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THE EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2008 CRISIS: AN APPRAISAL

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Abstract

We appraise the new EU supervisory architecture presented by the Commission in a package of five ‘draft legislative acts’. Two would establish a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to undertake macro-prudential issues. Three would establish the system of European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): Banking, Securities and Insurance.

The theoretical case for this package of draft legislative acts has been made by the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU. The package has been examined by the ECOFIN of 2 December 2009, which has introduced changes to the Commission's three draft legislative acts concerning the ESAs. We examine the theoretical approach underlying the draft legislative acts, which is based on the State theory of money. We find it incomplete in the case of the ESRB because the mission of ECB in 'mitigating system risks within the financial system' cannot be attained without real powers and tools; it is in essence a macro-economic phenomenon.

We also arrive at another conclusion relating to the three proposals on the ESAs. The theoretical underpinning of the three is based on the premise of the school of regulation. Today's evolution of the EU cannot allow ESAs to go beyond their Treaty competence. Nor could the ESAs attain their objective of 'setting the common rules for supervising national entities'. Thus, the conception of the EU system of financial supervision is deficient, in need of repair.

We propose an alternative approach to the new EU supervisory architecture consisting of three elements. First, we restate the case for the Central Banks to assume responsibility for the ‘last resort of managing risk’, and be endowed with real power. Second, the role of the national central banks in ‘micro-supervision’ should be enhanced; amongst other things, credit rating should be their responsibility. Third, a structure for the budgetary burden is proposed by the establishment of the ‘European Fund for Financial Stability’ endowed with its own capital resource.

Keywords

Theory of money; European Supervisory Authorities, de Larosière report; financial supervision; money externalities; European Central Bank; National Central Banks; European Steering Committee of Vice-Governors of NCBs; credit rating agencies; European Fiscal Authority; European Fund for Financial Stability; financial transaction tax; natural monopoly.
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1. Introduction

Had the financial crisis of 2008 not occurred, the package of five draft legislative acts under consideration would not have been submitted, irrespective of the need to re-consider the institutional structure of the EMU.¹

Had its impact on the real economy been local or regional, the call for identifying how to avoid a repeat in its intensity and scale would not have become a global concern.

Had the cost to the EU and its Member States - which took the form of State aid to the financial institutions to the EU²- not been that high,³ 'business as usual' would have continued.

The EU response to the 2008 crisis is embodied by the Report by the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (chaired by J. de Larosière - hereafter, DLR);⁴ it has been transposed by the Commission into a package of five draft legislative acts.

We examine the logic underlying the DLR recommendations, Commission draft legislative acts and ECOFIN conclusions in section 2, with the analytic tools borrowed from the current paradigm of thinking. We pay attention to its limited power to explain 'causation' or suggest 'policy options'.

There are four unresolved issues that pre-occupy financial authorities. These are:

- The Too Big to Fail Problem;
- Separation of Banking from Investment;

¹ See, among many articles and books on the incomplete EMU, Caravelis (1994: sections: 2.12; 2.13 and 7.5 to 7.8), where the argument that the EMU's institutional arrangement is defective is made.
² Allessandri and Haldane (2009) state: “the scale of intervention to support the banks in the UK, US and the euro-area during the current crisis ... totals over $14 trillion or almost a quarter of global GDP. It dwarfs any previous state support of the banking system. These interventions have been as imaginative as they have been large, including liquidity and capital injections, debt guarantees, deposit insurance and asset purchase”, and conclude: “The state has instead become the last-resort financier of the banks.”
³ de Larosière (2010: 8-9) quotes statistics from the Commission and states: “The cost to the European Union of the total aid given to financial institutions in all forms, whether disbursed or not (loans, liquidity, guarantees, asset purchases, capital participations, etc.), is in the region of 3,700 billion euro, or around 25 % of Europe’s GDP (the figure for the United States, which has a comparable GDP, is around $12,000 billion).
⁴ The DLR examined the causes of the financial crisis and made 31 Recommendations to repair the EU Regulatory regime, enhance the EU Supervisory structure, and promote financial stability at the global level.

The European Commission endorsed the DLR recommendations, with some modifications relating to the sectors and stages of implementation. It also made suggestions concerning the composition, voting rights and addressee warnings, under the macro-prudential supervision.

The Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) Council of 8 June 2009 accepted the DLR’s view for ‘a’ European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) but changed its composition. It agreed to the establishment of a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), but added a Steering Committee. And it emphasised that the new mechanisms ‘should not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States’.

The Brussels European Council of 18/19 June 2009 agreed to the new supervisory framework; it stressed the importance of ‘the cross-border framework for the prevention and management of financial crises’ and the need ‘to take up the issue of global regulation and supervision’
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- Future of Shadow Banking;
- The Budgetary Burden.

The LDR has not addressed them fully; hence no recommendations have been made. At this stage of unfolding matters, we have not received concrete proposals from the Commission, nor from the Council.

Faced with these policy options, we restate the case for the Central Banks to assume responsibility for the ‘last resort of managing risk’, in section 3. Our premise is that Money is an Externality, not the creation of the State, nor is it a commodity entailing special qualities. We then appraise the ESA draft legal acts in the light of the ECOFIN's agreed general approach, in section 4: we arrive at a conclusion: they need major adjustments.

An appraisal of this kind leads us to propose an alternative supervisory architecture centred on two pillars:
- The first has to do with the role of the national central banks (NCBs) in 'micro-supervision', in section 5.
- The second concerns the structure for the budgetary burden; that is to say the establishment of the 'European Fund for Financial Stability' (EFFS), in section 6.

2. The new supervisory structure

Understanding the legal provisions contained in the five draft legal acts presupposes an understanding of the core argument of the DLR about the need for a new European supervisory structure. The DLR rests with a simple premise: 'learn from the real and important supervisory failures'; then devise a new architecture of supervision, having as guide the State theory of money.

The DLR examined the 'weak link in the chain' and found at least eight weaknesses of the current EU financial structure: Theoretically, these weaknesses make the case for another approach to supervision, seeking to solve the 'stability trilemma'. According to Schoenmaker (2008: 44, it arises from a situation when one wishes to attain three objectives:

“[1] stable financial system, [2] an integrated financial system, and [3] national financial stability policy, [which] are incompatible. Any two of the three objectives can be combined but not all three; one has to give.” (my [])

Integration of financial markets in the EU has progressed satisfactorily. If we concentrate on cross-border penetration of European banking, we find that: “average cross-border penetration has gradually increased from 11% in 1995 to 21% in 2007” (Schoenmaker, 2008: 46).

de Larosière (2010:1) echoes the same trend:

“In Europe there are around 5000 banks (8000 in the US). Of that number, the great majority are small and medium-sized domestic - frequently regional - institutions. They are confronted by around forty cross-border groups representing almost 70% of the European market. Those groups have seen dramatic asset growth: in excess of 50% between 2001 and 2005.”

The UK House of Lords report (2009: 32) citing witness evidence, stated: “the largest 43 cross-border banking groups in the EU account for 77% of total EU bank assets”. It then alerted to the obvious: “This would take powers of supervision from national supervisors in regard to the cross-border banks and would represent a major reform of the EU financial supervisory structure.”

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5 These are: a) Lack of adequate macro-prudential supervision, b) Ineffective early warning mechanisms, c) Problems of competences, d) Failures to challenge supervisory practices on a cross-border basis, e) Lack of frankness and cooperation between supervisors, f) Lack of consistent supervisory powers across Member States, g) Lack of resources in the level 3 committees, h) No means for supervisors to take common decisions.
If one examines the ECB’s mapping of banking groups, one finds that for the period of 2001 to 2005, “the consolidated assets of the sample as a whole increased from around 54% to 68% of overall consolidated EU banking assets. This indicates that cross-border banks hold a sizable – and rising – share of total EU banking assets.” (Schoenmaker, 2008: 46-47)

de Larosière (2010: 8) cited various sources of statistics and stated the magnitude: “This shows that the banking sector’s assets come to 800% of GDP in Switzerland, over 600% in Belgium, and over 500% in the Netherlands, whereas the proportions range between 100 and 300% for the large industrialised countries.”

Hence attaining the objective of financial stability means that national policy has to give. If national policy is relinquished, it is claimed that ‘peculiar regulatory regimes' encouraging financial innovations - such as off-balance-sheet vehicles and securitisation - will be unable to continue such abuse.

Suppose one wished to repair the current practice and solve the ‘supervisory trilemma’, what would its constituent elements be? The five draft legislative acts propose:

1. To separate institutionally Micro- from Macro-prudential Supervision.
2. To create a new structure called: European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) endowed with macro-prudential supervision, by enhancing the responsibility of the European Central Bank.
3. To modify the existing structure of Micro-prudential supervision by creating a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS).

Each of these elements merits exhaustive consideration (see Annex 1).

One should note the contrast between the micro- and macro-prudential. The former examines ‘how individual agents treat supervision’ on the assumption that asset prices, market/credit conditions and economic activity are independent of their decisions. This assumption is based on the premise that the decisions are taken individually, or that they are typically too small to have any significant impact. Hence they possess no dominant position. The latter focuses on the financial system as a whole. It treats aggregate risk as dependent on the collective behaviour of financial institutions.

For micro-prudential supervision, the DLR states its main objective:

“to supervise and limit the distress of individual financial institutions, thus protecting the customers of the institution in question. The fact that the financial system as a whole may be exposed to common risks is not always fully taken into account.” (p.38)

Thus, protection of the consumer via mitigation of risks is a common objective which, if attained, financial stability becomes a public good. And if internalised by the financial institutions, it becomes a Money Externality (see Appendices 1 and 2). This public good externality is also recognised by the DRL: “micro-prudential supervision attempts to prevent (or at least mitigate) the risk of contagion and the subsequent negative externalities in terms of confidence in the overall financial system” (p.38).

6 Bini Smagli (2009) also argues that “while in principle there is a single European financial market, in practice, national institutions and financial centres compete…. This in turn encourages a ‘lighter’ supervisory touch … In this context, the stability of Europe’s financial market is likely to depend on the weakest link in the chain.”
7 de Larosière (2010:1) criticises the abuse: “For a given amount of regulatory own funds, these processes permitted a much higher capital “turnover”, thus expanding the creation of credit in a dangerously procyclical way. That gave the institutions in question the illusion that securitised or off-balance-sheet products had been dispersed and would never come back to haunt them. We have seen how the crisis destroyed those illusions.”
8 The UK House of Lords report (2009: 12) went further in its elaboration: “Micro-prudential supervision is the day-to-day supervision of individual financial institutions. The focus of micro-prudential supervision is the safety and soundness of individual institutions as well as consumer protection.”
For **macro-prudential supervision**, the literature is recent.⁹ For Borio (2009), it consists of two dimensions:

- How risk is distributed in the financial system at a given point in time, call it “cross-sectional dimension”.
- How aggregate risk evolves over time, call it “time dimension”.

These two dimensions bring us back to the **transmission mechanism of money**.¹⁰ How does it affect the other sectors, financial and real? How does it impact on the components of Trade, Investment and Production? Macro-prudential supervision is a generic term for a supervisory body endowed with four roles: Licensing, Oversight, Enforcement and Crisis management; or it is given the tools to exercise these roles.¹¹

Macro-prudential supervision for the **cross-sectional dimension** is necessary because the induced ‘systemic risk’ may lead to a failure of the transmission mechanism or may generate a sequence of bankruptcies because of “common (correlated) exposures across financial institutions”. Borio (2009: 2) tells us ‘why’:

> “These arise either because institutions are directly exposed to the same or similar asset classes or because of indirect exposures associated with linkages among them (e.g. counterparty relationships). Common exposures are critical because they explain why institutions can fail together.”¹²

It presupposes interdependence of systems and inter-connectedness of sectors. The ‘network externality’ is generated by the payments system and with it a number of other money externalities are induced.¹³ Both are well advanced in the EU due to shadow banking.

The **time dimension** also plays an important role in transmitting the **risk externality** to the real economy via ‘feedback effects’. According to Borio (2009: 2),

> “the key issue in the time dimension is how system-wide risk can be amplified by interactions within the financial system as well as between the financial system and the real economy. This is what pro-cyclicality is all about … Feedback effects - the endogenous nature of aggregate risk - are of the essence.”¹⁴

For this kind of monitoring, the body responsible for macro-prudential analysis should possess ‘specialised knowledge’ and ‘experience’. The challenge, therefore, for the new architecture is dual:

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⁹ The UK House of Lords report (2009: 12) describes the task: “Macro-prudential supervision is the analysis of trends and imbalances in the financial system and the detection of systemic risks that these trends may pose to financial institutions and the economy. The focus of macro-prudential supervision is the safety of the financial and economic system as a whole, the prevention of systemic risk.”

¹⁰ An EUI WP on Transmission Mechanism by the author is being revised.

¹¹ The question of the proper design is important. Borio (2009: 2) calls for attention: “Just as an asset manager, who cares about the loss on her portfolio as a whole, focuses on the co-movement of the portfolio’s securities, so a macro-prudential regulator would focus on the joint failure of institutions, which determines the loss for the financial system as a whole. The main policy question is how to design the prudential framework to limit the risk of losses on a significant portion of the overall financial system and hence its ‘tail risk’.”

¹² This aspect of the transmission mechanism is recognized by the DLR: “While risks to the financial system can in principle arise from the failure of one financial institution alone if it is large enough in relation to the country concerned and/or with multiple branches/subsidiaries in other countries, the much more important global systemic risk arises from a common exposure of many financial institutions to the same risk factors. (p. 38).

¹³ See sections 5 and 6 for a fuller discussion.

¹⁴ The mitigation of the ‘pro-cyclicality’ in the view of the DLR may be attained by two means. First, change the Basel 2, as suggested in the preceding section. Second, focus on ‘correlated shocks’. That is to say that “to pay particular attention to common or correlated shocks and to shocks to those parts of the financial system that trigger contagious knock-on or feedback effects” (DLR: 38).
A. to contain the cumulative impact during the expansion period;
B. to manage the factors determining the speed of instability in a recession.

In the absence of these two mechanisms, the seeds of ‘financial instability’ will be sowing at an unknown speed. The recommendation of the DLR has been to create a new body. The recently submitted draft legal acts by the Commission called it: European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). In both the DLR and the Commission proposals, one cannot feel sure that the core problem of ‘how to mitigate the forces associated with the A and B challenges’ are fully taken in account.

However, the creation of a new institution usually raises two inseparable issues. The first has to do with its organisational structure, the second with its mandate and means.

2.1 European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
As to the organization, the LDR has proposed that the ESRB be chaired by the ECB President, with the logistical support of the ECB. In addition, it has considered logical to compose the ESRB with the central banks of the ESCB General Council and other bodies.

The Council of 9 June 2009, with the support of the Commission, suggested a different composition, by adding a Steering Committee of members plus observers (representatives of the national supervisors and President of the Economic and Financial Committee). The end result is shown in Annex I.

This organisational setting is taken up by two Commission draft legal acts.

The first is a Council decision, based on Article 127 (ex-105) of the Treaty, which authorises the President and the Vice-President of the ECB become members of the ESRB (art.1); entrusts to the ECB the task of the secretariat of the ESRB (art.2); and lays down the guidelines for the ‘collection of information’ necessary for the tasks of the ESRB.

The second proposal is an EP and Council Regulation based on Article 114 (ex-95), the single market legal base. The proposal is important in many respects:
1. It establishes a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
2. It defines the Mission, Objectives and Tasks of the ESRB.
3. It lays down the organisational structure: a General Board, a Steering Committee and a secretariat.
4. The General Board will have 33 members with voting rights and 2 observers without voting rights.
5. It states the composition of the Steering Committee that will have 12 members (2 from the ECB, 5 from the General Board of the ESRB; 3 from the Authorities; one from each the Commission and Economic and Financial Committee.
6. It also creates an Advisory Technical Committee that will have 61 members (27 representatives of NCBs; one from the ECB; 27 supervisors from the National authorities; 3 representatives from the European authorities; 2 from the Commission and 1 from the EFC).

15 The Lisbon Treaty has amended ex-article 105 (6); the amended Art. 127 reads: “6. The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.”
16 See COM(2009) 500 final - 2009/0141 (AVC) - Proposal for a council decision entrusting the European Central Bank with specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board.
It is important to know the **mission** of the ERSB, and thus what the ECB is supposed to do. Article 3(1) of the 2nd proposal states:

“The ESRB shall be responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system within the Community in order to prevent or mitigate systemic risks within the financial system…”

The ECOFIN of 2 December 2009 re-iterated its position of 20 October 2009: “the Council reached agreement on a draft regulation aimed at establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to monitor potential threats to the stability of the financial system.”

What does this ECOFIN agreement mean to the mission of the ESRB?

First, art.3 (2) lays down eight tasks for the ESRB, which are further elaborated in four articles (15 to 18) of the 2nd proposal, including the Powers of the ESRB. Both tasks and powers are summarised in the Commission memorandum that states:

“The ESRB will not have any binding powers to impose measures on Member States or national authorities. It has been conceived as a “reputational” body with a high level composition that should influence the actions of policy makers and supervisors by means of its moral authority. To this end, it will not only provide high quality assessment of the macro-prudential situation but it may also issue risk warnings and recommendations which identify the potential unbalances in the financial system which are likely to increase systemic risks and the appropriate remedial actions.”

This is a very narrow mandate for the ESRB. It is based on the **moral authority** of the ECB, because it “will not have any binding powers to impose measures”. And it is endowed with ‘toothless tools of power’ because it will simply issue risk warnings and recommendations.

Without real power and tools, the ESRB will rely on the good will of the national and European supervisory authorities to be supplied with ‘the necessary information’. Article 15(2) of the 2nd proposal is revealing:

“The European Supervisory Authorities, the national central banks and Member States shall cooperate closely with the ESRB and provide all the information necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks in accordance with Community legislation.”

Second, there is an erroneous statement concerning the budgetary implications of this proposal. The Commission states:

“The budgetary cost related to the ESRB will be borne by the ECB and will not have any direct implication for the Community budget. The cost of such support will depend on the extent to which the existing staff and resources of the ECB can be used to fulfil the tasks of the Secretariat of the ESRB.”

Who is to bear the cost of an enlarged Secretariat for the ESRB? Who will pay for the tasks conferred upon the ECB to organize the meetings and the selection of market information? Certainly, the EU budget will do so.

**2.2 The ESRB proposals appraised**

The theoretical justification for the involvement of the ECB is based on shaky grounds:

1. Let us put the matter in theoretical perspective. We have no agreed definition of ‘financial stability’. We have ‘a working’ definition of the concept of ‘systemic risk’ if it is considered as a ‘money externality’. The ECB has one instrument, the interest rate, to attain one objective, price stability. But the Commission’s proposals endow the ECB with an additional task of managing...
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‘systemic risk’ across frontiers. A result largely induced by the ‘network externalities’ themselves generated by the payments system and by a number of ‘seigniorage externalities’. Hence two goals: price stability and financial stability, to be attained by one instrument, the interest rate.

For de Vries (2009: 3), we are back to the days of the European Monetary System:

“So what should be the role of a Systemic Risk Board if it has no clear goal, no instruments and may only give advice? This is like an ECB that cannot set the interest rate, but has to advise national central banks on the interest rate that they should set. Pretty much a return to the days of the EMS it looks like. At the time local central banks were well advised to follow the lead of the Buba, but often acted otherwise. As national interests prevail in a crisis, the advice is likely not heeded when it is most needed.”

2. The ECB has no right to ‘bail out’ failed banking or financial institutions (Treaty, Art. 125, ex-103). In the EU we have a centralized monetary policy (Treaty, Art. 127, ex-105) but decentralized national economic policies (Treaty, Art. 120 to 122, ex-98 to100). And the EU budget provides for no burden sharing fund conceived to cope with either economic or financial crisis. We return to this last point in section 6.

3. The 2nd proposal from the Commission recognises the important role of National Central Banks (NCBs) in providing specialised information to the ESRB, and states:

“The objective of the reform is to ensure a smoother interaction of supervision at the macro-prudential and micro-prudential levels. In fulfilling its role as macro-prudential supervisor, the ESRB will need a timely flow of harmonised micro-level data, while micro-prudential supervision by national authorities will benefit from the ESRB’s insights into the macro-prudential environment.” (p.6)19

This is a commanding challenge and pre-supposes ‘expertise knowledge’ in both micro- and macro-economy, and of policies pursued. In the EU, we have independent institutions, the National Central Banks (NCBs), which have acquired both. Yet ‘expertise knowledge’ in a sound macro-prudential system has not yet been acquired by the ECB.20 The NCBs are in better legal position to acquire the ‘specialised knowledge’ from the national supervisors engaged daily in micro-supervision.

The above solution is dependent on two important elements: transparency and regulatory tools. The ESRB may organise its mandate to impose ‘transparency’. But it will possess no ‘regulatory tool’. Hence we are faced with the question of a ‘voluntary delegation of national power to a European institution’, in order to save the proposals on the ERSB.

4. The recent experience with the financial crisis of 2008 does not support the Commission’s thesis that ‘all can be arranged by tailor-made regulation’. The regulatory weaknesses identified by the LDR have been taken care of by new or amending EU legislation. Tackling ‘systemic-risk’ is a Herculean task; it cannot be dealt with by a body stripped of binding regulatory and supervisory means.

5. The single most important error of the proposals about the ESRB is the adoption of the DLR’s view that by upgrading the Level 3 committees to European Authorities, it will solve the problem of

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19 The UK House of Lords report (2009: 27) echoes the same sentiment: “one of the failures that led to the crisis was the lack of link up between the macro-prudential side and the micro-prudential side of supervision ...This highlights the two areas that reform of EU supervisory structures aims to address. First, there was a failure to identify macro-prudential and systemic risks to the financial services industry at any level. …. Second, there was a failure of micro-prudential supervisors satisfactorily to identify and mitigate risks through the supervision of individual institutions.”

20 For the ‘expertise knowledge’ of the Systemic regulator, the Chief Executive of Goldman Sachs states the following: “Regulators need to be able to identify risk concentrations early and prevent them from growing so large as to threaten the system. If systemic problems arise, regulators need to take prompt action to limit their impact and protect the safety of the system. To do this, the systemic regulator must be able to see all the risks to which an institution is exposed and require that all exposures be clearly recognised.”(Blankfein, 2009: 11 “To avoid crises, we need more transparency”, Financial Times, 13 October 2009).
communication between micro- and macro-supervisor (ESRB). This cannot be defended on theoretical
grounds. Powers still reside in the national domain.

6. For practical but important matters, a ‘toothless ESRB’ will have less power than any European
Supervisory Authority (ESA). Under the proposed Regulations, an ESA may indirectly impinge on the
fiscal responsibility of a Member State by instructing National authorities ‘to ensure a timely follow
up’ by the national competent authorities.21. But compliance with the ESA’s decision implies a
‘budgetary cost’.

7. The risks induced by the nature of banking (i.e. transformation of short-term resources - based
on sight deposits - into medium- and long-term loans) generate money externalities (see next section),
which surpass national frontiers and go beyond the powers of micro-supervisors. In other words,
‘liability management' induces - in the words of de Larosière (2010: 4) - “tendencies towards the
excessive expansion of credit, the creation of asset bubbles, etc.” Hence we have a macro-economic
phenomenon to address, not a micro-supervision centred in the national bodies.

We propose a different theoretical approach in the next section, which is based on the premise that
money is externality, making the case for the ECB to assume the complete role of the macro-
prudential supervisor.

3. The Last Resort of Managing Risk and the NCBs22

Under the Treaty, the European Central Bank (ECB) defines the monetary policy of the euro area.
During the 2008 financial crisis, the ECB provided ‘emergency liquidity assistance’ within the euro
area. The US Federal Reserve followed in essence the same policy of monetary laxity as did the UK
Bank of England and many other central banks in the globe. At present, the ECB has no direct
supervisory functions. The two proposals under consideration, as we said in the preceding section, do
not repair this deficiency.23

We are interested to know whether there is room to change the institutional architecture of the two
proposals on the ESRB and thus make it more resilient and more efficient in eliminating sources of
vulnerability.

3.1 Internalisation of Money Externalities by the ECB

Let us borrow from the premise that money is an externality, its tools of analysis.24 Theoretically, a
Central Bank should internalise and induce the five categories of money externalities. Yet the central
bank that fully captures the seigniorage externalities, in particular, the four-type of reserve externalities, may be endowed with the responsibility of supervision of the banking and financial
system. The ECB captures the ‘reserve externalities’ and the current experience of its ‘liquidity
assistance’ supports this theoretical premise.25

22 This matter was first treated in my EMU monograph in 1994 (section 7.7).
23 Member States operate different formats of supervision. In 1997, the UK split the roles of supervision and monetary
policy between the FSA and the BoE; the discussion today is about going back to the 1996 situation (BoE being
responsible for both). Other Members States split these roles, notably Germany, but she announced draft legislation to
merge the two, under the auspices of the Bundesbank. Several National Central Banks (NCBs) still hold a supervisory
role: Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic.
24 See Taxonomy of money externalities in Appendix 1
25 See Definitions of money externalities in Appendix 2
The question of interest is to know whether the traditional function of lender of last resort is attainable when a NCB is faced with global markets and money externalities in its banking and financial markets. Back to 1992, it was recognised by the Promisel report that “banks increasingly have dealings with non-banks such as trust and insurance companies, so traditional measures of inter-bank dealings are potentially misleading. Banks and non-banks alike need proper contingency plans for disasters”. 26

Davies and Green (2008: 3-6) have examined the global role of banks - traditional and ‘shadow’ - as well as the scale of financial markets and said:

“McKensey and Company estimate that global financial assets have more than doubled in the last ten years, and are set to increase by a further 50 percent by the end of this decade … It is therefore not surprising that a regulatory system designed some time ago is beginning to creak. Furthermore, the growth of the cross-border financial activity is even more rapid: international capital flows have been expanding at over 10 per cent a year over the last fifteen years…”.

Given the scale of capital flows of cross-border, the interdependence of banking and financial intermediaries has increased to an extent that casts doubt on the ability of monetary authorities to devise contingency plans for financial crises. But under these circumstances, the traditional function of lender of last resort is redundant. This becomes clearer if we examine ‘a’ source of financial instability in global markets.

Liability management and risk externalities have increased systemic risk disproportionately. Given the global activities of banks (traditional and shadow) in managing their portfolios, payment systems and netting schemes have become global. Yet there is a fact here to recognise. Both the ‘liability management’ and the ‘risk externalities’ are internalised by the private sector: banks and financial companies, not by Central Banks. Consequently, this fact renders the traditional function of ‘lender of last resort’ inoperative.

Suppose financial instability is caused by ‘unmanaged’ systemic risk. Then its remedy cannot be based on the provision of the necessary liquidity because the Central bank does not manage ‘liability’, nor can it contain risks outside of its jurisdiction. The ECB’s ‘liquidity support’ in August 2008 simply prevented the collapse of the system.

There is another aspect to consider. To the extent that global markets are not regulated at a global level, three institutional prerequisites are not effective. These are: a) netting schemes, b) uniform accounting methods and c) disclosure rules. They have been rendered ineffective at national level because – as the 2008 financial crisis attests - the a), b) and c) systems, on their own, cannot minimise systemic risk. Central Banks, therefore, will have to treat ‘systemic risk’ as their prime function.

Theoretically, systemic risk has increased exponentially because of two factors: increased interconnectedness of the global system and increasing cross-border capital flows. The institutional setting of 1944 was designed to deal with a different scale of finance, capital and investment movements. By today, it has been rendered ineffective by a different structure due to the increasing role of the financial sector in affecting Trade, Production and Investment. Globalisation has caused a change in the traditional function of central banks; it calls for a new institutional arrangement to deal with liability and risk externalities.

In other words, the theoretical case for the ECB to assume responsibility for managing systemic risk can only be made under the premise that Money is an Externality. Effectively, it is the management of systemic risk, which necessitates the supervisory role of the ECB in the scheme of the European System Risk Board (ESRB), not the function of lender of last resort. This is the first prerequisite to meet for the creation of the ESRB.

26 Quoted in Freeman (1993:41) commenting on Promissel report by the Basle Committee.
There is a second pre-requisite. For the ESRB to be able to manage ‘systemic risk’, a legally binding relation between the macro-supervisor and the micro-supervisors is needed for the proper flow of information between the ESRB and the micro-prudential supervisors. The Commission proposals, as we said in the previous section, seem to rely on ‘moral suasion’ and ‘the tool of embarrassment’ for this key relationship.

We have reservations over it:

1. If the ESRB issues a macro-prudential risk warning, under Article 16 of the 2nd proposal, who would enforce it? The ESRB on its own can not do it, given its remit. It will send it to the ECOFIN or International bodies for a Decision.

However, setting priorities right is important to macro-prudential policy. The more important is monitoring. “A macro-prudential approach has implications for the monitoring of threats to financial stability and for the calibration of prudential tools… it should pay special attention to the sources of non-diversifiable, or “systemic”, risk in the financial system” (Borio (2009:3)).

When we come to consider ‘the calibration of prudential tools’ (i.e. capital requirements, insurance premium, etc.), the macro-prudential supervisor will have to tailor its ‘guidance’ to the individual institutions responsible for their contribution to system-wide risk, irrespective of their size or legal form. But the ESRB would have no powers to impose it. For this to be effective, one needs the knowledge of the risk-related market in which the bank or financial company is active. The appropriate structure would be to have ‘micro-prudential supervision integrated into the system of the ESRB’. And the ‘micro-supervisor’ should be accountable to a single body, the ESRB.

2. How could one integrate the two? The DLR and the Commission proposals on ESAs propose an institutional change by upgrading of the Level 3 committees because “the structure and the role bestowed on the existing committees are not sufficient to ensure financial stability in the EU and all its Member States.” (DLR: 46)27

They are to become, if the draft legislative acts are adopted as proposed, regulatory Authorities of the EU, endowed with a delegated power that may be considered ‘excessive’. In essence, the delegated powers of the ESAs constitute a transfer of power from the national supervisors to them on unfounded grounds. We explore this point further in the next sections.

The core problem is to identify the ‘risk concentrations’. One needs to have built a market-tailored system continuously feeding information to the ESRB. For this to happen, the micro-supervisors should be obliged to provide the ESCB with ‘expertise information. Thus have the genesis of the ESFS. Will the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) solve the problem?

4. European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)

Three Commission draft legislative acts have followed faithfully the DLR recommendations for setting up the ESFS; the latter consists of two tiers:

i. The European supervisors (in middle of Annex 1), consisting of three authorities:

27 What are these level 3 committees? They were created by the so-called Lamfalussy framework, in 2001.; Level 1 involves the adoption of legislative acts - under the co-decision procedure – which transpose global rules devised by international standard setting bodies into EU legislation. For example, the Capital Requirements Directive transposes the Basel II rules into EU legislation. Level 2 Committees provide the technical implementation of the legislation, creating a set of rules, “a second tier of more detailed regulation” that can be changed quickly and refined where necessary. This system is known as comitology. Level 3 consists of three Committees: European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), situated in London; European Securities Regulators (CESR), having its location in Paris; and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) situated in Frankfurt. Level 4 refers to enforcement of regulations by the national authorities.
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1. European Banking Authority (EBA)\textsuperscript{28}
2. European Pensions Authority (EPA)\textsuperscript{29}
3. European Securities Authority (ESA)\textsuperscript{30}

ii. The \textbf{National supervisors} (at bottom of Annex 1), consisting of:

1. National Banking Supervisors
2. National Insurance and Pensions Supervisors

\textbf{4.1 European Authorities}

The three new European Authorities are \textbf{not} new because they will replace the Level 3 Committees but will have a 'new organizational structure' and a 'new mandate'.\textsuperscript{31}

The three will be Community bodies with legal personality.

Let us concentrate on the EBA proposal, since the proposals define the \textit{same} organizational structure and the \textit{same} mandate.

The composition of the EBA Authority shall comprise:

1. a Board of Supervisors, which shall have 32 members;\textsuperscript{32}
2. a Management Board,\textsuperscript{33}
3. a Chairperson,
4. an Executive Director, and
5. a Board of Appeal.\textsuperscript{34}

The tasks and powers of each of the above are laid down in their relevant draft regulation. The caviar of EU institutional structure is applied to the new Authorities:


\textsuperscript{31} Level 3 Committees are not in charge of day-to-day micro-prudential supervision, which is a national competence. They simply bring together supervisors and act as a link between the Commission and national supervisory authorities. They also act as fora for information exchange between supervisors, foster supervisory convergence and formulate best practice. Level 3 Committees can issue \textit{non-binding} guidance.

\textsuperscript{32} They will be: a) the Chairperson, who shall be non-voting; (b) the Head of the national public authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each Member State; (c) one representative of the Commission who shall be non-voting; (d) one representative of the European Central Bank who shall be non-voting; (e) one representative of the ESRB who shall be non-voting; (f) one representative of each of the other two European Supervisory Authorities who shall be non-voting.

\textsuperscript{33} The Management Board shall be composed of the Chairperson, a representative of the Commission, and four members elected by the Board of Supervisors from among its members. Each member other than the Chairperson shall have an alternate, who may replace the member of the Management Board if that person is prevented from attending.

\textsuperscript{34} Article 44 defines its Composition: 1. The Board of Appeal shall be a joint body of the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and the European Securities and Markets Authority. 2. The Board of Appeal shall be composed of six members and six alternates, who shall be individuals with relevant knowledge and experience, excluding current staff of the competent authorities or other national or Community institutions involved in the activities of the Authority.
a) To be independent from political and industry influences, at EU and national level;
b) To have clear mandates and tasks coupled with sufficient resources;
c) To be accountable to the political authorities at the EU and national levels.

4.2. The ECOFIN changes

The ECOFIN of 2 December 2009 has given a boost to the three ESAs under consideration. It “agreed on a general approach on draft regulations” but introduced changes that merit serious consideration:

1. The majority of contentious issues related to the Principle of Subsidiarity have been eliminated. In order to limit the scope of the tasks and powers of the Banking ESA, for example, the ECOFIN of 2 December 2009 amended slightly its tasks (Article 6(1)) so that the ESAs could be advisory rather than regulatory in nature. ESAs will be held responsible for publishing update information.

ECOFIN slightly amended the powers delegated to the ESAs in art. 6 (2); it amended any direct power of ESA to adopt individual decisions in cases of the 'breach of EU law' (under art. 9(4)). It also deleted the power of an ESA (i.e. art. 10 (3)) to 'adopt an individual decision requiring a national financial to comply with its obligations under the legislation'.

Yet the more important change is the deletion of ESA’s 'exclusive supervisory powers over entities with Community-wide reach or economic activities with Community-wide reach' (art. 6(3)). Hence direct supervision of cross-border institutions is retained at the ECOFIN level.

Nor would the ESAs 'have appropriate powers of investigation and enforcement' as specified in the relevant legislation, as well as the possibility of 'charging fees' if the ECOFIN amendments are accepted by the European Parliament.

Even art.7 on technical standards has been amended by ECOFIN in order to limit ESA's policy choices that may derive from a technical standard.

There is a serious amendment by the ECOFIN to Article 9 on 'breach of EU law'. The Council has removed the Commission's binding powers over national authorities to enforce the EU law. ECOFIN's view is that the Commission “issues a formal opinion” (in place of 'taking a decision') to the national competent authority to take action complying with the EU law.

Equally, the ESA's discretionary power to take action against a particular national Regulator - under Article 10 concerning action in emergency situations - has been amended by ECOFIN. It is now the Council that may adopt a decision to that effect.

2. The ECOFIN has misinterpreted the Principle of Proportionality. Under Article 5 of ToL, the principle of proportionality states: “the content and the form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”. In economic theory we have the term of ‘cost efficiency’ to depict matters of this kind.
“subsidiarity principle” 38, not the ‘cost-efficiency criterion’ - which is the economic term for the principle of proportionality. The latter is associated with the cost of a new institutional structure.

Art. 23(1) of the Commission's draft legislative acts incorporates this 'safeguard clause': “The Authority shall ensure that no decision adopted under Articles 10 [action in emergency situations] or 11 [settlements of disagreements] impinges in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of Member States.” (my [])

ECOFIN amended art. 23 in order to strengthen the Council's powers. The amended text (par.2) states: “Where a Member State considers that a decision taken under Article 11 (3) impinges on its fiscal responsibilities, it may notify the Authority and the Commission within two weeks after notification of the Authority's decision to the competent authority that the decision will not be implemented by the competent authority.” In other words, any national government will be allowed to suspend the ESA's decision seeking to settle a disagreement between competent authorities in cross-border situations, on grounds of impinging on 'its fiscal responsibilities'.

This fiscal safeguard clause is economically erroneous and the idea of devising a new architecture of financial supervision without cost is fallacious. We cannot devise a new EU policy on prudential supervision with peanuts. There are other articles that may involve fiscal action to remedy in time an emergency situation; this may be art. 21(4) on a warning or recommendation from the ESRB. 39 Under the current rules and practices, the cost of saving the financial and banking sectors from total collapse has been colossal.

Who is to bear the implicit incurred cost? The five draft legislative acts are silent. We examine this new architecture in section 6 and explain why this situation may arise. It leads us to propose the European Fund for Financial Stability (EFFS). It is a remedy to the contentious issues found in the ESA proposals, but not dealt with.

4.3 Issues in need of clarification

1. There is another issue associated with the principle of subsidiarity. It effectively means that national supervisors are required to become subordinate entities to the ESAs. It would thus end the long standing competence of national supervisors and the hierarchical structure they have worked with until the financial crisis of 2008.

The key to this change in structure is art. 25 on the composition of the ESA’s Board of Supervisors. The 27 national supervisors would be part of the Board. Will it work?

The logic of the draft regulation is ‘voluntary cooperation amongst national authorities and EU Institutions’. But this option has not worked under the Level 3 committees, and that is why the Commission and the LDR have strived to beef the new Authorities with new responsibilities. As we said in the preceding sections, it is unlikely to be functional under the Authorities because the ‘specialised knowledge’ and the ‘local market expertise’ reside with the national markets.

(Contd.)
Thus, something else is needed to make it obligatory for the national authorities prepare and submit to the ESRB the “proper, primary, timely information exchange among all supervisors to enable complete assessment – from the national to European to global levels.” (LDR: 48)

This can happen if the National Central Banks (NCBs) retain competence in financial supervision, under an alternative architecture of supervision (see Annex 2). Only then would the ‘complete information’ be legally obligatory. Only then would the step ‘from the national to European to global levels’ be realised.

2. There is an additional issue with the ESA proposals but it was first stated by the LDR: “the ESFS should be neutral with respect to national supervisory structures” (p.48). This ‘neutrality’ is not feasible, given the current political integration of the EU, because of two reasons.

The first reason is recognised by the LDR:

“national supervisory structures have been chosen for a variety of reasons and it would be impractical to try to harmonise them – even though it may well be that the current trend could continue towards the emergence of a dual “twin peaks” system (banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions being covered by the same authority and markets/conduct of business by another one).” (p.48)

The second reason is ‘national sovereignty’. If it is given up or delegated to an ESA, then the entire debate about the pros and cons of the Maastricht Treaty setting up Economic and Monetary Union is to restart. This is impossible today.

What is possible and feasible, today, is to recognise reality. And reality resides in the fact that the National Central Banks (NCBs), under the current Treaty, have lost their ‘monetary sovereignty’ to the benefit of the European Central Bank (ECB). Today, NCBs are Agencies of the ECB in implementing the centralised decisions taken by the ECB/ESCB system.

There is another aspect of reality. In a decentralised system of monetary policy, financial stability in certain markets and countries is crucial for a timely and proper implementation of monetary decision. The NCBs are better apt to assume the responsibility for the Last Resort of Managing Risk, something we examine in the next sections and depicted in Annex 2.

The important thing to recognize is the EFFS - as proposed by the DLR and endorsed by the three ‘draft legal acts’ - is a very costly institutional structure. We already have a structure that needs a different upgrading that would be cost-effective, as the principle of proportionality calls for.

This slight upgrading accompanied by a new mandate is proposed in the next section.

3. There are grounds to believe that the ESAs may not attain the main objective of the exercise, namely, ‘the integration of micro-prudential supervision into the system of the ESRB’. This is important to the new architecture. The core problem resides with the logic of the ESA proposals, whose stress is put on making ‘the financial system as a whole safe simply by making individual financial firms and instruments safe’. This has been addressed by the Warwick Commission (2009: 3) and concluded:

“In trying to make themselves safer, banks, and other highly leveraged financial intermediaries, can behave in a way that collectively undermines the system. Where risks are endogenous to the financial system – where, for example, risks relate to the interdependence of institutions and their behaviour and perceptions – micro-prudential regulation will prove inadequate. Indeed, in certain circumstances, what seems to be sensible micro-prudential regulation can create endogenous risks.”

The Warwick Commission (2009: 3) gives an example: “But imagine an environment where an economic recession triggers a rating downgrade, which leads all holders of the asset to try and sell the same credit at the same time to avoid the higher capital requirement, which causes the credit price to collapse after the downgrade. This makes it harder for the
However, this is exactly the opposite of the prime objective of the new system, namely to avoid individual acts creating a dynamic that 'can turn a little local difficulty into a systemic crisis'. How could it be avoided? We propose a different structure in the next section.

5. Role of National Central Banks (NCBs)

The principle source of financial instability is the risk externality generated by the failure of one institution interlinked with a chain of financial markets and systems. It is institutional in nature. The risk externality is the more important source because the settlement systems are integral parts of the money process (M-C-M*), where M is exchanged for real resources (C) and the end result is captured by M*.

The money process (M-C-M*) is interwoven with information systems and interdependent payment systems linked via the intermediation of money externalities. Failure to manage liability and risk externalities exposes EMU to financial instability.

In the alternative scheme we propose (see Annex 2), institutional financial instability could be remedied by conferring on national central banks the task of last resort of liability and risk externalities. In this way, the moral hazard (induced by the same institution that authorises the establishment of a bank and also rescues it from failure) partly disappears because the two roles are divorced. The ECB is responsible for authorization. NCBs will be responsible for supervision and closures of insolvent institutions. The proposed ESAs cannot have this responsibility.

Given that the ECB should assume power in prudential supervision, under our scheme, the responsibility of implementation should rest with the NCBs. This is analogous to the scheme of the ECB’s centralisation of monetary policy and decentralisation of its implementation; under this scheme we respect the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality.

Under the principle of subsidiarity, the NCBs will be responsible for the closure of insolvent banks, as the second Banking Directive under the 'home-rule' requires. And under the principle of proportionality, cost efficiency will be increased substantially.

Separation of authority between two bodies dealing with Decision and Execution respectively is a means of checks and balances. And this is shown in Annex 2. The European Authorities have no reason to exist. The current committees of Level 3 will be under the authority of the European Steering Committee of Vice-Governors of NCBs.

5.1 The Steering Committee

It will assume the power attributed by the DLR to the Authorities, referred to in section 5.1. The Steering Committee, amongst other things, will:

1. become the implementing body of all decisions taken by the ESRB;
2. become the ‘standards setter’ for regulatory matters;
3. review, supervise and have powers over the National Supervisors;
4. supervise individual banks, insurers or investment firms;
5. re-define the Home versus Host supervision over the blurred definition of Branches and Subsidiaries;
6. have the power to impose Fines and Sanctions;
7. be the body to which the Level 3 committees are accountable;

issuer of the credit to borrow, which threatens its liquidity and then solvency, which in turn leads to a further credit downgrade and more selling.”
8. be responsible for providing the ESRB with timely and reliable information about risks, potential and manifested, and possible exposures in all national markets.

In short, the Steering Committee will be responsible for the correct implementation of decisions by the ERSB and have binding, discretionary, regulatory and supervisory powers, under the auspices of the General Council of the ESCB/ECB. It will become a powerful body, with a difference, on the following grounds:

First, the Steering Committee will have a derivative ‘legal personality’ stemming from the Statutes of the National Central Banks, of which 16 have been reformed in accordance with the ECB/ESCB Statute.

Second, the major weakness of the current structure of prudential supervision has been the inducement of Money Externalities residing in the sphere of ‘failure of co-ordination’ between macro-prudential supervision and micro-supervision, and ‘failure to act’ at the level of Members States, despite the early warnings. The repair, therefore, should concentrate on the proper and balanced powers of the institutions concerned.

Third, the integration of the macro-prudential with the micro-supervision will be the core responsibility of the Steering Committee. All other layers of power will be subordinate to it.

Fourth, the revised organisational structure - as depicted in Annex 2 - will capture all ‘Transactions Costs Externalities’ because it will be far more cost-effective if compared to the ESAs structure.

Fifth, the majority of ‘money externalities’ associated with 'Confidence Externalities' will be captured by the Steering Committee. This is more important for public institutions, today. One of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis has been the loss of Trust, Regulation and Guarantees Externalities.

Sixth, the current fear of revealing confidential data amongst national supervisors in Level 3 committees will not be repaired with the three ESAs. But in our scheme, the Vice-Presidents of the NCBs forming the Steering Committee will be responsible for the free-flow and transparent information. This is its prime mandate as an organ of the new system.

5.2 College of supervisors

There would be the colleges of supervisors, in our scheme (Annex 2). In fact their creation is foreseen in two Directives: revised Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and the Solvency 2. Their task would be to monitor ‘all cross-border banking institutions established in the EU’. “As an order of magnitude, this could encompass at least 50 financial institutions having a significant market share in another Member State.”(DLR: 51)

In our scheme, they would assume an important role, under the guidance of the European Steering Committee, given their functional role to inform directly the latter of the potential and emerging risks in cross-border activities.41

Matters falling in the remit of the Steering Committee for a Decision may be easily delegated to the College of Supervisors for resolution; matters of interest to the cross-border groups may be:

- A common interpretation of Community texts;
- Relations between “home” and “host” supervisors, with an objective to achieve proper governance of the supervision of transnational groups and of monitoring subsidiaries and branches of those groups;
- Establishing technical standards downstream of the texts;

41 According to de Larosière (2010:6), “Europe currently has around 36 colleges. And they are beginning to operate internationally in the case of groups whose activities extend beyond the boundaries of the EU”.

16
• Binding mediation in the case of differences of opinion between two supervisors.

The core idea is to develop a common culture of supervision and risk analysis. To this end, each college would consist of the national supervisors of each country in which the bank has a branch, as well as the representatives of the bank. Colleges will play an important role in providing a consistent interpretation of rules applied to one bank across different Member States, and will become a forum for exchanging information amongst supervisors.

There is a ‘mandatory obligation’, arising from the responsibility of college of supervisors to act upon risks identified by the ESRB. The latter's recommendation may be considered ‘toothless’ unless sanctions are foreseen. Who will impose them? Under the draft legal acts, we do not know. Under our scheme, it will be the European Steering Committee. It would simply request national authorities to implement sanctions.

5.3 National supervisors

The DLR recognises that “the existing national supervisors, who are closest to the markets and institutions they supervise, would continue to carry-out day-to-day supervision and preserve the majority of their present competence” (p.47). However, under the draft legal acts, they would be subordinate to the European Supervisors. The new Authorities would have binding powers over national supervisors on supervisory standards, etc.

Furthermore, under the proposed legal acts, the supervisor of the home Member State will continue to function as the first point of contact for the firm concerned. On the other hand, the Authorities would co-ordinate the application of common high level supervisory standards, guarantee strong cooperation with the other supervisors, and guarantee that the interests of host supervisors are properly safeguarded.

But these matters, today, fall in the remit of responsibility of the national supervisors. The experience of the 2008 financial crisis is telling. National supervisors ‘ignored risk warnings’ Why? They were not fully involved, and because of ‘fractured relationship’ between the Level 3 supervisors and national supervisors. The national supervisors possess an important advantage: Expertise knowledge arising from their proximity to taking action at the national level. The proposed ESAs would depend on this comparative advantage. Yet it is not their own, but it is of the national supervisors’ experience and knowledge of the market.

This thorny relationship is easily solved under our scheme. National supervisors are accountable to the Vice-Governors of the NCBs. They have an interest to provide them with ‘complete up to date information’. And the sanctions are easier to impose in a national context, without risking misjudgement over ‘who’ is really responsible for failure to act.

Resolution of the ‘thorny relationship’ does not necessary solve a related problem. It has to do with the necessary retraining of national supervisors, coupled with a new scheme of incentives. But both matters fall in the competence of national authorities.

In this new structure of Annex 2, there is a problem: Who should be responsible for Credit Rating.

5.4 Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs)

An EC Regulation is now put in place. It has followed the DLR recommendation. 42 However, under our Money Externalities approach, it is not fully consistent with the principles of good legislation

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42 The key elements of the initial proposal were: CRAs must disclose key models; methodologies and assumptions on which their ratings are based. The removal of conflicts of interest from the ratings system through disclosure
protecting both taxpayers and users of financial services. Furthermore, the question of legal and financial independence is not resolved. Nor is the question of sanctions clearly set.

This brings us back to the linkages between Finance and Trade, Finance and Production and Finance and Investment. It raises concerns about the role of oligopoly - three Credit Rating Agencies in the USA - appraising and setting the AAA rate for the mortgage-backed securities. It also raises the question of whether the real risk was spread via the links that packages of securities were supposed to do, but failed. The financial crisis of 2008 has shown that ‘the risk may have been spread but at the expense of a sky-high leverage’.

Under the proposed supervisory structure of Annex 2, the NCBs will license and supervise the private CRAs. But as long as the CRAs are private institutions, they play an important role in the assessment of Risk:

First, by legislation, the private sector is called upon to assess itself in order to safeguard a public good – i.e. financial stability.

Second, the questions of Objectivity, Conflict of Interest and Accountability, although taken into account in the adopted Regulation, are difficult to know and enforce.

There is another fear. By regulating private rating agencies, the EU institutions “would actually become party to the blame when things go wrong in future”. In essence, it is recognition of an ‘inability’ by the public sector to have its own rating system serving the public good of financial stability.

This fear of public failure induces external diseconomies because, at present, the rating of a financial institution determines the level of capital that the institution is required to hold under the Basel rules. Even if the Basel rules are revised as proposed by the LDR, the new rules will have to rely on ‘some’ rating estimated by ‘some’ body.

Hence this problem has to be resolved by the new structure of Annex 2, together with the question of whether the new regulation, will have ‘adverse effects on the competitiveness of the EU businesses in the global economy’.

The alternative would be another form of supervision applicable to globalised market. But we are not yet there.

In the context of our scheme, there should be a new Regulation requiring that any credit rating by a NCB in the EU will have to be approved by the ECB in conformity with the EU principles and that it will be applicable to all Member States.

(Contd.)

requirements. Introduction of a registration regime for CRAs. EU financial institutions may only trade in instruments rated by an EU registered rating agency - were retained in the adopted Regulation.

43 Prof Goodhart giving evidence before the UK House of Lords (2009: 17).
44 The witnesses before the UK House of Lords (2009: 17-19) are revealing: “The French Representation felt that there was a need to avoid clearing the rating agencies of responsibility for the quality of their ratings and giving them a “public endorsement. Moody’s accepted that there was a danger that “legislators could create the mistaken impression that because ratings are a closely regulated product they are fully endorsed by a national or EU authority” … The FSA told us that it was important for the Commission to monitor the use of ratings to ensure that regulation does not have this effect … DG Markt, in response to these criticisms, highlighted the due diligence requirements on the part of financial institutions that form part of the amendments to the CR D… The Regulation itself states “The user of credit ratings should take utmost care to perform their own analysis and conduct appropriate due diligence”, although the proposal includes no enforcement process.”

45 The view of the UK House of Lords, based on the evidence it received is that “The new text will therefore continue to inhibit the participation of EU financial institutions in the global market until there is an international consensus on the regulation of CRAs” (p.19).
6. A European Fiscal Authority (EFA)

Whereas the ECB under the Treaty (article 127, ex-105)\(^{46}\) can provide ‘liquidity’, it cannot provide ‘capital’. Furthermore, there is no automatic mechanism in the Treaty providing for ‘capital’ by an EU body in cases of stress, crises or natural disasters, save some budget lines in the EC budget for ‘emergency support’.

I argued in my monograph (1994: section 7.8) that the Maastricht Treaty erred in its institutional structure of Economic and Monetary Union because the EMU was essentially a ‘common monetary union’, neglecting the economic aspects of it. A repair of this neglect was needed by instituting a European Fiscal Authority (EFA).\(^{47}\) The optimism of the early 1990s did not allow proper discussion of the EFA, although the so-called ‘economic governance’ started drawing attention. Later on, the Stability Pact stopped all discussion about a EFA. Nor was the question of ‘what could the ECB do if faced with the case of financial instability’ properly addressed.

The argument is essentially centred on ‘what’ categories of ‘money externalities’ are captured by the ECB for which a compensatory mechanism be devised to counter its effects, or to mitigate certain sources of vulnerability to the system.

The main concern was the capturing of seigniorage externalities and the generating of price level externalities by the ECB. It is in the nature of its monetary unit that will spur and internalise learning and technological externalities. The internalisation of these three categories of externalities effectively calls for the creation of a Fiscal Authority in the EU. In addition, given the fact that there can be no effective monetary policy without the support of a fiscal policy and given that money is considered as super-non-neutral, shared responsibility establishes a new regime. A EFA for enhanced cooperation between the monetary and fiscal policy becomes imperative.

Our argument for an EFA has nothing to do with the federal-camp proposal. The federal-camp argument is about an EU mechanism of redistribution of income in order to correct regional disparities. Our argument is twofold. First, it is about the categories of money externalities captured by the ECB which are at the expense of national central banks and of national banking systems. Second, it is about why EMU is defective in its present institutional setting.

We have identified seigniorage as the internalisation of externalities generated in the banking system. This means a surplus that is generated by the banking system. It is derived from two components of demand for money; the first is a direct demand for currency, the second is an indirect demand for bank reserves (i.e. demand for deposits and reserve requirements). In our scheme of a money process (M-C-M*), the exchange of money (M) for real resources - i.e. the commodities (C) - will be a loan carrying with it interest which is free but captured by M*.

In other words, in an oligopolistic money market, the following may happen. The generation or internalisation of money externalities will be captured by the producer of a currency (in our case the ECB); in this way, the ECB will capture real seigniorage. A second mechanism is induced by the decision of the ECB to place its reserves on money markets; it mainly confers appreciable benefit on the banking system that manages the reserves, generating additional income via the reserve liability externality.

Theoretically, a EFA will be functioning as a body whose primary objective will be to 'redistribute' the seigniorage externalities captured by the ECB. However, there is no way to estimate what is the amount of seigniorage accrued or generated because ‘money externalities’ are not measurable, nor quantifiable. And some others exist on account of the interdependent nature of the monetary system.

\(^{46}\) Treaty references are made to the consolidated versions of the Treaties (OJ C115, 9 May 2008).

\(^{47}\) It is to be understood that an EFA should be endowed with an EU Fund and with the management of Economic Policy at the EU level. An EFA will not have taxing powers. Hence ‘fiscal’ is not ‘synonymous’ to the power of Tax, in this WP.
Hence, an EFA is born out of the necessity to **complete the institutional structure** that would extract the optimum level of seigniorage and distribute it equitably. For this to occur, one needs to know the sources of seigniorage.

An important source of seigniorage externalities is the reserve-type. Suppose a central bank of a third country decides to hold Euro as its reserve. Any creation of reserve assets entails a **reserve-type externality** in the sense that low-powered money for the central bank in question becomes the reserve component of the national money supplies, generating either an external economy or diseconomy. It will also induce a **distributional externality** since they share the same monetary unit. Then any reserve creation will create benefits and costs similar to the ones experienced under the dollar standard.

The Euro by now has become fully fledged credit money. Then the **resource saving seigniorage** generated and it is substantial. It is analogous to the major monetary transformations we have experienced, when moving from hard metallic money to refined with intrinsic value to paper money and possible to electronic in the near future. Any resource-saving seigniorage will lead to a greater producer's surplus on the borrower's side because the cost involved in fulfilling the function of a reserve centre or of a technological innovation in settlement of debts will be less. This results from the size of the European market and from the depth of unified financial markets. Consequently two sources of **gains-externality** will be born.

The first derives from the superior productivity induced by a superior technocratic frontier. The second is the **technological externality** internalised by the banking system because it will use advanced technology for the transmission of payments and for settlement of debts.

The term **forced saving externality** denotes the power of the banking system to extend credit in excess of saving either because banking liabilities are accepted as means of payment or because of a not-fully regulated banking system, like today's shadow banking. These acts entail sources of financial vulnerability if ‘confidence externalities’ are destroyed in the process.

Similarly, the **revolving fund externality** is used to denote the power of commercial banks to use the flow of income, consumption, investment, profits and wages in order to create private debt (or liquidity) or inside money. Both notions are integrated into the power of the banking system to distribute savings via their **liability and risk management externalities** but the two differ in their effects.

The **forced saving externality** will be operational when credit overdraft is extended to finance investment and thus, saving is preceded by investment, without causing inflationary finance. The **revolving fund externality** will be effective only if it leads to redistribution of income via a price increase. For this to occur, private debt should be considered as a net worth. An easy mechanism to transform debt into a net worth is the shadow banking that has generated and captured these types of ‘money externalities’.

With the creation of the ECB, national banking systems of the Euro area have been obliged to give up their activities in the financial area because their monetary unit no longer existed; in a sense they have transferred such seigniorage to the ECB.

The most important aspect of the ECB is the effective transfer of national monetary sovereignty to an EU institution whose capacity of creating the **price level externalities** is associated with the producer of a single currency. Yet a producer of money, even when inflation is anticipated, could impose an ‘excise tax’ on the holders of real balances whenever he decides to increase its money supply. This effectively means a **redistribution externality** capturing real national resources and transferring them to the European entity.

However, capturing the **redistribution externality** implies that a national tax authority or EU with its budget would put in place a system that would favour **indirect transfers**. Should this redistribution externality be captured by the ECB, because of the absence of an EFA endowed with a budget, it
would lead to a second externality, identified as *fiscal set externality*. It is caused by the divergence between the *marginal value* attached by Member States and the *marginal cost* of an extra monetary unit issued by the ECB.

Still in the category of ‘price level externalities’, the *money-illusion externality* will be operative if the ECB uses its monetary policy to generate price level changes to modify the burden of debt proportionately. It is similar to the Keynes’s method of the *General Theory*. Keynes proposed to use the money supply, instead of changes in wages, to induce changes in the burden of debt through the operation of the *money illusion externality*. If this power was exercised by the ECB, it would be an external economy to the Member States, though a number of social groups might not be consenting parties.

This brings us to another pressing problem. If the ECB assumed responsibility for monetary policy, its objectives might be in conflict with the economic policies of Member States. This separation of responsibilities reflects the economic logic of EMU but may lead to monetary instability. Meade (1990) had expressed concerns about this possibility. His explanation rests on the interdependence of monetary and fiscal policies and the elasticity of demand and supply coupled by multiplier effects. It could cause the following situation. Monetary policy might reduce the price level by less than it might affect the budget deficit while fiscal policy might affect the price level by more than the budget deficit.

Hence the interdependence assured by our money externalities, cannot be managed by two entities having divergent objectives. Assume the ECB raises the interest rate by y% in order to cause an x% fall in inflation. This would only occur if the *expectational demand* for money and *expectational rate of interest* react according to traditional theory. In our model, the situation is ‘ambiguous’ and would depend on the *expectations externality* and on *price level externalities*, causing fiscal set, redistribution and money illusion externalities. The end result might be lower or higher inflation rate depending on the new level of income that corresponds to the new *expectational rate of interest*.

The EFA would have to assume the above ‘coordinating role’. A well functioning monetary system needs an *‘automatic mechanism’* that allows monetary or systemic disturbances to be corrected without producing inequitable effects and without aggravating existing structural weaknesses. The solution to this automatic mechanism lies in the technical characteristics of the monetary system and in the institutional setting-up to support it.

In other words, if the proposed establishment of the ERSB were accepted without a EFA, there would be a *half-built house*. Under the current pressure due to the financial crisis of 2008, the Commission complied with the decision of the European Council of 18-19 June 2009 and submitted the package of legislative proposals referred to in the preceding sections.

There is not a single clear hint to a *EU capital recourse* in the five proposals under consideration. As we said earlier, the Commission proposals respected the ECOFIN’s view of *‘not impinging the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States’*. This is theoretically *incorrect* and in reality *inconsistent* with the mission of the proposals seeking to repair the EU supervisory structure. The urgent question to address is:

*Who should bear the budgetary burden for mitigating and tackling Financial Instability?*

This is the *missing element* in both the DLR and Commission proposals, but it could be easily repaired. We seek to make the case for a *European Fund for Financial Stability (EFFS)* in the next section.

### 6.1 European Fund for Financial Stability (EFFS)

Institutional balance in the financial field, under the Treaty of Lisbon, is rather difficult but *not* impossible. Ideally our EFA should be created to assume responsibility for *‘economic governance of*
EMU’, with its own budget, independence and mission. But this is almost impossible, today. A reduced mission going to the right direction is a small step, but may help preserve ‘financial stability’.

Our assumption is that regulation alone can not repair financial instability; nor can regulation preserve financial stability.

As we argued in earlier sections, the Commission proposals for supervisory repair, without the necessary modifications, will lead to a high cost that may be translated into a deadlock.

Theoretically, the supervisory repair needs a global response because the actors are global, the markets are globalised and the forces of change reside with Haute Finance. But I do not see the global response forthcoming in the short period, but an EU response in time could be welcomed.

By default, we are left with the EU searching for a regional answer. The European Fund for Financial Stability (EFFS) is conceived in this endeavour:

- It will have a mission, whose content will tell us what the legal base should be.
- It will have its own budgetary resources.

6.2 Mission of a European Fund for Financial Stability (EFFS)

The EFFS will take action for all cross-border cases considered by the ESRB ‘eligible’ for ‘emergency capital support’ (see Annex 2).

There should be no confusion between the ECB’s facility to provide ‘liquidity assistance’, as it has done since August 2008, and the EFFS’s power to grant ‘capital aid’ for a specific objective to preserve financial stability or to repair a fractured financial system.

The EFFS’s action should respect the same principles under which the recent ‘state aid’ in the form of ‘guarantees on deposits’ granted by Member States to their financial sector in 2008. It effectively invoked art. 107 (ex-art. 87 (3) (b)) of the Treaty by respecting the principle that such ‘support’ should not distort competition or affect trade, both being incompatible with the single market.48

There is a problem with ‘responsibility’ for bailing out a failed institution. If the ESRB assumes the ‘moral suasion’ powers proposed by the Commission proposals, then ‘cross-border crisis management’ means that it is exercised at the EU level. In such a juncture, it would need to be at an EU level, with “EU funds”, rather than at the national level.49

In reality, the EFFS would be endowed with the ability to provide ‘capital of last resort’, something that only the Member States have had so far.

This case of ‘bailing out’ should not be confused with the cases covered by Article 125 (ex-103) of the Treaty. The latter prevents the EU or other Member States from providing financial assistance to a Member State facing rising ‘public debt’.50


49 We are proposing a rescue to DLR: “In view of the absence of an EU-level mechanisms for financing cross-border crisis resolution efforts, Member States should agree on more detailed criteria for burden sharing than those contained in the existing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and amend the MoU accordingly.” (p.37)

50 A recent proposal by Gros and Mayer (2010) to create a “Euro(pean) Monetary Fund” seeks to overcome the “no bailing out clause”. In reality, this proposal is a refined re-dressing of the ex-Minister of Finance of Germany and father of the “Stability Pact” - Mr Theo Weigel. The Gros and Mayer proposal entails two pillars: A ‘financing mechanism’ that is
Under our scheme of micro-prudential supervision (see Annex 2, lower part), it will remain a national responsibility, with the exception of cross-border cases. If a national financial firm ‘gets into trouble’ then responsibility for bailing out a failed institution remains a national concern.

Or if Member States would be ‘unwilling to cede national micro-prudential supervisory powers to an EU body’ (opting out clause, under our Annex 2), they would hold on to their responsibility for bailing out their financial companies.

In our alternative scheme, the European Fund for Financial Stability (EFFS) would be endowed with its own capital resources under the EU budget (see section 6.3). This would permit it to have the budgetary resources needed to rescue ‘distressed banks’. In this instance, the legal proposal for the creation of the EFFS would need to lay down a system of mandatory burden sharing between Member States for ‘capital support’ if it would exceed a certain amount.

Furthermore, the financial crisis of 2008 has shown that the private sector did not restructure by itself.\textsuperscript{51} It left it to the public sector. Hence how could one finance a rescue plan? The burden sharing becomes an urgent issue in search of a solution.\textsuperscript{52}

6.3 Resources of the European Fund for Financial Stability

In order to maintain the independence of the entire system, and, in particular, the ECB’s, the European Fund for Financial Stability (EFFS) should be endowed with its own capital resources.

We are not short of proposals, today. First, the DLR (2009: 36) proposed a theoretical scheme of burden sharing arrangements. The sources of capital would come from the financial institutions. They entail one or a combination of the following:

- a. the deposits of the institution;
- b. the assets of the institution;
- c. the revenue flows of the institution;
- d. the share of payment system flows of the institution.

And the public purse of Member States would have to contribute to the private resources. Yet they are voluntary agreements.

Gros and Micossi (2008) proposed a Delors-type scheme. It has three elements. First, there would be EU-backed bonds, offered to the public with the intention of creating a new market. Second, these EU-bonds will be the capital of a newly set up, called ‘European Financial Stability Fund’; its size is expected to be about ‘€500-700 billion’. Third, this Fund would be set up at ‘the European Investment Bank’. Its main mission would be to use the Fund ‘for bank recapitalisation’, especially for banks which are situated in the EU periphery.

Although the idea is good, it is not in competition with our proposal. Yet its structure (i.e. budget resources, objectives and management) is totally at variance with our EFFS.\textsuperscript{53}

(Contd.)

\textsuperscript{51} For the ‘distressed banks’, the DLR sets the priorities: ‘priority should always be given to private-sector solutions (e.g. restructuring). When these solutions appear insufficient, then public authorities have to play a more prominent role and the injection of public money becomes often inevitable’ (p.33).

\textsuperscript{52} Our scheme opts for Buiter’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} potential solutions; he states “1. a supranational euro zone-wide tax and borrowing authority; 2. a euro zone wide fund, specifically dedicated to fiscal backing for the ECB/euro system; and 3. an ad-hoc, fiscal burden-sharing rule options” (Buiter, 2009).
We are tempted to propose three potential sources:

a. Transaction tax,

b. Fines imposed by the EU,

c. Various EU budget lines on recovery or solidarity.

We concentrate on the transaction tax (TT) in the next section. Fines and various EU budget lines is not the object of this WP.

6.4 A Transaction Tax (TT)

The objective of imposing a ‘transaction tax’ is eight-fold.

1. To eliminate holes in the market where a two tier financial system - one ‘regulated and taxed’, the other ‘slightly regulated and largely untaxed’ - exists. This situation has given rise to two important categories of money externalities: ‘Transaction Cost Externalities’, and ‘Seigniorage Externalities’. The ‘slightly regulated and largely untaxed’ sector in the main has captured both categories and has established via this act the so-called ‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions.

This first objective does not necessarily mean that on its own it can solve all aspects of competition. On this aspect, we say more in section 7.5; it is a first step to the right direction in under cutting the sources that favour the emergence of 'big' financial institutions.

2. To apply a uniform transaction tax to all institutions and all types of liability managed, without exemptions and without differential rates, it will generate an immediate impact. It will change the ‘incentives of the actors’. It will favour incentives towards long term investments and away from short term speculation; in this way, a transaction tax (TT) may induce another ‘external economy’ by stabilizing financial markets via a combination of other acts to which we refer below.

A single TT will mean that the current costs arising from 1) brokerage fee, 2) exchange fee, 3) short term volatility of prices, 4) market movement in response to transactions etc, will disappear. And with them their potential to ‘distort’ and to ‘control liquidity’ will disappear. This is a major capture of the ‘efficiency externality’, whose quantitative dimension cannot be known ex ante.

Yet the major attraction to governments is that a TT is a secure source of revenue for dealing with so many effects the 2008 crisis has generated. Kapoor (2009:1) assembled the evidence of the Norwegian study and said: “Various estimates show that such taxes could rise predictable, stable, and easy to collect revenues in the range of hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Figures of the range of 0.5%-2% GDP annually have been reported by several studies”. And Schulmeister (2009:1) arrived at similar estimates for Europe: “revenues would amount to 1.6% of GDP at a tax rate of 0.05% (transaction volume is assumed to decline by roughly 65% at this rate)”.

3. To install fair treatment. In a global world where finance is linked to Trade, Production and Investment, shadow banking plays an important role in promoting 'exceedingly high turnover'.

(Contd.)

53 In a scheme like ours, the EU is a ‘guarantor’ by definition. Then it is only logical that a crisis in the financial sector would mean that the crisis management is based on public funding. If used, it would induce a number of money externalities whose net impact is disproportionate to those who bear the cost vis-à-vis to those who benefit from the crisis management.

54 Other sources may be or Insurance fee, or Resolution fund, or Contingent capital. But they are complicated and have not been debated.

55 A recent survey of economic literature on ‘Financial Transaction Tax’ by Darrvas and von Weizsäcker (2010) concluded: “we do see some merit in the case for a small financial transaction tax as a Pigou tax if financial transactions indeed cause negative external effects that need to be internalised. (p.9). This limited in scope survey is not with the literature surveyed, nor with the papers and articles cited in this WP.
such capital movements have caused serious disturbances to the market. It had captured and used for its own benefit the ‘forced saving externalities’ particularly in the subprime sector and the ‘revolving fund externality’ in financing of Mergers and Acquisitions.

This globalised world has also generated two other Money Externalities: the distribution and fiscal set externalities, because the former was used for the act of securitisation of financial products, thus increasing leverage. However, increased leverage is an act of conferring upon those managing ‘securitised products’ an external economy, and impose on the end-user an ‘external diseconomy’. The first may not be taxed, depending on the location, whilst the end-user will be taxed. Hence we have the origin of the fiscal set externality.

Setting a ‘transaction tax’ on each stage of securitisation will impose a fairer share of the burden.

4. To minimise waste. There is an efficiency externality largely geared into the minimisation of waste and resources, due to the simplicity of a TT. Kapoor (2009: 3) states:

“Consider a stock transaction tax of 0.1% for instance. A trader with a daily investment horizon would on average trade once a day and end up paying a 250*0.1 = 25% effective tax rate. A pension fund with a five year horizon, on the other hand, will end up paying only 0.02% or 1/1250th the rate of the daily trader.”

Furthermore, according to the Norwegian study: “Applying small transaction levies, of the order of a few hundredths of one per cent, can raise vast sums of money, and because these transfers are carried out electronically, it makes implementation simple and each transaction traceable. Many such transaction taxes already operate successfully and raise billions of dollars of revenue for countries as varied as the UK and Brazil.” (Hillman, D, S. Kapoor and S. Spratt (2006: 12)

Schulmeister (2009:3) stresses two points. First, a “FTT would compensate the distortion effect caused by the exemption of financial services from the value-added-tax”. Second, if a FTT is only applied to transactions on exchanges in two countries - UK and Germany - “neither country needs to fear a significant ‘emigration’ of trading. This can be presumed because roughly 97% of all transactions on exchanges in the EU are carried out in these two countries”.

5. To create a fair tax incidence. The TT will touch all markets, and its impact will be felt by the shadow banking. In this way the principle of fair incidence is met. But more importantly, its system risk will be minimised and its leverage reduced.

Transaction taxes, by its form, entail a highly progressive incidence as opposed, for example, to sales taxes or value added taxes which are regressive. If applied to the hedge funds, which in 2007 accounted for as much as 50% of trading volume in certain markets, price volatility and speed of movement will be reduced, and disclosure enhanced. Thus, two main sources of financial vulnerability will be contained.

Yet which segments of the EU society are the beneficiaries of the current system? The Norwegian study identified two: large co-operations and the rentier class. As to the large co-operations benefiting

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56 Hillman, D, S. Kapoor and S. Spratt (2006: 7) studied the evolution of currency markets from the 1970s to 2005 and found who are the biggest beneficiaries of globalisation: “Annual turnover in the global market for currencies, has, for instance, expanded from about $4 trillion in the 70s to $40 trillion in the mid- 80s to more than $450 trillion now - a more than 100 fold increase. Profits at financial services firms are also at a record high with the top two most profitable banks, Citibank and HSBC, posting more than $40 billion of profits between them in 2005 alone”. Kapoor (2009:1) also looked at the ‘equity markets’: “Turnover in equity markets registered a seven fold increase between 1993 and 2005 to about $51 trillion and the notional value of OTC credit default swaps alone rose to more than $60 trillion from almost nothing a decade ago”.

57 The Norwegian Study (2006) devotes its chapter 3 to responding to the objections, one of which is the tax incidence (i.e. the burden impact), the economic incidence (i.e. who pays the TT), the efficiency gains arising from our learning and technological externalities, and net benefits for the banks involved arising from a Rent (when banks’ transactions are settled in ‘gross’ form but they are funded on a ‘net’ basis.

As to the citizens involved, Kapoor (2009: 2) summarized the Norwegian study: “financial transactions are still disproportionately conducted by the richer segments of society either directly (through in house asset management) or through vehicles such as hedge funds. More than 25% of financial assets in the United States, for example, are owned by the top 1% richest population.” The same trend of concentration of economic benefits is found in Europe.

6. To create a system difficult to evade and avoid. Historically, transaction taxes are not new in the world. Hillman, D, S. Kapoor and S. Spratt (2006) in their study - commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - compiled a list of the countries that have some form of transaction tax levied on financial services. About 40 countries (both developing and advanced) have taxed these services. At least ten EU Member States have exercised this tool.

The UK has been the front runner, and its tax earnings are substantial. “Financial Transaction taxes have been around for hundreds of years with the Stamp Duty on the trading of shares in the London Stock Exchange being one of the oldest still around. This tax, which is now, levied electronically at 0.5% (50 basis points) of the face value of share purchases collects more than $7 billion every year.” (Kappor, 2009:3).

The US has its own regime by using the Section 31 fee on financial transactions. “Security transaction taxes apply to transactions in publicly traded shares and exchange traded futures and options and the revenue raised is used to cover the cost of the operations of financial regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)” (Hillman, D, S. Kapoor and S. Spratt, 2006:15)

All past and recent official reports on ‘offshore financial centres’ and those who have been against the Tobin tax (initially intended for the stabilisation of exchange rate) stress the point that such taxes should be applied at world level. They all propose an International Agreement to be struck for its effective implementation. And they usually accuse the US for laxity, but the truth is different.\(^{59}\)

There are two objections to the TT. The TT is not reliable source and a TT is difficult to collect. Both were examined by the Norwegian study and found exactly the opposite:

First, one can not easily evade and avoid it. “Such levies are collected electronically at minimal cost, on average about 50 times less than the corresponding costs for the collection of income taxes. Once the collection has been plumbed into the electronic system it is automatic and very difficult to avoid.” (Hillman, Kapoor and Spratt, 2006:12). Hence the tracing is easy because financial transactions leave an electronic trail and/or are settled at a central clearing centre.

Second, “they are difficult to avoid [because] that they are collected automatically either at the point of the initiation of the transaction or at the point of their settlement. While there have been some fears of transactions moving offshore to avoid unilaterally implemented taxes, these are exaggerated.” (Kappor, 2009: 3) (my [])

Third, the Norwegian study summarised its findings as follow:

“- Where FTTs [Financial Transaction Taxes] have been levied, financial markets have generally adopted them with no major repercussions

\(^{58}\) In 2005, these were: Citigroup ($25bn), HSBC($16bn), UBS ($11bn), JP Morgan Chase ($8bn), Barclays ($7bn), Goldman Sachs ($6bn), ABN Amro ($5bn), Merill Lynch ($5bn), Morgan Sanley ($5bn), Deutsch Bank ($5bn).

\(^{59}\) Kapoor (2009:3), however, finds the US case interesting: “This is an interesting model where the financial markets pay for their own regulation and can be expanded also to include not only paying for all financial market regulation and supervision but also for rainy day financial bailout funds and past bailouts.”
- FTTs raise substantial amounts of revenue
- In most cases, this income is collected electronically at the point of settlement with minimum cost to the governments
- Evasion has not proved a serious problem.” (Hillman, Kapoor and Spratt, 2006: 16).

7. To **mitigate price volatility.** The early proponents of a TT argued that “the predominance of speculation over enterprise” (Keynes, 1936) leads to dampening the economic growth and employment. It is a harmful activity because the price mechanism does work efficiently, leading to misallocation of resources, thus a **negative externality.**

For Tobin (1978), the overshooting of exchange rates, of stock prices, of interest rates and of commodities prices are due to short-term speculation that produces long swings in prices and persistent deviations from their fundamental equilibria. Hence setting a small tax on 'foreign exchange' - the largest market - will reduce price volatility, and the 'efficiency externality' will be captured by the market, irrespective of a lower speed in concluding financial transactions.

These cases have been analysed by Schulmeister (2009:12) and arrived at the following:

a. “A FTT would reduce excessive liquidity stemming from transactions which are very short-term oriented and destabilizing over the short run as well as over the long run.”

b. “Any (expected) profit from trend-following (technical) trading is reduced by a general FTT. This reduction will be the bigger, the smaller is the average difference between the buy price and the sell price, i.e. the higher is the “speed” of trading. As short term trading becomes less attractive, price runs will become less pronounced.”

c. “Since long-term appreciation (depreciation) trends are the result of upward (downward) runs lasting longer than counter movements, a general FTT would dampen the “long swings” of asset prices”.

8. To **safeguard financial stability.** If a TT could reduce - even eliminate - the sources of financial instability, it is a welcome tool because the 'public good externality' is extended to the entire economic system.

Krugman (2009) has argued that 'part of the fragility of the financial sector observed during the 2008 crisis was due to the heavy reliance on short term arrangements and, more broadly, excessive systemically relevant leverage.' For the last twenty years, the financial sector relied on short-term financing for its funding needs (interbank market, commercial paper). When the market for this short-term funding broke down, the situation immediately became systemically relevant and public intervention was needed. A transaction tax might have helped somewhat to discourage such short-term arrangements.

Darvas and von Weizsäcker (2010:10) went further by stating: “If financial sector regulation is sufficiently light to allow substantial financial innovation, the chances are that it will be periodically outsmarted by the financial industry, at a cost to the general public.” However, they have added a note of caution: “In a sense, this observation is just a variant of the well-known insight that if there is one inefficiency in your system – in this case imperfect regulation – then more efficiency in the rest of the system could be a bad thing.” (p.10)

There is another argument linked to the incentives system (or race of new information) made by Stiglitz (1989). The idea is simple: 'it will always pay to have new information faster than other market participants and then to trade on it. This provides a powerful private incentive heavily to invest in being – perhaps just a millisecond – faster.'

Darvas and von Weizsäcker (2010: 12) appraised the Stiglitz argument as follows: “While many private investments in information gathering and processing for private gain also serve the general public by making markets better at absorbing information, it is plausible that these ‘arms-race incentives’ may produce ‘too much of a good thing’. A financial transaction tax could help to reduce
such over-incentives to invest in being fastest by discouraging very short-term speculation that exploits minor information advantages.”

6.5 Transaction tax and Competition

We argue elsewhere that financial markets have established a monetary triangle between Finance and Trade, Finance and Production and Finance and Investment. In doing so the ‘monetary triangle’ has been increasing the fluency of the financial markets and its capacity to extend liquidity via the spread of all types of risk.

At the same time, the monetary triangle had assumed the power to extend or deny the financing of ‘real investment’. This has been due to a number of inherent features of banking favouring ‘short term financing at the expense of long term investment’. Could, therefore, a TT reverse the direction? Our answer is ‘Yes’ because of four inter-related reasons.

1. A TT will internalise almost all Confidence externalities, the major victims of the financial crisis of 2008. Yet, what would enhance ‘confidence externalities’? A simple act will do. Impose a TT on ‘a disorderly market’ captured and managed by the ‘too-big to fail’ financial companies. The latter possess the power to set indiscriminately ‘high fees’ to retain profits.61

Remedying the ‘taxed’ versus ‘untaxed’ system will be an important element of building ‘confidence externalities’. A TT would install fair competition; would begin addressing the ‘monopolistic features’ of the too-big to fail companies that have maintained ‘high net profits’ (without counting bonuses and other fringes) for a long time. High net profits are not produced in perfectly competitive markers. In principle, they would not have permitted such excesses in the first place.62

2. Whereas a TT may enhance ‘confidence externalities’, by itself, it will not enhance the competitiveness of the financial sector of the EU. As long as the regulatory structure of the financial sector allows cross-subsidisation of diverse activities, under the system of universal banking (i.e. Banking coupled by Investment), its size has no limits. And with it, a number of uncompetitive practices would be accepted by the competition authorities in the EU.

Three non-competitive practices come to mind:

a. Practices of collusion are not easily spotted by authorities because of cross-subsidisation and of numerous subsidiaries and branches.

b. The power of extending credit to financial innovation at the expense of ‘industrial innovation’ resides in the complex nature of incentives of capturing Rents that may be lawful or unlawful.

c. The role of ‘intermediation’ has destroyed its trust and credibility externalities; the discretionary power of these mega institutions to direct savings to ‘portfolio investments’ at the expense of the real sector has broken the link between the savers and the intermediary.

3. There is another interesting question. Why is a ‘big’ with respect to a ‘small’ financial company more apt to internalise three categories of ‘money externalities’ (ME):

- Transaction cost externalities;

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60 EUI WP on “Financial Crisis of 2008: The Transmission Mechanism”, currently revised.

61 The Leader of the Financial Times, 18.11.2009, stated: “Fund managers’ charges, for example, are usually large and are often not linked to the quality of the real costs of their services”.

62 The Leader of the Financial Times, 18.11.2009, stated: “The profit-generating power of financial companies across the developed world has been stubbornly remained higher than that of other companies”.

28
• Technological externalities;
• Seigniorage externalities?

One possible answer is that the internalisation of these $M_E$ is easier by a ‘big’ financial company if its activities are centred on both sectors (regulated and unregulated). Size in this instance is a determining factor.

4. If this hypothesis is true then capturing the above mentioned $M_E$ effectively establishes a Natural Monopoly.

Should this be a plausible theoretical case, the regulatory, fiscal and supervisory policies would need major revision. For example, if the market power possessed by a Natural Monopolist is exercised at will, then it will become a permanent source of vulnerability, and thus confer a serious ‘diseconomy’ on the rest of the economy. The supervisory repair that we have proposed in this WP goes to the right direction, but it is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient. And our transaction tax may be a useful tool, but it is only one instrument.

7. Overall conclusion

In appraising the five draft legislative acts from the Commission on the new EU supervisory architecture, we have arrived at two conclusions. First, in the case of the European System Risk Board, the mission of European Central Bank in mitigating system risks within the financial system cannot be attained without real powers and tools. Second, in the case of the three proposals on the European Supervisory Authorities, the Treaty of Lisbon cannot allow them to go beyond their Treaty competence. Nor could they achieve the integration of micro-prudential supervision into the system of the ESRB.

In order to repair the incompleteness of the first case and the deficiency of the second case, we propose an alternative approach to the new EU supervisory architecture. It consists of three elements. First, all Central Banks should assume responsibility for the last resort of managing risk. Second, the role of the national central banks in ‘micro-supervision’ should be enhanced. Third, to establish the ‘European Fund for Financial Stability’ endowed with its own capital resource.
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Appendix 1: Taxonomy of Money Externalities

I  Transaction Costs Externalities
   a) Shared-Variable: Network Externality
   b) Information:  
      i) Efficiency Externality ($E_f$)
      ii) Organizational Externality ($E_o$)
      iii) Expectations Externality ($E_e$)

ii  Price Level Externalities
   a) User Externality:  
      i) Distributional Externality
      ii) Hoarding Externality
   b) Producer Externality:  
      i) Fiscal Set Externalities
      ii) Redistribution Externality
      iii) Money Illusion Externality

iii  Confidence Externalities
   a) Commodity Clause or Constant PPP Guarantee
   b) Brand-Name Cost
   c) Government's Functions and Economic Background
   d) Symbol of Sovereignty
   e) Trust Externality
   f) Guarantees:  
      i) Constitutional Rules and Objectives
      ii) Credibility and Reputation
      iii) Endowments

iv  Learning and Technological Externalities
   a) Technical Learning
   b) Social Economies
   c) Informational Content
   d) Public Good
   e) Technological Knowledge and Invention
   f) Capital Accumulation and Innovation
   g) Gains Externality

v  Seigniorage Externalities
   a) Liability Management
   b) Risk Externalities
   c) Forced Saving
   d) Revolving Fund
   e) Reserve-Type:  
      i) Reserve management
      ii) High-powered money
      iii) Interest rate
      iv) Exchange rate

Appendix 2: Definitions of Money Externalities

Money externalities
In a money process defined as Money-Commodity-Money (M-C-M*), a money economy (or diseconomy) - M-E - is an event realised in the market that confers an appreciable benefit (or inflicts an appreciable damage) on some person(s), transactor(s) or institution who were not fully consenting parties or active participants in reaching the decision(s) which led directly or indirectly to the event in question.

Money externalities
They are non-quantitative, qualitative and not measurable. Money externalities are not priced.

Interwoven M-C-M* process
It should be understood that the banking system, securities and futures markets, stock and money exchanges, payment and net settlement systems and everything else necessary to organise a money process, are integral parts of the institution of money. Otherwise monetary policy cannot be assumed to work, let alone have effects on key monetary variables such as the rate of interest.

Transaction costs externalities
They are generated in the trading system by either incomplete markets or by market failures. An ideally efficient trading should function without cost. If not, we have 'market organisation cost set of conditions' leading to real-income externalities. In a money economy in which the money process (M-C-M*) is interwoven, income effects are generated by the intermediation of money. The trading system is inseparable and interwoven; an externality generated in one system will enter into the utility or cost function of more than one independent decision-maker.

A shared variable externality
It is due to the existence of the monetary stock in a M-C-M* and has to do with the fact that the possession of a real balance carried with by individual A affects not only the welfare of the holder but the welfare of everyone else in the system who gains from the fact that individual A is a participant in the exchange system.

Efficiency externality, (E)
It is generated by the transformation of monetary systems reflected in evolution of their monetary unit - i.e. Nature of money (the stuff made of) - from the Primitive stage to the Advanced stage. Adam Smith (1776: ch. iv) made the case for the efficiency externality, by examining the monetary transformations as the development stages unfolded.

Organisational externality, (E_o)
It is Meade's (1973: 40) postulate that “in every concern, both public and private, the operation of the pricing system will involve a cost.... Everywhere there is some element of externality due to the 'market organisation-cost'”. We may think of the cost-effectiveness due to the organisation of a money economy, an organisational externality. Thus, E_o is the result of organised markets that follow a M-C-M* process. Goods do not buy goods, but only via money in any organised market.

Expectations externality (E_e)
It is Keynes's (1936) link between his 'liquidity preference' and 'user cost'. Where expectations rule, they attribute to money a special status as a 'liquid asset': “expectations as to the future of the rate of interest as fixed by mass psychology have their reactions on liquidity preference (GT: 170). The induced role of money as a liquid asset assumes the role of a 'store of value' and helps to bridge the lack of knowledge about the ruling prices in the present with the uncertain future prices. Thus, through the reduction of the cost relating to imperfect information about ruling commodity prices and about the expected rate of interest, the expectations externality reduces uncertainty and costs associated with uncertainty.

Price level externalities (P_e)
They are generated by any act of a user of money or of a producer of money, which affects, either directly or indirectly, the general level of prices. The case of price level externalities due to the user of money has been made by Wicksell (1906, Lec. II: 11). The case of price level externalities due to the producer of money was made by Keynes in his A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923).
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**Distributional externality**  
It is induced by an individual’s decision to withdraw from or inject into the money process his real balances held in the form of money with a view to the future. In doing so, he confers an effect on all other individuals who are not necessarily fully consenting parties to this decision. Any change in the price level would change the marginal valuation of their tangible goods and thus may cause an *equi-proportional income distribution*. It would also cause a divergence between private and social valuations.

**Hoarding externality**  
It is better illustrated with an example taken from the resource allocation case. The use of money affects the intertemporal allocation of resources and, in this sense, bypasses the problem of synchronisation of receipts and payments. It thus contributes to superior productivity since synchronisation depends on the costs of acquiring information and of exchange. If the hoarding of today leads to superior techniques tomorrow then we confer an appreciable benefit on the next generation.

**Fiscal set externality**  
"The power of taxation by currency depreciation is one which has been inherent in the state since Rome discovered it" (Keynes, *Tract*: 8). This is a pure case of a *fiscal set externality* since the event is not fully consenting and the divergence between marginal value and marginal cost widens as the power of taxation increases, causing marginal value to remain above marginal cost.

**Redistribution externality**  
It is induced by the power of a producer of money to tax via its act having an impact on the price level, resulting in *unequal incidence*. It gives rise to redistribution of *wealth*. An act by a financial company that causes a 'stock appreciation' is a windfall *profit*. In a zero sum game, it is a 'redistribution externality'. A windfall profit is also induced if the 'money' rate of interest is not equal to the 'real'; "that is, the real rate of interest falls to a negative value, and the borrower reaps corresponding benefit" (*Tract*: 20).

**Money -illusion externality**  
In Keynes’s world of Uncertainty, Unemployment and Inflexible money wages, his preferred policy was to *change the burden of debt* via unexpected changes in the total stock of money. This act would confer appreciable external economies or diseconomies on a number of social groups who are not necessarily fully consenting parties. It is perceived as a means to overcome the inefficiency of labour markets, lack of knowledge and confidence crises.

**Confidence externalities (Cₖ)**  
They are generated by the institutional structure necessary to support a monetary system and its money. They are mainly associated with the producer of money but are internalised and reflected in the choice of the users. Mundell (1980: 379) gives an example of this type of externalities in his discussion of the EMF and of the ECU: 'Any new institution that is created is an attempt to internalize what used to be an externality in the system.’ The idea is about mechanisms or means that would *mould the preferences* of citizens in favour of ‘a’ money

**Commodity clause externality**  
It is a derived ‘external economy’ linked to induce confidence in the use of money. It was once thought that a national currency's convertibility into a specific amount (weight) of gold or another precious metal was a necessary condition for it to have value.

**Constant PPP guarantee externality**  
It is also derived from a ‘legal’ clause guaranteeing the *constant value of money*. Hayek’s (1978) *Denationalisation of Money* is about entrusting private institutions with money-issuing powers to issue non-interest bearing Swiss ducats, under three guarantees: price index, legal clause, convertibility.

**Brand name externality**  
It is geared into a ‘special feature’ of a money associate with a cost for the producer to engineer it; in its absence, consumers will not be able to distinguish between the output of different firms, and the quality of money sold will be destroyed. Hence brand-name differentiated output is necessary for the competitive production and sale of money.
Government's economic resources externality
It resides with the ‘economic size’ of the producer of money, usually measured by its GNP. It is also linked to the complementary activities of government - such as defence, stability, social cohesion, etc. - which are generators of ‘confidence’.

Symbol of sovereignty
It assembles a number of ‘relationships’ linked to the nature of the State and of the Society. For example, the relationship between money and freedom; between the keeping of promises and the certainty of contracts; between social function and the rule of law”. Simmel's (1990) symbolic expression of money is thus stated: “One of the basic facts of our subjective world was that we express social relations through symbolic images. Money was one of these. From being a functional it had become a symbolic expression of economic relationships.”

Trust externality
The essence of it is best stated by Frankel (977: 14): “money contributed to the extension of individual personality and facilitates the development of an ever widening circle of economic interdependence based on trust. Under conditions of direct barter trust is confined to the parties immediately involved. The use of money extends it to the people of the village, of the tribe, of the nation, and finally, to vast areas of the world”

Constitutional guarantees externalities
They are related, for example to two constitutional features of the ECB intended to induce confidence externalities; they are its independence and its price stability objective. On paper, the ECB entails the only legally guaranteed clauses in the world.

Credibility externality
Credibility arising from the consistency of monetary policy is not marketed and has no price. It is an essential element won the hard way. Moreover, it is a shared-variable type. It enters into the utility function of every transactor that uses, say, the Euro which had internalised this credibility externality. It also enters into the cost function of every producer who uses this money to conclude a contract.

Reputation externality
Credibility feeds ‘reputation’ in monetary stability and this is important for creating and maintaining confidence in the strength of the new institutional arrangement. Bundesbank's reputation had been established because its D-mark had served as an anchor currency for the EMS and the ERM, relying on Germany's monetary restraint.

Endowments externality
It is induced at a micro level in the banking sector by the ability of a bank or other financial company to face ‘set-up costs’; its capacity of raising ‘emergency capital’ is another added advantage. In a competitive setting, substantial set up costs would give rise to losses or to a non-convex production possibility set.

Learning (L) and technological (T) externalities
They are generated in all economic activities on the assumption are capable of learning and communicating. Both learning and communicating contribute to the growth of knowledge and to the induced externalities. In forming his decisions, economic man applies reason in the context of accumulated experience. The greater the market and volume of transaction, the greater the social economies of scale, the greater the internalised external economies. If this growth of knowledge is applied to a process, it is transformed into human capital.

Technical learning externality
It is associated with the capacity of man to learn from the past technical progress and with his ability to transpose it into ‘technical invention’. Pasinetti (1981: 22) equates growth in knowledge with technical progress and maintains: “as long as the intellectual abilities of mankind do not deteriorate, technical progress is an inherent characteristic of human history.”

Social economies externality
It is due to the fact that the use of ‘one’ money is not only a function of the width and the depth of the market. It also stems from the external economies due to 'new information' which only money carries with. Given that the production of information is costly and that it is cumulative, the introduction of money would capture all the external economies of the sectors of research and technology; these are interwoven with the growth of knowledge.
Informational content externality
It is an in-built feature that money carries. Brunner and Meltzer (1971: 792) believe that money reduces costs in two ways. The first reduction in information costs concerns the quality of goods. The second has to do with the increased knowledge: “as the use of an asset in exchange increases, the transactor learns more about the asset's properties.” In this sense, money is said to internalise all externalities induced by the 'use of the same currency unit'.

Public good externality
The public properties of money stem from its being a standard and those gains are generated in comparability and inter-changeability. Given that money introduces standardisation, it leads to reduced transaction costs and to economies of scale. Both are external economies to the firm and to the user. Weldon (1968, 1971, 1973) argued that money is essentially a public good, because it entails public attributes by reference to its provision and its availability and because the distribution of real balances among individuals generates money externalities.

Technological knowledge externality
A body of knowledge is accumulated in the M-C-M* process via learning and communicating. Given that knowledge arises from the deliberate seeking and observing of markets or other activities, such knowledge could be considered as a source of human capital. If human capital via the use of a monetary unit is preserved, then it is capable of being transformed into technological knowledge.

Invention externality
It arises from the internalisation of existing knowledge available in the money process (M – C – M*) and transposed into a 'monetary invention' or financial product. In principle, if the 'characteristics' of an input or of a product are known and made public, then the individual consumption of this knowledge does not diminish the availability or usefulness of that knowledge to any other. The indivisible information can be transmitted easily from one person to another. This is Arrow’s (1962:172) invention becoming a production of information; this means that the optimal conditions require that the transmission should take place at a marginal cost close to zero.

Capital accumulation externality
Technological knowledge if correctly used will promote capital accumulation. Yet the mechanism through which capital accumulation is promoted has not been clearly stated. Wicksell (Lec. II: 6) recognises that, though the technological knowledge we have inherited from the past and captured by money is a source of growth, it does not necessarily mean a higher production possibility frontier. It mainly depends on monetary policy.

Innovation externality
If the internalisation of any of the above-mentioned learning and technological externalities is transposed into a new product or new application constitutes an ‘innovation externality’. All monetary transformations have been associated with a new family of such externalities. And the credit creation power of the banking system induces the financing of innovation externality.

Gains externality
It is induced in the sphere of our M-C-M* and associated with the idea of unequal exchange in a money economy where money captures the additional value (M*). Thus, money as an intermediary would confer new and additional gains over and above the values, which existed before.

Seigniorage externalities (S_R )
At one time 'seigniorage' originated with the right of the State to charge a 'fee' for minting money on private account. This change was higher than the actual cost of minting; thus it was a source of income to the State. Today, seigniorage has to do with the internalisation of externalities generated in the banking system and with its incidence on and consequences for those who are participants in our M-C-M* process.

Liability management externality
There are, at least, two sources of liability externalities. The first arises when a bank or financial company provides this facility and acts as a clearing house for payments. The banks or companies reduce transaction costs. The second source arises when a financial company is capable of ‘transforming liabilities into assets’. The latter will possess entirely different risk, return maturity and liquidity characteristics. These two liability externalities procure to the banks or financial companies’ profits.
Risk externalities
In principle, all contracts concluded in money-terms involve risk. A risk externality is present in our money process (M-C-M*) whenever a time element is involved. Paying out in money for wages and other expenses of production, separating purchase from sale, production from consumption or investment from saving induce a risk externality. All these acts involve a period; a contract is concluded in period t in the expectation of recouping the incurred expenses plus profit by disposing of the product or service for money at period t+1. Managing risk generates a risk externality. There are at least four risk externalities arising from differences in bank regulation.

Regulatory risk externality
It stems from the regulatory systems existing in different countries while the same bank is located in different countries, managing savings of depositors residing in different countries. A failure of this bank will confer an appreciable damage on residents in more than one country.

Inter-banking risk externality
It is present when the failure of one bank causes loss of confidence in its ‘subsidiary’ or its ‘branch’ located in different counties. This kind of risk externality is prominent in global markets where market exposure increases as the banking activity in different countries or locations. This source of risk externality is due to the inter-bank market handling foreign assets in portfolios that are global.

Network risk externality
A third source of risk externality arises in the payment systems. This is a cross-border externality that mainly depends on technology and regulation. The payment systems externality could be defined as the volatility of potential outcomes when the failure of one system inflicts an appreciable damage upon other systems connected with it.

Systemic risk externality
It is defined by the Committee of Governors (1992: 488): “the risk that the failure of one participant in an inter-bank funds transfer system or securities settlement system, as in financial markets generally, to meet his required obligations will cause other participants or financial firms to be unable to meet their obligations when due”. Two overlapping aspects of systemic risk exist: a) payment systems and b) netting arrangements; both have a common origin: a counterpart may default on its side of a contract causing a series of failures. This is an event inflicting appreciable damage on third parties while the latter are not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision of default.

Forced saving externality
It arises from the fact that ‘bank liabilities are not necessarily regarded as liabilities’. Bank liabilities are seen as means of payment. Any bank lending in excess of saving shall result in unintended forced saving. Chick (1983: 237) stated the case: “No one asked the holders of the new deposits whether they wanted a larger aggregate money supply, nor does that question occur to the receiver. No one refuses payment for a sale just because the source of payment is an overdraft - otherwise granting overdrafts would be pretty futile. But in aggregate there is now a larger quantity of money than before which 'no one intended' to accumulate. In that sense it could be said to be 'forced’.

Revolving fund externality
Whereas money constitutes a constraint on effective demand, the ability of banks to offer their liabilities as credit constitutes the case for a revolving fund. “The 'revolving fund' reflects the fact that the circular flow of income, consumption as well as investment, profits as well as wages, runs, almost in its entirety, through the banking system. That is even truer today, with the great diminution of payment of wages in cash” (Chick, 1983: 240). And ‘inside money’ (debt created by the private sector) is associated with the ‘revolving fund externality’

Producer’s surplus externality
It arises from the internalisation of ‘gains in efficiency’ or from capturing ‘Rents’ that are not legalised. The real source of it is the when competition is imperfect, either through collusion or the result of legal or constitutional arrangements.

Reserve management externality
Suppose the ECB pays interest on its reserve liabilities. Then the ECB could use the differential between the rate paid on reserve liabilities and open market rates on similar securities to influence demand for substitutable
assets. This act amounts to saying that if the bank pays higher interest on reserves, the demand for reserves rises; thus, there is deflationary pressure.
And there is another source. Suppose non-residents hold Euro-cash. Any change, say, in the exchange rate of Euro/Dollar or Euro/Yen would mean an induced exchange rate externality since the non-residents are not consenting parties.

High-powered money externality
It arises from the fact that ‘a low - powered in the home country (Euro) becomes reserves to other countries; this would constitute an external act generating an economy or diseconomy, stemming from sharing the same monetary unit. Take the case of the US dollar. “International banking means the private creation of international or multinational money. Low-powered money in the United States becomes high-powered money in Europe. The European central banks have increasingly lost control over domestic money supply” (Mundell, 1973b: 152).

Debt reduction externality
Suppose a third country holds its official reserves in the form of interest bearing assets denominated in Euro. The holding of these assets would mean a corresponding increase in demand for Euro denominated assets in the Host country. This would indirectly cause a fall in the interest rate of the Euro issuing country. This interest rate externality will induce all the incidence externalities and the most important effect would be to change its debt with respect to third countries holding Euro-denominated assets.


Source: Commission on ‘European financial supervision’, COM(2009), 252, 27.05.2009, based on the de Larosière report (2009), and adapted in accordance with the ECOFIN’s conclusions of 9 June 2009
Annex 2: A European System of Financial Supervision (SEFSYS)

**European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)**
- Chair: ECB President
- Vice-Chair: ECB Vice-President
- 27 Governors of the General Council of the European System of Central Banks
- European Commission

**European Steering Committee of 27 Vice-Governors of National Central Banks**
- Chair: ECB Vice-President
- College of Supervisors
- Observers: Chairs of the Level 3 Committees
- European Economic Area

**National Supervisors**
- Banking Supervisors
- Insurance and Pension Supervisors
- Securities Supervisors

Risk warnings and Recommendations

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