COPING WITH INSECURITY IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we explore the security dimension of development in fragile situations, and address how the EU can better focus on the security dimension of its policies towards countries facing fragility. We stress development sequences in which economic, political and security factors interact, pointing to the linkages, and, at times, the trade-offs, between these problem-solving activities. Our guiding hypothesis throughout this paper is that societies facing fragile situations can begin to change in the security and development domains “as they are, in spite of what they are, and because of what they are” (Hirschman), and that the EU, both as it is, and in spite of what it is, can help them to do so. We draw two implications from this starting point. First, the EU should be guided by “possibilism” in its policy choices regarding the potential reforms and changes in the security-development nexus. Second, policy-makers and analysts should remain attentive to the possibilities of linkages and transversality, meaning that, instead of assessing only the possible effect of one single reform measure in the security-development nexus, it is more fruitful to seek out the inter-connections and external effects that are likely to emerge when several reforms are implemented either simultaneously or sequentially. It is both the combination and the process by which one thing leads to another that matters. First, we identify the security dimension of fragility situations and emphasise the wide range of instruments that the EU, as a global civilian power, has at its disposal to address these situations. Second, we present and discuss the four major ways to approach the security-development nexus from a policy standpoint: state-building, peace-building, human security, and the responsibility to protect. We argue that these frameworks should not be seen as competing with each other, but as making valuable points to be considered in any development strategy. Third, focusing upon problem-solving dynamics from a qualitative perspective, we explore the twists and turns of the relationship between security and development, highlighting, along the way, some of the unsuspected and unorthodox opportunities for change and reform in dire circumstances.

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1 Introduction: the Security Dimension of Development

In countries facing fragile situations, ordinary citizens and their families are deeply concerned about their personal safety, as they are threatened by crime and violence, civil conflict and war, persecution by the police and corrupt and ineffective justice systems (Narayan et al., 2000, 155). For them, overcoming poverty and increasing security go hand in hand. The United Nations recognise peace and personal security as essential ingredients for "human development in its fullest sense" (United Nations Development Programme 2002, 85). Marked by high levels of insecurity for the population and for the regime in power, situations of fragility can give rise to risks and threats on a local, regional or even global, scale, as investors flee, disease spreads and the environment is imperilled. A weak or non-existent legitimate monopoly of violence combined with the lack of infrastructure, capacity or willingness to enforce this monopoly, facilitate human rights violations, high levels of violence, and a lack of the provision of essential public goods and services to the population. The absence of a monopoly of violence gives rise to oligopolies in which territories are governed by actors who challenge the regime, threaten neighbouring countries, or, as in the cases of illicit trade and piracy, may even threaten European and global security. Moreover, displacement and mass migration induced by situations of fragility can put neighbouring countries under considerable pressure. In extreme cases, countries in situations of fragility face ongoing wars and rebellions, and local populations face the prospect of massacres and everyday armed violence. Countries facing fragile situations are certainly not all post-conflict, and even less post-armed conflict, societies. Insecurity makes the promotion of human development much harder precisely at a time when people's basic needs for food, sanitation, health care and education are not met. In short, insecurity is one of the main reasons why policy-makers and analysts talk about fragility in the first place, and why they seek to design policies to face fragility-related challenges.

The European Union is potentially in a very good position to face the twin issues of security and development, especially compared to the IMF and the World Bank. The challenge of the link between security and development is at the core of the EU's distinctive foreign policy and its emergence as a civilian world power putting to use a wide array of policy instruments, political, economic, cultural and military, at its disposal. It is also consistent with the 2003 European Security Strategy, as the security-development nexus embodies the core objectives of the EU in international politics, namely, contributing to peace and stability, and promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law and effective multi-lateralism. Moreover, the EU sees its main contribution to international security in the combination of civilian and military resources in order to face violent conflict and fragility situations. Peace-building and state-building successes are specifically associated with the type of missions that the EU favours with extensive civilian functions, economic re-construction, institutional reform and election oversight (Doyle, Sambanis 2006). The European Union has repeatedly asserted that achieving security and development are its prominent foreign policy objectives (Faria, Magalhaes Ferreira 2007, Young 2008). The European Security Strategy and the European Consensus on Development highlight the importance of integration and coherence between security and development policies. With these positions, the EU is coherent with a large multi-lateral agenda promoted by all the major international organisations, ranging from United Nations agencies, to the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD/DAC. Fragility situations are security challenges as much as they are a development challenges (Gaspers 2005, 2009, Jolly and BasuRay 2007, Johnson 2009). Finally, it is largely in the framework of the EU that the Member States design a large number of policies which affect developing countries.

Ironically, this favourable context presents dilemmas and difficulties of its own for the EU. At the nexus between security and development, when ESDP military and civilian crisis management operations converge with institution-building, conflict prevention and
COPING WITH INSECURITY IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS

economic development, serious questions of the demarcation of powers between the Pil-
lars arise (Hoffmeister 2008). Deciding upon whether a certain action should be attrib-
uted either to the European Union’s Security and Defence Policy or to the European
Community’s Development Policy:

“has repercussions on the voting rules in the Council and on the role of the Euro-
pean Parliament in decision-making. It determines whether the European Court of
Justice has jurisdiction over the action, and what the functions of the Council and
the Commission, respectively, are in its implementation.” (Hoffmeister 2008, 158).

While the complex link between security and development is widely recognised, the
pathways towards coherent EU goals, operational plans and programmes, and, ulti-
mately, meaningful action, remain challenging. What do we mean by security and devel-
opment? To what extent, and how, are security and development policy tasks inter-
dependent? Why is it that converting knowledge about the link between security and de-
velopment into action, and, crucially, collective-action, remains challenging? Should the
primary concern of the EU be the fragility situation itself with its local characteristics and
consequences, or the risk that de-stabilising risks and threats might be exported?
Should the EU address insecurity before poverty or vice versa? Should EU policy-makers
define development assistance as an EU security interest, or frame it in moral terms?

In this paper, we explore the security dimension of development in fragile situations
and address how the EU can better envision the security dimension of its policies to-
wards countries facing fragility. We stress development sequences in which economic,
political and security factors interact pointing to the linkages, and, at times, the trade-
offs, between these problem-solving activities. We are particularly interested in the se-
curity and development dynamics that unfold in spite of manifold and entrenched resis-
tance, and the ways in which the EU can contribute to these changes.

Our guiding hypothesis throughout this paper is that societies facing fragile situations
can begin to change in the security and development domains “as they are, in spite of
what they are and because of what they are” (Hirschman 1963, 6), and that the EU,
both as it is, and in spite of what it is, can help them to do so. We draw two implications
from this starting point.

First, the EU should be guided by “possibilism” in its policy choices regarding potential
reforms and changes in the security-development nexus. What may emerge “probabilis-
tically” from the characteristics of countries in fragile situations, as well as from the
various challenges and opportunities that they face, clearly matters. But policy-makers
and analysts should also discover and explore the paths, narrow, but within their reach,
that lead to outcomes that “appear to be foreclosed on the basis of probabilistic reason-
ning alone” (Hirschman 1986, 173).

Second, policy-makers and analysts should remain attentive to the possibilities of
linkages and transversality, meaning that, instead of assessing only the possible effect
of one single reform measure in the security-development nexus, it is more fruitful to
seek out the inter-connections and external effects that are likely to emerge when sev-
eral reforms are implemented either simultaneously or sequentially. It is both the com-
bination and the process by which one thing leads to another that matters.

Our task in this paper is threefold.

First, we identify the security dimension of fragility situations and emphasise the wide
range of instruments that the EU, as a global civilian power, has at its disposal to ad-
dress these situations.

Second, we present and discuss the four major ways to approach the security-
development nexus from a policy standpoint: state-building, peace-building, human se-
curity, and the responsibility to protect. We argue that these frameworks should not be
seen as competing with each other, but as making valuable points to be considered in any development strategy.

Third, focusing upon problem-solving dynamics from a qualitative perspective, we explore the twists and turns of the relationship between security and development, highlighting, along the way, some of the unsuspected and unorthodox opportunities for change and reform in dire circumstances.

2 Insecurity and policies towards fragility

Since the mid 1990s, there has been a growing recognition worldwide that the insecurity stemming from fragility situations is a serious concern both locally and globally. It is a serious concern locally because ordinary citizens directly affected by fragility situations often consider security as their most pressing priority, and want law and order to be re-established as soon as possible and maintained over time. It is also a global concern reflected in the resolutions and statements of the UN Security Council, the EU and other regional organisations, notably the African Union. The UN Security Council, as the main international body responsible for international security and peace, engages with fragile states in Africa on a frequent basis. Numerous meetings and decisions in the last years were devoted to situations of fragility in Africa. According to the data of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, about 40% of peace-keeping operations worldwide take place in African countries in situations of fragility. Approximately 49,000 United Nations troops are currently stationed in the frame of UN Peace-keeping Operations in African fragile situations. With nine out of twenty-one missions taking place in fragile situations in Africa (the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic and the Somalian coastline), African fragile states are a major operational ground for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

What are the identified threats, on a local, regional and global scale, which stem from situations of fragility? What is the scope and reach of the security dimension of the EU’s development policies towards these states?

2.1 The Security-Development Nexus is not New: When Europe faced Fragility

Before we consider the ways in which security and development currently work in fragile situations, it is important to underline that this nexus is by no means new, limited to the post 9/11 context, nor is it unique to Africa. Security has been a fundamental component of development policies since the late 1940s, and, at the time, it was post-war Europe that was widely-perceived as facing a dramatic situation of fragility. There has never been a golden age in which development was a-political and shielded from security concerns. Security has always been embedded in development policies, albeit in various ways and to different degrees.

When economic development of under-developed areas emerged as a new field of studies and of policy-making in the late 1940s and early 1950s, its founding moment was the Truman doctrine for aid to Greece and Turkey, and, as part of the same U.S. grand strategy, the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe (Packenham 1973: 25-58; Pollard 1985; Hogan 1987). Both programmes were the products of wars, World War II and the consequences of its human and material destruction, and the beginning of the Cold War as well as incipient civil wars. After all, before becoming Secretary of State, George C. Marshall was a General who understood the importance of alleviating economic distress. For example, from 1946 until 1949, Greece was facing all the characteristics of a fragile situation: major conflict-related human losses and material destruction, long-standing economic and political problems, a government unresponsive to the people’s needs, territorial conflicts with neighbouring countries, and raiding and pillaging expeditions by guerrilla groups (Jones 1989). U.S. policy-makers launched the
Marshall Plan in June 1947, noted historian Melvyn Leffler, because of what they saw as “(...) an impending shift in the correlation of power between the United States and the Soviet Union”. (Leffler 1992, 163, 157-164). Irrespective of the results of the Truman doctrine and of the Marshall Plan for development and security (they were mixed), and irrespective of whether or not this approach could be easily transferred to other regions of the world, notably developing countries (it could not), from the beginning, large-scale foreign aid, expanded trade, financial transfers and technical assistance have been closely connected to national security and power-balancing as strategic considerations. Justified or not, these concerns give no sign of fading away. In recent years, the growing European perception of China’s involvement in Africa as a geo-political competition, justified or not, has contributed to generate much more European attention and interest in Africa (Tull 2008).

The Marshall Plan’s institutional legacy has been significant as well, from the Committee on European Economic Co-operation (CEEC), to the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), in charge of the distribution of the Marshall Plan funds in Western Europe, to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) founded in 1961, envisioned, in part, as continuing the Marshall Plan with developed market countries joining the United States as donors, and with states in the developing world as the recipients. Since the Marshall Plan was connected to the Monnet Plan and later to the Schuman Plan, the EU itself, as both an economic and a security actor, is an indirect result of this link between security and development. The security dimension of development aid, while contested (see, notably, Banfield 1963, 4-36), remained present throughout the Cold War. For example, the influential British economist and major figure of development studies, Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, emphasised, in the mid-1970s, that only genuine development could avoid the threat of violent revolutions (Duffield 2001, 35). In all the major analyses of economic and political development, security plays a significant, albeit ambivalent, role (Pye 1966, 126-152; Huntington 1968). In summary, while security is not the only motivation, nor the only aspect of development policy (Lumsdaine 1993), the complex articulation between development and security has always been a significant issue in general, and particularly so in Europe.

2.2 Facing situations of fragility: the EU as security and development actor

The increasing strategic importance and political relevance of fragility situations stems from the economic, security and development damage that they cause to local societies, as well as regional and global neighbours (Brainard et al., 2007). While each fragility situation is unique, their broad characteristics include the following: weak, but usually not completely absent, governing capacity (Trefon et al., 2004, Trefon 2007), lack of control over the territory, lack of a monopoly on the use of force, widespread conflicts, large and small-scale armed violence in criminally- and politically-motivated contexts (Geneva Declaration 2008), poor economic performance and uneven development, high corruption and lack of transparency, higher risk of instability and armed conflict, and general lack of trust and state legitimacy (Faria, Magalhaes Ferreira 2007). In Sub-Saharan Africa, these situations, identified as being fragile by all the major indexes of fragility (World Bank LICUS, Failed State Index, EU Donor Atlas, CPIA/DAC, DFID), concern 14 countries in particular: Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, the Côte Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

Policy-makers in Europe recognise that the European Union has an effect on fragility situations, not only deliberately, but also inadvertently, in numerous ways (EU 2003, 2005, 2007). In fact, the range of instruments, institutions, actors, agreements, policies, documents, etc., is such that the risk of contradictions and of policies working at cross-purposes has become serious. The EU’s trade policy vis-à-vis Africa, for example, might inadvertently worsen fragility situations, and, for example, increase the security risks
that the instrument for stability is supposed to mitigate. The EU’s fishery policy might put local fisheries out of work, inadvertently triggering illegal migration thereby strengthening trafficking networks, and ultimately endangering the weak law enforcement mechanisms that the EU is painstakingly putting into place. In short, it is not just security and development policies and instruments that are involved in fragility situations. In every domain, policy-makers in Europe should become fully aware of the development and security consequences of their policy choices.

The EU is applying to this task a range of policies and actions in order to face fragility situations, notably Disarmament, De-mobilisation and Re-integration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions, as well as development aid (EU 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008). The EU has also been working hard on improving its policy framework, increasingly aware of the need to promote coherence and co-ordination: Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy, the European Consensus on Development, the Africa-EU Strategy, the European Security Strategy (ESS), as well as a range of more focused concept documents (Faria, Magalhaes Ferreira, 2007, Support Study 2008). For example, the European Union has produced Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, which contributes to the increased recognition that the protection of fragility- and war-affected children is an important aspect of the protection needs of local populations (Nosworthy, et al., 2009). The EC’s financial instruments have also been re-formed to allow for greater flexibility and a faster response, thereby creating a range of better-adapted policy tools, such as the Instrument for Stability (IFS), the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund (EDF), and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (EU 2005, 2007, 2008). This list does not exhaust the levers of action at the EU’s disposal in fragile situations. For example, air transportation can fuel fragility and facilitate its negative externalities, and the EU can influence the behaviour of transporters through a variety of means, ranging from legislation, ethical transportation clauses or ESDP missions on the ground (Griffiths, Bromley 2009). EU air safety mechanisms have already effectively targeted a number of companies involved in small arms and light weapons flows by banning them from EU airspace.

3 Approaching the Security and Development Nexus

What are the peculiar lenses that the EU uses to approach the security-development nexus and the EU’s policy involvement in this area? A range of conceptual frameworks emerged during the 1990s to tackle issues of security and development inter-dependently. These approaches seek to re-define challenges and tasks and to re-direct policies. While these approaches and the discussions that they generated have been useful, they have also led to some conceptual confusion and a lack of clarity, since these frameworks partially overlap, and partially compete, with each other. We emphasise that these frameworks complement each other: each of them is raising distinct and significant issues to be considered in the design of EU development strategies. They also facilitate the debates on how to cope with different situations of fragility. In what follows, we present and successively discuss four main frameworks: state building, peace-building, human security, and the responsibility to protect.

3.1 Helping to (re-) build States

Aid donors have shifted their emphasis regarding the proper role of the state in African development (Englebert, Tull 2008, 114). While, in the 1960s and 1970s, the state was perceived as an engine of growth, in the 1980s and in the 1990s, it was considered as an obstacle to development. After this momentary demise, the state, in general, and state-building, in particular, have reclaimed their rightful place in the design of policies.
COPING WITH INSECURITY IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS

towards fragility. Security and protection are not only at the core of Max Weber’s ideal-type of the state, but figure prominently in the tumultuous and violent history of state construction. Charles Tilly, for example, emphasised that coercive exploitation is a key aspect of state-making. Insecurity and war make states and “banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war-making all belong on the same continuum (…)” (Tilly 1985, 170). Most of the states in the world today, particularly in Europe, are themselves the product of fragility, insecurity and wars. There is now an international consensus that the primary aim in fragile situations is to help build resilient states (on the changing donor goals and policies, see van de Walle 2001, 188-234). The building of state capacities, not limited to administrative reform, but also facilitating the professionalisation of law and security as well as education, has become a major approach to address development and security in fragility situations. Re-inforcing, or facilitating the creation of, stable state structures is seen as important, since state structures are usually considerably weakened, or even missing altogether, in fragility situations. While sound, in principle, state-building is best envisioned as part of a broader strategy.

If isolated, state-building might become excessively geared towards technical issues, and it might limit the assistance to an inter-bureaucratic affair, notably an interaction between the bureaucracies of the development agencies and the local bureaucracies. Other political agents, such as sub-state actors and parties, and dynamics, or the value-laden character of apparently neutral, technical choices, might easily be missed or under-estimated. The Weberian bureaucracies of national governments and international organisations, in their orientation towards rationalisation (Barnett 2003, Piiparinen 2007a, 2008) and simplification (Scott 1995), risk designing inadaptable apparatuses, which might prove to be inadequate in situations of fluidity, arguably one of the core features of fragility. The focus of much state-building work, moreover, is on central state structures, and it is important to continue to consider not only regional governments, but also, in a much more systematic way, local agendas and logics, at the level of the clan, the municipality, the community, the district or the ethnic group (Autesserre 2008, 2009).

Moreover, since any state needs to be considered legitimate, state-society relations should remain at the core of the state-building approach. State-building processes are linked to social coherence, the expectations of citizens and their trust in the legitimacy of policy-makers. An overly-strong focus on the state might lead to the neglect of the need for bottom-up perspectives that take local, cognitive and cultural aspects into account, and fully engage civil society and sub-state groups. Furthermore, state-building policies do not have visible quick or short-term impacts. Under conditions of extreme fragility, it might be insufficient to engage exclusively in activities that may only have a long-term impact, important as this impact ultimately is. Finally, the state-building approach might assume that the regime in power and the state are identical entities. In political systems characterised by personalised structures of authority where patron-clients relationships are predominant and the situation is fragile, this is usually not the case, as the regime in power often lacks legitimacy, does not necessarily act in the interest of its citizens, due to the rent-seeking behaviour of the leaders, and, most importantly, might be a major cause of insecurity for the populations. In short, state-building is best seen as part of a larger strategy, which also relies on quick- and medium-impact measures, and acknowledges that, under fragility, the state is not the only political unit that establishes political order and guarantees service delivery, from security to employment and health.

3.2 Helping to (re-) build Peace

Peace-building is a framework which aims at the design of a broader, comprehensive strategy, which includes state-building. Although the idea of peace-building has earlier roots, it gained global political attention in the attempts to reform UN peace-keeping. Boutros Boutros Ghali, introduced the term, in the Agenda for Peace, and the Agenda for Development, as referring to subsequent peace maintenance measures in the follow-up
phase of an UN peace-keeping operation. With the considerable extension of peace-keeping mandates in the 1990s – not limited to the organisation of elections, disarmament, anti-landmine and re-construction measures, and partial takeover of administrative functions – the civil dimensions of peace-keeping increasingly gained importance. The Report of the Brahimi Panel (UN 1999) emphasised the need for better co-ordination of civil and military actors, and the various national and UN agencies engaged in post-conflict zones. This understanding of peace-building, which emphasises the civil dimension of peace-keeping and the problems of co-ordination, focuses on the immediate aftermath of conflict.

Since the late 1990s, a wider conception of peace-building has underlined that the boundary between in-conflict, post-conflict and pre-conflict is difficult to draw. Consequently, peace-building should refer to preventive, in-conflict and post-conflict activities alike. It advocates for a positive understanding of peace, meaning that the absence of large-scale violence, while crucial, is not sufficient. This wider version of peace-building gained prominence with the increasing recognition that the overall record of success for peace-keeping was mixed at best. Numerous countries slipped back into conflict after the peace-keeping force had left. Moreover, the causal relationship between poverty and the risk of civil war became clearer. The wide version of peace-building calls for the integration of development and security in broader terms than the narrow version, which focused on peace-keeping. In short, in the wider peace-building framework, the relevant countries are not exclusively post-conflict countries, but also the countries that face a significant risk of slipping into major violence.

The EU and its Member States largely agree on the wider notion of peace-building:

"Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management.” (European Council 2008: 14)

"It will maintain its support to conflict prevention and resolution and to peace-building by addressing the root-causes of violent conflict, including poverty, degradation, exploitation and unequal distribution and access to land and natural resources, weak governance, human rights abuses and gender inequality. It will also promote dialogue, participation and reconciliation with a view to promoting peace and preventing outbreaks of violence.” (European Council 2005: 27, para 92)

Critics point to the confusion caused by a wide understanding of peace-building (Paris 2007). However, the difference between wide and narrow understandings should not be over-emphasised. At the core of peace-building is the idea that the primary objective of any external intervention should be peace, defined as the achievement of a temporarily stable and safe environment in which further initiatives and projects, such as state-building projects, can thrive. The advocates of a negative and a positive definition of peace agree that the starting point of any engagement is to guarantee the immediate halt of major violence. In contrast to the state-building framework, which focuses on designing and creating optimal institutions, peace-building highlights the priority of non-violent practices of conflict resolution.

There are three different ways to embed non-violent practices of conflict resolution in fragile states. First, liberal-institutionalist peace-building is centred on the ideas of democratisation, economic liberalisation, neo-liberal development, human rights, and the rule of law (Richmond 2004, 2005). These ideas are at the core of peaceful conflict resolution and the key task of peace-building is to bring fragile states in compliance with these global norms. The liberal-institutionalist approach to peace-building is criticised for being overly technocratic and over-ambitious (Krause and Jütersonke 2005). The liberal project of transplanting Western models of organisation into fragile states as means of
peace and prosperity might bring peace-building close to being a neo-colonial project, a new mission civilisatrice (Paris 2002). Second, Republican peace-building prioritises building structures which guarantee basic principles, such as deliberation, constitutionalism and the division of power and representation (Barnett 2006, 2009; Ghani, Flockhart 2008). While goals such as democracy and free markets are not objected to in principle, the Republican approach suggests that these objectives are too idealistic. Instead, peace-building should be more pragmatic and aim at achieving a “least bad state” (Barnett 2009). Third, bottom-up or participatory peace-building limits the scope of external intervention to creating and maintaining a space in which local actors can work for themselves to re-establish the practices of peaceful conflict resolution and political order, according to their own cultural values and norms (Chopra 1996, Chopra and Hohe 2004, Pouligny 2006). The core premise of this position is that any successful peace-building process requires the commitment of the population as a whole. Only through a wider participation can legitimate and trusted state structures be built. While local élites are important in this process, this conception of peace-building foregrounds the importance of the wider civil society in carrying a peace-building process. Moreover, liberal norms are dropped, and which structures and practices are implemented is the self-determined choice of local élites and populations.

In summary, peace-building, whether in its minimalist or maximalist, liberal, republican or bottom-up expression, is a framework that centres on establishing practices of non-violent conflict resolution. The key debates are over the role that local actors can, and should, play in the peace-building process, and how optimistic the effects of external intervention are judged.

3.3 Helping to (re-) establish Human Security

Human security is a framework for dealing with fragility, which originated in attempts to widen the concept of development. Two issues form the core of human security. Firstly, to place human needs and concerns at the centre of international attention, and secondly to understand these needs and concerns as matters of security. Human security departs from traditional notions of development and security. Development policies are supposed to address questions of violence, and to refer to more than economic growth. These questions are understood as security issues and should be prioritised. Moreover, the central object of reference should not be the state, but the communities, groups and populations living in its territory.

The term “human security” was introduced by UNDP in the frame of its 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994) drafted for the 1995 World Summit on Social Development. The 1995 Copenhagen Declaration, the outcome document of the World Summit, officially embraced it as a guiding concept for development work. The UNDP Report understood human security as:

“first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.” (UNDP 1994: 23).

The Report suggested that security should address economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political security. The idea of human security generated debates over three dimensions. This concerns, firstly, the content of human security.

“While all proponents of human security agree that its primary goal should be the protection of individual human lives, they differ as to what the individual should be protected from.” (Shani 2007:4).

This leads to differentiating between a narrow and a broad understanding. The narrow understanding claims to prioritise insecurities and to include only physical or military threats to survival. The broader understanding aims to integrate a wider range of
threats and adds non-physical aspects and notions of injustice, such as economic (mis-)distribution, socio-cultural (mis-)recognition and political (mis)representation. Secondly, conceptions of human security differ with regard to who the protecting subjects of human security are. One version prioritises the territorial state. In upholding Westphalian sovereignty, it is claimed that states have to be the primary provider of security for people. If states fail to do so, groups of states have to intervene to protect them (see the discussion on the responsibility to protect, below). A second version attempts to give primacy to people protecting themselves and stresses the role of non-state or sub-state organisations in assisting them to do so. Thirdly, human security is conceptualised either in negative or in positive terms. The negative version understands security as the absence of threats, usually framed by understanding security as “freedom from a threat”. The positive version defines security as the existence of possibilities to protect, usually framed in terms of “empowerment” or “emancipation”.

The EU has embraced a wider understanding of human security, which, however, remains relatively unspecified. It is argued in the 2008 Review of the European Security strategy that:

“We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity.” (European Council 2008: 3)

The differences between traditional understandings of security and human security should not be over-emphasised (Chandler 2008, Gaspers 2009). Moreover, the intellectual, conceptual differences on what the priorities of policies (whether following a more traditional, a narrow or a broad understanding of human security) should be, can hardly be settled in the abstract. As Jolly and Basu Ray (2007) argue:

“limits to define a core of high-priority concerns with human security can be set after exploring the concerns of people in specific situations rather than before.”

In short, human security encourages policy-makers and analysts to think broadly about the specific needs of human beings in concrete situations, rather than following an abstract set of principles.

3.4 Helping to Protect

A normative framework closely affiliated to human security is the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). The core concerns of R2P are the issue of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference, which are basic norms of international relations. Non-interference is arguably the most important norm of the UN charter, and has been part of the UN’s success in preventing major inter-state wars. R2P sees sovereignty in conditional terms, and encourages reflection on whether and when it is legitimate to violate sovereignty through intervention. The origins of R2P are in the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which, in 2000, was given the task of finding a balance between two principles: on the one hand, the principles of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and recognition that the state is the chief guarantee of international and human security; and, on the other, what to do in the event of massive violations of human rights, such as genocide. The notion of R2P was embraced in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Declaration:

“Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept the responsibility and will act in accordance
with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility.” (para 138).

The EU institutions support the R2P. As is stated in the development and security strategy documents:

“Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” (European Council 2008: 3)

“The EU also strongly supports the responsibility to protect. We cannot stand by, as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of international humanitarian law and human rights are committed.” (European Council 2005:14 para. 37).

Although R2P has been welcomed in the UN General Assembly and has strong support from leading states, considerable criticism has arisen. Critics contest the operational usefulness of the concept and highlight its potential dangers. R2P may make the usage of military intervention more likely or provide a wild card for intervention in fragile states, either of the character of the 2003 Iraq intervention, or intervention for minor humanitarian purposes, environmental or health concerns (Evans 2008: Chapter 3, Evans and Weiss 2009). The lead protagonists of R2P have responded to these criticisms that the doctrine should be understood in minimal terms, as, firstly, only referring to extreme cases of mass atrocities (crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity), and, secondly, as taking military action only as an instrument of last resort, while the prime emphasis should be on prevention, monitoring and peace-building in the frame of the UN. Such a limitation of the R2P framework is useful, especially if R2P is understood as a basic legal principle of international law. However, the operational critique is more significant, especially in the context of policies towards fragile states. Firstly, despite initial success, such as its acceptance at the 2005 World Summit, the R2P did not trigger any intervention in Darfur. Secondly, while R2P is a principle to revise sovereignty in conditional terms, in many cases of fragility, sovereignty is already considerably weakened or does not exist de facto. Somalia is a case in point. If the point is to re-build state structures and ensure human security, R2P has initially little to add to the other frameworks that deal with fragility.

However, R2P is useful since it provides an additional normative layer which enables discourse on prevention and provides a legal basis for worst case scenarios and a lens for the prevention of mass atrocities. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise the close resemblance between R2P and the debate on local ownership in the politics towards fragility. Local ownership of development and/or peace-building has become an alternative term to refer to sovereignty, and is an accepted standard for good development assistance which was accepted and welcomed, for instance, in the Paris Declaration. However, ownership is differently weighted by advocates of liberal, republican or participatory peace-building, (Chesterman 2007, Donais 2009).

The EU has found, in its Development Consensus, a useful way of conceptualising ownership as responsibility:

"Developing countries have the prime responsibility for their own development. But developed countries have a responsibility, too. The EU, both at its Member States and Community levels, is committed to meeting its responsibilities. Working together, the EU is an important force for positive change.” (European Council 2005:4, para 2)

As in the R2P framework, the relationship between outside intervention (development assistance) and inner-state development is understood as a relationship of mutual responsibility. Seen in the light of an understanding of ownership as "responsibility to de-
velop”, R2P can be seen as useful component of the overall development strategy that provides a legal-normative standard in cases of massive violations of human security.

3.5 Towards a Synthesis?

While our discussion of four major ways to approach the security-development nexus embraced by the European Union is not exclusive, these frameworks have emerged as the primer working platforms for policy. Although they have their origins in different debates and communities, and although they partially overlap, it is important to highlight their mutually beneficial character, as they emphasise crucial issues to be considered and contemplated in designing country-specific responses to fragility – not in defining a limited set of general principles or priorities. Let us sum up:

- **State-building** points to the importance of institutions, and, if we follow the critics of the concepts, should also refer to non-state, sub-state institutions.

- **Peace-building** refers to the priority of establishing practices of non-violence conflict resolution in a pragmatic and comprehensive way. While liberal (state) institutions can, in principle, be part of established practices of conflict resolution, the framework’s orientation sketches a non-idealistic, pragmatic way forward.

- **Human Security** encourages us to prioritise the needs and concerns of people, and invites reflection on the ambivalent character of the state as both a source of security and insecurity.

- The **Responsibility to Protect** highlights the importance of considering concerns over principles of international law, sovereignty, non-interference, self-determination and humanitarian law in policies towards fragility.

These frameworks also help us to raise four questions:

- Firstly, the question of whether peace, security and stability should be understood in narrow (negative) terms, or if policies should be more ambitious and address them in a broad (positive) way.

- Secondly, whether measures that have a visible and immediate impact on the emergence of violence should be prioritised over long-term, preventive practices, or whether both sets should be balanced.

- Thirdly, the question of when, whether and, if so, how deeply international actors can, or should, intervene into fragile states and what role the local populations and elites assume in this process.

- Fourthly, the question of how far security and development organisations and practices can be transformed, integrated and merged, or whether they can only be co-ordinated while a functional separation is preserved.

4 Security and Development in Practice: Problem-Solving and Social Change

To examine the security-development nexus in practice, we focus on policy-making and problem-solving processes. We explore the ways in which different actors in fragile situations define, attack, circumvent, and even, at times, avoid or neglect problems of insecurity and development. While it is useful to be aware of what a country is, that is, its geography, history, endowment with natural resources, values, institutions, social and political structures, etc., it is also insufficient (Hirschman 1967, 5). We suggest that, for the development of a country, what actors do and what their country becomes as a result of what they do (or do not do) matter. How do actors go about solving the problems of insecurity and development that they are facing? Policy practice and research
over the past ten years (from academic security, development studies, International Relations as well as policy analysis) has made it clear that policies tend to be ineffective or fail and be counter-productive when they are designed in a way that does not correspond to the needs of the specific countries, or even regions and local communities, facing the situation of fragility. This is, by now, well established, and much of the criticism raised against contemporary policies towards fragility concerns precisely this point. Something akin to a compulsory wish list has emerged on how policies should be revised. This wish list usually entails:

- A better co-ordination of the different policy domains and the different actors involved in the policies is needed.
- Policies need to be carefully designed to reflect the specific needs of a country and should avoid general blueprints.
- Local ownership is paramount. The priority of policies should be the needs and concerns of the people living under conditions of fragility, rather than the needs and concerns of regimes, or of the interests of Western, developed nations. More engagement with civil society, community and other non-state actors is needed.
- The military is a needed actor in policies towards fragility, but its specific role should be better specified.

While these points are well-known, it is important to re-emphasise their relevance for analysis and action periodically. They have succeeded on the level of rhetoric (already an achievement), but they have not transformed policy practice in a visible manner, nor replaced more traditional policy approaches. This is primarily due to three reasons. Firstly, analysis has, at times, remained at the level of criticism and/or rhetoric, and done little to assist in the practical implementation of these points. Hence, analysis needs to be encouraged to consider the challenges and dilemmas of action more. Secondly, existing institutional and political arrangements hinder or disable transformed practice. Hence, it is important to explore the ways in which practices can be transformed under existing political and institutional conditions. Thirdly, the issues raised point us to dilemmas and trade-offs, which are problematical and not easily solvable as such. What is needed is a careful context-specific analysis of how these dilemmas work in different situations and how we can cope with them, if not solve them. In the following sub-section, we provide some inspiration on how the negative consequences of these three drawbacks might be mitigated. We discuss some general principles to help re-direct policy and analysis, and sketch avenues on how we can jump from analysis to transformed policy-practice. In so doing, we stress the twists and turns of the relation between security and development, highlighting along the way some of the unsuspected and unorthodox opportunities for change and reform in dire circumstances. We underline the continuing interplay between economic, political and security factors. These interactions are particularly significant and relevant when one focuses not on the macro-level but on the more fine grain, qualitative, characteristics of specific fragility situations.

4.1 Security and Development Problem-Solving beyond “all good things go together” and “the doom spiral”

In policy practices and reflections on the link between development and security, two simplified conceptions which are the mirror image of each other, tend to prevail. On the positive side, it is the premise that “all good things go together” (Packenham 1973, 123-9): security is the pre-condition for development, in that it always favours development, and, conversely, development always leads to security both locally and globally. On the negative side, it is the premise that “all bad things go together”, that a “doom spiral” sets in, as insecurity makes development impossible (or more difficult and limited) and, conversely, under-development generates insecurity not only for local societies, but also regionally and globally. Poverty and insecurity are mutually re-inforcing and situations of
fragility increase infant mortality, create refugees and fuel trafficking in drugs and weapons. External donors cannot deliver assistance and the private sector cannot invest. Once a country is caught in such a doom spiral, it is difficult to get out.

We argue that these premises, which might help to alert and encourage donors to become involved, do not capture what is actually taking place in countries facing fragile situations. Instead, we suggest that, in order to avoid the pitfalls of the “all good things go together” assumption, one the one hand, analysts and policy-makers should remain alert to the possibly perverse consequences of an advance in security for development and vice versa, i.e., the problematical security implications of an advance in development. To avoid the pitfalls of the “doom spiral” assumption, on the other hand, analysts and policy-makers should accept the possibly positive consequence of a worsening security situation for development and vice versa, i.e., the positive security implications of a worsening of development.

Moreover, confronted with the challenges of fragility and insecurity, it is often tempting to look for some “pre-requisite” that must allegedly be introduced before change can assert itself (Hirschman 1963, 6; Dahl 1997). For example, in many countries facing situations of fragility, especially in Africa, political systems are based upon personalised structures of authority where patron-clients relationships are predominant and shape the security and development choices, for example, by favouring regime protection and wealth (Bayart 1993). Consequently, it is commonly argued, only after a fundamental recasting of the political culture guiding the region’s elites can significant changes in security occur, such as, for example, a security culture that prioritises democracy and human security. By contrast, we suggest that societies facing fragile situations can begin to change in the security and development domain as they are. After all, fragility situations are not new in Africa, and, in many African countries, fragility is not a temporary situation but politics as usual: states were already facing major challenges before the fragility situation. Fragility is less a temporary situation or an objective condition, and more a permanent mode of political operation (Clapham 1996, Bayart 1993, Bayart et al., 1999, Chabal, Droz 1999, Hibou, ed. 2004, Englebert, Tull 2008, 110. See, also, Hironaka 2005, 94-103).

In what follows, we build upon the rich experience of local initiatives, indigenous capacity and the EU’s involvement in linking security and development in African countries facing fragile situations, notably SSR and crisis management missions (Brzoska 2006). Our working hypothesis is that well-known and well-entrenched obstacles to change in the security-development nexus are often ambivalent:

“(...) many among the conditions and attitudes that are widely considered as inimical to change have a hidden positive dimension and can therefore unexpectedly come to serve and nurture progress.” (Hirschman 1963, 6; 1985, 1986, 3-34, 56-76).

Using real-life problem-solving situations, we explore six mechanisms: in fragile situations: 1) resilience and resistance strategies matter; 2) insecurity can be an opportunity for development policies; 3) fragility can help to create parallel local security institutions; 4) insecurity and violence can be ingredients of reforms; 5) sequences and imbalances contribute to security-development reform; and 6) less engagement can be more.

4.1.1 Resilience and resistance matter: the strategy of fragility

In fragility situations, relative weakness and relative strength often co-exist. State institutions in DR Congo, for example, have been weakened, but they have not disappeared altogether (Trefon, 2004, 2007). In fact, while DR Congo has been facing tremendous odds, ranging from the inadequacy of the state, the extreme heterogeneity and polarisation of its populations, and the dislocation of war and foreign occupation, it has continued to display a stunning propensity for resilience (Englebert 2003). Facing the demands
of donors, public authorities, while fully aware of the situation of fragility facing their country, and precisely because of this fragile context and their (relatively) precarious position, were able to keep and even re-inforce a strong bargaining position and develop a strategy of avoidance and resistance. Even when sovereignty appears to be at its lowest point, the remaining state is capable of shielding what it sees as the core of its autonomy from the donors. For example, in RD Congo, two important security services, military and civilian intelligence, and border guards services, have been kept outside of SSR (Melmot 2008, Davis 2009). Parallel structures of authority are maintained and further developed, while the formal game of sharing power in the transition agreement is being played. State authorities continue to prefer to “divide and conquer” donors by focusing on bilateral links and by by-passing multi-lateral frameworks (Melmot 2008). These cunning stratagems to evade outside pressure for structural changes skilfully should not come as a surprise. The paradoxical logic of strategy (as opposed to common sense linear logic) is often the weapon of the weak, fighting against the odds, not the favoured means of action of those with power and plenty (Luttwak 1992).

Moreover, fragility situations and the remnant, dysfunctional, public institutions can be useful to both governments and rebels alike. Some actors might even create, preserve and exploit fragility situations in order to ensure their political survival (Clapham 1996, 208-243; Chabal, Droz 1999, 3-16). Fragility can become politics by other means, a political and military strategy designed to control the population in the placet of the state or the public order. It then provides a welcome opportunity for predation and domination. In Sierra Leone, the rulers intentionally destroyed the capacity of the state in order to provide public goods themselves (Reno 2003). In summary, fragility is not necessarily bad for every local actor, and it does not imply weakness for all the actors involved. Local actors react, try to circumvent the donors’ strength and exploit their weaknesses, and this is why straightforward engineering approaches are unlikely to succeed. The EU should shift its linear, social engineering approach to a more flexible and strategic approach.

4.1.2 Insecurity as an opportunity for development policies

Critics of the security-development nexus usually raise three concerns. First, critics argue, the emergence of security in an already crowded policy-agenda and decision-makers with limited energies and capabilities is bound to distract both donors and developing countries. A concern for security can even hold back action on the main issue, the poverty of reduction. Security concerns might re-direct action to other issues which are of less immediate concerns to the population. Second, critics also argued that security is only a surface problem, a symptom of deeper, structural, problems. It is therefore better to tackle the underlying causes of insecurity than to address it directly. Third, critics underline that a genuine effort to face security challenges would probably go beyond the capacity of the donor and the partner countries. As a consequence, it is likely that only limited, timid, policy initiatives will be implemented and their effects are likely to remain modest as well.

In contrast, we argue that the connection between security and development can generate opportunities for reform. First, local populations often express a major and immediate concern for security and peace. For example, in the DR Congo’s Kivus civil society, representatives rightly claimed that elections should wait until peace had been established, but they were not listened to (Autesserre 2009, 271). Ignoring these pressing concerns runs counter to local ownership. Moreover, the problem of fragility, particularly with regard to the security-development nexus, is, in fact, a collection of problems, each of which is likely to attract different groups and organisations which might facilitate coalition-building and joint-efforts. One problem can be seen to be inter-related with the others, so that “to solve or attenuate one is expected to improve the other”. (Hirschman 1963, 265) The emergence of other concerns, such as insecurity, might be an opportunity for reformers to find new allies. Finally, the notion of fragility brings a number of concrete advantages for donors. Donors can use simplified procedures (Article 72/73
EC). They can make the case for an increase in the aid volume as well as human re-
source re-inforcements. Furthermore, since the notion of fragility is now broadly ac-
cepted, and found to be relevant, the existence of a fragile situation can facilitate joint-
analyses and joint-strategy formulations.

Second, in fragile situations, insecurity can act as a searchlight and help in the early
detection of social ills, which, if neglected, might be much more difficult to handle
(Hirschman 1981, 119). Finally, timid or perfunctory policy initiatives can have the un-
tended effect of mobilising, in the donor countries as well as in the partner countries,
those who stand to benefit from the proposed solution. This leads to demands for more
vigorous policies than the ones that had been initially contemplated (Hirschman 1981,
149).

4.1.3 Fragility leads to the rise of parallel local security
institutions

The withering of state capacity does not imply an absence of governance. In fact, time
and time again, fragility situations have triggered “local institutional initiatives that facili-
tated the survival and organisation of social life during the years of conflict and that
could be useful in the future”. (Englebert, Tull 2008, 125, 127). Actors such as tradi-
tional chiefs, civil society groups, churches and aid agencies, step in to take charge of
services, notably security, previously delivered by the state (Vlassenroot 2008, 2). In
the security domain, fragility situations can accentuate unequal access to security and
justice, intolerance of outsiders, violence, illegality and unaccountability. However, in
some cases, failures of state policing and weak state sovereignty have re-invigorated
self-policing (Baker 2008). The resulting “multi-choice policing” provides a safety-net
and can deepen local democracy. The success of this alternative policing would, in turn,
be further helped by favourable state responses and EU support. Different conceptions
of social order and justice should be linked to the state-legal notions. Considerable inter-
penetration and overlap between state and non-state policing characterise these initia-
tives (Baker 2008, 77). Promoting state/non-state alliances and publicly accountable po-
licing agencies would help these processes. In some regions of the Congo, armed groups
have, at times, departed from a pattern of pure profit accumulation to a situation in
which their search for profit accompanies a “negotiated, mutual accommodation of eco-
nomic and political interests linked with security provision (…)” (Vlassenroot 2008, 15.
See, also, Morvan 2005). These indigenous security institutions are all the more impor-
tant because they often have the support of ordinary citizens and are a good illustration
of what an actual local ownership means.

4.1.4 Insecurity and violence are an ingredient of reform

Violence has long been identified as an element of reform in economic and political de-
development (Hirschman 1963, 257, 256-260). As Samuel Huntington noted:

“In no society do significant social, economic, or political reforms take place with-
out violence or the imminent likelihood of violence.” (Huntington 1968, 357).

While not all types of violence are ingredients of reform, some might contribute to
signal problems and/or to get reforms through. For example, some violence and insecu-

rity may signal the distribution of unequal wealth and a worsening of the gap between
the rich and the poor. After the large demonstrations that shook Mozambique in February
2008, in which at least five people were killed and more than 100 injured, a local
columnist noted that these demonstrations, in a generally improved economic context,
had been useful because, before the riots, the elites had not understood the widespread
impact of the economic crisis (Hanlon 2009, 126). Similarly, in the coastal areas of the
northern Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces in Mozambique, anti-cholera pro-
grammes have been a source of a decade of tension and violence. Poor people were
COPING WITH INSECURITY IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS

convinced that, far from treating and preventing the disease, the anti-cholera campaign was an attempt of the rich and powerful to kill them.

"In a climate of distrust and disempowerment, the poor responded violently against outsiders who they assumed were putting cholera in their water to eliminate them." (Serra 2003; Hanlon 2009, 128)

The violent and recurrent violent popular mobilisation against the anti-cholera campaign and the grain riots were messages of protest against insecurity and social inequality (Serra 2009).

The quest for security is also a direct problem-solving activity. For example, in DR Congo, a response to manage the high level of insecurity was the emergence of local defence forces, which aimed to protect the interests of some ethnic communities with access to local assets (Vlassenroot 2008, 10). But, for its members, joining these militias was solving an immediate problem: obtaining limited livelihood security, and some social status in an environment in which more legitimate systems of subsistence were unavailable (Vlassenroot 2008, 10, 12. See, also, Morvan 2005). Once created, some of these militias put in place some limited attempts to promote local development or alternative justice mechanisms (Vlassenroot 2008, 11). Finally, fragility situations concentrate attention. They make it possible to take action against powerful groups or interests, especially in the security domain (Hirschman 1963, 261). Crises stimulate action, and, hence, learning about a problem on which insight had been low. Informal practices should not be romanticised as they cannot solve every problem on their own. However, they remain the unmistakable sign of a social creativity which should become a source of levers for change.

4.1.5 Sequences and imbalances contribute to security-development reform

To tackle the development-security nexus in fragile situations, “joined-up” strategies combining all policy tools simultaneously in a coherent package that includes political, security, humanitarian and development instruments are often considered to be well-suited to the discontinuity of the context (Faria, Magalhaes Ferreira 2007). Promoting a “coherent, co-ordinated and complimentary” approach on a complex inter-sector issue such as security and development is widely perceived as an important policy priority. This leads to complex co-ordination and decision-making processes, however. In some cases, as in the Congo, some practitioners have underlined that, in transition periods, the reform capacity for SSR is at a low point (Melmot 2008, 23). Over-ambitious co-ordinated actions plans can be counter-productive. Their implementation cannot meet the objectives and fail to produce sufficient results. Moreover, the officials in the European Commission Delegations and in the EU Member State aid offices are already busy with their daily work. While everyone, in principle, favours the fragile states initiative, in reality, it might, for example, become a secondary priority because of the added co-ordination burden on the personnel of the Delegation of the European Commission.

It might be preferable to recognise that there is no need to spend considerable effort on early integration and on a simultaneous or balanced approach to the security-development nexus. Seesaw advances and adjustments of security and development policies are the inevitable characteristics of policy action in contexts of fragility. They are even desirable, since policy-makers become aware of the imperfections and imbalances of their action through the failures, irritations, and discomforts that characteristic of these situations (Hirschman 1985, 74-75). For example, in Sierra Leone, there were no conceptual or substantial linkages between the various elements of SSR, which proceeded independently (Horn, et al., 2006, 110, 118). And yet, ironically, the case of Sierra Leone is frequently presented, including by the OECD-DAC, as an example of good practice in SSR. This casts doubt on the single-minded concern with formal bureaucratic co-ordination in the security-development nexus.
The possibility of breaking down a complex series of inter-related tasks, such as the vicious circle of poverty and insecurity, into a series of sequential steps is valuable. Several tasks need to be undertaken, but they do not require an "integrated" approach since they are separable from one another. Some imbalance might be acceptable as well as self-correction, because of the reactions on the part of both the market and public policy responses. For example, providing immediate, physical security may be the pressing request of ordinary citizens facing a situation of fragility. In so doing, however, both donor countries and local actors might soon realise that, in order to make sure that security institutions behave lawfully, the rule of law should be established as rapidly as possible. Their initial response to the weight and urgency of immediate security needs can spearhead initiatives to more ambitious and challenging tasks of building capacity, changing forms of legitimisation and, ultimately, favouring broader political and institutional reforms.

However, it should be acknowledged that sequential problem-solving brings with it the risk of remaining blocked at one particular step or in one particular domain. Moving forward in only one of several desirable policy areas might make it more difficult, and, perhaps, impossible to act later in another area. Still, given the pervasive conventional wisdom about the need for co-ordination, it is useful to bear in mind that duplication, confusion and lack of communication among people working along parallel lines are not always bad, and can even lead to less costly and faster reforms (Hirschman 1971, 66).

4.1.6 Security and development do not necessarily advance jointly

The key bet of many development policies is that one thing might lead to another. It is, therefore, important to know whether insuring security can actually trigger, or at least help, in one way or the other, sustainable economic development not just in broad policy slogans but also in real-life situations. An assessment of 17 UN-led state-building operations five years after they had started revealed an interesting pattern regarding the establishment of security – defined as the absence of war and the re-establishment of a full monopoly over the means of violence - and the potential link between security and other dimensions of state-building, such as economic development, democracy and the creation of institutional capacity (Zürcher 2006). First, state-building missions do achieve important security goals: 13 of the 17 missions had put an end to war (1,000 battle-related deaths a year or during the war) (Zürcher 2006, 14). More intrusive missions seem slightly more successful at stopping wars, but both intrusive and non-intrusive missions succeed in this regard. While putting an end to war was harder to achieve in the poorest post-war countries, state-building operations achieved their goal in this context as well (7 cases out of 11) (Zürcher 2006, 14). State-building missions were less successful at re-establishing a full monopoly of the means of violence, as they only succeeded in 9 out of 17 cases (Zürcher 2006, 14). Lower level fighting between rival armed-fractions or armed-gangs that may use violence against civilians is stopped about half of the time, and, to achieve this goal, intrusive missions seem to work slightly better (Zürcher 2006, 19). Moreover, in the poorest countries, the missions only succeeded in 4 cases out of 11. What is striking, however, is that this relative success in the security realm does not seem to have implications for other dimensions of state-building. Securing does not appear to lead to positive consequences for the rule of law or the effectiveness of government, economic development and democracy. Similarly, for the practitioners who were actively involved in the SSR, it remained an open question as to whether restoring basic capacity and public trust in the police and the military in Sierra Leone would lead to wider economic, political and social improvement (Horn, et al., 2006, 121-122). One (security) thing does not necessarily lead to another (development).

These examples show that the connection between security and development progress can take different forms, and that the pattern is not always an inter-relation between the two policy domains. Proclaiming that the two domains are totally separated would be an over-reaction, however. While security and development might not always
be tied together in an easy, functional way, for good and for bad, there might be alternations between interdependence and autonomy at different points in time and in different contexts (Hirschman 1981, 142-166; 1995, 221-230).

4.1.7 Less can be more

The EU boasts its continuing involvement and the relative stability of its engagement in state-building and development more generally. However, gaining flexibility in this regard and allowing for periods of selective disengagement could enlarge the range of possible EU initiatives. The assumption that “more state-building is better state-building” is widespread among Western policy-makers (Englebert, Tull 2008, 135-139). They allocate more resources to the countries in fragile situations that they consider to be important, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, and Kosovo, than to those they consider to be peripheral. From a security standpoint, this implies that stronger EU and UN military missions, with more military means and more robust mandates, would offer the best opportunity for success.

However, the experience of development policies in general, and specifically in the realm of security and development policy, shows that some uncoupling and disengagement can have positive consequences (Hirschman 1995, 190-192). Less, or more limited and selective, engagement can favour more room for manoeuvre for social experimentation and the growing role of local initiatives. Framing DR Congo as a test case for UN peace-keeping, by, for example, implying an intense engagement, often portrayed as a “protectorate”, partially led to a number of problematical policy choices during the three years officially dedicated to the transition from war to peace and democracy (2003-2006) (Autesserre 2009, 258).

4.2 More Co-ordination is not (always) the Answer: Networks in Security and Development

If there is one consensus regarding fragility and the security-development nexus in Africa, it is the staggering complexity of the problem.

“(…) Attempts to deal with precarious states have proven quite complex and problematic” (DAC 2006, p. 17).

Policy-makers and analysts recognise that:

“(…) achieving real progress in fragile states requires a long-term commitment” (DAC 2006, p. 20).

They often consider contexts of fragility to be “complex, of a highly fluid and political nature, and entirely different for each country” (DAC 2006, p. 21). Policy-makers face a genuine difficulty in comprehending the present inter-related and future repercussions of the links between security and development. In these domains, information on the situation on the ground is often inadequate, while objectives and values conflict with each other. Moreover, it is not only fragility situations that are complex. The EU itself is a highly complex and, at times, unco-ordinated international actor, especially in the field of development, a competence shared between the European Commission and the Member States.

In order to face this complexity, the conventional and ubiquitous response is the call for more and better co-ordination between security and development policies and communities. The UN Peacebuilding Commission, especially designed for co-ordinating the policies of the major donors, the principles of the Paris Declaration, as well as every single proposal embedded in the EU’s development and security strategies, all repeat the need for more co-ordination. Almost every report on security sector reform complains about the poor co-ordination of international programmes. Co-ordination is required, but...
the key question is, how co-ordination can be best organised. By co-ordination, actors often mean different things (Wildavsky 1979, 132-133; Dewandre 2002). For example, co-ordination can be about power. In order to co-ordinate, one must often be able to persuade others to do things that they do not want to do, especially when their goals are in conflict, as they often are. Moreover, co-ordination can also be a way of sharing the blame if things go wrong. When actors cannot be coerced, their consent might be sufficient if the differences are reconciled by compromise, for example, by adding new ends or new priority tasks.

**4.2.1 Co-ordination**

Co-ordination is initially a means of designing policies in a more efficient and effective way, to avoid “aid orphans” or policy overlap, as well as to prevent contradicting policies. Involving all the various actors operating in situations of fragility with similar mandates and projects in the deliberation of how to design and implement policies can be a way to avoid, or mitigate, bureaucratic rivalries. The security-development nexus highlights that the challenge is not only to co-ordinate the different inter-governmental, state, non-state and private actors involved in development policies (in the traditional sense), but also those from the field of security, such as departments of defence and military organisations, the police and all the actors involved in SSR.

The current co-ordination initiatives are not sufficient or have led to few practical outcomes (Chandler 2007, Young 2007, Paris 2008). Hence, we see the increasing call for more co-ordination. Two different models have been proposed of how co-ordination should be conducted and how far reaching it should be. The models diverge over the question of whether co-ordination should aim at relying on existing organisational fields of security and development and merely co-ordinate between them (Model 1: boundary organisations), or whether co-ordination should aim at transforming and overcoming boundaries between fields, merge them and create novel organisational structures (Model 2: transformative).

Advocates of the second model have presented ideas such as establishing ministries of crisis prevention (Mueller 2000), or transforming development and security organisations into “human security workers” (Glasius 2008, Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities 2004). The existing boundaries between security and development actors are a hindrance to better policies. As Glasius argues (2008:49-50),

“as long as the tasks of protection and reconstruction are given over to separately trained separately organised personnel, even from within the same institution, misunderstandings and turf wars are likely to obstruct the provision of human security.”

Moreover, such a type of integration will lead to a situation in which security is centred on the needs of people. Sceptics suggest that such a radical reform is difficult (or even impossible) to implement given the long history of separate organisations. Moreover, integration proposals which spur the ongoing concerns into merging the two fields might lead to a subordination of one field over the other. Furthermore, integration may lead to a development policy that is driven by the security interest of Western states (Abrahamsen 2005, Duffield 2002, Lambach 2006). Military strategists see the basic role of the military in protecting the nation state endangered, and the identity and functioning of the military threatened (Young 2007).

Proponents of the first model offer a less ambitious model of integration, which takes the boundaries between security and development for granted, and suggests that the working between the organisations needs to be improved, for instance, through steering committees and co-ordinating bodies. In this model, rather than a merger between fields, the organisation of dialogue and co-operation between fields stands at the centre. Such a model is seen to be advantageous as the core capacities and relative advantages, (such as the military capability to be employed rapidly) of each field remains un-
challenged. Moreover, co-ordination initiatives can be implemented easily and quickly. However, critics of this model point out that co-ordination bodies can be substitutes for action. As, for instance, David Chandler suggests:

“It often appears that, at the institutional level, it is preferable to engage in internal re-organisation, ‘re-organising the desk chairs’, with the claim to be taking a policy issue seriously, than it is actually to engage with the policy area itself.” (Chandler 2007:371)

Other critics point out that co-ordination mechanisms might increase turf wars between organisations from security and development. As one critic noted, the EU’s Policy Coherence for Development Measure “appears to be more of a conceptual battleground pitching the development and security communities against each other”. (Young 2008:422)

4.2.2 Networking: towards an alternative model

The degree to which security and development can be merged should not be over-estimated, and it is valuable to develop an alternative model which may lead to a better, co-ordinated policy from the second model. One such alternative model is that of co-ordination through networks. The term “network” needs to be taken with caution, as it is ambiguous and it is often not clear what the term implies. As an approach, networking co-ordination has been developed from different directions, which are not limited to the debates on new modes of governance, social anthropology (Knox, Savage and Harvey 2006), sociology of science (Gibbons et al., 2002) and reflections from development practitioners (for example, Mosse and Lewis 2005, Lewis et al., 2003). Sketches for using networks to facilitate better policies for situations of fragility have only recently been introduced. Scholars, such as Robert Ricigliano (2005), have made proposals along these lines, and the initiative of the UN Peace-building Support Office to facilitate so-called “communities of peace-building practice” is a good example of an early attempt to conduct co-ordination based upon networking. The core features that distinguish a networking approach from the above-described models is its de-centralised, problem-oriented organising principle, the way knowledge, learning and analysis are integrated into co-ordination, and its inclusionary principle that aims to integrate all the actors affected by a problem.

4.2.3 De-centralised, problem-oriented organising principle

The core of a network approach is to favour de-centralised solutions. Instead of merging fields or creating central steering and co-ordination bodies, the ambition is to create a flexible, fluid structure which takes problematical situations as an organising principle. Networking requires a multiplication of the sites in which co-ordination takes place and aims to facilitate the number of “knots” in which organisations from different fields link with one another in order to cope with specific problematical situations.

For instance, the problem of how refugees can be protected from aggressors and be provided with food and shelter in a conflict zone requires a very different form of co-ordination than the problem of how a war-shattered state, such as Burundi, can develop a tourism policy and infrastructure. The problem of how a village can be convinced to stop poppy farming and support insurgents requires the co-ordination of very different actors than the problem of how aids prevention programmes can be effectively designed in different countries.

As an approach, networking recognises that policy coherence is a relative term. As Maurizio Carbone (2008) has suggested, policy coherence in EU development policy is relational. A policy might be considered as coherent from one perspective (let us say, trade, or development), while less so from another (let us say, fishery or security).
Situations of fragility are characterised by weak structures and rapidly changing conditions. A networking approach aims to reflect this uncertain and fluid character of fragility, and aims to make *ad hoc* co-ordination, in the light of a specific problematical situation, a virtue, not a hindrance. Moreover, a networking approach reduces the risks of turf wars between the organisations from different fields, as it essentially minimises the turf that is at stake, and initially leaves organisational identities untouched. By focusing on problematical situations, the question is not one of who should be responsible for doing what, but to ask who can do what in the face of a problematical situation.

4.2.4 Task uncertainty and knowledge deficit: on how to connect analysis and practice

The second advantage and core feature of a network approach is the way that it integrates analysis and learning into co-ordination. One of the problems of current co-ordination initiatives is that central co-ordination requires task certainty. It needs to be known what is to be done, before co-ordination can occur (Paris 2008). Arguably, this is hardly the case in policies towards fragility, in which knowledge is very uncertain. Indeed, Susan Woodward (2007: 154) makes this case in reviewing the knowledge base of current policies:

“current policies tend to be based on research that has been superseded [...]. If effective peace-building depends on addressing ‘root causes’ and the knowledge on which these policies are based is wrong, then our intervention may do more harm than we would by ignoring the causes altogether.”

Our knowledge is limited, uncertain and contested, with regard to what causes fragility and what works and what does not work in order to cope with fragile situations for security and development. This task uncertainty causes a major problem for co-ordination schemes. As Chisholm notes:

“Central co-ordinating schemes do work effectively under conditions where the task environment is known and unchanging, where it can be treated as a closed system.” (1989:10, cited after Scott 1995: 231)

Policy organisations have reacted to the “knowledge deficit” which presents a core hindrance to co-ordination in mainly two ways. Firstly, in setting up analytical and research bodies inside organisations. Examples include the fragile state group in OECD/DAC, the Best Practice Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the diverse EU learning bodies. However, as first studies of these units suggest, the analytical and operative branches often do not communicate very well, and very often the operative people hesitate to take analytical work into account (for example, Bebbington et al., 2004).

Secondly, in setting up strategies to achieve certainty through quantification and measurement. A large deal of analytical work has been focused on fabricating composite indicators that can measure aspects of fragility. While these attempts are worthwhile in order to indicate broad correlations between aspects of fragility and direct attention to what needs to be considered in abstract terms in policies towards fragility, the trust in numbers hardly provides answers to what needs to be done in a given problematical situation. Results and “best practices” are not easily transferable across contexts, and quantification implies abstracting from local contexts, which might be decisive in making a certain policy work (Scott 1995).

The de-centralised organisation of networks provides an alternative way of coping with knowledge deficits. Through facilitating co-ordination between practitioners who cope with similar problems, experienced-based knowledge is more easily transferred across different contexts with out the loss of knowledge that quantitative or central solutions imply. Secondly, by integrating analysis and learning at every level of the co-
ordination “knots”, abstract knowledge can be combined much better with local knowledge which guarantees that the knowledge is relevant.

In summary, a network approach encourages organisations to conduct analysis, and to collect experience-based knowledge at all the sites involved in co-ordination, whether this is in capital- or community-based field missions, regional missions or at headquarters level.

4.2.5 Increasing accountability and ownership

Another major problem of co-ordination mechanisms has been identified in their lack of accountability. The more partners are involved in a policy decision, the more difficult it becomes to hold anyone accountable for the decision or its implementation. As David Chandler argues:

“the more co-ordination there is between domestic and international policy actors, the less policy responsibility lies with any one of them, and there has been no shortage of experimentation in this area.” (Chandler 2007: 370)

A network approach essentially aims at widening the number of participants involved in co-ordination. Such an approach increases the representativity of decisions and implementation by aiming to integrate all those who are affected by a problem (including donors, implementation agencies, as well as local parties). In this regard, a network approach is more in line with what has been discussed as a participatory or bottom-up approach to peace-building. Chandler’s pessimism points us to the danger that co-ordination through networking leads to even less accountability. Yet, this argument can only be countered by pointing to the problem-orientation of network co-ordination. The participants in network co-ordination, those who are affected by a problematical situation, will have high stakes in coping with the problem.

In summary, a networking approach is a promising route to take, which can be further employed in organising the EU’s policy towards fragility.

4.3 Humanitarian Principles in the Security Development Nexus: Revising Impartiality and Neutrality

One of the fundamental transformations since the 1990s has been the changes taking place in the field of humanitarianism. These changes, often described as “new humanitarianism”, are characterised by the following developments:

• A professionalisation and rationalisation of classical humanitarian actors, and their growing attempt to engage in more far-reaching development relief and peace-building activities. (Barnett 2005, Rigby 2001, Chandler 2001)

• The politicisation of the purpose humanitarianism. Whereas humanitarian actors once attempted to insulate themselves from the world of politics, they now work closely with states and attempt to eliminate the root causes of conflict that place individuals at risk. (Barnett 2005, Weiss 2006, Rigby 2001, Chandler 2001)

• The growing role of military organisations in the delivery of humanitarian aid, be it in the format of peacekeeping operations, or by private military companies (Stockton 2007, Huysmans 2002, Pugh 2002, Spaerin 2001). Key examples include the role of NATO in the former Yugoslavia, the combination of military action and humanitarian aid delivery in contemporary counter-insurgency strategies, such as that conducted in Iraq, and in the idea of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan (Jacobsen 2005, Piiparinen 2007).

These trends present profound changes in the sector of the delivery of humanitarian aid, and have raised ongoing concerns on the part of humanitarian, development and
military agencies alike. It is argued that they may lead to an “erosion of classical humanitarian principles” (Pugh 2002). The legitimacy of humanitarian actors and their ability to act impartially, to be perceived as being neutral, and to maintain their independence, have all become increasingly constrained. This might involve the risk of violence turning against humanitarian actors, and also lead to problems of both access and the delivery of emergency aid to the people in need. Military agencies, in turn, see the problem that military humanitarianism overburdens military organisations, distracts from their original tasks, and impedes the problems of co-ordinating with humanitarian actors.

Yet, while these criticisms point to the difficulties and dangers of entangling military, political and humanitarian dimensions in order to cope with complex emergencies, this (idealistic) controversy is, in many ways, a false debate. In order to address this debate, we have to consider:

- that humanitarian principles have never been as absolute and value-neutral, as is often presented. Humanitarian aid has always been political, faced questions of (political) conditionality, and has had, even if designed in technical terms, political consequences (Ferguson 1990);
- the role of the NGOs as neutral actors has been seriously undermined, not least by the NGOs themselves;
- that humanitarian aid, in acting independently, may fuel violence by providing resources to violent actors or by allowing for their re-organisation. (Anderson 1999, Goodhand 2002). Aid delivered can become part of the resource struggles of a conflict itself. A sudden massive amount of aid runs the risk of exacerbating a conflict, and these resources may become incentives for fighting, rather than a stimulus for peace;
- that humanitarian action is often dependent on the protection of humanitarian spaces and the delivery of goods;
- that high levels of insecurity affect the quality and quantity of humanitarian aid that can be delivered negatively; (Harmer 2008: 535).
- that statistical evidence does not show clear signs that humanitarian-military co-operation puts humanitarian workers at an increased risk (Harmer 2008).1

Given these developments and dimensions, it makes little sense to challenge the inter-dependency between military, humanitarianism and politics fundamentally. As Thomas Weiss (2006) argues, there is no longer any need to ask whether politics and humanitarian action intersect. The real question is how this intersection can be managed in order to ensure more humanised politics and more effective humanitarian aid. In other words, discourse and rhetoric needs to be brought in line with what is actually happening in practice, and the primary aim is to manage the dilemmas in a way which guarantees basic human needs.

4.3.1 Towards managing the humanitarian-security dilemmas

A promising approach for revising our understanding of impartiality and neutrality in and for EU policies, can be found in the solution that the UN Department of Peace-keeping operations has found in its Peace-keeping Capstone Doctrine and in the Implementation of the so-called “do no harm” principles, as well as in the introduced networking perspective.

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1 A major global survey organised by the British Overseas Development Institute finds these concerns unjustified. Harmer (2008) argues, in summarising the findings, that, while there is an increase in violence towards aid workers, no direct relation between an integrated mission and the number of violent incidents can be identified.
In an attempt to develop guidelines for contemporary peace operations, the UN Peace-keeping Capstone Doctrine asks itself how notions of consent and impartiality can be re-interpreted to reflect contemporary conditions. Although it focuses on the question of what consent by involved parties and impartiality may mean for primarily military peace-keeping forces, the approach taken here reflects both philosophical considerations as well as operational practice, and, as such, is adaptable beyond peace-keeping. The central move of this approach is to argue for a differentiation between a strategic and a tactical level, in order to strike a balance between universal claims and the operational needs of flexibility in local situations. “Consent” by the parties to the peace or cease-fire agreement, is re-defined as a dynamic and multi-layered concept. As is argued, consent cannot be evaluated at a single point of time; while essential for the success of a mission, it must be constantly “managed”. However, it is suggested that consent may often be lacking at the immediate tactical (local) level.

“Impartiality” is defined in the sense that the mandate must be applied without favour or prejudice towards any party, and should not be confused with “neutrality”. The approach taken here is to understand the principles of impartiality and consent as broad guidelines, which require interpretation in concrete practical situations, and will not always be met in every circumstance. Such a view reflects operational experience. As, for instance, revealed by qualitative studies of humanitarian actors (e.g. Hillhorst and Schmidt 2002), principles are interpreted by field workers in response to demands placed upon them in the field. As Shannon (2009), among many others, argues, the meaning of humanitarian principles and the demarcations of humanitarian space are negotiated and continuously re-negotiated in concrete local situations.

Another response to the role of humanitarian actors in (post-) conflict situations has been the development of “do no harm principles”, following Mary Anderson (1999), which centrally advocate the importance for (independent) humanitarian actors to be conflict-sensitive. The idea of “do no harm” has, for instance, been adopted in the OECD/DAC Principles of Good Engagement in Fragile States. As OECD/DAC (2007:1) outlines:

“International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of corruption or human rights violations must be carefully judged for their impact on domestic reform, conflict, poverty and insecurity.”

As argued by OECD/DAC, and in Anderson’s (1999) original proposal, development and humanitarian actors should engage in a careful analysis of how a humanitarian measure fuels a conflict, and whether the actors increase or decrease the societal divisions which are at the heart of a conflict and which can lead to re-newed outbreaks of a conflict. As Anderson suggests that what possibly constitutes these divisions is highly context-dependent, analysis has, hence, to operate at a local level, not at a national one. Notwithstanding this, the “do no harm” rules put a great deal of pressure on aid agencies as well as on donors to engage in sound political and conflict analysis, raising the question of analytical capabilities. However, existing studies suggest that the overall quality of analysis is relatively poor (for example, Cliffe and Luckham 1999), an aspect which requires certainly improvement through additional resources or assistance for analysis.

In summary, the revision of the principles of impartiality needed in the context of the changing environment for humanitarianism in the security and development nexus requires an ongoing context-specific reflection, in which the classical humanitarian principles can only be broad guidelines, as it is important to guarantee deliberative space so that these can be adapted adequately in the local context.
5 Conclusions: From Engineering to Problem-solving

In this paper, we have discussed the relevance of the security-development nexus for European Union policy-making. We have outlined that insecurity, in all its dimensions, is a crucial challenge in situations of fragility. Fragility requires policy-makers to consider the connections between development and security-related activities and to ponder about the ways in which the toolboxes of security and development policies can be creatively combined, co-ordinated or conducted in parallel. Centrally, we have highlighted the importance of thinking creatively about the possible combinations, which takes local needs as a starting point. This argument was made at various levels. Firstly, we stressed the historical experience of combining security and development in the EU's history, and that the EU is in an ideal position to combine policy tools in various ways. Secondly, we suggested that the currently discussed approaches of state building, peacebuilding, human security and the responsibility to protect should not be understood as narrow paradigms. Rather than paradigms coming with ready-made priorities and competing against each other, these approaches are different frames to work with, which can be combined creatively to address specific challenges. Thirdly, we discussed critically what has become a compulsory wishlist in reforming the policies in the security and development nexus. We questioned the call for ever more co-ordination which is based upon the idea that security and development policies automatically advance each other. All good things do not, necessarily, go together. Nor should we work on the pre-assumption of a doom spiral, in which more insecurity inevitably leads to less development, and vice versa. Situations of insecurity can be starting points for reform and they can also provide opportunities for change. To recognise these various plays of insecurity and development challenges, and practices of protection and development, we need to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of governing structures in local situations without preconditions. As we argued, one way to embed such a mode of inquiry in current policy-making is to refrain from centralised ideas of co-ordination and analysis, and to turn to more complex structures of combining analysis and co-ordination at various local, national and regional levels in network structures, which follow a more problem-solving, rather than an engineering, attitude.

Such a problem solving attitude can be translated into a range of principles and recommendations for the EU:

Limit blatant contradictions: change quickly when EU policies work at cross-purpose

The EU's policies (and absence of policies) have multiple effects on fragility situations and these policies might work at cross-purpose and weaken the security of both poor citizens and the EU. This is unfortunate because it leads to dysfunctional outcomes and because these contradictions lead to accusation of hypocrisy, further undercutting the EU's ability to pursue its objectives. The range of instruments, institutions, actors, agreements, policies, documents, etc., is such that the risk of contradictions and of policies working at cross-purposes has become serious. The EU’s agriculture, fish or trade policy vis-à-vis Africa, for example, might inadvertently worsen fragility situations, and, for example, increase the security risks that the instrument for stability is supposed to mitigate. The EU’s fishery policy might put local fisheries out of work, inadvertently triggering illegal migration, thereby strengthening trafficking networks, and ultimately endangering the weak law enforcement mechanisms that the EU is painstakingly putting into place or re-inforcing. In short, it is not just security and development policies and instruments that are involved in fragility situations. In every domain, from agriculture and fisheries to trade, EU policy-makers should become aware of the development and security consequences of their policy choices. Raise the awareness among EU institutions and among the Member States that what the EU does in trade and development aid might have security implications, and, vice versa, security initiatives might have implications for development and trade.
Addressing security and development is strategy, not engineering

Advocates of policy changes which simultaneously affect security and development often perceive their proposed reforms as being non-antagonistic. Moving out of fragility, making the population more secure and, in so doing, freeing energies for development, they assume, can only be beneficial to all actors involved and ultimately to the country as a whole. Developing and securing activities are frequently conceived as an engineering task in which a common sense linear logic of resource-mobilisation and allocation is what really matters. This technical approach is reinforced by the common outside impression that, in fragile situations, the state apparatus has collapsed entirely and new institutions need to be rebuilt from scratch. This explains the frequent reference to notions such as "virtual anarchy", "security vacuum" or "rule of law vacuum". Yet, experience shows that fragility-related insecurity is not necessarily bad for every local actor, and that fragility situations do not imply the weakness of all the actors involved. Local actors react, try to circumvent the donors' strength and exploit their weaknesses, and this is why straightforward engineering approaches are unlikely to succeed. The EU should shift its linear, social engineering approach focused on its available instruments to a focus on the problem itself and a more flexible, strategic approach that recognises the contested and political character of many donor objectives and policies. The growing resort to instruments of civilian and military crisis management is an opportunity not only to encourage joint (military, civilian, and aid/development) planning, but also to think more strategically. It is also an opportunity to reward risk-taking by the staffs, which is often essential in fragility situation.

Focus on the local security-development nexus

In fragile situations, local populations often express a major and immediate concern for security and peace. Ignoring these pressing security concerns is counter-productive: instead of implementing a pre-existing blueprint, much can be achieved if the security needs of the population are taken seriously, a first step towards genuine local ownership. Moreover, most of the security and justice in post-conflict and fragile states is not carried out by the state police and judiciary, but by non-state security and justice organisations. Paying attention to these existing mechanisms allows us to gain a more accurate understanding of the needs of people, the obstacles as well as the possibilities and resources to (re-) build a functioning and supportive state/society relationship to be gained. Informal local practices should not be romanticised, as they cannot solve every problem on their own. However, they remain the unmistakable sign of a social creativity which can become a lever for change. The EU should obtain a better knowledge about local security initiatives by using systematically local knowledge and expertise, and, when appropriate, support them and create linkages with development projects. Opening the political dialogue between the EU and ACP countries in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement to local civil society organisation is a priority. It is high time that the capacity for dialogue with civil society was built up and the capital-centric bias of member state embassies and delegations of the EC was countered.

Recognise that violence is an ingredient of reform

Violence is an element of reform in economic and political development. While not all types of violence are ingredients of reform, some might contribute to signal problems and/or to get reforms pushed through. Insecurity and violence can act as a searchlight and may help in the early detection of social ills, which, if neglected, might be much more difficult to handle. Recognising these problems is a necessary first step on the road to reforms. Moreover, insecurity and violence concentrate attention. They make it possible to take action against powerful groups or interests, especially in the security domain. Crises stimulate action, and, hence, stimulates learning about a problem upon which insight had been poor.
Favour sequences and imbalances instead of co-ordination

To tackle the development-security nexus in fragile situations, the EU often favours “joined-up” strategies combining all policy tools simultaneously in a coherent package which includes political, security, humanitarian and development instruments. “Co-ordination, complementarity and coherence” have become over-used watchwords. We suggest, instead, that, while some co-ordination is valuable especially within the EU, there is no need to spend considerable effort on early integration and on a simultaneous or balanced approach to the security-development nexus. See-saw advances and adjustments of security and development policies are the inevitable characteristics of policy action in contexts of fragility. They are desirable since policy-makers become aware of the imperfections and imbalances of their action through failures, irritations, and discomforts. Imbalances are one of the processes through which policy-makers realise that one element should lead to another. Duplication, confusion and lack of information-sharing among people working along parallel lines are not always bad, and can even lead to less costly and faster reforms. Instead of focus single-mindedly on co-ordination, the EU should enlarge its mode of action and experiment with sequences that can help reforms.

Recognise that security and development are not always connected: explore variations in their relations

The EU and the international conventional wisdom is that security and development are always connected one way or the other. This assumption is sometimes wrong, however: securing does not always lead automatically to positive consequences for the rule of law or for the effectiveness of government, economic development and democracy. The connection between security and development progress can take different forms, and the pattern is not always an inter-relation between the two policy domains. While security and development might not always be tied together in a functional way, there might be alternations between interdependence and autonomy at different points in time and in different contexts.

Disengage selectively to provide space for local initiatives

The EU boasts its continuing involvement and the relative stability of its engagement in state-building and development more generally. However, gaining flexibility in this regard and allowing for periods of selective disengagement could enlarge the range of possible EU initiatives. The assumption that “more state-building is better state-building”, while widespread among Western policy-makers, is not supported by the evidence. Less, or more limited and selective, engagement can provide some room of manoeuvre for social experimentation and favour the growth of local initiatives.

In summary, EU policy-makers should gain a renewed appreciation of the many unsuspected and unorthodox opportunities for manoeuvre and advance in the security-development nexus. By doing so, they will enhance the resourcefulness of the EU.
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