Concepts of Europe in Classical Social Theory: Themes in the Work of Ernst Troeltsch and his Contemporaries and their Status for Recent Conceptions of Modernity in Europe

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Abstract
Current debates about European cultural and political identity suggest a need for closer investigation of the conceptions of Europe articulated in classical social theory. This article examines the conception held by the German sociological theologian and close colleague of Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch. The article argues that in his writings on modernity, historicism and ‘Europeanism’ (Europäismus), Troeltsch qualifies Weber’s vision of the ‘universal significance and validity’ of occidental rationalism by partly replacing Weber’s abstract thematization of the occident by European cultural experiences in particular. Troeltsch here produces a more culturally localized and concretized account of the precise sense in which modernization processes accede to ‘universal-historical’ meaning. Troeltsch’s clarification serves both as a precursor to contemporary thinking about multiple modernities and as a fund of counter-responses to the claims of recent post-colonial critics about malign Eurocentrism in social theory. His statements deserve to be read alongside those of contemporaries such as Simmel, Durkheim, Jaspers, Mannheim and Alfred Weber and reappraised in the light of current positions in comparative historical sociology and European philosophical self-understanding.

Keywords: Ernst Troeltsch; Max Weber; Europeanism; Eurocentrism; historical sociology; multiple modernities.

Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) is best known as a theologian of the late Wilhelmine period in Germany and as a close colleague of Max Weber at Heidelberg. Most of his writings address questions in theology, ethics and the philosophy of religion in the German Protestant tradition of historical theology, after F.D.E. Schleiermacher and the ‘History of Religion School’ represented by Albrecht Ritschl at Göttingen. But Troeltsch is also recognized in sociology for his study, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches (of 1912), which was influenced by Weber’s Protestant Ethic, and for various essays on historicism and the history of European ideas in his third volume of Collected Works, titled Der Historismus und seine Probleme (of 1922). This volume includes a lengthy notable section on ‘Europeanism’ (Europäismus), which forms the main subject of this article.

I will not claim that Troeltsch’s writings have the same sociological depth as Weber’s or the same immediate relevance to empirical research. Troeltsch’s chief contribution remains in the field of theology, not sociology. But I will argue that insofar as Troeltsch consciously kept a foothold in both sociology and theology, consciously addressed normative questions in religious belief-systems and did not declare himself to be – in Weber’s famous self-description – ‘religiously unmusical’, his writings allow us to deal in some ways more adequately
than Weber’s with the more philosophical, theological and certainly thorny question of ‘validity’ and ‘universality’ in occidental rationalism. Of course many other writers at Heidelberg and elsewhere in Germany and Europe addressed this question in the same inter-war period. It is sufficient to mention Jaspers’ early *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Mannheim’s and Alfred Weber’s *Kultursoziologie*, Scheler’s *Wissenssoziologie*, Husserl’s late *Crisis of the European Sciences*, Elias’ early work for *The Civilizing Process*, Voegelin’s sociology of cosmoologies, Schutz’s early phenomenological studies and later ‘multiple realities’ conception, Cassirer’s *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Arendt’s doctoral dissertation on love and St. Augustine, Gadamer’s early studies on Greek philosophy and of course, rather notoriously, Parsons’ early vision as a student at Heidelberg in the late 1920s. But it is Troeltsch’s neglected contribution which will be examined here.

I begin by setting out the most salient contexts of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thought about Europe and its place in ‘civilization’. I then turn to the main ways in which Troeltsch’s writing departs from Max Weber’s statement of the ‘universal significance and validity’ of occidental rationalism. I here advert to several ambiguities in the famous openings words of Weber’s Preface to the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*. I follow this with an excursus on Parsons’, Habermas’ and Wolfgang Schluchter’s conflicting readings of these words, before finally turning in full to Troeltsch’s Europeanism. I conclude with an account of the significance of what I shall call ‘singular universals’ and ‘singular universalism’ for contemporary understandings of modernity.

But first of all, I set out two main sets of contemporary issues that motivate this investigation. These are the thesis of ‘multiple modernities’ and the current question of European cultural and political ‘identity’.

**Multiple modernities**

The thesis of multiple modernities has been adumbrated by Shmuel Eisenstadt (1987a; 1999; 2002), Wolfgang Schluchter (1979; 1988; 1996; 1998) and Björn Wittrock (2002) in several important edited collections, with further contributions from Arnason (1993; 1997; 2003), Wagner (1994; 2001a; 2001b), Szakolczai (1999; 2003) and Delanty and Isin (2003). The thesis holds that no one paradigmatic sequence of modernization governs social evolution. No single condition of modernity contrasts with any single condition of ‘tradition’ or ‘traditionalism’. There can be multiple trajectories of modernity and multiple imbrications of modernity and tradition. Many different modernities occur at different times and places and at different speeds of development. The particular
course of modernization theorized by Parsons and his school on the model of nineteenth-century western European and then twentieth-century north American industrial society is not valid for all societies. It is preferable rather to speak of different sites and pathways of modernization in diverse world regions, which can include China, India and Japan as much as north and south America, the Mediterranean and the Middle East or any other appropriate territorial division. Eisenstadt’s studies in particular begin from Jaspers’ thesis of the Axial Age civilizations of China, India, Persia, Israel and Greece in the period 800 to 200 BC (Jaspers 1953; Eisenstadt 1986; 1987b; Eisenstadt, Schluchter and Wittrock 2001; Eisenstadt and Sachsenmaier 2002).

The thesis of multiple modernities thus corrects some of the more Eurocentric tendencies of earlier generations of social theory, and thereby vindicates the project of structural analysis of global social change. It provides a response to the claims of postcolonial critics about ethnocentrism in western social science, and at the same time demolishes obscurantist notions of ‘clashes of civilizations’ popularized by writers such as Huntington (1996). It shows how different civilizations can start from different fundamental premises but still share common world experiences that lead to change, self-criticism and inter-cultural dialogue.

**European ‘identity’**

Debates today about European cultural and political ‘identity’ raise a plethora of issues reaching well beyond the scope of this article (see Friese and Wagner 2002, 2003; Friese, Negri and Wagner 2002; Delanty 1995, 2002, 2003; Cerruti 2003; Cerruti and Enno 2001; Passerini 1998; Malmborg and Strath 2002). However, some account must be given of how these issues relate to European thinking in classical social theory. It is possible to speak schematically of three main types of position:

1. *Essentialist positions* elide differences between peoples, regions, religions, ethnicities and social classes in Europe; or they erect questionable distinctions between Europeans and non-Europeans; or they ignore longstanding geographical indeterminacies, especially with regard to Asia and ‘Eurasia’; or they speak obscurely of a common European ‘spirit’.

2. *Sceptical positions* discern little possibility of union in Europe higher than at the level of disparate nationalities and nation-states; or they argue that higher-order union can at most occur through functional integration between political, economic and legal-administrative systems in the form of technocratic ‘outputs from above’, not democratic ‘inputs from below’; or they argue that
projects of union in Europe are of little democratic consequence in the face of global capitalist forces. These positions are represented among others by Grimm (1995), Offe (1998) and leftist critics such as Anderson (2002, 2003) and Debray (2003).

3. **Constitutionalist positions** hold that higher-order union is possible, but that it is only possible and only desirable in the form of a federal ‘constitutional patriotism’ that goes decisively beyond traditional national patriotism. Nationality and all other markers of cultural identity are seen as playing little or no relevant role, neither fostering nor hindering or mitigating union. Nationality is seen as an artificial and ultimately redundant construct of sovereign polities, not a foundation of them. This third type of position is defended in its austerest form by Habermas (2001a, 2001b).

Essentialist positions are clearly objectionable. Sceptical positions are less objectionable insofar as they illuminate both obstacles to union and sources of hegemony, exclusion and diminished democratic agency in the global context. However, in most other respects, they tend, implicitly, either to acceptance of conservative nationalist notions of solidarity or to rather determinist, functionalist and reductionist – not to say defeatist – forms of reasoning. On both accounts they remain unduly narrow and unimaginative in their sense of the scope for democratic agency (notwithstanding the insight in Gramsci’s celebrated maxim, ‘pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will’). Constitutionalist positions obviate these faults but raise further difficulties. It is unlikely that a constitution alone will invite broad democratic identification with a common European polity, and it is doubtful that a constitution alone can account meaningfully for all that has been and might be signified by this polity in future for all of its possible citizens. It is arguable that rather thicker efforts need to be undertaken in cultural and political characterization, where some attempt is made to describe some distinctively European historical experiences in social, political, intellectual and religious life. It is certain that all such efforts will run a risk of essentialism, but it is not certain that they must degenerate into essentialism necessarily. It should be possible to produce more ‘substantial’ accounts of European civilizational forms that amount to more than a roll-call of differential exclusions and negations: the non-African, the non-Asian, the non-Judaeo-Christian, and so on. I will argue in the following that classical social theory provides at least some clues for a more ‘substantial’ account of European civilizational forms. Before turning to Troeltsch’s contribution, I begin with an overview of the main late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century repertoires of thought.
Europeanism and Eurocentrism, c. 1880-1945

The prospects of finding resolutely self-critical accounts of European civilization in nineteenth-century social thought certainly do not appear promising. If any case is to be made for a phenomenon of malign Eurocentrism in social thought of the period, it is most surely to be lodged against Comte, Spencer, Taine and – rather later – Pareto and Mosca. On one side of these figures stand the chauvinist discourses of social Darwinism and ‘racial science’. On the other side stand more liberal figures such as Tocqueville and Mill. Common to most of these writers are notions of ‘stages’ or ‘steps’ of evolution marked out by European examples. Such notions range from the conceptions of eighteenth-century British political economy and utilitarianism down to those of later nineteenth-century German figures such as Lamprecht.

Although Marx and Durkheim both advance substantially beyond the tacit positivist metaphysics of much nineteenth-century thought, their writings still share an assumption of the paradigmatic course of European social evolution. Durkheim’s are closely informed by anthropological studies of non-western societies, while Marx’s of course allow for pre-capitalist modes of production: not only feudalism but also the so-called ‘Asiatic mode of production’, as well as Lenin’s later ‘unequal rates of development’ theorem. But both Marx and Durkheim still defend a unilinear schema of development, which leads eventually toward the type of capitalist socio-economic structure prevalent in nineteenth-century industrial Europe. It cannot be said that these assumptions are fundamentally questioned or revised during the process of sociology’s institutionalization in the US in the 1940s, after Sorokin and Parsons. For the most part they are reinforced.

Similarly, when we turn to direct thematizations of European culture in the period, the prospects scarcely look better. Most conceptions are not sociologically reflective. Some speak only in terms of canons of personalities mapped out by the names of great male artists, philosophers, scientists and statesmen; or they equate Europe with Judaeo-Christianity; or they define Europe by the sum of European nations, each with a unique mission in the schema of world culture, in the spirit of Mazzini; or they heark back to an eighteenth-century ethos of enlightenment cosmopolitanism, ignoring the restriction of this ethos to tiny aristocratic elites, touring gentlemen and patrons of the royal courts.

After the outbreak of war in 1914 and the resultant trauma, many discourses switch rapidly to tones of fatalism and pessimism. Often they are characterized by plangent lamentation for lost heritage or by dark resignation before an all-enveloping ‘Asiaticism’. Prime among these is
Oswald Spengler’s *Decline of the West* (of 1918-22), which finds numerous echoes in European jeremiad writing of the inter-war period. Humanistic nostalgia narratives appear in Germany in the post-1918 writing of Thomas Mann, and later Friedrich Meinecke after 1945. French literary life in the 1920s notably revolves around anguished denunciations of western civilization among the dadaists and surrealists and a craze for ‘Orientalism’ – as well as chauvinist anti-Orientalism – among writers such as Henry Massis and Drieu La Rochelle, as well as Céline (Said 1978; Cadwallader 1981). Less extreme but still largely ante-diluvian statements occur among figures such as Hermann Hesse, Arnold Toynbee, T.S. Eliot and C.G. Jung. Essentializing motifs also return to a degree in more reflective texts of the period such as Paul Valéry’s *Crise de l’esprit* (of 1919), Paul Hazard’s *Crise de la conscience européenne* (of 1935), Léon Brunschvicg’s posthumous *Esprit européen* (of 1947) and (later) Jaspers’ *Vom europäischen Geist* (of 1947). These contexts of thought tend to be characterized by a certain portentous ethos of tragedy. Platonism and Christianity are said to have fallen in Flanders’ fields. Europe is said to have reached her summit of self-understanding in the moment of her downfall – an image famously recalling Hegel’s wise Owl of Minerva flying only at the twilight.

It is important, however, to appreciate the ambiguous multifacetedness of European intellectual life between the wars and to recognize ways in which many writers at the same time sought to think creatively and constructively about ‘decadence’. The inter-war period was clearly a time in which a multitude of social and intellectual undercurrents eventually polarize around the virulent forces of chauvinism, nationalism and anti-Semitism on the one hand, fatalism, nihilism and anti-intellectualism on the other. This was the ‘crisis’ feared and fought against by Valéry, Husserl, Romain Rolland, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and many others. But it should be stressed that the social crisis was not inevitable after the Versailles settlement of 1919; nor was it inevitable after 1929. A great many intellectuals and ordinary citizens sought to grapple with the question of Europe’s place in the world, its traditions of science and humanistic culture, its notions of democracy and its concomitant trail of destruction and conquest, as complicated strands of a substance of lived value-orientation. Of all the most equivocal of legacies in this connection, the most influential is surely Nietzsche’s, and his statements here deserve some consideration.

It is possible, up to a point, to distinguish between a reactionary Nietzsche – the Nietzsche of the cult studied by Tönnies (1990) [1897] – and a subtler, more challenging and contemporary Nietzsche. The former speaks derisorily of Europe’s ‘modern ideas’ of democracy, egalitarianism, socialism and feminism emanating from Christian
fraternity, ressentiment and the herd instinct: Nietzsche writes of the ‘European of today’ as a ‘sublime abortion’, obsessed with industry, conformism and professionalism, committed to the ‘democratic mixing of classes and races’ (2001a: 56, 114, 128; 2001b: 215-6). The latter looks to ‘we good Europeans’, beyond nationalism and ‘fatherlandishness’ (2001a: 134-9; 1967): Nietzsche declares that Europe’s future will lie not in an ‘eternalization of the European system of many petty states’, not in the ‘national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning with which European peoples nowadays delimit and barricade themselves against each other as if with quarantines’ (2001b: 242). ‘We who are homeless are too diverse and racially mixed in our descent, as “modern men”, and consequently we are not inclined to participate in the mendacious racial self-admiration and obscenity that parades in Germany today’ (2001b: 242):

Whatever term is used these days to try to mark what is distinctive about the European, whether it is ‘civilization’ or ‘humanization’ or ‘progress’…; behind all the moral and political foregrounds that are indicated by formulas like these, an immense physiological process is taking place and constantly gaining ground – the process of increasing similarity between Europeans, their growing detachment from the conditions under which climate- or class-bound races originate, their increasing independence from that determinate milieu where for centuries the same demands would be inscribed on the soul and the body – and so the slow approach of an essentially supra-national and nomadic type of person who, physiologically speaking, is typified by a maximal degree of the art and force of adaptation. This process of the European in a state of becoming can be slowed down in tempo through large-scale relapses… The still-raging storm and stress of ‘national feeling’ belongs here, as does the anarchism that is just approaching. […]

[T]he most unambiguous signs declaring that Europe wants to be one are either overlooked or willfully and mendaciously reinterpreted. The mysterious labor in the souls of all the more profound and far-ranging people of this century has actually been focused on preparing the path to this new synthesis and on experimentally anticipating the Europeans of the future. (2001a: 133-4, 148) (emphasis in original)

Many of the more palatable aspects of Nietzsche’s dicta lie at the forefront of recent deconstructive readings of European relations to the Other, descending through Freud and Heidegger to Derrida (1992), Deleuze and Guattari (1980: 27-31), Kristeva (2000), Cacciari (1994, 1997), Said (2003) and many others. These engagements indicate the complexity of the beast called ‘European nihilism’. They bring into focus a broad swathe of earlier contexts of intellectual de-centering and self-othering in Europe, represented by texts such as Karl Kraus’ *The Last Days of Humanity* (of 1920), Robert Musil’s ‘Helpless Europe’ (of 1922), André Malraux’s *Tentation de l’Occident* (of 1926), the later Thomas
Mann’s ‘Achtung Europa!’ (of 1935), James Joyce’s late *Finnegan’s Wake* (of 1939), Hermann Broch’s theme of the ‘gay apocalypse’ in his study *Hugo von Hofmannsthal and his Time* (of 1955), Elias Canetti’s *Crowds and Power* (of 1960), Karl Löwith’s *Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism* (of 1965) and Arendt’s *Life of the Mind* (of 1971). But it is equally important to consider other interventions of a more conventionally sociological kind. Among these are two remarkable statements in Durkheim and Simmel.

Durkheim’s closing pages in *The Division of Labour in Society* (of 1893) suggest that economic interdependence relations among European nation-states are fast bringing into being a single, functionally integrated society. ‘Between the different types of society coexisting on earth’, Durkheim writes,

there are too many intellectual and moral divergences to be able to live in a spirit of brotherhood in the same society. Yet what is possible is that societies of the same species should come together, and it is indeed in this direction that our society appears to be going. We have seen … that there is tending to form, above European peoples, in a spontaneous fashion, a European society that has even now some feeling of its own identity and the beginnings of an organization. If the formation of one single human society is for ever ruled out …, at least the formation of larger societies will draw us continually closer to that goal. (1984: 337).

Durkheim’s mode of argument here is clearly a functionalist one. His proposal is that if there is an emergent sentiment of solidarity in Europe, it is the outcome of increasingly shared economic interests, not of any previously kindred beliefs and values. But Durkheim’s plausible implication is that such interdependencies will in turn foster practices of mutual civic identification across national boundaries.

Simmel, like many German intellectuals and war volunteers (including many Jews) at first saluted the Prussian war campaign for its effect of uniting the German folk against decadent French and English *Zivilisation*. But Simmel swiftly retracted this partisanship, declaring in March 1915 that Europe will in future have to see itself as one world-historical bloc, at once internally riven by national conflict and externally united as one bloc among others (Simmel 2000a). Echoing Nietzsche, Simmel avows that ‘just as it lies in the essence of life to reach beyond life, so it belongs to the essence of German culture to find itself beyond itself’ – in ‘Europeanism’ (*Europäertum*). Simmel announces that unlike ‘internationalism’ – by which he appears to mean both aristocratic cosmopolitanism and socialism – Europeanism is ‘not reachable by an aggregation or an abstraction’ (*nicht durch Zusammensetzung oder Abstraktion erreichbar*). It is ‘something thoroughly primordial’ (*etwas
durkhaus Primäres), ‘fixable neither by logic nor by definite contents’ (nicht logisch oder mit bestimmten Inhalten festzulegen). It nourishes and extends nations without destroying them (2000a: 114, 115-6). Not without a certain tinge of anti-Americanism, Simmel writes in July 1915 of America’s delivery of arms to England:

As paradoxical as it may sound at present, I am convinced that Europe remains a unity relative to other parts of the world. Europe once possessed a species of solidarity. Today, however, Europe’s unity appears only under the sign of negativity: it is dismembering itself, in hateful struggle with itself. Europe is on the point of committing suicide. And America here sees a chance to place itself at the pinnacle of world events. It waits in the wings, like an heir at the death bed of the rich father. America’s munitions deliveries ... are the first great practical manoeuvre with which America hopes to speed up the clock of world history. America furnishes the European peoples with the weapons with which to destroy themselves to its advantage – and has itself paid for them in [Europe’s loss of] immeasurable riches. In a single stroke, America contrives Europe’s enervation in two ways: a masterpiece of world-historical speculation! [...] For far too long we have assumed the course of world history to unfold on Europe’s shores alone, the crest of its waves leaving Asia millennia in the past and now coming to rest for ever in our continent. The disaster of this inner-European war is that its acute afflictions and sufferings raise Europe’s insularity to unparalleled heights in just the moment that this insularity threatens us with an unprecedented world-historical danger. In the end Europe dwells in one house, America in another. (Simmel 2000b: 138-9, 142) (translation by A.H.)

Durkheim’s and Simmel’s statements on Europe are partly comparable to Troeltsch’s. Like Simmel, Troeltsch moved rapidly from an initial nationalist outburst to insistence on peace in a legal framework (Cho 1995, 1996, 1998). By 1919 he calls for acceptance of Versailles and (with Weber) rejection of the romantic-nationalist sentiments and utopian-anarchist sentiments then rife in Germany. In the last five years of his life Troeltsch thematizes Europe as a horizon for future cultural and political ‘synthesis’ and ‘compromise’. Although he remains alert to the popular sense of servitude to France and America and mistrust of Wilson’s League of Nations, he adheres to the principle of a system of international law. His writings see Europe as a possible intermediary political agency, between nationalism and ‘internationalism’ (in the sense of socialism).2 In a late essay on natural-rights traditions in political thought (1925b), he speaks against the grain of the German penchant for a dichotomy between ‘western European’ legalism and ‘true German’ ‘communality’. He proposes that Wilhelm von Humboldt’s idea of the flourishing of individuality in community will find its home neither in Germany alone nor in the England of J.S. Mill but in Europe as a whole,
in the synthesis of the two traditions. This insistence remains in sharp contrast to those who still adhered to the time-honoured Kultur-Zivilisation distinction in Germany. Troeltsch in this sense stands as one of the last representatives of a tradition of nineteenth-century European liberalism which believed ardently in the possibility of trans-national cultural and political consensus. In this respect he also differs from Weber’s more conflict-oriented views, as I discuss shortly.

Clearly Troeltsch’s liberalism is no longer something to which we can turn for normative guidance in any unmediated way today. The experiences of mass politics, class conflict, revolution and war which dominated the twentieth century make any unmediated return to nineteenth-century liberal precepts unthinkable today. But we should note that it was precisely the German – and German-Jewish – intellectuals’ liberal proclivities at Heidelberg and elsewhere that underlay the efflorescence of anti-Eurocentric sociology in their land in the 1920s and early ’30s. It was their ‘cosmopolitan’ sensibility – not a naively aristocratic but a sociologically reflective, cosmopolitan sensibility – that led to the numerous extensions and developments of Max Weber’s verstehende Soziologie. I now therefore consider how Troeltsch reinterprets Weber’s oeuvre and lends to it a self-consciously, self-critically, ‘Europeanist’ slant. I here use the term ‘Europeanism’ – following Troeltsch’s Europäismus – to denote both (1) empirical sociological characterizations of European affairs and (2) value-laden acclamations of European affairs, but not to the neglect, exclusion or denigration of other world regions and civilizations. I use ‘Eurocentrism’, in contrast, generally always as a term of criticism. However, I signal from the outset here that the mere fact that a scholar concentrates on European affairs as an object of study does not, by itself, make that scholar Eurocentric in any objectionable sense.

Troeltsch and Max Weber

As is well-known, Troeltsch lived with Max and Marianne Weber in the same house on the Neckar until Troeltsch left Heidelberg for Berlin in 1914. Troeltsch also travelled with the Webers to the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences in 1904 and published much of his work in Weber’s Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. This notably included the first installments of Troeltsch’s Social Teaching study in 1908 and 1910, which appeared as a book in 1912. These were also the years in which Weber published the first version of The Protestant Ethic (in 1904-5) (hereafter ‘PE’) and the four replies to Karl Fischer and Felix Rachfahl from 1907-10, to whom Troeltsch also replied in 1910, defending Weber (Troeltsch 1978; Weber 1978, 2001). Troeltsch also wrote two essays on
Protestantism and secularization in 1906, as well as a review of William James’ *Varieties of Religious Experience* in 1904 which impressed Weber (Hennis 1998). Indeed Troeltsch had already written widely on theology and Christian history before Weber began work on the PE in earnest. The two men’s collaboration during these years was, therefore, very close. Weber frequently cites Troeltsch in his first reply to Rachfahl, and Troeltsch cites Weber’s PE no fewer than 38 times in his *Social Teaching* (Chapman 1993: 4). It can be said that the only significant difference between them at this time was that whereas Weber’s interests lay mostly in the sociology and social psychology of religious practices, Troeltsch’s lay more in the sociology of theological ideas – although the two sets of interests naturally overlapped considerably.

When, however, Troeltsch took up the chair of philosophy formerly held by Dilthey in Berlin in 1915, the two men’s thinking diverged more noticeably. While Weber began his pioneering studies of comparative socio-economic systems, Troeltsch continued to write mostly in the vein of intellectual history. Both men write grand stock-taking statements at the end of their lives. In Weber these take the form of the revisions and additions to the PE, the Intermediate Reflections and Preface to the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* and the Vocation essays. In Troeltsch they take the form of prefaces and additions to his four volumes of Collected Works (1912; 1913; 1922, 1925a), as well as the late lecture series *Der Historismus und seine Überwindung* (1923). But it is significant that Troeltsch’s statements do not assert such sharp conflict between value-perspectives and modern realities as Weber’s do. In general, where Weber sets up antinomies, Troeltsch tends to want to resolve antinomies. Where Weber emphasizes antagonism, fragmentation, disenchantment, irreconcilability of value-spheres and choices, born-again polytheism, nationalism and power-politics, Troeltsch will thematize ‘synthesis’ and ‘compromise’. Where Weber sees finally only an internecine war between science and religion, Troeltsch will still see the two thought-systems as compatible with, and criticisable by, one another. It can be said that in these respects Troeltsch’s thinking is less hard-edged, less self-consciously ‘tragik’, than Weber’s. It is certainly less mercilessly self-objectivating and distanciating. One may perhaps criticize it for a certain syncretic aspect – it is possibly rather too willing to be inclusive of multiple epistemological standpoints and rather less attuned than Weber’s to the prices that sometimes have to be paid for such inclusiveness (although, as I explain shortly, one price it is definitely not willing to pay is Hegelian totalizing metaphysics). However, I want to argue that Troeltsch’s manner of mediation between value-abstention and value-affirmation remains in some respects more appealing than Weber’s. I first set about
demonstrating this by first pinpointing some problems with Weber’s theme of ‘universal history’ (*Universalgeschichte*).

**Max Weber on ‘universal history’**

In the Preface to volume 1 of the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* Weber opens with the words:

> A product of modern European civilization studying the problem of universal history is bound to ask himself, and rightly so, to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie on a line of development having universal significance and validity [von universeller Bedeutung und Gültigkeit]. (1930: 13) 

Several ambiguities occur in this statement.

First Weber asserts that cultural phenomena have arisen on western soil that are not mere curiosities of a particular time and place but have significance and validity for all other civilizations. On the other hand, he adds that this ‘universal significance and validity’ is what ‘we like to think’ – where ‘we’ means ‘we Europeans’ or ‘we westerners’. This ‘universal significance and validity’ is our perception: we ‘like to think’ it because we are products of the very civilization that has created these phenomena. Is, then, this ‘universal significance and validity’ only our perception, only ‘what we like to think’, not after all something objective? Here is a first ambiguity in Weber: one between a statement about a reality and an apparent withdrawal of the statement as reflecting only a perspective.

Then there is a second ambiguity contained in the juxtaposition of ‘significance’ and ‘validity’. This appears to be implied by the German *gültig* and its root verb *gelten*. *Gelten* in German has two semantic values:

1. Valid by convention, in the sense of ‘prevalent’, ‘in force’, ‘in currency’ – for example in the proposition: ‘Euros are valid currency in the Eurozone but not in Britain’.

It is as if Weber has inserted *Bedeutung* in order to offset the full chauvinistic force of *Gültigkeit* in its second application – but at the cost of a hedging of his bets.
Finally there is a third ambiguity in the use of the word ‘universal’. Elsewhere Weber uses the other German word for ‘universal’, allgemeingültig, which is a compound of gültig and repeats the same ambiguity contained in it. Universell and allgemeingültig in this context might imply any of the three following readings:

1. What happened in the West must be undergone by other societies insofar as they are to reach the level of modern civilization – a chauvinistic reading.
2. What happened in the West will eventually be undergone by other societies insofar as they continue to evolve through processes of rationalization – a non-chauvinistic but still ethnocentric reading.
3. What happened in the West has affected other societies and will probably continue to affect them but does not represent a course of development they either will, need, or ought to adopt or repeat themselves. Universell on this reading has the sense of ‘relevant to all’ but not – necessarily – ‘true for all’. It has the conventional, not demonstrable, sense of allgemeingültig.4

The first reading certainly does not correspond to Weber’s intention. The second corresponds to Parsons’ reading in The Structure of Social Action (of 1937), where it is synthesized with the work of Durkheim and Pareto. The third is almost certainly the most normatively defensible reading; but it does not find any further elaboration in any other passages of Weber’s writing. I will argue that it is Troeltsch who first elaborates this more defensible reading of Weber. But I will first pass by way of an excursus on Wolfgang Schluchter’s clarification of the passage because Schluchter’s clarification usefully highlights some important differences between Habermas’ reading of Weber and the thesis of multiple modernities.

**Schluchter and Habermas on Weber’s universalism**

In his The Development of Occidental Rationalism, Schluchter reads Weber as saying not only (1) that occidental rationalization processes strike modern westerners as being significant for other peoples but also (2) that these processes really are significant for other peoples, but (3) that they are significant only insofar as they arose contingently, in a particular historical context, not insofar as they represent a paradigm of evolution that necessarily will, could or should determine or obligate other peoples. They are universal, therefore, in their singularity:
The rationalism of mastering the world is *our* perspective; we use it like a search-light to illuminate a segment of world history; and it has for *us* a claim to correctness insofar as we are concerned with continuity. It belongs to *our* hermeneutic initial situation, which not only arose contingently but remains particular. However, modern Occidental culture is at the same time of such a kind that *all* civilized people [*Kulturmenschen*] could take an interest in it. For it brought a new, historically previously unknown, interpretation of civilized humanity [*Kulturmenschentum*]. This not only makes it a special phenomenon but gives it a special status. And because this is the case, it poses a universal-historical problem and is of universal significance and validity. Even the civilized people who do not choose this alternative for themselves are forced to recognize in it a possible interpretation of civilized humanity, an interpretation against which they need not relativize their own choice, but to which they must relate it, insofar as they want to live consciously. (1979: 36-37) (emphasis in original)

This passage appears as a quotation in Habermas’ *Theory of Communicative Action*, volume 1, where it is cited with approval (Habermas 1984: 180). However, it is important to note that Schluchter’s passage does not tally with Habermas’ reading in any accurate sense. Habermas’ is different and rather closer to Parsons’. Habermas contends that Weber’s as-we-like-to-think parenthesis represents a ‘relativistic inconsistency’ in Weber, where Weber momentarily steps back from the implication of his own argument. Habermas maintains that Weber cannot have meant to impute rationalization processes to a western ‘cultural singularity’, where Habermas uses ‘cultural singularity’ to mean merely ‘particularistic’. Weber can only have meant to speak of certain fundamental structures that all societies are bound to acquire insofar as they continue to evolve toward modernity. Habermas allows for what he calls variations in the ‘cultural contents’ of these structures but insists that when Weber spoke of ‘universal significance and validity’ he essentially meant ‘certain formal properties of the modern understanding of the world, … a few necessary structural properties of the modern life forms as such’:

The universalist position does not have to deny the pluralism and the incompatibility of historical versions of ‘civilized humanity’; but it regards the multiplicity of forms of life as limited to *cultural contents*, and it asserts that every culture must share certain *formal properties* of the modern understanding of the world, if it is at all to attain a certain degree of ‘conscious awareness’ or ‘sublimation’. Thus the universalist assumption refers to a few necessary structural properties of the modern life forms as such. If, however, we regard this universalist view as itself cogent only *for us*, the relativism that was rejected at the theoretical level returns at the meta-theoretical level. I do not think that relativism, whether of the first or second order, is compatible with the conceptual framework in which Weber accounts for the rationality problematic. Certainly Weber had his relativistic reservations. They derived
from a source that would have disappeared had he traced the peculiarity of Occidental rationalism not to a cultural singularity, but to the selective pattern that rationalization processes assumed under the conditions of modern capitalism. (1984: 180) (emphasis in original).

The shortcomings of Habermas’ argument here can be detailed as follows. The distinction between a ‘genuinely universal’ level of societal rationalization and a ‘merely particularistic’ level of cultural variation is invidious. It reproduces Parsons’ troublesome notion of the societal and the cultural as two discrete ‘systems’ – a borrowing Habermas openly deploys in volume 2 of his opus. While some level of societal analysis should be distinguished from a level of cultural analysis and not collapsed into the latter – as with some versions of postmodernist intertextuality – Habermas and Parsons effectively reduce different civilizational enactments of modernity to a single paradigm. They do not appreciate sufficiently that the very features they deride as epiphenomenal variations can themselves articulate and transform societal structures in their own authentically singular-universal ways. It is as if they have forgotten, or repressed, the non-nationalist signification of Kultur in German at the beginning of the twentieth century, when it meant something close to contemporary English ‘civilization’ – such as in Alfred Weber’s Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie (of 1935), Rickert’s concept of Kulturwissenschaft, or Freud’s Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Civilization and its Discontents) (of 1930) (compare Reckwitz 2000). They instead accept the rather etiolated signification of ‘culture’ in English present in mid-century American functionalist theory and also, to a certain extent, in contemporary Anglophone ‘cultural studies’. In Margaret Archer’s terms, Habermas and Parsons both commit a species of ‘downwards conflation’: they drag different civilizational forms downwards into a scheme of invariant ‘deep structure’ (Archer 1988). They do not mediate sufficiently dialectically between particularizing and generalizing terms of analysis, between ‘variance’ and ‘invariance’. Habermas’ universalism in this sense comes unintentionally close both to a form of Eurocentrism, on the one hand, and to an effect of sociological de-contextualization, on the other; and it tries to ward off the danger of the former only by intensifying the problem of the latter (Delanty 1997; 1999). While it strenuously wishes to ‘include the other’, it does so only on condition of abstraction: it remains the abstract negation of postmodernism, not its internal dialogical transformation.

I therefore propose that Weber’s analyses do imply speaking of occidental rationalism in terms of a ‘cultural singularity’, namely in terms of a European cultural singularity. Further I propose that it is in this European cultural singularity that the universality of occidental
rationalism concretely resides. This is the concrete ‘singular universalism’ evoked by Schluchter and the thesis of multiple modernities, and it is this concrete ‘singular universalism’ that is explicated at length by Troeltsch.

**Troeltsch’s Europeanism**

In the section on ‘Europäismus’ in *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, Troeltsch addresses two tasks: first, criticism of ‘Eurocentrism’ in philosophy and the history of ideas; second, civilizational characterization of European history. Before I turn to the first of these, I state briefly Troeltsch’s view of the scope of ‘historicism’.

By historicism Troeltsch understands neither (1) Hegelian metaphysics nor (2) romantic relativistic historicism. The former imposes on history a schema of total necessary development; the latter dissolves history into a multitude of discrete contexts devoid of all interconnection. By historicism Troeltsch means the synthetic understanding of all works, actions and material contexts of human life over time by means of concepts relating thought to existence without resort to a totalizing logic. His conception in this sense comes close to Dilthey’s view of historicism as a theory of knowledge for the human sciences (Troeltsch indeed dedicated his book to Dilthey). However, Troeltsch’s affiliations are neither exclusively to Dilthey’s *Lebensphilosophie*, nor exclusively to Rickert’s Neo-Kantianism, nor exclusively to Weber’s *Soziologie*. Troeltsch’s *Historismus* differs from Weber’s *Soziologie* insofar as it still adheres to some possibility of mediating sociological observation with normative questions of the true and the good. In this one respect it comes closer to Mannheim’s vision of a normative, ‘relationist but not relativist’, *Wissenssoziologie*. (Mannheim himself saluted Troeltsch in his essay on historicism from 1924 (Mannheim 1956)). But beyond this, Troeltsch also sees historicism as having ethical significance: it stands for humane tolerance and respect for differences of cultural values. It represents a liberal-cosmopolitan ethos that looks forward to similar visions in figures such as Cassirer, Panofsky and Isaiah Berlin.6

Troeltsch begins his first task by criticising ideas of universal history in German philosophy and historical writing since the eighteenth century, first in Herder and Lessing, then Kant, Schiller, Hegel, Ranke and others. Although the idea did not originally mean ‘world history’ for Herder, it soon came to acquire this meaning. Troeltsch declares that all evolutionary teleologies, all stage-conceptions of history, all notions of entelechy in history, must be repudiated. These ways of thinking are little more than projections of the European self-image – and Troeltsch adds pointedly that behind all of them ‘lurks the figure of the conqueror, the
colonizer and the missionary’ (Der Eroberer, der Kolonisator und der Missionär steckt in allem europäischen Denken) (1922: 707). Troeltsch here uses no word directly equivalent to the English ‘Eurocentric’: the word did not of course exist in the 1920s, either in English or in any German equivalent. His preferred phrases are ‘Übertreibungen des europäischen Selbstgefühls’, ‘Europäerhochmut’ and ‘überall verbreitete naïve Selbstverabsolutierung’, and the like. These phrases entail at least four senses:

1. Concentration on European instances of a phenomenon also possessing instances in other places of the world – and neglect, ignorance or misunderstanding of these other instances.
2. Belief in the existence of a phenomenon in all places of the world which in fact exists only in Europe; hence conflation of something local for something ubiquitous.
3. Belief in Europe as the most developed civilization, where ‘most developed’ implies ‘best’.
4. Belief in European values as valid for all societies, where ‘valid for all’ implies ‘true for all’.

All these senses clearly revolve around some idea of self-projection, or ‘Selbstverabsolutierung’.7 Significantly, however, Troeltsch does not censure all self-projection tout court. He declares, on the one hand, that all instances of philosophizing about humanity in the abstract cannot hope to be more than instances of philosophizing about European being. He announces that while humanity exists as a whole, it cannot be known as a whole, if by ‘known as a whole’ is meant subsumed under one total systematic science – such as Hegel’s dialectic or Comte’s philosophie positive. On the other hand, he proposes that unknowingly Eurocentric conceptions are capable of becoming knowingly Eurocentric conceptions. They can become critical self-projections, by reflecting on their origins and comparing themselves with the projections of other civilizations and studying those other civilizations empathically. When they do so, they cease to be Eurocentric in any malign sense. They become acts of reflective self-understanding:

For us there is only a world-history of Europeans [Europäertum]. The old conception of world history must take on new and more modest forms. We must be resolved to reject all overextensions of the European self-image and all forcible monism of a way of thinking that makes everything converge on one point. […]

For us there is only the universal history of European culture, which certainly needs to look comparatively at other cultures practically and theoretically in order to understand itself and its relation to the others but which cannot thereby
Troeltsch does not, however, conclude from this that all that Europeans can know is European being. He does not hold that Europeans can know only themselves and no others. Rather, his claim is that if Europeans know themselves at all, they know themselves only through knowing others — whereas malign Eurocentrism furnishes neither knowledge of others nor self-knowledge. Thus his claim is that Europeans cannot know others under any total system of knowledge. Non-totalizing studies — such as Weber’s — are possible and eminently desirable. In this sense Troeltsch’s conception is not a perspectivist one. He holds that reflective self-projection entails neither that all one can know is one’s own standpoint, nor that if one wants to know others one must somehow shed this standpoint altogether. His view is that if we are Europeans, Europe informs our theoretical constructions and ethical beliefs; we should therefore take this into consideration; but, the fact that we need to do so does not by itself jeopardize our possibility of understanding. Clearly there are limits to our understanding, and it is our intellectual and ethical duty to push back these limits. We must endeavour to understand all the instances of our object of study, not only the European instances. But we should not presume ourselves capable of knowing all the instances, because we are always knowing from a standpoint, a centre, a horizon — which is always limited. However, the fact that our knowing is limited and located does not mean that all we know in the end is a perspective. Our way of understanding is circular; but it need not be viciously so, though it often is. We can make our understanding virtuously circular, though we often fail. In this sense Troeltsch’s argument has the classic form of a hermeneutic circle. The argument runs like a leitmotif in anti-Cartesian thought from Gadamer and Heidegger back to Dilthey, Schleiermacher, W.v. Humboldt and Vico.8

Troeltsch addresses his second task by speaking of different ‘civilizational complexes’ (Kulturkreise). These include ‘the Middle Eastern complexes, which eventually coalesce into Islamic culture, as well as the Egyptian, Hindu, Chinese and lastly the Mediterranean-European-American complexes, to note only the largest’ (708). Troeltsch speaks in Weberian terms of a ‘Mediterranean-European-Atlantic bloc’, characterized by planned attitudes to action over time, leading to economic take-off in the societies of western Europe. These he distinguishes from more cyclical attitudes to time in the ancient civilizations of the Sumerians, Acadians, Assyrians and Babylonians (716). Although the Oriental civilizations influence and interact with
western Mediterranean antiquity in Greece, and although Arab civilization receives, preserves and transforms the legacy of the Greeks, only northern-western Europe constructs an overarching bridge between monotheistic religious modernity and classical antiquity. The Islamic world blends Jewish and Christian religiosity with Greek culture but it develops in a different direction from northern-western Europe. The latter definitively breaks with the Oriental roots of Mediterranean antiquity; it preserves from the Orient only the prophetic contents of ancient Judaism; it takes its central idea of the autonomous personality from Greek culture. Troeltsch comments that in this respect ‘the goals of the Islamic world have never been those of an autonomous, free and infinitely self-creating humanity, such as in Europe. […] However numerous and close its ties to Europeanism, Islam has a universal history of its own and does not belong in the universal history of Europeans’ (727). European political society arises in large part on the basis of the legal-administrative structures of the Roman empire and its subsequent Christianization, and it is consolidated in the commercial and political freedom of the medieval cities (716-18). The unifying agency in this formation is the Catholic church, which defines the structures of cultural and political power in Europe from the Carolingian Middle Ages onwards. Troeltsch comments that in this one respect, Hegel’s attribution of modern European civilization to the legacies of the Germanic and Greco-Roman rather than Oriental peoples is correct – even though Hegel refers only to modern civilization tout court and chauvinistically excludes the East except insofar as it represents a principle of ‘nothingness’ which is negated in the ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ of the Greco-Romans and the Germans (726). Troeltsch concludes:

Our universal history is all the more a European self-understanding as it is only Europeans who, with their amassing of very diverse cultural elements, their never-resting intellect and their incessantly ambitious self-education, have need of such a universal-historical consciousness on a critical scientific footing. Only Europeans build continually on a rationally projected future and only they need historical experience for this task, which they collect at different times and stages in order to preserve at length. Only Europeans have become philosophers of history out of chroniclers and epic story-tellers, prophets and mystics, archivists and politicians, because only they strive to acquire a consciously directed future out of a consciously recorded past. (1922: 710)

In two final paragraphs Troeltsch raises the question of Europe’s destiny beside America to the west and Russia to the east, and the uncertainty of Europe’s boundaries with Asia. Although he says that only those Slavic peoples who moved furthest westwards from Asia after the
first Germanic migrations had any impact on ‘Europe’s more decisively Latin culture’, and although he says that the division between Latin Rome and Greek Byzantium is itself constitutive for Europe, with the Orthodox church having a ‘remoter connection’ to classical Greece than that of western European culture, he avers that Russia’s close connections to the west in religion, politics and economy place her among Europe’s ‘strongest forces of the future’ (728). Indeed he goes so far as to say that only the ‘conjunction of the Greek-Orthodox and Latin-Catholic religions makes talk of Europeanism permissible’ (729, n.388). Similarly he underlines that even as Americans continue to look to Europe as a source of heritage, the era of colonial America as a sanctuary for European fugitives is definitively over. America ‘has been stepping ever more stridently into the foreground of world culture, and now indeed into its very centre after our all-destructive war’. Therefore he warns that ‘we should not harden ourselves too sharply and arrogantly against Americanism, for in truth we are involved in America and America’s place in our future cannot be forgotten. (729-130).

Taken in isolation, none of these statements might seem particularly remarkable. However, I want to argue that taken as a totality, they amount to something important. Troeltsch supplies nothing of the contents of substantive civilizational analysis that Weber does, but I want to suggest that he interprets these contents’ moral meanings for us – for us contemporary Europeans, if we are Europeans, and if we can be sure that this who ‘we are’ – more richly than Weber. I put the argument for this as follows.

**Troeltsch’s Europeanism versus Weber’s Occidentalism**

Troeltsch’s rejection of any strict disjunction between observation and valuation allows him to resolve Weber’s ambivalence between an assertion of the universality of occidental rationalism and an apparent retraction of the assertion. Troeltsch neither retreats into perspectivism (in the fashion of postmodernists), nor launches forward into universalizing abstraction (in the manner of Parsons and Habermas). He does not here deny the contingency and singularity of the processes Weber describes, but he defines their universality in their contingency and singularity, not in any generally applicable construct. Their universality holds not merely ‘for us’; it holds in reality, but it holds concretely, not abstractly. Troeltsch sees Europe as providing this missing dimension of concretion. Weber’s Occident, in contrast, remains something of an abstraction of social science, hard to identify with in lived experience. Europe remains an at once theoretical and ethical frame of reference; it has an identifiable
history, and is not merely a perception or construction: it is not only a skein of ideologies and sinister prejudices, though it is certainly also this.

Further, Troeltsch does not see Europe’s universality as precluding the universality of other civilizations. Troeltsch sees many embodiments of the universal in different world religions and civilizations. This is the sense in which he speaks of the universality of Islam – as one universal among other singular universals. In an earlier, more theological work, *The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions* (1972 [1902]) (which cannot be discussed here), Troeltsch makes clear that while ‘absoluteness’ should be understood normatively, it should also, *at the same time*, be understood in a steadfastly relativizing, sociologizing and anti-Hegelian sense. Christianity’s absoluteness remains a validity-claim – not an established fact – and in no way cancels the validity-claims of other world religions. Troeltsch in this sense thinks of the absolute *in* the relative, the universal *in* the singular, the identical *in* the different and plural. He shows how value-standpoints make up concrete realities of experience, not always perspectives to be doubted and objectified. He treats the relation between projections of thought, value, feeling and reality as a potentially virtuous circle, rather than as a disjunction that might revert to Cartesian doubt or to positivism and scientism. He does not affirm Weber’s rather stringent Neo-Kantian distinction between what is and what appears, between how things are in themselves and how we merely ‘like to think’ they are. By commending Weber’s account and then qualifying and thickening it by linking it to ‘Europeanism’, he shows how the things Europeans have experienced and produced are genuinely relevant to other societies, insofar they concern and affect others and bear witness – not least – to a legacy of destruction and subjugation, but are not necessarily true for others insofar they represent a scheme of development through which others must pass.

Troeltsch in these respects resolves some of Weber’s more undialectical tensions and allows them to come into a more fruitful exchange. He harmonizes some of the more centrifugal forces of Weber’s work. He removes Weber’s ambivalence between at least latent Eurocentric scientism and objectivism on the one hand and at least latent relativism on the other (notwithstanding Weber’s fierce disclaimers of both). It would be possible to object to this that contrasting Troeltsch and Weber in this way depends rather too heavily on a view of Weber’s highest defining ambition as lying in the foundation of sociology as a comparative ‘science of civilizations’. This view has certainly been disputed by Hennis (2000a, 2000b) who would rather read Weber as a modern critic of the fate of ethical *Lebensführung*, in the spirit of Aristotelian eudaimonian philosophy. In this respect Hennis would want to see Weber and Troeltsch brought rather closer to one another than I
have presented them here. However, it should be noted that Hennis idiosyncratically excludes all of the more scientific aspirations of Weber’s work which made applications such as Parsons’ and Bendix’s first possible. Weber’s corpus remains an untidy bundle of tensions between both Parsonian developmentalist and neo-Aristotelian readings – and between Marxian and Nietzschean and nationalist readings. It is not possible to cancel these tensions by imposing a unifying intention on them; but it is possible to work creatively and constructively with them, as I believe Troeltsch does.

Troeltsch arrives at this proposal because he has a different relationship to romanticism from Weber. He begins partly from Schleiermacher, who in turn drew from Kant’s distinction between statements that subsume the particular under the general (such as statements in science) and statements that intuit the general in the particular (such as statements in aesthetics and theology) (The Critique of Judgement, First Introduction). Schleiermacher thematized this distinction in Kant between a subsumptive faculty of intellect and a reflective faculty of judgement that sees generality in particularity. In his writings on hermeneutics Schleiermacher referred to the latter as the capacity to divine the ‘individual general’ (das individuelle Allgemeine) (Frank 1977). Hegel’s philosophy of course also develops a conception of the ‘concrete universal’; but Hegel’s system finally subsumes the concrete and particular in a closed totality. In contrast, Schleiermacher and other early romantic thinkers sought to show how concrete particularity resists any ultimate system of mediation, such as Hegel’s ‘identity of identity and difference’. It was this opposition to Hegel that unleashed the turn to empathic historicism in nineteenth-century German thought, and it is this empathic tradition that underlies both Troeltsch’s and Weber’s concern with ‘historical individuality’. But whereas the romantic content of this tradition tends to remain suppressed in Weber’s scientific writing, Troeltsch is more generous with it. Whereas Weber cannot bring himself to accept romantic historicism’s compatibility with social science, Troeltsch makes more of an effort to salvage its value for our understanding of the universal in the singular. Both begin by renouncing teleological metaphysics; both turn to the human sciences; and both end by rejecting positivism. But whereas Troeltsch describes ways of redeeming these three projects by drawing together their three residual moments of validity – the philosophical, the historicist and the scientific – in an open unfinished synthesis, Weber sees only a congeries of antinomies.

I have now described the main philosophical differences between Troeltsch and Weber. I end briefly with one further difference concerning their perceptions of the future of the west and the social character of the
two continents of the north Atlantic. Here there is a sense in which one can say that Troeltsch was rather less fascinated by the Anglo-Saxon conquest of the Atlantic than Weber was. Troeltsch’s *Social Teaching* study has different emphases from Weber’s *Protestant Ethic* and draws slightly different conclusions. First Troeltsch’s leading protagonists are more central European than Weber’s. Troeltsch not only discusses Weber’s beloved Baxter and Franklin but also Augustine and the stoics, Acquinas, the papacy and medieval natural law, and at length. (Weber of course also intended to write about medieval Christianity but in the end never did – and it cannot be insignificant that he never did (Schluchter 1988).) Second, Troeltsch’s account of the breakthrough to modernity in Europe is rather less concerned than Weber’s with methodical conduct of life in England and Holland and rather more so with the political and intellectual developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in central and southern Europe. Troeltsch’s theme is less the ‘spirit of capitalism’ than tolerance, pluralism, *Aufklärung* and ‘social teaching’. Third, Troeltsch’s view of the present is more trusting of residues of fraternalism and solidarity than Weber’s. Troeltsch does not only see individualism, bureaucracy and an iron cage. He is more interested in the role of national churches in social amelioration and he is not interested in great power politics; his vision is more ‘ecumenical’. Troeltsch is less convinced of the destruction of *Gemeinschaft* and less concerned with sects, exclusive small groups and voluntary associations. He in one sense comes closer to Durkheim’s confidence in possibilities of intermediary association between the collective and the individual – although he does not of course share Durkheim’s purely secular humanism. In these respects one can say that Troeltsch was not Weber’s ‘would-be Englishman’, in Roth’s phrase (Roth 1993). Troeltsch did not, in the end, weight Anglo-Saxon experiences so highly in the schema of things. He articulates a more continental European modernity, where Catholicism, humanism, communalism and idealism have only slightly less importance in the scheme of things than Protestantism, capitalism, pragmatism and experimentalism. In short, with some exaggeration and some anachronism, one can say that Troeltsch was a Europeanist in his social views where Weber was an ‘Atlanticist’. 10

**Conclusion: multiple modernities and singular universals**

I have proposed an affinity between the thesis of multiple modernities and the notion of ‘singular universalism’. I now conclude with some closer analysis of this link, which involves first rebutting a possible hypothetical objection.
One might be argue that the concept of multiple modernities formally implies one modernity. If it did not, it would be impossible to identify different contexts as being instances of the same conceptual type. Either modernity must be one or the many contexts cannot be instances of the same type but must be instances of different types (some of them might be instances of the type modernity, some of them of the type ‘tradition’). ‘Modernity’ is an abstract noun; it is already an abstraction from a plurality of modern events, modern processes, modern behaviour, and so on. Abstract nouns cannot themselves be pluralized without obscure consequences. Therefore the thesis of multiple modernities tries to have its cake and eat it: to keep a grip on modernity as something conceptually unitary and at the same time accommodate as much civilizational pluralism as possible. It cannot do both.

The structure of this objection refers to a rather central principle of modern formal logic, which holds that ‘singular terms’ and ‘universal terms’ cannot be conflated. The principle appears classically in Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Atomism of 1919, and more recently in Tugendhat (1982). In the statement ‘The castle of Heidelberg is red’, the singular term is ‘the castle of Heidelberg’; the universal term is ‘red’. Singular terms correspond to logical subject, universal terms to predicate. The castle of Heidelberg is not the only castle which is red. There are, and can be, many red castles. But there cannot be many ‘reds’, much less many ‘rednesses’. ‘Red’ is not a singular term which can be pluralized, as ‘castle’ is. There can only be many red things. Russell termed the maxim of refraining from treating universal terms as if they were singular terms the principle of Occam’s Razor, after William of Occam (1285-1349) who held (heretically) that no evil exists as a singular entity and that only evil things exist. Occam held that evil should not be hypostatized: it should be stripped down, with the razor of clear thought, to its really existent subjects of attribution. In the same spirit, Russell held that universal terms such as ‘red’, ‘good’, ‘beautiful’ should not be thought of as singulars which themselves can be pluralized: ‘rednesses’, goodnesses’, ‘beauties’. They should be reduced to their really existent subjects of attribution: red things, good things, beautiful things. On this reasoning, it might be argued that the concept of modernity tries to make a singular out of what is better understandable as plural – ‘modern things’ – and further that the thesis of multiple modernities tries to make a plural out of what is at best understandable as singular – namely ‘modernity’ (if it is understandable at all as singular). The thesis tries to make universals out of singulars and singulars out of universals. It thereby confuses two levels of analysis: that of attribution with that of predication: ‘modern X’ with ‘X is modern’.
The thesis of multiple modernities is, however, aware of this objection, and consciously defies it. The thesis argues that the consequences of pluralizing modernity are not obscure when they are understood in historical concretion. It invites us to think more dialectically about the relationship between the one and the many. It certainly holds that modernity need not only be thought of as one, where modernity is an ‘essence’ with merely multiple ‘appearances’. In this sense it is not Platonism in disguise: it is not the thesis that that ‘all is one and nothing is many’ (in Parmenides). But it also holds that modernity need not only be thought of as multiple, where nothing is identifiable as an instance of the same. In this sense it is not relativism in disguise: it is not the thesis that ‘nothing is one and all is many’ (in Heraclitus). Multiple modernities rejects formal logic’s principle of the ‘excluded middle’. It is the thesis there exists an in-between – a ‘broken middle’, as Gillian Rose once called it (Rose 1992) – and it calls this ‘in-between’ the ‘singular universal’, of which there can be many. On these grounds, we do not need to accept Russell’s ontological reductionism and logical positivism. We do not need to say that only modern things exist while ‘modernity’ and ‘modernities’ merely predicate these things. We can accept less nominalistic conceptions of the correct use of singular and universal terms. We can accept conceptions such as the late Wittgenstein’s suggestion of ‘family resemblances’ between things linked together by ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing’ (1953: 67). In this sense we can speak of both family resemblances between ‘modernity’ and ‘modern things’ and higher-order family resemblances between ‘modernity’ and ‘modernities’. If we do so, we avoid both the hypostasis of modernity as having multiple emanations in the world of things and the reduction of modernity into multiple ‘representations’, ‘constructions’, ‘discourses’, ‘perspectives’. The former exemplifies Eurocentric essentialism. The latter exemplifies relativism and postmodernism.

These pairs of antitheses can and should be criticized with the aid of dialectical logic (not formal, propositional logic). To assert that all that exists is one-essence-with-many-appearances is the same as to assert that all that exists is many-appearances-without-an-essence. In the one case, being is essentialized; in the other, nothing is essentialized. The one falls over into the other; the other falls over into the one. The category of what comes in-between, namely becoming – coming-into-being-from-nothing – is in both cases forgotten. Thus these antitheses merely oscillate viciously with one another: dogmatism produces scepticism, scepticism produces dogmatism; nihilism is the token of positivism, positivism the token of nihilism. It is mistaken to view the one and the many, the universal and the singular, the European and the non-European, as
preceding one another; they are coeval, and move with one another through time, in historical becoming. But to say this is not to say, and need not be to say, that we must finally accept dialectical closure and totality, in the manner of Hegel. We are capable of ‘negative dialectical’ thinking, as Adorno among others teach. Here I submit that many strands of early twentieth-century European civilizational sociology together with numerous figures in contemporary comparative historical sociology articulate precisely these processes of historical becoming without totalizing dialectical closure. They demonstrate that the Eurocentric positivism of nineteenth-century British, French, Franco-Italian and mid-twentieth century American evolutionary thinking by no means describes the whole of western social science. They represent only a few examples of a rather broad tranche of so far relatively neglected sources of European thinking with which we must today engage if we are to gain purchase on Europeanism and Eurocentrism in social theory and social experience and not rest content with polemical simplification. Troeltsch, Max and Alfred Weber, Jaspers, Mannheim, Husserl and Valéry are only a few figures whose statements on Europe need to be placed alongside those of historians, anthropologists, archaeologists, philosophers and artists of the period and recognized as interventions as self-critical as those of more recent authors such as Patocka (1996, 2002), Gadamer (1989), Derrida (1992), Brague (1992), Cacciari (1994, 1997), Kristeva (2000), Chakrabarty (2000), Said (2003) and Hardt and Negri (1999). Many European writers of the inter-war period demonstrate a fairly continuous thread of critical reflexivity in European cultural life, rendering untenable any dichotomy between a Eurocentric colonial modernity in the first half of the twentieth century and an anti-Eurocentric postcolonial ‘postmodernity’ in the latter.

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Notes

1 Three short overlapping articles have been written on Troeltsch’s idea of Europeanism by Cho (1995; 1996; 1998). The best survey of Troeltsch’s theology in English to date is Chapman (2001). Chapman helpfully draws our attention to Troeltsch’s differences with Weber over questions of value and science, but no study has addressed the significance of Troeltsch’s and Weber’s disagreements for contemporary thinking about modernity, Europe and the west.

2 Like Weber, Troeltsch did not support socialism. The question of whether this makes him a liberal ‘apologist’ of inequality must be left open at this juncture. The latter is claimed by Benson (1999); but there are arguments against the claim. Mannheim (1956), who read Troeltsch closely, did not take this view.


4 I say ‘not necessarily’ because the possibility that other societies might adopt western courses of development or that these courses might be ‘true’ or ‘good’ for them to adopt should not be ruled out a priori. To rule it out would be no less dogmatic; but the possibility is certainly not likely, nor highly morally recommendable.

5 Oddly, however, it does not occur in the abridged English translation of Schluchter (1979). I here use McCarthy’s translation in Habermas (1984: 180).

6 But note that Troeltsch’s ‘tolerance’ is not nebulous. In Der Historismus und seine Überwindung Troeltsch speaks of ‘intellectual individualism, eclectic historicism … lax liberalism and directionless tolerance’ as a problem of ‘our present age’ (1923: 46-7). This posthumous text can be understood as a sort of sociologized re-working of Kant’s philosophy of history. It attempts to preserve Kant’s regulative idea of universal morality in an historicized form. (Its title, however, is misleading and was not Troeltsch’s own. Troeltsch did not believe that historicism needed to be ‘overcome’ (except when it was mistaken for relativism or determinism, and it except it became ‘eclectic’) (Chapman 1993: 9).

7 See also McLenann (2000; 2003) for a similar analysis of the term.

8 In Gadamer’s terms, ‘pre-judgements’ are constitutive and enabling of understanding. They can also be constraining and vitiating of understanding but need not be (Gadamer 1975). Compare also the first four propositions of Vico’s New Science on the ‘conceit of nations’: ‘By its nature, the human mind is indeterminate; hence, when man is sunk in ignorance, he makes himself the measure of the universe’; ‘Another property of the human mind is that, when people can form no idea of distant and unfamiliar things, they judge them by what is present and familiar’; ‘In addition to the conceivable of nations, there is the conceivable of scholars, who assert that what they know is as old as the world’ (Vico 1999: 75-7) (third edition of 1744). Such early instances of anti-Eurocentric European thinking are not often considered post-colonial critics.
Perhaps surprisingly, Troeltsch does not mention the Bolshevik revolution. Weber’s study of the 1905 revolution (from 1906) might have suggested to him a vision of Europe as a median polity between individualist forces to the west and collectivist forces to the east – a vision Troeltsch intimates in commentaries elsewhere on socialism and individualism (1912: 965; 1925b) but not here.

An impressionistic reading of the Proceedings of the First Congress of German Sociologists in 1910 suggest that whereas Weber and Sombart tend to stand on one side, a sort of ‘Atlantic side’, preoccupied with capitalism, individualism and materialism, Troeltsch, Tönnies and Simmel stand on another side, a sort of ‘continental European side’, preoccupied with the fate of community, culture and solidarity (compare Käsler 1984). It should, however, be noted that Troeltsch’s ‘European side’ is not comparable to Simmel’s. Although Simmel was not openly hostile to America, he remained deeply attached to European humanistic traditions in art and philosophy. This is less the case with Troeltsch. Troeltsch defends no ‘tragedy of culture’ thesis; he does not revolt against the mass society; nor does he associate massification with Americanism. In Troeltsch’s writing the emerging American century is neither hypostatized, as it at least is implicitly in Weber, nor demonized, as it at least implicitly is in Simmel.

Failure to recognize this is, I believe, a problem with the argument of Chakrabarty (2000). But note an alternative approach to singular universals from within postcolonial theory by Hallward (2001), and by Badiou (1997) with reference to St. Paul; see also Jameson (2003).

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