The European Union Response to Emergencies
A Sociological Neo-Institutionalist Approach

Cécile WENDLING

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

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Abstract

Disasters can strike at any time and can be of various types: natural like the Tsunami of 2004 that left over 300,000 people dead or man-made like the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah fighters. In face of the recurrence of major emergencies both inside and outside the EU borders, EU governments agreed in 2001 to set up a system which would allow them to pool their resources. The Council Decision of 2001 created the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) relying on the so-called Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), as the crisis centre for civil protection located in Brussels at the European Commission. In 2005, another major step was made regarding EU emergency management, with the creation of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA). These arrangements, which are legally dealt with by the Council, were developed to share information, ensure coordination and collective decision-making at EU level in an emergency. It is dealt with by the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen). These two new organizational structures of EU emergency management, the MIC and the SitCen, and the two new organizational architectures of EU emergency management (commission- and council- based) are the object of my research.

I address the question of their creation, adoption and implementation, developing a sociological neo-institutionalist approach based on the concept of divergent isomorphism. Incorporating an agency aspect, I demonstrate thanks to the use of the process-tracing method that new EU organizational structures emerged in an institutional context of fight for legitimacy: On the one hand, EU officials relying on input-legitimacy based on the isomorphically copied model; On the other hand, national officials relying on output-legitimacy drawn from their actions during crises. Thus, I contribute to the development of both EU integration theory in the field of security and organizational theory in the field of emergency management.
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Acronyms

CCA   Crisis Coordination Arrangements
CCPM  Community Civil Protection Mechanism
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIVCOM Committee for Civilian aspects of Crisis Management
COGIC Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives
DG    Directorate General
DG ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
DG ENV European Commission Environment
DG RELEX European Commission External Relations
DfID  Department for International Development (UK)
EC    European Commission
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
EU    European Union
EU MS European Union Military Staff
GDACS General Disaster Alert and Coordination System
HEWS  Humanitarian Early Warning System
ICMA  Integrated Crisis Management Arrangements
JRC   Joint Research Centre of the European Commission
MIC   Monitoring and Information Centre
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSC   Political and Security Committee
PROCIV Council working party of civil protection
SitCen Joint Situation Centre
UN    United Nations

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INTRODUCTION
Introduction

Disasters can strike at any time and can be of various types: natural like the Tsunami of 2004 that left over 300,000 people dead or man-made like the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah fighters.\(^1\) Between 1998 and 2002, natural and man-made disasters affected more than 7 million people and caused at least 60 billion EUR of insured losses, in Europe only.\(^2\) Whatever the cause, getting help to victims is often a race against time. The aid and assistance that arrive in a disaster zone in the first days are paramount, because it can make the difference between an emergency brought under control or degenerating into a major humanitarian crisis. All Member States have a history of dealing with major emergencies and all Member States have their national structures of emergency response. But in 2001, EU governments agreed to set up a system which would allow them to pool their resources. The Council Decision of 2001 created an advanced emergency management mechanism called the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) relying on the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) in Brussels at the European Commission.\(^3\) The MIC is where emergencies are managed at EU level. The MIC gathers the requests of affected countries and coordinates the offers of the States participating in the CCPM so as to have them match the request. In 2005, another significant step was taken regarding EU emergency management, with the creation of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA).\(^4\) These


arrangements which are under the responsibility of the Council were developed to share information, ensure coordination and collective decision-making at EU level in an emergency. It is managed by the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen). These two new organizational structures of EU emergency management, the Monitoring and Information Centre and the Joint Situation Centre, and the two new organizational architectures of EU emergency management (commission- and council-based) are the object of my research.

What is the puzzle?

Why after major earthquakes\(^5\) and storms\(^6\) occurring in or close to the EU and after the 9-11 Terrorist attacks on US soil, was a community mechanism for civil protection created at the commission level, whereas after the London bombings in 2005 the EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) were created at Council level, strengthening the EU intergovernmental response to crisis? The EU Member States decided within a few years to create two different organizational structures in the same field. They chose to create a community mechanism in the field of emergency management, which is closely related to security and hence state sovereignty. Usually, States are not eager to use the community method when security is involved. Member States added a Council-based cross-pillar decision-making arrangement four years after the implementation of the CCPM, in an attempt to counterbalance the community method used with the CCPM. However, the CCA are poorly linked to the CCPM from an organizational point of view. The CCA are indeed linked to the General Secretariat of the European Commission and not directly to the MIC located at the Directorate General Environment. Moreover, the CCA have never been used in a real emergency, although they are under the stricter control of Member States. So far, it has

\(^5\) A 6.8 earthquake hit Italy in the 1980s and a 7.4 earthquake hit Turkey in August 1999, according to the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System, www.gdacs.org.

\(^6\) Storms hit France, Germany and Denmark in 1999.
always been the CCPM coordinated at Commission level that has been activated. As a matter of fact, even in the case of the Lebanon crisis of 2006, which was described in the media as a “war situation”, the CCPM was used to cope with the crisis rather than the CCA. This observation concerning EU modes of response to emergencies contradicts the common “Westphalian order” argument according to which, in the field of security, Member States prefer to avoid developing EU supranational structures and will always adopt EU frameworks preserving all their sovereignty and control.⁷

I seek to explain the adoption of two different organizational models, architectures and structures aimed at coping with emergencies (the CCPM first and then the CCA), and to compare organizational model adoption and model rejection. While the CCA were adopted in 2005, an enhanced version of the CCPM was rejected. I also investigate the consequences of the emergence of EU emergency management in Brussels on a day-to-day basis and in the field during emergencies, by addressing the case of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah forces. I examine creation, adoption and implementation. Explaining why two organizational structures were created, adopted, and why one emergency management structure has been used and not the other so far, is crucial to understand the construction of the EU response to emergencies.

Why should we care?

First, this research contributes to the study of the organizational consequences of new security concepts, such as those of societal security or functional security.⁸ Climate change and terrorism are now high on the security agenda, and it is important to study

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⁷ The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) stresses the central importance of the sovereign nation state. International relations contemporary studies often portray the world as partitioned into states, which, in the international political sphere, prefer a lack of strong collective institutions and few rules, as they are said to face a lot of conflicts of interests.

how the European Union actors deal with these risks and threats in terms of creating new mechanisms and arrangements. The environment has been a major issue since the 1990s\(^9\) and it has become even more salient with the conclusion of the UN panel on climate change.\(^10\) The consequences of climate change on civil protection are paramount, as more and more heat-waves, tornadoes, storms, etc can occur, which need the adaptation of actors to cope with the higher probability of their occurrence. 9/11 and later the Madrid bombings occurring on 11 March 2004 and the London bombings taking place on 7 July 2005 have raised the issue of terrorism.

The common point between the risks linked to climate change and the threat of terrorism having an impact on civil protection is that they are a transnational threat. Moreover, they are transsector-based in nature. They touch upon environment, security, health, etc. They mix EU internal and external issues. This creates a situation where new types of organizational architecture are needed. From a broader perspective, this research contributes to the analysis of the organizational and institutional changes linked to the new sociological trends: adaptation of organizations to a “risk society”\(^{11}\) and to a “liquid society”,\(^{12}\) both concepts underlining the change in perception of risk and security in today’s world. Therefore, to sum up, the puzzle is important because it should help understand the creation of a new EU security architecture to adapt to these new security challenges.

Second, this research contributes to evaluating EU integration theory in the field of emergency management. Researchers often study police cooperation at EU level,\(^{13}\) EU

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\(^{10}\) Chapter 19 of the IPCC report on climate change available online on the webpage of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, UNEP: [http://www.ipcc.ch/](http://www.ipcc.ch/).


intelligence service cooperation,\textsuperscript{14} EU humanitarian actors cooperation,\textsuperscript{15} EU military cooperation,\textsuperscript{16} but they rarely study civil protection forces cooperation.

Answering the puzzle also means contributing to building up knowledge in the field of emergency management. Emergency management has long been a neglected field of study because extraordinary events were considered rare and unpredictable,\textsuperscript{17} But also because emergency management was only getting on the policy agenda during or after a disaster. This means that the budgets available were low. This also means that no political entities were involved to strongly support effective action in the field.\textsuperscript{18} Since 9-11, public administration and policies have been more and more involved in disaster management, specially at the “federal” level: Following the enhanced public expectation for protection, emergency management has become a key inter-organizational activity at the “federal” state both in the US and in the EU.\textsuperscript{19} This means that emergency management is more and more a profession and the field is more and more the focus of studies of researchers specialising in the domain.\textsuperscript{20} They often stressed the flaws of disaster management, in terms of lack of coherence, lack of preparedness.


\textsuperscript{19} Concerning the increase in public expectations see for the EU: Special Eurobarometer 217, Wave 62.1 “Attitude of European Citizens toward the environment – EU 25”: 46% declared themselves “worried” about disasters.

Some major disasters (e.g. Katrina, 9-11) led to special issues in public administration reviews to analyze what went wrong and what could be done better. 21 This piece of research will contribute to the emergency management studies and try to fill one of its gaps. So far, very little attention has been dedicated to a careful study of how the adoption of organizational architectures and structures has an impact on the ability of the EU to deal with emergency situations. The challenge to the EU and to the administrative theory is to understand how organizational structures of emergency management were created, adopted, how they operate concretely, and what the impact in the field is. What were the solutions found by EU public administration to have the possibility to adapt quickly and effectively when a crisis strikes? Why did the European Commission end up with some operational function in times of disaster? How did the Council manage to develop an ad-hoc structure of emergency management after the London bombings? Turning to organizational studies, the idea is to shed light on these points.

Finally answering the puzzle means investigating the process of organization emergence, from creation to adoption and later to implementation. Using a process-tracing approach, my work contributes to the study of organization emergence, looking at the gaps that can appear between the formal organizational model and the way the organizational architecture and structure are concretely implemented (i.e. phenomenon known in the literature as “decoupling”),22 but also exploring the impact a phase can have on the next one (how creation has an impact on adoption, how adoption can have an impact on implementation).

21 See for instance the December 2007 special issue of the Public Administration Review on Katrina.

By “understanding” the process of emergence of the EU crisis response, I intend to “explain” some of the aspects of the EU assistance offered to affected countries during emergencies when it comes to adoption and implementation. If “understanding” and “explaining” are often seen in the international relations studies as belonging to two separate traditions, in my thesis, I tried to reconcile these two approaches by linking sociological neo-institutionalism to agency aspects. Therefore I chose to focus on achieving a deepened and detailed historical knowledge of the emergence of the two EU organizational crisis management structures. Hence I adopted an insider perspective, looking at the organizational actors and how they defined the new institutional setting. However, I do not exclude the fact that explaining social phenomena also means observing strategic bargains between the actors involved. In fact, the literature on organizational studies often theoretically includes the potential rational conflicts between the actors to highlight some of the puzzling outcomes of the organization, even when the authors position themselves rather in the “understanding” tradition as defined by Hollis and Smith. Moreover, my attempt to combine a sociological neo-institutionalist approach with agency and entrepreneurs (e.g. Member States) is part of a larger one, driven by researchers such as Beckert. To reconcile the two traditions, the latter relies on the uncertainty concept. In my study, I intend to reconcile the two epistemological trends by showing how the phase of creation linked to the sociological neo-institutionalist concept of isomorphism still has an impact when it comes to the intensive bargaining of the phase of adoption and implementation. In addition to this theoretical argument, my empirics support the idea that “understanding” can help “explaining” : In 2007, the British and the French delegations which were opposed to each other during the adoption phase came together and produced a France-UK non-paper to the surprise of all the actors involved in civil protection at EU level, these two


countries having recurrent conflicting interests when it came to EU security and defence. This fact shows that the interests of actors debating during the adoption phase are not fixed, and can be influenced by the prior phase of creation, when it comes to adoption and implementation.

**What is EU emergency management?**

The object of this research is the emergency management capacity of the EU in the field of civil protection. I use the concept of emergency management in the field of civil protection, but no single concept exists in the literature as such. Kaunert uses the US concept of “Homeland Security” in the EU context, although this is a wording that European officials will not use. Other terms used in the EU context include concepts such as “EU disaster management”, “EU civil protection assistance”, etc. The use of the concept of “crisis management” often refers to peacekeeping or peace-building operations in the EU jargon, although it can still be found in other contexts as in the case of the “Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements” which is under scrutiny. By emergency management in the field of civil protection I mean the protection of populations and their environments (cultural heritage, means of production, etc.) from risks or threats, both from a political decision-making perspective and from an operational angle. Hence I include the political level of decision-making by the Member States and the EU actors in charge and the operational level of organizing the sending of assistance by the EU or national on-duty officers. Within the EU, I focus on the European Commission and the Council of the European Union (including its secretariat).

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27 The German Federal office for civil protection and disaster assistance (BBK), which is the German administration in charge of emergency management at federal level, uses the expression of “EU disaster management”. See for instance: [http://www.civil-protection.com/katastrophe/info_kongress_e.htm](http://www.civil-protection.com/katastrophe/info_kongress_e.htm).

28 The EU officials working at the MIC use the concept of « EU civil protection assistance » on their webpage. See for instance: [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mechanism.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mechanism.htm).
The role of other EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, Committee of the Regions, etc. is not examined in details, since their operational and political role in emergency management is limited. Emergencies are understood here in terms of “all-hazard”. “All-hazard” in the literature of emergency management means that natural disasters, industrial catastrophes and terrorist attacks are all encompassed. Finally, emergencies tackled by the CCPM and the CCA can occur both inside and outside the EU.

Road map

The argument of the thesis is developed in 6 chapters. The study starts out by introducing the research problem and by outlining the general analytical approach chosen. Therefore, chapter 1 focuses on the reason to opt for a sociological neo-institutionalist approach. Drawing from the sociological neo-institutionalist literature, it presents the explaining factor to be studied for the three phases of creation, adoption and implementation: that of divergent isomorphism. Accordingly, chapter 2 outlines the research methodology of the thesis. It highlights the role played by the process-tracing in the study, from model creation to model adoption and later model implementation. It aims at underlining the added value of the study of the process, showing why each phase has an impact on the following one. Moreover, chapter 2 explains the case selection, the data collection, and the use of comparison in the empirical chapters of the thesis. Comparing alternatives (at the three crucial moments of creation, adoption, and implementation) helps building the decision-tree tracing the genesis of EU emergency response. Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6 are the empirical chapters of the thesis. Chapter 3 provides detailed analyses of the creation of the CCPM and of the CCA. Chapter 4 consolidates the findings by looking at the second phase, that of model adoption. By
comparing the case of the adopted CCA to the case of the rejected “enhanced CCPM”, it contributes to the explanation of the co-existence of two EU structures of emergency response since 2006. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 focus on the implementation: Chapter 5 explores the implementation of the CCPM and of the CCA in Brussels at Commission- and Council-level, in the day-to-day practice. Chapter 6 investigates the implementation in the field of the CCPM during emergencies. It compares the cases of the Pakistan earthquake (October 2005) with the Lebanon crisis (Summer 2006). It analyzes the way Member States sent assistance in the field, using the CCPM or using other available channels of assistance (national channel, NATO channel, UN channel, etc.) and explains why discrepancies exist in the way EU Member States respond to emergencies.30

30 Chapter 6 does not investigate the CCA implementation during emergencies because the CCA have never been activated for real crisis and emergency situations so far. The CCA have only been used in the context of exercises.
THEORY
Chapter 1:  
EU integration in Emergency Management:  
A framework of analysis

In this chapter, I present and discuss the analytical framework guiding my research. My analysis is grounded in sociological neo-institutionalist arguments applied to the field of emergency management. Sociological neo-institutionalism is a theoretical perspective at the crossroad between institutionalism and organizational studies. Schwok locates sociological neo-institutionalism in a theoretical field close to that of constructivism. She links sociological neo-institutionalism to discursive approaches, where studying actors’ interactions helps to understand their processes of social learning and of decision-making through persuasion.

To what extent can sociological neo-institutionalism highlight the emergence of a double EU emergency management framework? The research highlights both the intended and the unanticipated parts of the emergence process of EU emergency management. My goal is to reconcile sociological neo-institutionalism with agency in the new concept of “divergent isomorphism”.

The analytical framework detailed in this chapter will be used to understand three phases in the emergence of the two EU models of emergency management: the creation phase, the adoption phase and the implementation phase. These three steps were already identified in the literature as necessary to analyze organizations, in particular in their way to face crisis situations. As McKeown asks: “If plans or routines govern much

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31 Also known in the literature as « normative institutionalism » and “organizational institutionalism”. I use the concept of sociological neo-institutionalism as most of the authors (e.g. Hall and Taylor, diMaggio and Powell, Meyer and Rowan, etc) do. But a minority of authors like Peters prefers to use the concept of normative isomorphism to refer to the same theoretical trend. Others like Campbell and Pedersen use the concept of organizational institutionalism.

of what organizations do, then what governs their creation, adoption and implementation?” 33 Studying “creation” means exploring explanatory factors for the drafting of written documents at the basis of an organizational model. It means looking at the role of EU or national bureaucrats drafting the first version of a text to be discussed. Studying “adoption” means investigating explanatory factors for the formal approval of the organizational model by relevant decision-makers. It means looking at the role of Member States decision-makers when trying to have a model adopted or rejected. Studying “implementation” means exploring the practice of actors when they respond to emergencies at EU level and in the field. It means looking at the practice of emergency responders as matching with or diverging from the model.

In the creation phase, the agency aspect is represented by bureaucrats in their choice of the model to be copied. This is what I call divergent isomorphism. In the adoption phase, the agency aspect is represented by Member States decision-makers in their choice of strategic discourse to have a model adopted or rejected. This is linked to the previous phase of creation as the model copied is imposing a wording and some linkages between ideas that are used by the Member States decision-makers. In the implementation phase, there is a combination of both bureaucratic and political actors from the EU level and from the national Member States level. They all try to legitimate their action either by referring to the model as created or by justifying divergence with the models. This is where what I call the decoupling is important to explain the practices of actors and the agency aspect. In conclusion, I argue that the process from creation to implementation is driven by the competition between formal model legitimacy (input legitimacy) and by strategic actions of actors drawing legitimacy from their result (output legitimacy). Although this is salient in each of the phases, this aspect can not be a substitute for the examination of the other main sociological neo-institutionalist processes that shape the selection and implementation of an organizational model, namely the diffusion process during the phase of creation (isomorphism), the sense-

making/interpretation process during the phase of adoption (discourse) and the learning process, during the phase of implementation. However I show that those purely neo-institutionalist aspects need to be combined with agency to explain the emergence of EU structures of emergency management.

This chapter is organized as follows: First I show that both emergency management functionalist arguments and rational neo-institutionalist arguments based on principal-agent do not account for the existence of a double structure of EU emergency management: Neither the need for redundancy nor an alleged attempt by states to gain control over “EU agent” are enough to elucidate the puzzle under scrutiny. Second, I show that the historical neo-institutionalist approach has a limited added value to solve the puzzle. Third, the chapter contrasts the previously presented argumentation with elements of sociological neo-institutionalist theory, which accounts more fully for the imperfection of the existing EU double emergency organizational architecture and structure, than rational and historical neo-institutionalism. Drawing on the concept of isomorphism, the subsequent section outlines a research gap in the existing literature on isomorphism and develops a set of specific research questions for this thesis. Developing the concept of “divergent isomorphism”, I explain why different actors copied different organizational models, a situation which led to the creation of two parallel EU organizational models of emergency management.

1. EU emergency response: the limits of rational design

One way to analyze EU emergency response is to interpret its creation, adoption and implementation in a rational design perspective. According to this perspective, actions are driven by expectation of consequences among rational actors pursuing their interests. Organizational design comes after the analysis of different functional alternatives (centralised/decentralised, top-down/bottom up). Actors try to build the most efficient organization. Two fields of literature give rational design explanations for the observation of the existence of a double EU structure of emergency response (CCPM
& CCA). On the one hand, the emergency management literature develops the concept of redundancy to explain the duplication with a functional argument. On the other hand, the EU integration literature based on rational neo-institutionalism, mainly principal-agent theory, analyzes the way states manage to remain in control and limit the power of the European Commission by duplicating the same structure but at Council level. This section briefly introduces these two approaches and highlights their explanations of the puzzle under scrutiny. This section presents these two approaches based on a rational design perspective which were the starting point of the research process but which will not be those adopted in this study.

1.1. Emergency management literature: Building redundancy?

The starting point of my research was the observation that authors of emergency management coming in a large majority from the US explain the creation of a federal level of emergency management coordination with functional arguments based on the expected efficiency of the structures. They argue that the choices of organizational architecture and structure of emergency management are salient, because the design adopted is supposed to be robust, and withstand the various potential shocks that inevitably befall them. Hence, having a federal layer of control is presented as necessary to coordinate the network of actors involved both operationally and strategically. This idea has been strongly represented on the political scene in the US since 9/11. The US

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34 Redundancy means the duplication of critical components of a system with a view to increasing its reliability. In organizational science, it means the existence of two organizational structures, one being able to back up the other in case of emergencies.


studies focus on the governmental system of emergency management from the federal to the local level and they mostly explore the emergency management system through network analysis - they sometimes include more than governmental institutions in their analysis, going from non-profit to business ones.37 Doing so, they test different characteristics of an emergency network. For instance, they explore the degree of centrality needed in an emergency network, they investigate top-down vs. bottom-up approaches of emergency management, etc. Moreover, the authors focusing on the organizational architecture and structure from a rational design perspective often mention in lists of “best practices” that redundancies are needed to functionally ensure continuity management in emergency response.38 This principle of redundancy could explain why two EU emergency management structures (CCPM and CCA) were created.

Switching from a public administration political perspective to an organizational perspective, building redundancy is a way to ameliorate the robustness of the organization. According to Sagan, theories based on the concept of «high reliability organizations» underline the fact that the leadership must allocate resources for emergencies, both in terms of money (investment) and in terms of human skills development (training).39 In high reliability organizations, planning for safety means incorporating organizational redundancy (e.g. organizational architecture which allows duplication) to avoid individual cognitive failures.40 A robust culture must also socialize people to assimilate safety issues, making safety part of their routines at work. This can allow for a decentralization of safety matters in the organizational architecture.


Organizational learning is based on trial and error: a past crisis - or the simulation of a possible coming crisis – allows for a constant improvement in planning.

This particular analysis of emergency management is well suited to understand the reason underlying the creation of the CCPM and CCA. First, the EU emergency response is similarly based on a principle of decentralisation: the principle of subsidiarity means that the EU intervenes only if the affected state asks for assistance. Second, the EU emergency response relying both on CCPM and the CCA similarly includes duplication. Finally, this literature is relevant because it shows that the analysis of who talks to whom, who interacts with whom and how the pattern of interaction influences action is paramount in emergency management. At the beginning of the present research project, the focus was clearly on the rational design perspective. The primary idea was consequently to analyze the CCPM and the CCA in a logic of effectiveness, assessing the degree of centralisation, the choice between a bottom-up and a top-down approach, etc. as identified in the US literature on organizations dealing with emergency situations.

It appeared quickly that this was not reflecting the logic at stake when conducting the empirical field work. Interviewees in charge of creating the CCPM and the CCA were not mentioning choices in terms of organizational structures to guarantee effectiveness. They did not reflect on alternatives such as flat or hierarchical structure, top-down or bottom up structure, decentralised or centralised structure. On the contrary, they mentioned adopting directly an organizational model which they already knew. They mentioned copying a model which was in their span of attention. This is why the current research started focusing on sociological neo-institutionalism, probing around the concept of isomorphism to highlight the sometimes irrational aspects of the organizational architectures and structures which were investigated at EU level. In a nutshell, if the present study aims at exploring the organizational architecture and structure of EU emergency management and its impact, it is not based on rational design perspective. It rather argues that the historical process of creation of the organizational structures and later of their adoption and implementation matters to
understand the practice in a logic of appropriateness. The present study also includes literature of EU integration which can highlight the political process of creation and adoption of new EU structure, departing from functional reasoning. This is what will be presented in the next section. However, before turning to sociological neo-institutionalism, I would like to mention that similarly to the emergency management literature, part of the literature on EU integration explains that new EU organizational architectures and structures emerge from a rational design perspective. I will now turn to rational neo-institutionalism using principal-agent theory and explain why I do not use this analytical framework in my research.

1.2. Principal-agent theory: Enhancing Member States’ control?

Principal-agent theory is the part of the rational neo-institutionalist perspective which was primarily used to explain EU integration. For instance Garrett and Weingast use principal-agent theory to demonstrate that the EU legal system is in fact consistent with member states interests. This theory explores the delegation of a task from a principal to an agent. The principal-agent theory developed to explain EU integration processes stipulates that new structures appear, when States (principals) rationally delegate to EU actors (agents) a part of their task. Rationalist neo-institutionalist authors show that states use EU to reach their own objectives. For instance, Moravcsik suggest that Member States government are used to limiting the supranational autonomy of EU

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41 In this study, « the logic of appropriateness » is understood in the sense of March and Olsen’s seminal formulation : The logic of appropriateness refers to rule-based action of actors, conceived as the « matching of a situation to the demands of a position. », see: March, J. and J. Olsen (1989): Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York, the Free Press, page 23.

actors and controlling their action so as to achieve their own objectives.\textsuperscript{43} Delegation can only be decided because Member States are sure that the EU institutions are under their tight monitoring (possibility of sanctions, etc). Member States want EU institutions to remain under their control. By contrast, EU institutions designed as “empty vessels” try in a tug-of-war with States to find margins of initiative to develop their autonomy.\textsuperscript{44} This theoretical framework could help explain the puzzle of a EU double structure of emergency management. This theory could explain why, after the European Commission had gained much more autonomy through the CCPM, the EU Member States created the CCA, not based at the European Commission but at the Council, and hence more directly under their own control.

This theoretical framework is of interest because there is a permanent tug-of-war between the Member States and the EU institutions, in which both of them try to keep initiative and control. However, this approach often leads to conclusions showing that inter-governmentalism prevails in the field of security and crisis management. Security is described as a field where EU Member States are keen to keep their sovereignty intact.\textsuperscript{45} Some authors stress that the creation of EU structures in the difficult field of crisis management is sometimes considered as “a bridge too far” or less strongly as: “possibly too soon”.\textsuperscript{46} They also mention that other structures could be seen as more appropriate, like NATO.

However, the CCPM is a community mechanism in the field of security. This shows that even in the strategic field of security, Member States can go as far as adopting a community mechanism, and even as giving the green light to the European


Commission to monitor crisis responses like in Lebanon in 2006. Moreover, the CCA were never used in practice - even in this case of the Lebanon crisis. It had been adopted by states against reinforcement of the CCPM. But the practice shows that the Community Mechanism continues to prevail over an intergovernmental structure. Thus Member States do not simply behave as principals trying to control EU agents. This is why the principal-agent rational perspective is not appropriate to explain the puzzle under scrutiny.

1.3. The limited use of rational neo-institutionalist theory

In this section, I have shown that rational answers based on a logic of consequentiality do not work, may they be based on a functional logic of redundancy or on principal-agent theory. More generally, rational neo-institutionalist theory can not help to solve the puzzle entirely. Actors do integrate actions that can maximize the attainment of their own preferences and I recognize the fact that strategic interaction among actors plays a role in the shaping of new institutions. Nevertheless, I think this analysis, particularly well suited to explain the phase of adoption of a new organizational structure (i.e. where Member States from the North and Member States from the South confront their perspectives on civil protection), does not work when it comes to explaining the creation of the first draft documents defining an organizational model and the implementation phase. During these phases, organizational routines and the logic of appropriateness predominate. I show that because actors are used to certain practices, they have a tendency to reproduce them. Having briefly explained why rational design perspective can not fully help to solve the puzzle, section 3 turns to sociological neo-institutionalism and investigates how this field of theory provides tools to explain the EU emergency response from 2001 to 2006. However, before going into

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this, I first explain in section 2 why the historical neo-institutionalist view was also rejected in this study.48

2. EU emergency response: the limit of historical neo-institutionalism

While historical neo-institutionalism could contribute to this research, my focus will be on sociological neo-institutionalism.

2.1. The contribution of historical neo-institutionalists

The contribution of historical neo-institutionalism in this study is twofold: First, historical neo-institutionalism is useful to consider the existence of path dependent patterns in a process of emergence of institutions. Second, historical neo-institutionalism was the first neo-institutionalist branch to reject the notion that politics can be separated from the public administration. This statement holds true here.

The interesting aspect of historical neo-institutionalist theories to study the EU emergency management is the consideration of path dependence and unintended consequences leading to the persistence of certain practices.49 Using process-tracing, I will show that certain path-dependent patterns exist as defined by Pierson and that sometimes unintended consequences can happen (in particular in the case of activation of the CCPM by default during the Lebanon crisis in 2006).50 From this perspective, it is possible to say that institutions provide cognitive templates of interpretation that can have an impact on the process of development of an institution in the sense of stabilising

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48 According to Hall and Taylor, three types of neo-institutionalism must be considered: rational neo-institutionalism, historical neo-institutionalism and sociological neo-institutionalism. This is the reason why it is necessary to explain why sociological neo-institutionalism was used rather than the rational and the historical perspectives.


its use. In addition, the added value of historical neo-institutionalism is that this approach stresses the interdependence of multiple causable variables in their interactive effects.\(^{51}\) According to historical neo-institutionalists like Steinmo, history is not a chain of independent events. It is hence by tracing the historical process of emergence of an institution that it is possible to explain its existence and the way it works.

Moreover, historical neo-institutionalism is partially relevant here because it was one of the first branches of neo-institutionalism which rejected the notion that politics can be separated from the public administration.\(^{52}\) We will see that the practices of EU administrative officials play a great role in the explanation of the outcome. They are the shapers of the first draft documents leading to political adoption.

Nevertheless historical neo-institutionalism has some limits which led to the adoption of a rather sociological neo-institutionalist approach to solve the puzzle under study.

### 2.2. The limited use of the historical neo-institutionalist approach

The three limits of the historical neo-institutionalist approach are the following: first, sociological neo-institutionalist approach is better suited to explain change than the historical neo-institutionalist approach. Second, the units of analysis of historical neo-institutionalists are usually located at a more macro level. Historical neo-institutionalist theories usually deal with states, economies, or markets. On the contrary, sociological neo-institutionalists follow a meso level analysis taking organizations as the main level of analysis. This fitted better the object of study which is the organizations which emerged at EU level in the field of emergency management. Finally, because the question of legitimacy is not under scrutiny in the historical neo-institutionalist

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approach whereas it plays a role in the field of emergency management at EU level, I adopted a sociological neo-institutionalist approach, which strongly emphasizes the analysis of the legitimacy aspects.

As pointed out by Peters, the historical neo-institutionalist approach is more relevant to understand persistence than changes. This is an element of the historical neo-institutionalist paradigm which is often stressed in the literature comparing the three types of neo-institutionalism that played a great role in my choice of the sociological paradigm. Indeed, in my case, the several changes that occurred in the process of emergence of EU emergency management are what I wanted to explain. (e.g. the adoption of the CCA in a context where the CCPM had already been implemented, the implementation of the CCPM by default in war context although the CCA could have been used, etc). This led me to focus on the sociological neo-institutionalist approach so as to understand the different patterns of evolution of both the CCPM and the CCA, evidenced the different stages where changes could occur (creation, adoption and implementation). I adopted the sociological neo-institutionalist perspective rather than the historical neo-institutionalist one, because changes are not the exception and because changes are not necessarily originating from external events. On the contrary, Krasner or Thelen use historical neo-institutionalist concepts such as “punctuated equilibrium” or the “dynamic constraints model” which require an external event for change to occur, changes remaining exceptional and stability being the rule.


54 The way historical neo-institutionalists incorporate changes is through the concept of “punctuated equilibrium”, but this concept has limited relevance here for two reasons: first Krasner, who developed the concept, posits that institutions are characterized by long periods of stability, punctuated by crises. In my case, I do not see long periods of stability, and I do not see crisis as entailing direct changes. In my research changes exist prior to the occurrence of the crisis. Second, Krasner explains that the changes come from the external environment. In my research, I incorporate internal aspects as well. The combination of internal aspects is present in the work of Thelen in her “dynamic constraints model”, but always as a response to external events. In my case, the external event is not always a pre-requisit. For these two reasons I did not use the concept of punctuated equilibrium nor the “dynamic constraints model” coming from the historical neo-institutionalist perspective. About these two concepts, see: Krasner, S.D. (1984): “Approaches to the state: alternative conceptions and historical dynamics”, in: Comparative politics, Vol. 15, n°32, (January 1984), pages 223-246 and Thelen, K. (1991): Union of parts: Labor politics in postwar Germany, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Moreover, because I concentrate more precisely in this study on organizational aspects, aspects which are played down by historical neo-institutionalists, I rely on sociological neo-institutionalism. Historical neo-institutionalism focuses on explaining national political economies, on analysing similarity or difference between democratic states, or on comparing markets or health care systems at a more macro level of analysis.\footnote{Illustration of the fact that historical neo-institutionalists adopt a macro approach (working on units of analysis such as states, labor market or national economies) can be found here: Lichbach M. and Zuckerman A. (ed.) (1997): \textit{Comparative politics: rationality, culture, and structure}, New York, Cambridge University Press or Steinmo, S., Thelen, K., Longstreth, F. (1992): \textit{Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.} On the contrary sociological neo-institutionalism follows a more micro level of analysis and encompasses organizational studies. The units of analysis of sociological neo-institutionalists are most of the time the organizations. More precisely, sociological neo-institutionalists focus on the reason for the emergence of particular types of organizational structures and architectures. According to Hall and Taylor, “the problematic that sociological neo-institutionalists typically adopt seeks explanation for why organizations take on specific sets of institutional forms, procedures and symbols; and it emphasizes how such practices are diffused through organizational fields or across nations. They are interested for instance in explaining the striking similarities in organizational form and practice (…)”\footnote{in: Hall, P.A., Taylor, R.C.R. (1996): “Political science and the three new institutionalisms”, in: \textit{Political Studies}, Vol. 44, n°5, page 946.} This is exactly what my research is about: identifying why two EU organizational structures and architectures for emergency management emerged and why they are copies of already established organizational models. My goal is to stress how organizations originate and change over time. Therefore, the micro/meso level focusing on organizations was more appropriate in my research than the macro one.

Another reason why sociological neo-institutionalism is more suited than historical neo-institutionalism is linked to the issue of the social legitimacy of actors. According to sociological neo-institutionalists, legitimacy is one of the criteria which can explain the creation, the adoption and the implementation of organizational structures. Because
actors seek legitimacy, they can adopt practices that are dysfunctional with regard to the achievement of the organization’s formal goals. Legitimacy, which plays a great role in my study, in particular when addressing isomorphism and its consequences when it comes to implementation, is an aspect which is not considered as such by historical neo-institutionalists.

In a nutshell, because sociological neo-institutionalists are better placed to elucidate organizational aspects in their changes and legitimacy issues, I have adopted their theoretical framework rather than that of rationalist or historical neo-institutionalists. This does not mean that I reject any interpretation of my cases in terms of power relations (rational perspective) or path dependence (historical perspective). Both play a role in my study but they are not the main explanatory factors accounting for the co-existence of two EU emergency management structures, one being used and the other not. Each of the paradigms of neo-institutionalism (rational, historical and sociological) is “motivated by a different problematic,” 57 and the one closer to the question at stake here is that of the sociological neo-institutionalists.

3. The emergence of two models of EU emergency response: A sociological neo-institutionalist answer

Sociological neo-institutionalist theories (also known as “organizational institutionalism”) 58 account for the imperfection of organizational designs, and often tackle the question of duplication of organizational architectures and structures. Sociological neo-institutionalism underlines how organizational models are imperfect. It shows that political, historical or symbolic issues can prevail when it comes to designing


organization. This means apparently functional models could have been created for other types of reasons than those of being efficient in practice.

According to emergency management theorists, this is particularly true nowadays in the field of emergency and crisis management due to the politization and mediatization of crisis.\textsuperscript{59} Political actors know that an unexpected crisis could bring them to the centre of the political and media attention. Therefore, to avoid the risk of being under scrutiny, they might adopt emergency and crisis management procedures more to prove they had done something to anticipate disasters rather than guarantee the most effective crisis response.\textsuperscript{60} When adopting a crisis and emergency management tool, they will not focus on its effectiveness, but on the legitimacy it can have, so as to cover for their choices.

This is why sociological neo-institutionalism is relevant. Contrary to other previously described theoretical perspectives, sociological neo-institutionalists show that organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and rules defined by prevailing organizational models.\textsuperscript{61} It means that the nature of its founders and its foundation can greatly influence the nature of the organization.\textsuperscript{62} Sociological neo-institutionalists show that organizational structures come from actors who recognize a situation as close to a familiar one and hence copy the model they know when creating a new one. This process known as isomorphism will be presented in details in this section.

Sociological neo-institutionalists explain that organizational structures come from actors


who blindly create a model without looking at what others do around them. This myopia of actors can contribute to a growing number of situations in which two organizational structures of an entity have exactly the same functions although being independent structures. Sociological neo-institutionalists show an organizational architecture and structure is adopted when the new model proposed matches the culture and history of actors but also when the model proposed enhances the legitimacy of actors. This can explain why certain models which are not the most efficient can be adopted. They show finally that once a model is adopted it often can continue to be used by default.

Sociological neo-institutionalists focusing on organizations in a logic of appropriateness highlight the fact that, in their process of figuring out which behaviour is best appropriate, actors in charge often imitate an organizational architecture and structure pre-existing in another context. It is stressed that uncertainty (here emergency is linked to a situation of high uncertainty) increases the bounded rationality effect and entails imitation. The concept used to depict this phenomenon is that of isomorphism.

I show in this section that exploring this notion can help us account for the creation of the CCPM and then of the CCA, as well as the consequences when crisis strikes.


67 The concept of bounded rationality means that humans can not take rational decisions because they have finite computational resources and can be overloaded with information (particularly in the event of an emergency). Originally the term was coined by Herbert Simon. Since then, it has often been used in organizational studies to explain the failures of organizations. See: Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press and Simon, H.A. (1996): Models of my Life, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press.

Institutional theories have often been criticised for their lack of consideration of the role of organizational self-interest and active agency in organizational response. Opting for isomorphism means here that both the role of the environment and of the agency factors will be incorporated in the institutionalist approach. Isomorphism will be used in a way to accommodate the interest-seeking active organizational behaviour. Authors have tried several times to accommodate the interest-seeking behaviour of actors and institutional change and it often remained one of the problems facing institutional organization theory: “The relationship between interests and institutions remains a point which needs further clarification. (...) This holds true because it remains unclear how rule-following and entrepreneurial optimizing can be brought together without giving up the crucial insight of the new institutionalism in which rules and scripts appear to agents as taken-for-granted”. For instance, Beckert uses the concept of “uncertainty” to link an institutionalist approach to some agency aspects. In my case, I want to show how using the concept of isomorphism I can integrate and even explain heterogeneity in a field integrating agency aspects. This is what the next section will explain going from the concept of “isomorphism” to that of “divergent isomorphism” used here.

3.1. From isomorphism to “divergent isomorphism”

In this section, I present and analyze the concept of isomorphism: First, I define the concept. Second, I investigate its usage. Third, I explore the use of the concept of isomorphism in the context of EU integration studies. This will contribute to the introduction of the analytical framework chosen here.

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3.1.1. What is isomorphism?

The authoritative article regarding the “theory of organizational isomorphism” is that of DiMaggio and Powell published in 1983. They used isomorphism to explain homogenization of organizational structure in a given field, i.e. in a set of organizations attempting to carry on a common enterprise. They define isomorphism as a constraining process which forces an organization in a field to adopt an organizational structure to resemble other organizations facing the same set of environmental conditions. Organizational structures are created in order to increase their compatibility with the environment. This is due to the fact that organizations in a field compete for resources and customers (competitive isomorphism). It is also due to the fact that organizations compete for power and institutional legitimacy (institutional isomorphism).

DiMaggio and Powell focus on institutional isomorphism and identify in their article three mechanisms through which this institutional isomorphic change can occur: coercive isomorphism that is linked to the political influence of a government; mimetic isomorphism which is associated with standard imitated response in times of uncertainty; and normative isomorphism which is associated with the professionalisation of actors in charge. The concept of “model” adopted here is used in the literature, as well as that of “organizational form”, “template for organizing” or

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72 The expression “theory of organizational isomorphism” is used by Powell and DiMaggio in their authoritative article published in 1983. I use « isomorphism » as a theory (as defined by Van Evera) which assumes that actors in a given field will copy the same organizational model. In this sense I have « A causes B » (being in the same field involves copying the same organizational model). The reason for this (called by Van Evera « explanation of the causal link ») is the search for legitimacy. Building on this theoretical framework I develop the theory of « divergent isomorphism ». Being in the same field does not necessarily involve copying the same organizational model because even if actors look for legitimacy, they can derive this legitimacy from different sources. This is why I reconcile sociological neo-institutionalist theories with some agency aspects. On the definition of a theory, see : Van Evera, S. (1997) : Guide to methods for students of political science, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, page 9.


“archetypal patterns”.\textsuperscript{75} It means the abstract organizational arrangement which is used in existing organizations, and can be copied. If it is adopted, it becomes an organizational structure (at the micro level) and is embedded in the organizational architecture (at the macro level).

\textbf{3.1.2. History of the concept: How has isomorphism been used so far?}

The history of the use of the concept of isomorphism was traced by Mizruchi and Fein.\textsuperscript{76} First thanks to a quantitative analysis based on American journals of sociology they showed that emphasis had been put on mimetic isomorphism. To avoid this pitfall, I will consider the three types of isomorphism, as equally possible and equally explored.

Second, the concept of isomorphism has been used so far primarily to study the populations of organizations treated as a field with quantitative methods. (e.g. Fennell and Alexander focus on the population of “emergency care community hospitals” in the US).\textsuperscript{77} Instead my focus is on the process within one single organization leading to the copy of a pre-existing organizational model. In fact, one criticism raised by Mizruchi and Fein on the studies focusing on a population and studying the copy of an organizational structure by quantitative analyses, is that “researchers are positing a particular process that results in a behavioural outcome, but they are measuring only the outcome while assuming the process.”\textsuperscript{78} I avoid this problem by conducting an in-depth qualitative analysis of the process.


Third, isomorphism has been used so far to explain how an organizational change comes as an adaptative process: the organizations are obeying and conforming to their field. Some limits to this argument have already been identified by Kraatz and Zajac thanks to the study of liberal arts colleges in the US from 1971 to 1986. Here I will continue studying some of the limits of institutional isomorphism and I will therefore use isomorphism not only as a way to conform, but as a choice of actors, as they do not necessarily copy the same model in the present situation, even if they seem to operate in the same field. Even if they are a set of diverse organizations attempting to carry on a common enterprise, that of EU emergency management, the margin of initiative of actors can lead to the co-existence of two different copied models instead of one.

In this sense, isomorphism is not an impersonal process leading to organizational structure creation. Rather, isomorphism is a constraining process chosen by actors seeking to enhance their legitimacy or power. This is why entrepreneurs are part of the research design as a key element to take into account. This is also why we can notice variations in the type of organizational model copied. Isomorphism is often used to show that organizational models are not adopted for functional reasons, but that other aspects play a role: “Formal structure of many organizations in post industrial society dramatically reflects the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities.” In the present study, the CCPM and the CCA have similar activities, but the institutional environments of the two are different (Commission and Council). This situation leads to the exploration of different constraining processes of isomorphism not linked to a different field of activity but linked to different institutional environments.

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3.1.3. Isomorphism and EU integration

How has the concept of isomorphism been used to explain EU integration? The concept of isomorphism has been used to study EU integration since the late 1990s. For instance, Radaelli uses the concept of mimetic isomorphism to understand policy transfer from the Member State level to the EU level.\(^{82}\) He claims isomorphism is the process of “policy diffusion”\(^{83}\) which was used in the case of monetary policy, direct corporate tax policy and media ownership policy. In the first two cases, the EU model is a copy of a national model. In the third case, the commission strategically constructed a national model in the UK and in Germany to then implement it at EU level. Hence, Radaelli shows that EU institutions catalyse mimetic processes of isomorphism. He argues the presence of pre-existing national models (given or constructed) is a prerequisite for isomorphism. By contrast, I argue isomorphism and EU integration do not only mean bottom-up or top-down transfer between the member state level and the EU level. I seek to study other types of transfer such as transfer between internationally recognised models (UN, NATO, etc) and EU models and between EU model in a field to another field. I do not imply that EU integration means “systematic imitation” of “desirable national models”.\(^{84}\) The EU institutions do not necessarily need a national model (given or strategically constructed). Other models can be copied to gain legitimacy.

To sum up, isomorphism is a valid concept to understand policy transfer at EU level. But I want to demonstrate that other alternatives are available to actors than EU-


\(^{83}\) “Policy diffusion”, and more particularly “policy transfer”, are concepts used in the literature to refer to the process wherein imitation, copying and adaptation are the consequences of the decisions of policy makers. Authors used either a rationalist perspective based on a mechanical transfer model (e.g. Mörth) or a more sociological neo-institutionalist perspective based on the logic of appropriateness (e.g. Radaelli). It is the second trend which is used in this study.

Member states transfer. The logic of choice and the logic of appropriateness must be studied, focusing on the role of different actors leading to different copying strategies. In this sense, I follow the approach of Dolowitz and Marsh: the transfer of policies, organizational models, etc. results from strategic decisions taken by actors inside and outside government. This is why studying isomorphism means focusing on the policy entrepreneurs, supra-national institutions, bureaucrats and civil servants as well as elected officials to understand why a model was copied, what the competitive models available were, why a model was rejected/adopted, etc. And this is even more important in the studied context of EU integration as pointed out by Rose: intergovernmental and international organizations encourage exchange of ideas. The European Union and other institutions such as the OECD, NATO, UN, etc. encourage exchanges of practices among nations. This is a particular framework where voluntary and coercive transfers are initiated. According to Egeberg, these transnational networks represent a fourth level of government that fosters imitation and standardization. This idea is applied by Mörtth who pointed out the role played by the EU and the OECD in policy transfers in Europe in the field of research and technology. The model of Egeberg is based on system crisis, entrepreneurial leadership, path dependency, intergovernmental bargaining and imitation. All these elements are combined to explain change in the EU institutional architecture and how new EU organizational structure emerged. If the model of Egeberg is encompassing a large number of independent variables to explain how new EU structures come about, the way they interact is not clear. This is why I adopt an analytical framework based on the study of isomorphism as


a mechanism, and see, using process-tracing, how the different elements identified by Egeberg play a role in the emergence of EU emergency management.

In a nutshell, isomorphism must be studied in an in-depth qualitative way and that the use of process-tracing could lead to a better understanding of the outcome –i.e. the existence of a EU double structure of emergency management- than the pursuit of large quantitative studies. Isomorphism is not an impersonal process leading to organizational structure creation based on the same pre-existing one. It is a institutional process which can be chosen by actors seeking to enhance their legitimacy. This is why the research relies on the concept of divergent isomorphism. I now explain my research design in more details.

3.2. Research design

In this section I present my research design. First, I detail the constraining process of isomorphism as applied in my study. Second, I explain the necessity to incorporate agency in such a sociological neo-institutionalist approach, pointing out the role of the actors involved in the process of divergent isomorphism. Third, the elements of the context/environment which could intervene in the process are mentioned. Fourth, the model copied as such is investigated to understand why a model could be chosen over another. Finally looking at the decoupling process (gap between the model adopted and the model implemented), the analytical framework is stretched to include model implementation issues. The question of the legitimacy will be the last dimension covered.
3.2.1. The constraining process of isomorphism

What types of constraining process can take place in cases of isomorphism? Three types of isomorphism have been identified by DiMaggio and Powell. In the case of EU crisis management structures, this means the following. First the organizational architecture of the CCPM and of the CCA can be copies of national level architectural model, because entrepreneurs of change are partly member states’ bargainers. They know what they have at home, and they can try to push for this model at EU level when they see a window of opportunity. In this case, this is a logic of coercive isomorphism. As identified by DiMaggio and Powell, under the pressure of political decision from one government, an organization can adopt one particular organizational architecture. This trend of diffusion of models between the EU and the national level has already been identified in the past, as for instance by Radaelli. It could be a possibility in the field of emergency management as well.

Second, the CCPM and the CCA can be a copy of EU architectural models from other fields of activity. European Commission officials have to experience different DG. So they are used to successful European organizational structure from other fields and can try to copy them in another field. In this case, based on the work of DiMaggio and Powell, the actor adopts an organizational architecture following normative pressure. This is due to the professional careers of actors in charge. The recruiting method of EU officials who often internally move from one European Commission DG to another, or from one unit to another, explains why they tend to adopt the same architectural model. Being under time pressure in their work, they tend to re-use former documents and adapt them slightly to face the new problem at stake. Doing so, they reduce the delays


of production of documents, and are familiar with what they present to their hierarchy. Contrary to the concept of spill-over which can be used in a non-intentional sense, there is an intention of EU officials, which I will investigate in my empirical analysis (see chapter 3).\textsuperscript{92}

Third, the CCPM and the CCA can be copies of architectural models taken from other international organizations perceived as successful in the international security arena. As explained by Sahlin Andersson, actors in public organizations have a growing tendency to refer to and turn their attention to international examples.\textsuperscript{93} In a situation where the EU is still forging its security identity and where actors are still trying to position themselves in terms of legitimacy, mandate, etc and gain power, the EU can copy the architectural models of other organizations recognised as having a strong security identity and legitimacy to act. It can be the one created by another federal state (e.g. US) or by another international organization (e.g. UN, NATO, etc.). This is what DiMaggio and Powell call a mimetic process. The more ambiguous the goal pursued, the more uncertain the relationship between means and ends, the greater the extent to which an organization will model itself after an organization perceived as successful in the field. The more restricted the number of visible alternatives, the greater the probability of mimetic isomorphism. As we can see, the interaction of the different actors in charge of organizational model proposals plays a role, as does the interaction between the latter and different organizational model alternatives.

Moreover, the literature on policy transfer identifies different levels of imitation: copy, emulation, hybridation, synthesis, harmonisation, diffusion, convergence and

\textsuperscript{92} The concept of spill-over was primary used by neo-functionalist authors like Haas to explain why integration in one particular sector could lead to integration in another sector, beyond state control. It was then used by neo-institutionalist authors to explain why actors used to certain professional practices can copy them in another field of activity when they change positions in an organization. This is what DiMaggio and Powell call normative isomorphism. At EU level, some spill-overs are non-intentional (i.e. the “functional spill-over” concept) others are more intentional (i.e. the “cultivated spill-over” concept). In the case of cultivated spill-over, it means that the commission cultivates the process of spill-over to gain more authority or power in a specific field.

inspiration. So what does it mean in the case of isomorphism? In the case of isomorphism, it is a copy of the organizational model. This includes the use of the same wording, of the same organizational chart, of the same administrative techniques. The necessary conditions to prove the existence of isomorphism identified here are the following: First, some empirical evidence is needed to show that there was a pre-existing model (timing aspect). Second, there must be evidence of the copy (similarity aspect). Third, there must be evidence of an interaction between the pre-existing structure and the actors copying it (interactive aspect). Finally, the actors must acknowledge that they have chosen to copy (intentional aspect).

Authors usually point out isomorphism as a constraining process to justify homogeneity or convergence in a field. For instance, McNamara highlights the role of isomorphism to explain the multiplication of independent central banks. In the present case, there surely is a tendency in ministries and administrative bodies (such as DG) to create a crisis management structure. But if they all copy models, they do not copy the same ones. Hence my objective is not to account for homogeneity or convergence, which authors do when using isomorphism, but to explain the reasons for choosing one model and not another. I will focus on the study of what I call “divergent isomorphism”. Thanks to a comparison between the creation of the CCPM and of the CCA, I have the possibility to bring about an added value by analysing the reasons behind the choice of a particular model to imitate or an alternative one, meaning studying the emergence of competitive models. This is why two dimensions, that of the constraining process (neo-institutionalism) and that of the actors (the agency) are combined here. Before turning to


85 In French: organigramme.


the actors, I would like to add one last comment on the particularity of the neo-institutionalist constraining process in the case of emergency and crisis management.

As emergencies occur repeatedly, actors (member state officials, member state civil protection forces) can become more competent in operating with one or the other EU models of response. Thus Member states which have already implemented the CCPM (for providing or receiving assistance) can be encouraged to use it further. This means that exploring the organizational model from creation to implementation can help explain the mechanism which locked EU response into a particular use of an EU organizational design and not another (use of the CCPM, no use of the CCA) even if the two tools were created and adopted. The development of competence within a particular institutional design is a major feature of sociological neo-institutionalism. Authors argue this situation can explain the resistance to implementation of new arrangements when other mechanisms pre-exist. This could explain why, in the field, the CCA were never used, whereas the CCPM continued to be used, even in war situations. This could also explain why actors who are used to the CCPM are more keen to use it again than those who have never tried using the CCPM before. According to neo-institutionalists, the learning effects are enhanced by the availability and analysis of feedback. This seems particularly relevant in the context of emergency management, in which the practice of lesson-learnt meetings is well institutionalised at the organizational level. This is supposed to facilitate intentional organizational learning. Moreover, the learning effect seems also relevant here through the acquisition of inherited knowledge. As the EU organizational structures of emergency response draw from other pre-existing organizational models (Marine pollution one, NATO one), this

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98 This statement is also made by historical neo-institutionalists when studying path dependency effects and lock-in. Adopting a sociological neo-institutionalist perspective focusing on the organizational aspect, I strongly link this situation to organizational learning capacity, which can be intentional, rather than considering only the mechanism of lock-in as conceptualised by historical neo-institutionalists.


100 This will be shown in chapter 3.
can enhance a form of learning from the formal model imitated. Finally, organizational theories point out that organizations frequently increase their learning by recruiting new members, with a previous experience in the domain during their career. This enhanced the learning effect inside the organization through second-hand knowledge. This point is of relevance here because of the transfer of personnel between NATO and the EU, or National authorities and the EU. This raises questions: What type of learning can explain the implementation or the non-implementation of an organizational model? What are the factors influencing the learning process of actors? First, the role of the inherited knowledge (from Marine pollution and NATO) and the congenital knowledge (combination of the knowledge inherited and its conception prior to adoption) must be studied, to show the impact of the creation and adoption phase on the implementation.\footnote{Huber, G.P. (1991): “Organizational learning: the contributing processes and the literatures, in: Organization science, Vol. 2, n°1, Special issue: Organizational learning: Papers in Honor of and by James G. March, pages 88-115.} This knowledge is influenced by the identity and status of the creators of the framework (who come with second-hand knowledge). Second, the impact of the experimental learning must be analyzed (lesson-learnt report, etc.) These two elements will be taken into account, especially in the last empirical part, that of implementation.

### 3.2.2. The actors

I define isomorphism as a constraining process that leads actors creating a new organizational structure to copy an existing organizational model in their span of attention. This leads to the emergence of new organizational structures which are very similar to pre-existing ones. The fact that the actors are restricted to their span of attention creates myopia. It means that different actors can simultaneously copy different models, without being aware of the presence of the others.
Who are the actors in the present case that can appear with an organizational model proposal? First the European Commission Officials can do so, because the European Commission acts as an initiator in the policy process. Second, the government presiding over the European Union can decide the main focus of their Presidency and hence have an impact on the EU agenda when it comes to creating new EU structures, in particular in the field of security. Of course, often, the proposals do not come directly from the Minister in charge but from national bureaucrats who draft the document related to the model proposal. Finally, some officials of the Council Secretariat can also have an impact on this process.

What are the conditions identified in the literature for actors to take part in an isomorphic process of model creation, adoption and implementation? First, when actors experience dissatisfaction with a current organizational framework, they will have a tendency to copy an organizational model that they perceive as working. This can be enhanced through the perception of policy failures or risk of policy failures in their own organization. This element linked to the field of security is paramount, because governmental structures have often been tested for their competence in managing crises and providing security for their citizens. The sense of failure to respond to a crisis situation and to manage disaster-driven emergencies can create a sense of the need of organizational change with the implementation of a reliable structure. This contributes to strengthening the trend towards isomorphism. Second, when actors interact in a network of elite in a given field, they will have the possibility to encounter and experience organizational model alternatives. This will enhance their ability to copy. Moreover, this will be even stronger, when actors can experience high labour turnover.

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between different parts of an organization or between organizations. A high turnover enhances the probability of copy of organizational models. Some authors like Bennett and Rosenau use the concept of penetration, which is a bit less strong than that of turnover. In this case, the actor remains in his organization but becomes in parallel a member or a participant in the political process of another organization. For instance a French official of the Ministry of Defence can be involved in the NATO political process and remain inside the ministry he reports to. Fourth, when actors want to enhance trust, they will copy an organizational model, because they can claim it has been tested in the past and because they seem to present a “neutral” model, rather than defend their own interest. To sum up, copying a model is a good way to maintain or strengthen internal and external commitment.

How can actors have an influence on model adoption once the model is created according to the literature? Dostal uses organizational discourse to show how the OECD could impose its model of EU welfare and labour market policy. He explains that the creation, the development and the release of discourse is crucial when actors compete to have their model adopted. He shows that a tool of control and influence to be successful is the control of the wording of the model but also of the discursive interaction patterns. “In order to develop discursive power, agents of successful organizations will tend to represent their organization’s point of view repeatedly and in a broad variety of contexts while convincing other institutions to adapt to them incrementally.”

104 Labour turnover is an organizational concept concerned with movements of individuals into jobs and out of jobs. The higher the turnover, the more affected in a large number of different positions inside the organization or in different organizations within a sector the individuals will be.


106 In my research, I use the concept of discourse as defined in “organizational discourse”: According to Grant, organizational discourse describes the language and symbolic media used by organizations and their staff and managers. The organizational models (and their wording) are a way for organizational actors to control and legitimize their organizational discourse in the field of emergency management. On the concept of organizational discourse, see: Grant, T., Keenoy, T. and Oswick, K. (2001) ‘Organizational discourse: key contributions and challenges’, in: International Studies of Management and Organization, Vol. 31, n°3, pages 5–24.

According to Dostal the first mover has an advantage as he can set the wording which will be used and the type of interaction which will follow. However, the success of actors is based on the long-term maintenance of discursive validation procedures. The interaction timing will be part of the study, as the French had the first mover advantage reinvesting the CCPM and trying to enhance it. But the UK managed through alliance with successive presidencies to guarantee a long-term maintenance of discursive validation procedure, at a very high level. This will be the object of chapter 4.

Schmidt uses a similar conception of discourse to explain the dynamics of institutional change. She even argues for the recognition of a new type of neo-institutionalism: discursive neo-institutionalism. A major dichotomy is used by Schmidt and Radaelli when studying the impact of discourse on model adoption or rejection in the EU, the one between “communicative discourse” and “coordinative discourse”. I argue this distinction could be a relevant one to explain why France failed to have its model passed, over-investing communication discourse and neglecting coordination discourse, whereas on the contrary the British managed to enhance trust through a very restrictive communicative discourse and developing coordination discourse. To sum up, discourse can be used by actors to alter the perception of problems and also to influence the shaping of preferences regarding the models. I argue discourse can contribute actively to the adoption or rejection of a copied model. This is why the actors play an important role. If they know how to use the discourse in a

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108 According to Schmidt, discourse is the content but also the interactive process that serve to communicate. In her integration of the interactive aspect, her concept of discourse comes close to that of organizational discourse used here. The discourse does not only concern ideas but also about the institutional context in which and through which the ideas are spread. This is why the concept of discourse as used by Dostal and Schmid can help explain the dynamics of organizational changes in my research. On the contrary, I do not use the concept of “idea” as used by historical neo-institutionalism in the last decade (see: Steinmo, S. (2008): “historical institutionalism”, in: Della Porta, D., Keating, M. (ed.) (2008): Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences, a pluralist perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pages 129-131).


111 See chapter 4.
pertinent manner linked to the given field, they have more chance to impose the model created when it comes to adoption and later implementation.

Some authors study the role of ideas or norms to explain model adoption or rejection.\footnote{Goldstein, J., Keohane, R.O. (ed.) (1993) : \textit{Ideas and Foreign Policy, beliefs, institutions, and political change}, Ithaca, Cornell University Press; Goldstein, J. (1993): \textit{Ideas, interests, and American trade policy}, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.} In my case, I prefer to use the concept of organizational discourse of actors, because I focus on the type of interaction and strategy (communication vs. coordination), which is a key element of discourse and is not so strongly considered in the concepts of ideas and norms. Moreover discourse and its communication/interaction aspect can also provide the link between model creation and model adoption and between model adoption and model implementation. Indeed, due to isomorphism, the models rely on a certain wording. The models build certain linkages. This is why when it comes to adoption, it is important to consider how actors developed their discursive strategies based on the available wording and linkages. Moreover, studying the implementation of the CCPM in the context of two emergencies (Pakistan earthquake and Lebanon crisis), I will also address the role of discourse and communication in the way Member States and EU institutions dealt with the situations. I will show the importance of the way actors communicate during crisis.

Indeed “Entrepreneurs in crisis situations can take advantage of fluid social situations to reframe the preferences of others.”\footnote{in: Fligstein, N. (2001): “Institutional entrepreneurs and cultural frames – the case of the European Union’s Single Market Program,” in: \textit{European Studies}, Vol. 3, n°3,page 264.} It means for instance that the European Commission can take advantage of an emergency to try to reframe the preferences of Member States, when it comes to the choice of the channel of assistance. In an emergency/crisis situation, in the field, it is possible for new practices to emerge that help the actors involved incorporate (or not) the new channel of assistance available. This type of reasoning can also be found in Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth.\footnote{Thelen, K., Steinmo, S. (1992): “Historical institutionalism in comparative politics”, in: Steinmo, S., Thelen, K., Longstreth, F. (1992): \textit{Structuring politics}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, page 17.} According to them, actors can develop strategic behaviour to defend the status quo or
under particular fluid social conditions (here: emergency situation), they can try to attain new, hitherto unused social arrangements. Often, entrepreneurs who manage to bring about change are linked to political coalition or social network. I include in my study the notion of institutional entrepreneur, but I argue like Lounsbury and Crumley that the emergence of a new organizational structure results from spatially dispersed heterogeneous activity by actors who are belonging to networks, rather than by a “hero” who by himself could bring about the change.\footnote{Lounsbury, M., Crumley, E.T. (2007): “New Practice Creation: An institutional perspective on innovation”, in: Organization studies, Vol. 28, n° 7, (July 2007), pages 993-1012.} This raises questions: Who would be the actors who will opt for the status quo, and who would be the actors who will incorporate changes in their behaviour due to the implementation of new organizational architecture and structure? And why? Could the environment/context/culture/tradition have a potential impact? These are the aspects I will elucidate in the next sub-section.

3.2.3. Context/Environment

According to the sociological neo-institutionalist theory, isomorphism takes place in a “field”. The field is defined as an intermediate level between organization and society.\footnote{Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., Hinings, C.R. (2002): “Theorizing change: the role of professional associations in the transformation of institutionalised fields”, in: Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 45, n°1, pages 58-80.} DiMaggio and Powell who are at the origin of the concept defined a field as sets of organizations that in the aggregate constitute an area of institutional life. They gather organizations that produce similar services and products.\footnote{DiMaggio, P.J., Powell, W.W. (1983): “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality I organizational fields”, in: American sociological review, Vol. 48, n°2, (April 1983), pages 147-160} It was formulated by Scott as: “a set of diverse organizations attempting to carry on a common enterprise”.\footnote{in: Scott, W.R. (1995): Institutions and Organizations, London, Sage Publication, page 103.} In this study, the field under scrutiny is that of emergency management in the EU. I argue the activities carried out by the CCPM and the CCA are similar enough for us to
consider that they operate in the same organizational field. In this field operate other EU emergency management tools that I do not include in my study: the sector-based EU emergency management tools (managed by the DG TREN, DG SANCO, etc). I argue it is a field in the sociological neo-institutionalist sense because the multiplication of crisis centers could be observed in each DG of the European Commission during the 1990s.

Which type of environment can foster isomorphism? First, according to the literature, isomorphism takes place in a context of high uncertainty. When actors face situations which challenge current order and routine, they will have a tendency to opt for a copy of an organizational model. In particular, uncertainty about the causes of problems leads actors to search for models they can borrow.\textsuperscript{119} Second, a context of interdependence fosters isomorphism. Structural elements are copied because environments create boundary-spanning exigencies for organizations. Organizations which incorporate structural elements isomorphic with the environment are said to be better able to manage the interdependence.\textsuperscript{120}

Moreover, neo-institutionalist theories explain that the better the fit between the new organizational model created at EU level and the Member States culture and tradition, the greater the chance that the Member States will push for the adoption of the model, and later adapt its action to the new implemented model. For instance, Fligstein shows that pre-existing institutions constrain or enable actors to engage in new behavior.\textsuperscript{121} Cultural practices give a sense to actors regarding what type of organizational model makes sense or not.\textsuperscript{122} This is of relevance for the study of model adoptions and implementations. Depending on the Member States, and hence on the


\textsuperscript{122} Cultural practices or cultural frames are expressions used in the neo-institutionalist theory to refer to collectively held views, that define how actors perceive and deal with situations.
national culture of civil protection, one model can be preferred to another, or used more than another.

In addition, neo-institutionalists commonly invoke the environment to explain organizational innovation, in particular they invoke exogenous shocks or crises. This crisis approach is a possibility which must be taken into account, as both the CCPM and the CCA emergence followed drastic events (9-11 and the London Bombings). Those crises might have played a role in the emergence of the new organizational models. Understanding which role exactly will be one of the objects of the empirical chapters. They might not be the first element playing a role in the model creation.

I now turn to the organizational model as such and identify what criteria it must fulfill to be chosen by bureaucrats, adopted by policy-makers and later implemented by the civil protection forces of different Member States.

### 3.2.4. The model

According to the literature, the model copied is chosen for the following reasons. A first reason to adopt the model is that it has proved its effectiveness and success and hence has turned out to be legitimate. An organization does not only compete for resources, it also competes for political power and institutional legitimacy, and this drives changes. Following this logic, Tolbert and Zucker show that the adoption of the change can be purely symbolic. This fight for power and legitimacy seems the case at EU level. In the EU context, a conflict for resources exists but also a conflict for influence

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and control within a policy area, and at another level ideological conflict is also present. So following this theory, the actors who created the CCPM and the CCA must have done so referring to models that give them leeway to have the legitimacy to justify the necessity to change, but also to construct the leadership to have the change adopted as they want it.

Second, the model must be “in the span of attention” of actors. Indeed actors use available interpretation frames to understand the problem and to anticipate the solution. In other terms the model must be known and accessible to them. This is why “confronted with a problem, the first place for an organization to look is to its own standard operating procedures” or the one with which they interact.

Third, actors will copy a model when it is feasible. This includes the fact that resources are available to adopt the model. They will adopt models used by organizations that are perceived as close in terms of identity. So they will have a tendency to use models from fields with a similar activity. “Subjective identification” is more important than other criteria such as geographical proximity. Often the model copied is close in terms of political value influence.

An important point which characterised the model is the wording linked to it and the linkages it creates. I argue models once created provide actors with a repertoire of possible collective understandings to which they can refer when they are being adopted. The created models provide words and linkages between ideas which are at the basis of the discursive interactions when it comes to adoption. The strategic use of organizational discourse by advocates/entrepreneurs can thus lead either to model adoption or to model rejection, through the construction of meaning, identity and


legitimacy. A broad range of concepts is used by neo-institutionalists to explain model adoption or model rejection through the use of discourses: Some authors like Dostal, Schmidt, or Schön and Rein, use the concept of “organizational discourse”, “policy discourse” or “discursive institutionalism” which include not only the content but also the pattern of interaction among actors, a pattern which is linked to the discourse. This is what we have explained previously. Others focus on the symbolic aspect of the rhetoric of actors in organizations and look more specifically at the form and content of the discourse in their symbolic use. This includes for instance the definition of the potential alternatives to solve a problem in terms of typification (what is at stake?). For instance, how issues are linked together is stressed in the literature. Following this approach, the use of language and symbol is the key to explain political outcome. This approach seems relevant here as, in the phase of creation through isomorphism, some linkages already appeared, and some wordings were associated to a model and not another. This might be important to see if this still plays a role when it comes to model adoption. Moreover, symbolic aspects have been identified as playing a role in emergency and crisis management. Authors identify different forms to be studied such as synecdoche, metaphors, stories, analogies, etc. As concerns the content, some criteria playing a major role were identified: causality, novelty, proximity, problem


132 I exclude here the work of linguist, the study of language theory as such (Foucault, Derrida, etc). I only consider authors who linked discourses to model adoption or rejection in a given social arena.

population, and affordability.\textsuperscript{134} This seems particularly relevant to study emergency management because the proximity of the emergency, the novelty, etc are often criteria used by actors in their discourse. In the present case, I will analyze how the French and the British couple symbolic elements differently in their discourse. Regarding the form and the content, the objective is also to use the criteria identified by the literature and see if they were present or absent in case of adoption and in case of rejection of models, to see if they can be part of the explanation.

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<th>French model</th>
<th>UK model</th>
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<td><strong>Causal stories</strong></td>
<td>(mechanical, accidental, intentional, inadvertent)\textsuperscript{135}</td>
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<td><strong>Representative example</strong></td>
<td>Metaphor, Synecdoche, Analogy, Symbols\textsuperscript{136}</td>
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Illustration 1: Criteria identified by the literature on discursive strategy

Some authors particularly stress the use of symbols inside rhetoric.\textsuperscript{138} They distinguish between the correct use of symbols (mobilising support) and the misuses of


symbols (non credible in case of symbol saturation). Among the authors studying symbols, we can find Edelman\textsuperscript{139} but also Elder and Cobb\textsuperscript{140}. According to them, symbols serve to enhance convergence of actors. They assume that political action challenges the logic, that emotions, interpretations, play a great role through the use of symbols. In the case of emergency management Clarke has pointed out the fact that setting up crisis management structure and procedure entails a symbolic part.\textsuperscript{141} According to Clarke, emergency management means that “organizations and experts use plans as forms of rhetoric, tools designed to convince audiences that they ought to believe what an organization says.”\textsuperscript{142} The documents cannot really improve the organizational ability to deal with disasters – because the number of uncertainties is too high - but they are there for symbolic and political reasons. This symbolic aspect of organizational discourse is certainly an element that must be taken into account here to make the link between the discourse of the phase of adoption and the subsequent concrete implementation (or absence of implementation). If the discourse developed on EU emergency response is purely symbolic no implementation should follow. On the contrary, if the discourse is linked to practices, implementation should follow. This is why studying discourse will not be limited to the adoption part. Discourse and “double-talk” will be analyzed in the part on implementation. I argue adoption and implementation are interconnected through this aspect of double-talk (acting in a sense, and talking in another). I will elaborate a bit more on this in the next sub-section on decoupling.

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\end{itemize}
3.2.5. Decoupling

Once formal organizational architectures and structures have been adopted, they can be implemented by actors or not. For instance, the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection (CCPM) was activated in various emergency situations, whereas the Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) were never used in practice during an emergency. Besides, there can be different degrees of implementation of the model depending on the actors concerned and on the environment (the type of emergency, the location of emergency, etc.). For instance, from one disaster to another, the CCPM was not used the same way depending on the member states concerned. This is why I will now turn to the literature again and see how it can explain what happens in this last phase of implementation at the organizational level. As a matter of fact, the neo-institutionalist literature focusing on organizations predicts that sometimes when conforming to the adopted institutional rules is in conflict with the requirements of the day-to-day work, it can produce “surface isomorphism”. It means that conformity with the model is achieved by deliberately “decoupling” the formal model from the actual organizational functioning. According to Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin and Suddaby, “decoupling” occurs if the prescriptions of institutional contexts contradict the demands of the technical field contexts. They draw from the work of Brunsson. Looking at the implementation phase and at the decoupling, I will analyze if isomorphism was just a means to get a model created and later adopted, or if the organizational model still plays a role when it comes to implementation both in Brussels on a day-to-day basis and in the field during an emergency, and how.

At headquarters level in Brussels, the different crisis centres rely on the model adopted because it defines their legislative framework for action. However, with the


Introduction of the implementing rules and Standard Operating Procedures, some grey zones can emerge, in which the margins of initiative of actors can either be broadened or restricted as regards the initial official model. Different authors like Selznick, Crozier, Friedberg, Brunsson and Bezes worked on the gap between the formal administrative model adopted and the concrete implementation in the organization to which it refers. As no adopted model can exhaustively plan and totally describe the whole range of empirical situations, the organization will differ in practice. I will investigate this aspect identifying the grey zones of the organizational models and looking at the role of the discourse strategies of the actors involved (double talk, variation in communication strategies, etc.). According to the sociological neo-institutionalist literature, there are different ways to explain the gap between the organizational model adopted and the organizational architecture and structure as implemented. According to Brunsson, organizations are exposed to inconsistent demands from their environments. For instance, in the present case, the Monitoring and Information Centre (Crisis Centre of the CCPM) is supposed to alleviate as much suffering as possible when an emergency occurs, but the MIC is also supposed not to take over the leadership of Member States, which want to remain the masters of the game. Facing inconsistent demands is difficult for an organization because organizations are supposed to follow consistent rules.

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145 I define grey zones as areas where the organizational model can be interpreted in one way or another by actors when implementing it. These zones of uncertainties regarding the interpretation of the organizational model can benefit either the EU officials or the Member States officials. These grey zones are part of the non-rational dimension of organization where constant adjustment can be made. They can be the source of “friction”, “dilemma” or “doubt”, to refer to Selznick’s description in: Selznick, P. (1948): « Foundations of the Theory of organization », in : American sociological review, Vol. 13, n°1, (February 1948), pages 25-35.


Therefore “organizational hypocrisy” occurs. To win legitimacy and to survive, organizations rely on hypocrisy: organizations adapt their “talk” and “decisions”. Organizations will “talk in a way that satisfies one demand, decide in a way that satisfies another”. Therefore gaps will occur between the organizational model and the way the organizations operate in practice, decide in practice, talk in practice. Double-talk and inconsistencies in the practice of an organization are hence explained by the external pressures of the inconsistent environment. In contrast, Crozier and Friedberg show how individual actors can “play” with these gaps to develop “margins of initiative”. In this case, the gap between the formal organizational model and the implementation also depends on the capacity of actors to play with the rules, to develop their own margins of action. Thus, not only the external pressures, but also the capacity of the actors to play with the rule must be taken into account to explain the gap between the model as adopted and as implemented. Finally, going back to isomorphism and to Meyer and Rowan, beyond the question of the external pressures and the individual capacity to play with the rules, what is at stake is legitimacy. Thanks to isomorphism, actors create and adopt a model to gain “external legitimacy.” On the contrary, internally, the organizations maintain different habits, when it comes to implementation. As a consequence the organizational model is in practice decoupled from the organizational architecture and structure. Unlike Meyer and Rowan I argue that the organizational model is not purely artificial. I believe it is not only a means to get a mechanism or arrangements adopted. I believe it has an impact on the implementation as well. However I argue that there still is a gap between the organizational model as adopted and as implemented. This is why it is necessary to


study these grey zones (or uncertainties), and to identify how individual actors deal with the external pressures when it comes to implementation on an administrative day to day basis, and how they develop their margins of initiative. I argue neo-institutionalist theories are suited to explain what happened at EU level in the field of emergency management. But to do so, they need to incorporate some agency aspects. Therefore, this study will investigate the tug-of-war between Member States and EU officials when it comes to implementation. It will also illustrate how actors can develop competences to play with the grey zones, where constant adjustments are possible. So the objective of the empirical chapters on implementation will be to identify how the model created and adopted thanks to isomorphism still has consequences and how the actors manage to play with it and develop their own margins of initiative. In other words, I will try to analyze the process of “decoupling” in practice both at headquarters level in Brussels and in the field. The last sub-section will detail a bit more the question of legitimacy and the way I incorporated neo-institutionalism with agency aspects.

**3.2.6. The legitimacy**

Two types of legitimacy are at stake in my study: input legitimacy and output legitimacy.\(^1\)\(^5\)\(^2\) Input legitimacy is that coming from the process of creation and adoption of the model (isomorphism), whereas output legitimacy is the one coming from the result in the field (the action and communication). EU actors can easily draw from input legitimacy as they often were much involved in the emergence of the CCPM and the CCA. On the contrary EU actors do not have European forces or material on their own, in this sense they can not rely on output legitimacy. National civil protection actors can not draw so much from input legitimacy, as they often do not know enough about the legal basis, the official documents, etc. On the contrary, they control the means in the field. So they can draw their legitimacy from the result, the impact during the crisis.

These two competitive legitimacies are facing each other during crisis situations. This is what will be studied to understand why the CCPM is implemented or not. These two concepts of legitimacy competing at EU level explain the need to combine neo-institutionalist aspects (legitimacy coming from the process of copying and from the model) with agency and the margins of initiative of actors (legitimacy coming from the impact on the field, etc). Because legitimacy can be drawn from different sources, it can lead to divergent isomorphism.

4. **Outcome**

I focus on isomorphism as causal mechanism explaining the model creation of CCPM and of CCA, and do so for two reasons. Empirically, there are numerous hints in interviews and in the wording of documents that it plays an important role. Interviewees do recognize that they took over a model and used it in their field of action. The wording of the original model is kept and can be traced in the documents of the new organization structure. Theoretically, isomorphism is used in organizational theory to explain innovation and in particular the spreading or the same new organizational model among different organizations of a field. But it is also used in EU integration studies to investigate policy transfer, in particular from Member States to EU level or the opposite. However, so far, the use of isomorphism has often been limited to exploring homogeneity. In the present case, the fact that actors did not copy the same model is a new situation. I define this situation as a case of divergent isomorphism. This will be the object of the study. More precisely, the objective is to understand the linkage between a specified initial condition (uncertainty, network of elites, dissatisfaction of actors, etc.) and the specific outcome which is the adoption and implementation of two different organizational structures in the same field, which are both copies of different pre-existing organizational models. The linkage is understood in terms of processes involving interaction between actors but also between individual and social aggregates (existing organizations). The method used is that of process-tracing. I believe there is

Wendling, Cécile (2009), The European Union Response to Emergencies: A Sociological Neo-Institutionalist Approach
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/11317
plenty of evidence that models are spread in a field but not much has been done on why it happens and how, focusing on the process.

Studying the process means understanding when those elements play a role, in which sequence, and why. It also means studying the consequence of isomorphism in the crisis management itself. Indeed my contribution to this field is to focus on the following question: to what extent does the imitation of an organizational model have an impact on the organizational architecture and structure? Is the organizational model copied only as a way to legitimize action and create a new structure and with the actors subsequently diverging from the original model in their practice? Or does it have an influence on the way CCPM and CCA are implemented? In other words, is imitation a device to frame a proposal and convince stakeholders to adopt it? Or is it more than that, meaning the isomorphic process of creation constrains the effectiveness of the organization later on using the cases of the CCPM and the CCA, I will give an answer following the second point of view. The organizational model chosen is not purely an instrumental device but it has a real impact on the organizational architecture and structure. It will have an impact on the way states adapt to CCPM or CCA when an emergency occurs dealt with at EU level. However, I will also highlight the fact that there always remain some discrepancies between the formal model adopted and the EU crisis response in practice in the field (during an emergency).

Going one step further, the organizational structure and architecture that appear must be studied in their social and cultural dynamics, therefore, the CCPM and the CCA must also be analyzed in terms of current ideas and norms in the field of security. Drawing from the work of the Copenhagen School on societal security and the work of Ekengren on functional security, the securitization of environmental issues for the


154 The concept of securitization is a means to specify whether a given area of interest is merely ordinarily politicized or is considered essential for survival. This is the discourse of actors that constructs a security problem starting from an issue (such as climate change, etc.).
CCPM and the perceived raise of the terrorist threat for the CCA are constructed social circumstances, accounting for the adoption of a model or another. This rationalised the reason for existence of the new architectures and structures in their diversity (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde\textsuperscript{155}, Eriksson\textsuperscript{156}). As Haas explains: “Before states can agree on whether and how to deal collectively with a specific problem, they must reach some consensus about the nature and the scope of the problem and also about the manner in which the problem relates to other concerns in the same and additional issue areas.”\textsuperscript{157}

In the present case, in their discourse, actors have distinguished between natural disasters and terrorist threats, even if on paper both the CCPM and CCA are all-hazard. This might explain why two different structures appeared based on two different models. In the case of the CCPM, a public problem which was already dealt with at EU level (marine pollution) gains momentum and turns into a broader risk concern encompassing civil protection. In the case of the CCA, a new risk/threat was suddenly considered a public issue and made an entry on the agenda.\textsuperscript{158}

Authors who refer to the myth of an intentional designer of the organization believe there is no single “designer.” They prefer to refer to the schemes or the models of the institutional design, which will impact the design: for instance Goodin uses the wording of “scheme”\textsuperscript{159} and Dryzek uses the wording of “model institution”.\textsuperscript{160} Design is not the product of accident. Even if direct design seems impossible, indirect design is feasible. Accidents happen, but the frequency and direction of accidents can be significantly

\begin{thebibliography}
\item \textsuperscript{156} Eriksson, J. (2001): \textit{Threat politics, New perspectives on security, risk and crisis management}, Aldershot, Ashgate publishing.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Dryzek, J.S. (1990) : \textit{Discursive democracy}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
\end{thebibliography}
shaped by the intentional interventions of bureaucrats and planners. This is the idea I defend in this research. This is why I use the concept of organizational model (in the phase of creation) turning into organizational architecture (at the macro-organizational level) and organizational structure (at the micro-organizational level). This is also why I develop the concept of divergent isomorphism, which encompasses both the organizational constraints (span of attention, culture, etc) and the intention of actors involved.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained my choice of a sociological neo-institutionalist perspective over other leading theories. I presented a version of sociological neo-institutionalism which tries to incorporate the agency aspect. For instance I presented an alternative conception of isomorphism to that offered by dominant neo-institutionalist theories, calling for a qualitative approach based on process-tracing and therefore calling for the consideration of divergent isomorphism, depending on the borrowing of available models by actors. The fact that different actors operating in a same field of EU emergency management copy different available models brings back the agency aspect into the sociological neo-institutionalist framework.

Moreover, if the creation of the organizational structure is based on divergent isomorphism, the adoption phase which follows is drawing from available models copied and relies on different discursive strategies of models’ advocates. This means that Member State representatives - both political leaders or bureaucrats - rely on different contents and forms of discourse to have a model adopted. Here too, the agency comes back into the game. For instance actors link the CCPM to natural disasters and the CCA to the fight against terrorism, although both are all-hazard structures. In addition to that, they built different discursive patterns of interaction to defend their

model (coordination or communication). This leads to the convergence or divergence of Member States preferences, and thus model adoption or model rejection. I argue that creation has an impact on adoption. Models once created provide protagonists with a repertoire of possible collective understandings to which they can refer when it comes to adoption. The created models provide words and linkages between ideas which are at the basis of the discursive interactions when it comes to adoption. The strategic use of discourse by advocates/entrepreneurs can thus lead either to model adoption or to model rejection, through the construction of meaning, identity and legitimacy.

Finally I suggest those insights into model creation and adoption based on sociological neo-institutionalism might be useful in understanding the implementation of EU emergency response. If states’ preferences can be altered by institutionalized organizational model and discourse, this situation implies step-by-step change in their integration of existing EU Emergency Response Channel of intervention in a disaster. If the EU or national actors tried to legitimize a EU emergency response by copying successful pre-existing organizational models, they still have restricted or enhanced possibilities when it comes to implementing a model in the administrative day-to-day practice and during emergencies in action.

In a nutshell, isomorphism is not an artificial means to have a model adopted. The organizational model plays a role when the organizational architecture and structure are being implemented. However, actors still have margins of initiative when it comes to implementation of the organizational architecture and structure, thanks to the existence of some grey zones to be identified. Hence, legitimacy comes from the model (input legitimacy) but also from the practice during the implementation phase (output legitimacy). Here too, the agency aspect is underlined: Actors must try to figure out behaviour to legitimize their action, diverging from the original model, when they apply decoupling strategies.

The next chapter focus on the methodology and explain the use of a process-tracing method linking the three stages of creation, adoption and implementation to explain
why the EU has developed two ways to respond to emergencies CCPM and CCA, but only uses one in times of emergencies (the CCPM).
METHODOLOGY
Chapter 2

Methodology:
Combining Comparative Case Studies
With Process-Tracing

This chapter bridges the gap between the previous theoretical chapter and the subsequent empirical chapters. I present my methodological approach based on comparative case studies combined with process-tracing. Case studies can serve a variety of purposes, from theory testing to theory building. This research aims at developing theory. Therefore it is based on “heuristic case studies”. In this sense, the present study does not present conflicting perspectives but instead investigates the sociological neo-institutionalist approach by developing a set of theoretically based conjunctures on isomorphism, which are then evaluated empirically in the field of civil protection in the EU. Among case study research methods, that of process-tracing as formulated by George and Bennett has emerged as a way to develop theory in social sciences. Using process-tracing, this study focuses thus on isomorphism as a causal mechanism explaining model creation, adoption and implementation.

Why not choose a quantitative approach? The quantitative studies of isomorphism tend to take the outcome for the process, by measuring over time the spreading of an organizational form. On the contrary, I wanted to investigate why actors copied a particular model, and then trace the process that leads to the adoption of a pre-existing organizational structure, and finally analyze the consequences during implementation.


Therefore a qualitative study was needed. I decided to focus on the EU emergency management and studied two cases: that of the CCPM and that of the CCA. I compared their creation, their adoption, and their implementation in chapters three, four and five. Because the CCA have never been implemented during a real crisis, chapter six deals only with the implementation of the CCPM during two emergencies.

I first explain the case selection. Second I comment on my comparative modes. Third I explain the use of the process-tracing method. Finally I detail the data collection.

1. Case selection

Authors defining what a case is often answer the question by determining the boundaries around places and the time periods that characterise the case in a universe of cases.\(^\text{164}\) In comparative studies, there is a long tradition of studying countries as comparable cases, organizations as comparable cases, looking at a particular period of time. In my research, I compared two organizational frameworks – the CCPM and the CCA - in their phases of creation, adoption/rejection and implementation, among the universe of crisis management structures at EU level. I chose these ones focusing on the protection of citizens and their environment having an all-hazard approach, and did not include sector-based EU emergency management tools, such as the one used by DG TREN or DG SANCO, which focus on a particular type of risk or threat. I compared two different countries France and the UK, as respective advocates of the enhanced CCPM and of the CCA, among the universe of EU Member States.

Moreover, in crisis management, there is a tradition of comparing emergencies. For instance, Ekengren, Matzen and Svanthsson compare 4 crises (the Moscow theatre Hostage crisis in 2002, the Portuguese Forest fires in 2003, the Madrid Bombing in 2004

and the Asian Tsunami in 2004). In my study, I compared two crises: that of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and that of the 2006 Lebanon crisis, as two cases exhibiting variations on the dependent variable (weak or strong EU involvement in the crisis management). In this section, I explain this case selection process in details, both in terms of places and time, from why I chose the EU, to why I chose the CCPM and the CCA, and then to why I selected France and the UK, and why I opted for the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and the 2006 Lebanon crisis, and finally why this particular timeframe.

1.1. Why the EU Civil Protection mechanism and the Crisis Coordination Arrangements?

Why does this research focus on the EU? I chose the EU because it is currently a laboratory where new institutional designs are being created. This is ideal to study the emergence of new organizational structures. In particular in the field of security, the EU structure and architecture is of relatively recent origin. As a result, the structure is still malleable (compared to national security structure). Therefore it is of interest to explore where these recent structures come from and how these still flexible structures can evolve in time.

Whereas in the past, emergency management was dealt with at a national level, new threats (terrorism) and new risks having consequences beyond the national borders (i.e. nuclear accidents, etc) have rendered the exclusively national provision of security ineffective. This led to the consideration of emergency management at intergovernmental levels first, mostly with the creation of bilateral agreements (for marine pollution, forest fires, etc). And then, most interestingly, the issue of civil

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As far as the nature of emergencies or of geographical areas is concerned, roles are not clearly separated. The only separation one can find in the official documents is that the level of dangerousness of the crisis must be high to activate the CCA. But in the case of those major emergencies, both the CCPM and the CCA could be activated, a situation which does little to clarify the respective roles of the two institutional frameworks. According to the organizational model described in the legal documents, both the CCA and the CCPM cover the following functions: Information access and sharing, the facilitation of the provision of mutual operational and technical support, enabling greater consistency in the action taken by Member States, enabling debates on collective external action and coordination. Even if the members of the SitCen point out the fact that the CCPM focuses on Civil protection and the CCA is “more encompassing”, the missions and the functions are of the same type. On paper, it is hard to distinguish between the two centres. First, both the MIC and the SitCen have representatives in the Member States. Second, both the MIC and the


169 Email EU 29.

170 This comment was made by various members of the PROCIV committee.
SitCen use a particular IT interface with the Member States. Finally both the MIC and the SitCen are in charge of organising emergency management exercises. And both the MIC and the SitCen are organizational structures in charge of emergency response. Because the functions of the CCPM and CCA as described in the organizational models are very close, it is interesting to see why in one case the model adopted was implemented and not in the other.\textsuperscript{171} I compared the CCPM to the CCA, as they are similar but one was used during crises, and the other not, a puzzle which is at the origin of my research project.

\textbf{1.2. Why France and the UK? Why the Pakistan and the Lebanon crises?}

Nevertheless, studying the emergence of EU emergency management does not mean just focusing on EU institutions and neglecting Member States. Therefore a choice of two countries was made: France and the UK. I explain this case selection first. Second, I justify the selection of the crises studied: the Pakistan and the Lebanon crises. Finally, I say a word on the timeframe selected.

France and the UK were the focus of the study, as representatives of two different conceptions of EU emergency management: France was pushing for a reinforcement of the community mechanism, whereas the UK was unwilling to see the CCPM prevail and hence was arguing for the development of the intergovernmental CCA. Moreover, they are two players of equal importance in terms of influence and capabilities in the field of security in Europe: Both of them are considered large Member States. Both of them have military capabilities, and illustrated themselves in the making of the European Security and Defence Policy.\textsuperscript{172} In addition to that, I have selected two Member States which

\textsuperscript{171} The CCA have never been activated for real crisis situation. The CCA have only been tested during exercises.

\textsuperscript{172} In 1998, the French British summit in Saint-Malo launched the ESDP.
recognize each other as equal and have equal access to the discourse, when it comes to arguing on the future of EU integration in the field of emergency management.\footnote{This would not have been the case if I had chosen a small and a large Member State, for instance.}

However, both of them often took opposite positions while facing crisis situations (e.g. Iraq). They often disagreed on the optimal organizational model which would allow the European Union to reach agreement and develop a common security strategy (e.g. on the optimal link between EU and NATO). In the case under scrutiny, they defended two different models (reinforced CCPM and CCA) and were the members of two different coalitions of interest regarding civil protection in the EU (the south and the north ones). But one of them managed to have its model adopted (the UK); the other one failed to get its model passed (France).

Regarding the implementation phase, two cases of crises were selected: the cases of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and the 2006 Lebanon crisis. They are the two major disasters that the EU CCPM faced after the studied case of the South East Asian Tsunami of 2004, which authors like Ekengren, Matzen and Svantesson used to illustrate the limits of the EU action in times of major disaster.\footnote{Ekengren, M., Matzen, N., Svantesson, M. (2006): The new security role of the European Union, Transnational Crisis Management and the Protection of Union Citizens, Stockholm, Swedish National Defence College.} The two cases are used here as examples of emergencies which put the CCPM to the test after the Tsunami lessons. The cases are chosen for the differences they exhibit on the dependent variable: the CCPM was not intensively implemented in Pakistan, while the CCPM was intensively implemented in Lebanon. Our main purpose is to explore the factors that explain the differences among the reaction of the different EU Member States (In Pakistan, Member States did not adapt fully to the CCPM. In Lebanon, some Member States adapted to the CCPM, some others did not). Finally, they were also relevant cases as both the UK and France were concerned by these crisis managements being head or deputy-head of the coordination at EU level. They also have strong historical links with these two countries.

The overall timeframe of this project stretches from the emergence of the CCPM in the late 1980’s until 2006 and the Lebanese crisis. For pragmatic reasons, I did not
include the following years as it was difficult to study a process in the making. Moreover the Lebanese crisis offered a good closing moment, as it was the first time the CCPM was activated in a first pillar mode during a “war” situation. Moreover this limitation finds another reason: later after this date the mechanism was recast and this recast was officially adopted in 2007. This recast led to changes (such as the financing by the MIC of transports of means of assistance) which marked the starting of a new phase in the MIC activities, with other types of debates among Member States during Committee Meetings. Regarding the CCA, 2006 is also a good closing date, as the first exercises are hence included in the study. It is not a problem not to have included 2007 and 2008, as no activation of the CCA took place others than further exercises. In a nutshell, the timeframe chosen is appropriate because it encompasses the phase of creation and adoption of both the CCPM and the CCA, and the beginning of the implementation phase. This timeframe also includes the moment of opposition between France and the UK. In 2007, on the contrary a new phase started with the so-called French-British joint non-paper on emergency management, indicating a new willingness to find a compromise on EU emergency management.

In short, the cases were mainly selected due to their difference on the dependent variable (CCPM copy of the marine pollution framework, CCA copy of the NATO framework in chapter 3; France failing to have the enhanced CCPM adopted, the UK succeeding in having the CCA adopted in chapter 4; CCPM implemented, CCA not in chapter 5; Pakistan showing a weak EU crisis management, whereas Lebanon proving the emergence of the EU in crisis management in chapter 6). The originality of this study is that different levels of comparison between different cases have been incorporated.


2. **Comparative case research**

In my study, I used different types of comparison: Comparison between two organizational models, comparison between two Member States in their role as advocates of a favored model, comparison of two historical development processes, comparison of two crises. The originality of my research lies hence in the way it incorporates different types of unit of analysis that are being compared, and hence different levels of comparison in one piece of research. I will explain this choice first. Second I will highlight a common aspect of my comparisons: they are all case-oriented and binary. I will show the strengths and the weaknesses of this mode of comparison.

### 2.1. Mixing different comparisons to understand linkages

Most of the research on European integration or on security exclusively analyzes either high-level strategic decision-making between States or middle-range comparison between organizations. They rarely combine the two approaches. This is the reason why I have decided to highlight linkages between these aspects which are normally considered separately. Doing so, I can answer certain questions in a more detailed way such as for instance that of the politicization of crisis management. By mixing the two levels of analysis which are normally kept apart by researchers, I could demonstrate that the whole process that is said to be politicized is in fact not politicized the same way during the different phases. Indeed I showed that in the creation and the implementation phase, the actors involved will tend to prefer a problem-solving approach in which national decision-makers are more oriented towards pragmatic actions (rather than sticking to strategic decision-making preferences). On the contrary, this depoliticization argument which hold true in the creation and implementation phases do not hold true in the adoption phase. In this adoption phase, the strategic decision-making between Member States is a prerequisite to explain the outcomes. Without taking the political positioning of the Member States into account, the
organizational level is not enough to understand why an organizational model is adopted or rejected.

So to combine the different levels of comparison and highlight linkages, I focused on different phases: Step 1, I investigated the creation of the CCPM and the CCA, looking at the causes leading to their emergence both inside the EU institution but also testing the impact of the outside world (impact of the Italians? Impact of NATO? etc). Step 2, I explored the adoption of the CCPM and the CCA looking at two main opponents in the political EU arena: the UK and France. I tried to identify the interactions between this phase and that of creation. I saw that the way the model had been created could have an impact on the adoption. Step 3, I explored the implementation of the CCPM and the CCA looking at both the bureaucratic and administrative aspects in Brussels, and the operational aspects in the field during a crisis (in Lebanon and in Pakistan). In a nutshell, I tried to provide a narrative explanation of the subsequent steps and to trace divergence or convergence in the process through a comparative approach.

My comparisons have common aspects: in every step, they are case-oriented and binary. This is what I will explain in the next section.

2.2. Using binary case-oriented comparison to study complex processes

A first common point in my comparisons is that I always follow a case-oriented approach. A second common point is that I always compare two cases. According to Dogan and Pélassy, the binary comparison of cases is a way to have a very detailed analysis, which enables the researchers to study complex processes and to highlight specificities. In this sense, opting for binary comparison was convenient as the cases compared were also incorporated in a complex process-tracing approach. Resorting to a binary logic of comparison helped me trace the alternative tracks in every phase.

identified and build a decision tree of emergence of the EU emergency management organizational structures from creation to implementation. For instance, it starts with two models which are copied (that of Marine pollution for the CCPM and that of NATO for the CCA), then I can trace if the model suggested by European Commission officials is adopted or not by the Council, finally if they are implemented or not during crises. A binary approach helped me understand why something could happen or on the contrary did not happen. For instance, I could explain why the enhanced CCPM model was not adopted in 2005, whereas the CCA were adopted.

Nevertheless Dogan and Pélassy stress the fact that binary comparison can be risky, as what is linked to the specific context of the cases and what could be generalised might remain unclear at the end. I acknowledge that this is one of the limits of the binary comparison. Combining binary comparison with the process-tracing approach, I hope to overcome this problem thanks to the identification of tracks, that could be generalised, from creation to implementation. Another difficulty is that I compare somehow interdependent cases (what happens in Pakistan can have an impact on the way actors behave in Lebanon, etc). This is one problem identified as the “problem de Galton.”\textsuperscript{178} I managed to overcome this problem clearly identifying the similarity, the processes of imitation or of diffusion between my cases, the learning effects, etc. Combining the comparison with the process-tracing method, this situation even turns out to be an added value rather than a difficulty. Therefore I will now turn to the process-tracing method and explain why I used it.

3. Using process-tracing

My research is based on process-tracing, in the sense of George and Bennett: “attempts to trace the link between possible causes and observed outcomes”.\textsuperscript{179} This is


one of the recognised methods of theory development. First, I justify my choice of the
process-tracing method. Second, I show that opting for process-tracing I could
incorporate the agency aspects and explain the divergences observed. Third, I
acknowledge some of the limits of the process-tracing method and I will highlight how I
overcome them. Finally I discuss the current use of process-tracing in my field of
research, EU integration and security aspect.

3.1. Developing theory through process-tracing

I decided to use process-tracing, because isomorphism as such is defined in the
literature as a constraining process. So tracing the process was relevant to evaluate the
constraints coming from the institutional setting and the possible margins of initiative of
the actors involved. I could trace the process of isomorphism to see if I could find links
between the reasons why a model was copied and the observed outcome on a day-to-
day basis in Brussels and in action during a disaster. Moreover, two different models
were copied. So I could compare two different paths from creation to implementation,
and see if the difference in the process could explain the difference in the outcome. I
hence followed a process-inductive approach. It means I did not start with the theory to
construct my potential tracks and decision tree of emergence of EU emergency
management. Rather, I had in mind a heuristic purpose of empirically identifying causal
paths in order to explain the puzzle of having two EU emergency management systems,
one being used and not the other.¹⁸⁰ Doing so, I could develop the theory of
isomorphism further and try to include potential points of divergence in the isomorphic
process, which were not studied as such in the literature.

¹⁸⁰ The literature identifies two types of approaches: the process-induction approach and the process-verification
approach. My study is part of the first one, in the sense defined by Bennet, A., and Geroge, AL.
3.2. Studying divergent isomorphism through process-tracing

Another reason to use process-tracing is thus the fact that it provides ways to deal with the actors and the divergences. Process-tracing is a way to disclose what actors wanted.\textsuperscript{181} In other words, process-tracing is a way to put the will and action of actors in a coherent frame of reference, which highlights their reasons for acting in such a way. Thanks to process-tracing, it is possible to uncover how the actors framed the problem (here the lack of coherence of EU action in emergency situation), and hence design what they saw as a potential solution to it (the CCPM and the CCA). To do so, a broad range of empirical data is needed. But as I could combine both interviews and participatory observation, I consider I had enough material to use the process-tracing method. Finally, I found my study could rely on process-tracing without being deficient in negative evidence, because I had two cases: one based on implementation and one where no-implementation took place, a situation which could help me explain why situations occur or do not occur.\textsuperscript{182} Importantly, the process-tracing method made it possible to determine more precisely by what means the organizational model copied could prevail or on the contrary be instrumentalised or “highjacked” in practice. Without the presence of negative evidence, the explanatory power of the process-tracing approach would be lower.


\textsuperscript{182} Negative evidence is a proof that an event did not occur (although it could have been planned). For instance, I can prove in my research that the enhanced CCPM was debated but its adoption did not materialize. I also use the fact that the CCA activation was an hypothesis planned by the Finish presidency in the case of the Lebanese crisis, but that it was not implemented. In other words, having only signs of CCPM activations for all the emergencies which occurred, I can say that the CCA have never been activated. Negative evidence can be used to carry out counterfactual case studies.
3.3. Identifying the limit of process-tracing

I acknowledge that examining the historical evidence intensively and tracing the process of causation, I focused on a restricted number of cases. It is difficult to know to what extend it is possible to generalise what I found to other cases. Nevertheless, thanks to this intensive exploration of the cases, I could demonstrate the limits of the current sociological neo-institutionalist theory based on those examples and I could offer ways to overcome some of them.

Another limit of process-tracing identified in the literature is the fact that the method focuses on one type of explanation without testing others. However my initial expectation, when I started to tackle the issue of EU emergency management, was that the outcome could be explained by a search for efficiency (saving as many victims as possible, etc). In the process of my research, and after some initial data-collection I revised my analysis, and started to focus on political aspects explaining the way actors created, adopted and implemented EU emergency management. I could see that there were links between the creation, the adoption and the implementation phases. Therefore I ended up opting for process-tracing. It helped me support my argument that sociological neo-institutionalist theories were the most appropriate ones to explain EU emergency management.

In addition to that, my research includes the idea that more than one path might have been taken. As a matter of fact I stress at the end of chapter 3, that both the reinforcement of the CCPM and the adoption of the CCA had been officially considered as options in 2005. Moreover my study includes the influence of random or unaccounted factors in the causal process. I consider that unlikely or inefficient outcomes can occur (identification of the grey zones, unwritten rules, in chapter 4). Finally I also show that some causal paths become less possible. For instance I identify a closure of some previously feasible paths (such as a second pillar activation of the CCPM). I justify the causal process identifying constraints that tied actors to certain choices (copy of a
particularly model, existence of a particular mode of discourse linked to a given model, etc.).

3.4. Process-tracing to study EU integration and policy diffusion

Finally, to support my choice of the process-tracing method, it seems important to put my research in the context of other pieces of research on EU integration in the field of security and on policy diffusion, using the process-tracing method. For instance, Schimmelfennig used process-tracing to study the EU, NATO and the integration of Europe. Interestingly, he also included the role of discourse and the rhetoric of actors to trace the integration process in his study. I think departing from research based on variables and opting for research focusing on social mechanisms is appropriate to understand the process of EU integration. Indeed, process-tracing is strong on the “how” and on the “interactions” as stressed by Checkel. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze a process where a large number of actors interact at different levels (bureaucratic, political, operational) to produce an outcome. For this reason, process-tracing is well suited to study EU integration, and in particular in the field of security where different pillars and hence different EU actors are combined. The fact that process-tracing can help study interaction effects makes it an appropriate method in my study. In addition to that, process-tracing is recommended to study diffusion as pointed out by Leichter. The study of policy diffusion requires to focus on “mechanisms


and motivations beyond the sharing of political forms."\textsuperscript{187} This is yet another reason to use the process-tracing method here, in a study of the diffusion of particular models (the marine pollution one and the NATO model). As shown by the literature on similar topics, the process-tracing method is relevant in my study.

3.5. Process-tracing and comparison: two complementary methods

Why was it helpful to combine process-tracing and comparison? According to George and Bennett, "process-tracing can serve to make up for the limitations of a particular controlled comparison".\textsuperscript{188} In other words, when it is not certain that only one aspect can make the distinction between two cases, it is better to overcome this difficulty by combining comparison with a process-tracing approach. This is a first reason why to combine process-tracing with comparison.

Second, combining the two methods helps determine why two cases can lead to two different outcomes. It means that through the use of deviant cases, the explanatory factors can be tested. For instance, the non adoption of the enhanced CCPM serves as a deviant case compared to the adoption of the CCA. The non-implementation of the CCA in practice during a crisis serves as a deviant case compared to the implementation of the CCPM.

Before concluding, I explain my modes of data collection to conduct this process-tracing approach.


4. Data collection

In this section, I detail the question of data collection. I explain first that my study is based on document analysis and on interviews. Second, I stress the role played by my participatory observation during my internship at the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) at the European Commission in Brussels from March to July 2007.

4.1. Documents and interviews

The study relies on the analysis of official EU documents (EU treaty, Council Decisions, European Commission Report, European Parliament Report, Commission and Council communications, etc) but also a great number of working documents prepared by different commission and council officials. Access to these documents was facilitated due to my Internship at the Unit A3 of the DG ENV from March to July 2007. I could access the intranet of the European Commission, in which all the relevant legal documents to my topic were electronically archived. I could also consult numerous working documents on the IT server of the Unit. 

Interviews were another main source of information. They were particularly useful to overcome the problem of access to restricted documents. They were also particularly useful to crosscheck information coming from different sources (e.g. between the national and the EU level, between the UK and France, etc). I conducted interviews in two European capitals (London and Paris). In France I interviewed officials of the Ministry of the Interior and of the Secretariat General aux Affaires Européennes. In London, I interviewed their British counterparts mainly based at the Cabinet Office and DfID. The interviews were also occasions to collect written materials such as reports, letters, etc which were used in this study. It was more difficult to access UK officials than French ones. For instance, UK officials met me out of their office in coffee places,

189 Even if I could consult documents with a limited degree of confidentiality was limited during my internship, I strictly followed the policy of not mentioning those sources in my research, even if they contributed to more precise questions in interviews, etc. For documents coming from the Council on the CCA, access was rarely granted.
whereas French officials accepted my coming in their office to interview them. I could feel that my being French created more trust from the French side than from the British one. I obtained a greater number of interviews in France than in the UK. By way of compensation, I interviewed several times certain key members of the UK Permanent Representation in Brussels.

In Brussels, I interviewed the Representatives of Member States in Committee meetings, Commission officials (from unit A3 of the DG ENV managing the CCPM but also with various other DGs dealing with emergency management), and Council Officials working on the issue of emergency management. The contact was easier with Member States representatives and commission officials than with Council officials. Inside the Council in particular, Council secretariat and EU Military staff people were more open to interviews than the SitCen officials. I had informally met with SitCen members in the past, who had helped me understand their work. However, when I asked for official interviews, I received an email saying it was forbidden to interview any SitCen members. One of the difficulties was certainly linked to the sensitivity of the topic of emergency management. Confidentiality often prevails, so as to keep the means of response hidden from potential terrorists groups. Therefore, access to documents was also restricted, in particular in the case of the CCA.

To overcome this obstacle, I tried to get information sources outside the EU institutions, from actors knowing them quite well. I interviewed experts in emergency management (mostly academics or member of think-thanks). In addition to that, I interviewed NATO officials, as soon as I identified the strong links between the EU institutions of Emergency Management and the NATO ones. The EADRCC officials were good sources to have an external point of view on the CCPM activations, as most of the disasters managed by the EU were also simultaneously managed by the EADRCC. Finally, the relief web online library of the United Nations was a great source of documentation (in particular to obtain the different press releases of the EU Member...
States and of the EU institutions during disasters, but also reports of international organizations or NGO’s on particular disasters).  

A difficulty linked to the conduct of interviews when doing process-tracing is the fact that some of the actors no longer had the same position as they used to. For instance, the persons who were at the origin of the CCPM are now mostly retired or in another position inside the European Commission. Thanks to contact with officials in place, I could obtain their personal details and interview them. But it was not always the case: For instance, UK 4, who was the British EU coordinator during the Pakistan earthquake, had left DfID. None of his colleagues whom I contacted could give me his personal details. This is certainly one of the interviewees missing in the list. Nevertheless, with the only exception of UK 4, I could interview all the population I had targeted, having a comprehensive panel of interviewees from different organizations and different countries of origin.

Regarding the Pakistan and the Lebanon cases, the field research was made in 2006 and 2007, respectively one and two years after the disaster. Of course, this gap in time can change the perception of the actors interviewed. Nevertheless, I found this timing good, as the actors had more distance with their action and could hence analyze certain aspects better, such as their ability to develop interoperability, their ability to learn from their actions, etc. Most of the report’s findings are based on individual interviews with people sent on field during the disaster and people who coped with the disaster from their headquarters in Brussels, Paris or London. The focus of the research is on the first two weeks which followed the emergencies, as this study focuses on the role of civil protection actors and not on that of humanitarian aid (involved during several months after a disaster of such magnitude in reconstruction missions). The study relies on the analyses of different types of written documents as well: press releases of the different governments involved in the European response and of the European Union, official declarations of the ministers and commissioners in charge, Situation reports published during the emergency by the MIC and by other national entities (such as the DfID for


DOI: 10.2870/11317
UK), post-crisis reports of states and of the European Commission published in the months and years following the emergency, Council Conclusion following the extraordinary meetings, etc. As secondary sources, reports of the United Nations and of Foundations (e.g. on the Pakistan earthquake disaster response) were used.

In total I conducted 50 semi-structured interviews of between 45 and 120 minutes. Since my research touched upon security issues, I assured confidentiality to all my interviewees. I did not record conversations to make the interviewees feel more comfortable. But I wrote a verbatim account of all that they were saying, and typed the interview right after leaving the interviewees.\footnote{Later in the text of the PhD, interviews were made anonymous by using a figure instead of a name.} However I have kept all the interviews which amount to more than 170 pages of text. In addition, I could benefit from my internship to have lunch or coffee with a lot of EU officials involved in emergency management. These informal discussions were often as important as my interviews, as people talked more freely on their work, their difficulties, their hopes, etc. I will now stress in greater details the role played by my participatory observation at the Monitoring and Information Centre.

4.2. Participatory observation at the Monitoring and Information Centre

Beyond the document and interview analyses, my research relies strongly on my participatory observation during my internship at the European Commission from March to July 2007 in the Unit A3 of the DG Environment. Beyond the study of documents, I could observe the practices of actors inside the MIC, both during emergencies and during day-to-day work. I was involved in MIC training and exercises.

\footnote{It must be said that at the council but also at some commission DG’s such as DG RELEX or DG JLS, no electronic devices are allowed inside the offices.}

\footnote{The coding is based on the organization for which the interviewee is working followed by a number: EU for the European Commission or the European Council, FR for French organizations (Ministry, Permanent Representation, etc), UK for United Kingdom organizations, DU for Dutch ones, SE for Swedish ones, IT for Italian ones, BE for Belgium ones, etc.}
linked to the use of their IT database during emergency. I also participated in the various committee meetings, where the Unit was administratively and politically involved. During this internship, I could identify the grey zones, the informal non-written rules, the routines. I gathered my observations every day in a diary. Finally, my internship was also a way to learn about EU difficult decision-making procedures and EU legislative processes in real situation. I could explore the conflicts of interest during decision-making between Member States, or between different EU officials (coming from different DGs), etc. The fact that I was an European Commission Trainee gave me access to a large number of emails and telephone numbers of both EU and national officials. Arranging interviews was facilitated.

On the contrary, certain actors had identified me during meetings as a MIC official. When they belonged to DGs having conflicts with the MIC, they adapted their discourse taking account of my particular status at the time. To overcome this situation, I tried to introduce myself as a European University Institute Researcher. For instance, I always used my EUI mailbox when contacting people for interviews and not my European Commission mailbox, etc.

Another difficulty was the fact that I could observe the MIC in action but not the SitCen. I acknowledge that my research relies on a greater level of information collecting on the CCPM than on the CCA. Still, I consider that I have gathered enough materials on the CCA creation and adoption to be able to include this in my study and answer the puzzle of the existence of this EU double structure of emergency management, with the CCPM being overused in its pillar I framework, and the CCA never activated. Doing my internship, I could see the impact of the process on the outcome. I could see how the political debate in committee meetings found an echo when crisis management was actually involved.
5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I justified my case selection and my choice of method. I explained my data collection from interview and document analysis, to participatory observation at the MIC at the European Commission in Brussels.

Overall I show that the added value of my research relies on the combination of process-tracing and comparative case research. Doing so, I can retrace the two tracks of emergence of respectively the CCPM and the CCA, and identify in every step (creation, adoption, and implementation) the criteria that can lead to success or failure. Moreover, I can identify common points and differences in the emergence process between the CCPM and the CCA, and I can stress how one step influences the other (how creation influences adoption, or how adoption influences implementation).

More generally, this method is appropriate to study EU integration processes but also to have a qualitative approach of the study of isomorphism. Developing a combination of process-tracing and comparative case research should enhance the understanding of the complex linkages at the origin of policy making in complex organizational frameworks.

Finally the method chosen - starting with the process of creation of official documents by bureaucrats and tracing the emergence of EU crisis management up to the decisions of political actors during emergencies - is relevant to the sociological neo-institutionalist approach. Opting for a rational or a historical neo-institutionalist approach would have meant using another methodological approach. First, if I had adopted a historical neo-institutionalist approach, I would have opted for a top-down political approach rather than a bottom-up organizational one. I would have started with the macro-level of states and societies and I would have analysed the set of norms and beliefs at a holistic level first to then explain particular outcomes during crises, rather than seeing how the aggregation of the behaviour of diverse organizational actors could lead to such an EU response in case of emergencies. Indeed historical neo-institutionalists examine the underlying forces bringing the states together or on the
contrary pushing them apart, studying first and foremost the role played by values at a macro level. Second, if I had adopted a rational neo-institutionalist approach, I would have focused mainly on the decision-making process itself leading to the co-existence of two EU emergency structures, building decision trees based for instance on Council Decision minutes. I would have seen if game theory could be applied to highlight the logic at stake. However, doing so, it would have been difficult to include the role played by bureaucrats in the phase of drafting of documents.

CREATION
Chapter 3:

The Sources of Two Models of Emergency Management:
the Community Civil Protection Mechanism
and
the Crisis Coordination Arrangements

In October 2001, the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) was introduced to deal with emergencies at EU level, mostly modelled on the community marine pollution framework used by DG Environment of the European Commission. In 2005, the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements were created. These Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) led to the adoption of a cross-pillar intergovernmental model in the field of EU emergency management, much on the NATO model of crisis management. This successive creation of two different European models, first based on the community method and second based on intergovernmental processes, contradicts the rationalist theories of European integration because crisis management is often presented as a domain where delegation and use of community approach is not relevant. It is often depicted as too sensitive an issue to be let in the hands of the European Commission. This counterintuitive creation of first a community approach and then an intergovernmental one is what this chapter will explain, showing the principal-agent theory is not enough to elucidate EU integration.

\footnote{This is why a pillar structure was adopted for the EU in the Maastricht Treaty, so as to separate security issues (Pillar II and III) from community issues under the responsibility of the European Commission (Pillar I).}
process and arguing for exploration of other explaining factors drawing from new sociological neo-institutionalist works.

This chapter focuses on how the CCPM and the CCA were initially formulated and framed, initially as written documents to be presented to decision-makers for adoption, demonstrating that isomorphism is the relevant concept to understand the creation of the EU structures of emergency management. This chapter empirically draws from interviews with the creators of the CCPM and of the CCA. It traces the process of creation of new organizational architectures and structures, from the abstract model formulation until the moment when the organizational models are ready to be adopted. I focus on the EU level which is now seen as a critical locus of decision-making in Europe, producing collective policies with considerable consequences for member states.\(^\text{195}\) The outcome of the chapter will be to give an explanation of where the idea of the organizational model, architecture and structure of the CCPM and of the CCA comes from, and to offer an analysis of how they went through demonstrating the limit of the rationalist models, and developing the new concept of divergent isomorphism. At the end of the chapter, I will have identified the factors leading to the genesis of EU organizational models of emergency management and highlight the constraining process of divergent isomorphism.

In the first section, I explain the creation of the CCPM model. Then, in a second section I investigate the emergence of the CCA model. In a third section, I show that divergent isomorphism can explain the coexistence of two EU emergency management models, before turning to some concluding remarks on model creation.

1. Explaining the creation of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism model

To enhance crisis management capacity and to deal with the imminent threat of major transnational emergencies, the EU has developed a community mechanism in the field of civil protection which is managed by the DG Environment under the label of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM). This mechanism was established by a Council decision in 2001.\footnote{Council of the European Union (2001): European Council Decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance intervention, (2001/792/EC).}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 April 1985</td>
<td>First meeting held at the European Comission DG environment under Italian impulse in Brussels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 May 1985</td>
<td>Meeting of ministers on Civil protection held in Rome following the involvement of G. Zamberletti, the minister of Interior of Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 1987</td>
<td>Declaration in the J.O mentioning “Civil protection”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 1987</td>
<td>Declaration in the J.O mentioning “Civil protection”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 November 1990</td>
<td>Declaration in the J.O mentioning “Civil protection”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April 1994</td>
<td>Council of civil protection organized under Greek presidency at the request of the Italians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1994</td>
<td>First resolution on civil protection creation of an action programme for civil protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December 1999</td>
<td>Following the Turkey earthquake storms, and the Erika shipwreck, European Council decision establishing a Community action programme in the field of civil protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October 2001</td>
<td>European Council Decision establishing a community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance intervention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 2: The emergence of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism
This section explains the historical process, which led to the creation of the CCPM. The first section will look at the question: why integrate civil protection at EU level. I show that the reason why civil protection emergency management was integrated at EU level is the strong involvement of Italians inside DG ENV of the European Commission, and the habits by DG ENV to link environmental and non-environmental issues together. The second section considers the question: how was civil protection emergency management integrated at EU level. I demonstrate that the integration process is an incremental one, starting with informal programmes and ending with a stronger legal tool (official Council declaration of 2001). The third section questions the role of the emergencies in the creation of the CCPM. It will show that the process of creation of the mechanism is not directly based on the shock of major disasters. The role played by bureaucrats seems to be the main trigger, disasters being only used as “drawer opener”. As a matter of fact, disasters paved the way for political changes, but the process of emergence started before their occurrence and ran independently thanks to the role played by bureaucrats. The fourth section focuses on the organizational model of the CCPM and show that the Marine Pollution Model developed by the Commission was copied to create the CCPM model. This is why the conclusion is that the CCPM creation is a case of isomorphism, triggered by Italian bureaucrats who were used to dealing with marine pollution and used the window of opportunity of 9/11 to have their model chosen.

1.1. Why integrate civil protection?

The integration of civil protection into the EU sphere is not a self-evident matter for two reasons. On the one hand, protecting the population is a matter of sovereignty of Member States, and thus not typically a EU prerogative. On the other hand, looking at the feasibility of EU integration in the field of civil protection, the existing mismatch

197 I use the expression of “drawer opener” to express the idea that the texts are already in the pipeline and that officials only have to grab them when they are asked to produce a text by their hierarchy at the moment of the emergency.
between the national civil protection entities in each Member State makes it difficult to anticipate a comprehensive EU framework.

1.1.1. Civil protection: a matter of sovereignty?

The protection of the population is by nature linked to the concept of sovereignty. The concept of EU solidarity only recently challenged that of national sovereignty in the face of disasters, following the major disasters on EU soil such as the major floods in Eastern Europe and the terrorist attacks on EU soil in Madrid and London. The word “solidarity” appeared repeatedly in the political leaders’ official speeches following the events. Solidarity was also included in the EU practices with the creation of a so-called “solidarity fund” to facilitate reconstruction in countries affected by major disasters. However, the expressed desire to take collective actions often dies out with the comeback to normalcy and declining media attention.\(^\text{198}\)

1.1.2. National processes of emergency management: A fundamental mismatch

The fundamental mismatch between the different entities in charge of civil protection in each Member State must be stressed. Some Member States like France have a strong culture of national centralized civil protection, whereas others like Germany rely on a decentralized approach, where the regions (i.e. Länder) are in charge of the protection of their citizens. The nature of the civil protection teams varies from one Member State to another, from voluntary forces to military ones. Even in one Member State, civil protection can involve different types of teams like in the French case where the firemen of Paris are members of the military, whereas the firemen of Nantes are volunteers. Regarding the organizational architecture of civil protection at national level,

in Spain or in Greece, civil protection is under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, whereas in Sweden or Norway (both states participating in the CCPM), there is no Ministry of the Interior. In Denmark, Slovenia and Sweden, civil protection is placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and in Norway it is placed under the umbrella of the Ministry of Justice! In a nutshell, civil protection in Europe is not at all a single well-integrated whole concept. It includes different approaches, different ways of working and very different national organizational architectures and structures. Some architectures and structures are designed so as to place the respondent at local level; some others place it at higher national levels. The diversity in the national structures makes it more difficult to build a common comprehensive EU framework. Even the wording is complex. In certain countries, the expression civil defence is used, in others it is the term civil protection; in others the main expression is emergency management or contingency planning. The translation of the expression is complex. Even for one expression, such as that of civil defence, the meaning can differ: “In Spain and Norway for example, the term of civil protection has a wider meaning than the term civil defence. In France, it is the opposite – the term civil defence has a wider meaning than the term civil protection. In Ireland, the term civil defence relates to a voluntary organization. It is a mess!” As a consequence for both the question of principle of sovereignty and the question of disparities in the national practices of civil protection, EU integration in the field of civil protection is not a self-evident matter.

199 By organizational architecture, I understand the macro level of organization (i.e. the type of ministry in charge of the decision-making for civil protection, the legal framework on which civil protection relies). By organizational structure, I understand the micro level of organization (i.e. the composition of the crisis forces and of the crisis headquarters, etc).

200 In the literature of emergency management, the “respondent” is the person coping with the crisis. It can be a local respondent, a regional respondent or a national/federal respondent.

201 The English expressions used here are tentative translations of the different Member States National concepts. But the reader must be aware of the difficulty of translating the expression. Sometimes the same word means very different things, or two different words can mean the same thing as illustrated with the concept of “civil Defence”.

202 Comment of a EU official trying to summarize in a paper the different meanings of civil protection and civil Defence, Brussels, July 2007.
1.1.3. The role played by Italians in the integration process

Even in this difficult context, a number of factors have helped to push the topic of civil protection up to the European political agenda in the 1980s, among which the strong involvement of Italian officials. The European Commission started to tackle the issue of civil protection in the early eighties due to the presence of two Italian Commissioners, Commissioner Carlo Scarascia-Mugnozza (1973-1977) and Commissioner Lorenzo Natali (1977-1981), that were both Commissioners for the Environment. Italy is a country which faces different types of major risks of natural disasters (forest fires, landslides due to heavy rains, floods, volcano eruptions, and marine pollutions). This is why there is a major interest in and an awareness of the role of civil protection by Italian politicians. A European Commission officer interviewed mentioned this quite clearly: “La protection civile, à l’origine, on peut dire que c’était très timide. Mais à l’instigation de la DG ENV qui avait des commissaires italiens, une sorte d’embryon d’unité s’est formé. Il faut dire qu’en Italie, ils ont eu pas mal de crises, du tremblement de terre aux inondations, ils ont des volcans, etc.”

Therefore the Commissioners thought of having an informal group at the DG ENV to tackle the issue of civil protection at EU level. Hence, due to the Italian interest and involvement, civil protection entered the EU through DG ENV, where the Italian Commissioners were working.

1.1.4. The possible inclusion of non-environmental issues at DG Environment

Why was it possible to include a non-environmental issue in an organizational structure (DG ENV) focusing on the environment? To answer this question, one must

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203 in: Interview EU 1. Translation: “At the origin, civil protection was very shy. But due to the presence of Italian officials at the DG ENV, an embryo of team emerged. At that time, Italy had experienced quite a lot of crises, from earthquake to floods, volcano eruptions, etc”.

204 Interview EU 23.
look at the long history of integration of environmental policies and non-environmental policies. It is a trend which started very early at European level with the integration of topics such as agriculture, energy and transport with the environmental topics. Linking civil protection and the environment was hence not so impossible as other cases of linkages between direct environmental issues with non-direct environmental issues on EU agenda pre-existed. The fact that climate change leads to a raise in natural disasters is a way for the Italian actors involved to justify the importance of the linkages between civil protection and environmental issues on the EU agenda in their discourse.

European Commission Documents explaining the action of DG ENV to the general public always places the paragraph on civil protection next to the one on climate change. Therefore both the strong involvement of Italians who are very concerned with and aware of disasters and the fact that environment at EU level was already a topic leaving much leeway in the integration of non-environmental issues led to the consideration of an informal integration of a Civil Protection cell inside DG ENV. Now I will present the route they followed to reach EU integration.

1.2. How to integrate civil protection?

This section details the process of integration of civil protection, from the organizations of informal and formal meetings, to the elaboration of the first legal documents (i.e. action programme first and later Council decision). This process led to the creation of an organizational structure, the so-called Monitoring and Information Center (in short the MIC) in 2001, dealt with by unit A3 of the DG Environment of the European Commission.

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206 See brochures on DG ENV available to the general public at the European Commission Info Point.
1.2.1. The first meetings

The starting-point that can be identified for integration of civil protection on the EU agenda is 1985. On 24 April 1985, a first meeting was held at the European Commission under Italian impulse, where it was decided to have a first meeting of ministers on civil protection. On 2 and 3 May 1985, the meeting of ministers on civil protection was held in Rome following the involvement of the Minister of Interior Giuseppe Zamberletti. Here too an Italian protagonist in charge at that time mentioned the Italian context as the reason for the involvement of Giuseppe Zamberletti: “Alors si je me souviens bien c’est en mai 1985 que Zamberletti en charge de la protection civile invite les autres ministres en charge, pour une réunion informelle à Rome. Il faut vous remettre dans le contexte de l’époque. L’Italie avait connu une énorme catastrophe naturelle: le tremblement de terre qui avait fait des milliers de morts et beaucoup de sans abris.” This meeting set the foundation of the EU legislation on civil protection as six resolutions were passed over the following 9 years further to the Rome meeting. In fact, to talk about EU integration in the field of civil protection in the late 1980s and early 1990s, one must refer to the directly visible meetings but also to the subsequent legal and administrative procedures (such as resolutions, declarations, action programmes, etc.) so as to precisely trace the process of creation of a EU administrative capacity in the field of civil protection. Therefore the attention of the reader must be drawn now on the different legal tools used. First the procedures implemented were weak and non-binding tools (i.e. “declaration”). And step by step their legal basis strengthened into more binding legal tools (i.e. leading to the creation of a budget line, etc) as will be shown in the next paragraph.

207 Interview EU 24.

208 in: Interview EU 24. Translation: “If I remember correctly, it was in May 1985 that Zamberleti, minister in charge of civil protection invited his European counterparts for an informal meeting in Rome. You must be aware of the context. Italy had been hit by several natural catastrophes, including an earthquake which had caused thousands of deaths and had left a lot of homeless people in the streets.”

1.2.2. The first official texts

The first official EU texts mentioning civil protection at EU level were developed in the context of the “Europe for citizens” programme, because Italian European Commissioner for Environment Ripa di Meana thought civil protection could be part of this more comprehensive programme.\(^{210}\) This comprehensive programme was not a very strongly binding tool and it did not refer directly to the concept of “civil protection”. This was the beginning of the process.

More interestingly, the results of the resolutions following the Rome meeting were a number of operational instruments covering both preparedness and response in the event of a disaster. As major evolutions, they set the basis of joint training, exchange of experts, and simulation exercises. This means that they stress the role of “human factors”. Moreover they start to mention a possible inclusion of “technical or operational factors” such as the creation of an operational cell.\(^{211}\) This means that they start mentioning the possibility of having EU resources of disaster response in the field of civil protection.

However all the activities presented in the resolutions and going beyond the first very general programme were organised on the basis of the subsidiarity principle laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. Of importance was the Resolution of 8 July 1991 on improving mutual aid between Member States in the event of technological disasters. This came into force after the informal meeting of the Council that took place on 8 July 1991 on improving mutual aid between member states in the event of a natural or technological disaster. This was due to the context of the first Gulf War, where EU24\(^{212}\) who had been so far a Commission official mainly in charge of marine pollution was asked by Commissioner Wallström to develop a civil protection tool at a very short notice. EU24 who is Italian too, managed to make a concrete proposal very quickly.

\(^{210}\) Interview EU 24.


\(^{212}\) Due to confidentiality, the main actors have been code named, see methodological chapter.
because in 1990, the Italian Presidency had tried to reach an inter-governmental agreement on civil protection but it had failed because of lack of time. So he could use this attempt and pass a text at European Commission level, in the war context which created this window of opportunity. On 21 April 1994 a Council of Civil Protection took place organized under the Greek Presidency at the request of the Italians and on 31 October 1994, there was the first resolution on “civil protection”. This resolution was mixed, which legally means it was a resolution signed both by Member States and the Council. Consequently, the European Commission managed to have a so-called “Action Programme for civil protection”. This is a legal tool that is used in case of unwillingness of Member States for the Commission to manage to get some funding for projects limited in their duration. This was a major step in the strengthening of the EU involvement because of the emergence of a EU budget line.

In 1998, a council decision approved the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, which contains provisions on matters such as prevention, emergency preparedness, public information and participation, industrial accident notification systems, response and mutual assistance. But it was only after the creation of the CCPM in 2001 that the role of EU in the field of civil protection was officially proclaimed. As head of unit and later head of directorate, EU23, who is Italian as well, managed to develop the CCPM and give it a formal crisis cell structure thanks to the emergence of the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). Here the procedure adopted led to the creation of a new organizational structure. This was a major step in the process of the building of the organizational structure.

In a nutshell, the analysis of the process shows that the main milestones of the evolution are the different legal tools chosen, from informal statement to the creation of a budget with the action programme and the creation of an organizational structure (the so-called Monitoring and Information Centre) with the Council declaration of 2001. One red thread that has been identified is the constant involvement of Italians in the process.

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213 This convention officially entered into force on 19 April 2000.
(Commissioners, Ministers, European Commission Officials, etc.). The other recurrent aspect is the linkage of environmental with non-environmental issues. This linkage made in the discourse gave officials leeway to gradually include a civil protection unit in DG ENV. One question remains related to the drivers of EU integration in the field of emergency management: that of the role played by emergencies. For instance, EU24 mentioned during his interview that the Gulf War created a window of opportunity. Other interviewees mentioned that the Italian earthquake or the Turkish earthquake had played a role in the process of EU integration. What role do emergencies really play? The next paragraph will focus on this question.

1.3. Do disasters matter?

Often authors studying the EU follow the reasoning that the crises themselves are the catalyst of EU integration.\textsuperscript{214} Is it so in the case of civil protection? Were crisis catalyzing events or did other elements such as potential rivalries between the European Commission and the Council played a role?

1.3.1. Were crises catalyzing events?

Several interviewees mentioned that the idea of the CCPM had been incubating since the earthquake in Turkey in August 1999, when certain inadequacies in the coordination of international emergency teams were identified. Moreover, 1999 had been a terrible year regarding natural and man-made catastrophes, as storms had affected several EU countries, the Erika shipwreck had shocked EU population, etc.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{214} For instance it is said that the crisis occurring in the Balkans led to the emergence of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).


Wendling, Cécile (2009), The European Union Response to Emergencies: A Sociological Neo-Institutionalist Approach European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/11317
This situation is said to have led to the Council Decision 1999/847/EC of 9 December 1999 establishing a Community action programme in the field of civil protection. In September 2000, France which had been hit by the storm of 1999, used its presidency (July-December 2000) to organize a French initiative on population protection. The proposal was not implemented. But the idea of bringing civil protection on the EU agenda kept being mentioned. Does it mean that EU integration in the field of civil protection is driven by crisis? One could point out that the German presidency had organized a German initiative under their presidency too (January-June 1999), although their country is not directly affected by a crisis.\footnote{The proposal was not implemented. Those documents remained food for thought which were partly used to draft the 2001 Community model proposal.}

Moreover, it is not clear if one can say that 9/11 led to the adoption of the CCPM. During Spring 2001, negotiations took place during committee meetings to develop civil protection at EU level under the Swedish Presidency.\footnote{Interview of SE 1.} Some ideas were mentioned to go beyond the Community action programme well before 9-11. The number 112 as unique emergency number was suggested earlier, and even the main point of creating a community mechanism for civil protection was raised prior to 9-11. In fact, during Spring 2001, Germany was against the idea as civil protection is a regional issue in their country, and hence not so much included at Member States level. For them, creating a community model was going too far. Italy was also against the community model proposed, because they judged it was not going far enough. They wanted a true communitarisation of means such as means of transport of assistance.\footnote{This concept is used to refer to community- and not nationally- owned means such as carriers to transport assistance.} At that time, SE2 was leading the discussion as Committee member of the Member states having the Presidency (Sweden). Although Sweden was against the community model, SE2 had worked with the EU officials in charge of civil protection, and was personally in favor of adopting the community model on the basis of the marine pollution framework (with no finance of transport, but pooling and sharing of means of assistance). 9-11 was then a
“drawer opener”. The proposals were in the pipeline and had been already fully discussed but the crisis offered the opportunity to speed up the adoption process. Indeed the community model which was put forward and heavily discussed was adopted in October 2001. “The need for a Europe-wide approach to civil protection took on a new sense of urgency after the Terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001. Member States quickly realized that the Union would need a clear, coordinated disaster response strategy if a similar attack were to take place in a member state.”\(^{219}\) This is why the CCPM supplemented the community action programme in 2001 in the context of 9-11. But another element of the context played a role too: the development of EU civilian crisis management in the sense of management of civil war by the Council.\(^ {220}\)

1.3.2. Have conflicts between the Commission and the Council played a role?

The development of EU civilian crisis management in the sense of management of civil war included a part on civil protection since the Feira European Council. Indeed four civilian crisis management aspects had been identified at that time by the EU in the context of ESDP mission (Pillar II) dealt with at Council level: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. Although Unit A3 “Civil Protection” by DG ENV created to deal with the civil protection aspect of crisis management thought this was not relevant to include civil protection in civilian war management dealt with by the Council, they agreed to it because it created a window of opportunity to develop their own services and procedures, and potentially get funding. For them it was indeed a positive development, because it was stressing the importance of civil protection as such at EU level. But they thought that Civil Protection should not be a part of Civilian Crisis


\(^{220}\) The Council took over the expression of “crisis management” which now in EU jargon only relates to Pillar II activities.
Management dealt with by the Council because in some cases it can be closely related to humanitarian assistance and therefore should remain neutral and not too political. For them, having civil protection including as well in the Pillar II could create some difficulties during intervention in the field.

Hence, although civil protection had been one of the four civilian crisis management aspects since Feira, in 2000, the fact that the CCPM can mean a “non-Pillar II” civil protection operation led to a situation where Civil Protection has never been used in any civilian crisis management so far of Pillar II (not even in simulation exercises of civilian crisis management). It means that offering the possibility of a Pillar I activation led to a situation were the European Commission took advantage of a new legal framework to take over what could have been a task dealt with by the Council.

So crises were catalyzing events used by the Commission to get a stronger legal basis of action, but this is not the direct origin of the CCPM. Other aspects such as the conflict of interest between the Commission and the Council can put pressure on actors to adopt a mechanism which is more favorable to the interest of their own organization. Moreover, as explained, the CCPM was discussed in spring 2001 well before the turning point of 9-11.

### 1.3.3. Did the December 2004 South East Asian Tsunami play a role?

The CCPM as created in 2001 and used during the Tsunami included the Community action programme (mainly an instrument to finance workshops and trainings in the field of preparation for disaster). A Brussels-based Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) was created, which is the operational Centre to centralize the request of states needing help and the means made available by other participating states. A web-based alert and notification application called the Common Emergency and Information System (CESIS) was implemented, which provides a common web-

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221 Interview EU 10.
based platform of alert where participating states can share information. Hence since 2001, the CCPM provided an opportunity for collecting validated emergency information, for releasing that information to the Member States, and for sharing lesson learnt from intervention. However, the MIC could not finance transport of assistance in the field for instance. The legal tools did not include this aspect in its mandate. When the Tsunami occurred, there were 30 states participating in the CCPM (EU-25, Bulgaria, Romania, Lichtenstein, Iceland, Norway) and negotiations were taking place with Croatia and Ukraine. Support was available to affected countries on their request and all the states participating in the CCPM were free to decide whether to help or not a country in need. But, as some Member States had assistance but no transport capacities, certain in-kind assistance did not reach the affected areas. This is why the limits of the mechanism appeared. After the South Asian Tsunami, the mechanism underwent its major reinforcement, with a proposal of the European Commission to improve the mechanism.\footnote{European Commission (2005): Improving the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, COM (2005/137/EC).} In fact, following the South Asian Tsunami of December 2004, there was a widespread recognition of the need to further strengthen the mechanism: First, in its extraordinary meeting of 7 January 2005, the General Affairs and External Relations Council decided to examine improvements of the mechanism, including its analytical capacity. Moreover, the EU Action Plan adopted on 31 January 2005 outlines several key areas for action relating to civil protection. The Council’s request coincides with calls from the European Parliament for the creation of a pool of specialised civilian civil protection units, with appropriate material, which should undertake joint training and be available in the event of natural, humanitarian and environmental disasters, or those associated with industrial risks, within or outside the Union.\footnote{See: European Parliament (2005): Resolution on the Tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean, 13 January 2005.} Simultaneously, due to mediatization and pressure from public opinion following the shock of the images of the Tsunami, several Member States made proposals for improving the civil protection response capacity of the EU. While the detail of the Member States proposals differs, there appears to be agreement to build on the existing mechanism rather than creating a
new one. This is why the CCPM established in 2001 was recasted in 2007. Simultaneously, the civil protection action programme which provides the funding of activities that aim at preventive action, preparedness and an effective response expired at the end of 2006. Since 2007 onwards, the Council adopted a new financial instrument. Here too the crisis of the Tsunami helped pushing for a reform through the light it shed on the problems of the existing mechanism. But the problems which led to the so-called recast of the mechanism exist independently from the crisis. It was linked to the restricted legal basis of action. The recast of the mechanism helped overcoming these limits.

The fact that the mechanism went through an evolution not directly based on the shocks that major disasters represented, but catalysed through it is an interesting point, as often authors studying EU integration follow the reasoning that the crises themselves led to the changes. In the EU civil protection case, the crises are used to justify the changes, but they rarely come first. What seems to come first is the idea of an organizational model. Indeed the European Commission officials interviewed mentioned a model of reference when developing EU emergency management response: that of Marine Pollution. This will be the object of the next paragraph.

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1.4. Where does the organizational model adopted in 2001 come from?

Most of the persons in charge of developing the CCPM in 2001 had originally been involved in the issue of marine pollution within the framework of DG ENV. So they used their experience in the field of marine pollution to create new larger crisis procedures in the field of EU civil protection. Nowadays the mechanism for civil protection is still linked to the marine pollution framework.

Marine pollution was tackled at EU level in the late 1970s and 1980s due to the fact that Europe is one of the largest markets in crude oil imports and 90% of crude oil is transported by sea. Shipwrecks like the Erika and later the Prestige have stressed the need for a EU response to massive oil spills which affected EU coastlines in different Member States at the same time. The Council resolution of 26 June 1978 created an action programme on the control and reduction of pollution caused by hydrocarbons released at sea. Later this was transformed into a community framework of cooperation in the field of marine pollution, which started to be operational in 2000. As we can see, the creation of a community mechanism in the field of civil protection follows a similar path, of having first an action programme later turned into a community framework through the adoption of a stronger legal basis for the Commission to take action (from resolution to decision).

In the field of marine pollution, European Commission officials were used to having exchanges of experts, and to the presence of observers in crisis situation, so they thought they could develop the same kind of exchange in the field of civil protection,

227 Interview EU 24.

228 See European commission webpage on Marine Pollution, available here: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/marin/mp01_en_introduction.htm


and start with the human factor. Moreover, they were used to supplementing member states effort during catastrophes and promoting cooperation at EU level, which they decided to do as well in the field of civil protection, and which ended up in the creation of the MIC.\footnote{Interview EU 1 and EU 24.} Therefore the creation of the CCPM draws on previous experience in the field of marine pollution. European Commission officials had this model in mind when creating a new cooperative framework called “community mechanism for civil protection”. One EU official even admitted that he used the same word document he had written to draft the Marine Pollution framework to write a proposal for the new Civil Protection framework. The name of “mechanism” is a unique term though to describe a framework used by the European Commission. It can make us think it is a new type of organizational architecture. But in fact, its origin is not as such linked to a special legal basis or a special organizational framework. It comes from a meeting held by Unit A3 in 2001. The wording was suggested, not because of a legal sense, but because of the image of Charlie Chaplin, in Modern Times, where all cogs come together to produce something. Other proposals during the meeting included the French word “plateforme” or very long English expressions, so at the end they stuck to the idea of “mechanism”, which makes sense in the legal context of subsidiarity, where all member States are supposed to join forces to produce enhanced synergies.

1.5. Outcome

In this paragraph I sum up the main points regarding the CCPM creation process going back to the theoretical framework developed in chapter 1, and relying on the process, the actors, the context and the model, to tackle the issue of isomorphism.

The context of linkage/interdependence of environmental issues with non-environmental issues fosters isomorphism inside DG ENV. Organizational structures used in an environmental issue are copied and used in civil protection. Events such as
the Turkish and Italian Earthquake, 9/11 or the South East Asian Tsunami stress uncertainties. However, they have a role of “drawer opener” rather than of initial trigger.

Regarding actors, first, we can see that the fact that European Commission officials are recruited internally and are used to rotating in different DGs or services of a DG about every three years has consequences on the way they follow their process of professionalization. They are used in one field to community method that they can easily tend to recreate in another. In this sense, we can observe functional spill-over effects from the field of marine pollution to the field of civil protection at EU level. Moreover, we can observe cultivated spill-over (concept which includes the intention of actors). Officials intentionally used the same word document as for the Marine Pollution framework. Initiators of legal texts, European Commission officials have the power to coin names and expressions, which also gives an impact on how the organizational architecture is seen and how it appeared in the discourse of actors when it comes to adoption.232 Second, we can see the role of network of elite. In fact, the CCPM creation case shows a strong impact on the Italian network of elites, even if when asked, Italians do not acknowledge this consciously in their interviews.

What can be said about the organizational model? The model of marine pollution was legitimate. It had proved to be useful and successful at EU level and hence could be copied. To conclude, the CCPM is a case of isomorphism. The four identified necessary conditions of timing aspect, similarity, interactive aspect and intention aspect are here: The model chosen is based on a pre-existing one (marine pollution framework). This model had gained legitimacy due to the importance of marine pollution response in the EU. The similarity both in the process of adoption (step-by-step from a programme to a community tool) and in the content of the instrument (exchange of experts, training, etc) are strong. The same actors interact both for marine pollution and civil protection. The intention is manifest: Same word documents were used and the expressions “marine pollution” were replaced with “civil protection’. Hence the same wording and similar organizational structures were developed.

232 The question of discourse will be the object of the next chapter.
1.6. Conclusion

The development of Civil Protection at Community level followed an incremental legal track, with first joint resolution of Member states and Council, then Action Programmes (which are short-term instrument to finance projects) and then the mechanism as a community tool creating an organizational structure (the MIC) thanks to a Council Decision. Thus starting with a weak legal tool, the European Commission managed to have more leverage of actions thanks to a community-based mechanism, in the field of Civil Protection. The particularity of this process relies here on the fact that the red thread and main driver of this process was provided by the Italian backing thanks to their strong presence in DG ENV and the EU possible policy linkage of environmental issues with non-environmental ones. This section has shown that the CCPM creation is about a socialization process (the human factor of training, exchange of experts, etc), a symbolic EU visibility in times of crises (9-11 being a drawer opener to meet the expectations of the EU citizens). But the model adopted was established mainly thanks to the role of EU professional bureaucrats who copied a pre-existing model. This is why I argue sociological neo-institutionalism is the framework which is relevant here to understand the model creation, more than a rationalist approach based on functionalist argument or principal-agent theory.

In the CCPM case, isomorphism follows a normative way as we can observe a copy of the marine pollution organizational model. The fact that the CCPM is a case of normative isomorphism means that bureaucrats influenced by their professionalisation and following their own self-interest can create organizational structures. This is due to the existence of advocates (like EU24 in the present CCPM case). They modify the original group (dealing with marine pollution) into some more formal global organization based on the marine pollution model but encompassing the whole field of

233 The commission can draw upon the main discourse of climate change and its consequences to actively support the inclusion of civil protection in the new EU Treaty (Constitutional Treaty, Lisbon Treaty).
civil protection activities. The creation of the CCPM is hence certainly linked to the inherent tendency of organizations to expand. The expansion provides its leaders with increased power and prestige. It retains or attracts good personnel, and has a tendency to reduce internal conflicts. It also means that parallel to this reorganization, a public problem which was already on the agenda (marine pollution) became reframed and hence encompassed in the bigger domain of risk and security: that of civil protection. Finally, it can be interpreted as a case of spill-over, in the sense of Mitrany (at the origin of the expression): successful cooperation in one area leads to further cooperation in other areas; and then in the sense of Haas, for the inclusion of bureaucratic tasks into political interest framework (there is no neutrality of the EU officials). However, I argue that the spill-over here is mainly linked to the fact that European Commission officials have a career which brings them from a unit to another, from a DG to another. They can thus use toolkits developed in one field of community action in another one, this leading to the spreading of a community model. Hence, I go beyond the concept of functional spill-over, and prefer the concept of “cultivated spill-over” integrating the intentional aspect.

The external source of support consisted of the Italian network as we have demonstrated. So we must not neglect the impact of the Italian coalition. Meaning the supranational entrepreneurs manage to make the last step, after the initiation of the process of integration by national actors. According to Moravcsik, supranational

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237 The concept of cultivated spill-over (linked to EU officials task expansion) was used to express the fact that the intention of European Commission officials could play a role in reinforcing the purely mechanical functional spill-over, studied earlier by functionalists. See on the concept of cultivated spill-over: Natalicchi, G. (2001): *Wiring Europe: Reshaping the European Telecommunications Regime*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, page 185.
entrepreneurs intervene to overcome failure in the domestic and intergovernmental coordination of information and ideas. This is the case here, where the Italian government did not manage to have the text passed under their presidency. This situation led to Italian officials of the European Commission taking over the file, and leading the process until the end (emergence of the model). According to Moravcsik, “the two level network manager approaches suggest that a window of opportunity for supranational officials opens if and only if there are failures of organization, representation, and aggregation.” 238 This failure of the presidency due to the fact that presidency was too short to have the text passed, can explain the role that European Commission officials could play later. In this sense, what we find here is reinforcing the findings of Moravcsik. Going a step further, what we observe is reinforcing the findings of Cox on the role of executive heads in international organizations: key personalities can bring about expansion of tasks and of authority inside their organization by maximising the opportunities offered by their environment. 239

Having identified the main drivers, one can raise the following question: What are the drivers that could have been expected and are missing? First of all DG environment services are used to dealing with a lot of NGOs when in the process of creating new institutional framework. In the case of civil protection, this was not the case. This situation seems normal as civil protection forces are state forces which are often opposed to humanitarian actors which are NGOs. But still, certain non-state organizations could have played a role and this was not the case: for instance firemen organizations (trade-unions, voluntary associations) were absent. The lobby of the 112 led by Oliver-Paul Morandini was not very present as well to push for the CCPM. Incidentally, it is also worth noting that although certain Members of the European Parliament are involved in the issue of civil protection (e.g. MEP Galeote, MEP


Papadimoulis), they did not appear as strong advocates of the CCPM in the creation process.

Looking at the process of creation of the CCPM, it seems Member States tolerate and even encourage the commission’s role in terms of collecting data and notifying national actors of possible disturbance. As long as there is no conflict with national decision-making, the centrality of monitoring and surveillance by the Commission is appreciated, in particular in countries facing a lot of natural risks like Italy.\textsuperscript{240} It is on the interest of Member States to see more horizontal coordination by the European Commission. In this sense, they rely on the expertise and resources of the European Commission (such as those that the MIC can provide) without having to be “dependent on the European Commission” in their own crisis management. On the contrary, for political and strategic issues in times of major emergencies, Member States will prefer to turn to the Council, in particular since the creation of new structures based at the Secretariat of the Council and assisting Javier Solana as representative.\textsuperscript{241} This is what will be presented in the next section with the detailed case of the creation of CCA/ICMA (section 2). Then the two processes of the creation of the CCPM and of the CCA will be compared (section 3) and the concept of “divergent isomorphism” will be developed.

2. Explaining the creation of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements model

This section explains the creation of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (in short: CCA). First, I will investigate why Council-based organizational structures of emergency management were created. I will show it is due


\textsuperscript{241} When the post of EU counter-terrorism coordinator was created in 2004, the incumbent Dutch politician Gijs de Vries, was employed by the Council, reporting to the High Representative for CFSP, rather than by the Commission where he could have been placed as well, due to the fact that staff and financial resources were available (e.g. at the DG Justice and Home Affairs).
to the importation of the NATO model. Second, I will explore how the transfer of model was concretely made from NATO to the EU highlighting the role played by the Dutch to initiate the process of creation of the CCA. I will show that the CCA developed as a joint presidency work (from the Dutch presidency to the Austrian one). Finally I will study the role played by the London Bombings. I will show that although not the first and main trigger, they were used as catalyst for the CCA by the UK, to be seen at the origin of Council-based structures of emergency management.

2.1. Why create a council-based organizational structure of emergency management? The importation of the NATO model

Three organizational structures of emergency and crisis management were created at the EU level at the Council secretariat after the Amsterdam Treaty, and after the nomination of Javier Solana as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy in June 1999: the so-called Policy Unit, the EU military staff and the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen). The role of these new organizations is to support the High Representative in his work. This includes the preparation of meetings in which the High Representative takes part, but also the monitoring of unfolding crisis events, the writing of policy reports, etc. The Treaty of Amsterdam asks Member States and the Commission to provide these new organizations with information, including confidential information.

The creation of these new organizational structures is due to the arrival of J. Solana as Secretary General of the European Union and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Before he was appointed by the EU, Javier Solana had

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242 The policy unit is an organizational structure which is assisting Solana in his work. The Policy Unit has a relatively flexible structure, organized in individual Task Forces defined by Solana’s priority areas. See on the role of the policy unit: Schneckener, U. (2001): “EU crisis management in Macedonia”, in: Internationale Politik, Vol. 2, (Fall 2001), available online.

243 On the role and organizational structure of the EU military staff and the SitCen see below.

244 To read the official text of the treaty and the precise definition of the tasks, see online: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s50000.htm.
worked at NATO. He had been Secretary General of NATO from December 1995 to October 1999. As Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana was used to having these kinds of unit assisting him, so he recreated them at EU level when he started working at the Council as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Therefore, the transfer of personnel from NATO to the Secretariat of the Council was accompanied by a transfer of the organizational model. In this section the SitCen and EU MS which are the Council organizational structures contributing the most to EU emergency management will be presented, as will their role in the field of civil protection. This section will explain the imitation process which led to the existence of Council-based emergency management structure, copying the NATO ones. It will also highlight the difficulties linked to this situation. This section starts dealing with the SitCen and then deals with the EU Military Staff.

2.1.1. The Joint Situation Centre

The SitCen is an organizational structure which was created to gather intelligence in the different member states and share it, on the NATO model. The SitCen is composed of military and civil officials working 24/7 on crisis management issues. The objective was to provide the Council with high quality information. In 1998 when the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was first developed no structure existed to allow member states to share intelligence. There was only some exchange of confidential information in the form of diplomatic telegrams. Since its creation, the SitCen has recruited intelligence analysts from Member States and has facilitated information exchange through the creation of secure communication networks. For instance, it has installed secure communications with the five operational military

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245 Interview EU 3 and interview EU 4.

246 See: [http://www.grip.org/bdg/g4501.html](http://www.grip.org/bdg/g4501.html).

247 By NATO the Council refers to the North Atlantic Council. By the EU it refers to the Council of the European Union.
headquarters (based on the NATO model). Its main objective was to produce reports on long-term strategic trends to help the Council in its decision-making. But, linked to this SitCen, the Council developed in 2005 integrated crisis management procedures (cross-pillar), the so-called Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA). “The arrangements are designed to enable the Council and the European Commission to successfully respond to any major emergency or crisis that may affect several EU Member States, or the interests of the Union as a whole.”

This gave an opportunity to the SitCen to enlarge its activities and be a Council secretariat-based actor which could be a potential EU-based coordinator in times of crises. According to the seventh report of the UK House of Lords Committee on the EU, the missions of the SitCen are the following. First it must contribute to early warning (in conjunction with other Council-based EU Military Staff) in case of emergency. The sources on which the SitCen relies are open-source materials, military intelligence, non-military intelligence and diplomatic reporting. Second, the SitCen must conduct situation monitoring and assessment when crises occur. Third, the SitCen’s role is to provide facilities for crisis task force (it means that the crisis steering group and crisis support group which are activated in case of emergencies could be based at the SitCen in the occurrence of a major crisis). Finally, the SitCen is supposed to provide an operational point of contact for the High Representative.

One of the major problems is the contribution of Member States. They are supposed to share some of their information in times of crisis. But the culture of national intelligence services is a culture of bilateral exchanges of information. In contrast, the SitCen is meant to allow European sharing of information on a multilateral basis. A


[249] Parts of this report are available online, see: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldeucom/53/5313.htm.

[250] The crisis steering group is an ad-hoc organizational structure which acts as central coordinating body in the event of an emergency. It consists of the following high-level cross-pillar actors or their representatives: Presidency, Secretary General, Commission, Member States affected, Joint situation Centre. The crisis steering group is assisted by a crisis support group composed of senior officials with relevant expertise.
second difficulty in the importation of the NATO organizational model in the EU context is the control of flows of information. So-called “standard output” of the SitCen goes to members of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which defines the position of the EU in response to crisis.\textsuperscript{251} As a consequence, the European Commission receives the material through its representative on the PSC. The representative of the Commission works at the External Relations Directorate-General (in short DG RELEX) but it has only a restricted circulation within the External Relations Directorate-General. No information goes to other DGs (such as DG ENV, DG ECHO, etc.) At the moment nothing is transmitted to the Parliament as well, although the Council is negotiating arrangements to permit a limited release. This could create major difficulties in the occurrence of a crisis. For instance, the on-duty MIC officers might not be included in the information-sharing process.

\textbf{2.1.2. The EU Military Staff}

The EU military staff (in short EU MS) was created in June 2001 by the Council to deal with military aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It performs early warning, strategic planning and situation assessment.\textsuperscript{252} It is providing military expertise for the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as it is its main function. Besides, the EU MS was granted an emergency management role as well. It can be used in times of emergencies because of an access to military database granted to the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) of DG ENV of the European Commission. As a matter of fact, the MIC can see which type of military material could be made available in the emergencies (mainly transport) thanks to the

\textsuperscript{251} The Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is also known by its French acronym as “COPS” is the core of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It is composed of national representatives at senior/ambassador level, placed within the framework of the Member States permanent Representations in Brussels.

\textsuperscript{252} See the website of the EU Military Staff: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1039&lang=en.
access granted to the EU MS data base. The MIC can thus use military transport to bring assistance to affected countries.

Here too some difficulties appeared: For instance, when a military plane is required to transport civil protection assistance in the field of a disaster, there are two possible ways to obtain it. The example of Italy will be used to give a concrete case illustrating the difficulties. Either the MIC can contact the Italians in charge of civil protection and ask them to contact the Defence Minister to obtain military transport. Or the MIC can use the EU Military Staff and then the EU MS itself can contact the Italian Ministry of Defence to obtain it. Since the likelihood to obtain military transport from Italy is higher when using the EU military staff as military officers are used to such a model (at NATO), it is in the MIC’s interest to use the EU Military Staff. But this is not well received by the national civil protection contact point of the MIC, who find themselves bypassed.253

Consequently, new organizational structures emerged linked to the CCA, on the NATO model, due to transfer of personnel with the arrival of Javier Solana. This finding confirms what Cox wrote in 1969 on NATO staff and organization. He pointed out the fact that NATO is composed of officials assigned by their national administration to the task for a given period. This practice according to him increases the intensity of intergovernmental cooperation by familiarizing a great number of officials with the working practices of NATO. This means they can then perpetuate and develop them later in their organization on the NATO model, as being familiarised with it. 254 Those council-based structures can be complementary (as we have seen with the example of the EU Military Staff) but can sometimes overlap with the European Commission ones. The separation of the role between the SitCen and the MIC is sometimes unclear. What is interesting here in the choice of the organizational model is that the high turn-over of actors leads to a homogenization of the structure adopted. Even in the vocabulary used,

253 The example is drawn from a discussion I had with a colleague during my internship at the DG ENV.

there is little difference between the NATO and the EU terms: For instance, the “Crisis Coordination Arrangement” wording is a NATO wording. One person interviewed on the difference between those new Council-based structures under Solana’s responsibility and NATO organizational structures answered the major difference was “the colour of the carpet”. This anecdote means that the similarity is acknowledged by actors, who find it easier to work within the two structures. This paragraph explained why the EU Council was equipped with emergency management structures. The main argument is that the new Council organizational structures are copies of the NATO structures. In the next section, the detail of the historical process leading to this will be presented so as to explain how this transfer happened.

2.2. How to create a council-based structure? A joint Presidency work

The designing of the CCA was originally done by Dutch Officials at the Ministry of the Interior of Netherlands. This prior step was followed by strong cooperation between the successive EU presidencies, up to the Austrian one. Consequently, the council-based structure was the result of a long process of joint presidency work.

When the Netherlands presided over the EU, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior was working on a project called “Sagbata”. This project was a NATO supported project which was initiated by the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. “The Sagbata project reacts to the need for insight in the effects of strategic measures which must be taken by senior political advisors in case of major disasters.” The objective of Sagbata was to consider in details what the consequences on decision-making procedures following a bioterrorist attack

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could be. This project aimed at increasing the awareness of the threat of bioterrorism and identifying means of response. This study led to a reflection around the creation of a Crisis and Emergency Management tool (including an IT interface).\textsuperscript{257} This study included a part on consequences on other EU countries. When dealing with this part of the study, the Dutch officials in charge at the Ministry of the Interior realised coordination in times of crisis was missing in some areas such as bioterrorism at EU level.\textsuperscript{258} NATO had structures but not the EU. This is why searching for answers to fill this EU gap, they borrowed the NATO terminology of “Crisis Arrangement” and put it on The Hague Programme Agenda, which was designed under their presidency at that time. As a matter of fact, the Hague Programme, which was endorsed by the Council in November 2004, aimed at defining priorities in the field of security for the EU. Among others, it dealt with terrorism. This is how the same Dutch officials dealing with Sagbata started to use the Hague Programme to fill what they considered a EU gap to be bridged. ICMA (Integrated Crisis Management Arrangements) was the general wording they used at that time.

The programme aiming at developing EU emergency management structures was organised as a joint work of the successive EU presidencies (from the Netherlands to Austria), and was supposed to be finalised and put into force during the Austrian Presidency.\textsuperscript{259} It often happens at EU level that successive presidencies meet to plan a reform running over one or more years. This was the case with The Hague Programme.

But the 2006 London Bombings were a catalyst for the enforcement of the CCA prior to ICMA. The next section will explain how the London Bombings occurring under the Presidency of the EU led to the confiscation of the process and consequently to an implementation prior to the enforcement planned under the Austrian Presidency.

\textsuperscript{257} See: Sagbata Project Support Office (2005): \textit{Strategic decision making during crisis situations, Measures, Consequences and Alternatives}, available on request.

\textsuperscript{258} Interview DU 1.

\textsuperscript{259} Interview EU 3 and Interview EU 4.
2.3. Did emergencies play a role? The London bombings, as a catalyst for the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements

On 1 June 2006, the Council for Justice and Home Affairs approved the so-called interim Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) in Brussels. CCA is the wording which prevailed when the UK Presidency took over the issue that the Dutch had initiated. Subsequently, the Council's Secretariat was put in charge of writing the internal standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the CCA. The first version of the SOPs was made available on 1 July 2006. A second revised version was published on 23 October 2006. In between, the London Bombings occurred.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>The European Council endorsed the Hague Programme aiming at defining priorities in the field of security for the E.U.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st June 2006</td>
<td>The council for Justice and Home affairs approved the so called interim Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) in Brussels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July 2006</td>
<td>First version of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) are made available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July 2006</td>
<td>London Bombings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October 2006</td>
<td>Second revised version of the SOPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 October 2006</td>
<td>First E.U emergency and crisis coordination Arrangements exercise (CCA EX06) to test the functioning of the CCA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 3: The Emergence of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements

There seems to be a link between the speeding up of the emergence of the CCA under the UK presidency and the occurrence of the London Bombings. Although the idea of Council-based emergency structures had been incubating since the Dutch presidency and was supposed to be adopted under the Austrian Presidency, the
terrorist attack on UK soil changed the situation. The UK was unwilling to make a mere symbolic statement in Brussels following the attack, similarly to what the EU Presidency did right after the Madrid attacks. They wanted something more concrete. So the CCA were quickly developed and presented in their revised version and tested in an exercise.

Regarding the above-mentioned SOPs, it must be said that none of these documents is for public release given the sensitivity of the information contained, meaning it was not possible to use them directly in this research project. But, after interviews, it is possible to say broadly that there are three levels of emergencies described in the CCA as developed in 2005 and 2006: The third and lowest level concerned a cross-border emergency, having an impact on two or more Member States because of its location on a frontier, but not affecting the EU as a whole directly. The second level concerns crises where the solidarity of other Member State can be expressed and the European institutions can play a role in terms of information provision and coordination enhancement. The first level encompasses crises having a direct impact on the EU as a whole. In this case, the institutions based both at the Council and at the Commission level would be activated and coordinated, but most probably the Council will be playing the leading role, with the SitCen as strategic and political coordinator during the crisis.

The Crisis Coordination Arrangement (CCA) structure involves a CCA support group (senior officials of the Council and of the Commission with an advisory role) and the CCA steering group (with the Presidency, the Member States directly concerned by the crisis, and top Council and Commission officials such as their secretaries general). Because the CCA (in the UK wording) and ICMA (in the Dutch wording) were developed by different presidencies, there was a strong competition between them. The Austrian presidency, which occurred after the London Bombings and the speeding up of the CCA adoption by UK, was left with “ICMA” to save the face and present something too, as a result of the joint presidency work.260 Due to the London Bombings,

260 Interview EU 3 and EU 4.
one joint instrument developed into two different instruments, if one looks at the organizational aspects: Indeed ICMA is now a manual with national contact points, that Member States can use in case of bilateral joint work should any crises happen at a border. So it is only internal to the EU, and based in the capitals. This ICMA tool is what the Austrian Presidency managed to implement, as the result of the long process starting in the Hague programme. On the contrary, the CCA presented by the UK were thought to be activated for both crises outside and inside the EU. It is an instrument which is Brussels-based, as it triggers meetings among REP in Brussels in the ad-hoc crisis steering group. This is what the UK managed to design following the London Bombings occurring under their EU Presidency.

In this paragraph I have showed that the London Bombings were used by the UK as catalyst, to have the CCA considered as a result of their presidency. Consequently Austria was left with ICMA, which developed into another kind of emergency management tool.261

2.4. Outcome

I sum up the main outcomes regarding the CCA creation process going back to the theoretical framework developed in chapter 1, and relying on the process, the actors, the context and the model, to tackle the issue of isomorphism.

First, there is a context of high uncertainty due to the fact that there is a perceived threat of bioterrorist attack in a context where very recent EU structures are not encompassing all the necessary elements to face terrorism. In addition to that, there is a strong interdependence between the Member States, NATO and the EU. In fact, national military staffs were used to work with NATO, so it is easier for them to get used to working with the EU, if the EU is close to the NATO model. Finally, the London bombings were not the triggering event, but they worked as a CCA catalyst.

261 ICMA will not be studied in this thesis. Indeed, the research focuses on all-hazard emergency and crisis management organizational structures, which operated both inside and outside the EU borders.
Regarding the actors, first, it is possible to stress the dissatisfaction of Dutch officials with the EU framework of emergency management. They foresaw a risk of policy failure so they tried to bridge the gap. Second, there is clearly a network of European elite: the officials of Member States successively in charge of the EU presidency decided to work together to build a Council-based structure of emergency management. There is even a process of emulation between them, leading to the implementation of two tools: CCA and then ICMA. The turn-over of officials between NATO and EU and the inter-penetration of the structures lead to an imitation process. The fact that Solana was first working as Secretary at NATO, and then at the EU, fostered the process.

What can be said about the model chosen? The NATO model had the legitimacy. NATO is an organization having a strong and recognized identity in the field of crisis management, whereas the EU was young in the area and needed to position itself. To conclude, the CCA is a case of isomorphism. The four identified necessary conditions of timing aspect, similarity, interactive aspect and intention aspect are here: The model chosen is based on a pre-existing one (NATO framework). This model had gained legitimacy due to the recognition of NATO as a successful player in the field of crisis management. The similarity both in the organizational structures and in the wording used is strong. An interviewee even said the only difference between the EU and the NATO structures of emergency management was the colour of the carpet. The intention is manifest. Dutch officials said in interviews they had imported the NATO framework. A lot of interaction could be found between the NATO and the EU, also linked to the fact that Brussels is a headquarter for the two of them. Hence the same wording and similar organizational structure were developed.
2.5. Conclusion

I now go back to the theory presented in chapter 1 to detail the result of CCA case. In the case of the CCA, isomorphism followed a mimetic approach as we can observe a copy of the NATO model. In a context of the EU forging its security identity and of new actors emerging and trying to gain legitimacy and power (e.g. SitCen), we observe that the CCA model copies a model of an organization having a rather strong security identity, all the more so as the actors concerned are involved in the two organizational frameworks, the EU and the NATO ones. So I argue the creation of the CCA follows a mimetic process. The uncertainty in means and ends, but also in the goals of a EU crisis coordination structure leads to the imitation of a model coming from an organization where crisis management was perceived by security players as a success. Moreover, the creation of the CCA (and ICMA) shows the willingness of states to regain control in the field of crisis management. By fully controlling the decision-making process in an event of an emergency, they place the European Commission in a role restricted to operational aspects. Finally, in the case of the CCA, it is not a known EU public problem which is reframed in terms of risk (marine pollution reframed in terms of civil protection), but a new threat (that of terrorism) which leads to the inclusion of a newly perceived policy problem on the EU agenda, that of protecting societies from the dangers of major transnational catastrophes. The next section will now put together the result of the CCPM creation and of the CCA creation and will develop the idea of “divergent isomorphism”.

3. Divergent Isomorphism and the co-existence of two EU emergency management models

The reason for the co-existence of emergency management structures both at the Secretariat of the Council and at the European Commission is that first, inter-governmental agreement failed (the Italian presidency lacked time to have it passed), so the European Commission took over, and developed its own capabilities. The European Commission officials hence imposed a community model, even if it meant a fuzzy architecture (officially pillar I in peace context, pillar II in war context). The operational aspects bypassed the political aspects, which were too difficult and slow to solve. Then, when the crises were getting importance in 2005, the topic of terrorist threat started to be put on the Agenda of the Presidency again, which created new Council based structures linked to CCA and ICMA, when the London Bombings opened a window of opportunity. As the actors in charge of EU crisis management and NATO crisis management were the same in those member states presiding over the EU, they copied the NATO model, which had already a strong legitimacy and was considered successful. The transfer of personnel between NATO and the Council of the European Union accelerated this process of imitation of the architecture and structure. As the CCA are more recent, they have not been tested yet, and this allows the European Commission to still have a competitive advantage in terms of experience. Currently, an attempt is being made to bring the Commission and Council structure together in times of emergency: The UK-France Non Paper (13/6/2007) suggests the creation of a disaster response coordination cell. This will not be detailed here, as the research timeframe stopped in 2006. However, the point which must be made before turning to the case of France and UK (in the next chapter), is that the bureaucrats played a major role in the model creation. So the background of bureaucrats is important to understand which model is proposed for adoption. If they are European Commission officials, they can propose EU community models from another field. If they come from other international institutions,

262 See chapter 2 section 1.
they can use toolkits coming from another organization to propose a model. This is why we can observe what I call "divergent isomorphism". Both the CCPM and the CCA result from isomorphism, but as it is not the same bureaucratic actors, they diverge in their choice. The background of the creator and their span of attention (myopia of CCA creators regarding the existence of the CCPM) are paramount to understand the existence of a double structure of emergency management.

We can notice a lot of common aspects in the process of the creation of the CCPM and of the CCA: the role of crisis, the role of a network of elite and the imitation of a successful organizational model. But drawing from the work of Weir, we can notice that the policy sequence is different: For the CCPM it is first a network of elite (Italian network), then crisis (9-11) then model (bureaucratic extension). It means that the network existed prior to the political process (contact between nationals from member states are permanent between Brussels and their countries of origin). It also shows that the role of "Inners" was key (European Commission Officials) and that the incentives were mainly the extension of their field of competences and activities, the extension of the legal mandate and hence the extension of the organization. On the contrary, for the CCA, it is first the idea of imitation of an organizational model (permeability: same actors at NATO and at the EU level), then coalition (between the successive presidencies) and then the crisis (i.e. the London Bombings CCA catalyst). So in this case the alliance is a product of the political process (rotating presidency). We can observe the role of outers (bureaucrats of the Ministry of the Interior in the Netherlands). The incentives were to enhance national control on decision-making process at EU level in times of crisis. Particularly salient is the fact that in none of the cases the emergency comes first. It is always a second or third element in the policy sequence. As such the crisis is not the trigger but more a "drawer opener". This contradicts the idea that most new structures are created after major shocks. The Balkans war is said to have led to the creation of ESDP. The ESB or co-called mad cow disease is said to have led to the new health security EU agency, etc. In the case of civil protection emergency management, the disasters are not the initial trigger. The internal dynamic driving the creation of the
organizational models starts before, even if the EU capacities are punctuated by disasters. The disasters are the moment when political leaders talk in front of the media to ask for more EU actions. But their sudden enthusiasm is disconnected from the pre-existing political and administrative process. Moreover, it must be said that their enthusiastic communicative discourse is often very different from their coordinative discourse, occurring inside closed doors in Brussels.\(^{263}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Sequence</th>
<th>CCPM</th>
<th>CCA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Coalition (Italians)</td>
<td>1 Model (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Crisis (9-11)</td>
<td>2 Coalition (successive presidencies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Model (marine pollution)</td>
<td>3 Crisis (London Bombings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key role of</td>
<td>Inners</td>
<td>Outers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Extension of the organization</td>
<td>Enhanced national control on decision-making process at EU level in times of crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 4: Comparing the CCPM and the CCA creation process

4. Outcome

In terms of isomorphism, we do not observe the direct copy of national models but copies of a European model (Marine Pollution) and an outside intergovernmental model (NATO). Although this could be seen as surprising, it can mean that actors have acknowledged the fact that European integration can not be based on the export of national model at EU level, but that consensual models in a EU-27 must be found among organizational models that are already shared (i.e. at EU level or international level).

\(^{263}\) I will come back on the role of discourse in chapter 4 and chapter 6.
Brussels as a place to exchange policy information might be a place of interpenetration of different policy networks which works as catalyst of isomorphism. The impact of the geographical propinquity (NATO, EU being both in Brussels) might be questioned here.

If we put the CCPM and the CCA creation in the context of new risk/threat perception and emergence of new security concepts, we can notice two different processes: In the case of the CCPM a recognized policy problem (that of marine pollution) becomes perceived as integrated in a broader risk for the population and the environment and hence integrated in one civil protection topic. On the contrary, the new threat of terrorist attacks emerges, hence a new policy problem. This led to the creation of the CCA at EU level. In other words, if risk/threat perception and norms of security (encompassing functional security concepts) play a role, their driving forces are different. In one case, they transform a recognized policy problem into a larger one, in the other case, they lead to the creation of a policy problem from scratch. It seems important to understand why the European Union has made the choice to create new structures such as CCA pushed by the UK instead of focusing on reinforcing the CCPM following the French alternative model (i.e. giving more means to the MIC), whereas both options were considered possible, as it appears in the following document drafted to enhance EU emergency management capacity after the difficulties experienced when dealing with the Tsunami:

"discussion should focus in particular on:
− whether it is sufficient to plan to reinforce and rationalize existing structures or whether new mechanisms should be put in place to complement or replace the existing structures;
− the scope of these structures and procedures (natural/man-made disasters, inside/outside the Union);
− relations to be established with the MIC (Civil Protection Monitoring and Information Centre) and ECHO;
− relationship to work in progress in connection with implementing the Plan of Action on combating Terrorism and the Hague Programme;
− increased coordination of military resources made available by the Member States to support operations of this type, in the light of the role played by Member States' military capabilities in the recent earthquake;”

Whereas this chapter has explained the mechanism of model creation for the CCPM in 2001 and for the CCA in 2005, explaining why two model could emerge independently from each other, the next chapter will compare the failed strategy to have a model adopted with a successful one, comparing the attempt of the French to push for a model of “reinforced CCPM” to the UK strategy to have the CCA adopted in 2005. The next chapter will focus on the role of advocates of a model (France, the UK) to explain why a model is adopted or rejected. The explaining factors will be linked to the strategies of the advocates. As isomorphism follows different copying strategies (inside EU or NATO) and as the driving force of the mechanism of adoption does not play an active role at the same moment and in the same way, I argue we need to know more on the origin of preferences of actors and how they push them through on the EU arena to have their preferred model adopted. This is why following the sociological neo-institutionalist approach chosen here to explain the creation of emergency management structure at EU level, I will go into more details regarding the role of the discourse as conveying the content of a model and as part of the interactive process leading to adoption or rejection.
ADOPTION
Chapter 4:

Conflicting strategies, discourse and model adoption

The CCPM adopted by the Council Decision of October 2001 was a copy of the EU Marine Pollution model and the CCA adopted in 2005 were a copy of the NATO model. I now put aside the question of the creation of the models by bureaucrats. I focus instead on the adoption of the organizational model by policy-makers. To understand why a model is adopted or rejected, this chapter will look at 2005, a year which was a landmark in the development of the EU emergency response.

In 2005, two possibilities existed for European decision-makers: either to adopt the CCA model (and hence go towards the co-existence of two EU models of emergency management) or to enhance the pre-existing CCPM model (and hence go towards more communitarisation of means with the creation of a EU civil protection force). If the decision had been taken to enhance the CCPM and to reject the CCA, the EU would not have found itself with two co-existing EU structures of emergency response. Only the CCPM would have been developed. However, the decision was made to adopt the CCA instead of enhancing the CCPM towards more communitarisation of means: “Le 26 janvier dernier, la Commission européenne a déposé une proposition de décision du Conseil refondant le mécanisme communautaire de protection civile créé en 2001 (déciision 2001/792/CE, Euratom du Conseil du 23 octobre 2001). Cette proposition fait suite à une consultation organisée entre janvier et juin 2005 par la Commission européenne. A l'issue de cette consultation, la Commission européenne a renoncé à créer..."

265 To the reader: The enhanced CCPM was not adopted, so it means that the CCPM as defined in 2001 continues to exist unchanged, with no reinforcement of the communitarisation of the means. In parallel the CCA start running, as they were adopted. So this situation leads to the coexistence of two competing models.
This is why it is paramount to investigate what happened in 2005 to account for the puzzle of the co-existence of two EU emergency response frameworks, one community-based and one inter-governmental. In 2005, the adoption of the CCA was supported by the UK, whereas the reinforcement of the CCPM (with the creation of a EU civil protection force) was supported by France. Therefore the objective of this chapter is to explain why the CCA model pushed by the UK was adopted instead of the enhanced CCPM model defended by France.

The method used to identify the vectors leading to adoption or rejection is comparative. I will compare the case of France and the UK, in their role as advocates of two competing models. This chapter explains why and how a model, once created, can get either adopted or rejected at EU level. The case of adoption of the CCA in 2005 versus the rejection of the French alternative to enhance the CCPM developed between 2001-2006, highlight the forces at play in the EU policy-making arena when it comes to adoption of Council resolutions.

In matters of civil protection and emergency response, actors involved both at the EU and the national level recognised there is an opposition between two groups of Member States: Member States from the south of the EU (i.e. Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece) which were and are the advocates of the enhanced CCPM model, and Member States from the north of the EU (i.e. the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark) which were and are the advocates of the CCA. “However well rationalised the choice of model may be, it is inevitable that it will, at least to some degree, reflect the

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267 The enhanced CCPM is a model drawing from the existing CCPM which was developed between 2001 and 2005. It is based on communitarisation of means: a European Civil Protection Force could be planned, as well as community owned means of assistance. The Barnier Report (officially published in 2006) advocates such an enhanced CCPM model of EU emergency management.
Taking the example of France and the UK, countries which belong to respectively the south and the north groups of Member States (in terms of civil protection culture and political strategies towards the models), the aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I explain why the subject of communitarisation of means in the field of civil protection came to the attention of officials in southern Member States and how they defended their position (stressing the role of the culture fit and the role of the positive experience of the CCPM). Secondly, I highlight why on the contrary the inter-governmental CCA were the focus of the work done by Northern States officials and how they managed to have them adopted. Through the analysis of how France tried to push for more CCPM, and the UK tried to push for the adoption of the CCA, this chapter focuses on a crucial puzzle in EU policy-making: why does an organizational model become prominent and hence adopted by the Council, or on the contrary, why does a model get neglected and rejected? To do this, the chapter will present the alternatives that were presented by France in the 2001-2006 period to improve EU emergency management in the sense of communitarisation of means. It will identify what type of strategy France used to advance this alternative model on the political agenda of the EU, and why the strategy has not worked so far. Then the chapter will explain how and why the UK succeeded in having the CCA adopted.

The analysis is based on the use of organizational discourse. Pre-existing models provide actors with a repertoire of possible collective understandings to which they can refer when they argue for or against a model adoption. Organizational models provide words and linkages between ideas which are at the basis of the discursive interaction when it comes to adoption. The strategic use of discourse by


269 In my research, I use the concept of discourse as defined in “organizational discourse”: According to Grant, organizational discourse describes the language and symbolic media used by organizations and their staff and managers. The organizational models (and their wording) are a way for organizational actors to control and legitimize their organizational discourse in the field of emergency management. On the concept of organizational discourse, see: Grant, T., Keenoy, T. and Oswick, K. (2001) ‘Organizational discourse: key contributions and challenges’, in: International Studies of Management and Organization, Vol. 31, n°3, pages 5–24.
advocates/entrepreneurs can thus lead either to model adoption or to model rejection, through the construction of meaning, identity and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{270}

This chapter draws empirically from interviews conducted since 2006 with people in France (Ministry of the Interior, SGAE, etc.) and in the UK (Cabinet Office) and with their Representatives in the Permanent Representations in Brussels. This chapter also relies on the study of government documents, letters, reports that contributed to the development or promotion of an organizational model of EU emergency response. A larger number of sources were publicly available regarding the French model than the British one. Moreover the interviewees seem to link the CCA model with a greater level of secrecy and confidentiality than the enhanced CCPM model. Consequently, access to the sources was more difficult for the section on the adopted model than for the one on the rejected model. However, this difference will be studied as such, in the comparison between the two strategies, the French failed one, based on a strong communicative discourse, and the British successful one, based on a strong coordinative discourse and a very restricted communicative discourse.

I consider “France” and “the UK” as advocates because there is a consistency in the discourse of all the French and all the British actors involved. Stressing the homogeneity of the discourse of all the actors of one country, it is thus possible to generalise and talk about a French position and a British position. The opposition of the south against the north coalition is not the focus for two main reasons: First, there was a problem of feasibility. It was much more time-consuming to study the case of all the Member States of each coalition. Second, there is still some heterogeneity in the discourse of the Members of each of the coalition. So it is more difficult to generalise and talk as I do with France and the UK of one position, consistently stated by every individual involved.

In the first section, I investigate the French case: I show that a discursive strategy based on communication leads to the rejection of the model of the enhanced CCPM. In the second section, I explore the British case. I demonstrate that a discursive strategy based on coordination leads to the adoption of the model of the CCA. In the third section I go back to the theoretical framework presented in chapter 1 and I identify in details the vectors to have a model adopted, as an outcome of the comparison of the discursive strategy (first mover advantage vs. long-term maintenance, affordability vs. novelty, etc).

1. France, the advocate of the rejected model

According to the French authorities, Europeans should aim at greater collective efforts to reinforce the obligations of solidarity in the field of civil protection. Why did France defend such a position? What was the strategy used by France to enforce the adoption of its preferred model? Why did it fail?

1.1. France and the enhanced Community Civil Protection Mechanism Model

To explain why France pushed for the adoption of an enhanced CCPM, we will present how much the CCPM reflects the culture and experience of France (“strong fit”), one of the great advocates of the CCPM model.²⁷¹

²⁷¹ In the literature, different concepts are used to describe and analyze this cultural match. I adopt here the term used by Kingdon: “fit”. I mean a EU model is more likely to be promoted by a Member State relying on a similar type of national model.
1.1.1. **Strong fit between the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and the French civil protection culture**

Civil protection is part and parcel of the French security culture, whereas in some European Member States, there are no civil protection forces as such, the function being dealt with by the police, the army or other types of organizations.²⁷² The origin of a national French civil protection dates back to the end of World War Two. Prior to World War Two, civil protection was dealt with at local level by volunteers under the command and control of city mayors.²⁷³ After 1944, due to the war and the increase of major risks, the Ministry of the Interior was entrusted with the task to manage the civil protection of the population at national level. This meant for instance that national means were acquired and dealt with at national level, and that step-by-step an organizational structure was developed inside the Ministry of the Interior leading to the creation in the 1970s of the “Direction de la Défense et de la Sécurité Civile” (DDSC). This means that in France, when a crisis goes beyond the local level, the State is in charge of the coordination of the means.²⁷⁴ The national organizational structure (DDSC with the COGIC as the operational national crisis Centre) is in charge of the pooling of means.²⁷⁵ It plays a role of command and control and ensures coherence in the planning for and the management of emergency response.

A certain similarity exists between the French civil protection system and the organizational structure foreseen at European level in the enhanced CCPM model (i.e. a EU crisis Centre, in charge of communitarisation of means). When a crisis goes beyond


²⁷⁴ i.e. the crisis affects a geographical area larger than the city, or the crisis can have consequences going beyond the local level.

²⁷⁵ COGIC stands for Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises. To read more on the missions of the COGIC, see : [http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_1_interieur/defence_et_securite_civiles/gestion-risques/cogic](http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_1_interieur/defence_et_securite_civiles/gestion-risques/cogic).
the national level, the European Union would be in charge of the coordination of the means. The EU would have a civil protection force and community-owned means of assistance. Thus, we can observe a fit between the French national security culture of civil protection and the European civil protection model of the CCPM and even more of the enhanced CCPM. The enhanced CCPM could be seen as a model copying that of French Civil Protection. This is a case of coercive isomorphism as defined by Powell and DiMaggio, with one government imposing its model regarding a new organizational structure to be adopted. Some French actors even insist on the fact that the French “doctrine” should be preserved when intervening in emergencies in a EU framework. They think it is important to fight for this.

In addition to the strong fit, another element can explain why France is an obvious candidate to push for the enhanced CCPM model. France has a positive experience of EU civil protection and of the CCPM (as adopted in 2001 by Council Decision).

### 1.1.2. French positive EU civil protection experience

French decision-makers have made use of the CCPM organizational architecture and structure in two ways. First, France was faced with rather high level of natural disasters of different kind: the oil tanker Prestige shipwreck, forest fires, floods, etc during which the CCPM was used on French soil. Second, French decision-makers were


277 Intervention Mr Margenet on the Pakistan earthquake, in: *Colloque de société française de médecine de catastrophe, en partenariat avec la Brigade des Sapeurs Pompiers de Paris et le Haut Comité Français de Défense Civile*, 2006.

278 On 13 November 2002, an oil tanker, the Prestige, caused an oil spill off the coast of Cape Finisterre (Spain). On 19 November 2002, it sank off the coast of Galicia to a depth of 3,500 metres, with from 50 to 60,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil in its tanks. This was to be the third oil spill in European waters in three years, following that of the Erika in 1999 and the Baltic Carrier in 2001, with extensive ecological damage to the marine and coastal ecosystems in Portugal, Spain and France.
asked to offer assistance and responded positively in different emergencies outside the EU borders via the MIC (e.g. Tsunami in South East Asia in 2004, Pakistan earthquake in 2005, Lebanon crisis in 2006 to name but a few). Moreover, France is involved in a European Programme with a view to enhancing European civil protection and preventing risk in Europe: Eurorisk in the framework of the Global Monitoring for the Environment and Security (GMES) led by the DG Entreprise of the European Commission. Moreover, France took part in the organization of trainings and exercises to test the Community Civil Protection Mechanism several times (e.g. Euratox was organised in France in 2002). We will now present in greater details why French experience of EU civil protection is positive looking at those different aspects.

First, France could directly benefit from the CCPM during different crises, whereas the UK has never used the CCPM to respond to an emergency. The case of the oil tanker Prestige illustrates how it impacted France crisis management positively, even if the visibility of the EU action was restrained. The Erika Shipwreck of 1999 was an example of the limits to state action in disaster management. At that time, 400 kilometers of French coastline were polluted and a major problem was that French, German and Spanish response equipment was not fully compatible. This is why, after the Erika shipwreck, the European Commission took various measures to reinforce the provisions against marine pollution, packages known as Erika I and Erika II and to develop a possible framework of assistance in the field of civil protection, the CCPM adopted in 2001. 279

In this context, the oil tanker Prestige shipwreck of November 2002, affecting three EU countries (France, Portugal and Spain), was perceived by the media as a test for measuring the performance of the new EU crisis management tools. Would the existence of EU tools such as the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and the marine pollution framework of Erika I and II change the way in which crises were handled? Was the CCPM already integrated into the organizational structure of crisis management and in the minds of national actors? Was it really a benefit for France to be a member of the

CCPM? Although most of the media answered the question of the impact of use of EU mechanism in France negatively, the report on the *Prestige* disaster submitted by the parliamentarian commission in France states that beyond the Spanish-French bilateral agreement, which already allowed for some mutual assistance at the time of the *Erika* disaster, the existence of a EU community mechanism has allowed broader resources such as anti-pollution boats coming from four countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Norway) to be mobilized.\(^{280}\) In a nutshell, at the EU level, thanks to the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and its Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), 14 boats coming from 8 countries were mobilized, together with 20 kilometers of floating barriers and several planes (specialized in the control of marine pollution).\(^{281}\)

Even if the *Erika* and *Prestige* shipwrecks were mediatized and politicized in France in order to prove that more EU is needed, this does not reflect the role played by the EU during the *Prestige* crisis. In addition to the pooling of materials, during the catastrophe, the European Commission provided the names of experts who could be contacted, and it also offered technical and scientific support thanks to satellite pictures coming from the *European Space Agency*. This allowed a more detailed analysis of the consequences of the catastrophe to be made. These actions helped the functional aspect of crisis management although this was not very visible and hence it did not give a very positive impression of EU success to public opinions. The case of *Prestige* allows us to see how the interface had been sufficiently integrated at the national level to be activated smoothly in times of crisis, and hence how France could experience how much it was possible to benefit from the CCPM (even if this perception is of course more shared among the elites than among the population which remains largely unaware of the role of the CCPM in times of crisis).\(^{282}\)


\(^{282}\) Interview FR2.
The second positive experience of the CCPM for France was when France provides assistance abroad or participates in European programmes and exercises in the field of civil protection. Indeed it is perceived by interviewees as an element that raises France’s profile. French actors see the CCPM as a way to promote France’s image abroad, and France’s leading role. So France is keen on organising EU exercises with a lot of media on board in the context of the CCPM framework (such as EUROTOX in 2002). French actors are keen on sending a French EU Head of coordination or Deputy Head of Coordination in the field when the CCPM is activated for provision of assistance abroad (e.g. in Pakistan, in Lebanon, etc). French actors are keen on being involved in high technology risk assessment. It offers business to French private companies. For instance, France is involved in the Eurorisk Consortium, in the Global monitoring for Environment and Security Framework. France is in charge of atmosphere risks, such as storms, forest fires, floods, avalanches, droughts, etc, whereas Italy is in charge of geophysical risks (e.g. earthquake, landslide, volcanoes, etc) and Sweden is in charge of man-made risks (chemical, nuclear, biological, radiological, etc).

Both the cultural fit and the French positive experience of CCPM explain why French policy makers supported an enhanced CCPM rather than of the adoption of a new model, such as the CCA. We will now present which strategy was adopted by France to push for the adoption of the enhanced CCPM model.

1.2. The French strategy to push for stronger Community Civil Protection Mechanism

This section focuses on the development of a model proposal by a Member State and its strategy to enforce its adoption at EU level, using the case of France pushing for reinforcement of the CCPM. First, I present how the strategic choice to push for a renewed CCPM is part of a broader French security strategy and is incorporated into it. Then I explain how France made of each crisis occurring between 2001 and 2005 an

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283 Interview FR 7.
opportunity to explain that a renewed CCPM concept was needed. After this, I show which methods were used by France to formalise its official position regarding the renewed CCPM. Finally, I highlight how France used political-administrative relations to detail implementation possibilities of its preferred model and hence pushed for its adoption.

1.2.1. The enhanced Community Civil Protection Mechanism and the French global security strategy: Gaining autonomy from NATO

Between 2001 and 2006, under President Chirac and the successive governments of his parliamentary majority, French political decision-makers pushed for a security order which could enjoy relative autonomy from the United States. Therefore France preferred the enhanced CCPM and the communitarisation of the means of assistance rather than a NATO model. France incorporated this preference in its global pro-European security approach. France has pushed for a stronger EU security policy since the 1990’s. Looking back at the history of the relationship between France, the EU and NATO, it appeared France started by using the failure of EU in Bosnia to highlight the need for a strong European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As a consequence of Bosnia and later of the Balkan events, France started from the assumption that further interventions should be made based on another model than the NATO model.284 Consequently, France pushed inside the co-called “Berlin Plus agreement” negotiations for more autonomy of the EU in relation to NATO. These negotiations taking place in 2002 and 2003 were supposed to define the relation between the EU and NATO. The comprehensive framework of EU-NATO relations were concluded on 17 March 2003. It was a time when French diplomats tried to ensure EU independence from NATO. Under the presidency of Jacques Chirac, the objective was to make a full EU military entity out of ESDP. French diplomats working at NATO bargained with a view to

keeping it in its cold war box. It means NATO was supposed to deal with the highest intensity operations or conventional attacks on Europe rather than deal with new security issues such as emergency management, new security threat, etc. 285 Quoting Michel Barnier: “l’Europe n’est plus au centre des priorités américaines en termes de sécurité. 92 % des forces américaines sont hors de l’OTAN. Une chose est sûre : prévenir un « 11 septembre européen » ne constitue pas l’objectif prioritaire de l’administration américaine, engagée sur d’autres fronts. Aux Européens, d’abord, de se prendre en main !” 286

The objective of France was to have the EU crisis management recognized and hence to turn the EU into an alternative to the NATO model in this domain. By contrast, the UK’s objective (supported by the Netherlands) was to bring the EU and NATO closer together. About this opposition, Senator Paul Girod wrote in his report on EU community action in the field of civil protection: “Un clivage réel existe donc entre la France, la Belgique, le Luxembourg et les pays méditerranéens qui souhaitent donner une véritable visibilité à l’Union européenne et d’autres pays, dont principalement les Pays-Bas, qui souhaitent mettre en valeur leur action dans le cadre de l’OTAN.” 287

Hence having a European crisis Centre MIC which does the same as the NATO crisis Centre EADRCC located in Brussels is also a way to guarantee EU autonomy in the field of emergency management. 288 We can see that the enhanced CCPM push strategy was included in a broader French security strategy towards the EU and NATO.


286 “Europe is not anymore the centre of US security priorities. 92% of US forces are engaged outside the NATO framework. One thing is for sure: Preventing a EU 9-11 is not one of the main objectives of the US administration. The Europeans must be taking care of this by themselves.”


288 The EADRCC is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre of NATO. It is a 24/7 crisis Centre to coordinate disaster relief efforts among NATO members and partners. The EADRCC was involved during the Pakistan earthquake (2005), Hurricane Katrina, etc. in parallel to the MIC involvement.
How did France push for the adoption of an enhanced CCPM, between 2001-2006? How did France manage to detach the EU from the NATO model and justify a stronger EU in the field of crisis management? The French approach was to use the United Nations idea of regional security pole to deal with disasters, which was developed inside the framework of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). Indeed the United Nations promoted a model based on regional cooperation to face disasters. “Regional poles” (in Asia, in Africa, the pacific, America and Europe) were supposed to help in the provision of mutual support and increase coherence of disaster management. This idea matched the French position of a strong European cooperation in the field of civil protection. France hence pushed in parallel for inclusion of the EU as a regional pole in the ISDR framework. France presented the CCPM as a way to build a European pole in disaster management. This position of France pushing to have the EU as an ISDR regional pole can be found in the letters exchanged between France and the ISDR framework, and in Girod’s report on EU community action in the field of civil protection: “Jacques Chirac expressed his will (…) to create a force d’intervention rapide européenne et de s’appuyer sur les capacités militaires de l’Union, en particulier le centre d’opération implanté au sein de l’État-major intégré au secrétariat général du Conseil. Il a par ailleurs inscrit sa démarche dans le cadre des Nations unies qui pourraient compter sur un pôle européen disposant de ressources préalablement identifiées et d’équipes entraînées à travailler conjointement.”


290 “Jacques Chirac expressed his will (…) to create a EU civil protection force and to rely on the EU military staff in case of emergencies. Moreover, he incorporated his approach on the EU in his position on the United Nations, stressing the UN could hence rely on a EU regional pole in case of emergencies.”
1.2.2. *Spreading the enhanced Community Civil Protection Mechanism concept in different political arenas*

French policy makers used each emergency to explain that the moment had come to act and create an enhanced CCPM, mainly by a process of communitarisation of the means of assistance but also by creating a European civil protection force. I will now present the different arenas where France put this topic on the agenda when a disaster stroke.

In Brussels, French civil servants in committee meetings and French politicians inside parliamentary group meetings repeatedly expressed this position after major crises. This was mentioned by interviewees and is reflected on the webpage of the press service of the European Parliament. The European Parliament issued reports on the topic (see report of MEP Galeote and MEP Papadimoulis) but the main source that is quoted when one expressed the need for an enhanced CCPM is Michel Barnier’s report *Pour une force européenne de protection civile: Europe Aid* submitted to the Council of the European Union and expressing the need for a civil protection force at EU level, and for more communitarisation of means. The Barnier report stated the following: “As the tsunami so tragically bears out, the price of non-Europe in crisis management is too high. First and foremost, a series of hastily organised individual responses is no match for a EU response that has been planned, organised and tested against specific scenarios. Secondly, multiplying responses results in a lack of coordination that diminishes the EU’s impact and visibility on the ground. The EU response can only be made more cost-effective by properly organising the Member States’ civil protection capabilities and consular assistance on the basis of common scenarios, training programmes and exercises.” Therefore the Barnier Report recommended the creation of a EU civil protection force called EUROPAID and the creation of a one-stop-shop for EU

humanitarian response. In France, the Senate issued a report on the topic too. In this report, Senator Paul Girod underlined the existing divergences among European Member States. However he suggested the idea of creating a European Civil Protection Centre, to enhance the exchange of information and to organize training, exercises, conferences, etc. Moreover, interest groups like the HCFDC (presided by Senator Girod) and Nouvelle République (presided by Michel Barnier) campaigned for an enhanced CCPM in France organising meetings on the topic. In the press, articles were published after each crisis to promote an enhanced CCPM. In a nutshell, France had a strong communicative strategy. However, the seasonability of the communication is strong: Every crisis led to a communication but this was mainly occurring in the summer (period of heat waves, forest fires, etc.). The communication often took place in a period when no real political activity was taking place.

Moreover, the study of the communication strategy of France shows that the causal stories developed were mainly “accidental”. There was a clear focus on natural disasters (forest fires, heat waves, and tsunami) both in the articles published in the press, in the written reports, and in the discourse of French actors in the workshops and conferences organised. The permanent use of the Tsunami as a representative example is a way for French actors to point out the presence of US aid in the field, whereas no “Europe Aid” was to be seen on the pictures (as this concept did not exist as such, every Member State sending its own assistance under the umbrella of the CCPM or not). Using this comparison, the French argued for the creation of a European civil protection force. If the use of the Tsunami was relevant because of the dramatic impact the catastrophe had on the civilian population, it seems that the use of this far-away over-


mediatized event led to an effect of saturation in the media arena. On the contrary, the recent new terrorist attacks on EU soil were less severe in terms of casualties, but had the advantage of novelty and proximity in the media arena. Therefore, one of the shortcomings of the strategy of France was the absence of terrorism and recent EU-located attacks in the discourse, whereas the UK was in a position of force, when it came to this issue.

1.2.3. A unified French position at EU level

To share its vision of reinforced CCPM, France sent clear signals at high executive levels. The idea of reinforcement of the CCPM through the creation of a European force of civil protection was first expressed by Jacques Chirac during the informal European Hampton Court Summit of 27 October 2005. The main idea was to rely on the EU’s own capacities. This would include collective possession of crisis assistance means such as planes, pumps, removable hospitals, etc. Second, in November 2005, the French Ministry of the Interior addressed a letter to the European Commission to promote the acquisition of collective means at the European level in the field of civil protection, such as pumps, removable medical clinics, etc. This clearly followed the idea of enhancing a communitarisation of means of action. Third, in December 2005, the French Defence Minister sent a letter to J. Solana to suggest using a military framework such as that of ESDP to enhance the European civil protection capacity.

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The fact that all these letters coming from different French sources defended the same idea shows the integration of the question in the French security strategy at high level of decision-making. The preferences of France were clearly and consistently stated. There was no problem of “problematic preferences” which could weaken the French position, according to the agenda setting theories (see chapter 1).

1.2.4. Strategic use of the political-administrative relationship: the Barnier-FR14 tandem

To present specific ways to implement the French alternative, Michel Barnier worked in close cooperation with FR 14, who is a European Commission Civil servant working at DG RELEX. It means that the position presented by France was not disconnected with the way European institutions actually work. The feasibility aspects were not supposed to be an issue from the point of view of the organizational process of emergence of new EU structures. FR 14 was the rapporteur of the Barnier Report. He worked with colleagues of DG RELEX to elaborate the report. Consequently, when there were meetings in Brussels on the Barnier Report, that Michel Barnier could not attend, he was there to defend the alternatives. It means that there is a strong use of a political-administrative relationship to detail the potential implementation possibilities of the proposed enhanced CCPM model, both in the form of written cooperation and oral presentations. How come the French failed to have their model adopted if we can observe as explained in this part a strong coherence in the messages sent in the different arenas and by different members of the executive in their letters, if France’s preferences were quite clear, encompassed in a full security strategy and precisely formulated (i.e. no “problematic preferences”), if knowledge of organizational processes was there...


298 There is a literature on political-administrative relations, in particular at EU level: For a literature review, see: Wille, A. (2007): “Bridging the gap: Political and Administrative Leadership in a reinvented European Commission”, Conference Paper Leading the Future of the Public Sector, June 2007.
thanks to the close Barnier /FR 14 relationship (i.e. no “unclear technology”), and stability of staff involved was noted, Barnier, FR 14 remaining strongly involved over time (no “fluid participation”)? All the criteria one can find in the Theory of Agenda setting (Kingdon, drawing from Cohen, March, Olsen for the organizational aspects) are here, but the CCPM enhanced model was not adopted. Why?

1.3. Explaining failures

Four kinds of reasons for failure can be identified: the French political context, the European administrative context, the European political context (where financial issues are paramount to convince Member States of model adoption) and finally the neglect of the role of experts (although the report was presented as a “recommendation” of knowledgeable persons). Analyzing this situation, we will show that the French strategy was based on communication more than coordination, and that this situation largely explains the failure.

1.3.1. The consequences of the 2005 referendum on the constitutional treaty

I begin with the reasons for failure linked to the French political context: First, on 29 May 2005, a referendum was held in France to decide whether the country should ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The result was a victory for the "No" campaign, with 55% of voters rejecting the treaty on a turnout of 69%. This event took place before the London Bombings and the decision to adopt the CCA, and in the middle of the French national campaign of communication in favour of the reinforced CCPM model. As France was the first Member State to say “no” to the constitutional treaty, it created a shock among the elites, both in France and at the EU level. As
mentioned during interviews, they felt they had less force at EU level to push for their preferences, given the fact that they were those slowing down the process with the rejection of the Treaty by the French population. The French elite had been quite successful in the convention to obtain major enhancement in the sense of a stronger Europe in the field of foreign policy and hence also in the sense of making of the EU a strong security actor. The Barnier report on EU civil protection clearly stated that it was relying on the existence of a European Union Minister of Foreign Affairs provided by the constitutional treaty to be adopted.\footnote{See: Barnier, M. (2005) For a European Civil Protection Force: Europe Aid, report submitted to the Council of the European Union.} The “no” of the French population hindered the rapid creation of the European Union Minister of Foreign Affairs which was a key to the French model of reinforced CCPM. The Barnier report stated: “It is hoped that before the next Commission takes up office the Heads of State and Government find some means of creating the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs as proposed in the draft Constitutional Treaty. The President of the European Commission could then give sole responsibility for humanitarian assistance and civil protection to a single Commissioner working with the Minister for Foreign Affairs/Vice-President of the Commission.”\footnote{in: Barnier, M. (2005) For a European Civil Protection Force: Europe Aid, report submitted to the Council of the European Union, page 18.} Therefore, the rejection by its own population weakened the idea that there was a strong commitment in France for more communitarised actions in the field of security. The elites felt it was more difficult to fight for their model. Moreover, the “no” hindered the rapid creation of the European Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, which was important for the French model adoption and implementation.

Moreover, the “no” to the referendum directly affected Michel Barnier who, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was at the time of charge of European Affairs inside the French government. In May 2005, Michel Barnier said in the press that the result was "a very testing moment, and a very big disappointment". He said it would now be "a great
deal more difficult for France to represent its interests". Shortly after, in June 2005, Barnier was replaced in the French government by Philippe Douste-Blazy. This means that being away from the government he had less power to influence the process of adoption of a French model at European level. Moreover, the fact that Michel Barnier as an individual lost his position lowered his profile, at a time when his personal commitment and involvement in the adoption of the French model was crucial to its successful adoption.

As the French strategy was based on communication rather than coordination, the face linked to the French position of reinforcement of the CCPM model in the media arena was that of Michel Barnier, who was in the press the voice of the French alternative. Michel Barnier being off the main political French stage following the referendum, the communication leader position was affected. As no coordination platform to defend the French model existed at EU level, there was no relay to push for the model in the political arena at EU level. Only Italy tried to defend the Barnier Report when it was officially published, but this did not help to have it through, as it was an individual attempt of a Member State alone, with no coordinative coalition to support the French preferred model.

1.3.2. Underestimation of the organizational frictions among the European Commission actors

Not only was the choice of a communication strategy dangerous, as it can affect the adoption of the enhanced CCPM when the leader is in a difficult situation, but also the involvement of the European Commission officials was too restricted. Michel Barnier essentially worked with European Commission DG RELEX officials. Hence he did not realise that the cooperation between DG ENV and DG ECHO was too small to

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301 In the preface of the Banier report, Michel Barnier mentioned his personal involvement: « The twelve proposals contained in its report are purely personal».
ensure the coming together of services having a long history of tensed relations. This is why the underestimation of coordinative discourse inside the European Commission made it very difficult to ensure model adoption and implementation.

The Barnier report designing the French model of an upgraded CCPM is based on the pooling of resources/expertise and the creation of a one-stop-shop, bringing together DG ECHO, DG ENV and DG RELEX. A civil security council should be created at the political level, which should consist of the same persons as the Crisis Steering Group adopted by the CCA with the difference that an upgraded MIC, rather than the SitCen, is mentioned to coordinate action. This relies on coordination between different DGs of the European Commission (DG ENV, ECHO, RELEX to name but a few). The alignment of DG ENV and DG ECHO structures to deal with disasters outside the EU is not easily feasible according to interviewees, because of the history of organizational fight between the two structures. An enhanced MIC will not be acceptable for DG ECHO. Second, even with DG RELEX, it is difficult to find a way to coordinate action with DG ENV. Why is that so? We will first explain the problem regarding the link between DG ENV and DG ECHO and then the one between DG ENV and DG RELEX, relying on interviews with European Commission Officials from those DGs.303

Sources of conflict between DG ENV’s Monitoring and Information Centre and DG ECHO

DG ECHO has a mandate for humanitarian disasters, natural and man-made disasters, occurring in third countries. They are donors, it means they support UN agencies, the Red Cross, NGOs which have a partnership agreement with their DG to intervene in times of crises. Moreover, DG ECHO relies on more than 100 expatriates based in third countries, thanks to its 6 regional offices and to its 30 country offices.

303 Interview EU 14; Interview EU 27; Interview EU 28.
They work in the field and have contact with local authorities on a long-term basis; contacts which can be activated should anything bad happen.

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<th>DG ENV</th>
<th>DG ECHO</th>
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<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Civil Protection forces of CCPM</td>
<td>NGO’s, Red Cross, and DG ECHO regional/national offices in the world</td>
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<td></td>
<td>participating states</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procedures</td>
<td>Request for assistance from the</td>
<td>Regional/national offices notifying a need thanks to</td>
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<td>country in need, dispatching</td>
<td>assessment of their experts in the field and contact with local</td>
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<td>information to CCPM Participating</td>
<td>community, then NGO or Red Crosse receive money</td>
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<td>states</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nature of the means</td>
<td>Pumps, medical assistance,</td>
<td>Food, blankets, etc.</td>
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<td>Canadair, etc.</td>
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<td>Crisis Centre</td>
<td>By the MIC, two on-duty officers</td>
<td>By the DG ECHO, two on-duty officers 24/7 with special phones and emails</td>
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<td>24/7 with special phones and</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget (approx.)</td>
<td>7-8 million Euros</td>
<td>700-800 million Euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle</td>
<td>Means-driven (depending on will of participating states to make certain means/teams available)</td>
<td>Needs-driven, based on humanitarian principle of neutrality, impartiality, independence, humanity, and assessment of countries capacity to respond to disasters</td>
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Illustration 5: A comparison of DG ENV and DG ECHO way to respond to emergencies

This table shows the difference between DG ENV and DG ECHO when coping with emergencies. I will analyze this table in details to highlight where the difficulties to align the two structures and have them work together are.

DG ECHO claims the MIC is creating difficulties when intervening in third countries to respond to emergencies. First the civil protection teams arrive with their means as “Member States assistance”, which means that they have national flags on their jackets. This is in contradiction with the humanitarian aid principles of neutrality, impartiality, etc, which normally guarantee the fact that DG ECHO can intervene everywhere in the world, even in war situations, with no political positioning. Second, when the MIC experts arrive, they do not have any local contacts nor any place to work, whereas the ECHO experts are well established in the field. So the ECHO experts are

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DOI: 10.2870/11317
reluctant to see the MIC coordinate too much of the assistance, without the practical knowledge and contacts. Third, DG ECHO claims the MIC is not “needs-driven”, as the CCPM relies on the will of States. So DG ECHO argues that it is political, which third countries they decide to assist or not, with which types of teams, equipments, etc. They think this might lead to the transport of unneeded materials (to show off in front of CNN camera and ensure public opinions), a situation which creates more difficulties in the field than it actually helps. DG ECHO mentions for instance that during the Tsunami, no hospitals were needed as such, but small dispensaries would have been better; on the contrary, the MIC coordinated the transport of different new hospitals on site, which were not relevant to the type of small injuries survivors were suffering from.\footnote{304 Interview EU 14.}

The MIC on the contrary stresses the fact that they have means, which DG ECHO would not have, if they did not exist. For instance, they have mine sweeping items, decontaminating material assistance, pumps, Canadairs, search and rescue teams, etc. They have a valuable role in terms of coordinating Member States civil protection forces and sending experts in the field to assess the situation. This allows economy of scales, when sending the material abroad (when one plane is used to transport material assistance from different EU countries). The on-duty MIC officials argue classic divide between civil protection and NGOs should not stand in the way of the emergence of a coordinate response in times of crises.\footnote{305 Interview EU 27.}

This conflict of interests among the two DGs leads to a conflict on the legal basis of interventions in emergencies taking place in third countries. During European Commission inter-services discussions with DG ENV, DG ECHO rely on the “Oslo Guidelines”.\footnote{306 The Oslo Guidelines concern the issue of the Military and Civil Defence Assets (The Oslo Guidelines were drafted by UN-OCHA). The guidelines were originally prepared over a period of two years beginning in 1992.} These Guidelines were the result of a collaborative effort that culminated in an international conference in Oslo, in January 1994, organized by UN-OCHA, and were released in May 1994. After unprecedented deployment in 2005 of military and
civil forces and assets in support of humanitarian response to natural disasters, following an increasing trend over the past years, the “Oslo Guidelines” were relaunched in November 2006, and a last updated version was published. In 1994, the “Oslo Guidelines” from UN-OCHA stated that it was clear that national military, civil defence and civil protection personnel and expertise had “enormous potential” to serve as an additional instrument for the effective delivery of International Disaster Relief Assistance. In 2006, the revised version of the “Oslo Guidelines” was issued, which stated that MCDA were “a last resort” in times of emergencies: “Foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military or civil defence asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.” DG ECHO uses this text to state the fact that the MIC should not intervene, except in case of last resort. DG ENV says the text focuses on military assets and “civil defence”, which is different from “civil protection”. However in the French Version of the Oslo Guidelines, civil defence was translated into “civil protection”, although in France, there is a difference between the two concepts. So DG ENV mentions that civil protection can not be confused with “civil defence” and seen as “last resort” but civil protection must be among the first respondents in times of

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308 Typical examples of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) capabilities in disaster relief operations are for instance: air, land and sea survey and assessment to ascertain the extent of casualties and damage; reconnaissance in the disaster zone and of the routes within and leading towards it; organized and mobile manpower to assist in search, rescue, evacuation, coordination and provision of relief services (e.g. medical aid, water, logistics, food and shelter); engineering; communications facilities/expertise; ground logistics support (land); medical support to civilian services; helicopters and aircraft for airlift/airdrop missions; provision by naval resources, for coordination, transport support, medical assistance, power, engineering, water purification and feeding facilities; nuclear, biological and chemical contamination and environmental emergencies; to name but a few.

emergencies. The inter-service consultation on those legal aspects is in progress but it remains a difficult topic for both DGs.

To avoid problems the two DGs started to work together on an official document called Memorandum of Understanding. The first version of the Memorandum of Understanding between DG ENV and DG ECHO was drafted in 2003 to enhance coordination between the two services, following the difficulties of coordination that occurred during the Baam earthquake. But because difficulties were encountered in the process of implementation of the improvements, it was redrafted including a third DG: DG RELEX who also had difficulty in integrating its action with those of DG ENV and its MIC. The role of DG RELEX will now be presented during crisis situation and the second version of the Memorandum will be explained. Doing so we will see that even the proposal to push for inclusion of DG RELEX and of consular protection in EU crisis management as presented in the Barnier report is problematic as well.

Sources of conflict between DG ENV’s Monitoring and Information Centre and DG RELEX

DG RELEX was put in charge of some aspects of emergency management by President Barroso. I will first explain why it is so, and what the consequences are in terms of relations between DG ENV and DG RELEX. After the South East Asian Tsunami of 26 December 2004, a GAERC meeting took place on 31 December 2004 during which E.C. President Barroso announced the establishment of a light but effective platform by DG RELEX to improve real-time policy coordination within its services when facing crisis situations outside the territory of the Union. The idea was to strengthen and consolidate flows of information to decision-makers, to maximize the synergies and complementarities between the various Community instruments mobilized for crisis and disaster response, and to support the work of geographical services. The concept of the platform was further developed in the Commission

310 Interview EU 28.
Communication of 20 April 2005 on Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in third countries (COM(2005)153). Since then DG RELEX has had a mandate to intervene in times of emergencies, mainly in the field of consular protection. The table below presents the role of DG ENV and DG RELEX in EU emergency management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DG ENV</th>
<th>DG RELEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>MIC and Civil Protection forces of CCPM participating states created in 2001</td>
<td>DG Platform created in 2002, no institutionalised contact point by Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procedures</strong></td>
<td>Request for assistance from the country in need, dispatching information to CCPM Participating states</td>
<td>Delegations coordinate European citizen protection and assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity to provide...</strong></td>
<td>Pumps, medical assistance, Canadair, etc. in times of natural and technological disasters</td>
<td>Rapid and usually high quality geopolitical analyzes, particularly targeting political crises, conflicts and wars outside the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis Centre</strong></td>
<td>At the MIC, two on-duty officers 24/7 equipped with special phones and emails</td>
<td>Crisis Platform accessible on a 24/7 basis. They have access to confidential information, including encrypted phones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget (approx.)</strong></td>
<td>7-8 million Euros</td>
<td>Stability instrument of 100 million Euro per Year for all types of crises (including civil crisis management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle</strong></td>
<td>Assistance to all victims</td>
<td>European citizen assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Illustration 6 : A comparison of DG ENV and DG RELEX way to respond to emergencies**

Taking these distinctions into account, we can see that there is overlapping between DG ENV and DG RELEX actions, and hence competition between the two. For instance, the MIC can be useful for consular protection (even if this typically is a DG RELEX task) because the aircraft bringing civil protection assistance can repatriate European citizens on their return. During the 2004 tsunami disaster, the MIC had encouraged Member States to make use of aircraft bringing civil protection assistance to repatriate European citizens on their return, thus building a bridge between traditional civil protection assistance and consular cooperation. Where appropriate and useful, DG ENV can make the Mechanism available for such new tasks, using its know-how and
infrastructure to provide operational assistance to the consular authorities. So the MIC can help DG RELEX on those aspects of emergency management. This situation creates insecurity for DG RELEX officials. They fear that the DG ENV could slowly take over some of their own tasks. Therefore they resist this change to ensure maintenance of their own organizational structure.

Simultaneously, EC Delegation (managed by DG RELEX) can also be useful to the MIC. Due to the increasing number of requests for civil protection assistance submitted by third countries to the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, the international dimension of the CCPM gained momentum. This situation places the EC Delegations in the field in major positions. For instance, to save valuable time during the handling of civil protection assistance operations by the MIC, it becomes crucial for the EC delegations to be aware of the mechanism and of the service the MIC provides through it. Indeed, EC Delegations can make a large range of services available to the MIC in the field in times of emergencies, if they know the way the mechanism works. When the Community civil protection mechanism mobilizes and dispatches small teams of assessment/co-ordination experts or sends a MIC representative on site, the Delegation often is in a position to offer practical and administrative support. In most cases this support can be: office space, communications equipment, computers, internet facilities, assistance in accreditation procedures, housing support and if possible advancement of the payment of local transport costs. Going further, the EC delegations could even store some EU civil protection insignia for local transportation (trucks etc.), if needed during the mechanism intervention. This would greatly enhance the visibility of EU action both with the affected population as well as with other international actors on-site. But to have a smooth coordination between the MIC and the EC delegation, it is difficult as DG RELEX is in charge of the Delegation and is not willing to see the MIC liaising directly with the delegations.

Moreover the “Commissioners RELEX” Group which is the group inside the European Commission in charge of foreign affairs, includes DG ECHO and DG RELEX
Commissioners but does not include DG ENV Commissioner on a permanent basis. This means it is very difficult to take appropriate measures to enhance coordination among the three DGs to deal with disasters, when one occurs in third countries. This is why the three DGs now work on a revised Memorandum of Understanding to try to work together better. But once again it is difficult. The Barnier report (drafted with the help of FR 14, a European Commission official based at DG RELEX) and the action of DG RELEX have led the DG ENV and DG ECHO officials to perceive DG RELEX strategic aim was to extend its influence over them. For instance through the Barnier report and through the crisis platform recently set up, DG RELEX positioned itself as the central coordinating body between MIC and ECHO. For this reason DG ENV people have always been critical of the idea of the platform, insisting that the Commission’s coordination tool for disasters inside and outside the EU should be run at the secretariat general of the European Commission, rather than at DG-level. Moreover, the DG RELEX is also extending its role via the Crisis Room because they are setting up a network of Commission’s energy correspondents with a view to better protecting Europe’s energy infrastructure. This involves specific measures such as the establishment of an information portal and an expert database, the launching of energy-related geopolitical analyses and prospective studies. The MIC maintains friendly and informal cooperation with the RELEX Crisis Room, having used some of its services such as media analyses, newsletters or satellite images on various occasions. But the MIC faces the problem (like recently during the flood in Bolivia in 2007), that the EC delegations are not trained to face emergencies. They often do not know that the MIC exists, they do not know what it can do. Therefore the MIC has asked DG RELEX to train its EC delegation officials, but the process has been blocked so far showing that bringing the European Commission services together is very difficult.

In the end, the Barnier report underestimated the lack of coordination among DGs and consequently presented an idealized version of an organizational model more than a pragmatic one. FR 14 defended the interest of DG RELEX (placing it at the head of DG

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311 Interview EU 13.
ENV and DG ECHO when it comes to emergency management). But this situation is not easy to accept by the DG ECHO and the DG ENV officials in charge. There is a lack of coordinative discourse, likely to bring these actors together in a context of potential adoption of an enhanced CCPM. Another aspect where coordination was neglected, is the question of the financial issues. This would have necessitated a coordination process to find a compromise between the different positions of the decision-makers involved. And this did not occur.

1.3.3. Underestimation of the financial issues

Another reason to explain the rejection of the French model, is the underestimation of the importance of financial issues and budget issues related to communitarisation of means at EU level. In fact, the French interviewees stress “the price of no Europe” during emergencies (duplication, risk of a NATO “US” leadership…) but do not mention the price of a stronger European communitarized model. The UK officials interviewed on the contrary start by mentioning money, budget, etc. This is at the centre of their preoccupation. Consequently we can note the opposition between the French who never explained in their communicative discourse why their model was financially feasible, and the British who expressed their fear of the financial consequences of the French model, and would have needed coordinative discussion to solve this issue.

When I asked UK officials in charge, why UK did not support more communitarisation of the means of assistance, the answer was based on the financial argument, i.e.: “The main reason why we did not push for a stronger CCPM is money! You should consider the fact that the contributor to the mechanism are from the north, and the recipient are from the south. Another driving force is the fact that smaller countries or southern countries did not invest so much in capabilities as northern
countries.” 312 However this financial argument used by British policy makers contradicts some observations. During the activations of the mechanism so far, the countries which provided assistance were often smaller EU country, and EU country located in Eastern Europe. Often, the cases of activations of the mechanism show that there are countries from the south helping countries from the south: It is often Portugal, French, Spain, Italy and Cyprus helping each others, with the exception of few cases where Norway, Germany and Austria intervened. Moreover, according to EU 26, working in Unit A3 at DG ENV, the creation of the CCPM did not slow down the investment of smaller EU country regarding civil protection equipments and teams. “Because the MIC is not a guarantee of assistance, EU member states can not slow down their own national investments. Look at Portugal. They asked for assistance in 2003, 2004, and then 2006. They did not feel comfortable to have to rely on the MIC. They were embarrassed! So they have invested a lot and now they are the best! They have an excellent forest fire system. You see, I noticed that, when you received help during a crisis situation, you were forced to report afterwards on this, and due to this situation Member States asking for assistance realise their weaknesses and then work on it to be better prepared.”313

When I asked the British officials why they did not activate the CCPM when they faced emergencies to benefit as well from the mechanism and receive help,314 they said this was against their self-sufficiency principle: “The UK aims to be self-sufficient when responding to disasters. It is not expected that external help will be needed.”315 Basing their decision on this principle of self-sufficiency, they are concerned that other Member States will stop being self-sufficient, and behave like free riders, relying on the assistance of their neighbours. They believe that an enhanced CCPM will be a way to have large Member States from the north financing emergency responses taking place in small

312 Interview UK 3.
313 Phone interview EU 26.
314 In particular during the severe floods that hit the UK in June and July 2007.
315 Email of UK 1.
Member States from the south. When I mention the fact that France, a large Member State, supported the enhancement of the CCPM, the answer was: “You are right, France is not fitting in my explanation…. But France has NATO! France doe not want the Americans on board, they want a purely EU framework, so they push for enhancement of the CCPM against the adoption of the NATO framework.”316 A comment which confirms the fact that France’s strategy to push for an enhanced CCPM, was part of the political strategy to develop an EU model, as opposed to the NATO one. In a nutshell, we can see that French policy makers did not manage to appease the fear of the British, who consider the enhanced CCPM would cause financial problem between the north and the south Member States, even if so far, this has never proved to be the case.

This difference in terms of finance and budget perception has consequences for policy making. An example of that opposition is the discussion that took place later on in 2006 and 2007 at European level on transportation of civil protection assistance with a view to potentially recasting the CCPM. The French position was the following: when means are available, it is regrettable that they are not used because of the lack of transportation capacity to bring them on the scene. To overcome this difficulty, France suggested that the European Commission could finance the transport of the material assistance in those cases. On the contrary, the UK did not want the EU to finance the transport of assistance, and tried to limit the EU contribution. At the end, the recast of the mechanism adopted in 2007 mentioned that the EU could finance transport, but only up to 50%. In conclusion, one key element in the adoption of the organizational model was its “financial feasibility” to be then converted into an operational organizational architecture and structure. By focusing on communication and neglecting coordination, the French did not perceive the importance of explaining their model better both to EC officials and to other Member States decision-makers. The example of the financial issues show how much coordinative discourse was missing between the different Member-States, to clarify the fear of some of them. In the next section, I will show that in

316 Interview UK 3.
addition the strategy of communication placed the French proposal on the agenda for “recommendation” rather than for “decision”.

### 1.3.4. Agenda mismanagement: recommendation instead of decision

Another reason why the French model was not adopted is that the communication campaign, the letters of French government members, the Barnier report, all those initiatives were based on “recommendation” but this did not include a place on the European agenda for decision. France’s role was to give advice more than to lead to implementation. Interviewees and documents which followed the publication of the Barnier report presented it as “useful basis for reflection” but not “binding” in any sense. The Barnier report was dealt with as a report of researchers or experts which gives recommendation regarding future strategies, more than as a proposal of a politician prior to decision.

However the Barnier report was not linked to experts, researchers, etc working on the same issues. In this sense, it is more an individual initiative out of the European expert or research community. It means that here too, one can note that the report was a one-off communication instead of a long-term work in the cooperative field of experts or in a research community.

### 1.3.5. Conclusion on model rejection

So what remains of the Barnier report and of the more general French proposal of enhancing the CCPM (i.e. Developping communitarisation of means, creating a European civil protection force, etc)? Certainly, the European Commission made some progress on the topic of consular protection, following the report (clearer information system for European citizens travelling outside the EU, attempt to achieve more pooling of consular resources, setting up of experimental European consulates). But on the main
issues, such as the creation of a one-stop-shop with DG ENV, DG ECHO and DG RELEX, the model proposal was not adopted and hence not followed by the setting up of a new organizational architecture and structure as such. There is no European civil protection force and no truly integrated European approach to crisis anticipation and preparation (e.g. no EU training Centre). The Memorandums of understanding between the different DG concerned show that the European Commission officials are aware of the difficulties and of the needs. But the implementation of a “one-stop-shop” is presented by interviewees as not feasible on a short-term basis.

Among the reasons for failure, the French discourse overstressed the accidental aspect in the causal story they built (focusing on natural disaster) and used the Tsunami as a representative example, although this was an issue saturated by a very strong media exposure, and far away from the EU soil. Moreover they neglected the affordability of the model (financial issues). Consequently looking at the French discourse in its form and content, we can see that the discourse took over the element of the CCPM model in place to develop the French enhanced CCPM model option. Because the CCPM model had been developed as a copy of the Marine Pollution Model, it focused on natural disasters, accidents... These elements were strongly present in the enhanced CCPM model, and in a way hindered the French in their strategy to push for adoption of the enhanced CCPM at a time when the terrorist attacks (i.e. catastrophe newly involving “intentionality”) on EU soil were getting momentum (this is what we will see turning to the case of UK)

Beyond all those reasons for failure, what seems the common point is that the French invested in communication and neglected coordination to pass their model through. Here we can refer to the work of Vivien Schmidt, on “communication discourse” versus “coordination discourse” in Europe.317 In the present case, we can see that the French invested first in politicians’ discourse in the media, second in government statements on EU civil protection (in letters), third in public debates in

think-tanks, i.e. they have focused on communicative discourse. They have neglected the role of coordinative discourse, which is for instance deliberation and discussion with other EU actors, stressing the normative and cognitive arguments. They have neglected the role of coordinative discourse among EU actors (between the different DG of the commission, between Commission and Council) but also between the successive presidencies and between Member States (particularly on the feasibility and affordability of the French proposal). Why? First, the fact that France experienced a strong fit in terms of culture and a positive experience of the CCPM might explain why the communication strategy was easier than a coordinative strategy with actors who do not share the same background. Second, the position of the French advocates as promoters of an ideal to attract people, led to the neglect of the realistic and pragmatic approach of conflict and friction among existing actors. When the position of those leaders had been weakened, the choice of a communicative discourse strategy made model adoption even more difficult.

To conclude: Because the use of the pure Agenda setting theories developed by Kingdon - drawing from Cohen, March, and Olsen for the organizational aspects - were not enough to explain French failures to have the enhanced CCPM model adopted, I have shown that the use of Schmidt’s theory of “communicative” versus “coordinative” discourse was necessary. Moreover, I have shown that using the form and content of discourse to understand adoption or rejection is important because the wording of the model, which emerged in the phase of creation, plays a role. There seems to be a link hence between the role played by isomorphism in the model copy and the discourse attached to the model when it comes to adoption.

I now turn to the case of the UK pushing for the adoption of the CCA.
2. The UK building the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements: the adopted alternative model

This section presents the adopted alternative model of the CCA and the role of its advocate, the UK. First, I explain the reason for emergence of the UK as a decisive actor in the field as advocate of an alternative model. Second, I analyze the UK strategy to push for the CCA. I show that the UK based its strategy on a strong coordinative discourse. Finally I sum up the reasons for the success of the UK.

2.1. The emergence of the UK as advocate of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements

Contrary to France, the UK does not have a strong cultural fit with the EU civil protection. Moreover, the UK experienced the CCPM only as assistance provider and not as assistance recipient. For these reasons, British policy makers perceived that it was in the interest of the UK to invest in another way to respond to emergencies, which would fit their culture and experience better: the CCA, more inter-governmental and less community-based in principle.

2.1.1 No fit between EU civil protection and the British culture of emergency management

There is no fit between the EU civil protection and the British culture of civil protection: Firstly, the British relies on the principle of self-sufficiency. It means they do not want to endorse the idea that assistance could be provided in the UK coming from external EU actors. Secondly, looking at their practice of emergency response, even in the worst case, they refused the CCPM activation. Thirdly, looking at the organizational level, the MIC contact point in the UK is not related to internal security but to external affairs. Finally, the UK officials do not make any difference in United Nations assistance.
and EU assistance. It means they consider the EU as an external actor which can be a mere channel of assistance among others when emergencies happen in third countries.

First, the British way to deal with home emergencies is based on the principles of independence and self-sufficiency: “The UK aims to ensure that it has sufficient capabilities to respond to disasters without seeking external assistance. This is done by constantly assessing the risks that face the UK and building up the capabilities to respond to these risks.”[318] The UK does not take into account any help from outside in their official discourse on emergency planning. On the contrary, French emergency planning considers a degree in which once reached French officials contact the MIC for CCPM activation. Second, looking at their practice of emergency response, we can see that even during major emergencies such as for instance the floods of 2007, the UK has never requested the EU for assistance.[319] Several times, on-duty MIC officers called their English counterparts to offer EU assistance during the floods, and every time the UK refused any activation of the CCPM. Even other participating states to the mechanism called the MIC to offer their assistance to the UK, in vain. Another case in point is the 2005 London Bombings. The MIC during these types of emergencies is placed on stand by. However, the UK did not call the MIC during the emergency. Looking at the organizational structure at the UK level, the contact point of the MIC is the Cabinet Office International Department in coordination with the Department for International Development (DFID). It means it is not linked to internal matters (like in France) but to external affairs. As a matter of fact, it is the Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office which considers all requests for assistance coming from the MIC. When the UK is responding through the MIC there are no assets specifically available for deployment overseas. UK civil protection capabilities are based on the risks that the UK faces and deployment overseas is not taken into consideration as such. As a result, each request is considered on a case-by-case basis and assets are offered based on the

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[319] In June and July 2007, there were several periods of extreme rainfall causing widespread flooding in England and parts of Wales. Approximately 49,000 households and nearly 7,000 businesses were flooded. Major infrastructures such as transport links, schools, power and water supplies were disrupted.
availability and accessibility for deployment. The assets in the UK are not hold centrally by the Cabinet Office, but are owned by other government departments. The decision to offer assistance is taken by the relevant department based on their own assessment of the effect of deployment to the UK capability, the logistics required to deploy the assets and the cost of the deployment. The Cabinet Office does not have a budget for overseas deployment and in most cases the UK will expect the country requesting assistance to meet the cost. It means emergency management in the UK is not as such related to interior security like in France (because of the concept of self-sufficiency) so the contact with the MIC is only accepted to provide assistance abroad (via DfID and the Cabinet Office). However, the assistance planned for provision abroad is not linked to a budget line. Consequently every time the UK participates in the CCPM operations, it means that relevant UK services are taken on their own assets and budget. Finally, interviewees often compare EU assistance in times of disasters with UN assistance. British officials follow the same internal procedures to provide assistance via the UN or via the EU and would prefer to give financial assistance to local actors (like the UN does) than send EU actors in the field. In this sense, they do not see the need for a European civil protection force.320

France had a centralised civil protection culture dealt with by the COGIC at the Ministry of the Interior both in cases of French emergencies and emergencies occurring abroad. By contrast, the UK has a decentralised way to deal with emergency. In the UK overseas interventions are separated from internal security issues (in which the principle of self-sufficiency dominates). After having demonstrated that the cultural fit differs in the case of France and in the case of the UK, I now show that even in the field of experience of the CCPM, the French and the British cases are different.

320 Email UK 1 and Interview UK 2.
2.1.2. The limited British experience of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism

In this section I explain why the British experience of the CCPM is limited: firstly in terms of reception of assistance (which never occurred), secondly in terms of provision of assistance (which is restricted to facilitating and not coordinating the EU response), thirdly in terms of non-institutionalisation of the CCPM channel of assistance, finally in terms of non-recognition of the EU added value when it comes to emergency response.

British policy-makers have never perceived the need to activate the Community Mechanism to request assistance. The UK objective was to show they were able to ensure that they had sufficient capabilities to respond to disasters without seeking external assistance. They did not want to provide legitimacy to the Community Mechanism, because they constantly fear other Member States could have the temptation not to invest anymore in risk management, and behave as free riders who expect other EU Member States to cover for their own vulnerability and emergency response. 321 Looking now at the other side of assistance (that of provision), when they provided assistance abroad via the CCPM (for instance during the Pakistan earthquake of 2005), they strictly saw their mission of “EU Head of coordination” as “facilitator” rather than as “coordinator”. This means they reported on the means available but they did not interfere in the allocation of means as decided by the different EU Member States in the field.322 Their preference is clearly for an intergovernmental approach of security in Europe, when it comes to implementation of emergency response. Moreover, assistance was provided on a case-by-case basis. This is the same for participation in EU exercises: “The UK considers participation in exercises on a case-by-case basis. It is for the departments with the relevant expertise to decide if they should participate in exercises, based on the relevance of the exercises and the value participation would add

321 Interview UK 3.

322 This point will be detailed in chapter 6 with the case of the Pakistan earthquake of 2005.
to the knowledge and expertise of other participating countries and to the UK”.\textsuperscript{323} This means the UK does not want to institutionalise the MIC and the CCPM channel of assistance. It is not part of their plans. It remains an exception. When asked on the added value of the CCPM, British interviewees only mentioned the sending of a coherent message to the population. According to them, sharing information at EU level thanks to the MIC can help the different governments of the EU give consistent account of an emergency. Consequently this enhanced trust between public opinion and political leaders. But they did not mention the potential economies of scales or scopes that EU Member States could make if they invested jointly in costly material assistance, like French interviewees mention to explain why the CCPM can help enhancing EU synergies.

French and British actors do not have the same experience of the CCPM and I will show that this situation leads to different positions regarding the future of EU emergency response. I now turn to the UK strategy to push for the adoption of the CCA, contrary to the French position which promoted the enhanced CCPM model.

\section*{2.2. The UK strategy to push for the adoption of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements}

The key elements of the UK strategy to have the CCA model adopted are the following. First, the anticipation of their presidency through the joint work they did with a core group of successive presidencies and the use of a “focusing event” (London Bombing) as a window of opportunity to bring the EU actors together at a right time;\textsuperscript{324} second a strong linkage made in the perception of actors between the problem of terrorism and the solution brought by their model; third an attempt to focus on an organizational gap (the decision-making part and the chain of command); fourth a cooperative approach towards a consensus. Therefore, I will show that the UK invested

\textsuperscript{323} Email of UK 1.

\textsuperscript{324} Here I refer to the concepts of “Focusing event” and “window of opportunity” as developed by Kingdon.
in a strong coordinative discourse, and opted for a very restricted communicative discourse. This situation enhancing confidentiality and common work strengthened the level of trust and hence the passage from the organizational model creation to its adoption.

2.2.1. Anticipating coordination and having the right timing for adoption

The UK was presiding over the European Union from July to December 2005. But, UK officials working in the field of security and defence prepared themselves in advance by working with the presidencies of the European Union prior to and coming after their presidency, forming a core group of successive presidencies to work on the issue with the Netherlands (which presided over the EU in July-December 2004); Luxembourg (which presided over the EU in January-June 2005); and Austria (which presided over the EU in January-June 2006). This practice is not unique as such. For instance, there is a practice of having regular meetings between the presidency and the presidency to come, in the context of the so-called “EU Troika”. What is interesting here is that the project to develop the CCA model lasted over successive presidencies, which cooperated on the issue.

So when the London Bombings occurred, the British could easily use this window of opportunity to pass the CCA which had been in preparation since the presidency of the Netherlands, without waiting for the Austrian Presidency to implement it as planned: “Après Londres, il y a EU un conseil spécial, et les anglais ne voulaient pas se rendre à Bruxelles pour faire encore une sorte de déclaration symbolique… Ils ne voulaient pas d’une nouvelle ‘déclaration de Madrid’. Ils voulaient montrer qu’ils pouvaient avoir une vraie ‘added value’. Du coup, ils ont accéléré le pas en vue de l’adoption des CCA alors que cela n’était pas prévu ainsi entre les présidences successives. On avait pensé que le projet aboutirait sous présidence autrichienne. Ceux-ci se sont retrouvés avec ICMA, adopté juste avant la fin de leur présidence, histoire de

325 Interview EU 3 and EU 4.
quand même adopter quelque chose. Mais ICMA n’était plus qu’une sorte d’annuaire de points de contacts dans les différents États Membres, au niveau des capitales, en cas de crise majeure... Alors que le CCA a englobé tout l’aspect prise de décision à Bruxelles. Pour tout vous dire, on ne savait pas quoi faire avec ICMA, mais il y a eut des pressions pour que quelque chose soit fait quand même avant la fin de la présidence autrichienne ».

As a consequence the Austrians were left with ICMA, which they did implement, but they have never caught the attention as much as the UK with the CCA, which was and still is perceived as the core organizational model of emergency management at Council level. In this sense, the UK managed to have the final word on the CCA proposal and drafted the final version following its own view thanks to prior involvement and a large coordination strategy with the successive presidencies but also thanks to the use of the London bombings as a strategic window of opportunity. Through their anticipation and their sense of timing they managed to find themselves in a leadership position. As a matter of fact they led a group cooperating on a security issues over a large period of time. This argument is based on interviews with actors involved and on the study of the JHA Council declaration of 13 July 2005 on the EU response to the London bombings which called for the development of: “arrangements to share information, ensure coordination and enable collective decision-making in an emergency, particularly for terrorist attacks on more than one Member State”. This declaration strictly follows that of the Hague Programme (point 2.4), which called for the establishment of an integrated EU arrangement for crisis management with cross-border effects, ICMA and CCA, to be implemented at the latest by summer 2006. So we can see that the adoption of the CCA was triggered by the London Bombing, building up on the preparatory work of the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

in: Interview EU 3 and 4. Translation: “After London, there was a special EU Council meeting. The British officials did not want to go to Brussels only to make a symbolic statement... They did not want another ‘Madrid declaration’. They wanted to show they could have a real added-value. Hence they accelerated the process of adoption of the CCA, although it had not been planned like this by the successive presidencies in charge of the project. Indeed it had been planned as a project which should have been completed during the Austrian Presidency. So the Austrians were left with ICMA to have their part of the project adopted as planned. But ICMA was then just a list of contact points in the different EU capitals, to be contacted in case of major crises. On the contrary, the CCA took over all the aspects of crisis decision-making in Brussels. To be honest, we did not know what to do with ICMA, but there were pressures for something to be done before the end of the Austrian presidency.”
It is intriguing to see that the UK could have such a rapid adoption of the CCA following the London Bombings. The fact that they had worked on the CCA with the Dutch a long time in advance facilitated the adoption. But still, they managed to speed up the bureaucratic process to have the CCA adopted right at the moment of the shock of the terrorist attack in a surprising way. Normally the process of adoption of a text at EU level can be very cumbersome. First, working groups (composed of national and EU experts and bureaucrats) have to prepare the decision of adoption. They build consensus to facilitate the work of the Committee of the Permanent Representatives, the co-called COREPER. Then the text to be adopted goes up to COREPER level (with a list of items split into two parts: Part I includes items where agreement was reached at Working Group level. Part II includes items where no agreement was reached, and where the COREPER must try to find consensus) Prior to submitting any text to the Council for adoption, the COREPER attempts to achieve agreement at its level on Part II. As a rule, the Council confirms COREPER’s agreement. This process can take weeks. The first explanation to understand why the CCA process of adoption was quicker is that the British directly worked at a very high level of the EU hierarchy. In fact, the Cabinet of the Presidency was leading the process, in very close cooperation with the Secretariat of the Council and the SitCen, which is under the leadership of an English person. Second, they did not use an adoption process based on the working groups, as it usually is the case. They directly went to the COREPER level. Bypassing the working groups, they could speed up the process. However, doing so, the discussion in COREPER was very tensed. For instance, some of the southern Member States (i.e. Italy, Spain) were against the adoption of the CCA. To solve this problem, the British used the co-called “Antici”. The Antici are young diplomats who work on the drafting

327 The Permanent Representatives are the ambassadors or deputy ambassadors of the EU Member States in Brussels.

328 Interview EU 3 and EU 4.

329 Normally, because the discussions have already taken place at working group or committee level, the discussions in COREPER are less tense and more formal.

330 Interview EU 3 and EU 4.
of text proposals to be adopted in COREPER II.\textsuperscript{331} They are personal assistants to the COREPER Members. Thanks to the work of coordination among the Antici one day prior to the Council meeting, the British managed to have the text passed in time, in spite of the opposition of some Member States, but also of some European Commission Officials (who were scared to see the Council taking over their rapid alert systems and crisis Centres). Having a top-level strategy of coordination, and bypassing the low level working groups, the British could benefit from the opportunity of the London Bombings to have the CCA model adopted at the right time of the window of opportunity.

Having studied the methods of the UK focusing on the form of discourse, I will now stress the way they used the content in their discourse strategy: I will now present the link that was made by the UK in the content of their discourse between the CCA model and terrorism.

### 2.2.2. Linking the adoption of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements model to the perceived threat of terrorism

In this section, my argument follows two steps. First, I stress how the UK used the threat of terrorism to demonstrate the necessity of the CCA. Second, I show that this linkage which was used in the adoption phase comes from the creation phase.

UK officials have linked the adoption of the model of the CCA to the perception of the problem of terrorist threat in Europe, which is one area where there is a consensus for the need of further rapid action. European citizens consistently express support for a strong and effective European contribution to the fight against terrorism. On this issue public awareness and public expectations of the Union are very high. For instance, when European citizens are asked in which areas they wish to see more decision-making at

\textsuperscript{331} The COREPER is divided into COREPER I and COREPER II: COREPER I is in charge of internal market, the environment, social affairs and culture whereas COREPER II is in charge of foreign affairs, security issues, as well as financial issues. The diplomats preparing texts for COREPER II are called Antici, as it was the name of their first chairman.
European level, 80% of European citizens mention counter-terrorism. On the contrary, the probability of a major emergency to be a terrorist attack instead of a natural disaster or an industrial catastrophe is rather low according to experts. In fact natural disasters are much more common. But European citizens do not express a need for action in the field of disaster management, as such. So the British managed to push for their model, using the threat which had the more impact on public opinion, that of terrorism, even if the CCA model they suggested could be in fact used in any major types of emergencies, just like the CCPM. So the organizational model of the CCA leads to the creation of a EU-wide operational network to provide support in times of emergencies based on the fear of terrorist attack. Even if, in reality, it is commonly agreed by interviewees that it could be used in other types of emergency. Even reports and documents on the CCA mentioned its use for instance in case of influenza pandemic, etc. So strategically, the UK managed to push for its model by linking it to the most perceived threat.

This argument used in the process of adoption is drawing from the process of creation of the model (and isomorphism). Because the model creation was based on a copy of the NATO model based on intentional threat, a link was made in the phase of creation between the CCA model and terrorism. This link could be used in the phase of adoption. Moreover, the British have linked their strategy to that of new actors in search of legitimacy and result in the field of terrorism such as the Counter Terrorism Coordinator and the EU joint situation Centre (SitCen). New actors appeared at EU level and new budgets were allocated to the fight against terrorism. Those resources were present, and the British suggested a way to make use of them. Whereas in the case of CCPM, Member States were scared they would have to pay, and create additional budget lines to enhance the pre-existing structure. Finally, using the threat of terrorism, the UK managed to create a single contact point in every member state to deal with the CCA, even if in fact a structure of single contact point already existing in the field of civil protection, to protect European citizens from major disasters. To sum up, the Council made faster progress on every topic linked to terrorism. On the contrary, the

332 See Eurobarometer, May 2006.
Council did not give specific follow-up on the improvement of existing civil protection tools. So as a consequence the UK model was quickly adopted and the French organizational model remained a proposal but was not adopted.\textsuperscript{333}

The UK used terrorism to pass the CCA. Moreover, they used another argument: that of the decision-making gap. They explained that the EU only had operational structures of emergency management and that the strategic decisional high political level structures were missing. This is the object of the next section.

\textbf{2.2.3. The decision-making gap}

The UK worked on the part of the organizational structure where there was a commonly perceived missing element: the strategic political decision-making level in times of emergency management. Consequently they managed to have the CCA adopted using the argument that the operational aspects (like those dealt with by the CCPM) should be put under a political and strategic crisis decision-making process, that of the CCA. They presented their model as a way to increase coherence, at a higher hierarchical level. Indeed, their model set up a clear organizational architecture and structure to take decision. The information flows and alternative paths of action are clearly described. Tasks are assigned in advance to the different bodies and persons in charge, with an order depending on the level of emergency. The manual detailing this information was agreed on and the procedures were tested in exercises, showing the added value of bridging the decision-making gap. Unfortunately, more details on bridging the strategic and political decision-making gap can not be given, as the procedures of the CCA are classified. But interviewees stressed this aspect several times. It seems an aspect as important as the terrorism argument.

One element that can be presented in more details on how the CCA brought coherence and coordination at higher level in the EU emergency response regards the

\textsuperscript{333} See point 39 of Council of the European Union (2006): Note 9589/06 from Counter Terrorism coordinator to the COREPER, Council, European Council on implementation of an action plan to combat terrorism, 19 May 2006.
way in which the CCA managed to generate coordination procedures even inside the European Commission. This will be the focus of the next section.

2.2.4. Generating coordination even inside the European Commission

The British based their strategy on generating consensus and enhancing coordination. To do so, they push for the adoption of a model which was a copy of a model that had proved its success (the NATO model). They knew this could appeal to governments because this reference to the NATO model enhanced the legitimacy of the CCA model and because by working with other presidencies, they had already developed a discourse of cooperation. Having allies helped getting agreement. They also knew the CCA will need a way to enhance coordination inside the European Commission as well. Therefore, together with the creation of the Council-based CCA, they pushed for the creation of a coordinative body at European Commission level.

Considering the number and diversity of crisis management tools (mostly rapid alert systems connected actors by sectors) managed by the European Commission and considering the raise of terrorism, the European Council under the British Presidency called upon the European Commission to develop integrated crisis management capacities, such as arrangements to share information, ensure coordination and enable collective decision-making in an emergency concerning more than one Member State. Already the Brussels European Council of November 2004, in adopting the Hague programme under the Dutch Presidency, had called for the Commission “to set up within its existing structures, while fully respecting national competences, integrated and coordinated EU crisis-management arrangements for crises with cross-border effects within the EU, to be implemented at the latest by 1 July 2006”. Austria, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom presidencies have launched a joint initiative to implement this part of the Hague Programme. As a result, to coordinate the different crisis management tools based in the different DG, the

334 Sectorial Rapid Alert Systems exist in various DGs: RAS-BICHAT, ECURIE, etc.
European Commission has created ARGUS, a general crisis management alert system.335 This system was primarily developed by DG JLS, and then because DG ENV and DG RELEX were reluctant to see another DG coordinating them, the system was removed from DG JLS and attached to the Secrétariat Général of the European Commission. A Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC) was supposed to be established, which could bring together representatives of all relevant Commission services during an emergency. The CCC was thought to coordinate efforts so as to evaluate the best available options for action and to decide on the appropriate response measures.336 The CCC when it started to be attached to the Secretariat General instead of DG JLS changed their name. It was not called “Crisis Coordination Centre” anymore but “Crisis Coordination Committee”, as the Secretariat General was not willing to have an operational role. The Secretariat General officials considered it was not part of their prerogatives.337 It was agreed that: “The President of Commission may decide either to keep the responsibility to himself or to assign the responsibility for the Commission response to a Member of the Commission. Such responsibility will entail leading and coordinating the response to the crisis, representing the Commission towards the other institutions and being responsible for communicating with the public.”338 ARGUS, an IT coordination tool for emergency management at the European Commission was created, because of the pressure that the Council could exert on the Commission to have a comprehensive approach and speak with one voice. In this sense, through ARGUS and the CCC, the Council development of the CCA model lead to entailing more consensus even inside


337 Interview EU 17.

the European Commission, to reduce the conflict areas between the different DGs concerned.

### 2.3. Reasons for success

In comparison with the French, the British based their strategy on a strong coordinative discourse, and very little communicative discourse. Almost no documents regarding the CCA are publicly available, and no information can be found on the issue. The general public, the think-tanks, etc. remained unaware of the development of a new model, but the top-level officials of the decision-making bodies (at Member States and Council level) were informed well in advance. Opting for a coordinative discourse instead of communicative discourse led to a situation of higher secrecy and enhanced trust among actors to share information and ideas at EU level. Basing their strategy on joint-work of successive presidencies the UK managed to ensure long-term maintenance of discursive validation, to compensate for the fact that they had no first mover advantage (like the French actors had, with the existence of the CCPM prior to their proposal of enhanced CCPM.).

It must be said here that, surprisingly enough, after a phase of opposition, France and the UK joined forces in 2007 to offer one vision of EU crisis management in the so-called French UK non paper. In June 2007, France and the UK issued a so-called “non paper” on EU disaster response: “how to improve coordination”. This “non paper” can be seen as an attempt to bring French and British decision-makers closer, and achieve common objectives. The “non paper” recognises the French attempt to develop a stronger civil protection pole and refers to the Hampton Court Summit. It also mentions the fact that EU effort should be seen as a contribution to UN ones, the EU action being included in the UN cluster or pole approach of emergency management. But the paper also integrated major UK ideas: it acknowledges the existence of the CCA and clearly

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339 If one googles « Crisis Coordination Arrangement », almost no information will be available. On the contrary, a great number of documents and articles are obtained at a glance for European Civil Protection, or Barnier Report.
refers to its implementation. The “non paper” promotes the creation of a disaster response coordination unit, using existing Council-based resources, and involving relevant Commission services, experts, and embassy staff. The mandate of this cell, like the CCA one, is cross-pillar. Instead of promoting the merging of civil protection and humanitarian services of the Commission, it suggests a combined civil protection and humanitarian response in case of disaster taking place outside the EU, through the enhancement of coordination procedures among the services. Instead of having only CCPM mandated head of coordination on site for Civil protection and ECHO officials for humanitarian aid, the unit will be the on the scene interlocutor to coordinate the operations as a whole. The cell, under the responsibility of the presidency of the European Union will also be the contact point for the EU for the political interlocutors of the affected country. The France-UK non paper offers a good example of the fluidity of positioning of advocates at EU level regarding the relevant crisis management organizational structure needed. In this sense, we can notice that France and the UK started by promoting two different models in two different ways, but converged in 2007 in their position. This is what had been observed already in the field of security and Defence with the coming-together of the two countries in St Malo. So this study confirms the trend. A reason to explain the fluidity is the constant reformulation of position negotiation after negotiation, and hence the evolution of the discourses of advocates. Thanks to the interaction process, we can observe a convergence in the wording used by French and UK actors, from two different ones (one based on the CCPM existing wording, the other based on the NATO wording) to one wording used to write a common statement paper. As a consequence, France decision-makers seemed to come closer to the UK ones regarding the role NATO and the EU should play in emergency management.\textsuperscript{340}

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesuperscript{340} This will not be developed here, but is mentioned to point out the fluidity of the position and the role of coordination and interaction among actors at EU level.
\end{footnotesize}
3. Discursive strategies of Member States advocate: the vectors to have a created model adopted

In the field of emergency management, the vectors to have a model adopted are a strategic use of discourse based on coordination more than communication, going back to the work of Schmidt and Radaelli.341 This chapter demonstrated that models available are better defended by coordinative discourse strategy than by communicative discourse strategy. Moreover, this chapter showed that it was less important to be the first mover (like France was) than to maintain, on a long-term basis, the discursive validation procedures (i.e. UK strategy), going back to the theory of Dostal.342 Regarding the form and content, the following table goes back in more details to the theoretical framework developed in chapter 1:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>French model</th>
<th>UK model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causal stories</strong>&lt;sup&gt;343&lt;/sup&gt; (mechanical, accidental, intentional, inadvertent)</td>
<td>Accidental (Tsunami, floods)</td>
<td>Intentional (terrorist attacks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representative example</strong>&lt;sup&gt;344&lt;/sup&gt; Metaphor, Synecdoche, Analogy, Symbols</td>
<td>Analogy with National aid (Promote the idea of Europe aid in parallel with US aid), principle of solidarity, community principle</td>
<td>Analogy with NATO, Principle of subsidiarity inter-governmentalism principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Novelty/Saturation</strong>&lt;sup&gt;345&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Saturation (Over mediatised Tsunami)</td>
<td>Novelty (Major attack on EU soil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proximity</strong></td>
<td>Far away (e.g. Tsunami)</td>
<td>Near by (e.g. London Bombings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affordability</strong></td>
<td>No mention of cost of Europe, stresses the “cost of non Europe”, Model perceived as creating a need for more EU funding</td>
<td>Cost presented as included in the Counter terrorist strategy of the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem population</strong></td>
<td>Focus on outside EU</td>
<td>Focus on inside EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coupling</strong></td>
<td>Emergency management with civil protection</td>
<td>Crisis management with terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 7: Comparing the French and the British discursive strategy

This table was made based on the wording found in the media (using the press articles quoted in footnotes in this chapter earlier) and in official documents (using the documents quoted in footnotes in this chapter earlier) that were used during the adoption phase. It makes a synthesis to identify the main trends. Moreover, these trends in the wording were confirmed during interviews. It seems that the focus on terrorism and on the “intention” aspect led to a positioning of the UK model as new. Moreover, they chose to link it to a direct threat inside the EU (near by) where the EU is only

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presented as an added value with no further cost and no diminution of sovereignty. On the contrary, the French position linked the model to civil protection in a remote area. The fact that the representative example of the Tsunami is linked to an accidental causal story which was over and over presented in the media made the perceived need for adoption of the model less strong. Finally the underestimation of the question of affordability weakened the French position. What seems striking if one compares the wording used in the adoption phase with that of the creation phase (i.e. the wording of the first draft documents of the CCPM and the CCA, but also of the interviewees who initially drafted the models) is the fact that the way the model was designed in its creation phase frames the type of discourse that were used during the adoption phase. Actors stick to the models. The models keep on being a source of legitimacy for actors to push for adoption.

4. **Outcome**

This examination of the French and British discursive strategies to have their preferred model adopted shows that a long-term coordinative discourse plays a very important role to ensure model adoption. On the contrary, investing in communicative discourse and being the first mover can be dangerous. The analysis stressed the fact that when decision-makers attempt to have their model adopted, they are influenced by the wording and the linkages which come from the phase of creation through isomorphism. However, they have margins of initiative when it comes to defining their discourse strategy (communication-coordination) and finding the right timing to speed up the bureaucratic process of adoption inside the Council. It is interesting to see that the positioning of France and the UK in their discourse on civil protection and EU emergency management reflects the finding of other authors working on ESDP. Both France and Britain seek to shape the EU role in the field of emergency management as much as in that of ESDP in ways that benefit their own grand strategy: France seeks a *Europe puissante* that will have real capabilities to counterbalance the United States and
have the means to undertake autonomous missions of assistance or military missions. Britain seeks an ESDP and a EU crisis management structure that can complement NATO. Authors like Bailes looking at the “language of ESDP” point out the fact that the EU language used in official documents safeguards both the primacy of NATO and the special policies of the now six non-NATO Member States of the EU.

This chapter helped to solve the puzzle because it showed that at a particular moment in time, when actors had the choice between enhancing the CCPM or creating a new structure with the CCA model, they opted for the adoption of the second model, thus leading to a situation of coexistence of two models adopted by two successive Council Decisions (in 2001 for the CCPM, in 2005 for the CCA). The question is now the following: how do actors manage in practice in times of emergency? Do they activate the CCPM? The CCA? And why? This will be the object of the last empirical part of the thesis.

One final comment on the use of discourse to explain EU integration: The study of discourse is a research programme which was developed mainly to understand public policy changes and international relations. In this sense, the study of discourse is interesting for authors analyzing the emergence of EU structures. I argue like Milliken, that discourse studies need to be further improved and integrated in the political and social sciences. I seek here to lay out potential areas for further development, including ways to link discourse strategy to promotion of created organizational model but also to transformation of organizational model into organizational architecture and structure (i.e. implementation). I argue the use of discourse is relevant to understand evolution of practices of interaction among actors. Moreover, it is important to link this to the potential political and organizational outcome of the use of discourse, as shown here. This chapter allowed better understanding of the process whereby the action of the

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EU in the field of emergency response is determined (enhancing an existing EU structure or adopting a new one). The next chapter will focus on the practical consequences that stem from the present situation regarding EU emergency response in practice. This is why the next chapters will turn to the consequences of the existence of new organizational architectures and structures first at headquarter level on a day-to-day basis (chapter 5), and then in the field when a crisis strikes (chapter 6). The next chapters will link the elements previously described in the creation process and here in the adoption process to those of implementation.
IMPLEMENTATION
Chapter 5:

Community Civil Protection Mechanism and Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements in practice: Brussels

This chapter explores two ways in which the EU has implemented its models of emergency management in Brussels at headquarter level thanks to the case of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism at the European Commission and the case of the Crisis Coordination Arrangements at the Council Secretary General. In keeping with my research framework, this empirical chapter focuses on implementation by the Brussels administration on a day-to-day basis - at the Commission and at the Council. Chapter 6 will focus on the in-field implementation during large scale emergencies.

The objective of this chapter is to analyze the gap between the organizational model and the implemented organizational architecture and structure. It focuses on the decoupling. I will show that the existence of a gap can lead to an unanticipated model implementation in the case of the CCPM. Or it can also mean a lack of implementation of the model, even if the model has been formally legally adopted in the case of the CCA.

I start with the case of the CCPM implementation. I first introduce the reader to the CCPM in Brussels. Then I present the gap between the anticipated organizational architecture and the one implemented: The CCPM was designed as a pillar I and II macro-level architecture depending on the type of emergencies (in peace, at war). But in practice, it is only activated in Pillar I. This is counter-intuitive, as it gives margins of initiative to the European Commission in situations where security is at stake. Third, I present the gap between the scheduled micro-level organizational structure and the
implemented one. I show that there are “grey zones” since the way the CCPM is activated or used is not strictly described in the model. Studying these fuzzy areas means analysing the leeway left to actors when it comes to implementation. I show thus that the CCPM was implemented in an unanticipated way, as it was activated even during war context in a framework supposed to be used only in peace situations (i.e. the pillar I framework).

I continue with the case of the CCA implementation. I first introduce the reader to the CCA in Brussels. Then I present the gap between the planned macro-level organizational architecture and the implementation of the CCA: The CCA was designed as a cross-pillar architecture. But in practice, this new type of architecture is difficult to implement. As a result, the CCA have never been activated in real emergency situations. The CCA are only regularly activated in the context of exercises. Third, I present the gap between the forecast micro-level organizational structure and the one which was implemented. I demonstrate that here too “grey zones” exist, where new actors try to gain as much freedom of action as possible. However, because of fears of take-over by other actors, the CCA did not materialise.

I conclude this chapter by going back to the theoretical framework developed in the thesis and by explaining why two structures co-exist, one used during emergencies, the other only used for exercises.\textsuperscript{349}

\textsuperscript{349} To this date.
1. The “unanticipated” implementation of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism

To explain why the CCPM has been implemented in an unanticipated way, I firstly present the CCPM in practice on a day-to-day basis. I highlight some facts and figures to show the trends of the CCPM implementation process. Second, I analyze the implementation of the CCPM in two ways. First I stress the gap between the formal CCPM model and its macro-level organizational architecture in practice. Second I uncover the gap between the formal CCPM model and its micro-level organizational structure. Looking at what I call the “grey zones” of the mechanism, I explain why the CCPM was not implemented as anticipated.

1.1. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism Tasks in Practice: Facts and Figures

1.1.1. The monitoring of emergencies

From 1 January 2002 to 30 September 2005, the MIC has monitored 83 emergencies world-wide. The Mechanism was activated for 37 of these emergencies.\textsuperscript{350} If one observes the number of activations of the mechanism per year, a considerable growth is immediately apparent. This can be evidenced in both those emergencies occurring in participating states as well as those in third countries for which the Mechanism was activated.

\textsuperscript{350} This number does not include 5 Exercises for which the Mechanism was activated as though a real emergency were taking place. It includes however the times the Mechanism was activated on standby.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Emergencies activated in the 30 participating states</th>
<th>Emergencies activated in third countries</th>
<th>Other emergencies monitored</th>
<th>Total emergencies monitored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 8: Overview of emergencies monitored by the MIC, per affected country

Source: European Commission, DG ENV, Unit A3 civil protection

The type of emergencies monitored by the mechanism varies from case to case. The same variety may be found in those for which the mechanism was activated, as does the degree of assistance provided. The following table illustrates this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Airplane crashes</th>
<th>Explosions</th>
<th>Fires</th>
<th>Floods</th>
<th>Forest fires</th>
<th>Hurricanes/ Cyclones/ Tropical storms</th>
<th>Maritime Accidents</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Seismic events</th>
<th>Severe storms (incl. Snowstorms)</th>
<th>Standby</th>
<th>Terrorist attacks</th>
<th>Tsunami</th>
<th>Volcanic activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>7/4</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>4/2</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>5/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>7/7</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 9: Overview of emergencies monitored (x) and handled by the MIC thanks to an activation of the CCPM (y), per type of emergency (x/y)

Source: European Commission, DG ENV, Unit A3 civil protection

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351 The participating states are the EU-27 plus Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein.

352 Until 30 September 2005.

353 An emergency is monitored by the MIC when the MIC manages the information related to the emergency, without activating the mechanism (e.g. without sending assistance in the field).

354 Assistance provided to 4 third countries.
As shown in the previous table, the mechanism has to date never been activated to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless it has been put on standby on four occasions where the risk factor of such an attack was considered to be high. These events were the D-day celebrations (France, 2004), Euro2004 (Portugal, 2004), the Olympic Games (Greece), and the funeral of Pope John Paul II (Italy, 2005). Those quantitative data shows that there has been a trend towards more use of the CCPM channel of assistance by Member States since 2001.

1.1.2. The training and simulation exercises

Moreover, the CCPM was used in a large number of trainings and simulation exercises since its adoption in 2001. According to the Council decision of 23 October 2001 establishing the community mechanism, the commission is in charge of setting up “a training programme with a view to improving the coordination of civil protection assistance intervention by ensuring compatibility and complementarities between the intervention teams”. The programme must include “joint courses and exercises and an exchange system whereby individuals may be seconded to teams in other Member States.” The European Commission in the CCPM framework asks Member states to organise European exercises in the field financed partly by the Commission. The European Commission also organises itself on desk training. Exercises took place in

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355 The MIC organizes training courses in the context of a training programme whose objectives are to reinforce and facilitate cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions. Four courses are available: induction course, operational management course, assessment mission course, high-level coordination course.

356 Simulation exercises organized at Community level are designed as field tests aiming at establishing a common understanding of cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions and to accelerate response in major emergencies. These exercises are designed to provide a learning opportunity for all actors involved in operations under the CCPM and enhance mutual operational co-operation. For instance, contingency planning, decision-making procedures, provision of information to the public and the media are tested and rehearsed.

various member states with the simulation of major crises and the involvement of operational actors from different European countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Time/Place</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Organiser</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMON CAUSE</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)</td>
<td>DEMA (DK)</td>
<td>BE, DK, IT, SE, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURATOX 2002</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>CBRN attack during and international sport event</td>
<td>Civipol (FR)</td>
<td>AT, ES, FR, IT, GR, SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLORIVAL II EU Response</td>
<td>February 2003</td>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Ministy of the Interior (BE)</td>
<td>BE, DE, FI, FR, GR, SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREST FIRE</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Forest fire</td>
<td>Entente (FR)</td>
<td>AT, BE, DE, ES, FR, GR, IT, LU, PT, SE, SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUDREX</td>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td>Earthquake + incident in chemical plant</td>
<td>Federa l Ministr y of the Interio r (AT)</td>
<td>AT, BG, CZ, DE, LV, PL, SK + UN/OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU ESCEX</td>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>Earthquake + other related emergencies in a fictitious third country</td>
<td>(FI)</td>
<td>FI, BE, DK, EE, PL, SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURATECH</td>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>Explosion on a train transporting chemical materials</td>
<td>Civipol (FR)</td>
<td>FR, BE, DE, IT, CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOLEX</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>Earthquake in a fictitious third country</td>
<td>(PL)</td>
<td>BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, PL, SE, SK, UK + UA, RU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>(IT)</td>
<td>Mainly NGOs from 10 participating states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROSOT</strong></td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Earthquake + chemical incident</td>
<td>(IT)</td>
<td>IT, FR, GR, PT, SE, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU- TACOM- SEE 2006</strong></td>
<td>July 2006 Bulgaria</td>
<td>Terrorist accidents</td>
<td>BG</td>
<td>GR, HU, RO, SI, SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUDANEX</strong></td>
<td>Septembe r 2006</td>
<td>Terrorist accidents + Severe weather</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>EE, HU, LI, SI, DE, DK, SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VESUVIO MESIMEX</strong></td>
<td>October 2006 Italy</td>
<td>Volcanic eruption assessment + evacuation</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>PT, ES, FR, UK, IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EULUX 2007</strong></td>
<td>June 2007 Luxembur g</td>
<td>Several accidents of unknown origin</td>
<td>LU, FR, DE and BE</td>
<td>HU, NL, PT, PL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 10 : Community exercises organised in the CCPM framework

Sources: European Commission, DG ENV, Unit A3 civil protection

The exercises are field tests which provide a learning opportunity for both the civil protection forces and national actors in the field and for the Brussels-based on-duty MIC officials. During the exercises, contingency planning is tested, as well as the decision-making procedure and the provision of information. The scenarios are suggested by the country or coalition of countries which respond to the annual calls of the European Commission. The Commission studies the applications and decides of the grant allocation to the most relevant project. The more Member States participate, the more they have the opportunity to get familiar with the CCPM framework. However, the limits of the CCPM exercises are the following: First, the organization of an in-field exercise is very challenging for a Member State. The administrative procedures and the financial procedures to follow in keeping with EU standards are very strict. Moreover, the Member States also organise their own national exercises. So the incentives to answer the call of the European Commission are very low.\(^{358}\) This is why all the Member States planned to ignore the call of the Commission as an expression of their

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\(^{358}\) This point was made by French and Spanish Representatives during PROCIV meetings in Spring 2007.
disagreement. On the other hand, the risk exists, if the EU guidelines are softened, that the Member States could use the pretext of the exercise to get the grant and use it in their own best interests and not those of the EU mechanism. Following that, the Commission and the Member States are negotiating to find a way to facilitate the organization of exercises without departing too much from the European rules of governance. A second limit is that field exercises attract a lot of politicians and media. This is an important element to present the CCPM to the European citizens, but this can also transform a real exercise into a show, a situation which does not really help to improve the CCPM, but only provides a good image for the national organizers.

While the media coverage of the MIC activities is low, its activity are significant. Consequently, few European citizens actually grasp the type of activities dealt with at the MIC. For instance, on-duty MIC officers were sent to Burma following the recent catastrophe. But nothing was mentioned in the press (both European and international).

Having introduced the CCPM in practice based on quantitative figures, the goal of this first part is to show the gap between the organizational model and its implementation in terms of organizational architecture and structures. The next section will provide answers to the questions raised by the facts and figures: Why is the mechanism activated in certain emergencies and not in others? I will start with a macro-level analysis of the CCPM architecture and the gap with the formal CCPM model. I will then continue with a micro-level analysis of the CCPM structure in practice and the gap with the CCPM forecast model.

1.2. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism organizational architecture in practice

The main gap between the CCPM organizational model and its architecture as implemented concerns the legal basis and the hierarchical decision-making process. The legislative framework defined for the CCPM organizational model relied on the pillar I

359 Interview FR 2.
or II depending on the type of emergency situation (peace or war). In practice, the CCPM is only activated under the pillar I.

1.2.1. The gap between the model and the implemented architecture: the pillars

Since the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has based its development on three pillars. The pillar I is the “community pillar”. It includes, among others, economic, environmental, and social policies. The pillar II consists mainly in Common Foreign and Security Policy. The pillar III deals with Justice and Home Affairs. Often authors studying EU crisis management focus on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) whose organizational architecture is based on the pillar II. They rarely include pillar I crisis management aspect. And if they do, they focus on the European Commission Directorate General for External Relations (in short DG RELEX). The decision to have three EU pillars was made because member states opposed the addition of those new policies to the European Community on the ground that they were keen to preserving their sovereignty.

However, by contrast, the CCPM is included in the pillar I even if it can be activated for crises inside and outside the EU borders. Why is the CCPM included in the pillar I? The legal reason for that is that EU treaties do not include any specific section on civil protection per se. All the activities and decisions linked to the CCPM

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362 The implementation of the new constitutional Treaty could change this situation. Article I-17 of the first proposed constitutional treaty stated that in the area of civil protection “the Union shall have competence to carry out supporting, coordinating or complementary action.” Furthermore, Article III-284, the Constitutions stipulate out that “the Union shall encourage cooperation between Member States in order to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing and protecting populations against natural or man-made disasters.”
are made under article 308 (Amsterdam Treaty), which means that unanimity is required. This article is often presented by interviewees as “article poubelle”.\textsuperscript{363} It means that it is often the article referred to in the absence of any clearly stated legal basis. This article is presented as broad enough to include all the issues possibly on the fringes of the European Treaty. How does this work? Interviewees in charge at the European Commission and at the European Council level explain the legal situation as follows. According to the legal basis, when a country outside the EU borders requires assistance, the European Commission must coordinate with the Member State presiding over the European Union. If the Presidency decides it is not a war situation, it is not declared as a part of “civilian crisis management” (which legally characterised pillar II issues), and the organizational entities of DG ENV can therefore intervene and deal with the crisis on its own. If, on the contrary, the presidency declares the situation as a war context, it means as part of “civilian crisis management”, then the CCPM is activated under the pillar II, and then decisions must be taken at Council level. But because no implementing rules have been drafted (there was no agreement on how this could work out), no one knows in practice how a pillar II activation of the CCPM could work. So it seems dangerous to test it during a crisis. In addition, interviewees mention it would take too much time to reach the COREPER level of decision-making, whereas the crisis asked for a rapid response.

As a consequence, even in the case of the Lebanon crisis, the Finnish presidency authorized the activation of the CCPM under Pillar I (although they considered first the option of using the CCA and then the option of using a Pillar II activation of the CCPM).\textsuperscript{364} Similarly during the Georgian crisis of August 2008, the French presidency was reluctant during 48 hours to activate the CCPM under Pillar I, but eventually did so because they feared an activation of the CCPM under pillar II would be too slow in

\textsuperscript{363} Interview EU 23, Interview EU 24.

\textsuperscript{364} Statement made by the Finnish Representative during a PROCIV meeting, in 2007.
practice. So the CCPM is legally based on a pillar I and II architecture. In practice, it has always been used in the sole context of the pillar I architecture, even in war contexts. Does it mean that DG ENV through the Pillar I architecture can deal itself with a large number of crisis management aspects due to the lack of implementing rule to allow a Pillar II activation of the mechanism? Based on the figures given in sub-section 1.1., the answer is no. Certainly the European Commission is exploiting this situation to cover a regular amount of crises but in practice the staffing level is low and imposes a material constraint which limits the margin of action of the DG ENV. The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) running the CCPM does not have enough employees who are qualified to be on-duty officials. Moreover on-duty officers are normal European Commission officials who are in charge of on-duty shift in addition to their other administrative tasks. Indeed 23 persons work at the MIC in shifts of 2 or 3 days. It means that in a normal situation 2 persons are on-duty, whereas the others deal with their day-to-day administrative work at the DG Environment Civil Protection Unit. The two on-duty MIC officers do not actually sit in the MIC room. They are in their office (or at home during nights and week-ends). They come to the MIC room in case of emergency. As a consequence, the MIC can be an empty room at some moments of the day. A shift is considered by European Commission officials as a "burden" because it takes time and the workload of the normal administrative day of a European Commission officer is already high. The shift agenda is filled in on a voluntary basis and the person in charge of filling in the shift table regularly has troubles to cover for the weeks to come. For the on-duty MIC officers, the less disaster the better, as they have more time to concentrate on their daily work. For instance, they can prepare meetings with the representatives of the Member States and the Presidency of the EU, they can organise trainings or conferences for EU civil protection coordinators or experts, they can prepare calls for proposals for projects on cross-border civil protection, they can

365 Interview EU 26.

366 All these observations were made between March 2007 and July 2007. The situation described here may have changed afterwards. In particular, there were some plans to permanently staff the MIC room.
answer the inter-service consultations of the European Commission, to name but a few of their day-to-day tasks. However, to be recognized as a centre, they still need a minimum amount of disasters taking place inside and outside the EU, during which they can show the added value of the existence of their unit. Meeting officials of the MIC in April 2008 in Brussels, I could see they were embarrassed because the CCPM had not been activated for months. So in a nutshell, as the MIC is operating 24/7, it is difficult for the MIC on-duty officers to be able to cover simultaneous emergencies on a long-term basis, being only two “on-duty”. A European Commission official said in an interview: “Even if the MIC wanted to deal with a large number of emergencies, this would not be feasible, not given the current conditions.” But to justify their existence, they still need a certain amount of activations.

In conclusion, the CCPM is officially a mechanism which can be activated in the context of pillar I or II. But in practice, it always relies on the Pillar I architecture of the EU. This does not mean that the MIC is free to deal with a lot of emergencies itself without an official decision of the COREPER, as staffing levels and material conditions are a strong limit to the crisis response capability. However, as we will now explain, this situation can still have consequences as, depending on the pillar structure, it is not based on the same hierarchical decision-making process.

1.2.2. Consequences on the hierarchical decision-making process

The Presidency of the European Union can decide that an intervention is exclusively a pillar II intervention using Member States assets indicated to the Council's Co-ordination mechanism for Civilian Aspects of Crisis management (including civil protection). It can alternatively decide to activate the CCPM to facilitate coordination inside Pillar I. What are the consequences in terms of the hierarchical decision-making process depending on the Pillar chosen? In the first case (Pillar II), the Committee for

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367 Interview EU 22.
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) will be in charge of assisting the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{368} The CIVCOM is a body composed of diplomats whose role is to provide the PSC with a clear overview of the means and resources available to the EU and to the Member States in the face of a crisis. The PSC can thus help the COREPER in the decision-making process, which itself assists the European Council. In the second case (Pillar I activation of the CCPM), it is the Committee for Civil Protection which makes the decision regarding the MIC budget, the organization of the MIC transport, etc. It is presided over by the European Commission. This Committee, created following decision 1999/468 (which means in the EU jargon that it is part of the so-called “comitology”) can sit in the legal form of a “regulatory committee” if the States have to make transport decisions or in the legal form of a “management committee” if the States have to make funding decisions. Moreover, there is a Council working party on civil protection called PROCIV. PROCIV is a body in charge of advising the Council on civil protection at European level. The Council sets its agenda and PROCIV is presided over by the Presidency of the European Union. PROCIV is composed of the Representatives of the CCPM participating states. They meet every month to prepare the work of the COREPER. Once they have taken a decision unanimously, this situation must be validated by the COREPER. (If the Treaty of Lisbon is adopted, unanimity might not be required anymore. A qualified majority will replace the unanimity principle.) The same representatives of Member States often sit in the regulatory committee for civil protection, in the management committee for civil protection and in PROCIV. But the way the Commission controls the agenda and the decision-making process varies with the different legal forms of these committees. For instance, sometimes the Commission is presiding over the assembly, sometimes not. Sometimes the proposals can come from the Commission officials, sometimes not.

As a consequence, depending on the decision-making process adopted (through CIVCOM or through PROCIV, etc.), the result of the decision in COREPER can vary.

This is why it is in the interest of certain participating states to push for the use of one committee or the other (and thus a pillar or another). Moreover, it is in the interest of certain participating states to keep CIVCOM and PROCIV well apart, or to bring the two together, as Britz has shown in her work on EU civil protection and the Nordic states.\textsuperscript{369} This impact of the so-called “comitology” and of the increase of working groups has been proved in other sectors as well.\textsuperscript{370} But it seems to be a particularly salient issue in civil protection, due to the complexity of the decision-making processes available to the actors described earlier. The fuzzier the legal basis, the greater the number of decision-making processes available.

This is why the hierarchical decision-making process and hence the EU architecture implemented is so important. To make a more detailed analysis of the gap between the model and its implementation, and to see how States or bureaucrats can play with this margin, I will now focus on the micro-level of the organizational structure.

\textbf{1.3. Community Civil Protection Mechanism organizational structure at work}

According to the 2001 Council decision, the mechanism consists in: the establishment and management of the so-called Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; the establishment and management of a common emergency communication and information system (CESIS); other support actions, such as measures to facilitate the transport of resources for assistance interventions, the identification of intervention teams and other intervention support available in Member States for assistance intervention in the event of emergencies, the setting-up and the implementation of a training programme for intervention teams and other intervention support; workshops and seminars, the establishment and, if needed, dispatch of


assessment and/or coordination teams. All those activities which do not directly relate to the management of the Environment are dealt with by DG ENV of the European Commission. This is the first puzzling element regarding the organizational structure of the CCPM that will be explained. Second, the MIC is never presented as a crisis Centre, although it is in terms of functions. This will be the second puzzling element regarding the CCPM organizational structure analyzed in the section. Finally, I will explore the practices of the MIC to deal with emergency situations and explain how difficult it is to understand why in a certain emergency the MIC was activated and not in another. This will be the last puzzling element presented.

1.3.1. Civil Protection at the DG Environment

The CCPM is managed by the DG ENVIRONMENT, under Directorate A “Communication, legal affairs and civil protection” in Unit A3 “Civil Protection”. First, the EU is the only institution in the world where civil protection is dealt with by the “Environment” and not by “internal affairs” or “Defence” authorities. As such, the mandate of the DG ENV does not clearly include Civil Protection. The focus of the sixth environment action programme 2001-2010 puts forward a series of actions in four priority areas: climate change, nature and biodiversity, environment health and quality of life, natural resources and waste. So the activity of the DG ENV can be related to civil protection as part of its role to maintain and improve the quality of life through high-level protection of natural resources and effective risk management. Civil Protection can also be related to the environment thanks to climate change. However there is not an obvious and direct link to tackling civil protection by DG ENV as such. Second, directorate A is a general one, in charge of horizontal issues such as communication or legal affairs of the DG. Unit A3 was added with a role in the field of civil protection although not providing the DG with such a “horizontal activity”.371 The presence of

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371 Horizontal activities are cross-sector-based support activities in an organization (i.e. Research & Development, Human Resources, Legal Affairs, etc.).
unit A3 in directorate A is a puzzling element in the CCPM organizational structure. Of course, looking at the process from creation to implementation, we can start to see the explanatory power of the process-tracing: Looking at the story of its emergence, we can understand why the MIC is located at DG ENV. However, a puzzling element remains: inside DG ENV the MIC has never been presented as a crisis centre. Why?

1.3.2. No real crisis centre?

In this section I show that the MIC is not really considered as a crisis centre: firstly in its external design (very small empty room), secondly in the wording (no mention of the term crisis centre), thirdly in its staffing (administrative officials).

When the CCPM was implemented, the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) was created. The decision was taken to locate it in a room in unit A3 “Civil Protection” of DG Environment. DG Environment is located in a European Commission building in Brussels, which is not in the main European district, but remote from it. Although this can hinder the swift encounter of other European Commission officials during a crisis (as their DGs are in the European district), it is often a recommended choice to locate crisis centres away from the main district, which can be targeted by terrorist attacks. The room is equipped with TV, fax machines, telephones, and PCs. There is a secure room next to it, if needed. However there are no extra security measures to access the MIC as it is for instance the case to access the DG RELEX crisis room or the recent DG JLS crisis room. The surprise of visitors when discovering the small MIC room and the relatively easy access is strong. One visitor even mentioned that the crisis room of the capital of his country was at least twice as big and as equipped as the MIC. So physically, the MIC does not have the characteristics of a crisis centre, as one can see in other crisis centres.

The MIC has since its creation never been referred to as a crisis Centre in official E.C. documents or in official E.C. declarations to the press. In official documents, the MIC is always called a “civil protection hub”, “a civil protection platform”, a “one-stop-shop for civil protection”, etc. When working inside the MIC, I was told not to use the
expression of European Crisis Centre. On-duty MIC officers are here to assist Member States crisis Centres but the MIC can not be called itself a European Crisis Centre. Why is that so? On-duty MIC officers fear they could upset Member States officials if using this wording. As they are dependent on the member states regarding the means of assistance, they do not dare called them “crisis center” as well. They prefer a softer wording. Furthermore, the acronym of the MIC is not clear to everyone. It means “Monitoring and Information Centre”, but most of the interviewees who are not European Commission Officials are not able to explain what this expression stands for. So not only physically but also in the wording, the MIC is not presented as a crisis Centre.

Are the persons working in the MIC crisis managers then? On a day-to-day basis, two on-duty officers are available 24/7. They are desk officers of Unit A3 “Civil Protection” and they are on-duty for 2-3 days a month, which means they are generalists, working on policies and funding programmes during the day, and being operational in the MIC when on-duty. During an interview, an expert sent by the MIC in the field said: “The MIC is composed of European Bureaucrats. Very few of them really know what civil protection is all about. They are working in the field of environment, they do their job, and sometime they get out of their office to sit in the MIC room. And even more: sometime they are sent in the field, where they are not credible!”372 Another expert in the field said: “The MIC officer who arrived in the field was over her head. She had no idea what a crisis was, I mean with dead bodies, etc.”373 On-duty MIC officers do not necessarily have a background in Civil Protection, but they follow regular training on the issue, and are joined by national experts (firemen, etc.) sent by individual country for one or two years. When on-duty they regularly update the participating states and experts in the field on the current state of emergency management. They send everyday a newsletter called “MIC Daily”, with the latest emergencies in the world. This newsletter is also available online. In case of an emergency they call the contact point of

372 Interview FR 5.
373 Interview FR 9.
participating states in order to prepare if necessary a report on the emergency and collect information on the possible availability of experts, material assistance, etc. So in practice, their role described in the official text is the one they have at work on a day-to-day basis. But some other roles which are present in the organizational model as endorsed in 2001 are not implemented. For instance, on-duty officers are supposed to have a role in terms of pooling the information provided by the participating states to maintain a production of serums and vaccines or other necessary medical resources and on the stocks which might be available for intervention in the event of major emergency and compile this information in the information system secured at the appropriate level. This is not done in practice, as the Member States opposed the implementation. They claim it is too sensitive an issue to be put in the hands of the on-duty MIC officers. They fear this would endanger the security of their citizens, rather than help protect them better. Consequently, even if this mission is stated in the official document adopted, this aspect of the MIC role was never implemented in practice. As we can see generalist European Commission officials are those in charge of operational matters even though they are not formally experts in crisis situations. In this sense, they are more experts in the administrative and political procedures than in the particular aspects of a crisis management Centre as such. However the description of their tasks includes typical crisis manager tasks. Some of them are carried out in practice. Some of their crisis manager tasks were adopted but are not implemented. Most of the time this gap comes from the opposition of Member States.

The on-duty MIC officers are in permanent contacts with the participating states. The type of contacts they have can impact the emergency response in practice. This is what will be explained now. To ensure a swift interface, the states have one 24/7 contact point which is the interface with the MIC. This is why all the participating states must submit to the commission an information template called the “country card template”. This document provides information on contact points in the context of civil protection and where appropriate of other services handling natural, technological, radiological or environmental accidents including marine pollution. The participating states must
provide and regularly update their information on their experts: the experts are classified according to the following categories: technical experts (to provide advice on specific, technical topics and risks), assessment experts (to provide an evaluation of the situation in times of crises), co-ordination team members (responsible for logistics and communications), co-ordination head (in charge of leading the coordination team during the intervention, he is in charge of liaising with the authorities of the affected country and the MIC). So the MIC works with one 24/7 contact point in each participating state. This organizational structure is decisive, because in some countries the contact point will be the Ministry of the Interior while in some others it would be the Ministry of Defence, etc. The choice of interlocutors is paramount because the decision to provide assistance or to ask for assistance relies on them. Moreover, the decision regarding experts and team members is also in their hands. So we can see how the organizational model adopted has an impact through the structure when crisis strikes, with the role played by the interaction between Member States actors and MIC officials. Moreover, in practice, when it comes to implementation, the actors can play with their margins of initiative and influence the emergency response with their choices (the Ministries of Defence will not make the same decision as the Ministries of the Interior). We can see that at this interface between Member States and the MIC, a lot of grey zones exist. This will be the object of the next section.

1.3.3. The Grey Zones of the implementation of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism

In this section, I highlight the grey zones of the implementation of the CCPM: the grey zones when it comes to the choice of experts and head of mission; the grey zones when it comes to the sending of material assistance; the grey zones when it comes to

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374 I define the grey zones as areas where the organizational model can be interpreted in a way or another by actors when implementing it. Theses grey zones can be the source of “friction”, “dilemma” or “doubt”, to refer to Sleznick’s description, as mentioned in chapter 1.
activation of the mechanism; and the grey zones when it comes to the community aspect of the mechanism.

The experts and Head of Mission

The MIC is in charge of the activation of the CCPM and of its smooth running. This includes typically: dispatching the experts during crises, along with written confirmation of their mission, envisaged duration of the mission, local contact person information, insurance coverage, daily compensation allowance, guidelines for technical assessment, co-ordination experts and head. However, the MIC has limited power in the choices of experts and Head/Deputy Head of mission. Those experts, who are recognized national experts in areas like incident management, technology, emergency assistance and emergency planning, are put in an expert database available to the MIC on the basis of the decision of the national authority in charge. The MIC has no say in who the experts appointed by a country are. Moreover, on-duty MIC officers are dependent on Member states decision to send or not their expert during an emergency and in particular the on-duty MIC officers are dependent on decisions coming from the Member States presiding over the European Union when crisis strikes abroad. For instance, when the MIC was activated for floods in Bolivia in 2007, Germany was presiding over the EU. As a direct consequence, the head of coordination sent to Bolivia was German like most of the experts sent. In 2005, the UK was presiding over the EU, and this is the reason given by interviewees to explain why the Head of the Mission was British: “At that time, Britain had the Presidency of the European Union. So the choice was made to have a British Head of coordination in Pakistan and France agreed and was given the opportunity to appoint a French as Deputy Head of coordination.”

This can create situations which are not optimal. For instance, the Head of Coordination can find

375 Interview FR 5.
himself in a situation where he does not speak the official language of the affected country.

The sending of assistance

First, a participating state hit by a major emergency must keep the MIC informed of the evolution of the situation. If assistance is needed, a participating state or third country can address a formal request for civil protection assistance to the MIC. In case of emergency occurring in a third country, the MIC contacts the competent authorities of the Member State presiding over the EU and with the other relevant Commission services in order to inform them of the situation (e.g. DG RELEX, DG ECHO, etc). The MIC collects the essential information and early warnings and transmits that through the established communication channels and networks to the competent civil protection authorities of all the participating states. In case of emergencies taking place in a third country, which may require assistance, the Commission might decide on its own initiative to inform the third country on a potential Community assistance if needed. The MIC must then keep the Member State presiding over the EU regularly informed of any events or developments. The MIC and the presidency are in charge of ensuring the effective involvement of the MIC (activation of the CCPM) but also disengagement at the end of the emergency. If not agreed otherwise, the state requesting assistance must bear the costs of assistance provided by the Participating States. During emergencies, the MIC works with other international organizations such as for instance the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian assistance (UN-OCHA), NATO, Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the International Marine Organization (IMO). Being in a context of CCPM activation (it means having validated all the necessary consultation steps described here), the question of the assistance sent and received remains a puzzle. In most cases, whenever the CCPM was activated, assistance was offered one way or the other. But the number of offers varies greatly from one year to the other with no clear rationale, as the table has shown.
previously. Only two rational factors can be identified: the type/magnitude of emergency and the distance. The closer, the more assistance sent. The greater the magnitude of the crisis, the more assistance sent. The other variations are hard to explain.

Similarly the number of offers of assistance eventually reaching affected states does not reflect a particular rationale. “In a number of cases, requesting states have refused assistance because they received too many offers of one kind and perhaps not the other. Some assistance may not have been accepted for political reasons”.376 Another element is the cases where assistance was not available, or not available quickly enough. The main reason for this according to on-duty MIC officers interviewed is the exhaustion of resources (e.g. they are used in another crisis). The assistance sent and offered is a grey zone, where a lot of operational aspects are mixed with political aspects.

Can the organizational architecture and structure account for some of these discrepancies in the offering of assistance? I argue it does. In some countries (Finland, Czech Republic) the Ministry of the Interior is the one taking the final decision to send assistance or not. In other countries, it is the Ministry of Foreign affairs (the Netherlands, the UK (DfID) or Norway). This can explain some of the differences as, depending on the participating States offering assistance, the interests of the country are different but also the interests of the organization taking the decision. The perspective of the Ministry of the Interior to send or not send assistance is different from the perspective of a Foreign Ministry. This is why in some countries the decision to send assistance on international disaster relief mission is now taken jointly by the ministries concerned or by the prime minister.377

Sending assistance can mean sending national means. But it can also mean sending EU experts. This difference is of importance because experts are “for free” for member


states. This is not taken on their budget but on those of the European Commission. On the contrary, they have to pay the bill for every national means they make available. And this is where difficulties arise to convince states to offer assistance. They will only send assistance if it is politically relevant for them.

The activation of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism

It is difficult to understand why the Mechanism is activated or not. This is a third grey zone, an expression used by an EU official in charge.\(^\text{378}\) Looking at the official figures provided by the European Commission, there were very few activations of the mechanism in 2002 and 2003, the first years of its implementation. During 2007, the number of activations in one year reached 17. Regarding activations, there is a rule which is the following: the MIC must receive a formal request for assistance by the country affected. But, as some affected countries do not know about the existence of the mechanism, the on-duty MIC officers have a margin of action: they can be more or less proactive in contacting the EU delegation on site, which is more or less proactive in contacting the national authorities dealing with the crisis. This can explain why the MIC was used during the floods in Bolivia in 2007 but not during the flood in Haiti and Argentina which occurred at the same period. Furthermore, the MIC is not equipped to deal with multiple emergencies, so if on-duty officers are busy with one emergency, they might be reluctant to push for another activation of the mechanism. Moreover, once the Mechanism is activated, the MIC is dependent on offers of assistance made by the participating States. If on-duty officers fear no participating States will be willing to help, they will not push for activation. Finally, when the MIC is activated and offers are made, sometimes the offers can be refused if other actors are already helping enough (other DGs or other international actors). Some actors such as NATO crisis management officers of the EADRCC mention the fact that the MIC sometimes is activated without

\(^{378}\) Interview EU 22.
any real “formal request” of the country. They argue the US has never asked to activate the MIC during Hurricane Katrina for instance. They say, the UK coordinator in the field, who represented the EU presidency at that time, suddenly had a double hat. They argue it is a problem as for instance MIC experts enter the territory with a tourist visa for instance and not an expert visa… The question of the official activation of the MIC is problematic. It seems it is less based on the type or magnitude of the crises, and more on political elements (such as the official request of the affected country, the official validation of the request by the Presidency, the judgement of the on-duty MIC officers, etc.)

The Community aspect of the Civil Protection Mechanism

Even if the CCPM exists, some can argue that the organizational structures of this community-based architecture (Pillar I) is very close to an intergovernmental-based architecture. Indeed this part showed that, in practice, Member States are leading the game when crisis strikes as they are the ones to decide if they ask for intervention or it they provide assistance. In this sense, the MIC is only a facilitator. Some would say it is putting a European cosmetic layer on top of Member States coordination, and in some cases this might seem true.

Others would say it is an organizational structure bringing a community added value as it socialised actors to others (skills development and training are done at EU level, informal relations take place thanks to the committee meetings among national bureaucrats, etc), it tries to bring about more coordination and rationality into the system (economy of scales and of scope when one plane can bring material assistance from different countries, instead of having each participating state flying over its own material help). This is definitely the elements which convert the mechanism into community tool. Moreover, the CCPM imposes certain requirements on national

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379 Interview NATO 1.
coordination system in terms of bureaucratic procedures: the national contact point must provide the MIC 24/7 with the relevant information. The national contact point must decide on national experts to be sent to follow EU civil protection training, etc. Hence the coordination capacities of the Commission and of the Member States have to be seen as interrelated. Moreover, the creation of the CCPM leads to a greater administrative involvement of the national crisis management structure in the Member States.\footnote{Even more for the Member States which relied on a decentralised system.}

In addition, participation in the CCPM is open to Member States but is also open to Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein in the light of Decision of the EEA Joint Committee N° 135/2002 of 27 September 2002, amending Protocol 31 to the EEA agreement, on cooperation in specific fields outside the four freedoms.\footnote{See: OJ L 336, 12.12. 2002, page 36.} With regard to the candidate countries to admission in the EU, participation is open to those countries having signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Commission. This point is of importance as Croatia and Ukraine are interested in joining the CCPM prior to possible EU adhesion, and this is legally possible. In this sense, others can argue that the Commission bases its action on an architecture which goes beyond the classic intergovernmental one of the EU 27.

The creation of the CCPM can hence be interpreted as an example of a community tool which is in search of a less hierarchical type of coordination. Community actors are not trying to achieve EU civil protection by forcing national civil protection to adopt and implement a EU way. The CCPM is a good example where the EU organizational architecture and structure developed was thought to adjust to take account of the fact that the topic (civil protection) was not directly in the Treaty but still could benefit from a EU added value in a heterogeneous context characterised by the complex diversity of national civil protection systems. Drawing on Mintzberg work,\footnote{Mintzberg, H. (1983,1993): \textit{Structure in five: Designing effective organizations}, Prentice-Hall, Englewood cliffs.} the EU level of community coordination is less based on a hierarchical mechanism and more based on
bureaucratic procedures (formal rules and guidelines to be followed), skills
development and training, and horizontal coordination mechanism (informal relations).

In conclusion, the choice of the model has a strong impact on the organizational
architecture and structure. It is not only a device to convince people, it really is then
having an impact on the crisis management itself (i.e. the MIC is located at DG ENV,
etc.). But margins of actions exist when a crisis strikes. In fact, we can see a gap between
model and architecture (reflected in the legal basis of action for instance) and the way
the structure is actually working. The CCPM actors can take advantage of this fuzzy
framework sometimes, but also suffer from it other times. For instance, the European
Commission officials have imposed their model and have managed to have a Pillar I
architecture: the CCPM has never been used under Pillar II, and the civil protection part
of Feira has never been activated as well. Moreover this fuzziness gives on-duty officers
a certain margin of action to illustrate themselves in a crisis or decide not to intervene:
this is this grey area put at their discretion, where they can see if intervening helps them
or not, so if they should push member states in their decision or not… On the other
hand, this gap between the architecture (legal mandate, etc.) and the structure in
practice can work the other way round. The vaccines issue is a good example: since it is
theoretically in the control of the MIC, but Member States do not give information in
practice. So the communication on those issues does not use the CCPM channels, and
the chain of command, authority of decision, etc. remain out of the reach of the MIC
actors.

1.4. Conclusion on Community Civil Protection Mechanism
implementation in Brussels

What remains of the CCPM formal model and of the process of emergence of the
CCPM? First, the fact that the creation of the CCPM was based on isomorphism through
a copy of the Marine Pollution Model has an impact on the organizational structure. The
CCPM is under the control of DG ENV and the MIC is located at DG ENV. Second, the
fact that DG ENV bureaucrats were at the origin of the model also has an impact. The MIC is managed by bureaucrats more than by practitioners of emergency response (firemen, etc.). It means the same people who drafted the CCPM model now are involved in the CCPM implementation. Third, the fact that Member States from the south pushed for the CCPM adoption has an impact: they make the greater use of the CCPM. They are the ones often activating the CCPM, contrary to Member States from the North which would be reluctant to activate the CCPM even when facing a disaster that could require such a decision. Finally, a last element remains from the CCPM model: the human aspect of training and exercises. The MIC is a socializing agent at EU level.

How did the actors involved develop their margin of initiative and manage to have the CCPM implemented in an unanticipated way? First of all, the fact that the CCPM had been activated several times in case of natural disasters (Pillar I) led to decision of actors to use it even in unintended situations such as the Lebanon crisis. In this sense the European Commission managed to have much more leeway than expected. Looking at Member States, they managed to keep a strong control on the CCPM leading to self-censorship on the part of the European Commission Officials working at the MIC: For instead, on-duty MIC officials hesitate to call the MIC a EU crisis Centre, because they fear to upset Member States. They will not dare to ask for activation of the CCPM if they think no Member States will follow and agree to send assistance. The Member States always have the last words to agree on activation, to choose the means of assistance to be sent and the experts.

Having identified the element of the models that were preserved and the margins of initiative developed by actors, we can observe a permanent tug of war between the European Commission and the Member States. I will now turn to the CCA case and see if we can observe the same. Finally in a last section I will compare the two cases concerning the theoretical framework.
2. No Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements implementation?

In this section, I explain that the CCA have never been implemented in practice during emergency situations. The CCA have only been activated in the context of exercises. I explain this situation drawing from my experience of the CCA and some majors facts on the CCA implementation. As I did for the CCPM, I firstly present the gap between the CCA formal organizational model and its macro-level architecture and secondly stress the gap between the CCA formal organizational model and its micro-level structure in practice.

2.1. Inside the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements in Brussels

The CCA in practice so far only includes the organization of on-desk exercises by the Council's secretariat to test the adequacy and efficiency of the CCA internal procedures. The Joint Situation Centre of the Council (SitCen) coordinates and provides the main operational backbone for implementing these arrangements and for conducting such exercises, whereas for the CCPM, it is the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). “The Joint EU Situation Centre has already carried out exercises that have explored the likely needs of a EU crisis co-ordination mechanism in the event of an incident both outside and inside the EU.” Those exercises are always table-top, based in Brussels, and made thanks to fictitious scenarios. The first exercise of the CCA took place on 30 October 2006 with a simulation of a major terrorist attack targeting different European cities. On 13 and 14 September 2007, a second exercise of the CCA was conducted. It was a simulation of the perpetration of a biological attack. It focused on managing all the consequences of such a biological risk for European citizens. Future exercises are being planned. For security reasons, it is not possible to quote the lesson-

learnt reports of those exercises. What can be said though, is that those exercises were table-top exercises based in Brussels. This means that the CCA were tested without involvement of the nationally based decision-making actors. This is a limit to the validity of the exercises, as in real time the national Brussels-based actors (the members of the Permanent Representative Committee) would need to coordinate with their capitals (Prime Minister office, etc.), which will make the decision-making process in Brussels much more cumbersome. The second point that can be made on those exercises is that the scenario is decided by the Presidency of the European Union. In the case of the biological exercises, the choice is linked to the priority of the Portuguese Presidency to focus on European protection against contamination via biological agent. This choice which is politically grounded might not reflect the most probable threat on EU soil. This is a second limit to the exercises.

The CCA have never been activated in practice during an emergency since their creation. Why? I now turn to the CCA organizational macro-level architecture and try to see why it might be difficult to implement the CCA during emergencies.

### 2.2. Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements organizational architecture

The CCA organizational architecture is a cross-pillar one and this legal basis creates difficulty in the implementation process, as no actor knows its role, and under which leadership it is placed. This situation creates fears and doubts and limits the implementation of the CCA in practice during real cases of emergencies (like the Lebanon crisis in 2006).

2.2.1. A new cross-pillar architecture

The legal basis of the CCA is a cross-pillar one. This is clearly stated in the official documents. “The arrangements are cross-pillar and are relevant for external crisis as well as crises inside the EU”. (...) “The arrangements should permit pragmatic co-operation between all relevant parties covering all policy sectors and institutions.” Cross-pillar arrangements emerged after the Maastricht treaty to allow more coherence and coordination between EU institutions and EU policies even if they were legally based on different pillars. Cross-pillar arrangements were developed first and foremost in the field of security, when internal and external EU issues were combined in a way that did not meet the legal pillar separation as adopted with the Maastricht Treaty. The trend towards cross-pillar arrangements in the field of security was strengthened after the main terrorist attacks on EU soil (Madrid and London Bombings).

What does it imply for the CCA? This involves exchange of information and communication among actors who do not have the same legal basis of action (i.e. not the same pillar-basis). In the CCA context, the counter-terrorist coordinator, the MIC, the Civil-military Cell of the Council ESDP crisis management structure are for instance supposed to share information and communicate on any major crisis issue. Cross-polarisation also means that a body has been selected to ensure a good level of coordination: in this CCA case, it is the SitCen. The choice of such an architecture is sometimes described by interviewees as a way to enhance effectiveness. According to them, sharing information can be a way to avoid unnecessary duplication, and can allow the EU to speak with one voice (“We need one coordinative structure ensuring a

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leadership, a position at EU level"). However, they often point out that this can not work in practice. Most of the time, the choice of such a cross-pillar architecture is perceived as a danger for the survival of their organization, or as a way to organise a hidden take-over. One interviewee summarised this situation like this: “It is political. The question is who talks to whom and when. It is complex, you see.”

Bringing about cross-pillarisation in the arrangement is described by EU officials as creating a fuzzy situation where people both at member states level and at EU level (Council, Commission) are wondering if they will benefit from the new level of coordination or suffer from it. An interviewee said for instance: “The Member states have direct access to the rapid alert system of the European Commission. But now if they have to go through the Crisis Coordination Arrangements, it is another flow of information. And the SitCen of course push for that, to be informed first, instead of having the Member States accessing the information of the Commission and dealing directly with it.”

2.2.2. Consequence on the hierarchical decision-making process of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements

“The arrangements should not lead to the establishment of new permanent structures and should be set up within existing structures. COREPER, in particular, will play a central role.” The hierarchical decision-making process which the CCA follow is not based on permanent structures. The CCA are based on the ad-hoc formation of a Crisis Steering Group. This Crisis Steering Group is composed of the Member States Representatives of the COREPER of the so-called “affected countries”. It means that in the case of an emergency, and to ensure swift decision-making, a smaller COREPER will

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388 Interview EU 17 and EU 18.
389 Interview EU 17 and EU 18.
390 Interview EU 17 and EU 18.
be composed. The criterion of “affected countries” is strongly debated. Does it mean that there must be victims inside the border of the country? Does it mean that the emergency must affect the political or economic interest of the country? No Member States want to be excluded from the decision-making process, but including all of them would purely mean having a regular COREPER meeting. An EU official said: “To make it short, the problem is the legal basis. We don’t have yet a clear cut competence, the role of the Council is not really clear. This is obvious if you read the report on the last CCA exercises… Some member states were not happy. Only directly affected Member States are involved, and what about the others? And in addition to that, the CCA is here to prepare things and not to take decision, you see, COREPER takes decision! So Member States in COREPER claim that if they are not involved right from the beginning… How can they take a decision and be involved in the COREPER afterwards?” I will now focus on the organizational structure of the CCA to see what the grey zones of the CCA are.

2.3. Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements organizational structure

In this section, I present the gap between the CCA micro-level organizational structure in practice and the CCA organizational model as endorsed in 2005. I highlight that in practice it is not easy to rely on an ad-hoc structure of emergency management and an extraordinary mode of governance.\[392\] I identify the grey zones of the CCA, as I previously did with the CCPM.

2.3.1. The difficulty of having ad-hoc structures of crisis management

The CCA rely on ad-hoc structures of crisis management: The Crisis Steering Group and the Crisis Support Group. The role of the Crisis Steering Group is to contribute

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\[392\] Extraordinary modes of governance are set up in states of emergency, to be able to cope with extraordinary contexts. Extraordinary modes of governance can include emergence of some ad-hoc political structures (to respond to the crisis), exceptional criminal procedures, etc. Often the declaration of a high state of emergency can cause a restructuring of the political power through the strengthening of the executive power (like in the US).
to the building of a common understanding of the crisis among the Member States. Its assessment is drawing on information provided by the Crisis Support Group, which is composed of experts (e.g. CBRN experts, medical experts, etc.). The Crisis steering Group’s role is to suggest possible EU responses and to elaborate potential scenarios. The Crisis Steering Group is also in charge of monitoring the implementation of the response. The Crisis Steering Group is composed of high level cross-pillar actors such as: The Presidency, The secretary general/High Representative, the Representatives of the affected Member States and of the European Commission. The SitCen and other agencies such as EUROPOL might contribute.

Permanent structures have a role as well. They will be requested to provide all the necessary administrative support: For instance the Council Secretariat will prepare papers for submission to the Crisis Steering Group. The SitCen will be requested to give an assessment of the threat. Even the MIC assistance can be required. But, in a sense, the CCA characteristic is to involve more people in the crisis management process than it normally is the case. Indeed the CCA procedure goes beyond the normal involvement of usual respondents. In this sense, it reflects the emergence of extraordinary mode of governance. For instance, the activation of the CCA is linked to the definition of different stages of emergency. Only a crisis which involves various Member States (multiple terrorist attack, breakdown of communication system in Europe, flu pandemic, accident in a nuclear reactor, etc) can lead to the activation of the CCA. In this sense, it creates new opportunities for existing structures (SitCen, Council Secretariat) to reposition themselves and gain in terms of leadership should an emergency occur. Ad-hoc structures (such as the crisis support group) create windows of opportunity to gain legitimacy for permanent structures in need of more recognition.

Having such ad-hoc structures linked to permanent structures in search of legitimacy in the new field of emergency response has consequences. For instance, the organizational locus of the CCA is not clear yet. It could be placed at the Council Secretariat in a secure room of the SitCen. The difficulty is to make a high level of confidentiality possible without hindering the communication between the
Representatives in Brussels and their capitals. One interviewee stressed the fact that he was willing to sit at the Crisis Steering Group but not “naked”! He mentioned that so far he had not been allowed to enter the SitCen rooms made available with a mobile phone and that due to this situation he could not imagine how he could possibly communicate with his capital to take appropriate decisions. The permanent national contact points of the CCA can be the same contact point as for the CCPM or a different one. For instance, in Italy it is a different contact point. But in the UK, both the CCPM and the CCA have their national contact point at the Cabinet Office (i.e. at the civil contingencies secretariat).

This is also creating a very complex situation, should the CCA be implemented in emergency situations. The co-existence of ad-hoc and permanent structures makes the routines of emergency response more fragile as this suddenly creates new bodies for a short period of time. EU actors not being used to those new ad-hoc structures find themselves confronted with doubts and fears. They actually anticipated the Grey Zones of the CCA.

2.3.2. The Grey Zones of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements

As the CCA have never been activated in real case scenarios, it is difficult to identify grey zones of activations as such. However, the CCA have grey zones as already identified in the context of exercises. The first one is that of the democratic control, the second one the intergovernmental aspect.

The democratic and financial control

The CCA is out of the democratic control of the European Parliament. Until now, no text on the CCA issue has been validated by the Members of the European Parliament (in short: MEPs) No data are available on the budget of the CCA either. The

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393 Interview FR 4.

394 Email UK 3.
European Parliament did not vote for it in its budget discussion. The Member States are those in control of the CCA budget. This is an opaque issue. Consequently, the European parliament is out. So is the commission. The lack of « droit de regard » is pointed by a lot of interviewees, who want to remain anonymous.

**The intergovernmental aspect of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements**

The CCA rely on a hierarchical system, as the *Crisis Steering Group* is made responsible for the crisis response of the EU. It also relies, like the CCPM, on bureaucratic procedures (the so-called Standard Operating Procedures of the CCA or in short SOPs), and skills development and training (with the CCA exercises). However, there are clearly less horizontal coordination mechanisms, as there is no permanent committee. This means that the coordination is passive: It is an “event coordination.” The arrangements are introduced as a reaction to an event (e.g. a major terrorist attack in different EU countries). It is the event not the issue itself that is the focus of the action of actors involved. On the contrary, the CCPM relies on an active coordination. It is a coordination where actors focus on an issue, that of civil protection. The mechanism relies on a permanent and active exchange of information.\(^{395}\)

To draw on the work of Egeberg following an organizational approach to EU integration, one of the crucial differences between the CCPM and the CCA is that the former relies on a primary structure and the latter on a secondary structure: \(^{396}\) The MIC is a primary structure, people dedicate their time fully to the structure. The CCA work on the basis of a secondary structure. Creating a committee system (*crisis steering group* with the members of COREPER of affected countries) means that this is not what occupied the participants fully, but they would meet if anything important happens.


Moreover, the organizational structures of the CCPM and of the CCA rely on different organizational demographies: The MIC is composed of EC officials and national END, national experts who are made available by their national administration. The CCA crisis steering group is composed of the heads of European institutions and Permanent Representatives (in short: Perm Rep) of the affected states. This means that creating routines of emergency response is easier in the CCPM context than in the CCA context, in which people rely on ad-hoc structures, for which they can not easily plan who could benefit from them. Consequently, the extraordinary mode of governance on which the CCA rely is not part of the culture of the people dealing with it. They do not feel comfortable with it and they sometimes even fear to activate it.

2.4. Conclusion on the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements implementation in Brussels

What remains of the CCA model? First, the part of the CCA model dedicated to exercises has been kept unchanged and has been implemented, with exercises taking place every year. Second, the same level of secrecy and confidentiality has been kept as well. Even after the implementation of the CCA, there are very few communications from the Council or from the Member States. Third, the attempt to rely on a cross-pillar structure remains, even if this legal framework blocks the situation.

How did the actors involved try to develop margins of initiative when it came to implementation? The SitCen tried to take over when the CCA were implemented. The SitCen organised all the exercises and drafted the lesson-learnt reports. On the contrary, the other actors did not get strongly involved in the CCA. They feared they would not be able to anticipate who could really benefit from it or control it. For instance, the services of the European Commission concerned (i.e. those in charge of early warning systems) feared they could be bypassed by the Council. The Member States of the EU feared the SitCen was trying to use the CCA to build an EU intelligence service and hence bypass their routine of bilateral coordinations at national level. Finally, the
Members of the European Parliament were reluctant to see the CCA gain power, without being placed under their democratic control.

To conclude, in the case of the CCA, the reasons for the gap between the model and the implementation, can be explained by the fact that few European Member States have a culture of extraordinary modes of governance based on ad-hoc structures. So they did not push for the implementation and even feared to activate the CCA when it was possible to do so (e.g. Lebanon Crisis, in 2006). Because of this situation, no learning-process could take place, as it happened in the case of the CCPM (from relatively small disasters to large international crises). This blocked further implementation of the CCA.
3. Outcome

The CCPM and the CCA which are two different organizational structures at the EU level do not follow the same organizational procedures (e.g. different hierarchical decision-making process), do not have the same cultural openness regarding information (the same level of secrecy & confidentiality), do not have the same technical structures (use different IT systems to share their information), etc. However they both aim at managing emergencies at EU level.

In the case of the CCPM, the gap between the formal organizational model and the organizational architecture & structure as implemented is due to the political ways in which the Member States tried to reinforce their control over the CCPM. This EU emergency management structure seems to have been designed to remain a community “empty vessel” to a certain extent. There is a legal model of EU emergency management leaving some fuzzy areas and a complex implementation process where both the States and the EC officials tried to preserve their margins of initiative. Characteristic of this situation are the grey zones, which often benefit the Member States, showing the importance of the political and material aspects when it came to implementation.

In the case of the CCA, the gap between the formal organizational model and the organizational architecture & structure is due to the fact that Member States had no culture of extraordinary modes of governance based on ad-hoc structures. Thus they did not push for CCA activation and could not develop a learning process, as the exercises were limiting the involvement of Member States to the presence of their Representatives, with the capitals being left uninvolved.

How come two different models were created in the EU to deal with emergency situations, even if they are somehow restricted in their action by the willingness of Member States? Why can we observe the presence of redundant Centres (MIC and SitCen), if in some respects they are both EU empty vessels? The answer provided by this thesis comes from the process-tracing. The structures were created because of a process starting with isomorphism and going through different discursive strategies of
actors trying to control the adoption so that it matched their preference. Once the process started, it continued and hence offered new possibilities to the Commission and to the Council to position themselves, gain resources and legitimacy, based on the models. The two structures –the MIC and the SitCen- hence pushed for their survival and tried by their practices as well to legitimize their presence. However, they still encounter either material & political (in the case of the CCPM) or ideal & cultural (in the case of the CCA) obstacles. In a sense, there are on the one hand the EU institutions basing their legitimacy on the original formal models and drawing from them in the practice (input legitimacy); And on the other hand, the states, who try to find a legitimacy in their choices of a channel of assistance through their action (output legitimacy). In order to make a more detailed analysis of this aspect, I will now study implementation in case of emergencies looking at what happened in the field. As the CCA has never been activated, I can not make a case study of its activation. This is why the next chapter only focuses on the CCPM. Two emergencies are used as case studies: that of the Pakistan earthquake (2005) and that of the Lebanon crisis (2006). In both cases, the CCPM was activated.
Chapter 6:

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism in action abroad
The Pakistan earthquake (October 2005) and the Lebanon crisis (Summer 2006)

In this chapter, I turn to the practical implications when crisis strikes. I focus on the CCPM because the CCA has never been used as such to deal with an emergency. The impact of crisis management mechanisms is often the less documented part in the literature: It is hard to measure the raise or decrease in efficiency after adoption of a new framework of action. Indeed it is difficult to isolate the effects directly derived from the CCPM implementation from those due to other elements, like for instance the presence or absence of NATO in the field, the strong or weak link between the local and the external players in the field, etc. However having presented the process of adoption and the content of the CCPM previously helps in this chapter because it gives the possibility to discuss and compare the potentially expected impact derived from the model and the experienced impact in action during major disasters.

Great scepticism surrounds the ability of the EU to be an international actor, and in particular when crises strike: According to Hill, the difficulty of promoting a unitary action is presented as standing in the way of an efficient EU crisis management. Therefore the role which the EU could play is described as very restricted in scale and scope of intervention. Other authors like Ekengren and Groenleer explains that in the

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past, EU response to crisis management remained “rhetorical or symbolical”. 398 Therefore they highlight the risk of an “expectation-capability gap” as mentioned earlier by Hill which they fear could be detrimental for the EU. This chapter shows that this fear could be partially true in the past and today in principle since the EU channel is not favoured by States. But EU crisis management can still emerge, and this is what I will explain in this chapter by analysing the development of the use of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM).

This chapter traces the evolution of the role of the EU in emergency management in action, since the creation of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in 2001. In particular the chapter focuses on two cases illustrating the role of the EU civil protection abroad during a disaster: the Pakistan Earthquake (2005) and the Lebanon crisis (2006). I investigate the uncommon situation of having a European Commission Directorate General coordinating operational field situations outside the EU borders. The chapter shows that the CCPM evolved from a light EU cosmetic response put on top of national civil protection responses (in the case of the Pakistan earthquake) to an attempt to develop in greater depth the role of the EU CCPM abroad, building up synergies among the national responses of Member States (in the case of the Lebanon crisis).

The cases of the Pakistan earthquake and the Lebanon crisis were selected because they are the two major disasters that the EU CCPM faced after the studied case of the South East Asian Tsunami of 2004, which authors like Ekengren, Matzen and Svantesson used to illustrate the limits of the EU action in times of major disaster.399 The two cases are used here as examples of emergencies which put the CCPM to the test after the Tsunami lessons. The cases are chosen for the differences they exhibit on the dependent variable: the CCPM was not intensively implemented in Pakistan, while the CCPM was intensively implemented in Lebanon. Our main purpose is to explore the


factors that explain the differences among the reaction of the different EU Member States (In Pakistan, Member States did not adapt fully to the CCPM. In Lebanon, some Member States adapted to the CCPM, some others did not). Turning to the theory, this difference in Member States adaptation is of interest. According to principal-agent theory, the Member States try to control the disaster response in their best interest, whereas the European Commission officials use their margin of initiative to develop their own organizational strategy in action. As disasters are a salient issue area and as the CCPM is non-binding for the states, principal-agent theory predicts that the Member states will not allow the European Commission to act independently at all. However the principal-agent theory also predicts that the European Commission will use the asymmetry of information to bypass the limit imposed by Member States and to prove its added value as an “independent” player during disasters. Using the first case of the Pakistan earthquake, this chapter will demonstrate that Member States firmly controlled the CCPM which remained only a superficial EU cosmetic layer put on top of national responses. However, I argue that the European Commission managed to find margins of initiative and developed its autonomy as shown in the second case of the Lebanon crisis. This is why this chapter argues overall that historical and even more sociological neo-institutionalist theories are needed to understand the process of the development of the use of the CCPM abroad. Institutionalisation means an incremental adaptation of the players which step by step build up new patterns of interaction (learning process from one crisis to another) but it also means sometimes that actors stick to one pattern of interaction even if it is sub-efficient.

Other explaining factors are excluded: First, the type of persons in charge and the role of the leadership is not an explaining factor in the present cases: MIC on-duty officials did not drastically change between the two emergencies. Stability in staffing also exists in terms of national civil protection forces. No interviewee mentioned the particular role of an individual person. So contrary to the perspective of Boin, t’Hart, Stern and Sundelius, I do not take the leadership as a discriminating factors in the way
the crisis were managed by the public authorities.\footnote{Boin, A. t’Hart, P., Stern, E., Sundelius, B. (2005): The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, New York, Cambridge University Press.} Second, I do not believe the type of catastrophe played a role (natural catastrophe versus man-made conflict). As a matter of fact, strictly the same procedures were followed. Moreover, the Lebanon case entails a natural disaster (oil spill on the Lebanese coasts). In addition to that, the same types of assistance was sent (experts, material assistance from national civil protection units). So contrary to the literature which makes a difference between the type of emergency, I believe the particular CCPM framework makes this distinction less relevant as an explaining factor.\footnote{For instance, Quarantelli and Dynes make the difference between dissensus crisis (man-made crisis like social crisis, terrorist attacks, etc) and consensus crisis (natural disaster, or emergency linked to technical agents), see: Quarantelli, E.L, Dynes, R.L. (1977): “Response to social crises and disaster”, in: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 3, pages 23-49.} Finally, as I study the link between Member States and the European Commission, more than the link between EU assistance and local people, I do not believe that local actors (Pakistanis in one case, and Lebanese or Cypriots in the other case) can make a drastic difference on the way the cases were handled. This is even more so, that I do not consider there is such an important difference in terms of type of country affected. It is not as if one was a rich and the other a very poor country, etc. So in a nutshell, I argue the choice of channel of intervention is political for Member States. It is based on their national conception of what the EU response in an emergency should be. Therefore actors following their favoured conception play with their communication and action to prove their legitimacy and minimize the one of the EU if needed. However, the comparison between the cases show that the European Commission even in a weak position managed to enhance its legitimacy and visibility. The EU managed to enhance its legitimacy drawing foremost from the original model, whereas the Member States tried to keep their margin of initiatives drawing their legitimacy from their action and communication during the emergencies.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one presents the context: It introduces the reader to EU civil protection abroad from adoption of the CCPM in 2001 to the case which will be first explored, the Pakistan earthquake in 2005. Section two
consists of the Pakistan case. It shows that the CCPM was only a superficial EU cosmetic layer put on top of national responses. It stresses that the choice of channel of assistance made by Member States was political, and often not in favour of more EU involvement. Section three explores the role of the CCPM in the Lebanon crisis. I argue that the CCPM developed its autonomy and visibility. The goal of the chapter will be to highlight the transformation of practices of disaster responses of EU member states and of EU actors (i.e. European Commission officials) due to the existence of the CCPM, therefore demonstrating that sociological neo-institutionalist theory is needed to explain the emergence of the EU actor in the security domain.
1. **The EU civil protection abroad from 2001 to 2005**

This section aims first at explaining what the CCPM framework is supposed to change based on the official EU documents. Then it explains how the CCPM was activated from 2001 to 2005 during crises. Finally, this section stresses the limits of the CCPM “in practice” in the field of an emergency thanks to the well-studied example of the 2004 South-East Asian Tsunami.

1.1. **The changes supposed to be brought by the Community Civil Protection Mechanism adoption in 2001**

When the CCPM was launched in 2001, European civil protection forces already had the experience of intervention. Indeed, a majority of EU Member States have a tradition of sending their national civil protection personnel on disaster relief missions outside Europe.\(^{402}\) Their civil protection department often includes an International Relations Unit which deals with such situations.\(^{403}\) As such EU Member States civil protection forces can not be regarded as a new actor in international disaster relief operations abroad, as stressed by the European Commission Civil Protection Unit.\(^{404}\) However, what is new, since 2001, is that Member States have been offered the possibility to decide to send their national civil protection forces outside the EU borders under the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) or to use their traditional purely national channels of assistance. In short, the new aspect is the choice given to Member States either to intervene on their own or to use the CCPM channel of the sending of national civil protection units under MIC coordination. In the next paragraph

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\(^{402}\) Only Ireland and Latvia do not have such a tradition of sending civil protection teams abroad outside the EU borders.

\(^{403}\) For instance the Italian Protezione Civile includes a unit in charge of international relations which intervenes when disasters strike abroad, but also organises training and courses outside the EU borders.

I will explain what changes the CCPM new channel of assistance is supposed to bring in the field during an emergency. Then I will explain what changes this is supposed to bring in-between emergencies (EU training, lesson-learnt report, etc).

According to the EU legislative framework in the field of civil protection, the main changes that can be expected in the field during an emergency are first the fact that national civil protection officers leading the mission are made EU coordinators or heads of coordination when the mission is under the CCPM.\footnote{See: Implementing rules following the European Council Decision of 2001: \textit{European Council Decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance intervention}, (2001/792/EC).} It means that they do not only report to their national civil protection department but also to the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) in Brussels. So first, the use of the CCPM abroad means the existence of a double line of reporting for on site officers. This reporting consists in various Excel spreadsheets which are sent both to the capital and to the MIC and which are inventories of the means available or missing in the field. The exchange of spreadsheet occurs via email. And phone calls are used to complement if needed. Second, having CCPM missions also means during the emergency a close link between the MIC and the National Contact Points in charge of civil protection during the provision of assistance to affected countries. The capitals of the participating Member States and the MIC are in close contact thanks to the sending of MIC Messages that are updates of the situation, and thanks to phone calls between on-duty MIC officers and national officials in their capital. It mean that the officials in the field, in Brussels and in the capitals can discuss together what is sent, when, how. This can enhance their capacity to share some common expectations and understandings of the situation. To sum up, having a mission placed under the CCPM umbrella means additional exchanges of information both between the field and the MIC and between the capitals of the participating Member States and the MIC. This is supposed to enhance the coordination between the different EU actors present in the disaster-affected country. This is supposed to lead to synergies, economy of scales, etc. Finally, using the CCPM umbrella allows the use of particular technologies and expertise of the European
Commission. It means the possibility for national civil protection officers to work with European Commission officers, who have access to European means such as Satellite images of the Joint Research Centre (JRC).

Changes also occur in between emergencies. According to the official legal texts, the CCPM is providing training to national civil protection forces before sending them abroad. The training consists in a detailed presentation of the operational and political task of the EU Head of coordination. The trainees are made familiar with the MIC operating procedures, with multi-cultural teamwork, etc. So the civil protection forces in the field had a EU training, which could potentially have an impact on their on site practice as well. Moreover, after every CCPM activation, the European Commission organises a debriefing at EU level with the actors involved. This is supposed to increase the efficiency of the EU cooperation from crises to crises. Finally, the MIC also organises exchanges of experts. The system allows for the secondment of national civil protection experts to administrations of other participating states on all aspects of emergency intervention. The aim of this secondment is to allow experts to gain experience and direct knowledge about similar responsibilities under different national systems; to familiarize themselves with various techniques used; to study the approaches taken by other emergency services; and, if necessary, to attend or give courses requiring specific expert knowledge not available in their home or host country respectively. The duration of these exchanges vary in length from a few days to a fortnight. In a nutshell, the MIC plays a role of socialization for national civil protection forces. They can learn to work together, to understand each other better, etc. All this can potentially have an impact on the EU response abroad during an emergency in the framework of a CCPM mission.

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406 The Joint Research Centre is a DG of the European Commission specialised in the provision of IT support and development of EU adapted software.


408 It is not possible to say more on the content of the trainings as the documents are not for public release. More information on trainings and exercises is available in chapter 5.
However we know very little on the impact of the activation of the CCPM on the sending of national civil protection assistance during a crisis. Does the CCPM really bring cooperation in the field of an emergency? How? And if not, Why? To answer this question, it is necessary to provide the reader with information on the organizational process of CCPM activations since 2001.

1.2. The organizational process of Community Civil Protection Mechanism activations since 2001

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism has been brought into play in a number of emergencies occurring outside the EU borders: the earthquakes in Algeria and Iran (2003), the South East Asian Tsunami (2004), Hurricane Katrina (2005), to mention a few examples. Why was the CCPM activated during these emergencies and not during others which occurred between 2001 and 2005 (for instance the tropical cyclone disaster in Madagascar in 2003, etc)? The qualification of a situation as a “crisis” or an “emergency” necessitating a EU civil protection intervention only relies on the formulation of a request of assistance by an affected country. No pre-determined EU criteria exist which define when the EU should or should not send assistance to a disaster-stricken country. This is why the previous list of cases of activation of the CCPM abroad is not composed of disasters following particular criteria. The only common point between the cases is the existence of the request of assistance. This is a first element to be taken into account. There is no EU criteria as such to activate the CCPM, but the request of an affected country.

The first element of a process of activation is always the request for assistance of the affected country. For instance, Thailand sends an official request for assistance due to a Tsunami. This request of assistance is received at the MIC. It must be validated by

409 See chapter 5 for detailed statistics on CCPM activation abroad and inside the EU borders.

410 See “major emergencies” on: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/index.htm to have a list of all emergencies where the CCPM was activated since 2001.
the MIC in consultancy with the EU Presidency in few hours. This means the on-duty MIC officers contact the EU presidency to know if the EU is ready to activate the CCPM. The EU presidency, which rotates every 6 months, played a major role because it decides of the possibility of a EU intervention but also of the channel used for the civil protection intervention: Pillar I CCPM framework of intervention, Pillar II CCPM framework of intervention or CCA framework. The three options exist since 2005. A pillar I CCPM framework intervention will normally be used for operation in a state which is not at war. A pillar II CCPM framework of intervention will be used in a context of war or failed state. A CCA activation will be used if the emergency is declared very important and strategic to the EU.\footnote{So far the CCA have never been activated for real emergency or crisis situation.}

The cases studied here are cases of green light of the EU Presidency for a pillar I activation of the CCPM.\footnote{As said in the previous chapter, so far no intervention has been validated in a second pillar CCPM activation framework or a CCA framework.} The Standard Operating Procedures of the MIC in these cases are the following:

Illustration 11: The Standard Operation Procedures of the MIC

So far the CCA have never been activated for real emergency or crisis situation.

As said in the previous chapter, so far no intervention has been validated in a second pillar CCPM activation framework or a CCA framework.
Although the formal request of assistance is the first step of the official process of a CCPM activation, this does not mean that the on-duty MIC officers do not do anything until reception of the formal request of assistance. In all the missions which will be described here the on-duty MIC officers received in the minutes following the earthquake, tsunami or bombings a pre-alert through an early warning system. There are various early warning systems used at EU level depending on the type of emergency. For instance, the on-duty MIC officers are informed of the earthquake and of the tsunami by the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) through the Joint Research Centre (JRC). Regarding humanitarian crisis such as the Lebanon cases, the on-duty MIC officers may be informed using the Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWS). Once an alert message is received, the on-duty MIC officers double-checks the information with the Media, and other available commission rapid alert systems (such as ECURIE, RAS-BICHAT, RAS CHEM, etc.)

If the alert is serious (which means for instance a red GDACS message), then the on-duty MIC officers initiates communication procedures with other players (UN-OCHA, Red Cross, other DGs, etc.) It means that at a early stage, on-duty MIC officers gather information to evaluate the situation. Having gathered as much information on the emergency as possible, the on-duty MIC officers inform the hierarchy of the DG ENV and prepare for activation. But it is only after final decision of the Presidency that the CCPM activated, following the official request of assistance of the affected

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413 GDACS is a web-based platform that combines existing web-based disaster information management systems in order to alert the international community in case of major disasters and to facilitate the coordination of international response during the relief phase of the disaster.

414 The European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) is a Directorate-General (DG) of the European Commission providing independent scientific and technological support for EU policy-making. It works closely with the relevant Commission services, such as the Environment, Agriculture, and Health and Consumer Protection DGs.

415 HEWS is an inter agency programme (UNICEF, UN-OCHA, etc are members of the programme).

416 RAS-BICHAT and RAS CHEM are Rapid Alert Systems for Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks. ECURIE is a rapid alert system for radiation and nuclear emergencies.

417 Preparing for activation means for instance agreeing on how to proceed for the duty shift system, the size of the team needed in the MIC room, potential cooperation or joint action with other players, etc.
country. The following cases will focus on the period between the decision of activation and the decision of disengagement of the CCPM. It means that the following cases will focus on the phase where the MIC can work in coordination with the Member States to assist a country in need.

The two cases selected are cases of CCPM mission in third countries. It allows testing the CCPM in large scale types of emergency where the EU’s role in the world is at stake. But it must be said that the CCPM can also be activated inside the EU, for mutual assistance between affected Member States. The CCPM mission of assistance in third countries, which means in countries outside the EU, must not be confused with ESDP ones. All civil protection personnel sent on international disaster relief missions never carry weapons. The civil protection forces respect on site the humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality and impartiality) when dealing with victims. Sometimes, the national civil protection organizations sent abroad request the military to assist them but this military assistance they get mainly concerns transport on site and not the operation itself.

The CCPM missions must not be confused with the donorship role of the EU in case of disasters. Since 1992, the European Commission has been involved in the financing of Humanitarian missions through NGOs thanks to its Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). Concerned here is only the direct assistance provided under the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (DG ENV). A last element which is excluded is the rapid alert mechanism of DG RELEX which manages large-scale and long-term reconstruction programs in countries which were politically destabilised. This study only concerns the assistance provided in the aftermath of a crisis (normal duration of a mission is around 2-3 weeks). In conclusion, this chapter distinguishes itself from most of the work conducted on crisis management of the EU focusing on ESDP, on

418 Typical ESDP missions are for instance the one in Bosnia or Rafah in Palestine. This is not included in the present study. ESDP missions are part of the second pillar.

419 Strategic transport (fixed wing and maritime), Tactical transport (fixed wing, rotary wing, boat, etc), engineering capabilities such as bridging support, fuel storage.
humanitarian aspects or on long-term EU reconstruction programme in politically destabilised countries, as it focuses on cases of CCPM activation abroad. It also distinguishes itself from the study of activation of the CCPM inside the EU borders. The idea will be to shed light on the specificity of the EU crisis management response provided in this particular CCPM framework outside the EU borders. The only studied case of CCPM activation outside the EU borders so far has been the one of the Tsunami. Therefore before turning to the cases, the last sub-section focuses on this important crisis.

1.3. The lessons of the Tsunami drawn in 2005

An undersea earthquake occurred at 00:58:53 UTC (07:58:53 local time) December 26, 2004 with an epicenter off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. The earthquake triggered a series of devastating tsunamis along the coasts of most landmasses bordering the Indian Ocean, killing large numbers of people and inundating coastal communities across South and Southeast Asia, including parts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand. Although difficult to produce, a study released by the United Nations says 229,866 people were lost, including 186,983 dead and 42,883 missing. The catastrophe is considered one of the deadliest disasters in modern history. In December 2004, the CCPM was activated in a Pillar I framework following the requests of assistance made by Thailand, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Maldives and following the decision of the Presidency recognizing the fact that the affected countries were not in a war situation. In the early days of the disaster, the MIC in close consultation with the


421 When interaction of the CCPM with other EU frameworks of intervention takes place, the situation will be mentioned and the coordination at EU level between the MIC and the other services of the EU will be analyzed.

Dutch Presidency dispatched 6 experts (from Sweden, France and Italy) to assess the civil protection needs in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia and the Maldives. It was the first time the on-duty MIC officers had to deal with such a large-scale disaster occurring abroad but affecting a large number of European tourists. It was also the first time the MIC had to work in close collaboration with DG ECHO, DG RELEX internally, as well as a large number of international organizations (UN) and NGOs (Red Cross). This role of coordination of the MIC with other international players had direct consequences. For instance, one of the MIC experts sent to Sri Lanka was fully integrated in parallel in the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Team. It means that MIC experts had to report to the UN in parallel to their EU assessment role. Assistance was sent (mainly search and rescue teams, pumping and water purification equipment, medical aid, shelter and food) by many EU Member States: In all, 16 Member States of EU-25, plus Bulgaria and Romania, made significant quantities of much needed aid available through the CCPM. But many organizational problems appeared.

1.3.1. The limit of organizational resources

The MIC standard operating procedures include sending one or two experts to conduct on site preliminary assessment of the scale of the disaster and evaluate the

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423 MIC experts are persons trained by the on-duty MIC officers to be sent on site. Five levels of training exist. About 1,000 experts coming from all EU member states were trained between 2001 and 2005. Some of them were part of exchange programmes organised by the MIC between different EU Member States. To see more on MIC experts: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/activities.htm.

424 The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team is a stand-by team of disaster management professionals who are appointed and funded by member governments, OCHA, UNDP and operational humanitarian United Nations Agencies such as for instance the UNICEF. Upon request of a disaster-stricken country, the UNDAC team can be deployed within hours to carry out rapid assessment of priority needs and to support national Authorities and the United Nations Resident Coordinator to coordinate international relief on-site.

needs. In the case of the Tsunami, two experts\textsuperscript{426} were not sufficient to conduct a serious evaluation of the situation, especially in the context where the number of sites affected was large. On which grounds should experts be sent to one site and not to another? This might bias the result of the evaluation. For instance, the decision was taken to send experts to Indonesia, where the largest number of victims were reported but also to the Maldives, despite the lower number of casualties on this site. Was it a good utilisation of the MIC resources? Quoting the conclusion of the lesson-learnt meeting from 1 February 2005,\textsuperscript{427} this decision is “valuable”. However interviewees among on site persons pointed out the absence of EU present in other areas, which were much more affected. Beyond this debate, the number of persons sent did not allow the accomplishment of all the tasks required. With too small a number of experts it is not possible to simultaneously assess the needs, ensure coordination between the various European national civil protection teams on site, provide adequate liaison with other international players on site, etc. Moreover, the experts on site were not equipped with appropriate communication equipment to monitor the situation and keep the MIC informed.\textsuperscript{428} Similarly this situation hindered the possibility for the MIC to report back to the experts on site on a systematic and regular basis. Moreover, the means of assistance sent did not always match the needs of the population in the field, due to the fact that the assessment capabilities were limited and too slow to have a real impact on the type of assistance transported on site. For example, field hospitals where not needed where they were sent, whereas small dispensaries would have better met the need better. In contrast, the means sent were large field hospitals, which did not meet the situation of having either corpses to deal with or really minor injuries. Several Member States officials stressed the fact that in some cases means of assistance were available in their respective countries but were not sent due to the lack of transport. At that time, the CCPM mandate did not

\textsuperscript{426} Overall 6 experts were sent in total, but only 2 were in charge of the preliminary assessment.


\textsuperscript{428} Interview FR9.
allow on-duty MIC officers to arrange for transportation, when no EU member states was willing to do so. 429

1.3.2. The limit of Community Civil Protection Mechanism visibility

Another aspect which was underlined in the media is the presence of US aid, compared to the absence of EU assistance.430 For instance, the US teams all wore on their jacket the big inscription “US aid” whereas no common insignia where worn by EU intervention teams. In conclusion the absence of leadership of the MIC was emphasized. National civil protection forces under national insignia sometimes did not even know about the MIC and the CCPM. National reports written on the Tsunami disasters often hardly mention the role of the CCPM. For example, in the Swedish foreign ministry paper on the crisis management during the Tsunami, there is almost no trace of the use of the CCPM.431 This is why following the Tsunami, the EU Austrian Presidency asked Michel Barnier to write a report on how to improve EU disaster response.

The Tsunami was an event, which led to a great number of articles and reviews on the way the EU was dealing with disasters. These articles were mainly written by Swedish researchers, who drew the attention on the mismanagement of the disaster in which 500 Swedes had lost their lives.432 The tsunami was also seen by Swedish policy makers as a reminder of the need to broaden the concept of security so as to include several aspects of human security: natural disasters and environmental degradation, poverty and pandemics, terrorism and organized crime, etc – all these constituting a

429 Nowadays, and following several post-Tsunami-lesson-learnt meetings, the on-duty MIC officers are entitled to find private transport providers, or to finance Member States transport up to 50% when needed.


threat to every European country. This led the Swedish academic community to focus on comprehensive concepts of security and investigate new possible security developments for the EU. They point at the limit of the EU response in the Tsunami case but they also identify ways to further develop EU civil protection. This is why it is interesting to look at the period which follows this major catastrophe and investigate if and how the EU response emerged during major disasters following the event.

In a nutshell, from 2001 to 2005, the impact of the CCPM activation in the field abroad was rather limited and often criticized. Despite the EU legislative framework adoption and the creation of the Brussels-based new organizational structure of the MIC, the EU disaster response was not visible. I shall now turn to the Pakistan earthquake of October 2005 and see if any changes occurred.

2. The Pakistan earthquake (October 2005)

After a short reconstruction of the facts, this section will first demonstrate that in the Pakistan earthquake the CCPM was more a cosmetic action upon national responses rather than a way to enhance the coherence and efficiency of a EU community response, like in the Tsunami. Second, I further show that the choice of the channel of assistance made by states is political: they can either reinforce the CCPM or weaken its existence by acting inside or outside the CCPM framework during a crisis. Their national strategy of communication can either stress the role of the EU in disaster response or on the contrary highlight the role of the UN or NATO (or their own national contribution).


Third, this section will investigate if the CCPM changed the way in which the European Commission services work together in a disaster. I will stress the coordination problems inside the European Commission. Finally, this section will explore the potential added value of the CCPM regarding the EU response in coordination with other countries in the world. This final section shows that the MIC can potentially rely on some margins of autonomy, although mostly tied up in its action by the willingness of Member States.

2.1. Short summary of the facts

An earthquake occurred in Pakistan at 08:50:38 Pakistan Standard Time (03:50:38 UTC) on October 8, 2005. It registered a minimum magnitude of 7.6 on the moment magnitude scale making it a major earthquake. The earthquake killed 73,338 persons and injured 69,412 persons in Pakistan, as shown in the table below. 76% of houses were destroyed.

Illustration 12: Key earthquake statistics.

Following the automatic alert of the earthquake on 8 October which was received via GDACS, the MIC established contact with the UK Presidency to provide a first assessment of the situation and to receive decision regarding potential activation. The MIC established communication with the countries participating in the CCPM from thereon, waiting to see if the Pakistan would send an official request of assistance. The Mechanism was formally activated on Sunday 9 October at 10:15 Brussels time following the official appeal for international assistance from Pakistan. On October, 20 2005 the CCPM was disactivated, following the end of the civil protection mission in Pakistan. The case study focuses on this period of activation from 9 to 20 October 2005.

2.2. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism, an EU institutional cosmetic layer on top of Member States responses

The EU response to the Pakistan earthquake shows that the CCPM at its beginning was more an EU institutional cosmetic action utilized in various national disaster responses, rather than a way to construct a well coordinated EU response to a massive disaster. The reason why states took the decision to add this EU endeavor to their national response is linked to their national political agenda regarding the role of the EU in disaster response. The addition of the CCPM EU make-up is a way either to stress the need to further develop the imperfect CCPM (France) or to keep control of the way EU disaster response develops without a strong CCPM (the UK).

First, the CCPM was used as an *a posteriori* EU stamp put on national assistance rather than *a priori* driver of the decision of the type of assistance to be sent. For instance, France decided to send national assistance and then appointed its national coordinator “EU vice-coordinator” as he was already in the field. Indeed, during the night of October 8 November, a French military plane had taken off from France to go to Pakistan. On board was a team in charge of evaluating the damages and a rescue

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438 Interview FR 5.
team.\textsuperscript{439} The team was composed of 5 officers; two of them were trained EU coordination experts.\textsuperscript{440} These two French firemen officers were appointed to assist in the EU CCPM framework, as they were already located in the field and made available by the French Ministry of the Interior. The French operational actors mobilized for this crisis, only heard about activation of the CCPM, once they had arrived in the field. As FR5 had 16 years of service in the French Firemen, spoke English, and had an international experience in the context of UN coordination, he was appointed Vice Coordinator for the CCPM. The others assisted him.\textsuperscript{441} The content of the plane (teams, materials) was in no way designed to be integrated into an EU coordinated approach. It followed a French decision-making procedure and then was incorporated in a MIC framework.

Second, until 4 days before the end of the mission, there was no EU MIC office on site where the British head of coordinator and the French Vice-coordinator could work together on the provision of assistance. According to the French Report “\textit{Mission Sécurité Civile intervenue au Pakistan du 8 au 21 Novembre 2005}” issued on October 11, 2005 the first European coordination meeting took place at the European Commission Representation.\textsuperscript{442} This meeting involved Mr. IIIka Uusitalo, Permanent Representative of the EU, UK 4 in charge of the coordination in the framework of the CCPM, and the French fireman FR 5, in charge of assisting him. A first question was: where to locate the crisis Centre to work jointly on the disaster? Neither the British Embassy nor the French Embassy wanted to have it, because they argued there was not enough space. So except during daily meetings, UK 4 and FR 5 worked separately: UK 4 was at the British

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See : « La sécurité civile de 1999 à aujourd’hui », in: \url{http://www.vie-publique.fr/th/dossier-actualite/chrono_article_3069.html}.
\item In: \textit{Debriefing of FR 5 by the European Commission}, January 2006.
\item Interview FR50.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Embassy and FR 5 at the French Embassy. Only at the end of the mission was the EU delegation involved.\textsuperscript{443}

Third, the MIC is said to have “monitored” the situation: But what did this mean in practice in the field? What was the role of UK 4 and his colleague FR 5 in the context of the CCPM in Pakistan? UK 4 thought its role was the one of a “facilitator”: Therefore he understood is role as a reporting one. Indeed, they used excell spreadsheet to report to Brussels on the location of European national civil protection assistance. Moreover, the U.N. representative was step by step included in the CCPM monitoring process and it clarified the role of the different actors for the MIC in Brussels but also for the UN. However, the data collected by the EU experts and by the UN were sometimes inconsistent. Consequently to sum up, the main part of the job of FR 5 and UK 4 was to participate in some regular UN meetings and to inform the daily Situation Reports for the MIC and for their respective government and to answer emails. FR 5 explained that he hoped to be a “coordinator” involved in the field. On the contrary, he was only reporting on what was happening without having any impact on the way the resources could be allocated in coordination with the different Member States involved.\textsuperscript{444}

Due to the gap between the French “coordination conception” and the British “facilitation conception”, some frictions occurred: The UK wanted to limit the role of the EU coordination to a simple reporting (of where the resources were located) whereas France pushed to have more advisory power to Member States on how to best allocate the resources so as to enhance synergies. To overcome this situation, a European evaluator arrived (Mr. Bourgoin). Moreover an EU crisis coordination Centre was finally created and located in an annex of the European Commission Delegation office. Ms. Balla, on-duty officer from the MIC, arrived to work there on October, 16 2005 and she was incorporated in the EU crisis coordination team. She was here to represent the Commission and she tried to be a mediator as soon as there was a disagreement

\textsuperscript{443} Nowadays the MIC is pushing for more direct implication of the EC Delegation in the field. It was for instance the case during the Flood in Bolivia in 2007. But at the time of the Pakistan Earthquake, this was not provided.

between the British and the French view. Therefore to sum up, the Pakistan case shows that it is not clear what coordination means. To collect and exchange information? To decide on appropriate allocations of means? To manage the means of the different member states jointly? Moreover it was not clear what the CCPM team in the field should coordinate. For instance, it was not clear if the coordination should only focus on civil protection means or if it should include more broadly the entire EU means (humanitarian or financial means). Moreover, the case of the earthquake in Pakistan showed that the EU MIC teams were limited in resources and could really be working jointly only at the end of the mission. Finally it highlights the fact that the EU MIC coordinator and vice-coordinator were mainly active in the administrative reporting part, without being empowered to act so as to ensure a coherence of the EU action in the field.

The opposition between the French and the UK perspective shows that the understanding of the EU response is a political matter. This is what will be explained in the next sub-section.

2.3. Why is the choice of the channel of assistance political?

Assisting victims of disasters means in terms of humanitarian principles helping to save lives and alleviate suffering. But Member States participating in a rescue and relief effort can use different channels of action which can be politically significant. They can either intervene on a unilaterally basis or on a multi-lateral basis. And if they choose to intervene in cooperation with other states, the choice of the framework is significant as well: in the case of the Pakistan earthquake, states can intervene within a UN framework, a NATO framework or a EU framework. Sometimes they can even combine

445 Interview EU 21.

446 Even more so as Pakistan is a country which is part of the “War on Terror” led by the US. Intervening in a NATO framework can hence be perceived as politically significant (i.e. winning hearts and minds), compared to intervening in an EU framework. The Pakistan earthquake offered TV images of enemies working in close cooperation as jihadi groups, NATO forces and Cuban doctors were all working in the same field.
the different frameworks of intervention. They can offer their material assistance (tents, field hospitals, etc.) to the EU MIC and NATO counterpart of the MIC called Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordinator Centre (EADRCC) at the same time. They can send an expert who will be simultaneously a UN and a EU expert. Many options are available. Moreover, States sending assistance as a national initiative can inform the EU of their assistance, which hence becomes a part of those the EU MIC monitors. In this case, the Member States follow their own initiatives of action but give them a EU twist. Or on the contrary, Member States can intervene without informing the EU MIC of their action, which means they can assist in the field without having their intervention recorded in the operations which the EU MIC has monitored. Finally, Member States also give funding to humanitarian NGOs during disasters. It means that they can either decide to send their civil protection forces or military forces on civilian mission in the field, or they can decide to finance the Red Cross or other NGOs and let them intervene in the crisis. This situation has an impact at the EU level as well: The humanitarian assistance based on funding is monitored by DG ECHO, whereas the sending of civil protection forces and materials is monitored by DG ENV through the MIC. So the choice of Member States can either politically reinforce DG ECHO or DG ENV inside the European Commission political game. The choice of Member States to use a channel of assistance or another is not based on efficiency of the channel of assistance (i.e. to best help the victims), but it is dependant on the political position of the Member States. Does the Member State try to reinforce NATO or the EU? Does it try to reinforce the Commission’s role or on the contrary try to prove it has no place in the field during emergency? This strategic political decision is hence linked to the political tradition and culture of the states, and can be path-dependant.
2.3.1. The nomination of the EU coordinator

The first element that shows that the MIC action is political is the fact that an English EU coordinator, UK 4, was appointed. As the EU presidency is consulted to have the authorization of activating the MIC, it often creates a situation where the country holding the EU Presidency obtains the leadership. In the case of the Pakistan earthquake, it was also a situation where the UK pushed for its involvement, as the UK had an historical and social link with Pakistan. It had been one of their Protectorates in the past, and Pakistanis represent today a large part of their population. But having the leadership also means having an influence on the way the CCPM is used in practice. It creates a precedent in the way the EU legislative framework of the CCPM is to be used abroad. As mentioned earlier, the UK understanding of the CCPM was limited to a role of facilitator, and they managed to impose this vision till the end of the mission. Indeed in the case of Pakistan a discussion took place in order to determine if the job of UK 4 and FR 5 was over as soon as the phase of civil protection came to an end, or if they should keep on as long as some parts of the population were having difficulties (health problems, etc.) On October, 17 2005, the European Commission recognized that the Civil Protection Phase was over but asked the team to continue evaluating the needs and coordinating EU means in the field so as to ensure a good hand-over with further humanitarian EU intervention. Therefore the team kept on collecting data, but there were major differences between the information provided by the different EU countries involved and by the U.N. The French experts asked to conduct an inspection in the field to determine which source of information was reliable. But UK 4 refused this operational aspect. So the mission stopped as it was. Other humanitarian actors continued without checking in the field if the data reported were correct. Here again, the political debate which took place between a rather administrative or rather operational approach of the MIC role shows that the CCPM implementation is a

political game where different conceptions of the EU role in times of disaster response are tested. Member States try to influence the process of development of the CCPM thanks to their political choices during emergencies.

More generally, the question of the channel of assistance used by each member states reflects their political strategy. In a nutshell, the states participating in the CCPM offered assistance in the form of food, blankets, medicine, medical teams, search and rescue or other experts, supplies or cash. A number of European search and rescue teams were deployed as part of the first phase of the relief operation. The MIC was active during the whole emergency, which is highlighted on their webpage regarding the Pakistan earthquake in the following statistics table:

- Nearly 600 emails and telephone calls handled during the initial phase of the emergency by the MIC
- 18 messages broadcast to all participating states by the MIC
- Detailed and updated reports of assistance provided throughout the emergency
- MIC officer sent onsite to support co-ordination team
- The EU civil protection co-ordination team ensured proper handover to humanitarian aid actors once the civil protection phase was over

However, in addition to these points, assistance was delivered on a bilateral basis as well. Some states used the UN or NATO to provide assistance as well. So the question can be asked of the changes brought about by the CCPM in the Member States national contribution. What is the impact of the CCPM? For which state did something change? Why? This is what will be explained in the following paragraphs, in which different groups of states will be identified according to their strategic use of the channels of assistance available.

2.3.2. The identification of five groups of States

Five groups of Member States can be identified according to their strategic use of the channels of assistance available.

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A first group of Member States participated in the CCPM only by informing the MIC of their action. In this case, their assistance was included in the MIC messages of information and in the MIC reporting. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the Netherlands are examples of this situation. They have provided one or all of the following: search and rescue teams, medical teams, field hospitals, shelter and contributions, as part of their national effort and reported it to the MIC. For these states, the only changes in their action involved keeping the MIC informed and receiving MIC messages. No change of action in the field and no change in their communication are noted. For instance, a study of the press releases issued during the CCPM activation period by these countries shows that the EU role in civil protection is never mentioned, except by Italy.\(^\text{449}\) Italy’s press released clearly mentioned the EU: “Italy prepared effective intervention programme in coordination with other EU countries based on the assessments that was carried out by the advanced team being sent to Pakistan by the Civil Protection Department.”\(^\text{450}\) Germany only mentioned the role of the Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) without mentioning the link between the THW rescue workers and the MIC.\(^\text{451}\) The Netherlands only mentioned in its press release 1 million immediate relief aid channeled through the Red Cross and its involvement through the UN: “The USAR team, which falls under the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, consists of sixty people and eight dogs. The members of the team are drawn from various public services and agencies: the police, the fire department, medical relief agencies and the Ministry of Defence. The costs will be borne by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is also coordinating the operation. The team, which is equipped to be completely self-sufficient for a maximum of ten days, is specially trained to search for survivors and to free people trapped under the rubble of collapsed buildings. Once in Pakistan, the team

\(^\text{449}\) The exhaustive study of the press releases was made for these countries based on the relief web online library checking all the press releases linked to the Pakistan disaster, see: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int).


will work with the UN Disaster and Assessment Coordination Team. The Dutch USAR team was also deployed to assist in the rescue effort following the earthquake in Alhoceima, Morocco in February 2004. This difference in the communication of the governments of different EU countries reflects their respective political positioning towards the MIC. Italy was a fervent promoter of the CCPM, whereas the Netherlands and Germany are not pushing for an EU community approach in the field of civil protection. The way people act and communicate during an emergency is reflecting the way the Member States are positioned in favor (southern group) or against (northern group) a too strong role of the MIC.

For a second group of countries the CCMP activation involved concrete changes. This group is composed of the Member States which are in charge of the coordination and the vice coordination for the CCPM in the field. France contributed as a state by sending 25 persons (search and rescue team and dogs). But, the clear investment of France in the CCPM is the role of vice-coordination played by FR 5. The UK contributed by having the role of coordinator through UK 4. Furthermore, UK Search and Rescue teams (75 people and 5 dogs) were used in the field. The Situation Report states the involvement of a Fire Brigade search and rescue team, several dog teams, a team from the International Rescue Corps and a rapid deployment team of Foreign and Commonwealth Office consular staff. Four DFID humanitarian advisers - who liaised with the UN to assess further support required were involved too. In total, 9 tons of relief supplies including blankets were made available to victims. In the case of the UK and France, the CCMP activation means a double reporting process (to their capital and to Brussels) and a time consuming process of meetings in the field for the

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453 See chapter 3 on the role of Italy in the CCPM emergence.


coordinator and vice-coordinator. It also means a greater involvement of the States: the list of assistance sent is greater for France and the UK than for other Member States of the EU involved. It is not a surprise to find France and the UK in this situation as they are the two countries fighting to impose their vision of what EU emergency management should be (see chapter 4). Here to, the choice of France and the UK is part of their strategic political decision towards the MIC and the CCPM, more than based on the assessment of the best possible way to assist the victims.

A third group of States reported their action in the EU CCPM framework while being involved in the UN framework. Denmark and Finland are part of this group. They reported their action to the MIC while sending experts on UNDAC teams.\(^{457}\) Both Denmark and Finland share the view that the UN should remain the actor to deal with emergencies in the world, and this position is reflected in the way they send their assistance during disasters.

A fourth group reported their action in the EU CCPM framework while being involved in the NATO framework. A good example of this is the case of The Czech Republic.\(^{458}\) “The Czech Republic will send in days to come additional humanitarian aid to Pakistan, this time using the air bridge from the Ramstein Air Base (Germany). Trucks with Czech humanitarian aid consisting of medicaments, medical and hygienic material, water cleaning pills and sleeping-bags will leave for Ramstein within 48 hours once the instruction from the NATO Crisis Coordination Centre is received.”\(^{459}\) The role of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) must be stressed here. It is the NATO counterpart of the MIC. The EADRCC is a Centre which operates 24/7 to coordinate disaster relief effort among NATO members and partners. The Centre was created in 1998 so as to involve potential eastern partners in the NATO

\(^{457}\) One UNDAC team member for Denmark and two for Finland.


framework, without touching sensitive military issues. East European Countries use the EADRCC for various reasons: First of all, they have a tradition of working with the EADRCC rather than with the MIC. Second, politically it stresses their alignment with the US against former USRR. Third, they use the same structure in their disaster relief national organization and the same type of material. So often the interoperability is greater if they work with EADRCC East European country partners than with MIC West European countries. Clearly the demarcation between the role of the MIC and the EADRCC is difficult. They have the same function, but are linked to different political traditions and interests. Sometimes even inside West European countries, different organizations can have an interest to use the MIC or the EADRCC. For instance, in Portugal, civil protection services and medical emergency services do not get along. Consequently the civil protection services take over all the relations with the MIC, hindering the participation of the medical emergency services in the MIC training. So they tend to be involved in the NATO training, which is close to the MIC training and remain accessible to them. The case of countries using a NATO channel of assistance rather than a EU one is thus political too, and linked to their history but also to their strategic positioning. Moreover, this example shows that different services of a same country can use different channels of assistance for internal political reasons.

A last group of states offered bilateral assistance or assistance via the UN but are not mentioned in the MIC communication (MIC messages, “MIC Daily”, etc.): It is the case of Ireland which contributed via the UN without any mention in the MIC framework. It is also the case of Sweden. Swedish communications during the emergency show the political strategy of this Member State towards the UN. Minister for International Development Cooperation Carin Jämtin said: “The earthquake in South Asia has caused a major humanitarian disaster. It is the duty of the international

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460 Interview NATO 1.
461 Interview EU 16.
community to help the people who have been affected and it is most gratifying, therefore, that many countries and humanitarian organizations have been able to respond quickly. By responding to the UN appeal, we want to offer rapid and flexible support to the UN in its efforts to lead and implement initiatives in the area. Sweden is prepared to provide further support as the situation develops. With the contributions Sida has made so far to the Swedish Rescue Services Agency for help with UN measures in the area, and to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Sweden's support amounts at present to approximately SEK 105 million. “

2.3.3. Outcome

The fact that five different groups of Member States can be identified according to their way to assist Pakistan and to communicate on their assistance shows the great heterogeneity of responses. Member States made different choices of channel of assistance. I argue that the decisions made by Member States on their contribution in the Pakistan disaster relief operations were politically driven. Using one channel of assistance or another, they positioned themselves regarding the role they intended to see the EU play in disaster response, compare to other players like NATO, UN, etc. I make this statement because I observe a parallel between the position Member States had during Committee meetings on the development of the CCPM (in favour or against) and their use of the CCPM as channel of assistance or not. Moreover the way they communicate on their action (mentioning or not the EU) stresses this phenomenon. The disaster response channel is a way to send a signal and shape the future of EU disaster management. For many of them, it was not supportive of a strong EU role. They kept on using the traditional channel of assistance they knew (NATO, UN, Red Cross,


464 See chapter 4.

DOI: 10.2870/11317
etc) without integrating the fact that the MIC was a potential framework of action and communication.

One limit to this argument of the political strategy of EU Member States is the influence of the past experiences of an EU Member State when it comes to decide on the framework of intervention (UN, NATO, EU, etc). For instance, Member States being used to intervene inside the EADRCC framework of NATO have a tendency to continue to do so. First, their material assistance has a greater level of interoperability with EADRCC material assistance than with the MIC one. Second, they have built contacts with members of the EADRCC during past operations.\textsuperscript{465} In this sense, the argument of a path dependent pattern is also to be integrated in the case of the use by East European countries of the EADRCC rather than the MIC. Going further on this historical neo-institutionalist track, it is possible to question the existence of routines of actors when it comes to disaster management. EU member States’ crisis centers often relies on Standard Operating Procedures, which define who to call, when, etc. If these SOPs are not updated to integrate new channels of assistance, actors will have a tendency to continue calling their regular counterparts, may they be at the UN, NATO, etc.

But overall, the question of the legitimacy support my argument of a political strategy of actors. The EU actors rely on \textit{“input legitimacy”}. It means by the legitimacy coming from the way institutions were created and adopted. As we have demonstrated in chapter 3, EU entrepreneurs drafted new models through isomorphism to be legitimate in the new field of emergency management. The creation of the model had a strong impact on the adoption as shown in chapter 4 (it framed the discussion at EU level) Now, during crisis management, relying on the formal model created can be identified as the EU way to justify its role in an emergency in action, as it has as such no civil protection forces, so could not get legitimacy by its proper acting on the ground. On the contrary, the EU Member States rely on \textit{“output legitimacy”}. It means they draw their legitimacy by the result of their action. They rely on what their civil protection forces and material assistance can do. Therefore by acting without the EU and still

\textsuperscript{465} Interview NATO 1.
obtaining result via other channels, they can show the unnecessary role of the EU. Action and communication is their way to maintain and enhance their margins of initiative.

The input legitimacy shows the impact of the prevailing concepts on the development of the organization. It stressed the impact of the isomorphic process of model emergence. The Inherited knowledge (from Marine pollution and NATO) and the congenital knowledge (combination of the knowledge inherited and its conception prior to adoption) prevail.\footnote{Huber, G.P. (1991): “Organizational learning: the contributing processes and the literatures, in: Organization science, Vol. 2, n°1, pages 88-115.} This is mainly influenced by the nature of the founders of the framework (who come with second-hand knowledge) and in this case by EU bureaucrats. On the contrary, the output legitimacy shows the impact of the experimental learning. Legitimacy comes from action and its result (Lesson-learnt report, etc.) In the case of Pakistan the Member States and their output legitimacy prevail over the EU officials and their input legitimacy. In a nutshell, the EU added value is not clear by looking at the Member States decisions during the Pakistan earthquake. Their action and communication goes against the model emergence in practice. However, there might be another added value to consider: the one that the CCPM can bring inside the European Commission, purely at a EU level. This will be the object of the next sub-section. I will show that here too it did not work out.

2.4. A lack of coordination at European Commission level

If the CCPM was not really used as much by EU Member States, one could expect this new EU framework to have an impact at EU level. But here too, this was not the case: At EU level, the Pakistan case shows the difficulty of coordination between the different European Commission DGs. This situation hinders the positioning of the European Commission as a more autonomous agent versus the States.
The Pakistan earthquake highlights the tension that exists between DG ENV MIC and DG ECHO. For instance, interviewees reported that Commissioner Michel (who is at the head of DG ECHO) made official declarations in the name of the European Commission, which only mentioned the funding provided to the victims of the Pakistan earthquake without mentioning the in-kind involvement of teams and materials in the CCPM framework. The EU Council extraordinary external relations meeting in Luxembourg mentioned the CCPM in its final declaration, but without naming it directly: “The Council welcomed the swift response by the European Commission, which has now committed a total of €13.6m in humanitarian assistance, and by Member States who have committed a further €60m. These funds are already helping to deliver items including tents, blankets, bedding, water, food and medical supplies to the affected areas. The Council also noted that many Member States are providing coordinated assistance through existing EU and other multilateral mechanisms and with the local authorities in the affected areas. The Council paid tribute to the work of relief organizations and individuals from across the Union.”

The CCPM framework contains the word “community” but is strongly dependent on Member States. And Member states did not seem to want to use the EU channel of assistance at all. So the European Commission is never stressing the community mechanism as such but always the coordination between national assistance. And national actors are not so keen in using the European Commission, or in referring to the fact that their action is integrated in a European Commission organised action. As a result, the implementation of the CCPM in the Pakistan case is minimum. One last aspect that could have an added value is the fact that the CCPM is supposed to allow the EU to speak with one voice to the outside world. The next sub-section focuses on this aspect.

2.5. Community Civil Protection Mechanism: Speaking with one voice to the outside world?

What are the other impacts of the activation of the CCPM in the Pakistan earthquake? A major change brought about by the CCPM during the Pakistan earthquake was creating an interface between the EU and the rest of the world in times of emergencies. This is an aspect in which the European Commission can develop its autonomy.

For instance, during the Pakistan earthquake, Russia offered the availability of aviation services to the MIC. These services were offered against payment. Hence, activating the MIC means activating a network of states which are not member states but have special agreements with the European Commission in the CCPM framework. This is for instance the case of the European Economic Area countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway) which are included as participating states in the CCPM framework. But this is also the case of candidate countries for EU accession which may have special agreements to be part of the CCPM assistance framework. Currently, agreements are being prepared with Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.

Regarding countries outside the European Union, like Russia, cooperation agreements are possible. In May 2004, the MIC signed a cooperation agreement with EMERCOM, its Russian counterpart. Moreover, the coordination in the field of civil protection is part of the “common space of external security” section of the Single Package of Roadmaps adopted in 2005 by Russia and the EU. In practice, these cooperative agreements foresee that on-duty MIC officers can spend a week a year at EMERCOM and EMERCOM officers can spend a week a year at the MIC. EMERCOM officials attend MIC training, etc. Similar partnership agreements were agreed with Ukraine.468 This shows that the CCPM still offers margin of initiatives to the European Commission officials. Using for instance their role of interface with the outside world,

468 Ukraine and Russia are part of these special agreements mainly because of their localisation close to the EU borders.
they can try to have a greater role during emergencies, and try to become a useful contact point for Member States.

Going back to the theoretical framework, the Pakistan earthquake case shows that the MIC involvement and hence the CCPM implementation in the field strongly depends on the willingness of Member States. Therefore it is possible to highlight a “decoupling” between what can be expected looking at the officials texts and decisions regarding the CCPM creation and adoption, and the implementation during an emergency. Two elements play a role. First, there are the political aspects. Member States strategic decisions favour the reinforcement of certain organizations against other for instance (NATO, UN against the EU). Second there are the ideal aspects. The culture fit can interfere (like for instance in the case of East European County with the EADRCC) but also the cognitive learning effect. This is shown thanks to the comparison of the different group of Member States. Certain Member States like France or Italy did adapt to the new CCPM organizational model and integrated the change in their practices and discourses. Other did not.
3. The Lebanon Crisis (Summer 2006)

The Lebanon crisis is an event which illustrates a new step for the CCPM. First, the MIC managed to show a EU added value by highlighting its own resources and expertise: By sending experts under MIC contracts and MIC funding, the MIC had more leverage of action. Second, Commissioner Dimas (who is at the head of DG Environment) was sent in the field during the crisis which gave a visibility to the CCPM. This visibility was an improvement for the CCPM, as the absence of visibility had always been the focus of critics (see the section on the Tsunami). For the first time, the MIC got a “face” (with Commissioner Dimas on site), MIC people had a visible status thanks to the MIC blue jackets with the EU civil protection logo on them, and the MIC managed to have its own discourse. Third, MIC technical expertise was used and proved useful to both the Lebanon authority and the Member States officers in the field. The next sub-section will show that the MIC managed to gain autonomy because of a context in which states made a decision by default. This part will explain that Member States activated the CCPM in a pillar I framework because it was too difficult for them to use other EU frameworks (i.e. pillar II CCPM activation or CCA activation). This atypical situation forced the European Commission to develop greater internal coordination, which also raised the profile of the EU for Member States. However the decision of States to use the CCPM framework (or not) remains political, in particular with regards to the balance of power between the DG ENV and the DG ECHO. Finally, the question of visibility remains a salient issue for Member States, although this chapter will demonstrate that in Lebanon the MIC managed to develop its own image.
3.1. Short summary of the facts

Following the capture of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006, hostilities at the Israeli-Lebanese border turned into a conflict between the Hezbollah and the Israeli army with a significant human toll. After one month of conflict, the UN reported the death of 1,183 Lebanese and the injury of a further 4,055 persons.\(^{469}\) Civilian infrastructure was destroyed leading to the disruption of major services. According to the European Commission DG ECHO, 630 km of roads, 78 bridges, 15,000 houses were hit which made it difficult to ensure appropriate shelter, food and health care in the country.\(^{470}\)

As a consequence, massive displacements took place.\(^{471}\) Thousands of people, both EU citizens or third-country nationals, were waiting to be flown out of Lebanon. Between 17-21 July, 27 ships transported around 18,000 evacuees to Larnaca and Limassol in Cyprus. In the meantime, additional ships were expected and thousands of other expatriates remained to be evacuated from Lebanon.\(^{472}\)

Simultaneously, a major oil spill affected the coast of Lebanon creating environmental damages. According to the Lebanese authorities, the spill was caused by the destruction of a storage tank at a power plant at Jieh, which was hit by Israeli bombs on 13 and 15 July 2006. There were also smaller sources of oil spills, which are believed to be caused by a ship that sank. Between 10,000 and 35,000 tons of heavy fuel oil contaminated the coastline and public beaches as well as ports and marinas.\(^{473}\) The oil

\(^{469}\) See UN Revised Consolidated Appelas Process (CAP), 31 August 2006.


\(^{471}\) The Lebanon Higher Relief Council estimates that the total number of displaced persons amounted to 915,752 people.

\(^{472}\) The total number of people evacuated from Lebanon via Cyprus during summer 2006 is estimated at around 50,000, among when according to the European Commission 20,000 were nationals of CCPM participating states.

spill was described by environmentalists as the worst environmental disaster in Lebanon’s history.

Both Cyprus and Lebanon requested assistance in the initial phase of the emergency in order to deal with the growing humanitarian crisis – mainly, welcoming and repatriating evacuees and dispatching humanitarian assistance to Lebanon. The evacuation of expatriates from Lebanon resulted in serious overcrowding at the ports of Larnaka and Limassol in Cyprus. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism was activated to help Cyprus address the difficult logistic situation resulting from the large influx of evacuees. On 21 July 2006, the Cypriot authorities activated the Mechanism, requesting assistance from the Member States and the Commission to help remove bottlenecks in the evacuation operation. More specifically, the Cypriot authorities requested the MIC to inquire into the possibility of making available additional ships and aircraft from the EU partners participating in the EU civil protection mechanism and also to use the aircraft or vessels bringing the humanitarian assistance into Cyprus in order to be able to carry any repatriated nationals when returning to their countries of origin. In addition, the MIC was requested to dispatch experts through and from the MIC to assist the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, the services of the European Commission and the Member States in the management of the situation.

On 27 July 2006 a request for assistance was also launched by Lebanon because they needed help to contain the environmental damages caused by the oil spill off the coast north of Beirut. Lebanon requested absorbents, skimmers, booms, dispersants, as well as specialized vessels to cope with the disaster.\(^{474}\) It also asked for a list of specialized registered companies which could be available to deal with the massive pollution.\(^{475}\)

\(^{474}\) Information regarding the request for assistance and the MIC activation are available online: [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/leb_cy_2006.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/leb_cy_2006.htm).

3.2. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism a strong EU actor in Lebanon?

During the Lebanon crisis, I argue the MIC proved its EU added value and positioned itself as a potential independent EU actor: The MIC financed and organized the contracts of the sending of EU civil protection experts itself, in addition to the MIC duty officers sent on site. Commissioner Dimas who was at the head of the DG environment was present on site at the heart of the crisis. The MIC made technical assistance available (satellite pictures and modeling expertise) which were useful in the field. To sum up, the use of a EU budget, the visibility of a EU Commissioner and the specificity of EU technical expertise offered during the crisis made the MIC a EU recognized and autonomous player.

In response to the two requests of assistance, the MIC immediately established an expert team (made available by Italy, Estonia and Finland) in Larnaka to assist the local authorities in the organization and coordination of the evacuation and relief effort and to assess needs for further European support. The team was dispatched on 23 July 2006, the day following the official request for assistance from Cyprus. This team was assisted by on-duty MIC officers sent to the site. These experts worked in close consultation with the Member States' consular teams on site, the EU representation as well as the international organization for migration for repatriation of third country citizens. Commissioner Stavros Dimas, responsible for the Civil Protection Mechanism, traveled to Cyprus to bring a message of solidarity and to raise awareness of the need for further support to Cyprus. A similar team of experts was deployed to Lebanon. It too was providing information to participating states on IDPs in Lebanon. This team, composed of one Finnish and two Swedish experts, issued joint situation reports with the EC Delegation in Beirut and ECHO representatives on site. Both teams were successively

476 Throughout the emergency, DG ECHO contributed by funding projects in the following activities: water and sanitation, shelter, food items, health support. To maximise the impact of DG ECHO humanitarian aid for the victims, the European Commission established a DG ECHO support office located in the EC Delegation in Beirut. The duration of DG ECHO intervention was scheduled for an 18 months period, during which the funded organizations (Red Cross, various NGOs) were supposed to have accomplished their projects.
replaced by other experts deployed through the MIC. Thanks to the cooperation of different European Commission services, 40,000 EU citizens wishing to leave the country were evacuated. The commission also assisted in the evacuation of around 10,000 non EU citizens in Lebanon, many of them from relatively poor countries.\textsuperscript{477}

Regarding the oil spill, the MIC provided satellite images of the area affected, thanks to the activation of the International Charter (Space and Major Disasters). Commission scientists at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra (Italy)\textsuperscript{478} and the on-duty MIC officers monitored the impact of the oil spill, which covered more than 150 km of coastline. Modeling and simulation studies were carried out to anticipate any possible movement of the oil slick.\textsuperscript{479} Beach cleaning equipment was sent by Norway, France, Finland and Cyprus via the MIC. Expert missions were conducted by Germany and Italy. An Italian helicopter was sent on site to conduct a survey. Three teams of experts seconded by Denmark were deployed. These experts specialized in coastal and marine pollution assessed the situation relating to the oil spill to identify priority needs and assist the Lebanese authorities in the planning and preparation of the containment and clean-up operations. The MIC expert teams remained there for 65 days in total. They assisted the local authorities in the assessment of the situation and provided training on how to use the cleaning equipment. A mission of experts to Beirut discussed and assessed interventions with the Ministry of Environment.\textsuperscript{480}


\textsuperscript{478} The European Commission’s JRC provides scientific and technical support for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. The JRC’s Institute for the Protection and Security uses scientific modelling techniques, satellite imagery and data collected in the field to analyze the spread of the slick and to identify risks to the marine habitat and coastline. This work is done in collaboration with a network of specialised international partners including the regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea and the German Space Agency.

\textsuperscript{479} European Commission (2006): \textit{EU assists Lebanon in managing the environmental impact of the Middle East Crisis}, IP 06/1098, Brussels, 11 August 2006, available online on this webpage: \url{http://www.reliefweb.int}.

3.3. Why and how was the Community Civil Protection Mechanism activated in a pillar I framework in a “war” situation?

The MIC gained autonomy and visibility because of a decision by default: Member States gave the MIC the leadership role because they did not manage to use other channels more appropriate in a war context, such as the CCA or the Pillar II activation of the CCPM.

Following the procedure described in the first section of this chapter, the activation of the CCPM was decided by the European Presidency. At that time, it was the Finnish Presidency which was in charge. They met following the request for assistance. The following scenarios were reviewed: First, the Finns in charge reviewed the possibility of activating the CCA. It was rejected as the arrangements were considered too new to be tested in practice. Second, a pillar II activation of the CCPM was considered and then rejected. It was a direct acknowledgement of a “war situation” which would have made the EU intervention more difficult diplomatically speaking. Hence the choice was made of a pillar I activation of the CCPM. This choice was presented by interviewees as problematic. Indeed, this was risky for the personnel sent to the crisis, as they are exposed to a war context with no modes of defence (no weapons, no troops to protect civil teams, etc.) A Unit A3 DG ENV official said: “We have not performed well in Lebanon. I mean we have done our best, but we are not designed for that type of situation. The experts we have sent had no experience of war, I mean, they did not have the necessary security briefing... This whole situation is because the Finnish presidency did not estimate the situation as civil crisis management, so it was the MIC which had to deal with the double emergency of marine pollution and humanitarian crisis. If I had been there and not on holidays, I would have said that I was against such a MIC activation. I mean for the oil spill treated separately it could be ok, but not for the whole crisis situation as it was.”

Moreover, the Lebanon

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481 According to the Finnish Representative sitting in European Commission civil protection Committee meeting.

482 Interview EU 22.
emergencies contained clear elements which led the media to describe the event as a “war situation”: Hostilities at the Israeli-Lebanese border quickly turned into a large-scale conflict between Hezbollah and the Israeli army with a significant human toll, following the capture of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006. Estimates reported in the media said the conflict resulted in the death of 1,183 Lebanese and the injury of a further 4,551 in the first weeks of July. Several bombings took place in Beirut, the Bekaa valley and in the south of Lebanon which were reported in the press. So the permanent activation of the MIC inside the Pillar I framework, even in a case reported as a “war”, raises questions in terms of security constraints in a field where insecurity prevails. The Representative from Finland (EU Presidency) said in a European Commission meeting that the main problem was that “there was a total lack of information on the situation of the affected areas in the south of Lebanon and this hampered the Presidency in getting a proper understanding of the dimension and impact of the crisis and to define proper political action.”

The speed of decision required from the side of the Presidency and the lack of information provided hindered a proper evaluation of the right type of crisis response to use (Pillar I, Pillar II activation of the CCPM? CCA?)

3.4. Why does the channel of assistance chosen remain political?

The following table summarizes the offers of assistance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country offering assistance</th>
<th>Country requesting assistance</th>
<th>Assistance offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Humanitarian supplies and expert support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Fire-fighting equipment, blankets and medicines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Humanitarian supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Generators, tents and fire-fighting equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Humanitarian supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Humanitarian supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Medicines and blankets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

European Commission (2007): Lessons Learned Lebanon – Humanitarian aid and civil protection minutes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Humanitarian supplies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Food, Kitchen items, Hygiene kits, Sheets, Blankets, Tents, Pillows, Beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Humanitarian supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Medicines, Hygiene kits, Kitchen items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Assistance teams to deal with evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Lebanon marine pollution</td>
<td>List of specialised registered companies, helicopter for aerial surveillance, equipment and disposal materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Lebanon marine pollution</td>
<td>Naval transport and pollution-cleansing equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Lebanon marine pollution</td>
<td>Pollution-cleansing equipment &amp; training experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Lebanon marine pollution</td>
<td>Naval transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Lebanon marine pollution</td>
<td>Booms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Lebanon marine pollution</td>
<td>Ships and pollution-cleansing equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Lebanon marine pollution</td>
<td>Booms, skimmers, hand tools and shoreline equipment, and a near-shore boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Lebanon marine pollution</td>
<td>Pollution-cleansing equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Lebanon marine pollution</td>
<td>List of specialised registered companies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 13: Assistance offered through or notified to the MIC,
Source: European Commission, DG ENV, Unit A3 civil protection

First, the channel of assistance is still political because the Member States can stress their use of the MIC (civil protection) or their use of other EU frameworks of action such as the humanitarian channels of assistance of DG ECHO (humanitarian aids). This political decision will have consequences: the offer of assistance will be different because the MIC and DG ECHO do not rely on the same assessment of the needs in the field. Second, Member states still have choices of channels of assistance outside the EU framework. So they can still use the CCPM to send particular signals.
The question raised by the assistance offered by States is the following: does the assistance meet the needs in the affected country? The quick response of the States speeds up the provision of assistance. By contrast, it shortens the period to assess the needs. How did the MIC assess the needs? A on-duty MIC officer explained that the MIC used the need assessments of the Lebanese government - Higher Relief Committee, which had been endorsed by a letter from the UN to its Member States on 17 August 2006. The MIC hence could update the Member States which could adapt their in-kind assistance to be sent. An interesting aspect is that other DGs of the European Commission conduct their assessment of the needs of the affected country differently. For instance, DG RELEX relied on information coming from their delegation in the field, while DG ECHO gathered information through their Regional Support Office in Amman (Jordan). DG ECHO claim their need assessment was more comprehensive, as they could contact a large number of both “traditional and non traditional humanitarian actors”. Each DG relies on its flow of information to assess the need. As the sources are different, the result can vary. Why are the sources so different? Why cannot they rely on the same types of information? The CCPM is based on State actions. It is a mechanism in which states help other states, so the MIC tends to base its judgment on State assessment. On the contrary, DG ECHO is a non-state player. The humanitarian actors who claim their neutrality often mistrust official government sources and prefer relying on other neutral humanitarian actors. This situation raises the whole issue of EU coordination in times of crisis.

Another aspect is that of the impact of the CCPM on the contribution of European Member States in the field. Some states used the CCPM to send teams and in-kind assistance in the field. For instance, France which is a supporter of the CCPM and actively supported the creation of a European Civil protection force since the Barnier Report, highlights the potential synergy that can be developed thanks to the CCPM in Lebanon. The Ministries of Interior, Defence and Foreign Affairs contributed to the provision of assistance up to 15 million EUR in the context of the French national effort.

to help Lebanon. This sum was mainly used to fund NGOs and other international organizations in charge of humanitarian aid. The decision to assist Lebanon was taken before the CCPM activation on 19 July 2006.\footnote{Government of France (2006): \textit{Envoi par la France d’aide humanitaire d’urgence}, Press release, Paris, 19 July 2006.} But in addition to that, France contributed to the CCPM through in-kind contributions after the CCPM activation. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up an operation called “\textit{un bateau pour le Liban}”. The “Cap Camarat” was used to transport assistance of other European Member States contributing in the framework of the CCPM: Germany, Malta, Latvia, Hungary, Ireland and Slovakia’s assistance was transported on this boat to Lebanon. The boat left Marseille on 11 July 2006 and arrived in Beirut on 17 July 2006 with 1,500 tons of assistance coming from 6 European countries.\footnote{Government of France (2006): \textit{Bilan de l’aide humanitaire d’urgence au Liban}, Press release, Paris, 9 September 2006.} The assistance consisted in health products, clothes, food, pick-ups, ambulances, water cleaning products, water purifiers, trucks, tents, etc. 700 tons which amounted to 3.5 million EUR were provided by France and the remaining space was used to transport 800 tons of assistance provided by other EU countries through the CCPM. France contributed as well by the appointment of experts in the CCPM framework. French civil protection forces assisted in the protection of European citizens and in the cleaning of the Lebanese coastline.

Other Member states followed different strategies. Finland was the country holding the EU presidency during the Lebanon crisis. Did it have an impact on Finland’s involvement? First of all Finland worked in close contact with the European Commission and Council during the whole crisis. However, when looking for instance at press releases issued by the Finnish government during the crisis, it is as if Finland had coordinated the evacuation more than the CCPM did. See for instance this press release issued on 24 July 2006: “Helsinki, 24 July 2006 -The Government noted that cooperation in the evacuation of EU citizens has worked well. Finland has conducted a daily telephone conference providing information on bus convoys, ships and planes that have transported citizens to safety. As the country which holds the Presidency, Finland..."
has coordinated EU action in Nicosia and Damascus and maintained contacts with the Israeli Government. Since last Sunday, bus convoys have transported almost 10,000 EU citizens to Damascus. The priority is now to arrange transport to Europe by sea. More than 100 Finnish citizens have been brought back to Finland, along with a number of people of other nationalities permanently resident in Finland. Remaining Finnish citizens wishing to leave the area are to be evacuated next weekend. The EU is still facing the challenge of evacuating several hundreds of its citizens from the war-torn region of Southern Lebanon. There are six Finns among these people. In response to Cyprus's appeal, the Finnish Government has announced that it will provide assistance in transporting people arriving in Cyprus from Lebanon by air to international airports.487

No mention is made of the activation of the CCPM, although this activation had taken place on 21 July 2006. There clearly is a gap between the activation of the CCPM and the visibility that Finland gave to it. This is even clearer if one compares the case of Finland with the case of Greece. Greece is a case in point as the EU commissioner for the Environment (in charge of the CCPM) was Greek. In fact, two Greek military vessels brought 45 tons of humanitarian supplies in the CCPM framework. Greece officially declared in a press release that EU member states could benefit from free transport by notifying the MIC office in Brussels: “Athens, 3 August 2006 - Greece, in coordination with the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Cyprus, informed its European partners that – continuing its work with regard to humanitarian aid for Lebanon – it will provide free transport for member-state humanitarian aid from the Port of Larnaca, Cyprus, to Lebanon, where it will be delivered to local authorities for distribution. The transport will be carried out by a Greek Navy landing craft, and the Republic of Cyprus will offer its services in Larnaca. Member states will be responsible, after notifying the competent MIC office in Brussels, for transporting their aid to Cyprus.” 488

Other states did not use the CCPM to send in-kind assistance but only to provide assistance teams. This is the case of Sweden, although Sweden had announced its readiness to contribute to assist Lebanon since 18 July 2006. Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation Carin Jämtin said “It is important that the UN take the lead in coordinating the relief operations that will be needed in the serious humanitarian crisis that is developing in Lebanon”. Clearly Sweden opted for a UN framework and not a CCPM one, although Sweden put its assistance teams in Cyprus for the evacuation. Other countries did not contribute to the CCPM at all. For instance, the Netherlands sent assistance to Lebanon without using the CCPM. The institutions they used were the following: International RedCross, World Food programme, UNOCHA, and UNICEF. Regarding the sending of in-kind assistance, the Dutch Ministry of Defence provided 50 trucks independently. No rational reasoning can be identified in the provision of assistance within or without the CCPM framework except the fact that the countries most involved are those politically sustaining the development of the CCPM or presiding over the European Union at the time of the disaster.

3.5. What does coordination at European Commission level bring?

The MIC managed to develop its role because the European Commission improved its coordination internally and could speak with one voice, at least through the first phase of the emergency. This raised the profile of the EU intervention.

In the Lebanese case, the CCPM was activated, but in parallel, DG RELEX (via its consular role) and DG ECHO (via financial support) were active during the whole time of the crisis too. On the one hand, DG RELEX Rapid Reaction Mechanism proved to be able to mobilize very quickly as well and assisted in the evacuation of 13,318 non EU citizens together with the International Organization for Migration. On the other

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hand, DG ECHO which had been active in Lebanon for 10 years with the provision of humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population in Lebanon closely followed the situation from its Regional office in Amman (Jordan). DG ECHO experts conducted assessment of the needs and liaisons with the Israeli military in order to ensure security for the humanitarian operations. In order to cope with the Lebanese crisis, DG ECHO made 30 million EUR available.\textsuperscript{491} This covered the provision of shelter, health, water, sanitation, psycho-social support, food, etc. DG ECHO issued grant agreements to finance UN agencies, the Red Cross and other NGO partners to accomplish the work of dispatching the humanitarian assistance. For the first time, MIC, ECHO and RELEX worked very closely together: First, in Brussels, they had regular Head-Quarter meeting at the DG RELEX in Brussels, and regular joint teleconference with the experts in the field. They even organized a joint lesson-learnt meeting, chaired by DG RELEX on 15 December 2006. Second, crucial in this coordination process was the coordination in the field and the role played by the EC Delegations in Beirut and Tel Aviv. They offered premises for both ECHO and MIC experts in the field. Moreover, the EC Delegations organized several important coordination meetings. For instance DG ECHO experts and EU Member States could communicate through the EC Delegation in Beirut. Australia, Canada and other third-countries could access MIC experts or ECHO experts briefings via the Delegation. European Commission Delegations in Beirut and Tel Aviv were also of importance regarding the provision of political information and advice to both ECHO and MIC experts in the field. They set up a special Lebanon crisis website. Even the Delegation security teams were mobilized to contribute to the operations. To sum up, they provided not only administrative support during joint meetings and on site location but also close relations with the local and national governmental authorities, as well as the assisting third-countries. Another key aspect of the EU coordination at EU level during the Lebanon crisis was the civil-military coordination. For instance, the MIC received four requests for the use of Military Civil Defence Assets. Hence, the MIC

\textsuperscript{491} According to the humanitarian aid decision adopted on 19 October 2006 (First emergency financial decisions were adopted on 24-26 July 2006 and then this was complemented with the developing of the crisis).
worked in close cooperation with EU Military Staff by the European Council Secretariat. The involvement of military means although used to intervene only where civilian means would be deemed insufficient (according to the Oslo Guidelines) creates a need for a high level of EU coordination between the European Commission Services and the European Council ones.\textsuperscript{492} In addition to that, it must be pointed out that every EU entity had to coordinate with other actors such as the Government of Lebanon, the United Nations Services (UN-OCHA), other countries, etc during a crisis. So the stakes are high and challenge the ability of the EU to speak with one voice. Why was the coordination process enhanced in the Lebanon case, compared to the two other cases? First of all, the internal role played by DG RELEX can be stressed. As the EC Delegation is in the field a clear strategic meeting point, DG RELEX is more and more playing an active role in a stricken countries. Second, the external demand of international organizations, NGOs and countries to have one European position and not several ones forced the EU actors to write joint briefings and documents. However, in Lebanon it seems clear that the humanitarian assistance provided to the population and the civil protection assistance did the same thing (except in the case of the oil spill). For instance, both DG ECHO and the MIC contributed to the supply of medical assistance, food, etc. So first, the coordination did not contribute to diminishing overlappings and duplications. The only notable difference between DG ECHO and MIC actions was the way in which the assistance was provided. In the case of DG ECHO it was a financial support to NGOs, Red Cross and UN agencies based on the need assessment of their regional office, whereas for the MIC it was a direct request of the Lebanese government and an in-kind response of EU Member States sent to the field. Second, the Joint Documents and briefings made by ECHO and MIC experts were cumbersome to write according to interviewees from the European Commission. For instance, the Joint Situation Reports were difficult to draft as the understanding of the context between MIC experts and ECHO experts was different, mostly due to the fact that their interlocutors and sources of information were different. It entailed very long discussions.

\textsuperscript{492} Interview EU 25.
Both sides noted it was “time-consuming” and “difficult”. As a result of this, the first 11 reports produced are MIC-ECHO joint situation reports, whereas the following reports were separate reports. This change is a clear sign of the difficulty to cooperate among DGs during a crisis.

So far, this chapter has only focused on the CCPM as no activation of the CCA took place. However, the following question remains: are there consequences of the CCA creation that one can notice during an emergency, even in the absence of an official activation?

3.6. Are there consequences of the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements creation?

Although the Crisis Coordination Arrangements were not activated, it does not mean that nothing happened from the Council of the European Union perspective. In addition to that, I argue the potential role that the CCA can play urges the European Commission to speak with one voice.

First, the SitCen played an active role during the Lebanon crisis. For instance, the SitCen established regular teleconferences with the Member States. This situation contributed to a better sharing of information. Second, the European Commission issued regular updates and was in close contact with the Member States via the COREPER (and the PSC). So even if no crisis steering group was set up as such by the council, the COREPER was intensively involved.493 For the European Commission, the presence of an “active” Council has consequences too. It means for instance that the European Commission needs to speak with one voice. Therefore, the MIC, but also DG RELEX and DG ECHO use a common tool ARGUS, which is the IT system to share information on crises managed by the European Commission Secretariat General Crisis Coordination Committee. Moreover a large number of inter-service meetings took place.

493 Intense policy coordination took place in the field of external affairs with two exceptional General Affairs and External Relations Councils, the organization of the Rome Conference and a visit of the EU Troika to Beirut (Finnish E. Tuomioja, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and EUSR M. Otte).
3.7. Does the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) benefit from a greater visibility abroad?

Finally, the Lebanon crisis shows a new MIC visibility abroad.

For the first time in Lebanon, it was possible to see EU civil protection teams wearing a blue MIC jacket. Moreover, experts can now be equipped with a communication toolkit provided by the MIC. This set includes for instance SatPhones, laptops, etc. This is called the “MIC in the box” and can be considered another aspect of the MIC visibility on site during an emergency.

Illustration 14: Picture taken during the Lebanese crisis

The Lebanon case demonstrates that the MIC can manage to find margins of action in the pooling of resources, the sending of experts or on-duty officers and in the technical expertise. It shows the CCPM can even become visible thanks to the presence of a Commissioner and the use of blue MIC jacket in the field. This new position of the
MIC is linked to the decision by default of Member states to activate the CCPM in the pillar I framework, but also to a new mode of coordination inside European Commission services with the existence of so-called joint-reports, joint-meetings, joint-teleconferences, etc.
4. Outcome

The CCPM is an ambiguous EU tool. It is said to be a community mechanism but it works like an EU stamp put on top of national responses. Several reasons can be identified which explain this situation: First, the CCPM is a non-binding mechanism. This legal framework means that the participating States are free to decide if they participate or not in a crisis. If they do, they can decide through which type of channels they offer assistance. As a consequence, their decision to use the CCPM framework is a political signal they use to push for more or less involvement of the CCPM. Their decision is not a way to enhance the efficiency of the assistance provided among EU partners, but a way to legitimize their position thanks to their action and communication in an emergency (output legitimacy). Assisting in a disaster means States investing money for the concerned Member. So it is seen by governments as a part of their foreign policy and image in the world. It is hence difficult to use their assistance as a part of their foreign policy and combine it in a EU framework, except this shapes the political EU disaster response in a way that serves their own interests. Second, the media coverage makes visibility a key issue in a crisis situation. Member States will tend to use their own flag and stress their own involvement so as to please the government and the voters. No mention of the CCPM will be made unless for political reasons in order to push for more CCPM. As a consequence the on-duty MIC officers are tied up. They do not want to upset Member States as they are the ones supporting them inside the European Commission against other DGs like DG ECHO (supported by humanitarian non-state actors). So they rely on Member States for every action. On the other hand, they can only exist by providing an added value (pooling and sharing of resources, synergy effect, special EU technical expertise of the JRC, etc.) drawing from the original models created and adopted. But this can only be achieved by coordinating Member States assistance in a stronger way, which is very difficult to do. In conclusion the scope of action of the MIC is narrow. And it seems its legitimacy
comes more from the model (input legitimacy) than from what it can achieve in the field in action and communication (output legitimacy), as they are restricted being a head without arms and hands. By contrast the scope of action of the country holding the EU Presidency is large. The cases show that the EU presidencies (i.e. UK and Finland) can have a real impact on the management of the crisis, both in terms of decision of activation and in terms of means and teams available.

However, during the Lebanon crisis, a new trend appeared: the MIC managed to position itself as a more autonomous EU actor. The MIC had a visibility (thanks to the MIC jackets, thanks to the on site presence of Commissioner Dimas, etc), experts (on MIC contract and funding), technical expertise of its own. This situation is due to a decision by default of states which created an opportunity for the MIC. It could have had a negative impact on the MIC if they had not managed to deal with the complex situation. However, they managed to position themselves well and make the best out of the abnormal decision by developing new patterns of interactions, gaining some output legitimacy. For instance the European Commission new internal coordination system helped upgrade the profile of the European Commission which could speak with one voice and hence have a stronger communication capacity.

Going thus well beyond the rational principal agent theory, and turning towards sociological neo-institutionalism, the following outcomes can be highlighted: Different countries have different historical-cultural traditions of sending assistance abroad. They are used to the UN framework, or the NATO framework or a bilateral framework, etc. When a new channel of assistance was created with the adoption of the CCPM and later of the CCA, every country faced the challenge of adaptation to these new possibilities. Certain path-dependency patterns can be observed. For instance, a country which was used to offering assistance in a NATO framework will tend to continue using this channel. Moreover the countries continue communicating on the validity of the chosen channel. Simultaneously, the cases show that the greater the consistency between the national civil protection political and administrative understanding and the MIC one (e.g. France) the more likely the Member States are to integrate the newly opened

Wendling, Cécile (2009), The European Union Response to Emergencies: A Sociological Neo-Institutionalist Approach European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/11317
channel of assistance. Furthermore, the comparison of the case of Pakistan and of Lebanon shows a general pattern of gradual adaptation to the CCPM and a trend towards institutional autonomy of the MIC which becomes recognised as a EU player in the field of a disaster. This is due to the fact that the pillar I CCPM activation is the EU channel of disaster response “by default” for Member States. The cases demonstrate that Member States avoid using new institutional processes of interaction hitherto untested (i.e. the CCA) by using the pillar I CCPM activation, even in a framework where clearly this option is risky. In any case, the provision of assistance is to a great extent constrained by institutional and political features. In this sense, the path dependency shows the impact of the original model. The cases show a systematic “double talk” or “hypocrisy” of Member States in their communication strategy and action. They separate themselves from the initial models, gain margins of initiative and hence prove their legitimacy by their output. The general pattern of gradual adaptation to the CCPM and towards institutional reinforcement of the MIC is driven by the repeated exposure of EU coordination failures in the media (i.e. during the South-East Asian Tsunami totally, and during Pakistan partially). This led to an enhanced social learning of actors towards more EU coordination and more EU communication, even if there often still is a gap between the Member States involvement in the CCPM and their communication on their assistance in the field (often presented as purely national).

In conclusion, the Pakistan and the Lebanon cases show the existence of a decoupling between the CCPM as created and adopted on which the EU actors rely the most, and the CCPM as implemented on which the Member States rely. This led to an EU coordination capacity rather weak during emergencies till the Pakistan earthquake. On the contrary, the MIC has managed since the Lebanon crisis to get certain lever of action thanks to its technical expertise, and to enlarge its margin of action and its visibility. In addition to that, the MIC used its link with the outside world to position itself on a long-term basis as a potential technical crisis response of tomorrow. Finally, certain pattern of


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adaptation of Member States to the CCPM appeared. This new situation which appeared during the Lebanon crisis is an element that shed a new light on the EU role abroad during crisis situation. It shows that the EU can meet certain expectations, even in an unanticipated use of its organizational framework (pillar I CCPM activation). In this sense, creation and adoption of new EU frameworks can seem useless in a first phase (no CCA activation, very restricted CCPM activation). But the mere existence of these new frameworks should not be understated and understudied, because when crisis strikes, EU actors can prove their usefulness and create precedent of EU involvement in unexplored security situations.
CONCLUSION
Conclusion

The emergence of EU emergency management is best understood from a sociological neo-institutionalist perspective. Institutions - understood here in the narrow sense of organizations - exert their influence on the choice of the organizational model because they frame the thinking of their actors regarding the creation of new organizational structures. I showed that, depending on the organizational structure in which actors are involved, they copy one organizational model or another, even if they operate in the same field of emergency management. As the empirical chapters on creation, adoption and implementation of the CCPM and the CCA have explained, actors copied for both the CCPM and the CCA organizational models that were in their span of attention, instead of following a functional logic (e.g. focusing on building redundancy) or a principal-agent logic. Neither the rational neo-institutionalist perspective (based on power and influence) nor the historical neo-institutionalist perspective (based on path-dependency) can solve the puzzle of the coexistence of two EU structures of emergency management, one being used (the CCPM) and the other not (the CCA). This is why I have resorted to sociological neo-institutionalism.

The existence of two EU organizational structures of emergency management—the CCPM and the CCA—results from a process of divergent isomorphism that the thesis investigated using process-tracing. Following the creation, the adoption and implementation of the CCPM and the CCA are impacted by the copied models, although some margins of initiative can be found by actors. In this conclusion, I emphasize first the added value of sociological neo-institutionalism. Second, I stress the specificity of my approach using the concept of divergent isomorphism and hence incorporating agency aspects into the sociological neo-institutionalist framework. Third, the other important aspect of my thesis concerns the field of emergency management. I
show that extraordinary modes of governance do not have the necessary legitimacy to be used ad-hoc when crisis strikes. Fourth, I present the domain of application of my research. Fifth I derive some key policy recommendations from my theoretical and empirical results. Finally, I will point out areas for further research.

**The added value of sociological neo-institutionalist perspective**

The added value of sociological neo-institutionalism is twofold.

First, the sociological neo-institutionalist perspective helps explain organizational change. Authors studying public policy often focus on one stage only, like policy formulation, policy implementation, etc. The sociological neo-institutionalist approach allows researchers to study the linkages between those phases and hence accounts for the eventual presence or absence of change. It gives the possibility to stress where the obstacle was located. For instance, I could identify that the enhanced CCPM failed at the adoption phase, whereas the CCA failed at the implementation phase.

Second, the sociological neo-institutionalist approach can make scholars think about bureaucracies in a more comprehensive way. It helped me demonstrate for instance that the role played by bureaucrats in the creation phase still has a weight during the adoption and implementation phases. The sociological neo-institutionalist approach helped me identify why. I do not suggest here that sociological neo-institutionalism should replace other dominant neo-institutionalist theories. I argue instead that sociological neo-institutionalist theory is appropriate to explain the process observed here leading to the puzzling situation of co-existence of two EU emergency management structures, one being used and the other not. More precisely, I contribute to the development of the theory of sociological neo-institutionalism incorporating an agency aspect with the concept of divergent isomorphism. This is what I will detail in the next sub-section.

Incorporating an account of agency aspect

By detailing the emergence of EU emergency management in three main phases (creation, adoption, implementation), I have shown that divergent isomorphism is influential from the creation phase until the end. Due to competing institutional demands and the limitation of the span of attention of actors, two organizations operating in the same field copied not the same but different organizational models. I demonstrated that the strategic use of discourse was paramount during the adoption phase. I underlined the complexity of the diffusion of a model once created. The role of the interaction among the actors (communication and coordination) but also the role of the wording attached to the models were stressed. Although the model is at the basis of the emergence of the organizational structures, I highlighted that actors can find margins of initiative in the implementation of the models. Doing so, I answered the following questions on organizational studies. How are new organizational forms created and legitimated? Who has the power to legitimate a novel form? I provide two answers.

In the case of EU emergency management, there is first an input-legitimacy factor. It means a legitimacy coming from the way institutions are created and models adopted. This is the case for instance when EU entrepreneurs drafting new models through isomorphism have a “legitimacy” in the creation phase. Later they can rely on it during the adoption and implementation process. Indeed I showed that the impact on adoption of the created model is strong, as the original model through its wording can frame the process. On the contrary, the impact on implementation of the created model is weak initially but then can develop (e.g. Lebanon), because in this last phase, input-legitimacy competes with what can be called the output-legitimacy. This is the legitimacy coming from the resulting action. This type of legitimacy is mainly in the hands of national entrepreneurs as they own the civil protection material assistance and teams contrary to the EU officials. For instance, the result in action and communication of their crisis management without the EU is a way they can use to show the unnecessary role of the
EU framework. The impact of the output-legitimacy on implementation is strong, but I showed there is still the possibility of a learning effect that will make national actors incorporate the created model in the long run and hence give EU entrepreneurs a chance, even by default (like in the Lebanese case).

The input legitimacy shows the impact of the prevailing concepts on the development of the organization. *Inherited knowledge* (from Marine pollution and NATO) but also *congenital knowledge* (combination of the knowledge inherited and its conception prior to adoption, according to Huber) have a strong impact.\(^{496}\) This is influenced by the nature of the founders of the framework like J. Solanna or EU24 (who come with *second-hand knowledge*). On the contrary, the output legitimacy shows the impact of *experimental learning*. Legitimacy comes from action and its result (Lesson-learnt report stressing the success of a mission, etc.)\(^{497}\)

**Building knowledge on emergency management**

The other important theme of the thesis concerns the field of emergency management. I first show that extraordinary modes of governance might not be a relevant solution in the field of crisis management at EU level: Ad-hoc organizational frameworks – like those adopted for the CCA – are feared by political and administrative actors, as no one really knows in advance who it will benefit. It identifies secondly in which phases of the emergence of crisis management structures the actors politicized or on the contrary depoliticised crisis management. Thirdly, even if this thesis showed the institutionalisation of the role of the EU in the domain, I do not assume that the role of Member States is declining or rising, I rather argue that it is changing.


\(^{497}\) This finding is close to that of Schimmelfennig in: Schimmelfennig, F. (1996) “Legitimate Rule in the European Union. The Academic Debate”, *Tübingen University Working Papers in International Politics and Peace Studies*, No.27.
First, the contrast between the CCPM and the CCA implementation illustrates the fact that extraordinary modes of governance, which can appear a priori as a solution to EU emergency decision-making, do not work in practice. Consensus can be reached on paper but, in practice, Member States are not ready to be left out of a EU decision-making process, even if it is for a good reason such as ensuring a swift crisis response. By default, classic modes of governance (first pillar based) prevail. This situation is a way for Member States to avoid cumbersome intergovernmental negotiations where too many players, too many stages in the process, can hinder the swiftness of the response. So even if Member States wanted 2nd pillar or transpillar actions to avoid the community method in the field of security, the CCPM activations show that in the end it goes back to the first pillar.

This has consequences in the way the EU acted in times of emergencies. For instance, the teams sent to Lebanon or Georgia did not carry weapons. Moreover, the EU response they provided was light. For instance, they focused on mitigating the consequences of the crises like recently extinguishing in Georgia the forest fires due to the Russian bombings, etc. In a nutshell, my thesis shows the difficulty of a crisis management linked to ad-hoc organizational structures, when stressing the fact that the organizational model of the CCA remains unimplemented. As a consequence, there is no chance for an “input-legitimacy” which could go beyond papers and documents. And the lack of action gives no chance for the second type of legitimacy either. No “output-legitimacy” can be used as a way to demonstrate the validity of the ad-hoc organizational structures linked to extraordinary modes of governance.

Second, my research shows that emergency management design at EU level is politicized as often pointed out in the literature. I illustrated this aspect highlighting two main views: one from the South (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, etc) and the other from the North (Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, etc). However I showed that if this aspect was stressed in the adoption phase, this is not completely true in the other

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phases of the process such as the creation and the implementation phases. For instance, in times of implementation during crises, Member States tend to have a problem-solving approach leading them to use the CCPM by default to avoid a high level of politicization which could hinder any EU actions. Going further on the way EU emergency management was “depoliticized,” one should stress the fact that a EU emergency management structure was created at the DG Environment of the European Commission. Linking civil protection to the environment, actors created the CCPM which is more easily activated than the CCA, managed at the Council at the SitCen. The organizational architecture and structure of the CCPM linked to DG ENV depoliticized the topic by linking it less to security intergovernmental issues as such. So if crisis management is politicized in the adoption phase, it is on the contrary rather depoliticized in the creation and implementation phases.

Finally, although I argue that an EU emergency management emerged and got institutionalized, this does not mean that emergency management can take place without national governments. States remain the holders of resources when it comes to implementation in action during crises. Moreover they are the holders of the decision-making power when it comes to council decision adoption. I do not assume that the role of Member States is declining or increasing in emergency management. But their role is changing. When acting in a crisis, they are responsible for more than their own citizens (due to the new measures on EU citizens' consular protections outside the EU borders), they are not only in multilateral contacts with each other but also in permanent contact with the MIC in Brussels.\textsuperscript{499} The mere creation of EU organizational architecture and structures challenges the Member States in their capacity to adapt to the changes when facing a crisis.

\textsuperscript{499} EU citizens are entitled to consular and diplomatic protection of 27 EU countries. See on the latest development: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/citizenship/diplomatic/fsj_citizenship_diplomatic_en.htm.
Domains of application

I will now generalize the results of my research and present the applicability of the main findings.

The applicability of the argument developed in this research depends on the following characteristics: First, the more closely the organizational model created is related to confidentiality, the more willingness there will be to adopt it. Confidentiality enhanced trust in the adoption phase. This is illustrated by the adoption of the CCA whereas the enhanced CCPM was rejected. However, the more closely the organizational model created is related to confidentiality, the less willingness there will be to implement it. Member States fear to be bypassed, and fear not to be included in the decision-making process. This was illustrated by the non-implementation of the CCA in practice. In other words, confidentiality is an advantage in the adoption phase but a burden when it comes to the implementation phase.

Second, the closer the match between national models and EU models, the more difficult the adoption. This is due to the fact that the Member States officials can be accused of trying to push for their own national model. This is shown by the case of France. The enhanced CCPM failed to be implemented. This model was close to the French conception of civil protection. However, the closer the match between national models and EU models, the stronger the implementation by actors. For instance, when France was involved in the field during emergency situations, the fit enhanced its involvement in favor of the CCPM. In a nutshell, a good match between national models and EU models is hindering the process of adoption but facilitating the process of implementation.

Third, the more public the decision-making process, and the more visible the action, the stronger the EU coordination. Media exposure is one of the ways used to demonstrate the EU added value going beyond the pure input-legitimacy. Enhancing its visibility in action for instance by using MIC jackets or by having the Commissioner on site for an interview, the European Commission can gain some out-put legitimacy as
well. This is illustrated in my work by the recent development of the MIC visibility in the Lebanon case.

Fourth, the more diverse the sources of recruitment of an organization, the less homogenous the models created and adopted are going to be. Indeed the broader the span of attention of organizational actors, the larger the spectrum of organizational models they will consider in case of organizational creation. In this sense, interpersonal links tend to become important when it comes to designing EU emergency management structures (Italian network, NATO network, etc). Obviously the role of these interlinked actors coexists with strong pressure coming from the institutional setting in which they evolve. But there is a tendency for the networks to form at the particular moment of initiative (creation phase) and discussion (adoption phase). Both the creation and the adoption phases were partially shaped by them.

Policy implications

First, this research shows that crises themselves do not create the changes. The organizational change is already in the making and the occurrence of a crisis is used by actors as a catalyst of change. In this sense, it shows the importance of projects sleeping in the drawers of the administration. They will be the ones used in case of a crisis to meet the demand of politicians in front of their electors in a period of media hyperactivity. This is certainly an aspect which EU bureaucrats should consider when taking a position. Having anticipated potential organizational changes could help them, should anything happen putting pressure on their organization.

Second, this research is of interest for practitioners because it shows how institutional changes can occur when informal rules are more influential than formal ones. This study illustrates the fact that the CCPM was implemented, even against the legal background, by actors in charge, and this repeatedly, whereas the formally legally adopted CCA remained unused. My research shows that the legitimization of an organizational architecture and structure can be more influential at EU level, than the
legal framework adopted. My conclusion points out that the informal processes can be a way to bypass the complexity of the EU organizational architecture and structure, working better than the attempt to legally develop cross-pillar EU architecture.

Areas for further research

First, additional cases could be studied and compared to this study. For instance, researchers could focus on sector-based tools of EU emergency management and see if their emergence differs from all-hazard tools, like the CCPM and the CCA. Another possibility would be to compare the emergence of the CCPM and of the CCA with that of other all-hazard emergency management structures used in other parts of the world such as the US (since the merger of FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security). The comparison of the emergence of the CCPM and the CCA with other cases could help test the generalization of the concept of divergent isomorphism in the field.

Second, this study paves the way for a qualitative use of the concept of isomorphism, which reconciles institutional processes with agency. It shows that further research is requested on the cognitive aspects of institutional design, when exploring the role of bureaucrats drafting the first documents at the origin of a policy. Where do their ideas come from? Do new organizations come from the routines of bureaucrats using the same document over and over again and slightly adapting it to fit the perceived expectation of their hierarchy? Or do new organizations come from nationally minded bureaucrats copying a pre-existing organizational structure to legitimate the position of their own country? Using cognitive studies could help distinguish between rather accidental or rather planned organizational designs. Developing the link between sociological neo-institutionalism and cognitive studies would certainly be one step forward to investigate the behavior of bureaucrats when creating new organizational design.
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