measures appointing a Commissioner General of Immigration responsible to manage the border control stations. Together with the Ellis Island Commissioner of

Immigration, processing the vast majority of the arrivals, the Commissioner General outlined the means to implement Congressional decisions. The ambiguity of the laws left a lot of margin for personal interpretation giving these presidential appointees a lot of influence to carry out the policies. Especially the ambiguity of the 'likely to become a public charge' clause gave these men a lot of margin to express their personal opinion on the 'desirability' of immigration. By far the easiest way to debar, commissioners often used this reason to send home suspects of other excluded classes as it resulted very difficult to prove these suspicions at the gates. Diseased migrants constitute an exception to this rule. It is the only category on whom the authorities managed to impose the much desired remote boarder control policies. For all the other categories practical and juridical barriers hindered the transfer of controls to the country of origin or ports of embarkation. Instead the authorities increased the responsibility on the shipping companies by augmenting the cost of maintenance and deportation and imposing fines for brining over excludables.

Gradually the immigration inspectors improved controls and closed backdoors, yet at the same time shipping companies opened new ones and refined the assistance given to its passengers to guarantee their landing. The ones running high risks of being returned were sent through Canada or American ports other than New York where controls remained less strict. The lines prepared their passengers on board for the interrogations at Ellis Island and assisted the ones likely to be detained. They attended curable passengers in hospitals at the port of embarkation or on arrival; traced back family or friends to transfer money to join them, to pick up detainees at the control station, place bonds for them and if that didn't work even gave free train tickets to complete their inland journey. If no friends or family could be traced back they sought assistance of philanthropic institutions. Shipping companies also used all possible means to gain favor of the many inspectors and translators working at the gates to facilitate the landing of their clients. Despite their efforts they couldn't avoid the selections of European migrants based on the various degrees of whiteness from infiltrating into the control stations. Depending on the commissioner of immigration in charge at Ellis Island, Southern and Eastern European migrants were not always considered white, neither before nor on arrival. They acquired this constitutional status only when they passed the

gates, and that so many eventually did, is for a large part due to the lucrative business they represented for the steam shipping companies.

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Consulats, New York, nr. 7.

Centre d'Archives du monde du Travail (CAMT / Roubaix)

Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 9AQ, 2-13, Dossiers des Assemblées Générales

GERMANY

Bremer Staatsarchiv (BSA)

2-R-11, Shiffahrt zur See, 2a-2c Dampschiffahrt, post- und Packetschiffahrt zwischen Bremen und V.S. 1837-1867.

2-B-13 Verhältnisse mit VS. Generalia en diversa: Auswanderung nach den US

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Appendix 1: Long term emigration movements through Continental Ports

1) Emigration figures from the port of Antwerp and Bremen 1832-1900⁸⁹⁹

| Year | Antwerp | Bremen | Year | Antwerp | Bremen | Year | Antwerp | Bremen |
|-------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|---------------|
| 1832 | | 10344 | 1855 | 7589 | 31550 | 1878 | 5191 | 21483 |
| 1833 | | 8891 | 1856 | 10010 | 36517 | 1879 | 9828 | 26654 |
| 1834 | | 13086 | 1857 | 13446 | 49488 | 1880 | 9990 | 80330 |
| 1835 | | 6185 | 1858 | 4080 | 23177 | 1881 | 38276 | 122767 |
| 1836 | | 14137 | 1859 | 1300 | 22011 | 1882 | 35125 | 114955 |
| 1837 | | 15087 | 1860 | 2507 | 30296 | 1883 | 32644 | 109881 |
| 1838 | | 9312 | 1861 | 2115 | 16540 | 1884 | 26800 | 103051 |
| 1839 | | 12412 | 1862 | 3155 | 15187 | 1885 | 24057 | 83973 |
| 1840 | | 12806 | 1863 | 2874 | 18175 | 1886 | 22049 | 76748 |
| 1841 | | 9594 | 1864 | 5827 | 27701 | 1887 | 33793 | 99350 |
| 1842 | | 13619 | 1865 | 3507 | 44665 | 1888 | 36098 | 95270 |
| 1843 | 3179 | 9927 | 1866 | 3491 | 61877 | 1889 | 39298 | 102923 |
| 1844 | 2961 | 19857 | 1867 | 9048 | 73971 | 1890 | 36653 | 140410 |
| 1845 | 5221 | 31822 | 1868 | 1810 | 66433 | 1891 | 48788 | 138457 |
| 1846 | 13178 | 32372 | 1869 | 3071 | 63519 | 1892 | 43532 | 127029 |
| 1847 | 15800 | 33682 | 1870 | 218 | 46781 | 1893 | 38067 | 106291 |
| 1848 | 11513 | 29947 | 1871 | 0 | 60516 | 1894 | 12901 | 47499 |
| 1849 | 10260 | 28629 | 1872 | 1429 | 80418 | 1895 | 18977 | 68922 |
| 1850 | 6831 | 25776 | 1873 | 6358 | 63241 | 1896 | 23407 | 67040 |
| 1851 | 8375 | 37493 | 1874 | 5316 | 30633 | 1897 | 14960 | 46798 |
| 1852 | 14463 | 58551 | 1875 | 4735 | 24503 | 1898 | 15983 | 60486 |
| 1853 | 15197 | 58111 | 1876 | 7374 | 21665 | 1899 | 25886 | 80787 |
| 1854 | 25719 | 76875 | 1877 | 5082 | 19179 | 1900 | 37491 | 95961 |

⁸⁹⁹ For Antwerp see Veraghtert K. "De havenbewegingen te Antwerpen tijdens de 19e eeuw: een kwantitatieve benadering" (Unpublished PhD, Catholic University of Leuven, 1977); Table LXI and for Bremen see Armgort A. *Bremer-Bremerhaven-New York, 1683-1960* (Bremen, 1992); p 125.

Emigration through Continental ports per thousand 1846-1914⁹⁰⁰

| | Bremen | Hamburg | Le Havre | Antwerp | Rotterdam |
|---------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1846-50 | 150,4 | 32,1 | 163,8 | 56,1 | 44,7 |
| 1851-55 | 262,6 | 140,2 | 224,5 | 72,2 | 13,5 |
| 1856-60 | 161,5 | 107,0 | 112,4 | 31,3 | 2,5 |
| 1861-65 | 122,3 | 127,1 | 59,5 | 17,4 | 8,6 |
| 1866-70 | 312,6 | 217,6 | 101,9 | 22,3 | 17,2 |
| 1871-75 | 67,6 | 81,8 | 137,6 | 17,8 | 15,9 |
| 1876-80 | 70,2 | 78,7 | 89,0 | 49,8 | 23,7 |
| 1881-85 | 126,9 | 190,3 | 131,7 | 169,5 | 52,5 |
| 1886-90 | 271,7 | 300,1 | 165,7 | 180,2 | 53,2 |
| 1891-95 | 303,3 | 285,3 | | 177,8 | 108,3 |
| 1896-00 | 307,4 | 225,2 | | 124,5 | 83,0 |
| 1901-05 | 680,9 | 479,3 | | 330,9 | 235,9 |
| 1906-10 | 749,5 | 540,8 | | 423,3 | 229,8 |
| 1911-14 | 577,0 | 460,8 | | 266,4a | 229,8 |

a) does not include 1914

⁹⁰⁰ See Van der Valk L.A. "Landverhuizers via Rotterdam in de negentiende eeuw." in: *Economisch en Sociaal historisch jaarboek* (Amsterdam, 1976); p 151 based on the figures of Willcox W. *International Migrations* (New York, 1929) vol 1 p 613, 678, 693, 703, 740.

Appendix 2: Old vs. New Immigrants arriving in the US per nationality⁹⁰¹

'OLD' Migration⁹⁰²

| Year | Belgium | Denmark | France | Germany | Netherlands | Norway | Sweden | Switzerland | UK | Total new | Total |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------|------------------|--------------|
| 1820 | 1 | 20 | 371 | 968 | 49 | 3 | 0 | 31 | 6024 | 7467 | 7691 |
| 1821 | 2 | 12 | 370 | 383 | 56 | 12 | 0 | 93 | 4728 | 5656 | 5935 |
| 1822 | 10 | 18 | 351 | 148 | 51 | 10 | 0 | 110 | 3488 | 4186 | 4418 |
| 1823 | 2 | 6 | 460 | 183 | 19 | 1 | 0 | 47 | 3008 | 3726 | 4016 |
| 1824 | 1 | 11 | 377 | 230 | 40 | 9 | 0 | 253 | 3609 | 4530 | 4965 |
| 1825 | 1 | 14 | 515 | 450 | 37 | 4 | 0 | 166 | 6983 | 8170 | 8543 |
| 1826 | 2 | 10 | 545 | 511 | 176 | 16 | 0 | 245 | 7727 | 9232 | 9751 |
| 1827 | 7 | 15 | 1280 | 432 | 245 | 13 | 0 | 297 | 13952 | 16241 | 16719 |
| 1828 | 2 | 50 | 2843 | 1851 | 263 | 10 | 0 | 1592 | 17840 | 24451 | 24729 |
| 1829 | 0 | 17 | 582 | 597 | 169 | 13 | 0 | 314 | 10594 | 12286 | 12523 |
| 1830 | 0 | 16 | 1174 | 1976 | 22 | 3 | 0 | 109 | 3874 | 7174 | 7217 |
| 1831 | 1 | 23 | 2038 | 2413 | 175 | 13 | 0 | 63 | 8247 | 12973 | 13039 |
| 1832 | 0 | 21 | 5361 | 10194 | 205 | 313 | 0 | 129 | 17767 | 33990 | 34193 |
| 1833 | 0 | 173 | 4682 | 6988 | 39 | 16 | 0 | 634 | 13564 | 26096 | 29111 |
| 1834 | 3 | 24 | 2989 | 17686 | 87 | 42 | 0 | 1389 | 34964 | 57184 | 57516 |
| 1835 | 1 | 37 | 2696 | 8311 | 124 | 31 | 0 | 548 | 29897 | 41645 | 42009 |
| 1836 | 0 | 416 | 4443 | 20707 | 301 | 57 | 0 | 445 | 43684 | 70053 | 70442 |
| 1837 | 0 | 109 | 5074 | 23740 | 312 | 290 | 0 | 383 | 40726 | 70634 | 71038 |
| 1838 | 14 | 52 | 3675 | 11683 | 27 | 60 | 0 | 123 | 18065 | 33699 | 34066 |
| 1839 | 1 | 56 | 7198 | 21028 | 85 | 324 | 0 | 607 | 34234 | 63533 | 64151 |
| 1840 | 2 | 152 | 7419 | 29704 | 57 | 55 | 0 | 500 | 42043 | 79932 | 80123 |
| 1841 | 106 | 31 | 5006 | 15291 | 214 | 195 | 0 | 751 | 53960 | 75554 | 76217 |

⁹⁰¹ The figures are taken from Willcox William, *International Immigration*, (New York 1929, 379-390). They are based on the statistics of the incoming ships at American port and represent fiscal years going from July 1 until June 30 of the year as shown in the tables. The nations represented by the 'old immigrants' are Germany, UK, Switzerland, Norway Denmark, Sweden, France, Belgium and the Netherlands while the 'new' immigrants include the Italians, Greeks, Russians, Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Poles, Spanish, Portuguese, Turks and Rumanians. The last total column includes all European arrivals.

⁹⁰² Norway includes Swedes up to 1868.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|
| 1842 | 44 | 35 | 4504 | 20370 | 330 | 553 | 0 | 483 | 73347 | 99666 | 99948 |
| 1843 | 135 | 29 | 3346 | 14441 | 330 | 1748 | 0 | 553 | 28100 | 48682 | 49012 |
| 1844 | 165 | 25 | 3155 | 20731 | 184 | 1311 | 0 | 839 | 47843 | 74253 | 74744 |
| | | | | | | | | | | Total | |
| Year | Belgium | Denmark | France | Germany | Netherlands | Norway | Sweden | Switzerland | UK | new | Total |
| 1845 | 541 | 54 | 7663 | 34355 | 791 | 928 | 0 | 471 | 64031 | 108834 | 109302 |
| 1846 | 43 | 114 | 10583 | 57561 | 979 | 1916 | 0 | 698 | 73932 | 145826 | 146312 |
| 1847 | 1473 | 13 | 20040 | 74281 | 2631 | 1307 | 0 | 192 | 128838 | 228775 | 229118 |
| 1848 | 897 | 210 | 7743 | 58465 | 918 | 903 | 0 | 319 | 148093 | 217548 | 218024 |
| 1849 | 590 | 8 | 5841 | 60235 | 1190 | 3473 | 0 | 13 | 214530 | 285880 | 286503 |
| 1850 | 1055 | 20 | 9381 | 78896 | 684 | 1569 | 0 | 325 | 215089 | 307019 | 308296 |
| 1851 | 25 | 14 | 20126 | 72482 | 352 | 2424 | 0 | 427 | 272740 | 368590 | 369535 |
| 1852 | 8 | 3 | 6763 | 145918 | 1719 | 4103 | 0 | 2788 | 200247 | 361549 | 362484 |
| 1853 | 87 | 32 | 10770 | 141946 | 600 | 3364 | 0 | 2748 | 200225 | 359772 | 361576 |
| 1854 | 266 | 691 | 13317 | 215009 | 1534 | 3531 | 0 | 7953 | 160253 | 402554 | 405542 |
| 1855 | 1506 | 528 | 6044 | 71918 | 2588 | 821 | 0 | 4433 | 97199 | 185037 | 187729 |
| 1856 | 1982 | 173 | 7246 | 71028 | 1395 | 1157 | 0 | 1780 | 99007 | 183768 | 186083 |
| 1857 | 627 | 1035 | 2397 | 91781 | 1775 | 1712 | 0 | 2080 | 112840 | 214247 | 216224 |
| 1858 | 184 | 232 | 3155 | 45310 | 185 | 2430 | 0 | 1056 | 55829 | 108381 | 111354 |
| 1859 | 25 | 499 | 2579 | 41784 | 290 | 1091 | 0 | 833 | 61379 | 108480 | 110949 |
| 1860 | 53 | 542 | 3961 | 54491 | 351 | 298 | 0 | 913 | 78374 | 138983 | 141209 |
| 1861 | 153 | 234 | 2326 | 31661 | 283 | 616 | 0 | 1007 | 43472 | 79752 | 81200 |
| 1862 | 169 | 1658 | 3142 | 27529 | 432 | 892 | 0 | 643 | 47990 | 82455 | 83727 |
| 1863 | 301 | 1492 | 1838 | 33162 | 416 | 1627 | 0 | 690 | 122798 | 162324 | 163733 |
| 1864 | 389 | 712 | 3128 | 57276 | 708 | 2249 | 0 | 1396 | 116951 | 182809 | 185233 |
| 1865 | 741 | 1149 | 3583 | 83424 | 779 | 6109 | 0 | 2889 | 112237 | 210911 | 214048 |
| 1866 | 1254 | 1862 | 6855 | 115892 | 1716 | 12633 | 0 | 3823 | 131614 | 275649 | 278916 |
| 1867 | 789 | 1436 | 5237 | 133426 | 2223 | 7055 | 0 | 4168 | 125520 | 279854 | 283751 |
| 1868 | 25 | 819 | 1989 | 55831 | 345 | 11166 | 0 | 1945 | 56195 | 128315 | 130101 |
| 1869 | 1922 | 3649 | 3879 | 131042 | 1134 | 16068 | 24224 | 3650 | 125224 | 310792 | 291319 |
| 1870 | 102 | 4083 | 4009 | 118225 | 1066 | 13216 | 13443 | 3075 | 160673 | 317892 | 313841 |
| 1871 | 774 | 2015 | 3138 | 82554 | 993 | 9418 | 10699 | 2269 | 142894 | 254754 | 253848 |
| 1872 | 738 | 3690 | 9317 | 141109 | 1909 | 11421 | 13464 | 3650 | 153644 | 338942 | 337762 |
| 1873 | 1176 | 4931 | 14798 | 149671 | 3811 | 16247 | 14303 | 3107 | 166844 | 374888 | 381993 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|-----|------|------|-------|------|-------|------|------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1874 | 817 | 3082 | 9644 | 87291 | 2444 | 10384 | 5712 | 3093 | 115728 | 238195 | 255397 |
| 1875 | 615 | 2656 | 8321 | 47769 | 1237 | 6093 | 5573 | 1814 | 85862 | 159940 | 175948 |
| 1876 | 515 | 1547 | 8004 | 31937 | 855 | 5173 | 5603 | 1549 | 48866 | 104049 | 114473 |
| 1877 | 488 | 1695 | 5856 | 29298 | 591 | 4588 | 4991 | 1686 | 38150 | 87343 | 100067 |

| | Total | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------|------------|--------------|
| Year | Belgium | Denmark | France | Germany | Netherlands | Norway | Sweden | Switzerland | UK | new | Total |
| 1878 | 354 | 2105 | 4159 | 29313 | 608 | 4759 | 5390 | 1808 | 38082 | 86578 | 95428 |
| 1879 | 512 | 3474 | 4655 | 34602 | 753 | 7345 | 11001 | 3161 | 49968 | 115471 | 122046 |
| 1880 | 1232 | 6576 | 4314 | 84638 | 3340 | 19895 | 39186 | 6156 | 144876 | 310213 | 308375 |
| 1881 | 1766 | 9117 | 5227 | 210485 | 8597 | 22705 | 49760 | 11293 | 153718 | 472668 | 528545 |
| 1882 | 1431 | 11618 | 6004 | 250630 | 9517 | 29101 | 64607 | 10844 | 179423 | 563175 | 648186 |
| 1883 | 1450 | 10319 | 4821 | 194786 | 5249 | 23398 | 38277 | 12751 | 158092 | 449143 | 522587 |
| 1884 | 1576 | 9202 | 3608 | 179676 | 4198 | 16974 | 26552 | 9386 | 129294 | 380466 | 453686 |
| 1885 | 1653 | 6100 | 3495 | 124443 | 2689 | 12356 | 22248 | 5895 | 109508 | 288387 | 353083 |
| 1886 | 1300 | 6225 | 3318 | 84403 | 2314 | 12759 | 27751 | 4805 | 112548 | 255423 | 329529 |
| 1887 | 2553 | 8524 | 5034 | 106865 | 4506 | 16269 | 42836 | 5214 | 161748 | 353549 | 482829 |
| 1888 | 3215 | 8962 | 6454 | 109717 | 5845 | 18264 | 54689 | 7737 | 182205 | 397088 | 538131 |
| 1889 | 2562 | 8699 | 5918 | 99538 | 6460 | 13390 | 35415 | 7070 | 153549 | 332601 | 434790 |
| 1890 | 2671 | 9366 | 6585 | 92427 | 4326 | 11370 | 29632 | 6993 | 122754 | 286124 | 445680 |
| 1891 | 3037 | 10659 | 6770 | 113554 | 5206 | 12568 | 36880 | 6811 | 122311 | 317796 | 546085 |
| 1892 | 4026 | 10125 | 4678 | 119168 | 6141 | 14325 | 41845 | 6886 | 93598 | 300792 | 570876 |
| 1893 | 3324 | 7720 | 3621 | 78756 | 6199 | 15515 | 35710 | 4744 | 78767 | 234356 | 429324 |
| 1894 | 1709 | 5003 | 3080 | 53989 | 1820 | 9111 | 18286 | 2905 | 52751 | 148654 | 277052 |
| 1895 | 1058 | 3910 | 2628 | 32173 | 1388 | 7581 | 15361 | 2239 | 74820 | 141158 | 250342 |
| 1896 | 1261 | 3167 | 2463 | 31885 | 1583 | 8855 | 21177 | 2304 | 64827 | 137522 | 329067 |
| 1897 | 760 | 2085 | 2107 | 22533 | 890 | 5842 | 13162 | 1566 | 41173 | 90118 | 216397 |
| 1898 | 695 | 1946 | 1990 | 17111 | 767 | 4938 | 12398 | 1246 | 38022 | 79113 | 217786 |
| 1899 | 1101 | 2690 | 1694 | 17476 | 1029 | 6705 | 12797 | 1326 | 45123 | 89941 | 297349 |
| 1900 | 1196 | 2926 | 1739 | 18507 | 1735 | 9575 | 18650 | 1152 | 48237 | 103717 | 424700 |
| 1901 | 1579 | 3655 | 3150 | 21651 | 2349 | 12248 | 23331 | 2201 | 45546 | 115710 | 469237 |
| 1902 | 2577 | 5660 | 3117 | 28304 | 2284 | 17484 | 30894 | 2344 | 46036 | 138700 | 619068 |
| 1903 | 3450 | 7158 | 5578 | 40086 | 3998 | 24461 | 46028 | 3983 | 68947 | 203689 | 814507 |
| 1904 | 3976 | 8525 | 9406 | 46380 | 4916 | 23808 | 27763 | 5023 | 87590 | 217387 | 767933 |
| 1905 | 5302 | 8970 | 10168 | 40574 | 4954 | 25064 | 26591 | 4269 | 137134 | 263026 | 974273 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|--------|--------|---------|
| 1906 | 5099 | 7741 | 9386 | 37564 | 4946 | 21730 | 23310 | 3846 | 102193 | 215815 | 1018365 |
| 1907 | 6396 | 7243 | 9731 | 37807 | 6637 | 22133 | 20589 | 3748 | 113567 | 227851 | 1199566 |
| 1908 | 4162 | 4954 | 8788 | 32309 | 5946 | 12412 | 12809 | 3281 | 93380 | 178041 | 691901 |
| 1909 | 3692 | 4395 | 6672 | 25540 | 4698 | 13627 | 14474 | 2694 | 71826 | 147618 | 654875 |
| 1910 | 5402 | 6984 | 7383 | 31283 | 7534 | 17538 | 23745 | 3533 | 98796 | 202198 | 926291 |
| 1911 | 5711 | 7555 | 8022 | 32061 | 8358 | 13950 | 20780 | 3458 | 102496 | 202391 | 764757 |
| 1912 | 4169 | 6191 | 8628 | 27788 | 6619 | 8765 | 12688 | 3505 | 83027 | 161380 | 718875 |
| 1913 | 7405 | 6478 | 9675 | 34329 | 6902 | 8587 | 17202 | 4104 | 88204 | 182886 | 1055855 |
| 1914 | 5763 | 6262 | 9296 | 35734 | 6321 | 8329 | 14800 | 4211 | 73417 | 164133 | 1058391 |

'NEW' Migration⁹⁰³

| Year | Austria | Hungary | Bulgaria | Greece | Italy | Poland | Portugal | Russia | Finland | Rumania | Spain | Turkey | Total New | Total |
|------|---------|---------|----------|--------|-------|--------|----------|--------|---------|---------|-------|--------|-----------|-------|
| 1820 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 5 | 35 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 139 | 1 | 224 | 7691 |
| 1821 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 62 | 1 | 18 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 191 | 0 | 279 | 5935 |
| 1822 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 3 | 28 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 152 | 4 | 232 | 4418 |
| 1823 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 3 | 24 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 220 | 2 | 289 | 4016 |
| 1824 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 45 | 4 | 13 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 359 | 2 | 435 | 4965 |
| 1825 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 1 | 13 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 273 | 0 | 372 | 8543 |
| 1826 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 57 | 0 | 16 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 436 | 2 | 519 | 9751 |
| 1827 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 1 | 7 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 414 | 1 | 477 | 16719 |
| 1828 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 34 | 1 | 14 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 209 | 6 | 278 | 24729 |
| 1829 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 23 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 202 | 1 | 237 | 12523 |
| 1830 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 2 | 43 | 7217 |
| 1831 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 0 | 66 | 13039 |
| 1832 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 34 | 5 | 52 | 0 | 0 | 106 | 0 | 201 | 34193 |
| 1833 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1699 | 1 | 633 | 159 | 0 | 0 | 516 | 1 | 3010 | 29111 |
| 1834 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 104 | 54 | 44 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 107 | 1 | 332 | 57516 |
| 1835 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 61 | 54 | 29 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 183 | 0 | 364 | 42009 |
| 1836 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 115 | 53 | 29 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 180 | 3 | 387 | 70442 |
| 1837 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 36 | 81 | 34 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 230 | 0 | 404 | 71038 |
| 1838 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 86 | 41 | 24 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 202 | 0 | 366 | 34066 |

⁹⁰³ Russia includes Finns and Poles respectively from 1892 and 1899 onwards. Austria includes Hungarians between 1892 and 1904.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|
| 1839 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 84 | 46 | 19 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 428 | 1 | 588 | 64151 |
| 1840 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 5 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 136 | 1 | 191 | 80123 |
| 1841 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 179 | 15 | 7 | 174 | 0 | 0 | 215 | 6 | 597 | 76217 |
| 1842 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 100 | 10 | 15 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 122 | 2 | 281 | 99948 |
| 1843 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 117 | 17 | 32 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 145 | 5 | 325 | 49012 |
| 1844 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 141 | 36 | 16 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 270 | 10 | 488 | 74744 |
| 1845 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 137 | 6 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 304 | 3 | 468 | 109302 |
| Year | Austria | Hungary | Bulgaria | Greece | Italy | Poland | Portugal | Russia | Finland | Rumania | Spain | Turkey | Total New | Total |
| 1846 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 151 | 4 | 2 | 248 | 0 | 0 | 73 | 4 | 482 | 146312 |
| 1847 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 164 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 158 | 2 | 343 | 229118 |
| 1848 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 241 | 0 | 67 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 164 | 3 | 476 | 218024 |
| 1849 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 209 | 4 | 26 | 44 | 0 | 0 | 329 | 9 | 623 | 286503 |
| 1850 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 431 | 5 | 366 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 429 | 15 | 1277 | 308296 |
| 1851 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 447 | 10 | 50 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 435 | 2 | 945 | 369535 |
| 1852 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 351 | 110 | 68 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 391 | 3 | 935 | 362484 |
| 1853 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 555 | 33 | 95 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1091 | 15 | 1804 | 361576 |
| 1854 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1263 | 208 | 72 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1433 | 7 | 2986 | 405542 |
| 1855 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1052 | 462 | 205 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 951 | 9 | 2692 | 187729 |
| 1856 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1365 | 20 | 128 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 786 | 5 | 2315 | 186083 |
| 1857 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1007 | 124 | 92 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 714 | 11 | 1977 | 216224 |
| 1858 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1240 | 9 | 177 | 246 | 0 | 0 | 1282 | 17 | 2971 | 111354 |
| 1859 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 932 | 106 | 46 | 91 | 0 | 0 | 1283 | 10 | 2469 | 110949 |
| 1860 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1019 | 82 | 122 | 65 | 0 | 0 | 932 | 4 | 2225 | 141209 |
| 1861 | 0 | 51 | 0 | 1 | 811 | 48 | 47 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 448 | 5 | 1445 | 81200 |
| 1862 | 17 | 111 | 0 | 5 | 566 | 63 | 72 | 79 | 0 | 0 | 348 | 11 | 1272 | 83727 |
| 1863 | 28 | 57 | 0 | 4 | 547 | 94 | 86 | 77 | 0 | 0 | 500 | 16 | 1409 | 163733 |
| 1864 | 40 | 190 | 0 | 5 | 600 | 165 | 240 | 256 | 0 | 0 | 917 | 11 | 2424 | 185233 |
| 1865 | 322 | 100 | 0 | 7 | 924 | 528 | 365 | 183 | 0 | 0 | 692 | 14 | 3135 | 214048 |
| 1866 | 45 | 48 | 0 | 10 | 1382 | 412 | 344 | 287 | 0 | 0 | 718 | 18 | 3264 | 278916 |
| 1867 | 25 | 667 | 0 | 10 | 1624 | 310 | 126 | 205 | 0 | 0 | 904 | 26 | 3897 | 283751 |
| 1868 | 92 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 891 | 0 | 174 | 141 | 0 | 0 | 384 | 4 | 1786 | 130101 |
| 1869 | 1495 | 4 | 0 | 8 | 1489 | 184 | 87 | 343 | 0 | 0 | 1123 | 18 | 4751 | 291319 |
| 1870 | 4424 | 1 | 0 | 22 | 2891 | 223 | 255 | 907 | 0 | 0 | 663 | 6 | 9392 | 313841 |
| 1871 | 4884 | 3 | 0 | 11 | 2816 | 535 | 290 | 673 | 0 | 0 | 558 | 23 | 9793 | 253848 |
| 1872 | 4182 | 228 | 0 | 12 | 4190 | 1647 | 416 | 994 | 24 | 0 | 595 | 20 | 12308 | 337762 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|
| 1873 | 5765 | 1347 | 0 | 23 | 8757 | 3338 | 24 | 1560 | 74 | 0 | 541 | 53 | 21482 | 381993 |
| 1874 | 7888 | 962 | 0 | 36 | 7666 | 1795 | 60 | 3960 | 113 | 0 | 485 | 62 | 23027 | 255397 |
| 1875 | 6882 | 776 | 0 | 25 | 3631 | 984 | 763 | 7892 | 15 | 0 | 601 | 27 | 21596 | 175948 |
| 1876 | 5646 | 630 | 0 | 19 | 3015 | 925 | 471 | 4765 | 10 | 0 | 518 | 38 | 16037 | 114473 |
| 1877 | 5023 | 373 | 0 | 24 | 3195 | 533 | 1291 | 6579 | 20 | 0 | 665 | 32 | 17735 | 100067 |
| 1878 | 4504 | 646 | 0 | 16 | 4344 | 547 | 660 | 3037 | 11 | 0 | 457 | 29 | 14251 | 95428 |
| 1879 | 5331 | 632 | 0 | 21 | 5791 | 489 | 392 | 4434 | 19 | 0 | 457 | 29 | 17595 | 122046 |
| 1880 | 12904 | 4363 | 0 | 23 | 12354 | 2177 | 260 | 4854 | 160 | 11 | 389 | 24 | 37519 | 308375 |
| Year | Austria | Hungary | Bulgaria | Greece | Italy | Poland | Portugal | Russia | Finland | Rumania | Spain | Turkey | Total New | Total |
| 1881 | 21109 | 6826 | 0 | 19 | 15401 | 5614 | 171 | 4865 | 176 | 30 | 484 | 72 | 54767 | 528545 |
| 1882 | 20221 | 8929 | 0 | 126 | 32159 | 4672 | 42 | 16321 | 597 | 65 | 378 | 69 | 83579 | 648186 |
| 1883 | 16385 | 11240 | 0 | 73 | 31792 | 2011 | 176 | 9186 | 723 | 77 | 262 | 86 | 72011 | 522587 |
| 1884 | 21773 | 14798 | 0 | 37 | 16510 | 4536 | 701 | 11854 | 835 | 238 | 300 | 150 | 71732 | 453686 |
| 1885 | 17926 | 9383 | 0 | 172 | 13642 | 3085 | 440 | 16603 | 555 | 803 | 350 | 138 | 63097 | 353083 |
| 1886 | 16260 | 12420 | 0 | 104 | 21315 | 3939 | 238 | 17309 | 491 | 494 | 344 | 176 | 73090 | 329529 |
| 1887 | 25009 | 15256 | 0 | 313 | 47622 | 6128 | 110 | 28944 | 1822 | 2045 | 436 | 206 | 127891 | 482829 |
| 1888 | 30011 | 15800 | 0 | 782 | 51558 | 5826 | 23 | 31256 | 2231 | 1186 | 526 | 207 | 139406 | 538131 |
| 1889 | 23207 | 10967 | 0 | 158 | 25307 | 4922 | 57 | 31889 | 2027 | 893 | 526 | 252 | 100205 | 434790 |
| 1890 | 34137 | 22062 | 0 | 524 | 52003 | 11073 | 158 | 33147 | 2451 | 517 | 813 | 206 | 157091 | 445680 |
| 1891 | 42676 | 28366 | 0 | 1105 | 76055 | 27497 | 918 | 42145 | 5281 | 957 | 905 | 265 | 226170 | 546085 |
| 1892 | 76937 | 0 | 0 | 660 | 61631 | 40536 | 3400 | 81511 | 0 | 0 | 4078 | 1331 | 270084 | 570876 |
| 1893 | 57420 | 0 | 0 | 1072 | 72145 | 16347 | 4816 | 42310 | 0 | 0 | 206 | 625 | 194941 | 429324 |
| 1894 | 38638 | 0 | 0 | 1356 | 42977 | 1941 | 2196 | 39278 | 0 | 729 | 925 | 298 | 128338 | 277052 |
| 1895 | 33401 | 0 | 0 | 597 | 35427 | 790 | 1452 | 35907 | 0 | 523 | 501 | 245 | 108843 | 250342 |
| 1896 | 65103 | 0 | 0 | 2175 | 68060 | 691 | 2766 | 51455 | 0 | 785 | 351 | 169 | 191555 | 329067 |
| 1897 | 33031 | 0 | 0 | 571 | 59131 | 4165 | 1874 | 25816 | 0 | 791 | 448 | 152 | 125979 | 216397 |
| 1898 | 39797 | 0 | 0 | 2339 | 58613 | 4726 | 1717 | 29828 | 0 | 900 | 577 | 176 | 138673 | 217786 |
| 1899 | 62491 | 0 | 52 | 2333 | 77419 | 0 | 2054 | 60982 | 0 | 1606 | 385 | 80 | 207402 | 297349 |
| 1900 | 114847 | 0 | 108 | 3771 | 100135 | 0 | 4234 | 90787 | 0 | 6459 | 355 | 285 | 320981 | 424700 |
| 1901 | 113390 | 0 | 657 | 5910 | 135996 | 0 | 4165 | 85257 | 0 | 7155 | 592 | 387 | 353509 | 469237 |
| 1902 | 171989 | 0 | 851 | 8104 | 178375 | 0 | 5307 | 107347 | 0 | 7196 | 975 | 187 | 480331 | 619068 |
| 1903 | 206011 | 0 | 1761 | 14090 | 230622 | 0 | 9317 | 136093 | 0 | 9310 | 2080 | 1529 | 610813 | 814507 |
| 1904 | 177156 | 0 | 1325 | 11343 | 193296 | 0 | 6715 | 145141 | 0 | 7087 | 3996 | 4344 | 550403 | 767933 |
| 1905 | 111990 | 163703 | 2043 | 10515 | 221479 | 0 | 5028 | 184897 | 0 | 4437 | 2600 | 4542 | 711234 | 974273 |
| 1906 | 111598 | 153540 | 4666 | 19489 | 273120 | 0 | 8517 | 215665 | 0 | 4476 | 1921 | 9510 | 802502 | 1018365 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|---|-------|--------|---|------|------|-------|--------|---------|
| 1907 | 144992 | 193460 | 11359 | 36580 | 285731 | 0 | 9608 | 258943 | 0 | 4384 | 5784 | 20767 | 971608 | 1199566 |
| 1908 | 82983 | 85526 | 10827 | 21489 | 128503 | 0 | 7307 | 156711 | 0 | 5228 | 3899 | 11290 | 513763 | 691901 |
| 1909 | 80853 | 89338 | 1054 | 14111 | 183218 | 0 | 4956 | 120460 | 0 | 1590 | 2616 | 9015 | 507211 | 654875 |
| 1910 | 135793 | 122944 | 4737 | 25888 | 215537 | 0 | 8229 | 186792 | 0 | 2145 | 3472 | 18405 | 723942 | 926291 |
| 1911 | 82129 | 76928 | 4695 | 26226 | 182882 | 0 | 8374 | 158721 | 0 | 2522 | 5074 | 14438 | 561989 | 764757 |
| 1912 | 85854 | 93028 | 4447 | 21449 | 157134 | 0 | 10230 | 162395 | 0 | 1997 | 6327 | 14481 | 557342 | 718875 |
| 1913 | 137245 | 117580 | 1753 | 22817 | 265542 | 0 | 14171 | 291040 | 0 | 2155 | 6167 | 14128 | 872598 | 1055855 |
| 1914 | 134831 | 143321 | 9189 | 35832 | 283738 | 0 | 10898 | 255660 | | 4032 | 7591 | 8199 | 893291 | 1058391 |

APPENDIX 3: Rates of the NDLV members for the American Market

The price series presented here are based on the Continental Conference Minutes 1885-1902 completed with correspondence of the New York head agent to the board of directors and telegrams sent regarding price changes. It seems that the conference minutes give a full account of price changes with the date of when these took effect except during rate wars when changes are not always taken up and for which the correspondence was used. The reconstruction of the HAL prices 1902-1914 are solely taken from the correspondence. The dates used are based on when the letter was written and are therefore less accurate. Whether the data is fully complete, especially for the period after 1902 remains questionable, yet the correspondence indicates that if there are gaps, these should be minor.

HAL prepaid and return rates in dollars for third class between Rotterdam and New York 1885-1914

| Date | Return | Prepaid | Date | Return | Prepaid |
|-------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| 30/04/1885 | 23 | 18 | 20/06/1902 | 29 | 34 |
| 15/05/1885 | 17 | 17 | 05/11/1902 | 30 | 34 |
| 28/07/1885 | 20 | 19.5 | 01/01/1903 | 32 | 34 |
| 10/11/1885 | 20 | 22 | 12/05/1903 | 33 | 36.5 |
| 01/03/1886 | 20 | 22 | 01/07/1903 | 35 | 36.5 |
| 03/08/1886 | 18 | 12 | 31/10/1903 | 35 | 34 |
| 16/04/1887 | 21 | 21 | 13/11/1903 | 32 | 34 |
| 01/12/1887 | 19.5 | 20.5 | 28/01/1904 | 32 | 31.5 |
| 01/02/1889 | 19.5 | 20.5 | 21/06/1904 | 20 | 31.5 |
| 15/10/1889 | 20 | 21 | 28/06/1904 | 17 | 31.5 |
| 14/5/1890 | 20 | 19 | 16/09/1904 | 20 | 31.5 |
| 07/03/1892 | 20 | 22 | 14/11/1904 | 33 | 33 |
| 09/04/1892 | 21 | 26.5 | 03/03/1905 | 33 | 35.5 |
| 05/05/1892 | 21 | 24.5 | 30/06/1905 | 33 | 37.5 |
| 01/07/1892 | 21 | 21.5 | 15/11/1905 | 35 | 37.5 |
| 27/10/1892 | 21 | 24 | 01/01/1906 | 33 | 35.5 |
| 01/03/1893 | 21 | 30 | 02/02/1906 | 33 | 37.5 |
| 04/04/1893 | 21 | 25 | 15/05/1906 | 33 | 40 |
| 29/06/1894 | 18 | 25 | 06/12/1906 | 33 | 36.5 |
| 26/07/1894 | 16 | 25 | 16/01/1907 | 33 | 34 |
| 02/08/1894 | 16 | 17 | 15/03/1907 | 33 | 36.5 |
| 03/10/1894 | 14 | 17 | 13/04/1907 | 33 | 38.5 |
| 10/12/1894 | 12 | 17 | 10/05/1907 | 32 | 41 |
| 21/03/1895 | 16 | 17 | 31/05/1907 | 32 | 37 |
| 27/03/1895 | 16 | 22.5 | 28/06/1907 | 32 | 32.5 |
| 05/04/1895 | 16 | 25 | 15/08/1907 | 25 | 32.5 |
| 10/05/1895 | 20 | 25 | 04/10/1907 | 27 | 32.5 |
| 06/06/1895 | 16 | 25 | 01/11/1907 | 27 | 27.5 |
| 14/09/1895 | 25 | 25 | 18/11/1907 | 33 | 27.5 |
| 14/10/1895 | 20 | 25 | 27/11/1907 | 36 | 25.5 |
| 05/12/1895 | 25 | 25 | 20/12/1907 | 32 | 25.5 |

| Date | Return | Prepaid | Date | Return | Prepaid |
|------------|--------|---------|------------|--------|---------|
| 06/01/1896 | 25 | 22.5 | 02/01/1908 | 28 | 25.5 |
| 18/02/1896 | 25 | 27 | 07/01/1908 | 20 | 25.5 |
| 13/03/1896 | 25 | 31.5 | 15/01/1908 | 22 | 25.5 |
| 19/03/1896 | 25 | 34 | 07/02/1908 | 28 | 25.5 |
| 09/07/1896 | 25 | 31.5 | 21/02/1908 | 30 | 27.5 |
| 15/03/1897 | 26 | 31.5 | 31/03/1908 | 32.5 | 30 |
| 08/08/1897 | 25 | 29.5 | 22/05/1908 | 30.5 | 30 |
| 27/08/1897 | 26 | 27 | 22/07/1908 | 32 | 30 |
| 15/10/1897 | 26 | 31.5 | 28/09/1908 | 32 | 27.5 |
| 23/11/1897 | 26 | 29.5 | 07/12/1908 | 32 | 38.5 |
| 10/12/1897 | 26 | 31.5 | 27/12/1908 | 34 | 38.5 |
| 01/01/1898 | 26 | 33.5 | 31/12/1908 | 30 | 38.5 |
| 23/02/1898 | 26 | 31.5 | 16/04/1909 | 33 | 38.5 |
| 28/04/1898 | 26 | 29.5 | 31/12/1909 | 35 | 38.5 |
| 01/07/1898 | 27 | 29.5 | 30/03/1910 | 35 | 36.5 |
| 13/07/1898 | 27 | 27.0 | 20/05/1910 | 35 | 38.5 |
| 23/07/1898 | 27 | 29.5 | 06/09/1910 | 33 | 38.5 |
| 31/10/1898 | 27 | 31.5 | 05/12/1911 | 35 | 38.5 |
| 14/03/1899 | 27 | 29.5 | 01/01/1912 | 35 | 40.5 |
| 10/07/1899 | 25 | 29.5 | 07/06/1912 | 37 | 40.5 |
| 01/07/1900 | 28 | 29.5 | 11/6/1912 | 37 | 38.5 |
| 06/09/1900 | 28 | 31.5 | 13/08/1912 | 38 | 41 |
| 01/11/1900 | 28 | 34.0 | 21/11/1912 | 39 | 41 |
| 01/01/1901 | 28 | 31.5 | 10/01/1913 | 35 | 34 |
| 23/01/1901 | 29 | 31.5 | 02/06/1913 | 37 | 38.5 |
| 15/05/1901 | 29 | 29.5 | 15/11/1913 | 37 | 40.5 |
| 12/09/1901 | 29 | 31.5 | 05/01/1914 | 29.5 | 40.5 |
| 01/12/1901 | 29 | 34.0 | 01/02/1914 | 25 | 27 |

RSL prepaid and return rates in dollars for third class service between Antwerp and New York 1885-1902

| RSL | Return | Prepaid | RSL | Return | Prepaid |
|------------|--------|---------|------------|--------|---------|
| 30/04/1885 | 25 | 20 | 05/12/1895 | 25 | 27,5 |
| 05/05/1885 | 20 | 20 | 08/01/1896 | 25 | 25 |
| 28/07/1885 | 23 | 22,5 | 18/02/1896 | 25 | 29,5 |
| 10/11/1885 | 23 | 25 | 10/03/1896 | 25 | 31,5 |
| 01/03/1886 | 23 | 25 | 01/05/1896 | 27 | 31,5 |
| 02/08/1886 | 21 | 15 | 01/07/1896 | 29 | 31,5 |
| 16/04/1887 | 23 | 23 | 02/10/1896 | 27 | 31,5 |
| 01/12/1887 | 22 | 22,5 | 12/10/1896 | 26 | 31,5 |
| 01/02/1889 | 21,5 | 22 | 12/12/1896 | 29 | 31,5 |
| 14/05/1890 | 21,5 | 20 | 31/01/1897 | 26 | 31,5 |
| 07/03/1892 | 21,5 | 23 | 08/05/1897 | 28 | 31,5 |
| 04/09/1892 | 21,5 | 27,5 | 17/07/1897 | 28 | 29,5 |
| 01/07/1892 | 21,5 | 25 | 09/12/1897 | 28 | 31,5 |
| 27/10/1892 | 21,5 | 25 | 02/02/1898 | 26 | 31,5 |

| | | | | | |
|------------|------|------|------------|----|------|
| 01/03/1893 | 21,5 | 32 | 01/07/1898 | 27 | 31,5 |
| 04/04/1893 | 21,5 | 27,5 | 07/10/1899 | 26 | 28 |
| 03/08/1894 | 21,5 | 21 | 09/01/1900 | 27 | 29,5 |
| 03/10/1894 | 14 | 21 | 05/04/1900 | 27 | 31,5 |
| 03/11/1894 | 14 | 16 | 14/06/1900 | 27 | 29,5 |
| 08/12/1894 | 12 | 16 | 29/08/1900 | 27 | 31,5 |
| 18/03/1895 | 16 | 16 | 01/10/1900 | 25 | 31,5 |
| 27/03/1895 | 16 | 25 | 01/11/1900 | 26 | 34 |
| 13/04/1895 | 20 | 27,5 | 01/01/1901 | 28 | 31,5 |
| 11/05/1895 | 25 | 27,5 | 13/06/1901 | 28 | 29,5 |
| 05/06/1895 | 20 | 27,5 | 01/07/1901 | 29 | 29,5 |
| 14/09/1895 | 25 | 27,5 | 28/07/1901 | 31 | 29,5 |
| 14/10/1895 | 20 | 27,5 | 27/11/1901 | 31 | 31,5 |

HAPAG prepaid and return rates in dollars for third class Regular, Union and Express Service between Hamburg and New York 1885-1902

| HAPAG | Return Regular | Prepaid Regular | Return Union | Prepaid Union | Return Express | Prepaid Express |
|--------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 30/04/1885 | 25 | 20 | | | | |
| 15/05/1885 | 20 | 20 | | | | |
| 28/07/1885 | 23 | 22,5 | | | | |
| 10/11/1885 | 23 | 25 | | | | |
| 01/03/1886 | 23 | 25 | 21 | 23 | | |
| 03/08/1886 | 21 | 15 | 19 | 13 | | |
| 16/04/1887 | 24 | 24 | 22 | 22 | | |
| 01/12/1887 | 23 | 23,5 | 21,5 | 22 | | |
| 01/02/1889 | 23 | 23,5 | 22 | 22,5 | 26 | 26 |
| 14/05/1890 | 23 | 21,5 | 22 | 20,5 | 26 | 24 |
| 07/03/1892 | 23 | 25 | 22 | 23 | 26 | 27 |
| 09/04/1892 | 23 | 27,5 | 22 | 25 | 26 | 30 |
| 22/06/1892 | 23 | 24,5 | 22 | 22 | 26 | 27 |
| 01/03/1893 | 23 | 32 | 22 | 30 | 26 | 35 |
| 04/04/1893 | 26 | 27,5 | 22,5 | 24 | 28 | 30 |
| 13/07/1893 | 26 | 25 | 22,5 | 21,5 | 28 | 27,5 |
| 03/09/1893 | 26 | 27,5 | 22,5 | 24 | 28 | 30 |
| 26/07/1894 | 18 | 27,5 | 16 | 24 | 20 | 30 |
| 04/08/1894 | 18 | 22,5 | 16 | 19 | 20 | 25 |
| 21/08/1894 | 18 | 22,5 | 16 | 17 | 20 | 25 |
| 07/03/1895 | 18 | 22,5 | 16 | 17 | 20 | 25 |
| 27/03/1895 | 18 | 30 | 16 | 25 | 20 | 32,5 |
| 11/04/1895 | 18 | 27,5 | 16 | 25 | 20 | 32,5 |
| 15/04/1895 | 18 | 27,5 | 18 | 25 | 20 | 32,5 |
| 14/05/1895 | 20 | 27,5 | 20 | 25 | 22 | 32,5 |
| 03/07/1895 | 22 | 27,5 | 22 | 25 | 24 | 32,5 |
| 14/09/1895 | 30 | 27,5 | 27 | 25 | 32 | 32,5 |
| 14/10/1895 | 25 | 27,5 | 22 | 25 | 27 | 32,5 |
| 14/11/1895 | 25 | 30 | 22 | 27,5 | 27 | 35 |

| HAPAG | Return Regular | Prepaid Regular | Return Union | Prepaid Union | Return Express | Prepaid Express |
|--------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| 05/12/1895 | 30 | 30 | 27 | 27,5 | 32 | 35 |
| 26/02/1896 | 30 | 31,5 | 27 | 29,5 | 32 | 36,5 |
| 21/03/1896 | 30 | 31,5 | 27 | 31,5 | 32 | 36,5 |
| 05/06/1896 | 30 | 31.5 | 27 | 31.5 | 32 | 34 |
| 01/07/1896 | 30 | 31.5 | 27 | 31.5 | 33 | 34 |
| 01/08/1896 | 30 | 31.5 | 27 | 31.5 | 34 | 34 |
| 20/09/ 1896 | 30 | 32.5 | 27 | 32.5 | 34 | 35 |
| 01/01/1897 | 30 | 34 | 27 | 29.5 | 34 | 36 |
| 18/03/1897 | 30 | 34 | 27 | 29.5 | 32 | 36 |
| 01/04/1897 | 26 | 34 | 27 | 29.5 | 32 | 36 |
| 04/05/1897 | 30 | 34 | 27 | 29.5 | 32 | 36 |
| 11/05/1897 | 30 | 34 | 27 | 31.5 | 32 | 36 |
| 19/05/1897 | 30 | 36 | 27 | 34 | 32 | 38.5 |
| 01/06/1897 | 30 | 36.5 | 27 | 36.5 | 32 | 38.5 |
| 11/10/1897 | 32 | 36.5 | 27 | 36.5 | 34 | 38.5 |
| 18/10/1896 | 32 | 36.5 | 27 | 36.5 | 36 | 38.5 |
| 04/11/1896 | 30 | 36.5 | 27 | 36.5 | 32 | 38.5 |
| 30/11/1897 | 30 | 36.5 | 27 | 36.5 | 32 | 38.5 |
| 06/12/1897 | 30 | 34 | 27 | 31.5 | 34 | 38.5 |
| 14/12/1897 | 34 | 34 | 27 | 31.5 | 34 | 38.5 |
| 29/1/1898 | 26 | 34 | 26 | 31.5 | 30 | 38.5 |
| 23/02/1898 | 26 | 31,5 | 26 | 31.5 | 30 | 36 |
| 10/03/1898 | 26 | 31.5 | 26 | 31.5 | 30 | 34 |
| 16/03/1898 | 26 | 34 | 26 | 34 | 30 | 36.5 |
| 28/05/1898 | 26 | 36.5 | 26 | 36.5 | 30 | 37.5 |
| 01/07/1898 | 28 | 36.5 | 28 | 36.5 | 30 | 37.5 |
| 04/08/1898 | 28 | 34 | 28 | 34 | 30 | 38.5 |
| 10/08/1898 | 29 | 34 | 29 | 34 | 30 | 38.5 |
| 22/08/1896 | 33 | 34 | 33 | 34 | 36 | 38.5 |
| 10/09/1898 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 36 | 38.5 |
| 27/09/1898 | 33 | 31.5 | 33 | 31.5 | 36 | 34 |
| 05/10/1898 | 30 | 31.5 | 30 | 31.5 | 35 | 34 |
| 09/01/1899 | 28 | 31.5 | 28 | 31.5 | 35 | 34 |
| 04/03/1899 | 27 | 29.5 | 27 | 29.5 | 35 | 31.5 |
| 09/03/1899 | 27 | 29.5 | | | 28 | 31.5 |
| 04/04/1899 | 27 | 31.5 | | | 28 | 34 |
| 27/04/1899 | 27 | 34 | | | 28 | 36.5 |
| 24/05/1899 | 27 | 36.5 | | | 28 | 38.5 |
| 28/08/1899 | 28 | 36.5 | | | 30 | 38.5 |
| 18/09/1899 | 28 | 34 | | | 30 | 38.5 |
| 05/10/1899 | 28 | 31.5 | | | 30 | 35 |
| 19/10/1899 | 28 | 31.5 | | | 35 | 35 |
| 27/10/1899 | 28 | 29.5 | | | 35 | 34 |
| 06/11/1899 | 28 | 29.5 | | | 37 | 34 |
| 13/11/1899 | 30 | 29.5 | | | 37 | 34 |
| 09/01/1900 | 27 | 31.5 | | | 30 | 34 |
| 15/05/1900 | 27 | 34 | | | 30 | 36.5 |
| 15/06/1900 | 27 | 36.5 | | | 30 | 38.5 |
| 29/09/1900 | 27 | 34 | | | 30 | 38.5 |

| | | | | |
|------------|----|------|----|------|
| 01/11/1900 | 30 | 36.5 | 33 | 38.5 |
| 14/01/1901 | 30 | 34 | 33 | 38.5 |
| 01/07/1901 | 31 | 34 | 35 | 38.5 |
| 17/08/1901 | 31 | 34 | 33 | 38.5 |
| 01/01/1902 | 30 | 34 | 33 | 36.5 |
| 19/02/1902 | 30 | 31.5 | 33 | 36.5 |

NGL prepaid and return rates in dollars for third class Regular and Express Service between Bremen and New York 1885-1902

| NGL | Return Express | Prepaid Express | Return Regular | Prepaid Regular | NGL | Return Express | Prepaid Express | Return Regular | Prepaid Regular |
|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 30/04/1885 | 27 | 22 | 25 | 20 | 07/10/1896 | 32 | 36,5 | 30 | 34 |
| 15/05/1885 | 22 | 22 | 20 | 20 | 01/08/1896 | 32 | 36,5 | 25 | 34 |
| 28/07/1885 | 25 | 24,5 | 23 | 22,5 | 01/10/1896 | 32 | 36,5 | 28 | 34 |
| 10/11/1885 | 25 | 27 | 23 | 25 | 01/01/1897 | 32 | 36,5 | 30 | 34 |
| 01/03/1886 | 25 | 27 | 23 | 25 | 18/03/1897 | 32 | 38,5 | 30 | 36,5 |
| 03/08/1886 | 23 | 17 | 21 | 15 | 18/07/1897 | 32 | 38,5 | 30 | 34 |
| 16/04/1887 | 25 | 25 | | | 25/08/1897 | 32 | 36,5 | 30 | 31,5 |
| 01/12/1887 | 26 | 26 | | | 20/09/1897 | 32 | 34 | 30 | 29,5 |
| 01/02/1889 | 26 | 26 | 23 | 23,5 | 08/11/1897 | 30 | 34 | 28 | 29,5 |
| 14/05/1890 | 26 | 24 | | | 23/11/1897 | 30 | 36,5 | 28 | 31,5 |
| 07/03/1892 | 26 | 27 | 23 | 25 | 10/12/1897 | 30 | 38,5 | 28 | 34 |
| 09/04/1892 | 26 | 30 | 24 | 27,5 | 29/01/1898 | 30 | 38,5 | 28 | 34 |
| 01/03/1893 | 26 | 35 | 24 | 32 | 23/2/1898 | 26 | 38,5 | 28 | 36,5 |
| 04/04/1893 | 28 | 32,5 | 26 | 30 | 23/03/1898 | 26 | 38,5 | 30 | 36,5 |
| 18/07/1893 | 30 | 32,5 | 28 | 30 | 01/07/1898 | 30 | 38,5 | 35 | 36,5 |
| <u>30/09/1893</u> | 28 | 32,5 | 26 | 30 | 11/07/1898 | 33 | 38,5 | 35 | 36,5 |
| 29/06/1894 | 26 | 32,5 | 24 | 30 | 01/01/1899 | 33 | 36,5 | 35 | 34 |
| 26/07/1894 | 18 | 32,5 | 16 | 30 | 07/03/1899 | 28 | 36,5 | 30 | 34 |
| 03/08/1894 | 18 | 25 | 16 | 22,5 | 05/04/1899 | 28 | 38,5 | 30 | 34 |
| 01/03/1895 | 18 | 25 | 16 | 22,5 | 01/06/1899 | 28 | 38,5 | 30 | 36,5 |
| 27/03/1895 | 18 | 32,5 | 16 | 30 | 23/08/1899 | 30 | 38,5 | 30 | 36,5 |
| 15/04/1895 | 22 | 32,5 | 20 | 30 | 20/10/1899 | 30 | 38,5 | 35 | 36,5 |
| 03/07/1895 | 24 | 32,5 | 22 | 30 | 10/11/1899 | 33 | 38,5 | 35 | 36,5 |
| 09/09/1895 | 24 | 32,5 | 22 | 30 | 09/01/1900 | 28 | 38,5 | 30 | 36,5 |
| 14/09/1895 | 32 | 32,5 | 30 | 30 | 12/06/1900 | 29 | 38,5 | 30 | 36,5 |
| 25/09/1895 | 35 | 32,5 | 30 | 30 | 31/07/1900 | 29 | 38,5 | 30 | 34 |
| 14/10/1895 | 27 | 32,5 | 25 | 30 | 01/10/1900 | 29 | 38,5 | 33 | 34 |
| 15/11/1895 | 27 | 37,5 | 25 | 35 | 04/10/1900 | 29 | 36,5 | 33 | 31,5 |
| 05/12/1895 | 32 | 37,5 | 30 | 35 | 01/11/1900 | 30 | 38,5 | 33 | 34 |
| 01/01/1896 | 32 | 35 | 30 | 32,5 | 18/01/1901 | 30 | 38,5 | 33 | 36,5 |
| 12/02/1896 | 32 | 36,5 | 30 | 34 | 14/02/1901 | 30 | 38,5 | 33 | 36,5 |
| 20/03/1896 | 32 | 36,5 | 30 | 34 | 01/07/1901 | 31 | 38,5 | 35 | 36,5 |
| 15/06/1896 | 32 | 36,5 | 30 | 35 | | | | | |

**NGL prepaid and return rates in dollars for third class Regular Service
between Bremen and Baltimore 1885-1902**

| NGL BT | Return | Prepaid | NGL BT | Return | Prepaid | NGL BT | Return | Prepaid |
|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| 30/04/1885 | 25 | 20 | 01/03/1895 | 13 | 22,5 | 19/08/1897 | 30 | 29,5 |
| 15/05/1885 | 20 | 20 | 27/03/1895 | 13 | 27,5 | 20/09/1897 | 30 | 27 |
| 28/07/1885 | 23 | 22,5 | 15/04/1895 | 13 | 27,5 | 08/11/1897 | 28 | 27 |
| 10/11/1885 | 23 | 25 | 03/07/1895 | 19 | 30 | 23/11/1897 | 28 | 29,5 |
| 01/03/1886 | 23 | 25 | 09/09/1895 | 19 | 30 | 10/12/1897 | 28 | 34 |
| 03/08/1886 | 21 | 15 | 14/09/1895 | 27 | 30 | 12/01/1898 | 30 | 34 |
| 16/04/1887 | 23,5 | 23,5 | 25/09/1895 | 27 | 30 | 29/01/1898 | 28 | 34 |
| 01/12/1887 | 22,5 | 23 | 14/10/1895 | 22 | 30 | 11/07/1898 | 30 | 34 |
| 01/02/1889 | 22,5 | 23 | 15/11/1895 | 22 | 30 | 07/03/1899 | 27 | 34 |
| 14/05/1890 | 22,5 | 21 | 05/12/1895 | 27 | 30 | 19/09/1899 | 27 | 36,5 |
| 07/03/1892 | 22,5 | 23 | 01/01/1896 | 27 | 30 | 01/10/1899 | 30 | 36,5 |
| 09/04/1892 | 22,5 | 25 | 12/02/1896 | 27 | 31,5 | 9/01/1900 | 27 | 36,5 |
| 01/03/1893 | 22,5 | 32 | 20/03/1896 | 27 | 31,5 | 15/01/1900 | 27 | 34 |
| 04/04/1893 | 24,5 | 27,5 | 15/06/1896 | 27 | 35 | 01/08/1900 | 27 | 31,5 |
| 18/07/1893 | 26,5 | 27,5 | 01/08/1896 | 25 | 35 | 01/11/1900 | 30 | 34 |
| 30/09/1893 | 24,5 | 27,5 | 01/09/1896 | 28 | 35 | 18/01/1901 | 30 | 36,5 |
| 29/06/1894 | 24,5 | 27,5 | 16/09/1896 | 30 | 35 | 01/07/1901 | 31 | 36,5 |
| 26/07/1894 | 24,5 | 27,5 | 02/10/1896 | 30 | 34 | 01/01/1902 | 30 | 34 |
| 03/08/1894 | 24,5 | 22,5 | 16/06/1897 | 30 | 31,5 | | | |

APPENDIX 4: HAL TOTAL PASSENGER CARRYINGS 1873-1914⁹⁰⁴

| Year | Total Cabin | Total 3rd |
|-------------|--------------------|------------------|
| 1873 | 198 | 2820 |
| 1874 | 270 | 1511 |
| 1875 | 624 | 1815 |
| 1876 | 580 | 2622 |
| 1877 | 718 | 2149 |
| 1878 | 820 | 2880 |
| 1879 | 795 | 4132 |

| Year | Ebound 1st | Ebound 2nd | Ebound 3rd | Wbound 1st | Wbound 2nd | Wbound 3rd |
|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1880 | 253 | | 468 | 435 | | 9558 |
| 1881 | 273 | | 672 | 533 | | 15511 |
| 1882 | 293 | | 1240 | 472 | | 17677 |
| 1883 | 348 | | 1866 | 621 | | 18003 |
| 1884 | 218 | | 3426 | 523 | | 10547 |
| 1885 | 838 | | 3064 | 831 | | 6530 |
| 1886 | 852 | 795 | 4089 | 1034 | 1374 | 9680 |
| 1887 | 860 | 876 | 2687 | 1092 | 1606 | 16466 |
| 1888 | 734 | 1011 | 6183 | 1270 | 2106 | 16298 |
| 1889 | 1376 | 1430 | 5102 | 887 | 1919 | 15879 |
| 1890 | 1604 | 1545 | 6103 | 1660 | 2533 | 18758 |
| 1891 | 1712 | 1699 | 9271 | 1710 | 2877 | 35929 |
| 1892 | 1779 | 1083 | 7891 | 1857 | 3448 | 31680 |
| 1893 | 1350 | 1325 | 12402 | 1711 | 4192 | 30216 |
| 1894 | 2052 | 1505 | 9696 | 1682 | 1552 | 11207 |
| 1895 | 2020 | 1197 | 5997 | 1803 | 1238 | 13729 |
| 1896 | 1004 | 2061 | 5215 | 1944 | 2330 | 13343 |
| 1897 | 814 | 2003 | 4065 | 1044 | 1749 | 10687 |
| 1898 | 715 | 2036 | 4260 | 843 | 2621 | 14140 |
| 1899 | 1543 | 2672 | 3819 | 1259 | 2759 | 18025 |
| 1900 | 2300 | 3541 | 7049 | 1829 | 3671 | 26018 |
| 1901 | 2220 | 2543 | 6285 | 2233 | 3278 | 25762 |
| 1902 | 3324 | 2593 | 8464 | 3122 | 3907 | 32569 |
| 1903 | 2973 | 2817 | 10971 | 3015 | 5398 | 36812 |
| 1904 | 2839 | 2802 | 11076 | 3029 | 5222 | 27198 |
| 1905 | 3128 | 3380 | 10277 | 3246 | 6623 | 41319 |
| 1906 | 3704 | 4016 | 15885 | 3833 | 9983 | 42499 |
| 1907 | 3766 | 4830 | 22105 | 4136 | 11274 | 47725 |
| 1908 | 3663 | 4369 | 20721 | 4078 | 6947 | 11720 |
| 1909 | 4219 | 4170 | 10446 | 4415 | 12382 | 29738 |
| 1910 | 5115 | 4512 | 12251 | 5336 | 14146 | 36270 |
| 1911 | 4684 | 4218 | 16757 | 5335 | 12812 | 22758 |
| 1912 | 4961 | 4571 | 14046 | 5575 | 13081 | 33782 |
| 1913 | 4968 | 4127 | 14047 | 5315 | 15132 | 48820 |
| 1914 | 4980 | 3530 | 18997 | 9781 | 14279 | 22918 |

⁹⁰⁴ GAR, HAL, 318.14, Wentholt Archief, I, p 1-30.

**APPENDIX 5: Total Passenger Carryings of Main services on the
North Atlantic 1899-1914⁹⁰⁵**

A) New York services of Continental Lines and main British Lines

AUSTRIA-AMERICANA⁹⁰⁶

| | 3td WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1906 | 15410 | 1836 | 17246 | 284 | 54 | 338 | 200 | 55 | 255 | 17839 | 36 | 27 |
| 1907 | 18080 | 4490 | 22570 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22570 | 32 | 29 |
| 1908 | 4646 | 14046 | 18692 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18692 | 28 | 34 |
| 1909 | 14968 | 4222 | 19190 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19190 | 37 | 34 |
| 1910 | 13052 | 4321 | 17373 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17373 | 36 | 31 |
| 1911 | 7952 | 6933 | 14885 | 776 | 648 | 1424 | 266 | 337 | 603 | 16912 | 31 | 32 |
| 1912 | 13523 | 5278 | 18801 | 1245 | 692 | 1937 | 436 | 569 | 1005 | 21743 | 34 | 31 |
| 1913 | 20035 | 6247 | 26282 | 1638 | 842 | 2480 | 465 | 603 | 1068 | 29830 | 36 | 31 |
| 1914 | 7015 | 5476 | 12491 | 648 | 491 | 1139 | 194 | 568 | 762 | 14392 | 20 | 18 |

FRENCH LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | Total 3rd | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------|-----|----|
| 1899 | 22885 | 9994 | 32879 | 3165 | 2331 | 5496 | 2958 | 3374 | 6332 | 44707 | 54 | 52 |
| 1900 | 30635 | 14733 | 45368 | 5186 | 3914 | 9100 | 3603 | 3874 | 7477 | 61945 | 56 | 52 |
| 1901 | 35973 | 11970 | 47943 | 4091 | 2586 | 6677 | 3159 | 2913 | 6072 | 60692 | 54 | 54 |
| 1902 | 49502 | 14345 | 63847 | 4787 | 3278 | 8065 | 3837 | 3711 | 7548 | 79460 | 59 | 58 |
| 1903 | 51445 | 10666 | 62111 | 7351 | 4115 | 11466 | 4019 | 3938 | 7957 | 81534 | 59 | 60 |
| 1904 | 34665 | 9515 | 44180 | 6914 | 4112 | 11026 | 4549 | 4653 | 9202 | 64408 | 54 | 54 |
| 1905 | 55813 | 8448 | 64261 | 6870 | 4074 | 10944 | 4950 | 4576 | 9526 | 84731 | 72 | 55 |
| 1906 | 62400 | 27622 | 90022 | 9015 | 5437 | 14452 | 5885 | 5825 | 11710 | 116184 | 79 | 63 |
| 1907 | 66217 | 36372 | 102589 | 10993 | 6093 | 17086 | 5758 | 5575 | 11333 | 131008 | 86 | 67 |
| 1908 | 24003 | 37124 | 61127 | 8157 | 5837 | 13994 | 4557 | 4513 | 9070 | 84191 | 69 | 72 |
| 1909 | 46754 | 19078 | 65832 | 14401 | 5905 | 20306 | 4452 | 4271 | 8723 | 94861 | 100 | 84 |
| 1910 | 50934 | 11391 | 62325 | 16275 | 7129 | 23404 | 3122 | 4292 | 7414 | 93143 | 109 | 97 |
| 1911 | 38641 | 29967 | 68608 | 15908 | 7957 | 23865 | 4511 | 4219 | 8730 | 101203 | 107 | 92 |
| 1912 | 49777 | 32781 | 82558 | 16378 | 7805 | 24183 | 4621 | 4326 | 8947 | 115688 | 101 | 90 |
| 1913 | 65337 | 29383 | 94720 | 20988 | 9416 | 30404 | 5250 | 5456 | 10706 | 135830 | 109 | 97 |
| 1914 | 27306 | 15313 | 42619 | 12127 | 7467 | 19594 | 3696 | 3858 | 7554 | 69767 | 85 | 81 |

⁹⁰⁵ The following statistics were made by the Conference Secretary Peters based on the figures sent in by the passenger lines. See GAR, HAL, Passage Department, 580, Conference Statistics.

⁹⁰⁶ These are the continental passengers of this Line, for the Mediterranean one's see further.

HAMBURG AMERICA LINE⁹⁰⁷

Regular

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------|-----|----|
| 1899 | 32674 | 6043 | 38717 | 4559 | 3921 | 8480 | 2551 | 2898 | 5449 | 52646 | 63 | 65 |
| 1900 | 49057 | 6698 | 55755 | 5679 | 5070 | 10749 | 3499 | 3472 | 6971 | 73475 | 61 | 57 |
| 1901 | 47168 | 6066 | 53234 | 5618 | 4578 | 10196 | 2972 | 3032 | 6004 | 69434 | 53 | 53 |
| 1902 | 68471 | 10164 | 78635 | 8184 | 5224 | 13408 | 4668 | 4628 | 9296 | 101339 | 57 | 52 |
| 1903 | 65354 | 9392 | 74746 | 7083 | 3858 | 10941 | 2785 | 2664 | 5449 | 91136 | 48 | 45 |
| 1904 | 77816 | 22089 | 99905 | 11490 | 7645 | 19135 | 6011 | 5838 | 11849 | 130889 | 77 | 78 |
| 1905 | 97577 | 13788 | 111365 | 10173 | 6634 | 16807 | 7087 | 6114 | 13201 | 141373 | 76 | 67 |
| 1906 | 116461 | 27316 | 143777 | 14700 | 8972 | 23672 | 12046 | 10161 | 22207 | 189656 | 83 | 76 |
| 1907 | 140641 | 45109 | 185750 | 15707 | 10339 | 26046 | 13418 | 11598 | 25016 | 236812 | 101 | 76 |
| 1908 | 36599 | 36972 | 73571 | 12790 | 10338 | 23128 | 10598 | 9987 | 20585 | 117284 | 70 | 70 |
| 1909 | 89799 | 18410 | 108209 | 19631 | 9349 | 28980 | 10592 | 10368 | 20960 | 158149 | 74 | 69 |
| 1910 | 96250 | 27662 | 123912 | 23798 | 11415 | 35213 | 11348 | 10557 | 21905 | 181030 | 82 | 71 |
| 1911 | 53613 | 29145 | 82758 | 21027 | 10492 | 31519 | 10292 | 9404 | 19696 | 133973 | 75 | 64 |
| 1912 | 85327 | 28449 | 113776 | 23999 | 10594 | 34593 | 11232 | 10500 | 21732 | 170101 | 81 | 72 |
| 1913 | 122467 | 26872 | 149339 | 26826 | 11662 | 38488 | 13307 | 11635 | 24942 | 212769 | 87 | 78 |
| 1914 | 49724 | 31424 | 81148 | 10654 | 9052 | 19706 | 7100 | 10039 | 17139 | 117993 | 51 | 50 |

Express

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1899 | 5102 | 3554 | 8656 | 3216 | 2151 | 5367 | 3764 | 2666 | 6430 | 20453 | 18 | 16 |
| 1900 | 10155 | 8055 | 18210 | 6988 | 5068 | 12056 | 7180 | 6372 | 13552 | 43818 | 37 | 37 |
| 1901 | 10463 | 6531 | 16994 | 4870 | 3746 | 8616 | 6975 | 6425 | 13400 | 39010 | 32 | 30 |
| 1902 | 10286 | 5941 | 16227 | 3607 | 2561 | 6168 | 3649 | 3504 | 7153 | 29548 | 26 | 25 |
| 1903 | 24676 | 9997 | 34673 | 6948 | 4115 | 11063 | 5764 | 6125 | 11889 | 57625 | 37 | 35 |
| 1904 | 3292 | 2263 | 5555 | 2500 | 1352 | 3852 | 3023 | 2555 | 5578 | 14985 | 11 | 9 |
| 1905 | 1369 | 2071 | 3440 | 1935 | 1590 | 3525 | 2200 | 2300 | 4500 | 11465 | 7 | 7 |
| 1906 | 1491 | 1713 | 3204 | 1318 | 1227 | 2545 | 1448 | 1559 | 3007 | 8756 | 6 | 6 |
| 1907 | 2153 | 2073 | 4226 | 2045 | 1622 | 3667 | 1993 | 2050 | 4043 | 11936 | 8 | 8 |
| 1908 | 1272 | 1649 | 2921 | 1243 | 1079 | 2322 | 1062 | 1163 | 2225 | 7468 | 7 | 7 |
| 1909 | 1238 | 1213 | 2451 | 931 | 584 | 1515 | 1062 | 905 | 1967 | 5933 | 5 | 5 |
| 1910 | 1020 | 1252 | 2272 | 829 | 633 | 1462 | 1143 | 793 | 1936 | 5670 | 4 | 4 |

Union

| | 3rd WB | WB |
|------|--------|----|
| 1899 | 4726 | 24 |
| 1900 | 6565 | 24 |
| 1901 | 5231 | 20 |
| 1902 | 5508 | 21 |
| 1903 | 5408 | 18 |
| 1904 | 0 | 0 |
| 1905 | 2421 | 6 |
| 1906 | 10623 | 15 |

⁹⁰⁷ HAPAG discontinues the Union service in 1906 and opens a limited monthly freight and westbound steerage passenger service to Philadelphia in 1910 and shortly before WOI to Boston and Baltimore.

NORTH GERMAN LLOYD

Express

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 19878 | 9946 | 29824 | 4744 | 4672 | 9416 | 6750 | 6382 | 13132 | 52372 | 46 | 43 |
| 1900 | 22961 | 13886 | 36847 | 6823 | 4846 | 11669 | 8378 | 5994 | 14372 | 62888 | 51 | 45 |
| 1901 | 18426 | 10862 | 29288 | 5455 | 3512 | 8967 | 6589 | 5291 | 11880 | 50135 | 32 | 31 |
| 1902 | 18820 | 15678 | 34498 | 7149 | 4138 | 11287 | 8272 | 7528 | 15800 | 61585 | 29 | 30 |
| 1903 | 22896 | 21049 | 43945 | 9568 | 5110 | 14678 | 10375 | 8662 | 19037 | 77660 | 33 | 32 |
| 1904 | 21926 | 18288 | 40214 | 9218 | 5140 | 14358 | 9929 | 9060 | 18989 | 73561 | 31 | 31 |
| 1905 | 22065 | 15906 | 37971 | 10093 | 5903 | 15996 | 10527 | 9399 | 19926 | 73893 | 32 | 32 |
| 1906 | 21369 | 22848 | 44217 | 10435 | 6649 | 17084 | 10149 | 8910 | 19059 | 80360 | 31 | 31 |
| 1907 | 24628 | 27121 | 51749 | 11623 | 7346 | 18969 | 11350 | 9065 | 20415 | 91133 | 37 | 37 |
| 1908 | 12705 | 20788 | 33493 | 8821 | 7151 | 15972 | 11080 | 9825 | 20905 | 70370 | 43 | 43 |
| 1909 | 24036 | 11116 | 35152 | 8742 | 5190 | 13932 | 10374 | 8815 | 19189 | 68273 | 39 | 39 |
| 1910 | 21106 | 15522 | 36628 | 8852 | 5198 | 14050 | 9746 | 8561 | 18307 | 68985 | 37 | 38 |
| 1911 | 16362 | 17739 | 34101 | 9088 | 5025 | 14113 | 9085 | 7757 | 16842 | 65056 | 36 | 35 |
| 1912 | 25547 | 18334 | 43881 | 9069 | 4903 | 13972 | 8315 | 7935 | 16250 | 74103 | 34 | 35 |
| 1913 | 29420 | 21590 | 51010 | 10226 | 4738 | 14964 | 9183 | 8553 | 17736 | 83710 | 38 | 38 |
| 1914 | 19181 | 19266 | 38447 | 3068 | 1963 | 5031 | 2940 | 4089 | 7029 | 50507 | 23 | 20 |

Regular

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Totql | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 33770 | 3489 | 37259 | 3437 | 2406 | 5843 | 2828 | 3443 | 6271 | 49373 | 53 | 48 |
| 1900 | 41739 | 6126 | 47865 | 4548 | 2921 | 7469 | 3585 | 3445 | 7030 | 62364 | 51 | 42 |
| 1901 | 58378 | 7818 | 66196 | 4977 | 2965 | 7942 | 3383 | 3426 | 6809 | 80947 | 54 | 44 |
| 1902 | 63370 | 8241 | 71611 | 6491 | 3475 | 9966 | 2742 | 3187 | 5929 | 87506 | 57 | 39 |
| 1903 | 65809 | 9520 | 75329 | 8869 | 4518 | 13387 | 3210 | 3725 | 6935 | 95651 | 56 | 45 |
| 1904 | 53621 | 14250 | 67871 | 9150 | 4534 | 13684 | 3110 | 3535 | 6645 | 88200 | 58 | 43 |
| 1905 | 66367 | 7411 | 73778 | 11842 | 5461 | 17303 | 2561 | 3763 | 6324 | 97405 | 57 | 50 |
| 1906 | 80563 | 12535 | 93098 | 13557 | 5102 | 18659 | 2647 | 3279 | 5926 | 117683 | 64 | 50 |
| 1907 | 100817 | 32808 | 133625 | 15125 | 6028 | 21153 | 2710 | 3225 | 5935 | 160713 | 76 | 62 |
| 1908 | 26014 | 31257 | 57271 | 9917 | 5133 | 15050 | 3175 | 3105 | 6280 | 78601 | 56 | 45 |
| 1909 | 67656 | 14327 | 81983 | 14148 | 5360 | 19508 | 5190 | 4966 | 10156 | 111647 | 66 | 53 |
| 1910 | 57889 | 22194 | 80083 | 14437 | 5936 | 20373 | 6538 | 5647 | 12185 | 112641 | 64 | 51 |
| 1911 | 35437 | 24262 | 59699 | 14384 | 6036 | 20420 | 5813 | 6128 | 11941 | 92060 | 59 | 47 |
| 1912 | 64509 | 21131 | 85640 | 17341 | 6633 | 23974 | 7775 | 6792 | 14567 | 124181 | 70 | 51 |
| 1913 | 101676 | 16037 | 117713 | 18115 | 6299 | 24414 | 7085 | 6420 | 13505 | 155632 | 88 | 58 |
| 1914 | 28772 | 11507 | 40279 | 6453 | 3977 | 10430 | 2367 | 4418 | 6785 | 57494 | 40 | 28 |

RED STAR LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | Total 3rd | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 20129 | 6108 | 26237 | 3422 | 2839 | 6261 | 897 | 1097 | 1994 | 34492 | 52 | 52 |
| 1900 | 31007 | 8778 | 39785 | 4300 | 3618 | 7918 | 1261 | 1358 | 2619 | 50322 | 50 | 51 |
| 1901 | 32786 | 8541 | 41327 | 4462 | 3332 | 7794 | 1800 | 1598 | 3398 | 52519 | 52 | 50 |
| 1902 | 47019 | 8325 | 55344 | 4850 | 3269 | 8119 | 2035 | 2069 | 4104 | 67567 | 54 | 52 |
| 1903 | 54697 | 12597 | 67294 | 6375 | 3859 | 10234 | 2597 | 2911 | 5508 | 83036 | 51 | 51 |
| 1904 | 39139 | 15792 | 54931 | 6511 | 4098 | 10609 | 2918 | 2830 | 5748 | 71288 | 50 | 50 |
| 1905 | 59435 | 12706 | 72141 | 7560 | 4591 | 12151 | 3816 | 3760 | 7576 | 91868 | 53 | 51 |
| 1906 | 64620 | 19425 | 84045 | 9551 | 4541 | 14092 | 3556 | 3214 | 6770 | 104907 | 58 | 49 |
| 1907 | 69869 | 29134 | 99003 | 8438 | 5042 | 13480 | 3324 | 3319 | 6643 | 119126 | 55 | 50 |
| 1908 | 21804 | 29448 | 51252 | 6514 | 4725 | 11239 | 2566 | 2836 | 5402 | 67893 | 53 | 53 |
| 1909 | 48992 | 14327 | 63319 | 11438 | 3866 | 15304 | 3126 | 3285 | 6411 | 85034 | 51 | 51 |
| 1910 | 50351 | 18779 | 69130 | 13027 | 4911 | 17938 | 4014 | 4458 | 8472 | 95540 | 53 | 52 |
| 1911 | 33456 | 22124 | 55580 | 12798 | 4147 | 16945 | 3591 | 3347 | 6938 | 79463 | 51 | 51 |
| 1912 | 52822 | 18623 | 71445 | 14352 | 4198 | 18550 | 3737 | 3959 | 7696 | 97691 | 53 | 53 |
| 1913 | 70057 | 19962 | 90019 | 16623 | 4246 | 20869 | 3074 | 3106 | 6180 | 117068 | 59 | 53 |
| 1914 | 24927 | 17158 | 42085 | 6617 | 2382 | 8999 | 1129 | 2336 | 3465 | 54549 | 33 | 31 |

RUSSIAN EAST ASIATIC / RUSSIAN AMERICAN LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1906 | 2577 | 0 | 2577 | 233 | 0 | 233 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2810 | 5 | 0 |
| 1907 | 10001 | 4932 | 14933 | 286 | 73 | 359 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15292 | 17 | 15 |
| 1908 | 6196 | 8082 | 14278 | 335 | 282 | 617 | 20 | 38 | 58 | 14953 | 17 | 17 |
| 1909 | 14231 | 4581 | 18812 | 765 | 229 | 994 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19806 | 21 | 19 |
| 1910 | 18669 | 6316 | 24985 | 2361 | 714 | 3075 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28060 | 24 | 25 |
| 1911 | 16157 | 11181 | 27338 | 2982 | 921 | 3903 | 71 | 246 | 317 | 31558 | 23 | 24 |
| 1912 | 20363 | 11639 | 32002 | 3666 | 1297 | 4963 | 283 | 240 | 523 | 37488 | 27 | 26 |
| 1913 | 23169 | 17130 | 40299 | 5156 | 2101 | 7257 | 290 | 224 | 514 | 48070 | 29 | 29 |
| 1914 | 9812 | 10060 | 19872 | 3401 | 1868 | 5269 | 97 | 245 | 342 | 25483 | 22 | 25 |

URANIUM LINE / NEW YORK-CONTINENTAL LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1908 | 278 | 2789 | 3067 | 12 | 27 | 39 | 7 | 12 | 19 | 3125 | 6 | 6 |
| 1909 | 9505 | 3341 | 12846 | 332 | 172 | 504 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13350 | 22 | 21 |
| 1910 | 19642 | 10016 | 29658 | 758 | 231 | 989 | 47 | 44 | 91 | 30738 | 28 | 28 |
| 1911 | 5846 | 13286 | 19132 | 448 | 382 | 830 | 99 | 194 | 293 | 20255 | 25 | 26 |
| 1912 | 13938 | 10836 | 24774 | 531 | 575 | 1106 | 138 | 212 | 350 | 26230 | 27 | 26 |
| 1913 | 10046 | 4316 | 14362 | 702 | 434 | 1136 | 54 | 0 | 54 | 15552 | 21 | 22 |
| 1914 | 1171 | 2404 | 3575 | 728 | 315 | 1043 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4618 | 15 | 13 |

RUSSIAN VOLUNTEER FLEET

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1906 | 5206 | 799 | 6005 | 0 | 12 | 12 | 28 | 8 | 36 | 6053 | 5 | 4 |
| 1907 | 21277 | 14290 | 35567 | 290 | 129 | 419 | 159 | 78 | 237 | 36223 | 21 | 21 |
| 1908 | 3537 | 8072 | 11609 | 125 | 162 | 287 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11896 | 8 | 9 |

AMERICAN LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1899 | 11340 | 6512 | 17852 | 5989 | 4234 | 10223 | 8414 | 7275 | 15689 | 43764 | 46 | 45 |
| 1900 | 16839 | 8597 | 25436 | 7447 | 5296 | 12743 | 6999 | 8990 | 15989 | 54168 | 44 | 44 |
| 1901 | 12510 | 5606 | 18116 | 6030 | 3146 | 9176 | 6180 | 4129 | 10309 | 37601 | 39 | 39 |
| 1902 | 20651 | 7312 | 27963 | 7095 | 4376 | 11471 | 7388 | 4877 | 12265 | 51699 | 54 | 57 |
| 1903 | 16027 | 9199 | 25226 | 6084 | 3152 | 9236 | 4471 | 2793 | 7264 | 41726 | 44 | 45 |
| 1904 | 28030 | 12422 | 40452 | 4727 | 2807 | 7534 | 4106 | 3166 | 7272 | 55258 | 48 | 48 |
| 1905 | 27116 | 10094 | 37210 | 6731 | 3912 | 10643 | 5626 | 4404 | 10030 | 57883 | 50 | 50 |
| 1906 | 26612 | 12701 | 39313 | 8329 | 3667 | 11996 | 5663 | 3872 | 9535 | 60844 | 51 | 50 |
| 1907 | 23064 | 15635 | 38699 | 8261 | 3951 | 12212 | 5130 | 3955 | 9085 | 59996 | 48 | 48 |
| 1908 | 6985 | 23893 | 30878 | 5528 | 3445 | 8973 | 3615 | 2633 | 6248 | 46099 | 49 | 49 |
| 1909 | 18974 | 12565 | 31539 | 7332 | 3176 | 10508 | 3411 | 2372 | 5783 | 47830 | 50 | 49 |
| 1910 | 14313 | 12252 | 26565 | 7701 | 2997 | 10698 | 3859 | 2968 | 6827 | 44090 | 44 | 46 |
| 1911 | 9965 | 16862 | 26827 | 6539 | 2662 | 9201 | 3305 | 2107 | 5412 | 41440 | 41 | 41 |
| 1912 | 11525 | 11147 | 22672 | 5996 | 2474 | 8470 | 2625 | 1750 | 4375 | 35517 | 40 | 39 |
| 1913 | 17970 | 9327 | 27297 | 6660 | 2421 | 9081 | 2019 | 1130 | 3149 | 39527 | 40 | 40 |
| 1914 | 9881 | 9913 | 19794 | 14871 | 9263 | 24134 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 43928 | 50 | 51 |

CUNARD LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------|----|----|
| 1899 | 20855 | 11809 | 32664 | 9160 | 7388 | 16548 | 9856 | 10828 | 20684 | 69896 | 62 | 62 |
| 1900 | 22723 | 12093 | 34816 | 10798 | 7296 | 18094 | 9299 | 8847 | 18146 | 71056 | 51 | 50 |
| 1901 | 19933 | 10314 | 30247 | 9394 | 6554 | 15948 | 8388 | 8733 | 17121 | 63316 | 57 | 57 |
| 1902 | 23650 | 9619 | 33269 | 9070 | 6195 | 15265 | 7238 | 7107 | 14345 | 62879 | 51 | 50 |
| 1903 | 33781 | 12273 | 46054 | 11863 | 7963 | 19826 | 6578 | 6473 | 13051 | 78931 | 65 | 63 |
| 1904 | 38929 | 22260 | 61189 | 12197 | 8907 | 21104 | 5948 | 5907 | 11855 | 94148 | 63 | 66 |
| 1905 | 38062 | 14387 | 52449 | 10928 | 7356 | 18284 | 7618 | 8213 | 15831 | 86564 | 63 | 64 |
| 1906 | 62298 | 18472 | 80770 | 13899 | 9028 | 22927 | 9104 | 8772 | 17876 | 121573 | 68 | 70 |
| 1907 | 61744 | 27533 | 89277 | 17620 | 11404 | 29024 | 10957 | 9518 | 20475 | 138776 | 70 | 68 |
| 1908 | 32396 | 33688 | 66084 | 17650 | 13493 | 31143 | 12893 | 11783 | 24676 | 121903 | 80 | 80 |
| 1909 | 42730 | 19699 | 62429 | 16122 | 11479 | 27601 | 14354 | 12726 | 27080 | 117110 | 67 | 66 |
| 1910 | 32413 | 21994 | 54407 | 17940 | 12039 | 29979 | 15657 | 13666 | 29323 | 113709 | 63 | 62 |
| 1911 | 36444 | 30865 | 67309 | 17609 | 11872 | 29481 | 14673 | 13959 | 28632 | 125422 | 61 | 62 |
| 1912 | 40611 | 26986 | 67597 | 17243 | 11194 | 28437 | 13976 | 12022 | 25998 | 122032 | 59 | 54 |
| 1913 | 48089 | 25701 | 73790 | 17176 | 10883 | 28059 | 12994 | 10636 | 23630 | 125479 | 56 | 56 |
| 1914 | 25223 | 27948 | 53171 | 13742 | 9217 | 22959 | 13602 | 10430 | 24032 | 100162 | 50 | 49 |

WHITE STAR LINE

Liverpool

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 25145 | 13004 | 38149 | 4200 | 3396 | 7596 | 8514 | 8105 | 16619 | 62364 | 56 | 55 |
| 1900 | 29365 | 16227 | 45592 | 5810 | 4548 | 10358 | 9140 | 8152 | 17292 | 73242 | 50 | 50 |
| 1901 | 30462 | 14724 | 45186 | 6865 | 4898 | 11763 | 11306 | 10102 | 21408 | 78357 | 66 | 66 |
| 1902 | 40215 | 15727 | 55942 | 7385 | 5737 | 13122 | 11018 | 9506 | 20524 | 89588 | 65 | 65 |
| 1903 | 45468 | 25300 | 70768 | 9638 | 7231 | 16869 | 12451 | 11724 | 24175 | 111812 | 81 | 80 |
| 1904 | 57784 | 34243 | 92027 | 10846 | 8643 | 19489 | 13022 | 12625 | 25647 | 137163 | 70 | 71 |
| 1905 | 45782 | 18103 | 63885 | 11243 | 8053 | 19296 | 13527 | 11569 | 25096 | 108277 | 66 | 64 |
| 1906 | 49452 | 17956 | 67408 | 12947 | 8265 | 21212 | 11914 | 9925 | 21839 | 110459 | 67 | 65 |
| 1907 | 41807 | 20324 | 62131 | 12238 | 6763 | 19001 | 9110 | 7226 | 16336 | 97468 | 55 | 51 |
| 1908 | 13674 | 21350 | 35024 | 9081 | 6659 | 15740 | 6872 | 6161 | 13033 | 63797 | 45 | 45 |
| 1909 | 17983 | 10799 | 28782 | 10835 | 6534 | 17369 | 6845 | 5959 | 12804 | 58955 | 45 | 42 |
| 1910 | 21986 | 15859 | 37845 | 12797 | 7995 | 20792 | 7285 | 6766 | 14051 | 72688 | 44 | 45 |
| 1911 | 18358 | 22619 | 40977 | 13584 | 7933 | 21517 | 7684 | 6584 | 14268 | 76762 | 46 | 45 |
| 1912 | 18253 | 18977 | 37230 | 12657 | 8006 | 20663 | 6982 | 6186 | 13168 | 71061 | 47 | 46 |
| 1913 | 29136 | 17397 | 46533 | 13121 | 8490 | 21611 | 6238 | 5920 | 12158 | 80302 | 47 | 47 |
| 1914 | 19534 | 17542 | 37076 | 13355 | 7116 | 20471 | 7671 | 5105 | 12776 | 70323 | 45 | 46 |

Southampton

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1907 | 11719 | 10313 | 22032 | 6604 | 3443 | 10047 | 6376 | 5143 | 11519 | 43598 | 29 | 32 |
| 1908 | 10121 | 24282 | 34403 | 6820 | 4403 | 11223 | 7448 | 6644 | 14092 | 59718 | 49 | 50 |
| 1909 | 20114 | 14514 | 34628 | 8246 | 4056 | 12302 | 6735 | 5781 | 12516 | 59446 | 50 | 50 |
| 1910 | 17364 | 10407 | 27771 | 9188 | 4334 | 13522 | 7580 | 6345 | 13925 | 55218 | 44 | 43 |
| 1911 | 12335 | 15106 | 27441 | 8132 | 5091 | 13223 | 7891 | 7780 | 15671 | 56335 | 36 | 36 |
| 1912 | 12465 | 9902 | 22367 | 7233 | 3921 | 11154 | 6031 | 6142 | 12173 | 45694 | 34 | 34 |
| 1913 | 23035 | 13902 | 36937 | 10257 | 5558 | 15815 | 7770 | 7615 | 15385 | 68137 | 42 | 42 |
| 1914 | 10399 | 10665 | 21064 | 5038 | 3247 | 8285 | 6083 | 5518 | 11601 | 40950 | 22 | 21 |

B) Main Non-New York services of Continental Lines and British Lines

AMERICAN LINE PHILADELPHIA SERVICE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|---------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 6966 | 2284 | 9250 | 2714 | 2667 | 5381 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14631 | 46 | 45 |
| 1900 | 10405 | 2656 | 13061 | 3016 | 2431 | 5447 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18508 | 39 | 40 |
| 1901 | 8407 | 2509 | 10916 | 3280 | 2494 | 5774 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16690 | 45 | 46 |
| 1902 | 13254 | 2684 | 15938 | 3961 | 2778 | 6739 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22677 | 49 | 48 |
| 1903 | 17422 | 3632 | 21054 | 3777 | 2656 | 6433 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 27487 | 48 | 48 |
| 1904 | 18428 | 6604 | 25032 | 3459 | 2443 | 5902 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30934 | 43 | 44 |
| 1905 | 19427 | 3407 | 22834 | 4094 | 3061 | 7155 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29989 | 41 | 42 |
| 1906 | 24838 | 3988 | 28826 | 4078 | 2643 | 6721 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35547 | 38 | 40 |
| 1907 | 28989 | 4608 | 33597 | 5060 | 3103 | 8163 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41760 | 44 | 43 |
| 1908 | 7554 | 5292 | 12846 | 3484 | 2938 | 6422 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19268 | 33 | 32 |
| 1909 | 13618 | 2549 | 16167 | 3386 | 2267 | 5653 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21820 | 29 | 29 |
| 1910 | 18108 | 3525 | 21633 | 4356 | 2650 | 7006 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28639 | 30 | 31 |
| 1911 | 11216 | 4843 | 16059 | 4014 | 2208 | 6222 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22281 | 26 | 26 |
| 1912 | 12687 | 2497 | 15184 | 3702 | 2214 | 5916 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21100 | 24 | 23 |
| 1913 | 15645 | 2627 | 18272 | 3491 | 1826 | 5317 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23589 | 23 | 23 |
| 1914 | 7053 | 2375 | 9428 | 3082 | 1622 | 4704 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14132 | 26 | 25 |

CUNARD LINE BOSTON SERVICE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|---------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 7611 | 1732 | 9343 | 767 | 606 | 1373 | 672 | 377 | 1049 | 11765 | 29 | 29 |
| 1900 | 10230 | 4214 | 14444 | 1135 | 1124 | 2259 | 824 | 686 | 1510 | 18213 | 22 | 22 |
| 1901 | 16683 | 4787 | 21470 | 2061 | 1368 | 3429 | 1291 | 1258 | 2549 | 27448 | 30 | 30 |
| 1902 | 23296 | 5045 | 28341 | 2515 | 1604 | 4119 | 1676 | 1424 | 3100 | 35560 | 29 | 30 |
| 1903 | 27747 | 5665 | 33412 | 3606 | 1736 | 5342 | 1639 | 1526 | 3165 | 41919 | 31 | 31 |
| 1904 | 30199 | 11665 | 41864 | 3564 | 2275 | 5839 | 1767 | 1869 | 3636 | 51339 | 23 | 23 |
| 1905 | 26750 | 6855 | 33605 | 3938 | 2228 | 6166 | 1932 | 1619 | 3551 | 43322 | 25 | 24 |
| 1906 | 30897 | 7792 | 38689 | 4458 | 2440 | 6898 | 1734 | 1656 | 3390 | 48977 | 25 | 26 |
| 1907 | 31538 | 10357 | 41895 | 5329 | 2811 | 8140 | 1915 | 1798 | 3713 | 53748 | 25 | 26 |
| 1908 | 11356 | 9023 | 20379 | 4872 | 2922 | 7794 | 1643 | 1319 | 2962 | 31135 | 25 | 25 |
| 1909 | 19120 | 6523 | 25643 | 6348 | 3028 | 9376 | 1887 | 1378 | 3265 | 38284 | 24 | 24 |
| 1910 | 18300 | 4999 | 23299 | 5427 | 2525 | 7952 | 1688 | 1262 | 2950 | 34201 | 17 | 17 |
| 1911 | 13681 | 6313 | 19994 | 5916 | 2565 | 8481 | 1706 | 1324 | 3030 | 31505 | 16 | 16 |
| 1912 | 17670 | 8027 | 25697 | 6864 | 3280 | 10144 | 2599 | 2331 | 4930 | 40771 | 19 | 22 |
| 1913 | 20822 | 6763 | 27585 | 7048 | 2897 | 9945 | 2495 | 1817 | 4312 | 41842 | 21 | 19 |
| 1914 | 12310 | 6906 | 19216 | 6074 | 2982 | 9056 | 2729 | 2120 | 4849 | 33121 | 20 | 18 |

NORTH GERMAN LLOYD BALTIMORE SERVICE⁹⁰⁸

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|-----------|-------|----|----|
| 1899 | 20077 | 1535 | 21612 | 895 | 675 | 1570 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23182 | 43 | 44 |
| 1900 | 19712 | 2111 | 21823 | 870 | 855 | 1725 | 8 | 343 | 351 | 23899 | 33 | 31 |
| 1901 | 26719 | 1408 | 28127 | 843 | 722 | 1565 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29692 | 38 | 35 |
| 1902 | 48153 | 2432 | 50585 | 1278 | 1034 | 2312 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 52897 | 50 | 41 |
| 1903 | 71002 | 2741 | 73743 | 2559 | 1409 | 3968 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 77711 | 54 | 40 |
| 1904 | 38209 | 2878 | 41087 | 1814 | 1106 | 2920 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 44007 | 42 | 32 |
| 1905 | 62675 | 1762 | 64437 | 2481 | 1531 | 4012 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 68449 | 54 | 44 |
| 1906 | 63951 | 3169 | 67120 | 3431 | 1747 | 5178 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 72298 | 56 | 41 |
| 1907 | 64774 | 5400 | 70174 | 3789 | 1591 | 5380 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75554 | 62 | 45 |
| 1908 | 8223 | 5593 | 13816 | 1593 | 1874 | 3467 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17283 | 35 | 28 |
| 1909 | 24930 | 1491 | 26421 | 2643 | 1440 | 4083 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30504 | 36 | 26 |
| 1910 | 32005 | 1971 | 33976 | 3197 | 1887 | 5084 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 39060 | 32 | 39 |
| 1911 | 16759 | 3055 | 19814 | 2768 | 1623 | 4391 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24205 | 27 | 42 |
| 1912 | 27803 | 2599 | 30402 | 2558 | 1513 | 4071 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 34473 | 39 | 42 |
| 1913 | 39299 | 2471 | 41770 | 2751 | 1696 | 4447 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46217 | 49 | 40 |
| 1914 | 16666 | 1823 | 18489 | 980 | 1407 | 2387 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20876 | 24 | 21 |

REDSTAR LINE PHILADELPHIA SERVICE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|-----------|-------|----|----|
| 1899 | 4366 | 270 | 4636 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4636 | 24 | 22 |
| 1900 | 4951 | 363 | 5314 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5314 | 20 | 20 |
| 1901 | 4243 | 312 | 4555 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 5 | 47 | 4602 | 18 | 19 |
| 1902 | 5853 | 254 | 6107 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6107 | 23 | 21 |
| 1903 | 7554 | 251 | 7805 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7807 | 23 | 23 |
| 1904 | 2034 | 260 | 2294 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2294 | 21 | 21 |
| 1905 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 543 | 20 | 563 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 563 | 8 | 5 |
| 1906 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 793 | 801 | 1594 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1594 | 21 | 23 |
| 1907 | 0 | 20 | 20 | 0 | 847 | 847 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 867 | | 26 |
| 1908 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 882 | 882 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 882 | | 22 |
| 1909 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1359 | 929 | 2288 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2288 | | 25 |
| 1910 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1441 | 871 | 2312 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2312 | | 23 |
| 1911 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1381 | 730 | 2111 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2111 | | 24 |
| 1912 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1677 | 601 | 2278 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2278 | | 26 |
| 1913 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1795 | 673 | 2468 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2468 | 26 | 24 |
| 1914 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 617 | 363 | 980 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 980 | 17 | 15 |

⁹⁰⁸ In 1902 the Line also opens a monthly service to Galveston the annual carryings balancing between 2300 and 13500 WB and between 800 and 1100 EB. Just as HAPAG right before the war, a service to Boston and Philadelphia is opened.

WHITE STAR LINE BOSTON SERVICE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|---------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1903 | 489 | 210 | 699 | 96 | 41 | 137 | 105 | 18 | 123 | 959 | 4 | 2 |
| 1904 | 15822 | 5088 | 20910 | 2146 | 1053 | 3199 | 2073 | 1361 | 3434 | 27543 | 27 | 25 |
| 1905 | 11117 | 3678 | 14795 | 2382 | 1258 | 3640 | 2761 | 1842 | 4603 | 23038 | 23 | 24 |
| 1906 | 13507 | 4373 | 17880 | 2630 | 1235 | 3865 | 2651 | 1651 | 4302 | 26047 | 23 | 25 |
| 1907 | 13554 | 5261 | 18815 | 2082 | 1151 | 3233 | 2026 | 1670 | 3696 | 25744 | 19 | 19 |
| 1908 | 6862 | 5823 | 12685 | 1386 | 746 | 2132 | 1558 | 1293 | 2851 | 17668 | 18 | 18 |
| 1909 | 5499 | 1834 | 7333 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 775 | 634 | 1409 | 8742 | 11 | 11 |
| 1910 | 11282 | 3672 | 14954 | 2270 | 800 | 3070 | 1732 | 1294 | 3026 | 21050 | 20 | 20 |
| 1911 | 8760 | 3826 | 12586 | 1931 | 546 | 2477 | 1481 | 987 | 2468 | 17531 | 17 | 17 |
| 1912 | 8433 | 2646 | 11079 | 2685 | 1564 | 4249 | 679 | 524 | 1203 | 16531 | 17 | 18 |
| 1913 | 9799 | 3716 | 13515 | 4668 | 3262 | 7930 | 41 | 77 | 118 | 21563 | 19 | 19 |
| 1914 | 7106 | 3899 | 11005 | 3414 | 2523 | 5937 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16942 | 16 | 16 |

C) Mediterranean services to New York unless specified

AMERICAN LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1905 | 0 | 5907 | 5907 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5907 | 0 | 50 |
| 1906 | 0 | 7749 | 7749 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7749 | 0 | 50 |
| 1907 | 0 | 10308 | 10308 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10308 | 0 | 48 |
| 1908 | 0 | 9287 | 9287 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9287 | 0 | 49 |
| 1909 | 0 | 5288 | 5288 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5288 | 0 | 49 |
| 1910 | 0 | 1987 | 1987 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1987 | 0 | 46 |
| 1911 | 0 | 4484 | 4484 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4484 | 0 | 41 |
| 1912 | 0 | 4416 | 4416 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4416 | 0 | 39 |
| 1913 | 0 | 3844 | 3844 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3844 | 0 | 40 |
| 1914 | 0 | 1295 | 1295 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1295 | 0 | 28 |

ANCHOR LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 13696 | 971 | 14667 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 6 | 20 | 14687 | 28 | 23 |
| 1900 | 14764 | 1266 | 16030 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 13 | 51 | 16081 | 25 | 24 |
| 1901 | 16084 | 2133 | 18217 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 68 | 27 | 95 | 18312 | 33 | 24 |
| 1902 | 26144 | 3777 | 29921 | 0 | 209 | 209 | 87 | 55 | 142 | 30272 | 33 | 22 |
| 1903 | 26601 | 7289 | 33890 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 90 | 90 | 180 | 34070 | 32 | 20 |
| 1904 | 15026 | 12199 | 27225 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 130 | 103 | 233 | 27458 | 28 | 25 |
| 1905 | 21129 | 4051 | 25180 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 215 | 50 | 265 | 25445 | 25 | 15 |
| 1906 | 25835 | 6678 | 32513 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 261 | 105 | 366 | 32879 | 26 | 22 |
| 1907 | 21833 | 9024 | 30857 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 263 | 78 | 341 | 31198 | 25 | 22 |
| 1908 | 2704 | 6475 | 9179 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 54 | 53 | 107 | 9286 | 14 | 13 |
| 1909 | 11531 | 2085 | 13616 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 164 | 50 | 214 | 13830 | 19 | 13 |
| 1910 | 11264 | 3347 | 14611 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 154 | 66 | 220 | 14831 | 19 | 19 |
| 1911 | 8560 | 6631 | 15191 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 141 | 40 | 181 | 15372 | 18 | 18 |
| 1912 | 9160 | 4865 | 14025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120 | 48 | 168 | 14193 | 18 | 16 |
| 1913 | 15416 | 2972 | 18388 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 143 | 45 | 188 | 18576 | 19 | 19 |
| 1914 | 4563 | 3513 | 8076 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 96 | 24 | 120 | 8196 | 15 | 15 |

AUSTRIA-AMERICANA⁹⁰⁹

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1904 | 4276 | 5142 | 9418 | 54 | 12 | 66 | 62 | 9 | 71 | 9555 | 8 | 8 |
| 1905 | 4106 | 2069 | 6175 | 71 | 35 | 106 | 54 | 23 | 77 | 6358 | 12 | 19 |
| 1906 | 14254 | 4199 | 18453 | 195 | 66 | 261 | 241 | 46 | 287 | 19001 | 35 | 27 |
| 1907 | 16577 | 9669 | 26246 | 941 | 240 | 1181 | 441 | 106 | 547 | 27974 | 31 | 29 |
| 1908 | 2472 | 11411 | 13883 | 1640 | 683 | 2323 | 353 | 282 | 635 | 16841 | 32 | 34 |
| 1909 | 19297 | 5347 | 24644 | 3176 | 858 | 4034 | 691 | 520 | 1211 | 29889 | 38 | 34 |
| 1910 | 16940 | 5108 | 22048 | 3260 | 938 | 4198 | 819 | 775 | 1594 | 27840 | 36 | 31 |

⁹⁰⁹ Launched a limited service to New Orleans in 1908.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|-----|-----|------|-------|----|----|
| 1911 | 11140 | 8481 | 19621 | 2547 | 496 | 3043 | 421 | 382 | 803 | 23467 | 32 | 32 |
| 1912 | 20968 | 15730 | 36698 | 3514 | 1091 | 4605 | 670 | 629 | 1299 | 42602 | 36 | 31 |
| 1913 | 13750 | 11310 | 25060 | 5822 | 1333 | 7155 | 724 | 659 | 1383 | 33598 | 38 | 31 |
| 1914 | 9108 | 3969 | 13077 | 4371 | 685 | 5056 | 160 | 347 | 507 | 18640 | 22 | 16 |

COMPAGÑIA TRANSATLÁNTICA⁹¹⁰

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1904 | 4312 | 1599 | 5911 | 25 | 14 | 39 | 21 | 23 | 44 | 5994 | 12 | 11 |
| 1905 | 6814 | 2267 | 9081 | 223 | 32 | 255 | 47 | 27 | 74 | 9410 | 12 | 11 |
| 1906 | 6400 | 3160 | 9560 | 130 | 27 | 157 | 84 | 32 | 116 | 9833 | 12 | 12 |
| 1907 | 6474 | 4525 | 10999 | 333 | 108 | 441 | 235 | 157 | 392 | 11832 | 13 | 12 |
| 1908 | 608 | 3861 | 4469 | 167 | 125 | 292 | 190 | 197 | 387 | 5148 | 12 | 12 |
| 1909 | 3088 | 2053 | 5141 | 233 | 176 | 409 | 362 | 274 | 636 | 6186 | 12 | 12 |
| 1910 | 1296 | 87 | 1383 | 247 | 80 | 327 | 303 | 138 | 441 | 2151 | 12 | 12 |

CUNARD LINE⁹¹¹

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1903 | 240 | 3428 | 3668 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 74 | 166 | 240 | 3908 | 1 | 3 |
| 1904 | 0 | 15237 | 15237 | 0 | 151 | 151 | 0 | 850 | 850 | 16238 | | 18 |
| 1905 | 39388 | 4423 | 43811 | 1432 | 203 | 1635 | 578 | 1108 | 1686 | 47132 | 24 | 19 |
| 1906 | 50363 | 8674 | 59037 | 2451 | 471 | 2922 | 1059 | 2009 | 3068 | 65027 | 27 | 24 |
| 1907 | 54105 | 14048 | 68153 | 3039 | 1051 | 4090 | 1156 | 2108 | 3264 | 75507 | 30 | 27 |
| 1908 | 13823 | 16636 | 30459 | 1646 | 965 | 2611 | 877 | 2784 | 3661 | 36731 | 27 | 24 |
| 1909 | 38755 | 5072 | 43827 | 3215 | 876 | 4091 | 981 | 3111 | 4092 | 52010 | 24 | 24 |
| 1910 | 41930 | 5947 | 47877 | 3574 | 645 | 4219 | 967 | 3321 | 4288 | 56384 | 26 | 22 |
| 1911 | 20118 | 11744 | 31862 | 1480 | 390 | 1870 | 196 | 2068 | 2264 | 35996 | 25 | 23 |
| 1912 | 31854 | 10224 | 42078 | 3723 | 621 | 4344 | 1351 | 3207 | 4558 | 50980 | 28 | 27 |
| 1913 | 37205 | 20187 | 57392 | 7344 | 1502 | 8846 | 2089 | 5511 | 7600 | 73838 | 32 | 33 |
| 1914 | 10513 | 9080 | 19593 | 6746 | 665 | 7411 | 1424 | 3390 | 4814 | 31818 | 28 | 24 |

DOMINION LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1902 | 14018 | 3602 | 17620 | 647 | 162 | 809 | 360 | 937 | 1297 | 19726 | 14 | 14 |
| 1903 | 17765 | 3265 | 21030 | 1064 | 184 | 1248 | 715 | 1900 | 2615 | 24893 | 21 | 19 |

⁹¹⁰ The Spanish Line seemed to have worked together with the Cunard Line, but after 1910 it stopped taking Italian or Greek passengers.

⁹¹¹ These are the figures of the Cunard Fiume service. Westbound steerage passengers were counted Continental passengers here represented in Bold while the rest were considered Mediterranean. From 19⁰⁹ onwards the eastbound passengers are divided in Continentals and Mediterranean; 1908 includes 10 022 continentals, 1909 3836; 1910, 4777; 1911,7033; 1912, 5875. For 1913 and 1914 the total passengers for both services are given

FABRE LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 14121 | 1804 | 15925 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 26 | 50 | 15975 | 26 | 23 |
| 1900 | 15648 | 1257 | 16905 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 77 | 103 | 17008 | 23 | 11 |
| 1901 | 14157 | 694 | 14851 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 9 | 32 | 14883 | 28 | 10 |
| 1902 | 21617 | 4262 | 25879 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 77 | 74 | 151 | 26030 | 27 | 13 |
| 1903 | 25029 | 8987 | 34016 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 168 | 255 | 423 | 34439 | 29 | 17 |
| 1904 | 17225 | 12150 | 29375 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 96 | 87 | 183 | 29558 | 28 | 19 |
| 1905 | 30178 | 8035 | 38213 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 157 | 173 | 330 | 38543 | 33 | 21 |
| 1906 | 31757 | 12306 | 44063 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 210 | 272 | 482 | 44545 | 34 | 23 |
| 1907 | 29569 | 17316 | 46885 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 248 | 241 | 489 | 47374 | 33 | 27 |
| 1908 | 6315 | 21596 | 27911 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 371 | 455 | 826 | 28737 | 25 | 29 |
| 1909 | 18287 | 6520 | 24807 | 33 | 0 | 33 | 486 | 505 | 991 | 25831 | 38 | 29 |
| 1910 | 20853 | 10159 | 31012 | 317 | 77 | 394 | 720 | 670 | 1390 | 32796 | 38 | 33 |
| 1911 | 13399 | 13434 | 26833 | 771 | 497 | 1268 | 447 | 860 | 1307 | 29408 | 40 | 39 |
| 1912 | 25802 | 17185 | 42987 | 2017 | 1280 | 3297 | 690 | 1080 | 1770 | 48054 | 42 | 42 |
| 1913 | 36786 | 12780 | 49566 | 3214 | 2003 | 5217 | 1037 | 1332 | 2369 | 57152 | 45 | 44 |
| 1914 | 15189 | 13395 | 28584 | 2209 | 1813 | 4022 | 1122 | 1559 | 2681 | 35287 | 45 | 45 |

FRENCH LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1903 | 0 | 14379 | 14379 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14379 | 0 | 59 |
| 1904 | 0 | 14599 | 14599 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14599 | 0 | 54 |
| 1905 | 0 | 11700 | 11700 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11700 | 0 | 54 |
| 1906 | 0 | 15966 | 15966 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15966 | 0 | 60 |
| 1907 | 0 | 19787 | 19787 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19787 | 0 | 61 |
| 1908 | 0 | 21651 | 21651 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21651 | 0 | 67 |
| 1909 | 0 | 11214 | 11214 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11214 | 0 | 67 |
| 1910 | 0 | 13749 | 13749 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13749 | 0 | 78 |
| 1911 | 0 | 16251 | 16251 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16251 | 0 | 77 |
| 1912 | 0 | 17964 | 17964 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17964 | 0 | 80 |
| 1913 | 0 | 8935 | 8935 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8935 | 0 | 61 |

HAMBURG AMERICA LINE**Regular**

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 2540 | 3519 | 6059 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 424 | 1672 | 2096 | 8155 | 5 | 6 |
| 1900 | 2477 | 20 | 2497 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2497 | 4 | 1 |
| 1901 | 10815 | 844 | 11659 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11659 | 18 | 13 |
| 1902 | 12706 | 2753 | 15459 | 248 | 19 | 267 | 187 | 348 | 535 | 16261 | 17 | 11 |
| 1903 | 17828 | 5568 | 23396 | 727 | 68 | 795 | 194 | 467 | 661 | 24852 | 16 | 15 |
| 1904 | 12535 | 10947 | 23482 | 246 | 55 | 301 | 646 | 940 | 1586 | 25369 | 17 | 18 |
| 1905 | 15215 | 6699 | 21914 | 655 | 42 | 697 | 824 | 1477 | 2301 | 24912 | 20 | 21 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|----|----|
| 1906 | 24338 | 6887 | 31225 | 1757 | 250 | 2007 | 1207 | 2645 | 3852 | 37084 | 23 | 26 |
| 1907 | 21479 | 16850 | 38329 | 2589 | 1248 | 3837 | 1579 | 2976 | 4555 | 46721 | 23 | 25 |
| 1908 | 3822 | 9670 | 13492 | 885 | 740 | 1625 | 514 | 1556 | 2070 | 17187 | 12 | 12 |
| 1909 | 16442 | 2928 | 19370 | 2688 | 1179 | 3867 | 1072 | 2059 | 3131 | 26368 | 20 | 20 |
| 1910 | 16469 | 5718 | 22187 | 1796 | 848 | 2644 | 1140 | 2066 | 3206 | 28037 | 17 | 17 |
| 1911 | 8288 | 9817 | 18105 | 2874 | 853 | 3727 | 924 | 2018 | 2942 | 24774 | 15 | 16 |
| 1912 | 12486 | 8307 | 20793 | 2830 | 823 | 3653 | 981 | 2328 | 3309 | 27755 | 14 | 15 |
| 1913 | 16011 | 6002 | 22013 | 4809 | 1108 | 5917 | 1460 | 1968 | 3428 | 31358 | 16 | 16 |
| 1914 | 8188 | 2337 | 10525 | 2284 | 728 | 3012 | 598 | 1762 | 2360 | 15897 | 10 | 10 |

Express

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1900 | 4378 | 3584 | 7962 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 378 | 1914 | 2292 | 10254 | 7 | 8 |
| 1901 | 4487 | 3151 | 7638 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 442 | 1524 | 1966 | 9604 | 7 | 9 |
| 1902 | 1642 | 1316 | 2958 | | | 0 | 152 | 1181 | 1333 | 4291 | 3 | 6 |
| 1903 | 1447 | 1026 | 2473 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 217 | 515 | 732 | 3205 | 2 | 3 |
| 1904 | 566 | 591 | 1157 | | | 0 | 94 | 739 | 833 | 1990 | 1 | 2 |
| 1905 | 218 | 723 | 941 | 166 | 0 | 166 | 97 | 919 | 1016 | 2123 | 1 | 2 |

HELLENIC / GREEK LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1907 | 3563 | 2299 | 5862 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 190 | 85 | 275 | 6137 | 3 | 3 |
| 1908 | 998 | 5088 | 6086 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 226 | 207 | 433 | 6519 | 6 | 6 |
| 1909 | 6518 | 4107 | 10625 | 112 | 351 | 463 | 423 | 24 | 447 | 11535 | 9 | 9 |
| 1910 | 11439 | 4087 | 15526 | 378 | 327 | 705 | 1119 | 280 | 1399 | 17630 | 13 | 13 |
| 1911 | 5737 | 5444 | 11181 | 0 | 707 | 707 | 2113 | 198 | 2311 | 14199 | 13 | 13 |
| 1912 | 8568 | 4342 | 12910 | 1144 | 389 | 1533 | 1053 | 253 | 1306 | 15749 | 11 | 11 |
| 1913 | 3800 | 4591 | 8391 | 992 | 511 | 1503 | 443 | 265 | 708 | 10602 | 7 | 7 |

ITALLO-NEW YORK LINE⁹¹²

| NY | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|----|----|
| 1908 | 3073 | 3680 | 6753 | 0 | 312 | 312 | 595 | 349 | 944 | 8009 | 8 | 6 |
| 1909 | 14137 | 1115 | 15252 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 890 | 163 | 1053 | 16305 | 18 | 8 |
| 1910 | 10990 | 3779 | 14769 | 304 | 111 | 415 | 758 | 510 | 1268 | 16452 | 17 | 17 |
| 1911 | 8115 | 6373 | 14488 | 1289 | 806 | 2095 | 255 | 218 | 473 | 17056 | 18 | 14 |
| 1912 | 8935 | 7279 | 16214 | 729 | 753 | 1482 | 319 | 199 | 518 | 18214 | 10 | 10 |
| 1913 | 12824 | 4245 | 17069 | 923 | 615 | 1538 | 111 | 204 | 315 | 18922 | 12 | 11 |
| 1914 | 3352 | 9723 | 13075 | 940 | 473 | 1413 | 119 | 137 | 256 | 14744 | 13 | 13 |

⁹¹² Or Italia Societa di Navigazione a Vapore, was founded by HAPAG to operate line between Italy and South America. In 1906 it sold its shares to Navigazione Generale Italiana that used the ships on the New York and Philadelphia route

| PHIL | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1908 | 112 | 8299 | 8411 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 36 | 39 | 8450 | 1 | 9 |
| 1909 | 8239 | 2369 | 10608 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 164 | 219 | 383 | 10991 | 18 | 18 |
| 1910 | 10104 | 3268 | 13372 | 70 | 12 | 82 | 340 | 152 | 492 | 13946 | 17 | 17 |
| 1911 | 6054 | 7006 | 13060 | 429 | 239 | 668 | 22 | 59 | 81 | 13809 | 13 | 18 |
| 1912 | 5395 | 2794 | 8189 | 221 | 57 | 278 | 48 | 18 | 66 | 8533 | 8 | 8 |
| 1913 | 8583 | 2222 | 10805 | 422 | 50 | 472 | 19 | 17 | 36 | 11313 | 10 | 9 |
| 1914 | 3316 | 3758 | 7074 | 363 | 111 | 474 | 17 | 11 | 28 | 7576 | 9 | 9 |

LA VELOCE

| NY | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1901 | 13532 | 3709 | 17241 | 202 | 228 | 430 | 296 | 157 | 453 | 18124 | 14 | 13 |
| 1902 | 20167 | 5588 | 25755 | 28 | 0 | 28 | 452 | 349 | 801 | 26584 | 22 | 22 |
| 1903 | 31172 | 10162 | 41334 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 786 | 444 | 1230 | 42564 | 26 | 21 |
| 1904 | 18894 | 13968 | 32862 | | | 0 | 671 | 401 | 1072 | 33934 | 23 | 20 |
| 1905 | 32476 | 5319 | 37795 | | | 0 | 768 | 387 | 1155 | 38950 | 29 | 22 |
| 1906 | 28938 | 6040 | 34978 | 156 | 73 | 229 | 780 | 486 | 1266 | 36473 | 24 | 19 |
| 1907 | 29822 | 11993 | 41815 | 254 | 181 | 435 | 1278 | 675 | 1953 | 44203 | 26 | 25 |
| 1908 | 5049 | 9674 | 14723 | 0 | 180 | 180 | 738 | 408 | 1146 | 16049 | 13 | 13 |
| 1909 | 18656 | 3695 | 22351 | 145 | 72 | 217 | 1269 | 421 | 1690 | 24258 | 18 | 14 |
| 1910 | 20520 | 5339 | 25859 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2317 | 1067 | 3384 | 29243 | 21 | 21 |
| 1911 | 13376 | 9375 | 22751 | 1457 | 411 | 1868 | 849 | 651 | 1500 | 26119 | 17 | 17 |
| 1912 | 15308 | 5233 | 20541 | 1638 | 486 | 2124 | 123 | 199 | 322 | 22987 | 10 | 9 |
| 1913 | 21011 | 6798 | 27809 | 1763 | 672 | 2435 | 104 | 405 | 509 | 30753 | 14 | 14 |
| 1914 | 9858 | 15578 | 25436 | 2149 | 1135 | 3284 | 224 | 332 | 556 | 29276 | 17 | 17 |
| PHIL | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
| 1912 | 454 | 1073 | | 48 | 33 | | | 12 | | | 3 | 3 |
| 1913 | 3357 | 1048 | | 115 | 37 | | 3 | 10 | | | 6 | 6 |
| 1914 | 1945 | 2027 | | 126 | 43 | | 5 | 13 | | | 6 | 7 |

LLOYD ITALIANO

| NY | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1905 | 568 | 613 | 1181 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1181 | 1 | 1 |
| 1906 | 19958 | 6053 | 26011 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 203 | 68 | 271 | 26282 | 14 | 14 |
| 1907 | 26355 | 10354 | 36709 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 314 | 134 | 448 | 37157 | 20 | 20 |
| 1908 | 5902 | 9426 | 15328 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 224 | 91 | 315 | 15643 | 13 | 13 |
| 1909 | 17564 | 2867 | 20431 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 481 | 230 | 711 | 21142 | 20 | 20 |
| 1910 | 14721 | 6933 | 21654 | 28 | 1 | 29 | 482 | 225 | 707 | 22390 | 20 | 20 |
| 1911 | 7501 | 6984 | 14485 | 493 | 159 | 652 | 0 | 53 | 53 | 15190 | 15 | 15 |
| 1912 | 19851 | 8429 | 28280 | 1809 | 595 | 2404 | 217 | 292 | 509 | 31193 | 18 | 18 |
| 1913 | 26060 | 6547 | 32607 | 1978 | 805 | 2783 | 137 | 158 | 295 | 35685 | 18 | 18 |
| 1914 | 9874 | 12735 | 22609 | 1919 | 930 | 2849 | 349 | 269 | 618 | 26076 | 17 | 17 |

| PHIL | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1912 | 347 | 878 | 1225 | 21 | 13 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1259 | 2 | 3 |
| 1913 | 1154 | 257 | 1411 | 44 | 21 | 65 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 1480 | 2 | 2 |
| 1914 | 601 | 798 | 1399 | 71 | 60 | 131 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 1534 | 3 | 3 |

LLOYD SABAUDO

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1907 | 15862 | 8424 | 24286 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 595 | 349 | 944 | 25230 | 14 | 13 |
| 1908 | 4899 | 15541 | 20440 | 564 | 284 | 848 | 491 | 591 | 1082 | 22370 | 13 | 14 |
| 1909 | 18496 | 4591 | 23087 | 119 | 125 | 244 | 1468 | 624 | 2092 | 25423 | 18 | 19 |
| 1910 | 14968 | 6005 | 20973 | 89 | 207 | 296 | 1498 | 607 | 2105 | 23374 | 19 | 18 |
| 1911 | 8542 | 4177 | 12719 | 102 | 410 | 512 | 1244 | 149 | 1393 | 14624 | 14 | 13 |
| 1912 | 7116 | 4428 | 11544 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 652 | 376 | 1028 | 12572 | 7 | 8 |
| 1913 | 19762 | 4189 | 23951 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1268 | 492 | 1760 | 25711 | 14 | 14 |
| 1914 | 4984 | 7563 | 12547 | 728 | 54 | 782 | 1163 | 443 | 1606 | 14935 | 12 | 12 |

NATIONAL GREEK LINE

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1909 | 5968 | 2715 | 8683 | 273 | 228 | 501 | 122 | 54 | 176 | 9360 | 6 | 6 |
| 1910 | 7513 | 2919 | 10432 | 800 | 423 | 1223 | 10 | 171 | 181 | 11836 | 8 | 8 |
| 1911 | 5473 | 4120 | 9593 | 727 | 413 | 1140 | 137 | 253 | 390 | 11123 | 9 | 9 |
| 1912 | 11113 | 6622 | 17735 | 2528 | 903 | 3431 | 169 | 236 | 405 | 21571 | 12 | 11 |
| 1913 | 2572 | 3896 | 6468 | 560 | 550 | 1110 | 196 | 190 | 386 | 7964 | 5 | 6 |
| 1914 | 5559 | 4727 | 10286 | 1262 | 836 | 2098 | 564 | 242 | 806 | 13190 | 11 | 11 |

NAVIGAZIONE GENERALE ITALIANA

| NY | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 8835 | 1981 | 10816 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 76 | 48 | 124 | 10940 | 11 | 11 |
| 1900 | 17263 | 4724 | 21987 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 285 | 265 | 550 | 22537 | 18 | 18 |
| 1901 | 24660 | 7091 | 31751 | 68 | 49 | 117 | 465 | 429 | 894 | 32762 | 27 | 26 |
| 1902 | 31445 | 9697 | 41142 | 683 | 408 | 1091 | 606 | 824 | 1430 | 43663 | 34 | 30 |
| 1903 | 27360 | 10627 | 37987 | 972 | 448 | 1420 | 581 | 769 | 1350 | 40757 | 32 | 26 |
| 1904 | 17315 | 14535 | 31850 | 903 | 538 | 1441 | 395 | 496 | 891 | 34182 | 26 | 25 |
| 1905 | 35617 | 8241 | 43858 | 1086 | 542 | 1628 | 508 | 561 | 1069 | 46555 | 34 | 27 |
| 1906 | 38155 | 7344 | 45499 | 997 | 677 | 1674 | 357 | 376 | 733 | 47906 | 34 | 25 |
| 1907 | 34295 | 13085 | 47380 | 1028 | 633 | 1661 | 178 | 211 | 389 | 49430 | 24 | 24 |
| 1908 | 9314 | 19293 | 28607 | 416 | 305 | 721 | 452 | 391 | 843 | 30171 | 18 | 17 |
| 1909 | 35486 | 6933 | 42419 | 946 | 535 | 1481 | 601 | 600 | 1201 | 45101 | 38 | 37 |
| 1910 | 23159 | 11204 | 34363 | 874 | 859 | 1733 | 695 | 832 | 1527 | 37623 | 24 | 30 |
| 1911 | 20067 | 16611 | 36678 | 930 | 1051 | 1981 | 914 | 717 | 1631 | 40290 | 24 | 24 |
| 1912 | 24272 | 12875 | 37147 | 1357 | 822 | 2179 | 547 | 611 | 1158 | 40484 | 17 | 17 |
| 1913 | 29816 | 11250 | 41066 | 2486 | 1168 | 3654 | 381 | 433 | 814 | 45534 | 17 | 16 |
| 1914 | 16790 | 22950 | 39740 | 3165 | 1732 | 4897 | 666 | 565 | 1231 | 45868 | 23 | 21 |

| BOS | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1910 | 6003 | 223 | 6226 | 334 | 82 | 416 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 6644 | 9 | 6 |
| 1913 | 975 | 120 | 1095 | 81 | 4 | 85 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1180 | 2 | 1 |
| 1911 | 1878 | 1584 | 3462 | 106 | 105 | 211 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3673 | 4 | 4 |
| 1912 | 1388 | 1420 | 2808 | 49 | 50 | 99 | 12 | 24 | 36 | 2943 | 6 | 7 |
| 1913 | 3432 | 1728 | 5160 | 97 | 76 | 173 | 17 | 20 | 37 | 5370 | 7 | 7 |
| 1914 | 1028 | 698 | 1726 | 53 | 29 | 82 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 1813 | 3 | 3 |

NORTH GERMAN LLOYD

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 21645 | 10163 | 31808 | 629 | 10 | 639 | 1606 | 3205 | 4811 | 37258 | 29 | 31 |
| 1900 | 27444 | 13225 | 40669 | 1040 | 0 | 1040 | 2187 | 4752 | 6939 | 48648 | 36 | 36 |
| 1901 | 24600 | 8738 | 33338 | 724 | 0 | 724 | 1833 | 3712 | 5545 | 39607 | 36 | 38 |
| 1902 | 29617 | 11299 | 40916 | 747 | 5 | 752 | 2431 | 3775 | 6206 | 47874 | 40 | 38 |
| 1903 | 29576 | 14165 | 43741 | 1512 | 148 | 1660 | 2335 | 3299 | 5634 | 51035 | 30 | 30 |
| 1904 | 22902 | 28968 | 51870 | 3334 | 1082 | 4416 | 2409 | 3596 | 6005 | 62291 | 31 | 32 |
| 1905 | 46613 | 11905 | 58518 | 4907 | 1524 | 6431 | 2886 | 3946 | 6832 | 71781 | 36 | 35 |
| 1906 | 47469 | 13635 | 61104 | 5570 | 2134 | 7704 | 2770 | 3947 | 6717 | 75525 | 33 | 33 |
| 1907 | 45416 | 19332 | 64748 | 7107 | 3285 | 10392 | 3058 | 3695 | 6753 | 81893 | 38 | 38 |
| 1908 | 8536 | 29436 | 37972 | 4138 | 2278 | 6416 | 2624 | 3471 | 6095 | 50483 | 30 | 30 |
| 1909 | 30429 | 6143 | 36572 | 5923 | 2238 | 8161 | 2736 | 3843 | 6579 | 51312 | 31 | 33 |
| 1910 | 32522 | 12119 | 44641 | 6192 | 3023 | 9215 | 3542 | 4371 | 7913 | 61769 | 37 | 38 |
| 1911 | 21746 | 12311 | 34057 | 4960 | 2265 | 7225 | 1996 | 3463 | 5459 | 46741 | 25 | 27 |
| 1912 | 28747 | 11471 | 40218 | 5287 | 1927 | 7214 | 2133 | 2641 | 4774 | 52206 | 20 | 20 |
| 1913 | 33452 | 12196 | 45648 | 6789 | 2463 | 9252 | 2080 | 2794 | 4874 | 59774 | 21 | 20 |
| 1914 | 14455 | 4079 | 18534 | 3016 | 1209 | 4225 | 1254 | 1876 | 3130 | 25889 | 12 | 12 |

PRINCE LINE

| NY | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1899 | 14266 | 3465 | 17731 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 221 | 377 | 598 | 18329 | 17 | 16 |
| 1900 | 13857 | 3768 | 17625 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 246 | 519 | 765 | 18390 | 17 | 18 |
| 1901 | 12455 | 1592 | 14047 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 159 | 311 | 470 | 14517 | 17 | 15 |
| 1902 | 16922 | 2466 | 19388 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 59 | 61 | 120 | 19508 | 18 | 15 |
| 1903 | 16228 | 5331 | 21559 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 93 | 19 | 112 | 21671 | 19 | 17 |
| 1904 | 7937 | 6453 | 14390 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 85 | 5 | 90 | 14480 | 14 | 13 |
| 1905 | 14179 | 4562 | 18741 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 91 | 3 | 94 | 18835 | 16 | 17 |
| 1906 | 15942 | 5437 | 21379 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 92 | 17 | 109 | 21488 | 16 | 16 |
| 1907 | 8683 | 5808 | 14491 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 159 | 3 | 162 | 14653 | 13 | 12 |
| 1908 | 441 | 2295 | 2736 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 49 | 11 | 60 | 2796 | 3 | 4 |

SICULA AMERICANA

| | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1907 | 9314 | 6767 | 16081 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 76 | 0 | 0 | 16081 | 12 | 10 |
| 1908 | 3920 | 19270 | 23190 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 263 | 230 | 493 | 23683 | 16 | 17 |
| 1909 | 14576 | 2583 | 17159 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 266 | 80 | 346 | 17505 | 15 | 14 |
| 1910 | 10594 | 4608 | 15202 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 151 | 24 | 175 | 15377 | 14 | 14 |
| 1911 | 7130 | 9504 | 16634 | 209 | 180 | 389 | 191 | 17 | 208 | 17231 | 12 | 15 |
| 1912 | 17225 | 7023 | 24248 | 1052 | 344 | 1396 | 71 | 40 | 111 | 25755 | 17 | 17 |
| 1913 | 27646 | 4007 | 31653 | 1163 | 353 | 1516 | 81 | 32 | 113 | 33282 | 16 | 16 |
| 1914 | 7990 | 11231 | 19221 | 2338 | 644 | 2982 | 256 | 79 | 335 | 22538 | 16 | 16 |

WHITE STAR LINE

Boston

| BOS | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1903 | 0 | 1529 | 1529 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 133 | 133 | 1662 | 0 | 1 |
| 1904 | 14119 | 8316 | 22435 | 1166 | 100 | 1266 | 1214 | 3222 | 4436 | 28137 | 17 | 18 |
| 1905 | 15884 | 5980 | 21864 | 1875 | 235 | 2110 | 1059 | 2542 | 3601 | 27575 | 15 | 15 |
| 1906 | 18733 | 7788 | 26521 | 2227 | 414 | 2641 | 1104 | 2699 | 3803 | 32965 | 16 | 16 |
| 1907 | 17538 | 8560 | 26098 | 2289 | 604 | 2893 | 1153 | 2962 | 4115 | 33106 | 16 | 15 |
| 1908 | 6066 | 12815 | 18881 | 1553 | 506 | 2059 | 1145 | 2303 | 3448 | 24388 | 15 | 16 |
| 1909 | 16096 | 4622 | 20718 | 2627 | 454 | 3081 | 1092 | 2416 | 3508 | 27307 | 16 | 17 |
| 1910 | 11862 | 4030 | 15892 | 2127 | 619 | 2746 | 1316 | 2647 | 3963 | 22601 | 15 | 15 |
| 1911 | 9951 | 9487 | 19438 | 2716 | 570 | 3286 | 909 | 1711 | 2620 | 25344 | 15 | 14 |
| 1912 | 14802 | 7761 | 22563 | 2672 | 687 | 3359 | 909 | 2019 | 2928 | 28850 | 15 | 15 |
| 1913 | 18128 | 8215 | 26343 | 3510 | 745 | 4255 | 1055 | 2217 | 3272 | 33870 | 14 | 14 |
| 1914 | 9334 | 8710 | 18044 | 2444 | 471 | 2915 | 1259 | 1995 | 3254 | 24213 | 13 | 13 |

New York

| NY | 3rd WB | 3rd EB | 3rd Total | 2nd WB | 2nd EB | 2nd Total | 1st WB | 1st EB | 1st Total | Total | WB | EB |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1904 | 398 | 4886 | 5284 | 92 | 101 | 193 | 70 | 422 | 492 | 5969 | 2 | 4 |
| 1905 | 17246 | 7562 | 24808 | 2086 | 230 | 2316 | 1035 | 2697 | 3732 | 30856 | 14 | 14 |
| 1906 | 25480 | 10918 | 36398 | 2893 | 451 | 3344 | 1286 | 3165 | 4451 | 44193 | 15 | 15 |
| 1907 | 22938 | 12120 | 35058 | 2750 | 822 | 3572 | 1275 | 3418 | 4693 | 43323 | 14 | 15 |
| 1908 | 4289 | 12502 | 16791 | 1244 | 486 | 1730 | 1193 | 2967 | 4160 | 22681 | 13 | 13 |
| 1909 | 14954 | 2147 | 17101 | 2239 | 175 | 2414 | 984 | 2384 | 3368 | 22883 | 12 | 11 |
| 1910 | 10169 | 1622 | 11791 | 1563 | 94 | 1657 | 803 | 2428 | 3231 | 16679 | 8 | 9 |
| 1911 | 9922 | 8333 | 18255 | 1621 | 480 | 2101 | 723 | 2235 | 2958 | 23314 | 10 | 12 |
| 1912 | 5510 | 3267 | 8777 | 1072 | 96 | 1168 | 416 | 1827 | 2243 | 12188 | 5 | 5 |
| 1913 | 6471 | 4633 | 11104 | 1503 | 262 | 1765 | 583 | 1996 | 2579 | 15448 | 5 | 5 |
| 1914 | 6390 | 2246 | 8636 | 1957 | 102 | 2059 | 449 | 1783 | 2232 | 12927 | 6 | 6 |

Annex 5: HAL through rates to and from hinterland destinations⁹¹³

| Destination | 1893 | 1895 | 1900 | 1907 | Destination | 1893 | 1895 | 1900 | 1907 |
|-------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|---------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Aachen | | 1,29 | | 1 | Leeuwarden | | | | 0,9 |
| Agram | 14,15 | 11,5 | 8,4 | 8,4 | Leipzig | | | | 3,05 |
| Alexandria | | | | 12 | Lille | | | | 0,9 |
| Allenstein | | | | 5,3 | Mainz | | 2,31 | | 1,55 |
| <i>Bajohren</i> | | | | 7,15 | Mannheim | | 2,93 | | 1,8 |
| Basel | | 3,98 | | 4,55 | Marseille | | | | 2 |
| Batoum | | | | 16 | Milan | | | | 3,75 |
| Belovar | | | | 9 | Miskolcz | | | | 7,55 |
| Bern | | 5,2 | | 5,65 | Mitrovicza | | | | 9,55 |
| Berlin | | | | 3,1 | Mohacs | | | | 9,6 |
| Beyrouth | | | | 15 | Munchen | | 5,93 | | 4,85 |
| Brunn | | | | 6 | Munkacs | | | | 8,55 |
| Budapest | 11,95 | 8,78 | 7,55 | 7,55 | Myslowitz | | | | 5,6 |
| Bukarest | | | | 10,35 | Naples | | | | 2 |
| Budweis | 9,4 | 6,52 | | | Oderberg | 5,87 | | 5,6 | 5,6 |
| Chiasso | | 8,28 | | 8,35 | Oedenburg | | | | 6,5 |
| Chur | | 6,03 | | 6,7 | <i>Ostrowo</i> | | | | 4,9 |
| Coblenz | | 1,8 | | 1,25 | Oswieczim | 6,07 | | 5,7 | 5,7 |
| Cologne | | | | 0,95 | <i>Ottolotschin</i> | | | | 5 |
| Constantinople | | | | 12 | Paris | | | | 1,8 |
| Czernowitz | | | | 8,75 | Peterwardein | | | | 9,55 |
| Debreczin | 13,6 | 10,18 | | 9 | Pilsen | | 4,91 | | |
| Dobricza | | | | 10,2 | Pireaus | | | | 9 |
| Dusseldorf | | | | 0,95 | <i>Posen</i> | | | | 4,3 |
| Eperjes | 13,6 | 8,19 | | 7,55 | <i>Prostken</i> | | | 6,55 | 6,55 |
| Essegg | | | | 9,45 | Prag | 8,95 | 7,55 | | 4,6 |
| <i>Eydtkuhnen</i> | | | | 6,65 | Saloniki | | | | 9 |
| Franfurt a/M | | | | 1,75 | Samsoun | | | | 14 |
| Fuime | | 10,79 | 8,4 | | Sillein | | | | 6,25 |
| Funfkircken | | | | 9,2 | Smyrna | | | | 9 |
| Genoa | | | | 2 | Strassburg | | | | 2,9 |
| Groningen | | | | 0,9 | Stuttgart | | 4 | | 2,85 |
| Grosswardein | | | | 9,2 | Szegedin | 13,6 | 11,2 | | 8,75 |

⁹¹³ The destinations in italic are the boarder control stations. Between 1890 and 1897 the most popular through booking points of the company in order of importance were: Vienna, Groningen, Mannheim, Mainz, Leeuwarden, Marseille, Berlin, Stuttgart, Ludwigshafen, Basel, Cologne, Trier, Paris, Oderberg, Munich, Frankfurt, Strasburg, Crefeld, Posen, Düsseldorf, Aschaffenburg, Heilbronn, Pezsau, Dirschau, Leipzig, Kassau, Wurzburg. GAR, HAL, 318.04, Passage Department, 221-226; Letters August 24 1894; December 6 1895; March 23, 1898; February 6 1900; Circular Zotti October 1905; HAL rate sheet April 12 1907; Uranium Line that rate sheet November 29 1909, the company quoted the same rates as HAL

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------|------|-----|-------|---------------|------|------|------|------|
| Hermannstadt | | | | 9,65 | Temesvar | 13,6 | 11,6 | | 9,15 |
| <i>Illovo</i> | | | | 5,65 | <i>Thorn</i> | | | | 4,95 |
| Innsbruck | | 5,95 | | 6,55 | <i>Tilsit</i> | | | | 6,6 |
| <i>Insterburg</i> | | | | 6,35 | Trebizonde | | | | 15 |
| Jaffa | | | | 14 | Triest | 12,2 | 11,3 | 9,55 | 9,35 |
| Jassy | | | | 10,15 | Tripolis | | | | 16 |
| Kaschau | 13,6 | 7,9 | 7,9 | 7,55 | Turin | | | | 3,65 |
| Karlstadt | | | | 8,4 | Ungvar | | | | 8,35 |
| Klausenburg | | | | 9,2 | Vukovar | | | | 9,5 |
| Krakau | | | | 5,95 | Wien | 7,18 | 7,18 | 6 | 6 |
| Kronstadt | | | | 9,2 | Zombor | | | | 9,5 |
| Linz | 10,2 | 7,6 | | | Zurich | | 6,34 | | 5,45 |
| Laibach | | | | 8,5 | | | | | |

Appendix 6: New York agents and Agents under bond 1897-1909

The three lists gathered, one of the New York City agents, Brooklyn and Williamsburg and the other two of agents under bond for the New York Territory do not allow drawing for reaching conclusions. Not enough is known about how inclusive the second and third lists are neither about the true delimitation of the New York territory. Combining the list do seem to indicate that the number of agents in New York City strongly decreased over the years from 35 in 1897 to 12 and 11 in 1906 and 1909 respectively. Hopefully these lists can serve as a stepping stone for further reconstruction of migration networks, the importance of which has received an increasing amount of consideration in research.

List of Agents of the Continental Lines in New York City April 10 1897

| NEW YORK | CGT | HAPAG | HAL | NGL | RSL |
|--|-----|-------|-----|-----|-----|
| S Barasch 74 Ridgeway St. | | H | N | | R |
| H. Birdsall, 187 West St. | F | H | N | L | R |
| H. Bischoff & Co, StaatsZeitung Bldg | F | H | N | L | R |
| F. Brodsky & Co 1331 2nd Ave | F | H | N | L | R |
| F. Budzynski, 122 Cedar St. | | H | N | L | R |
| Geo Deffas, 240 East 79th St. | | H | N | L | R |
| Falck & Co, 26 Canal St. | F | H | N | L | R |
| A. Falck & Co 127 Bowery St. and 156 East 125th St | F | H | N | L | R |
| C. Foucart, 37 Desbrosses St. | | H | N | L | |
| A. Germansky, 30 Canal St. | | H | N | | |
| M Hauser & Co, 370 Grand St. | | H | N | L | R |
| S. Jarmulowsky, 54 Canal St. | | H | N | L | R |
| A. Johnson & Co, 27 Broadway | F | H | N | L | R |
| A. Kass, 78 Essex St. | | H | N | | R |
| J Keller, 117 Charlton St. | F | H | N | | R |
| J. Kellerman, 49 Norfolk St. | | H | N | | R |
| M. Kobre, 40 Canal St | | H | N | L | R |
| Hugo Lederer, 58 Ave B | F | H | N | L | R |
| W. Leuman, 18 Greenwich St. | | | N | | R |
| Peter McDonnell, 2 Battery Place | F | H | N | L | R |
| Markel Bros, 94 Canal St. | | H | N | L | R |
| Missler & Krimmert, 106 West St. | F | H | | L | |
| M. Muller, 1 Broadway | F | H | N | L | R |
| O. Ott, 6 Greenwich St. | | | N | | R |
| E, Pflugj, 130 Greenwich St. | F | | N | | R |
| A. Ragette, 2662 Third Ave | | H | N | | R |
| I. Rosenberg, 92 East 14th St | F | H | N | L | R |
| J. Rosenbaum, State Bank, 378 Grand St. | | H | N | L | R |
| M. Rosett, 66 Greenwich St. 167 Stanton St. | F | H | N | L | R |
| J. Rosuck, 6 Market St. | | H | | | |
| P. Rovnianek & Co, 25 Avenue "A" | | H | N | L | R |
| L. Scharlach & Co, 362 Grand St. | F | H | N | L | R |
| A. Schleisinger & Son, 350 East Huston St. | | H | N | | R |
| H. Schnitzer, 141 Washinton St. | F | H | N | L | R |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|
| H. Tamsen, 52 Avenue "A" | | H | N | L | R | |
| Zwilchenbart, Gasser & Co, 61 Greenwich St. | F | H | N | L | R | |
| Mandel & Baros, 157 Rivington St. | | H | N | L | | |
| Total | | 17 | 34 | 35 | 26 | 33 |
| BROOKLYN/WILLIAMSBURG | | | | | | |
| Bernheim 646 Broadway | | H | N | | | |
| Epstein, 78 Graham Ave. | | H | N | | | |
| Grochowski, 49 Grand Str | | H | N | | | |
| Kellerman, Thatford & Belmont, Aves Brownsville | | H | N | L | R | |
| Koch, 48 Broadway | F | H | N | L | R | |
| Lehrenkrauss & Sons, 379 Fulton St. | F | H | N | L | R | |
| Scheldt, 180 Graham Ave | F | H | N | L | R | |
| Schultz, 194 Ewen St. | F | H | N | | | |
| Siems, 131 Greenpoint Ave | F | H | N | L | R | |
| Total | | 5 | 10 | 10 | 5 | 5 |

List of agents under Bond in New York Territory September 21st 1906

| Agent | Locality | Bond | Agent | Locality | Bond |
|--------------------|-------------------|------|-----------------------------|--------------------|------|
| Antonio Andretta | Hartford Ct | 500 | C. Litchman | Trenton, NJ | 500 |
| Jos Bolcar | Passiac NJ | 500 | I. Lewin | New Haven, Ct. | 500 |
| Max Beuchler | Bridgeport Ct | 500 | M. Leibschutz | Louisville, Ky | 500 |
| M. Blitzstein | Philadelphia | 500 | B. Litchman | Amsterdam, NJ | 500 |
| Bowie & Co | Bridgeport O. | 1000 | V. Luczkowiak | Dunkirk, NY | 500 |
| Stephen Berleczyk | Barberton O. | 500 | H. Labowicz | New Haven, Ct. | 500 |
| Chas Bicsak | Garfield NJ | 500 | Adolf Mandel | NY | 500 |
| Jos Bolcar | Boonton NJ | 500 | Markel Bros. | NY | 500 |
| S. Barasch | NY | 500 | E. Mantel | Indianapolis, Ind | 500 |
| S. Bronstein & Son | Baltimore | 500 | A. Mitro | Lorain, O. | 500 |
| G. Dziadick | Derby, Ct | 500 | A. Michalkiwicz | Elizabethport, NJ | 500 |
| Davis & Hurwitz | Syracuse, NY | 500 | R. Melville | Toronto, Can | 3000 |
| A.V. Dzubay | South Fork, Pa | 500 | E. Nierenstein | Hartford Ct | 500 |
| Deutsch Bros. | NY | 1000 | H. Norton | Vanderbilt, Pa | 500 |
| Erdelyi & Weiner | Donora, Pa | 500 | G. Oroszy | Lorain, O. | 500 |
| Jos. Emory | Wilmington, Del | 500 | G. Prince | Rochester, Pa | 500 |
| H. Epstein | Brooklyn, NY | 500 | Bela Pucky | Colombus, O | 500 |
| B. Ewnowitch | Middletown, Ct | 500 | A. Pirhalla | Jessup, Pa | 500 |
| A. Friedman | Passiac NJ | 500 | E. Prokocimer | Newark, NJ | 500 |
| M. Friedman | Luczerne, Pa | 500 | Polowe, Mogilewsky & Werner | NY | 1000 |
| M. Fodor | New Brunswick, NJ | 500 | J. Rizsak | Passiac NJ | 500 |
| S. Fleischhaker | Rochester, Pa | 500 | N. Rizsak | Carteret, NJ | 500 |
| E. Germanus | Newark, NJ | 500 | P. Rovnianek & Co | NY | 1000 |
| A. Grochowski & Co | Brooklyn, NY | 500 | C. Rainke | Philadelphia, Pa | 500 |
| A. Greenbaum | Barberton O. | 500 | N. Rizsak | South-Carteret, NJ | 500 |
| B. Gross | Cresson, Pa | 500 | J. Rojewski | Camden, NJ | 500 |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|---------------------|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----|
| T. Garbinsky | Auburn, NY | 500 | J. Reichman | Mt Pleasant, Pa | 500 |
| M Gordon | Hartford Ct | 500 | A. Rudewick | Freeland, Pa | 500 |
| M Greenwald | Rondout, NY | 500 | M. Rakowsky | Conshohocken, Pa | 500 |
| M. Gross | Avoca, Pa | 500 | J. Rizsak | South-Bethlehem, Pa | 500 |
| M Hirsch | Seymour, Ct | 500 | N. Rizsak | Carteret, NJ | 500 |
| S.Holzmans & Sons | Johnstown, Pa | 500 | W. Sawa | Wilkes-Barre, Pa | 500 |
| P. Harbula | Ambridge, Pa | 500 | J. Simon | E.Toledo, O | 500 |
| M. Hahn | Brooklyn, NY | 1000 | L. Sirotiak | Yonkers, NY | 500 |
| Aaron Hurwitz | Brooklyn, NY | 500 | F. Sakser | NY | 500 |
| L. Hyman | Carbondale, Pa | 500 | C. Scheid | NY | 500 |
| P. Hegedus & Co | Wet Seneca, NY | 500 | L Sabow | Chrome, NJ | 500 |
| Aaron Hurwitz | Scranton, Pa | 500 | M. Sameth | Yonkers, NY | 500 |
| M & L Jarmulowsky | NY | 1000 | W. Szetela | Thompsonville, Ct | 500 |
| J. Jacob | Canton, O. | 500 | J. Schneider | Providence, RI | 500 |
| Jubelirer Bros. | New Salem, Pa | 500 | F. Savage | Durya Borough, Pa | 500 |
| S. Kiernozycki | Plymouth, Pa | 500 | P. Szewczyk | Niagara Falls, NY | 500 |
| Max Kobre | NY | 500 | F. Szetela | Adams, Mass | 500 |
| S. Kohan | NY | 500 | A. Spiro & Co | Ansonia, Ct | 500 |
| Emil Kiss | NY | 500 | J. Tonkay | Jacobs Creek, pa | 500 |
| E. Kaplan | Syracuse, NY | 500 | B. Trilecz | Canonsburg, Pa | 500 |
| T. Knoblauch | Reading, Pa | 500 | J. Tomcsanyi | Homestead, Pa | 500 |
| M. Korlath | Scalp Level, Pa | 500 | W. Teitelbaum | Johnstown, Pa | 500 |
| | Ponxsutawney, Pa | 500 | F. Trudnowski | No. Buffalo, NY | 500 |
| S. Keltonik | | | A. Ujhelyi | S. Lorain, O | 500 |
| A. Klein | Martins Ferry, O. | 500 | M Walenk | Scranton, Pa | 500 |
| K. Kazemekas | Waterburry, Ct | 500 | L. Warady | Trenton, NJ | 500 |
| Krumholz & Zeisler | Trenton, NJ | 500 | Zaruba & Durish | Clarcksburg, W-Ver | 500 |
| Abraham Kass | NY | 500 | A. Zemany | Windber, Pa | 500 |
| A. Klein | Yonkers, NY | 500 | G, Zavateson | Allegheny, Pa | 500 |
| N. Lusher | Montreal, Can | 1000 | | | |

List of Agents under bond in New York Territory January 5 1909

| Agent | Locality | Bond | Agent | Locality | Bond |
|--------------------|----------------------|------|--------------------|---------------------|------|
| Jos Bolcar | Passiac NJ | 500 | S. Holzmans & Sons | Johnstown, Pa | 500 |
| Max Beuchler | Bridgeport Ct | 500 | P. Harbula | Ambridge, Pa | 500 |
| M. Blitzstein | Philadelphia | 500 | J. Haarhay | Philadelphia, Pa | 500 |
| Stephen Berleczky | Barberton O. | 500 | I. Herz | Philadelphia, Pa | 1000 |
| Jos Bolcar | Boonton NJ | 500 | A. Horbal | Derby, Ct | 500 |
| F. Burszinski | Buffalo, NY | 500 | Aaron Hurwitz | Brooklyn, NY | 500 |
| J. Beda | Duquesne, Pa | 500 | P. Hegedus & Co | Wet Seneca, NY | 500 |
| J. Beler | Johnstown, Pa | 500 | M & L Jarmulowsky | NY | 1000 |
| J. Bertok | Toledo, O | 500 | J. Jacob | Canton, O. | 500 |
| S. Blaustein | Baltimore | 500 | S. Jex | Mt Pleasant, Pa | 500 |
| T. Coon | Wharton NJ | 500 | J. Jacobson | Reading, Pa | 500 |
| I. Cherkowick | Gilberton, Pa | 500 | F. Jagocki | Brooklyn, NY | 1000 |
| I Csisarik | Duquesne, Pa | 500 | Jubelirer Bros. | New Salem, Pa | 500 |
| G. Dziadick | Derby, Ct | 500 | S. Kiernozycki | Plymouth, Pa | 500 |
| Davis & Hurwitz | Syracuse, NY | 500 | S. Kahan | NY | 1000 |
| Deutsch Bros. | NY | 1000 | Max Kobre | NY | 1000 |
| O. Dobrovolsky | Barnesbore, Pa | 500 | E. Kaplan | Syracuse, NY | 500 |
| Erdelyi & Weiner | Donora, Pa | 500 | T. Knoblauch | Reading, Pa | 500 |
| B. Ewnowitch | Middletown, Ct | 500 | H. Korn | Brooklyn, NY | 1000 |
| L. Esiner | Trenton, NJ | 500 | M. Korlath | Scalp Level, Pa | 500 |
| M. Fikete | Norton, Va | 500 | K. Kazemekas | Waterburry, Ct | 500 |
| F. Fritsche | Long Island City, NY | 500 | M. Katzander | Stockertown, Pa | 500 |
| S. Fischgrund | Wilmerding, Pa | 500 | V Kubelka & Co | NY | 1000 |
| A. Friedman | Passiac NJ | 500 | Herman Kirch | NY | 1000 |
| M. Friedman | Luczerne, Pa | 500 | J. Karabinus | Martins Creek, Pa | 500 |
| M. Fodor | New Brunswick, NJ | 500 | S. Keltonik & Co | Conemaugh, Pa | 500 |
| S. Fleischhaker | Rochester, Pa | 500 | J. Kovacs | Brooklyn, NY | 1000 |
| S. Fleischhaker | Beaver Falls, Pa | 500 | C. Kristupek | Ambridge, Pa | 500 |
| L. Friedl | Mingo Junction, O | 500 | I. Kline | Niles, O | 500 |
| E. Germanus | Newark, NJ | 500 | M. Kosiolek | Niagara Falls, NY | 500 |
| A. Grochowski & Co | Brooklyn, NY | 1000 | J. Kiss | S. Bethlehem, Pa | 500 |
| A. Grochowski & Co | Jamaica, NY | 500 | Krumholz & Zeisler | Trenton, NJ | 500 |
| A. Greenbaum | Barberton O. | 500 | A. Klein | Yonkers, NY | 500 |
| B. Gross | Cresson, Pa | 500 | E. Lenartowicz | Central Falls, R.I. | 500 |
| S. Glick | Clinton, Pa | 500 | Lipschutz & Wurzel | Philadelphia, Pa | 500 |
| J. Goodman | Manayunk, Pa | 500 | W. Lucas | Minersville, Pa | 500 |
| S. Goodman | Coatsville, Pa | 500 | N. Lusher | Montreal, Can | 1000 |
| T. Garbinsky | Auburn, NY | 500 | C. Litchman | Trenton, NJ | 500 |
| M Gordon | Hartford Ct | 500 | I. Lewin | New Haven, Ct. | 500 |
| D. Gordon | Patterson, NJ | 1000 | B. Litchman | Amsterdam, NJ | 500 |
| P. Green | Bridgeville, Pa | 500 | V. Luczkowiak | Dunkirk, NY | 500 |
| M Greenwald | Rondout, NY | 500 | Adolf Mandel | NY | 1000 |
| F. Gross | Buffalo, NY | 1000 | F. Mekszrunas | Manayunk, Pa | 500 |
| M Hirsch | Seymour, Ct | 500 | L. Moeser Co | Pittsburgh, Pa | 500 |

| Agent | Locality | Bond | Agent | Locality | Bond |
|--------------------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| J. McDonald | Harrisburg, Pa | 500 | J. Radziwon | Buffalo, NY | 500 |
| G. Matyas | Treskow, Pa | 500 | V. Rozuk | Newark, NJ | 1000 |
| C. Marz | Elizabeth, NJ | 500 | S. Ramonat | Shenandoah, Pa | 500 |
| L. Markowitz | Buffalo, NY | 500 | A. Romanosky | Lawrence, Ma | 500 |
| Markel Bros. | NY | 1000 | J. Simon | E.Toledo, O | 500 |
| Markel & Rosen | Brooklyn, NY | 1000 | D. Simon | Mansfield, Pa | 500 |
| A. Miernicki | Shenandoah | 500 | F. Sakser | NY | 500 |
| E. Mantel | Indianapolis, Ind | 500 | E. Sameth | Perth Amboy, NJ | 500 |
| A. Mitro | Lorain, O. | 500 | L Sabow | Chrome, NJ | 500 |
| A. Michalowicz | Elizabethport, NJ | 500 | J. Schneider | Providence, RI | 500 |
| A. Michalowicz & Pankuch | Elizabeth, NJ | 500 | E. Schwartz | Pottstown, Pa | 500 |
| E. Nierenstein | Hartford Ct | 500 | Stone & Zujawski | Northampton, mass | 500 |
| H. Norton | Vanderbilt, Pa | 500 | J. Samley | Pittston, Pa | 500 |
| J. Nagy | Toledo, O | 500 | J. Slabinski | Plains, Pa | 500 |
| A. Neubauer | Brooklyn, NY | 1000 | B. Sharfman | Hartford Ct | 500 |
| H. Oppenheim | NY | 1000 | E. Shurgot | Philadelphia, Pa | 500 |
| W. Oliwiecki | Niagara Falls, NY | 500 | Sanditz & Traurig | Waterbury, Ct | 1000 |
| G. Oroszy | Lorain, O. | 500 | Steiner Bros | Kensington, Pa | 500 |
| Bela Pucky | Colombus, O | 500 | F. Savage | Durya Borough, Pa | 500 |
| A. Pirhalla | Jessup, Pa | 500 | J. Tomcsanyi | Homestead, Pa | 500 |
| E. Prokocimer | Newark, NJ | 500 | J. Torok | Martins Ferry, O. | 1000 |
| N. Papp | Cleveland, O | 500 | H. Torbet | Dillonvale, O | 500 |
| K. Papp | Rankin, Pa | 500 | J. Tetlak | Cleveland, O | 500 |
| A. Pamer | Akron, O | 500 | M. Tafel | Butler, Pa | 500 |
| S. Payer | Pottstown, Pa | 500 | E. Trochanowski | Mt Camel, Pa | 500 |
| J. Pacowsky | Ford City, Pa | 500 | M. Tulenczik | Toronto, O | 500 |
| Pollak Bros | Lyndora, Pa | 500 | A. Ujhelyi | S. Lorain, O | 500 |
| F. Prelewicz | North Tonawanda, NY | 500 | A. Ujhelyi | Klyria, O | 500 |
| J. Rizsak | Passiac NJ | 500 | C. Voelker | Atlantic City, NJ | 500 |
| J. Rizsak | Wharton NJ | 500 | V. Willus | Jerset City NJ | 500 |
| P. Rovnianek & Co | NY | 1000 | V. Willus | Kingsland, NJ | 500 |
| C. Rainke | Philadelphia, Pa | 1000 | S. Wills | Auburn, NY | 500 |
| N. Rizsak | South-Carteret, NJ | 500 | M. Woll | Lebanon, Pa | 500 |
| J. Reichman | Scranton, Pa | 500 | J. Whitelaw | Akron, O | 500 |
| J. Recke | Punxsutawney, Pa | 500 | Williams & Namanyi | Wet Seneca, NY | 500 |
| A. Rudewick | Freeland, Pa | 500 | M Walenk | Scranton, Pa | 500 |
| M. Rakowsky | Concshohocken, Pa | 500 | L. Warady | Trenton, NJ | 1000 |
| J. Rizsak | South-Bethlehem, Pa | 500 | S Yasik | Wilmington, Del | 500 |
| J, Rizsak | Alpha, NJ | 500 | Zaruba & Durish | Clarcksburg, WV | 500 |
| N. Rutsek | South Carteret | 500 | A. Zemany | Windber, Pa | 500 |
| A. Rusin | Syracuse, NY | 500 | G, Zavateson | Allegheny, Pa | 500 |

Appendix 7: Advertisements of the HAL in American Newspapers

The advertising expenses of the Line are predominantly for cabin passage (see Part III chapter II, 4.3) If not specified the add was placed all year. If only for six months this usually covered the period from March till September, 4 months from April 15 till August 15. The figures in bold represent the contribution of the Holland America Line for joint advertisements with other lines in that particular newspaper.

| American newspapers, location and duration | 1894 | 1897 | 1903 | 1907 | 1910 | 1913 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| Dutch Papers | | | | | | |
| De Nederlander, Chicago | 50 | 40 | 40 | | | |
| De Volkstem, De Pere Wisc | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 |
| De Wachter, Grand Rapids Mich | | 25 | 25 | 25 | | |
| De Standaard, Grand Rapids Mich | 65 | 65 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| De Gids, Grand Rapids Mich | | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 |
| De Gids, De Pere Wisc | | | 20 | 20 | | |
| De stem des volks, Grand Rapids Mich | | 40 | | | | |
| De Vryheidsbanier, Grand Rapids Mich | 40 | 40 | | | | |
| De Calvinist, Grand Rapids, Mich | | | | | | 37 |
| Onze Standaard, Green Bay Wisc | 60 | 60 | 60 | | | |
| De Hollandsch-Belgische Amerikaan, de Pere | | | | 60 | | |
| Onze Toekomst, Chicago | | | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 |
| De Hope, Holland Mich | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| De Grondwet, Holland Mich | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| De Hollander, Holland Mich | 16 | | | | | |
| De Hollandsche Amerikaan, Kalamozoo, Mich | 60 | 40 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| De Volksvriend, Orange City Ia | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 |
| De Vrye Hollander, Orange City | | | | 48 | 48 | 48 |
| De Telegraaf, Paterson N.J. | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Het Oosten, Paterson, NJ | | | | 60 | 30 | 30 |
| Pella's weekblad | | | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| Sioux Centre Nieuwsblad | | | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| The Holland American, Rochester, NY | | | | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Boston | | | | | | |
| Beacon 6m/6m/ /-/ | 21.67 | 24.37 | | | | |
| Globe / 4m/4m / /12m | 40 | 32 | | 182.5 | 250 | |
| Herald /4m/4 m/ /12m | 32 | 32 | | 273.8 | | |
| Transcript /4m/4m / /12m | 76.8 | 72.8 | | 138.1 | 138 | 312 |
| Journal /4m/4m/ /-/ | 43.2 | 43.2 | | | | |
| Boston Christian Science Monitor ////6m | | | | | | 390 |
| Boston City Directory | | | | 5.85 | 4 | |
| Boston Satchel Guide | | | | | 15 | |
| Chicago ill | | | | | | |
| Stoelkers Guide | 39 | 39 | | | | |
| Chicago Record Herald 6m/ 6 m/6m/4m/4m/4m | 81.9 | 56.6 | 100 | 100 | 90 | 90 |
| Chicago Tribune 6m/6m/ /12 m | 95.55 | 98.35 | 375.3 | 417 | 403 | 461 |
| Chicago Freire Presse | | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| Illinois StaatsZeitung | 329 | | | | | |
| Interocean/ 5m | | 52.5 | | | | |

| American newspapers, location and duration | 1894 | 1897 | 1903 | 1907 | 1910 | 1913 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Las Novedades | 100 | | | | | |
| Los Angeles Times | | | | | 75 | 218 |
| Meriden Record ////6m/6m | | | | | 33 | 33 |
| Milwaukee/ Herald | | | 70 | 70 | | |
| Minneapolis Journal /-/6m/6m | | | 128.4 | 23.4 | | |
| Minneapolis Tribune ////6m/6m | | | | | 96 | 94 |
| Montreal Gazette | | | 92.4 | 48 | | |
| Montreal La Presse ///6m/6m | | | | | 103 | 131 |
| New Heaven Journal & Courier /- /6m/6m/6m | | | | 28 | 28 | 40 |
| New Orleans Times Democrat /-/6m/4m/6m/6m | | | 110 | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| New Orleans Picayune /- / 4m/6m/6m | | | | 70 | 70 | 94 |
| New Heaven Leader -/-6m/-/-/- | | | 33.75 | | | |
| Norfolk Public Ledger /- / 3m/ 3m/3m | | | 81 | 36 | 33 | 33 |
| Omaha Beach /6m | | | 176.4 | | | |
| Philadelphia Ledger /6m /6m/ 4m/4m /4m | 163.8 | | 323.4 | 160 | 158 | 156 |
| Philadelphia Record //// 4m/4m | | | | | 128 | 156 |
| Providence Journal //6m/6m/6m/6m | | | 81.5 | 93.45 | 115 | 153 |
| Rochester Democrat Chronicle -/-6m/-/-/- | | | 118.86 | | | |
| Saint Paul Pioneer Press & Dispatch 6m/6m/6m | | | 109.2 | 29.28 | 94 | 125 |
| San Francisco Call | | | | 37.44 | 37 | 225 |
| San Francisco Chronicle | | | | 62.4 | 62 | 187 |
| San Francisco Democrat | | | | 60 | | |
| San Francisco Argonaut | | | | 48.75 | | |
| Springfield Republican /-/6m/6m/6m/6m | | | 48 | 48 | 55 | 55 |
| Syracuse Herald -/6m/-/-/- | | | 87.36 | | | |
| Troy Record N.J. /3m / /- | 14.18 | | | | | |
| Utica Herald Dispatch /6m | | | 37.25 | | | |
| Viginian Pilot /- / 3m/3m/3m | | | | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| Winnipeg Free Press /6m | | | | | | 140 |
| Winnipeg Telegram | | | | | | 100 |
| Miscellaneous | | | | | | |
| American Golf | | | 180 | | | |
| Annual Report Netherlands Chamber of Commerce | | | | 13 | 20 | 20 |
| Badischer Volksfest Verein | | | | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| Bischoff Calendar | | 10 | | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| By Rail and Water | | | | | | 75 |
| Calender Morgen Journal | | | 95 | | | |
| Cooks Guide / Traveller's Gazette | | 125 | 125 | 150 | 150 | 150 |
| Courier de France | | 12 | | | | |
| Detroit Journal | | | 64.25 | | | |
| Der Deutsche in Amerika | | | 100 | | | |
| Dutch Fare Program | | | 50 | | | |
| Eendracht maakt Macht | | | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Glas Naroda | | | 35 | | | |
| Guide Franco Americain | | | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| Grosser NY Burger & Bauer Calendar | | | | 45 | 45 | 45 |
| Hotel America | | | 30 | | | |
| Kartford Lampoon | | | 12.5 | | | |
| Kawkab American | 25 | 150 | | | | |

| American newspapers, location and duration | 1894 | 1897 | 1903 | 1907 | 1910 | 1913 |
|---|----------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Liedich's Traveller's Guide | | | | | | 100 |
| L'union Francaise | | | 10 | | | |
| Medical Record | | | 200 | | | |
| medical Times | | | 180 | | | |
| Minneapolis Beuer & Bauer Kal | | | | 30 | | |
| Nederlandsche Stamdag Programma | | | | | | 25 |
| Ocean Sailings | | | | | | 50 |
| Oldenburg Verein Journal | | | | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Old World Tourist Guide | | | 30 | | | |
| Plastic Catalogue | | | | 15 | | |
| Photo Era | | | | | | 125 |
| Schweizer Calendar | | | 50 | | | |
| Stockler's Guide | | | 39 | | | |
| Szabadszag Calendar | | | | 275 | 250 | |
| Toronto Art Club Catalogue | | | | 20 | | |
| Traveller's & Shipper's Mail Guide | | | | 39 | | 39 |
| Union Chretienne des Jeunes Gens | | | | 12 | 25 | |
| US Tobacco Journal | | | 250 | | | |
| Women's Art Association of Canada | | | | | 20 | 20 |
| Yale Courant | | | 25 | | | |
| Extra Minneapolis | | | 234 | | | |
| Extra advertising Steamship Rotterdam | | 502.2 | | | | |
| Total | 3714.43 | 4582.8 | 9183.2 | 7867 | 8066 | 10983 |