Multi-level Party Politics in Italy and Spain

Alex Wilson

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

Florence, June 2009
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Department of Political and Social Sciences

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Alex Wilson

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Abstract

This thesis undertakes an empirical exploration of multi-level party politics in Italy and Spain since the 1990s, with a particular focus on the regional level of party organisation and electoral competition. It finds that statewide parties have adopted different territorial strategies to confront the common challenge of multi-level coordination in a decentralised political system. Regional branches of statewide parties increasingly respond to the competitive pressures emerging from sub-national party systems, rather than the preferences of the national leadership, although the interests of national and regional elites may often coincide. Regional party systems in both countries are diverging in their structures of competition, not only from the national level but also from each other. This is closely related to the different types of electoral challenge posed by the main non-statewide parties in these regions. The methodological design consists of two national frameworks and four regional case studies, two in Italy (Campania, Lombardia) and two in Spain (Andalusia, Galicia). These are linked through the use of comparable empirical indicators over a similar timeframe. The national frameworks required the compilation of a new data-set on regional elections in Italy and Spain, a detailed analysis of party statutes and their evolution, and a full exploration of the secondary literature in different languages. The regional case studies required extensive archival analysis of the main national newspapers and their regional editions, reinforced by a series of in-depth interviews with political actors in all four regions. The case studies found strong empirical evidence concerning the distinctive character of presidentialism at regional level; the continued importance of clientelism in shaping political relations at sub-national levels; the pursuit of autonomist strategies by regional branches of statewide parties; the variety of competitive strategies adopted by non-statewide parties; the role of regional arenas as battlegrounds for national factional disputes; and the importance of local coalition testing for subsequent coalitional choices at regional level. The comparative conclusions serve to consolidate these findings, as well as to reflect on further avenues for research in this rapidly developing field.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>3-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1.2</td>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>11-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1.3</td>
<td>Regionalisation and Party Strategies</td>
<td>22-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1.4</td>
<td>Methodological Design</td>
<td>29-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1.5</td>
<td>Regionalisation in Italy and Spain</td>
<td>33-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2.1</td>
<td>Multi-Level Party Organisation in Italy (1995-2007)</td>
<td>51-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2.2</td>
<td>Multi-Level Party Systems in Italy (1995-2007)</td>
<td>68-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2.3</td>
<td>Organisational and Systemic Linkages in Italy</td>
<td>92--94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3.3</td>
<td>Organisational and Systemic Linkages in Spain</td>
<td>132-134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3.4</td>
<td>Concepts and Regional Case Studies</td>
<td>135-146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Regional Party Politics in Italy</td>
<td>147-242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4.1</td>
<td>Regional Party Politics in Campania (1995-2007)</td>
<td>148-194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4.2</td>
<td>Regional Party Politics in Lombardia (1995-2007)</td>
<td>195-236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4.3</td>
<td>Comparative Conclusions for the Italian Regions</td>
<td>237-242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td>Regional Party Politics in Spain</td>
<td>243-337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5.1</td>
<td>Regional Party Politics in Andalusia (1990-2007)</td>
<td>244-283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5.2</td>
<td>Regional Party Politics in Galicia (1989-2007)</td>
<td>284-330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5.3</td>
<td>Comparative Conclusions for the Spanish Regions</td>
<td>331-337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>Comparative Conclusions</td>
<td>339-354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>355-370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexes</td>
<td></td>
<td>371-381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Chapter 1.1: Introduction

This thesis examines the impact of state decentralisation to the regional level (hereafter ‘regionalisation’) on party politics in Italy and Spain, through the adoption of a multi-level perspective that compares national and regional levels of party competition. Focusing on recent changes to multi-level party organisations and party systems, this research generates intra-national and cross-national comparisons. These will be of particular interest for scholars of Italian and Spanish politics, but will have broader implications for scholars of comparative politics. This research addresses the question of whether political parties in Italy and Spain are diverging between territorial levels in organisational or systemic terms, and in doing so highlights the mechanisms through which regionalisation impacts on political parties. Existing studies of federal systems have posited an interdependent relationship between decentralisation and political parties, with more decentralised federations fostering more decentralised parties, while more centralised federations foster more centralised parties (Elazar, 1987; Riker, 1975; McKay, 2001; Filippov et al., 2004; Thorlakson, 2007). Yet we know little about the transmission mechanisms through which state decentralisation affects political parties, and this limits our understanding of recent processes of federalisation in Western Europe, where centralised unitary states have undergone substantial processes of regionalisation (Hesse and Wright, 1996), resulting in the creation of decentralised systems with federal features (Stepan, 2001). Italy and Spain fit the profile of centralised unitary states undergoing substantial processes of regionalisation, although this process is occurring for rather different reasons (Moreno, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). Party politics in these multi-level systems sheds revealing light on the territorial dynamics of state decentralisation, because parties are not only responsible for shaping the institutional reforms that lead to state decentralisation, but are also heavily affected by the competitive and organisational pressures unleashed by the creation of new (or reinforced) levels of elected sub-national government. The response of political parties to these pressures can induce powerful centripetal or centrifugal dynamics into the process of decentralisation (Keating and Wilson, 2009). However party organisations in Western Europe achieved the ‘nationalisation’ of electoral politics precisely through the ‘vertical dislocation’ of
issues and allegiances (Caramani, 2004), so tended to develop rather centralised party organisations (Katz and Mair, 1994), which they may be unwilling or unable to adjust in response to changes in their external environment (Panebianco, 1988). The Italian and Spanish cases provide substantial empirical evidence on the relationship between state design and political parties, which can help to refine existing frameworks for analysing multi-level politics in decentralised systems (Deschouwer, 2003; Hopkin, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006). This thesis argues that the territorial dynamics of multi-level politics need to be evaluated in light of broader changes to political parties. These include the weakening links of parties with civil society (Schmitter, 2001) and their closer relationship to the state (Katz and Mair, 1995); the decline of party membership (Biezen and Mair, 2001) and the rise of executive leadership (Poguntke and Webb, 2004); and the increase in competitive bipolarism (Mair, 2006), despite partisan de-alignment and the decline of traditional cleavage structures (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002). Existing comparative studies of multi-level politics have considerably advanced our empirical understanding in this field (Hough et al, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006), but their principal limitation has been a tendency to treat multi-level politics in relative isolation from other processes of party change.

Multi-level politics in Italy and Spain is a vast area for theoretical and empirical research, so this thesis necessarily focuses on comparable indicators that can measure change in multi-level party organisations and multi-level party competition. The research focuses on the main political parties that compete across the national territory (‘statewide parties’), because these are primarily responsible for structuring political relationships between territorial levels. This complements existing studies that have analysed regionalist parties in Western Europe (De Winter and Tursan, 1998; De Winter et al, 2006), but rarely addressed the important question of how regionalist parties induce change in statewide parties (SWP) and their regional branches (Roller and van Houten, 2003; Hepburn, 2007). Regionalist parties can have widely differing aims, from cultural autonomy to full national independence (De Winter and Tursan, 1998), so the more generic term ‘non-statewide parties’ (NSWP) is used to compare these political actors in multi-level party systems (Pallares et al, 1997). The analysis of NSWP focuses primarily
on the competitive pressures they induce on SWP at national and regional levels of electoral competition, although their varied internal organisation and political objectives are addressed in the regional case studies. This thesis focuses empirically on party systems and party organisations at regional level, whose structures of competition are significantly less explored than those at national level (Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Hepburn, 2007). This analysis of regional party politics is located within a broader multi-level framework, which compares divergence or convergence from the national level, and considers the impact of regional party competition on national politics. Studies of regional politics in Italy and Spain face a difficult trade-off between breadth and depth of analysis. A comprehensive study of party politics in all 20 Italian regions and 17 Spanish regions would need to focus on rather narrow indicators, and would probably be unable to convey a nuanced understanding of regional political dynamics, partly because there is little secondary literature in this field. An alternative approach is to focus on particular regions as case studies, although this approach risks losing sight of the national framework in which these operate, and could obscure important inter-regional differences or similarities. This thesis has overcome this trade-off by adopting a mixed approach that combines national frameworks of party politics in all Spanish and Italian regions, with four regional case studies (2 in Italy, 2 in Spain) that focus on the dynamics of party politics. The use of similar indicators and a common framework at both levels of analysis helps to improve the empirical coherence of the findings.

This research makes a series of general and contextual observations, which are discussed at various lengths in different chapters and drawn together in the comparative conclusions. At this stage it is necessary only to draw attention to some of the most recurrent findings of this research project, which testify to the usefulness of the mixed approach discussed above. The thesis finds that party competition in the Italian and Spanish regions has adopted distinct patterns that often diverge from the national level, although these have rarely undermined (and sometimes reinforced) the prevailing structures of national party competition. Regional branches of SWP respond primarily to the challenges of regional party competition, rather than the prerogatives of the national leadership, and have pursued distinct political strategies to improve their competitive
position within the regional party system. These regional branches can therefore no longer be viewed as ‘satellites’ of the national party, and should be seen as varyingly autonomous components of more pluralistic party organisations. There are some exceptions to this rule, and these occur where SWP have succeeded in retaining a centralised organisation through successive electoral victories, or in regions where SWP branches are perennially excluded from the regional government, thus increasing their dependence on the national party. This generally conforms to a broader view of modern party organisations as increasingly composed of ‘careerists’ rather than ‘believers’ (Panebianco, 1988), whose primary objective is to control the state for its resources and legitimacy (Katz and Mair, 1995). Statewide parties have adopted different strategies to accommodate the growing assertiveness of their regional branches. Intra-national differences are clearly evident, but the most striking differences are cross-national. Italian parties have maintained formally centralised organisations, but in practice have developed increasingly ‘stratarchical’ relations between national and sub-national levels, as an informal mechanism to accommodate sub-national elites. Spanish parties have developed more decentralised organisations, but these are nevertheless closely integrated between levels. In Italy the behaviour of sub-national elites is of limited interest to national party leaders, and does not significantly influence their national political strategy. In Spain regional branches of SWP are seen as crucial components of any national party strategy, and their ability to compete effectively in regional party systems can have a determining effect on national politics. In both countries we find that regional branches of SWP often adopt highly autonomist strategies in regional party systems (Roller and van Houten, 2003; Hepburn, 2007). These vary significantly in response to the electoral strength and competitive positioning of the main NSWP in the region. Yet common features include the demand for greater autonomy for the regional government, usually as a way to stimulate regional economic growth, and the pursuit of greater autonomy for the regional party, which consistently projects itself as the best defender of regional interests in national politics.

These autonomist strategies are inherently ‘catch-all’ because they do not focus on particular social sectors, and seek instead to encompass a wide range of diverse territorial
interests, which are then counter-posed against other regions or the central state. In many respects regional branches of SWP are ideally suited to developing these autonomist strategies, because they can appeal to moderate voters who support greater autonomy but are unwilling to support the more radical options advocated by NSWP, while continued links with the national party are justified as a way of securing regional interests in the national arena. These strategies often place NSWP on the defensive, making them radicalise their positions on the question of autonomy to maintain a core support base, or encouraging them to carve out a niche position on the left-right of the political spectrum, with either strategy implying a substantial reduction in their ‘catch-all’ territorial appeal. Whereas SWP in wealthier regions emphasise the importance of endogenous resources, demanding less interference and fewer impositions by the central state (e.g. fiscal autonomy), SWP in poorer regions emphasise the importance of exogeneous resources (e.g. transfers from the central state), as a way to overcome historical economic differences between regions. This qualifies the view that wealthier regions tend to support decentralisation, whereas poorer regions tend to be fearful of its damaging impact on welfare provision (Keating, 1998). Poorer regions in Spain have adopted autonomist discourses for regional economic growth that emphasise the importance of continued resources from the central government. This strategy is less present in southern Italy where politicians are keen to secure fiscal transfers from the central state, in order to maintain or construct their personal support base, but have not sought to expand regional government autonomy or develop a concerted strategy for regional economic growth. Politicians in southern Italy disingenuously argue that fiscal transfers have been reduced by successive national governments, and are now insufficient for adequate welfare provision. In reality the modest reduction in transfers from the national government have been more than compensated by hugely increased transfers from European Union structural funds. The argument of ‘comparative grievance’ (Moreno, 1997) in southern Italy obscures the role these same politicians have performed in driving down levels of institutional performance, through their clientelised dissipation of state resources. Yet the absence of an autonomist discourse in southern Italy also reflects its negative associations (Keating, 1997), because regional autonomy is perceived as an objective that primarily serves the interests of northern Italians (Roux, 2008). This is an understandable reaction.
to the hostile rhetoric of the Northern League, which has openly advocated a substantial reduction in fiscal transfers from north to south (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). In general terms the ‘politics of growth’ (Keating, 1997) has become an important dimension of regional party competition, encouraging political leaders to formulate broad-based coalitions that help secure their electoral success. These “development coalitions” represent “a cross-class, placed-based alliance of social and political actors dedicated to economic growth in a specific location” (Keating, 1998, 144). In fact “adopting a pro-development role has attractions for regional political leaders, giving them an image of dynamism and modernity and allowing them to pitch their appeals to the regional electorate as a whole, without being confined to class or sectoral interests” (Keating, 1998, 148). These ‘catch-all’ territorial appeals should be viewed as part of broader political strategies, which can induce a response from competitors in the party system. This perspective contrasts with the depolitised approach adopted in most studies of ‘regional governance’, whose more enlightened authors have indeed highlighted the close and interdependent relationship between sub-national government and non-governmental groups (Le Gales and Lequesne, 1998), yet not fully considered the importance of regional party competition in framing political leadership strategies.

Regional party politics in Italy and Spain is characterised by the pervasive use of clientelist mechanisms, not only between politicians and voters (‘vertical clientelism’), but also within the political class (‘horizontal clientelism’). Although clientelism remains a limited explanation for electoral mobilisation in Spain as whole (Hopkin, 2001b), its mechanisms remain strong in rural territories highly dependent on state resources. In northern Italy, clientelism is a very limited explanation for electoral mobilisation, due to high levels of economic development and dispersed centres of economic production, but clientelist ties remain strong between the regional government and certain sectors of the business community, which in turn have provided ample financing in election campaigns. In southern Italy clientelism remains an important explanation for electoral mobilisation, due to a weak economy reliant on state transfers, very high levels of welfare dependency, and a regional electoral system where elected candidates are purely determined by preference voting. In Italy and Spain clientelism has a pronounced impact on regional
party organisations, allowing institutional leaders to strengthen their position within the regional party or governing coalition, through the selective allocation of resources or remunerative positions to their supporters, a form of ‘horizontal clientelism’ that expands as regionalisation increases the patronage capacity of regional governments. Clientelism contributed to the growth of presidentialism in regional politics, allowing the regional president to exert a powerful control over the regional party, irrespective of whether he formally controls the party apparatus. Clientelism has different effects on the stability of regional governments. In southern Italy ‘horizontal clientelism’ takes the extreme form of an aggregation of local powerbrokers, which regularly defect from opposition parties to governing parties in exchange for financial resources or well remunerated posts. This reduces the effectiveness of government alternation through competitive elections, and produces governing coalitions that are over-sized, unstable, and incoherent. In northern Italy and most Spanish regions, clientelism has helped to strengthen executive leadership and improve government stability, partly because governing coalitions contain a strong electoral hierarchy between the competing parties, with the regional president in effective control of the dominant coalitional partner. Existing studies have argued that presidents use their increased political visibility and executive powers to become more autonomous from parties (Poguntke and Webb, 2004; Calise, 2006; 2007). The experience at regional level is that presidents use executive powers to assert greater control over the regional party, either by supporting loyal factions and weakening others, or by becoming core mediators in factional disputes. Control over regional party organisations has allowed regional presidents to depend less heavily on support from the party leadership, and has sometimes raised the stature of regional presidents in national politics. Regional presidents are nevertheless constrained by their party organisations, because their position of authority within the regional party depends partly on the suppression of factional disputes, or at least strong cross-factional support. Regional presidents are therefore rarely able (or even willing) to oppose the national leadership on key issues, because this would produce fractures within the regional party that would undermine the prevailing consensus that surrounds their presidential leadership.
The analytical timeframes for Spain (1991-2007) and Italy (1995-2007) are similar and consistent across the national frameworks and regional case studies. In Italy this allows the project to focus on multi-level party systems after the collapse of the governing partitocrazia, with the subsequent bi-polar shift in party competition since 1994 (Bartolini et al, 2004); the operation of a new regional electoral system since 1995 (Fabbrini, 2001); and the direct election of regional presidents since 1999 (Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). In Spain the project focuses on party competition after PSOE lost its predominant position in the national party system, as PP was successfully transformed into a centre-right ‘catch-all’ party (Gunther et al, 2004). The outline of the thesis is the following: Chapter 1.2 provides a brief overview and critique of the key literature that addresses party politics in multi-level system. Chapter 1.3 develops hypotheses for the expected impact of regionalisation on multi-level party organization and party systems. Chapter 1.4 outlines the methodological design of the research project, composed of two national frameworks and four regional case studies. Chapter 1.5 compares processes of regionalisation in Italy and Spain, relying primarily on secondary literature. This allows the subsequent Chapters to focus on how these distinct patterns of state decentralisation have impacted on party politics. The national frameworks compare multi-level party organisations and party systems in Italy (Chapter 2) and Spain (Chapter 3), relying on a variety of sources: Aggregate electoral data; the collection of data on regional government formation; a comparison of party statutes; and relevant secondary literature. Chapter 3.4 links these national frameworks to the regional case studies, by highlighting important variables that have a determining impact on structures of regional party competition, but which are rarely explored in the literature on multi-level party politics. The regional case studies are located within the national frameworks and use comparable empirical indicators. Yet in terms of data they rely primarily on extensive archival research and in-depth interviews with key political actors. Campania (Chapter 4.1) and Lombardia (Chapter 4.2) are the regions selected for Italy, while Andalusia (Chapter 5.1) and Galicia (Chapter 5.2) are the regions selected for Spain. Intra-national comparisons are developed in the conclusions for the Italian regions (Chapter 4.3) and those for the Spanish regions (Chapter 5.3). Chapter 6 contains comparative conclusions that consider the cross-national implications of this project, and consider future avenues of research.
Chapter 1.2: Literature Review

This literature review will consider the analytical frameworks that have been developed to compare the behaviour of parties in multi-level systems, and will assess empirical evidence from existing case studies that have addressed the interdependent relationship between state organisation and the behaviour of political parties. This will highlight salient research questions and under-explored empirical cases, which will inform the research questions, case selection, and methodological design adopted for this project.

Emerging Frameworks for Analysing Multi-level Politics

Scholars of comparative politics have begun to address the challenges of multi-level politics, mainly through case studies that evaluate the behaviour of parties in decentralised multi-level settings (Hough et al., 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006). These national case studies have generated an abundance of empirical material, but still not developed a strong comparative framework for analysing the behaviour of parties in multi-level systems. Nor have specialists of comparative politics supplied this framework, given their tendency to focus almost exclusively on the national arena of party competition and organisation. Recent examples of this approach include a comprehensive study of national elections in Western Europe by Daniele Caramani (2004), which did not consider sub-national elections. Caramani argues that party system ‘nationalisation’ is a characteristic of democratic consolidation, and occurs through the development of national political spaces; the territorial homogenisation of electoral behaviour; the supremacy of the left-right cleavage above others (including territorial cleavages); and the creation of nationalised political parties which ‘vertically dislocate’ issues, organisation, and allegiances. Yet in many advanced industrial democracies, mainly located in Western Europe (e.g. UK, Spain, Belgium, Italy), recent decades have seen strong processes of ‘regionalisation’, i.e. state decentralisation that reinforces the regional level of government. This process challenges the capacity of nationalised parties to compete effectively in multi-level systems characterised by diverse ‘loci of power’ (Deschouwer, 2003), with ‘denationalisation’ of electoral politics becoming a potential
outcome in more decentralised states (Hopkin, 2003; Leonardi, 2003). To analyse this phenomenon the study of multi-level politics either needs to develop a new conceptual language (Deschouwer, 2003), or successfully adapt theoretical perspectives derived from comparative studies of national politics (Hopkin, 2003). Lori Thorlakson (2006, 2007) has developed an analytical framework that compares multi-level party systems in terms of their congruence, whether inter-regional (‘horizontal’) or national-regional (‘vertical’) congruence. Thorlakson argues that congruence can be analysed along three dimensions: the similarity of competing parties; the similarity of aggregate electoral behaviour; and the similarity of core party system structures. This framework also seeks to capture the linkages in multi-level party systems, in order to measure the degree of interdependence between territorial levels. Ingrid van Biezen and Jonathan Hopkin (2006) have developed an analytical framework for comparing party organisations in multi-level settings, which focuses on candidate selection; electoral strategies; and governing strategies. These are aspects of party organisation which contain the greatest potential for inter-level conflict, since they affect whether politicians can remain in elected office and/or access the resources of sub-national government. Also of relevance for multi-level politics are arrangements for party financing between territorial levels (Deschouwer, 2003), and the direction of political career paths (Stolz, 2001; 2003). The timing of regional elections can also affect party strategies, since they may be held at different points of the national electoral cycle (Jeffery and Hough, 2001; 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006). Regional elections can acquire a ‘nationalising’ character when they are held in several regions at the same time (‘horizontal simultaneity’), or held concurrently with national elections (‘vertical simultaneity’), with both arrangements reinforcing the need for multi-level coordination (Deschouwer, 2003). Conversely where regional elections are held separately from national or other regional elections, they are more likely to develop a distinctively regional character (Hough and Jeffery, 2006). Regional coalition formation is another area for potential divergence between territorial levels. Coalition formation affects whether parties can enter the regional government, but may undermine the competitive alignment of the party at national level (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). Yet regional coalitions are also a vital opportunity for national coalition testing, allowing the party leadership to assess the suitability of potential coalition.
partners in regional arenas, prior to transposing or rejecting such an alliance at national level (Downs, 1998). The organisational strategies of statewide parties (SWP) that cover the national territory are also affected by the challenge of non-statewide parties (NSWP), which can either adopt a ‘nationalist’ or ‘regionalist’ character (Pallares et al, 1997). The impact of NSWP on party systems at national level has already been analysed, particularly the different strategies used to accommodate or reject their demands (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983; Meny and Wright, 1985; De Winter and Tursan, 1998; De Winter et al., 2006). Yet few studies have compared the impact of NSWP in regional party systems, where they have stronger weight in electoral and parliamentary terms, and enter into direct competition with regional branches of SWP (Hepburn, 2007). NSWP seek to caricature regional branches of statewide parties as ‘puppets’ of the national leadership, severely constrained in their capacity to defend regional interests (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). In response regional branches of SWP may adopt autonomist strategies modelled on those of NSWP (Roller and van Houten, 2003; Hepburn, 2007), a strategic choice that can generate tensions or conflict with the party leadership. Autonomist demands will revolve around the question of party organisation, but also the broader relationship between regional and national government. Conflict between territorial levels may intensify when the same SWP controls both national and regional governments, with potential disputes over the allocation or expenditure of resources (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). Conflict between territorial levels can escalate when the SWP loses control over the national government, since this reduces the incentives for regional branches to comply with national demands (Roller and van Houten, 2003).

**Empirical Evidence on Multi-level Politics**

Scholars of comparative federalism have posited an interdependent relationship between institutional decentralisation and the organisational arrangements of political parties (Filippov et al. 2004), with some arguing there is a direct correlation between decentralised federations and decentralised parties (Elazar, 1968, 1987; Riker, 1975; McKay, 2001). These assumptions are confirmed by several case studies of party politics in federal systems. In Switzerland the cantonal level of party organisation has retained
substantial autonomy, in line with a highly ‘peripheralised’ federal system where most policy-making and tax-raising powers reside at the cantonal level (Ladner, 2001). In Canada the provincial party has gained considerable strength over time vis-a-vis the federal party, leading to ‘stratarchical’ patterns of party organisation with weak or inexistent organisational linkages between territorial levels (Carty, 2004; Filippov et al, 2004; Pelletier, 2004), stimulating ‘split-level’ patterns of electoral competition (Wolinetz and Carty, 2006). In USA the federal level of party organisation is itself divided with separate organisations serving the Presidency, House of Representatives and Senate. These have very little control over the political agenda or personnel selection of the Democrat and Republican parties on the ground, leading to a stratarchical system in all but the names of the competing parties (Kolodny and Katz, 1995). Germany is a more centralised federal system, so retains integrated multi-level party organisations and party systems. This reflects the importance of joint-decision making at federalism level, where Lander governments are directly represented in a powerful Upper House (Bundesrat), composed entirely of their delegates (Detterbeck and Renzsch, 2003). Regional party organisations in Germany have significant control over resources and candidate selection procedures (the latter enforced by Constitutional rules), but are nevertheless closely integrated into national decision-making structures (Roberts, 1989; Downs, 1998). All but one Chancellor since 1949 had previously held a ministerial or presidential role at Land level when elected into federal office, and the same applies to all but one of the main opposition candidates since the 1960s (Jeffery, 1999). The highly centralised federal system of Austria has similarly encouraged the development of integrated party organisations and party systems (Abedi and Siaroff, 2006).

Comparative studies of federal systems also confirm the inter-dependent relationship between state decentralisation and party system incongruence. Lori Thorlakson (2007) finds a strong correlation between state decentralisation (measured through the territorial allocation of fiscal resources) and the congruence of multi-level party systems (measured in national-regional and inter-regional terms), in six federal systems (Austria, Australia,  

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1 Angela Merkel is the only German Chancellor since 1949 never to have held a ministerial position in a German Land prior to her election as Chancellor, and this is largely due to her rapid integration as an ‘Easterner’ into Kohl’s CDU leadership after the unification of Germany in 1991.
Canada, Germany, Switzerland, USA). William Downs’ (1998) pioneering study of regional coalition formation in Western Europe involved a comparison of federal (Germany), regionalised (Belgium), and centralised (France) political systems. Downs found that regional coalitions were crucial processes of national coalition testing. This was particularly evident in Germany, where a series of coalitions between SPD and the Greens at regional level in the 1980s became an important testing ground for their subsequent coalition governments at federal level (1998-2005). A similar process occurred in Germany during the 1960s, when the ‘grand coalition’ of CDU and SPD was tested out in several regions prior to being adopted at federal level (Roberts, 1989). Coalition testing has also occurred in Austria, where the consociational proporz system operated in seven of the nine Austrian provinces until 1998. This ensured all parties were represented in the provincial government, allowing the far-right FPO to enter provincial governments while being excluded from national government by a ‘grand coalition’ of the main centre-right (OVP) and main centre-left (SPO) parties. Coalition testing at provincial level between FPO and OVP heavily influenced the decision by OVP to break its ‘grand coalition’ with SPO in 2000, as a prelude to forming a controversial national coalition government with FPO (Fallend, 2004; Abedi and Siaroff, 2006).

The experience of classic federal systems would suggest there is a strong and unidirectional relationship between state and party organisation, whereby the relative centralisation (or peripheralisation) of the state determines the relative integration (or bifurcation) of multi-level party organisations (Renzsch, 2004). However the process through which a federal system is created will also affect multi-level party systems and party organisations. Whereas ‘coming together’ federations are formed after independent constituent units agree to form a federal super-structure, ‘holding together’ federations are formed after political elites in unitary systems decentralise state structures to accommodate strong territorial cleavages (Stepan, 2001). In ‘coming together’ federations (as well as Germany where a federal system was imposed by occupying powers), party organisations institutionalised alongside (or even after) a federal system of government, so adjusted their organisations to reflect state structures. In ‘holding together’ federations, mass party organisations were institutionalised well before a
federal system was in place, making them potentially unable or unwilling to adjust their organisations to reflect changes in state structures. The category of ‘holding together’ federations has been applied to various West European states (UK, Spain, Belgium), which have undergone extensive processes of regionalisation to accommodate their multi-national political differences (Stepan, 2001). Yet decentralisation can also occur in response to performance deficits at national level (Hesse and Wright, 1996), as evident from Italy where strong processes of regionalisation were triggered by the corruption and inefficiency of the unitary state, leading to the collapse of the national party system and its component party organisations (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001).

In Belgium national party organisations fragmented along territorial-linguistic lines in the 1960s and 1970s, when the state was still highly centralised. This fragmentation accelerated the subsequent process of decentralisation, since statewide parties were now absent as ‘moderating forces’ (Deschouwer, 2004). Although electoral competition in Belgium has become entirely focused around the regional level, parties are keen to control the federal government because of its resources, and have sought to guarantee congruent coalitions are maintained across territorial levels (Downs, 1998; De Winter, 2006). Belgium also displays clear differences in party competition between levels, with a collusive federal level alongside a more competitive regional level (Deschouwer, 2004). Devolution in Scotland and Wales since 1999 has created significant problems of coordination for British political parties. The presence of strong NSWP; territorial variations in the electoral strength of SWP; and the Mixed Member-Proportional electoral system used for regional elections; have combined to create distinct regional party systems with innovative patterns of coalition formation. This has generated Labour-Liberal Democrat governing coalitions in Scotland and Wales that have no precedent at national level (Bohrer and Krutz, 2005; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006). SWP have adjusted to these multi-level challenges by adopting very different territorial strategies. The Liberal Democrats retain a federal organisation with strong regional autonomy, where national intervention in regional choices remains rare but informal linkages between territorial levels is strong (Laffin, 2007). The Conservatives decentralised their territorial organisation in Scotland and to a lesser extent in Wales, as a competitive
response to their marginal position in these regional party systems, a process facilitated by the low importance of these regions for Conservative victories in national elections (Bradbury and Hopkin, 2006). The Labour Party has maintained a highly centralised organisation, justified by the necessity of multi-level coordination because Labour was in government at both national and regional level. The national leadership intervened heavily in regional choices (particularly over candidate selection), but was sometimes unable to impose its preferences on the regional party, particularly when this concerned leadership selection (Hopkin, 2001b; Bradbury and Hopkin, 2006; Laffin and Shaw, 2007; Laffin et al, 2007). Regional party systems in Spain are characterised by the presence of numerous NSWP (Pallares et al, 1997), which vary in electoral strength but only dominate party systems in the bi-lingual regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country (Hamann, 1999; Pallares and Keating, 2003), where a strong nationalist cleavage exists (Keating, 2004). Some regional branches of SWP (e.g. the Catalan Socialist Party) have developed more autonomist strategies in response to the challenge of strong NSWP (Roller and van Houten, 2003). NSWP in Spain also have strong coalitional leverage over the national party system, because their support is usually necessary for SWP to secure an absolute majority in the Spanish parliament. This has allowed NSWP to extract significant concessions from governing SWP, particularly over regional autonomy and resources (Colomer, 1998; Aja, 2001; Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). In Italy the Northern League (LN) used its pivotal position in the post-1994 party system to force a ‘northern agenda’ into the heart of Italian electoral politics. LN then aligned itself with the centre-right coalition, in exchange for its agreement on a federal reform of the Italian State (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001; Gold, 2003).

**Avenues for Research in Multi-level Politics**

Existing analyses of multi-level politics have pursued a series of national case studies, whose primary objective is the collection of empirical data through which to construct a more general framework (Hough et al., 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006). Systematic cross-national comparisons are rare, although exceptions include a pioneering study of regional coalition formation in Belgium, Germany, and France (Downs, 1998); a
convincing analysis of the relationship between state decentralisation and multi-level party systems in six federal states (Thorlakson, 2007); and a comparison of multi-level party organisation in the UK and Spain (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). No comparative study has scrutinised the multi-level relationship between organisational and systemic change in political parties, although this aspect is crucial because organisational responses are directly affected by systemic challenges (Roller and van Houten, 2003). Unitary states undergoing processes of regionalisation represent ideal case studies for analysing the political dynamics of multi-level systems, since the resulting tensions of institutional change are more likely to result in inter-territorial conflict than the consolidated patterns of behaviour in classic federal systems. Comparative regional case studies of party politics are useful for examining how broader institutional or organisational changes impact on existing territorial power structures, and may highlight the transmission mechanisms through which state decentralisation affects political parties. Case studies of regional party systems have generally focused on territories with strong NSWP, such as Catalonia in Spain (Roller and van Houten, 2003); Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium (Deschouwer, 2004); or Scotland and Wales in the UK (Bohrer and Krutz, 2005; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006). Yet case studies of regions dominated by SWP are more useful for illustrating the political dynamics of state decentralisation, since these can be more easily distinguished from the separate question of competing national identities and their political mobilisation within multi-national states (Keating, 2001a; 2004). The role of SWP in structuring inter-territorial relationships needs to be more carefully assessed, since existing analysis has focused on the multi-level behaviour NSWP (De Winter and Tursan, 1998; De Winter et al, 2006; Hepburn, 2007). Finally, existing studies of multi-level politics are rarely linked to the broader changes and challenges to political parties. This include partisan de-alignment in voting behaviour (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002); the declining aggregative function of political parties and their weakening links with civil society (Schmitter, 2001); the emergence of ‘cartel parties’ reliant primarily on the resources and legitimacy of the state (Katz and Mair, 1995); the substantial cross-national decline in party membership (Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Scarrow, 2002); and the rise in ‘presidentialised’ politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2004). This thesis attempts to integrate the study of multi-level politics more closely
within the broader field of comparative party politics, by adopting a strong comparative dimension, and by linking developments in multi-level politics to more general developments in party politics. The detailed and contextual findings from the national and regional case studies will also be of interest for scholars of Italy and Spain.

The regional case studies evaluate salient dimensions of multi-level politics that are rarely subjected to systematic research, including the phenomenon of ‘presidentialism’ at regional level. In Italy the direct election of regional presidents has strengthened their position vis-à-vis parties in the regional legislatures (Fabbrini, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003; Calise, 2006; 2007). Yet the absence of empirical case studies on regional presidentialism in Italy allows us to make only tentative speculations on how this might affect intra-party and inter-party dynamics, and whether this process varies significantly between northern and southern Italy. In the Spanish case no systematic analysis has been conducted of regional presidentialism, although there is a compelling empirical case for doing so, given the rise of regional party ‘barons’ in PSOE (Colomer, 1998; Mendez, 1998; 2006); the long leadership of PP founder Manuel Fraga in his native region of Galicia (Maiz and Losada, 2000); and Jordi Pujol’s (CiU) long reign as regional president in Catalonia (1980-2003).

Another neglected dimension of analysis explored in the regional case studies is the role played by clientelism in regional party politics. Case studies of party clientelism in Italy in the 20th century are abundant. These explore how mass parties in the post-war period developed expansive networks for clientelist resource redistribution, which they channelled to supporters in exchange for votes, through varied mechanisms such as public employment, public contracts, economic assistance, or selective welfare benefits (Tarrow, 1967; Allum, 1973; Zuckerman, 1975; Caciagli, 1982; Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988). The only limitation to this compelling range of similar empirical findings is their geographical range (focusing mainly on central-southern regions), and a tendency towards single-party bias (focusing mainly on the clientelist behaviour of DC politicians, to the neglect of other governing parties). Yet the clientelist behaviour of Italian Socialist Party (PSI) politicians is now taken for granted, since their party organisation was

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European University Institute
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destroyed in the 1990s by extensive corruption scandals unearthed by prosecuting magistrates (Della Porta and Vanucci, 2007). There is also evidence the Italian Communist Party (PCI) joined the ‘spoils system’ in southern Italy, where it used clientelist mechanisms to control key municipalities (Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988; Demarco, 2007; Allum and Allum, 2008). Clientelism in post-war Italian politics (1947-1994) was closely linked to the consolidation or expansion of competing party factions, which relied heavily on local/regional power-bases to compete for influence within their national parties (Zuckerman, 1975; Belloni, 1978; Bettcher, 2005). The role of party factional-clientelism as a mechanism for territorial control has never been explored in Italy since 1994. While some authors assume factions could not endure the collapse of mass party organisations in the 1990s (Bettcher, 2005), others take clientelism as a given and focus instead on its relative virtues (or vices) as a mechanism for economic development and institutional performance (Piattoni, 1998; 2002). There is evidence that ex-DC powerbrokers have continued to operate autonomously at sub-national levels, where they can exploit the continuation of preference voting in sub-national elections to maintain their local/regional bases, and can negotiate advantageous alliances with a range of national parties (Calise, 2006; 2007). Preference voting in national elections was deemed a crucial factor behind the consolidation of mass party factionalism and clientelism in Italy (Allum, 1973; Zuckerman, 1975; Belloni, 1978; Hine, 1982; Allum and Allum, 2008). Although preference voting has been eliminated from national elections in Italy since the 1994 electoral reform (D’Alimonte, 2005), it has remained in place for sub-national elections (regional, provincial, local), where it entirely determines which party politicians are successful in obtaining seats. The regional case studies will explore how these inter-related mechanisms for territorial control endured in post-1994 regional party systems, and how they inter-acted with new developments at regional level, including the decentralisation of policy functions and financial resources to regional governments, and the direct election of regional presidents. Although an objective of state decentralisation in the 1990s was to improve the poor institutional performance of the Italian state (Hesse and Wright, 1996; Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001), it also contained the potential to expand inefficient policies of party clientelism, given the increase in resources available to sub-national politicians. The direct election of regional
presidents was designed to enhance the accountability and raise the profile of sub-national leadership (Fabbrini, 2001; Calise, 2006; 2007), but strong regional leadership is not necessarily inconsistent with clientelist mechanisms for resource distribution, since regulating access to public resources can be used to strengthen the position of presidents vis-à-vis their supporting parties, and can be used to selectively privilege party factions favourable to the institutional leadership.

Studies of clientelism in Spanish politics have been very limited, although research by Jonathan Hopkin (2001a) suggests that clientelism has a very limited impact on electoral mobilisation because patterns of elite recruitment, state spending, and public employment cannot be easily traced to clientelist objectives. Nevertheless clientelism has been a historically important feature of territorial power relations in Spain, particularly in rural and under-developed areas where local notables (‘caciques’) exchanged their intermediary capacities for political support (Kurth, 1993; Blakeley, 2001). Although no study has been conducted of how clientelism affects regional party politics in Spain, several regions have been consistently dominated by the same party, which creates the potential for new clientelist mechanisms to become rooted. The policy competences and financial resources of Spanish regions have increased significantly since the 1980s (Gibbons, 2000), allowing them to develop an increasingly prominent role in delivering economic aid and welfare support to collective groups and individual citizens. While the expansion of the welfare state in Spain was not primarily pursued with clientelist objectives in mind (Hopkin, 2001a), the creation of an extended class of state dependents, generated unevenly across the national territory due to inter-regional economic imbalances, can enhance the use of selective welfare control for political ends (Ferrera, 1996). Clientelism in Spain may also be linked to policies for economic development, including business support and infrastructural projects. Studies of institution-building and economic development in the region of Galicia suggest that clientelism is crucial to explaining public policy choices (Maiz and Losada, 2000), while policies for economic development in the region of Andalusia are often targeted to clientelist objectives (Montabes et al, 2006). Although clientelism in Spain is unlikely to share the synergetic relationship with factionalism and preference voting of the Italian case, Spanish parties
are nevertheless elite-driven organisations that developed alongside the democratic state, and therefore heavily oriented towards control of public office and receipt of public subsidies (van Biezen, 2003; van Biezen and Hopkin, 2004). Clientelism may therefore represent a useful mechanism for the consolidation of party organisations and the stabilisation of electoral support. Some evidence for this emerges in southern Spanish regions such as Andalusia, where PSOE increased its support among state dependents in rural areas during the 1990s, despite a significant nationwide decline in electoral support (Hopkin, 2001a). While factionalism in Spanish parties remains an unexplored area, it can also relate closely to party clientelism, since control of government resources allows some factions to thrive at the expense of others. Clientelism and factionalism in Spain may also be linked to regional presidentialism, as a strong institutional leader is able to regulate access to public resources, and can therefore privilege favourable factions or particular client-groups.

Chapter 1.3: Regionalisation and Party Strategies

Chapter 1.3 will conceptualise the organisational strategies that statewide parties (SWP) can adopt in response to the competitive pressures induced by regionalisation. This in turn generates broad hypotheses on how we might expect these pressures to affect the multi-level organisation of SWP, as well as the dynamics of multi-level party systems. These hypotheses will then be tested empirically on the Italian and Spanish cases. Roller and van Houten (2003) have outlined the range of organisational strategies that SWP can in response to the challenge of strong NSWP present in some regional party systems. They conclude that four ideal-type strategies exist:

1. Abandon the national organisation and split into regional parties.
2. Decentralise organisational structures and grant more autonomy to regional level.
3. Maintain existing territorial structure despite the presence of regional challengers.
4. Centralise structures to better coordinate response to regional challengers.
These ideal-type strategies represent a useful starting point for conceptualising the strategic behaviour of SWP in regionalised multi-level systems, although they require some further elaboration. Abandoning the national organisation and splitting into regional parties represents a type of ‘nuclear option’, that will only take place where internally accommodating strategies fail and territorial-linguistic boundaries can be drawn, as in the Belgian case (Deschouwer, 2004). Parties may well choose to maintain existing territorial structures, if only because of organisational ‘stickiness’ (Panebianco, 1988), but this outcome can reflect very different motivations. The party may believe it is unaffected by regionalisation, so does not need to change its multi-level structures. Or it may be affected by regionalisation, but believes its existing multi-level structures are adequate to confront this challenge. Or it may be affected by regionalisation, but unable to adjust its internal structures. The party in question may be trying to maintain highly centralised internal structures, or it may already possess relatively decentralised internal structures, so the absence of organisational change tells us little about territorial dynamics within the multi-level organisation. The relative centralisation or decentralisation of the party organisation then represents the principal basis for understanding its territorial strategy, and reflects a choice parties must make between the ‘cohesion’ and ‘flexibility’ of their multi-level organisation. This can be conceptualised into two opposing ideal-type territorial strategies, which real-existing SWP will mould to their existing political preferences and organisational arrangements.

An ideal-type ‘flexible’ territorial strategy has the following features:

1) Regional party has considerable policy autonomy and independent resources  
2) Regional party has a significant role in national level decision-making  
3) Differentiated party programmes are accepted at regional and national levels  
4) Candidate selection is decentralised in sub-national elections, while regional party is granted a determining role in candidate selection for national elections  
5) Regional party can determine its own coalitional choices for regional government, allowing a certain degree of incongruence with the national level
6) Regional politicians are encouraged to dominate party/institutional offices at regional level, encouraging an autonomous regional leadership to emerge

An ideal-type ‘cohesive’ territorial strategy has the following features:

1) Regional party has very limited policy autonomy and few independent resources
2) Regional party has an insignificant role in national level decision-making
3) Party programmes at regional level must entirely conform to national priorities
4) Candidate selection is highly centralised in national elections, while national party wields veto power over candidate selection in sub-national elections
5) Regional coalition formation fully congruent with national patterns and priorities.
6) Regional politicians are encouraged to enter party/institutional offices at national level, encouraging a dependent regional leadership to emerge

Both these ideal-type strategies inherently contain a series of risks and opportunities. The potential opportunities of a ‘flexible’ strategy are that it allows the regional party to become territorially rooted, developing a distinct regional agenda that responds to sub-national concerns. This should enhance party performance in regional elections and increase party control of the regional government, the latter facilitated by regionally determined coalitional choices. Disputes between national and regional party levels become less likely and easier to resolve, given the toleration of differentiated regional agendas, and the presence of regional politicians in national structures (‘voice’ rather than ‘exit’). The regional party may prove capable of reflecting the strong cultural or nationalist cleavages that exist in certain regions, and so become more effective in challenging strong NSWP (Roller and van Houten, 2003). The potential risks of a ‘flexible’ strategy are that a static regional political class can emerge (through control of institutions) which is self-perpetuating (through control of candidate selection), and unable or unwilling to respond to changing national priorities. Differentiated agendas between national and regional levels may transform into divergent ones that become impossible to reconcile, while regional ‘barons’ may prevent the emergence of a coherent
national programme and strong national leadership, leading to electoral and organisational decline for the broader party.

The potential opportunities of a ‘cohesive’ strategy lie in projecting a coherent political programme at all territorial levels, potentially strengthening party cohesion, voter identification and electoral performance. This may prevent the ossification of regional politics by encouraging the movement of political actors between territorial levels, allowing national politicians to become grounded in sub-national politics, while raising the profile of regional issues at national level. It should also allow the national leadership to remain strong and unconditioned by the competing demands of regional ‘barons’. The potential risks of a ‘cohesive’ strategy are that the regional party fails to become territorially rooted, weakening its performance in regional elections and reducing its access to the regional government, restricted further by nationally imposed coalitional choices. A national programme may also not adapt well to political conditions at sub-national levels, particularly in regions with strong cultural or nationalist cleavages. Disputes between national and regional levels may become more frequent, given the refusal to tolerate differentiated regional agendas, while the intransigence of the national leader and weak regional representation in national structures make ‘exit’ (rather than ‘voice’) the only solution to sustained territorial disputes.

SWP are likely to incorporate both ‘cohesive’ and ‘flexible’ elements in their multi-level organisation. Yet regionalisation will make purely ‘cohesive’ territorial strategies more difficult to sustain, since these are less able to respond to competitive differences in regional party systems, and will depend heavily on strong organisational control from the national leadership, which can be challenged (or ignored) by powerful politicians at sub-national levels. Regionalisation therefore places a strong pressure of re-configuration on the organisation of SWP, which can generally be expected to undergo a shift from more ‘cohesive’ to more ‘flexible’ territorial strategies.

Hypothesis 1: Statewide parties in regionalised states will generally shift to more decentralised organisational structures.
Internal decentralisation can occur through *formal* organisational change (i.e. codified changes in the composition or function of party organs, usually outlined in party statutes), but also through *informal* organisational change (i.e. uncodified changes to territorial power relations). Organisational arrangements within parties are notoriously ‘sticky’ (Panebianco, 1988), and national leaders will tend to avoid formal changes that question the primacy of the national level, since this represents the basis for their continued leadership. This makes it more likely that pressures from the regional party will be accommodated by informal organisational change. Yet if regional pressures are combined with broader challenges to the national party, this may result in formal organisational change that includes decentralisation of party structures. Broader challenges could include a significant decline in electoral support, a divided national leadership, a sudden displacement from government office, or a severe ideological crisis.

Hypothesis 2: Statewide parties are more likely to change their informal structures to accommodate powerful sub-national elites, rather than their formal structures.

Regionalisation implies a substantial transfer of policy functions, financial resources, and administrative capacity to regional governments. This should encourage politicians to compete more actively to access regional governing institutions, whether through representation in the regional parliament, or through control of the regional executive. Regional politicians will develop strong incentives to pursue distinct policies or coalitions that maximise access to regional government, even if these clash with the preferences of the party leadership (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). This conforms to a ‘cartelised’ view of party organisations, whose politicians are primarily concerned with controlling the state for its resources and legitimacy, and much less bound by societal ties, ideological cohesion, or collective objectives (Katz and Mair, 1995; Schmitter, 2001). Regional politicians will increasingly respond to the competitive dynamics of regional party systems, rather than those of the party leadership at national level. This is relatively unproblematic if party competition at both levels is fully congruent, but more problematic if party competition is incongruent between levels (Thorlakson, 2006; 2007).
Party competition that diverges between territorial levels is likely where support for SWP is unevenly distributed across the national territory (Hopkin, 2003), or where support for NSWP is particularly strong (Pallares et al, 1997). Incongruent party competition becomes more likely in decentralised political systems, where successive interactions between regional parties can produce distinct patterns of alliance or conflict.

Hypothesis 3: Regional branches of statewide parties will increasingly respond to the competitive dynamics of regional party systems, rather than the preferences or objectives of their national leadership.

Regional party systems are characterised by the varied electoral strength and diverse political strategies of NSWP. Yet a common feature of successful NSWP is their capacity to present themselves as the best defenders of territorial interests, while portraying regional branches of SWP as mere delegates of national parties, heavily constrained in their capacity to advance and defend territorial interests (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). As a competitive response to this challenge, regional branches of SWP may develop more autonomist political strategies, presenting themselves as strong defenders of the regional interest, and differentiating their policy positions or strategic choices from those of their national party (Roller and van Houten, 2003). Autonomist strategies in SWP are more likely where NSWP have considerable electoral strength in regional party systems, but will vary in character depending on the type of competitive challenge posed by NSWP.

Hypothesis 4: Statewide parties will increasingly adopt autonomist political strategies in regional party systems. These will vary according to the political strategies and political objectives pursued by the main non-statewide parties in the region.

Control of regional government and its substantial resources will allow some regional politicians to become more autonomous from their national party, as they will depend less on the national level for financial resources, political visibility, and career advancement (Montero, 2007). This applies above all to regional politicians in positions of institutional leadership (e.g. regional presidents), who gain greater political visibility
and can regulate government access for other political actors. Institutional leaders could therefore exert a strong \textit{de facto} control over regional party organisations, which may also increase their prominence and weight in national politics. This reflects the growing importance of ‘careerists’ rather than ‘believers’ in party organisations (Panebianco, 1988), and the existence of distinct forms of ‘presidentialism’ in political systems that are not presidential or semi-presidential in design (Poguntke and Webb, 2004).

Hypothesis 5: Regional political leaders in key institutional positions will exert strong control over the regional party, and will become more powerful within the national party.

The response of the national party to the emergence of strong regional politicians is unlikely to be uniform across parties. Multi-level party organisations are nevertheless bound by a strong common interest in controlling government office, which confers resources and legitimacy at all territorial levels. This should stimulate a pattern of organisational ‘stratarchy’, as both national and sub-national levels respect their mutual autonomy in order to maximise their access to public office (Katz and Mair, 1995). The national leadership will only intervene heavily in sub-national choices when these risk damaging the internal coherence or electoral performance of the national party. This could occur if regional politicians pursue governing coalitions entirely inconsistent with those pursued at national level, or if regional politicians pursue controversial policies that undermine overall party cohesion and electoral support (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). Inter-level conflict is likely when these controversial coalitions or policies are equally important for regional politicians to secure their (re)-election. Alternatively, national parties could exploit differences in regional party systems to test out governing coalitions or particular policies that have never been adopted at national level, which makes the regional arena a potentially crucial one for experimentation (Downs, 1998).

Hypothesis 6: National party leaders will usually tolerate greater autonomy for regional branches when this increases access to sub-national government, but will intervene to oppose choices of the regional party that undermine strategic choices at national level.
Chapter 1.4 Methodological Design

This project adopts a mixed approach composed of two national frameworks (Italy, Spain) and four regional case studies (Campania and Lombardia in Italy, Andalusia and Galicia in Spain). The national frameworks compare multi-level party systems and party organisations across the national territory; develop categories for regional party systems; and highlight salient features for analysis in the regional case studies. The regional case studies closely examine the dynamics of party competition and organisational change, consider the organisational and systemic linkages between territorial levels, reflect on the characteristics of regional political leadership, and introduce an understanding of the local dimensions of regional party politics. This mixed approach overcomes the trade-off between breadth and depth of analysis in regional party politics (see Chapter 1.1), and seeks to locate contextual findings within a more comparative framework, which may be usefully adapted to analyse multi-level party politics in other political systems.

Selection of Empirical Indicators

Empirical indicators are selected to measure and compare change over the course of the analytical time-frame. Narrowing party systems and organisations to a set of indicators raises the inevitable problem of neglecting other relevant areas of party activity. This problem can be partially compensated by selecting broad indicators able to convey the core features of parties in systemic and organisational terms. These are refined and applied at both levels of analysis, ensuring they are applicable in both general terms (national framework), and can also contribute towards a more contextual understanding (regional case studies). The regional case studies are crucial in identifying other relevant variables, as well as exploring the salient dynamics identified in the national framework.
Empirical Indicators for Party Systems

The indicators for party system are based on the congruence (or similarity) of parties and party competition between territorial levels (Thorlakson, 2006; 2007). The number of parties will provide a starting point to differentiate between national and regional party systems, as well as between different regional party systems. The number of parties will not be evaluated according to a minimum electoral threshold of support, or through a statistical measurement, but will consider all parties that win seats in national or regional parliaments. Even parties with a relatively low level of support in Italy and Spain may prove essential to winning elections or forming governing coalitions at national or regional level, given the highly competitive nature of their party systems. The territorial coverage of statewide parties is another inter-regional indicator that evaluates whether parties are represented in different national/regional party systems over the timeframe. While these empirical indicators will provide a good measurement of the party system format, they need to be considered alongside other indicators that measure the structures of competition (Sartori, 1976). Coalition formation is particularly useful as a defining feature of party competition in most Spanish and Italian regions, and as a process that links national and regional arenas through processes of coordination and experimentation (Downs, 1998), while the resulting patterns of government alternation can illustrate the intensity of party competition (Mair, 1997), as well as the degree of congruence between national and regional levels of party competition (Thorlakson, 2006). Analysis of party systems in the national frameworks relies primarily on data for regional elections and government formation, as well as relevant secondary literature. Analysis of party systems in the regional case studies additionally relies on archival research, documentary evidence, and a series of in-depth political interviews.
Empirical Indicators for Party Organisation

Measuring organisational change in political parties is a complex endeavour that needs to consider both formal rules and informal practices. While change to formal rules may betray a continuation of existing informal practices, changes to informal practices can occur without changes in formal rules. Formal organisational change generally takes place through revisions to party statutes, which can simultaneously affect different areas of party organisation. This analysis focuses on changes to the regional level of party organisation, particularly whether this has obtained an enhanced autonomy from the national level, or an enhanced influence over national party decision-making. A related but complementary indicator for measuring organisational change is candidate selection, which focuses on the role of the regional party in multi-level elections. Although candidate selection has already been included in existing frameworks for measuring party decentralisation (Hopkin 2003; Deschouwer, 2003), its application is not uncomplicated. Decentralised candidate selection procedures are not always closely related to levels of state decentralisation, since they can be linked to historic traditions of personal representation (e.g. UK) or Constitutional prerogatives (e.g. Germany) (see Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). A further distinction must be made between ‘decentralisation’ of procedure (i.e. handing power of selection to the regional or local party branches) and ‘decentralisation with democratisation’ of procedure (i.e. handing power of selection to regional or local party primaries). Whereas the former procedure should strengthen the sub-national party organisation, the latter may undermine it by establishing direct links between the membership base and the party leadership. Changes in candidate selection procedure that increase the autonomy of one sub-national level (e.g. regional branches), may do so at the expense of others (e.g. local branches). Finally, the scope of candidate selection should be considered, namely whether it applies to all parliamentary candidates, or only to ‘leadership’ selection (Hopkin, 2001b). Candidate selection is nevertheless a crucial empirical indicator that can best measure the locus of territorial power within party organisations, because it highlights which territorial level performs the core ‘nominating function’ (Truman, 1954). Analysis of formal changes to party organisations will be mainly conducted at the level of national framework, through an analysis of party
statutes and key secondary literature. Analysis of informal changes to party organisation will be mainly conducted in the regional case studies, which rely on archival analysis, documentary evidence, and in-depth political interviews.

**Selection of Regional Case Studies**

The regional case studies for Italy (Campania, Lombardia) and Spain (Andalusia, Galicia) compare the behaviour of statewide parties in diverse territorial contexts, where their level of access to sub-national government varies considerably, and the prevailing political culture is very different. This variation is necessary to confirm whether the organisational behaviour of statewide parties has become territorially differentiated, or whether these parties display similar behaviour across the national territory. Case selection avoided regions where non-statewide parties are predominant in electoral terms (more than 40% of electoral support), because these weakly reflect the political dynamics that prevail in the rest of the country, since the behaviour of all political actors is heavily determined by competing nationalist mobilisation. The selected regions nevertheless contain non-statewide parties, which obtained seats in the regional parliament and entered the regional government, so represent a systemic challenge for competing statewide parties. This allows non-statewide parties to become an object for comparative analysis in the regional case studies. Since this research project focuses on party system dynamics and organisational change, it must explore regions with different structures of party competition, because this variable will affect organisational adaptation in both statewide and non-statewide parties. One Italian region is therefore dominated by the centre-right coalition (Lombardia), while the other has alternated between competing coalitions, but is now dominated by the centre-left coalition (Campania). One Spanish region is dominated by a centre-left statewide party without alternation in government (Andalusia), while the other was long dominated by a centre-right statewide party, which was eventually displaced from office by a coalition of centre-left statewide and non-statewide parties (Galicia). All the regions selected are relatively large in size (population > 2 million), which ensures the dynamics of regional politics could have a significant effect on national party politics, and may influence the territorial strategies of statewide parties.
Chapter 1.5: Regionalisation in Italy and Spain

Chapter 1.5 provides an outline of regionalising processes in Italy (Chapter 1.5.1) and Spain (Chapter 1.5.2), focusing on the respective role played by statewide (SWP) and non-statewide parties (NSWP), and relying primarily on secondary literature. This helps to frame the subsequent chapters, which evaluate how state decentralisation has shaped party politics in Italy and Spain, and rely primarily on original empirical data collected for the purpose of this thesis.

Chapter 1.5.1: Regionalisation of the Italian State

The post-war Italian state can be characterised as a decentralised unitary system (Keating, 1988; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). Although several levels of sub-national government existed (regional, provincial, local), their autonomy was severely circumscribed by a centralised legislative, administrative and financial apparatus (Hine, 1996; Gold, 2003; Amoretti and Bermeo, 2004). The 1948 Italian Constitution recognised the political and financial autonomy of the Italian regions (initially created in 1919); provided for the election and composition of regional governments and assemblies (Articles 114-128); and created a de iure asymmetry between Special Status (SS) and Ordinary Status (OS) regions, with SS regions granted immediate and higher levels of autonomy (Article 116). SS regions include the two large islands (Sicily, Sardegna), and three small bi-lingual regions in northern Italy (Trentino-Alto-Adige, Val d’Aosta, Friuli-Venezia Giulia), while OS regions varied in size and covered most of mainland Italy. Although elected governments were generally established in SS Regions by 1948 (Friuli-Venezia-Giulia only in 1963), the main political parties in Italy chose to postpone the creation of OS regional governments and assemblies. These were only established in 1970 under strong pressure from the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which wanted to build on a successful record of ‘Red’ municipalism in its electoral heartlands of central-northern Italy, and sought to control regional government in order to affirm its own capacity for government at national level, leading to a tactical abandonment of its earlier ideological hostility to state decentralisation (Gold, 2003; Amoretti and Bermeo, 2004). Yet the weak
commitment of Italian parties to developing regional autonomy was most evident in the delayed constitutional transfer of functions to the regional level; the lack of ‘exclusive’ legislative competences attributed to the region; extensive control by the national government over all ‘concurrent’ (i.e. shared) competences; continued reliance on the national government for over 90% of financial resources; and a highly centralised administrative system. This situation continued into the 1990s with little consensus on whether (or how) to reinforce the role of regional governments (Hine, 1993; 1996).

This static situation was altered by the collapse of the Italian party system and the rise of the Northern League (LN) in the 1990s. These changes occurred through various overlapping stages. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered an organisational split within PCI, the largest Communist Party in Europe, as the majority faction formed into the moderate Party of the Democratic Left (PDS), while the minority faction formed into the radical Party of Refounded Communists (PRC) (Bull and Heywood, 1994). In a separate development, networks of political corruption among the governing parties were unravelled by prosecuting magistrates, through a series of investigations that became known as tangentopoli (‘Bribesville). These had the effect of destroying the main governing parties, resulting in the electoral and organisational collapse of the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in the 1994 national election (Morlino, 1996; Katz, 1996). An electoral system reform in 1994 introduced a Mixed Member-Majoritarian (MMM) system, which generated a bi-polar shift in party competition (D’Alimonte, 2005), subsequently leading to wholesale alternation in government between competing coalitions (Bartolini et al, 2004). This replaced the earlier system of partial government alternation around a predominant party (DC). The party system crisis had begun during the 1980s, when a series of protest movements in northern Italy mobilised against the profligacy, corruption, and inefficiency of the Italian state, exemplified by the reckless behaviour of its governing parties. These protest movements federated to form LN in 1989, which became a crucial actor in the post-1994 party system. LN provided political support to actors seeking to ‘clean up’ the Italian political system, and made powerful linkages in its political discourse between the centralisation of the Italian state and the networks of political corruption it had fostered
LN convincingly tied its principal objective of state decentralisation with the broader cause of democratic renewal, and in doing so forced a policy adaptation in other Italian parties, which sought to challenge LN by developing their own proposals for a more decentralised state (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). Although LN has occasionally advocated the ‘secession’ of northern Italy, its principal objective has remained a federal reform of the Italian state (Diamanti, 1997; Tarchi, 1998), which represents the key political condition for its electoral and governing alliance with the centre-right coalition since 2000 (Baldini and Vassallo, 2001; Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001).

The process of regionalisation in Italy during the late 1990s/early 2000s was carried out by centre-left governments (1996-2001), who did not rely on the parliamentary support of LN. These institutional reforms were developed largely as a competitive response to the political-electoral threat posed by LN in northern constituencies (Cento Bull, 2002). However the “centre-left was aware that it had to advance proposals that would offer a convincing increase in regional autonomy, but without depriving the centre of the instruments necessary to ensure equality in public-service delivery between rich and poor areas of the country” (Bull and Newell, 2005, 166). Measures of state decentralisation can be categorised as legislative, financial, or administrative (Watts, 1996). The centre-left reforms combined all of these and additionally included a radical measure of executive decentralisation, which strengthened regional presidents (and their executives) vis-à-vis parties in the legislature. The principal measures of administrative decentralisation became known as the Bassanini Laws (1997-8), which transferred many administrative functions to sub-national level, reflecting the actual delineation of competences in the Italian constitution (Articles 117-118). The Bassanini Laws included the abolition of a number of duplicating ministries at national level; greater autonomy for the educational sector; greater regional responsibility for economic development and transport; and the establishment of a new mechanism (United Conference) for coordination between national and sub-national levels of government, particularly on issues relating to implementation of EU law (Gilbert, 2000). The Bindi reforms (1999-2000) transferred management of the health sector to regional governments, which became responsible for developing autonomous systems of health care provision (rather
than merely implementing national directives), and supervising the administration of health-care at local levels. These reforms removed many of the drastic restrictions imposed by the national government on regional autonomy in health care management. The Bindi reforms were accompanied by a substantial measure of financial decentralisation, so that regions became responsible for determining and financing their own healthcare expenditure, through a share of national income tax (IRPEF) and a regional business tax (IRAP). Although health-care constituted 70-80% of regional government expenditure, this had been almost entirely financed by national transfers, leading to escalating healthcare costs because there was no incentive for regional governments to contain their expenditure (Maino, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). A system of ‘fiscal federalism’ was designed (though not fully implemented) to eventually replace centralised tax transfers with an equalising national fund reliant on VAT revenues, in order to assist socio-economically disadvantaged regions with the high costs of healthcare (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001).

Legislative decentralisation was a more tortuous process that began in 1997 with the creation of a bi-cameral Commission (Bicamerale), entrusted with developing a political consensus on the organisation of the Italian state. The competences of OS regional governments are listed in the Italian Constitution, so its revision is necessary to formalise the transfer of powers from national to regional level. The Bicamerale collapsed in 1998 because of opposition from the centre-right leadership, momentarily stalling the process of Constitutional reform (Bull and Pasquino, 2007). Nevertheless many of its proposals were later taken up the governing centre-left coalition in the Constitutional reform it approved unilaterally in the Italian parliament between September 2000 and March 2001, and ratified in a national referendum (October 2001). This reform represented a political response by the centre-left to its heavy defeat in the 2000 regional elections, which had seen LN ally with the centre-right parties to win control of all regional governments in northern Italy. By responding to the autonomist demands of northern Italy, the centre-left sought to reduce support for the centre-right coalition in the 2001 national election. The Constitutional reform was opposed by the entire centre-right coalition, including LN, which dismissed it as an inadequate façade for continued centralisation (Cento Bull,
Yet this reform did represent a substantial advance towards a federal state in Italy (Amoretti and Bermeo, 2004), its main weakness in this respect being the absence of formal mechanisms for ‘shared rule’ at federal level (Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). The governing parties chose to postpone reforming the powerful Senate into a chamber of territorial representation, because this would require its current membership to accept a change in its composition, method of election, and functions (Bull and Pasquino, 2007). Article 117 was significantly revised to explicitly list the areas of exclusive competences of the state; list the areas of concurrent competence; and attribute all other competences not listed to the regional level. An important norm was inserted to allow the national government to ‘determine the essential levels of services concerning civic and social rights which must be guaranteed across the national territory’, which reflected centre-left concerns that universal service provision could be undermined by decentralisation (Bull and Newell, 2005). However this norm replaced a more drastic provision in the 1948 version of Article 117, which forced regions to legislate ‘within the limits of general principles established by the laws of the state and on condition that regional laws are not contrary to the national interest and the interests of other regions’, a norm which had been used to justify successive national interventions in the already limited areas of regional competence (Cento Bull, 2002). National controls *ex ante* on regional laws were replaced by *ex post* powers of referring a regional law to the Constitutional Court (Article 127), preventing the Italian government from suspending any regional law it chose, and increasing the effective autonomy of regional governments (Cammelli, 2000). The vast number of concurrent competences (including education, health, and economic development) opened the door to numerous conflicts between regional and national governments on the precise scope of their respective competences (Cento Bull, 2002), resulting in a proliferation of cases referred to the Italian Constitutional Court (Roux, 2008). The substantial increase in ‘exclusive’ regional competences never materialised, with most innovation in the field of shared competences, including a new economic role attributed to the regional government.

In 1999 the main parties in the Italian parliament did reach bi-partisan agreement on another Constitutional reform, which institutionalised the direct election of regional
presidents in OS regions, a radical measure of executive decentralisation designed to strengthen leadership capacity at regional level. As well as direct election by voters, this reform also made the regional president able to nominate his own executive. The terms of regional presidents and their legislatures (known as ‘councils’ in OS regions) were tied together, so if the council censured an incumbent president, or if an incumbent president resigned before the end of legislature, either outcome would lead directly to new elections (Fabbrini, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). Prior to this reform, regional presidents and their executives were selected by the council, whose shifting party coalitions produced chronic instability, high turnover, and weak leadership capacity at regional level (Baldini and Vassallo, 2001). This reform only required a Constitutional revision because the existing Constitution specified that regional executives were to be selected by their regional assemblies (Article 122). The reform was closely modelled on the 1993 reform of local government, which established the direct election of Italian mayors, with the objective of overcoming similar problems of leadership capacity, governing instability, and frequent turnover in the executive (Fabbrini, 2001).

The victory of the centre-right coalition in the 2001 national election allowed LN to exploit its blackmail potential over the centre-right government (2001-2006), and compel its coalitional partners to support more devolution of powers to regional governments alongside a broader federal reform of the Italian state. In 2001 the LN leader Umberto Bossi became Minister for Institutional Reform, and was entrusted with developing these proposals. Yet the northern regionalist demands of LN soon clashed with the other coalitional partners (Forza Italia, National Alliance, Union for a Democratic Centre), who had to consider their support bases in central-southern Italy (Bettoni and Leonardi, 2003). This led to inter-party negotiations that produced a much broader proposal for Constitutional reform, whose content reflected the niche demands of each governing party, and sought to obscure the decentralising thrust of the LN proposals (Bull and Pasquino, 2007; Roux, 2008). The insistence of LN on devolution of powers was met through an increase in the number of ‘exclusive’ regional competences (health-care, local

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2 Bossi resigned due to ill health in 2003, but was replaced as Minister for Institutional Reform by another prominent Leghista Roberto Calderoli.
The most radical aspect of the proposed centre-right reform was not the additional devolution of powers to regional level, but rather the attempt to transform Italy into an explicitly ‘federal state’, through a dramatic change in the composition and election of the Italian parliament, and the attribution of different competences to the Chamber and Senate. This aimed to replace the existing system of ‘perfect bicameralism’, whereby both chambers have almost identical powers. The Senate would have been transformed into a genuine ‘chamber of territorial representation’, responsible for determining issues of ‘shared competence’ between regional and national levels; holding elections on a rotating basis that coincided with regional elections in the respective council or parliament; become unable to bring down the national government; and include non-voting participants from sub-national governments and parliaments in its proceedings. The Chamber would obtain an exclusive capacity to determine issues of ‘exclusive competence’ for the national level, while ‘perfect bicameralism’ would be retained in a restricted number of policy areas (budget; constitutional and electoral reforms; issues of fundamental rights). Due to the wide range of ‘shared competences’ envisaged, the Senate would have become the more powerful chamber, shifting Italy from a system of ‘perfect’ bicameralism to a system of ‘asymmetric’ bicameralism (Cammelli, 2004).

3 These policy areas were overlooked in the 2001 reform and thereby inadvertently ‘left’ to the regional level, whose competences are not constitutionally listed, unlike those that affect the national level. Yet there is no evidence that regions sought to legislate in these areas of national competence.

4 The Senate has always been elected on a regional basis. Yet the timing of regional elections has never coincided with those of the Senate.
Another feature of this proposed reform was a stronger Prime Minister, who would be solely responsible for nominating and dismissing ministers, and could determine the dissolution of the Chamber (hitherto a function of the President). The Prime Minister would become directly elected by virtue of a formal link to the winning party list, thereby avoiding a parliamentary vote of confidence, and could only be removed from office by his own governing majority through a ‘constructive’ vote of no confidence in the Chamber. This juridically controversial reform was approved unilaterally by the centre-right coalition in the Italian Parliament (November 2005), but failed ratification in a national referendum (June 2006). The overall reform was seen by voters as a coaltional response to the autonomist demands of LN, which made it particularly unpopular in central and southern regions (Roux, 2008). The process of Constitutional reform has since largely stalled, although parliamentary Commissions were active during the second Prodi government (2006-2008) in seeking to develop more bi-partisan proposals.

Chapter 1.5.2 Regionalisation in Spain

The current process of regionalisation in Spain can be traced to the period of democratic consolidation after the death of General Franco in 1975, its outcome heavily shaped by the institutional design of the 1978 Spanish Constitution; the resurgence of nationalist political cleavages (particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country); and the subsequent behaviour of parties and legislators in the Spanish parliament (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Regionalisation in Spain also has more historical roots, such as the Second Republic (1931-6) which created self-governing institutions for the Catalan, Basque and Galician peoples, and the First Republic in 1873 which created 17 states with their own Constitution, Parliament, Executive and Judiciary (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). Both these attempts at accommodating regional ‘diversity’ within the national ‘unity’ of the state were brought down by centralising and nationalistic dictatorships, illustrating the

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5 Constitutional reforms approved by less than 2/3 of both Houses may be subject to a nationwide referendum. While the centre-left sponsored Constitutional reform (2001) was convincingly approved by referendum (Yes 64.2%, No 35.8%), the centre-right sponsored Constitutional reform (2006) was clearly rejected by referendum (Yes 38.7%, No 61.3%). Although the centre-right reform was overwhelmingly rejected in central and southern Italian regions, a majority of voters supported the reform in Veneto and Lombardia. This highlights the close association of this reform with LN and the reluctant campaigning in its favour by other centre-right statewide parties, particularly AN and UDC (Roux, 2008)
perennial difficulty that Spain has encountered in managing its ‘nation’ and ‘state’ building processes in a democratic manner (Linz and Stepan, 1996). The 1978 Constitution reflected the difficult compromise between accommodating resurgent regionalist cleavages suppressed under the Franco regime, and ensuring that national legislators retained control over key policy areas and the process of decentralisation itself (Colomer, 1998). The enduring fear of a ‘military coup’ (actually attempted in 1981) served to reinforce this cautious attitude on the part of both national legislators and regionalist politicians (Gunther et al, 2004).

The 1978 Constitution neither reflects classic federal models, nor does it reflect a unitary model, and is instead tailored to the political realities of post-Franco Spain rather than any over-arching ideal form of institutional design (Colomer, 1998). The notion of ‘shared sovereignty’ between national and regional levels is not present, with Article 1.2 stating that ‘national sovereignty is vested in the Spanish people, from who emanate the powers of the State’. Article 2 nevertheless “recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it (Spain) is composed”, and provides for the existence of regions, known as Autonomous Communities (AC). This must be considered alongside other provisions that stress the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible unity of all Spanish people” (Article 2) and the principle of “solidarity between regions” (Article 2), with a “just and adequate economic balance guaranteed by the state” (Article 138). While regions are able to proceed towards developing Statutes of Autonomy that outline their electoral system and fundamental rights, define their territorial boundaries, and list their legislative competences (Article 81), these do not have the status of Constitutional laws but are instead Organic Laws, which need to be ratified by the Spanish parliament in order to enter into force, with the further provision that they can be amended or repealed by an absolute majority of votes in the Congress (Article 81). Spanish is affirmed as the official language of the Spanish state, while other languages can be made co-official only within the region (Article 3). Although the competences of the Spanish government are extensive and clearly listed (Article 148), the competences of the regional governments are to be developed in the Statutes of Autonomy, with only a Constitutional list of the
powers and functions that regional governments can accede to with national approval (Article 149), subject to the framework of national laws establishing ‘harmonising principles’ (Article 150). While the principle of self-government is granted to all municipalities, provinces and regions (Article 137), the regions are forbidden from amending or abolishing the boundaries of the 52 Spanish provinces, which can only be done by the Spanish parliament through an Organic Law (Article 141). The national government can also suspend the law of an AC while it contests its legality in the Constitutional Court (Article 160), while the AC has no formal influence in the selection of the Constitutional Court (Article 159).6

Although the Senate is nominally the ‘House of Territorial Representation’ (Article 69), containing over 50 members delegated by the regional governments, around four-fifths (208) of Senators are actually elected on a provincial basis (4 senators per province), simultaneously with elections to the Congress (Article 69). Meanwhile the Senate has weak legislative powers and only acts as a minor revising chamber. The main ‘territorial’ features of the Senate are its ultimate capacity to decide on issues relating to the inter-territorial compensation fund; oblige divergent AC to comply with national laws and constitutions; and ratify inter-regional agreements (Stepan, 2001; Caravita, 2002). The 1978 Constitution did not automatically establish the AC but outlined two different routes for creating them. The ‘fast route’ (Article 151) was intended for the ‘historical communities’ of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, which had Statutes of Autonomy ratified during the Second Republic. The ‘slow route’ (Article 143) was intended for all other regions, so any AC created would be based on provincial units given the option to fuse and form larger units. Any such fusion would require the assent of a majority of regional and provincial voters as expressed in a referendum. In neither track was it possible to abolish the Spanish provinces.

Statutes of Autonomy were approved in Catalonia and the Basque Country by 1980, and were followed by regional elections won by nationalist parties (CiU in Catalonia, PNV in

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6 The 12 members of the Spanish Constitutional Court are elected as follows: 4 by the Congress (3/5 majority), 4 by the Senate (3/5 majority), 2 nominated by the government and 2 nominated by the General Council of the Judiciary.
the Basque Country). The governing Union for a Democratic Centre (UDC) eventually agreed for the region of Andalusia to be given autonomous powers through the ‘fast track’ procedure for ‘historic’ regions, after considerable political mobilisation by the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). Andalusia subsumed eight southern provinces and thereafter constituted the largest region in Spain, while the recognition of its dubious claims to ‘nationality’ status diluted the more distinctive nature of the Basque and Catalan claims (Genieys, 1998). The first regional elections were held in Andalusia in 1982, shortly after those held in Galicia (1981), the former region becoming a stronghold for the centre-left PSOE, while the latter became a stronghold for successive centre-right statewide parties (UCD, AP, PP). The main statewide parties developed bi-partisan agreements that sought to circumscribe and control (‘harmonise’) the entire process of regionalisation (Acuerdos Autonomicos), in recognition of its potentially centripetal tendencies. The first clear example of this was the LOAPA (Ley Organica de Armonización del Proceso Autonomico), an Organic Law agreed in 1981 by the two main statewide parties (UCD, PSOE), which sought to symmetrise the process of regionalisation (Colomer, 1998). While many aspects of this controversial Law were struck down by the Constitutional Court for violating the autonomy of regional governments, including a provision whereby the Spanish state could enact ‘basic laws and norms’ in areas of exclusive regional competence, other aspects of this agreement went unchallenged. Above all the decision was taken to establish regional governments across the national territory, subject to the development of Statutes of Autonomy. This eventually led to the creation of 13 ‘new’ regions, whose elections would be held concurrently with those of Spanish municipalities (1983, then at 4 year intervals) (Aja, 2001; Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). This provided full territorial coverage for regional governments in Spain, and transformed the regional question from an exclusively ‘vertical’ one (i.e. negotiation between the centre and a few autonomous ‘nationalities’) to one that incorporated a ‘horizontal’ dimension (i.e. negotiation between different regions over the allocation of power and resources).

A second Acuerdo Autonomico in 1992 between PSOE and PP agreed a ‘limit’ to regional competences, and endeavoured to bring the competences of ‘ordinary’ regions in
line with those of ‘historic’ regions. This not only occurred through statute reform, but also through the transfer of powers and financial resources by the Spanish Parliament without statute reform, a possibility envisaged under Article 150 of the Constitution (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). This led to the functions of ‘ordinary’ regional governments becoming increasingly symmetrical with those of ‘historic’ regions. Government policies in education, culture, social welfare (except unemployment insurance) and health-care became almost entirely transferred to the regional government, which began to develop an important role in economic and environmental policy (Gunther et al., 2004). This was reinforced by a complementary process of administrative decentralisation in the 1990s, whereby the regional governments increased their administrative capacity significantly, alongside a reduction in the central bureaucracy (Gibbons, 2000).

Yet several factors have prevented the enduring symmetrisation of regional competences. The first is the status of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia in the 1978 Constitution, where they are recognised as ‘historical nationalities’. This distinction was diluted after Andalusia became a ‘historic nationality’ and regional governments across Spain were given enhanced powers (Genieys, 1998), but it remains crucial in framing the political discourse of regional nationalists. The second factor is the process of bilateral negotiation to reform Statutes of Autonomy, which never occur simultaneously in all regions and can result in an asymmetrical distribution of regional competences and resources. The third is the retention of asymmetric ‘foral arrangements’ for fiscal transfers in the Basque Country and Navarre, allowing these regions to retain 90% of their revenue from taxation (Aja, 2001). This has encouraged other wealthy ‘historic’ regions (e.g. Catalonia) to demand similar arrangements. A fourth and crucial factor in fostering asymmetry is the presence of strong NSWP in ‘historic’ regions, which often control the regional government and may also have a determining impact on national government formation (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004).

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7 In the case of healthcare legislation, around 60% of Spanish regions have full legislative authority, while in 40% of regions the national level retains some legislative authority on health matters, largely for financing reasons. (Rico et al., 1999).

8 In 1990, 60% of the Spanish administration was at the national level, 25% at the regional level and 15% at the local level. In 2001, this was reduced to 34% at the national level, increased to 46% at the regional level, and increased to 20% at the local level (Gibbons, 2000).
Although regional policy competences were mainly transferred in the 1980s, the transfer of financial resources was only completed in the 1990s. These fiscal reforms allowed Spanish regions to collect more of their ‘own resources’, reducing their dependence on the fiscal flows and policy priorities of the Spanish government. The reforms took place in two key stages, once under the PSOE minority government (1993), and once under the PP minority government (1996), which successively raised the level of income tax collected in non-formal regions to 15% and 30% (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004), and allowed regions to collect a series of indirect taxes (Aja, 2001). These reforms reflected significant pressure from NSWP on the PSOE and PP minority governments at national level, which relied on NSWP for their governing majority (Colomer, 1998; Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). NSWP in most bi-lingual regions (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia) continue to insist on their ‘fundamental difference’ with the rest of Spain, and signed the Declaration of Barcelona (1998) that supported the differentiation of the ‘historic nationalities’ from other regions (Gunther et al., 2004). More recently Catalonia and the Basque Country embarked on a process of reforming their Statutes of Autonomy, creating considerable political conflict and generating somewhat asymmetrical outcomes (Keating and Wilson, 2009). The Ibarettxe Plan in the Basque Country, named after the incumbent regional president affiliated to the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), proposed a confederal model that recognised the sovereignty of the Basque Country and granted it almost total autonomy. This was approved in the regional parliament by Basque nationalists yet decisively rejected in the national parliament, because of the concerted opposition of the main statewide parties (Keating and Bray, 2006). The Maragall Plan in Catalonia, named after the regional president that led the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), was an ambitious attempt to recognise a pluri-national State and increase the regional autonomy of Catalonia, supported by PSC and the main Catalan NSWP. Although its content was significantly modified by PSOE in the Spanish parliament, it was eventually approved by PSOE despite the hostility of PP, suggesting bi-partisan agreements on symmetrising the ‘State of Autonomies’ no longer hold (Keating and Wilson, 2009). The formal role of Spanish regions in national decision-making remains weak, while attempts to reform the Senate into a genuine ‘chamber of territorial representation’ have failed, partly because of the 3/5 majority required for Constitutional revision. This reflects the
lack of agreement between PSOE and PP on the ‘ideal’ design of the Spanish state, and unease among NSWP at wielding limited influence in a regionalised Senate. NSWP would inevitably form a parliamentary minority in such a body, because most regional governments are still controlled by SWP (Gunther et al, 2004). The absence of formal mechanisms for joint national decision-making has instead encouraged ‘competitive bargaining’ between regional leaders, who exert pressure on the national government for greater fiscal resources and enhanced policy competences (Colomer, 1998).

Chapter 1.5.3 Comparing Regionalisation in Italy and Spain

Some authors argue a federalisation of the state is taking place in both Spain (Moreno, 2001) and Italy (Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003), although they consider this process to be incomplete because regions are not formally represented in national decision-making (Moreno, 2001), and lack constitutional veto power over revisions that affect their status or competences (Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). Although ‘regionalised’ Upper Houses and constitutional veto powers for the regional level are not necessarily defining features of federal systems (Riker, 1975; Stepan, 2001; Filipov et al, 2004), they nevertheless represent a type of formal mechanism for channelling regional interests in national decision-making. Formal linking institutions in Spain are confined to sectoral conferences, which have a narrow remit and are resented by many NSWP as a constraint on their regional autonomy (Hopkins, 2002). Since 2004 the PSOE government has held several informal conferences of regional presidents to discuss issues relating to the ‘State of Autonomies’, yet these have a limited remit and unclear outcome. Formal linking institutions in Italy are also weak in scope and application. The State-Regions Conference (1983) and the Unified Conference (1996) were intended to coordinate activities across territorial levels, but only have a consultative capacity and meet at the behest of the Prime Minister (at most twice a year). Their agenda is set almost entirely by the national government, with a focus on the implementation of EU law (Hopkins, 2002). The informal Conference of Regional Presidents is more influential in Italy, and has allowed regional leaders to express independent or bi-partisan views on key political issues, and even succeeded in abolishing a number of national government agencies via referendum.
(Caravita, 2002). Since formal mechanisms are weak or absent in Spain and Italy, this leaves only informal mechanisms for channelling regional interests, the most important of these being political parties. The absence of formal linking institutions has generated a distinct type of non-institutional federalism in Spain, where regional political leaders compete intensely for the distribution of state resources (Colomer, 1998). This perspective is also applicable to Italy, where regions with varied levels of economic development compete actively for state resources. The absence of strong formal institutions that represent regional interests in national decision-making implies that informal mechanisms are necessary to channel regional interests and ensure coordination across territorial levels. This is done mainly through SWP organisations, which therefore have strong incentives to remain integrated between national and regional levels (Thorlakson, 2007). Yet both countries also contain NSWP, either in individual regions (Spain) or across several regions (Italy). These NSWP can channel regional interests through the party system, exerting their blackmail or coalitional potential over SWP in government or opposition. In Spain NSWP provide parliamentary support to minority governments formed by SWP, in exchange for policy or fiscal concessions that favour their regions. In Italy the LN has forced the ‘northern question’ into national politics (Centro Bull and Gilbert, 2001), provoking a competitive response from the centre-left coalition (evident from the decentralising reforms enacted between 1996 and 2001), and a coalitional response from the centre-right coalition (evident from the attempted federal reform of the Italian State between 2001 and 2006).

Spain and Italy contain varying degrees and types of asymmetry in their state design, which affects the nature of the federal arrangements that have emerged. In Spain the ‘historic’ regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country are edging closer towards a ‘jurisdictional’ (Chandler, 1987) form of federalism. They possess a wide range of virtually exclusive competences in areas such as health-care, education and culture, local justice and policing. They also display higher levels of economic development and institutional performance than most other regions, and therefore are less dependent on national guidelines and resources (Rico et al., 1999). In contrast ‘ordinary’ regions or economically under-developed ‘historic’ regions (Andalusia, Galicia) are more reliant on
national guidelines and fiscal resources, and closer to the ‘functional’ form of federalism (Chandler, 1987). Another asymmetry in Spain is linked to the ‘foral’ system of fiscal transfers, which is not entirely congruent with the asymmetry in policy competences, since this primarily benefits Navarre and the Basque Country (Aja, 2001). The main asymmetry in Italy concerns the bi-lingual Special Status (SS) regions of northern Italy (Trentino Alto-Adige, Val d’Aosta, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia). These regions vary in their political organisation, policy competences, and financial resources. They sometimes control almost everything except the army and judiciary (e.g. Trentino-Alto-Adige, see Giovaretti, 2004), and are close to the ideal-type ‘jurisdictional’ form of federalism. Yet these regions are small in population and territory, while their cultural-linguistic differences are fully recognised by the rest of Italy. In contrast OS regions cover most of mainland Italy and have a fully symmetrical distribution of competences, listed in the Italian Constitution. Recent processes of regionalisation have aligned their policy functions (though not financial resources) with the large SS regions of Sicily and Sardegna, generating a stronger de facto symmetry in state design. Although OS regions differ widely in their levels of institutional performance (Putnam et al., 1993), the existence of a uniform regional tax base, and the redistribution of resources from wealthier northern regions to poorer southern regions, limits inherent fiscal imbalances.

Symmetric or asymmetric patterns of decentralisation are likely to impact on multi-level party organisation and structures of party competition at regional level. While de iure asymmetry among Italian regions remains an important feature of state design, it may be of limited relevant for multi-level party dynamics. SS regions with ‘jurisdictional’ forms of federalism are small in population and size, so their higher degree of autonomy generates few political tensions in the rest of Italy. The strong de iure symmetry and ‘functional’ form of federalism in OS regions, and their broad alignment with the competences (though not the resources) of large SS regions (Sicily, Sardegna), is likely to encourage SWP to remain integrated and symmetrically organised across the national territory. Multi-level dynamics will also be affected by variations in institutional performance and economic development, which represent a strong feature of de facto asymmetry in Italy, given the much higher levels of institutional performance and
economic development in northern regions (Putnam et al., 1993). This may produce significant variations between regional party organisations and party systems. Meanwhile both *de iure* and *de facto* asymmetry are present in Spanish regions. This not only represents an important feature of their state design, but is also crucial for determining multi-level party dynamics. The regions with greater autonomy tend to be the larger ‘historic’ regions. Many of these regions contain strong NSWP that wield asymmetric leverage over the national party system, since they can offer or withdraw support from minority governments led by SWP, in exchange for concessions that favour their region. Many of the regionalist claims advanced by NSWP are contested by the main SWP, yet the latter are increasingly unable to develop bi-partisan agreements on state design, given the increasing intensity of their bi-polar political conflict (Keating and Wilson, 2009).

Chapter 2 compares party systems and party organisations in Italy from a multi-level perspective (1995-2007). Chapter 2.1 analyses the regional branches of statewide parties, evaluating their autonomy in decision-making; their influence over national decision-making; and their role in candidate selection procedures for multi-level elections, allowing the territorial strategies of statewide parties to be categorised and compared. Chapter 2.2 focuses on party systems in the 15 Ordinary Status (OS) regions which cover most of mainland Italy.9 It analyses the format of their regional party systems (number of parties; territorial coverage), as well as their structures of competition (coalition formation; alternation in government) (Sartori, 1976). Chapter 2.3 briefly compares multi-level organisational and systemic linkages in light of these findings.

Chapter 2.1 Multi-level Party Organisations in Italy (1995-2007)

The collapse of the Italian party system in the 1990s, together with a significant shift in its patterns of competition (see Part 1.2), did not produce a convergence in the organisational arrangements or strategic aims of its component parties. There emerges no wholesale drift towards a ‘catch-all’ (Kitcheimer, 1966), ‘electoral-professional’ (Panebianco, 1988), or ‘cartel’ (Katz and Mair, 1994) model of party organisation. Most parties competing in the Italian party system between 1994 and 2007 displayed an incomplete organisational rupture with their post-war predecessors. Organisational continuity was particularly evident in the Centre-Left Coalition (CLC), to a lesser degree in the Centre-Right Coalition (CRC). The CLC included three ‘successor parties’ to the Italian Communist Party (PCI): Democrats of the Left (DS), formed in 1992 from the majority PCI faction; Party of Refounded Communists (PRC), formed in 1992 from the minority PCI faction; and Party of Democratic Italian Communists (PDCI), formed in 1992 from a split within PRC. The CLC also included the Italian Popular Party (PPI),

9 It does not cover the five Special Status regions, because these vary widely in their form of political organisation; degree of autonomy; electoral systems; and timing of regional elections. This makes inter-regional comparisons extremely difficult during this timeframe. Where relevant references are made to the behaviour or organisation of political parties in Special Status regions.
main successor party to the Christian Democrats (DC), as well as the Italian Social Democrats (SDI), main successor party to the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). In 2002 PPI merged with two small parties to form Daisy-Democracy and Liberty (DL), under the new leadership of Francesco Rutelli (Mayor of Rome and former Radical), but continued to rely heavily on ex-DC personnel. In 2007 DL merged with DS to form the Democratic Party (PD), under the new leadership of Walter Veltroni (mayor of Rome and former DS Secretary). In the 1994-2007 period the CRC included National Alliance (AN), ‘successor party’ to the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI), as well as some ex-DC splinter parties (CCD, CDU) that merged to form the Union of Christian Democrats (UDC) in 2002. The CRC also included two entirely new parties without organisational predecessors: Forza Italia (FI) and the Northern League (LN). FI was founded in 1994 by billionaire Silvio Berlusconi (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999), while LN was founded in 1989 by the federation of regional protest parties in northern Italy (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). Organisational variety in the post-1994 Italian party system is partly attributable to systemic factors. A highly fragmented party system managed to co-exist with bi-polar patterns of party competition, because parties could form into competing pre-electoral coalitions for the purposes of winning elections (Bartolini et al. 2004). These broad coalitions allowed parties to access government without necessarily adopting ‘catch-all’ strategies that appealed to the centre ground of Italian politics. Since parties relied primarily on coalitional aggregation to access national government, this allowed them to preserve their distinct party structures, organisational strategies, and policy objectives. A low effective threshold for representation in the national electoral system created few incentives for parties to avoid fragmentation, with frequent intra-party disputes often leading to the formation of new parties in the Italian parliament.

Given the fragmented and fluid character of the Italian party system, it is necessary to develop criteria for the selection of statewide parties (SWP) for organisational analysis:

1) Criterion of National Territorial Coverage (focus on statewide parties).
2) Criterion of Permanence (focus on statewide parties that endure).
3) Criterion of Relevant Size (focus on statewide parties that are large).
In operationalising these criteria, we should take into account both national and regional levels of electoral competition. The criterion of national territorial coverage therefore requires the party to hold seats in at least half of the regional legislatures during the timeframe (1995-2007); the criterion of permanence requires the party to contest every national election held during the timeframe (1994, 1996, 2001, 2006); and the criterion of relevant size requires the party to achieve 4% of the vote in each national election.\(^{10}\)

The criterion of relevant size excludes a range of small (often transient) parties. The criterion of national territorial coverage excludes LN, because this party only obtains seats in 7 of the 20 regional legislatures (5 OS regions; 2 SS regions), all located in northern Italy.\(^{11}\) The criterion of permanence excludes DL, because it was only formed from a party fusion in 2002. This leaves us with four SWP for organisational analysis: FI and AN on the centre-right; DS on the centre-left; and PRC on the far-left. The following section will consider these organisations from a multi-level perspective, focusing on the autonomy of their regional branches; their influence over national party decision-making; and their role in candidate selection for multi-level elections.

**Forza Italia (FI)**

FI has continued to pursue a ‘business firm’ model of party organisation, with ‘light’ structures not weighed down by the formalised and bottom-up decision-making structures of democratic parties (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999). Reflecting the business empire of its founder and leader Silvio Berlusconi, FI adopted the top-down informal leadership of a family-owned enterprise. The top party personnel in 1994 were recruited almost entirely from Berlusconi’s Fininvest business empire. FI aimed at direct communication with the electorate through in-house television (Berlusconi’s three national private television channels); in-house marketing teams (Berlusconi’s polling and advertising agency

\(^{10}\) 4% national vote was also the legal threshold for obtaining seats through the PR ballot under the Mixed Member-Majoritarian (MMM) electoral system used for national elections between 1994 and 2001.

\(^{11}\) The seven regions where LN obtains seats are Lombardia, Veneto, Piemonte, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna (5 OS regions), Trentino-Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (2 SS regions).
Publitalia 80); and in-house football team (Berlusconi’s ownership of AC Milan). In strategic terms FI is clearly a ‘catch-all’ party, attracting centrist voters orphaned by the organisational collapse and electoral disappearance of the main governing parties in the 1990s. This is evident from levels of FI support in national elections (1994-2006), which display strong variations but generally confirm FI as the largest party (18.1-29.4%).

Although FI was partly institutionalised after the adoption of party statutes in 1998, this process was carried out with little internal consultation and largely confirmed the undemocratic nature of the organisation. Even these weak formal structures have little relevance to decision-making, and are regularly bypassed by Berlusconi and his small coterie of personal advisers (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999). Nor did the 2nd national assembly of FI (2004) amend the internal party organisation or discuss party policy, instead focusing entirely on the personal achievements of Berlusconi in government (Hopkin, 2005b). However many prominent national politicians in FI are former DC politicians (e.g. Claudio Scajola, Giusseppe Pisanu) or former PSI politicians (e.g. Sandro Bondi), while at sub-national levels the party relies heavily on former DC and PSI politicians to widen its electoral appeal and consolidate its territorial organisation (Fava, 2004). These politicians have developed informal party factions, permitted to operate mainly at sub-national levels but rarely recognised by the national party.

In formal terms the multi-level organisation of FI remains highly centralised and conforms to a ‘cohesive’ territorial strategy, but in practice sub-national party elites have been able to negotiate varying degrees of informal autonomy, resulting in some territorial ‘flexibility’.

In principle the autonomy of the sub-national organisation is entirely circumscribed by the regional coordinator, who is personally appointed or dismissed by the FI president (Art.27). The regional coordinators appointed in 1994 all belonged to the Fininvest Group, ensuring strong personal and institutional loyalty to Berlusconi (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999). According to party statutes (1998), the regional coordinators represent the ‘movement’ of FI in the institutional and political ambit of the region, guiding the

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12 Figures used for FI, AN, PRC, and DS support in national elections (1994-2006) are based on the PR ballot for the House of Deputies (1994-2006). The exception is DS support in the 2006 election, where Senate votes are used, because DS and DL formed an electoral coalition (‘Ulivo’) for the Deputies.

13 The first recognised faction in FI is ‘Christian Democrats for Liberty’, based in Lombardia and directed by the ex-DC regional president Roberto Formigoni (see Chapter 4.2).
actions and ensuring the conformity of sub-regional levels (Art.27). The coordinator appoints 5 members of the regional committee (including the vice coordinator), and presides this advisory body (Art.27). The regional committee also includes the FI spokesperson in the regional council, as well as the regional president if affiliated to FI (Art.28). The regional council is expected to meet every 3 years, convoked either by ¼ of its members or by the regional coordinator. This body includes all members of the regional committee, alongside any European or national parliamentarians elected or resident in the region (Art.28). This body is also presided by the RC (Art.27) but has no significant elective functions (Art.29). The regional executive consists of the RC and his personal nominees (Art.28), constituting a form of cabinet. Similar structures are repeated for provincial and local levels of FI, the principal difference being that provincial or local coordinators are elected by their respective council, rather than nominated directly by the president (Art.32). Despite their impressive formal powers, regional coordinators must continually negotiate their actions with elected sub-national elites, mainly former DC or PSI politicians. FI regional councillors represent a serious internal challenge for regional coordinators, because they can challenge their undemocratic position and advance stronger claims for regional representation, and so place pressure on Berlusconi to replace disliked coordinators. This occurred in July 2005 after a poor FI performance in regional elections. Some coordinators strongly opposed by local/regional elites were replaced, including Antonio Martusciello (RC Campania, 1994-2005), a former Fininvest employee substituted by Nicola Cosentino, an ex-PSI parliamentarian (see Chapter 4.1).14

The influence of the regional party in national decision-making is very weak in FI and largely confined to the regional coordinators, who are represented collectively at national level through the conference of regional coordinators, which has a clear mandate to control the sub-national party (Art.24). While regional councillors are present in other party structures, they are easily outweighed by nominated delegates of the national leadership, whether coordinators or members of the presidential committee (usually national parliamentarians). The national assembly includes all regional councillors and FI spokespersons in local or provincial councils, in addition to a number of elected

14 La Repubblica, National Edition (22/7/05).
delegates. In principle the assembly should meet every 3 years and is formally responsible for electing the president, determining the political direction of FI; electing 50 members of the national council; and electing 6 members of the presidential committee (Art.14). In practice it has only met twice (1998, 2004), and done little more than rubber-stamp leadership decisions (Hopkin, 2005b). The assembly can only be convoked by the FI president (Art.15), while statute revisions require a two-thirds majority (Art.74). The national council has only 50 members elected by the assembly, while a majority of its members are there by right, including all national or European parliamentarians affiliated to FI, as well as the sub-national party leadership. This includes the RC; any regional or provincial presidents affiliated to FI; all FI spokespersons in the regional council; and all FI mayors in large cities. The national council has few clear functions and no elective capabilities (Art.21). The presidential committee is composed largely of members nominated by Berlusconi. From sub-national levels only FI regional presidents are members by right. The presidential committee is formally responsible for revising party statutes, monitoring party finances (Art.23) and proposing/ratifying choices in candidate selection (Art.43).

Candidate selection for FI displays many of the centralising top-down features of the broader organisation, with a key function performed by the regional coordinator. In European and national elections, candidate selection is formally ratified by the presidential committee on the basis of lists approved by the regional coordinators (Art.43), with no obligation to consult other levels. In regional elections, lists are formally approved by the regional coordinator and subsequently ratified at the conference of regional coordinators (Art.44). In provincial elections, lists are approved and ratified by the regional coordinator, although FI candidates for regional or provincial president must also be ratified by the presidential committee (Art.44). The rules for local elections vary according to the size of the constituency and the contested position. All mayoral candidates are approved by the regional coordinator, while party lists for municipal councils must be approved by the provincial coordinator. In large cities (>50,000) party lists for the municipal council must also be ratified by the regional coordinator, while

15 The statutes do not actually specify how the assembly should proceed to electing the president!
candidates for mayor require ratification by the presidential committee. An additional provision is that the presidential committee and regional coordinator can each provide 10% of names for every municipal, provincial and regional party list. While candidate selection procedures in FI recognise the enhanced institutional position of directly elected mayors and regional presidents, they also reinforce national control over their selection by providing no ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms for candidate selection at any territorial level. Yet preference voting in sub-national elections (regional, provincial, local) has allowed individual political entrepreneurs, whether career politicians or independent businessmen, to conduct autonomous electoral campaigns under the FI label. All these political entrepreneurs need from FI is inclusion on party lists, which allows them to compete heavily with each other for preference votes, since this is the key to accessing sub-national public office (Vassallo, 2005b). Although the national leadership favours certain sub-national politicians, it is unlikely to exclude political entrepreneurs that can gather a substantial package of votes in sub-national elections.

**National Alliance (AN)**

Party statutes for AN were approved soon after the dissolution of its predecessor organisation MSI in 1995. MSI fielded its candidates under a broader AN list for the 1994 national election, and its leader Gianfranco Fini sought to formalise the transformation from neo-fascist to centre-right party by developing AN as a new organisation, although one still largely composed of former MSI elites. Leonardo Morlino (2001) argues that AN resembles the ‘modern cadre’ model of party organisation, reluctant to pursue all-inclusive ‘catch-all’ strategies that might weaken its internal or ideological cohesion (Koole, 1994; Wolinetz, 2002). This is evident from its modest support (with low variation) in national elections (12-15.7% 1994-2006). Party members remain an important source of finance, recruitment, and personnel (Koole, 1994; Morlino, 2001), and increased in the transition from MSI (165,000, 1980) to AN (485,000, 1998). The 1995 AN statute outlines its multi-level organisation, which resembles a distinct form of ‘democratic centralism’, characterised by the predominance

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16 Membership figures: Mair and van Biezen (2001).
of the national party in public office and the ‘presidentialisation’ of the party leadership. This underlines a ‘cohesive’ territorial strategy that remained unaltered until the 2006 national assembly, which introduced some partial concessions to sub-national party democracy after disappointing performances in the 2005 regional and 2006 national elections, particularly in former AN strongholds of central-southern Italy (see Annex 2).

While the 1995 AN statutes included regional organs of self-government, these remained highly circumscribed in their autonomy. The key figure at regional level was the regional coordinator, initially appointed or dismissed by the national president (Art.37). The founding AN statutes created a regional assembly (Art.34), which could develop proposals for sub-national or national organs to adopt (Art.35). The regional executive meanwhile was presided by the coordinator and included several of his nominees, with only a minority elected by the assembly. Members by right included all provincial party presidents; the AN spokesperson in the regional legislature; and resident members of the national political executive (Art.38). Statute reforms in 2006 partially democratised the regional party, making the regional coordinator a figure elected by the regional assembly through a secret ballot requiring an absolute majority of votes, replacing the earlier system of presidential nomination. The regional assembly now elects 8-10 members of the executive, although 7-10 members are still nominated by the coordinator. Yet the regional assembly has weak coordinating powers over sub-regional levels, and is constituted entirely by delegates from provincial congresses, on a basis proportional to AN votes in the previous national election. The regional coordinator therefore became more dependent on support from the provincial party, which is centralised around the provincial party president, whose powers were strengthened by the 2006 reforms.

The national decision-making organs of AN form a pyramidal structure in which the influence of the sub-national party is progressively diminished at higher levels. At the base of this structure is the national congress, which in principle should be held every 3 years, but in practice has been held every 6-7 years (1995, 2002, 2008). Congress is responsible for formally electing the national assembly and president; determining the political direction of AN; and proposing changes to party statutes. Congress is convoked
by the president, although in principle it can be convoked on request of 1/3 of its members (Art.16). Its members include all provincial party presidents and a number of delegates elected on a provincial basis, ensuring that elected members constitute an absolute majority of delegates (Art.20), while members by right include all national and European parliamentarians, as well as all regional coordinators. Although the national congress is the most representative organ of AN, the national assembly is considerably more powerful. It is ¾ elected by the congress and mandated by the latter to develop the political direction of AN; elaborate the national programme; modify the party statutes; and elect a number of significant party positions (Art.26). Yet ¼ of its members are nominated by the president (Art.28), making it less democratic than the congress and more subservient to the party leader. The national directorate meanwhile consists of around 100 party figures and meets three times a year on the orders of the president. Its membership is largely designated by the president and ratified by the assembly. The national political executive consists of only 25 members, all appointed by the president.

Candidate selection in AN is characterised by strong national control and limited sub-national autonomy. The regional executive performs the main nominating function for all types of elections. It proposes candidate lists for European, national, and regional elections, which are ratified by the national directorate (Art.39). The regional executive also ratifies candidate lists for provincial elections and local elections in larger cities (Art.30), which are proposed at their respective territorial level (Art.39). The provincial executive only ratifies candidate lists for local elections in smaller cities (Art.49). Although the regional level has a strong formal role in candidate selection, the strength of the provincial leadership and its effective control over the regional executive means candidate selection is negotiated primarily between the provincial and national party leadership. This represents a significant increase in sub-national autonomy, since before the 2006 reform the regional executive was entirely nominated by the regional coordinator, who was in turn directly nominated by the president.
Party of Refounded Communists (PRC)

PRC was formed from the minority faction of PCI in 1992, which consisted mainly of radical left politicians that did not want to disband the Communist organisation. PRC is located on the far left of the CLC, and so developed a turbulent relationship with the main governing parties (DS, DL) in the CLC. Its support during national elections has been modest and in decline (5.0-8.6%, 1994-2006). After bringing down the Prodi government in 1998, many PRC activists and politicians left to join PDCI, which continued to support the CLC. PRC shares a common aim with ‘left-libertarian’ parties in seeking to reject the capitalist growth model in favour of stronger solidarity and participatory democracy, but prefers a traditional ‘Class-Mass’ organisation to achieve these aims, characterised by a strong national leadership that endorses Marxist ideals. PRC therefore straddles the two categories of ‘Movement Party’ and ideological ‘Mass Based’ party formulated by Gunther and Diamond (2003). The 1st PRC statutes were approved in 1992, although these underwent important modifications in ensuing national congresses (1994, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005). The principal changes that affected the regional party occurred during the 2002 national assembly.17 PRC nevertheless retained a centralised multi-level structure, democratic in its internal election and founded on the provincial level. While PRC introduced a few symbolic changes intended to institutionalise the regional level, this did not alter the intra-party balance of power.

The regional party in PRC displays weak autonomy, with few distinct functions and a composition dominated by the provincial party. PRC is defined as a ‘unitary’ political body with a ‘unitary’ political direction (Art.8). This reflects the preference of the PRC leadership for a unitary state, and their continued rejection of the federal vision. The sub-national organisation of PRC consists of circles, federations and regional committees (Art.12). Circles can be established on either a territorial or thematic basis (Art.12), while federations are usually constituted on a provincial basis (Art.17). The elected leadership of the provincial party is the political committee of the federation (Art.35), hereafter referred to as the provincial executive. Each federation holds a congress in which it

17 Unless otherwise indicated, this text will refer to the most recent PRC Statutes (2005)
defines the political programme at provincial level; elects the entire provincial executive; and elects delegates to the national congress and regional congress (Art.28ter). The regional congress is an innovation of the 2002 statutes, where it became responsible for defining the party programme at regional level (Art.25), as well as electing the regional political committee (Art.20). The latter represents the elected leadership of the regional party (Art.37). This is significant because prior to these reforms the regional political committee was nominated by the provincial executive. The regional political committee is responsible for coordinating the activities of sub-regional levels; determining party positions at regional level; and making political decisions with respect to the regional government (Art.37). Secretaries of federations are members by right of the regional political committee (Art.28), while the regional congress (which appoints the remaining members) is constituted entirely by delegates from the provincial congresses (Art.28ter). Regional congresses are usually convoked by the regional political committee within 3 months of the national congress (Art.28), and are therefore not responsible for developing the political line in regional elections. This task is instead performed by the regional conference, a body convoked in occasion of regional elections and present since the 1992 statutes. The regional conference is composed entirely of delegates nominated by the provincial executive on a basis proportional to their membership figures (Art.32), reinforcing the weak autonomy of the regional level vis-à-vis the provincial level.

The influence of the regional party on national decision-making is very weak in PRC, because it is excluded from processes of internal selection, the latter remaining a core function of the provincial party. Unlike congresses of federations, the regional congress is not given responsibility for contributing to the national party programme (Art.25). Nor is it responsible for electing the national congress, a function reserved for the congresses of federations. The congress is responsible for approving or revising party statutes (Art.29), and electing the national political committee, including the party secretary (national leader). The national political committee appoints members of the national directorate, a form of party executive, from within its own ranks. Only the party secretary is a member by right. The party in public office has no privilege in the internal hierarchy of PRC, and this is reflected in elected politicians being given no automatic representation in national
organisms. This conforms to the structure of its predecessor PCI, which privileged the extra-parliamentary organisation above the party in public office, and adopted the provincial level as the basis for its territorial organisation\(^{18}\) (Wertman, 1988).

Candidate selection for PRC privileges the provincial party above the regional level for most types of election. Candidates for national elections are proposed by the provincial executive and ratified by the national directorate (Art.59). Candidates for regional elections are proposed by the provincial executive and ratified by the regional political committee. Candidates for provincial and local elections are proposed and ratified by the provincial executive, with no formal contribution of the regional level (Art.58). Only for European elections does the regional political committee propose candidates to be ratified by the national directorate (Art.59). Candidate selection procedures in PRC are more decentralised than in its predecessor PCI, especially with respect to sub-national elections, although the regional level remains similarly weak. PRC has consistently applied internal mechanisms for selecting candidates in its own party lists, yet has advocated the use of ‘open’ primaries (i.e. all sympathetic voters) for selecting coalitional candidates. PRC successfully insisted on ‘open’ primaries in Puglia to choose between Nichi Vendola (PRC) and Francesco Boccia (DL) as centre-left candidate for regional president in 2005.\(^{19}\) Vendola narrowly won these primaries (51% to 49%)\(^{20}\) and proceeded to narrowly win the regional election (49.8% to 49.2%), becoming the first and only regional president to be affiliated with PRC.

**Democrats of the Left (DS)**

The Party of Democrats of the Left (PDS) was formed in 1992 from the majority faction of PCI. The composition of PDS was dominated by moderate politicians from PCI, but also included a radical minority wing that chose not to join PRC. In 1998 PDS was re-founded as Democrats of the Left (DS), after some small parties merged into the

\(^{18}\) PRC has also continued the policy of the PCI in not allowing parliamentarians or regional councillors to hold the same office for more than two full terms (Article 57).

\(^{19}\) Repubblica, National Edition (10/12/2004)

\(^{20}\) Repubblica, National Edition (17/1/2005)
organisation. Leonardo Morlino (2001) argues that DS resembles a ‘modern cadre’ party in organisational terms, unwilling to develop ‘catch-all’ strategies that would weaken its internal or ideological cohesion (Koole, 1994; Wolinetz, 2002). This has generated modest levels of support during national elections (16.1-21.1%, 1994-2006), well below its predecessor PCI. Party members remained an important source of financing, recruitment and personnel (Koole, 1994). DS had the highest levels of party membership in Italy (561,193 members, 2005), although this represented a steady decline since the heyday of the PCI (1.75 million members, 1980). DS statutes were developed during the 1st national congress (1998), and significantly revised at the 2nd and 3rd national congresses (2000, 2005), which transformed DS into a ‘federal’ party organisation founded on the regional level (Giannetti and Mule, 2006). This highlights the symbiotic relationship between party preferences for state design and their organisational adaptation, since these changes closely reflected the Constitutional reforms DS sponsored in the Italian parliament (see Part 1.2). Although in formal terms DS have adopted a decentralised and ‘flexible’ territorial strategy, these new arrangements were never fully implemented because of the subsequent merger with DL to form the Democratic Party in October 2007, suggesting that territorial power structures never altered substantially.

In principle DS regional branches began to wield a high degree of autonomy, with substantial choice over internal structure and control over sub-regional levels. The 2005 reforms based the territorial organisation of DS on a ‘federal network’, founded on a series of regional unions (Art.7). These unions were granted statutory and political autonomy, with the capacity to formulate political programmes at all sub-national levels. Their autonomy was to be codified through political and organisational pacts with the national party, outlined in regional statutes of autonomy. Adjacent unions could choose to merge and form a pluri-regional union. Regional statutes would outline the entire sub-national structure of DS, while respecting the twin principles of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘federal solidarity’ (Art.8). The possibility of ‘federal intervention’ would only be permitted in cases of serious party damage at lower territorial levels. This intervention would be undertaken by the regional directorate at sub-regional levels; and by the

21 1980 PCI figures (van Biezen & Mair, 2001); 2005 DS figures (Giannetti & Mule, 2006).
national directorate at regional or sub-regional levels. Any intervention by the national directorate required the support of an absolute 2/3 majority of members, whereas an intervention by the regional directorate needed to comply with the guidelines of the respective statute. Another interesting feature of this ‘federal network’ was the subsidiarity warning mechanism (similar to the one contained in the proposed European Constitution), which obliged the national level to re-consider a political decision perceived to infringe the ‘subsidiarity’ of sub-national levels, if the warning mechanism was activated by at least 1/3 of the regional unions (Art.9). This ‘federal network’ was never fully implemented because the regional statutes had to be proposed by the regional unions within 6 months of the national congress (2005), and then ratified by the national council of guarantees (Transitional Norm 2). The 2007 DS congress instead confirmed the organisational merger with DL to form the Democratic Party (PD). Although the PD may develop decentralised multi-level structures in formal terms, as this would reflect both DS statutes (2005) and DL statutes (2002), it remains unclear whether this change would actually produce a fundamental shift in the multi-level balance of power.

Although the regional DS gained some influence over national decision-making, they held no pre-eminent position in selecting either national party organs or the party leadership. This was consistent with the 2001 Constitutional reform sponsored by the DS, which expanded ‘self-rule’ at regional level but did not provide for ‘shared rule’ at national level (Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). The DS organisation developed dual structures of national decision-making, with two party leaders (secretary and president) alongside two representative party organs (congress and assembly). This reform was pursued to allow Massimo D’Alema to remain in a powerful position within DS. D’Alema became party president after having to relinquish the post of party secretary upon his appointment as Prime Minister of Italy in 1998 (Giannetti and Mule, 2006). The national congress became responsible for defining the party programme; approving party statutes; electing the president; and electing ½ the national council. Delegates were elected from all levels of the party apparatus (regional, provincial, local), and while in principle national congresses were to be held every 3 years (Art.13), in practice their timing was more erratic (1998, 2000, 2005, 2007). The congressional assembly was the
highest decision-making body between successive national congresses, convoked by the president and composed entirely of delegates elected to the previous national congress. While the congressional assembly could approve changes to the party statute and elect a new president, it could not de-select an incumbent party president (Art.14), which remained an exclusive function of the national congress (Art.13). In principle the congressional assembly could revoke the party secretary, who was directly elected by an absolute majority of membership votes, as expressed through local congresses (Art.15).

Whereas the party secretary held a number of clear leadership functions (Art.15), the president remained an influential figure that presided over the congressional assembly and the national council (Art.19). The national council defined the political orientation of DS and had a number of important elective functions. Its members were mainly elected, half by the regional unions and half by the congressional assembly. All key national leadership figures were members by right, in addition to all secretaries of regional unions and all regional presidents affiliated to DS (Art.16). The national directorate was an elite body that had to be convoked during the formation or crisis of national governments involving DS; to take decisions on electoral strategies; or to resolve urgent internal crises. The national directorate was also required to perform a ‘federal’ function in ratifying inter-regional party unions, recognising federations in metropolitan areas, and deciding on ‘federal intervention’ in cases of serious discordance between national and sub-national levels (Art.17). DS statutes also provided for several advisory conferences, including a conference of regional secretaries. This had a consultative function and incorporated the party secretary, as well as all secretaries of regional unions, and was convoked on agreement of the party president and party secretary (Art.20).

Candidate selection procedures in DS (Art.28) gradually became more decentralised and potentially more differentiated than in other Italian parties. The regional level performed a significant role in candidate selection for most types of elections. Candidate selection procedures were always determined by a directorate (national, regional, provincial), generally at the territorial level of election. This directorate could choose between three potential procedures: ‘open’ primaries (i.e. all sympathetic voters), ‘closed’ primaries (i.e. party members) or ‘regulated selection’ (i.e. party elites). A selection committee was
established to choose candidates at the relevant territorial level, while an electoral commission was established at the next highest level to verify the correct application of procedures. For provincial and local elections, the selection committee was at provincial level while the electoral commission was at regional level. For regional elections, the selection committee was at regional level while the electoral commission was at national level. For national and European elections, the selection committee was at regional level while the electoral commission was at national level. Some divergence in candidate selection procedures for regional elections became evident, with the Tuscan DS approving a system of ‘open’ primaries to select candidates for the 2005 regional elections, while other regions adopted varying forms of regulated selection. But candidate selection in the 2006 national election remained very centralised.

Conclusions

Italian statewide parties adopted diverse organisational responses to the challenges of regionalisation. The core statewide parties on the centre-right (FI and AN) adopted the most centralised and ‘cohesive’ territorial strategies, with weak autonomy for the regional party and almost no influence over national decision-making. In both parties national organs are pyramidal in structure; highly centralised around the president; and dominated by his nominees from among the national party in public office. In both parties the key figure at regional level is the regional coordinator, initially appointed or dismissed by the party leader. Statute reforms in AN (2006) made the regional coordinator directly elected by the regional congress, so less dependent on support from the national leadership, and more dependent on support from the provincial leadership. In FI the regional coordinator formally retained control over sub-national branches and remained a delegate of the party leader, but in practice elected regional elites operated fairly autonomously at sub-national levels, and could heavily pressure the party leader to replace unpopular regional coordinators. This represents a form of organisational ‘stratarchy’ that is neither centralised nor decentralised in character.

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The core statewide parties on the CLC displayed rather different territorial strategies. PRC adopted a ‘cohesive’ territorial strategy, with low autonomy for the regional party and no influence over national decision-making. Yet PRC also strengthened the provincial party, which wields considerable autonomy and some influence in national decision-making. The internal structures of PRC are also relatively democratic and do not privilege the party in public office. In principle DS adopted a ‘flexible’ strategy with a federal model of party organisation, based on regional unions with their own statutes of autonomy, closely modelled on the Constitutional reforms (2001) supported by DS in national government. The regional party was granted significant autonomy and control over sub-regional levels and important functions in candidate selection, although with limited influence over national decision-making. Yet these reforms were never implemented after the 2005 party congress, because the subsequent party congress in 2007 formalised the merger of DS and DL to form the PD.

Statewide parties in Italy not only differ in their territorial strategies, but also in their broader organisational strategies. This makes it necessary to evaluate in greater detail how these different party organisations adjusted to decentralisation and the increased salience of regional political arenas. This can only be done through detailed regional case studies that explore how Italian statewide parties adapted their informal structures to confront multi-leve challenges (see Chapter 4), because analysis of party statutes yields rather limited insights, while secondary literature remains largely silent on the subject.
Chapter 2.2 Multi-level Party Systems in Italy (1995-2007)

Chapter 2.2 will compare the ‘format’ and ‘structures of competition’ (Sartori, 1976) of multi-level party systems in Italy, assessing their congruence in ‘horizontal’ (inter-regional) and ‘vertical’ (national-regional) terms (Thorlakson, 2006). The ‘format’ involves a measurement of the number of parties, as well as their territorial coverage across national and regional party systems. The ‘structures of competition’ compares national and regional patterns of coalition formation and alternation in government, with a particular emphasis on the dual structures of party competition (inter-coalitional and intra-coalitional) that operate in Italy. Chapter 2.2 will analyse the national party system in Italy, before proceeding to the comparison of party systems in the 15 OS regions.

National Party System in Italy (1994-2007)

The number of parties is a simple empirical indicator that allows us to compare the relative fragmentation of party systems (Sartori, 1976), as well as the ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ congruence of multi-level party systems (Thorlakson, 2006). Since 1994 dual structures of party competition in Italy have seen bi-polar, inter-coalitional competition co-exist with fragmented, intra-coalitional competition. Fragmentation is evident in the number of parties represented in the national party system, as measured by those parties that win seats to the lower house (Chamber) after national elections held during the timeframe (1994, 1996, 2001, 2006). These confirm a pattern of fragmentation that does not diminish significantly over the timeframe. Fragmentation in Italy cannot be attributed to the prevalence of parties specific to a given region, since region-specific parties are relatively few (see Table 1). The national party system is instead characterised by the prevalence of small statewide parties, due to the perverse interactions between a fragmented party system and a mainly majoritarian electoral system. The blackmail potential of small parties was strong under the national Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMP) electoral system (1994, 1996, 2001), a two-vote system whereby 75% of seats were allocated through single member constituencies, while 25% of seats were allocated through party lists with a 4% national threshold (D’Alimonte, 2005). The intensity of
inter-coalitional competition actually stimulated party system fragmentation, because it encouraged small and large statewide parties to compete within broader coalitions. Large parties allowed small parties to contest some safe majoritarian seats unopposed, in exchange for the small parties agreeing not to field their candidates in the rest of the national territory (Bartolini et al., 2004). This allowed the centre-left coalition (CLC) and centre-right coalition (CRC) to increase their competitiveness by avoiding more than 1 candidate in every single member constituency, but also contributed heavily to party system fragmentation. The number of small parties in the national party system is evident from Table 1, which shows that under the MMM electoral system only 7-9 parties were able to win seats through the proportional vote (because of the 4% national threshold), while 17-19 parties were able to win seats through the majoritarian vote. The only case where a party won proportional seats but no majoritarian seats was PRC in 2001, which chose not to field candidates for the majoritarian vote (Chamber), but nevertheless surpassed the threshold for obtaining seats in the proportional vote. Joint lists have also allowed small parties to win seats through the PR ballot, as evident from the successful CCD-CDU list in 1996, and the Margherita list in 2001 (PPI, Democratici, RI, Udeur).

The introduction of a new electoral system for the 2006 national election, which can be characterised as PR with majoritarian bonus, did not immediately reduce party system fragmentation. This electoral system allocates seats in the Chamber to closed party lists on a national-proportional basis, but also guarantees that the party or coalition with a plurality of votes obtains a comfortable governing majority.23 To encourage the formation of broad pre-electoral coalitions, this electoral system contains a threshold for party representation that varies according to whether the party competes independently (4%), or as part of a broader coalition (10% for the coalition; 2% for individual parties). The lower threshold for parties within coalitions led to virtually all parties joining one of the two competing coalitions in the 2006 election. This contributed significantly to party

23 A similar system was introduced for elections to the Senate elections, although in the upper chamber the majoritarian bonuses were allocated on a regional basis, so failed to guarantee the winning coalition would obtain a governing majority. In the 2006 election, the CLC narrowly obtained a plurality of votes in the Deputies (so secured a governing majority), while the CRC narrowly obtained a plurality of votes in the Senate. However the regional allocation of majoritarian bonuses in the Senate resulted in the CLC obtaining a narrow majority in the upper chamber, so the CLC was eventually able to form a government.
system fragmentation, because 8 of the 15 parties elected in OS regions obtained less than 4% of the national vote. Joint party lists also contributed to fragmentation, with successful ones formed between LN and the southern Movement for Autonomies (MA); between DC and New PSI; and between the Radicals and SDI.

Table 1: Number of Parties in Italian Chamber of Deputies

M= No. of parties winning seats in House of Deputies through Majoritarian vote (1994-2006)

P= No. of parties winning seats in House of Deputies through Proportional vote (1994-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Election</th>
<th>Number of Parties (All Regions)</th>
<th>Region-specific parties in Special Status (SS) Regions</th>
<th>Number of Parties (OS Regions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>18 (18M; 7P)</td>
<td>3 (SVP, LVA, LAM)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>17 (17M; 9P)</td>
<td>4 (SVP, LVA, LAM, IU)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>20 (19M; 8P)</td>
<td>4 (SVP, LVA, IU, SN)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>17 (1M; 16P)</td>
<td>3 (SVP, LVA,24 MA)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While structures of inter-coalitional competition at national level could be broadly characterised as bipolar, it is a rather ‘imperfect’ form of bi-polarism because some parties operating under the MMM electoral system (1994-2001) fielded lists that competed against the two main coalitions (D’Alimonte and Bartolini, 1998). The 1994 election saw three coalitions compete: A leftist coalition led by PDS and PRC; a centrist coalition composed of PPI and the Segni Pact; and a centre-right coalition composed of FI, AN, and LN. The 1996 election saw the leftist and centrist coalitions merge into a single centre-left coalition (CLC), which competed against a single centre-right coalition (CRC). Yet neither coalition included LN, which competed independently in northern constituencies. The 2001 election saw LN re-join the CRC but saw three significant party lists stand outside the competing coalitions (PRC, Di Pietro List, European Democracy). This pattern of imperfect bi-polarism occurred in part because the electoral system gave a strategic option to medium-sized parties reluctant to support either main coalition. These parties could choose to compete exclusively for proportional seats (where they needed to surpass the 4% national threshold), and could hope to influence government formation in

24 In the new PR with Majoritarian Bonus electoral system (2006-), the tiny region of Val d’Aosta has a single parliamentarian elected through a single member district. This allowed the election of a parliamentarian from the Val d’Aosta list (LVA). All other districts are multi-member.
the event of a hung parliament (i.e. no parliamentary majority in Chamber or Senate), or a divided parliament (i.e. different parliamentary majorities in Chamber or Senate). In contrast the single-vote PR with majoritarian bonus electoral system used in 2006 saw a pattern of ‘perfect’ bi-polarism emerge, because two broad coalitions were formed that encompassed virtually all parties. This can be partially attributed to the majoritarian bonus, awarded under the new electoral system to the coalition obtaining the most votes. This guarantees a governing majority of at least 55% seats in the Chamber, allowing the winning coalition to form a national government. This means medium-sized parties that stand outside competing coalitions have little prospect of influencing government formation. Nevertheless both electoral systems produced fragmented patterns of intra-coalitional competition, resulting in unstable governing coalitions that tended to fracture. This occurred in 1995 when LN brought down the first Berlusconi government, leading to the ‘technocratic’ Dini government and early elections in 1996. In 1998 PRC brought down the first Prodi government, leading to the formation of alternative centre-left governing coalitions led by Massimo D’Alema (1998-2000) and Giuliano Amato (2000-2001). In 2005 UDC brought down the second Berlusconi government, although a new government was formed with the same coalition partners. In 2008 a series of small parties within the CLC brought down the second Prodi government, leading to an early election in April 2008 (Wilson, 2009).

Despite its intense fragmentation, the national party system (1994-2007) was characterised by patterns of wholesale government alternation, which replaced the partial alternation that characterised the post-war Italian party system (Mair, 1997). The 1994 election was won by the CRC (led by Silvio Berlusconi); the 1996 election was won by the CLC (led by Romano Prodi); the 2001 election was won by the CRC (led by Berlusconi); and the 2006 election was won by the CLC (led by Prodi). Partial alternation in government however occurred during the 1996-2001 legislature, after PRC brought down the Prodi government in 1998. Massimo D’Alema (DS party secretary) became Prime Minister (1998-2000), and governed without PRC support by attracting ex-DC politicians (initially elected with the CRC) into the governing CLC. The competing coalitions also displayed rather different structures of intra-coalitional competition, as

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10.2870/13381
evident from their ‘electoral hierarchies’ (1994-2006). FI remained the largest party in
the CRC (20.6-29.4%), distantly followed by AN (12.0-15.7%) then LN (3.9-10.0%),
although in 2006 UDC (6.8%) actually surpassed LN (4.6%) in electoral terms. DS
remained the largest party in the CLC (17.5-20.3%), followed by PPI-DL (6.8-14.5%)
then PRC (5.0-8.6%), while several small parties obtained less than 3%.

Format of Regional Party Systems in Italy (1995-2007)

The dynamics of party systems in the 15 Ordinary Status (OS) regions are heavily shaped
by their electoral system, PR with majoritarian bonus, in operation since the 1995
regional elections. This electoral system is similar to the one used for national elections
since 2006, confirming a successful process of electoral system testing between territorial
levels. The main difference is the regional electoral system consists of two votes: one for
party lists in provincial constituencies, the other for a regional list composed of
candidates for regional president. The regional electoral system also allows preference
voting in party lists, which can be a very important feature of regional elections (see
Chapter 4), but is not possible in the national electoral system. Under the regional
electoral system, 80-90% of seats in the regional council are distributed on a proportional
basis to open party lists elected in provincial constituencies, while a variable majoritarian
bonus (10-20% seats) is allocated on the basis of the regionwide vote for the presidential
candidate. The majoritarian bonus varies in size to guarantee the winning coalition (and
their presidential candidate) has a clear governing majority in the council. The bonus is
allocated through a closed majoritarian list, whose composition is determined by the
candidates for regional president, so unaffected by the outcome of the provincial vote.

The regional electoral system was modified in 1999 to allow the direct election of
regional presidents, whose terms became directly tied to those of their regional council
(Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). This system of ‘semi-parliamentarism’ was designed to

25 In Special Status regions the direct election of regional presidents was only made possible after a
Constitutional reform in 2001. It was then implemented (with varying modalities) in the regions of Sicily,
Sardegna, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, and the province of Trentino. Val d’Aosta and the province of Bolzano
continue to use PR electoral systems.

26 Except the new Tuscan electoral system (implemented in 2005) that abolished the majoritarian list,
allowing the bonus to be distributed on a PR basis to party lists in provincial constituencies.
ensure greater autonomy and stability for the regional executive, which would be less affected by shifting party coalitions in the council (Fabbrini, 2001).

In order to compare the format of regional party systems, we should consider the number of parties that obtain seats to the regional council through the proportional vote, as measured after the 1995, 2000, and 2005 regional elections. This allows us to generate both ‘horizontal’ (inter-regional) and ‘vertical’ (national-regional) comparisons (Thorlakson, 2006), because a similar indicator was used to measure the number of parties in the national party system. Table 2 shows that OS regional party systems are less fragmented than the national party system, with fewer parties winning seats after regional elections. This suggests some parties are able to win seats in national elections but unable to win seats in regional elections, or at least not in every region. The regional electoral system contains different types of thresholds, depending on whether parties compete in a broader coalition or as an independent list. The legal threshold for coalitions is 10% of the regional vote, but party lists competing within successful coalitions do not have to surpass another threshold to obtain seats. The legal threshold for independent party lists is 4% of the regional vote, an arrangement that obviously encourages small parties to compete within larger coalitions. Despite the absence of a legal threshold for individual parties in larger coalitions, regional electoral systems do contain an effective threshold for such parties of around 1%, because of the limited number of seats (30-80) in OS regional councils. This suggests many Italian parties have minimal levels of electoral support in some OS regions, but does not clarify whether these parties are statewide (SWP) or non-statewide (NSWP). Nor does it clarify whether some Italian parties compete exclusively in national or regional arenas. For this we need to consider the territorial coverage of parties across regional party systems.

27 Except for the new regional electoral systems in Tuscany, Calabria and Puglia (implemented since 2005 regional elections). These contain varied thresholds (2-4%) even for parties within broader coalitions.
Table 2: Number of Parties in Regional Council after Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-Romagna</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazio</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10 (Nov. 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piemonte</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toscana</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean (Range)</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.6 (6-10)</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.1 (9-15)</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.5 (9-14)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The territorial coverage of parties is an inter-regional indicator that allows us to compare whether the same parties are represented in different regional party systems. It can be measured in terms of whether parties win seats in the proportional vote through provincial constituencies. Territorial coverage allows us to evaluate whether parties are able to win seats in all regions (‘full territorial coverage’), or only in some regions (‘partial territorial coverage’), and whether these parties are subsequently able to win seats in national elections (‘vertical territorial coverage’). Territorial coverage can also

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28 This includes personal or issue lists linked to a coalition, but not seats allocated via the majoritarian bonus. This is because the majoritarian bonus only affects the winning coalition; varies in size according to the relative success of the winning coalition (0-20%); includes semi-independent figures; and does not require the presentation of party labels. This makes it useless for measuring party system fragmentation.

Wilson, Alex (2009), Multi-level Party Politics in Italy and Spain
European University Institute
10.2870/13381

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74
identify whether region-specific or geographically concentrated parties win seats in OS regional elections. Analysis of electoral data for regional elections (www.interno.it) reveals that only four parties (FI, AN, PDS-DS, PPI-DL) display full territorial coverage (15 OS regions), while three parties (PRC, SDI, CCD-UDC) display virtually full territorial coverage (14-15 OS regions). Most parties display partial territorial coverage, particularly small parties within the CLC (PDCI, Greens, Italy of Values, Udeur), to a lesser extent some parties within the CRC (LN, CDU, New PSI). The Pensioners Party only secured seats in Lombardia through alliances with both CRC (2000) and CLC (2005). In the 1995 and 2000 elections the Radicals competed against both main coalitions in all OS regions, but only won seats in 2000 (2 regions), due to the 4% legal threshold for parties fielding independent lists. In 2005 the Radicals decided not to contest the regional elections, effectively becoming truncated at national level. Region-specific parties are generally absent from OS regional party systems (Bolgherini and Loughlin, 2006). The main exception is North-East Project (PNE), a regionalist party in Veneto that competed against both main coalitions in 2005 (5.4% vote, 6 seats). Some region-specific DC or PSI splinter parties (allied to either CLC or CRC) have also won seats in regional elections, but their organisations have not endured. Parties that win seats in OS regional elections are almost always able to win seats in national elections (‘vertical territorial coverage’), since the national level has a lower effective threshold for representation. Yet the format of OS regional party system displays two important territorial features: The presence of geographically concentrated parties (LN, Udeur), and the success of personal lists tied to presidential candidates.

Territorial coverage reveals the presence of geographically concentrated parties in northern regions (LN) and central-southern regions (Udeur), while both parties are absent from central-northern regions. At national level both parties are present in the party system, allied either to the CRC (LN) or the CLC (Udeur). LN has always obtained seats in the 5 northern OS regions, but consistently fails to win seats in central-northern or central-southern regions. Udeur was founded in 1999 and consecutively won seats in the 8 central-southern OS regions (2000 and 2005 elections), but failed to win seats in northern or central-northern regions. Both parties display strong variations in electoral
support within their geographical confines. LN is a large party in Lombardia (15.4-17.7%) and Veneto (12-16.7%); a medium-sized party in Piemonte (7-9.9%); and a small party in Emilia-Romagna (3.3-4.8%) and Liguria (4.3-6.5%). Udeur registers high levels of support in Basilicata (7.4-11.1%), Campania (7.0-10.3%) and Calabria (6.2-8.7%); and more modest levels in Molise (4.0-5.4%), Puglia (2.8-3.3%), Abruzzi (1.7-4.7%) and Lazio (1.7-1.9%). Udeur support in all these regions (except Lazio) increased between 2000 and 2005. Outside these central-southern regions, Udeur has only obtained a single seat in Marche (1.8% vote), a central-northern region that borders Abruzzo.

The 2005 regional elections saw the widespread use of ‘personal lists’, tied to competing candidates for regional president and presented alongside ‘party lists’. Most of these personal lists obtained seats, and some obtained high levels of support. This suggests personal lists are likely to become a defining feature of regional elections in Italy, as voters increasingly cast their preferences on a ‘personal-regional’ basis rather than a ‘party-national’ one. The first use of a personal list in OS regional elections occurred in 2000 when the CLC fielded the ‘Massimo Cacciari List’ in Veneto. This was distinct from the personal lists fielded in the 2005 regional elections, because it incorporated candidates from PPI, Democratici, RI and Udeur, none of which fielded separate party lists. These parties went on to form the Margherita electoral coalition in the 2001 national election. In the 2005 regional elections both coalitions fielded personal lists alongside party lists in five regions deemed to be highly competitive. The personal lists that won seats for the CRC were in Puglia (9.1%); Liguria (8.7%); Lazio (7%), and Molise (4.8%). The personal lists that won seats for the CLC were in Lazio (6.7%), Veneto (4.6%), Liguria (4.4%), Piemonte (2.9%); and Puglia (2.6%). The use of personal lists caused considerably controversy within the CRC, because FI leader Silvio Berlusconi feared the spread of ‘personal parties’ at regional level, so wanted to contain their use. Yet incumbent FI and AN regional presidents wanted to broaden their support and secure their re-election precisely through this mechanism.⁴⁹ The eventual compromise was that personal lists were only allowed for incumbent regional presidents

⁴⁹ La Repubblica (10/1/2005)
in highly competitive regions (Calabria, Lazio, Liguria, Puglia, Molise), but were forbidden for incumbent regional presidents in less competitive regions (Lombardia, Veneto, Piemonte), as well as CRC challengers to incumbent CLC Presidents. The CLC fielded personal lists in Lazio, Puglia and Liguria mainly to counter those of the CRC. However in Veneto and Piemonte only the CLC fielded personal lists. The CRC was defeated in Piemonte by only 2.8%, while the CLC personal list ‘For Bresso’ obtained 2.9%, making it crucial for the electoral success of the CLC.

**Structures of Competition in Regional Party Systems**

The structures of competition in regional party systems reflect the dual character of national party competition. Inter-coalitional competition can be measured through patterns of pre-electoral coalition formation, as well as their immediate effect (i.e. alternation in government). Intra-coalitional competition can be measured by comparing the relative strength of parties in regional governing coalitions, and the relative stability of regional governments. In the Italian case this highlights both ‘horizontal’ (inter-regional) and ‘vertical’ (national-regional) incongruence in regional party systems, despite the absence of region-specific parties (Thorlakson, 2006). Regional elections are also confirmed as vital arenas for national coalition testing (Downs, 1998; Di Virgilio, 2006). This is because Italian parties initially developed rather differentiated coalitions for regional elections, whose relative success was used to compare the suitability of particular coalitions for adoption at national level, as well as repetition at regional level.

In order to evaluate the competitive dynamics of regional party systems, we need to consider the distinct motivations of competing parties. On the basis of their coalitional behaviour in national politics (1994-2007), Italian parties can be located into three broad categories: Core governing parties; peripheral governing parties; and ambivalent coalitional parties. Core parties are larger parties that form the basis of competing pre-electoral coalitions, and display full loyalty to post-electoral governing coalitions. This category applies to DS and PPI-DL on the centre-left, FI and AN on the centre-right.

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30 The CRC personal list in Calabria (2.5%) failed to win any seats because of the 4% threshold in the new Calabrian electoral system, introduced in the 2005 regional election.
National elites in these parties sought to align their policy positions, political strategies, and governing behaviour. They fielded a series of electoral coalitions that became the ‘testing ground’ for subsequent organisational fusion, itself the culmination of a long period of ‘party integration’ whose regional effects will be discussed in the case studies (Chapter 4). Peripheral governing parties are small parties that compete within pre-electoral coalitions and usually join post-electoral governing coalitions. They often seek to distinguish themselves from larger governing parties by adopting a more confrontational approach to coalitional relations, but generally remain loyal to their respective coalition, usually because they are unable to win seats outside the coalitional framework. These parties are mainly located within the CLC (e.g. PDCI, Greens, SDI, Italy of Values), but also within the CRC (e.g. UDC and New PSI). Ambivalent coalitional parties are uncomfortable with the existing coalitional frameworks, and often fail to join pre-electoral coalitions or participate in post-electoral government formation. On the CLC this includes the Party of Refounded Communists (PRC). PRC brought down the Prodi government in 1998; opposed the subsequent D’Alema (1998-2000) and Amato (2000-2001) governments; and stood outside the CLC in the 2001 national elections. Another ambivalent party on the CLC is Udeur. Composed initially from ex-DC politicians that abandoned the CRC to join CLC governments in 1998 and 1999, Udeur later brought down the second Prodi government in January 2008 (Wilson, 2009). The main ambivalent party on the CRC is the Northern League (LN), which brought down the first Berlusconi government in 1995; stood outside the CRC in the 1996 national election; and only re-joined the CRC in 2000 after LN obtained a firm coalitional agreement to implement a federal reform of the Italian state (see Chapter 1.5).

Although the above categories of coalitional behaviour can display strong variations over time (e.g. LN has become more loyal to the CRC since 2000), they are nevertheless useful for highlighting the dynamics and intensity of regional party competition, particularly the complex relationship between core and ambivalent parties. Their electoral strength in different regions allows us to assess the relative intensity of inter-coalitional

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31 Although in the 2008 national election UDC competed outside the centre-right coalition, this was only after Berlusconi refused to allow them to field their own party lists for this election, and his insistence that they enter into his People of Liberty coalition (Wilson, 2009).
competition, as well as the core dynamics of intra-coalitional competition. Ambivalent parties can also affect the stability of regional governing coalitions, because in some regions they wield blackmail potential over their respective coalition, while in others their blackmail potential is minimal. The role of ambivalent parties is particularly relevant in OS regional party systems, since two of these parties (LN, Udeur) display a geographically confined distribution of electoral support.

**Pre-electoral Coalitions in Regional Party Systems**

Pre-electoral coalitions in Italian OS regions for the 2000 and 2005 elections are remarkably congruent, with the formation of two broad coalitions in 14 of the 15 OS regions (Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte, 2000; Di Virgilio, 2006; Bolgherini and Loughlin, 2006). Yet the 1995 regional elections saw the CLC field incongruent pre-electoral coalitions, while the 2000 regional elections saw the CLC field regional coalitions incongruent with its coalitional behaviour in the 2001 national election. The formation of horizontally congruent pre-electoral coalitions in 2000 and 2005 has also disguised the varying intensity of inter-coalitional competition in different regions. This can be measured through the Margin of Victory (MoV) obtained by the winning coalition in successive regional elections. MoV is the percentage difference between votes for the winning coalition and votes for the highest losing coalition, as measured in the determining regionwide vote. The MoV can also be compared with support for ambivalent coalitional parties, to determine their relative blackmail potential.

The 1995 regional elections saw the CRC field congruent pre-electoral coalitions in all OS regions (FI, AN, CCD). These coalitions did not include LN, which had recently brought down the first Berlusconi government (1994-5), and whose leadership decided to compete against both coalitions in all regions. The CLC was incongruent across OS regions (see Table 3), partly because PPI had recently split along coalitional lines, thus complicating the process of pre-electoral coalition formation. In 5 regions the CLC fielded a ‘broad’ coalition which included PDS, PPI and PRC; in 8 regions the CLC fielded a ‘centrist’ coalition which included PDS and PPI (but excluded PRC); and in 2
regions the CLC fielded a ‘leftist’ coalition that included PDS and PRC (but excluded PPI). The presence of incongruent and untested coalitions under a new electoral system meant these regional elections became a crucial process of coalition testing for the national election in 1996 (Di Virgilio, 1996), as well as for subsequent regional elections.

The 1995 regional elections saw the CLC obtain control of 9 OS regions, while the CRC obtained control of 6 OS regions. Yet these elections clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of both coalitions to the electoral blackmail of LN and PRC (see Table 1). Although the CRC was able to win 3 northern regions without LN support, this was only possible in Piemonte because PRC stood outside the CLC. The CLC only secured 1 northern region without PRC support (Liguria), and this would not have occurred if LN had supported the CRC. LN obtains lower levels of electoral support in Liguria and Piemonte than in Veneto and Lombardia, but wields equivalent blackmail potential because inter-coalitional competition in Liguria and Piemonte is more intense. In contrast LN obtains seats but wields no blackmail potential in Emilia-Romagna, where the CLC is clearly dominant. PRC wields considerable blackmail potential in northern regions where the CLC is weakly competitive, but has little weight in central-northern regions where the CLC is highly competitive. The CLC won comfortably in Emilia-Romagna and Toscana without PRC support, while in Umbria and Marche PRC support was unnecessary for coalitional victory. PRC therefore obtains its highest support in central-northern regions where it wields least blackmail potential. The 1995 elections demonstrate that PRC wields significant blackmail potential in central-southern regions, due to the intensity of inter-coalitional competition. PRC support was indispensable in the 3 regions with a very narrow MoV (under 1.0%), and the CLC might also have secured Calabria with PRC support. While these elections proved only a broad CLC (PDS, PPI, PRC) would be competitive across OS regions, they also proved that LN was indispensable for the success of the CRC in northern regions. A broad CLC was eventually fielded in the 1996 national election, yet LN once again stood outside the CRC in this election, facilitating a clear CLC victory in both chambers of parliament (D’Alimonte and Bartolini, 1998).

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32 Blackmail potential is calculated on the basis of actual votes cast, although it should be recognised that the strategic choices of voters may be affected by the type of coalition presented.
Table 3: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in 1995 Regional Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>CLC (Main Parties)</th>
<th>CRC (Main Parties)</th>
<th>Winning Coalition (%)</th>
<th>MoV (%)</th>
<th>PRC (%)</th>
<th>LN (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>PDS-PPI</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (38.2)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardia</td>
<td>PDS-PPI</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (41.6)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piemonte</td>
<td>PDS-PPI</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (39.7)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>PDS-PPI</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (42.4)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-Romagna</td>
<td>PDS-PPI</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (53.8)</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>PDS-PPI</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (50.1)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>PDS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (59.9)</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>PDS-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (51.6)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazio</td>
<td>PDS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (48.1)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>PDS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (48.2)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>PDS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (50.5)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>PDS-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (47.9)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>PDS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (49.8)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>PDS-PPI</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (54.8)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>PDS-PPI</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (44.2)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLC = Centre-Left Coalition  
CRC = Centre-Right Coalition  
MoV = Margin of Victory (% difference between winning and highest losing coalition)

The 2000 regional elections saw more congruent pre-electoral coalitions formed (Table 4). A broad CLC competed in 14 of the 15 OS regions, while a centrist CLC (excluding PRC) competed only in Toscana. The CRC fielded congruent coalitions in all regions, now additionally supported by LN. Despite a clear swing towards the CRC after four years of turbulent CLC governments at national level (Di Virgilio and Chiaramonte, 2000), these regional elections confirmed the structures of competition evident in 1995. Although LN was less crucial for CRC victory in many northern regions, its support was still necessary for the CRC to seize Liguria back from the CLC. The 2000 regional elections confirmed the weak blackmail potential of PRC in central-northern regions, where its support was only necessary for victory in Marche. These elections marked the emergence of Udeur in central-southern regions, whose electoral support surpassed a
declining PRC in four regions. Udeur support was important for the CLC to seize control of Campania, and helped reinforce CLC dominance in Basilicata.

Table 4: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in 2000 Regional Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>CLC (Main Parties)</th>
<th>CRC (Main Parties)</th>
<th>Winning Coalition (%)</th>
<th>MoV (%)</th>
<th>LN (%)</th>
<th>PRC (%)</th>
<th>Udeur (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD-LN</td>
<td>CRC (55.1)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardia</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD-LN</td>
<td>CRC (62.5)</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piemonte</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD-LN</td>
<td>CRC (51.9)</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD-LN</td>
<td>CRC (51.3)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-Romagna</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD-LN</td>
<td>CLC (56.7)</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toscana</td>
<td>DS-PPI</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (49.6)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (56.5)</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (49.9)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazio</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (51.0)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (49.2)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise33</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (48.8)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (54.4)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (54.0)</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CLC (63.2)</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>DS-PPI-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-CCD</td>
<td>CRC (49.8)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decision by PRC to support the CLC in the 2000 regional elections is surprising, in light of its coalitional behaviour at national level. Relations between PRC and the CLC became very strained after PRC brought down the Prodi government in 1998. PRC entered the opposition and failed to support the CLC in the 2001 national election, where it chose to field no candidates in the majoritarian ballot for the Chamber, and fielded independent candidates in the majoritarian ballot for the Senate. This decision was primarily responsible for the heavy CLC defeat in this election (Bartolini et al., 2004). To explain the evident incongruence in coalitional behaviour between national and regional levels, we should consider the coalitional incentives contained in their respective electoral systems. Under the MMM electoral system used for national elections (1994-2001), PRC could win seats through the proportional ballot without needing to form pre-

33 The 2000 elections were later annulled in Molise. New elections held in November 2001 saw the CRC win (58.2%), with a substantial Margin of Victory (16.4%) over the incumbent CLC.
electoral coalitions, so long as PRC surpassed the 4% national threshold. This made PRC more willing to stand aside (Deputies) or accept defeat (Senate) in the majoritarian ballot, because it could still win parliamentary seats and conceivably hold the balance of power in the event of a ‘hung parliament’ (no majority in either House) or a ‘divided parliament’ (different majorities in Deputies and Senate). The regional electoral system eliminates this possibility. If PRC competed outside the CLC, it would be unable to win seats through the majoritarian bonus, since this is awarded only to the winning coalition and is always sufficient to guarantee a governing majority. Standing outside the coalitional framework in regional elections would reduce the number of seats secured by PRC in the event of a CLC victory, and guarantee that PRC had no impact on regional government formation, since the winning coalition would obtain a governing majority regardless.\footnote{A similar situation occurred when LN fielded independent lists in the 1995 regional elections. Despite a strong performance, LN remained in opposition because the CRC in Lombardia, Veneto and Piemonte was guaranteed a comfortable governing majority in the regional council (Baldini and Vassallo, 2001).} So PRC preferred to compromise with the rest of the CLC in the 2000 regional elections, in order to influence regional government formation or policy, rather than pursue a path of coalitional congruence across territorial levels.

The 2005 regional elections saw the same pre-electoral coalitions repeated in all regions except Toscana, where PRC once again stood outside the CLC. These regional coalitions were now more congruent with coalitional choices made at national level, since PRC had returned to support the CLC in the 2006 national election. A swing towards the CLC allowed it to secure control over 12 of the 15 OS regions (Di Virgilio, 2006), but the underlying structures of competition remained broadly consistent with those of previous regional elections. The coalitional blackmail of LN was evident once again, because the CRC could not have retained Lombardia and Veneto without LN support (see Table 5). The coalitional blackmail of PRC was also evident in the northern regions of Piemonte and Liguria, where the CLC could not have won without PRC support. The weak blackmail potential of PRC in central-northern regions was once again confirmed, because PRC support was again unnecessary for coalitional victory. Although PRC was crucial for CLC victory in the central-southern regions of Lazio and Puglia, it was surpassed in four central-southern regions by Udeur. Basilicata again confirmed its
unusual status as a central-southern region dominated by the CLC, as evident from the third successive and substantial increase in its MoV.

Table 5: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in 2005 Regional Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>CLC (Main Parties)</th>
<th>CRC (Main Parties)</th>
<th>Winning Coalition (%)</th>
<th>MoV (%)</th>
<th>LN (%)</th>
<th>PRC (%)</th>
<th>Udeur (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>Ulivo-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-UDC-LN</td>
<td>CRC (50.6)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardia</td>
<td>Ulivo-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-UDC-LN</td>
<td>CRC (53.9)</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piemonte</td>
<td>PDS-DL-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-UDC-LN</td>
<td>CLC (50.8)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>Ulivo-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-UDC-LN</td>
<td>CLC (52.6)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-Romagna</td>
<td>Ulivo-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-UDC-LN</td>
<td>CLC (62.7)</td>
<td>27.5</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ulivo-PRC</td>
<td>FI-AN-UDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Molise 35</td>
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<td>FI-AN-UDC</td>
<td>CRC (54.0)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>FI-AN-UDC</td>
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<td>FI-AN-UDC</td>
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<td>FI-AN-UDC</td>
<td>CLC (58.9)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ulivo = Electoral coalition of DS, DL and SDI fielded in 9 of the 15 OS regions.

Although the pre-electoral coalitions in 2005 were congruent across OS regions, they also contained an important process of coalition testing within the CLC, linked to broader processes of party integration. Three of the main CLC parties (DS, DL, SDI) had previously formed an electoral coalition (Ulivo) for the 2004 European Parliament elections. Their leaders were divided over whether to form a similar electoral coalition for the 2005 regional elections. Whereas proponents of an electoral coalition argued that greater unity would be rewarded by an enhanced electoral performance, proponents of party lists disputed this view and sought to use the regional elections to measure relative strength prior to the 2006 national election.36 The eventual compromise was that electoral coalitions would be fielded in 9 regions, while party lists would be fielded in 6 regions (see Table 5), allowing CLC parties to compare their performance. The electoral coalition

35 These elections in Molise were held in November 2006.
36 *La Repubblica* (20/11/2004) ‘Ulivo, e scontro sulle regionali’
produced ambiguous results, as evident when comparing the performance of *Ulivo* in the 2005 regional elections, against its component parties in the 2000 regional elections. Only 3 regions saw *Ulivo* perform substantially better than its component parties (Toscana, Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna); 3 regions saw almost identical results between *Ulivo* and its component parties (Umbria, Marche, Liguria), while 3 regions saw *Ulivo* perform worse than its component parties in 2000 (Basilicata, Lazio, Veneto), despite a general increase in CLC support between 2000 and 2005 (Di Virgilio, 2006). The performance of *Ulivo* in the central-southern regions of Lazio and Basilicata was particularly negative, with a respective fall of 4.8% and 10% vis-à-vis its component parties in 2000. In contrast the 6 regions where party lists were fielded in 2005 confirmed a substantial rise in support for the component parties of *Ulivo*, especially when compared to support for their predecessor organisations in 2000. The ambiguous performance of *Ulivo* in the 2005 regional elections was reflected in the decision taken by CLC party leaders for the 2006 national election: DS and DL fielded party lists for the Senate, alongside *Ulivo* lists for the Chamber. SDI meanwhile formed an electoral coalition with the Radicals. The 2006 national election saw *Ulivo* lists (Chamber) perform substantially better than party lists (Senate) across the national territory, stimulating the subsequent fusion of DS and DL to form the Democratic Party in 2007.

*Government Alternation in Regional Party Systems*

Three regional elections have been held under a new party system and electoral system, and have generated three types of alternation in regional government (Di Virgilio, 2006):

1) Regions dominated by the Centre-Right Coalition (CRC) with no alternation in government (Lombardia, Veneto).
2) Regions dominated by the Centre-Left Coalition (CLC) with no alternation in government (Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Basilicata)
3) Regions with wholesale alternation in government between CLC and CRC (Piemonte, Liguria, Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Calabria, Puglia)

Component parties 2000 = DS + PPI + Dem+ RI + SDI ; Component parties 2005 = DS + DL + SDI ;
These categorisations show significant differences but also some elements of continuity with patterns of partial alternation in the 1970-1995 regional party systems. Category 1 includes two large northern regions formerly dominated by DC, while Category 2 includes four central-northern regions formerly dominated by PCI, as well as the central-southern region of Basilicata (formerly dominated by DC). Category 3 includes six central-southern regions formerly dominated by DC, as well as two northern-western regions (Liguria, Piemonte) where PCI and DC had previously competed for supremacy (Vassallo and Baldini, 2000). Continuity is most evident in central-northern regions where PCI dominance has been substituted by CLC dominance, and in northern-western regions where intense competition between PCI and DC has been replaced by intense competition between CLC and CRC. Regions formerly dominated by DC now vary widely in their structures of competition: Northern regions are dominated by the CRC; most central-southern regions display intense competition between CRC and CLC; but one central-southern region is dominated by the CLC. Only central-southern and northern-western regions are vertically congruent in competitive terms with the national party system, which is characterised by wholesale alternation in government.

While government alternation is a useful indicator for the intensity of inter-coalitional competition in Italy, it cannot unravel the distinct dynamics of intra-coalitional competition in OS regions. In regions dominated by a single coalition (CRC or CLC), intra-coalitional competition may be more relevant than inter-coalitional competition in determining the dynamics of the party system, while intra-coalitional competition can also have a determining effect on the stability of governing coalitions. To evaluate the types of intra-coalitional competition across OS regions, we should consider the electoral support displayed by the main parties in regional elections (see Table 6).
### Table 6: Range of Electoral Support for Parties in Regional Elections (1995-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Centre-Left Coalition (CLC)38</th>
<th>Centre-Right Coalition (CRC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DS</td>
<td>PPI/DL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>12.3/16.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardia</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piemonte</td>
<td>17.7/21.7</td>
<td>3.7/10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>26.2/30.3</td>
<td>4.2/5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-Romagna</td>
<td>36.1/43.0</td>
<td>2.9/5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toscana</td>
<td>36.2/40.9</td>
<td>3.6/6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>32.1/38.6</td>
<td>4.1/5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>26.8/33.6</td>
<td>5.3/6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazio</td>
<td>19.9/27.2</td>
<td>4.8/6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>18.6/24.1</td>
<td>8.7/16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise39</td>
<td>10.9/20.1</td>
<td>9.6/12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>14.2/19.6</td>
<td>8.3/16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>15.7/22.1</td>
<td>6.2/9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>17.4/21.8</td>
<td>16.1/17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>14.3/15.5</td>
<td>7.8/14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OS regions display varying patterns of intra-coalitional competition, as highlighted by the different types of electoral hierarchies found in the competing coalitions. The CRC displays four types of electoral hierarchy. The first occurs in northern regions dominated by the CRC (Veneto, Lombardia), where FI and LN obtain their highest levels of support. FI is always 1st (22.7-33.8%), LN always 2nd (12.0-17.7%), AN always 3rd (8.1-10.7%). This model of intra-coalitional competition is incongruent with the national level, where LN is electorally subordinate to AN. The second type of electoral hierarchy occurs in northern regions contested between CRC and CLC (Piemonte, Liguria), where FI is always 1st (19.7-30.8%), AN always 2nd (7.1-11.9%), and LN always 3rd (4.3-9.9%). This model of intra-coalitional competition is largely congruent with the national level. A similar electoral hierarchy is evident in Emilia-Romagna, a central-northern region dominated by the CLC. Yet the CRC is much weaker here so LN wields no blackmail potential over the party system. The third type of electoral hierarchy occurs in central-northern regions (Toscana, Umbria, Marche), which are dominated by the CLC. FI is

38 Ranges for DS and DL do not include results from 8 regions where these parties fielded Ulivo lists in the 2005 regional elections, as well as from earlier electoral coalitions in Lombardia (2000) and Veneto (2000).

always 1st (15.8-20.2%), AN always 2nd (10.9-16.2%), while LN is practically absent (under 1%). The fourth type of electoral hierarchy occurs in central-southern regions where FI and AN support has declined consistently in successive regional elections (see Annex 2), while support for ex-DC parties on the CRC (CCD-CDU, UDC) has risen substantially. The outcome is a substantial equalisation of the electoral hierarchy in all central-southern regions, particularly since the 2005 regional elections. In Calabria the main CRC parties obtained almost identical levels of support: UDC actually became 1st party (10.4%), FI came 2nd (10.0%), AN came 3rd (9.9%). In its historic stronghold of Lazio, AN (16.9%) was almost displaced as 1st party by FI (15.4%), while in Campania FI (11.9%) was almost displaced as 1st party by AN (10.6%). In Basilicata and Molise, UDC displaced AN as 2nd party, although FI remained 1st party. Only in Abruzzo and Puglia was a clear electoral hierarchy maintained in the CRC (FI 1st, AN 2nd, UDC 3rd).

The CLC displays three types of electoral hierarchy in OS regions. In northern regions dominated by the CRC (Lombardia, Veneto), DS are a relatively weak 1st party (12.3-16.5%), followed by PPI (6.5-10.7%) and PRC (3.0-7.7%). In central-northern regions dominated by the CLC (Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Marche, Umbria), as well as the northern region of Liguria, the DS are always 1st party and dominate the CLC (26.2%-46.0%). PRC is stronger in these regions and usually comes 2nd (5.7-11.%), while PPI is weaker and usually comes 3rd (2.9-6.4%). The second type of electoral hierarchy occurs in the northern region of Piemonte, where DS are clearly 1st party (17.7-21.1%) but never dominate the CLC, while PRC (5.5-9.3%) and PPI-DL (3.7-10.4%) compete for 2nd party status. This reflects the national party system in terms of DS and PRC support, although DL is considerably stronger at national level. The third type of electoral hierarchy emerges in central-southern regions, where support for ex-PCI parties (DS, PRC) has declined over the timeframe (see Annex 1), while support for ex-DC parties on the CLC (DL, Udeur) has risen substantially. This process has significantly levelled the electoral hierarchy in all central-southern regions, where no clear 1st party emerges because DS and DL obtain equivalent levels of support, particularly since the 2005 elections. DL narrowly surpassed DS in Campania (+0.7%) and Molise (+1.5%), while DS narrowly
surpassed DL in Abruzzo (+1.8%) and Calabria (+1.0%). In Basilicata (2000)\textsuperscript{40} support for DS and PPI was identical (17.4%). Only Puglia and Lazio retain a clear electoral hierarchy. In Puglia the DS (16.6%) clearly surpass DL (9.7%), while in Lazio (2000) the DS (19.9%) were much stronger than PPI (4.8%). The 2005 regional elections highlight an intense competition for 3\textsuperscript{rd} party status. In 4 central-southern regions Udeur clearly surpassed PRC in electoral terms (Basilicata, Calabria Campania, Molise), while in 3 central-southern regions (Abruzzi, Lazio, Puglia) PRC remained stronger than Udeur. Although PRC and Udeur were the main contenders for 3\textsuperscript{rd} party status, SDI (Abruzzo) and Italy of Values (Molise) have occasionally been 3\textsuperscript{rd} party, reflecting the weakness of the CLC electoral hierarchy in central-southern regions. The decline of ex-PCI parties and the concomitant rise of ex-DC parties has not only levelled the electoral hierarchy, but also made centre-left governing coalitions significantly more centrist.

Electoral hierarchies in OS regions necessarily affect patterns of intra-coalitional competition, which can affect the stability of regional governing coalitions. In northern regions the alliance between FI and LN has become a defining feature of their party systems. In Lombardia and Veneto LN is electorally powerful, and therefore necessary for CRC dominance. In Liguria and Piemonte LN is strategically important for the CRC, because of intense inter-coalitional competition with the CLC. The core governing alliance between FI and LN is recognised in the distribution of key posts in the regional government: CRC regional presidents are always affiliated to FI (1995-), whereas CRC presidents of the regional council are always affiliated to LN (2000-). This arrangement formed part of a broader coalitional deal that persuaded LN to re-join the CRC in 2000 (see Part 4.2). Although no government has collapsed in northern regions since 1995, the regional coalitional dynamics between FI and LN are an unexplored area which the case study of Lombardia will seek to unravel (Chapter 4.2). In central-northern regions the CLC is clearly dominated by the DS, who always control the presidency; a majority of positions on the executive; and most seats in the council. Central-northern regions display substantial continuity with the 1970-1995 regional party systems, whose governments

\textsuperscript{40} Basilicata and Lazio data is given for 2000 regional elections because these regions saw DS and DL form into an electoral coalition ("Ulivo") for the 2005 regional elections.
were always dominated by PCI (Vassallo and Baldini, 2000). They also display strong governing stability, because no regional government has collapsed. Stability is guaranteed by the permanent governing alliance of DS and DL, whose party organisations eventually merged in October 2007. Although PRC is electorally powerful in central-northern regions, it wields little blackmail potential because its support is unnecessary for the CLC to win regional elections. A strong electoral hierarchy is absent from the CLC in central-southern regions: DS and DL compete to lead the governing coalition, while smaller parties on the left (PRC, PDCI, Greens) and centre (Udeur, SDI, Italy of Values) compete for prominent governing positions. CLC regional presidents elected in 2005 belong to different parties: DS (Campania), DL (Basilicata, Calabria), PRC (Puglia) and SDI (Abruzzi). None of these parties simultaneously controlled a majority of seats in the executive, or a majority of governing seats in the council, raising questions about the effective political leadership of regional presidents.

Central-southern regions have seen a decline in support for ex-PCI parties (DS, PRC), alongside a rise in support for ex-DC parties (DL, Udeur), a development liable to disturb intra-coalitional dynamics because it shifts the balance of power within the CLC more towards the centre. This process is evident since 1999, when the formation of Udeur triggered the collapse of several governing coalitions in central-southern regions. Campania, Calabria, and Puglia saw CRC governments replaced by CLC governments. This occurred after many ex-DC politicians, elected as part of the CRC, decided to join Udeur and form an alternative regional government with the CLC. These decisions were correlated with developments at national level, where many ex-DC politicians joined the D’Alema governments (1998-2000). Yet in Molise and Sicily ex-DC politicians abandoned the CLC to form new governments with the CRC, suggesting the national context was exploited by regional politicians to obtain more prominent governing posts. It would be useful to analyse how regional government formation and stability in central-southern regions has been affected by the levelling of electoral hierarchies and the influx of ex-DC politicians into the CLC, and this is a theme that will be explored further in the regional case study of Campania (Chapter 4.1)
Conclusions

Party systems in the Italian OS regions are territorially differentiated, despite the absence of region-specific parties. Party system formats vary according to the geographically concentrated presence of LN (northern regions) and Udeur (central-southern regions), or their mutual absence (central-northern regions). This generates some ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ incongruence (Thorlakson, 2006), because both parties are present in the national party system (1994-2007). The 2005 regional elections were characterised by the presence of personal lists tied to competing candidates for regional president, which gained substantial support and obtained several seats in regional councils. This will ensure they become a defining feature of future regional elections. Regional elections are confirmed as key arenas for national coalition testing (Downs, 1998; Di Virgilio, 2006), as well as key arenas for testing the advantages of electoral coalitions and party integration. Regional pre-electoral coalitions have developed in response to the bipolarising incentives of the regional electoral system introduced in 1995 (PR with majoritarian bonus), which created distinct coalitional incentives from the national electoral system in operation between 1994 and 2001. The electoral system reform introduced prior to the 2006 national election was largely modelled on the regional system, which had guaranteed almost ‘perfect’ patterns of inter-coalitional bipolarism.

OS regions display sharp variations in the intensity of inter-coalitional competition, which have generated different patterns of alternation in government. Whereas many regions underwent wholesale alternation in government (vertically congruent), other regions are dominated by a single coalition with no alternation in government (vertically incongruent). Inter-coalitional competition is also affected by the blackmail potential of ambivalent coalitional actors (LN, PRC, Udeur), which varies widely across OS regions. Regional party systems also contain territorially differentiated structures of intra-coalitional competition. While northern and central-northern regions display strong electoral hierarchies in their governing coalitions, central-southern regions display very weak electoral hierarchies. This is likely to affect inter-party relations; coalitional dynamics; governing stability; and regional leadership. The relevance of distinct electoral
hierarchies in OS regions will be further explored in the case studies of Lombardia (Chapter 4.1) and Campania (Chapter 4.2), whose patterns of intra-coalitional competition diverge significantly from the national level.

Chapter 2.3 Organisational and Systemic Linkages in Italy

Italian parties have not adopted strong organisational responses to the challenges of regionalisation, and have maintained rather centralised structures, at least in formal terms. This outcome can be partly explained through the competitive dynamics of OS regional party systems. The simultaneity of OS regional elections a year before national elections has made them an important process of national coalition testing (Di Virgilio, 2006), and contributed towards the national character of these regional electoral campaigns (Bolgherini and Loughlin, 2006). The regional electoral system introduced in 1995 has encouraged parties to form broad pre-electoral coalitions, which can hope to secure the majoritarian bonus, and heavily penalises parties that compete outside the coalitional framework. This development has broadly aligned regional patterns of coalition formation with the bi-polar tendencies of the national party system. The direct election of regional presidents has encouraged coalitional partners to negotiate their choice of presidential candidate at national level, in order to ensure a proportional distribution of presidential candidates to parties across the national territory. This has reinforced the primacy of national party elites in determining leadership selection at regional level. Nevertheless preference voting within party lists for regional elections gives national party elites much less discretion in selecting successful candidates for the regional council, and encourages more decentralised patterns of candidate selection (Chapter 4).

The surprising lack of formal organisational change is stimulated by the dual structures of party competition (inter-coalitional and intra-coalitional) that operate at national and regional levels. This encourages political aggregation and organisational inertia, because parties can access regional government without modifying their electoral strategies, organisational characteristics, or policy objectives. In central-southern regions the main statewide parties in both coalitions (FI, AN, DS, PRC) have lost significant support over
the timeframe, but can still access the regional government because intense inter-coalitional competition leads to frequent alternation in government. The CLC has further extended its coalitional range in these regions since 1999, incorporating many politicians previously elected as part of the CRC, and generating even fewer incentives for organisational adjustment. The absence of electoral hierarchies in central-southern regions means there is no obvious way to determine regional leadership. Instead regional branches of statewide parties remain dependent on the national level to secure them positions of potential control (e.g. coalitional candidates for regional president), and ensure a fair balance of executive posts is maintained across regions. In central-northern regions the pervasive dominance of the CLC provides few incentives for the main statewide parties to make organisational changes. Since the DS are historically in control of regional governments, they have no incentive to adjust their organisational structures, particularly if this might weaken internal cohesion. FI and AN remain permanently excluded from regional government, with no reasonable prospect of overturning the CLC, making their sub-national branches dependent on the national party for organisational resources and career advancement. In northern regions dominated by the CRC a similar pattern emerges. The CRC is comfortably in control of the regional government and its substantial resources, providing few incentives to make organisational adjustments that might weaken internal cohesion. The CLC in these regions has no prospect of accessing government without a substantial change in party system dynamics, which breeds continued dependency on the national level. As long as Italian parties rely primarily on coalitional aggregation for their electoral success, regional elites will continue to rely heavily on the inter-party bargaining capacity of their national political elites.

Yet the lack of formal organisational change emphasises the importance of exploring informal changes in the interaction between national and regional levels, rarely discussed in the secondary literature yet a key objective of the regional case studies. This national frameworks suggests the presence (or absence) of formal organisational change reveals relatively little about informal process of organisational adaptation, in particular the various mechanisms that party leaders use to accommodate sub-national elites. FI is the most unusual case because in formal terms it remains a highly centralised multi-level
organisation, yet has adopted a ‘light’ organisation structure that allows local powerbrokers to secure continuity in elected office through preference voting and adhesion to the ‘party label’. The lack of resources from the national party for regional electoral campaigns compels these powerbrokers to depend on their own resources for re-election, and encourages their de facto autonomy from the national leadership. These local powerbrokers are mainly politicians from the former DC and PSI organisations (Fava, 2004), so are less dependent on the party leader for career advancement and ideological orientation than most FI parliamentarians. Territorial variations in the aggregation of local powerbrokers and their relative access to sub-national government help to explain the sharp decline of FI in regional elections in central-southern Italy (see Chapter 4.1), as well as the continued resilience of FI in regional elections in northern Italy (see Chapter 4.2). Meanwhile the main successor parties to DC and PSI rely heavily on elected elites to ensure organisational continuity at sub-national levels, after the collapse of their more structured predecessors in the corruption scandals of the 1990s. The PCI and MSI organisations were largely untainted by these corruption scandals, but their main successor parties, DS and AN, have become affected by the loss of ideological cohesion and internal discipline implicit in the transformation from anti-system parties to core governing parties. The regional case studies emphasise how these parties are now characterised by strong factionalism, whose features vary across the national territory. Although factionalism helps to foster close ties between national and sub-national elites, it also encourages the emergence of ‘personalised’ politics at sub-national levels, with the rise of local or regional factions closely tied to institutional leaders. LN remains a powerful political actor in northern Italy, whose autonomist drive has produced competing organisational responses from statewide parties (Chapter 4.2), while Udeur became an important political actor in central-southern Italy, through the recruitment of centrist DC politicians weakly allied to the competing coalitions. These very different non-statewide parties have produced different types of challenges for regional branches of statewide parties in northern and southern Italy, which reflects strong and sustained differences in political culture between these parts of the national territory.

Chapter 3 compares party politics in Spain from a multi-level perspective, focusing on systemic and organisational change at regional level. Chapter 3.1 compares how statewide parties have adapted their territorial structures to confront the challenges of regionalisation, evaluating the relative autonomy of the regional party; the influence of the regional party on national party decision-making; and the role of the regional party in candidate selection procedures for multi-level elections. Chapter 3.2 compares multi-level party systems in Spain, highlighting inter-actions between statewide and non-statewide parties at different territorial levels. Regional party systems are compared in terms of their format (number of parties; territorial coverage of parties), and their structures of competition (coalition formation; alternation in government) (Sartori, 1976), which allows us to compare their ‘vertical’ (national-regional) and ‘horizontal’ (inter-regional) congruence (Thorlakson, 2006; 2007). Chapter 3.3 briefly reflects on the multi-level linkages between organisational and systemic change in Spain.


Only three Spanish parties fulfil the criteria used to select core statewide parties in the Italian case (see Part 2.1), namely full territorial coverage; relevant electoral size; and organisational permanence. Only four parties won seats to more than one regional parliament (PSOE, PP, IU, CDS).41 The centre-left PSOE and centre-right PP won seats to every parliament after regional elections, whereas the radical left IU won seats in 10-15 parliaments. CDS won seats to four regional parliaments after the 1991 elections, but thereafter failed to win any seats in regional or national elections, thus disqualifying it from consideration on the criteria of territorial coverage and organisational permanence.

Spanish parties are generally characterised as highly centralised and oligarchical organisations, fully controlled by the party in central office (van Biezen, 2003; van

41 The only exceptions to this rule are Basque nationalist parties, which win seats to the Basque parliament and the Navarran parliament (through Basque-speaking provinces).
Biezen and Hopkin, 2004). While this holds for most Spanish parties from the 1970s until the mid 1990s, the last decade has seen organisational differences emerge among the main statewide parties (SWP), particularly with regard to the relative centralisation of their multi-level organisations. PSOE has adopted a more decentralised and federal party organisation, consistent with a ‘flexible’ response to multi-level challenges, whereas PP retained a more centralised and unitary party organisation, consistent with a ‘cohesive’ response to these challenges (see Chapter 1.2 for outlines of ‘cohesive’ and ‘flexible’ strategies). Yet PP and PSOE both conform to the ‘catch-all’ model in their broader organisational structures and electoral strategies. PCE-IU has pursued a different type of party organisation, between a ‘Movement Party (reflected in IU) and a mass-based ‘Leninist Party’ (reflected in PCE) (Gunther and Diamond, 2003). This ambiguity is reflected in the territorial organisation of IU, which has rejected ‘Leninist’ centralism in favour of an explicitly federal organisation with a high degree of autonomy, while PCE leaders have sought unsuccessfully to retain control of the IU organisation. Regionalisation of the Spanish state has generated ‘bottom-up’ pressures from regional elites, which have sought greater autonomy at sub-national levels, as well as greater recognition within the national party. Yet these pressures only produce formal organisational change when they coincide with ‘endogeneous’ or ‘exogenous’ shocks to the party organisation, such as declining electoral support, national leadership crises, or loss of control over the national government. PSOE re-discovered organisational unity within a more decentralised party structure, recovering fully from the severe leadership crises of the 1990s. In contrast PCE unsuccessfully sought to main total control over IU, a strategy that compelled regional IU elites to seek greater autonomy from the national party. Despite losing control of the national government in 2004, PP did not suffer from severe multi-level tensions during this timeframe. This partly reflects the strong internal control exercised by the party leadership, in an organisation characterised by ‘presidentialised’ leadership (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2004), as well as the absence of any sharp drop in electoral support. The organisational responses of PSOE and PP to the challenges of regionalisation reflect their differing views on the ideal-type design of the Spanish state. The PSOE leadership now supports a federal state with some asymmetrical
features, while the PP leadership supports a decentralised unitary State with symmetrical features (Orte and Wilson, 2009), and this is reflected in their internal organisation.

**Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE)**

PSOE is the main SWP on the centre-left of the Spanish political spectrum, and has been the principal party of government in the democratic era (1982-1996, 2004-). For over two decades PSOE was controlled by Felipe Gonzalez, a charismatic leader who was both PSOE secretary-general (1977-1997) and Prime Minister of Spain (1982-1996). The political programme, governing style, and socially variegated support base of PSOE in the 1980s displayed the classic signs of a ‘catch-all’ organisation. PSOE rejected Marxist doctrine in the late 1970s, and when in government pursued free market reforms; expanded social welfare programmes; and enthusiastically supported EU and NATO membership. Under the Gonzalez leadership, PSOE won four consecutive national elections, leading to three absolute majorities (1982, 1986, 1989) and one relative majority (1993) in the Spanish parliament. In 1993 PSOE was compelled to form a minority government reliant on the external support of the Catalan nationalists CiU. PSOE lost the 1996 and 2000 elections, leading to the resignation of Gonzalez as secretary-general in 1997, and later the resignation of his chosen successor Joaquin Almunia in 2000. The election of Jose Luis Zapatero as secretary-general in 2000 began a process of organisational, programmatic, and generational renewal. This helped PSOE to win the 2004 election with a relative majority, forming a minority government reliant on external support from mainly Catalan left-wing parties (ERC, IC-V, IU). Although the socially variegated support base of PSOE was less evident in the 1990s, when a decline in support affected the urbanised middle classes much more than rural workers and state dependents (Hopkin, 2001a), the subsequent decade has seen PSOE restore its ‘catch all’ support base. Membership levels for PSOE reflect its dominant position on the centre-left, contrasting favourably with the ongoing decline of PCE-IU (see below). By the time of its first election victory in 1982, PSOE could count on 115,945 members, a figure that rose consistently until 1993 (351,463). PSOE was overtaken by PP in 1993 as the largest membership party in Spain, with increases in PSOE membership thereafter becoming
more subdued. The most recent figures suggest around 400,000 members between 1998 and 2000 (Mendez Lago, 2006). The low growth in membership is a good reflection of the difficulties faced by PSOE in the 1990s, not only during the Gonzalez governments (corruption scandals; governing fatigue; loss of electoral support) but also during the chaotic opposition to the PP government (organisational strife; leadership struggles; further loss of electoral support). PSOE recovered from these difficulties in the 2000s, and was able to compete again with PP for control of the national government. Moreover PSOE never lost its dominant position within the centre-left, given the decline in IU support. In the 2000s PSOE neither returned to its ‘dominant’ position of the 1980s, nor did it become marginalised in opposition, but became one of two main competing SWP in an increasingly bi-polarised party system (see Chapter 3.2).

Since the late 1990s PSOE has developed into a federal party organisation that explicitly recognises the autonomy of regional branches, and grants them significant influence in national party decision-making. Although the adoption of a ‘flexible’ strategy reflects growing intra-party support for regionalisation, these organisational transformations only occurred after a series of shocks to PSOE in the 1990s: A series of national leadership crises, declining electoral support, and loss of control over the national government. This state of perennial crisis allowed regional party leaders to strengthen their role in intra-party decision-making (Mendez, 1998). In the 1980s PSOE leaders had agreed on the need to ‘federalise’ party structures, but simply intended this as creating elected regional branches, with limited support for developing PSOE into a party ‘federation’ with considerable autonomy for the regional sphere (Mendez, 2006). A ‘pact of federation’ already existed between PSOE and its Catalan counterpart PSC since 1975, which gave PSC much greater formal autonomy than other party branches (including the Basque PSE), while reinforcing strong informal ties between PSC and PSOE (Roller and van Houten, 2003). It is perhaps this loose structure of affiliation that PSOE leaders associated with party ‘federations’, discouraging organisational solutions that might codify regional party autonomy in the rest of Spain. Yet processes of regionalisation encouraged the emergence of regional party ‘barons’ (Colomer, 1998), who combined control of regional public office (as regional president) with control over regional party
branches (as regional secretary-general). The symbiotic relationship between institutional and party power is evident from southern Spanish regions dominated by PSOE (Andalucia, Extremadura, Castilla-la-Mancha), where many of the most powerful regional ‘barons’ emerged. The unexpected resignation of Gonzalez as party leader in 1997 triggered a serious leadership crisis, with the appointment of a weakly legitimised successor (Joaquin Almunia) undermined by the selection of a rival (Josep Borrell) as PSOE candidate for Prime Minister in 1998 (Hopkin, 2001b). In this critical context, regional party leaders began to collectively substitute for the absence of strong national leadership, and ultimately became crucial for guaranteeing a degree of intra-party stability (Mendez, 1998). The leadership crisis allowed these regional ‘barons’ to engineer a power shift within PSOE, encouraging the adoption of a decentralised ‘federal’ party model throughout Spain, while retaining the asymmetric ‘pact of federation’ with PSC in Catalonia. From the late 1990s, PSC became more independent from PSOE under the leadership of Pascall Maragall, who adopted an autonomist strategy that transformed PSC into the largest Catalan party in electoral terms, capable of appealing to both nationalist and non-nationalist voters (Roller and van Houten, 2003; Lago et al, 2007; Orte and Wilson, 2009). This stance was largely tolerated by the PSOE leadership because it allowed PSC to control the Catalan government (2003-), and improved PSOE support in Catalonia for national elections.

The process of party decentralisation is fully consolidated in PSOE statutes (2004), which confirm the adoption of a ‘federal structure’ founded on multiple territorial levels (Art.14). The regional party is the head of a ‘federation’ that can choose its own name (Art.15); determine its internal organisation (Art.16); and resolve disputes with the national level through defined mechanisms of conflict resolution (Art.18). While the regional federation can also determine the structure of the broader sub-national organisation, in principle even diverging from the national model, broadly analogous sub-national structures have been retained in practice. These structures always include a regional secretary-general as party leader; a powerful regional executive; and the election of both through a regional congress. The multi-level organisation of PSOE also reflects historical variations in the territorial organisation of the Spanish state. The Basque PSE
contains strong provincial organisations with distinct attitudes to Basque nationalism, reflecting the unique institutional importance of the Basque provinces (Letamendia, 2006). The Galician PSdeG incorporates comarcas, a historic Galician district located between the local and provincial levels (Jimenez, 2003). Yet the national party has veto power over changes to sub-national structures, which must be codified in regional party statutes that require ratification by the federal committee (Art.35). PSOE statutes also raise some doubts over the extent of regional autonomy by specifying the methods of election each level should adopt and basing these entirely on national structures. This implies only analogous sub-national structures will be ratified by the federal committee.42

Sub-national party branches perform an important function in national decision-making by determining the composition of the federal congress, the supreme decision-making body of PSOE held every 3-4 years (Art.30). The congress determines the political direction of the party and ratifies any changes to its organisational structure. The delegates are responsible for electing the secretary-general; the federal executive committee; and 33 members of the federal committee, all through separate and secret individual ballots (Art.5.1). Delegates are wholly elected on a provincial basis (Art.30) through closed blocked lists (Art.5.2), the electoral weight of each province reflecting the level of party membership (van Biezen, 2003). All seats are allocated to the winning list unless a minority list gains over 20%, at which point the minority list obtains a broadly proportional share of seats, although in all cases the winning list must be guaranteed 50% + 1 seats (Art.5.2). Elections of national party organs have been by secret ballot since the mid-1990s, when the ‘collective vote’ of regional federations was abolished. This was initially intended to weaken the stranglehold of Alfonso Guerra (PSOE vice secretary-general 1979-97) over the party organisation, since Guerra had exploited the ‘collective vote’ of regional federations to nominate his supporters to the party congress, particularly in the region of Andalusia which accounted for around 25% of delegates (Mendez, 1998; van Biezen and Hopkin, 2004). The broader outcome was greater internal pluralism, with the federal congress genuinely performing the function of leadership selection. After a

42 Specified methods of election include a secret individual ballot for the Regional Secretary-General; a majoritarian vote for the regional executive commission; and membership of the Regional Executive Commission to be proposed by the regional secretary-general (Art.5).
heavy election defeat in 2000 led to Almunia’s resignation as party leader, the ensuing congress saw the backbench parliamentarian Zapatero elected as party leader, despite competing against three candidates with stronger positions in the party establishment, including the narrowly defeated regional ‘baron’ Jose Bono (Mendez, 2006).

Between party congresses the highest decision-making body is the federal committee. Although this body includes some members by right (national leaders; all regional secretary-generals), it is mainly elected by regional congresses, with an additional 33 members elected by the federal congress (Art.34). Amongst other functions the federal committee designates the party candidate for Prime Minister; approves the national electoral programme; ratifies candidate lists; and ratifies regional party statutes (Art.35). Despite these impressive formal functions, the federal committee only meets twice per year and has minor influence as a political body (Mendez, 1998). A more significant role is played by the federal executive, the key governing body at national level whose members are elected by the federal congress (Art.40). Regional party leaders are not members by right of the federal executive, but in practice are frequently elected to these posts. Their presence in the executive became most significant during the leadership crisis of the mid-1990s (Mendez, 2006), when the regional ‘barons’ dominated this body in numerical and political terms. Their presence in the executive was substantially reduced after the 2004 congress consolidated the Zapatero leadership (Mendez, 2006), but many powerful regional ‘barons’ remain. The regional leadership also plays an important role in national decision-making through the territorial council, a consultative but influential body that gathers all regional leaders (secretary-generals and/or regional presidents) in regular meetings with the party leader. The territorial council is convoked every 2 months to discuss inter-regional issues and their co-ordination, as well as national policies that affect the regions (Art.47-48). It reached a peak in influence during the national leadership crises of the mid-1990s, when it was more important for national decision-making than the federal committee or even the federal executive, given the

43 Manuel Chaves (Reg. Pres. Andalusia, 1990-) was given the honorary position of PSOE President in 2000, recognition of his crucial role as interim secretary-general after the resignation of Almunia, healing party divisions and organising a smooth leadership selection. In 2007 the federal executive also included Juan Rodríguez Ibarra (Reg. Pres. Extremadura, 1982-) and Jose Montilla (Reg. Pres. Catalonia, 2006-).
political weight of the regional ‘barons’ at this time (Mendez, 1998). Although the party leadership is now more consolidated than in the late 1990s, the expanded competences of regional governments have extended the range of policy areas the territorial council is required to co-ordinate, thus guaranteeing its continued political relevance.

Candidate selection procedures are used in PSOE to select the order and names of candidates for blocked party lists, and are distinct from leadership selection procedures (see below). Candidate selection is a complex multi-level process, with a crucial function performed by electoral commissions and executives at different territorial levels. Membership of these bodies is over-lapping, because members of the electoral commission are nominated from within their respective executive. Although the regional party has strong formal autonomy in determining candidates for regional and local elections, it has no formal influence over national elections, where the provincial level performs the core nominating function. Candidates for European elections are entirely determined at national level. Lists are proposed by the federal electoral commission and ratified by the federal committee. Candidates for national elections are proposed by local associations and pass to the provincial executive for approval. The lists are then handed to the federal executive, which can change the order and names of candidates, while the list is formally ratified by the federal committee. Candidates for regional elections are proposed by local associations or local executives, and must be approved by the provincial executive. The regional electoral commission determines the order and names of candidates to be approved by the regional committee, while final ratification resides with the federal electoral commission, which can also alter the order and names of candidates. The procedure for local elections varies according to the status and size of the conurbation, although in all cases candidates must be proposed by the local executive or 20% of local party members. Ratification at federal level is necessary only for provincial capitals or larger cities (over 50,000), while ratification at regional level is necessary for medium-sized cities (20,000-50,000), and ratification at provincial level is necessary for smaller conurbations (under 20,000). Candidate selection procedures in PSOE appear to

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44 Candidate and leadership selection procedures are outlined in Chapters of the ‘Normativa Reguladora de los Cargos Publicos Titulo III’ annexed to PSOE statutes (2004).
grant substantial autonomy to the sub-national organisation, but also contain strong potential for national intervention, making it necessary to analyse candidate selection through regional case studies (Chapter 5), which can highlight the effective degree of regional autonomy, as well as the relative level of national interference in these choices.

Leadership selection procedures are used in PSOE to select candidates for Prime Minister; regional presidents; and mayors of provincial capitals. They can either take the form of internal party selection (similar to candidate selection) or electoral primaries restricted to party members.45 Candidates for electoral primaries can be proposed by the party organisation or party members. In most cases electoral primaries have ratified the choices of the party leadership, the main exception being the election of Josep Borrell in 1998 as party candidate for Prime Minister, defeating the secretary-general Almunia and triggered a severe leadership crisis (Hopkin, 2001b). The use of primaries was drastically reduced in the 2003 local and regional elections, where it was not applied in any regions and only in 14 larger cities (popn.>50,000). The national and sub-national PSOE leadership successfully suspended its use for almost all regional and local elections in 2007,46 reflecting greater levels of intra-party harmony while recognizing the earlier problems caused by the use of electoral primaries for leadership selection.

*Popular Party (PP)*

PP was founded in 1989 as a successor party to Popular Alliance (AP), a political formation created in 1976 to accommodate 7 small parties led by figures close to the Franco regime (Ramiro, 2005). The historic leader of AP was Manuel Fraga, a former Minister under General Franco, who consolidated AP as the main party on the right of the political spectrum, but failed to surpass an electoral ‘ceiling’ of around 25%. This reflected the fascist past of Fraga and the weak democratic credentials of AP (Hopkin, 1999). After internal leadership divisions in the 1980s, Fraga re-gained control of AP and re-founded it as PP in 1989. The principal objective was to transform PP into a centre-

45 Revised in 2004 PSOE Statutes to include ‘enrolled sympathisers’
46 *El País* (07/08/2006)
right ‘catch-all’ party, which could appeal to moderate voters disillusioned with PSOE governments yet left without centrist alternatives after the collapse of UCD in the 1980s. Fraga immediately appointed a younger party leader (Jose Maria Aznar), untainted by collaboration with the Franco regime, but remained influential within PP as regional president of Galicia (1989-2005) and founding president (Art.45). Aznar as party president (1989-2004) adopted a more moderate political agenda than his predecessor; pursued a generational renewal in the party leadership and personnel; and actively competed for the ‘centre’ ground of Spanish politics (Ramiro, 2005). This strategy was helped by declining support for the Gonzalez-led PSOE governments in the 1990s, as well as the total collapse of statewide centrist parties such as UDC, many of whose personnel merged into PP (Gunther et al, 2004). This allowed PP to become the only SWP on the centre-right of the Spanish political spectrum, while its growing support in the 1990s allowed it to form a minority (1996-2000) then majority (2000-2004) government at national level. PP is currently the main opposition party at national level under the leadership of Mariano Rajoy (2004-). The ‘catch-all’ organisational strategy of PP was closely reflected in membership figures. Although membership of AP rose consistently (from 27,225 in 1977 to 262,755 in 1989), more substantial increases in PP membership allowed it to surpass PSOE by 1993, with more than 700,000 members registered by 2005 (Astudillo and Garcia-Guereta, 2006). The case of PP clearly demonstrates that the adoption of ‘catch-all’ strategies and organisations can stimulate (rather than hinder) the phenomenon of mass membership in Spanish parties.

Since the 1990s, PP has been the main competitor to PSOE in a national party system characterised by intense bi-polarism, through the adoption of similar ‘catch-all’ strategies aimed at competing for the centre ground of national politics. Yet these parties now differ widely in their approach to territorial management, with PP continuing to pursue a centralised and ‘cohesive’ organisational strategy. PP inherited local, provincial, and regional party branches with organs of self-government from its predecessor (Astudillo and Garcia-Guereta, 2006). Yet the autonomy of these sub-national branches remains heavily circumscribed. The internal organisation of sub-national levels is dictated by national party statutes (PP, 2004) and made fully congruent with the national level. This
contrasts with PSOE and IU where only guiding principles are in the statutes, while the regional party determines the broader organisation (van Biezen, 2003). The regional PP is also obliged to coordinate and comply with the decisions or views of the national organs (Art.23). Although PP statutes insist the party organisation should adopt a ‘regionalised’ and ‘decentralised’ character that reflects the Spanish state (Art.19), sub-national party democracy is highly restricted and decision-making is fully centralised around the regional party president (Art.23), reflecting the presidential model adopted at national level (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2004; Ramiro, 2005). The regional secretary-general is the second highest position, but very much subordinate to the regional party president. The regional congress is always held within 4 months of the national congress (Art.26), usually every 3-4 years (van Biezen, 2003). Although the regional congress is formally responsible for electing the regional party president and 22 members of the regional executive (Art.29), these elections are combined into a single blocked list which contains no provision for minority representation (Art.30). This is designed to prevent minority groups from electing their members to key governing positions, and generally ensures the regional congress ratifies national leadership choices. Extraordinary regional congresses are difficult to convoke and require the assent of both regional and national party leaderships, through two-thirds of the regional directive committee (Art.27) and a majority of the national executive committee (Art.26). This makes the regional congress a weak body for intra-party decision-making and leadership selection. The regional executive is formally the most important governing body at that level, responsible for determining the strategic direction of the regional party (Art.35). Whereas 22 members are elected alongside the regional party president, members by right include the regional secretary-general; the PP spokesperson in the regional parliament; PP spokespersons in provincial assemblies; and the regional youth leader (Art.34). The regional directive committee is responsible for organisational matters and densely concentrated with figures from the party in public office. It includes all members of the regional executive and contains no directly elected component, except for ten members elected by the youth organisation (Art.33). An interesting innovation of the 2004 PP statutes is the creation of

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47 This includes all regional parliamentarians; any national parliamentarian elected in the region; PP heads of provincial government; and PP Mayors elected in provincial capitals.
an autonomous council. This consultative body assembles all regional party presidents to discuss issues relating to the development of the ‘State of Autonomies’, and is clearly modelled on the PSOE territorial council, although its role is more limited than its PSOE counterpart, meeting only twice a year (Art.38) and without formal powers. A significant and asymmetric exception to limited regional autonomy in the PP organisation is Union for a Navarran People (UPN), a regionalist party that substitutes for PP in Navarre. The alliance between UPN and PP began as an electoral coalition during the 1980s, and became an organisational merger in 1993 (Pallares and Keating, 2003). Yet UPN remains an independent organisation, whose relationship with PP is codified through a stable and permanent ‘pact of collaboration’ (Additional Disposition 4, PP 2004). This has allowed UPN to retain full organisational autonomy in the regional sphere, while delegating authority to PP in the national sphere.48

In line with its restricted autonomy, the regional PP has minimal influence over national decision-making, a process that remains extremely centralised around the national party president (van Biezen, 2003; Ramiro, 2005; Astudillo and Garcia-Guereta, 2006). Even the national party in public office cannot influence key issues such as leadership selection, evident in 2003 when Aznar designated Mariano Rajoy as the future party leader and candidate for Prime Minister,49 despite the existence of other PP politicians with equivalent or greater support in the parliamentary party (Astudillo and Garcia-Guereta, 2006). PP statutes affirm that the national congress is the ‘supreme’ organ of the party (Art.23), responsible for ratifying all key organisational decisions (Art.29). The territorial balance in the congress is calculated on a combination of party membership and electoral support (van Biezen, 2003), with delegates sent by all territorial levels of the party on an open list system (Art.28). Congress is formally responsible for electing the party leader; 35 members of the national executive; and 35 members of the national directive committee (Art.30). Since 1989 the election of party leader and his executive

48 UPN is also able to nominate 1 representative to the National Executive Committee and 1 representative to the autonomous council (AD4). Although no major tensions were registered between PP and UPN during the timeframe of analysis, severe political conflict between PP and UPN later erupted in 2008.

49 Rajoy was appointed PP secretary-general and candidate for PM in 2003. Despite losing the 2004 national election, Rajoy became party president in the ensuing national congress.
have been combined onto a single blocked list, thereby restricting possibilities for internal choice; eliminating the representation of minority groups; and ratifying choices made by the party leader (Ramiro, 2005). Meanwhile the national directive committee is entrusted with formal organisational functions related to convoking congresses, and is fully dominated by the party in public office, particularly those elected to the Spanish parliament. Only 35 elected members are chosen by the national congress on a combined list with the party president. The national executive is formally responsible for determining the political direction of the party, as well as electing key organisational positions (Art.35), but can only make these appointments on the basis of a specific proposal from the party leader (Art.42), and in practice has fully conformed to leadership nominations (Ramiro, 2005). Although 35 members of the national executive are elected by the national congress, most of the party leadership are members by right. The 1999 PP congress also created a management committee, a party executive composed entirely of figures nominated by the party president (Astudillo and Garcia-Guereta, 2006).

Processes of candidate selection in PP are fully controlled by party organs through electoral committees established at all territorial levels. The national electoral committee is the most powerful in candidate selection and involved in all types of election (Art.48). It is closely controlled by the party leadership, which has resisted attempts to adopt electoral primaries for candidate selection, despite a substantial increase in party membership (Ramiro, 2005). Candidates for European elections are proposed and ratified by the national electoral committee. Candidates for national elections are proposed by provincial electoral committees but must be ratified by the national electoral committee, which can change the order and names of candidates (van Biezen, 2003). Candidates for regional elections are proposed by regional electoral committees but must be ratified by the national electoral committee. Candidates for local elections vary according to the size of territory. Local electoral committees propose candidates for local elections but can only ratify candidates for municipalities with a population under 20,000. Municipalities with a population over 20,000 are either ratified by provincial electoral committee (provincial capitals) or by the regional electoral committee (not provincial capitals). Leadership selection is even more tightly controlled by the national leadership than
candidate selection, with no role played by the party membership or sub-national party organs. Candidates for regional president, mayors in provincial capitals, and heads of provincial government, are all proposed and ratified by the national electoral committee. This reinforces the full dependence of the sub-national leadership on support from the national leadership to remain in public office. Although the national party has significant powers of intervention in sub-national candidate selection, how it exercises those powers cannot be gleaned from party statutes, and requires more careful analysis of informal relations through regional case studies (see Chapter 5).

United Left (IU)

IU began as an electoral coalition of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE); smaller left-wing parties; and individual candidates proposed by social movements or organisations. It was initially created for the referendum on NATO entry in 1986, and fielded candidates in the ensuing national elections. The objective of IU was to broaden the appeal of PCE beyond its core constituency, and heal rifts between conflicting components of the Spanish communist movement (Ramiro, 2004). Initially defined as a ‘political and social movement’ (1st congress in 1989), IU became increasingly institutionalised in the 1990s, with the development of party statutes in 1992 that outlined its territorial organisation; provided for the direct election of delegates (rather than nomination by parties or factions); and introduced individual direct membership, complementing the existing system of indirect membership through affiliated associations (Ramiro, 2000). While many leftist politicians considered IU as a potential successor party to PCE, most grassroots members and activists (as well as the PCE leadership) opposed any moves to abandon the party organisation. PCE therefore continues to exist as a political organisation, but has subsumed its electoral and institutional functions within IU. PCE membership has been in rapid decline since the first national elections, falling consistently from 191,607 (1977) to only 26,533 members (1999). As a result PCE members have become less numerically dominant within IU. While 78.1% of IU members were affiliated to PCE in 1992, only 38.4% were affiliated to PCE by 1999. Yet PCE is now the only organised party within IU, after the expulsion of all others by 2001.
PCE-IU remains far from the ‘catch-all’ model of party organisation, resembling a ‘left-libertarian’ party in its ideological positioning; relatively limited electoral support; and assembly structure of decision-making; while retaining many features of the ‘class-mass’ party through PCE (Gunther and Diamond, 2003).

In the 1990s, PCE-IU leaders had actually sought to surpass PSOE as 1st party in electoral terms by pursuing radical strategies of opposition to PSOE governments. The PCE-IU leadership (combined in the same person) saw no trade-off between ‘policy-seeking’ and ‘vote-seeking’ strategies (Ramiro, 2004), accusing PSOE of being ideologically bankrupt, politically corrupt, and as ‘right wing’ as PP (Ramiro, 2000). IU adopted blocking tactics against PSOE-led governments in the Madrid and Andalusian regional parliaments, a tactic which clearly favoured PP (Alcantara and Martinez, 1998). While support for IU rose to a peak of 10.5% in the 1996 national election, IU unsuccessfully continued its attack on PSOE during the PP minority government (1996-2000), and only abandoned this strategy after a catastrophic defeat in the 1999 local and regional elections. This resulted in a sudden volte-face prior to the 2000 national election, when IU signed a pre-electoral agreement to govern with PSOE if necessary to prevent another PP government (Ramiro, 2004), a move that did not stave off electoral collapse (5.4% in 2000). Although IU adopted a more conciliatory approach towards PSOE after 2000, this did not prevent a further decline in the 2004 election, where IU and its Catalan partner IC-V only obtained five seats in Congress, elected from just three regions (Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia). After the 2004 national election, IU formed a parliamentary coalition with PSOE, ERC and IC-V, but did not pursue a governing coalition with PSOE.

The territorial organisation of IU reflects a highly decentralised model that recognises the ‘sovereignty’ of IU regional federations, and links this to a federal vision for Spain as a whole (Art.10, IU 2004). Regional federations are given wide-ranging and clearly defined autonomy, which extends to virtually all areas of activity except party strategy at national and European level, and any alliances with other statewide parties (i.e. PSOE or PP). While regional coalitions with PSOE require national level consent, potential coalitions with PP are excluded for ideological reasons. This leaves the possibility for a regional
federation to include NSWP within IU (e.g. Andalusia); to form an electoral coalition with NSWP (e.g. Balearic Islands); or to form a governing coalition with NSWP (e.g. Basque Country). Regional federations can define their own territorial structure, the only formal requirements being the minimum unit of local assembly, and the need to be open to thematic or sectoral groups (Art.28), with no formal veto power from the national party. In practice all IU federations are led by regional coordinators directly elected by their regional congress (Art.39), so are broadly congruent with national structures. The regulation of regional or sub-regional units is a task of the regional federation, which is also responsible for defining the IU regional programme (Art.10).

The adoption of a highly decentralised model of organisation began in the 4th and 5th federal assemblies (1994, 1997), and was significantly reinforced in the 6th and 7th federal assemblies (2000, 2004). However the concession of greater regional autonomy was initially accompanied by a purge of dissident elements, and a hardened national line in disputes with several regional federations, particularly Galicia and Valencia. The latter were controlled by the Partido Democratico de la Nueva Izquierda (PDNI), a reformist party that wanted IU to develop closer links with PSOE. This objective was firmly rejected by the PCE-IU leadership, leading to the expulsion of PDNI from IU structures in 1997 (Ramiro, 2000). In Galicia the regional federation split bitterly over this issue, because the regional IU leadership and the majority of regional activists supported the dissidents, and backed the choice of the regional leadership to pursue a ‘renegade’ electoral coalition with PSOE in the 1997 regional election (Alcantara and Martinez, 1998). This triggered the collapse of IU Galicia, which has never recovered in organisational and electoral terms from this territorial conflict (see Chapter 4.2). In Valencia the momentary ‘independence’ of the regional federation was declared and organisational unity severely tested, but some degree of intra-party cohesion was eventually restored (Ramiro, 2000). Since 1999 the rapprochement with PSOE has allowed IU to develop more constructive relationships with its centre-left rival, as evident from their regional governing coalition in Asturias (2003-2007). Considered alongside the possibility for varied coalitions with region-specific parties, this development has increased the organisational autonomy and coalitional leverage of regional IU
federations. Yet earlier conflict over coalitional strategy, as well as declining support in national elections, have weakened the integrative capacity of the party leadership. This produced an organisational rupture when the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC), nominally independent since the 1930s but ideologically tied to PCE (Bull and Heywood, 1994), broke all remaining organisational ties with PCE in 1997 (van Biezen, 2003). This occurred after long disputes over coalitional positioning, as PSUC had long favoured an alliance with PSC in Catalonia that was rejected by PCE. While a liaison committee in the Spanish parliament was initially continued for coordination between IU and its Catalan counterpart IC-V (van Biezen, 2003), this arrangement also ended after IC-V formed a separate parliamentary group (Entesa) with its governing partners in the Catalan parliament (PSC, ERC).

The influence of IU regional federations on national decision-making is strong and reflects the federal principles outlined in the party statutes. Regional federations elect almost 50% of the federal assembly, supreme decision-making body of IU held every 3-4 years, while an equivalent amount are elected by sub-regional bodies. An additional 150 members are there by right (maximum 5% total) as members of the federal political council. This is the governing body of IU between elections and has extensive powers, with 50% members elected by the federal assembly; 50% by regional federations; and only the regional coordinators as full members by right (Art.39). The federal executive is composed of the general coordinator; all regional coordinators; and all members of the permanent commission (Art.40). The latter consists of 10-12 members and is the only body nominated by the general coordinator (van Biezen, 2003), effectively constituting his personal ‘cabinet’. The general coordinator is elected by the federal assembly, where the influence of regional federations is strong and the outcome highly contested, as evident from the election of Gaspar Llamazares as IU leader in 2000. Llamazares defeated the PCE secretary-general Francisco Frutos and so divided the PCE and IU leadership for the first time (Ramiro, 2004). The federal executive became heavily factionalised between groups hostile to the Llamazares leadership (led by PCE), and groups favourable to his leadership, thus further weakening the integrative capacity of the

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50 Llamazares is also a PCE member, so this dispute also reflected strong internal divisions within PCE.
party leadership. Thereafter Llamazares became dependent on support from IU regional federations (particularly their regional coordinators) to remain in power, so granted them full autonomy in the regional sphere and avoided any form of intrusive national intervention (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008). Although this strategy was necessary for Llamazares to remain IU leader, it further weakened the internal coherence of the party organisation. This was reflected in the increasingly renegade behaviour of its Basque federation Ezker Batua, whose leadership adopted pro-nationalist positions that strengthened its support in the Basque Country (see Chapter 3.2), but which undermined IU support in the rest of Spain (which remains largely hostile to Basque nationalism).

Candidate selection in IU also affirms a federal and decentralised division of competences (Art.48). Whereas dual PCE and IU structures exist in terms of party organisation, the selection of candidates for public office is exclusively determined within IU. Only IU or affiliated party members can nominate candidates, while ‘open’ primaries are rejected in favour of ‘closed’ primaries. No other provisions are placed on how regional or sub-regional federations should organise their internal selection. Candidates for European elections are entirely determined at national level (Art.50), while candidates for national elections are approved by regional federations and ratified by the federal political committee. Candidates proposed by regional federations must conform to general guidelines set out by the federal political committee on the principles of gender, plurality, and consensus (Art.49). In contrast candidates for local and regional elections are entirely approved and ratified by IU regional federations, which are only required to abide by the three general principles listed above, with no explicit mechanism for national intervention should these principles be violated. Although the national party retains a significant role in candidate selection for European and national elections, these produce few elected representatives because of low support for IU.51 In contrast the array of IU elected representatives at sub-national levels are chosen without national intervention, while the regional federation maintains strong control over candidate selection for these elections. This restricts the influence of the national leadership to regions where it has close informal ties to the regional leadership.

51 In 2004, IU elected only 5 members of Congress (2 of which belonged to IC-V) and only 1 MEP.
Conclusions

The main statewide parties in Spain have adopted different models of territorial organisation. PP has adopted the most ‘cohesive’ strategy by imposing a presidentialised model at regional level, broadly analogous to the national level. This ensures full multi-level congruence in organisational structure; guarantees subordination of the broader sub-national party to the regional party president; and makes the tenure of the latter dependent on continued support from the national leadership. Candidate selection is tightly controlled by party organs, with a determining role played by the national level for all types of election. In contrast PSOE has adopted a more ‘flexible’ strategy that gives greater autonomy to the regional party in deciding its own structure and those of sub-regional levels. Yet PSOE also places restrictions on regional autonomy, specifying the methods and positions of election at all territorial levels, and requiring that regional statutes be approved by national organs. Whereas the regional leadership has a significant role in national decision-making, it is the provincial party that elects all delegates to the national congress. Although candidate selection is a multi-level process where the regional party is very relevant for sub-national elections, the provincial party performs the main nominating function in national elections, and is involved to varying degrees in local and regional elections. IU has adopted the most ‘flexible’ territorial strategy, recognising the full autonomy of the regional federation in its extensive competences, including candidate selection for sub-national elections; control over the sub-regional party; and electoral or governing alliances at sub-national levels. Regional federations also perform a crucial role in national decision-making through the federal congress, where they have exploited divisions within the national leadership to increase their autonomy (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008). The current territorial strategy of IU represents a radical change from the centralised ‘cohesive’ strategy pursued by the PCE leadership in the 1980s and 1990s. The latter contributed to the electoral decline of IU, resulted in irretrievable damage to the regional federation in Galicia, produced an organisational divorce in Catalonia, and undermined broader PCE control over the IU organisation.
Although SWP in Spain have generally adjusted their organisational structures to reflect processes of regionalisation, radical changes in territorial power structures have only occurred after broader organisational crises, triggered by divisions over coalitional strategy (IU) or the choice of party leader (PSOE). Both disputes were accompanied by a significant decline in electoral support, reducing the integrative capacity of the national party. This encouraged regional branches to pursue more autonomous policies (IU), or allowed regional party leaders to shift the balance of power in their favour by decentralising organisational structures (PSOE). In contrast PP was able to pursue a centralised territorial strategy, not only because this reflected its unitary vision for Spain, but also because it was accompanied by a strong growth in electoral support over the 1990s. All SWP in Spain maintain a substantial component of asymmetry in their multi-level organisation, with higher levels of autonomy granted to particular regional branches. The main asymmetrical arrangement within PSOE is the ‘pact of federation’ with the Catalan PSC (Roller and van Houten, 2003). The Catalan PSUC broke all its organisational ties with PCE (van Biezen, 2003), so the Catalan IC-V is now an independent counterpart of IU. In the Basque Country, the regional federation of IU is increasingly independent from the party leadership, while the other party branches are more integrated (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008). The organisational asymmetry of PP is reflected through its unique pact of collaboration with UPN, a regionalist party that substitutes organisationally for PP in Navarre. Any understanding of the diverse territorial strategies pursued by SWP must consider the effect of multi-level party competition (Chapter 3.2), while a comprehensive understanding of changes to territorial power structures can only be obtained through regional case studies, which can analyse informal patterns of accommodation and effective levels of autonomy (Chapter 4).

Giovanni Sartori (1976) argues the number of parties represents a useful but limited indicator for the ‘format’ of a party system, which needs to be considered alongside other indicators that measure its ‘structures of competition’. Chapter 3.2 applies this logic to multi-level party systems in Spain, as a way of measuring their ‘horizontal’ (inter-regional) and ‘vertical’ (national-regional) congruence (Thorlakson, 2006). With regard to the format of multi-level party systems, the number of parties will be considered alongside their territorial coverage. With regard to the structures of competition, patterns of coalition formation and government alternation will be compared. This analysis will firstly evaluate the national party system, before comparing regional party systems.

National Party System in Spain: Format and Structures of Competition

The simplest measure for the format of a national party system is the number of parties represented in the national parliament. In the Spanish case this can be calculated by including all parties that win seats to Congress (Lower House) after national elections, since Congress is far more powerful than the Senate (Stepan, 2001). This simple calculation reveals a remarkable consistency in party system format over the timeframe:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Parties</th>
<th>(Statewide Parties, Non-Statewide Parties)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(3 Statewide, 8 Non-Statewide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(3 Statewide, 8 Non-Statewide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>(3 Statewide, 9 Non-Statewide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(3 Statewide, 8 Non-Statewide)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all national elections held during the timeframe, the same statewide parties (SWP) are elected to Congress (PSOE, PP, IU). These parties control over 90% of parliamentary seats and obtain more than 80% of the vote share in national elections (see Table 7). National governments are always single party (PSOE or PP). Some possess an absolute majority in the Spanish parliament (majority governments), while others possess only a relative majority in the Spanish parliament (minority governments).
Table 7: Statewide Parties elected to Congress in Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1993-1996 Vote (Seats)</th>
<th>1996-2000 Vote (Seats)</th>
<th>2000-2004 Vote (Seats)</th>
<th>2004-2008 Vote (Seats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>38.8% (159) Minority Govt.</td>
<td>37.6% (141)</td>
<td>34.2% (125)</td>
<td>42.6% (164) Minority Govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>34.8% (141)</td>
<td>38.8% (156) Minority Govt.</td>
<td>44.5% (183) Majority Govt.</td>
<td>37.7% (148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>9.6% (18)</td>
<td>10.5% (21)</td>
<td>5.5% (9)</td>
<td>5.0% (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The national party system has become increasingly bi-polar over the timeframe (1991-2007), as evident from the combined vote share for PP and PSOE in elections to the Congress (see Chart 1), as well as the ongoing decline in support for IU. The intense competition for electoral supremacy between PSOE and PP has generated a pattern of minority governments at national level, which was the outcome after 3 of the 4 national elections held during the timeframe (see Table 7).

Chart 1

The number of non-statewide parties (NSWP) that obtained seats in Congress has remained consistent over the timeframe (8-9). Only 5 NSWP have repeatedly obtained seats in Congress (see Table 8). These are located in Catalonia (CiU, ERC); the Basque Country (PNV); the Canary Islands (CC); and Galicia (BNG). Only 8 regions have elected NSWP to Congress at all during the timeframe. The Catalan parties, Convergence and Union (CiU) and Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), obtain the most seats after national elections (16-18 combined). The number of seats obtained by CiU fell between 1993 (17) and 2004 (10), as the number of seats obtained by its Catalan rival ERC rose between 1993 (1) and 2004 (8). The Basque NSWP regularly obtain 8 seats; the Canary Coalition (CC) obtains 3-4 seats; the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) obtains 2-3 seats; while NSWP in other regions have never obtained more than 1 seat.

Table 8: Non-statewide Parties elected to Congress in Spain (Number of Seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>PA (1)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>PAR (1)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>CHA (1)</td>
<td>CHA (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>PNV (5),</td>
<td>PNV (5),</td>
<td>PNV (7),</td>
<td>PNV (7),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HB(2), EA(1)</td>
<td>HB(2), EA(1)</td>
<td>EA(1)</td>
<td>EA (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>CC (4)</td>
<td>CC (4)</td>
<td>CC (4)</td>
<td>CC (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>CiU(17),</td>
<td>CiU(16),</td>
<td>CiU(15),</td>
<td>CiU (10),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERC(1)</td>
<td>ERC(1)</td>
<td>ERC (1)</td>
<td>ERC (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>BNG (2)</td>
<td>BNG (3)</td>
<td>BNG (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>NB (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>UV (1)</td>
<td>UV(1)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The national party system format then reveals three interesting trends. The first is a high stability in the relative vote/seat share of SWP and NSWP. SWP obtain around 90% of parliamentary seats (Table 7), while NSWP obtain around 10% of parliamentary seats. The second trend is enhanced bi-polarism between PP and PSOE. These SWP now account for more than 80% of the vote share combined (see Chart 1), while support for
IU has declined. As levels of support for PP and PSOE have converged, a pattern of minority governments has resulted from their intense bi-polar competition. The third trend is the clear difference in the parliamentary weight of NSWP. The Catalan NSWP possess the greatest parliamentary weight; followed by the Basque NSWP; then the Canary Islands and Galicia. NSWP in other regions have very little parliamentary weight.

The national party system in Spain is characterised by three instances of wholesale alternation in government between statewide parties: UCD to PSOE (1982); PSOE to PP (1996); and PP back to PSOE (2004). Although governing coalitions have never occurred at national level, a series of variable ‘parliamentary coalitions’ have been formed between SWP that lack a parliamentary majority, and NSWP willing to support the national government but without entering a governing coalition (see below).

1993-1996: PSOE minority government in parliamentary coalition with CiU
1996-2000: PP minority government in parliamentary coalition with CiU, CC, PNV
2000-2004: PP majority government in parliamentary coalition with CiU
2004-2008: PSOE minority government in parliamentary coalition with ERC, IU, ICV

These parliamentary coalitions highlight an important feature of the national party system, namely the relative ‘coalition potential’ and ‘blackmail potential’ (Sartori, 1976) of NSWP. Whereas ‘coalition potential’ can be defined as the capacity to form a majority governing or parliamentary coalition, ‘blackmail potential’ can be defined as the capacity to prevent a governing or parliamentary majority from being formed.

Although 8-9 NSWP are regularly elected to Congress, very few of these have the potential to determine a parliamentary majority. In 1993 PSOE was 17 seats short of an absolute majority, so a coalition with either CiU (17 seats) or IU (18 seats) represented the only possible governing solutions. The terrible relations between PSOE and IU prevented any form of coalition between them, so the centre-left PSOE formed a parliamentary coalition with the centre-right CiU. In 1996 PP was 20 seats short of a majority in Congress. Given the ideological impossibility of an alliance with IU (21
seats), this obliged PP to ally with a group of NSWP. The support of CiU (16 seats) was necessary but not sufficient for a parliamentary majority, so additional coalitions were developed with CC (4 seats) and PNV (5 seats). The collapse of the coalition with PNV in 1998 did not matter because the parliamentary coalitions with CiU and CC proved more resilient. The parliamentary coalition with CiU continued into the period of PP majority government (2000-4), because it was tied to the external support PP offered the CiU minority government in Catalonia (Roller and van Houten, 2003). In 2004 PSOE fell 12 seats short of an absolute majority, so CiU support (10 seats) was insufficient per se to obtain a parliamentary majority. Instead PSOE pursued a leftist parliamentary coalition with ERC (8 seats) and IU-ICV (5 seats). This was largely a coalition between PSOE and Catalan parties, since ERC and IC-V (independent Catalan counterpart of IU) accounted for 10 seats, while IU itself accounted for only 3 seats.

Patterns of national coalition formation indicate that governing SWP rely heavily on support from Catalan NSWP to form minority governments. NSWP from other regions display significantly less coalition potential and almost no blackmail potential. CiU was indispensable for parliamentary coalitions with PSOE and PP in the 1990s. CiU initially wielded strong coalition potential (evident from the parliamentary coalitions formed with PSOE in 1993 and PP in 1996), as well as strong blackmail potential (evident from the termination of its parliamentary coalition with PSOE in 1995, leading to an early election in 1996). Yet the electoral decline of CiU over the timeframe has reduced its coalition and blackmail potential, so after the 2004 election PSOE was able to form a parliamentary coalition without CiU support. This PSOE minority government was dependent on parliamentary support from other Catalan parties, namely ERC and IC-V. CiU is still likely to wield blackmail potential over any future PP minority governments, since PP is unable to form parliamentary coalitions with leftist Catalan parties (ERC and IC-V) or the Galician BNG, which represent useful coalitional options for PSOE, and potential alternatives to parliamentary coalitions with CiU.
Regional Party Systems in Spain: Format and Structures of Competition

Regional party systems will be compared using the same indicators as the national party system. This allows us to evaluate ‘horizontal’ (inter-regional) and ‘vertical’ (national-regional) congruence in the party system (Thorlakson, 2006). To compare the format of regional party systems, we measure the number of parties that win seats to regional parliaments, as well as the relative presence of SWP and NSWP (see Table 9).

Table 9: Number of Parties in Regional Parliaments in Spain

[S=Statewide Parties  N= Non-Statewide Parties]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>5 (4S+1N)</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Isles</td>
<td>6 (2S+4N)</td>
<td>7 (3S+4N)</td>
<td>6 (3S+3N)</td>
<td>6 (3S+3N)</td>
<td>6 (3S+3N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Count.</td>
<td>7 (2S+5N)</td>
<td>7 (3S+4N)</td>
<td>7 (3S+4N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>6 (3S+3N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Isles</td>
<td>7 (4S+3N)</td>
<td>5 (2S+3N)</td>
<td>4 (2S+2N)</td>
<td>4 (2S+2N)</td>
<td>4 (2S+2N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>4 (2S+2N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CastileManche</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
<td>2 (2S)</td>
<td>2 (2S)</td>
<td>2 (2S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile-Leon</td>
<td>4 (4S)</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>6 (3S+3N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>4 (4S)</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
<td>2 (2S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>6 (3S+3N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
<td>4 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (2S+1N)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PP and PSOE won seats in all regional parliaments, displaying ‘full territorial coverage’ across regional party systems, while IU only won seats in some regional parliaments, displaying ‘partial territorial coverage’. The number of regions where IU actually won seats declined over the timeframe (from 15 to 11), a development that largely explains the drop in the mean number of SWP represented (see Table 9). The number of NSWP represented in regional parliaments also declines over the timeframe. Whereas 27 NSWP obtained seats after the 1995 regional elections, only 20 NSWP obtained seats after the 2003 regional elections. Some regions saw a fall in the number of NSWP in regional parliaments (Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Cantabria, La Rioja), while others witnessed the complete disappearance of NSWP from their regional parliaments (Asturias, Extremadura, Valencia). Six regional parliaments currently contain no NSWP, while five regional parliaments contain only a single NSWP. This affects regional structures of party competition, because single NSWP can potentially wield both ‘coalition’ and ‘blackmail’ potential in the regional parliament, should neither of the competing SWP be able to obtain an absolute majority. These regions are often those where IU has lost its parliamentary contingent, a development which further increases the blackmail potential of single NSWP (see later in this chapter).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
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<td>3 (3S)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>5 (3S+2N)</td>
<td>6 (3S+3N)</td>
<td>6 (3S+3N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>4 (3S+1N)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
<td>3 (3S)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean

53 Although UPN is a regionalist party located in Navarre, its non-competition and enduring pact of collaboration with PP means UPN be classified as an asymmetric component of the PP organisation for the purpose of this analysis.
Table 10: Non-Statewide Parties with Seats in Regional Parliaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>PAR, CHA</td>
<td>PAR, CHA</td>
<td>PAR, CHA</td>
<td>PAR, CHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>URA</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>PSM, UM,</td>
<td>PSM, UM,</td>
<td>PSM, UM,</td>
<td>PSM, UM,</td>
<td>PSM, UM,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UIM-IM,</td>
<td>AIPF,</td>
<td>COP</td>
<td>AIPF</td>
<td>AIPF</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIEF</td>
<td>Verdes</td>
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</tr>
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<td>PNV, HB,</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV,</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV,</td>
<td>EAJ-PNV,</td>
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<td>EH,</td>
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<tr>
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<td>UA</td>
<td>UA</td>
<td>UA</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>ARALAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>CC, AIC,</td>
<td>CC, PCN,</td>
<td>CC, AHI</td>
<td>CC, FNC</td>
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<td>AHI</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>UPCA, PRC</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile-Leon</td>
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<td>UPL, TC-PNC</td>
<td>UPL</td>
<td>UPL</td>
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<td>CiU, ERC</td>
<td>CiU, ERC</td>
<td>CiU, ERC</td>
<td>CiU, ERC,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ciutadans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
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<td>BNG</td>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>BNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>PRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarra</td>
<td>HB, EA</td>
<td>HB, EA,</td>
<td>EH, EA,</td>
<td>ARALAR,</td>
<td>Na-Bai,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>CDN</td>
<td>CDN</td>
<td>CDN</td>
<td>EA, CDN</td>
<td>CDN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>UV</td>
<td>UV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>BNV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While regional party systems in Spain are clearly ‘territorialised’, given the varied presence and strength of NSWP in regional parliaments (Hamann, 1999; Pallares and Keating, 2003), many NSWP have disappeared from regional party systems. This reflects a process of consolidation within regional party systems that requires us to explore whether this has produced changes in competitive dynamics at regional level, and whether these changes are congruent with those occurring at national level.

Structures of competition will be compared through patterns of coalition formation and government alternation (see Table 11). Regional party systems in Spain are characterised mainly by single party governments or governing coalitions, with occasional instances of minority governments with external support. Minority governments and parliamentary coalitions are more prevalent at national level, because at regional level SWP and NSWP are much more willing to enter governing coalitions.

Table 11: Government Formation in the Spanish Regions\(^{54}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>PP-PAR (M) 91-93; PSOE (Min) 93-95</td>
<td>PP-PAR (M)</td>
<td>PSOE-PAR (M)</td>
<td>PSOE-PAR (M)</td>
<td>PSOE-PAR (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>PSOE-IU (M) 91-3, PSOE (Min) 93-5</td>
<td>PP (Min)</td>
<td>PSOE (M)</td>
<td>PSOE-IU (M)</td>
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<td>PP-UM (M)</td>
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<td>PSOE-UM-PSM-IU (M)</td>
<td>PP-UM (M)</td>
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<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>PSOE-AIC (Min) 91-93; CC(Min) 93-5.</td>
<td>CC (Min)</td>
<td>CC-PP (M) 99-2001; CC (Min) 2001-2003</td>
<td>CC-PP (M) 2001-2003; CC (Min) 2005-2007</td>
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<td>PP-PRC (M)</td>
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<td>Castile-Leon</td>
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<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>PSOE-PR (M)</td>
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<td>Madrid</td>
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<td>Murcia</td>
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<td>Navarre</td>
<td>PP (Min)</td>
<td>PSOE (Min.) 95-96 PP (Min) 96-99</td>
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<td>Valencia</td>
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PSOE has entered government in 16 of the 17 Spanish regions (all except Castile-Leon) since the first regional elections were held. Nevertheless PSOE has lost control of five regions to PP since 1995 (La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, Valencia), and become excluded from governing coalitions in the Basque Country since 1998. Where PSOE has entered the regional government, this increasingly takes the form of a governing
coalition, mainly with NSWP (Aragon, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia), but sometimes with IU (Asturias, Balearic Islands) or its Catalan counterpart IC-V (Catalonia). PSOE has formed 36 stable regional governments over the timeframe, with an even split (18:18) between single party and coalition governments. Electoral support for PSOE varies widely across regional party systems (see Annex 3). In electoral terms, PSOE continues to dominate the regional party systems of Andalusia, Asturias, Castile-la-Mancha and Extremadura, where its support is generally above 40% (sometimes above 50%). All these regions except Asturias are located in southern Spain. PSOE support is structurally weak in the Balearic Islands (less than 30%); Basque Country (less than 25%); and Navarre (less than 25%), where it faces strong competition from NSWP. PSOE support varies considerably in Catalonia and Galicia (Annex 3), largely due to vote switching between PSOE and NSWP in successive regional elections (Pallares et al, 2006a; Lago et al, 2007), but also due to much higher rates of abstention for PSOE supporters in regional elections in Catalonia (Lago et al, 2007).

PP has entered government in 12 of the 17 Spanish regions. PP remains excluded from government in the southern PSOE ‘fiefdoms’ of Andalusia, Castile-la-Mancha, and Extremadura, as well as the Basque Country and Catalonia. PP support has increased in most regions over the timeframe (see Annex 3), allowing the party to dominate six regional governments (Castile-Leon, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, Valencia). PP support remains structurally weak in Catalonia (under 15%) and the Basque Country (under 25%), where it faces competition from strong centre-right NSWP, and has adopted an uncompromising attitude towards nationalist demands. Although PP is excluded from the Basque government by the main NSWP, in Catalonia PP formed a parliamentary coalition to support the CiU Minority government over two legislatures (1995-2003), in exchange for the parliamentary support that CiU offered the national PP minority government. PP is less dependent on coalitions with NSWP to control the regional government than PSOE. PP has formed 42 stable regional governments over the timeframe, with an uneven split (29:13) in favour of single party governments (69%). Yet PP also lost control of some regional governments to coalitions formed between PSOE

55 ‘Stable’ governments are those lasting a minimum of 12 months after regional elections.
and various NSWP. This occurred in Aragon (1999), the Balearic Islands (1999 and 2007), Cantabria (2003), and Galicia (2005). In the Balearic Islands and Galicia this outcome occurred despite PP remaining by far the largest party in electoral terms.

IU has only entered government in four regions, and always through governing coalitions. The anti-PSOE strategy of the PCE-IU leadership in the 1990s prevented regional coalitions from emerging where PSOE lost its absolute majority, an outcome that occurred in Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Extremadura and Madrid. In these regions IU usually developed some form of parliamentary coalitions to support PSOE minority governments, although in Andalusia IU formed a ‘blocking coalition’ with PP to paralyse the PSOE minority government (1994-6), leading to early elections (Alcantara and Martinez, 1998; Montabes et al., 2006). IU adopted a more collaborative approach towards PSOE after the 1999 regional elections, but its possibility to access regional government was reduced by declining electoral support (see Annex 3), leading to the disappearance of IU from several regional parliaments (see Table 9). Yet in some regions IU continues to wield strong coalition potential. In Asturias IU developed a governing coalition with PSOE after the 2003 regional election, which became a parliamentary coalition after the 2007 regional election. In the Balearic Islands, IU formed a governing coalition with PSOE and some NSWP to remove PP from power in 1999 and 2007. In Catalonia, IC-V formed a governing coalition with PSC and ERC after the 2003 regional election, which was reiterated after the 2006 regional election. Because IU is located on the far left of the political spectrum, its coalition potential is generally restricted to regions where PSOE is strong but sometimes lose its absolute majority. The exception to this rule is the Basque Country, where IU has formed a governing coalition with NSWP since 1998, including the centre-right Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). This coalition allows NSWP in the Basque Country to govern without support from the main SWP (PSOE, PP) or radical Basque nationalists. Electoral support for IU has held up better in regions where it is relevant for coalition formation (e.g. Asturias, Basque Country, Catalonia), and declined sharply in regions where it has no coalitional relevance. In electoral terms IU has effectively collapsed in Galicia (less than 1% since 1997) and in the Canary Islands (less than 1% since 2007).
A common feature of national and regional party systems in Spain is the absence of coalitions (governing, parliamentary, or electoral) between PP and PSOE. Bi-polar competition and government alternation between PSOE and PP has become the defining feature of the national party system, so represents an important constraint on regional coalition formation. The only exceptions to this rule occurred in Navarre and the Basque Country. In Navarre PSOE provided parliamentary support to a UPN regional government between 1996 and 1999, a controversial arrangement opposed by the PSOE leadership, which proceeded to disband the regional party branch (Alcantara and Martinez, 1998). A similar arrangement was nevertheless supported by the PSOE leadership after the 2007 regional election saw no governing majority emerge in the Navarran parliament. In this case the regional branch of PSOE was forbidden by the party leadership from entering a coalition government with the Basque nationalists Na-Bai, leaving no feasible option except for PSOE to provide external support to a minority coalition government led by UPN. The 2001 Basque election saw PP and PSOE make a pre-electoral pledge to govern together if necessary to overthrow the controversial Basque nationalist government led by PNV. This arrangement was defeated electorally because the Basque NSWP increased their vote share and formed a governing coalition with IU. After the 2005 Basque election, PP offered its vote of investiture to the PSOE candidate for regional president, in a bid to prevent PNV from re-electing Ibarretxe as regional president, an attempt which only failed because radical Basque nationalists voted the investiture of Ibarretxe (Pallares et al, 2006b).

The Spanish regions have developed their own patterns of coalition formation and government alternation, which allows us to compare and categorise their structures of party competition. Regional party systems display strong ‘horizontal’ (inter-regional) and ‘vertical’ (national-regional) incongruence (Thorlakson, 2006), although the main SWP (PSOE and PP) are present in most regional governments. To categorise patterns of alternation in regional government, it is useful to distinguish between wholesale alternation and partial alternation (Mair, 1997). Regional party systems in Spain indicate there are various types of partial alternation, with a significant difference between regions
where the largest party remains in power by forming governing coalitions with much smaller parties, and regions where partial alternation is a regular occurrence that leads to the displacement of a major party from the regional government.

Non-alternation in government is a pattern that characterises ten of the seventeen Spanish regions, with the same party forming a government after every regional election. This category is easily applicable to two regions controlled entirely by PSOE (Castile-le-Manche, Extremadura), and one region controlled entirely by PP (Castile-Leon) since the first regional elections were held in 1983. The category of non-alternation is also applicable to four regions controlled by PP majority governments since the 1995 regional elections (La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Valencia), since victory in four successive regional elections (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007) fulfils the minimum criteria established by Sartori (1976) for predominant party systems. Another three regions (Andalusia, Basque Country, Navarre) are dominated by large parties that exploit partial alternation to ensure they remain in control of the regional government. In these cases partial alternation is exploited by the predominant party to ensure there is no substantial alternation, requiring us to categorise these regions as a variant of non-alternation. In Andalusia, PSOE has always been the largest party and continually dominates the regional government. Although PSOE failed to gain an absolute majority in three successive elections (1994, 1996, 2000), it was able to govern effectively between 1996 and 2004 through a coalition government with the Andalusian Party (PA), a small NSWP. PSOE restored its absolute majority in the 2004 election and retained it after the 2008 election. In the Basque Country, PNV has been the largest party since the first Basque elections in 1982, dominating the regional government through partial alternation. PNV has formed selective governing coalitions with other Basque nationalists, as well as competing statewide parties (PSOE, IU), so fully exploited its central position in a fragmented and highly polarised party system (Llera, 1999). In Navarre, UPN has exploited an equally fragmented and polarised party system to dominate the regional government since 1993. UPN has relied on external support from PSOE (1996-1999; 2007-); the abstention of Basque nationalists from the regional parliament (1999-2003); and a governing coalition with UDN (2003-). PSOE has been unable to compete effectively with UPN since the
early 1990s, while the PSOE leadership has restricted the coalitional options of its regional branch by rejecting alliances with Basque nationalists, since these would prejudice the broader electoral interests of PSOE.

Partial alternation that leads to a major party being removed from regional government is a dominant characteristic of four regions (Aragon, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Cantabria). In all these cases NSWP remain in government by forming selective governing coalitions with the main SWP (PP and PSOE), although these NSWP often obtain lower levels of support than the main SWP. Aragon was governed by a coalition of PP and the Aragonese Regionalist Party (PAR) between 1987 and 1999, while PSOE remained the largest party in electoral terms. The 1999 election saw a substantial increase in PP support (becoming 1st party) and a concomitant fall in PAR support. Yet PP became excluded from the regional government because PAR chose to form a governing coalition with PSOE, a formula re-iterated after the 2003 and 2007 regional elections. In the Balearic Islands, PP remains the largest party throughout the timeframe (over 40% of the vote), but almost always needs to form a coalition government. Between 1991 and 1995 PP formed a governing coalition with the small Union of Mallorca (UM), whose 2-3 seats were necessary for an absolute majority. After the 1999 election, UM (7.3% vote, 3 seats) decided to form an alternative coalition government with PSOE, IU, and the Socialist Parties of Mallorca and Menorca (PSM). Although PP remained the largest party in the regional parliament (28/59 seats), it was nevertheless forced into opposition. After the 2003 election, UM (7.3% vote, 3 seats) chose to re-establish the governing coalition with PP, consigning its former partners to opposition. The 2007 election saw UM (6.8% vote, 3 seats) once again abandon PP and re-establish the governing coalition with PSOE, IU and PSM. In the Canary Islands, various NSWP united in 1993 to form the Canary Coalition (CC), which became the largest party in the regional parliament. This allowed CC to overthrow a PSOE-led coalition government in 1993 and govern as a minority until 1995. CC was confirmed as the largest party in the 1995 regional election, and proceeded to form a minority government reliant on external support from PSOE. After the 1999 regional election, CC formed a governing coalition with PP, reflecting the external support that CC provided to the PP national government. This governing coalition with
PP was repeated after the 2003 and 2007 regional elections, although in 2007 PSOE surpassed CC in electoral terms by more than 10%. As a demonstration of its coalitional supremacy, CC was able to terminate its governing coalitions with PP mid-legislature to rule as a minority government (2001-3; 2005-7). In Cantabria, the Regionalist Party of Cantabria (PRC) formed a coalition government with PP in 1995, which was reiterated after the 1999 election. In 2003 PRC chose to form an alternative coalition government with PSOE, although PP was clearly the largest party in electoral terms and only 2 seats short of an absolute majority. The PRC-PSOE coalition was repeated after the 2007 election, which again confirmed PP as the largest party.

Only three regions in Spain are characterised by patterns of wholesale alternation in government during the timeframe (Asturias, Catalonia, Galicia), which is perhaps surprising since this is the prevailing pattern of government alternation at national level. Among these regions only Asturias shares similar competitive features to the national party system. Asturias is characterised by intense bi-polar electoral competition between PP and PSOE, which has prevented either party from obtaining an absolute majority in the regional parliament since 1987. Minority governments are usually formed by PSOE (1987-1991; 1993-5; 2007-) and reliant on parliamentary support from IU, although PSOE and IU have also formed governing coalitions (1991-3; 2003-2007). PP also formed a minority government (1995-1999) reliant on parliamentary support from an independent and an ex-PSOE defector (Alcantara and Martinez, 1998). Unlike the national party system, NSWP are absent in Asturias while IU wields strong coalition potential. In Galicia, PP obtained four consecutive majorities in the regional parliament (1989-2005), but was ultimately displaced from office by a governing coalition of PSOE and the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG). Party competition in Galicia is rather distinct from the national level, and is characterised by competing blocs: PP dominates the centre-right, whereas PSOE and BNG together dominate the centre-left. Regional elections are characterised by a substantial transfer of votes between PSOE and BNG, and a very limited transfer of votes between PP and PSOE-BNG (Pallares et al, 2006a).
In Catalonia, wholesale alternation occurred after more than two decades of single party CiU regional governments (1980-2003). CiU initially governed as a majority (1980-1995), but later as a minority (1995-2003) with parliamentary support from PP. In 2003 CiU was finally displaced from government by a centre-left governing coalition formed by PSC, ERC and IC-V. This governing coalition collapsed because of tensions over reforming the Catalan statute of autonomy, but was reconstituted after the 2006 Catalan election. Coalition formation and party competition in Catalonia nevertheless remains fairly open, unlike in Galicia where party competition has crystallised around competing blocs. Although the PSC-ERC-ICV coalition was reiterated under new leadership in 2006, alternative options were considered, including a ‘grand coalition’ between PSC and CiU (the two largest parties in the Catalan parliament), or a ‘nationalist coalition’ between CiU and ERC, which would have excluded all SWP (Lago et al, 2007). Whereas a ‘grand coalition’ was rejected by the PSC leadership (but supported by the PSOE leadership), a ‘nationalist coalition’ was rejected by the ERC leadership (but supported by party members), which preferred a coalition government with PSC (Orte and Wilson, 2009).

Conclusions

Regional party systems in Spain display strong horizontal and vertical incongruence over the timeframe (1991-2007). Ten of the seventeen Spanish regions are characterised by patterns of non-alternation in government, in contrast to the wholesale alternation that characterises the national government. Only three regions are characterised by wholesale alternation in government, and only one of these (Asturias) displays the intense bi-polar competition between PP and PSOE that characterises the national party system. Asturias is also characterised by the prevalence of minority governments, because no party is able to secure an absolute majority. Catalonia saw alternation in government between CiU and a three-party centre-left coalition led by PSC. Galicia saw alternation in government between PP and a coalition of PSOE and Galician nationalists. The remaining four Spanish regions are characterised by partial alternation in government, whereby a single NSWP remains in power by forming various governing coalitions with competing SWP. Although this NSWP is rarely the largest party in electoral terms, it benefits from the
constraints imposed on coalition formation between PSOE and PP. This pattern of government alternation has never occurred at national level, although it shares a slight similarity to the parliamentary coalitions that CiU developed with both PSOE (1993-6) and PP (1996-2000). Regional party systems therefore differ not only in the relative electoral weight of statewide and non-statewide parties (Hamann, 1999; Pallares and Keating, 2003), but also in their prevailing structures of party competition.

Chapter 3.3 Organisational and Systemic Linkages in Spain

Although PP and PSOE have adopted rather different territorial strategies, both parties have increased their access to regional government, and have done so by forming governing coalitions with NSWP. PSOE now relies heavily on coalitions with NSWP to govern at regional level, while PP is less dependent on coalitions with NSWP, but has lost office in several regions to coalitions between PSOE and NSWP. The willingness of PSOE to form governing coalitions with Basque, Catalan, and Galician nationalists has allowed it to enter government in all but one Spanish region. The fervent rejection of nationalist demands by PP has excluded it from government formation in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where it remains weak in electoral terms (see Annex 3). Yet this may have improved its performance in Castilian-speaking regions, many of which are now dominated by PP governments. The main constraint on regional coalition formation is the absence of coalitions between PP and PSOE, although exceptions to this rule occur in the Basque Country and Navarre. These coalitions are usually supported by the national party leaders, who have become increasingly hostile to the radical and irredentist claims of Basque nationalism (Pallares et al, 2006b). PP has even endorsed the competing cause of Navarran regionalism, which its organisational counterpart UPN exploits to guarantee its central position in the regional party system and secure its control over the regional government. The differences in territorial strategy between PSOE and PP are particularly evident in the region of Catalonia. The hostility of PP to Catalan nationalism has marginalised its position in the Catalan party system, and restricted its electoral support. In contrast the PSC leadership has adopted an autonomist strategy designed to win over both nationalist and non-nationalist voters, allowing PSC to form governing
coalitions with Catalan nationalists and compete effectively for first party status with CiU (Lago et al., 2007).

Regional party systems have delivered crucial opportunities of government to IU, whose electoral support has declined in successive national elections, while its party leadership remains characterised by factionalism (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008). IU has been able to develop a pivotal function in several party systems. This includes Asturias, where PSOE is strong but generally fails to obtain an absolute majority, so relies heavily on coalitional support from IU. It also includes the Balearic Islands, where IU has allied with PSOE and regionalist parties to displace PP from government. In the Basque Country, IU has developed a niche position between the nationalist and non-nationalist camps, and has exploited this to form a governing coalition with NSWP (Pallares et al., 2006b). IC-V has also formed part of the Catalan government since 2003, through successive coalitions with PSC and the left wing Catalan nationalists ERC. Yet in several regions IU has been unable to wield coalition potential, exacerbating its electoral decline (see Annex 3) and triggering its disappearance from the regional parliament (see Table 9). Moreover IU has limited coalition potential at national level, where PSOE has generally been able to govern successfully through parliamentary coalitions with NSWP.

The multi-level politics of IU highlights the important role that control over regional government performs in stabilising electoral support for SWP, as well as increasing the autonomy of their regional party branches. In the Basque Country, IU has been able to develop highly autonomous positions from the national party through its coalition with Basque nationalist parties (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008), while in Catalonia IC-V has justified its rupture with IU through an enhanced role in local and regional governing coalitions with PSC. The centralised PP has been unwilling to concede significant autonomy to its Basque or Catalan party branches, whose exclusion from the regional government increases their reliance on the national party. Yet PP has hitherto tolerated the extensive autonomy of its Navarran counterpart UPN, because the latter controls the regional government and is virulently opposed to Basque nationalism. The Basque branch of PSOE (PSE) remains tightly integrated into the national leadership (Letamendia, Wilson, Alex (2009), Multi-level Party Politics in Italy and Spain European University Institute 10.2870/13381
2006), partly because of its electoral difficulties in the Basque Country and its exclusion from the regional government. Also relevant is the polarisation of the Basque party system between nationalists and non-nationalists, which obliges PSE to compete with PP for the minority of non-nationalist voters, and makes neither party able to erode significant support from Basque nationalists (Pallares et al, 2006b). PSC has become more autonomous in Catalonia through its control over regional and local governments, as evident from its autonomous choices over coalition formation after the 2006 regional election, where PSC supported a governing coalition with ERC despite intervention from the PSOE leadership in favour of a coalition with CiU (Orte and Wilson, 2009). Linkages between national and regional party systems are generally weak in Spain, because most NSWP obtain few seats (or none) in the Spanish parliament, allowing PP and PSOE to pursue regional governing coalitions that have no precedent or effect at national level. The main exception to this rule is Catalonia, whose NSWP are crucial for government formation at national level. As a result the main Spanish and Catalan parties have sought to guarantee coalitional congruence between national and regional levels, which is deemed necessary for governing cohesion at both Catalan and Spanish levels of governments. The parliamentary coalition between PSOE-PSC, ERC and IC-V at national level (2004-2007) was effectively a replication of the governing coalition formed between PSC, ERC and IC-V at regional level (2003-). The parliamentary coalition between PP and CiU at national level (1996-2004) meanwhile was reciprocated by a parliamentary coalition between CiU and PP at regional level (1995-2003).
Chapter 3.4: Concepts and Regional Case Studies

Before proceeding to the case studies of Italian regions (Chapter 4) and Spanish regions (Chapter 5), this Chapter will discuss some important dimensions of analysis that emerge in the regional case studies, but which have largely been absent from existing studies of multi-level politics (e.g. Hough et al, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006). This includes the development of presidentialism at regional level, the prevalence of clientelism in shaping political relations at sub-national levels, and the dynamics of party factionalism at sub-national level. These dimensions of analysis require tighter conceptual definitions, particularly as they relate to the objectives of this research. The regional case studies will reflect on the collective interests of the regional political class (Stolz, 2001; 2003), as well as the use of regional arenas for the career advancement of both national and sub-national politicians, while considering the potential role of local levels as arenas for coalition testing in Italy and Spain. This will help to frame the extensive empirical discussion of these issues in the regional case studies.

Clientelism

Although clientelism is a common political mechanism in democratic and undemocratic regimes, it is rather difficult to conceptualise for the purposes of research. Political clientelism over-laps considerably with the separate question of political corruption (Hopkine, 2001a), and can be difficult to distinguish from welfare dependency due to increased social spending by the state (Ferrera, 1996). Nor is the existence of political clientelism confined to areas of socio-economic backwardness, as clientelist mechanisms can adjust to socio-economic change, with the result that “there is no necessary link between political clientelism and a stage of modernization” (Zuckerman, 1975, 44). Political clientelism in Spain is generally characterised as a rural phenomenon that is expected to weaken with the advance of urbanisation (Losada and Maiz, 2000; Hopkin, 2001a), although in Italy clientelism has adapted extremely well to poor and densely inhabited environments (Allum, 1973; Parisi and Pasquino, 1980; Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988). The classic definition of clientelism is that of a “dyadic relationship between
individuals of unequal power who exchange goods and services on the basis of an unwritten contract in an ongoing fashion” (Piattoni, 1998, 11). Yet democratic settings create the possibility for competing patrons, which can interrupt the ongoing nature of the clientelist exchange, and make the relationship between client and patron less unequal. Nor is clientelism always hierarchical in structure, for example when politicians selectively distribute goods and services to powerful businessmen (Walston, 1988). Most authors distinguish between two types of clientelism, an older clientelism based on the highly unequal relationship between local notables and their local client groups, and a newer clientelism based on competing political parties. This new clientelism is varyingly described as ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Tarrow, 1967), ‘interventionist State clientelism’ (Walston, 1988), ‘clientelism of political parties’ (Caciagli, 1982), or ‘mass party clientelism’ (Hopkin, 2001a). These different definitions reflect common attempts to capture the pervasive control exercised by political parties over the public administration, whose lack of impartiality or autonomy vis-à-vis political pressures tends to subordinate collective policy-making to strong individual interests. In this context “there is no rational state administration capable of stopping the private use for private ends of public functions or which can act as mediator when the barter vote is normal currency everywhere in civil life and in the administrative machine” (Sapelli, 1995, 115).

The regional case studies will analyse the various ways that political clientelism in Italy and Spain affects party organisations and party systems. As a broad definition, clientelism is taken to mean a “selective distribution of benefits, which is not justified in universalistic terms” (Hopkin, 2001a, 117). Clientelism between voters and politicians is reflected in the selective distribution of welfare payments and provisions (Ferrera, 1996); the provision of unnecessary public employment for political supporters (Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988); and public subventions to inefficient economic actors with the objective of electoral gain, which can reinforce a “subsidized economy” dependent on government resources (Caciagli, 1982, 282). Yet clientelist exchange can also affect the relationship between different political actors. In this respect a conceptual distinction should be made between ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ forms of clientelism. The concept of ‘vertical’ clientelism encapsulates the classic relationship between patron as politician and client as
voter, conducted through the mechanism of the ‘vote of exchange’ (Parisi and Pasquino, 1980, 17). The concept of ‘horizontal’ clientelism encapsulates the relationship between patron as party leader and client as party politician. Party leaders in government have access to significant powers of patronage, including the capacity to nominate followers to governing positions, as well as to lucrative positions in public and semi-public bodies, often created precisely for that purpose. Party politicians have local support bases which they can mobilise behind the party leader in exchange for their nomination. This type of political exchange is particularly prominent within factionalised party organisations (Zuckerman, 1975; Belloni, 1978), where competing faction leaders use their powers of nomination to extend their political following. It can also apply to fragmented or fluid party systems, where political entrepreneurs with access to government resources can expand their party organisations and electoral support through this mechanism (Allum and Allum, 2008). The ‘particularist’ nature of this exchange lies in the decision to create or distribute lucrative posts in the public administration purely on the basis of party-factional affiliation, rather than the objective capabilities of these politicians to conduct the necessary functions, or even the objective need to create these new posts.

Studies of clientelism and democratic party politics have focused extensively on the Italian case, and highlighted the extensive networks of resource distribution exploited by DC politicians (‘patrons’) in southern Italy to build up a base of personal supporters (‘clients’) (Tarrow, 1967; Allum, 1973; Caciagli, 1982; Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988). This formed part of a political strategy adopted by DC in southern Italy to confront the strong electoral challenge posed by PCI. Given that PCI was very strong in central-northern regions, DC needed to maintain control of central-southern Italy to retain their stranglehold over national politics, and resorted to the consolidation or creation of clientelist mechanisms for resource distribution (Tarrow, 1967; Caciagli, 1982; Chubb, 1982). Yet the widespread use of clientelism also reflected the political preferences of many post-war DC leaders, who:

“were impressed by the ability of clientelism to limit conflicts and thus regulate and stabilize a society in change... the mass clientele party has proved itself capable of
governing a large part of southern Italy which has experienced an accelerated urbanization without industrialization, with transfers of population from the country with no prospect for employment, an increase of the unproductive middle classes, a reduction of the actively employed population, and a persistence of pockets of poverty and marginality......yet at the same it has succeeded in containing social tensions by either composing or postponing the explosion of conflicts, or by transforming them into corporate conflicts or into individual competitions.”” (Caciagli, 1982, 287-289).

There is also evidence of clientelism being used by DC politicians in northern Italy to build their personal support bases, (Zuckerman, 1975), while other Italian parties were also successful in exploiting clientelist structures, particularly the parties that formed governing coalitions with DC. The most notorious example was PSI, whose electoral expansion during the 1980s was based on the development of clientelist networks of political control, under the guise of an expansion of state spending. In many cases these clientelist networks were also networks of political corruption, uncovered by prosecuting magistrates in the 1990s, leading to the incarceration of prominent PSI politicians (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2007), prompting the electoral and organisational collapse of PSI after the 1994 national election (Katz, 1996; Morlino, 1996). There is also evidence the ‘anti-system’ parties PCI and MSI participated in the ‘spoils system’ at sub-national levels, particularly in southern Italy. A prominent example is the municipality of Naples, governed in a reckless and clientelist manner not only by DC ‘powerbrokers’, but also by MSI ‘notables’ and PCI ‘bureaucrats’ (Allum, 1973; Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988; Demarco, 2007; Allum and Allum, 2008).

Since party clientelism is a highly pervasive and flexible mechanism for political control in post-war Italian politics, we must consider how it adapted to the collapse of the main party organisations in the 1990s. Political science has remained largely silent on this issue, perhaps because the collapse of these mass parties generated a loss of interest in their mechanisms for political control, or because clientelism does not adapt easily to existing theoretical models of party competition and organisational adaptation. Mauro Calise (2007) argues that “notables with local powerbases” continue to be a prominent
feature of Italian politics, particularly at sub-national levels where they have preserved their powerbases and access to government through preference voting. Simona Piattoni (1998, 2002) has focused on the role of clientelism for economic development, institutional performance, and political leadership, arguing that clientelism is not necessarily a wasteful mechanism for public expenditure, and can be “virtuous” when exploited by strong political leaders as “a tool for economic development…. and a method for creating (embryonic) networks of trust and cooperation” (Piattoni, 2002, 3), overcoming inefficiencies and obstacles in a largely malfunctioning administrative-political machine. Jonathan Hopkin (2001a) has argued that clientelism can sometimes be socially acceptable because it implies a redistribution of resources to poorer segments of society. Simona Piattoni (1998, 487) insists “the point of departure is to treat clientelism not as a syndrome, but as a political strategy that can be judged on the basis of its economic and social effects”. Yet if clientelism is a political strategy for economic development, then it has done little to reduce the North-South divide in Italy, as most southern regions now lag further behind northern regions in GDP terms (Bull and Baudner, 2004). This outcome is only unsurprising if we follow the argument of Mario Caciagli (1982, 489) that the purpose of party clientelism was precisely “to maintain the south in a structural condition of backwardness”, and thereby avoid self-sustaining economic development that would weaken the clientelist support base. While the merits of these competing arguments lie outside the objectives of this research, they nevertheless highlight the need for a detailed exploration of how clientelism relates to party politics and political leadership.

The case studies of Italian regions in Chapter 4 reveal that political clientelism has survived the collapse of party organisations and the transformation in party competition, and has profited considerably from the process of regionalisation. Decentralisation has enhanced the possibility for clientelistic behaviour by dispersing the levers of power (Walston, 1988), and provided greater resources for regional politicians to pursue the vote of exchange through “welfare manipulation” (Ferrera, 1996, 25), as well as the selective allocation of public subsidies and employment. As the Italian government struggled to contain its public expenditure to meet EMU entry requirements in the 1990s,
regional governments expanded their welfare functions and public expenditure, often using EU funds to match declining national transfers (Bull and Baudner, 2004). Yet in southern Italy this enhanced autonomy did not produce strong endogeneous economic growth, higher levels of institutional performance, or more universalistic welfare provision. Regionalisation accentuated the North-South divide in institutional performance (Puttnam et al., 1993), because “for most of the southern political elite the regional level of government primarily represented an alluring opportunity to allocate a constant flow of resources according to particularistic criteria” (Fargion, 1997, 150). There is some tentative evidence of “virtuous clientelism” (Piattoni, 1998, 2001), particularly in northern Italy where strong political leaders have focused on the common objective of economic growth and infrastructural development. In Spain political clientelism performs an important role in stabilising electoral support and building party organisations, as well as delivering state-sponsored economic development (Montabes et al., 2006). Although the Spanish government pursued a policy of fiscal retrenchment in the 1990s to cope with an economic recession and guarantee convergence with EMU criteria, regional governments increased their share of public expenditure and developed an active role in welfare provision (Rhodes, 1997) and support for economic development (Maiz and Losada, 2000). This significantly enhanced the scope for clientelist exchange at sub-national levels. Meanwhile national decision-making weakly conforms to clientelist objectives (Hopkin, 2001), and has been primarily geared towards fiscal efficiency (Rhodes, 1997).

In Italy the development of party clientelism was closely linked to the consolidation of party factionalism, evident from the intense competition between DC factions, which generated a huge and wasteful increase in state expenditure. National factions relied heavily on local/regional powerbases, which they usually controlled through clientelist resource distribution (Zuckerman, 1975). Yet the collapse of the main governing parties in the 1990s destroyed most of these party factions. Kim Eric Bettcher (2005) suggests new party factions in Italy are likely to be fluid and weakly developed, since they can only operate effectively within larger party organisations. Mauro Calise (2006) argues that many DC party factions survived in the form of new or refounded parties, while at
sub-national levels many factional powerbrokers maintained their localised and clientelistic support bases through preference voting, and could negotiate favourable alliances with the national parties and competing coalitions. Since a faction can be defined as “any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is part” (Beller and Belloni, 1978, 419), it can take a variety of less institutionalised forms, including factional tendencies and personal-client groups. The regional case studies highlight the existence of personal-client group factions in Italy, formed by DC or PSI politicians that began to operate within new parties to which they display limited loyalty. The regional case studies also highlight the formation of new party-factions (Udeur), and the existence of factional alliances (Beller and Belloni, 1978), formed at regional level from groups of local ex-DC or ex-PSI powerbrokers. Factional tendencies have emerged in the former anti-system parties (DS, AN), whose organisational unity and ideological glue have weakened as a result of their transformation into governing parties. Factional tendencies are also evident in Spanish parties, particularly PSOE and IU during the 1990s. Local factions emerged in support of competing national leaders, different visions of government policy, and alternative coalitional strategies. These factional disputes became multi-level conflicts whose primary battlegrounds were the Spanish regions. Although PP was less characterised by intra-party factionalism than PSOE or IU, and at national level remained centralised around the party leader (van Biezen, 2003; van Biezen and Hopkin, 2004), at regional level PP displayed some factional tendencies, although these were more evident in regions where the party consistently controlled sub-national government, rather than regions where PP was usually in opposition at sub-national levels.

**Presidentialism**

The emergence of regional presidentialism can be operationalised using the framework of analysis developed by Poguntke and Webb (2004) for studying presidentialism at national level. These authors argue that presidentialism can even occur in systems that are not presidential or even semi-presidential in design, and that the ‘functional logic of
presidentialism’ is evident from three dimensions: Leadership resources are high and not accountable to the legislature (‘executive face’); leadership autonomy is high and not accountable to parties (‘party face’); and the electoral process is personalised around competing leaders (‘electoral face’). Since this research focuses on the organisational and systemic behaviour of political parties, it is the ‘party face’ of presidentialism that will be primarily analysed, although the ‘executive face’ is also relevant and overlaps with the ‘party face’ in practice. In Italy regional presidents are directly elected, nominate the regional executive; and have their terms tied to the respective regional council (Fabbri, 2001). Although presidents can still be censured by their council, this leads directly to fresh elections, because councils can no longer replace presidents. Nevertheless support from the regional council is necessary for presidents and their executives to approve any legislation, creating significant potential for tensions between directly elected leaders and their supporting parties in the council (Fabbri and Brunazzo, 2003; Calise, 2006; 2007). Although the councils now have no formal powers to nominate the president or executive, their system of election (proportional representation with preference voting) and legislative behaviour (organised on party lines) encourage strong continuity with regional party systems before 1995. Mauro Calise (2006, 4) believes “the class of the legislative assemblies preserved most of their old prerogatives and logic of belonging. There was no change comparable to that of the executive. The only significant change was the gradual emptying of their functions and responsibilities”. In Spain regional presidents are nominated by their respective parliaments, and can be replaced mid-legislature without fresh elections. In formal terms the executive has weak autonomy from the legislature. In practice patterns of presidentialism still emerge because of trends in party organisation and party competition. All parties in Spain propose their candidates for regional president as part of the electoral campaign, which tends to be personalised in nature, making it politically impossible for winning parties to subsequently renege on their choice of president. Another feature of party organisations in Spain is the iron control of the ‘party in central office’, and the weak autonomy of the ‘party in public office’ (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2004). The result is that party politicians in the regional parliament have little room for maneuver over leadership choices, without risking exclusion or isolation from the party apparatus. Since key decisions are taken outside the
legislative arena and only implemented there, this facilitates a concentration of autonomy and resources around regional leaders.

Although the ‘electoral face’ of presidentialism is beyond the confines of this analysis, an important distinction needs to be made between ‘presidentialisation’ and ‘personalisation’ of politics, insofar as these concepts apply to the study of party organisations and party systems. Studies of presidentialism have tended to present these phenomena as virtually inter-dependent (Poguntke and Webb, 2004; Calise, 2006), although they remain conceptually and empirically distinct. Presidentialisation implies a centralisation of power and resources around institutional leaders, whereas personalisation implies a centralisation of power and resources around individual politicians. At regional level these concepts coincide perfectly when regional presidents are also powerful party leaders, since control over institutional resources facilitates control over party organisations. Yet it is also conceivable that regional presidents fail to develop full control over their party organisations, or that parties become personalised without controlling the institutional leadership. Whereas presidentialisation is naturally linked to institutional leadership and is more readily identifiable, personalisation can emerge in different ways and at different levels of political leadership. Both phenomena can be linked to broader changes in party organisations and party systems.

The transformation of ‘mass parties’ into ‘catch-all’ and subsequently ‘cartel’ parties (Katz and Mair, 1995) is a development that suggests the collective-ideological objectives of politicians are weakening at the expense of their individual-careerist ones (Panebianco, 1988). Electoral campaigns are increasingly media-driven and focused around leadership candidates, while party systems are more bipolarised (Mair, 2006). The outcome is that personalised parties and presidentialised leadership increasingly conform to the expectations of the electorate, as well as the interests of political leaders (Calise, 2007). It may nevertheless be inappropriate to view parties and presidents as opposing forces (Calise, 2006), or to consider presidentialisation as the process of becoming unaccountable to parties (Poguntke and Webb, 2004). Strong institutional leadership depends on cooperation with parties that retain a strong grip on legislative
bodies. It is more likely that presidents will exploit their privileged access to the power and resources of government to enhance or consolidate their control of party organisations, and use party control as a key mechanism for asserting institutional leadership. The success of this strategy will vary according to the nature of the party organisation concerned, as well as the conditions of the party system. The presence of strong competing parties will significantly constrain the centralisation of power and resources in party-institutional leaders, particularly when these competing parties form part of a governing coalition.

**Political Class**

The case studies will provide some reflection on the nature of the regional political class, since new or reinforced regional institutions enhance the career opportunities for sub-national politicians, whose control of sub-national institutions may become their primary objective rather than progression to national levels (Stolz, 2001; 2003). In the Spanish case there is strong evidence that regional politicians orient their careers towards control of regional institutions, rather than progression to the Spanish parliament, and use their sub-national power-bases to increase their importance within the broader party organisation (Montero, 2007). This may also encourage some national politicians to seek control of regional institutions, as a mechanism to increase their stature within the national party. In Italy distinct electoral systems have an effect on the incentives of regional politicians. At national level preference voting has been eliminated from the electoral system since 1994. This has allowed party leaders to determine their choice of candidates for closed party lists, and agree collectively on coaltional candidates for majoritarian constituencies. At regional level the continuation of preference voting has encouraged a high degree of intra-party competition, since this mechanism determines which party candidates are elected to the regional council (Walston, 1988; Calise, 2006). Whereas national politicians must rely primarily on strong links with the party leadership to guarantee their (re)-nomination, regional politicians must rely primarily on a strong local/regional support base. The national electoral system encourages the nomination of
party loyalists or high-profile symbolic candidates, while the regional electoral system encourages the perpetuation of local powerbrokers with weaker links to the leadership.

Party system change in Italy during the 1990s had a profound effect on the strategic interests of individual politicians. The collapse of the DC and PSI organisations saw their component politicians pursue a variety of career options. While many abandoned politics for retirement (or incarceration), others formed into new party organisations (e.g. PPI, CCD, UDC). These new parties displayed limited electoral support and political influence. Many other former DC or PSI politicians joined Forza Italia (a few joined National Alliance), but most of these ‘career’ politicians were significantly restricted in their political advancement in FI because the party leader (Silvio Berlusconi) sought to privilege an alternative political elite founded on ‘amateur’ politicians bound to him by personal loyalty (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999; Fava, 2004). Another possibility open to DC or PSI politicians was sub-national politics. This option was palatable to those politicians with territorial power-bases or local prominence, since this might guarantee their election and grant them considerable autonomy from party organisations, to which they could re-negotiate their terms of affiliation. The fragmentation of PCI to form PDS and PRC in 1992 also affected the career choices of their component politicians. The formation of PDS helped to consolidate a new party leadership, intent on modernising the party and moderating its political line. This situation generally favoured politicians belonging to the ‘Right’ faction of PCI, which had earlier supported an alliance with the ‘Left’ DC, while disadvantaging politicians belonging to the ‘Left’ faction of PCI, which had previously rejected alliances with DC (Hine, 1982). Although many leading politicians from the ‘Left’ faction of PCI joined PRC (Bull and Heywood, 1994), others remained within the PDS/DS organisation but were marginalised from the levers of national power. This encouraged some of them to aim for control over sub-national institutions, partly as a way to strengthen their position within the national party. The most notable example of this process was Antonio Bassolino in Naples (see Chapter 4.1).
Coalition Testing

Another important feature of regional party systems is the use of local governments as arenas for coalition testing. Parties at regional level may adopt coalitional choices that are incongruent with those of the national level, although the national leadership can intervene to prevent certain coalitional options being enacted. Parties at local level usually have greater leverage in pursuing diverse coalitions, although these may be subject to national constraints (Pridham, 1989). Local levels are particularly important for testing coalitions never enacted before at national or regional levels, such as governing coalitions between statewide and non-statewide parties in Spain, or governing coalitions between parties of opposing blocs in Italy. Given that local and regional parties rely on a common pool of sub-national politicians, successful local coalitions are more likely to be adopted at regional level, while unsuccessful local coalitions are more likely to be discouraged at regional level. Local coalitions represent a crucial opportunity to analyse the behaviour of non-statewide parties, allowing us to examine whether they are promiscuous or monogamous in their patterns of coalition formation. This helps evaluate the organisational and systemic strategies non-statewide parties adopt in regional party systems. Local coalitions in Spain are likely to represent ideal ‘breeding grounds’ for regional coalitions, since local electoral systems and structures of government are broadly similar to those of the regional level. Local coalitions in Italy are also likely to influence regional choices, since the local electoral system is a form of ‘PR with majoritarian bonus’, whose coalitional incentives are broadly analogous to those of the regional level. However there are important differences. The local electoral system contains two rounds of voting, with the possibility for different coalitions in each round, contrasting with the regional electoral system that contains a single round of voting (Fabbrini, 2001). In this respect local elections may see narrower and incongruent coalitions pursued in the first round of voting (which determines the allocation of seats in the council), while broader and more congruent coalitions are pursued in the second round (which determines the choice of mayor and distributes the majoritarian bonus).
Chapter 4 Regional Party Politics in Italy

Chapter 4 is composed of two case studies analysing party politics in the Italian regions of Campania (Chapter 4.1) and Lombardia (Chapter 4.2), followed by some comparative conclusions (Chapter 4.3). These case studies focus on the organisational and systemic dimensions of regional party competition, and are broadly located within the national framework developed in Chapter 2. The case studies emphasise a series of factors that have a determining effect on regional party politics, which are rarely highlighted in comparative analyses of multi-level politics (e.g. Hough et al, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006), as discussed in the previous chapter. This includes the ‘presidentialisation’ of regional party organisations; the pervasive role of clientelism in the regional party system; the varying effects of intra-party factional conflict at regional level; the adoption of autonomist political strategies by governing statewide parties; and the operation of regional electoral systems. Chapter 4 confirms the necessity of analysing the competitive dynamics of regional party politics, through a reflective adaptation of analytical theories derived from the comparative study of party politics at national level.

The empirical indicators used in these regional case studies are consistent with those adopted for the national frameworks, albeit with a more contextual focus and a greater consideration of the feedback effects between organisational and systemic change. The organisational analysis highlights significant changes in the structure and behaviour of regional party organisations, including their relationship with the national party. It considers whether these changes are affected by relative party access to sub-national government, and the extent to which this has determined the choice of regional political strategies. The systemic analysis focuses on coalition formation and government alternation at regional level, and what this suggests about the underlying structures of regional party competition. The case studies consider the salient factors that determine coaltional choices and patterns of alternation in regional government, and emphasise the extent to which these are regional choices or just an imposition of national preferences. The case studies also consider ways in which local party politics can have a significant effect on regional political strategies, such as ‘coalition testing’ in local arenas.
Data collection for these regional case studies was obtained through a variety of sources: Archival analysis of the main national Italian newspaper (*La Repubblica*) and its relevant local editions; semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key regional political actors; data on regional elections from the Ministry of Interior website (www.interno.it) and relevant secondary sources (e.g. party publications). The timeframe for analysis is 1995-2007. The interviews for Campania (Chapter 4.1) were conducted in February 2007, whereas the interviews for Lombardia (Chapter 4.2) were conducted in November 2007.

**Chapter 4.1 Regional Party Politics in Campania**

**Chapter 4.1.1 Political Geography in Campania (1995-2007)**

Campania is the largest region in mainland southern Italy, comprising five provinces with a total population of 5,790,187 (2007). The region is dominated by Naples province (3,082,756), which contains 53% of the regional population. Naples is also the regional capital and by far the largest city (975,139). The second province is Salerno (1,089,737), with almost 19% of the regional population, while the city of Salerno is the second largest with a population of 132,790. The remaining provinces are Caserta (891,473, 15% regional popn.); Avellino (437,649, 7.5% regional popn.); and Benevento (288,572, 5% regional popn). Campania is the most heavily urbanised region in Italy (431.2 inhabitants per square kilometre), and characterised by continued population growth (0.2% per annum 1995-2004), despite being the second poorest Italian region after Sicily. Regional GDP in Campania is only 68.4% of the EU-27 average, and well below the Italian average (107.4%). Although annual regional GDP growth (1.7%, 1995-2004) has been slightly above the Italian average (1.3%, 1995-2004), this has been insufficient to catch up with the more economically developed northern regions.

56 Data on size of population in cities, provinces and region of Campania (www.citypopulation.de). All other economic, social and demographic indicators (European Commission, 2007).
The demographic structure of Campania is younger than the Italian average: 18% of the population is under 15 (Italian average = 14.2%) and only 14.8% of the population is over 65 (Italian average = 19.2%), although the working age (15-64) regional population (67.2%) reflects the Italian average (66.6%). Levels of employment in Campania are much lower with only 44.2% of the working age (15-64) population in active employment (Italian average = 57.6%), and only 27.9% of women (Italian average = 45.3%). Regional unemployment (14.6%) and female unemployment (20.9%) are more than double the Italian average (7.7% and 10.1% respectively). Youth unemployment in Campania is extremely high (38.8%), even compared to a high Italian average (24%). Real unemployment is even higher than these figures indicate, because of the widespread distribution of invalidity pensions to those in long-term unemployment. Invalidity pensions saw an exceptional growth over several decades, reaching a peak in 1982 (5.38 million, i.e. around 10% of the Italian population!) when they overtook the number of old-age pensions (Ferrera, 1996). The distribution of invalidity pensions favours southern Italian regions such as Campania, where “more than 20 percent of the population obtains disability allowances” (Maguire, 1993). Other mechanisms that reduce official unemployment figures include early retirement schemes (Dell’Aringi and Lodovici, 1997) and extended studies for university students. The structure of employment in Campania thus reflects a “debased tertiary process whereby…. almost the whole economy…is supported by public funds…giving shape to a subsidized economy” (Caciagli, 1980, 272). Employment is more heavily weighted towards services (71.2%) than the Italian average (65%). The services sector is largely composed of small businesses that provide employment but low incomes, and an over-sized public administration in constant expansion (Caciagli, 1980). Only 24% of the working population is involved in industry (Italian average = 30.8%) with 4.8% in agriculture (Italian average = 4.2%). Levels of education are below the Italian average: 56.6% of the population possesses low levels of education (Italian average = 49.3%), and 32.4% possesses medium levels of education (Italian average = 38.5%). The regional population with high levels of education (10.9%) is not as distant from the Italian average (12.2%).
State dependency in southern Italy has had a determining effect on its party politics (Caciagli, 1980), with the clientelist ‘vote of exchange’ surpassing the ‘vote of belonging’ or the ‘vote of opinion’ (Parisi and Pasquino, 1980). Voters in Campania rely heavily on politicians to deliver selective subsidies for businesses, public employment for workers, or welfare benefits for the unemployed and elderly (Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988). Party politics was also shaped by socio-economic changes in the post-war period. Southern Italy was historically characterised by *latifundi* (large holdings), held by absentee landlords with little interest in developing mechanisms of production. The existence of a large class of rural workers (*braccieri*) with a precarious existence was a historical characteristic of southern Italy (Kurth, 1993). This encouraged widespread emigration, not only to the Americas and northern Europe, but also to the industries of northern Italy, particularly in the post-war period. It also saw migration within southern Italy, as inhabitants abandoned their villages and moved to larger cities such as Naples for employment (Putnam et al, 1993). To counter the peasant mobilisation of PCI in southern Italy, the DC implemented a radical Agrarian Reform Law (1950) designed to break up these large-holdings into a series of small farms distributed to local peasants. Although economically inefficient, these small farms were crucial for building up a large property-owning but state-dependent DC support base in southern Italy, weakening the capacity for electoral mobilisation of PCI (Tarrow, 1967; Sapelli, 1995). In response many of the former land-holding elite, based in large cities such as Naples, shifted their electoral support from DC to MSI (Tarrow, 1967). The development of a new urban property-owning class, nevertheless reliant on state patronage, proved a successful mechanism for maintaining DC power in large southern cities such as Naples, while the absence of an industrialised working-class contained the electoral expansion of PCI in southern Italy (Allum, 1973; Chubb, 1982).

The party system change of the 1990s requires us to revaluate the dynamics of political competition in Campania, additionally shaped by the introduction of a new regional electoral system in 1995, which can be characterised as a two vote ‘PR with majoritarian Bonus’ system. Around 80-90% of seats are allocated on a proportional basis to party lists elected in provincial constituencies, while 10-20% of seats are allocated exclusively
to the winning coalition, on the basis of a closed list nominated by the competing coalitional candidates for regional president (Fabbrini, 2001). Single preference voting is used to determine which party candidates obtain PR seats in provincial constituencies, but only the regionwide vote for regional president determines the majoritarian bonus, and hence determines the winning coalition. Regional elections in Campania are characterised by the prevailing use of preference voting (73.5% in 2005), which is well above the Italian average (42.0%) (Vassallo, 2005b). Politics in Campania is also characterised by competing territorial dynamics between the heavily urbanised province of Naples (over half of seats in regional council) and the less urbanised surrounding provinces (under half of seats in regional council). This requires parties to build alliances that will gain support in the regional centre, as well as in the various peripheries.

Regional politics in Campania is dominated by statewide parties, and reflects the bipolarised fragmentation of the national party system. In line with other central-southern regional party systems, there is no clear electoral hierarchy within the competing coalitions (see Chapter 2.2), reinforcing an intense competition for coalitional leadership. The main statewide parties in Campania (DS and PRC on the CLC; FI and AN on the CRC) have declined in strength over the timeframe, while new ex-DC parties (DL and Udeur on the CLC; UDC on the CRC) have increased their support (see Table 12). Udeur is the only non-statewide party in southern Italy, and is particularly strong in Campania, where it has been allied to the CLC since its formation in 1999. The 1995 regional election was won by the CRC, with Antonio Rastrelli (AN) elected regional president. This occurred partly because the CLC did not include PPI, which fielded a competing presidential list and split the centre-left vote. The 2000 regional election saw the CLC field a broad coalition (including DS, PPI and PRC) and a popular presidential candidate, obtaining a comfortable Margin of Victory (10.0%). The 2005 regional election was again won by the CLC, although with a crushing Margin of Victory (27.2%) over the CRC. Since 2000 the regional president has been Antonio Bassolino (DS), formerly mayor of Naples (1993-2000) and PCI national parliamentarian (1987-1993).

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57 PR seats allocated through provincial constituencies in Campania: 1995=80%, 2000=80%, 2005=90%.
58 MoV is the % difference between winning and losing coalitions (see Chapter 2.2).
4.1.2 will focus on changes to party organisations in Campania, while Chapter 4.1.3 will focus on changes in the regional party system.

Table 12: Regional Elections in Campania (% support for Main Parties)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI-DL</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udeur</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCD-UDC</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 4.1.2 Party Organisation in Campania (1995-2007)

Regional politics in Campania is characterised by the existence of two different types of party organisation, present in both competing coalitions. The first party type characterises Democrats of the Left (DS) and National Alliance (AN), main successor parties to the ‘counter-posing, anti-system parties’ of PCI and MSI (Sartori, 1976). At regional level these parties remain heavily structured and hierarchical, in line with their organisational predecessors, but now also display strong factional tendencies (Beller and Belloni, 1978), although these factions are usually aligned to competing party leaders at national level. Collective leadership within these party organisations is increasingly substituted by personalised leadership (Calise, 2007), although this is significantly stronger where these parties control positions of institutional leadership, and significantly weaker where these parties are excluded from sub-national public office, as evident from the differences between DS and AN in Campania. DS have become the core governing party of the CLC throughout Campania, a process that has stimulated the ‘presidentialisation’ of their party organisation around institutional leaders that regulate access to power and resources at sub-national levels. This is evident from the de facto control exerted by the regional president Antonio Bassolino over the DS organisation, particularly in Naples where Bassolino was mayor during the 1990s. Presidentialised party leadership is also evident.
in the *de facto* control exerted by Enzo De Luca over the local DS in Salerno, a support base consolidated over several terms as mayor of Salerno, and used to contest the Bassolino-Naples leadership of the DS regional organisation. In contrast AN have become increasingly excluded from the levers of sub-national power in Campania, contributing to the weakness of their regional leadership, and enhancing their dependence on the national party for financial resources and career advancement. This demonstrates the progressive “cartelisation” (Katz and Mair, 1995) of the former anti-system parties in Italy. These parties depend increasingly on the resources and legitimacy of the state, display a weakening relationship with civil society, are dominated by their party in public office, and have begun to develop stratalarchical relations between territorial levels.

The second party type characterises the successor parties to DC and PSI, the main governing parties in Italy and Campania until the mid-1990s. This type applies to all ex-DC parties (DL, Udeur, UDC) and ex-PSI parties (SDI, NPSI) in the region, as well as Forza Italia (FI), which is dominated by DC and PSI factions in Campania. These regional parties are weakly structured and non-hierarchical, dominated by local powerbrokers that control public office, while the party in central office is insignificant. These local powerbrokers are weakly affiliated to their respective national parties, and frequently change party affiliation to advance their political careers or material interests. They rely on clientelised local support bases to secure their re-election through preference voting (Calise, 2007), and exploit their own entrepreneurial resources (public or private) to finance re-election campaigns, rather than the limited resources provided by the party organisation (Allum and Allum, 2008). The strength of these parties within the CLC has increased over the timeframe, while those within the CRC have actually declined, as many local powerbrokers have simply moved from the opposition CRC to the governing CLC. The radical left parties at regional level (PRC, PDCI, Greens) are more difficult to categorise because they display features of both types of party organisation. Although these radical left parties are densely structured and formally hierarchical, in practice the party organisation has weak control over the behaviour of its elected members at regional level, while party politicians and activists frequently defect between left-wing parties.
Despite these organisational differences, parties in Campania display some common features: They have all failed to pursue a process of internal regeneration; remain closed in their electoral and organisational orientation; and are controlled by oligarchical party elites. Organisational stasis is favoured by the low threshold for representation of party lists in the regional council, and the formation of broad coalitions to win regional elections. This has encouraged parties to aggregate their core bases of support, rather than adopt policies or structures oriented towards electoral expansion, since broad coalitions represent the primary mechanism for accessing regional government (see Chapter 2.3). There is certainly scope for intensifying electoral competition in Campania, given that regional elections display a progressive decline in voter turnout (73.9%, 1995; 69.4%, 2000; 67.7%, 2005), but the parties are not interested. The shift of local powerbrokers into the governing CLC since the late 1990s has accentuated a trend towards political aggregation, at the expense of genuine alternation and effective party government.

**Democrats of the Left (DS) in Campania**

DS were the largest party in the CLC until the 2005 regional election, when they were narrowly overtaken by DL. Electoral support for DS declined sharply between 1995 and 2000, increasing only slightly in 2005 (see Table 2). This is surprising given the hugely increased CLC support over the timeframe (1995, 39.3%; 2000, 54.2%; 2005, 61.6%), and the election of Antonio Bassolino (popular DS mayor of Naples) as regional president after the 2000 and 2005 elections. DS support is strongest in the province of Naples (16.6%, 2005), where 36,000 of its 60,000 regional party members (60%) are located. DS support is also strong in Salerno (15.9%, 2005), but much weaker in the three smaller provinces. DS support in the cities of Naples and Salerno relies heavily on the educated public sector and professional classes, as well as small concentrations of industrial working-class voters. The most important organisational shift has been the transformation from a divided and factionalised regional party in the mid-1990s, to a more unified and presidentialist party in the 2000s, under the strong *de facto* control of...

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60 *La Repubblica*, Naples edition, 24/10/01.
Antonio Bassolino. Yet this control did not extend to the DS in Salerno, which instead became presidentialised around Enzo De Luca, the popular DS mayor of Salerno city.

Presidentialisation of DS Campania was a gradual process that began in the early 1990s. In 1993 Bassolino was nominated PDS party commissar for Naples, at the height of corruption scandals that engulfed the local party federation. These corruption scandals were linked to the involvement of local PCI leaders in the spoils system of the governing partitocrazia in Naples, and active intervention was sought by the new PDS leadership to avoid the stigmatisation of political corruption that had engulfed the main governing parties. This role re-connected Bassolino with politics in Campania after two decades in national PCI leadership positions. Although Bassolino made some local allies in the process of rooting out party corruption, this role also earned him many internal enemies. Bassolino’s affiliation with the ‘Left’ PCI faction distanced him considerably from the regional party in Campania, then controlled by the ‘Right’ PCI faction. The position of Bassolino in the national PDS (later DS) had also been weakened, since his motion to retain the PCI organisation had abjectly failed in the 1992 party congress. The ‘Left’ faction thereafter split between politicians who remained as a minority within the more moderate PDS, and politicians who joined the more radical PRC (Bull and Heywood, 1994). In 1993 Bassolino became the first directly elected mayor of Naples, winning an absolute majority on a programme of political renewal, at the height of the corruption scandals and party system crisis (Fabbrini, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). Bassolino established a popular record of symbolic policies and proposals for regeneration, which contributed to his triumphant mayoral re-election in 1997.

The popular tenure of Bassolino as mayor of Naples allowed him to create a group of close collaborators (known as Bassoliniani) within DS Campania. The latter had crystallised into two main factional tendencies, a ‘reformist’ faction in favour of alliances

61 Bassolino was born in Afragola (province of Naples), and in the 1970s headed the regional PCI federation in Campania.
62 Interview 13 (CdM).
63 Interviews 7 (DS), 13 (CdM). The dominance of the ‘Right’ PCI faction in Campania also explains the participation of the sub-national party in coalitions with the governing parties, which ultimately proved the basis for the political corruption scandals that Bassolino was charged to investigate.
with moderate parties, and a ‘radical’ faction in favour of alliances with leftist parties. These factions competed intensely to control sub-national party branches, particularly the important posts of regional secretary in Campania and provincial secretary of Naples.\(^{64}\) The close association of Bassolino with ‘radical’ DS factions at regional and national level, and his close relationship with PRC leader Fausto Bertinotti,\(^{65}\) initially alienated many ‘reformist’ factions in the regional DS.\(^{66}\) While the ‘reformist’ factions were divided over their support for D’Alema or Veltroni at national level, the ‘radical’ factions were divided over their support for Bassolino at regional level.\(^{67}\) This inter-party factionalism contributed to the loss of DS support in the 2000 election, but Bassolino’s election as regional president significantly strengthened his position within the regional party. Bassolino won over his contenders in the ‘radical’ faction by supporting the leftist national leadership bid of Luigi Berlinguer and Sergio Cofferati in 2001.\(^{68}\) Campania was the only region where a majority of members supported Cofferati and Berlinguer, highlighting the strength of ‘radical factions’. Nevertheless Piero Fassino was elected as party secretary, while Massimo D’Alema was elected as party president. After this leadership contest, Bassolino used his institutional powers to reconcile the competing regional factions, producing a more pacified regional party that nevertheless retained many of its factional differences.\(^{69}\) Bassolino won over hostile ‘reformist’ factions at regional level through his central position in mediating between Fassino and Cofferati after the 2001 leadership contest;\(^{70}\) his support for the coalitional leadership of Romano Prodi (ex-DC);\(^{71}\) his support for the DS leadership of Fassino in 2004,\(^{72}\) and his backing for the process of party alignment and integration in the CLC,\(^{73}\) which culminated in the fusion of DS and DL to form the Democratic Party (PD) in 2007.

\(^{64}\) *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (9/12/98; 18/12/99).
\(^{65}\) *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition. (21/2/01), Interviews 7 (DS), 13 (CdM).
\(^{66}\) Interview 7 (DS).
\(^{67}\) *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (12/1/01).
\(^{68}\) *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (11/1/01).
\(^{69}\) Interviews 7, 11 (DS).
\(^{70}\) *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (12/1/03).
\(^{71}\) *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (23/4/03).
\(^{72}\) *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (26/10/04).
\(^{73}\) *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (27/10/06).
Bassolino secured the loyalty of competing factions at regional level, and proceeded to transform DS Campania into a ‘presidentialised’ party, exploiting his position of institutional leadership to regulate party access to the powers and resources of sub-national government. Given the large number of parties in the centre-left governing coalition, all institutional positions became the object of intense inter-party negotiation. Through his nominating capacities as institutional leader, Bassolino became the prime negotiator for DS in these inter-party negotiations, granting him considerable discretion in promoting supporters to key posts. This allowed Bassolino to develop a powerful control over DS Campania primarily through informal mechanisms, since he never held significant formal positions in the party organisation during this time. The intra-party position of Bassolino was strengthened by the regionalising reforms approved by national governments between 1999 and 2001. Direct election improved his political visibility, while the formal capacity to nominate the regional executive strengthened his negotiating position vis-à-vis supporting parties in the regional council (Fabbri and Brunazzo, 2003). The increased policy competences and financial resources of regional governments allowed Bassolino to make political nominations that consolidated his patronage network within DS Campania, further strengthened by consistent CLC victories in sub-national elections during the 2000s. The CLC developed a stranglehold over the regional government, retained control of the key municipalities and provinces of Naples and Salerno (1993-), and extended their control to all provincial governments (2004-) and all provincial capitals (2006-). DS politicians were appointed to key posts at regional level (presidency, executive, council); elected mayors or vice-mayors in key municipalities; and appointed to manage the proliferation of regional/local Agencies or semi-state Companies, created largely to accommodate party politicians.74 This enhanced access to government focused DS politicians on the objective of controlling sub-national institutions, rather than pursuing ideological battles or competing aggressively for leadership posts, but also contributed to the development of a party “remote from society, closed and institutionalised…. whose only aspiration is electoral victory.”75 The control

74 La Repubblica, Naples Edition (5/12/02).
75 Interview 7 (DS).
of Bassolino over DS Campania enhanced his influence in national politics, with his key allies given prominent places on party lists in 2006 and elected to the Italian parliament.\textsuperscript{76}

The main intra-party competitor to Bassolino in Campania was Vincenzo De Luca, mayor of Salerno (1993-2001; 2006-) and former national parliamentarian (2001-6). De Luca’s institutional leadership in Salerno allowed him to develop a presidentialised control of the local DS, leading to escalating conflicts with DS Campania, which remained firmly under the control of Bassolino and his allies. De Luca’s rise to power in Salerno bore strong similarities to that of Bassolino in Naples, founded on a strong personal and transversal support base, reflected in crushing victories in local elections (1993, 1997, 2006). Although De Luca stood down as Mayor in 2001 because of the two-term limit, he nominated his close collaborator, Vincenzo De Biase (DS), as CLC candidate for the 2001 mayoral elections. De Biase won these local elections convincingly with the active support of De Luca and his coalition of backers, allowing De Luca to return and compete in the 2006 mayoral election, despite intense disagreement within the CLC over the ongoing judicial investigations into political corruption during his earlier administrations.\textsuperscript{77} De Luca won this election despite fielding a personal list against both centre-left and centre-right coalitions! DS were the only party that did not field any lists in this local election (so did not compete against Luca), reflecting the internal divisions created by his decision to form a personal party at local level to secure his re-election\textsuperscript{78}. The political strategy of De Luca is founded on a populist territorial discourse that pits Salerno against the region of Campania, perceived to be under Neapolitan control.\textsuperscript{79} De Luca presents himself as an honest amateur politician from Salerno, fighting against the vested interests of a corrupt political class in Naples.\textsuperscript{80} De Luca perpetuated an acrimonious public dispute with Bassolino, whom he accused of encouraging widespread clientelism;\textsuperscript{81} mismanaging the regional

\textsuperscript{76} La Repubblica, Naples(23/2/06).These included Riccardo Marone, his substitute as Mayor of Naples (2000-2001), and Anna Maria Carlone, the wife of Bassolino.
\textsuperscript{77} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (29/12/05)
\textsuperscript{78} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (24/04/06).
\textsuperscript{79} Interview 9 (DS).
\textsuperscript{80} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (7/1/01).
\textsuperscript{81} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (5/1/01)
government;\textsuperscript{82} and turning a blind eye to political corruption.\textsuperscript{83} DS Salerno has tended to support De Luca in these intra-party disputes, and has deviated in many cases from the line of the regional party. Although most informed observers agree the dispute between Bassolino and De Luca is mainly due to strong personal differences, rather than substantially different ideological positions or policy practices,\textsuperscript{84} earlier disputes contained a factional dimension. De Luca and the Salerno DS were close to the party leadership, fully supporting the Fassino-D’Alema leadership bid in 2001. This contrasted with Bassolino and DS Campania, which backed the failed Cofferati-Berlinguer bid.\textsuperscript{85} De Luca consistently stressed his close relationship with D’Alema, and contrasted this with the more radical positions of Bassolino. However these differences became much less significant after Bassolino’s re-alignment with the national leadership in 2001.

\textit{Christian Democratic Parties and the Centre-Left Coalition in Campania}

Christian Democrats (DC) dominated the 1970-1995 regional party system, forming the basis for all coalition governments during this period. Although the DC organisation collapsed in the mid-1990s, former DC politicians and their factions continued to dominate the regional party system. While the constellation of DC factions at national level collapsed along with the party organisation in the 1990s (Bettcher, 2005), several DC factions survived at sub-national levels, where local powerbrokers could rely on preference voting to secure their re-election, and could develop shifting alliances with competing national parties and coalitions (Calise, 2007). These new DC factions consisted primarily of local personal-client groups, informally structured into factional alliances at regional level, and led by the \textit{primus inter pares} of these local powerbrokers. Regional faction leaders sometimes wielded influence in national politics, either because they simultaneously controlled the national party (e.g. Udeur), or because they succeeded in forming an organised faction with similar interests at national level (e.g. DL).

\textsuperscript{82} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (24/10/06)
\textsuperscript{83} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (9/10/05)
\textsuperscript{84} Interviews 7, 9 (DS).
\textsuperscript{85} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (5/11/01).
The exceptional degree of organised factionalism in the DC between 1947 and 1994 was stimulated by a series of factors: the broad ideological range of DC support; the strong personal divisions in the party leadership; differences over coalitional preferences; and the prevailing use of clientelist mechanisms for resource distribution (Zuckerman, 1975; Belloni, 1978; Bettcher, 2005). DC factionalism was further stimulated by preference voting system at all levels of election, which allowed factions to compete against each other and contemporaneously reinforce the overall party vote (Sartori, 1976). DC factions reflected collective differences in policy and ideology, but also competing personal interests over power or career advancement (Hine, 1982). DC factions were partly “factions of principle” and partly “factions of interest” (Sartori, 1976; Bettcher, 2005). Several interviewees suggest that DC factionalism underwent a gradual but continuous shift in the democratic era, becoming increasingly less concerned with the pursuit of collective policy-ideological goals, and increasingly more focused on personal career advancement and clientelist control of state resources (Allum and Allum, 2008).  

Factional alliances in post-1995 regional party systems rely primarily on the capacity of regional leaders to distribute key posts and clientelist resources to local powerbrokers, and for this reason developed most effectively within the governing coalition. Despite the collapse of the DC organisation in the 1990s, former DC politicians in Campania have never been stronger in the regional council, comprising around 1/2 of members in the 2005-2010 Legislature, partly because the successor parties to PCI and MSI have undergone an electoral decline (see Chapter 2.2). Former DC politicians have survived primarily as local powerbrokers, building on their extensive political networks to form regional factional alliances. These factional alliances became particularly strong in the governing CLC, where they dominated Daisy-Democracy and Liberty (DL) and Union for a Democratic Europe (Udeur). Factional alliances of former DC politicians also characterise the opposition CRC, dominating Forza Italia (FI) and the Union of Christian Democrats (UDC). These regional parties exist almost entirely in public office, with weak bureaucratic structures and little hierarchical control, reflecting a “party of the

86 Interviews 8 (DL), 10 (Ulivo), 11 (NPSI), 13 (CdM).
87 Interview 2 (AN)
elected” rather than a “party of bureaucrats” (Calise, 2006). This broader process was accentuated by the organisational collapse of DC, which made the figure of “party bureaucrat” financially unsustainable for its successor parties (Allum and Allum, 2008). Regional factional alliances incorporate both established and new powerbrokers, and lobby primarily for control of public nominations and distribution of public resources. Factional alliances compete intensely with each other for party personnel and core voters, as former DC politicians in Campania display a strong willingness to shift between competing parties and coalitions, according to the respective opportunities for career advancement or personal enrichment, thereby exacerbating inter-factional hostility. This reflects the “degeneration” of the DC organisation in the 1980s, when many local powerbrokers began to enrich themselves through the corrupt control of government institutions, and developed “personal patronage networks” based on clientelism, some of which survived the collapse of the DC organisation (Allum and Allum, 2008). Since 1995 competition between these factional alliances has contributed to the instability of the regional governing coalition, and contributed heavily to the weak institutional performance of the regional government (see Chapter 4.1.3).

The most powerful ex-DC party in Campania was DL (successor party to PPI), whose electoral support doubled over the timeframe (see Table 12), becoming the largest regional party after the 2005 election. At national level the DL leadership sought to attract secular and liberal voters, and expand the party personnel beyond DC politicians. In Campania DL remained entirely composed of DC politicians, who made no significant effort to regenerate the party personnel or expand their electoral horizons beyond former DC voters. Their regional leader was the national parliamentarian Ciriaco de Mita (former Prime Minister and DC leader), who presided over a factional alliance of former DC politicians with local power-bases. The personal power-base of De Mita was the province of Avellino, where PPI-DL maintained exceptionally high levels of support in regional elections (21.3% PPI, 1995; 19.5% PPI, 2000; 28.2% DL, 2005), well above the regional average. This Avellino faction was active since the 1970s, when it

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88 Interviews 1 (SDI), 2 (AN), 7 (DS), 8 (DL), 9 (DS), 10 (Ulivo), 13 (CdM).
89 Interviews 1 (SDI), 8 (DL).
constituted the local powerbase for a national DC faction led by De Mita known as *Base*. This faction was characterised by a heavily clientelist organisation; policy statements in favour of economic development; and a left-wing positioning at national level (Tarrow, 1967; Zuckerman, 1975). The *Base* faction formed the basis of regional and local governing coalitions between DC and PSI in Campania during the 1970s and 1980s, and many of its leaders supported the local governing coalitions between PPI and DS in the 1990s. Nevertheless PPI Campania suffered heavily from the organisational split of the national party in 1995, with many of its politicians preferring to join Forza Italia rather than ally with their former PCI opponents. The subsequent expansion of support for DL Campania can be attributed primarily to the capacity of De Mita’s factional alliance in reintegrating these former DC politicians into DL party structures, a process aided by the increased exclusion of the CRC from sub-national government in Campania. These former DC politicians joined mainly from FI, with some moving directly to DL and others passing through more ‘centrist’ organisations such as Udeur or UDC. They included prominent regional PPI ‘defectors’ to the CRC in 1995, such as Riccardo Villari and Andrea Losco, who carried with them a substantial package of local votes. This reinforced the electoral strength of DL throughout Campania, particularly in the provinces of Naples (1995 PPI, 5.6%; 2005 DL, 15.7%) and Caserta (1995 PPI, 7.6%; 2005 DL, 13.2%), where PPI support had been most weakened by the 1995 split.

The consolidation of De Mita’s factional alliance strengthened the presence of former DC politicians within the governing CLC. This was largely at the expense of the opposition CRC, many of whose politicians abandoned the coalition to join the government. This process of political aggregation also prevented the regeneration of the DL party organisation, as places were found to accommodate ex-DC local powerbrokers rather than recruit new blood from outside the traditional DC families. This failure of party regeneration even threatened De Mita’s control of some local DL organisations, particularly in larger cities such as Naples and Salerno, where some prominent DL politicians favoured party modernisation and closer integration with DS. This included

90 Interviews 1 (SDI), 8 (DL), 13 (CdM).
92 Interview 8 (DL)
Rosa Russo Iervolino (mayor of Naples 2001-) and Angelo Villani (provincial president of Salerno 2004-), who displayed more loyalty to the regional-institutional leadership of Bassolino (DS) than the party-political leadership of De Mita (DL). The various opponents of De Mita were unable to challenge his position as regional leader during the timeframe, although they succeeded in frustrating some of his nominations to local party posts.\textsuperscript{93} De Mita’s leadership was founded on his extensive political network and enduring local power-base in Avellino, but was aided by his political profile as a reformist DC leader who had consistently advocated progressive alliances with left-wing parties in a long political career.\textsuperscript{94} De Mita nevertheless became isolated from the national DL leader Francesco Rutelli in the 2000s,\textsuperscript{95} because he consistently failed to pursue organisational renewal and opposed moves towards party integration in the CLC. De Mita opposed the merger of PPI with smaller parties to create DL in 2002;\textsuperscript{96} opposed decisions to field unitary lists with DS for the local,\textsuperscript{97} regional\textsuperscript{98} and national elections;\textsuperscript{99} opposed the use of electoral primaries to select the leadership candidate for the 2006 national election;\textsuperscript{100} and opposed the formation of the Democratic Party (PD) in 2007. De Mita instead advocated the ‘Bavarian CSU model’ for DL in southern Italy, based on greater autonomy from the national party and a stronger Christian identity,\textsuperscript{101} protectionist economic policies and enhanced support for traditional family structures.\textsuperscript{102} In line with this objective, De Mita sought to develop a southern-based DC faction within the national DL.\textsuperscript{103} This attempt was frustrated by the formation of PD, which required the dissolution of DL as a separate organisation, and further diluted the ex-DC component within the PD organisation. Although De Mita generally relented to all changes imposed by the national DL leadership for the sake of party unity (De Marco, 2007), many DL politicians perceived De Mita as an obstacle to party modernisation.

\textsuperscript{93} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (15/7/06). An example of this was the deposition of De Mita’s protégé, Angelo Montemarano,\textsuperscript{95} as DL spokesperson in the Municipal Council of Naples in 2006.

\textsuperscript{94} Interview 1 (SDI), 8 (DL), 13 (CdM).

\textsuperscript{95} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (20/10/06, 5/12/06).

\textsuperscript{96} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (17/7/01).

\textsuperscript{97} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (12/3/06).

\textsuperscript{98} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (22/12/04)

\textsuperscript{99} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (26/10/05).

\textsuperscript{100} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (26/10/05).

\textsuperscript{101} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (7/9/03).

\textsuperscript{102} Interview 8 (DL).

\textsuperscript{103} Interviews 1 (SDI), 8 (DL), La Repubblica, Naples Edition (8/10/02),
Relations between De Mita and Rutelli were aggravated by the accusation that De Mita was responsible for violating electoral procedures in the 2006 regional congress, and the suspicion that Rutelli was rallying anti-De Mita factions in Campania. The isolation of De Mita from the DL leadership increased his reliance on clientelism to create incentives for former DC politicians to remain in DL structures and support his leadership. This resulted in tough coalitional bargaining over the distribution of posts, most evident during protracted processes of regional government formation. However, this attitude also confirmed DL party modernisers in their belief that De Mita represented the ‘old’ clientelist DC politics of southern Italy, so the formation of PD in 2007 was later used as an opportunity to undermine the factional leadership of De Mita.

Udeur was a competing factional alliance of ex-DC politicians in Campania, composed almost entirely of politicians that defected from the CRC to join the CLC. Udeur was founded in 1999 and increased its support in successive regional elections (see Table 2). The regional party leader (Clemente Mastella) was also its national leader. Mastella maintained a personalised control of the party organisation, and retained a local powerbase in the province of Benevento, where Udeur obtained its highest vote share in regional elections (18.7% 2000; 28.0% 2005). The decline of Mastella’s former party (CCD) in Benevento after his defection (19.6%, 1995; 6.5%, 2000) demonstrates the importance of personal followings, rather than party labels or coalitional positioning, in determining support for ex-DC parties in southern Italy. Udeur support also increased in the other provinces of Campania, largely because Mastella was capable of developing a factional alliance of local powerbrokers that had initially been elected into the CRC. In 1998 Mastella succeeded in prompting the defection of 10 regional councillors elected as part of the CRC, as well as 5 members of the regional executive, triggering a severe

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104 La Repubblica, Naples Edition (5/12/06).
105 La Repubblica, Naples Edition (31/10/03).
106 Interviews 1 (SDI), 8 (DL), 13 (CdM)
107 Recent developments in national politics (2008) have terminated De Mita’s factional leadership. The early national election in April 2008 saw the new PD leader Walter Veltroni exclude De Mita from PD party lists, citing the 40+ years he had already spent in the national parliament (Wilson, 2009). This prompted De Mita to abandon PD and seek re-election to the Senate on UDC party lists, although unsuccessfully because UDC did not surpass the 8% regional threshold for obtaining seats in the Senate.
108 Interview 3 (Udeur).
109 La Repubblica (8/11/98)
crisis that brought down the centre-right regional government (1995-1999).\textsuperscript{111} Mastella used this governing crisis to build his factional alliance by pushing heavily for posts in the new regional executive, even succeeding in obtaining the post of regional president for one of his recruits, Andrea Losco, a prominent ex-DC defector from FI.\textsuperscript{112}

The structure of Udeur at regional level was informal and leader-centric, with low ‘entry demands’ and equally low ‘exit costs’. Udeur capitalised on defections from a weak and divided CRC to bolster its party personnel and local bases of electoral support.\textsuperscript{113} Many of these regional politicians used Udeur as a ‘stepping stone’ prior to joining DL,\textsuperscript{114} while others remained within Udeur structures, because its neo-centrist positioning and strong DC identity was considered preferable to DL, which at national level was more left-leaning and oriented towards integration with DS.\textsuperscript{115} In building this factional alliance, Mastella regularly faced the problem of defections, as evident in 2000 when 3 regional councillors elected on Udeur lists joined a temporary neo-centrist formation (‘Democrazia Europea’) led by Sergio D’Antona, a Catholic trade unionist from Caserta.\textsuperscript{116} In 2002 Udeur lost three more regional councillors to DL,\textsuperscript{117} including former regional president Andrea Losco. Mastella was unable to secure Losco’s nomination as CLC candidate for mayor of Naples,\textsuperscript{118} so Losco joined DL where he was nominated regional coordinator,\textsuperscript{119} and subsequently elected to the European Parliament. Intense competition between DL and Udeur over the same pool of ex-DC personnel and voters heightened the public antipathy between their regional leaders, leading to intense rivalry over coalitional nominations.\textsuperscript{120} Given the weak organisational cohesion of Udeur, DL party leaders were not excessively concerned over the possibility of mass defections from

\textsuperscript{110}La Repubblica (23/11/98).
\textsuperscript{111}La Repubblica (3/12/98).
\textsuperscript{112}La Repubblica, (7/1/99).
\textsuperscript{113}Interview 3 (Udeur).
\textsuperscript{114}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115}Interview 2 (AN), 9 (DS), 10 (Ulivo)
\textsuperscript{116}La Repubblica, Naples Edition (12/10/00).
\textsuperscript{117}La Repubblica, Naples Edition (8/10/02).
\textsuperscript{118}La Repubblica, Naples Edition (8/2/01).
\textsuperscript{119}La Repubblica, Naples Edition (28/11/01).
\textsuperscript{120}Interview 8 (DL), La Repubblica, Naples Edition (12/9/04), (21/12/05).
their ranks, although the popularity of Mastella in central-southern regions became evident during the electoral primaries to choose a PM candidate for the CLC in 2005, when Mastella obtained 21.3% of votes in Campania, his highest level in Italy. 

Since these factional alliances compete over a defined pool of party personnel and voters, they are more concerned with preventing the rise of rival factions than competing with non-DC parties. Factional leaders are more willing to accept non-DC nominations to key posts, than to accept the nomination of politicians from rival faction, while the local powerbrokers that constitute these factions must compete with each other for preference votes to secure their election. A relevant comparison are the “machine politicians” of Irish politics (Carty, 1981), who rely heavily on personal ties and local clientelist networks to support their candidature, but compete entirely within their party electorate. The existence of competing ‘machines’ creates an obsession with undermining party rivals, as political entrepreneurs strive for relative individual performance rather than collective party performance. This situation was created and reinforced in Ireland by the interaction between preference voting and strong party allegiances, whereas in Campania this is reinforced by the interaction between preference voting and factional politics. The primary concern is to galvanise local supporters rather than expand electoral appeal to new groups or different territories. Party allegiance is now much weaker in Italy, especially since the collapse of the DC in the mid-1990s, allowing political entrepreneurs to shift easily between parties and coalitions, although these ‘machine politicians’ rarely enter more structured and ideological party organisations such as DS or AN. The role of faction leaders such as Mastella and De Mita is to coordinate alliances of local politicians at regional and sometimes national levels. Yet these faction leaders face inevitable difficulties in retaining control of their key party personnel, who are tempted to abandon them for rivals who might secure better nominations and resources, so are generally willing to accept defectors along with their package of votes.

121 Interview 8 (DL).
122 La Repubblica (18/10/05). Campania was the worst result for Romano Prodi (54.4%) in the whole of Italy. The national average for Prodi (backed by DS and DL) was around 75%.
National Alliance (AN) in Campania

AN Campania remains closed in its organisational and electoral orientation, and has failed to expand its personnel beyond existing MSI cadres. Structured and hierarchical, the regional party is nevertheless factionalised, its internal divisions exacerbated by the exclusion of AN from sub-national government and the absence of strong regional leadership. Electoral support for AN Campania declined sharply over the timeframe (see Table 12), in line with most central-southern regions (see Chapter 2.2). The 1995 regional election represented the organisational and electoral peak of AN Campania. The party was able to impose its own candidate for regional president (Antonio Rastrelli) on the CRC;\textsuperscript{123} contributed to a convincing CRC victory; and led the first regional government that included AN (1995-1999), allowing the party to briefly relinquish its factional divisions. The collapse of this regional government in 1999 triggered the resurgence of factional disputes, with a consequent struggle for internal control and distancing from national positions.\textsuperscript{124} This contributed to a poor performance in the 2000 election that aggravated inter-factional disputes throughout the second legislature (2000-2005). The 2005 election confirmed the decline of AN Campania, while the increased electoral distance between CLC and CRC made the prospect of controlling future regional governments more unlikely. Nevertheless greater party unity prevailed in this legislature,\textsuperscript{125} partly because the CLC regional government faced difficult scandals of clientelism and misrule, and partly because AN sought to counter and capitalise on the more severe divisions of its principal ally FI.

The majority faction within AN Campania is ‘Social Right’, led at national level by Giovanni Alemanno.\textsuperscript{126} This faction is characterised by a conservative family policy, strong support for social welfare, and protectionist economic policies. Part of its success is related to the strong family structures, high levels of state dependence, and weak economic structures of southern Italy. ‘Social Right’ is frequently in conflict with the

\textsuperscript{123} La Repubblica (2/3/1995).
\textsuperscript{124} Interview 2 (AN)
\textsuperscript{125} Interviews 2, 12 (AN)
\textsuperscript{126} Interviews 2, 12 (AN), 13 (CdM).
party leader (Gianfranco Fini), and distant from the coalitional leader (Silvio Berlusconi). It clashes mainly with ‘Protagonist Right’, the minority faction within AN Campania, led at national level by Ignazio La Russa and Maurizio Gasparri. This faction is more liberal (particularly on economic issues), generally supportive of the party leader, and very supportive of the coalitional leader. The national faction most closely affiliated to the party leader (‘New Alliance’) is most favourable to economic and social liberalism, and highly supportive of attempts to modernise the party organisation, broaden its appeal to moderate voters, and distance AN from its fascist MSI roots. This faction is entirely marginal within AN Campania, reflecting the existence of a conservative regional party that never broadened outside the ranks of MSI, although less ideological and radicalised than its predecessor organisation. Sub-national party posts are generally distributed along factional lines, so further consolidate factional divisions. The failure to regenerate the party organisation can be partly attributed to the exclusion of AN from sub-national government in Campania, alongside its inclusion in the national government (2001-2006), a situation that discouraged ambitious and younger AN politicians from remaining in sub-national politics. Although candidate selection for party lists remains formally centralised in AN (see Chapter 2.1), preference voting diminishes the importance of hierarchy in party lists, enhances intra-party competition, and further weakens organisational unity. The absence of strong regional leadership, as well as the isolation of AN from the levers of institutional power, has made it possible for the national party leader Gianfranco Fini to intervene heavily in regional choices, as evident from his decision to re-candidate Antonio Rastrelli for the 2000 election, and his imposition of Italo Bocchino as regional presidential candidate for the 2005 election. Weak regional leadership contributed to the loss of AN support in the 2005 regional election, and influenced the decision to reform party statutes so regional coordinators would be elected by assemblies rather than nominated by the president (see Chapter 2.1).

127 La Repubblica, Naples Edition (20/6/04); Interview 2 (AN)
128 Interviews 2, 5, 12 (AN)
129 Interview 12 (AN)
130 La Repubblica, National Edition (21/3/95)
131 Interview 2 (AN)
Forza Italia (FI) in Campania

FI Campania is a weakly structured and non-hierarchical organisation dominated by local powerbrokers, in contrast to the highly centralised ‘business firm’ model of FI organisation at national level (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999). FI Campania is composed mainly of former DC and PSI powerbrokers with local support bases, who display weak loyalty to the FI organisation, frequently defect to join other parties (particularly those in the governing coalitions), and are often in conflict with the FI leadership. Electoral support for FI Campania collapsed in the 2005 regional election (see Table 12) due to factional disputes and the defection of key powerbrokers to the governing CLC, while regional support for FI in comparable national elections remained much higher. The principal difficulties of FI Campania are linked to its centralised and undemocratic structures, which have generated factional disputes between the representatives of the national leadership and local powerbrokers. The prolonged spell of FI Campania in regional opposition has contributed to the loss of powerbrokers to the governing CLC.

The process of recruiting former DC and PSI politicians to solidify the FI organisation at sub-national levels is a phenomenon observed throughout Italy (Fava, 2004). This process transformed FI Campania into a party dominated by ex-DC politicians, alongside a significant ex-PSI faction, as well as some independent powerbrokers without affiliation to the former governing parties. The controversial DC politician Ciro Pomicino once described FI Campania as an “empty vessel” that could be conquered by DC politicians in the wake of the corruption scandals that destroyed the national DC and PSI organisations. Many DC or PSI politicians in Campania chose to exploit this “empty vessel” at a time when the FI national leader was a clear electoral asset, helping them gain control (or consolidate their hold) over local electoral constituencies, which they maintained as (or developed into) clientelist political networks. The weak ideological cohesion of FI was preferable for many of these politicians, since this loose organisation allowed them to continue their political activities largely unhindered by the usual

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132 La Repubblica (11/10/95). This expression was taken from a judicial investigation into political corruption that involved Pomicino and several prospective FI candidates.
constraints of party organisation. FI regional politicians are required to run individual electoral campaigns funded entirely by their own resources, and compete heavily with each other for preference votes.\textsuperscript{133} Although intra-party competition and a \textit{laissez faire} approach to ideological inconsistency were initially complementary forces that helped establish FI Campania, they proved unable to hold together these local powerbrokers in regional opposition. These political elites had dominated the regional government from 1970 until 1999,\textsuperscript{134} so were unwilling to remain in a party organisation consigned to the opposition benches throughout the 2000s, prompting many to defect and join ex-DC parties in the CLC such as Udeur or DL.

The principal conflicts within FI Campania did not occur between its ideologically diverse DC or PSI components. Most of these politicians had narrowly defined territorial constituencies and were not inclined to struggle over the heart and soul of an organisation that weakly represented their political beliefs, and many felt would not endure. These diverse factions in Campania instead united against the new business elites promoted by Berlusconi, asserting their regional autonomy and challenging the ‘light’ structures and centralised control of the FI leadership. This was reflected in their concerted and ultimately successful attempt to remove the nominee of the party leader, Antonio Martusciello, from his post as regional coordinator. Martusciello was an employee in Berlusconi’s \textit{Fininvest} business empire, elected to the Italian parliament in 1994 and simultaneously nominated regional coordinator of Campania, a position that entailed formal control over the sub-national party (see Chapter 2.1). Despite lacking any experience of local or regional politics, Martusciello was handed control of a regional organisation dominated by political ‘professionals’, whose position would be challenged by centrally led attempts at party ‘modernisation’ or the promotion of business elites. Although FI controlled the resources of government office between 1995 and 1999, and made consistent efforts to recruit DC or PSI politicians, around 1/3 of FI regional councillors abandoned the party during this period, principally to join an expanded CLC, eventually overthrowing the CRC regional government in 1999. The centralised

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{133} Interview 4 (FI).
  \item\textsuperscript{134} DC and PSI governed in coalition in Campania from 1970 till 1995.
\end{itemize}
territorial strategy of FI contributed to these defections, as party leaders did not consult elected regional politicians on their choices, so regional politicians began to oppose this top-down, business firm style of party management. As a serving FI regional councillor (formerly DC) put it, “business people like Martusciello know nothing about how to manage people or politics…. why should we stay here if we don’t count for anything?”135

The overall performance of FI improved in the 2000 regional election despite the coalitional defeat. This actually triggered a serious intra-party dispute, as several FI politicians attacked Martusciello publicly for only supporting the candidature of his brother (Fulvio Martusciello) to the regional council, and failing to show any interest in the performance of the broader party.136 Candidate selection for sub-national elections in FI is formally the responsibility of the regional coordinator (see Chapter 2.1), yet in practice sub-national elites can ensure their presence on party lists through their ability to guarantee a strong packet of preference votes. The limited number of seats to be distributed in regional elections ensures a strong intra-party competition for votes, which according to some FI politicians was distorted by the level of support that Martusciello gave to his brother’s campaign. The credibility of Antonio Martusciello was further questioned after his failure to win the 2001 mayoral election in Naples, and the second legislature saw increasing demands within FI Campania for an ‘institutionalisation’ of the party organisation, introducing greater elements of internal democracy that would strengthen the position of elected politicians.137 This reflected the view of Claudio Scajola at national level, a powerful ex-DC parliamentarian around which the anti-Martusciello factions now rallied.138 Severe factionalism resulted in two separate closing congresses for the European Election campaign in 2004,139 with an intense dispute over the choice of candidates proposed by Martusciello.140 The 2005 regional election saw ongoing factional disputes, with FI unable to agree a candidate for regional president. The independent figure eventually accepted by all competing factions, Antonio D’Amato,

135 Interview 4 (FI).
138 *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (19/8/08). Scajola was largely responsible for drafting the FI party statutes in 1998, which many within FI hoped would be the start of an institutionalizing process.
140 *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (19/5/04)
eventually withdrew amidst the depth of party divisions. A third of FI regional councillors elected in 2000 had abandoned the party by the end of legislature in 2005, mainly to join the governing CLC. The collapse of FI electoral support in 2005, despite another impressive personal performance by Fulvio Martusciello, obliged the national leadership to replace Antonio Martusciello as regional coordinator with Nicola Cosentino. Cosentino is a national parliamentarian formerly affiliated to PSI, broadly respected by elected sub-national elites in FI, as well as a long-standing opponent of Martusciello. Another opponent of Martusciello, Giuseppe Gargani (ex-DC), was nominated RC for southern Italy, highlighting the growing strength of FI factions in southern Italy composed by former DC and PSI politicians.

**Communist Parties (PRC and PDCI) in Campania**

Communist parties in Campania display weak leadership capacity, frequent defections, and poor coordination between their elected members and the broader party organisation. PRC has faced severe electoral and organisational challenges, due to the strong leftist element in the regional DS; the nationwide split that led to the formation of PDCI in 1998; and the ‘renegade’ behaviour of elected PRC politicians in the regional council. The consequences have been a decline in PRC support (see Table 2), alongside a modest increase in PDCI support from 1.6% (2000) to 2.7% (2005). In national terms PDCI took only a minority of PRC members, but in Campania the party was 3:1 in favour of PDCI, leading to the defection of most PRC members and regional councillors during the 1995-2000 Legislature. The participation of PRC in the regional government was however secured by the excellent relations between PRC national leader (Bertinotti) and DS regional president (Bassolino), and reflected earlier PRC participation in the

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141 *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (15/2/05).
142 Despite the collapse in electoral support, FI only lost two councillors in the 2005 elections (from 9 to 7), because of the complex allocation of seats in the regional electoral system.
143 *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (22/7/05).
144 Interview 4 (FI).
146 *La Repubblica*, Naples Edition (22/7/05).
147 The other Far Left party in Campania are the Greens, whose support has remained more stable over the timeframe (2.9% 1995; 2.8% 2000; 3.5% 2005)
Bassolino municipal governments of Naples (1993-2000). This political agreement did not prevent elected PRC regional councillors in the 2000-2005 Legislature from conducting a sustained campaign against the Bassolino regional administration, principally over planned privatisations and the construction of a waste incinerator in Acerra.\textsuperscript{148} This intense and uncompromising campaign led to the regional party organs being dissolved by the national leader;\textsuperscript{149} the defection of 2/3 regional councillors to PDCI in the middle of legislature;\textsuperscript{150} and the temporary withdrawal of PRC from the regional government.\textsuperscript{151} The multi-level organisation of PRC is founded on the provincial level, so regional party structures remain weak despite recent processes of regionalisation (see Chapter 2.1). Yet in practice this means the party in central office is unable to monitor or control the activities of its elected regional politicians. In contrast to the positive relations between the PRC leader Fausto Bertinotti and Antonio Bassolino, the national PDCI leader Oliveiro Diliberto was highly critical of Bassolino’s regional leadership and the conduct of his regional government.\textsuperscript{152} PDCI Campania took in all PRC defectors and twice withdrew its support for the regional government.\textsuperscript{153} Neither Communist party increased overall support for the far left in Campania, despite an unfavourable economic context and malfunctioning sub-national governments. This reflects the closed nature of their party organisations and electoral strategies, competing primarily with each other to secure core voters and party personnel, and raising their political profile by generating conflict with moderate parties in the governing coalition.

\textit{Candidate selection in Campania}

Candidate selection for party lists is tightly controlled by national and sub-national elites, although the use of preference voting to determine which candidates are elected significantly diminishes leadership control and enhances intra-party conflict. Strong patterns of preference voting makes the order of candidates on party lists relatively

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{La Repubblica}, Naples Edition (15/1/03).
\textsuperscript{149} Interview 10 (Ulivo)
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{La Repubblica}, Naples Edition (15/2/04).
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{La Repubblica}, Naples Edition (21/2/05).
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{La Repubblica}, Naples Edition (7/4/06), Interview 10 (Ulivo)
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{La Repubblica}, Naples Edition (20/7/04), (24/10/06).
unimportant (Vassallo, 2005b), encouraging parties to field local powerbrokers that collect a high number of preference votes and boost overall party support (Calise, 2007). Candidate selection in post-1995 regional party systems is also characterised by strong inter-party negotiations over the choice of coalitional candidate for the regional presidency. This process is crucial for evaluating the dynamics of intra-coalitional competition at regional level (see Chapter 2.2), and assessing the relative weight of national and sub-national elites in determining regional decision-making. The following analysis will focus on the selection of regional presidential candidates for the main competing coalitions (CLC and CRC) in the 1995, 2000, and 2005 regional elections.

The choice of CLC candidates for regional president (1995, 2000, 2005) reflected the intense hostilities between ex-DC factional alliances in Campania, a situation that weakened their collective coalitional bargaining, and privileged the more structured and hierarchical DS organisation. The choice of regional presidential candidate was influenced by their prominence in local politics and their experience in national politics. In 1995 the CLC failed to agree a common candidate for regional president in Campania, mainly because of recent splits within the PPI organisation over their coalitional positioning. Many former PPI politicians joined the CRC (elected on FI lists), while those who remained within PPI proved unable to agree on a common candidate with the main centre-left parties, PDS and PRC. PPI eventually fielded their own list against both main coalitions, which not only performed poorly (8.3%), but also split the centre-left vote sufficiently to allow the CRC to win the 1995 election. The exclusion of PPI meant the CLC presidential candidate was only supported by PDS and PRC, who eventually confirmed the prosecuting magistrate Giovanni Vacca as their non-party candidate.

Although the 2000 election saw regional party leaders agree in advance to form a broad pre-electoral coalition that would include PDS, PRC, PPI, and Udeur, serious difficulties emerged over the choice of coalitional candidate. Amidst this impasse the DS mayor of Naples, Antonio Bassolino, unilaterally proposed his own candidature, which was soon accepted by PRC and most of the radical left, but provoked fury within PPI, who wanted to nominate one of their own. This generated intense and protracted intra-coalitional disputes, only resolved when the regional PPI leader (Ciriaco De Mita) relented to
Bassolino’s candidature a month before the elections, after assurances that any future regional government would give key posts to PPI politicians\textsuperscript{154} (Allum and Cilento, 2000). The failure of PPI to propose a credible alternative to Bassolino can be partly attributed to the refusal of Udeur to support the PPI candidate Gerardo Bianco. Udeur leader Clemente Mastella supported Bassolino’s candidature, in exchange for the latter’s agreement to allocate key positions in the future regional government to Udeur nominees, including the presidency of the regional council.\textsuperscript{155} Mastella was also desperate to avoid a PPI bid for the presidency, since this would weaken his own competing factional alliance, which rested on the capacity to guarantee public office for local ex-DC powerbrokers.\textsuperscript{156}

The interim replacement for Bassolino as mayor of Naples was the vice-mayor Riccardo Marone (DS), a close political ally. Simultaneous DS control over the three main institutional leadership positions in Campania (regional president of Campania; mayor of Naples; mayor of Salerno) was considered politically unsustainable by other parties in the CLC, so an agreement was reached to field a PPI candidate for mayor of Naples in 2001, although the agreed coalitional candidate, Rosa Russo Iervolino, was the preferred choice of Bassolino rather than De Mita.\textsuperscript{157} The decision by Bassolino to contest the 2005 regional election was fully supported by all the main governing parties and politicians (including De Mita and Mastella), because Bassolino’s mediating form of leadership was now seen as crucial for holding together a fractious governing coalition.\textsuperscript{158}

The CRC candidate for regional president was nominated by AN in all three sets of regional elections (1995, 2000, 2005), although AN obtained a lower vote share than FI. In every election FI Campania was too divided to agree a joint candidate. In the 1995 election AN seized the initiative by successfully proposing the candidature of local MSI ‘notable’ Antonio Rastrelli, while a nascent FI regional organisation was still being assembled and unable to agree on a candidate to propose.\textsuperscript{159} For the 2000 election, AN initially agreed that FI should nominate the presidential candidate, after Rastrelli had

\textsuperscript{154} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (16/3/00)
\textsuperscript{155} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (25/5/00).
\textsuperscript{156} Interviews 3 (Udeur), 8 (DL), 10 (Ulivo).
\textsuperscript{157} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (18/1/00)
\textsuperscript{158} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (22/4/03).
\textsuperscript{159} La Repubblica (2/3/95).
been deposed in 1999 by ex-DC politicians within the CRC. Yet the spontaneous decision of Bassolino to contest these elections for the CLC meant the leading FI politician in Campania, Antonio Martusciello, became unwilling to stand out of fear he would lose against Bassolino, who was then highly popular. Martusciello assumed the CRC would lose the 2000 regional election, and sought to compete instead in the 2001 mayoral election in Naples, where the CLC candidate would inevitably be weaker than Bassolino.\footnote{Martusciello subsequently lost the 2001 Mayoral elections in Naples to Rosa Russo Iervolino (PPI).} This led to Rastrelli being recalled from semi-retirement by AN party leader Gianfranco Fini, to contest the 2000 election on behalf of the CRC.\footnote{Interview 2 (AN)} The 2005 election saw FI agree well in advance on their candidate (Antonio D’Amato), only for this candidate to withdraw because of severe conflict within FI, mainly between DC/PSI factions and the regional coordinator. The party leader intervened again to nominate a young protégé (Italo Bocchino) as presidential candidate just 50 days before the elections.\footnote{La Repubblica, Naples Edition (15/2/05); Interview 2 (AN)} Although Bocchino was universally expected to lose the 2005 election, the long-term objective was to raise his profile for a more credible challenge in the 2010 election. Yet Bocchino resigned soon after the 2005 election to re-gain his seat in the national parliament, citing the impossibility of overturning the centre-left majority amidst the serious divisions within the centre-right opposition.\footnote{Corriere del Mezzogiorno, Campania (14/10/05).}

Coalitional candidate selection highlights the disruptive effects generated by the absence of a strong electoral hierarchy in Campania, as each of the competing parties pushes heavily for their own presidential candidate, and consistently rejects those proposed by others, resulting in coalitional decision-making that is protracted and inconclusive. In this decision-making vacuum, the choice of presidential candidate becomes imposed, either by the national leadership (AN in 2000 and 2005) or by popular local-national politicians (DS in 2000). Coalitional candidate selection sheds revealing light on the continuing dynamics of DC factionalism in Campania. The competing ex-DC factional alliances in the CLC (DL and Udeur) proved extremely reluctant to allow the other to nominate positions of institutional leadership, mainly because this would undermine the appeal of
their own organisation. This created a heavy reliance on more structured party organisations (DS) to provide coalitional-institutional leadership, as evident from the 2005 election where Bassolino was the only choice supported by all governing parties. FI Campania was also characterised by intra-party factionalism that prevented it from nominating a coalitional candidate for the CRC in successive regional elections, so generated a dependence on more structured party organisations (AN) to provide coalitional leadership. Coalitional candidate selection also underlines the relative autonomy of sub-national politicians in Campania. Intervention from the national leadership is primarily oriented towards resolving serious blockages in coalitional decision-making, rather than imposing choices at regional level on a regular basis. National elites appear more willing to develop ‘stratarchical’ arrangements with sub-national elites, particularly if this can maximise access to government office and avoid the heavy costs of national involvement (Katz and Mair, 1995). When the national leadership is called upon to intervene in candidate selection (as occurs frequently in Campania), the choices however inevitably reflect their own preferences.

**Chapter 4.1.3 Regional Party System of Campania**

The party system in Campania is characterised by the weakness of electoral hierarchies in the competing coalitions (see Chapter 2.2), which has generated intense inter-party competition for coalitional leadership. The centre-left governing coalition (1999-) has been conflictual and unstable, partly because it incorporates a vast number of parties and political actors, including many politicians from the former DC, PSI and PCI organisations. Some former DC and PSI politicians stuck with the party organisations they entered in 1994, but most have shifted between rival parties and coalitions, contributing to the development of factional alliances. Although Campania underwent wholesale alternation in government between CRC and CLC in 2000, this occurred after many former DC politicians had already abandoned the centre-right governing coalition, triggering the downfall of the CRC government in 1999, and heralding the formation of a CLC government with a strong centrist orientation. The incumbent regional president Bassolino has been incapable of asserting strong institutional leadership in Campania,
despite the Constitutional reforms in Italy that strengthened regional presidents vis-a-vis parties their legislatures, and the impressive popular mandates Bassolino obtained through direct election. The leadership capacity of Bassolino was constrained by ‘personalised’ parties (DL and Udeur) that challenged the DS for coalitional leadership, and pushed incessantly for an undue distribution of resources and nominations to their supporters as a way to bolster their respective factional alliances and party organisations. While this research confirms the “return of parties” to institutional control in Italy after their serious organisational crises in the mid-1990s (Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003), it suggests this rarely takes the form of more effective party government, and is mainly evident in the collective capacity of parties to constrain institutional leadership, usually through blocking mechanisms in the legislature (Calise, 2006). This suggests political parties in Italy are not only weak mechanisms for aggregating the preferences of voters, but are also increasingly unable to govern effectively (Schmitter, 2001). In Campania this has contributed to maintaining low levels of institutional performance, with poor legislative implementation and weak scrutiny of the executive (Puttnam et al, 1993). Successive reforms to devolve policy competences and financial resources to regional governments have merely perpetuated the clientelist and inefficient networks of resource distribution that historically characterise regional politics in southern Italy (Allum, 1973; Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988; Demarco, 2007), resulting in the suffocation of ambitious region-building projects under the weight of vested local interests. Institutional leadership in such a political context relies heavily on the capacity to mediate between competing parties in the governing coalition, a function the regional president has pursued rather effectively in Campania, making his position within the governing coalition indispensable. In contrast to other regions, this leadership strategy has rarely focused on the ‘politics of growth’ (Keating, 1997), or the construction of a broad-based ‘development coalition’ to advance economic interests (Keating, 1998). Bassolino has instead continued to operate within an ineffective political system, based on the clientelised dissipation of state resources through local powerbrokers and their constituencies. Nor did the main non-statewide party in Campania (Udeur) push statewide parties into adopting more autonomist positions, because Udeur focused its own efforts on gaining a clientelised control of state resources, through which to reward

Wilson, Alex (2009), Multi-level Party Politics in Italy and Spain
European University Institute
10.2870/13381
its local powerbrokers and their constituents. The behaviour of Udeur reflects the prevailing incentive structures for NSWP in southern Italy, where a common perception exists that federalism is a political project designed to benefit northern Italians (Roux, 2008), perhaps understandable since this view is consistently articulated by the Northern League in its anti-southern rhetoric (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001).

Coalition Testing in Campania

The formation of a vast centre-left governing coalition in Campania was a gradual process influenced by local and national developments, and held together by a series of bi-lateral relations between party leaders. Collaboration between DC and PCI elites at regional level initiated well before the 1995 election, when the DC-PSI regional governing coalitions (1970-1995) relied on external support from PCI to overcome their own factional divisions. PCI had already formed governments in the municipality of Naples during the 1970s, through various coalitions with Socialist parties (Allum, 1973; Chubb, 1982; Allum and Allum, 2008). This gave an experience of sub-national government to PCI party elites, who were not isolated from the ‘spoils system’ of governing parties at local levels, as evident from the ensuing corruption scandals in the Naples PCI Federation. The decision by Antonio Bassolino to contest the 1993 mayoral elections was a moment of rupture with the collusive practice of local DC and PCI elites, and was crucial for consolidating the alliance between DS and PRC. The latter was then held together by strong personal relations between Bassolino and PRC leader Fausto Bertinotti, and represented the continuation of a strategy adopted by the ‘Left’ PCI faction, which sought to prevent the emergence of ‘enemies to the left of the Party’. The left-wing orientation of the regional DS and their president served to weaken and divide Communist parties in Campania, whose elected members often adopted radical positions to differentiate themselves from the regional leadership, thereby increasing their organisational divisions and reducing their electoral support. The strength of the

164 Interview 13 (CdM).  
165 Interviews 13 (CdM).  
166 Interview 7 (DS)  
167 Interview 10 (Ulivo)
political relationship between Bassolino and Bertinotti allowed the local DS-PRC coalition in Naples to survive the collapse of the national governing coalition between these parties (1998). Although participation in the regional government from 2000 created strong divisions within PRC Campania, the positive relations between Bassolino and Bertinotti allowed the regional government to navigate through the growing hostility of PDCI leader Oliveiro Diliberto. Although Bassolino had initially aligned himself with leftist DS factions opposed to coalitions with former DC politicians, the failure of the CLC without PPI support in the 1995 regional election prompted a re-consideration of this political strategy. Bassolino thereafter sought to construct a strong political relationship with PPI in Naples, and was instrumental in negotiating with Ciriaco De Mita for a ‘broad’ DS-PPI-PRC alliance in the 2000 regional election, an arrangement that survived the tensions created by the unilateral decision of Bassolino to resign as mayor of Naples and stand as regional president in 2000 (Allum and Cilento, 2000). Another crucial political relationship was between the regional president and Udeur leader Clemente Mastella. Given the personal tensions between Mastella and De Mita, who headed competing factional alliances (see Chapter 4.1.2), the relationship of both politicians with Bassolino was crucial for maintaining the stability of the governing coalition. These bi-lateral political relationships determined the dynamics of the regional governing coalition, and highlighted the crucial mediating function of Bassolino as regional president. These party leaders encouraged the creation of similarly broad governing coalitions at local levels in Campania, which eventually allowed the CLC to control around 80% of sub-national institutions in Campania during the 2000s.168

**Government Alternation in Campania**

The regional electoral system introduced in 1995 and modified in 1999 was devised to create competing coalitions with directly accountable leaders, and reinforce the stability of the regional government vis-à-vis the blackmail potential of parties in the legislature. However politicians in Campania remain wary of bi-polarising dynamics, which finds

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168 Interview 11 (NPSI)
limited support outside DS and AN.\textsuperscript{169} Regional politics displays a clear tendency towards political aggregation rather than wholesale alternation,\textsuperscript{170} as evident from the willingness of regional politicians to abandon the confines of opposition to join the regional government. Political aggregation in Campania has created a “system of power” founded on mutual convenience rather than political coherence;\textsuperscript{171} shielded an ‘oligopolic’ governing class from strong inter-party competition;\textsuperscript{172} distorted the effects of an electoral system that magnifies gains for the winning coalition; and led to the formation of turbulent regional governments.\textsuperscript{173} Political aggregation has weakened inter-coalitional competition in Campania, evident from the successive expansion in CLC support over the timeframe, but has significantly enhanced intra-coalitional competition within the CLC, as competing parties jostle for control of the regional coalition and undermine the stability of the regional government.

The national party system change (1994) and regional electoral system reform (1995) combined to introduce the logic of bi-polarism to regional politics (see Chapter 2.2). Yet in Campania this was soon undermined by the formation of Democratic Union for the Republic (UDR) in 1998, an ex-DC party with neo-centrist objectives that manifested diverse systemic effects at national and regional levels. At national level UDR was led by former DC leader Francesco Cossiga, and composed primarily of former DC politicians elected within the opposition CRC. These politicians abandoned the CRC to join or support CLC governments (1998-2001), which sought to rule without relying on PRC. Whether this constituted another manifestation of Italian trasformismo or an unusual gesture of institutional responsibility remains open to interpretation, but its immediate effect was to guarantee governing stability for the elected CLC government, which was able to avoid early elections and complete its full legislative term. At regional level the formation of UDR instead led to the destabilisation and overthrow of several elected regional governments in central-southern Italy (Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Sicilia, Molise), through a series of ‘coups’ coordinated by Clemente Mastella, a political ally of

\textsuperscript{169} Interview 2 (AN)
\textsuperscript{170} Interviews 7 (DS), 11 (NPSI).
\textsuperscript{171} Interviews 1 (SDI), 7 (DS), 10 (Ulivo)
\textsuperscript{172} Interview 11 (NPSI).
\textsuperscript{173} Interviews 1 (SDI, 7 (DS)
Regional politicians that joined UDR defected from both centre-left and centre-right governing coalitions, and proceeded to form new centre-left (Campania, Calabria, Puglia) or centre-right (Sicily, Molise) regional governments, depending on the preferred aggregation of local powerbrokers, and the respective opportunities for patronage and career advancement. Although UDR ultimately failed in its objective of creating an independent centrist pole and soon dispersed as a political organisation, the regional effects of its neo-centrist strategy endured in Union for a Democratic Europe (Udeur), formed as the personal party of Mastella in 1999. Udeur Campania encouraged former DC politicians elected in the centre-right coalition (1995) to abandon the regional government and form an alternative government with the CLC (1999), who granted these defectors prominent governing positions and greater political weight. Udeur then competed alongside the CLC in the 2000 and 2005 regional elections. The presence of Udeur in the regional government not only shifted the governing CLC into a more centrist position, but also recreated the factional conflicts between ex-DC politicians in the governing coalition, which had characterised regional politics before 1995. This led to protracted and conflictual processes of government formation, with perennial tensions and instability in the governing coalition.

**Government Formation in Campania**

Political parties throughout OS regions in Italy have sought to secure a proportional share of nominations to the regional executive, although the reform of OS regional governments in 1999 made nomination of the executive an exclusive function of the president (Vassallo and Baldini, 2000). The governing parties in Campania have also sought to direct their respective policy areas, in practice making the executive weakly accountable to the president (Calise, 2006). Government formation in Campania under the CLC has been turbulent and prolonged, characterised by intense disputes over party weight in the executive. Once formed the executive has suffered perennial crises and frequent resignations, generated mainly by tensions between regional leaders, requiring

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175 Interviews 10 (Ulivo), 11 (NPSI), 13 (CdM).
arduous processes of coalition maintenance to resolve the paralysed government and legislative gridlock that emerged, contributing to poor institutional performance. Although the 2000 regional election was convincingly won by the CLC (MoV 10.0%), the process of government formation was extremely protracted with severe inter-party disputes. These were not fully resolved until the middle of the legislature, which was characterised by constant governmental instability (Demarco, 2007).

Bassolino had initially sought to allocate posts in the executive to independent experts rather than party politicians, in line with his ‘technical cabinet’ as mayor of Naples between 1993 and 2000 (Allum and Cilento, 2000). Yet the regional leaders of PPI (Ciriaco De Mita) and Udeur (Clemente Mastella) insisted these posts should be distributed only to party politicians, and each pushed for a number of portfolios disproportionate to the relative electoral weight of their parties. Udeur (10.3%) and PPI (10.5%) were keen to ensure equal representation for their party organisations, aiming for full parity with DS (14.2%), the largest party in the coalition. Faced with the inability to form an executive that had the support of governing parties in the council, the regional president was forced to abandon the idea of an entirely ‘technical’ executive, so only allocated 3 posts to independent experts, while the rest were distributed to party politicians, including all the high spending portfolios. Bassolino only succeeded in ensuring that members of the executive were not also members of the council. ¹⁷⁶ Yet this compromise proved inadequate because Udeur and PPI leaders made additional demands on Bassolino, and proceeded to blackmail the president by threatening to withdraw their support for the nascent executive. Mastella continued to insist the remaining independent experts should be replaced with party politicians, with the particular objective of increasing the portfolios allocated to Udeur,¹⁷⁷ while De Mita insisted on replacing Teresa Armato (PPI) in the key Health portfolio. Although affiliated to the same party, Armato was not affiliated to the factional alliance led by De Mita (see Chapter 4.1.2), so the latter sought to nominate an alternative politician that would respond to his factional

¹⁷⁶ La Repubblica, Naples Edition (27/5/00; 20/7/01).
¹⁷⁷ La Repubblica, Naples Edition (27/5/00)
leadership. De Mita then actively undermined presidential nomination of the executive, a key feature of the 1999 regional government reform. Yet Armato refused to abandon her post (since she was supported by Bassolino), so the remaining PPI regional ministers (all affiliated to the De Mita faction) abandoned the executive. Although the regional president eventually engineered a compromise that retained Armato in the Health portfolio, the executive still took 5 months to form (April-September 2000), and already in February 2001 entered a new crisis when the Udeur leader withdrew his ministers, as part of an inter-party dispute over choosing coalitional candidate for mayor of Naples.

In the midst of the dispute between Bassolino and Mastella, De Mita capitalised on the weakness of the regional president to withdraw his own PPI supporters from the executive, and insisted once more on the resignation of Armato from the Health portfolio, an outcome eventually achieved in February 2002 after a year of governmental paralysis. The remainder of the 2000-2005 Legislature was marked by strong opposition from the far left parties (PRC, Pdci, Greens), who withdrew their support for the executive and adopted abstentionist or blocking tactics in the council, leading to a legislative gridlock exacerbated by chronic absenteeism within the CLC.

The 2005 election confirmed the electoral dominance of the CLC (MoV 27.3%), but also its internal divisions. De Mita succeeded in obtaining 4 posts for DL in the executive, although Bassolino had sought to allocate 3 each to DS and DL, reflecting their effective parity in terms of electoral performance. Udeur was eventually satisfied with 2 posts in the executive and the presidency of the regional council for Mastella’s wife, Sandrina Lonardo. The 2005 executive confirmed the disappearance of all remaining independent experts and their replacement by party politicians, a development strongly promoted by ex-DC parties. This only partially improved coalitional stability, with both SDI and
Pdci\textsuperscript{188} resigning in protest at excessive regional clientelism and their own marginalisation in the regional executive (Iossa, 2006).

The intensity of inter-party disputes in Campania is closely linked to the progressive expansion of the regional governing coalition. Coalitions in expansion face the inevitable problem that existing parties are generally unwilling to concede their posts, so the only solution is to create new posts that can accommodate all coalition partners. This creates a progressive ‘spoils system’ that leads to all types of government nomination conforming to the logic of party representation (Walston, 1998). The CLC in Campania adopted this solution to the problem of an expanding coalition, a classic but highly criticised mechanism exercised by governing parties in the ‘First Republic’ (1947-1994). The expansion of the ‘spoils system’ is evident from the gradual politicisation of the regional executive (see above); the proliferation of lucrative posts in the regional council, where unnecessary parliamentary commissions were created so that politicians could be allocated their presidency;\textsuperscript{189} the proliferation of semi-state agencies headed by party politicians; and the nomination of party politicians to new managerial posts in the regional public administration.\textsuperscript{190} Clientelist relationships between party politicians are strong in Campania, with a debilitating impact on the effectiveness of regional government, and a determining effect on party system dynamics.

\textit{Clientelism and the Party System in Campania}

Clientelism is a pervasive feature of the regional party system, with a determining effect on the relationship between party politicians and their electorate (‘vertical’ clientelism); the relationship between party leaders and party politicians (‘horizontal’ clientelism); and the low institutional performance of the regional government (Putnam et al, 1993). Vertical clientelism is founded on the vote of exchange between party politicians and

\textsuperscript{187} Interview 1 (SDI), (Iossa, 2006).
\textsuperscript{188} La Repubblica, Naples Edition (24/10/06).
\textsuperscript{189} This was highlighted by the decision to create a Mediterranean parliamentary Commission alongside a Maritime parliamentary Commission. Presidencies of Commissions are crucial for regional politicians because they entail additional functions so are well remunerated, regardless of their practical necessity.
\textsuperscript{190} Interviews 10 (Ulivo), 11 (NPSI).
their local electorate (Parisi and Pasquino, 1980), and is encouraged by the continuation of preference voting to determine successful candidates in regional elections. Although preference voting does not always imply a clientelist exchange (it could be linked to popularity or visibility), in the socio-economic context of Campania it is often linked to a particularistic exchange of favours. The political patron seeks the votes of constituents in regional elections, while constituents rely heavily on political patrons to distribute cash benefits, deliver public subsidies, provide public employment, and intermediate with the public administration to gain favours or advantages. The prevalence of clientelistic exchange in southern Italy is closely tied to the nature of the Italian welfare state, characterised by ‘peaks of generosity accompanied by large gaps of protection’ (Ferrera, 1996, 29). The Italian welfare state provides few benefits for the non-institutional labour market, particularly those of working age who lack contributory entitlements or sources of income, as unemployment benefits provided by the central state cover only 9% of the unemployed population. This situation is exacerbated in southern Italy because of the prevalence of non-institutional or illegal employment; high levels of effective unemployment; and a very high proportion (26.4%) of households in poverty (Ferrera, 1996). The absence of universal welfare provision has encouraged local and regional authorities to adopt an active role in delivering social assistance, which has adopted a particularistic character in line with the prevailing nature of political exchange (Fargion, 1997). ‘Welfare manipulation’ is particularly evident in the distribution of invalidity pensions, unemployment benefits for seasonal workers, and cash benefits to families or the elderly (Ferrera, 1996; Dell’Aringa and Ludovici, 1997). High structural unemployment in Campania means the provision of public employment is another crucial area for clientelist exchange, as political patrons use their leverage over a politicised administration to secure public posts for their constituents. Clientelism also characterises the distribution of selective subsidies or bureaucratic intermediation for businesses in a state-dependent and highly inefficient economy (Caciagli, 1980; Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988; Allum and Allum, 2008). Processes of regionalisation have increased the resources available to regional politicians for clientelist redistribution. The enhanced regional role in economic development and social assistance has delivered ample opportunities for political manipulation (Fargion, 1997), while regional devolution of health-care has
provided additional opportunities for politicians to distribute employment and resources on a particularistic basis, a problem aggravated by the extensive collusion of public and private health-care providers in regions formerly dominated by DC (Ferrera, 1996)

Strong ties of vertical clientelism in Campania have helped to consistently elect local powerbrokers in sub-national elections. These politicians are weakly affiliated to their respective party organisations, but usually re-elected through the mechanism of preference voting. The collapse of the main party organisations and concomitant fragmentation of the party system has provided ample opportunities for these local powerbrokers to shift strategically between parties and coalitions (Calise, 2006), stimulating strong patterns of horizontal clientelism, as party leaders compete to secure their support. The pursuit of career advancement and sources of remuneration by local powerbrokers significantly expanded the centre-left governing coalition in Campania (which controls access to government resources) and weakened the opposing centre-right coalition (which lacks significant access to government resources). Patterns of horizontal clientelism were catalysed by processes of regionalisation, which increased the opportunities for local powerbrokers to exercise government patronage, e.g. through the new capacity of regional governments to nominate lucrative posts in the health sector.191 Horizontal clientelism in Campania has encouraged a tendency towards political aggregation, and largely preserved a “closed political oligopoly”, whose principal objective is to secure governmental resources for themselves and their territorial/sectoral supporters.192 The poor quality of the regional political class is frequently emphasised by interviewees,193 who underline its continuity with the “debased” political class of the 1980s, characterised by the emergence of “business politicians” interested exclusively in their “personal patronage networks” (Allum and Allum, 2008). Continuity is evident in the composition of regional parties (which are barely affected by internal renewal), the strong sense of collective self-interest and low sense of civic responsibility among regional politicians.194 The 1970-1995 party system was also characterised by executive

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191 Interviews 1 (SDI), 2 (AN), 5 (AN), 6 (AN), 7 (DS), 8 (DL), 11 (NPSI).
192 Interview 11 (NPSI).
193 Interviews 2, 5 (AN), 7 (DS), 10 (Ulivo), 11 (NPSI).
194 Interviews 10 (Ulivo), 13 (CdM)
instability, institutional paralysis, governmental inefficiency, political corruption, and factional rivalry within the governing parties (Vassallo and Baldini, 2000).

Strong patterns of vertical and horizontal clientelism have contributed to the electoral dominance of the CLC in Campania, which has expanded its electoral support in successive regional elections (see Chapter 4.1.1), despite low levels of institutional performance, weak economic growth, and continuous governing instability. CLC regional governments have been attacked by their own governing parties for failing to address the core regional problems of organised crime, high unemployment, poor health-care, corrupt waste management, and low economic growth. The regional government stands accused of “squandering a fortune” in European and national funding over the 2000-2006 period; having “no concept of development” in the region; and wasting resources on ineffective small projects which fail to make large-scale infra-structural or economic improvements. Although retrenchment in national expenditure during the 1990s to converge with EMU criteria did necessitate a reduction in state transfers to southern Italy, this was more than compensated by additional EU Structural Funds, which became heavily oriented towards Objective 1 regions (under 75% EU GDP) such as Campania (Bull and Baudner, 2004; Demarco, 2007). Despite 7.7 billion Euros of EU funding during between 2000 and 2006, regional GDP fell from 71.8% to 68.4% of the EU average, while Campania obtained the record in personnel costs of all Italian OS regions, being responsible for 40% of the national deficit (Demarco, 2007). Although the regional government developed an enhanced administrative capacity to absorb EU funds, largely because this policy area was placed under the direct control of a regional president who insulated it from broader administrative inefficiency (Bull and Baudner, 2004; Fargion et al, 2006), the regional government later squandered these resources in a way that failed to promote sustainable economic development or effective policy-making. Campania is far from any “virtuous” model of clientelism, whose primary justification is the promotion of economic development (Piattoni, 1998, 2002). Developing a concerted strategy for

195 Interviews 1 (SDI), 7 (DS), 8 (DL)
196 Interview 8 (DL).
197 Interview 7 (DS)
198 Interview 1 (SDI)
regional economic growth has not been a priority for the governing CLC, because the interest of most southern politicians resides with the clientelised dissipation of resources to their local constituents. Deficiencies in institutional performance are often blamed by southern politicians on the modest reduction in transfers from the central government, an insincere argument used to obfuscate the role of the broader political class in lowering institutional performance by perpetuating this inefficient resource distribution.

The inability of the executive to implement a coherent region-building project is partly due to the behaviour of politicians in the council, who ensure that government resources continue to be wasted in a fashion that favours their electoral interests, but fails to promote regional growth or improve institutional performance. Yet the executive itself has become prone to clientelist patterns of policy-making, as governing parties have exploited their regional portfolios to expand their electoral weight: DL effectively controls the immense health-care sector; DS controls the transport sector, business support and welfare policies; SDI controls the tourism sector; and Udeur controls environmental policies. The tendency among governing parties to exploit their sectors in a clientelist fashion is never denied by interviewees, who only dispute relative levels of clientelism. For example, the DS sponsored minimum income policy is accused by DL politicians of encouraging personal ties of dependence, while the enormous costs of the DL-managed health system are seen by DS politicians as confirmation of DL’s sectoral clientelism. The regional government (and most local governments) have maintained control of key shares in out-sourced companies, nationalised several private utilities, and created a wide range of new local and regional agencies. The growth in these agencies has been remarkable, with many having no clear functions, leading to the creation of “a para-state that has grown in a disproportionate manner.” This para-state is used mainly for clientelist purposes, as unnecessary or over-remunerated positions are created to reward party politicians for their loyalty rather than skills, a process that accelerated with the collapse of mass party organisations, which had previously been able to offer

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199 Interviews 1 (SDI), 7 (DS), 10 (Ulivo), 11 (NPSI).
200 Interview 7 (DS)
201 Interview 8 (DL)
202 Interview 11 (NPSI)
bureaucratic posts or generous pensions to politicians no longer involved in electoral politics (Allum and Allum, 2008). Regional politicians have also exploited their control of public appointments to further politicise the regional public administration, packing the latter with political appointees entirely complicit with the political class and grateful to individual politicians for their public employment.204

Although the regional government controls most financial resources, it does not have the monopoly of clientelist practice in Campania. This practice is also endemic among opposition CRC parties, which have pursued a “weak” form of opposition to the regional government, with the primary objective of obtaining “crumbs from their table.”205 The CRC parties have been reluctant to publicise the misadministration of the regional government, and have rarely exploited public channels such as parliamentary commissions. Some opposition leaders have used their privileged knowledge of government misadministration to obtain private favours from the governing parties, in exchange for public silence on these issues.206 This suggests most opposition politicians are primarily interested in ‘cutting a deal’ over patronage, nominations and resources,207 rather than developing the clear alternative to clientelist management they advocate to the public.208 The main tactic of opposition in the 2000-2005 legislature was the boycott of council sessions, which had the effect of exposing widespread absenteeism among the governing CLC, but also allowed CRC politicians to block change without having to account for their motivations.209 This highlights a broader problem of party politics in the council, namely politicians with narrowly defined local interests. Many of these politicians fail to attend the council unless their interests are directly threatened, discourage reforms that alter comfortable clientelist arrangements, and block ambitious policies that could improve economic growth but would change power structures.210

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204 Interview 10 (Ulivo): Enacted through a system of personnel ‘recycling’, political appointees are initially given jobs in semi-state agencies, but thereafter swiftly moved into the regional administration as ‘experts’. At regular intervals the council passes a law regularising their status as permanent officials of the region.  
205 Interview 5 (AN).  
206 Interview 11 (NPSI)  
207 Interviews 10 (Ulivo).  
208 Interviews 5(AN), 6 (FI)  
209 Interview 10 (Ulivo).  
210 Interviews 4 (FI), 7 (DS), 10 (Ulivo)
**Presidentialism and Executive-Legislative Relations in Campania**

The reform of regional government in 1999 sought to separate the election of the president, as well as the nomination of the executive, from the blackmail of party politicians elected in the council (Fabbrini, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). It also separates policy *formulation* (executive) from policy *implementation* (legislature), as a way to improve the effectiveness of regional government. This reform was imposed onto a regional political class unaccustomed to this separation of functions. In Campania this failed to insulate regional policy-making from party political interests, and may have aggravated the poor institutional performance of the regional government by straining political relations between the executive and council. Since the executive is no longer appointed or dismissed by the council, and there is no longer overlap of membership between these bodies, governing parties in the council have fewer incentives to support policies of the executive, as evident from the numerous instances of legislative paralysis caused by chronic absenteeism in the legislature.\(^{211}\) Separation of functions has meant the council is no longer involved in the initial stages of government policy-making, so frequently fails to support laws that were formulated without its input.\(^{212}\) Although the executive has not collapsed since 1999, this is largely because the terms of president and council are tied together (Fabbrini, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). Councillors need the president to remain in office because this is necessary for their own tenure. Governing instability is evident from the protracted and conflictual processes of government formation, and the perennial loss of governing majorities during crucial council votes.

The 1999-2001 reforms of regional government only reinforced the ‘executive face’ of presidentialism (i.e. autonomy from the legislature), but did not significantly transform the ‘party face’ (i.e. autonomy from parties) (Poguntke and Webb, 2004). These aspects of presidentialism are closely related in the Italian regions, because parties are able to condition functioning of the executive through blackmail potential in the legislature. This requires a reflection on the counter-position between ‘presidents’ and ‘parties’ advanced

\(^{211}\) Interview 4 (FI), 10 (Ulivo),  
\(^{212}\) Interviews 2 (AN), 10 (Ulivo).
by Mauro Calise (2006), who argues these are opposing forces in democratic politics. The case of Campania suggests strong institutional leadership is unfeasible without full control over the main party organisations. Presidential control of the largest party, as well as a governing coalition characterised by strong electoral hierarchy, may be necessary pre-conditions for institutional leadership to overcome veto players and vested interests.

Chapter 4.1.4: Conclusions

Politics in Campania is characterised by a “strong homeostatic tendency”, evident from its party organisations and regional party system since 1995. Regional parties remain closed in their electoral and organisational orientation; display strong continuity with the political elites of the 1970-1995 period; and fail to pursue any significant form of organisational renewal. Two types of party organisations emerge within the competing coalitions. The first is characterised by the former ‘anti-system’ parties (PCI, MSI), which have become the core governing parties (DS, AN) in their respective coalitions. These parties rely heavily on access to government to overcome factional divisions and strengthen party unity, and to justify their common objectives in light of weakening ties with civil society. Although both parties display organisational stasis and electoral decline in Campania, continued access to regional government for DS (1999-) has allowed them to become more unified under the ‘presidentialised’ leadership of Antonio Bassolino, while exclusion from regional government for AN (1999-) has exacerbated intra-party factionalism; highlighted the lack of regional leadership; hastened electoral decline; and contributed to the lack of organisational renewal. The other main type of regional party is characterised by networks of politicians from the former governing parties (DC, PSI), who continue to dominate the regional party system despite the collapse of their former party organisations, because they can secure their consistent re-election through preference voting. In Campania these politicians dominate two of the main parties in the regional governing coalition (DL, Udeur), and two of the main parties in the regional opposition (FI, UDC), but display weak loyalty to these new organisations, and generally change party or coalition for career advancement or

213 Interview 13 (CdM)
enhanced remuneration. To exert collective pressure in regional politics, these local powerbrokers often group into regional factional alliances, whose primary objective is the favourable distribution of nominations and resources to their members. These factional alliances are stronger and more enduring among governing CLC parties, because of their enhanced access to the resources and nominations of regional government, and substantially weaker among opposition CRC parties, given their concomitant exclusion from many of these resources and nominations. This has consolidated a tendency towards political aggregation in the regional party system, as former DC or PSI politicians abandon the opposition to join the ‘spoils system’ of regional government, weakening inter-coalitional party competition and preventing wholesale alternation in government. This distances regional politics from the bipolarising objectives of the regional electoral system, as well as the bipolarising trend of the national party system (see Chapter 2.2).

Political aggregation in the party system has helped to perpetuate the lack of renewal in party organisations, whose leaders focus on aggregating local powerbrokers and their support base, rather than developing ‘catch-all’ strategies that could win over disillusioned voters from other parties, or appeal to the growing number of voters that abstain from regional elections. Aggregation has reinforced the prevalence of clientelism in regional government, contributing to low levels of institutional performance, as positions and resources are allocated or created mainly to support an expanding ‘spoils system’, rather than maximising the effectiveness of government expenditure. This has generated an over-sized regional governing coalition, characterised by endless inter-party disputes which paralyse the functioning of regional government. These disputes are not just the predictable outcome of a governing coalition that encompasses most of the Italian political spectrum, from avowed Communists to conservative and neo-centrist Christian Democrats, but also reflects the outcome of intense competition between rival factional alliances who priority is to obtain nominations and resources for their members. This results in protracted and inconclusive processes of government formation, followed by weak and unstable governments, characterised by low levels of institutional performance. The latter is exacerbated by an inefficient distribution of government resources, usually on a clientelist basis, with the primary objective of holding together the regional
governing coalition and maintaining local powerbrokers in office. A corollary of this is the consolidation of ineffective regional government, incapable of improving its institutional performance or stimulating patterns of economic growth, so contributing its share to sustained socio-economic stagnation. Low institutional performance in the Italian regions is not just explicable through patterns of civic culture (Putnam et al, 1993), but is closely related to the choices and actions of the political class, whose behaviour can have a determining impact on institutional performance.

Reforms to the system of regional government and its election have not succeeded in insulating executive leadership from legislative fragmentation. The absence of strong electoral hierarchy in the governing coalition, combined with the blackmail potential of supported parties in the legislature, have resulted in a severely constrained form of presidential leadership. Many regional party leaders reject the principle and operation of strong executive government, so do their utmost best to undermine it. This highlights the broader failure of using constitutional-electoral solutions to resolve deeper problems of poor accountability, pervasive clientelism, irresponsible government, socio-economic dependency, and weak state capacity in southern Italy. The collapse of the governing parties did not improve this situation (Calise, 2006), largely because it failed to uproot the political networks and clientelist ties of regional politicians. The latter are no longer even bound by the hierarchical leadership, ideological coherence, collective rules, or common electoral objectives of ‘mass’ party organisations. These had already begun a process of degeneration in Italy during the 1980s, with the rise of “business politicians” interested only in self-enrichment through control of government resources, whose perpetuation in office was ensured through “personal patronage networks”, with little concern for the “collective logic of party action” (Allum and Allum, 2008). The rise of personalised parties and factional alliances in the 1990s have merely enhanced the chaotic and mysterious struggle for powers and resources in regional politics, while their incorporation into fragmented and over-sized coalitions has merely served to further obscure the vexed question of governmental accountability.
Chapter 4.2: Regional Party Politics in Lombardia

Chapter 4.2.1 Political Geography of Lombardia

Lombardia is the largest Italian region, with a census population of 9,545,441 (2007), comprising over 16% of the national population (59,131,287). Lombardia is located in mainland northern Italy and composed of 11 provinces, the largest being Milan (3,884,481), which contains over 40% of the regional population. The other provinces are Brescia (1,195,777), Bergamo (1,044,820), Varese (855,400), Como (572,441), Pavia (521,296), Mantova (397,533), Cremona (350,368), Lecco (327,510), Lodi (215,386) and Sondrio (180,429). Milan is also the largest city in Lombardia (1,303,437), distantly followed by Brescia (190,044), Monza (121,445) and Bergamo (115,645). Lombardia has a high population density (408.8 inhabitants per square kilometre), attributable to the heavily urbanised Milan province. The surrounding provinces contain only medium-sized provincial capitals (population <200,000) and numerous small towns. Population growth in Lombardia (0.5% per annum, 1995-2004) is above the national average (0.3%). Lombardia is the wealthiest Italian region (GDP=141.5% EU average), evident when compared to the Italian average (GDP=107.4% EU average).

The demographic structure of Lombardia is consistent with the Italian average: a similar proportion of the population is under 15 (13.5% Lombardia, 14.2% Italy), aged 15-64 (67.7% Lombardia, 66.6% Italy), and aged over 65 (18.8% Lombardia, 19.2% Italy). A strong regional economy ensures the employment rate (65.5%, 15-64) is above the Italian average (57.6%, 15-64); the female employment rate (55.5%) is above the Italian average (45.3%); and the unemployment rate (4.1%) is significantly below the Italian average (7.7%). The structure of employment also deviates considerably from Italy as a whole. Regional employment in agriculture (1.7%) is well below the Italian average (4.2%), regional employment in manufacturing (38.6%) is well above the Italian average (30.8%), while regional employment in services (59.7%) is below the Italian average.

Data on size of population in cities, provinces and region of Lombardia (www.citypopulation.de). All other economic, social and demographic indicators (European Commission, 2007).
Educational attainment in Lombardia is above the Italian average, with a higher proportion possessing medium levels of educational qualification (41.2% Lombardia, 38.5% Italy), and a lower proportion possessing low levels of educational qualification (46.3% Lombardia, 49.3% Italy). The proportion with high levels of educational qualification in Lombardia (12.5%) is only slightly above the Italian average (12.2%).

Lombardia is a highly industrialised region, characterised by a strong concentration of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in its less densely populated northern provinces, accompanied by a strong concentration of large enterprises in the densely populated province of Milan. The city of Milan is the centre of Italy’s finance industry, and a key international centre for the fashion industry. The industrial districts of SMEs in northern Italy instead represent a distinct form of industrial organisation, founded on cooperative relationships within the entrepreneurial class (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). Structural economic changes since the 1970s have seen the decline of large-scale enterprises and the sustained growth of SMEs (Trigilia, 1991). The decline of large-scale manufacturing has been attributed to the intensification of international competition, the high level of Italian taxation (more difficult to avoid for large businesses), punitive labour laws, and excessive bureaucratic regulation. The growth of SMEs is aided by their capacity to circumvent many of these difficulties. Regional politics has consistently emphasised the priorities of economic growth in Lombardia, and sought to actively respond to the needs of regional entrepreneurs, particularly the SMEs that constitute a huge potential support base for political parties. Yet this economic community became disillusioned with DC governments in the 1980s, switching their support to the Northern League (LN) (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001), and during the 1990s to Forza Italia (FI).

DC remained the largest party in the 1970-1995 regional party system, although its electoral support underwent a substantial decline between 1970 (40.9%) and 1990 (28.6%). This gradual erosion did not benefit the Italian Communist Party (PCI), whose electoral support also fell from 30.0% (1975) to 18.9% (1990). The decline of the larger parties transformed the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) into a powerful actor in regional politics, because its support was necessary for DC-led coalitions to obtain a governing
majority in the regional council. PSI leader Bettino Craxi maintained a personal powerbase in Milan, while local and regional coalitions between DC and PSI were a vital testing ground for subsequent governing coalitions at national level (Pridham, 1989). In Lombardia the DC had focused heavily on the needs of local entrepreneurs, developing a highly cooperative and somewhat clientelist relationship with the business community (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). This helped to compensate DC for the loss of its rural support base, through rapid processes of urbanisation and the declining importance of agriculture to the Italian economy, a process highly advanced in northern regions characterised by strong manufacturing sectors (Hopkin and Mastropaolo, 2001). Yet the high levels of taxation, inefficient public administration, excessive regulation, and manifest political corruption of the governing parties combined to produce growing discontent among regional entrepreneurs, which manifested itself through the emergence of protest leagues in northern Italy. These federated to form the Northern League (LN) in 1989, whose support grew throughout the corruption scandals that engulfed the governing parties in the 1990s (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001; Gold, 2003) The Lombard League is the most powerful federation in LN, since most of the party leadership are from this region, including the federal secretary Umberto Bossi. Yet the LN faces strong competition in Lombardia from Forza Italia (FI), the largest party in electoral terms. The FI leader Silvio Berlusconi is a self-made billionaire from Milan, widely supported because of his entrepreneurial success, anti-party rhetoric, ambiguous attitude towards fiscal evasion, and ownership of AC Milan football club. The combined strength of these new parties in Lombardia highlights the decline of parties with organisational predecessors in the 1947-1994 party system. Left wing parties are particularly weak in Lombardia, whether they emerge from PCI (DS, PCI, PDCI) or DC (PPI-DL) structures. The collapse of DC and PSI has thus largely favoured new parties on the centre-right.

The electoral system in Lombardia is PR with Majoritarian Bonus: 80-90% of seats are allocated through a provincial ballot on a proportional basis, while 10-20% seats are allocated on a regional ballot exclusively to the winning coalition.\textsuperscript{215} This electoral system ensures the province of Milan accounts for over half the seats in the council, but

\textsuperscript{215} Seats allocated on a PR provincial basis: 1995=80%; 2000=90%; 2005=80%.
that any winning coalition needs to obtain considerable support in the northern provinces. Preference voting is used to select candidates for party lists, a feature that encourages intra-party competition in regional elections (Vassallo, 2005b). Intra-party competition in Lombardia is more evident in loosely structured parties such as FI and DL, where prominent candidates compete intensely for preference votes, than in more densely structured organisations (LN, AN, DS, PRC), where party elites usually avoid fielding high-profile candidates against each other (Mazzoleni, 2005). The prevalence of preference voting for regional elections in Lombardia (22.4%) is only half the national average (42.5%), and the lowest of any Italian region (Vassallo, 2005b).

The 1970-1995 regional party system was characterised by continuous governing coalitions between DC and PSI, which sometimes included smaller liberal or socialist parties. PCI and MSI were both excluded from the regional government. The post-1995 regional party system is characterised by the predominance of the centre-right coalition (CRC), which has comfortably won successive regional elections (1995, 2000, 2005). LN has formed part of the governing CRC since 2000, but was only necessary for CRC victory in the 2005 election. FI remains the largest party in Lombardia, and has formed the basis for successive coalition governments. Since 1995 the regional president has been Roberto Formigoni, an ex-DC parliamentarian who joined FI in 1998. National Alliance (AN) has formed part of this regional governing coalition since 1995, overcoming the exclusion of its predecessor MSI from sub-national government. The main successor organisations to PCI (DS, PRC) and DC (PPI-DL) are located in the opposing centre-left coalition (CLC), and continue to remain excluded from the regional government. Governing coalitions in Lombardia display a strong electoral hierarchy, in line with other northern regional party systems (see Chapter 2): FI is the strongest party, followed by LN, AN, and UDC. DS are the strongest party in the opposing coalition. Although the regional party system consists mainly of statewide parties, LN is not only a key political actor in electoral terms (see Table 13), but also a key actor in coalitional terms, through its successive alliances with statewide centre-right parties.
Table 13: Regional Elections in Lombardia (% support for Main Parties)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>20.2 (Centrosinistra)</td>
<td>27.1 (Ulivo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPI-DL</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>See above</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
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Chapter 4.2.2 Party Organisation in Lombardia (1995-2007)

Political parties in Lombardia vary significantly in organisational terms, particularly in their capacity for political leadership and their choices of electoral strategy. An evident difference emerges between new parties (FI and LN) and those with predecessor organisations (DS, PRC, DL, AN). FI and LN have adopted expansive ‘catch-all’ strategies allowing them to dominate the centre ground of regional politics. In the 1990s FI and LN were able to attract voters disgusted with the political corruption displayed by the main governing parties (DC, PSI), but unwilling to trust the successor parties of PCI. FI and LN also attracted former DC or PSI voters orphaned by the collapse of these party organisations. FI pursued this dual strategy most effectively, actively recruiting key DC and PSI politicians into the party organisation, while also encouraging local entrepreneurs to enter politics. It is mainly the former DC and PSI factions that control FI Lombardia. As a result the light and centralised organisational structure of FI at national level has been territorially reinforced by dense and decentralised networks of former DC or PSI politicians. In contrast LN has not actively recruited such personnel, and has sought to make more of a clean break with the party politics of the pre-1995 period. LN has mainly encouraged local entrepreneurs to enter electoral politics, and has actively sought to develop a new regional political class. Both party organisations have resolved their internal differences by developing an autonomist political discourse, which presents them as defenders of the regional interest against the alleged complacency, indifference, or hostility of the national government. A key plank of this strategy is the demand for

216 DS and PPI-DL formed electoral coalitions together in the 2000 and 2005 regional elections.
greater regional autonomy in policy development and financial resources. This demand was eventually taken up by the CRC national government through a federalising reform of the Italian state, approved in the national parliament (2005) but decisively rejected by voters in a referendum (2006). Voters in Lombardia (and Veneto) nevertheless approved the Constitutional reform by a clear majority (Roux, 2008), because its principal tenets were broadly consistent with the federalist demands advocated by FI and LN in Lombardia. Both parties are characterised by strong regional leaders, although in LN these are indistinguishable from the national leadership. The Lombard League is fully controlled by Umberto Bossi,\textsuperscript{217} with effective delegation to his national allies Roberto Maroni and Roberto Calderoli, who represent the left and right wings of the regional organisation. In practice FI Lombardia is dominated by the regional president (Roberto Formigoni), who effectively controls the dominant ex-DC faction in the regional council.

Political parties in Lombardia with organisational predecessors (DS, PRC, DL, AN) are more closed in their electoral and organisational strategies, focused primarily on the maintenance of their core support base and internal cohesion, largely at the expense of electoral expansion. These parties never set the political agenda in Lombardia, which responds largely to the regionalist drive of FI and LN, and have barely made attempts to advance their own ‘autonomist’ demands. The absence of institutional leaders at sub-national level increases their dependence on the national party, which is barely interested in the politics of Lombardia, and appears content to develop largely ‘stratarchical’ arrangements with the regional party. Both moderate (DS, PPI-DL) and radical (PRC) parties in the CLC display these characteristics. They are further weakened by permanent exclusion from the regional government, which undermines their capacity to assert sub-national political leadership, and reduces the incentives for more prominent national politicians to become involved in regional politics. The expected certainty of CLC defeat in regional elections has encouraged these parties to develop oligarchic practices intent on preserving positions of power, although most politicians recognise the inherent weakness of their position. This has encouraged the regional branches of DS and PPI-DL

\textsuperscript{217} LN leader Umberto Bossi suffered a debilitating stroke in 2003. After this management of the party organisation has increasingly become a function of his political allies, who continue to remain loyal to his undisputed control over the political direction of LN.
to promote measures leading towards party integration, as a way to overcome their marginal position in regional politics and avoid the impression they are old parties dominated by entrenched local elites. Some of these measures of party integration, in particular the ‘centre-left’ electoral coalition formed exclusively in Lombardia for the 2000 regional election, actually preceded analogous processes of party integration at national level. Closed organisational and electoral strategies also characterise AN, a governing party in Lombardia whose regional elites have focused on preserving their core support and maintaining their internal cohesion, rather than competing actively for centre-right votes with FI and LN. This process has been facilitated by consistent control over the regional government, through a stable alliance with stronger coalitional partners.

Factionalism is characteristic of all political parties in Lombardia, and can have a constraining effect on the exercise of party leadership and the adoption of expansive electoral strategies. Strong party leadership and expansive electoral strategies only succeed when a dominant faction emerges in the regional party (FI), or when organised factions are barely tolerated by the party leadership (LN). Yet these solutions for overcoming factional stasis rely heavily on continued party access to government, a situation that reinforces governing parties and weakens opposition parties.

*Forza Italia (FI) in Lombardia*

FI is the largest regional party in electoral terms. Control of FI Lombardia has become presidentialised around Roberto Formigoni, who has exploited the post of regional president to develop a loyal ex-DC faction that operates under his leadership and dominates the regional party. This is particularly evident in the regional party in public office, where ex-DC factions loyal to Formigoni have obtained a ‘near hegemonic’ position of control.\(^{218}\) This has reinforced the capacity of Formigoni to assert a strong leadership position within the regional government, where Formigoni has successfully averted the coalitional blackmail of his supporting parties (particularly LN) by

\(^{218}\) Interview 31 (FI).
threatening to dissolve the regional council and hold new elections.\footnote{219 Interview 27 (DS), 28 (DL), 220 Interview 31 (FI), 221 La Repubblica, Milan Edition (7/3/98)} Despite the centralised organisational structure of FI (see Chapter 2.1), the ascendancy of Formigoni highlights how informal strategies of territorial accommodation can result in *de facto* autonomy for regional levels characterised by strong or united leaders.\footnote{220}

Formigoni’s personalised control over FI Lombardia is surprising because he only joined the party in 1998 (four years after its creation), which excluded him from initial positions of power. In the 1995 regional election, the CRC chose Formigoni as their presidential candidate because of his prominent experience in DC politics, particularly his leadership of *Movimento Popolare*, the political branch of *Comunione e Liberazione* (CL), a Catholic association with close business ties that remains powerful in Lombardia. Formigoni has exploited CL to consolidate his political powerbase in Lombardia, a process aided by his enduring tenure as regional president (1995-), which has privileged the networks of interest between regional government, organised Catholicism, and the business community. The process through which Formigoni joined FI explains his desire to establish a strong regional powerbase. The collapse of DC saw Formigoni join its main successor party PPI, which stood outside both main coalitions in the 1994 national election. In 1995 the PPI leadership decided to join the CLC, producing an internal split that prompted Formigoni to form CDU with other PPI politicians. CDU was a small party allied to the CRC. Formigoni decided to abandon CDU after the 1998 national congress, when his attempt to take over the national leadership narrowly failed,\footnote{221} and proceeded to join the swelling ranks of former DC politicians in FI. Formigoni’s subsequent focus on expanding and consolidating his regional power-base in FI is traceable to this earlier failure to control a national party. His capacity to combine institutional and party control in Lombardia is closely linked to his ability at weaving together disparate DC and PSI politicians into a strong factional alliance. The autonomist strategy pursued by Formigoni and the governing CRC in Lombardia (see Chapter 4.2.3) has given many politicians from these discredited governing parties a new lease of life as technical experts, advocates of the business community, or proponents of regional self-government. This
has allowed many of the old political actors to adapt and survive in the post-1995 regional party system, which in Lombardia is heavily focused on the drive for regional autonomy and the pursuit of economic growth.

In formal terms the sub-national organisation of FI is controlled by the regional coordinator, who is nominated and directed by the party leader (see Chapter 2.1). Yet the regional coordinator in Lombardia, Paolo Romani (1994-2006), effectively lost control of the regional party to Formigoni by the middle of the 2000-2005 Legislature. Romani was a close ally and former employee of Silvio Berlusconi, and a parliamentarian in the liberal faction of FI. Despite his close ties to the party leader, Romani was unable to retain control of the FI Lombardia because he lost the support of former DC and PSI politicians, who chose to converge around the competing regional leadership of Formigoni. The latter constructed a dominant personal faction that consisted mainly of ex-DC politicians, many of whom were linked to CL and known as ciellini. Former DC politicians account for around ½ FI politicians elected to the regional council, and an overwhelming majority of these are part of Formigoni’s faction. The other FI factions in Lombardia include a small ex-DC faction not allied to Formigoni; a substantial ex-PSI faction; and a small liberal faction allied to Paolo Romani. The liberal faction is composed of FI politicians elected only after 1994, and is very supportive of Berlusconi but generally hostile to Formigoni. Party tensions exploded in 2002 when many FI councillors loyal to Formigoni boycotted the regional coordination, controlled by the liberal faction, and the liberal faction retaliated by boycotting the regional council for several months in alliance with LN. This led to the absence of a legal quorum and temporary delays in passing regional legislation. This stand off was eventually resolved through an alliance between Formigoni and the ex-PSI faction, which referred nationally to Fabrizio Cicchito. The combined strength of DC and PSI politicians in Lombardia allowed them to control party and public appointments, shutting out Romani.

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222 Interview 31 (FI).
223 La Repubblica, Milan Edition (1/7/01).
224 Interview 31 (FI).
225 La Repubblica, Milan Edition (30/10/02).
226 La Repubblica, Milan Edition (31/3/03).
and the liberal faction.\textsuperscript{227} Although the liberal faction constituted around 1/3 of FI regional councillors after the 2000 election, their loss of political control reduced them to only two regional councillors by the end of legislature.\textsuperscript{228} Their strength was not increased after the 2005 election, which tended to favour candidates closely associated to Formigoni. The liberal faction now only remains strong in Milan city,\textsuperscript{229} where Formigoni’s powers are constrained by the FI Mayor Letizia Moratti. In 2006 Paolo Romani was substituted as regional coordinator by Maria Stella Gelmini,\textsuperscript{230} a newly elected national parliamentarian whose lack of political weight suggests the national leadership finally recognised its reduced control over the regional party. This recognition of territorial autonomy was confirmed when Formigoni was allowed to found \textit{Rete Italia}, an association with around 600 FI politicians in Lombardia that are close to him.\textsuperscript{231}

Formigoni’s strong control over FI Lombardia is closely linked to his capacity for nomination to key institutional positions and a wide array of public bodies. This includes key posts in the devolved health-care sector, public administration and semi-public agencies, and is certainly not confined to his powers of nomination over the executive. In the 2005 regional election, Formigoni sought to expand his personal support base beyond the confines of FI, by fielding a ‘personal list’ that would compete alongside ‘party lists’. A strong ‘personal list’ would increase his personal powerbase in the regional council and dilute the weight of other coalitional partners (Mazzoleni, 2005), in particular LN with whom Formigoni had developed a turbulent governing relationship. Berlusconi was opposed to sanctioning personal-territorial parties in FI (see Chapter 2.2), and pressured against this outcome in Lombardia.\textsuperscript{232} The weakened liberal faction at regional level duly supported the party leader, opposing Formigoni’s personal list as a “neo-centrist” project that would “undermine the logic of bi-polarism” and weaken FI as a party organisation,\textsuperscript{233} although Berlusconi had agreed that FI presidents in other regions could actually field ‘personal lists’ (see Chapter 2.3). Formigoni only relented in this dispute because LN

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{227} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan Edition (29/2/04)
\item \textsuperscript{228} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan Edition (24/7/04)
\item \textsuperscript{229} Interview 31 (FI),
\item \textsuperscript{230} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan edition (13/2/06).
\item \textsuperscript{231} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan Edition (25/8/06).
\item \textsuperscript{232} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan Edition (21/1/05).
\item \textsuperscript{233} Interview 31 (FI).
\end{itemize}
threatened to field a competing presidential candidate (Mazzoleni, 2005), which would have split the CRC vote and permitted a CLC victory. Formigoni still obtained a convincing victory in 2005 without his ‘personal list’, and proceeded to strengthen his _de facto_ control over FI Lombardia.

Although Formigoni has created a regional powerbase in FI Lombardia, he has refrained from undermining the national leadership of Berlusconi, who has been unwilling to grant the regional president a more prominent role in national politics. Formigoni’s simultaneous institutional and party control is highly dependent on the continued success of FI as a national party, while strong support for FI Lombardia is also tied to the personal appeal of Berlusconi. It is doubtful whether Formigoni could form a successful personal party outside of FI, while his position of institutional leadership would certainly weaken if FI declined in electoral terms vis-à-vis its coalitional partners. This qualifies the view advanced by Mauro Calise (2006) that directly elected ‘presidents’ are challenging oligarchic ‘parties’ for control of democratic politics in Italy. The strong institutional leadership of Formigoni in Lombardia is founded largely on party control.

_Lega Nord (LN) in Lombardia_

In electoral terms LN has remained the second largest party in Lombardia (see Table 13). Within the region its electoral support is territorially differentiated: much higher in the northern provinces (Bergamo, Brescia, Como, Lecco, Sondrio, Varese), characterised by the proliferation of SMEs in industrial districts (Trigilia, 1997), and much weaker in the southern provinces (Cremona, Lodi, Milano, Mantova, Pavia), characterised by the continued presence of larger enterprises. Most of the southern provinces are small, with the significant exception of Milan. LN difficulties in the city of Milan became particularly acute in local elections where LN support fell to only 4% in 2001 and 3.7% in 2006. In the 1990s the Lombard League faced organisational and electoral difficulties because of national leadership decisions to ally with the CRC, since the party contained prominent politicians and many supporters that favoured an alternative alliance with the

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234 Interview 24 (LN), 27 (DS).
CLC, while others wanted LN to avoid any form of alliance with statewide parties.\textsuperscript{235} Their divergence with the positions of the party leadership were only resolved through the centralisation of control around the federal secretary Umberto Bossi, and the ensuing resignation, marginalisation, or compliance of left-leaning LN politicians. This centralisation occurred during the ‘secessionist’ period of LN politics in the late 1990s, which reinforced the party leader and his direct relationship with party activists.

The location of LN in the CRC was not a guaranteed outcome in the 1990s, with concerns raised about the political and business ethics of FI leader Silvio Berlusconi, the democratic credentials of AN (successor to the neo-fascist party MSI), and intense electoral competition with FI in northern regions. Among prominent politicians in the Lombard League favourable to governing coalitions with the CLC was Marco Formentini, formerly mayor of Milan (1993-1997). Formentini wanted to use Lombardia as an arena for experimenting with governing coalitions between LN and centre-left statewide parties,\textsuperscript{236} a process already enacted in the Special Status region of Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, and the provinces of Vicenza and Padova (Veneto region).\textsuperscript{237} Formentini was initially supported by Roberto Maroni, a prominent LN politician and leader of the left-leaning faction in the Lombard League. Yet the clear drift of the party leadership towards the CRC from 1999 prompted the high-profile defection of Formentini, who joined the CLC soon after being elected with LN to the European Parliament,\textsuperscript{238} while Maroni succumbed to strong pressure from Umberto Bossi and negotiated a deal on federalism with the CRC, paving the way for a broader coalitional agreement.\textsuperscript{239} While the Lombard League contained strong left-leaning factions, it also contained a strong hard-line faction (led by Roberto Calderoli and known as the Duri), opposed to LN allying with either main coalition.\textsuperscript{240} In the 1990s these features distinguished the

\textsuperscript{235} Interview 23 (LN)
\textsuperscript{236} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan edition (22/3/95)
\textsuperscript{237} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan edition (5/9/96)
\textsuperscript{238} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan edition (21/10/99)
\textsuperscript{239} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan edition (18/2/00)
\textsuperscript{240} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan edition (3/1/00)
Lombard League from its partners in neighbouring regions, which were more favourable to coalitions with the centre-right, and lacked any comparable hard-line factions.\footnote{La Repubblica, Milan edition (22/6/99)}

Since these competing coalitional demands (CRC or CLC) had the potential to split the party organisation in the 1990s, the party leader Umberto Bossi pursued a compromise option for the 1999 elections (local, provincial, European), whereby LN would compete against both CLC and CRC. This decision was duly implemented at all territorial levels, although it entailed exclusion from sub-national government. The two-round provincial elections saw 7 of the 11 provinces in Lombardia contested. The outcome was disappointing for LN, whose candidates were defeated in all 7 provinces and only reached the 2nd round in Bergamo, but nevertheless resolved the coalitional debate in favour of allying with the CRC. The claims of the duri faction that LN could ‘go it alone’ in Lombardia were clearly disproved by these provincial elections, and this faction then became the most supportive of continuing alliances with the CRC. The claims of the left-leaning faction that LN should ally with the CLC were undermined by the latter’s poor performance, losing the large provinces of Milano, Bergamo, and Brescia, and winning only the small provinces of Lecco, Lodi and Cremona. This partly explains the weakness of intra-party resistance to Bossi’s decision to develop pre-electoral and governing coalitions with the CRC for the 2000 regional elections. These confirmed the electoral decline of the CLC, and created an inevitable expectation the CRC would win the ensuing national election (2001), rendering the prospect of allying with the CLC largely futile for LN, which now sought to attain its new objective of a federal Italian state.

Although LN in the 2000s became more firmly allied to the CRC, the Lombard League has frequently been critical of the regional government, particularly the FI regional president. Despite inter-party tensions LN remains part of the governing CRC, in line with the congruent multi-level coalitions enforced by the party leadership.\footnote{Interview 30 (LN)} During the 2000-2005 Legislature, LN councilors allied with FI factions hostile to Formigoni’s leadership and temporarily boycotted the council, creating a legislative paralysis due to
the absence of legal quorum. This dispute was not allowed to escalate further by the party leadership, despite tensions with Formigoni over the personal list (see Part 2.2), because of the need to maintain the multi-level coalition with the CRC, necessary to implementing a federal reform of the Italian state.\textsuperscript{243} The imposition of coalitional choices by the party leadership is always successful in the Lombard League. The party leadership determined coalitional choices for the 2004 provincial elections, where LN stood outside the CRC in all regions for the 1\textsuperscript{st} round ballot but joined the CRC in all regions for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} round ballot. The party leadership also determined coalitional choices for the 2005 regional elections, choosing to re-iterate the electoral and governing coalitions with the CRC in all regions. While centralised decision-making is compatible with lobbying for key policy and office objectives at national level, it is rather inconsistent with the discourse of federalism advocated by LN in Italian politics, and represents a dramatic organisational shift from the ‘confederation’ of independent regional Leagues formed in 1989. LN has become the most centralised party in national politics, where politicians that disagree with leadership choices have little internal ‘voice’, and must choose between ‘exit’ (e.g. Formentini) or ‘loyalty’ (e.g. Maroni).

\textbf{National Alliance (AN) in Lombardia}

AN is the third governing party in Lombardia, but its support in regional elections has undergone a progressive decline over the timeframe (see Table 13). In electoral terms AN was unable to capitalise on the collapse of DC or the ensuing CRC predominance, but fully exploited this opportunity to participate in sub-national government. This reflects a regional party that failed to expand beyond its immediate organizational or electoral confines, and largely contented itself with guaranteed access to sub-national government. AN has rarely sought to influence the agenda of regional politics set by FI and LN, whose ambivalent political relations determine the stability of the governing coalition. AN has been most effective in obtaining a substantial number of positions in the regional government, despite its limited electoral and political weight.\textsuperscript{244} AN elected only 7

\textsuperscript{243} Interviews 23, 24 (LN)
\textsuperscript{244} La Repubblica, Milan Edition (7/2/05)
councillors in the 2005 regional elections, yet 3 of these became regional ministers, holding significant positions such as the regional vice-presidency. AN Lombardia has abandoned the objective of expansive ‘vote-seeking’, and focused almost entirely on ‘office-seeking’ and ‘policy-seeking’ (Strom, 1990). The regional party is highly factionalised but broadly under the control of Ignazio La Russa, who leads the ‘Protagonist Right’ faction at both national and regional level. The ‘Protagonist Right’ faction is the largest in Lombardia, and remains most supportive of liberal economic reforms and FI leader Silvio Berlusconi, which may explain the absence of significant tensions between FI and AN in Lombardia. The smaller factions are ‘Social Right’ (economically and socially conservative, distant from the party leader) and ‘New Alliance’ (economically and socially liberal, close to the party leader). Factional disputes are constrained by the collective focus of AN on controlling sub-national government.

In the mid-1990s Ignazio La Russa had encouraged AN leader Gianfranco Fini to adopt more ‘autonomist’ positions in northern Italy, with a view to containing the electoral appeal of LN.\(^\text{245}\) Fini opposed this strategy because of concerns that an autonomist strategy would damage the party’s support base in southern Italy, and might compel LN into more radical and secessionist positions. Yet La Russa continued to pressure the national leader to adopt electoral and governing coalitions with LN, as a mechanism for electoral success and as a way to moderate the policy positions and contain the appeal of LN.\(^\text{246}\) Although the AN leadership never sanctioned a more autonomist strategy in Lombardia, La Russa was able to implement part of his political strategy during coalitional negotiations with LN in 2000. Despite the clear rupture between LN and the CRC in the late 1990s, La Russa maintained strong personal relations with Roberto Maroni (LN), which were resuscitated by the party leadership to broker the pre-electoral coalitions between LN and the CRC for the 2000 regional elections.\(^\text{247}\) AN and LN agreed on a “Programme for the Enactment of Devolution”, whose content heavily influenced the Devolution Bill approved by the CRC national government in 2005. After the 2005 regional election La Russa’s control over AN Lombardia was somewhat

\(^{245}\) La Repubblica, Milan Edition (14/5/96)

\(^{246}\) La Repubblica, Milan Edition (16/12/97)

\(^{247}\) La Repubblica, Milan Edition (18/2/00)
weakened by the nomination of a party rival, Cristiano Muscardini, as regional coordinator.\textsuperscript{248} This occurred after La Russa and other factional leaders were secretly recorded making disloyal comments about the party leader, prompting Fini to nominate loyalists as regional coordinators and declare the end of factionalism in AN.\textsuperscript{249} Yet factional leaders such as La Russa continue to dominate the internal politics of AN, suggesting the end of factionalism was a rhetorical flourish rather than an achievement.

**Democrats of the Left (DS) and Daisy-Democracy and Liberty (DL) in Lombardia**

The main centre-left parties in Lombardia, DS and DL, are largely confined to the electoral support and political networks of their organisational predecessors, PCI and the ‘Left’ DC factions. DS and DL remain closed in their organisational and electoral orientation, and display weak leadership capacity at regional level, but have nevertheless promoted party integration as a mechanism for broadening their electoral appeal and increasing their access to sub-national government. These regional processes preceded analogous developments at national level, which culminated in the merger of DS and DL to form the Democratic Party (PD) in October 2007. In the 2000s DS and DL Lombardia began to adopt slightly more autonomist positions vis-à-vis the national government (controlled by the CRC), in an attempt to prevent FI and LN from dominating the autonomist discourse in Lombardia. This strategy generated some tensions with national elites, who did not support the regional branches in their bid to promote more autonomous credentials. Regional DS and DL politicians often favoured developing alliances with LN, particularly when the latter became estranged from the CRC. Yet any attempt towards alignment with LN was consistently rejected by national elites, who remained concerned by LN’s divisive and xenophobic postures. Nor has coalition testing between the CLC and LN been possible in Lombardia, because LN supports congruent multi-level coalitions with the CRC. Neither DS nor DL have produced strong regional leaders able to assert the autonomy of their regional party, or protect its interests in national decision-making. This is partly because electoral system for national elections

\textsuperscript{248} *La Repubblica*, Milan Edition (20/7/05)
\textsuperscript{249} [http://www.centrostudimalfatti.org/old/alleanza_nazionale.html](http://www.centrostudimalfatti.org/old/alleanza_nazionale.html)
(1994-2001) resulted in very few parliamentarians elected in Lombardia, but also because exclusion from regional (and most local) governments limited the leadership capacity of sub-national elites. Exclusion from sub-national government increased dependence on the national leadership to raise the political visibility, provide avenues for career advancement, and deliver financial resources to sub-national elites. This ultimately constrained the autonomy of their respective organisations, and undermined their ability to challenge the CRC in Lombardia.

The dire condition of the CLC in Lombardia was evident from its largest party DS, which was weakened in every stage of its organizational transformation (from PCI to PDS to DS), losing personnel and supporters but largely unable to attract new ones.\textsuperscript{250} This represents a continuation of the problems experienced by PCI Lombardia, whose electoral support declined consistently during the late 1970s and 1980s. The process of de-industrialisation in the Italian economy since the 1970s, with the closure of large factories and the rise of small businesses, weakened the traditional support base for the Italian left, which became unable to win significant support from employers or workers in northern SMEs (Cento Bull and Gilbert).\textsuperscript{251} The “left in Lombardia has always been seen as heavily ideological and barely able to represent the territorial interests of a rapidly changing society.”\textsuperscript{252} In recent decades Lombardia has achieved levels of economic growth that transformed it into the second richest EU region,\textsuperscript{253} an economic development focused on the growth of SMEs in the industrial districts of northern Lombardia, where the CLC now faces its great difficulties in attracting support.\textsuperscript{254} The social effects of these rapid economic changes include large-scale immigration, greater concerns about personal security, and the fragmentation of family structures. This has resulted in political problems the left has been unable to address with its existing ideological schema.\textsuperscript{255} The drive for competitiveness in global export markets has highlighted the high levels of taxation and bureaucratic inefficiency of the Italian state,
creating political demands for lower taxation and a reformed public administration. Yet the “world of work” supported by the CLC is tied to out-dated models, which pits unionised employees against large corporate employers, and does not reflect the decline of large corporations and trade unions in Lombardia. The Italian left has also failed to promote meritocracy in work, or consider the demands of consumers. The CLC in Lombardia has become closely associated with an inefficient public sector and a declining core of large-scale factory employees. The political vacuum has been filled by a CRC more attentive to the needs of the private sector, particularly through its new parties (FI and LN), whose support base is built on widespread dissatisfaction in the private sector (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001), whether from employers concerned at their profits, or workers concerned to keep their jobs and raise their monthly wages.

DS had the most structured organizational presence of all CLC parties in Lombardia, with around 54,000 members. Their internal composition closely reflects the ideological factions at national level, with a clear majority in favour of the party leadership (Fassino-D’Alema); a small minority faction in favour of more liberal-reformist positions; and a significant leftist faction (20-25%). Each faction was highly dependent on their national leader, suggesting a high level of ideological congruence and vertical integration. Since the late 1990s, DS Lombardia was debating whether to adopt more autonomist positions, with many regional elites seeing to counter what they see as a national biased towards DS electoral strongholds in central-northern regions and vested governing interests in central-southern regions. The former DS regional secretary Pierangelo Ferrari frequently expressed the resentment of DS Lombardia, who felt abandoned against a strong LN and FI. Permanent exclusion from the regional government (and most local ones) made the DS unable to develop a strong governing record at sub-national levels, which might have improved their legitimacy in the eyes of regional voters, strengthened their weak media profile, and helped the emergence of confident sub-national leaders. National party leaders were not of great assistance to DS

256 Interviews 26 (DS), 29 (Verdi)
257 Interviews 26 (DS), 29 (Verdi).
258 Interview 26 (DS).
259 *La Repubblica*, Milan edition (30/6/00)
260 Interview 26 (DS)
Lombardia, given their unwillingness to advance significant reforms on security and immigration, economic growth or the reduction of taxation, streamlining bureaucracy or implementing fiscal federalism, issues that would appeal to the Lombard electorate and might benefit the regional party.\textsuperscript{261} The only tangible support from the national DS was the 2001 Devolution Bill, enthusiastically supported by DS Lombardia as a concrete and substantial measure of legislative decentralisation, which countered the hypothetical referenda on devolution or secessionism then being proposed by Formigoni and the LN.\textsuperscript{262} Yet LN successfully presented the 2001 Devolution Bill as an insincere and incomplete attempt by the CLC to pursue state reform for electoral gain, since it was swiftly approved between defeat in the 2000 regional elections and defeat in the 2001 national election. The ensuing national governments led by Berlusconi (2001-2006) saw LN pursue a more drastic federal reform of the Italian state, approved by the entire CRC in the form of the 2005 Devolution Bill. DS Lombardia campaigned against this reform, which was comfortably abrogated in a nationwide referendum (38.7\% Yes, 61.3\% No). But this further distanced them from voters in Lombardia, who came out in favour of this legislation (54.6\% Yes, 45.4\%). More recently DS Lombardia became infuriated by the unwillingness of the second Prodi government (2006-8) to support an expansion of regional competences for Lombardia, or to implement a full system of fiscal federalism in Italy,\textsuperscript{263} so supported proposals advanced by the FI regional president in this domain.

DS Lombardia were unable to shape national party decision-making, despite the immense size of their region. DS decision-making was focused around the party leadership and its elites in the national parliament, where DS Lombardia was weakly represented.\textsuperscript{264} The MMM electoral system (1994-2001) virtually eliminated the parliamentary presence of the CLC in Lombardia. In the 1994 election the CRC won 74/75 majoritarian constituencies for the Deputies and all 35 majoritarian seats in the Senate seats. In the 2001 elections the CRC in Lombardia won 70/74 majoritarian seats in the Deputies and

\textsuperscript{261} \textit{La Repubblica}, Genoa edition (6/6/00)  
\textsuperscript{262} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan edition (2/3/01)  
\textsuperscript{263} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan edition (5/8/06)  
\textsuperscript{264} \textit{La Repubblica}, Milan edition (15/5/01)
all 35 majoritarian seats in the Senate. Although the ‘PR with majoritarian bonus’ electoral system used in the 2006 national election automatically produced a stronger DS parliamentary presence from Lombardia, the compensating loss of DS seats in central-northern regions meant prominent candidates from these regions were simply ‘parachuted’ by the national leadership to head party lists in Lombardia. This met with some protest from DS Lombardia, but its weak position within the party made it unable to resist this affront to its autonomy. The ensuing national Prodi government contained no ministers from Lombardia (2006-8). Although autonomist positions had become grounded in DS Lombardia, with growing support for the view that a “federal party should come from below” as the “expression of the territory” rather than “national factions”, internal reforms in the direction of a ‘federal network’ (see Chapter 2.1) did not alter the inherent dependency of the regional party on the national leadership. This is largely because strong local or regional leaders remained absent, a feature aggravated by the general failure of the CLC in sub-national elections. Although CLC mayors have sometimes been elected in smaller provincial capitals, the CLC has not won the crucial city of Milan since 1992. CLC politicians have few avenues through which to gain public visibility and institutional experience, so making them entirely dependent on the national leadership and its various factions for their career advancement.

DL Lombardia is composed almost entirely of politicians from the former ‘Left’ DC factions, and exists almost entirely in public office. Its presence on the ground is almost negligible, with only 850 members in the city of Milan. However individual DL politicians have retained local support networks that survived the collapse of the DC, and remain in office by competing for preference votes. Although DL Lombardia is distant from the modernising objectives of the national party, it has always supported the national leader Francesco Rutelli, because of his importance in projecting a new and

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265 Interview 28 (DL).
266 Interview 25 (DS), 28 (DL).
267 Interview 26 (DS)
268 Interview with Luciano Pizzetti (DS Regional Secretary), La Repubblica, Milan edition (20/4/06).
269 Interview 25 (DS)
270 La Repubblica, Milan edition (4/12/06)
modernising image that its regional elites lacked. DL Lombardia therefore made no attempts to form factional alliances with the more assertive successors of ‘Left’ DC factions in southern Italy (see Chapter 4.1). DL politicians had few incentives to develop the broader party organisation, since this possessed few financial resources to aid their regional election campaigns, and provided few career opportunities for them at national level, given the low number of CLC parliamentarians elected in Lombardia. Exclusion from sub-national government further reduced the incentives and resources available to develop the party organisation, encouraging regional elites to hold onto their remaining vestiges of power and influence, and avoid active processes of party regeneration.

Candidate selection for DS and DL party lists reflected their self-preserving instincts. These parties usually fielded candidates with strong ties to ancillary organisations, in particular the trade unions CGIL (close to DS) and CISL (close to DL), whose candidates were most capable of rallying the core vote (Mazzoleni, 2005). Although DS and DL supported attempts to represent ‘civil society’ on party lists, their conception of this heavily favoured political activists already involved in their parties. DS strictly imposed two-term limits on regional councillors, in an attempt to develop internal promotion and enact generational change, whereas DL confirmed its nature as a party in public office by re-confirming all existing regional councilors, and providing little or no support to newcomers (Mazzoleni, 2005). Both parties sought to balance these self-preserving instincts by proposing intra-coalitional candidates for regional president that broke the mould of internal selection, and sought to win support from moderate non-aligned voters. The CLC candidates for regional president have twice been neo-centrist former DC politicians (Diego Masi in 1995, Mino Martinazzoli in 2000) and more recently a prominent non-party entrepreneur (Riccardo Sarfatti in 2005). These presidential candidates encountered serious difficulties collaborating with party elites during the election campaign, and after their defeat became very distant from the CLC, either joining the CRC (Masi) or forming separate groups in the regional council (Martinazzoli and Sarfatti). The inability to generate or promote strong candidates for regional leadership represents a serious brake on the governing aspirations of the CLC in

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271 *La Repubblica*, Milan edition (22/5/06)
Lombardia, and unless resolved will continue to damage their prospects in regional elections, which have become highly personalised around competing leaders.

The closed organisational arrangements and electoral orientation of DS and DL Lombardia form part of a ‘survival strategy’, aimed at stemming the loss of votes from their core constituencies, hold onto remaining positions of party and institutional power, and retain close links with their ancillary organisations, in particular the trade unions capable of rallying the core vote. This strategy is a response to the aggressive external environment faced by the CLC in Lombardia, characterised by low and declining electoral support; strong electoral challenges from new parties (FI and LN); permanent exclusion from the regional government; weak presence in local governments; virtually no representation in the Italian parliament; and minimal influence over national party decision-making. Yet these party elites broadly recognised the ultimate futility of their existing organisations. Although the Italian political system has bi-polarised at all territorial levels, in Lombardia the CLC faces the complication of a predominant CRC supported by a strong LN. DS and DL elites in Lombardia therefore sought to pursue an ‘integration strategy’, aligning their institutional positions and organisational strategies to encourage the creation of a single centre-left party. They pursued policies to aid this party merger, such as the unprecedented formation of a ‘centre-left’ electoral coalition for the 2000 regional election, the endorsement of a ‘Ulivo’ electoral coalition for the 2005 regional election, and the decision to form a united and coordinated opposition in the regional council after the 2005 election. These attempts sometimes proved counter-productive to their intentions. Although Lombardia was the only region to develop a ‘Centre-Left’ list for the 2000 elections, which included candidates from DS and the component parties of DL (PPI, DEM, RI), this list performed disastrously (20.2%), temporarily stalling further moves towards party integration at national level, and failing to mask the continued electoral decline of these parties in regional elections. In the 1995 regional election PDS and PPI alone had obtained more support than the entire ‘Centre-Left’ list in 2000 (see Table 13). Regional elites nevertheless largely supported the formation of a ‘Ulivo’ electoral coalition (DS, DL, SDI) for the 2005 regional election.
The electoral outcome was more promising and in line with a strong ‘Ulivo’ performance in all northern and central-northern regions (see Chapter 2.2).

Regional politicians in Lombardia were mainly supportive of the party fusion between DS and DL in October 2007, as they hoped the Democratic Party (PD) would be less encumbered by the historical difficulties of the centre-left in Lombardia; would broaden its appeal to regional voters by pursuing more autonomist strategies; and would operate freely within a more decentralised party organisation.²⁷² Yet the success of PD Lombardia depends on the willingness of the party leadership to tolerate genuine regional autonomy (including coalitional choices), and its capacity to develop more convincing sub-national leaders, who will reject the closed and self-preserving instincts of most DS and DL elites. The prospect of organisational regeneration was slightly boosted by the electoral primaries to select the PD regional coordinator, convincingly won by the 29-year old Maurizio Martina, formerly DS provincial secretary in Bergamo. Martina was supported by the regional DS elite, and was aligned to electoral lists supporting Walter Veltroni, the establishment candidate for party leader, so it is doubtful whether this inexperienced politician could implement a truly innovative and difficult strategy.

**Radical left parties (PRC, PDCI, Greens) in Lombardia**

PRC is the main party of the radical left, but displays many of the organisational and electoral problems faced by the moderate centre-left parties, perhaps unsurprising given the common past shared by PRC and DS politicians in the PCI organisation, whose support base in Lombardia eroded in the late 1970s and 1980s. PRC has certainly adopted a ‘survival strategy’, and unlike the DS has not sought to counter-pose this with an ‘integration strategy’, with no significant attempts made to integrate with other radical left parties, namely PDCI and the Greens. PRC support is primarily confined to the provinces of Milan and Brescia.²⁷³ The few successful candidates for regional elections tend to have close affiliations with trade unions, particularly the militant union Cobas or

²⁷² Interviews 26, 33 (DS).
²⁷³ Interview 32 (PRC).
the radical wing of CGIL (Mazzoleni, 2005). Since PRC has adopted a unitary model of party organisation, founded on provincial federations rather than regional structures (see Chapter 2.1), the regional party has few mechanisms through which to conduct a concerted opposition. It exists only in public office, where its regional councillors are almost independent in their political activities, having neither strong support nor serious restrictions from the provincial organisation. 274 Regional councillors are elected on a provincial basis, so tend to be actively involved in their respective federations, and have limited time or ability to campaign on regional issues. The traditional support base for PRC remains unionised manual workers in the manufacturing districts surrounding Milan and Brescia, but even here many of their supporters have shifted towards LN. 275

Radical left parties in Lombardia have failed to develop convincing responses to the tensions between immigration and security, or between social solidarity and economic competitiveness, and this has limited their capacity to win votes in Lombardia. 276 Although PRC has co-opted several social movements in Milan, these groups appeal almost entirely to politicised youth, display limited organisational effectiveness, and face an ongoing process of decline. 277 Campaigning on environmental issues has been another feature of radical left opposition, uniting them against the ‘business growth model’ supported by the CRC regional government. However the arguments used by the Communist parties (PRC, Pdci) displays an ideological and obstructionist tendency, so illustrates clear differences with the more pragmatic approach of the Greens, focused on societal and environmental harmony. 278 These differences are damaging for the radical left, since party integration could grant them considerably more weight in the regional CLC, where moderate parties are relatively weaker than at national level. In the 2005 regional election PRC (5.7%), PDCI (2.4%) and the Greens (2.9%) accounted for 11% of votes in Lombardia. Yet no significant attempts were made to pursue party integration, reflecting the conservative and self-preserving instincts of their party elites.

274 Interview 32 (PRC).
275 Interviews 29 (Verdi), 32 (PRC)
276 Interviews 29 (Verdi), 32 (PRC)
277 Interview 32 (PRC).
278 Interviews 27 (DS), 29 (Verdi).
Chapter 4.2.3 Party System of Lombardia (1995-2007)

The party system in Lombardia is characterised by non-alternation in regional government, with LN part of the governing CRC since 2000. The CRC has obtained a high Margin of Victory (MoV) over the CLC in successive regional elections (14.0%, 1995; 31.0%, 2000; 10.7%, 2005). LN support was unnecessary for CRC victory in 2000, but became crucial for CRC victory in 2005, because of a reduced MoV. Coalition formation in the governing CRC has responded to the prerogatives of the national parties, while governing stability depends on the relationship between LN and the FI regional president. The pre-electoral coalitions in 2000 were a crucial stage in the national reconciliation between LN and the CRC, and were repeated for the 2001 national election, guaranteeing LN participation in the Berlusconi governments (2001-2006). This prompted LN and the CRC to re-iterate their pre-electoral and governing coalition for the 2005 regional elections. The governing CRC in Lombardia is characterised by a strong electoral hierarchy, which sees FI remain the largest regional party (controlling the regional presidency), LN the second regional party (controlling the presidency of the regional council), and AN the third governing party (controlling the vice-presidency). Formigoni is an increasingly powerful leader, due to his growing control over the largest party (FI), and his pursuit of an autonomist governing strategy that unites the CRC. This strategy is founded on promoting greater regional autonomy, both in policy development and the control of fiscal resources, and the promotion of measures that support regional economic growth. This has enhanced intra-coalitional stability, guaranteed the loyalty of LN, and reinforced the coalitional and party leadership of Formigoni. The autonomist governing strategy pursued by the CRC has also divided the opposition CLC between its moderate and radical components. While moderate parties (DS, DL) have sought to develop a ‘constructive opposition’, sometimes providing parliamentary support to popular government proposals (e.g. devolution of financial resources to Lombardia), the radical parties (PRC, PDCI, Greens) continued to pursue an ‘obstructive opposition’, opposing all measures approved by the regional government. Neither form of opposition raised the profile of the opposition, and only served to exacerbate centre-left divisions. The local-regional media actively support Formigoni, who has been successful not only
in ‘personalising’ regional politics, but also in exploiting the extensive resources of regional government to promote his successive election campaigns (Mazzoleni, 2005).

**Coalition Formation in Lombardia**

Coalition formation in Lombardia has responded to the bi-polarising incentives of the regional electoral system introduced in 1995. The outcome has been coalitional predominance and non-alternation in government, rather than wholesale alternation in government between competing coalitions. The 1995 electoral reform introduced the majoritarian bonus, which guaranteed a majority of seats in the council to the winning coalition, and allowed the competing coalitions to nominate their candidate for president.

The competing parties in Lombardia responded immediately to the bi-polarising incentives of the new electoral system, fielding coalitions and presidential candidates in the 1995 election that could appeal to the centre ground of electoral politics, particularly voters orphaned by the collapse of DC and PSI. The CRC in Lombardia needed to compete without LN, because the latter had recently brought down the first Berlusconi government (1994-5). This prompted the CRC to select a presidential candidate (Roberto Formigoni) from the smallest coalitional partner (CDU), a measure designed to appeal to the entrepreneurial ex-DC vote in Lombardia, given Formigoni’s strong ties to Catholic business associations and the centrist positioning of CDU. FI and AN were significantly stronger than CDU in Lombardia, yet neither sought to field presidential candidates, although Formigoni did later join FI. The CLC also sought to direct its appeal towards the centre ground of ex-DC voters, with PDS and PPI agreeing on Diego Masi as their presidential candidate. Masi was an ex-DC politician from the neo-centrist Segni Pact, whose leader had successfully promoted a national referendum to reform the electoral system. The Segni Pact competed in the 1994 national election and 1995 regional elections, but had limited electoral appeal and subsequently merged into AN. This choice of right-leaning candidate infuriated PRC, who fielded a competing candidate (Pippo Torri) that split the CLC vote and contributed to defeat. The CRC governed the whole legislature under the leadership of Roberto Formigoni. Although a few regional
councillors defected to join the neo-centrist movement UDR in 1998, these never undermined the governing coalition, unlike in central-southern regions where they overturned the regional government (see Chapter 2.2 and Chapter 4.1).

A significant shift in intra-coalitional relations occurred prior to the 2000 regional elections, which impacted heavily on the politics of Lombardia. A coalition agreement was reached between FI leader Silvio Berlusconi (de facto leader of the CRC) and LN leader Umberto Bossi. LN agreed to form pre-electoral and governing coalitions with the CRC, and in return the CRC agreed to implement a federal reform of the Italian state when elected to the national government. This coalition agreement was tested in the 2000 regional elections, when LN formed pre-electoral and governing coalitions with the CRC in all regions. In return LN obtained the presidency of the regional council and key ministerial portfolios in northern regions (e.g. Health and Infrastructure in Lombardia). However Formigoni was reluctant to implement this agreement, believing that LN support was unnecessary for coalitional victory, and would only disrupt his control over the governing coalition. He only relented because this coalition was necessary for FI to enter the national government, and continued rejection would have alienated him from the party leader; threatened his position within the party organisation; and seriously undermined his institutional control. Not only did LN support prove unnecessary for CRC victory in 2000, but the ensuing distribution of seats in the regional council allowed LN to wield blackmail potential throughout the Legislature, because the core governing parties (FI, AN, CCD) held only 40 of the 80 seats. The alliance between LN and the CRC compelled the CLC to become more united or face inevitable defeat in 2000. Unlike the 1995 election, PRC formed a pre-electoral coalition with moderate parties (DS, PPI) in Lombardia, although the latter once again imposed an ex-DC politician with centrist leanings as presidential candidate. The CLC candidate, Mino Martinazzoli, was a former DC Minister, founder of PPI (1994), and Mayor of Brescia (1994-1998). After the 2000 election he became estranged from the CLC, and later became president of Udeur.

279 La Repubblica, Milan Edition (8/11/97; 17/1/98). Although a UDR group formed temporarily in Lombardia, this eventually chose to provide external support to the regional government.

280 Interview 23 (LN); La Repubblica, Milan Edition (11/4/00)

281 More precisely this occurred because the CRC gained 60%+ of the vote, so the ‘majoritarian bonus’ of additional seats (allocated through a closed list) was halved from 16 to only 8 seats.
The 2005 regional election saw a re-iteration of the same pre-electoral alliances that characterised the previous election. Formigoni stood again as presidential candidate. The main threat to coalitional stability was his proposal to field a ‘personal list’, adamantly rejected by LN on the grounds it would weaken their coalitional weight in Lombardia. LN threatened to field a competing presidential candidate while Berlusconi was also opposed, eventually forcing the regional president to back down. LN support proved necessary for coalitional victory. LN increased its intra-coalitional weight because its electoral support remained stable (+0.1%) while FI and AN both lost ground. This was reflected in the allocation of seats to the winning coalition, which favoured LN as the only governing party to increase its share of seats from 10 to 15. Yet improved political relations between LN and Formigoni have prevented the legislative paralysis and conflict that paralysed much of the 2000-2005 Legislature.

The CLC in the 2005 regional election was unable to take advantage of the favourable national electoral cycle and overturn the CRC majority in Lombardia. The main moderate parties (DS and DL) were unable to agree in advance on a prominent candidate for regional president, so a non-party entrepreneur (Riccardo Sarfatti) was chosen just 3 months before the election, failing to build adequate momentum (Mazzoleni, 2005). After the election defeat Sarfatti became distant from the main centre-left parties in Lombardia, and proceeded to form his own group in the council, repeating the pattern of CLC presidential candidates after the 1995 and 2000 elections. CLC presidential candidates are chosen for their centrist or independent credentials, but wield no control over regional party elites, so are unable to lead the centre-left opposition after election defeats. If party control is a necessary condition for coalitional leadership, this raises the question of why the largest party in the regional CLC (DS) never fielded presidential candidates for regional elections in Lombardia. DS interviewees cite three reasons. The first is the concern that DS candidates would not appeal to former DC or PSI voters, whose support remains necessary for coalitional victory in the post-1995 regional party system. The second is that DS lack prominent local or regional leaders to field as presidential candidates in Lombardia. The third is the weakness of DS Lombardia in intra-party and
intra-coalitional negotiations over candidate selection. The choice of coalitional candidates for regional president must balance the competing demands of different parties in the CLC. Since elections in the OS regions are held concurrently, presidential candidates are negotiated at national level by party leaders. The DS leadership was reluctant to nominate presidential candidates in Lombardia, preferring to nominate candidates in secure regions dominated by DS and the CLC (centre-north), or competitive regions where DS and the CLC had a good chance of entering the regional government (centre-south, Liguria, Piemonte). Since DS Lombardia had almost no influence in national decision-making, they were unable to impose their preferences on this issue.

**Coalitional Predominance and Autonomist Governing Strategies**

The CRC in Lombardia has secured its electoral predominance and governing cohesion through the pursuit of an autonomist political strategy. This is founded on two related objectives: Greater autonomy and higher economic growth. The drive for autonomy pursued by the CRC is largely rhetorical, and consists of a sustained political discourse demanding the devolution of policy competences and financial resources to the regional government, as part of a broader federal reform of the Italian state. The drive for economic growth is often rhetorical, focusing on the supposed neglect of Lombardia by successive national governments, and is closely linked to the autonomist drive. But it also involves active political lobbying in the economic interests of the region, and an extensive involvement of the private sector in delivering public services. The widespread use of public-private partnerships has reinforced clientelist ties in Lombardia between the regional government and politically influential sectors of the business community, with the latter providing extensive financial support for the CRC in election campaigns.

The autonomist governing strategy of the CRC is evident from the start of Formigoni’s tenure as regional president and pre-dates the governing coalition with LN. Formigoni initially adopted autonomist policies to compete for votes with LN, “stealing the battle-horse of the League”\(^\text{282}\) by supporting policy positions that resonated with their

\(^{282}\) Interview 23 (LN)
electorate. The adhesion of LN to the CRC reinforced this governing strategy, which became essential for holding together a governing coalition that encompassed a wide spectrum of electoral support. FI and LN competed to re-capture the entrepreneurial vote that progressively abandoned DC from the 1970s onwards (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001), while AN rallied the core MSI and right wing DC vote. FI additionally appealed to many former PSI voters, while LN obtains support from voters disillusioned with all statewide parties in Lombardia, including many voters who progressively abandoned PCI and its main successor parties (DS and PRC) from the 1970s onwards. The pursuit of common objectives that benefit all regional voters, regardless of class differences or sectoral interests, and which only penalises voters outside the region, constitutes the basis for the territorial ‘catch all’ strategy pursued by the CRC in Lombardia.

This strategy has been particularly successful for FI, which remains the largest party in Lombardia, and has effectively re-composed the DC-PSI governing alliance within a single, loosely structured party organisation. LN has sought to differentiate its electoral appeal from its main coalitional competitor, but has been compelled to pursue more radical positions. These have been unsuccessful in overturning the electoral hierarchy of the CRC, but have largely stabilised LN support in regional election. The outcome of electoral competition between FI and LN has been beneficial for both parties, since their combined vote share in regional elections is huge (1995, 46.9%; 2000, 49.3%; 2005, 41.8%). Yet the tensions of electoral competition between FI and LN have sometimes disrupted the stability of the governing coalition, in which both parties have been key components since 2000. The smaller governing parties in Lombardia (AN, UDC) have performed a stabilising function in the coalition, neither advancing nor obstructing these autonomist strategies, and focusing almost entirely on their governing functions.

The pursuit of an autonomist strategy in the CRC can be traced to 1996, when Formigoni developed an alliance with Enzo Ghigo (FI regional president of Piemonte) and Giancarlo Galan (FI regional president of Veneto), to promote a series of referenda on issues relating to regional autonomy. This campaign had the support of Berlusconi, who was keen to undermine the newly elected Prodi government (1996-8). Although most
referendum proposals were ruled inadmissible by the Constitutional Court, those admitted led to the abolition of four national ministries that managed regional affairs despite having no formal competence in this area while the long autonomist campaign boosted the CRC regional leadership in northern Italy. In 1997 Formigoni provided political support for a far more controversial ‘referendum’, sponsored by LN and its ‘Parliament of Padania’ (elected by LN supporters), on whether northern Italy should secede from the Italian state; develop federal arrangements; or maintain the status quo. Formigoni supported the federal option and rejected the secessionist tendencies of LN, but his regular meetings with Roberto Maroni (elected ‘Premier of Padania’ by LN supporters) were criticised as an institutional legitimisation of LN’s unconstitutional tactics. Although Formigoni continued to reject the extreme secessionist positions of LN in the late 1990s, he recognised the electoral need and political opportunity of developing more moderate proposals for regional autonomy in Lombardia. Thereafter Formigoni began to advocate a ‘Senate of the Regions’ (modeled on the German Bundesrat); the implementation of fiscal federalism; greater autonomy for regional governments; and the creation of large city-states (e.g. Milan) with extensive autonomy. Formigoni blamed successive CLC national governments (1996-2001) for rejecting many of his ‘innovative’ legislative reforms, such as the introduction of vouchers for private schooling, and used the ensuing conflicts to claim the Italian government was holding back the exercise of regional autonomy in Lombardia.

With the accession of LN to the regional government in 2000, Formigoni began to develop a more radical autonomist discourse, which strengthened the coherence of the governing coalition, while undermining the distinctive electoral appeal of LN. The first step took place soon after the 2000 election, when the president and his executive swore loyalty to Lombardia, its People and Statute in their opening address, a controversial decision adopted without informing the national party leaders. Formigoni then began to
demand a regional police force;\textsuperscript{289} the total devolution of health-care policies;\textsuperscript{290} a territorial re-designation of state aid;\textsuperscript{291} and extensive regional powers over immigration policy.\textsuperscript{292} Formigoni backed another LN-sponsored referendum in 2000 on greater devolution for northern regions, again declared unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{293} Most autonomist demands remained at the level of political rhetoric, and were never transformed into concrete policy proposals. This generated some dissatisfaction from LN politicians,\textsuperscript{294} but guaranteed loyalty from more centralist coalition partners (AN, UDC), as well as FI politicians concerned at the extremist tendencies of LN.\textsuperscript{295} Yet this autonomist discourse progressively shaped attitudes within the regional branches of statewide parties: Regional FI politicians have ‘matured’ their support for a federal organisation of the state,\textsuperscript{296} the regional branches of AN and UDC now back greater autonomy for the regional government,\textsuperscript{297} and even opposition parties (DS and DL) now support an asymmetric devolution of competences and resources to Lombardia. This growing political consensus has prompted LN to seek out more radical positions on regional autonomy, to differentiate themselves from statewide parties, a strategy that has largely reinforced the effective monopoly exercised by FI over the moderate autonomist discourse.

The drive for regional economic growth is entirely complementary to the demand for greater fiscal and policy autonomy. The CRC consistently argues for the retention of greater financial resources in Lombardia (which would otherwise be distributed to the central state or poorer southern regions), in order to boost economic activity by strengthening regional infrastructure, lowering regional taxation, and distributing resources in a manner beneficial to the business community (e.g. entrepreneurial incentives, research and development, public subsidies). The CRC has made distinct appeals to the export-driven SMEs of northern Lombardia, many of which became

\textsuperscript{289} La Repubblica, Milan Edition (1/6/00).
\textsuperscript{290} La Repubblica, Milan Edition (15/6/00).
\textsuperscript{291} La Repubblica, Milan Edition (11/6/00).
\textsuperscript{292} La Repubblica, Milan Edition (18/7/00).
\textsuperscript{293} La Repubblica, Milan Edition (16/9/00).
\textsuperscript{294} Interviews 23 (LN), 24 (LN).
\textsuperscript{295} Interview 29 (LN).
\textsuperscript{296} Interview 31 (FI).
\textsuperscript{297} Interviews 23 (LN), 24 (LN), 29 (LN), 31 (FI).
alienated from the DC-led governments of the 1980s, and began to support a nascent LN receptive to their demands (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). These included lower taxation, a more efficient public administration, a more developed regional infrastructure, fewer business regulations, and active measures to support economic competitiveness in international markets. Despite limited policy competences and financial resources in the field of economic development, the regional government has made successful appeals to this electorate, promoting new infrastructural projects (e.g. high-speed railway lines to connect Lombardia and Piemonte with France), vigorously defending existing infrastructural arrangements (e.g. three international airports in Milan, seen as unnecessary by Alitalia and many Italian politicians), and lobbying heavily for international events that raise the economic profile of the region (e.g. successful Milan bid for Expo 2015, unsuccessful Milan bid for the 2016 Olympic Games). Yet the most popular demand of the CRC is presented in the guise of ‘fiscal federalism’, which implies a reduction in financial transfers from Lombardia to the central state and southern Italy, generating lower taxation and increased investment in Lombardia. The pursuit of ‘fiscal federalism’ highlights the interaction between autonomist and economic growth, suggesting the CRC has constructed a successful “development coalition” (Keating, 1998), which forms the basis for its continued electoral success in Lombardia.

The common objective of economic growth, consistently advocated by the CRC in Lombardia, also serves to obscure the clientelist ties between the regional government and politically influential sectors of the business community. This was a common characteristic of all northern regions governed by DC (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001; Hopkin and Mastropaolo, 2001). Formigoni’s initial powerbase in regional politics was built on his de facto control over Movimento Popolare, the political branch of Comunione e Liberazione (CL), a Catholic business association that is powerful in Lombardia. CL represents around 15,000 enterprises and 200,000 individual members throughout Italy, and Formigoni has succeeded in positioning this association within the CRC. This was achieved through the widespread use of public-private partnerships to deliver public services for the regional government, including the management of health-care, infrastructure for education, the construction of public housing, and the construction or
maintenance of regional transport. Public-private partnerships are a key objective for CL and its members, which have provided ample financial support for Formigoni’s re-election campaigns (Mazzoleni, 2005). Yet even ardent critics of the Lombard government’s public-private model argue political clientelism has limited effects on CRC electoral dominance. The most effective mechanism for political actors to develop clientelist ties with the electorate is through selective intervention in the allocation of welfare benefits (Ferrera, 1996; Rhodes, 1997). Lombardia is characterised by high levels of economic development, minimal unemployment, and good salaries in the private sector, making the distribution of welfare benefits a relatively weak mechanism re-election. Lombardia is the Italian region with the lowest rate of preference voting (Vassallo, 2005b). Since preference voting is the traditional mechanism for Italian voters to reciprocate the clientelist deal (Zuckerman, 1975; Caciagli, 1980; Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988), its relative absence suggests party clientelism is relatively weak in Lombardia. Although the selective allocation of public subsidies, public contracts, or public goods to local businesses can be advantageous for politicians seeking re-election, it can also generate resentment from economic actors excluded from this allocation, while the sheer scale of SMEs in Lombardia makes the allocation of clientelist advantages an insufficient mechanism to secure individual or collective re-election. While the ‘vote of belonging’ has weakened in Lombardia, this has been largely replaced by the ‘vote of opinion’, rather than the ‘vote of exchange’ (Parisi and Pasquino, 1980).

**Dynamics of Regional Presidentialism in Lombardia**

The regional president in Lombardia exerts a strong control over the executive, and the latter is able to secure comfortable majorities for its legislative proposals in the council, despite the need to balance a four-party governing coalition that includes the turbulent LN. Government formation after every set of regional elections has been swift and directed by the president. The leadership capacity of Formigoni relies heavily on control over the largest regional party, implying that directly elected regional presidents rely on

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298 *La Repubblica*, Milan Edition (19/12/00)
299 Interview 29 (Verdi)
control over regional party organisations to assert their institutional leadership. The coalitional strength of LN represents the main constraint on the executive leadership of Formigoni, although LN has become co-opted into the autonomist governing strategy. The smaller coalition partners (AN and UDC) are fully loyal to the president, and rely on him to restrain the extremist positions of some LN politicians.

The institutional leadership and party control of Formigoni is reinforced by his capacity to nominate politicians to a wide range of institutional positions, public bodies and semi-public agencies. Inter-party bargaining within the governing coalition does represent a constraint on the nominating capacity of the institutional leader (Formigoni), but also serves to strengthen his control over FI Lombardia. Since the institutional leader is responsible for conducting coalitional negotiations over access to government nominations and institutional resources, this grants him considerable discretion to promote his followers (and ignore his detractors) in the party organisation, through the selective allocation of positions. Yet the need to operate within multi-level party organisations constrains the behaviour of regional presidents. Becoming estranged from the national leadership could threaten their control over the regional party, undermine their leadership capacity in regional institutions, and hinder their prospects for career advancement. This explains the unwillingness of Formigoni to challenge strategic choices of the national leadership, although these were sometimes perceived as being directed against his political interests. This included the decision to ally with LN for the 2000 regional election, and the rejection of Formigoni’s proposal to field a ‘personal list’ for the 2005 regional election. Yet Formigoni turned these constraints in his favour, constructing a strong political relationship and governing strategy with LN, and transforming the FI Lombardia into his ‘personal party’ (Calise, 2007).

The introduction of ‘semi-parliamentarism’ in the organisation of regional government introduced a new institutional design in all 15 Italian OS regions (Fabbrini, 2001). Yet the effective capacity of regional leadership is determined by the interactions between institutional and party control, and not simply whether directly elected leaders (and their executives) are able to resist pressures from the ‘return of parties’ in the legislature.
Formigoni has recognised the primacy of party through his allocation of posts in the executive, which are granted almost entirely to politicians that simultaneously hold seats in the council. Formigoni wields strong discretion in selecting FI regional ministers, but allows other party leaders to nominate their representatives in the executive, although this is technically an exclusive function of the president. This experience contrasts with other Italian regions where presidents have sought to nominate non-party or technical executives, or at least sought to ensure the separation of functions between regional councillors and ministers (Vassallo and Baldini, 2000). A positive outcome of these politicised arrangements include rapid processes of government formation, as well as enhanced coordination between governing majorities in the executive and council, ensuring that most legislation is quickly ratified. The only impasse in the council occurred during the 2000-2005 Legislature, when LN allied with FI opponents of Formigoni to obstruct the progress of legislation. The current legislature has not been characterised by such disputes, mainly because Formigoni wields stronger control over FI, and has developed a better political relationship with LN. In 2006 the president even dismissed the LN regional health minister, Alessandro Ce, who had openly criticized clientelism in the health-care system. Formigoni resisted pressures for his re-instatement by allowing LN to nominate an alternative, upholding the primacy of party while ensuring that members of the executive remained loyal to his leadership. Excessive pressures of party intervention can be resisted by Formigoni, whose threat of resignation carries with it the immediate dissolution of the council and fresh elections, leading to the potential loss of incumbency for politicians in the council. Formigoni has made no secret of his ambitions for a prominent position in national politics, as evident from his temporary election to the Italian Senate after the 2006 and 2008 elections. Yet these ambitions have been constrained by his crucial role in holding together the regional governing coalition. Any shift from regional to national politics would require a potentially disruptive re-

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300 La Repubblica, Milan Edition (30/8/05).
301 La Repubblica, Milan Edition (28/2/06) Although it is impossible to permanently combine the post of national parliamentarian and regional minister, elected national parliamentarians that already hold posts in regional legislatures are given up to 90 days to determine which post to renounce. Meanwhile the reverse situation is impossible, as national parliamentarians who compete as candidates for regional president must renounce their parliamentary seat in advance.
negotiation of key positions in the regional government, which partly explains the reluctance of Berlusconi to allow Formigoni to take up a ministerial post after the CRC victory in the 2008 national election.

The opposition CLC has been largely unable to exploit divisions in the governing coalition, and has divided over the tactics of regional opposition. The moderate parties of the CLC (DS and DL) have sought to pursue a form of ‘constructive opposition’, offering legislative support for certain proposals sponsored by the regional government, such as the popular demand to increase regional competences through Article 116 of the Italian Constitution.302 This is a mechanism contained in the 2001 Devolution Bill (approved by the CLC), which allows a region to obtain further competences through an act of Parliament, but has never been implemented due to concerns among statewide parties over the asymmetric distribution of policy competences or financial resources. The radical parties of the CLC (PRC, PDCI, Greens) continue to oppose virtually all policies of the regional government, in a form of ‘obstructive opposition’ that has no discernible effect on the legislative outcome. While the moderate parties present themselves as ‘better managers’ of the political-economic system dominated by the CRC in Lombardia,303 the radical parties propose drastic alternatives to the ‘business model’ advanced by the CRC.304 The ensuing relationship between radical and moderate components of the CLC has become acrimonious in Lombardia, with the radicals accusing the moderates of conducting a weak opposition in exchange for access to patronage from the regional government,305 while the moderates accuse the radicals of conducting an unrealistic opposition that only distances the CLC from the future prospect of entering the regional government. In any case the regional system of government contains few structural incentives to coordinate regional opposition. The 1999 reforms strengthened the executive leader and the governing coalition (Fabbrini, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003), but did not strengthen the regional opposition, granting neither legislative prominence nor enhanced resources to the opposition leader. In Lombardia all

302 La Repubblica, Milan Edition (5/8/06).
303 Interviews 27 (DS), 29 (Verdi), 32 (PRC), 33 (DS)
304 Interviews 27 (DS), 29 (Verdi), 31 (FI), 32 (PRC)
305 Interviews 31 (FI)
CLC presidential candidates became estranged from their supporting parties after regional elections, and formed separate groups in the regional council.

Chapter 4.2.4 Conclusions

The party system in Lombardia is characterized by a strong CRC which has comfortably won successive regional elections (1995, 2000, 2005), always under the leadership of Roberto Formigoni, a former DC politician now affiliated to Forza Italia (FI), the largest party in Lombardia. Since 2000 the CRC has formed pre-electoral and governing coalitions with the Northern League (LN), the second largest party in Lombardia. Regional coalitions in the CRC form part of nationwide coalition agreements, which are negotiated by national party leaders. The coalition agreement between LN and the CRC was tested during the 2000 regional elections, and repeated in subsequent national and regional elections. In 2000 Formigoni wanted to avoid the inclusion of LN in the regional pre-electoral coalition, because he felt capable of securing re-election without LN support, and knew the presence of LN in any governing coalition would weaken his personal control, a view validated by the actual outcome. Conversely some politicians in the Lombard League (regional branch of LN) supported an alternative coalition with the centre-left coalition (CLC). The national CRC leadership was nevertheless able to impose its coalitional choices in Lombardia, not only because decision-making in the CRC remains highly centralised around the party leaders, but also because the leaders of FI (Berlusconi) and LN (Bossi) wield considerable personal influence in Lombardia. The participation of LN in the national CRC government (2001-2006) guaranteed all regional governing coalitions between these parties would be upheld, but failed to guarantee governing stability in Lombardia because strong tensions emerged between the FI regional president and the Lombard League, leading to temporary paralysis during the 2000-2005 Legislature. Governing cohesion was restored through an autonomist political strategy spear-headed by the regional president. This focused the regional governing coalition on the common objectives of greater autonomy and enhanced economic growth, and was able to win over an array of weakly aligned voters. This autonomist strategy guaranteed the loyalty of LN politicians in the governing coalition, but also proved
acceptable to the smaller and more centralist parties in the governing majority, National Alliance (AN) and Union for a Democratic Centre (UDC), which focused on their governing functions and stabilised the multi-party coalition. The 2005 regional elections saw a re-iteration of these pre-electoral and governing coalitions, reflecting the continued adhesion of LN to the CRC at national level. LN support then became crucial for coalitional victory in the 2005 regional elections, while the relationship with the FI regional president improved considerably in the current legislature.

Formigoni developed a strong control over FI Lombardia, the governing coalition, and the broader regional government. Formigoni’s *de facto* control over FI Lombardia relies heavily on his institutional leadership, since he does not hold formal positions in the party organisation. The regional president has promoted a regional faction of former DC politicians loyal to his leadership, and developed a strategic with the regional faction of former PSI politicians, excluding the liberal faction (hostile to the leadership of Formigoni) from key positions in the regional government and party organisation. The liberal faction had controlled the party during the 1990s through its close ties to Berlusconi, but became marginalised at regional level during the 2000s, a process that generated severe factional conflict. Formigoni was able to win these conflicts because of his capacity to allocate public resources and nominate supporters to key posts in the regional government and other public bodies. Intra-coalitional negotiations over portfolio and resource allocation restrict his nominating capacity but increase his intra-party control, because his active support is necessary for FI politicians to obtain positions of influence or remuneration at regional level. Full control over FI Lombardia allows Formigoni to exert a stronger leadership over other parties in the governing coalition. LN politicians are no longer able to exploit FI factional disputes to enhance their coalitional leverage. The smaller governing parties in Lombardia (AN, UDC) rely heavily on Formigoni to restrict some of the radical positions adopted by LN politicians, and so have become fully loyal to his institutional leadership.

The governing coalition in Lombardia has retained a stable and clear electoral hierarchy, in contrast with central-southern OS regions where the president does not control the
largest party, and must pursue more accommodating forms of regional leadership (see Chapter 4.1). Strong regional leadership has guaranteed rapid processes of government formation, as well as effective coordination between executive and legislature. Unchallenged regional leadership has also affected the opposing centre-left coalition (CLC), which has split between its moderate and radical components. The Democrats of the Left (DS) and Daisy-Democracy and Liberty (DL) have adopted a ‘constructive opposition’, supporting selected initiatives of the regional government (e.g. proposals for greater regional autonomy), whereas the Party of Refounded Communists (PRC) and other radical left parties pursue an ‘obstructive opposition’, opposing the regional government on virtually every piece of legislation. Neither strategy has been particularly successful, and serves to highlight the absence of coordinated regional opposition, reinforced by the lack of incentives to support opposition leadership at regional level. Weak coordination is also evident from the relationship between defeated CLC presidential candidates and their supporting parties after regional elections, with presidential candidates proceeding to form separate groups in the regional council.

Presidential control in Lombardia is reinforced by the 1999 reform to the system of regional government. These introduced the direct election of regional presidents; allowed the president to appoint the executive; and obliged the simultaneous dissolution of presidency and council should the president resign, or be removed from office by the council (Fabbrini, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). Formigoni has exploited these reforms to enhance his party control and coalitional leadership, further strengthened by enhanced powers of nomination in regionalised policy sectors such as health-care. These reforms were designed to strengthen relatively weak presidents against strong party interests in the council (Fabbrini, 2001; Fabbrini & Brunazzo, 2003), so never envisaged that presidents could accrue huge executive power through party control, with no significant counter-weights placed on the potential expansion of executive power. The result is that procedures for legislative scrutiny of executive proposals remain weak, presidential nominations are rarely subject to legislative approval, and the development of opposition leadership lacks both structures and incentives. Formigoni has exploited institutional resources to favour his personal re-election, while his close ties with the
Catholic business association *Comunione e Liberazione* ensures additional funding for re-election campaigns (Mazzoleni, 2005). This heavily disadvantages the opposing CLC, whose candidates have few resources, but also penalises politicians in the CRC not closely linked to the regional president. This highlights the lack of effective regulation on party campaigning and party financing for regional elections in Italy, and the strong advantage wielded by incumbents with close ties to organised business.

Party organisations in Lombardia demonstrate marked differences between new parties (FI, LN) and those with organisational predecessors (AN, DS, PRC, DL). The new parties obtain 40-50% of the vote share in regional elections, competing successfully for the unaligned ‘vote of opinion’ (Parisi and Pasquino, 1980). FI and LN appeal to the entrepreneurial communities of SMEs, formulating demands for greater regional autonomy to support economic growth. The most recent example is the demand for ‘fiscal federalism’, implying a reduction in resource transfers from Lombardia to Rome. These demands have remained at the level of political rhetoric, since OS regions have weak discretion over their financial capacity. Parties with organisational predecessors are more closed in their political orientation, regardless of whether they are aligned to the opposition CLC or the governing CRC. AN has formed part of the governing coalition since 1995, but its support has declined over the timeframe. AN Lombardia remains a factionalised organization without strong regional leadership, and has neither advanced nor opposed the autonomist discourse of LN and FI. AN politicians maintain the semblance of intra-party cohesion by focusing on their governing functions, a purely ‘office-seeking’ strategy that results in AN obtaining an almost disproportionate number of key posts in the regional government, while delegating the process of attracting voters to FI and LN, whose expansive electoral competition has determined CRC dominance.

The organisational successors of PCI (DS, PRC) and the ‘Left’ DC factions (DL) cannot justify their *raison d’etre* through control of government. Yet their regional branches have adopted closed political strategies, relying on maintaining intra-party cohesion, rallying core voters, and retaining close ties with ancillary organisations (particularly trade unions) that deliver the core vote. These ‘survival strategies’ represent an attempt to
preserve existing positions of intra-party power, in the midst of an ongoing electoral decline that began with their predecessor organisations in the 1970s. Their regional branches display a weak influence in party decision-making, because national CLC parliamentarians from Lombardia rare. This is not merely an outcome of electoral decline, but also a consequence of the MMM electoral system for national elections (1994-2001), whose territorial constituencies disproportionately penalised politicians competing in northern regions where the CLC is weak, and disproportionately benefited politicians competing in central-northern regions where the CLC is strong. In Lombardia the CLC obtained almost no parliamentary seats in national elections, whereas in central-northern regions the CLC obtained almost all parliamentary seats. Nor has the CLC been able to build up regional leadership through a prominent record in local government. This is also dominated by the CRC in Lombardia, with the exception of some provincial capitals in the smaller southern provinces. The city of Milan has been governed by the CRC since 1992, a considerable disadvantage for the CLC because this is the only institutional position that can compete in prominence with the regional presidency. In recognition of this weakness, many DL and DS elites have sought to pioneer processes of party integration in Lombardia. Party elites largely recognised their existing limitations, and sought to promote a unified centre-left party that could broaden its electoral appeal, preceding the process of integration that led to the creation of the Democratic Party (PD) in 2007. Whether PD proves to be more successful than its component parties in Lombardia will depend on a variety of factors. This includes whether a strong regional leader emerges, whether party elites abandoned their closed and self-preserving instincts, and whether the national leadership is willing to allow the regional branch to develop autonomous organisational arrangements, coalitional strategies, and policy positions. In contrast to the moderate centre-left parties, the radical left parties have been unwilling and unable to develop similar measures of party integration, for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile the centralised strategy of PRC has been unsuccessful in influencing regional politics, and has merely widened the gulf between the party in public office and the party in central office. The latter is based in provincial federations, which are weakly interested in supporting (or even monitoring) the activities of their elected regional councillors.
Chapter 4.3 Comparative Conclusions for the Italian Regions

Party politics in the Italian regions is territorially differentiated, partly due to strong variations in the electoral strength of statewide parties (SWP) and presence of non-statewide parties (NSWP), and partly due to distinct structures of party competition. Regional branches of SWP display varying organisational characteristics, attributable primarily to differences in political leadership, electoral strategy, and access to sub-national government. The most striking difference occurs within the multi-level organisation of Forza Italia (FI). FI is the largest party in Lombardia, where it is controlled by the regional president Roberto Formigoni, and dominated by politicians from the former DC and PSI organisations. Formigoni has pushed FI Lombardia into a successfully ‘catch-all’ autonomist strategy, which has driven the Northern League (LN) into more radical positions in defence of regional interests, which have consolidated its core support but allowed the moderate autonomist discourse to become dominated by FI. Yet the drive for autonomy has consolidated the FI-LN alliance in regional politics, with these parties dominating the centre-right coalition (CRC) and the regional government. In contrast FI Campania lost considerable support in regional elections, and lacks credible leadership. Control over the regional party is bitterly contested between an alliance of DC and PSI elites and the new business elites promoted by Berlusconi. The DC and PSI elites successfully shut out the liberal faction close to Berlusconi (as occurred in Lombardia), but failed to transform FI Campania into a successful ‘catch-all’ party. Many of the powerbrokers proceeded to join the centre-left governing coalition (either directly or passing through other parties), or focus entirely on their own re-election, a type of individualistic behaviour encouraged by preference voting in the regional electoral system, as well as the absence of financial resources from the national party. Another loosely structured party that displayed strong regional variations was Daisy-Democracy and Liberty (DL). In Lombardia and Campania the DL organisation was entirely composed of DC powerbrokers and existed almost entirely in public office, with little resources (or intervention) from the national party. DL Campania nevertheless underwent an electoral expansion to become the largest party in the centre-left coalition (CLC), while DL Lombardia maintained low levels of support and remained in a subordinate
position within the CLC. A partial explanation for this discrepancy is the presence of a highly contested ex-DC support base in southern Italy, which in northern Italy is primarily occupied by FI and LN (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). The success of DL Campania in claiming a strong share of this is closely linked to the factional leadership of Ciriaco De Mita, who persuaded many ex-DC powerbrokers elected in the CRC to join DL, in exchange for key institutional posts or financial resources. This strategy would have been unfeasible if the CLC had not begun to develop a growing monopoly over access to sub-national government. DL Lombardia lacked a similar factional leader, partly because it remained excluded from sub-national government. Yet DL Campania had to compete aggressively against Udeur, a NSWP that joined the CLC and lobbied for a substantial share of the spoils of sub-national government. Udeur and DL party leaders entered into bitter conflict at regional level, partly because they competed over the same pool of local powerbrokers, a situation which exacerbated the instability and tensions within the governing coalition. As with FI Lombardia, the behaviour of DL Campania was closely linked to the prevailing structures of party competition, and the type of challenge posed by the main NSWP in the region.

Democrats of the Left (DS), Party of Refounded Communists (PRC), and National Alliance (AN) were more structured and hierarchical party organisations, partly because their predecessor organisations remained largely untouched by the corruption scandals of the early 1990s. Yet these parties had difficulty in adjusting to the competitive dynamics of the post-1994 party system, and were unable to successfully integrate territorial differences into their multi-level organisation. The regional party in public office of PRC is largely uncontrolled and unsupported by the party in central office, which revolves entirely around the provincial federations, showing the evident failure of its centralising strategy (see Chapter 2.1). In Lombardia PRC remained a peripheral actor in regional politics, and in Campania PRC was heavily weakened by the split that formed PDCI in 1998, while its elected regional councillors often behaved in a ‘renegade’ fashion. DS and AN were more successful in maintaining internal discipline, but the relative cohesion of their regional parties depended heavily on access to sub-national government. DS Campania became ‘presidentialised’ under the leadership of regional president Antonio Wilson, Alex (2009), Multi-level Party Politics in Italy and Spain European University Institute 10.2870/13381
Bassolino, and focused primarily on control of sub-national institutions rather than electoral mobilisation or developing links with civil society. DS Lombardia lacked a comparable leadership figure, partly due to limited sub-national governing experience, and partly due to the absence of national parliamentarians from the region, a direct outcome of the Mixed Member-Majoritarian electoral system used for national elections (1994, 1996, 2001), that significantly over-represented DS in its electoral heartlands of central-northern Italy, but virtually eliminated its parliamentary representation from Lombardia. National elites became more of a hindrance than a benefit to DS Lombardia, despite the measures of decentralisation approved when the CLC controlled the national government (see Chapter 1.5). Yet DS Lombardia was unable to break free from its dependence on the national party for financial resources and career advancement, a situation that prevented the adoption of more autonomist positions, which lacked the backing of the party leadership but might have obtained support from regional voters.

Regional branches of AN also have limited autonomy, display high levels of factionalism, and tend to focus exclusively on their governing functions. Territorial variations are mainly evident in the relative strength of factions: the largest faction in AN Lombardia is ‘Protagonist Right’, concerned primarily with liberal policies, whereas the largest faction in AN Campania is ‘Social Right’, concerned primarily with welfare policies. AN Lombardia has not pursued an autonomist discourse to rival FI and LN, and its support has declined in successive regional elections, despite forming part of the regional government since 1995. AN Lombardia is focused exclusively on its governing functions, of which it controls a disproportionate share, and generally performs a stabilising function in the CRC. AN Campania is largely excluded from sub-national government, so is more racked by factional conflict, but its leadership over the CRC (given the constant crisis within FI Campania) provides an important reason to set aside factional conflicts. The most surprising aspect of the behaviour displayed by DS and AN at regional level is their exclusive obsession with control of government and its resources, and their loss of any substantial interest in electoral mobilisation or retaining strong societal ties. This would suggest their multi-level party organisations have become increasingly ‘cartelised’ and ‘stratarchical’ (Katz and Mair, 1995), with the national leadership becoming uninterested in the behaviour or objectives of its regional branches.
Government formation and stability in the Italian regions displays strong variations between northern and southern Italy. This is partly due to a strong electoral hierarchy in northern Italy, alongside the levelling of electoral hierarchies in southern Italy. The absence of strong electoral hierarchy in Campania produced tensions between the largest party (DL) and the regional president (DS), but even more pernicious was the conflict between DL and Udeur. This complicated government formation by raising the demands of their factional leaders in the allocation of posts, and led to frequent government paralysis as factional leaders withdrew their supporters from the regional government. The regional leadership of Bassolino was often paralysed by these conflicts, and his control over the DS organisation was insufficient to maintain a strong hold over the governing coalition, although it transformed Bassolino into the key mediator between the competing demands of DL and Udeur. This unwieldy governing CLC was nevertheless held together under Bassolino, and became progressively more dominant electorally through the adhesion of local powerbrokers initially elected as part of the CRC. This process of political aggregation prevented genuine alternation, and contributed towards a highly turbulent and ineffective regional government, with a widespread preference for a clientelist dispersion of resources to accommodate the interests of powerbrokers and their constituents. The regional governing coalition abjectly failed to develop a political strategy that could promote regional economic growth and improve the poor functioning of the regional government. In Lombardia the strong electoral hierarchy in the governing CRC strengthened the institutional leadership of regional president Formigoni, who controlled the largest party FI. Meanwhile LN in Lombardia was more concerned to advance regional autonomy and economic growth than Udeur in Campania, and much less focused on the clientelist distribution of posts and resources than Udeur. In Lombardia the ‘axis’ between FI and LN was able to deliver relatively stable government with clear leadership. Clientelism was only pervasive in the symbolic relationship between Formigoni and the Catholic business community, reciprocated through public-private partnerships implemented by the regional government, and business financing for Formigoni’s re-election campaigns. The smaller governing parties in Lombardia (AN and UDC) were a stabilising influence in the regional government. The main governing tensions occurred within FI until Formigoni’s personal faction gained supremacy, as well
as between FI and LN in the 2000-2005 Legislature. In Campania the array of smaller parties in the CLC were another disruptive factor in the governing coalition, and were primarily interested in their own share of the spoils system, while small parties had no significant role in intra-coalitional or inter-coalitional politics in Lombardia.

The 1999 reform to regional government significantly strengthened the regional president through three mechanisms: direct election in all OS regions; the sole capacity to nominate the regional executive; and the tied terms of president and council, so the council could not replace the president during the legislature without fresh elections (Fabbrini, 2001; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). This produced rather different effects in Lombardia and Campania, given the different characteristics of their political class and regional party systems. In Lombardia it made the council largely subordinate to the presidency, ensuring governing stability and secure majorities for regional legislative proposals, but also very weak council scrutiny over the functioning of the executive. Weak scrutiny is not only the outcome of a guaranteed majority for the governing coalition, but also attributable to the absence of clear functions and rights for opposition parties in the council, as well as the complete failure of this majoritarian reform to reinforce the position of opposition leader, which remains entirely ineffectual. The weakness of opposition leadership in both regions is also attributable to the self-preserving instinct of party elites and their unwillingness to delegate authority. In Campania the council had its capacity for policy formulation removed by these reforms, but its obstructive capacity remained high because of weak cohesion in the governing coalition, leading to frequent boycotts and absenteeism in the council. Scrutiny of the executive in Campania remains extremely poor, while the council has not significantly improved legislation formulated by the executive. Instead local powerbrokers discreetly maintain status quo arrangements that favour the clientelist dispersion of resources to their local constituents. The ‘PR with Majoritarian Bonus’ for regional elections has allowed a bipolarising dynamic to emerge. Yet in Campania this needs to be evaluated in light of regular defections from the opposition to the governing coalition, while in Lombardia the new electoral system has reinforced CRC predominance and made government alternation less likely. Although the current electoral system strengthens the governing majority in the council, the
perpetuation of preference voting in regional elections weakens the cohesion of regional party organisations, and makes them unable or unwilling to control the behaviour of elected regional elites. The latter are drawn almost entirely from parties that competed in the 1970-1995 regional party system, which had already degenerated into a corrupt class of “business politicians” with “personal patronage networks”, interested primarily in personal enrichment and unconcerned by the “collective logic of mass parties” (Allum and Allum, 2008). The organisational weakness of Italian parties since the 1990s has made them unwilling and unable to intervene effectively in sub-national politics, since this would require the allocation of significant personnel and resources, whose scarcity renders them insufficient even for the objectives of national politics. This leaves regional party systems prey to precisely those ‘machine politicians’ who can use their own resources (or those of the state) to secure their re-election. The deficiencies of the political class are particularly evident in Campania, which reflects the long-standing corruption of the main governing parties in southern Italy (Tarrow, 1967; Caciagli, 1980; Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988; Demarco, 2007; Allum and Allum, 2008). Yet the judicial investigations into political corruption revealed that it was a pervasive phenomenon that extended into northern Italy and affected all governing parties (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2007). The substantial continuity in the political elites that govern Lombardia, and the absence of a complete overhaul of the clientelist mechanisms and brokerage politics that allowed this to degenerate into outright corruption, is a question that raises the possibility of more continuity in this domain in Lombardia than has hitherto been made public.
Chapter 5: Regional Party Politics in Spain

Chapter 5 is composed of two case studies analysing party politics in the Spanish regions of Andalusia (Chapter 5.1) and Galicia (Chapter 5.2), followed by some comparative conclusions (Chapter 5.3). The case studies focus on the organisational and systemic dynamics of party politics in these regions, complementing the national framework that analysed broader changes to multi-level party organisations and party systems (Chapter 3). The case studies emphasise a series of factors that have a determining effect on regional party politics, but which are rarely highlighted in comparative analyses of multi-level politics (e.g. Hough et al, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006). This includes the ‘presidentialisation’ of regional party organisations; the pervasive role of clientelism in the regional party system; the varying effects of intra-party factional conflict at regional level; the adoption of autonomist political strategies by governing statewide parties; and the operation of regional electoral systems. Chapter 5 confirms the necessity of analysing the competitive dynamics of regional party politics, through a reflective adaptation of analytical theories derived from the comparative study of party politics at national level.

The empirical indicators used in these regional case studies are consistent with those adopted for the national framework in Chapter 3, albeit with a more contextual focus and a greater consideration of the feedback effects between organisational and systemic change. The organisational analysis will highlight significant changes in the structure and behaviour of regional party organisations, including their relationship with the national party. It considers whether these changes are affected by relative party access to sub-national government, and the extent to which this has determined the choice of regional political strategies. The systemic analysis will focus on coalition formation and government alternation at regional level, and what this suggests about the underlying structures of regional party competition. The case studies consider the salient factors that determine coalitional choices and patterns of alternation in regional government, and emphasise the extent to which these are regional political choices, or whether they are an imposition of national preferences. The case studies will also considers ways in which
local party politics can have a significant effect on regional political strategies, such as through processes of ‘coalition testing’ in local electoral or governing arenas.

Data collection for these regional case studies was obtained through a variety of sources: Archival analysis of the main national Spanish newspaper (El Pais) and its relevant local editions; semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key regional political actors; electoral data on regional elections from a variety of sources; and the use of relevant secondary sources (e.g. party publications). The timeframe for analysis is 1991-2007. The interviews for Andalusia (Chapter 5.1) were conducted in March 2007, while the interviews for Galicia (Chapter 5.2) were conducted in November 2007.

**Chapter 5.1 Regional Party Politics in Andalusia**

**Chapter 5.1.1 Political Geography of Andalusia**

Andalusia is the largest region in Spain, with a census population of 8,059,461 (2007), comprising almost 18% of the total population (45,200,737). Andalusia occupies most of the southern coast of Spain, and was constituted from 8 provinces in 1980. The largest province is Seville (1,849,268), which includes the regional capital and contains almost 23% of the regional population. The other provinces are Malaga (1,517,523), Cadiz (1,207,343), Granada (884,099), Cordoba (792,182), Jaen (664,742), Almeria (646,633), and Huelva (497,671). Seven of the ten largest cities in Andalusia are provincial capitals, the largest being Seville (699,145); Malaga (561,250) Cordoba (323,600) and Granada (236,207).306 Andalusia has a relatively low population density (86.9 inhabitants per square kilometre), reflecting its predominantly rural character, although the region contains several medium-sized cities and has undergone a steady growth in population (+0.8% per annum, 1995-2004). Regional economic growth has also been strong (+3.8% per annum, 1995-2004), slightly above the Spanish average (+3.7% per annum). Andalusia nevertheless remains a relatively poor region (77.6% EU GDP), especially

306 Data on size of population in cities, provinces and region of Andalusia (www.citypopulation.de). All other economic, social and demographic indicators (European Commission, 2007).
when compared to the Spanish average (100.7% EU GDP). Overall unemployment (13.8%), female unemployment (19.4%), and youth (15-24) unemployment (24.5%) are substantially higher than the Spanish average (9.2%, 12.2%, and 19.7% respectively). This difference is even sharper when overall employment levels (15-64) are compared: 55.4% for Andalusia, 63% for Spain as a whole. The working population of Andalusia is also more concentrated in agriculture (9.2%) than Spain as a whole (5.3%), while the proportion employed in industry (25.8%) is below the Spanish average (29.7%). An identical proportion of the population is employed in services, although the composition of the service sector in Andalusia varies significantly from more developed regions, with the proliferation of small retail businesses with relatively low levels of income.

Andalusia contains strong intra-regional differences in economic development and demography. The five coastal provinces (Malaga, Cadiz, Granada, Almeria, Huelva) are more economically developed than the three inland provinces (Sevilla, Cordoba, Jaen), largely due to the growth of mass tourism since the 1960s. The 4 central-western provinces (Sevilla, Cordoba, Cadiz, Malaga) are more densely populated than the 3 eastern provinces (Granada, Almeria, Jaen), although the western province of Huelva (which borders Portugal) is the least densely populated. Despite some areas of strong economic development, enduring levels of poverty remain in many rural areas, which have become fertile ground for political parties that exploit welfare dependency for electoral purposes, particularly the governing PSOE. The expansion of state spending under PSOE governments in the 1980s and early 1990s increased the number of non-contributory pensions and unemployment benefits (Ferrera, 1996), which had a very strong take-up in Andalusia. The Rural Unemployment Scheme introduced by the PSOE government invited the development of clientelist ties, through its reliance on certification from the local mayor to obtain welfare benefits for agricultural workers (Blakeley, 2001; Hopkin, 2001; Hopkin and Mastropaolo, 2001). Although the Spanish government retrenched its welfare expenditure during the late 1990s, largely to achieve the convergence criteria for EMU, this was compensated by a sustained increase in infra-structural investment (heavily co-financed by the European Union), and increased
regional expenditure on social welfare provision, including the establishment of minimum income schemes in all Spanish regions (Lappara and Aguilar, 1996).

Over two-thirds of the Andalusian population (68.5%) is of working age (15-64), well above the Spanish average (65.1%). The population aged over 65 (14.6%) is below the Spanish average (18.5%), while the population aged under 15 (16.9%) is slightly above the Spanish average (16.4%). This challenges the common misperception of Andalusia as a region whose working age population has fled. Although a substantial proportion of the regional population did leave Andalusia in the 1960s and 1970s, mainly to work elsewhere in Spain (particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country), inter-regional migration from Andalusia is now quite low. The region is far enough from Madrid to avoid the demographic ‘flight to the capital’, a feature that characterises many of the rural regions surrounding Madrid, whose populations have declined and aged more quickly than the Spanish average (EC, 2007). In Andalusia migration is mainly intra-regional, largely between rural and urban areas.

During the Second Republic (1931-6) and Spanish Civil War (1936-9) Andalusia was riven by class warfare, as the rural peasantry supported the Republican government, while the traditional land-owning nobility supported General Franco. The subsequent Franco regime (1939-1975) allowed Andalusia to remain in a state of under-development, partly as a punishment for its perceived disloyalty during the Civil War, and partly as a mechanism to solidify the traditional social order (Kurth, 1993). This neglect was evident from the absence of major infra-structural developments during the Franco regime, and the lack of any sustained efforts towards improving educational levels. A substantial proportion of the adult population remains illiterate, including a majority of the working age population whose education took place under the Franco regime, people who are now in their 50s or 60s (Andalusian Parliament, 2007). This structural problem affects overall levels of educational achievement in Andalusia, which remain well below the Spanish average. The proportion of the Andalusian population with a high (22.6%) or medium (17.8%) level of education is well below the Spanish average (28.2% and 20.6%)

Wilson, Alex (2009), Multi-level Party Politics in Italy and Spain
European University Institute
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respectively), while the proportion with a low level of education (59.2%) is much higher than the Spanish average (51.2%).

**Electoral system in Andalusia**

The Andalusian electoral system is very similar to the national one: PR with closed blocked lists; D’Hondt method of allocation; provinces as electoral constituencies; and a 3% formal threshold (effective threshold around 5%) for representation on a provincial basis. The Andalusian electoral system also stipulates that no province can obtain more than twice the seats of any other, a provision that over-represents the less populous provinces of Huelva and Almeria, and under-represents the more populous provinces of Seville and Malaga (Montabes and Torres, 1998; Lago Penas, 2004). The effect of this electoral system is that no single province or geographical area can dominate regional politics, which should encourage parties to make broad electoral appeals that encompass urban and rural interests, inland and coastal provinces, and poorer or more developed areas of Andalusia. Although Andalusia elects 61-62 members of the Spanish Congress, the number of seats in the regional parliament is capped at 109, making it the region with the highest ratio of voters to representatives (Lago, 2004). This may have adversely affected the emergence of new regional parties, since all parties that obtained seats in the Andalusian parliament were created before the first regional election in 1982, in contrast with many other Spanish regions where regionalist parties emerged only after the creation of regional governments (Hamann, 1999; Linz and Montero, 2001).

**Regional politics in Andalusia**

Regional politics in Andalusia is dominated by statewide parties (PSOE, PP, IU), which account for over 90% of votes and seats in regional elections (see Table 14). The only significant NSWP is the regionalist Andalusian Party (PA), which obtained seats in the regional parliament until 2008. The regional presidency and executive have continuously been controlled by PSOE, which won a plurality of votes and seats in every regional election. Although PSOE majority governments (1982-1994) characterised the first
decade of regional politics, in 1994 PSOE lost its absolute majority in the regional parliament and formed an unstable minority government without a parliamentary majority (1994-1996). An early regional election was held in 1996, which increased the share of votes and seats held by PSOE but did not restore its absolute majority, obliging PSE to form a majority coalition government with the much smaller PA (1996-2000). The PSOE-PA coalition government was reiterated after the 2000 regional election, because PSOE was once again unable to secure an absolute majority. In the 2004 regional election PSOE recovered its absolute majority, an outcome repeated after the 2008 regional election. PP has consolidated its position as the second largest party in Andalusia. The 1994 regional election saw PP come close to challenging the electoral supremacy of PSOE, with only a small difference in vote share between PSOE and PP (4.3%). Subsequent regional elections widened this difference to a peak of 18.4% (2004). Another distinguishing feature of Andalusian politics is the above-average electoral strength of IU (see Table 14). IU could have formed a majority regional coalition (governing or parliamentary) with PSOE on three separate occasions (1994, 1996, 2000), but this never materialised for reasons that will be explored.307 The 1986, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 regional elections were all held on the same day as national elections,308 an arrangement that has substantially increased turnout; heavily influenced competing party strategies; and reinforced the electoral and systemic dominance of PSOE.

Table 14: Regional Elections in Andalusia (% support for Main Parties)

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<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>48.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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307 The only partial exception is the ‘single issue’ coalition that PSOE and IU formed to agree the Andalusian Statute of Autonomy reform in the regional parliament (Orte and Wilson, 2009).
308 Only the 1982, 1990 and 1994 regional elections were held on different days.
No understanding of party politics in Andalusia is complete without some reflection on its distinctive history. In the first half of the twentieth century, Andalusia was still characterised by sharp social divisions, with a small nobility that controlled very large estates (*latifundios*), but remained largely absent from the countryside. The large rural population consisted mainly of landless workers (*braceros*), whose impoverished and precarious existence as a rural proletariat encouraged the rise of anarchist (and later communist) movements in the region (Kurth, 1993; Blakeley, 2001). Andalusia became a focus of support for the Republican government in the 1930s, which offers a partial explanation for the resilience and strength of left-wing parties today. Another historical feature of Andalusia is the prevalence of clientelist ties in shaping social and political relations, although the nature of political clientelism has undergone huge transformations. A clientelism of local notables shaped the (pre)-Franco era, characterised by mass illiteracy, huge social divisions, and an impossible physical distance from central authorities. A very different clientelism of political parties shaped the post-Franco democratic era, with a central role played by PSOE, the main governing party in the region (Sapelli, 1995; Montabes et al, 2006). Although clientelism is no longer the principal explanation for electoral mobilisation in Spain (Hopkin, 2001a), it remains an enduring and significant presence in Andalusian politics, where it heavily shapes the strategy and organisation of regional parties (Montabes et al, 2006).
Chapter 5.1.2: Party Organisation in Andalusia (1990-2007)

Chapter 5.1.2 will compare the organisational structures and strategies of the four main political parties in Andalusia (PSOE, PP, IU, PA), the only ones to have obtained seats in the regional parliament during the timeframe (1990-2007). It will focus on the main governing (PSOE) and opposition (PP) parties in Andalusia, but will also reflect on the important coalitional role played by smaller statewide (IU) or regionalist (PA) parties.

**Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) in Andalusia**

PSOE has remained the largest party in Andalusia, in terms of electoral support and party membership, since the first regional elections were held in 1982. PSOE support fell sharply between 1990 and 1994, recovered partially in 1996 and 2000, and recovered fully by 2004 and 2008 (see Table 14). This recovery allowed PSOE to restore its absolute majority in the regional parliament (2004-), the pattern of the first three regional legislatures (1982-1994). In the early 1990s, PSOE Andalusia became a battleground for national factional disputes. By the end of the decade it was transformed into a highly unified party under the leadership of Manuel Chaves, regional president of Andalusia (1990-) and secretary-general of PSOE Andalusia (1994-). This process of pacification in the regional party contributed heavily to electoral recovery in successive regional elections. The combined executive and party control of Chaves conforms to a broader process of ‘presidentialisation’ in Spanish politics (van Biezen and Hopkin, 2004). In Andalusia this helped to strengthen party cohesion and restore PSOE to its predominant position. To fully comprehend this process, we must analyse the inter-factional disputes of the early 1990s, and the important role that Andalusia played as the defining battleground between competing party factions.

A series of complex factional conflicts shook PSOE in the early 1990s, when it still controlled the national government and a majority of regional governments. These

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309 The timeframe for analysis in Andalusia is slightly different from that applied in Chapter 3 for the national framework (1991-2007), because Andalusia held a regional election in 1990 rather than 1991.
factional conflicts generated disarray in PSOE and contributed to heavy defeats in local-regional (1995) and national (1996) elections. Some scholars have referred to these factional conflicts as a symptom of the broader problems facing the PSOE national government and its party organisation in the 1990s (Gunther et al, 2004), while others have focused on the divided PSOE leadership that emerged after the resignation of Gonzalez as party leader in 1997 (Hopkin, 2001a), or the effect these national divisions had on the consolidation of strong regional party ‘barons’ (Mendez, 2006). No existing study has focused precisely on the factional conflicts of the early 1990s. This is partly because its core dynamics were played out in the battleground of Andalusia, a region that comprises 18% of the Spanish population but accounts for ¼ of PSOE members and votes in party congresses. Andalusia was also the home region of PSOE secretary-general Felipe Gonzalez and vice secretary-general Alfonso Guerra (1977-1997), party leaders and key protagonists in these disputes.

The competing factions PSOE in the early 1990s were generally known as guerristas and renovadores. The precise nature of these factions is quite debateable. In some ways they were ‘factions of principle’ (Sartori, 1976), contesting the policy choices and ideological positioning of PSOE. Whereas renovadores (‘renewers’) were often younger party cadres who wanted PSOE to advocate more ‘new left’ policies, particularly social and cultural reforms to transform traditional Spanish society, the guerristas were often older politicians that wanted PSOE to adopt classic ‘old left’ policies, such as a greater role of the state in the Spanish economy, more redistributive economic policies, and the restoration of close ties between PSOE and trade unions. Both these national factions comprised a multiplicity of local and regional factions, many of which did not conform to these generational and ideological distinctions, and revolved primarily around competing personalities that sought control over the party organisation. This is closer to the notion of ‘factions of interest’ (Sartori, 1976) or ‘factions of personality’ (Bettcher, 2005). At the centre of these factional conflicts lay the powerful figure of Alfonso Guerra, who had been responsible for managing the internal organisation of PSOE since the early 1980s, an arrangement that allowed Felipe Gonzalez to focus on his governing functions as Prime Minister of Spain (1982-1996). Guerra developed his own party faction
(guerristas), which temporarily controlled the party organisation in the early 1990s, but had entirely disbanded by the end of the decade. Any explanation for the ‘new left’ turn of PSOE under the leadership of Zapatero (2000-) should reflect on the abrupt demise of the traditionalist faction and its once powerful leader.

The political careers of Gonzalez and Guerra originated in the Andalusian capital of Seville, so their political networks overlapped extensively. Guerra maintained a strong personal control over PSOE Andalusia, which allowed him to control the national party. Until 1997 regional PSOE federations cast a ‘block vote’ in the federal congress, an arrangement which allowed Andalusia (due to its population size and party membership) to cast a determining 25% of votes, without any mechanism for minority representation (Mendez, 1998; van Biezen and Hopkin, 2004). This allowed Guerra to maintain full control over national party organs, so long as he could control PSOE Andalusia. Any challenge to his political authority would need to come from within PSOE Andalusia, or from the party leader. The political demise of Guerra’s faction was sealed when he lost control over PSOE Andalusia, and in this respect Manuel Chaves (regional president of Andalusia since 1990) played an instrumental role as de facto leader of the regional renovadores. Chaves had the full support of party leader Gonzalez, who began to oppose Guerra’s faction when it became clear it sought to undermine his own leadership.310

The earliest challenge to Guerra’s leadership of PSOE Andalusia came in the 1980s from Jose Rodriguez de la Borbolla, who was regional secretary general (1977-1988) and regional president of Andalusia (1984-1990). Borbolla had been a close ally of Guerra, but began to carve out a more independent role as regional president. In 1988 Borbolla dismissed many Guerra supporters from the regional executive, a decision that prompted the fury of Guerra supporters within PSOE Andalusia, who proceeded to remove Borbolla as regional secretary-general and replace him with Carlos Sanjuan.311 PSOE Andalusia vetoed the re-nomination of Borbolla as their candidate for the next regional election, effectively curtailing his political career. Although Borbolla had the support of

310 Interview 21 (PSOE)
311 El Pais (01/03/88)
most PSOE regional parliamentarians in this factional dispute, he lost the crucial support of the party in central office. The relative obscurity of Sanjuan, whose key credentials for intra-party election were his loyalty to Guerra, required a more visible presidential candidate to contest the 1990 regional election.\(^{312}\) The choice of the party leadership was Manuel Chaves, Minister for Work in the Gonzalez government (1986-1990), and a leading parliamentarian in the Congress (1977-1990), who maintained excellent personal and political relations with Gonzalez and Guerra. Although Chaves comfortably won the 1990 regional election and became regional president, PSOE Andalusia remained under the leadership of Carlos Sanjuan. The factional conflicts of the 1990s soon crystallised around the alternative figures for executive (Chaves) and party (Guerra-Sanjuan) leadership. Their eventual resolution in favour of Chaves determined the demise of Guerra’s national faction, while their destabilising effects are still used by PSOE politicians to justify concentrating executive and party control in the person of Chaves.\(^{313}\)

The early involvement of Chaves in PSOE factional disputes were geared towards conflict mediation, as the newly incumbent regional president sought to stabilise a regional executive riven by factional conflicts.\(^{314}\) Chaves only began to dissociate himself from Guerra when it became evident the latter sought to unseat Gonzalez from the PSOE leadership, and in doing so Chaves made a strategic choice that would heavily influence the political direction of PSOE.\(^{315}\) The turning point was the process of candidate selection for the 1993 national elections, when guerristas excluded all politicians not affiliated to their faction from nomination to provincial party lists.\(^{316}\) Chaves excluded several older guerristas from the regional executive, although he publicly justified this in terms of generational renewal rather than factional positioning.\(^{317}\) Chaves avoided formal recognition as head of the renovadores faction, and averted the full backlash from guerristas still in control of PSOE Andalusia.\(^{318}\) Full control was the objective of the regional guerristas, and this became more evident after they refused to

\(^{312}\) Interview 21 (PSOE); \textit{El Pais} (27/10/91).
\(^{313}\) Interviews 16, 22 (PSOE).
\(^{314}\) \textit{El Pais} (18/10/91); (27/10/91).
\(^{315}\) Interview 21 (PSOE).
\(^{316}\) \textit{El Pais} (24/4/93).
\(^{317}\) \textit{El Pais} (14/7/93).
\(^{318}\) \textit{El Pais} (8/7/93).
develop pacts with *renovadores* over nominations to the 1993 PSOE congress,\(^{319}\) an uncompromising and antagonistic attitude that led to many high-profile regional defections from their ranks.\(^{320}\) The various *renovadores* factions in Andalusia thereafter became coordinated by Carmen Hermosin (regional minister and parliamentarian),\(^{321}\) and were supported ‘behind the scenes’ by Gonzalez and Chaves,\(^{322}\) who publicly sought mediation between the competing factions. The personal overtones of this factional conflict were particularly strong in Andalusia, where the generational element was much less clear-cut. Gonzalez, Hermosin, Chaves, Guerra and Sanjuan belonged to exactly the same generation of PSOE politicians that came to power in the 1970s.

The grip of the *guerristas* on Andalusia was first broken in the regional parliament, where most parliamentarians defected to the *renovadores* in 1993.\(^{323}\) The ensuing regional congress (1994) saw Chaves contest the post of regional secretary-general, rallying together several *renovadores* factions, winning the support of many ex-*guerristas*, and defeating the incumbent Sanjuan with 64% of votes.\(^{324}\) Although the *guerristas* continued to control other Spanish regions, they were crippled by their loss of power in Andalusia, which they never recovered after Chaves developed a firmer control over the regional party. This contributed heavily to their decline and eventual dispersal as an organised faction by the end of the decade.\(^{325}\) The weakness of Guerra after losing control over Andalusia became evident when Gonzalez resigned as secretary-general in 1997, following the defeat of PSOE in national elections. Instead of contesting the party leadership that Gonzalez had simply handed over to Joaquin Almunia, Guerra was obliged to resign as vice secretary-general and exit from the national leadership.

Presidentialised leadership is characterised by the combination and reinforcement of party and executive control (Poguntke and Webb, 2004). This applies to the regional leadership of Manuel Chaves since 1994, which has been very effective in resolving

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\(^{319}\) *El Pais* (26/9/93)

\(^{320}\) *El Pais* (8/7/93).

\(^{321}\) *El Pais* (26/9/93)

\(^{322}\) Interview 21 (PSOE).

\(^{323}\) *El Pais* (13/9/93).

\(^{324}\) *El Pais* (25/10/93); (30/6/97).

\(^{325}\) *El Pais* (30/6/97).
intra-party tensions and preventing the emergence of organised factions that could challenge his political authority or produce intra-party divisions, maintaining full control over the regional government. 326 The leadership style of Chaves is very different to the centralising guerristas, focused primarily on territorial mediation rather than territorial subordination. This includes respecting the autonomy of provincial party leaders, 327 and avoiding personal involvement in intra-party disputes. The latter are mediated by loyal party secretaries (rather than Chaves himself), and the regional president only intervenes when these disputes become intractable. 328 Chaves has transformed the post of regional president into a unifying figure, rather than an object of factional conflict, who encapsulates a strong sense of political authority and governing purpose. 329 This is perhaps his greatest contribution to the autonomist political strategy pursued by PSOE Andalusia since the early 1980s, helping to sustain PSOE’s dominance over the regional government (see Chapter 5.1.3). PSOE Andalusia has opened up the process of candidate selection and delegate selection to give a greater voice to sub-regional units, 330 reflecting the broader decentralisation of PSOE structures (see chapter 3.1). The abolition of the ‘block vote’ for regional federations, together with the possibility for minority representation at provincial level, have made intra-party representation less monolithic and centralised (Mendez, 2006). A more pluralist approach towards political diversity has helped PSOE Andalusia meet its objective of remaining the natural party of government, 331 where divergent view-points are accommodated within a single governing party rather than through alternation in government. Chaves’ secure control of PSOE Andalusia is evident from his plebiscitary re-election as RSG: 90% in the 1997 regional congress 332, 79% in the 2000 congress; 333 and 99.6% in the 2004 congress. 334

326 Interviews 16, 18, 22 (PSOE)
327 Interviews 16, 21, 22 (PSOE).
328 Interviews 16, 18 (PSOE).
329 Interview 18 (PSOE).
330 Interview 18 (PSOE)
331 Interview 22 (PSOE)
332 El Pais (30/6/97)
333 El Pais (4/12/00)
334 El Pais (27/7/04)
Chaves has performed important mediating functions at national level, which have raised his stature in national politics, and helped to consolidate his leadership in Andalusia. In 1998 a divided party leadership emerged from ‘closed’ electoral primaries that selected Josep Borrell as PSOE candidate for Prime Minister, while the defeated Joaquin Almunia remained PSOE secretary-general (Hopkin, 2001b). Chaves had openly supported the candidature of Almunia in the electoral primaries, reflecting the preferences of Andalusian party members, who preferred Almunia (56%) to Borrell (44%). After this leadership election, Chaves became instrumental in mediating between Almunia and Borrell, although the resignation of Borrell in 1999 paved the way for Almunia’s return as PSOE candidate for Prime Minister. In the 2000 leadership election, the southern regional ‘baron’ Jose Bono (40.8%) was narrowly defeated by the backbench national parliamentarian Jose Luis Zapatero (41.7%), who won by only 7 votes in the PSOE congress (Mendez, 2006). Chaves had privately backed Bono for the leadership, as did most regional delegates from Andalusia (60-65% for Bono), but neither regional ‘baron’ contested this narrow and unexpected victory. Instead Chaves united PSOE behind the relatively untested Zapatero, performing a crucial role in convincing other regional ‘barons’ to support the new party leader. Chaves signalled his support for Zapatero by participating in the national executive committee, and accepting the honorary nomination as PSOE president. This represented an important generational compromise within PSOE, reconciling the older generation of politicians in control since the 1970s (including Chaves and most regional ‘barons’) with the younger generation of politicians that had emerged since the 1990s (including Zapatero and his allies). Successive electoral victories in the 2000s have consolidated the Zapatero leadership, which is now less dependent on support from regional party ‘barons’ (Mendez, 2006). Chaves has conformed to the socially modernising agenda of the Zapatero leadership, taking a lead role in organisational renewal by developing a younger (and more gender

335 *El País* (23/1/98)

336 *El País* (26/4/98). This was a reversal of the national result where Almunia (45%) was clearly defeated by Borrell (55%), *El País* (25/4/98).

337 *El País* (21/11/98)

338 *El País* (23/7/00)

339 Interviews 16, 21 (PSOE); *El País* (24/7/00).

340 Interviews 16, 18, 21 (PSOE)
balanced) generation of PSOE politicians in Andalusia,\textsuperscript{341} while never really relinquishing control over the PSOE organisation.

Candidate selection for regional and national elections has become largely decentralised to the provincial level in PSOE Andalusia,\textsuperscript{342} in contrast to the period where Guerra controlled the party organisation and candidate selection was heavily factionalised and centralised. Provincial secretary-generals are now the crucial actors in candidate selection, mediating between local preferences and referring their choices to the regional leadership. The latter generally complies with the requests of the provincial party.\textsuperscript{343} Any alterations made at national level are oriented towards ensuring an appropriate balance of age and gender has been maintained, almost always the case in Andalusia.\textsuperscript{344} Elected PSOE candidates represent a broad spectrum of age and experience. Leadership posts at regional and provincial levels are usually held by politicians in their early fifties, while most regional parliamentarians are elected in their thirties or forties,\textsuperscript{345} reflecting a conscious attempt by PSOE Andalusia to pursue generational renewal within a structured and hierarchical organisation. The PSOE regional government has also developed a policy of equal representation for men and women in the regional executive, adopting similar provisions for PSOE party lists to the regional parliament. The PSOE-sponsored Statute of Autonomy reform in Andalusia transformed this into a binding obligation on all parties that compete for seats in regional elections. Another distinctive feature of PSOE Andalusia is the territorial council established in 2004. Modelled on the analogous national party structure, created to accommodate powerful regional ‘barons’ in the late 1990s (Mendez, 1998; 2006), the territorial council in Andalusia incorporates all 8 provincial secretary-generals alongside the regional secretary-general (i.e. Chaves), creating an informal arena through which provincial leaders can express concerns or resolve disputes between territorial levels.\textsuperscript{346} This reflects the high level of congruence between the structures and objectives of the national and regional party branches, and

\textsuperscript{341} Interviews 16, 20 (PSOE)
\textsuperscript{342} Interviews 20, 21, 22 (PSOE).
\textsuperscript{343} Interviews 21, 22 (PSOE)
\textsuperscript{344} Interviews 20, 22 (PSOE)
\textsuperscript{345} Interview 20 (PSOE); Regional Parliament website (www.parlamentodeandalucia.es).
\textsuperscript{346} Interview 16, 22 (PSOE).
attempts at early resolution of intra-regional disputes. The internal cohesion of PSOE Andalusia has also contributed significantly towards its electoral recovery since 1994.

**Popular Party (PP) in Andalusia**

PP remains the second largest party in Andalusia, but has increased its support over the timeframe (see Table 14). PP increased its share of the vote by more than 50% between 1990 and 1994. PP obtained a further 226,000 votes in the 1996 regional election, although its vote share fell due to the concomitant timing of national and regional elections, which produced an increase in voter turnout (from 67.7% in 1994 to 77.9% in 1996) that disproportionately benefited PSOE (Montanes and Torres, 1998). The expansion of PP support is crucial for explaining the lack of serious divisions within the party organisation, despite its status of permanent opposition at regional level. The principal objective of PP Andalusia is not to conquer the regional government, but rather to increase the chances of PP entering the national government. It does so by mobilising PP support for national elections, held concurrently with regional elections in Andalusia since 1996. Andalusia represents a huge potential reservoir of votes and seats for competing statewide parties, as a Spanish-speaking region that accounts for over 18% of the total population. PP was only able to win the 1996 and 2000 national elections because it substantially increased its vote share in Andalusia (+5.6% and +5.2% respectively). A strong performance in Andalusia allows PP to counter its structural weaknesses in Catalonia and Basque Country (see Chapter 3.2), where its electoral support remains restricted by strong NSWP on the centre-right of the political spectrum. The objective of PP Andalusia is primarily ‘vote-seeking’ at the regional level, with a view to ‘office-seeking’ at the national level.

Although in 2004 PP lost electoral ground in Andalusia, this was publicly attributed to events occurring at national level, rather than deficiencies in the regional campaign. PP

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347 *El Pais* (8/3/96)  
348 Interview 15 (PP)  
349 Interviews 15 (PP), 22 (PSOE).  
350 Interview 22 (PSOE).
politicians in Andalusia attributed their defeat to the growing opposition to the Iraq war, as well as the PP government’s mishandling of the 11th March terrorist attacks. Privately the PP leadership recognised this serious drop in electoral support, and proceeded to change the regional leadership. PP re-proposed their earlier candidate for regional president (Javier Arenas), who increased the PP vote share substantially (+7.0%) in the 2008 regional election. So long as national and regional elections are held concurrently in Andalusia, it is unlikely regional PP leaders will envisage any ‘trade-off’ between their national and regional electoral strategies, and will justify their gains and losses largely in national terms. This might be different if regional elections were held at another point during the electoral cycle, because this would highlight the inability of PP to gain control over the regional government, and might encourage the regional party to formulate differentiated electoral appeals or policy proposals. Differences between national and regional strategies are very hard to identify when regional elections are held on the same day as national elections. The current arrangement nevertheless suits PP Andalusia, which is guaranteed a substantial share of votes and seats in regional elections, and whose more ambitious leaders can aspire to national public office.

The most important figure in PP Andalusia is Javier Arenas, a national parliamentarian first elected as regional party president in 1993, with 96% support in the regional congress. Arenas had been a UCD national parliamentarian, but joined PP soon after the national leadership passed from Fraga to Aznar in 1989. Arenas collaborated closely with Aznar in seeking to modernise and moderate PP, in order to compete for the ‘centre ground’ of Spanish politics. Arenas fully implemented at regional level the objectives set by Aznar for the national party, strengthening his political authority at regional and national level. Arenas replaced all 8 provincial executives in 1994, substituting the older generation of AP politicians (many of whom had participated in the fascist regime) with younger and more moderate figures. Arenas himself represented this generational renewal, being only 36 at the time of his election as regional party president. This organisational renewal was peacefully accepted by PP Andalusia for three reasons:

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351 Interview 15 (PP)
352 El Pais (26/7/93).
353 El Pais (7/2/94)
Firstly, the existing regional party felt unable to compete adequately with PSOE Andalusia, because the latter successfully capitalised on the region’s historical anti-fascist sympathies and dissuaded voters from supporting AP, a party still associated with the Franco regime. Secondly, the substantial success of PP in the 1994 regional election reinforced the view that organisational renewal could permanently enhance electoral performance. Thirdly, many important AP politicians were allowed to remain active in this new regional party, but in less public positions of authority. Others were successful in entering the national parliament (or even the national government) in 1996, while some took the chance to retire gracefully from politics. This generational compromise partly explains the overwhelming re-election of Arenas as regional party president in 1996 (97% votes in the regional congress), despite the radical changes he made to intra-party power structures. Arenas was chosen by the national leadership to stand as PP candidate for regional president in the 1994 and 1996 regional elections, reinforcing the close integration of national and regional party levels.

In 1996 Arenas was appointed Minister for Work and Social Policy in the PP minority government (1996-2000), but continued as regional party president until he was appointed PP secretary-general in 1999. This is the second highest post in the party hierarchy, responsible for managing several aspects of internal organisation, including the resolution of disputes between territorial levels, so clearly incompatible with the post of regional party president. While maintaining his informal control over PP Andalusia, Arenas proposed the nomination of Teofila Martinez (mayor of Cadiz and national parliamentarian) as party president of Andalusia. This choice was duly ratified by the national directorate, which proceeded to nominate Martinez as PP candidate for regional president in the 2000 election. Martinez was re-nominated as PP candidate for regional president in 2004, a decision that caused some dissent in party ranks from local politicians who protested that her candidature was ‘imposed from above’ by the party

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354 Interview 17 (PP)
355 Interview 15 (PP)
356 El Pais (19/1/99)
357 El Pais (24/1/99)
leadership, a coalition of ex-PP defectors who contested 200 seats in the 2003 local elections. The decline of PP support in the 2004 regional election triggered a second renewal of the party organisation, once again spearheaded by Arenas. The latter replaced Martinez as RPP in 2004 and agreed to his own nomination as PP candidate for regional president in 2008. The continuing role of Arenas as intermediary between regional and national politics was evident from his key role during the PSOE-sponsored reform of the Andalusian Statute of Autonomy (2006-2007). Arenas became the prime negotiator for PP during its passage in the regional parliament (where the reform was opposed by PP), as well as during its passage in the Spanish parliament (where the reform was approved by PP after numerous modifications). Arenas successfully resisted attempts by some PP politicians to reject the Andalusian statute in the Spanish parliament, while negotiating concessions with the PSOE government (Keating and Wilson, 2009).

Arenas is clearly the regional ‘baron’ of PP Andalusia, wielding personal and formal control over the entire sub-national organisation, on which the party depends entirely for regional leadership. Yet the figure of Teofila Martinez highlights another interesting feature about PP Andalusia, namely its broader reliance on popular local politicians who won mayoral contests and parliamentary seats in former urban strongholds of PSOE during the 1990s. Other examples include Celia Villalobos (mayor of Malaga and national parliamentarian) and Soledad Becerril (mayor of Seville and national parliamentarian), who like Teofila Martinez (mayor of Cadiz and national parliamentarian) perform key political functions at multiple territorial levels. Although PP Andalusia has made significant headway among the urban middle classes, particularly in larger cities with higher levels of economic development, it has not advanced significantly in rural or under-developed areas, where PSOE remains more powerful. This discrepancy was highlighted in the 1995 local elections, where PP was the most voted party in all eight provincial capitals, but PSOE remained the most voted party in

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358 El Pais (20/9/02).
359 El Pais (20/4/03).
361 El Pais (24/10/06).
362 Interviews 15, 17 (PP).
The difficulty of PP in rural areas of Andalusia is exacerbated by its necessity of obedience to the national party, which has obliged it to defend national policies that are unpopular in the region. The most evident example was the Rural Unemployment Scheme introduced by PSOE governments and commonly regarded as clientelistic (Blakeley, 2001; Hopkin, 2001b; Hopkin and Mastropaolo, 2001). Attempts by national PP governments (1996-2004) to reform this scheme proved extremely unpopular in rural areas of Andalusia, where this limited PP electoral advances. The reluctance of PP Andalusia to openly defend regional interests is reflected in the unwillingness to advance a more autonomist strategy, in response to the prevailing autonomist discourse of PSOE (see Chapter 5.1.3). This reluctance must be explained with reference to the subordination of regional interests to national ones within PP, and the unwillingness of the PP leadership to tolerate regionalist strategies that advocate asymmetric, irreconcilable and competing territorial demands.

**United Left (IU) in Andalusia**

IU is the third largest party in Andalusia, but its electoral support has declined sharply since 1996 (see Table 14). This decline broadly reflects national trends (see Chapter 3.2), although IU support in Andalusia remains well above the national average. Within Andalusia IU support is most heavily concentrated in the central inland province of Cordoba (12.3% 2000; 11.3% 2004), and weakest in the eastern coastal province of Almeria (4.5% 2000; 3.9% 2004). The electoral decline of IU has triggered an important shift in its national and regional party strategies. In the 1990s IU competed for electoral supremacy with PSOE and rejected any form of coalitional agreement with its main rival. In the 2000s IU recognised its electoral limitations and sought to improve its credentials as a junior coalition partner in future PSOE-led governments. The shifting political strategy of IU Andalusia heavily influenced that of the party leadership, perhaps inevitably since Andalusia is the largest regional federation in terms of party membership.

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364 Interviews 15, 17 (PP).
and electoral support. Most IU leaders hail from local strongholds in Andalusia, which makes national and regional party strategies overlap, a pattern evident from other SWP.

The main factional conflicts in IU focused on the choice of political strategy vis-à-vis PSOE, and the ensuing character of political relations between IU and its larger left-wing rival (Ramiro, 2004). Until the late 1990s, IU Andalusia was controlled by ‘hard-line’ factions opposed to any form of political alignment or coalitional agreement with PSOE. These were eventually displaced by more ‘moderate’ IU factions, which favoured political alignment and coalitional agreement with PSOE. These leadership changes in Andalusia paved the way for ‘moderate’ factions to gain control of the party leadership through the election of Gaspar Llamazares as IU general coordinator in 2000. In Andalusia the ‘hard-line’ factions remain concentrated in the strong regional branch of PCE, the Partido Comunista Andaluz (PCA), led by Manuel Alcaraz from 1981 till 2002.365 PCA was the regional powerbase for the PCE secretary-general Julio Anguita (1988-1998), who also controlled the post of IU general coordinator (1989-2000), in a combined PCE-IU leadership that lasted over a decade. The PCE-IU leadership became closely aligned at regional and national levels, with Alcaraz remaining a key ally of Anguita. At national level the PCE-IU leadership developed a policy of total opposition to ‘right wing’ PSOE governments, combined with the unrealistic objective of surpassing PSOE as largest party on the left of the political spectrum (Ramiro, 2000; 2004). IU refused to offer any parliamentary support to PSOE in the 1990s, but rarely wielded ‘blackmail potential’ over the national party system because NSWP were able and willing to form parliamentary coalitions. Yet in Andalusia the ‘hard-line’ PCE-IU factions could put this strategy of total opposition into practice, because they wielded blackmail potential over the party system after the 1994 regional election. In implementing this controversial strategy, the ‘hard-line’ PCE-IU leadership demonstrated its severe limitations, and fatally undermined their own control over the regional party.

365 In this PCA is supported by ‘hard-line’ radical unions and agricultural collectives (strong in Andalusia but weak in most of Spain), which also oppose any form of coalition with PSOE.365
The 1994 regional election in Andalusia produced a hung parliament, with neither PSOE nor PP able to secure a parliamentary majority, while PA held insufficient seats to form a governing majority with either party (see Chapter 5.1.3). This made IU pivotal to determining any legislative majority in the regional parliament. Instead of seeking significant concessions from PSOE in exchange for their coalitional support, the ‘hard-line’ PCE-IU leadership paralysed the PSOE minority government by blocking all its proposals (including the budget) in the regional parliament. This strategy was pursued by IU in full collusion with the centre-right PP, and became known as the pinza (‘pincer’) strategy. This succeeded in weakening the executive and paralysing the legislature, but failed to devastate PSOE as intended, because the regional president resolved the impasse by calling an early regional election in 1996. This produced a substantial increase in PSOE support, which allowed it to form a majority governing coalition with PA. It also produced a sharp decline in IU support, as their voters punished them for their obstructionist alliance with PP (Montabes and Torres, 1998). The perversity of the ‘hard-line’ strategy was even more evident at local level, where IU councillors were forbidden by their regional federation from developing governing or parliamentary alliances with PSOE after the 1995 municipal elections. The outcome was a PP mayor installed in every provincial capital of Andalusia, including cities where PSOE and IU controlled a legislative majority (Malaga, Huelva, Cordoba)\(^{366}\). IU has never since wielded blackmail potential over the regional party system, a condition that encouraged the ascendency of more ‘moderate’ IU factions, keen to advance their coalition potential vis-à-vis PSOE.

Since the 1980s, several politicians within IU Andalusia sought to develop closer relations with PSOE. Although the dominant coalition of ‘hardliners’ saw high levels of IU support as fertile ground for strategies to undermine and surpass PSOE, more ‘moderate’ figures saw an opportunity to gain governing experience and ensure left-wing dominance in Andalusia. The latter view was strong among elected IU politicians, such as Herminio Trigo (mayor of Cordoba 1986-1995), who realised the advantages of developing governing pacts at local and regional levels. Trigo abandoned PCE in 1991 to become General Coordinator of Nueva Izquierda (NI), a reformist faction of IU that later

\(^{366}\) *El País* (18/6/95).
organised itself as a party (PDNI). PDNI advocated a close alliance between IU and PSOE at all territorial levels, leading to heavy disputes with the ‘hardline’ PCE-IU leadership that eventually compelled PDNI to leave IU in 1997 (Ramiro, 2000). In Andalusia the remnants of PDNI allied with the Greens and merged into PSOE, strengthening the ‘Leftist’ and ‘Ecological’ components of the latter.\footnote{El País (12/1/00), Interview 19 (IU).} In the early 1990s, ‘moderate’ IU politicians entered into conflict with the IU regional coordinator, Luis Carlos Rejon, who represented the ‘hardliners’ in the regional parliament,\footnote{El País (17/6/91).} and was the architect of the uncompromising ‘pincer’ strategy.\footnote{Interview 21 (PSOE)} Rejon was forced into an acrimonious resignation after the drop in IU support during the 1996 regional election,\footnote{El País (24/4/96), Interview 21 (PSOE).} while the ensuing conflict prompted the ‘hardline’ national leader Julio Anguita to delay the election of a new regional coordinator. This election was not held until 1997 but nevertheless resulted in the victory of a ‘moderate’ candidate (Antonio Romero), who shifted the coalitional strategy of the regional IU federation. This was evident after the 1999 local elections, when IU Andalusia encouraged coalitions with PSOE (and even PA) that minimised the number of PP Mayors.\footnote{El País (4/7/99); (25/6/99).} These coalitional agreements restored a PSOE Mayor in Granada, Seville and Almeria, as well as an IU Mayor in Cordoba.\footnote{El País (28/8/00).}

The ‘hard-line’ PCE-IU leadership suffered a debilitating blow from the loss of Andalusia in 1997, which represented 1/3 of party members and ¼ of votes in the party congress.\footnote{El País (28/8/00), (9/11/00).} It lost control of the national leadership after Gaspar Llamazares became IU general coordinator in 2000, narrowly defeating the PCE secretary-general Francisco Frutos (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008). In Andalusia the election of Frutos was backed by PCA leader Manuel Alcazar but opposed by Rosa Aguilar (mayor of Cordoba), who successfully rallied ‘moderate’ factions opposed to Frutos.\footnote{El País (2/11/00).} IU Andalusia thereafter allied closely with the national leadership of Llamazares, whose close ally Diego Valderas was elected regional coordinator in 2000 and nominated to the national
executive, while Rosa Aguilar was nominated to the second highest party position in 2003. In contrast Alcaraz resigned as leader of PCA in 2002 after two decades in control, while Rejon was expelled from IU for standing in other party lists for the 2004 European Parliament elections. Yet the ‘moderate’ IU leadership remained insecure, because an anti-Llamazares coalition (Convocatoria de Andalucía) obtained 42% support in the 2003 regional congress. IU Andalusia was nevertheless able to develop a more constructive relationship with PSOE in the regional parliament, and improve its credentials as a coalition partner. This collaborative strategy continued after the 2003 local elections, when a PSOE-IU governing coalition was additionally formed in Seville, and an IU Minority government was formed in Cordoba, reliant on external support from PSOE. IU collaborated closely with PSOE in reforming the Andalusian Statute of Autonomy (2006-2007). Although this reform was a personal initiative of the PSOE regional president, IU guaranteed its full support in the regional parliament, Spanish parliament, and regional referendum (Keating and Wilson, 2009).

**Andalusian Party (PA)**

PA is the only significant NSWP in Andalusia, where it remains fourth party in electoral terms. PA defines itself as a ‘nationalist’ party of Andalusia, but has never advocated such radical demands such as independence, and can therefore be categorised as a ‘regionalist’ party. PA won seats to the regional parliament in successive regional elections (1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004), and occasionally won seats to the Spanish parliament (1977, 1979, 1989, 2000), although PA has rarely been significant at national level (see Chapter 3.3). PA became a crucial actor in the regional party system during the 1990s, when it offered external support to the beleaguered PSOE minority.

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375 El País (9/11/00), Interview 21 (PSOE).
376 El País (22/11/03).
377 El País (13/5/02).
378 El País (5/5/04).
379 El País (22/11/03).
380 Interviews 16 (PSOE), 19 (IU).
381 Interview 18 (PSOE).
382 El País (9/6/03).
383 El País (26/5/03).
384 Interviews 16 (PSOE), 19 (IU)
385 El País (3/11/06).
government (1994-6), and later formed two majority coalition governments with PSOE (1996-2000; 2000-2004). PA reached its peak in support after the 1990 regional election (see Table 14). Its support fell sharply in 1994 then oscillated in subsequent regional elections, before collapsing entirely in 2008, when PA lost all its parliamentary seats.

The electoral collapse of PA was closely linked to both intra-organisational conflict and broader developments in the regional party system. The electoral resurgence of PSOE in 2004 allowed it to form a regional government that no longer relied on coalitional support from PA, plunging the latter into the now unfamiliar territory of opposition. The alignment of PSOE and IU weakened and isolated PA in the party system, because PA could no longer expect to remain the preferred coalition partner for future PSOE-led governments. Although PA has always claimed its objective is to defend the ‘national’ interests of Andalusia, its distribution of electoral support contains strong socio-demographic and geographical variations. The PA electorate is mainly drawn from the urban middle class, young people and citizens who are politically active. PA has always had difficulty in attracting the supporter of older, poorer and politically disinterested regional voters (Montabes et al, 2006). In geographical terms PA support was much higher in the five central-western provinces of Andalusia (6.5-14.5% in 2000; 6.2-8.0% in 2004), and much lower in the three eastern provinces (3.7-5.2% in 2000; 4.4-5.7% in 2004). Yet the collapse of PA in the 2008 regional election heavily affected all provinces, confirming that PA had lost control over any remaining local strongholds.

PA can trace its origins to a left-wing regionalist movement that emerged during the 1960s, when Alejandro Rojas-Marcos and other student political activists opposed to the Franco dictatorship fielded candidates for local and university elections in Seville. They competed under the banner of Poder Andaluz (‘Andalucian Power’), but re-named themselves Alianza Socialista de Andalucia (‘Socialist Alliance of Andalucia’) in 1971. The movement was successively re-founded as Partido Socialista de Andalucia (‘Socialist Party of Andalucia) in 1974; Partido Socialista de Andalucia - Poder Andaluz

386 Interview 14 (PA); Las Claves de la Autonomia de Andalucia (PA, 2003).
in 1979; and Partido Andalucista (PA) in 1984. The political philosophy of PA is heavily inspired by the works of Blas Infante, a regionalist writer and politician who supported a referendum on autonomy for Andalusia in the 1930s, and was executed by the invading Francoist army in 1936 for his socialist affiliations. Infante was subsequently recognised in the Statute of Autonomy as the ‘founding father of Andalusia’, and remains a historical reference point for both PA and PSOE Andalusia. Consistent features of PA include a nationalist political discourse, and a heavy reliance on personalised leadership rather than structured organisation. The co-existence of several charismatic local leaders increased PA support in many municipalities, but also produced strong personal divisions, competing territorial power-bases, and divergent coalitional strategies. Intra-organisational conflict led to the formation of several splinter parties, and ultimately contributed to the electoral collapse of PA.

PA claims to be the only party that represents the ‘nation’ of Andalusia, but behaved more as an aggregation of local ‘barons’, and was heavily undermined by the autonomist governing strategy pursued by PSOE (see Chapter 5.1.3). Local PA leaders relied heavily on personal control of municipal institutions to maintain their stature within the party organisation. The formation or rupture of alliances between local PA ‘barons’ undermined party stability, leading to frequent leadership changes at regional level. Local ‘barons’ included party founder Alejandro Rojas-Marcos, whose power-base in Seville permitted his election as national parliamentarian (1989-91); regional parliamentarian (1994-6); mayor (1991-1995); and deputy mayor (1995-1999); prior to retiring from active politics in 2004. Another local ‘baron’ was Pedro Pacheco, whose powerbase was Jerez de la Frontera, second city of Cordoba province. Pacheco was mayor of Jerez for over two decades (1979-2003), and regularly elected regional parliamentarian (1982-2004). Pacheco created the main ‘splinter groups’ of PA: Partido Andalucista del Progreso (1993) and the Partido Socialista de Andalucia (2001).

387 PA website; (PA, 2003).
388 Interview 14 (PA); (PA, 2003).
389 Interviews 14 (PA), 15 (PP).
390 Interview 14 (PA).
391 Interviews 15 (PP), 16 (PSOE), 17 (PP).
392 Interviews 14 (PA), 18 (PSOE).
393 El Pais (24/3/93).
Another local ‘baron’ was Patricio Gonzalez, the populist mayor of Algeciras (1992-2003), second largest city in Cadiz province. Gonzalez advocated the creation of a 9th province of Algeciras, to remedy the perceived neglect of local infrastructure in favour of the provincial capital. These fractious local ‘barons’ eventually lost control over their municipal institutions, and in turn lost control over the party leadership.

Coalitional strategies at regional and local level represented the cause (or at least the pretext) for most of the intra-party conflicts in PA during the 1990s. Divergences over coalitional strategy were linked to competing ideological preferences, personal tensions, and rival leaders. PA never developed a policy of congruent coalition formation across territorial levels, with individual pacts negotiated at their respective territorial level, reflecting local conditions and opportunistically oriented towards maximising access to government. In Seville, PA and PP formed a coalition to control the local government after the 1991 and 1995 elections, although PSOE was the most voted party in the municipality. This arrangement allowed Alejandro Rojas-Marcos to become mayor of Seville for one term (1991-5), and Soledad Becerril (PP) to become mayor in the following term (1995-9). This PP-PA alliance collapsed after the 1999 elections because of personal-local disputes, rather than its obvious incongruence with the regional PSOE-PA governing coalition. In Jerez de la Frontera, Pedro Pacheco required external support from PSOE to govern as mayor from 1995 till 2003, encouraging him to advocate a region-wide alliance with PSOE. Pacheco heavily criticised Rojas-Marcos for pursuing an alliance with PP in Seville, leading to an escalating dispute that resulted in Pacheco being temporarily expelled from PA in 1993. A decade later the 2003 local elections saw Pacheco’s splinter party PSA become surpassed by PSOE as 1st party in Jerez, leaving Pacheco with the choice of entering opposition or forming a governing coalition with PP. In violation of his earlier beliefs, Pacheco proceeded to form a ‘time

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395 Interviews 14 (PA), 15 (PP), 16 (PSOE), 17 (PP), 18 (PSOE).
396 El Pais (30/5/91).
397 El Pais (28/5/91).
398 Interviews 14 (PA), 15 (PP).
399 El Pais (30/5/91).
400 El Pais (17/6/91).
401 El Pais (23/5/03).
share’ governing coalition with PP (2 years PA Mayor; 2 years PP Mayor).\textsuperscript{402} Although most PA politicians and activists consider it to be a left-centre party, most Andalusian voters (63.3\%) perceive PA to be a centrist party (Montabes et al, 2006), which reflects its opportunistic coalitional strategy and incoherent regionalist discourse. The steady erosion of local PA power-bases; the electoral resurgence of PSOE; and the pro-coalitional stance of IU; have all contributed to significantly restricting the governing opportunities available to PA.

Although PA has formed coalitions with both PSOE and PP after local elections, at regional level it has only been able to form coalitions with PSOE. In the 1994-6 legislature PA adopted a constructive attitude towards the PSOE minority government, then under attack from the ‘pincer’ strategy of PP and IU. PA offered external support to the PSOE minority government (1994-6), although this was insufficient to secure a governing majority. The 1996 regional election allowed PSOE and PA to form a majority coalition government, reiterated after the 2000 regional election. As a result of both coalitional agreements, PA obtained two ministries (Tourism and Parliamentary Relations) but maintained a rather low political profile, with most regional voters unaware PA was even part of the coalition government! (Montabes et al, 2006). This is perhaps because no severe coalitional crisis occurred during this period,\textsuperscript{403} while participation in the regional government helped PA to reduce intra-party tensions and focus on developing stronger governing credentials.\textsuperscript{404} PA exploited the extensive resources of the Tourism ministry to develop a clientelist electoral network, designed to strengthen its party organisation throughout the region (Montabes et al, 2006).\textsuperscript{405} PA support fell in the 2004 regional election, when the electoral resurgence of PSOE allowed a single-party majority government to be formed that no longer relied on PA support. These developments triggered a severe party crisis in PA, already mounting since the loss of key strongholds in the 2003 local elections. The 2004 PA Congress concluded with the ascendancy of a younger leadership group more hostile to the regional coalition with

\textsuperscript{402} El País (15/6/03).
\textsuperscript{403} Interviews 14 (PA), 18 (PSOE), 21 (PSOE).
\textsuperscript{404} Interviews 14 (PA), 19 (PSOE), 21 (PSOE).
\textsuperscript{405} Interviews 14 (PA), 15 (PP), 16 (PSOE).
PSOE, and keen to differentiate themselves from other parties in the political spectrum, through a more aggressively regionalist strategy.\footnote{Interviews 15 (PP), 16 (PSOE), 17 (PP), 21 (PSOE).} The collapse of PA in the 2008 regional election suggests this strategy failed, perhaps because the abrupt change alienated or confused traditional PA voters. In any case the final blow to PA came from its unwise decision to reject the proposed reform of the Andalusian Statute of Autonomy.

PA opposed this regional statute reform at every stage of its ratification (regional parliament, Spanish parliament, regional referendum), consistently arguing that it failed to advance the autonomy of Andalusia in line with other ‘historic’ regions such as Catalonia.\footnote{Ibid.} PA focused its criticism on economic and symbolic issues. Economic criticisms included the proposed system of regional financing, presented as unfavourable to the one agreed by the PSOE government for Catalonia, as well as the lack of an explicit reference to the ‘historic debt’ owed to Andalusia, after the widespread infra-structural neglect during the Franco regime.\footnote{El Pais (27/3/06); Interview 14 (PA).} Symbolic criticism focused on the terminology used to describe Andalusia, with PA insisting on ‘nation’ rather than ‘historical nationality’,\footnote{Interview 14 (PA).} in line with the demands of Catalan nationalists (Keating and Wilson, 2009). The attitude of PA also reflected a sense of betrayal by PSOE, which no longer privileged PA in coalitional negotiations after the expiry of their governing coalition in 2004.\footnote{Interviews 14 (PA), 15 (PP).} PSOE made more efforts to strike a deal with IU and PP over the statute reform, since these parties could also help the ratification process in the Spanish parliament. Although PA leaders sought solace in the low turnout for the regional referendum in 2007,\footnote{Interview 14 (PA).} the ‘Yes’ vote was carried decisively, while local elections held soon after the referendum confirmed a slump in PA support, with the loss of remaining local strongholds, soon followed by the collapse of PA in the 2008 regional election.

\footnote{Wilson, Alex (2009), Multi-level Party Politics in Italy and Spain European University Institute 10.2870/13381}
Chapter 5.1.3: Regional Party System of Andalusia (1990-2007)

The regional party system in Andalusia is characterised by the lack of alternation in government, with PSOE maintaining its predominant role in the party system. PSOE majority governments characterised the first three regional legislatures (1982-1994), followed by a shortened legislature where PSOE formed a minority government (1994-1996), two legislatures where PSOE governed with PA in a majority coalition government (1996-2004), and two legislatures where PSOE restored its single party majority government (2004-). The fall in PSOE support during the early 1990s appeared to mark a shift from ‘dominant’ to ‘moderate’ pluralism in the regional party system (Montabes, 2000), but subsequent regional elections never developed a pattern of competitive bi-polarism which would reflect the national party system (see Chapter 3.2).

The only period in which PSOE was unable to achieve a parliamentary majority in Andalusia was the 1994-1996 Legislature, when the coordinated ‘pincer’ strategy of IU and PP paralysed the regional parliament. This legislative coalition could not be transformed into a governing coalition because of the impossible ideological distances between IU and PP, and ultimately served to strengthen the systemic predominance of PSOE. The paralysis of the regional government during the 1994-6 legislature led to the bi-partisan approval of a law that allowed the regional president to dissolve the parliament and hold elections at a timing of his choice.412 Chaves promptly dissolved the legislature after it rejected the 1996 annual budget,413 and chose to hold regional elections concomitantly with national elections.414 Although IU obtained its best performance in the 1996 national elections, voters in Andalusia punished IU for its controversial ‘pincer’ strategy with PP. IU lost 90,000 votes in the regional election, leading to the loss of 7 seats in the regional parliament,415 and allowed PSOE to form a majority coalition government with PA. This severely weakened the blackmail and coalition potential of IU, triggering a profound transformation in the leadership and its coalitional strategy. The

412 Interview 15 (PP).
413 *El País* (23/11/95)
414 *El País* (4/1/96)
new IU leadership interpreted the 1994 regional election as a wasted chance to form a governing coalition with PSOE, precisely at the moment when it wielded greatest coalitional leverage. IU Andalusia has since pursued a more collaborative strategy towards the PSOE regional government, with the ultimate objective of developing some form of coalition should PSOE lose its parliamentary majority, conforming to similar shifts in the coalitional strategies of other IU regional federations (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008). IU began to pursue a more collaborative strategy towards PSOE after the change of regional leadership in 1997, but faced the obstacle of a strong rival as junior coalition partner in the form of PA, which had the advantage of already forming a coalition government with PSOE. The latter could have formed a governing coalition with either PA or IU after the 2000 regional election (both held the necessary 5 seats), but chose to re-iterate its coalition with PA. This was partly because the previous PSOE-PA coalition had been very stable, and partly because IU was still deeply mistrusted by PSOE politicians in Andalusia after the ‘pincer’ experience. The PSOE-PA governing coalition was terminated in 2004 after PSOE restored its absolute majority in the regional parliament, triggering a severe organisational crisis within PA. The PA leadership that emerged from this crisis altered its political strategy vis-à-vis PSOE, through an erratic process of distancing and differentiation. The collapse of PA in the 2008 regional election reduced the number of parties in the Andalusian parliament to three (PSOE, PP, IU). PSOE now has a stronger advantage over PP in the regional party system, because it wields an exclusive option to form a parliamentary or governing coalition with IU, a strategic option that is not available to PP because of their ideological incompatibility.

Another development that reinforces the predominance of PSOE in the regional party system is the concomitant timing of national and regional elections since 1996. This has become institutionalised in regional politics, because the PSOE regional president wields agenda-setting power in determining the date of regional elections, and is very unlikely to change an agreement that primarily benefits his own party. PSOE voters in Andalusia are

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416 Interview 18 (PSOE)
417 Interviews 14 (PP), 16 (PSOE),
418 Interviews 16, 18, 21 (PSOE); El Pais (4/2/00).
419 Interviews 15 (PP), 16 (PSOE)
much less willing than others to participate in separately held regional elections, a factor that contributed heavily to the low PSOE vote share in the 1994 regional election (Montabes and Torres, 1998). Although PSOE is the only party in Andalusia that supports the concomitant timing of national and regional elections, its control over the regional government allows it to dictate the ‘rules of the game’. The concomitant timing of national and regional elections has reinforced the national dimension of regional politics, already very high in a Spanish-speaking region with over 18% of the total population, with the potential to determine the outcome of national elections.

The concomitant timing of regional and national elections has encouraged PP to subordinate its regional electoral strategy to a much broader national strategy. This has been largely successful: PP increased its vote share substantially over the timeframe and won two national elections (1996, 2000). The multi-level electoral strategies of PSOE are more complex and focused on the performance of the regional government. During the 1990s, PSOE Andalusia suffered in electoral terms from its association with an unpopular governing party at national level, but unlike in other regions never lost office as a result. During the 2000s PSOE Andalusia benefited from the popularity of the national governing party under the leadership of Zapatero, while the resulting victories in Andalusia helped to consolidate the regional leadership of Chaves. In their aggregate voting patterns, the Andalusian electorate now make fewer distinctions between territorial levels than in the 1990s.421 This reinforces a view of the main parties (PSOE, PP, IU) as closely integrated multi-level organisations. Split voting in regional and national elections has declined sharply in Andalusia, a development that primarily benefits PSOE as the party which suffered most from high levels of split voting in the 1980s and early 1990s (Montabes and Torres, 1998).

How can we explain the electoral resilience and systemic predominance of PSOE in Andalusia? Some authors argue that PSOE has developed a powerful clientelist network

420 Interview 14 (PA).
421 Five regional elections in Andalusia (1986, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008) were held on the same day as national elections. Three regional elections (1982, 1990, 1994) were held on different days/years.
in the region, which helps maintain steady levels of support in successive elections (Sapelli, 1995; Blakeley, 2001). PSOE indeed controls extensive networks of public resources and subsidies at regional and local levels of government in Andalusia,\(^\text{422}\) including most local banks and the regional public media.\(^\text{423}\) The expansion of public employment and rural unemployment scheme also benefited PSOE Andalusia (Hopkin, 2001a), particularly in rural areas where the direct exchange between jobs and votes is most common.\(^\text{424}\) The expansion of welfare provision at sub-national levels (Rhodes, 1997) has reinforced the clientelist dimension of regional politics, given the high levels of welfare dependency in rural areas of Andalusia. Clientelism can also be linked to strong political leadership, and represent part of a concerted strategy for regional economic growth (Piattoni, 1998; 2002), and there is some evidence for this view in the Andalusian case. Spanish clientelism conforms largely to the ‘category’ model, where resources are distributed primarily to collective actors (e.g. key industries, municipalities), and more rarely conforms to the ‘network’ model, where resources are handed out directly by politicians to individual voters (Hopkin and Mastropaolo, 2001). Patterns of ‘category’ clientelism in Andalusia have been used to support economic development, through state aids to selected businesses, the distribution of extra funds to municipalities, and a vast but selective investment in regional infrastructure. PSOE Andalusia has consistently exploited its close ties to the national government to secure huge infra-structural investment in the region. The most controversial example was the fast-speed railway line built between Madrid and Seville, when no such line connected Madrid with key economic centres (e.g. Barcelona) or other peripheral capitals (e.g. Santiago de Compostela). PSOE regional governments have also exploited substantial resources from the EU Structural Funds (granted to poorer regions in the EU) and the EU Cohesion Funds (granted to poorer countries meeting the convergence criteria for EMU).

Economic growth in Andalusia (see Chapter 5.1.1) is driven by the construction industry, mass tourism, and infra-structural investment, which are closely related but highly volatile sectors of the economy. This state-sponsored economic model faces clear

\(^{422}\) Interviews 14 (PA), 19 (IU),
\(^{423}\) Interviews 14 (PA), 17 (PP)
\(^{424}\) Interviews 15, 17 (PP), 19 (IU).
difficulties of sustainability (e.g. when national and European resources expire, or when the housing market contracts), yet the opposition parties have been unable to offer an alternative model of economic development. PP has obtained significant support from the more entrepreneurial and less state dependent sectors of the Andalusian middle class, particular in larger and wealthier cities, but has failed to project an economic vision for Andalusia as a whole. The smaller parties (IU and PA) retreat within their local strongholds, and fail to build an alternative discourse of economic development. When PA controlled the regional tourism ministry (1996-2004) or key municipalities (1982-2007) it sought to expand and consolidate its clientelist networks (Montabes et al, 2006), rather than promote a distinct and differentiated model of economic development.

Where political clientelism in Andalusia has been more pernicious is its capacity to encourage party defections within the political class. As argued in the Italian case studies (Chapter 4), clientelism has a ‘vertical’ dimension (relationship between politicians and voters) and a ‘horizontal’ dimension (relationship between politicians). The ‘horizontal’ dimension of clientelism encourages politicians to shift between parties that can offer them greater levels of remuneration, or more secure benefits of incumbency, a situation that clearly raises problems of electoral accountability. A shift of politicians occurred in Andalusia after the collapse of UCD in the early 1980s, as many local ‘notables’ entered the structures of the governing PSOE. Yet this occurred during a highly unusual collapse of the main governing party (Hopkin, 1999), which allowed local UCD politicians to choose between the surviving parties in a transformed political spectrum. Although many local or regional UCD politicians in Andalusia chose to join PSOE, others remained within small centrist parties or joined the opposition AP, shunning the benefits of the main governing party. Many of these former UCD politicians re-emerged in the PP organisation, including the regional ‘baron’ Javier Arenas. In Spain the potential abuse of ‘horizontal’ clientelism is reduced by the strength of the party in central office, and the lack of preference voting in electoral systems. The party in central office continues to controls candidate selection, and through closed blocked lists can

425 Interview 14 (PA)
426 Interviews 15, 17 (PP)
427 Interview 17 (PP)
determine which candidates have a possibility of being elected. This allows the party in central office to wield powerful sanctions over the party in public office, curtailing the excessive protagonism of local powerbrokers. This contrasts sharply with the Italian case, where the continuation of preference voting in sub-national elections has encouraged the prevalence of clientelist ties between local powerbrokers and their constituents, permitting local powerbrokers to shift easily between parties (Calise, 2006; 2007).

Another potential explanation for PSOE dominance is primarily historical, linked to the left wing political alignment of Andalusia during the Republican governments of the 1930s. The left-leaning dynamics of the Andalusian party system are striking (Montabes and Torres, 1998; Montabes, 2000), and this is also reflected among regional voters: 38.5% position themselves on the left, 2.5% on the far left, 31.5% in the centre and only 19.5% on the right (OPA, 2007). Historical factors form part of the explanation. Interviewees emphasise a prevailing ‘fear of the Right’ and a general ‘closeness to the Left’ among Andalusian citizens, which even extends to many PP voters. PSOE has been able to exploit this ‘fear of the Right’ among the regional population, many of whom still remember the poverty and neglect of Andalusia during the Franco dictatorship. Emotive association with left-wing forces is particularly strong among older cohorts with low levels of literacy (see Chapter 5.1.1), who are less likely to be swayed by detailed criticism of PSOE’s governing record in Andalusia, or to recognise the moderation of PP since its transformation from AP. However historical continuity does not explain strong fluctuations in support for centre-right and centre-left parties in the 1990s, when the electoral advances of PP implied a potential challenge to PSOE hegemony. It also fails to explain why PSOE came to such a predominant position in a region that was a bastion of anarchists and communists during the Second Republic. Purely on the basis of historical continuity, regional voters might be expected to display greater levels of support for PCE-IU than PSOE. This is clearly not the case, although support for IU in Andalusia remains well above the national average.

428 Interviews 14 (PA), 17 (PP)
429 Los Andaluces (2006), Interviews 14 (PA), 17 (PP).
Any explanation for the continued strength of PSOE in the Andalusian party system needs to consider the success of its autonomist political strategy. PSOE responded quickly to the re-emergence of strong regionalist sentiments in Andalusia, and spearheaded the campaign in 1980 to recognise Andalusia as a ‘historic’ region that should proceed on the ‘fast track’ to regional autonomy (Moreno, 1997; Colomer, 1998). PSOE consistently argued that Andalusia deserves the same level of autonomy as the bi-lingual ‘historical nationalities’ (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia). The swift adoption of an autonomist strategy contained opportunistic political objectives: PSOE sought to destabilise the UCD government (which had opposed the creation of Andalusia), and counter the strong Andalusian Socialist Party (PSA), organisational predecessor to PA. The strategy proved largely successful because it exacerbated territorial tensions within UCD that contributed to its electoral and organisational collapse (Hopkin, 1999), contained the electoral threat from NSWP to the degree that PA is no longer able to win seats in the regional parliament, and allowed PSOE to dominate the regional government since the first regional election in 1982. PSOE constructed a powerful regionalist narrative that exalted its role in the creation of Andalusia, and minimised or distorted the role performed by other actors such as PSA. PP has been unwilling and unable to develop a competing autonomist discourse, not only because its predecessor party (AP) opposed the formation of Andalusia, but also because such a strategy would generate potential tensions with the party leadership in this highly integrated party.

PSOE Andalusia has always contained a strong autonomist element, but this has never generated factional tensions because its primary objectives (greater resources for Andalusia to boost social and economic development) fit squarely with the objectives of more centralist elements in the regional party. In any case national PSOE governments have been extremely generous in their financial allocations to Andalusia, diminishing the potential for regional grievance on this issue. PSOE Andalusia has remained focused on projecting a common strategy for regional economic growth, which has highlighted the inability of opposition parties to promote an alternative model of economic development. Opposition parties have responded to the powerful ‘development coalition’ (Keating, Interview 14 (PA)).
1998) of PSOE by mobilising local grievances, whether dissatisfaction with service provision in larger cities (PP); resentment at the primacy of provincial capitals (PA); or discontent with the absence of ‘progressive’ socio-economic change (IU). Such strategies are necessary for opposition parties to mobilise local support and win local elections, but do not constitute a regional discourse that can appeal throughout the vast and varied territory of Andalusia. The prevalence of local resentments can easily be interpreted as a threat to the advancement of regional interests, and hitherto no opposition party has formulated a political discourse that can overcome the diffidence of voters in poorer and more rural areas, while retaining the adherence of voters in wealthier urban areas.

Chapter 5.1.4 Conclusions

Regional politics in Andalusia can be difficult to separate out from national politics. The region is Spanish-speaking and accounts for almost 1 in 5 of the national population, so electoral politics inevitably takes on a national character. The party system is dominated by regional branches of statewide parties (PSOE, PP, IU), which are highly integrated into national structures. Regional leaders maintain close ties with their national leadership, while the composition of national and regional party elites overlaps considerably. Regional and national elections are held on the same day, introducing a national dimension to regional party competition, and encouraging the confluence of national and regional party strategies. Although statewide parties no longer face a convincing regionalist challenger since the demise of the Andalusian Party, they must compete intensely for votes in a region whose electoral size can determine the outcome of national elections. In the 1990s Andalusia became a focal point for intra-party conflicts in PSOE and IU. These conflicts were ultimately determined within Andalusia, with winning factions at regional level proceeding to secure national victory, while defeated regional factions were ultimately disbanded (PSOE) or marginalised (IU) at national level. Yet Andalusian party politics also has distinguishing features, in particular the predominance of PSOE within the party system, as evident from its electoral supremacy and continued control over the regional government.
The confluence of national and regional party strategies is most evident in PP Andalusia, whose primary objective is to mobilise regional support for national elections, because only strong electoral mobilisation in Andalusia can adequately compensate PP for its structural electoral weaknesses in Catalonia and the Basque Country (See Annex 3). Close alignment of national and regional political strategies has brought significant advantages to PP Andalusia, with a progressive increase in support during both regional and national elections (1990-2008). Alignment with the national party offers the prospect of career advancement in the Spanish parliament, as well as potential access to prominent local institutions, since the national party controls candidate selection for mayoralties of provincial capitals (see Chapter 3.1). Intra-party cohesion is guaranteed because PP Andalusia remains under the personal control of Javier Arenas, who also forms part of the national PP leadership. The powerbase that Arenas maintains in Andalusia is largely a source of strength for his national leadership, and has not produced significant divergence between his national and regional interests, perhaps because Arenas has remained in the Spanish parliament for his entire political career. Only the reform of the Andalusian Statute of Autonomy (2006-2007) created some intra-party tensions, because a group of PP parliamentarians wanted to block its adoption in the Spanish parliament, while Arenas feared the electoral consequences of such obstructionism. Yet Arenas was ultimately successful in producing a change of strategy in the national leadership, and negotiated a substantial compromise proposal with PSOE (Keating and Wilson, 2009).

PSOE Andalusia displays a symbiotic relationship with its national party, perhaps inevitable because Andalusia accounts for 25% of membership and votes in the PSOE congress. However the regional party is not subordinate to the national leadership and displays distinguishing features. PSOE Andalusia has become the personal ‘fiefdom’ of Manuel Chaves, whose presidentialised form of regional leadership involves simultaneous control of executive and party functions (Pogtunke and Webb, 2004), and effectively insulates PSOE Andalusia from unwelcome national intervention. Chaves’ pre-eminent role in regional politics remains unchallenged, partly because of his crucial mediating function in the national conflicts of the late 1990s, and partly because of his broad alignment with Zapatero. PSOE Andalusia had been a key battleground for
factional conflicts between ‘modernisers’ and ‘traditionalists’ in the early 1990s. The victory of the ‘modernisers’ in Andalusia proved crucial to the strong regional leadership of Chaves, the demise of the ‘traditionalist’ faction, as well as the ‘modernising’ strategy of the Zapatero leadership in the 2000s. Within PSOE Andalusia a more decentralised and pluralistic internal organisation has emerged under the leadership of Chaves, with a more autonomous role for sub-national party elites.

IU Andalusia also maintains a symbiotic relationship with the national party, and likewise became a battleground for intra-party factional conflicts in the 1990s, in this case between ‘hard-line’ and ‘moderate’ factions. The ‘hard-line’ factions remain powerful in Andalusia, but lost control of the regional federation in 1997, as a direct result of their failed ‘pincer’ strategy in the regional parliament. This strategy was designed to destabilise the PSOE minority government elected in 1994, but ultimately backfired after an early election increased support for PSOE, and allowed the formation of a majority coalition government between PSOE and PA. These ‘hard-line’ factions actually succeeded in reducing support for IU, undermining its coalition potential, and eliminating its blackmail potential in Andalusia. The failure of the ‘pincer’ strategy had powerful reverberations throughout Spain, allowing the ascendancy of ‘moderate’ sub-national factions keen to develop political alignments and coalitional agreements with PSOE. These ‘moderate’ factions gained control over the national IU leadership in 2000. The national and regional leadership of IU has since been highly integrated and overlapping, although a strong ‘hard-line’ PCE faction is a constant reminder of the sharp divisions that remain within IU Andalusia.

PA is the only NSWP in Andalusia, and has encountered serious difficulties in finding a stable role within the party system. This is partly due to its divided internal organisation, with a proliferation of competing and opportunistic local leaders contributing to the absence of strong regional leadership. Yet recent changes in the regional party system also had the effect of undermining PA. The resurgence of PSOE support in 2004 forced PA out of its comfortable status as junior coalition partner, to the unwelcome position of minor opposition party. The closer alignment between PSOE and IU has eliminated the
pivotal function of PA in the party system, which had been to support PSOE regional governments that lacked an absolute majority, and triggered a change in the PA leadership that resulted in an erratic and ultimately futile process of political differentiation. The final blow came from PA’s refusal to support the reformed Andalusian Statute of Autonomy, which sought to increase the policy autonomy and safeguard the financial resources of the region. This objection placed PA in an isolated and rather contradictory position, because its stated political objective is to advance Andalusia towards greater self-government. This reform is one of many examples where PA was out-flanked on the autonomist dimension by PSOE, a pattern traceable to the formation of Andalusia and the campaign to grant it ‘fast track’ regional autonomy.

In many respects the autonomist demands of PA have always been too radical for the voters of Andalusia, and the decision of the PA leadership to escalate these demands since 2004 has proven to be disastrous. The strategy of PA was closely modelled on the behaviour of Catalan and Basque nationalist parties, whose territories are very different in national identity and demands for self-government. Almost two-thirds of Andalusian voters (65.9%) support the present territorial design of the Spanish state, while 10.7% even favour the abolition of regional governments. This leaves only 15.4% of regional voters in favour of a federal solution with greater regional autonomy, and 4.1% of voters in favour of the possibility for regional independence, demands that could fit with the proposals of a regionalist party such as PA. Almost two-thirds of voters (63.8%) feel equally Andalusian and Spanish, 9.8% feel more Spanish than Andalusian, and 8.3% feel only Spanish. Nationalists can then only draw sustenance from the 14.6% of voters who feel more Andalusian than Spanish, and the miniscule 2% who feel only Andalusian (OPA, 2007). There is no linguistic divide in this Spanish-speaking region, in sharp contrast to Catalonia, the Basque Country, and even Galicia. Although a clear sense of regional identity exists among Andalusian voters, this generally takes a dual, inclusive and non-confrontational form. This type of regional identity is clearly more susceptible to the ‘soft’ autonomist strategy pursued by PSOE Andalusia, than the ‘hard’ autonomist strategy pursued by PA since 2004.
The party system of Andalusia is characterised by limited coalition formation and non-alternation in regional government. The systemic predominance of PSOE can be attributed to several factors. These include the ability of PSOE national and regional governments to attract substantial state investments in the region, and the development of clientelist networks to consolidate electoral support. PSOE has also succeeded in pursuing an autonomist political strategy that highlights the question of identity and resources, but above all promotes a model for regional economic growth, which although heavily reliant on state investment, continues to gain support throughout the regional territory. This contrasts sharply with the opposition parties (PP, IU, PA), who have tended to react against PSOE initiatives with an emphasis on the defence of local interests. Historical factors are also relevant in Andalusia, particularly the long tradition of strong left-wing political movements and the ensuing self-location of voters on the Left-Centre of the political spectrum, a context that disadvantages centre-right parties still associated by some voters with the Franco regime. There is also the obvious advantage of incumbency. PSOE is perceived as the party of government in Andalusia, successful in attracting significant resources to the region, encouraging economic development, and generally avoiding disastrous policies. The predominance of PSOE in the regional party system has been secured through the concomitant timing of regional and national elections, an arrangement that substantially increases voter turnout in regional elections. This has been largely to the benefit of PSOE, whose voters are less likely to participate in separately held regional elections (Montabes and Torres, 1998). Since the PSOE regional president can determine the timing of regional elections, he is unlikely to change an arrangement that privileges his chances of re-election, although like all political strategies this could backfire if the regional government is seeking re-election at a moment when a PSOE national government is highly unpopular.
Chapter 5.2 Regional Party Politics in Galicia

Chapter 5.2.1 Political Geography of Galicia

Galicia is a region located in the north-west of Spain, bordering Portugal and the Atlantic Ocean. The regional population (2,772,533) constitutes over 6% of the Spanish total (45,200,737), making it the fifth largest region in Spain. Galicia is divided into four provinces. The north-west coastal province of A Coruna is the largest (1,132,792), containing over 40% of the regional population. The city of A Coruna is the second largest in Galicia (244,388), and is the provincial capital. The province of A Coruna also contains the smaller regional capital, Santiago de Compostela (93,712). The south-west coastal province of Pontevedra is the second largest (947,639), containing over 34% of the regional population. This includes the city of Vigo (294,722), the largest in Galicia, as well as the smaller provincial capital Pontevedra (80,202). The north-east province of Lugo is third (355,176), with less than 13% of regional population. Its main city is the provincial capital Lugo (93,853). The south-east inland province of Ourense is the smallest (336,926), with around 12% of regional population, and its main city is the provincial capital Ourense (107,186). The western coastal provinces of Galicia (A Coruna and Pontevedra) account for almost 75% of the regional population, while the eastern provinces (Lugo and Ourense) account for the remaining 25%.

Galicia is a predominantly rural region with a low population density (91.6 inhabitants per square kilometre). It contains thousands of small villages and only seven medium-sized cities. All Galician municipalities have a population below 300,000, only 3 cities have more than 100,000 inhabitants, and only 7 cities have more than 40,000 inhabitants. Overall population growth in Galicia is static (0.0% 1995-2004), reflecting continued migration away from the region, mainly for reasons of employment. Galicia is characterised by strong inter-provincial migration, as the sparsely populated eastern provinces (Lugo, Ourense) lose inhabitants to the more densely populated western provinces (A Coruna, Pontevedra).

431 Data on size of population in cities, provinces and region of Galicia (www.citypopulation.de). All other economic, social and demographic indicators (European Commission, 2007).
Galicia is a relatively poor region (81.0% EU GDP), especially when compared to the Spanish average (100.6%). Regional economic growth (2.7%) is well below the Spanish average (3.7%), increasing the gulf between Galicia and the rest of Spain. Levels of unemployment in Galicia are only slightly above the Spanish average (9.9% in Galicia, 9.2% in Spain), a trend also evident in levels of female unemployment (13.5% in Galicia, 12.2% in Spain) and levels of youth (15-24) unemployment (21.0% in Galicia, 19.7% in Spain). The overall level of employment in Galicia (61%) is only slightly below the Spanish average (63.3%), while the level of female employment (51.0%) is almost identical to the Spanish average (51.2%). Galicia then remains a relatively poor region, but most of the adult population is employed, although the structure of employment differs significantly from Spain as a whole. A substantial part of the Galician population is employed in agriculture (10.7%), more than double the Spanish average (5.3%). This is partly due to extensive cultivation of terrain in a predominantly rural region, but also the largest fisheries sector in Europe. The proportion of Galicians employed in industry (30.3%) reflects the national average (29.7%), focused primarily on traditional Galician sectors such as timber and naval construction (Maiz and Losada, 2000). The services industry in Galicia (59.0%) is smaller than Spain as a whole (65.0%), and predominantly composed of small retail businesses with relatively low levels of income.

In demographic terms Galicia is one of the oldest regions in Spain. The proportion of the regional population over 65 (21.2%) is much higher than the Spanish average (16.9%), whereas the regional population under 15 (11.6%) is much lower than the Spanish average (14.5%). The working age (15-64) population in Galicia (67.3%) is only slightly below the national average (68.6%), although this proportion is expected to fall in the coming years. Demographic differences reflect an ongoing process of migration away from the region. In educational terms Galicia differs from the Spanish average. The Galician population with a low level of instruction (55.7%) is above the Spanish average, while the Galician population with a medium level of instruction (17.0%) is below the Spanish average. The Galician population with a high level of instruction (27.2%) is almost the same as the Spanish average (28.2%). As with all Spanish regions, low levels
of education and the phenomenon of illiteracy are concentrated among adults brought up before or during the Franco regime. Yet levels of education in Galicia are noticeably better than in Andalusia (see Chapter 5.1), suggesting the presence of a larger middle class in Galicia, and a lower level of educational neglect during the Franco regime.

Galicia has its own language (*gallego*), a variant of Portuguese spoken by 90% of the population and understood by 95% (Maiz and Losada, 2000). These proportions are far higher than Catalan or Basque obtain in their respective regions, and can be attributed to the lack of immigration to Galicia over the twentieth century. The Galician language was historically associated with a low social status, so rarely used in public life or commerce by higher social groups that preferred the use of Spanish, particularly during the Franco regime (Keating, 2001b). This situation has changed somewhat in the democratic era. The regional government has actively encouraged education in the Galician language at all levels (including universities), and has promoted the development of a regional public media that uses the Galician language. Galician has now become the language of public life (Schrijver, 2005), if not the language of social elites and commerce (Keating, 2001b). The widespread diffusion of the Galician language makes it relatively hard to construct any strong political polarisation around its use, in stark contrast to Catalonia and the Basque Country, where language remains one of the most contentious political issues.

Historically Galicia has always been a poor region, but its social composition is very different from southern Spanish regions such as Andalusia, where absentee landlords controlled vast estates, while the rural peasantry consisted mainly of agricultural workers with no property. The prevailing land-holding patterns in Galicia were small patches of land (‘minifundios’) controlled by peasant farmers (Kurth, 1993), whose strong sense of ownership prevented communist and socialist tendencies from becoming implanted in the region during the 1930s, despite endemic poverty and the peripheral relationship of Galicia to the central state. Galicia became one of the strongholds for General Franco during the civil war (Franco was a native of the region), although this did little to advance its subsequent economic development. Infrastructure within Galicia remained extremely poor, with few connections between numerous villages, while the main state investment
consisted of hydroelectric dams designed to generate power for the rest of Spain (Keating, 2001b). Only in the 1970s did the active population involved in agriculture fall below 50%. The Spanish state is a major source of employment in Galicia, particularly since the 1990s when Galicia struggled to adjust to the EU internal market, which damaged key sectors of its traditional economy (agriculture, fisheries, naval construction, timber industry) and sharply increased unemployment. The necessary improvements in infrastructure have been slow to realise, largely because of an inefficient and clientelised distribution of resources by successive regional and provincial governments, usually controlled by the post-Francoist AP and its successor party PP (Maiz and Losada, 2000).

Regional Politics in Galicia

Galicia has become a three party system, with two main statewide parties, PP on the centre-right and PSOE on the centre-right, competing alongside the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), a NSWP located on the centre-left. Only these three parties have obtained seats in the last four regional elections (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005), controlling close to a totality of the vote share (see Table 15). IU Galicia has undergone an electoral collapse, and disappeared as a competitive force in regional politics (see Chapter 5.2.2). Small centrist and/or regionalist parties characterised Galician politics in the 1980s and early 1990s, but have now disappeared from the party system, as their personnel and voters have shifted towards the three main parties. The disappearance of small parties has refined the competitive dynamics of the party system, which revolves around intense bipolar competition and government alternation between two competing blocs: PP on the centre-right versus PSOE and BNG on the centre-left (see Chapter 5.2.3). Regional elections in Galicia are always held separately from national, local or even European elections, lending a strong regional dimension to successive electoral campaigns.

432 The 1997 regional election did however see two former IU politicians elected on PSOE lists, as part of an electoral coalition between PSOE and IU Galicia that was publicly disowned by the national IU leadership, which fielded a competing list in the region (Alcantara and Martinez, 1998).
Table 15: Regional Elections in Galicia (% support for Main Parties)

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<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>32.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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The first regional election in 1981 saw a strong performance by the post-Francoist AP, while the centrist party UCD came second. These parties proceeded to form a governing coalition, with Xerardo Fernandez Albor (AP) installed as regional president (1981-87). This coalition government faced serious instability, deriving partly from the collapse of the UCD organisation. The 1985 regional election saw AP form another governing coalition with a small liberal party (PLP) and a centrist regionalist party, Galician Coalition (CG). It was also unstable and overthrown mid-legislature by an alternative coalition of PSOE, CG and the centrist Galician Nationalist Party (PNG), which saw Fernando Gonzalez Laxe (PSOE) installed as regional president until the end of legislature. In 1989 PP proposed Manuel Fraga, founder of AP and PP (as well as a native of Galicia), as their candidate for regional president. Fraga won the 1989 election and secured an absolute majority of seats in the Galician parliament, going on to win another three regional elections (1993, 1997, 2001), always with an absolute majority. Fraga also contested the 2005 election, which confirmed a plurality of votes and seats for PP, but produced the unexpected loss of its absolute majority. This allowed PSOE and BNG, respectively second and third party in the region, to form a coalition government under the leadership of Emilio Perez Tourino (PSOE). PP has always been the most voted party in regional elections, but in terms of parliamentary representation has benefited from disproportional and somewhat biased features in the regional electoral system.

Electoral System of Galicia

The Galician electoral system is broadly analogous to the national one: PR on the basis of provincial districts with a d’Hondt method of allocation. Yet it contains highly disproportional features that have distorted parliamentary representation. The Galician
electoral system caps the number of seats in the regional parliament at 75, and specifies that each province should be allocated 10 seats, with the remaining 35 seats distributed on a proportional basis. The result is a strong territorial imbalance (Lopez, 1997). The number of votes needed to obtain a seat in the more populous western provinces (A Coruna, Pontevedra) is double that needed to secure a seat in the less populous eastern provinces (Lugo, Ourense). This disproportionality was highlighted in the 2005 election. The provinces of A Coruna (24 seats) and Pontevedra (22 seats) accounted for 75% of the regional population but determined only 61% of seats, while the provinces of Lugo (15 seats) and Ourense (14 seats) accounted for only 25% of the regional population but determined 39% of seats. This disproportionality has a distorting effect on parliamentary representation because PP performs much better in the eastern provinces, while BNG performs much better in the western provinces (Lopez, 2005; Pallares et al, 2006a).

In December 1992 the Galician electoral system was unilaterally reformed by the PP regional government, which further reduced proportionality by raising the threshold for representation in each provincial district from 3% to 5%. This reform prevented small left-wing regionalist parties, which had hitherto obtained close to 4% in the western provinces, from obtaining seats in subsequent regional elections, and increased the allocation of seats to PP, the largest party in the region (Lopez, 2005). Another characteristic of the Galician electoral system is the distorting role played by Galician voters living abroad, who constitute 12% of the regional electorate (Pallares et al, 2006a). Galician voters living abroad are granted an equal voting weight to Galician residents, and vote for candidates in their former provincial districts rather than a separate constituency. Their votes can determine the choice of representative in provincial districts, and consistently display party preferences not reflected within the territory. Galician voters living abroad vote overwhelmingly for PP (around 70%), to a lesser extent for PSOE (around 25%), and very little for BNG (around 4%) (Lopez, 2005). This is largely due to the active role of PP regional governments in courting the vote and encouraging the registration of Galicians abroad, particularly those living in Argentina and Uruguay (Pallares et al, 2006).
Chapter 5.2.2 Party Organisation in Galicia (1989-2007)\textsuperscript{433}

Chapter 5.2.2 will focus on the main statewide parties in Galicia (PSOE, PP), the centre-right PP that controlled the regional government between 1989 and 2005, and the centre-left PSOE that leads the regional government since 2005. BNG is analysed as the main NSWP in Galicia, which consistently obtains seats in the regional parliament. BNG has formed a governing coalition with PSOE since 2005, and developed a pivotal role within the regional party system. Chapter 5.2.2 will also reflect on the demise of IU Galicia, which has been unable to secure seats in successive regional elections.

\textit{Popular Party (PP) in Galicia}

PP remains the largest party in Galicia, obtaining a plurality of votes and seats in every regional election since 1981. PP only obtained absolute majorities in the regional parliament under the leadership of Manuel Fraga (1989-2005), when it often surpassed 50\% of the vote (see Table 15). Although the PP vote share fell in 2005, the party obtained more votes than in previous elections, due to a much higher turnout. The 2005 election confirmed the loss of PP hegemony over the Galician party system, but also confirmed PP as the largest regional party in electoral terms, as well as the strongest party in every province (Pallares et al, 2006). PP Galicia certainly benefited from the enhanced popularity of the national PP leadership during the 1990s (see Chapter 3.2), but this cannot fully explain its supremacy in successive regional elections. The PP vote share in regional elections remains consistently higher than in equivalent national elections, and in three successive regional elections (1993, 1997, 2001) remained exceptionally stable, oscillating by less than 1\% (see Table 15). Regional elections in Galicia are always held separately from other types of election, so electoral mobilisation and political strategies take on a regional dimension. The success of PP Galicia between 1989 and 2005 is primarily attributable to the regional leadership of Manuel Fraga, whose combined control of executive and party functions in the region (1989-2005) helped to transform PP Galicia into a distinctly regional ‘catch-all’ party. Fraga wielded a strong and confident

\textsuperscript{433}The timeframe for analysis in Galicia is slightly different from that applied in Part 3 for the national framework (1991-2007). This is because Andalusia held a regional election in 1989 (rather than 1991).
leadership over PP Galicia, but never subdued intra-party factionalism, which flared up again in the late 1990s over the succession to his leadership, preventing Fraga from handing over the reins of the regional party to a younger generation of politicians. The excessive reliance of PP Galicia on the personalised leadership of Fraga became evident in the 2005 election, when the ailing 83-year old unsuccessfully contested another term in office. The loss of PP control over the regional government reduced intra-party factional tensions, by strengthening the faction closest to the national leader (Pallares et al, 2006a).

Fraga took over as regional party leader in Galicia in 1989, having just founded the PP organisation and handed over the national leadership to Jose Maria Aznar. A prominent figure in national politics, Fraga returned to his native region to inherit a party organisation that was riven by factional divisions, and had lost control over the regional government after its coalition partner, Galician Coalition (CG), abandoned it to form an alternative coalition with PSOE (1987-1990). This occurred mid-way through a legislature marked by conflict between centre-right parties (Maiz and Losada, 2000). Fraga’s entry into Galician politics re-invigorated the newly established PP organisation in several ways. Firstly, his political prominence allowed PP to win the 1989 regional election and (narrowly) obtain an absolute majority in the regional parliament, ending the complex coalitions that characterised previous legislatures, which had contributed to AP’s loss of regional power. Secondly, Fraga was a prominent national politician with close political ties in Galicia, offering strong regional leadership and political visibility in a party organisation accustomed to tensions between competing local leaders. Finally, Fraga was an able political negotiator who succeeded in conciliating the competing centre-right parties, and ultimately integrated all their key politicians within the new PP organisation. These centre-right parties constituted a ‘natural majority’ in Galicia during the 1980s, but through their divisions had allowed PSOE to form a regional governing coalition. Under the leadership of Fraga, PP Galicia became a composite of former Francoists (AP), Christian democrats (UDC), liberals (PL, PDP), and conservative Galician nationalists (CG). Fraga thus instantly formed a centre-right ‘catch-all’ party, capable of broadening its electoral appeal and rallying all centrist and rightist forces.

434 Interviews 39, 45 (PP).
Fraga put together this ‘catch-all’ party with remarkable speed, in contrast to the PP leader Jose Maria Aznar, who initially struggled to broaden the electoral appeal of PP, as evident from his heavy defeat in the 1989 national elections. Aznar eventually succeeded in developing PP into a ‘catch-all’ party through a process of policy moderation (distancing PP from the post-fascist roots of AP), internal regeneration (replacing the older generation of AP leaders), and political aggregation (integrating centrist politicians within the new organisation). The party leadership of Fraga had actually been part of the problem, because his right-wing views and prior involvement with the Franco regime limited the electoral appeal of AP. This created a ceiling of around 25% of the vote (techo de Fraga), beyond which AP could not proceed under his leadership (Hopkin, 1999). Yet Fraga was able to transform PP Galicia into a ‘catch-all’ party precisely because he relied on political aggregation and a strengthened regional leadership, rather than policy moderation or internal regeneration. This contrasts sharply with the PP organisation in other regions (e.g. Andalusia), where the regional leadership took a more interventionist approach in renewing the organisation, by promoting centrists and liberals at the expense of more senior AP politicians (see Chapter 5.1.2). Fraga adopted a laissez-faire approach in Galicia, allowing local politicians to compete for internal party positions, a situation which inevitably favoured incumbents and resulted in a slower renewal of the party organisation. In some areas of Galicia, particularly the more rural eastern provinces, this came close to non-renewal. This approach was necessary to rally together the disparate components of the Galician centre-right, and allow Fraga to develop a super partes leadership. Fraga then became “a veritable paterfamilias, keeping the traditional territorial rivalries of the Galician right in check” (Gilmour, 2006, 36).

A problematic aspect of Fraga’s political strategy was the perpetuation of local powerbrokers within PP Galicia, who organised into territorial factions centred around provincial party ‘barons’. The predominantly rural character of Galicia, with a proliferation of small villages dispersed across the territory, makes provincial governments more important than elsewhere in Spain, because their main function is to distribute state resources to municipalities. Indirectly elected by these municipalities,
provincial governments became powerbases for PP leaders that engaged in a clientelised distribution of resources (Maiz and Losada, 2000; Keating, 2001b). This also required control over the allocation of resources in the regional government, where provincial ‘barons’ sought key ministerial posts. As Michael Keating (2006, 145) observed:

“each of the four provinces of Galicia is run by a PP baron, who distributes patronage through the town and village mayors, and when the PP was in power, controlled a number of ministries in the regional government”.

The power of these provincial barons extended to control over candidate selection for national, regional and local elections, heavily determining the composition of the party in public office. The emergence of provincial ‘barons’ pre-dated the entry of Fraga into regional politics, but later co-existed with his regional leadership. Fraga tolerated the existence of these local powerbrokers, and secured his own unchallengeable position at regional level by mediating between their frequent disputes, guaranteeing them an equitable distribution of posts and resources from the regional government. Over the 1990s these provincial barons developed political alliances that formed the basis of competing regional factions. Michael Keating (2001b, 228) found that:

“the Galician PP is a combination of two rather distinct elements. A centralist, espanolista element, dominated by the Madrid leadership, has little time for Galician particularism and is increasingly inclined to a form of economic and social neo-liberalism to which the national PP has gradually evolved; it is strongest in the cities and in the province of La Coruna. The other element is more rooted in the rural world of traditional Galicia and espouses a traditionalist and somewhat anti-modern type of regionalism, associated with folklore and resting on networks of clientelism and patronage”.

The national leadership developed stronger ties with the urban faction (espanolistas) than with the rural faction (galleguistas), prompting the latter to adopt more autonomist positions vis-à-vis the national party. In response the urban faction supported close

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435 Interview 35, 39, 44 (PP)
alignment with the national leadership. Yet the national leadership had relatively little interest or control over Galician politics during the 1990s, since this was a remit of former party leader Fraga, who negotiated contentious issues directly with his protégé Aznar. This granted a high degree of informal autonomy to the regional party, distinct from the experience of PP in other regions such as Andalusia, where organisational renewal was accompanied by centralisation (see Chapter 5.1). The provincial leaders were also national parliamentarians, developing alliances in the national party and effectively controlling candidate selection within their province. These provincial ‘barons’ also headed their respective provincial government, an accumulation of functions permitted by Spanish electoral laws but forbidden by PP party statutes, which were rarely applied to the letter in Galicia during the 1980s and 1990s.

These factional tensions did not pose a threat to the cohesion of PP Galicia or its electoral appeal in the 1990s. Yet they escalated during the 2000s because of two factors. Firstly, Fraga’s advanced age and ill health raised expectations he would retire soon from active politics, encouraging factional leaders to compete for the succession. Secondly, the designation of Mariano Rajoy as future PP leader in 2003 transformed a regional factional dispute into a national political concern. Rajoy is a Galician-born politician with close ties to the centralist faction, so the factional dispute in Galicia became an early contestation of his national leadership. Due to the intensity of this factional conflict, Fraga became unable to hand over the reins of PP Galicia to a legitimised successor, which prompted his decision to stand again in the 2005 regional election at 83 years of age (Pallares et al, 2006a). Fraga had declared he would serve no more than two terms of regional government. Early in his fourth term Fraga insisted he would finish his career at the end of legislature (Lagares, 2003), a decision later reversed by political circumstances. The defeat of PP in the 2005 election strengthened the national leadership of Rajoy, by loosening the clientelist ties between factional leaders and the regional government, and reinforcing the centralist faction now in control (Pallares et al, 2006a).

436 Interview 39 (PP)
437 Interviews 35, 39, 44 (PP).
438 Interview 39 (PP).
439 El País (14/8/93).
The factional battle for the succession to Fraga can be traced to a conflict between Jose Manuel Romay (a veteran ex-AP politician) and Xose Cuina (a younger ex-UCD politician) in the mid-1990s. It is perhaps illustrative that both politicians remained strong supporters of Fraga (Lagares, 2003). Romay controlled the western province of La Coruna and had strong ties to Rajoy, who in turn was close to Aznar. Cuina was more distant from the national leadership but controlled the western province of Pontevedra, and developed a strategic alliance with the provincial ‘barons’ in the eastern provinces, Francisco Cacharro (Lugo) and Jose Luis Baltar (Ourense). After the 1997 election, Fraga chose not to appoint a vice-president in the regional executive, because any nomination would exacerbate factional conflict. The 1998 regional congress saw most of the candidates proposed by Romay and Rajoy defeated, in favour of those supported by the alliance of galleguista barons, with the exception of La Coruna where Romay consolidated his organisational hold. Rajoy was given greater prominence in the regional executive, but became a “baron without a territory”, unable to control the executive and with no significant role in candidate selection. The 1999 local elections saw PP lose control of key local governments to BNG (Vigo, Pontevedra, Ferrol), an outcome attributed to factional divisions within PP (Lagares, 2003). Although some PP politicians made Cuina a scapegoat for this disappointing result (Gilmour, 2006), others raised concerns about the negative impact of failing to rejuvenate the party organisation, indicating the 65-year old Romay as an example. The regional leadership of Manuel Fraga was deemed “sacred and untouchable” despite his advanced age, so Romay was encouraged to stand down as leader of A Coruna, while in return Cuina stood down as regional secretary-general. Cuina was replaced by Xose Palmou (a young politician closely allied to Rajoy), while the posts of ‘honorary presidents’ were created for Romay

440 El Pais (24/10/94).
441 El Pais (13/7/98).
442 El Pais (10/12/97).
443 El Pais (5/7/98).
444 El Pais (13/7/98).
446 El Pais (10/7/99).
and Rajoy. This barely diminished the strength of the provincial ‘barons’ that led the galleguista faction, who still controlled candidate selection, held or influenced key posts in the regional government, and dominated their provincial parties and governments.

Recognising the lack of internal regeneration within PP Galicia, Aznar entrusted Fraga with developing a more active policy in this domain, because Fraga was the only figure that could command the loyalty of both regional factions. This produced the irony of a 77-year old, who first came to government under General Franco, attempting to pursue a process of political rejuvenation. Fraga carried out his task half-heartedly, and without altering the intricate balance of existing power structures. More pressure came from Javier Arenas (Secretary-General) and Mariano Rajoy (Vice Secretary-General), whose top-down process of internal regeneration replaced around 50% of the PP sub-national leadership throughout Spain. This had some effect in Galicia, as many older ex-AP politicians were replaced by younger ex-UCD politicians, making the composition of PP Galicia younger and more centrist. This did not significantly weaken the galleguista faction because many of its leaders (including Xose Cuina) were ex-UCD politicians that benefited from the removal of the AP ‘old guard’. Rajoy mainly succeeded in reducing the accumulation of functions held by provincial barons allied to Cuina. The provincial baron of Lugo, Francisco Cacharro (ex-AP), was no longer permitted to combine the post of Senator with that of provincial president, leading to his resignation from the latter. Cacharro was nevertheless replaced as president of Lugo province by a close collaborator who retained his long-standing network of supporters and ensured his continued control. The provincial baron of Ourense, Jose Luis Baltar (ex-UCD), was re-elected with 99% votes in the provincial congress, and chose to renounce his seat in the Senate rather than his multiple posts at sub-national levels. Xose Cuina resigned as provincial party leader in Pontevedra in 1999, but retained his prominent position within the regional executive (Lagares, 2003). The 2001 regional election saw a substantial turnover in candidate selection, with over 1/2 of regional parliamentarians (including all but 3

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450 Interview 39 (PP)
451 El Pais (9/10/00).
regional ministers) excluded from party lists. Although the galleguista barons remained in their place, many of their supporters were no longer represented in the regional parliament or executive.

The 2003 Prestige disaster, which badly damaged the credibility of both national and regional PP governments, proved to be largely beneficial for the factional control of the espanolistas. Xose Cuina was forced to resign from the regional government, after it was discovered his family’s company had benefited financially from the disaster, the latest in a series of scandals linking Cuina’s personal enrichment to his control of the regional government. Meanwhile Xose Palmou averted a total PP collapse in the 2003 local elections, and was credited by many as a future regional leader (Gilmour, 2006). Fraga proved reluctant to endorse either candidate as his successor, and took an active role in mediating between factions during candidate selection for the 2004 national election. When the national leadership pushed for a weakened Cuina to be excluded from the Pontevedra lists, his ally Baltar (Ourense) threatened to withdraw his supporters from PP unless Cuina was re-instated as candidate for Pontevedra. This forced the national leadership to accede to his demands, which included full autonomy in candidate selection for Ourense. The 2004 national election saw the PP vote decline in Galicia overall, but hold up well in rural areas, an outcome interpreted as a victory for the galleguista barons. While the national leadership became concerned that Fraga would contest the 2005 election at the age of 82, without a successor and increasing the evident risk of defeat, the galleguistas were pushing for Palmou to be replaced as regional secretary-general, and the Galician PP to be re-founded as a more autonomous regional party. Although the galleguistas once more dominated candidate lists for the 2005 regional election, the PP defeat severed many of their clientelist networks within the party, which had relied on simultaneous control of government office at regional, provincial and local

453 El Pais (20/6/03).
454 El Pais (22/9/03).
455 El Pais (21/9/04).
456 El Pais (16/3/04).
457 El Pais (22/9/03).
459 El Pais (28/10/05).
levels. This allowed Rajoy to force through his chosen candidate as regional party president, Xose Nunez Feijoo.\textsuperscript{460} Cuina was unable to compete effectively against Feijoo, because his successor as provincial party leader in Pontevedra, Xose Manuel Barreiro, backed Feijoo in exchange for the post of party vice-president, prompting Cuina to resign from the regional party executive and confirming the victory of the espanolistas.\textsuperscript{461}

Since 2005 PP has been adapting to the different challenges of opposition, developing more formal party decision-making, and easing its dependence on control of public office to function effectively.\textsuperscript{462} PP Galicia has become closely aligned with national leader Rajoy.\textsuperscript{463} Interviews with PP politicians were characterised by highly coordinated responses, suggesting the strong imposition of a national party line. Most PP politicians denied any form of factional divisions had ever existed within PP Galicia.\textsuperscript{464} They did not acknowledge the 2005 electoral defeat or its causes, insisting it was actually a victory for PP because it obtained more votes and seats than any other party, and was only excluded from its ‘legitimate’ right to form a regional government by an ‘illegitimate’ socialist-nationalist coalition.\textsuperscript{465} This fits uneasily with the reality that PSOE-BNG obtained 111,000 more votes than PP (Lopez, 2005; Pallares et al, 2006a), and fully reflects the positioning of the national PP leadership towards the national PSOE government, which claimed PSOE won the 2004 national election ‘illegitimately’ because of the 11-M terrorist attack, and could only govern through an ‘illegitimate’ coalition with Catalan nationalists. In any case PP Galicia has recovered its organisational unity in the aftermath of these successive election defeats,\textsuperscript{466} and is now firmly controlled by espanolistas with their unitary vision of political organisation. PP defeat in the 2007 local elections, which led to PP losing all 7 larger cities in Galicia, as well as the provincial governments of Lugo and La Coruna,\textsuperscript{467} damaged both urban espanolistas and rural galleguistas. The

\textsuperscript{460} El Pais (28/11/05)
\textsuperscript{461} El Pais (22/12/05).
\textsuperscript{462} Interviews 44, 45 (PP).
\textsuperscript{463} Interview 35 (PP)
\textsuperscript{464} Interviews 35, 44, 45 (PP)
\textsuperscript{465} Interviews 35, 39, 45 (PP)
\textsuperscript{466} Interview 45 (PP),
\textsuperscript{467} Voz de Galicia website.
factional divisions of PP Galicia remain just below the surface, while the social and political structures that generated them remain unaltered.

Throughout this factional strife over the leadership succession, Fraga did not remain equidistant from the competing factions, and was more sympathetic to the *galleguistas*. This was partly because of his close relationship to Cuina, but also because of their autonomist positions, which reflected the stance of his own regional government (see Chapter 5.2.3). Fraga only gave up his backing for the *galleguistas* when they became rebels against the party leadership, prompting Fraga to publicly reject Cuina’s demand that PP Galicia be re-founded and granted more extensive autonomy, declaring that current levels of regional autonomy are “appropriate”\(^{468}\). Fraga limited himself to appealing that his successor be chosen entirely by the Galician party, although party statutes dictate the national executive commission should have the final choice.\(^{469}\) Fraga remained entirely neutral during the 2005 leadership campaign,\(^ {470}\) and has not spoken out against Feijoo or the new regional leadership. This does not reflect a change of heart from Fraga on the question of regional autonomy, but does reflect the shifting context at national level. Since Mariano Rajoy was designated PP leader in 2003, the factional strife in Galicia could no longer be confined to the region, and became a destabilising question about whether PP Galicia recognised the legitimacy of the future party leader, who was fully associated with the *espanolistas* and notoriously opposed to Cuina. Whereas Aznar had shown little interest in the complex machinations of Galician politics, Rajoy had both the mechanisms and the incentive to influence Galician politics in a more centralist direction,\(^ {471}\) and exploited the opportunity presented by PP defeat in 2005.

\(^{468}\) *El Pais* (29/10/05)
\(^{469}\) *El Pais* (25/10/04).
\(^{470}\) *El Pais* (30/8/05).
\(^{471}\) Interview 39 (PP).
Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) in Galicia

In the late 1980s PSOE succeeded in exploiting divisions within the Galician centre-right to temporarily form a regional governing coalition (1987-1990), and proceeded to perform well in the 1989 regional election (32.8%). Yet the 1990s saw PSOE struggle in Galicia: Excluded from the regional government by PP, riven with factional divisions, and losing the electoral competition with BNG. Electoral support for PSOE remained low in the three subsequent regional elections (see Table 15). In 1997 2001 PSOE was superseded in electoral terms by BNG, which became the leading party of opposition (Keating, 2001b; Schrijver, 2005). Nevertheless PSOE controlled many of the larger cities in Galicia, and consistently performed better in national than regional elections. The 2005 regional election saw a dramatic increase in PSOE support (33.6%), its highest level in Galicia. This change can be partly explained by national factors, such as the greater programmatic appeal and internal cohesion under Zapatero, who was heavily involved in a regional electoral campaign that represented a significant ‘test’ for his national government (Pallares et al, 2006a). Regional factors also form a crucial part of the explanation, in particular the decline in factional strife under the leadership of Emilio Perez Tourino (1998-), whose autonomist (galleguista) political strategy improved the appeal of PSOE in regional elections. To explain the regional success of PSOE in the 2000s, we need to reflect on the outcome of factional conflicts in the 1990s.

PSOE Galicia was heavily affected by the factional conflicts between guerristas and renovadores in the early 1990s, and was sharply divided between supporters of Borrell and Almunia for the party leadership in the late 1990s. These national conflicts were crosscut with more specific territorial conflicts in Galicia, which centred on the choice of political strategy and the issue of regional autonomy. Many politicians within PSOE Galicia (known as galleguistas) began to support a more autonomist political strategy,

472 PSOE Galicia is used for reasons of consistency, and to reflect its close integration within the PSOE organisation. The Galician branch of PSOE is actually known as the Socialist Party of Galicia (PSdeG).
with a greater defence of regional interests vis-à-vis the national party and central state. Others supported a nationalising political strategy (espanolistas), and sought to align the regional party fully with the national leadership, focusing on concrete policy issues rather than the demand for greater autonomy.\textsuperscript{473} These resembled ‘factions of principle’ rather than ‘factions of interest’ (Sartori, 1976), because they revolved around the choice of political strategy and the question of internal autonomy. These factional conflicts became subdued after PSOE entered the regional government in 2005, although the preferred extent of regional autonomy continues to divide politicians within PSOE Galicia.\textsuperscript{474}

The divisions between centralists and autonomists in the 1990s galvanised around the question of coalitional strategy in regional and local elections. Whereas the centralists favoured coalitions with non-nationalist left-wing parties (principally IU), the autonomists favoured coalitions with Galician nationalists (principally BNG). The shift towards autonomist positions was triggered by the failure of an electoral coalition between PSOE and IU in the 1997 regional election, and the subsequent collapse of IU Galicia. Coalitions with BNG became necessary to gain or retain control of local governments, and later became the only option to control the regional government. Although divisions remain within PSOE Galicia on the question of regional autonomy, coalitional strategy is now entirely determined by the necessity of alliance with BNG, a political context that significantly reinforces the autonomist faction.

Between 1977 and 1998 the centralist faction was led Francisco Vazquez, also regional leader of the guerristas during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{475} Vazquez was regional party leader (secretary-general) on three occasions (1977; 1980-1982; 1994-1998), but never fully controlled the regional party (Jimenez, 2003). Vazquez was also a national parliamentarian (1977-2004) and mayor of La Coruna (1983-2006). Meanwhile the renovadores were led by Antolin Sanchez, regional party leader between 1985 and 1994. Vazquez was successful in electing the delegates of his faction to the federal congress in

\textsuperscript{473} Interviews 36, 41, 42 (PSOE).
\textsuperscript{474} Interview 36 (PSOE)
\textsuperscript{475} See Part 5.2 (Andalusia) for a more detailed discussion on the origins and conclusion of this factional conflict, since changes within PSOE Galicia did relatively little to determine its national dynamics.
forcing the resignation of Antolin Sanchez as regional party leader, who publicly accused Vazquez of being “a fifth columnist of the Right”. Although firmly in control of the regional party executive, Vazquez was unable to control the behaviour of PSOE politicians in the regional parliament, because the composition of party lists for the 1993 election had been heavily influenced by Sanchez so consisted mainly of renovadores. In the 1997 Galician election, Vazquez ensured the guerrista Abel Caballero competed as PSOE presidential candidate, on the basis of an electoral coalition with IU, much trumpeted by the centralists as a valid alternative to coalitions with BNG. The electoral coalition with IU proved disastrous, PSOE barely improved its electoral performance (partly due to the limited charisma of Caballero), while IU Galicia underwent an organisational conflict that destroyed its remaining electoral support bases. This gave lie to the notion that PSOE Galicia could ally with strong left-wing forces opposed to Galician nationalism, and obliged the party to move closer towards the solution rejected by Vazquez and his faction, namely governing coalitions with BNG. This in turn triggered Vazquez’s permanent loss of the regional leadership in 1998.

Vazquez had opposed the discourse of Galician nationalism throughout his political career, which he interpreted as damaging for Galicia and the unity of Spain. Faced with the rise of BNG in the 1990s, Vazquez focused his political campaigning against them rather than PP, even resorting to negotiations with Fraga to halt the rise of Galician nationalism, and accusing BNG of being “like Herri Batasuna only without ETA”, because of their perceived hostility towards Spain and criticism of the Constitution. This became a feature of the disappointing PSOE campaigns in the 1993 and 1997 regional elections, where Vazquez pledged that PSOE would never govern in coalition with BNG. A major effect was to de-mobilise PSOE voters in regional elections (Lopez, 1997), because Vazquez’s stance eliminated the possibility of alternation in regional government, as voters knew only a coalition between PSOE and BNG could

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476 *El País* (14/1/94).
477 *El País* (30/1/94).
478 *El País* (5/2/94).
479 *El País* (19/6/94).
480 *El País* (27/12/95).
481 *El País* (15/7/97).
unseat PP. Yet the political strategy of Vazquez was not entirely irrational. Given the electoral expansion of BNG in the 1990s, PSOE had logical reasons to fear the advance of Galician nationalism among its traditional support base. Yet the more collaborative strategy adopted by PSOE autonomists in the late 1990s, through which PSOE and BNG formed sub-national coalitions wherever possible, proved to be a far more effective way to contain BNG and strengthen PSOE in electoral terms. Vazquez’s anti-nationalist positioning reflects the trade-offs that politicians must sometimes make between local, regional and national arenas. Vazquez’s main power-base was the province of La Coruna, where he was successively re-elected as national parliamentarian and local mayor. Vazquez obtained 5 consecutive absolute majorities in the city of La Coruna without requiring parliamentary support from BNG, because he attracted a substantial number of voters that backed PP in regional or national elections. If Vazquez had positioned PSOE closely with BNG at regional level, he would have jeopardised his transversal support base at local level, and perhaps even undermined his prospects in national elections. Vazquez traded off a political arena where he was unlikely to be successful (regional) for two political arenas with almost guaranteed success (local, national), and severely damaged the prospects of PSOE in regional elections. This may explain the hostility of PSOE Galicia after his departure, who accused him of being “disloyal” and locating himself “outside the party” through his declarations in support of Fraga and his unabated hostility to BNG. The case of Vazquez illustrates how crucial institutional control is for asserting regional leadership in Spain. Certainly the most prominent regional PSOE politician, Vazquez never achieved a ‘baronial’ control of the regional party because he never controlled the regional government. Although control of local institutions is sometimes a useful platform for gaining prominence in regional politics, it can limit the capacity to project a regional appeal. PSOE Galicia has been characterised as a weakly institutionalised party, dominated by politicians primarily interested in the control of local institutions (Jimenez, 2003).

The heavy PSOE defeat in the 1997 regional election emboldened many of the autonomist elements within the regional party (Schrijver, 2005). Xerardo Estevez, Mayor of Santiago de Compostela (1983-6; 1987-1999), called for PSOE to adopt a political
strategy less dependent on national politics, and more similar to the strategy of BNG, which projects itself as the sole defender of the ‘national interest’ in Galicia. The autonomist direction of PSOE became more evident after the election of Emilio Perez Tourino as RSG in 1998. With the support of the autonomist faction, Tourino convincingly defeated the centralist Miguel Cortizo (61.6% to 36.6%), who was backed by Vazquez. Yet the election of Tourino also reflected a compromise between warring factions, as he had been a close collaborator of Abel Caballero, the guerrista candidate for regional president in 1997. Immediately after his election, Tourino called for the adoption of a “federal vision” for Spain, and called for a strengthened alliance with BNG throughout Galicia. This was attempted in the 1999 local elections, through region-wide pacts of collaboration with BNG that resulted in governing or parliamentary coalitions wherever possible. Although the 1993 and 1997 PSOE electoral programmes never mentioned Galician identity and did not propose further regional autonomy, the 2001 electoral programme focused on regional identity, proposed a ‘federal impulse’ for greater autonomy, and described its guiding philosophy as galleguismo (Schrijver, 2005).

While Tourino maintained cordial relations with the PSOE leader Joaquin Almunia (1997-2000), the autonomist direction of the regional party created some concerns among the national leadership, particularly after the 2000 national election saw PSOE lose 10% of its vote share in Galicia. Fortunately the autonomist direction of PSOE Galicia broadly coincided with the election of Zapatero as PSOE leader, who supported a more pluralistic approach to managing territorial relations, and was willing to recognise the enhanced autonomy of regional branches, while supporting the development of a ‘federal’ model for the Spanish state. The federal model is one that allows varying interpretations of the relationship between Galicia and the central state, and can accommodate both autonomist and centralising elements. The view of Tourino and many Galician autonomists within PSOE is that Spain is a “nation of nations”, a view not

482 El Pais (4/1/98)
483 El Pais (19/10/98)
484 El Pais (17/11/98)
485 El Pais (16/6/99)
486 El Pais (19/3/00)
487 Interviews 38, 41 (PSOE).
opposed in any tangible respect by the national party.\textsuperscript{488} Moreover the assertion that “PSOE Galicia is a regionalist party, it has to fight for greater decentralisation”,\textsuperscript{489} is now more widely accepted within the regional party.\textsuperscript{490} Zapatero reinforced the regional leadership of Tourino in its efforts to exclude Vazquez and his core of factional supporters from key party positions.\textsuperscript{491} This close alignment with the national leadership may explain why Tourino’s leadership was not contested within PSOE Galicia, despite a very disappointing performance in the 2001 regional election, when PSOE was once again superseded by BNG as 2\textsuperscript{nd} party in Galicia. The success of PSOE’s autonomist strategy was only evident after the 2003 local elections, which saw PSOE mayors elected in many larger cities, amidst a substantial decline in BNG support. The 2005 regional election saw PSOE obtain almost double the support of BNG and led the subsequent governing coalition. Electoral success and enhanced control of sub-national institutions have subdued internal tensions within PSOE Galicia. Although many centralist politicians within the regional party are reluctant to make concessions to Galician nationalism, the evident success of the coalitional formula with BNG has made the rhetoric of regionalism currently dominant within PSOE Galicia.\textsuperscript{492}

The regional leadership dominates candidate selection for regional elections, and is extremely influential in candidate selection for national elections. Its hold over candidate selection increased with the ascent of the autonomist faction,\textsuperscript{493} producing an obedient regional party in public office, which fully accepts its orders from the party in central office. This helped the parliamentary stability of the governing coalition with BNG, since this relied on a single seat majority. PSOE Galicia also complied with the ‘modernisation’ programme of the Zapatero leadership, and sought to develop a party in public office that better reflected Galician society in terms of age, occupation, and gender.\textsuperscript{494} This conveniently removed some unwelcome local powerbrokers from institutional posts. PSOE Galicia lacks strong provincial leaders (in contrast to PP

\textsuperscript{488} El Pais (28/9/05)
\textsuperscript{489} Interview 38 (PSOE).
\textsuperscript{490} Interview 36 (PSOE).
\textsuperscript{491} El Pais (9/10/00; 16/2/03)
\textsuperscript{492} Interview 36 (PSOE).
\textsuperscript{493} Interview 42 (PSOE)
\textsuperscript{494} Interview 38 (PSOE)
Galicia), although powerful local leaders (e.g. Francisco Vazquez in La Coruna) temporarily wielded strong influence. This is largely because opportunities for patronage to build a provincial leadership have been limited within PSOE, because PP controlled all provincial governments until 2007. The dispersed and rural population of Galicia produces relatively few powerbases for local leaders, with the exception of the seven larger cities. Within PSOE Galicia, provincial and local party branches compete for influence with an intermediate territorial level of *comarcas*, historic sub-provincial districts that unite adjacent towns and villages. These have been incorporated into the PSOE organisation since 1979 (Jimenez, 2003), and continue to have a vital impact in nominating joint candidates in rural areas, although less relevant in urban areas where local branches are stronger. PSOE Galicia has recognised the weakness of sub-regional levels as a problem, and is contemplating reforms that would strengthen either the provincial level or the *comarcas*.

**United Left (IU) in Galicia**

A remarkable feature of Galician politics is the weakness of IU, which has never been a relevant force in regional politics, but over the last decade has completely collapsed, obtaining only 0.7% and 0.8% of the vote in the 2001 and 2005 elections. The institutional presence of IU Galicia is now confined to some seats in local councils in the province of La Coruna. The reasons for this electoral and organisational collapse are numerous. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) always had great difficulty in establishing a strong presence in Galicia, a region characterised by *minifundios*, small patches of land owned by peasant proprietors. The traditional social bases for Communist mobilisation in Spain, industrial workers in urban areas and rural workers on large estates (*latifundios*), are noticeably absent in Galicia. Yet political geography only explains part of the difficulties encountered by PCE and IU, especially since Galicia underwent a serious economic crisis in the 1990s that generated high levels of unemployment and triggered a decline in traditional sectors of the Galician economy (Maiz and Losada, 2000). The inability of PCE and IU to capitalise on discontent caused by economic dislocation is surprising, especially when compared to the extensive trade union
involvement of the nationalist BNG. Although historical circumstances contributed to the weakness of PCE Galicia, the strategic choices made by its national leadership in the 1990s were essentially responsible for its electoral and organisational collapse. Nor did the regional party develop a highly autonomous organisation with an independent political strategy, which would have allowed it to position itself more effectively on the nationalist dimension of the political spectrum, as in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

The formation of IU Galicia during the late 1980s led to the incorporation of non-communist actors, who rapidly became a counter-weight to PCE, which had weak roots in the region (see Chapter 5.2.1). These non-communist actors created difficulties for the national leadership of IU, dominated by PCE and firmly controlled by its leader Julio Anguita, who wanted to avoid weakening the position of PCE within the nascent IU organisation (Ramiro, 2000). IU Galicia soon became a stronghold for the New Left (NI) faction, which wanted to strengthen the IU organisation; reduce the dominance of PCE in its internal structures; and establish an alliance with PSOE. The growing appeal of left-wing Galician nationalism meant many IU politicians wanted to develop an alliance with Galician nationalists, a direction rejected by the national leadership. So in 1992 IU Galicia briefly declared organisational ‘sovereignty’, and formed an electoral coalition with Unidade Gallega, a left-wing nationalist party led by Camilo Nogueira. The UG-IU coalition gained only 3.1% in the 1993 regional election, so failed to surpass the 5% electoral threshold, leading to the exclusion of both parties from the regional parliament. This defeat ended the rapprochement between IU and Galician nationalism, with Nogueira and other nationalists returning to BNG, while many IU voters switched their support to BNG (Rivera, 2003). BNG was willing to incorporate some IU politicians in its ranks, but unwilling to develop an electoral coalition with a statewide party. PSOE was the only alternative for IU in the party system, and its regional leadership was searching for alternatives to allying with BNG. This option was fraught with difficulty for IU, because the national leadership was then engaged in a strategy of ‘total opposition’ to the PSOE government (Ramiro, 2000). So the leader of

495 El País (19/12/93).
496 El País (13/7/93).
IU Galicia, Anxel Guerreiro, avoided consulting the national party leadership during negotiations over an electoral coalition with PSOE, and simply presented the outcome as a *fait accompli* to Julio Anguita.\(^{498}\) This electoral coalition guaranteed 2 parliamentary seats for IU in the 1997 regional election, and allowed it to retain a separate party group,\(^{499}\) but was publicly denounced by Anguita as a “political, strategic and tactical error”.\(^{500}\) Anguita feared this coalition would become ‘contagious’ and spread to other regions where the IU leadership supported an alliance with PSOE,\(^{501}\) and perceived it as a covert attempt by the NI faction to undermine PCE control over IU (Ramiro, 2000). Anguita’s aggressive response was to deny any form of assistance to IU Galicia for the 1997 regional election;\(^{502}\) dissolve the regional party organisation;\(^{503}\) field a competing list which split the IU vote;\(^{504}\) and finally expel NI from the IU organisation for having supported IU Galicia in this campaign.\(^{505}\) Two (ex) IU parliamentarians were elected on safe seats through the PSOE list, but the outcome was very disappointing for both parties.

The national party leader Anguita had maintained the pretence of internal control, whereas the Galician leader Anxel Guerreiro had obtained his re-election as regional parliamentarian.\(^{506}\) Yet the overall effect was to devastate IU permanently in Galicia, where it was unable to compete effectively in subsequent regional elections, obtaining less than 1% of the vote share. This strategy ultimately weakened the national leadership, as evident from the resignation of Anguita as party leader in 1998, and the subsequent election of Llamazares as IU general coordinator in 2000 (see Chapter 3.2). It also led to the formal severing of organisational relations between IU and its Catalan counterpart IC, whose main Communist party (PSUC) had fully supported IU Galicia in this campaign for greater autonomy.\(^{507}\) The PCE-IU leadership simultaneously lost organisational

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\(^{498}\) *El País* (16/5/97).

\(^{499}\) *El País* (23/5/97).

\(^{500}\) *El País* (20/5/97).

\(^{501}\) *El País* (23/5/97).

\(^{502}\) *El País* (24/6/97).

\(^{503}\) *El País* (16/8/97).

\(^{504}\) *El País* (3/9/97).

\(^{505}\) *El País* (11/9/97).

\(^{506}\) *El País* (18/8/97).

\(^{507}\) *El País* (13/7/97; 19/7/97).
control over party branches in two of the large ‘historical nationalities’, an outcome which triggered its subsequent organisational and electoral decline throughout Spain.

**Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG)**

BNG is a Galician nationalist party that is one of the three major players in regional politics. BNG support more than doubled between 1989 and 1993, reaching its peak in the 1997 regional election (see Table 15), when it from the internal disarray of PSOE and surpassed its centre-left rival. Although BNG support declined in the 2001 and 2005 regional elections, it continued to maintain a pivotal role in the regional and local party systems of Galicia, where its support is indispensable for PSOE to enter government. This was evident from the 2005 regional election, where PSOE and BNG formed a ‘minimum-winning’ governing coalition, as well as from the 2007 local elections, where PSOE and BNG formed ‘minimum-winning’ coalitions in all six of the largest Galician municipalities (A Coruna, Lugo, Ourense, Pontevedra, Santiago, Vigo).

BNG can trace its political origins to student groups in the 1960s opposed to the Franco dictatorship. The current organisation was founded in 1982 as a “political front” to unite the disparate components of Galician nationalism. The supporting parties of BNG retain their organisational structures and autonomy, while delegating their electoral and institutional functions to BNG, similar to the internal structures of IU (see Chapter 3.1). The main party within BNG is the *Union do Povo Galego* (UPG), a Marxist-Leninist party that exerts “iron organisational control” over the internal structures of BNG (Maiz, 2003, 23). Although 75% of BNG members are technically ‘independents’ affiliated only to the BNG organisation (Barreiro, 2003), many of these are indirectly controlled by UPG (Maiz, 2003). UPG formally accounts for only 11.6% of BNG members (Barreiro, 2003), but its position has been reinforced by the decline of other organised parties within BNG, such as *Esquerda Nacionalista* and *Unidade Gallega*. In principle open to all Galician nationalist forces, BNG has remained a left wing organisation, evident from the

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508 Interviews 34, 37 (BNG)
509 Interview 46 (BNG).
weakness of its only centrist party, *Partido Nacionalista Gallego*, which accounts for just 1% of BNG members (Barreiro, 2003). Yet two factors have prevented the complete hegemony of UPG. The first is the “assembly” structure of BNG decision-making, which obliges all candidates and policies to be voted by party members at different territorial levels. The second is the post of BNG leader (national spokesperson), which has always remained outside the control of UPG.

Until 2005 the BNG leader was Xose Manuel Beiras (leader of *Esquerda Nacionalista*), a charismatic intellectual who formulated a series of common objectives for Galician nationalism, and located these within a coherent ideological discourse. This contained historical criticism of ‘neo-colonial’ policies pursued by the Spanish state against Galicia, which reached their apogee in the Francoist era, whether through the exploitation of raw materials or “the massive hydro-electric schemes to provide power for the industrialization of other Spanish regions” (Keating, 2001b, 226). This “anti-imperial” struggle was linked to a need for “completing the democratic transition of Galician society”. BNG argued that Galician society remained under the control of Franco era “notables”, who pursued clientelist policies “based on fear and dependency” among a predominantly rural population. Beiras laid the grounds for the radicalisation of Galician nationalism, becoming an effective opposition to both main statewide parties. Whereas PP dominated regional and local government with the help of “notables” inherited from the Franco era (Hopkin and Mastropaolo, 2001; Hopkin, 2001a), PSOE controlled the national governments whose economic policies led to widespread unemployment in Galicia (Losada and Maiz, 2000). BNG was considerably more effective than either of its centre-left rivals (PSOE and IU) in mobilising sectors of Galician society disadvantaged by free market reforms, including the agricultural sector; the fisheries sector; and declining heavy industries on the western coast (Maiz, 2003). BNG developed a strong nationalist trade union movement, which advanced considerably at the expense of its socialist or communist counterparts (Keating, 2001b).

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510 Interviews 34, 37 (BNG).
511 Interview 37 (BNG).
512 Interview 34 (BNG).
513 *El País* (29/12/95); Interview 34 (BNG).
This is reflected in BNG support, higher in the more industrialised coastal areas of western Galicia, lower in the deeply rural areas of eastern Galicia (Keating, 2006; Pallares et al, 2006a). BNG has difficulty in attracting support from the business community, partly because of continued association with the ‘anti-capitalist’ rhetoric it advanced throughout the 1980s,\(^{514}\) and partly because of its trade union activism. BNG can depend on widespread support among young Galicians, with a strong and active youth organisation that constitutes a significant portion of its membership (Atta, 2003; Maiz, 2003). This mobilisation of youth has produced a generational divide in Galician voting patterns, making BNG the “first party in Galicia for young people”\(^{515}\) but the last party among older people. 76% of BNG voters are under 45 years of age, while 70% of PP voters are over 45 years of age (Pallares et al, 2006a). Although BNG faces entrenched difficulties in winning support from older voters, its electoral prospects may improve over time, especially if younger voters maintain a stable political orientation.

The growing electoral appeal of BNG in the 1990s is largely attributable to a moderation of its policy proposals in successive electoral campaigns, sidelining Marxist rhetoric in favour of more pragmatic and concrete policy proposals. Recent electoral campaigns have advocated a pluri-national model for Spain, and distanced BNG from its earlier positions in favour of Galician independence (Schrijver, 2005). BNG profited from the internal divisions and electoral decline of PSOE Galicia (Keating, 2001b; 2006; Maiz, 2003), and was strengthened by the re-integration of prominent Galician nationalists (e.g. Camilo Nogueira), who had earlier supported an alliance with IU.\(^{516}\) Since the mid-1990s, BNG has placed a major focus on developing a strong governing record at sub-national levels. This has enhanced the coalitional potential of BNG in local and regional party systems, but has had a disruptive effect on organisational cohesion. BNG has “moderated its line on both socio-economic and nationalist issues, making huge political gains as a result” (Keating, 2001b, 229), but has barely altered its statutes or founding principles, reflecting a pragmatic approach towards policy moderation (Maiz, 2003), as

\(^{514}\) Interviews 34, 46 (BNG).
\(^{515}\) Interview 34 (BNG)
\(^{516}\) *El País* (28/1/91)

Wilson, Alex (2009), Multi-level Party Politics in Italy and Spain
European University Institute

10.2870/13381
well as an ideological gulf between its moderate and radical wings. The BNG leadership has aligned itself closely with conservative nationalists in Catalonia and the Basque Country, and has largely eschewed its links with radical left wing nationalists, such as Herri Batasuna in the Basque Country or Sinn Fein in Ireland (Keating, 2006). Although the political moderation of BNG is gradual and ongoing (Maiz, 2003), a turning point was the 1997 regional election. This saw BNG surpass PSOE in electoral support, making Beiras the ‘leader of the opposition’ in Galicia, a status confirmed after the 2001 election. A greater role in governing institutions required extensive cooperation with PSOE, from the formation of local coalitions in the 1990s to a full regional governing coalition since 2005. Beiras was crucial in preparing the ground for these coalitional agreements, by continually insisting that BNG should ally with PSOE, a “left-wing” party that shared a common enemy in the “right-wing” PP.

The relationship between Beiras and the UPG ‘colonels’ became strained in 2002 after UPG leader Francisco Rodriguez unsuccessfully challenged Beiras for the BNG leadership. In 2003 Beiras renounced his re-candidature in the next regional election. In 2005 Beiras resigned from the party leadership after intense disagreements with Anxo Quintana, the BNG candidate for regional president who replaced Beiras as party leader and subsequently became vice-president of Galicia. The disagreements between Beiras and the new BNG leadership revolved around the coalition government with PSOE, which Beiras felt located BNG in an unacceptably “subaltern” position. The new BNG leadership was aware that being junior partner in a PSOE-dominated executive presented obvious risks: lower political visibility; close association with government policies; and loss of support among more radicalised sectors of Galician society. Yet the BNG leadership felt this risk could be minimised by developing a “government of two parts”, with clear autonomy for BNG and PSOE within their respective policy portfolios, and different institutional leaders as reference points (for

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517 Interview 46 (BNG).
518 El País (8/3/96).
519 El País (29/4/02).
520 El País (30/8/03).
521 El País (11/4/05).
522 Interview 45 (BNG).
BNG this became Quintana as vice-president). Nevertheless the governing coalition with PSOE strained internal relations within BNG.\(^{523}\) Whereas the late 1990s were characterised by tensions between the UPG ‘colonels’ and other groups for control of BNG (Maiz, 2003), the 2000s saw a strategic alliance between UPG and the moderate ‘independents’ of the BNG movement, both of which supported and participated in the coalition government.\(^{524}\) This resulted in the creation of new groups, in particular radical collectives, opposed to the institutional integration of BNG.\(^{525}\) These groups allied with more moderate critics (e.g. Beiras) to challenge the party leadership, obtaining over 40% support in the 2006 party congress.\(^{526}\) The leadership sought to re-assert control by reducing the power of power activists,\(^{527}\) as evident from two key internal changes. The first change affected BNG ministers in the regional government, who were granted the remit to pursue more autonomous policies and select their own ministerial cabinets.\(^{528}\) The second change affected elections to the party congress, where a system of ‘delegates’ replaced the internally democratic but more risky ‘assembly’ structure.\(^{529}\) These changes were justified in terms of swifter decision-making,\(^{530}\) and closer alignment between BNG positions and the preferences of its voters (rather than party activists),\(^{531}\) but further aggravated internal tensions. Intra-organisational disputes did not affect the stability of the governing coalition, largely because candidate selection for the regional parliament, as well as cabinet posts in the regional government, were confined to members from UPG or ‘moderate’ independents, excluding more critical BNG groups.\(^{532}\) This resulted in a functioning coalition government, but also meant the BNG ‘party in public office’ was not fully legitimised by the broader organisation, thus threatening future cohesion.

\(^{523}\) Interviews 37, 43, 46 (BNG).
\(^{524}\) Interviews 43, 46 (BNG).
\(^{525}\) Interviews 43, 46 (BNG).
\(^{526}\) Interview 43 (BNG).
\(^{527}\) Interviews 37, 43 (BNG).
\(^{528}\) Interview 37 (BNG).
\(^{529}\) Interviews 37, 46 (BNG).
\(^{530}\) Interview 37 (BNG).
\(^{531}\) Interview 46 (BNG).
\(^{532}\) Interviews 43, 46 (BNG).
Chapter 5.2.3 Regional Party System of Galicia (1989-2007)

The regional party system in Galicia developed over three distinct phases, evident from patterns of coalition formation and alternation in government. The first phase consisted of unstable and shifting coalition governments (1981-1989); the second and longest phase consisted of stable single-party PP governments (1989-2005); and the third phase consists of a stable coalition government between PSOE and BNG (2005-). Galicia has developed a competitive regional party system with bi-polar structures of competition, characterised by the predominance of the left-right cleavage, although voting patterns are affected by the nationalist cleavage. PP is the largest party in Galicia but has to compete alone against both PSOE and BNG, who almost always form alliances that seek to exclude PP from power at regional and local levels. A PSOE-BNG governing coalition was only possible at regional level in 2005, but was common practice at local level since the 1990s, emphasising the importance of local ‘coalition testing’ for regional coalition formation.


The first phase of the regional party system in Galicia (1981-1989) was “characterized by instability due to the successive coalitions of the various political parties on the scene…. as the parliamentary configuration of the first and second legislative terms… presented no political force with an absolute majority of the seats. During this time the governing parties in relative majority experienced processes of international fragmentation and progressive loss of parliamentary support, with a concomitant political crisis and governmental instability” (Maiz and Losada, 2000, 66). After the 1981 regional election, AP (26 seats) and UCD (24) formed a majority governing coalition, with Xerardo Fernandez Albor (AP) installed as regional president. PSOE became the main opposition party (16 seats), alongside PCE Galicia (1); the predecessor to BNG (3), and Galician Left (EG, 1). Tensions in the governing coalition were mainly linked to the organisational collapse of UCD, more protracted in Galicia than elsewhere in Spain because of extensive clientelist networks developed by UCD in the region (Hopkin, 2001a). Instead of collapsing with the UCD organisation, these clientelist networks became the object of
contention between the disparate parties of the Galician centre-right. The collapse of UCD complicated the governing coalition led by AP, because UCD splintered into 5 parties: Two Christian democratic parties (CDS and PDP), a small liberal party (PDL), and two conservative Galician nationalist parties (CG and PNG). In the 1985 regional election, most of these splinter parties formed an electoral coalition with AP, the Popular Coalition (CP), which fell 1 seat short of an absolute majority. CG competed separately and obtained 11 seats, making it a powerful and indispensable coalition partner for AP, which could not expect support from leftist parties elected to the regional parliament. PSOE remained the main party of opposition (22 seats), although EG (3) and BNG (1) also obtained seats. The centre-right governing coalition was characterised by strong inter-party and intra-party tensions, resulting in the defection of the Galician nationalists CG and PNG in 1987 to form a governing coalition led by PSOE, with Fernando Gonzalez Laxe installed as regional president. This coalition government lasted until the end of legislature in early 1990, and was supported by individual defectors from AP or splinter parties of UCD (Alcantara and Martinez, 1998).

Manuel Fraga (PP) entered Galician politics in a critical moment of instability in the regional party system, characterised by its numerical fragmentation and lack of governing stability. The 1981 and 1985 regional elections saw 5-6 electoral lists obtain seats, but many of these lists contained representatives from several parties. Centrist regional politicians wielded powerful coalitional leverage, because they could negotiate terms of access to the regional government with either PSOE or AP. Under the leadership of Fraga, PP was able to secure four consecutive absolute majorities in the regional parliament (1989, 1993, 1997, 2001), allowing the regional president to assume “an indisputable position as party leader – both within the Autonomous Government and his own party – which the citizens clearly perceived” (Maiz and Losada, 2000, 66). Centrist and small leftist parties disappeared from the regional parliament in 1993, leaving only PSOE and BNG as parties of opposition. This was partly due to a change in the regional electoral law, approved unilaterally by PP in 1992, which raised the threshold for seats in provincial districts from 3% to 5% (Lopez, 1997). Whereas the party personnel and
voters of centrist parties shifted towards PP, the party personnel and voters of small leftist
parties shifted towards BNG and PSOE, consolidating the party system in Galicia.

**PP predominance (1989-2005): Regionalism and Clientelism as Political Strategies**

In constructing the PP organisation in Galicia, Fraga pursued an active process of political aggregation, and placed much less emphasis on policy moderation or internal regeneration (see Chapter 5.2.2). This was crucial for gaining the allegiance of former UCD powerbrokers, and ensured the vast majority entered PP. Fraga was also successful in recruiting many politicians from the conservative nationalist parties, CG and PNG, which had abandoned AP to form a governing coalition with PSOE in 1987. Thereafter support for CG fell sharply, evident from the 1989 regional election where CG obtained just 2 seats, and the 1993 election where CG obtained no seats. The remnants of PNG joined the party federation of BNG. This process of political aggregation to incorporate centrist parties and politicians was achieved in Galicia without producing severe tensions with AP. The electoral difficulties that Fraga’s party leadership faced at national level, namely an association with the Francoist regime and the lack of policy moderation, actually allowed Fraga to retain the loyalty of incumbent AP powerbrokers in Galicia, who remained devoted to his leadership. Fraga was able to hold together this party coalition (former Francoists, conservative Galician nationalists, Christian democrats and liberals) through two principal mechanisms. The first was the widespread use of political clientelism to retain the loyalty of provincial ‘barons’ in the party organisation. The second was the ideological gel of an autonomist political strategy, through a common focus on advancing regional autonomy and controlling sub-national institutions.

Fraga’s rule in Galicia during the 1990s coincided with a rapid expansion in the policy competences, financial resources, and administrative size of regional governments in Spain. The autonomist demands that shaped this process did not emanate from Galicia (Montero, 1997; Colomer, 1998; Gunther et al, 2004), but the PP regional president was nevertheless able to exploit regional autonomy to secure control over greater financial resources. Most of these resources were channelled directly from the Spanish state, to
fulfil the greater policy competences now expected from regional governments, including management of education and health, as well as regional economics development and infrastructure. Additional resources came from the EU Structural Funds (allocated primarily to poorer regions in Europe), and the EU Cohesion Funds (allocated to poorer countries meeting the entry criteria for EMU), both co-financed by the central government. This increased flow of resources allowed the “consolidation of the PP in government through solid networks of clientelist exchange relations between the Xunta and its citizens… growing levels of subsidies and public intervention of the autonomic institutions in every area… generating a dynamic of increased dependence of civil society on public action” (Losada and Maiz, 2000, 81).

Galician clientelism is characterised by “local collective benefits such as roads, bridges and public works projects, delivered through local collaborators” (Keating, 2001, 228). PP Galicia developed this into a multi-level network of political clientelism, held together by provincial party ‘barons’, who exploited their control over key posts in the regional executive to selectively allocate funds to their province, and then exploited their control over the provincial government to selectively distribute these resources to municipalities (Keating, 2006). Equivalent levels of benefit were often denied to municipalities not governed by PP politicians, resulting in a politically subjective allocation of funds, particularly for public works and infrastructure (Losada and Maiz, 2000). The regional leadership of Fraga became crucial for ensuring the flow of resources was spread equitably between provinces, party factions, and individual powerbrokers. Although clientelism stabilised PP Galicia, and helped to increase and consolidate its electoral support, it remains insufficient as a sole explanation for PP dominance under Fraga. These clientelist mechanisms were implanted in the broader social structures of rural Galician society, traditionally characterised by conservative peasant proprietors whose natural sympathy lay with centre-right parties rather than the nationalist, socialist, or communist ideals advanced by other Galician parties. This is still reflected in vote distribution, as PP remains predominant in the numerous small villages and among the

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533 Many smaller municipalities in Galicia saw their elected politicians switch allegiances to PP (from PSOE or BNG) in order to receive state patronage. (*El País*, 3/4/95).
older inhabitants of Galicia, whereas PSOE and BNG are much stronger in medium-sized cities and among younger inhabitants (Lopez, 2005; Pallares et al, 2006a).

The success of PP Galicia during the 1990s was heavily contingent on Fraga’s style of leadership, his simultaneous control of executive and party functions, and his adoption of an autonomist political strategy. Fraga consistently appropriated the historical myths and figures of Galician nationalism, including its founder Alfonso Castelao, and moulded their ideas to suit the contemporary political project of PP Galicia, which was presented as a continuation of these regionalist aspirations (Lagares, 2003). While the national PP leadership under Aznar and Rajoy consistently rejected a pluri-national vision of Spain (Keating and Wilson, 2009), at regional level Fraga adopted positions that were closer to Galician nationalism, although within the limits of the Constitution. Fraga discussed the existence of a Galician ‘nation’ during his first vote of investiture, and during his terms in office actively promoted use of the Galician language in education and public life, making his own speeches in Galician (Schrijver, 2005). On institutional matters Fraga repeatedly called for a federal reform of the state, with the Senate transformed into a genuine ‘Chamber of the Regions’, despite the reluctance of the PP leadership. Fraga consistently demanded greater policy autonomy for Galicia, although he never appealed for fiscal autonomy, given the dependence of the region on continued state investment. Fraga also argued in favour of greater regional involvement in EU decision-making, particularly in areas that closely affected Galician interests, such as the fisheries industry. This political strategy helped PP to absorb conservative nationalists into the organisation, whether as voters or politicians, and pushed genuine Galician nationalism onto the left of the political spectrum, where it galvanised around BNG. This created a sharp contrast with Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the largest nationalist parties remained on the centre-right (Keating, 2001b). The tough confrontation between PP and BNG allowed Fraga to contrast his moderate project with the more radical objectives of Galician nationalism, thereby rallying PP support among voters with a more centralist orientation.

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534 Interviews 39 (PP), 41 (PSOE), 45 (PP).
Moderate political regionalism is an obvious winning strategy in Galicia. Minimal levels of immigration and widespread use of the regional language encourage a distinct and shared cultural identity, in contrast to the more polarised and competing identities of the Basque Country or even Catalonia. Survey data (OPA, 2007) suggests most Galicians feel equally Galician and Spanish (61.5%), while few feel uniquely Spanish (5.8%) or uniquely Galician (3.5%), although many feel more Galician than Spanish (21.9%). The same data suggests Galicians are overwhelmingly favourable to the present ‘State of Autonomies’ (69.0%), more so than voters in the other three ‘fast track’ regions (Catalonia, Basque Country, Andalusia). A federal state with greater regional autonomy is supported by many Galician voters (16.8%), while the proportion that favours abolition of the regional government is very low (3.2%), in line with the proportion that favours the option of independence (4.3%). Over time the proportion of regional voters who support a re-centralisation of the Spanish state has declined sharply, with a greater proportion now supporting the status quo or a federation with greater regional autonomy (Schrijver, 2005). Limited political capital can be made out of defending centralist positions that seek to curb regional autonomy, or adopting positions on regional autonomy that are too radical. Yet PSOE adopted the former strategy until the change of regional leadership in 1998, while BNG adopted the latter strategy until its policy moderation in the 1990s (see Chapter 5.2.2). The subsequent shift of PSOE towards moderate regionalist strategies (Schrijver, 2005), alongside the ‘catch-all’ Galician nationalism of BNG (Barreiro, 2003), helped to dilute the distinctive and opportunistic positioning of PP in the regional party system.

**Party Competition in Galicia: Vote Switching in Regional Elections**

The bi-polar structure of regional party competition, with the centre-right PP competing against a centre-right coalition of PSOE and BNG, became increasingly evident in the strong patterns of vote switching between PSOE and BNG in regional elections (Barreiro, 2003; Pallares et al, 2006a). This co-existed with patterns of dual voting, whereby BNG performed better in regional elections, while PSOE performed better in national elections (Pallares and Keating, 2003). PP performed equally well in both types of election.
Regional elections saw PSOE and BNG compete for the status of second party, with BNG obtaining more votes than PSOE in 1997 and 2001. National elections (1993-2004) displayed a more consistent electoral hierarchy, with PP always first party (47.1-54.0%), PSOE always second (23.7-37.2%) and BNG always third (8.0-18.6%). The high levels of vote switching between PSOE and BNG in regional elections confirm that they compete over a similar section of the political spectrum, and voters perceive them as one of two potential governing options in Galicia.535

Patterns of vote transfer in the 2005 election would suggest that vote switching between PSOE and BNG is a form of ‘intra-bloc’ volatility, while vote switching between PSOE-BNG and PP is a form of ‘inter-bloc’ volatility. 83% of PP voters in 2001 supported the same party in 2005, 9% abstained, 6% switched their allegiance to PSOE, and only 2% switched to BNG. 86% of PSOE voters in 2001 supported the same party in 2005, 8% abstained, 4% switched their allegiance to BNG and only 2% switched to PP. The main shift occurred with BNG voters. Only 72% of BNG voters in 2001 supported the same party in 2005, while 15% switched their support to PSOE, 9% abstained and only 3% switched to PP. The outcome of the 2005 election was then determined by a huge increase in turnout, which benefited PSOE and BNG at the expense of PP, and a substantial vote transfer from BNG to PSOE (Pallares et al, 2006). Although the left-right cleavage remains the most salient in Galician politics, the nationalist cleavage is also strong. BNG is the most popular party among voters with an exclusively Galician sense of identity (53%), or those who feel more Galician than Spanish (40%). PP is the most popular party among voters with an exclusively Spanish sense of identity (53%), or those who feel more Spanish than Galician (59%). Among the largest category of voters who feel equally Spanish and Galician, PP is the strongest party (44%) followed by PSOE (39%) then BNG (18%). PP obtains significant levels of support from voters with an exclusive Galician identity (27%), or who feel more Galician than Spanish (31%), while PSOE support is fairly balanced across the subjective national identity spectrum (Pallares et al, 2006a). This may be an outcome of the convergence towards moderate regionalist strategies pursued by all the main parties in Galicia (Schrijver, 2005).

535 Interview 37 (BNG).
Coalition Formation between PSOE and BNG: Local Coalition Testing

The regional governing coalition between PSOE and BNG in 2005 was one of very few alternatives to a PP-led government, since only these three parties had been elected to the regional parliament. Although PP politicians claimed it was illegitimate and opportunistic, arguing PP should have the right to form a minority government as the largest party in the legislature (see Chapter 5.2), most voters expected a regional governing coalition would be attempted if PP lost its absolute majority. Local coalitions between PSOE and BNG had prevailed in most of the larger Galician cities. These local coalitions were largely successful in terms of governmental stability, with the vast majority enduring their full term and many reiterated after subsequent elections (Marquez, 2003; 2007). Although some local coalitions faced difficulties and a few unraveled, their overall success made them an important “school of learning”, with positive effects on the subsequent regional governing coalition between these parties.536

Local coalitions between BNG and PSOE were initially formulated as a competitive response to PP dominance of local party systems, rather than an initiative of regional party leaders, so varied widely in their implementation and success. PSOE and BNG were both stronger in more urbanised areas, so it is precisely the larger cities where PSOE-BNG coalitions were experimented to unseat PP from government. Among the early ‘testing grounds’ was Vigo, the largest city in Galicia, where PSOE and BNG formed a governing coalition in 1991537 that lasted until 1995, when PP seized back control of the city.538 After the 1995 local elections, the BNG leader Xose Beiras supported a region-wide pact with PSOE to exclude PP from power wherever possible. Francisco Vazquez (then leader of PSOE Galicia) rejected this option, because of his personal opposition to Galician nationalism and his concerns over the corrosive effects of such a coalition on PSOE support. Nevertheless in 22 smaller municipalities, where PP obtained the most votes and seats but not an absolute majority, it was unseated by a

536 Interview 41 (PSOE).
537 El Pais (23/8/93).
538 El Pais (29/5/95).
PSOE-BNG coalition. Upon his election in 1998, the new leader of PSOE Galicia, Emilio Perez Tourino, declared that BNG were “competitors rather than adversaries”, and agreed a regionwide pact of collaboration with the BNG leader Beiras after the 1999 local elections. The terms of this agreement specified that PSOE and BNG would form coalitions in municipalities where PP did not obtain an absolute majority of seats, although the choice of coalitional type was left to local branches. Its implementation after the 1999 local elections meant PP lost control over 5 of the 7 largest cities in Galicia (Vigo, Pontevedra, Lugo, Santiago de Compostela, Ferrol), where PSOE and BNG formed governing coalitions. In each case the mayor was selected from the governing party with most votes, whether PSOE (Santiago de Compostela, Lugo) or BNG (Vigo, Pontevedra, Ferrol). These coalitions faced immediate difficulties in Pontevedra and Vigo, where they soon collapsed and were replaced by BNG minority governments with parliamentary support from PSOE, but resisted in the other municipalities.

The difficulties faced by PSOE in managing local coalitions where BNG was first party, and the subordinate position of PSOE vis-à-vis BNG in the regional parliament, meant the PSOE leadership was reluctant to openly contemplate a regional governing coalition with BNG. In advance of the 2001 regional election, Tourino explicitly rejected the option of any governing coalition that would install the BNG leader Beiras as regional president. This contrasted with the attitude of Beiras, who had expressed support for a governing coalition with PSOE, partly because BNG was then superior in electoral terms and could expect to hold the presidency. The key shift in the coalitional positioning of PSOE occurred after the 2003 local elections, which saw a dramatic increase in PSOE support and a concomitant decline in BNG support, demonstrating that the strategy of bringing BNG into government actually benefited PSOE in electoral terms. In the 2003 local elections, PSOE secured an absolute majority in A Coruna and Ferrol, while PP retained its absolute majority in Ourense. In the other 4 large cities a PSOE-BNG governing coalition was negotiated, resulting in three PSOE mayors (Santiago de

El Pais (18/6/95).
El Pais (17/11/98).
El Pais (16-17/6/99)
El Pais (3/2/00).
El Pais (10/9/01).
Compostela, Lugo, Vigo) and only one BNG mayor (Pontevedra). The governing coalition in Vigo was soon dissolved because of personal conflicts over the choice of mayor, with the conflict between PSOE and BNG becoming so bitter that a PP mayor was eventually installed with the external support of BNG, and governed comfortably for the rest of the legislature. The failure of this local coalition did not have a destabilising effect on PSOE-BNG coalitions in the rest of Galicia, while the 2007 local elections saw PSOE-BNG governing coalitions installed in the six largest Galician cities. In advance of the 2005 regional election, neither PSOE nor BNG confirmed they would necessarily form a coalition should PP lose its absolute majority, although this option was now implicitly assumed by all parties involved (Pallares et al, 2006a).

**Coalition Formation between PSOE and BNG: Policy Alignment and Common Goals**

PSOE and BNG have converged in their policy positions since the 1990s, facilitating the process of coalition formation. BNG has developed more moderate policy positions on social and economic issues (Maiz, 2003), and re-focused its ultimate objective as greater autonomy for Galicia, arguing for a pluri-national state rather than complete independence (Schrjiver, 2005). PSOE Galicia has adopted a more autonomist strategy under the leadership of Tourino (1998-), aligning its positions on state design closer to the model advanced by BNG. Whereas BNG favours more of a ‘confederal’ model for Spain with powerful regions and a weak centre, PSOE now favours a ‘federal’ model for Spain, where regions are autonomous but closely integrated with a strong centre. The current difference is over competing visions of federalism, rather than a battle between competing nationalisms, while inter-party tensions over this question were sharply reduced by Vazquez’s exit from the regional leadership of PSOE in 1998. Vazquez had focused his political attacks on Galician nationalism, rather than the PP regional government, and sought to portray BNG as a group of dangerous left-wing extremists, despite mounting evidence of policy moderation and institutional responsibility. His

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544 *El País* (14/12/03).
545 *El País* (30/5/05).
546 *La Voz de Galicia* website ([www.lavozdegalicia.es](http://www.lavozdegalicia.es))
547 Interview 36 (PSOE),
548 Interview 43 (BNG).
replacement by Tourino allowed a closer alignment of PSOE and BNG positions at regional level. This helped the swift formulation of a regional government after the 2005 election, and guaranteed strong stability for the PSOE-BNG governing coalition.

One of the principal differences between BNG and PSOE concerns their internal structures. BNG is a confederation of different parties and groups, where individual members play an important role in intra-party decision-making, while the highest level of authority is the regional party. PSOE is a more centralised organisation with a predominant role played by party elites (members are increasingly marginal), whose highest level of authority is the national party. Considered alongside their different political trajectories, with PSOE as a Spanish governing party whose national leadership showed little interest in Galician politics until recently, while BNG is a modern nationalist movement whose sole political arena has always been Galicia, their current alliance in regional politics is necessarily one of convenience. Both party elites justify their alliance as a “democratic necessity” to remove PP from permanent control over sub-national government, and so terminate its supposedly corrupt mechanisms for socio-political control. PSOE and BNG elites could find strong evidence for the damage produced by non-alternation in regional government: Frequent corruption scandals engulfing the regional executive; wasteful mechanisms of clientelist resource distribution; weak parliamentary scrutiny over the executive; and the fascist collaboration of Fraga and many local PP leaders, all suggested the need for a long over-due “democratic regeneration of Galician society”. The alliance between PSOE and BNG was galvanised by the 2003 Prestige Disaster, when an oil tanker spilled its reserves on the Galician coast, and saw a massive popular mobilisation in response to the incompetent and insensitive handling of the crisis by PP governments at national and regional level, whose leaders were accused of complete indifference or pursuit of personal profit during the crisis. This environmental mobilisation further galvanised the PSOE and BNG alliance, which sought to make the protest slogan Nunca Mais (‘never again’) an enduring indictment of the regional government. Yet the present alignment of

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549 Interview 34 (BNG).
550 Interview 34 (BNG).
PSOE and BNG in Galician politics is also an unintended consequence of the personal leadership of Fraga, whose autonomist strategy forced a competing organisational response from PSOE, pushed Galician nationalism (BNG) towards the left of the political spectrum, and drew these parties together as a competitive response to PP predominance.

**Coalition Formation between PSOE and BNG: Party Stability and Portfolio Allocation**

The convergence of policy objectives, the long experience of local coalition testing, the identification and mobilisation of a shared electorate, and the common objective of guaranteeing alternation in regional government, helped to ensure a smooth process of coalition formation between PSOE and BNG after the 2005 regional election. Yet this coalition created divisions within BNG, leading to the resignation of Beiras from the national leadership. Although Beiras had previously supported a governing coalition with PSOE, he now rejected any coalition that would place BNG in a subordinate position. Within PSOE the governing coalition was only rejected by Francisco Vazquez, but his remaining supporters were already excluded from the party leadership, so had no effect on the coalitional outcome. PSOE favoured the enhanced stability of a governing coalition, since their higher electoral support guaranteed them the regional presidency and a greater share of portfolios. The 2003 local elections demonstrated that bringing BNG into government could weaken its electoral appeal, and represented an effective strategy to contain the regionalist challenger. Local governing coalitions had sometimes been unbenefficial in electoral terms for BNG, but the alternative of allowing PP to continue in the regional government would be interpreted as a clear betrayal of voters.\(^{551}\)

The other alternative of allowing PSOE to form a minority government with parliamentary support from BNG was also unpalatable, since this would grant PSOE exclusive access to the resources and visibility of the regional government, while highlighting the strong electoral performance of PSOE and the electoral decline of BNG. The BNG leadership concluded it would obtain a more favourable ‘policy-differential’ (Strom, 1990) in a majority coalition government, where its support would become indispensable for government decision-making, rather than in a parliamentary coalition.

\(^{551}\) Interviews 34, 37 (BNG)
BNG were entering as junior coalition partners into a regional government led by PSOE, so their principal concerns were to retain political visibility, internal autonomy, and policy leverage. BNG successfully proposed the post of vice-president of Galicia, to accommodate the new party leader (Anxo Quintana), and ensure BNG regional ministers had an institutional leader of their own, to avoid creating the impression they were accountable to the PSOE regional president. BNG also negotiated to obtain prominent portfolios with high levels of expenditure; enhanced public visibility; clear electoral benefits; and reflecting their immediate political objectives. These portfolios included Social Policy (clear electoral benefits from welfare distribution); Culture (promote Galician language and identity); Rural Policy (expand limited support in rural areas); and Innovation/Industry (improve image among the business community). More strategic portfolios were left to PSOE or ‘independent’ regional ministers (e.g. Economy and Taxation; Education; Health; Housing), since these were felt to contain high administrative burdens; considerable political risks; difficult trade-offs; and few electoral benefits.\footnote{Interview 43 (BNG).} BNG presented the regional executive as a “government of two parts”, to avoid being seen as a “peg” to PSOE.\footnote{Interview 37 (BNG).} In principle PSOE and BNG managed their respective portfolios with full autonomy and no interference from the other party.\footnote{Interviews 37, 43 (BNG).}

The PSOE-BNG governing coalition is fully consistent with characterisations of coalition formation as a complex and iterative bargaining process, rather than a discrete post-electoral outcome (De Winter, 2002). It highlights the importance of analysing the ideological-electoral and strategic-organisational objectives of portfolio allocation, rather than its sole relevance in terms of public expenditure. The process of local coalition testing between PSOE and BNG began more than a decade before electoral circumstances allowed this outcome to occur at regional level. The mechanisms devised for managing the regional coalition were shaped by past experience of local coalitions. Although BNG developed a careful and calculated coalitional strategy, its support fell in the 2007 local elections, implying there might be high electoral costs to allying with

\footnotetext{552}{Interview 43 (BNG).} \footnotetext{553}{Interview 37 (BNG).} \footnotetext{554}{Interviews 37, 43 (BNG).}
The regional leadership of PSOE and BNG nevertheless continued to emphasise governing stability, never losing a common vote in the regional parliament, despite only possessing a single-seat majority. The coalition was viewed by PSOE and BNG elites as a complete success, significantly improving its chances of re-iteration in future.555

The coalition government was stable partly because it avoided highly contentious issues, such as major changes to the institutional structure, or a transformation in the ‘rules of the game’ for regional elections. Unlike other regions, Galicia was unable to reform its Statute of Autonomy, although this had been a pre-electoral pledge of BNG in 2005 (Pallares et al, 2006a). PP and BNG were unable to reach an agreement on this reform, due to their competing visions of the relationship between Galicia and the central state, as well as their bitter rivalry.556 PP wielded veto power over any reform to the Galician Statute of Autonomy, which requires a two-thirds majority in the regional parliament. BNG was the only party in the regional parliament that did not wield individual veto power, but wielded conditional veto power through its governing coalition with PSOE, which would have been threatened if PSOE developed a separate agreement on statute reform with PP. The failure to pursue statute reform might have been beneficial to the governing coalition, because the experience of Catalonia suggests that clear differences can emerge on this issue between statewide and non-statewide parties, with potentially destabilising effects on governing coalitions (Keating and Wilson, 2009). This was evident after the Catalan coalition government collapsed because of internally divergent positions between PSC and ERC on the Catalan reform in 2006 (Orte and Wilson, 2009). Yet PSOE and BNG also failed to develop an agreement on making the regional electoral system more proportional, or reducing the impact of Galician voters abroad on the outcome of regional elections (see Chapter 5.2.1). This is harder to explain because any reform towards greater proportionality, or reducing the impact of Galician voters abroad, would benefit PSOE and BNG in electoral terms, largely to the disadvantage of PP.

555 Interviews 34 (BNG), 40 (PSOE), 41 (PSOE), 42 (PSOE), 43 (BNG).
556 Interview 34 (BNG).
Chapter 5.2.4 Conclusions

PP remains the largest party in Galician politics, but no longer has a monopoly of power over sub-national institutions, having lost control of the regional government (2005-), two of the four provincial governments (2007-), and the seven largest municipalities (2007-). PP controlled the regional government between 1989 and 2005 with an absolute majority in the regional parliament, and under the strong leadership of Manuel Fraga, who combined executive and party control. Fraga integrated the disparate components of the Galician centre-right into a single ‘catch-all’ organisation, held together by his personal leadership and pursuit of an autonomist political strategy. Fraga demanded greater autonomy and resources for Galicia, proposed a federal reform of the Spanish state, and actively promoted use of the Galician language in public life, while appropriating the myths of Galician nationalism for his own political project (Lagares, 2003). Fraga was successful in transforming PP Galicia into a distinct ‘catch-all’ party, in part due to his focus on political aggregation rather than internal regeneration and policy moderation, in contrast to the national level where all three objectives were combined under the Aznar leadership. Fraga continued to recognise the primacy of local powerbrokers within their territory, and tolerated internal divisions. These strengthened his regional leadership, because of his unique capacity to mediate between competing powerbrokers and their rival territorial factions. Intra-party factionalism was stimulated by clientelist political networks developed by PP in the region, which relied on simultaneous control of public office at multiple territorial levels (regional, provincial, local), and stabilised PP support in sub-national elections. Yet the escalation of factional conflict in the 2000s meant Fraga was unable to implement a leadership succession in PP Galicia, and only the loss of governing power resolved this conflict by strengthening the faction closely associated with national leader Rajoy (Pallares et al, 2006a).

PSOE Galicia suffered serious difficulties in the 1990s, undergoing a vicious circle of factional disputes and poor electoral outcomes. Intra-party conflict galvanised around the choice of coalitional strategy, as a centralist faction supported an alliance with the non-nationalist IU, while an autonomist faction supported an alliance with the Galician
nationalists BNG. Until 1998 the centralist faction was ascendant, led by Francisco Vazquez, a prominent local politician who opposed any form of alliance between PSOE and BNG. Vazquez lost control of PSOE Galicia after the 1997 regional election, where his much-trumpeted electoral coalition with IU failed miserably to advance either party. The autonomist faction became ascendant under the leadership of Emilio Perez Tourino (1998-), who actively encouraged governing coalitions with BNG at local levels. These were particularly successful in large cities, where PSOE and BNG combined to overthrow PP governments. Local coalition testing facilitated the regional governing coalition between PSOE and BNG, formed swiftly after the 2005 regional election.

The 2005 election saw a substantial increase in PSOE support and a decline in BNG support, reversing the outcome of the 1997 and 2001 elections where BNG obtained more votes and seats than PSOE. In the ensuing coalition government, PSOE obtained a majority of portfolios, including the regional presidency held by Tourino. BNG gained control over a minority of portfolios, although selected for their clear electoral benefits and public visibility, with BNG eschewing posts that required difficult political trade-offs. BNG also obtained the vice-presidency, created specifically to accommodate its party leader Anxo Quintana, who became the institutional reference point for BNG ministers in the regional government. These differentiated their governing activities from those of PSOE, to give the impression of a ‘government of two parts’. The governing coalition with PSOE nevertheless aggravated internal tensions within BNG, a confederation of different party groups and independent members who wield considerable weight in internal decision-making. More radical groups have obtained support by openly contesting the institutional drift of the party, potentially threatening the current leadership and its preferred coalitional strategies.

Galician politics has become highly regionalised. This is partly due to the timing of regional elections, which never coincide with other types of election. Also relevant are party strategies, which have converged towards a moderate regionalist or nationalist discourse, with a prevailing use of the Galician language in political debate (Schrijver, 2005). Equally important are structures of regional party competition, which have
become distinct from those in national politics. The regional party system is bi-polarised around two competing blocs, located on the centre-right (PP) and centre-left (PSOE and BNG). Vote switching in regional elections occurs mainly on the centre-left (PSOE and BNG) and much less in the centre (PSOE and PP), in contrast to national elections. Although the left-right cleavage is the most salient one in Galician politics, the nationalist cleavage has a significant effect on vote distribution. PP remains by far the largest party in electoral terms, although its support is much stronger in rural areas and among older voters, while BNG is much stronger in urban areas and among younger voters. Levels of turnout in regional elections vary considerably, while the regional electoral system contains disproportional features that benefit the largest party PP. Due to the intense bi-polar competition, both factors have a determining effect on parliamentary representation.
Chapter 5.3: Comparative Conclusions for the Spanish Regions

Statewide parties in Spain have adjusted differently to the dynamics of regional party competition, as highlighted in the case studies of Andalusia (Chapter 5.1) and Galicia (Chapter 5.2). Inter-party differences are evident, reflecting the diverse organisational trajectories of Spanish parties (Chapter 3.1). Intra-party differences are also present, with statewide parties (SWP) adopting diverse characteristics in each region, heavily influenced by regional party competition. Regionalisation of the Spanish state has therefore not only allowed consolidated strong NSWP (Hamann, 1999; Pallares and Keating, 2003), but also produced variations in the territorial organisation of SWP.

The PSOE organisation was shaken by factional conflicts between ‘modernisers’ and ‘traditionalists’ in the early 1990s, which adopted different characteristics in Galicia and Andalusia, influenced by the organisational trajectory of their regional branches. PSOE Galicia became divided over whether to adopt more autonomist positions in regional politics, and split on the question of whether to pursue coalitions with IU or BNG. The spectacular failure of the electoral coalition between PSOE and IU in 1997 determined a change in coalitional strategy towards alignment with BNG, which weakened the centralist faction and strengthened the autonomist faction. Since 1998 PSOE Galicia has been led by an autonomist faction, which is aligned to the national leadership of Zapatero, and has succeeded in increasing PSOE support and containing the electoral threat of BNG. This confirms the argument that an effective way to confront the regionalist challenger is to pursue a similar autonomist strategy, which can undermine its distinctive positioning in the party system (Roller and van Houten, 2003). BNG has become the principal coalition partner for PSOE, with both parties controlling the regional government and largest municipalities in Galicia. Control of sub-national government has become the main priority for PSOE Galicia, significantly improving its internal cohesion. PSOE Andalusia became the defining battleground for the conflict between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernisers’ in the party organisations, resolved in favour of the ‘modernisers’ through the decisive intervention of regional president Manuel Chaves, who secured control of PSOE Andalusia in 1994 and permanently displaced the
‘traditionalists’ allied to Alfonso Guerra. Chaves thereafter combined executive and party control in Andalusia, and performed a key mediating function at national level by rallying PSOE regional ‘barons’ behind Zapatero in 2000. PSOE Andalusia adopted a more pluralist style of internal organisation under the leadership of Chaves, with greater autonomy and influence for the provincial party, which now controls candidate selection for national and sub-national elections. In contrast PSOE Galicia has seen the regional leadership re-centralise candidate selection and retain tighter control over the sub-national party, while the provincial organisation remains weak and competes for influence with historic sub-provincial districts (comarcas), powerful in rural areas.

The PP organisation in Galicia and Andalusia demonstrated clear differences in the 1990s, but in both cases regional party leaders developed ‘catch-all’ party organisations that improved access to both sub-national and national government. In Andalusia the regional leader Javier Arenas developed a ‘catch-all’ organisation through political aggregation, internal regeneration and policy moderation, in perfect synchrony with the objectives of the national party leadership. This organisational transformation was facilitated by the continued exclusion of PP from control over regional government in Andalusia, which remained dominated by PSOE. The improved electoral performance of PP Andalusia helped to consolidate the regional leadership of Arenas, while the simultaneity of regional and national elections since 1996 has encouraged close alignment of national and regional party strategies. PP Andalusia has become focused on ‘vote-seeking’ strategies at regional level, with a view to realising its ‘office-seeking’ objectives at national and local levels, a strategy that maintained party cohesion despite the loss of successive regional elections to PSOE. In Galicia the regional leader Manuel Fraga developed a successful ‘catch-all’ organisation through the aggregation of local powerbrokers affiliated to various centre-right parties, including conservative Galician nationalists. Fraga held this party coalition together through a common focus on control of sub-national government, clientelist distribution of resources across territorial levels, mediation between competing powerbrokers in the Galician provinces, and the adoption of an autonomist strategy in regional politics. Internal regeneration and policy moderation were weakly pursued under the Fraga leadership, and only thoroughly enacted after his
defeat in the 2005 regional election, when PP Galicia became more firmly controlled by the centralist faction, close to the current national party leader Mariano Rajoy.

IU remains a force in Andalusian politics, where it has strong historical roots and obtains above-average levels of support. IU Andalusia also underwent severe factional divisions in the 1990s, linked to its coaltional strategy vis-à-vis PSOE. The ‘hard-line’ national leadership sought to undermine PSOE wherever possible, and seized its opportunity after the 1994 regional election, when IU support became necessary for any legislative majority. The obstructive behaviour of IU in the regional legislature, known as the ‘pincer’ strategy because of its full coordination with PP, triggered an early regional election in 1996 that significantly reduced IU support and allowed PSOE to form a majority governing coalition with PA. The failure of the ‘pincer’ strategy prompted the demise of the ‘hard-line’ faction at regional level, and its replacement by a ‘moderate’ faction keen to advance the coalition potential of IU. This faction has since formed parliamentary or governing coalitions with PSOE at local levels, but has never formed a coalition at regional level, with the exception of the ‘single issue’ coalition between PSOE and IU to reform the Andalusian Statute of Autonomy (Orte and Wilson, 2009). The ‘moderate’ faction is closely aligned with the national IU leader Llamazares, narrowly elected in 2000 with the significant backing of the Andalusian federation. In Galicia IU has become irrelevant, consistently unable to obtain seats in the regional parliament. This is partly due to historical conditions, with PCE failing to become implanted in a region of peasant proprietors. Yet IU was also unable to compete with Galician nationalism, which dominates the left of the political spectrum and erodes its potential support base among young people, unionised workers and ‘post-materialist’ voters (Atta, 2003; Maiz, 2003). The leadership of IU Galicia was ‘moderate’ and favourable to coalitions with PSOE, but the 1997 electoral coalition between these parties was actively undermined by the national party leadership, which fielded a competing list and expelled the dissidents from the party organisation, a move that did not secure lasting control for the national leadership but did permanently devastate IU Galicia.
NSWP display different organisational characteristics in Andalusia and Galicia, and have developed distinct functions in the regional party system. BNG is located on the centre-left of the Galician political spectrum, whereas PA is located in the centre of the Andalusian political spectrum, although its origins are socialist. BNG has developed local and regional coalitions exclusively with PSOE, seeking to implement regionwide pacts of collaboration wherever possible. PA pursued a long governing coalition with PSOE at regional level (1996-2004), but also pursued governing coalitions with PP at local level, while coalitional strategy was left to the opportunistic discretion of local elites. BNG is a party confederation whose individual members have considerable weight in internal decision-making, while PA is dominated by fractious local party elites and party members have a very limited role. BNG has formulated a powerful and articulate nationalist discourse, focused on the prospects for regional development and self-government. PA has formulated a weak and incoherent nationalist discourse, while its regional leadership is characterised by competing personal tensions and the defence of narrow local interests. PA politicians sought to use sub-national government to expand their clientelist powerbase (Montabes et al, 2006), whereas BNG saw clientelism as a mechanism for the continued oppression of Francoist elites. The differences between these parties are also evident from their governing coalitions with PSOE. PA formed a regional governing coalition for two legislatures with PSOE (1996-2004), but made few attempts to differentiate its role in regional government, with most voters unaware it even formed part of a governing coalition! (Montabes et al, 2006). The termination of this regional governing coalition produced serious divisions within PA, with a new regional leadership emerging that sought to differentiate itself from PSOE through a more confrontational approach in regional politics, as evident from its refusal to support the PSOE-sponsored reform of the Andalusian Statute of Autonomy. This strategy aggravated internal tensions and confused or disheartened regional voters, who abandoned PA in the 2008 regional election, where it lost all parliamentary seats. BNG has formed a regional governing coalition with PSOE since 2005. As part of its coessional agreement, BNG controls the vice-presidency and several high profile portfolios, selected on the basis of their electoral benefits and limited electoral costs. BNG has sought to differentiate itself from PSOE by developing a ‘government of two
parts’, with full autonomy in its respective portfolios and a separate institutional reference point, BNG leader Anxo Quintana, who controls the vice-presidency of Galicia. Whether this strategy of differentiation will prevent BNG from losing voters to PSOE is still unclear. The governing coalition has produced internal tensions within BNG, strengthening radical components opposed to the institutional drift of the leadership.

Both regional party systems contain a single party that obtains a plurality of votes and seats in every regional election (PSOE in Andalusia, PP in Galicia). Yet these party systems have developed different structures of competition. Andalusia is characterised by patterns of non-alternation in government and the continued systemic predominance of PSOE. The latter is able to govern even if it loses an absolute majority, because of the possibility to form coalitions with smaller parties (PA and IU). Whereas PA has now disappeared from the regional parliament, IU has moved closer towards PSOE and should be willing to support the regional government in future. This has reinforced the systemic predominance of PSOE, because the only possibility for genuine alternation would be for PP to obtain an absolute majority in the regional parliament, an outcome that has never occurred. The systemic predominance of PSOE is further reinforced by the concomitant timing of national and regional elections, which substantially increases the relative turnout of PSOE voters (Montabes and Torres, 1998). The Galician party system is characterised by more intense bi-polar competition along the left-right cleavage, leading to wholesale alternation in government. Although PP remains by far the largest party in Galicia, it has been displaced from regional and local governments by coalitions of PSOE and BNG. Galician bipolarism takes place between competing blocs (PP versus PSOE-BNG) rather than competing parties, while vote switching occurs mainly on the centre-left (between PSOE and BNG) rather than the centre (between PSOE and PP) of the political spectrum, clearly distinguishing it from patterns of bipolarism at national level. The Galician electoral system contains a series of features that make it highly disproportional and favour PP in terms of electoral outcome and parliamentary representation. This includes the over-representation of the eastern provinces, the biased role played by Galician voters abroad in regional elections, and the high threshold (5% of votes at provincial level) for parliamentary representation.
Political clientelism is prevalent in Andalusia and Galicia, due to a mixture of historical traditions, long control of sub-national governments by a single party, and the predominantly rural character of both regions. Although clientelism cannot fully explain electoral outcomes, it has reinforced the electoral predominance of PP in Galicia and PSOE in Andalusia, and helped stabilise their electoral support in difficult periods. Clientelist mechanisms in both regions are dependent on high levels of state transfers, but have produced varying levels of economic development. Economic growth in Andalusia is comparable to Spain as a whole, whereas economic growth in Galicia remains substantially below the Spanish average. Yet the mechanisms of party clientelism are broadly similar in both regions, which suggests the differences in economic growth cannot be attributed to the presence of ‘virtuous’ or ‘non-virtuous’ clientelism (Piattoni, 1998; 2001), but are linked to the declining traditional industries of Galicia (Losada and Maiz, 2000), and the growth in the tourism and construction industries in Andalusia. The process of urbanisation appears to be weakening clientelist ties in both regions. This is particularly evident from local elections in larger cities, where the predominant parties most associated with clientelism (PP in Galicia, PSOE in Andalusia) have been displaced by parties less associated with clientelism (PSOE and BNG in Galicia, PP in Andalusia).

SWP in Andalusia and Galicia have frequently adopted autonomist political strategies, to improve their electoral support and increase their access to government. These party strategies vary but share some common features: Demanding greater autonomy and resources for the regional government; projecting the party as a unique defender of regional interests vis-à-vis the central state and other regions; appropriating the myths of regional nationalism; and encouraging use of the regional language in public life (only Galicia). In Galicia an autonomist strategy was actively pursued by the PP regional president Fraga (1989-2005), who abandoned his earlier opposition to the ‘State of Autonomies’, and pursued a highly opportunistic strategy that absorbed conservative Galician nationalists into the PP organisation, and provided a unifying direction to PP regional governments otherwise characterised by factional-territorial divisions. This autonomist strategy was tolerated by the national PP leadership because of Fraga’s
unassailable position as party founder; his ability to remain within Constitutional limits; and his strong electoral appeal in Galicia. During the 1990s, PSOE Galicia was unable and unwilling to develop a competing autonomist discourse, which contributed to its electoral, organisational, and coalitional difficulties. The new regional leadership in 1998 pursued a more autonomist strategy that unified PSOE Galicia, improved its electoral support, and significantly increased its access to sub-national government.

In Andalusia PSOE has always pursued an autonomist strategy. PSOE campaigned extensively in favour of allowing Andalusia to accede towards greater autonomy through the ‘fast track’ route, initially reserved for the ‘historical nationalities’ of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia. Autonomist elements of PSOE Andalusia have rarely entered into conflict with more centralist elements, since both are focused on gaining resources from the central state to invest in regional infrastructure and economic development. Fiscal autonomy has never been debated, since this would be unbeneﬁcial to Andalusia as a poor and large region that beneﬁts considerably from present ﬁnancing arrangements. The autonomist strategy of PSOE Andalusia has become more personalised under the leadership of Manuel Chaves, who formulated an inclusive view of regional identity, evident from the reformed Andalusian Statute of Autonomy (Keating and Wilson, 2009), and transformed the presidency into a unifying regional institution. The inability and unwillingness of PP to pursue an autonomist strategy in Andalusia can be linked to two factors: Close alignment with a national leadership weakly tolerant of divergent territorial demands; and an overwhelming focus on mobilising local interests against the PSOE regional government. The adoption of autonomist strategies by SWP in both regions has helped to contain the growth of NSWP, pushing Galician nationalism onto the left of the political spectrum, and defeating Andalusian nationalism as a political force. Conversely the inability of IU to develop autonomist strategies in Andalusia and Galicia has made it unable to develop a ‘niche’ role in these regional party systems, in obvious contrast to its Catalan and Basque branches, which have avoided electoral decline by adopting regionalist or even nationalist positions in their respective territories (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008).
Chapter 6: Comparative Conclusions

Statewide parties (SWP) in Italy and Spain have responded to the challenges of regionalisation with diverse territorial strategies, which will be compared in view of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 1.3. The first observation to make is that all SWP have adjusted their organisational strategies to accommodate increased pressures from regional branches, but this has usually taken the form of informal accommodation rather than formal organisational change, thus fully confirming Hypothesis 2. Formal change to intra-party decision-making has only occurred in cases where the party faces a broader systemic threat to its effectiveness or survival. Organisational strategies have tended towards a greater decentralisation of party structures, broadly confirming Hypothesis 1.

The main exception is the Popular Party, which recentralised control over its regional branches in Spain, a process highlighted in the regional case studies. Internal decentralisation is most advanced in the other Spanish parties, PSOE and IU, whose formal structures now reflect the greater political weight of regional branches, in particular their leaders. The adoption of a more decentralised PSOE organisation only occurred after severe national leadership crises, a sharp decline in electoral support, and the resulting loss of control over the national government. The ‘flexible’ territorial strategy adopted under the leadership of Zapatero has significantly reduced political tensions between territorial levels. The party leader has been more willing than his predecessors to recognise internal pluralism, and in exchange regional branches have refrained from making excessive autonomist demands. This ‘flexible’ strategy has improved the integration of multi-level party structures, with strong ties and close coordination between national and sub-national elites, reinforced by increased electoral support at all territorial levels. PSOE branches in Andalusia and Galicia are now characterised by greater internal harmony, improved electoral support, and increased access to sub-national government. The adoption of a ‘flexible’ territorial strategy by IU has been less successful in terms of organisational unity, systemic weight, and electoral performance. A highly decentralised strategy was only adopted after the complete failure of the centralising strategy pursued by the ‘hard-line’ national leadership in the 1990s, which consistently rejected coalitions with PSOE at all territorial levels. The severe
limitations of the ‘hard-line’ strategy became evident in Andalusia, where it produced a sharp decline in the electoral support and systemic relevance of IU, allowing the ascendancy of ‘moderate’ regional factions keen to develop coalitions with PSOE. These ‘moderate’ factions later obtained control over the national party through the election of Gaspar Llamazares as IU leader in 2000. In other regions the conflict between national and regional branches of IU produced permanent organisational devastation. This is evident from Galicia, where IU already had weak organisational penetration, low levels of electoral support, and faced strong competition from left wing Galician nationalists. The collapse of the Galician organisation was accompanied by an acrimonious divorce from its Catalan counterpart IC-V, which maintains no formal relationship with IU.

The centre-right PP has adopted a ‘cohesive’ territorial strategy, founded on a centralised party organisation with low internal pluralism, and the exertion of strong hierarchical mechanisms of internal control. This coincided with an expansion in electoral support and access to government at both national and sub-national levels, thus reconciling the diverse interests of national and sub-national elites. Processes of regionalisation have nevertheless affected the PP organisation. Where PP dominates sub-national levels of government, the regional branch may develop considerable informal autonomy from the national leadership. This was evident in Galicia through the pursuit of an autonomist governing strategy and the consolidation of territorial factions with weak ties to the national leadership. Where PP is excluded from the regional government (e.g. Andalusia), the regional branch depends more heavily on the resources and career prospects of the national party, so fully conforms to their demands. In Galicia the national leadership only asserted greater control over the regional party when it lost control over the regional government in 2005, and did so by advancing a territorial faction that was closely aligned to the national leader Rajoy. The PP leadership had previously been unwilling to intervene heavily in Galicia, tolerated as a personal ‘fiefdom’ of party founder and regional president Manuel Fraga, who secured consistent electoral victories and perpetuated PP dominance over the regional government for 16 years. A similar pragmatism prevails in PSOE. The national leadership supported the autonomist direction of the PSOE Galicia since 1998, because this significantly improved its electoral support,
greatly increased access to sub-national government, and strengthened internal cohesion. In Andalusia the regional party is tightly controlled by regional president Manuel Chaves, whose relationship with Zapatero resembles that of an ally rather than a subordinate. Chaves has been successful in securing PSOE control over the regional government since 1990, so his full control over the regional party is seen as necessary for PSOE predominance in Andalusia. The multi-level behaviour of PSOE and PP fully confirm Hypothesis 6, which suggested that national leaders would tolerate greater regional party autonomy, but only if this increased access to sub-national government.

Italian parties have adopted more centralised organisational structures and pursued more ‘cohesive’ territorial strategies, but have sought to accommodate the growing assertiveness of elected regional elites through informal mechanisms. In formal terms, FI maintains the most centralised structures conceivable in a democratic party, yet in practice the national leadership is obliged to tolerate the relative autonomy of sub-national elites, mainly career politicians recruited from the former DC and PSI organisations, who control local strongholds and collectively defend their interests against business elites promoted by Berlusconi. Without altering its formal structures, FI has developed a pattern of internal ‘stratarchy’ in its multi-level arrangements. FI Lombardia maintains high levels of support, controls most sub-national governments, responds primarily to the institutional leadership of regional president Formigoni, and is dominated by former DC and PSI politicians, in a strategic alliance of convenience. The liberal faction close to the national leader has become shut out from key organisational and institutional positions. In Campania the regional party has no clear leadership, frequently loses key powerbrokers to the governing centre-left coalition, displays declining electoral support, and has little access to sub-national government. It is nevertheless dominated by an alliance of DC and PSI powerbrokers. These inter-regional differences perfectly display the potential benefits and disadvantages of ‘stratarchical’ multi-level arrangements. AN has a more structured multi-level organisation, although still characterised by strong factionalism at sub-national levels, as well as loosening ties between national and regional elites. National intervention is geared towards overcoming factional impasse at sub-national levels, particularly in candidate selection. The general
disinterest of national elites in the behaviour of their branches at sub-national levels is linked to centre-right control over the national government (1994-5; 2001-2006, 2008-), as well as the difficulty of intervening in sub-national levels characterised by strong intra-party tensions and powerful incumbents, who can secure their re-election through preference voting. In FI this has produced a distinct regional political class which is rarely interested in pursuing a national political career. In AN this has consolidated sub-national MSI elites only weakly interested in the modernising direction of the national party. The tendency towards organisational ‘stratarchy’ was not envisaged in the initial Hypotheses, which argued that state decentralisation would increase the importance of controlling regional governments for national elites. These unexpected findings are directly linked to the challenges and transformations undergone by Italian parties since the collapse of the party system in the 1990s. The party in public office has strengthened noticeably in all SWP (particularly at sub-national levels), at the expense of the party in central office whose authority has weakened dramatically, partly because bureaucratic structures are now too costly to maintain. The surviving party elites focused almost entirely on controlling the national government (often for the first time), rather than developing a strong record of sub-national government. There are some notable exceptions, national politicians who were unable to enter prominent leadership positions in the new parties, so used their control over regional institutions to increase their political weight in the party system. This characterises the political objectives of the FI regional president in Lombardia, as well as the DS regional president in Campania.

DS have developed more decentralised internal structures through successive statute reforms, although never implemented because of the organisational fusion with DL to form the Democracy Party in 2007. DS descends from a political organisation (PCI) that thrived despite its exclusion from the national government, but DS elites sought exclusive legitimisation in the control of government, rather than electoral mobilisation or societal transformation. These political elites ‘cartelised’ around the party in public office at different territorial levels. The dominance of the party in public office is particularly evident in Campania, where DS is exclusively focused on control over sub-national institutions and responds to the institutional leadership of Antonio Bassolino, regional
president since 2000. The objectives of the national leadership are not always pursued at regional level, where the party in central office no longer takes key decisions. DS exclusion from sub-national government in Lombardia has created a weak regional party with low autonomy and heavy dependence on the national party. DS Lombardia has almost no influence in national decision-making, partly because of the lack of parliamentarians elected under the electoral system used for national elections (1994-2001), which over-represented DS elites from central-northern regions. The DS leadership largely eschewed policies that would improve its support in northern Italian regions, and broadened its governing interests primarily to southern Italy, where limited organisational and electoral strength could be counter-balanced by increased access to public office, through varying coalitions with former Christian Democrats. These dominated the DL organisation, which was stratcharchical and cartelised in nature, existing almost entirely in public office. DL Campania increased its electoral and coalitional weight through a process of political aggregation, recruiting key powerbrokers from other parties and melding them into a factional alliance with considerable institutional presence. DL Lombardia remained weak in electoral terms, its elites intent on preserving their remaining positions of control, rather than developing ‘catch-all’ strategies that could compete for votes with the centre-right coalition. The weakness of DS and DL in Lombardia encouraged them to select more centrist candidates for regional president, who were not closely associated with sub-national elites. None of these candidates was supported by DS and DL after losing regional elections, contributing to the institutional weakness of opposition leadership. The inclusion of DS and DL in the government of Campania reinforced their alliance but also encouraged them to retain distinct organisational arrangements, as a way to assert their relative coalitional weight and reflect this in the distribution of key posts. This alliance of convenience bodes ill for the territorial implantation and organisational cohesion of the new Democratic Party.

PRC has adopted a ‘cohesive’ territorial strategy in principle, founded on strong provincial federations and democratic patterns of internal election, with regional branches that are weak with few elective functions. Yet this structure has actually prevented the national party from exerting significant control in the important arena of regional politics.
The party in central office wields little control over the behaviour of regional elites, who are largely autonomous in their parliamentary activities and sometimes clash with the party leadership. Like its centre-left partners DS and DL, PRC displays a tendency towards organisational conservatism, unwilling to adopt strategies that could broaden electoral appeal but might weaken internal cohesion. All parties in the centre-left coalition display an excessive focus on maintaining the core vote, through close ties with ancillary organisations such as trade unions. In DS and DL this organisational conservatism has been somewhat counter-balanced at national level by processes of party integration, designed to create a single centre-left party through political alignment and organisational fusion. In contrast PRC is unable to overcome differences with other radical left parties, a process that could have increased its weight in national and regional politics. Radical left parties have not sought to pioneer processes of party integration in Lombardia (or other regions), which might have increased their coalitional weight vis-à-vis their moderate centre-left partners.

The closed and self-preserving instincts of Italian political elites are reinforced by the broad coalitions in which they compete. These coalitions control government at national and sub-national levels through the aggregation of political actors, rather than the pursuit of ‘catch-all’ strategies designed to win a plurality of votes. This has encouraged individual parties to focus on internal cohesion rather than electoral expansion. DS and AN have become very factionalised, which suggests a focus on internal struggles rather than external projection. Party leaders have avoided ambitious or even popular proposals that might reduce ideological cohesion. Their professed belief in the miracle of majoritarianism merely conceals a cult of ‘everything must change, so that everything stays the same’. Other Italian parties (e.g. FI, DL, Udeur) are dominated by political elites from the former DC and PSI organisations. These elites display limited loyalty to their new party organisations, and are primarily concerned with maintaining a discreet and clientelised control over public office. They are mainly animated by petty leadership disputes, ideological or factional differences long forgotten by the general public, and an excessive belief in their own importance for the appropriate functioning of the state. The main element of renewal in Italian politics has come from LN and some sectors of FI,
which have promoted business elites into Italian politics, whose frequently unscrupulous behaviour in pursuit of their self-interest, and their ruthless search of ‘scapegoats’ for the decline of Italy (usually some type of immigrant), have contributed to a more hostile political and social climate. These broader failures of organisational adaptation are reflected in the response of SWP to processes of regionalisation. Instead of using decentralisation to develop closer relations with citizens whose territory they seek to represent, Italian parties have just exploited the resources and visibility of sub-national government, without making concerted attempts to improve its efficiency or effectiveness. This process is most exaggerated in southern Italy, where mechanisms of political clientelism were simply carried over from the ‘First Republic’ and expanded through the increased functions and resources of regional government. Political elites in northern Italy have exploited the demand for greater autonomy and lower taxation in a demagogical fashion, producing a message for electoral purposes but with little intention of producing genuine change in the workings of sub-national government.

In contrast Spanish parties have successively renewed their internal organisation, recovered from processes of decline by developing ‘catch-all’ electoral strategies, and responded to the challenge of regionalisation by increasing the effectiveness and visibility of the regional government. The outcome is that support among citizens for regional governments has increased consistently (OPA, 2007). Part of the explanation for this cross-national discrepancy resides in the lower fragmentation of national and regional party systems in Spain, and the absence of competing pre-electoral coalitions. This has allowed a symbiotic relationship to develop between organisational change, electoral success, and access to government. These dimensions of party competition are often disconnected in Italy because political aggregation, largely through pre-electoral coalitions, is the card that trumps all others when it comes to winning elections. This feature is further reinforced by the current electoral system at all territorial levels (‘PR with majoritarian bonus’), whose mechanisms heavily advantage pre-electoral coalitions. Another important difference in Spain is the capacity of the party in central office to maintain a close control over the party in public office at all territorial levels, reinforcing the alignment between organisational objectives and their effective achievement, and
preventing the emergence of national and sub-national elites with closed and self-preserving instincts. This represents a sharp contrast to the Italian case, where the party in public office has developed an excessive autonomy in all statewide parties, even the successor parties to PCI, which had fully subordinated the party in public office. The excessive autonomy of elected elites at sub-national levels is reinforced by the use of preference voting in local and regional elections, which allows politicians to shift easily between competing parties, so long as they can guarantee a strong package of votes.

The question of timing may also explain some of the strong cross-national differences that emerge between Spain and Italy. Spanish parties were institutionalised alongside the democratic state, to compete for control of institutions rather than to mobilise civil society (van Biezen, 2003). Confronted by the challenge of regionalisation, SWP simply adjusted their internal structures to compete for control of sub-national government. Italian parties have very different institutional origins, but all were heavily shaped under the conditions of a highly centralised but democratic state, characterised by clientelist relationships between national and sub-national levels of government. These parties underwent severe organisational crises in the 1990s, which later produced attempts to regain organisational cohesion by avoiding intra-party conflict. The territorial dimension of Italian politics is liable to create precisely the types of intra-party conflict that SWP have sought to avoid, given the cultural and socio-economic differences that prevail across the national territory. Italian SWP have avoided engaging fully with the representation of territorial interests, and allowed inter-territorial relations to continue in ‘behind the scenes’ negotiations between elites, largely shielded from public view. The main exceptions to this rule are new parties. LN has been unashamed in publicly defending the interests of northern Italy, but for this reason its support remains territorially concentrated, while support for a federal state is minimal in southern Italy (Roux, 2008). FI has projected opposing messages in southern and northern Italy, with little regard for internal coherence, but allowing FI to consolidate powerbases in northern regions (e.g. Lombardia) and southern regions (e.g. Sicily). Yet the loose institutionalisation of FI makes it weakly rooted in other regions (e.g. Campania), where it is unable to articulate territorial interests effectively through the party organisation.
Despite these considerable differences, party politics in the Italian and Spanish regions display a series of important similarities. Presidentialisation of regional party organisations occurs in all four regional case studies, although with some variations in internal dynamics. In Spain presidentialised control is recognised (even encouraged) by allowing the regional president to simultaneously control the regional party. In Italy presidentialism is not recognised in formal terms, because the regional president rarely control positions of party leadership at sub-national levels, but in practice regional presidents wield powerful informal control over the regional party, through the capacity to regulate party access to the nominations and resources of sub-national government.

Regional presidents in Italy and Spain have become (or remained) powerful actors in national politics, by using their sub-national powerbases as a means to assert national influence. This may cause tensions between national and regional party leaders (e.g. strained relationship between Berlusconi and the FI regional president of Lombardia), but can also strengthen leadership at both territorial levels (e.g. powerful alliance between Zapatero and the PSOE regional president of Andalusia). These findings consistently confirm Hypothesis 5, which argued that regional leaders in key institutional positions would exert a stronger control over the regional party, and would become more powerful actors in national politics. Yet this is more contained in Italy, given the ‘stratarchical’ relationship between national and sub-national party elites, and much stronger in Spain, given the ‘integrated’ relationship between national and sub-national party elites.

This thesis finds that presidentialisation of regional politics remains distinct from the phenomenon of personalisation, which can also occur among parties and politicians that do not control the regional government. PP Andalusia remains excluded from the regional government, but has come under the personal control of Javier Arenas, a prominent PP leader at national level. In Campania factional alliances of ex-DC politicians operate in the governing centre-left coalition (DL and Udeur), informally led by local powerbrokers with strong territorial appeal, who do not formally control governing posts at sub-national levels and have constrained the executive leadership of the DS regional president. Changes in Spanish party statutes are broadly reflected in the operation of their multi-level organisations. In contrast some Italian parties were keen to
adapt statutes to reflect their preferences for state design, such as the decentralised models of party organisation contained in the new DS and DL statutes, but never implemented these changes in practice. AN and PRC maintained more centralised unitary structures, reflecting internal doubts over the decentralising process and the appropriate degree of regional autonomy. The main exception to this pattern is FI, whose statutes suggest a highly centralised organisation with no regional autonomy. In practice FI is characterised by ‘stratarchy’ and strong informal accommodation between national and sub-national elites, with considerable autonomy for each respective territorial level.

This research finds that regional party competition in Italy and Spain displays different dynamics to national party competition (‘vertical’ incongruence), while strong inter-regional differences (‘horizontal’ incongruence) also appear (Thorlakson, 2006). Italian regions have pursued rather congruent pre-electoral coalitions (Di Virgilio, 2006), but these vary hugely in the relative weight of their component parties across the national territory, which in turn produces territorially differentiated electoral hierarchies within the competing coalitions. Whereas central-southern regions are characterised by the levelling of electoral hierarchies in governing and opposition coalitions, northern and central-northern regions are characterised by strong electoral hierarchies in both coalitions. This affects government stability and executive leadership. Campania has become dominated by an over-sized governing coalition, through a process of political aggregation that has incorporated the main sub-national elites from the ‘First Republic’ (DC, PCI, PSI), resulting in a proliferation of parties and powerbrokers that seek a disproportionate allocation of government nominations and resources. Their competition for primacy over the regional coalition heavily constrains the executive leadership of Bassolino, who controls DS but is unable to wield full control over a regional government characterised by chronic instability. Lombardia shares some of these characteristics of political aggregation, with the main governing elites (DC, PSI) represented in the the regional government alongside new business elites, but the electoral hierarchy between governing parties is strong and unambiguous. Formigoni controls the largest party (FI) and has strengthened his alliance with LN, the second largest party at regional level. AN and UDC are clearly subordinate to both main parties.
in electoral terms, and are unable to determine the policy direction of the regional
government, while their loyalty is compensated through a disproportionate allocation of
nominations and resources. In both regions the unnecessary proliferation of posts in the
regional government, semi-public agencies, and devolved policy sectors (e.g. health)
represents a crucial mechanism of ‘horizontal’ clientelism, used to strengthen the
governing coalition by rewarding loyalists and recruiting politicians from the opposition.
In Campania this process is aggravated by the pervasiveness of ‘vertical’ clientelism,
whereby local powerbrokers maintain strong support bases through preference voting,
which allows them to shift easily between competing parties and coalitions. The shift of
local powerbrokers into the governing CLC since 1999 strengthened this coalition in
electoral terms, but weakened it further in terms of internal cohesion. Although ‘vertical’
clientelism is less pervasive in Lombardia, whose strong economy prevents the social
structure from relying heavily on the distribution of welfare benefits, it does continue to
shape relations between the regional government and the business community, evident
from the close ties between Formigoni and powerful Catholic associations with close ties
to the business community, which heavily finance his re-election campaigns. The Italian
evidence confirms Hypothesis 3, which suggested the competitive dynamics of regional
party systems would shape the behaviour of regional parties more than the preferences of
their national leaders. Italian parties are exceptionally willing to tolerate divergent (even
corrupt) practices at sub-national levels, especially when these increase government
control. They are highly unwilling (perhaps unable) to rein in the opportunistic behaviour
of regional elites, even when this behaviour demonstrably clashes with their preferences.

Regional party systems in Spain are increasingly diverging from the national level in
their structures of competition. This is evident from patterns of alternation in government,
which increasingly favour non-alternation or partial alternation, contrasting with a
national party system characterised by intense bi-polar competition and wholesale
alternation. Yet the growing bi-polarism between PP and PSOE has had an important
effect on regional party systems, making it difficult for either main party to obtain an
absolute majority in the regional parliament, and increasing their reliance on coalitions
with non-statewide parties. This has become the most common regional governing option
for PSOE over the timeframe, which partly explains its willingness to pursue governing coalitions even with regional nationalists. The intensity of competition between PP and PSOE constrains coalition formation and generally prevents these parties from allying together against NSWP, some of which can ensure their permanence in government by forming selective coalitions with the main SWP. IU has developed a varied but pivotal function in some regional party systems (Stefuriuc and Verge, 2008). In the Basque Country, IU forms a governing coalition with Basque nationalists, and acts as a bridge between nationalist and non-nationalist camps (Pallares et al, 2006b). In other regions IU forms governing or parliamentary coalitions with PSOE. The electoral decline of IU in most other regions is linked to its inability to influence patterns of coalition formation.

The case studies of Galicia and Andalusia reveal the consolidation of distinct dynamics of regional party competition, which heavily influence the competing strategies of SWP. In Galicia the party system has crystallised around two competing blocs (PP on the centre-right, PSOE and BNG on the centre-left). PP governments at sub-national levels have been increasingly displaced by governing coalitions of PSOE and BNG. These coalitions were tested out in large municipalities before their adoption at regional level in 2005, helping to ensure the regional coalition government was formed swiftly and comfortably endured the legislature. In Andalusia the party system is characterised by a predominant party (PSOE), which dominates the regional government even when it loses an absolute majority, because it can form coalitions with much smaller parties. PP Andalusia has gained support over the timeframe but remains primarily focused on national elections (held concurrently with regional elections) and control of public office at national and local levels. This alternative governing focus allows PP to retain organisational unity in Andalusia, despite continued defeats in regional elections. In the Spanish case there is also strong evidence to confirm Hypothesis 3. The competitive dynamics of regional party systems determine the organisational behaviour of regional parties. Yet this is rarely at the expense of the national leadership, whose electoral strategies in national elections rely heavily on the behaviour and popularity of their regional branches. In contrast the Italian case sees national parties much less reliant on the behaviour of regional branches to improve their relative support in national elections.
A common feature of Italian and Spanish regional party systems is the prevailing use of clientelism to structure political relations, although the nature of clientelism varies considerably in different regions. In Spain clientelism largely conforms to a ‘category’ model where benefits are distributed to collective actors (e.g. municipalities, corporations, businesses). In Italy the ‘category’ model exists alongside the ‘network’ model, where welfare benefits or subsidies are distributed to individual voters (Hopkin and Mastropaolo, 2001), while the favour is reciprocated through preference voting in sub-national elections (Calise, 2006; 2007). The absence of preference voting in Spain has allowed the party in central office to retain greater control over the party in public office, and restricted the protagonism of local powerbrokers that manipulate welfare benefits for political ends. This has not entirely prevented sub-national powerbrokers from emerging through control over government resources, in PP Galicia provincial ‘barons’ used their control over government resources to sway political loyalties at local levels. Competing territorial/personal interests produced factional divisions which prevented the regional president (Manuel Fraga) from achieving a smooth leadership succession. The ‘category’ model of clientelism can be highly effective in mobilising political support, particularly when justified by the promotion of infrastructural and economic development, as evident from the behaviour of PSOE Andalusia. Clientelism cannot however fully explain electoral outcomes in the regions of Andalusia and Galicia, where historical characteristics and competing party strategies represent important explanatory variables. Welfare manipulation forms an essential aspect of clientelist mechanisms in Italy (Ferrera, 1996), although far more pronounced in poorer southern regions (e.g. Campania), whose inhabitants rely heavily on clientelism to fill severe patches in welfare provision. It is less endemic in richer northern regions (e.g. Lombardia), where the class of state welfare dependents is rather limited. Yet in both types of region clientelism shapes the nature of political leadership (Piattoni, 1998; 2002), and heavily affects relations between the various governing parties.

Another feature of regional party systems in Italy and Spain is the adoption of autonomist strategies by SWP. Autonomist strategies are used to confront the challenge of strong NSWP (Roller and van Houten, 2003; Hepburn, 2007), but also to undermine competing
SWP. The FI regional president pursued an autonomist governing strategy that helped to consolidate FI support amongst voters in Lombardia. This ensured that FI remained the largest party in the regional party system, undermining support for competing SWP while restricting support for the regionalist LN, whose more radical positions have consolidated its core support base but made it substantially less popular than FI. This autonomist strategy remained primarily at the level of political rhetoric, such as the demand for ‘fiscal federalism’ or the holding of referendums on regional autonomy. Yet the substantial shift in political discourse has been sufficient to obtain continued (even greater) loyalty from LN to the governing centre-right coalition. Other SWP in Lombardia have been unable to develop successful autonomist strategies, partly due to the weakness and low visibility of their regional leadership, and partly due to the reluctance of their national leaders to sanction autonomist strategies.

PSOE Andalusia has adopted an autonomist strategy since the early 1980s, mobilising support for the creation of Andalusia and its progress on the ‘fast track’ route towards greater regional autonomy (Moreno, 1997; Colomer, 1998). PSOE has justified its continued control over the regional government as necessary for attracting sufficient resources from the national government, in order to pursue a state sponsored model of regional economic growth. The autonomist strategy of PSOE has severely under-cut support for the Andalusian Party (PA), whose intra-organisational conflicts also contributed to its electoral collapse in 2008. Manuel Fraga pursued an autonomist strategy as regional president of Galicia (1989-2005), which helped to hold together the disparate coalition of actors that composed PP Galicia, and succeeded in pushing Galician nationalism onto the left of the political spectrum, where it galvanised around BNG. The combined challenge of an autonomist PP and a nationalist BNG obliged PSOE to develop a competing autonomist strategy, which eventually increased its support and enhanced its capacity to form governing coalitions with BNG. Autonomist strategies are much weaker in southern Italy. The DS regional president of Campania was obliged to pursue a weak form of regional leadership, given the constraints imposed by other governing parties. The main NSWP (Udeur) focused its objectives on clientelised control of government nominations and resources, rather than under-cutting SWP on the
autonomist dimension. In any case autonomist strategies have limited appeal in Campania, a poor region where federalism is seen as a way for northern voters to cut welfare provision to southern Italians (Roux, 2008). Regional politicians in Campania have demagogically exploited the unsustainable argument that the transfer of resources to southern Italy has been severely cut, while discreetly squandering a fortune in national and European funding to support their clientelist political networks (Demarco, 2007). With the exception of southern Italy, there is strong evidence in Spain and northern Italy to support Hypothesis 4, which suggested that regional branches of statewide parties would increasingly adopt autonomist strategies to compete effectively at regional level.

This project highlights numerous avenues for further research. Its scope has been necessarily broad, in order to compare systemic and organisational dynamics in different multi-level systems, and to overcome the paucity of detailed literature on regional party politics. Future studies could usefully focus on individual empirical indicators for multi-level party organisation (e.g. candidate selection) or multi-level party systems (e.g. coalition formation), and compare these across several cases. This project has underlined the necessity of regional case studies, which can outline a series of important variables absent from more general studies of multi-level politics (e.g. Hough et al, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2006), and has advanced a single methodological design that incorporates both national frameworks and regional case studies. This could usefully be adapted to other multi-level systems. For reasons of scope this project has not explored the electoral dimension of regional politics, particularly the degree to which regional elections are characterised by distinct voting patterns from national elections. Analyses of regional elections in Spain have become increasingly systematic (e.g. Pallares and Keating, 2003; Pallares et al, 2006a; 2006b; Lago et al, 2007). Regional elections in Italy have received much less detailed analysis, although growing personalisation and distinctive electoral systems may well be producing significant multi-level variations in voting behaviour.

This research highlights the importance of clientelism and factionalism in shaping political relations, and highlights the growth of presidentialism in regional politics. Whereas presidentialism has been studied from a comparative perspective at national
level (Poguntke and Webb, 2004), it has never been analysed at the regional level of
government, whose varied growth in autonomy and resources lead to rather different
forms of presidentialism emerging. Clientelism and factionalism in post-war Italian
parties was a subject for highly detailed research, which produced a substantial body of
rather similar empirical findings (Tarrow, 1967; Zuckerman, 1975; Beller and Belloni,
1978; Caciagli, 1982; Chubb, 1982; Walston, 1988). Yet the political dynamics of
clientelism were rarely developed in later studies, so became poorly incorporated into the
broader field of comparative party politics. No significant study has analysed clientelism
in Italian parties since the collapse of the party system, while research on clientelism in
democratic Spain remains extremely limited. This project has considered the relationship
of factionalism and clientelism with party politics, yet these phenomena have a broader
impact on levels of institutional performance. As demonstrated in the Italian case studies,
the collective behaviour of the regional political class can have a determining effect on
policy outcomes and levels of institutional performance, which can be heavily affected by
intra-party and inter-party relations. Regional party systems, particularly through the
behaviour of governing parties or coalitions, can have an independent effect on
institutional performance, which has never been measured. By considering important
party political variables, research on institutional performance might posit a less
deterministic relationship between ‘civic culture’ and ‘institutional performance’
(Puttnam et al, 1993). The question of institutional performance needs to be linked more
closely to questions of political representation, and could usefully reflect on the role of
the political class in shaping public attitudes and determining policy outcomes.
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361


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Annex 1: Acronyms for Political Parties or Coalitions

Italy

AN  National Alliance (Founded 1994)
CCD  Christian Democratic Centre (Founded 1994; Merged into UDC 2002)
CDU  Christian Democrats United (Founded 1995; Merged into UDC 2002)
CLC  Centre-Left Coalition (1994-2007)
CRC  Centre-Right Coalition (1994-2007)
Dem  Democrats (Founded 1999; Merged into DL 2002)
DC  Christian Democrats (Founded 1942; Disbanded 1994)\(^{557}\)
DS  Democrats of the Left (Founded 1998; Merged into PD 2007)
DL  Daisy-Democracy and Liberty (Founded 2002; Merged into PD 2007)
FI  Forza Italia (Founded 1994)
FL  Labour Federation (Founded 1994; Merged into DS 1998)
IV  Italy of Values (Founded 1998)
LN  Northern League (Founded 1989)
MA  Movement for Autonomies (Sicilian party Founded 2005)
PCI  Italian Communist Party (Founded 1921; Split into PDS and PRC 1992)
PD  Democratic Party (Founded 2007)
Pdci  Party of Democratic Communists (Founded 1998 from split in PRC)
PDS  Party of the Democratic Left (Founded 1992; Merged into DS 1998)
Pens  Pensioners Party (Founded 1987)
PNE  North-East Project (Founded 2004)

\(^{557}\) In 1994 DC splintered into several splinter parties, the largest being PPI. However small splinter parties continued to use the acronym DC in the 1990s and 2000s.

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European University Institute
10.2870/13381
PPI  Italian Popular Party (Founded 1994; Merged into DL 2002)
PRC  Party of Refounded Communists (Founded 1992)
PRI  Italian Republican Party (Founded 1895)
Pdsi  Italian Democratic Socialist Party (Founded 1947)
PSI  Italian Socialist Party (Founded 1892; Disbanded 1994)\textsuperscript{558}
Rad  Italian Radicals (Founded 2001)
RI  Italian Renewal (Founded 1996; Merged into DL 2002)
SDI  Italian Social Democrats (Founded 1998)
UDC  Union for a Democratic Centre (Founded 2002)
Udeur  Popular Democratic Union for Europe (Founded 1999)
Verdi  Green Party (Founded 1986)

Spain
AP  Popular Alliance (Founded 1976; Merged into PP 1989)
BNG  Galician Nationalist Bloc
BNV  Valencian Nationalist Bloc
CC  Canary Coalition
CDN  Convergence of Democrats of Navarre
CG  Galician Coalition
CHA  Chunta Aragonesista
CiU  Convergence and Union (Founded 1978 as Catalan party federation)
EA  Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity)

\textsuperscript{558} In 1994 PSI collapsed into various splinter parties, the largest being SDI. Nevertheless some of the smaller splinter parties continued to use the acronym PSI in the 1990s and 2000s.
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<td>United Left (Catalan branch)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC-V</td>
<td>Catalan Initiative-Greens (Founded 1987)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>United Left (Founded 1986)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Andalusian Party (Founded 1976)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCE</td>
<td>Spanish Communist Party (Competes as IU in elections)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Galician Nationalist Party (now competes as part of BNG)</td>
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<td>Aragonese Party</td>
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<td>Riojan Party</td>
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<td>Catalan Socialist Party (Federated with PSOE)</td>
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<td>UPN</td>
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Annex 2: Support for Italian Parties in Regional Elections

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National Alliance (AN)

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\(^{559}\) CS (‘CentroSinistra’) list fielded in Lombardia was a ‘prototype’ of *Ulivo*, incorporating DS and the parties that later formed DL.
Annex 3: Support for Spanish Parties in Regional Elections

Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE)

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Wilson, Alex (2009), Multi-level Party Politics in Italy and Spain
European University Institute
10.2870/13381
United Left (IU)

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560 In the 2007 elections IU joined an electoral coalition led by PSM which obtained 9.0%
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Annex 4: List of Political Interviews for Regional Case Studies

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Interview 1 = SDI Regional Councillor (06/02/2007)
Interview 2 = AN Regional Councillor (06/02/2007)
Interview 3 = Udeur Regional Councillor (06/02/2007)
Interview 4 = FI Regional Councillor (06/02/2007)
Interview 5 = AN Regional Councillor (06/02/2007)
Interview 6 = FI Policy Adviser (06/02/2007)
Interview 7 = DS Regional Councillor (07/02/2007)
Interview 8 = DL Regional Councillor (07/02/2007)
Interview 9 = DS Regional Councillor (08/02/2007)
Interview 10 = Ulivo Regional Councillor (2000-5) (09/02/2007)
Interview 11 = NPSI Regional Councillor (13/02/2007)
Interview 12 = AN Regional Councillor (13/02/2007)
Interview 13 = Journalist, Corriere del Mezzogiorno (14/02/2007)

Andalusia

Interview 14 = PA Regional Parliamentarian (20/03/2007)
Interview 15 = PP Regional Parliamentarian (21/03/2007)
Interview 16 = PSOE Regional Parliamentarian (22/03/2007)
Interview 17 = PP Regional Parliamentarian (22/03/2007)
Interview 18 = PSOE Regional Parliamentarian (22/03/2007)
Interview 19 = IU Regional Parliamentarian (22/03/2007)
Interview 20 = PSOE Regional Parliamentarian (22/03/2007)
Interview 21 = PSOE Regional Parliamentarian (22/03/2007)
Interview 22 = PSOE Regional Parliamentarian (22/03/2007)
Lombardia

Interview 23 = LN Regional Councillor (17/10/2007)
Interview 24 = LN Regional Councillor (17/10/2007)
Interview 25 = DS Regional Councillor (17/10/2007)
Interview 26 = DS Regional Councillor (17/10/2007)
Interview 27 = DS Regional Councillor (17/10/2007)
Interview 28 = DL Regional Councillor (17/10/2007)
Interview 29 = Verdi Regional Councillor (17/10/2007)
Interview 30 = LN Regional Councillor (25/10/2007)
Interview 31 = FI Regional Councillor (25/10/2007)
Interview 32 = PRC Regional Councillor (25/10/2007)
Interview 33 = DS Regional Councillor (25/10/2007)

Galicia

Interview 34 = BNG Regional Parliamentarian (21/11/2007)
Interview 35 = PP Regional Parliamentarian (21/11/2007)
Interview 36 = PSOE Regional Parliamentarian (22/11/2007)
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Interview 42 = PSOE Regional Parliamentarian (26/11/2007)
Interview 43 = Policy Adviser to BNG leader (26/11/2007)
Interview 44 = PP Regional Parliamentarian (27/11/2007)
Interview 45 = PP Regional Parliamentarian (27/11/2007)
Interview 46 = BNG Local Councillor (27/11/2007)