Note to the Reader

This book was written and prepared for publication prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It retains the classic numbering of the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (the EC Treaty).

Although the Treaty of Lisbon amends and renames the EC Treaty – now the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – it does not introduce any new significant substantive content to the competition law provisions.\(^1\) In short, the legal analysis in this book is not affected in any material way by the entry into force of the new Treaty.

As a matter of terminology, the Treaty amendments now require references to the Community to be read as Union, references to the common market as the internal market and references to the Court of First Instance (CFI) as the General Court.\(^2\)

For the convenience of the reader, a table of equivalence for the provisions discussed or referred to in this book is provided below.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Although Article 3(1)(g) EC, which provided for a system of undistorted competition in the internal market to facilitate the attainment of the Community objectives has now been repealed, the status of competition policy in the EU remains undiminished. According to Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, the Union retains the exclusive competence to establish the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, while the objective of maintaining undistorted competition reappears in Protocol No 27 on the Internal Market and Competition. The latter protocol expressly points out that the internal market set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted.


\(^3\) For the complete table of equivalence, see [2008] OJ C 115/361.

\(^4\) Replaced, in substance, by Article 3 TEU.

\(^5\) Replaced, in substance, by Articles 3 to 6 TFEU.
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