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COLLABORATORS AND PARVENUS? FATE AND FORTUNE OF LOYAL NOBLEMEN DURING THE DUTCH REVOLT

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Collaborators and Parvenus?
Fate and Fortune of Loyal Noblemen during the Dutch Revolt

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Abstract

This working paper addresses the limits of Habsburg patronage during the Dutch Revolt, which became clear not only through the rebellion of Prince William of Orange, but also through the opposition of noblemen remaining loyal. It proceeds by a juxtaposition of two loyal noblemen of the lower nobility, Charles Count of Berlaymont (1510-1578) and Philip of Sainte-Aldegonde, Baron of Noircarmes (?-1574), both of whom are portrayed as ‘parvenus’ and ‘collaborators’ in traditional (Dutch) historiography. Their decision to remain loyal was however rational, religious and emotional at the same time, rather than the mere selfish behaviour of parvenus. Nevertheless, the both were competing for the same Habsburg patronage resources and therefore chose different patrons and brokers to the Habsburg Court. Berlaymont and Noircarmes still adopted different strategies during the Dutch Revolt which changed opportunities for patronage. Despite their antagonism and their different patrons, Berlaymont and Noircarmes shared quite similar ideas on a desirable approach for the pacification of the Netherlands: a military intervention was under some circumstances necessary, but only if accompanied by reconciliatory measures. In this way, notwithstanding their portrayal as collaborators, they belonged to the ‘loyal opposition’ and even cooperated to express their disagreement with Habsburg policies. So recipients of patronage in the Netherlands became powerful bargainers, able to air their criticisms towards Habsburg policies.

Keywords
Patronage, nobility, Dutch Revolt
Introduction

In scholarship on the Dutch Revolt, there has always been much interest in the fortune of William Prince of Orange (1533-1584). This occurred for obvious reasons: the Prince was not only one of the first to rebel against Philip II King of Spain but he was also the leader of the uprising thanks to his prestige and wealth. As the Dutch Revolt ultimately gave birth to the Dutch Republic and its Golden Age, the victories and achievements of the Prince of Orange still form part of the myth of the origin of The Netherlands. The interest in the rebellious Prince of Orange led, however, to a neglect of those noblemen who remained faithful to their lord Philip II. Even if these loyal noblemen did what they were supposed to do, they did not receive a good press in (Dutch) historiography: over and over again they were regarded as collaborators with the Spanish who had committed treason against the Dutch nation, acting as egoistic parvenus in their search for royal patronage. The fate of the Count of Rennenberg serves as a clear example: in 1580 he reconciled with Philip II after nine months of negotiations, but from then on his reconciliation was framed as a ‘treason’ for money and titles and for his Catholic beliefs.

Just as Sharon Kettering’s influential study on Patronage and Politics during the Fronde, this working paper questions the common link made between patronage and political beliefs during the Dutch Revolt. It proceeds by a juxtaposition of two of the ostracized loyal noblemen, Charles Count of Berlaymont (1510-1578) and Philip of Sainte-Aldegonde, Baron of Noircarmes (?-1574). The pair had a parallel profile and status: neither were of high born nobility, but disposed of considerable properties and revenues in the border provinces with France. Equally, both noblemen were on their way to consolidating their upward social mobility by obtaining a provincial governorship. Beyond their similar social status, they share in an older nationalist and romantic historiography (and still unfortunately in the popular imagination), a reputation as collaborators and parvenus, as they were the only Dutch nobles appointed in the Council of Troubles, the exceptional tribunal led by the Duke of Alba to punish rebels and heretics in the Low Countries. This compromised them not only as participants in the general repression, but also as responsible for the execution of the Counts of Egmont and Hornes and the conviction of the Prince of Orange, all their social superiors. In addition, Charles of Berlaymont was alleged to have called the noble insurgents ‘nothing more than beggars’, after which they turned that insult into an honour by adopting it as the name for their opposition movement. Early on Louis-Prosper Gachard, first archivist of the Belgian state archives, pointed out

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2 See in this respect the interesting contributions to H. F. K. Van Nierop, G. Janssens, M. Fernández Álvarez e.a. (red.), Guillermo de Orange. De capitán de rebeldes a Pater Patriae (Fundación Carlos de Amberes), Madrid, 1998.


that this story was a myth, yet it is still found in many accounts of the Dutch Revolt. Noircarmes was even further discredited because of his continued help to the military expedition of the Duke of Alba in the years 1572 and 1573, sacking and plundering the cities of Meehelen, Zutphen and Naarden.

This microperspective on two loyal noblemen serves well to re-establish the role of mediators and agency in patronage questions, as recently proposed by H. Cools, M. Keblusek and B. Noldes in Your Humble Servant, Agents in Early Modern Europe and vigilantly applied by G. Janssen in his study on the patronage of William Frederick Count of Nassau-Dietz. By examining change and agency, both works react against the overtly structuralist tendencies of the pioneering studies on early modern patronage and clientelism of the aforementioned Sharon Kettering, Robert Harding and Antoni Maczak. Or, as Janssen puts it, ‘clientage was not a matter of fixed relationships, but a process of continual adaptation to change and to different social environments’.

In this contribution, I will demonstrate that the flexibility of patron-client ties and the permeability of patronage clienteles and political factions were present during the Dutch Revolt on the one hand, and within the Spanish-Habsburg monarchy on the other. I will show that Berlaymont and Noircarmes were competing for the same Habsburg patronage resources and therefore chose different patrons and brokers to the Habsburg Court. In the context of the Revolt, which changed patronage opportunities, they still adopted different strategies. Nevertheless, despite their different patrons and their rivalry, Berlaymont and Noircarmes maintained a similar political stance during the Dutch Revolt. Notwithstanding their portrayal as collaborators in Dutch historiography, they belonged to the ‘loyal opposition’ and even cooperated to express their disagreement with Habsburg policies.

Nobles from different clienteles could thus be in agreement on political strategy, acknowledgement of which goes against current historiography that tends to stress congruency between clienteles and political factions. This is particularly the case for literature on factionalism at the Spanish Habsburg Court. José Martínez Millán and his research group identify the power struggle of factions at the court not only as a fight for patronage resources, but also as a crucial disagreement on political and religious values. In this light, the faction around the Duke of Alba shared a rigid Salamanca conception of the divine power of the monarch, while the Prince of Eboli’s faction proved more open to a constitutionally anchored monarchy and the influence of Alcalá and Jesuit spirituality.

In foreign policy, the albistas were the hawks, the ebolistas the doves. Paul David Lagomarsino and lately José Eloy Hortal Muñoz have revealed how this factionalism also played a major part in decisions regarding the Netherlands. Notwithstanding the novel insights of this literature, the model is under pressure when associating Dutch nobles with Spanish factionalism. Indeed, as Liesbeth Geevers recently argued in her meticulous study on Orange, Egmond and Horn, the Spanish Court had more interest in having Dutch nobles in its sphere of influence, than vice versa. Despite the links

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10 The first major work in this series was: J. Martínez Millán, Instituciones y Elites de Poder en la Monarquía Hispánica durante el Siglo XVI, Madrid, 1992; now the thesis is deepened and reformulated in works with the scope of one single court: J. Martínez Millán and C.J. De Carlos Morales, Felipe II (1527-1598), La configuración de la monarquía hispánica, Valladolid, 1998; J. Martínez Millán e.a., La Corte de Carlos V, 5 vol., Madrid, 2000 and J. Martínez Millán and M.A. Visceglia, Felipe III: La Casa del Rey, Madrid, 2 vol., 2008.


through patronage and politics, the Dutch ‘grandees’ steered an independent course. This paper argues that this line of argument also applies to the less obvious case of loyal and not such high ranking noblemen during the Dutch Revolt.

Two perfect parvenus?
The Berlaymonts were of rather typical landed Hainaut nobility. In the Habsburg border province with France, the family possessed the fiefs of Berlaymont (with the title of bouteiller héréditaire du comté de Hainaut), Floyon and Pérulwez. In 1532, Charles of Berlaymont paid homage to this territorial anchorage by marrying Adrienne of Ligne-Barbençon, daughter of the leading Hainaut family. As in the case of many others, he acquired honour in the Habsburg-French wars, serving Emperor Charles V from 1542 onwards, even if that meant that his fiefs were repeatedly sacked by French troops. In 1553 he achieved an important victory in Longwy, deep into French territory. His mother’s relatives, however, continued in French service.

Berlaymont’s alliance with the Habsburgs was definitely a prudent decision. The Emperor and his sister Mary of Hungary, his regent in the Netherlands, rewarded him with an appointed as governor of Namur, where he possessed some minor properties. A governorship meant wealth (out of numerous emoluments, prerogatives in justice and gift-giving of cities), power (both towards inferior and superior levels) and patronage possibilities for appointments (even if shared). Probably then, Berlaymont also received the command of a bande d’ordonnance, part of the standing army of the Habsburgs in the Netherlands. In June 1555, Charles V also personally entrusted Berlaymont with the construction of the citadel of Charlemont, necessary to protect Namur after the latest French sack of the Mariembourg fortress.

Berlaymont was also promoted to the supraprovincial level, that is, to the Brussels conciliar government designed to govern the Erblände and the newly acquired provinces in the Low Countries. In 1555, Philip II appointed him Councilor of State and one of the Presidents of the Council of Finance. The election as Knight of the Golden Fleece in 1556 symbolically sealed Berlaymont’s upward social mobility through his loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty. When Philip II left

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14 Nevertheless, two other fiefs of Haultepenne and Hierges belonged to the jurisdiction of the prince-bishop of Liège, which also claimed the supreme jurisdiction of their Luxembourg fief of Beauraing. Berlaymont and Pérulwez are today in France, in the region Nord-Pas-de-Calais; Pérulwez is in Belgium; likewise Haultepenne is in the Belgian Ardennes, Hierges in the French Ardennes.
16 French troops had sacked respectively Pérulwez, Berlaymont and Beauraing in 1478, 1543 and 1554.
18 There has been discussion whether the provincial governorship proved an effective source of patronage: H. Van Nierop, ‘Willem van Oranje als hoog edelman: patronage in de Habsburgse Nederlanden’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 99 (1984), 651-676 against the older opinion of Paul Rosenfeld, The provincial governors from the minority of Charles V to the Revolt (Standen en Landen 17), Louvain, 1959. However, Van Nierop’s position has also been reassessed by M.-A. Delen, Het hof van Willem van Oranje, Amsterdam, 2002. For the gift-giving to provincial governors: M. Damen, ‘Corrupt of hoofs gedrag? Geschenken en het politieke netwerk van een laat-middeleeuwse Hollandse stad’, Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis 2 (2005), 68-94. For example, in 1571 Noircarmes receives 12,000 florins for his service from the city of Mons (AEM AVM 1303 f° 184), to compare: he only receives 100 florins a month for his captainship.
in 1559 for Spain, Berlaymont became a permanent advisor to the new governor-general Margaret of Parma, half-sister to the King. He did so together with Antoine Perrenot, soon to become Cardinal Granvelle, senior bureaucrat and servant of the Habsburg dynasty, and the renowned jurist Viglius, President of the Council of State and the Privy Council. So, Berlaymont could easily become a creature of Granvelle, the most powerful broker of the Habsburg monarchy. It has also long been debated whether Granvelle, Viglius and Berlaymont formed a consulta, a secret privileged council commissioned and trusted by Philip II, or a spontaneous synergy of men permanently present at the Brussels Court. In any case, when Berlaymont’s letters arrived in Madrid they were immediately translated into Castilian and scrupulously annotated by the King. The Count of Hornes complained in 1561 that the ‘parvenu’ Berlaymont was more honoured than himself.

By 1566, Berlaymont had thus been successful in obtaining the offices that the Dukes of Burgundy had used for creating a new nobility in their service: their splendid court, the advisory councils, the bandes d’ordonnance, the provincial government and above all, the Order of the Golden Fleece. Hans Cools has accurately described how between 1470 and 1530 the distribution of and competition for these offices – he even speaks of ‘noble institutions’ – created a kind of supraprovincial open elite in the Burgundian-Habsburg Low Countries. The open character of this governmental elite exposed newcomers to the label of parvenu; yet as will become clear, Berlaymont himself would not hesitate to use the term for his rival newcomer Noircarmes.

Even if Berlaymont and Noircarmes were both born in border provinces, they had different territorial backgrounds. Berlaymont originated from the provincial landed elite, but Philip of Sainte-Aldegonde, baron of Noircarmes from a rich city patriciate which became nobility. During the fourteenth- and fifteenth-centuries, the Sainte-Aldegonde family had assumed a thriving role in Saint-Omer, second city of Artois, as successful merchants, city mayors and échevins and as patrons of the Church of Sainte-Aldegonde and the Hôpital du Soleil. The family property consisted mainly of lands within or closely outside the city walls, as they acquired consecutively the fief of Nortkelmes (soon to be named Noircarmes, today Quelmes), Wisques, Genech, Selles and Avelin. During his life, Philippe of Sainte-Aldegonde, lord of Noircarmes, also obtained the fief of Maingoval (now Main) through his marriage to Bonne de Lannoy. He bought the county of Herties and the lordship de la Basse, under the jurisdiction of the French King, though he did however hope to change these for other lands within the Habsburg territory.

The Noircarmes family was more present at court than in war. Noircarmes senior was a chamberlain and sommelier de corps of Charles V and introduced his son to the imperial court. In

21 Last position is of: M. Baelde, De collaterale raden onder Karel V en Filips II (1531-1578). Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van de centrale instellingen in de zestiende eeuw, Brussels, 1965, 76-79.
22 Berlaymont to Philip II, 29/08/1566: Archivo General de Simancas, Secretaría de Estado [henceforth AGS E] 530 (original, Spanish translation and annotations of the King).
23 Geevers, Gevallen vazallen, 97.
28 That was at least his account to the Duke of Alba, 20/12/1571: Archivo de los Duques de Alba, Palacio de Liria, Madrid [henceforth ADA] Caja 46 n° 34-74.
1547 Philippe de Sainte-Aldegonde was one of the nineteen chamberlains accompanying the Emperor to Augsburg.²⁹ His younger brother Jean, Lord of Selles was a member of the archers du corps, becoming at the end of 1557 lieutenant-captain of this ‘Flemish Guard’ of Philip II and from 1559 onwards serving him at the Spanish Court.³⁰ Charles V and Philip II predestined the Noircarmes, both father and son, for local careers as their bailiff and captain of Saint Omer, rather than bestowing upon them offices at the provincial or supra-provincial level as they did with Berlaymont. These functions put the Noircarmes in a totally different position to their family predecessors who had been mayors or échevins of the city.³¹

Strikingly, it was not the patronage of the Habsburgs but that of the Dutch great nobles that assured Noircarmes a provincial governorship. Not included in the Brussels councils, it was easy for him to join the protest of Orange, Egmond and Horn against Granvelle, sharing their demand for a States-General to solve the country’s remaining problems. The grandees quickly – but in the end vainly – supported his candidature for the Council of State.³² Berlaymont mocked that Noircarmes was but a ‘fifth wheel’ in his attempt to belong to the Magnates’ Movement.³³ Nevertheless, it was precisely Noircarmes’ allegiance to the malcontent grandees that led to his promotion to the rank of provincial governor. First he replaced Montigny, Hornes’s younger brother, who was on a mission to Spain for the convocation of the Estates of Valenciennes in June 1566. When the Marquis of Berghes was to join Montigny, he obtained permission from the governess for Noircarmes to exercise his Hainaut and Cambrai governorship ad interim.³⁴ If Noircarmes still lacked an official appointment in the Brussels’ government, he could now participate in the meetings of the Council of State through his function as Hainaut Grand Bailiff. This appointment upset Berlaymont even more, who thought that ce jeune homme only cared about himself. He thought that Philippe of Croÿ, Duke of Aarschot had more right to this powerful position through his prestige (the Croÿ family that been omnipresent in Burgundian politics), rank (the only Duke in the Low Countries), experience (as Councillor of State since 1565) and especially his many Hainaut fiefs (which Noircarmes did not possess).³⁵ Nevertheless, the governor-general quickly put trust in Noircarmes and rewarded him a bande d’ordonnance.³⁶

The provincial governorship was a favour, but no sinecure. The main concern in the border provinces was no longer the war with France, but the Reformation, especially after the outbreak of the iconoclastic fury in 1566. Berlaymont and Noircarmes shared a very traditional religious profile, hardly threatened by the challenge of the Reformation.³⁷ So perhaps the reason for their ongoing

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³¹ The bailiff had to secure the rights and privileges of the lord sovereign, therefore often entering into conflict with the city magistrates. Noircarmes senior fought for his prerogatives as captain and the organization of the city defence, eventually ending up with a compromise with the existing guards. From 1554 onwards, Noircarmes junior did not settle any longer for a compromise and organized the city defence as he thought it convenient for the majesty of his lords. L. de Lauwereyns de Rosendaele, Histoire d’une guerre échevinale de 177 ans ou les baillis et les échevins à Saint-Omer de 1500 à 1677, Saint-Omer, 1867, 36-46.
³² The appointment was refused by the so-called letters from the Segovia Woods in October 1565.
³³ Berlaymont to Philip II, 30/08/1564: AGS E 525 f° 98 (copy) and f° 97 (Spanish translation), cf. summary in Gachard, CPhII I, 314.
³⁵ Morillon to Granvelle, 22/03/1567: E. Poulet and Ch. Piot, Correspondance du cardinal de Granvelle, 1565-1586 (Koninklijke commissie voor geschiedenis van België), 12 din, Brussels, 1877-1896 [henceforth Poulet, CGr] II, 300-310 (LXVI).
³⁶ See correspondence between Noircarmes and Margaret of Parma: AGR PEA 244/2, fol. 16-19.
³⁷ In 1554, one of Berlaymont’s sons became Knight of the Order of Malta. Berlaymont consciously refurbished the chapel in his castle of Beauraing, Noircarmes continued the patronage for his family chapel in the (now) cathedral of Saint Omer, where he was also buried when he died.
allegiance to Philip II was their deliberate stance on keeping Catholicism as the only religion with the Dutch realms, rather than their *parvenu* state. Noircarmes quickly became known as the man who successfully besieged Valenciennes (the ‘Dutch Genève’) in March 1567. He also set upon troops recruited by the Calvinists in Lannoy, Tournai and Maastricht. Later on, he firmly declared that the King should not even think of permitting two confessions in his realms.38 Significantly, in August 1567 Margaret of Parma only sent Berlaymont and Noircarmes to the Luxemburg Thionville as local nobles to welcome the Duke of Alba and his army.39

**Changing patterns of patronage**

Changes of governor always presented a critical moment for politics and patronage: bonds had to be renewed or created, the rules of the game re-established. During the Dutch Revolt, the ties surrounding change seemed even more precarious. Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, fourth Duke of Alba only became governor-general in October 1567 when Margaret of Parma refused to govern with him as her captain-general of the freshly arrived 10,000 soldiers.40 Even if this scenario had been anticipated in Spain,41 for the first time a non-native noble was appointed as governor of the *Burgundian Kreits*. Before this, the duty had fallen upon princes of the blood or (temporarily) on indigineous nobles. Five years later, it was Alba who refused to share power with the appointed governor Juan de la Cerda, fourth Duke of Medinaceli and like him *Grande de España*. Medinaceli eventually retreated in November 1573, without having had any chance to assume governmental tasks.42 However, one month afterwards, the Aragonese noble and *Gran Comendador de Castilla* Don Luis de Requesens managed to take over the Brussels’ government, yet Alba (and his son) only accepted after loud protests.43 So, within the timespan of 1567 to 1576, the governor of the Netherlands had no royal blood and was not from the indigenous nobility.44

These three governors became crucial agents in the distribution of Habsburg patronage in the Netherlands. Like his father45, Philip II entrusted them with a lot of responsibility as his ‘eyes’ in the field, yet also reserved for himself the final decision. Because of this, the urgent matter of making definitive appointments for vacant governorships – because of the departure of Orange and the executions of Egmond, Hornes and his brother Montigny – took a year and a half from 1568 until 1570. Alba also wanted to seize this opportunity to reorganize patronage in the Low Countries, just as he was also looking to reform the government and tax system. Generally, he wanted to raise the profile of the governor, by giving him a larger personal court, a more impressive personal guard and by reserving to the governor the *venerias* of Brabant, Flanders and Namur. Alva was also in favour of the earlier idea of appointing provincial governors for fixed terms, rather than for life. Nonetheless, the King was not keen on the novelties suggested by his *mayordomo mayor*. He did not agree to a limited

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38 Lo que Monsieur de Noircarmes mi Hermano me encargo de decir a su Magestad para la conservacion de los estados de Flandres (sic), s.d. [09/1568]: British Library London [henceforth BLL] Ms. Add. 28.387 fol. 140-141 (autograph), fol. 138-139 (copy).
41 *Memoria de los despachos necessarios al Duque para Flandes*, 19/03/1567: Instituto Valencia de Don Juan [henceforth IVDJ], Envió 6 ctp. 1, fol. 252-253.
Collaborators and Parvenus?

Geoffrey Parker has suggested that the arrival of the Duke of Alba brought a new government style, which he labelled `household government`: decision making moved from the collateral councils to the household and the council of war, briefly Alba’s familia. The statement is an exaggeration, not only because Philip deliberately did not want to change the system, but also because under Mary of Hungary and Margaret of Parma household and military functions had also been relevant in decision making. Yet the crucial difference was the presence of the tercios, which increased the number of criados paid directly by the King and decreased the power of the local military commanders. The informal consejo de guerra, which naturally consisted of courtiers from the Duke’s household and his personal secretaries, decreased the importance of the Council of State in policies of war and peace. It is clear that Noircarmes aimed to enter Alba’s familia, probably encouraged by his now international recognition as military commander after the siege of Valenciennes. He quickly managed to get a new command over 100 men of Walloon light cavalry. Moreover, the Duke appointed him as chef de finances, under the presidency of Berlaymont. His close proximity to Alba left Margaret of Parma irritated and disappointed. Nevertheless, Noircarmes’ integration into the Duke’s familia continued when he became good friends with Alba’s son Don Fadrique; by then Noircarmes had mastered the Spanish language.

Even when acting as a patron and broker, the Duke of Alba remained a statesman and did not particularly favor Noircarmes over Berlaymont. This becomes especially clear when he restructured the provincial governorships, a process also studied by José Eloy Hortal Muñoz. The King had proposed giving the Hainaut governorship to the Duke of Aarschot, as Noircarmes was often absent in his province as chef de finances. In this situation, Selles tried to have his older brother appointed as the Captain of the Royal Guard. Nevertheless, Alba maintained that both tasks were compatible (Hainaut was close to Brussels, the finances asked for only three days work in two), but decided to ask Noircarmes to withdraw from his finance office in return for his confirmation as Bailiff. For Berlaymont, Alba pushed the logic in the opposite direction. Alba judged it incompatible to appoint Berlaymont as governor of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht because he was the head of the three chefs de finances. He eventually appointed Berlaymont to grand veneur (Master of the Hunt) of Brabant, Namur and Flanders, even if he had wanted these honours for himself. Alba’s strategy of divide et impera became also clear when both Berlaymont and Noircarmes asked for the elevation of their baronies into counties. Noircarmes tried to bargain: he would willingly resign as President of the Council of Finance, if he received the title of Count. Alba however gave negative advice to Philip II,

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47 Parker, The Dutch Revolt, passim.
48 The already mentioned article by Doyle; there is a dissertation forthcoming on the Household of the Farnese family in the Low Countries by Sebastiaan Derks.
49 Gentilhombres de su Magestad con cargo de asistir cerca la persona de su Exa para hazer lo que se le ordenare del servicio de su Magestad los quales dichos scudos han de ser de oro, AGS CMC 2aE 49 s.f.
50 100 lances chevaux leigiers naturelz et subiectz desdicts pays : AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Segunda Época [henceforth CMC 2aE] nr 5 s.f. 09/05/1568. Nevertheless, it remains striking that Alba directly cherished the advice of a member of the League, which in 1563 he considered to be outright lese-majesty.
51 Morillon to Granvelle, 14/07/1567: Poullet, CGr III, 3-11 (II) and Morillon to Granvelle, 12/10/1567: Poullet, CGr III, 43-49 (XIV).
52 Lo que apunto su Magestad cerca de la consulta de los gobernadores, vandas, feudos, encomiendas, y otras cosas de Flandes en Madrid lunes 19. de septiembre 1569: AGS E 544 f° 99 (copy): ‘lo de St. Omer dessea Mos. de celles para retirarse, porque si el cargo de los Archeros no se disse a su hermano se les haria muy grave ser teniente de otro ninguno’.
53 Aarschot was buen caballero, pero no para dar gobierno, he would thus not serve well as Grand Bailiff of Hainaut: Alba to Philip II, 2/02/1570: Epistolar del III Duque de Alba, Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo (ed. Duque de Berwick y Alba), 3 vol., Madrid, 1952 [henceforth EDA] II 331-336 (1064).
54 Hortal Muñoz, El Manejo, 192 and 200.
suggesting delay because the weak health of Noircarmes could soon ‘solve the problem’. Under loud protest, Alba seemed more disposed to elevate Berlaymont to Count; yet here, the King thought Noircarmes would take it as a sign of distrust and suggested postponing the procedure in relation to both noblemen. Nevertheless, Noircarmes continued cooperating exclusively with Alba and Don Fadrique, especially during the renewed military expeditions after the Beggars’ Invasion in April 1572. Whenever at the same place, as in Utrecht in July 1573, Noircarmes made sure to reside as close to Alba as possible. It made no difference that the Duke of Medinaceli, a potential broker to Madrid, resided in the Netherlands. Noircarmes’ loyalty was again rewarded: when on 11 October 1573 the Count of Boussu fell into the hands of the Beggars, Alba appointed Noircarmes interim governor of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht. In this way, Noircarmes came to hold the office from which the Prince of Orange had resigned when he fled to the Holy Roman Empire. For the first time, a nobleman combined two important governorships that were not even adjacent to one another. Was it pragmatism or necessity on the part of a monarchy short of loyal noblemen?

Berlaymont was more flexible in his choice of brokers to the Spanish Habsburg Court, principally because he could still rely upon Granvelle. This facilitated his relations with both Medinaceli and Requesens. Medinaceli deliberately chose to act as a patron and broker towards the clients of Granvelle. Granvelle also explicitly recommended his creatures to Medinaceli, as ‘a governor had to govern with the aid of flamencos in order to gain the hearts and minds of the subjects’. Upon the request of whom to trust, Granvelle stated that he knew best the ‘elder’ servants, again recommending his client and old co-councillor Berlaymont. When Medinaceli was leaving, Berlaymont was wise enough to ask him to intervene for him at the Spanish Court. Afterwards, when writing to him on the situation in the Netherlands, he always asked that he and his family be recommended to the King. Requesens had been in Italy and was closely linked to Granvelle, first during his embassy to the Holy See in 1567 and later as viceroy of Milan. Requesens also acted as broker to Granvelle’s clients. Requesens quickly managed for the governorships of Noircarmes to go to Berlaymont’s eldest son Gilles. In less than a year the fief of Berlaymont was elevated to a county.

But again, Berlaymont continued to be flexible: in a letter to Alba, he still presented himself as Alba’s servant. So did his son Louis on another occasion, cognissant la sincere affection qu'il vous a plea monstrer porter a ceulx de nostre maison, promising to keep being a tres affectionnez serviteur.

Later Berlaymont also asked Alba to support his other son Jean as Bishop of Tournai.

Loyal opposition
Yet did this difference in patronage strategies also imply a different political stance during the Dutch Revolt, as the Brussels’ governors have been associated with very opposite factions and policies? By

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56 Alba to Philip II, 5/09/1571: EDA II, 724 (1418).
57 Hortal Muñoz, El Manejo, 33.
58 Noircarmes to Alba, 9/11/1573: ADA Caja 46 n° 63.
60 Hortal Muñoz, El Manejo, 53, in reference to a letter of Granvelle to Medinaceli, 15/07/1572: IVDJ, envío 47 doc. 31 of which the original is lost.
61 Granvelle to Medinaceli, 15/08/1572: IVDJ, envío 80 (cpt. 3) doc. 3.
63 J. Versele, ‘Los móviles de la elección de don Luis de Requeséns como gobernador general de los Países Bajos después de la retirada del Duque de Alba (1573)’, Studia Historica (Universidad de Salamanca) 28 (2006), 259-276.
64 Berlaymont to Alba, 1/10/1574: ADA Caja 30 n° 53.
65 Louis of Berlaymont to Alba, 16/04/1574: ADA Caja 31 n° 28.
and large Alba – as leader of the albistas - stands out as a hawk, while Medinaceli and Requesens have been seen as doves due to their affiliation with the ebolistas.\(^\text{67}\) The discussion in the Consejo de Estado on 29 October 1566 usually serves to illustrate the importance of factionalism in the formulation of the policy towards the Iconoclastic Fury in the Low Countries. Four of the councillors present, the prince of Eboli and clients, suggested that the King undertake a journey, accompanied by a small but significant army in order to re-establish loyalty and to grant a pardon. The other four, presided over by Alba, eventually won by urging for an impressive military expedition before the King traveled to the pacified Low Countries. This is one of the only cases of a perfect congruency between factions and opinions, at least so far as this concerns the Spanish Court. Dutch nobles hardly fit into this scheme. As mentioned, Liesbeth Guevers recently argued that the faction of the Prince of Eboli (the ebolistas) was not able to integrate the three main aristocrats in the Low Countries - the Prince of Orange, the Count of Egmond and the Count of Horn - into the Spanish-Habsburg Empire. Even if the ebolistas maintained a large correspondence, their brokerage did not satisfy the patronage aspirations or the politic expectations of the Dutch grandees.\(^\text{68}\)

The case of Berlaymont also proves that Dutch nobles fit with difficulty into Spanish factionalism. In the summer and autumn of 1566, Berlaymont expressed political opinions which seemed similar to those of the Ebolista faction. He asked, for example, for the King to come immediately, as only his presence would change the opinion of the malcontents. After the iconoclastic fury, he advised the King to wait as long as possible to start a military response. The King had to avoid every war, acting with douceur where possible in order to restore the public order.\(^\text{69}\) Despite this resemblance to the Ebolista stance, his immediate patron Granvelle was the outspoken opponent of the faction.\(^\text{70}\) Perhaps then his opinion was due to his support of Margaret of Parma who, it has been argued, was part of the Ebolistas.\(^\text{71}\) In any case, Berlaymont only referred in his letters to his duty to counsel the King as fiel vasallo y muy obediente criado y obligado a mi Rey y soberano señor.\(^\text{72}\)

In the opposite way, Berlaymont’s rapprochement to Medinaceli, who has been seen as the candidate of the Ebolista faction, did not imply a pacifist stance. Even if Medinaceli had been welcomed as the long expected medicina caeli (medicine from heaven), he had instantly to accompany Alba at the siege of Mons and assisted in the repression of the city. Some believed this was a deliberate attempt by Alba to compromise the good reputation of Medinaceli, but it was only half a year later in October 1572, after the harsh sack of Malines, that Juan de la Cerda openly opposed Alba’s policies.\(^\text{73}\) Berlaymont, however, had sought immediate access to the brokerage of the newly appointed governor. It is only significant that after Medinaceli’s opposition, Berlaymont still continued to seek his company in order to air his criticism. Hence, this paper argues that the power base, acquired by patronage, could easily serve to formulate criticisms of Habsburg policy. Nobles which did so formed part of what Gustaaf Janssens has called the ‘loyal opposition’.\(^\text{74}\) As a rule, a conflict could be solved by the voie de douceur or the voie de rigueur or de force. This was a basic division made by Roman political thought, Cicero amongst others, and especially known in the sixteenth-century by the monarchical version of Seneca, which argued in De Clementia that mildness and clemency were always more desirable than strictness.

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\(^{67}\) Even if also this affiliation has been nuanced by J. Versele, ‘Los móviles’.

\(^{68}\) L. Guevers, Gevallen vazallen, 182-185.

\(^{69}\) ‘y assi con ella no se pueden remediar los males (…) ay ny con ninguno otro remedio que V.Md. pueda embiar y dar como con su venida y presencia’, Berlaymont to Philip II, 29/08/1566: AGS E 530 s.f. and Berlaymont to Philip II, 29/08/1566: AGS E 530 s.f., relación.

\(^{70}\) Lagomarsino, Court Factions, passim.

\(^{71}\) J. Martínez Millán, ‘Grupos de poder en la corte durante el reinado de Felipe II: La facción ebolista, 1554-1573’, in: J. Martínez Millán (ed.), Institución y Elites de Poder en la Monarquía Hispana Durante el Siglo XVI, Madrid, 1992, 137-198

\(^{72}\) ‘devo a fiel vasallo y muy obediente criado y obligado a mi Rey y soberano señor’, Berlaymont to Philip II, 29/08/1566: AGS E 530 (original and Spanish translation).

\(^{73}\) Morillon to Granvelle, 17/10/1572: Piot, CGP IV, 459.

and cruelty. In the context of a rebellion or heresy, clemency did not mean relinquishing completely a military or repressive response, but instead accompanying it with reconciliatory measures such as a (general) pardon, the journey of the King or eventually even the convocation of the States-General. 75

Berlaymont for example criticised the way the Duke of Alba approached the Dutch nobles, even if they had once been his political enemies. The arrests of Egmont and Hornes led him to request an audience in which he fiercely defended the privileges of Knights of the Golden Fleece, including that they should be judged by members of the Order. 76 Furthermore, he contested that the judicial proceedings defined the King as souverain du payz and not souverain de l’Ordre. 77 Alva responded that Berlaymont’s opposition could lead to a warning during the next chapter of the Golden Fleece and forbade other audiences on this theme. 78 This is the real context of Berlaymont’s participation in the trial of Egmont and Hornes.

The criticism of Berlaymont comes perhaps as less shocking, as he was not dependent only on Alba as patron. It is more surprising (and also less known) that Noircarmes also criticised the Duke’s government. As early as 1568, the Grand Bailliff of Hainaut exposed his rather negative assessment to his brother Selles, at that time in the Netherlands after a mission in France. 79 Upon his return to the Spanish Court, Selles wrote his brother’s opinion down in Castilian (which was heavily influenced by his French mother tongue though). The (until now unknown) autograph remains today in the British Library amongst the papers of the Grand Inquisitor, the Cardinal of Espinosa. Noircarmes first criticised Alba’s military strategy, which took into account neither the power of Dutch cities nor the crucial position of the border provinces nor the possibility of an invasion by foreign powers. More fundamentally, he thought that the King had to win the hearts of his vassals, both of noblemen and others (assy de cavalleros como de qualquier’ otro genero de personas). The King seemed to lose his nobility and his lands at one and the same time, therefore he had to use force only partially and complement it with douceur and a general pardon. He underlined that he did not want the King to completely renounce the via de fuerça. 80 In 1570 and 1571, Berlaymont and Noircarmes set their traditional rivalry aside and jointly warned the King of their opposition to the Tenth Penny, a new tax proposed by Alba, by secretly sending a courtier to Madrid. They thought the new tax would only provoke more unrest, and should thus be abolished. 81

Equally in 1573, Noircarmes harshly assessed the policy of his patron. Now he urged not only for a general pardon, but also for peace negotiations. For hardliners peace negotiations were unacceptable, because they implied equality between the King and the rebels, whereas a pardon still maintained the hierarchical relationship. Now his pleas had some success, as he was the only military commander to get permission to start negotiations with the rebel party. 82 In December 1573, he sent diplomats to rebel cities but only Gouda responded. When English troops left the city in January 1574, Noircarmes formally promised the Gouda citizens pardon, but the attempt to negotiate did not get off

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76 Berlaymont to Philips II, 29/12/1567: AGS E 535 f° 179; cf. Janssens, Brabant in het verweer, 146.

77 Morillon to Granvelle, 1/02/1568: Poullet, CGr III, 190-195 (LXI).


79 Cf. Hopperus to Alva, 27/06/1568: ADA Caja 36 n° 50.

80 Lo que Monsieur de Noircarmes mi Hermano me encargo de decir a su Magestad para la conservacion de los estados de Flandres (sic), s.d. [09/1568]; BLL Ms. Add. 28.387 fol. 140-141 (autograph), fol. 138-139 (copy); ‘El dicho mi hermano sería de pareçer (salvo otro mayor) que para tornar a ganar los coraçones de los vassallos de aquella tierra, assy de cavalleros como de qualquier’ otro genero de personas su Magesta fuese servido hazer un perdón general porque con la sola fuerça no le pareç que se puede hazer aquel effeto antes mas por esto desesperar a muchos y ruinar la tierra del todo y desecar toda la noblesa della, lo qual no haria sy las cosas se remediasen en parte por la fuerça, y parte por la confiança de la lealdad de los vassallos della que toda dia los ay buenos.’

81 Morillon to Granvelle, 10/03/1572; Poullet, CGr IV, 125-128 (XLIX).

82 Noircarmes to Alva, 10/12/1573: ADA Caja 46 n° 71.
the ground. The capture of Philip of Marnix de Sainte-Aldegonde, Calvinist advisor to the Prince, was another occasion Noircarmes seized upon for negotiation. He obliged Marnix to write letters to Orange in order to convince him to negotiate peace. William of Orange cleverly responded that he wanted *une seure et bonne paix*, given the fact that God asked all Christians for peace. As his only condition, he asked that the *hispanolz* leave the country and he was convinced that Noircarmes wanted this too. Tactically, the Prince recalled their joint presence in *la chambre du feu empereur* and hinted at the doomed fate of Philip of Hesse and the Margrave of Brandenburg, once also nobles in Habsburg service.

As always in civil war, perceptions shifted alongside parties, yet Noircarmes found himself in a particularly troubled position. He was the forthright enemy of the Dutch Beggars, but also of some Dutch loyalists. Morillon criticized him for giving the pardon to Gouda too late, indicating that this had meant the royal party had lost much. To make things even worse, Noircarmes was also dismissed by Spaniards for being too lenient. According to an anonymous note, also kept in Espinosa’s papers at the British Library, by the end of 1573 Noircarmes was even hated by ‘our nation’ because he did not attack the walls of Haarlem ‘contrary to the opinion of good soldiers’. On the contrary (still according to the report), he obstructed royal *criados* in order to help his friends and relatives within the city walls, which was the only reason why the royal army had lost Alkmaar. Noircarmes wanted to prolong the war because he was *principe y absoluto señor* in it and because he wanted to make a compromise according to the wishes of the Allied States-General, ‘but against the honour of God and Christianity’. Alba too soon came to mistrust Noircarmes’ negotiations. Noircarmes avoided a fall from grace only by dying on 5 March in Utrecht. According to his doctor: *il s’est par trop travaillé à negocier.*

**Conclusion**

Helmut Koenigsberger, John Elliott and José Martínez Millán *cum suis* have shown that the Habsburgs – and Philip II in particular – were well aware of the potential of patronage to hold their composite state together. Over and over they used the distribution of offices as a means of rewarding and reinforcing loyalty and so skilfully strengthened their power and prerogatives. Nevertheless, this working paper addressed the limits of Habsburg patronage during the Dutch Revolt, made clear through the revolt of William of Orange, but also demonstrated amongst loyal noblemen.

The dynamics of Habsburg patronage created an open elite in the Low Countries, of which Berlaymont and Noircarmes formed part. They received awards, offices in the central institutions and the highly prized provincial governorship in return for their continuing loyalty. For both these noblemen, the hostilities offered even greater chances for social mobility as important offices fell vacant and new military offices were created. Moreover, they esteemed the Catholic stance of their King, fighting against the Reformation. He was better placed than the, by then, protestant William of Orange to guarantee the privileged position of Tridentine Catholicism. Their decision to remain loyal

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84 Noircarmes to Alva, 10/12/1573: ADA Caja 46 n° 71.
86 Orange to Noircarmes, 4/01/1574; WvO 10905, AGS E 557 f° 50. Orange to Noircarmes, 23/12/1573: WvO 3089, cf. Groen, *Archives IV, 300-302 (CDLXII/a)
88 Las causas que los españoles que sirven, en este feliciissimo Exercito de su Magestad dan, para mostrar la necesidad que ay, de que V.Exa. asiste personalmente a todo lo que resta de hazer en la guerra presente, son en substancia [s.d. einde 1573]: BLL Ms. Add. 28388 fol. 18-14.
89 Alva to Requesens, 1/01/1574: EDA III 573.
90 Morillon to Granvelle: Poulet, *CGR* V, 14-17 (VI).
was rational, religious and emotional at the same time, rather than the mere selfish behaviour of parvenus. Yet patronage also created fierce competition amongst nobles, another often overlooked basis for tension. In having built up a system with many different rewards, they also created scope for internal rivalries, particularly for noblemen with a similar profile. Berlaymont and Noircarmes aspired to the same goals in titles, the court and the provincial governorships and, therefore, they used different strategies and patrons. Their enmity grew worse over the years and in the end it also damaged the reputation of the Habsburgs. Joachim Hopperus, Dutch councillor in Madrid, thought that both should openly reconcile and give up their strife in order to achieve a more rapid pacification of the Netherlands.  

Different patrons did not exclude similar political positions within the chaos of the Dutch Revolt. Despite their antagonism and their different patrons, Noircarmes and Berlaymont shared quite similar ideas on a desirable approach for the pacification of the Netherlands: a military intervention was necessary, but only if accompanied by reconciliatory measures. So recipients of patronage in the Netherlands became powerful bargainers, able to air their criticisms towards Habsburg policies. This occurred from 1565 onwards among the Dutch grandees. It is, however, often forgotten that the remaining loyal nobility also continued opposition (but not rebellion). The recipient of offices, Noircarmes used his position as mediator to critically assess the style of government of his patron. This is why on the occasion of the death of Noircarmes Granvelle wrote that the King had not lost anything ‘because at the very moment Alba favoured him the most, he was writing heinous letters against the government of the Duke’. The Cardinal had kept some of these letters and was willing to send copies if they did not already have kept these letters in Spain.

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92 Granvelle to Juan de Zúñiga,  11/04/1574: BLL Add. Mss. 28, 388 fol. 42v (copy): ‘...no perdiera nada en ello su Magestad, quando mas le favorescia el Duque escrivía letras infernales contra el Duque y la forma del gobierno, quiça tienen algunas en España, yo podía mostrar algunas’.