Legitimacy through Jurisprudence?
The Impact of the European Court of Justice on the Legitimacy of the European Union

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“The judiciary [... ] has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment”.

— Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist no. 78

Legislatures, Judiciaries, and Public Opinion

Parliaments as Public Enemies?

“Congress as Public Enemy” is the title of a study, published in 1995, in which John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse analysed “public attitudes toward American political institutions” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). In their research, the authors combined quantitative and qualitative methods in order to find out the reasons for an apparent dissatisfaction of the American people with their political system. Their results were surprising: While Congress (like indeed every Parliament) had been designed, by the Fathers of the American Constitution, as the federal institution that would most closely reflect the will of the people, it was exactly the Congress which respondents to a national survey as well as participants in focus group interviews disliked most. Or, to be more precise, it was the way in which Congress operates that aroused the fury of the people.

Hibbing and Theiss-Morse discerned, in the public perception, a distinction between the institutions per se and their day-to-day operations. And while support for the constitutional set-up and the institutions it established remained strong, the very political process that is the consequence of this set-up turned out to be heavily disliked by “ordinary people”. The public, concluded the authors, refutes professionalised government, special-interest influence, controversial debate, compromise, and the lengthiness of democratic processes. As a consequence, the work of those institutions that display these features to the greatest extent is least appreciated. Paradoxically enough, therefore, Congress was perceived as “public enemy” — “because it is public” (149). It is the other side of the same coin that non-
majoritarian institutions, where the processes people dislike most are either not in operation or at least not visible to the general public, enjoy a high level of support. The distinction between the institution as such, as a part of the constitutional structure, on the one hand, and its actual operation on the other is less clear-cut; these institutions, or so it appears, live up better to the constitutional ideal. In the American ambience, this is especially true for the Supreme Court: Its individual members have a comparatively low profile (at least with regard to the general public, though certainly not for lawyers and other specialists); it operates in dignified settings, emphasised by the architecture and the sculptural symbolism of Cass Gilbert’s 1935 Supreme Court “temple” (cf. Maroon and Maroon 1996); with the exception of a few very prominent cases, disagreement among judges usually is not openly visible.

Unfortunately, comparative research in this field is rare, if not outright non-existent. It is therefore not clear to what extent Hibbing’s and Theiss-Morse’s findings allow for generalisations across modern pluralist political systems. Some preliminary and rather superficial observations may nonetheless, for the time being, corroborate the impression that legislatures, despite being the branch of government designed to represent the will of the sovereign people, are in general less popular than essentially non-democratically responsible judiciaries. According to a recent Eurobarometer opinion poll (Eurobarometer 2002b: B.9f), people in most member states of the European Union have more confidence in judicial institutions than
in the two other branches of government (see Figure 1).¹

A democratically elected legislature thus seems to be, by means of its mere existence as part of the constitutional order, a necessary but, because of the way it operates, by no means a sufficient prerequisite to secure public support for the political system. Other ingredients have to be added to the constitutional recipe in order to stabilise the polity. One of these ingredients might be a strong, independent and effective judicial system, with a special emphasis on its publicly most visible part: the supreme or constitutional court.²

The Contested Polity

The problem of parliaments' precarious legitimacy would certainly be aggravated in a “polity in the making” like the European Union. In an article first published in 1991, Joseph Weiler argued that people “accept the majoritarian principle of democracy [only] within a polity to which they see themselves as belonging” (Weiler 1999: 83). Strengthening the European Parliament, from his point of view, could hardly contribute to a higher level of popular support for the European integration process. The heart of the problem was not the widely acknowledged “democracy deficit”. What the European Union suffered from was a much deeper legitimacy problem. Strengthening the European Parliament in the European decision-making process, possibly accompanied by extended qualified-majority voting in the Council, might, from this perspective, do more harm than good. The results of Hibbing's and Theiss-Morse's research strengthen the case for Weiler's skepticism: If parliamentary processes, including the bargaining between different interests and the striking of compromises, enjoy little public support even in stable national contexts, it is reasonable to assume that the very same processes will hardly be able to strengthen a feeling of “belongingness” among the citizens of the European Union.

However, more than ten years after Joseph Weiler's analysis, Eurobarometer figures seem to indicate that European integration has regained at least part of its popularity. As Table 1 shows, positive answers prevail for all major indicators of support for the integration process. At first sight, one might even get the impression that attitudes toward the European Union are, in many aspects, more favourable than toward the nation-state. At least, European citizens display much more trust with regard to European institutions than toward their national equivalents (Eurobarometer 2002b: 7f., 47).
Table 1: Attitudes toward the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>positive</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership “good thing”</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit from EU for respective member state</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regret if EU failed</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the EU</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image of the EU</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 2002b.

Does this mean that the legitimacy deficit Weiler had noted has been cured? Hardly so. The dust of the fierce Maastricht debates may have settled down. But the social legitimacy of the European Union arguably remains precarious. European integration now faces not so much open hostility, but rather indifference and disinterest. The legitimacy deficit has not disappeared; it just comes in a different guise. In 1999, only about 57% of the European electorate participated in elections for the European Parliament — a turnout lower than in previous European elections and much lower than the average turnout in national general elections. Even those who did vote can hardly be said to have acted, unless in a very formal sense, in their capacity as citizens of the European Union: Electoral campaigns in all fifteen member states had been dominated by issues of national politics, rather than focusing on a genuinely European agenda. The 1999 elections were symptomatic for a lack of interest, on behalf of the European public, in European Union affairs.

The same lack of interest is reflected in the low public awareness of the work of the European Convention, composed of representatives of the European Parliament and the European Commission as well as of national parliaments and governments. The (rather restricted) academic and political public has widely acclaimed the “Convention method” as an inclusive and therefore promising approach to Treaty reform in the European Union. But while the Convention has elaborated a draft Constitutional Treaty for the European Union, the public at large has hardly taken notice. According to the results of the most recent Eurobarometer opinion poll only 28% of the respondents had even heard of the Convention’s existence (Eurobarometer 2002a: 10) — despite the fact that 65% declared themselves in favour of the adoption of a European Constitution (13). This discrepancy is not too difficult to explain: Media coverage is scarce, if it exists at all; and unsurprisingly so, if one considers the fact that 30% of the European citizenry are not interested in news concerning the European Union at all, while 49% pay only little attention (Eurobarometer 2002b: 10). And even though more people would regret than feel relieved if the European Union disappeared completely from the international stage, the most frequent attitude, as Table 1 shows, would be one of mere and simple indifference.
The Argument

Starting from these two points of departure, two sets of questions impose themselves:

1. What contribution can courts, and more particularly constitutional courts, make to the “production” of legitimacy for a given polity? What are the preconditions for their having an impact on the polity’s legitimacy, which factors influence this effect and what are its limits? How can their “legimatory” contribution be reconciled with democratic theory and with their own precarious position as a non-democratically responsible institution in a democratic environment? That is, what about the normative claim that “all State authority is derived from the people”, as for example Article 20 of the German Grundgesetz stipulates?

2. Can the theoretical findings be applied to a supranational polity, and if so, to what extent? Has the European Court of Justice been able to provide legitimacy for the European Union and for the integration process? How large is its potential to do so in the future? Under what conditions could this potential be further unfolded in the current constitution-making process?

Obviously, the answers to the second set of questions will largely depend on the answers to the first. This paper, therefore, focuses to a large extent on that first set. It attempts at shedding some light at the legitimatory function of the judiciary. Instead of viewing courts (and above all, constitutional courts) as mere consumers of legitimacy, I propose to analyse them as important producers of public support for the political system as a whole.

The second part of the paper is accordingly devoted to the elaboration of a model of “legitimacy through jurisprudence”. It starts out with an attempt at clarifying the catch-all term “legitimacy” and elaborating a working definition which focuses on the empirical-analytical rather than the normative connotations of the term. I will then try to individuate dimensions of legitimacy that together make up the legitimacy of a polity. In the next step, I will endeavour to locate the contributions of courts within these dimensions of legitimacy, applying a Habermasian-style framework of “deliberative democracy” and “legitimacy through legality”. In the light of the preceding analysis, I will finally identify tentatively some factors that condition, influence, or limit the impact of courts on securing a polity’s legitimacy.

In the third part of the paper, I will present some first — rather intuitive — ideas about what the results of the theoretical discussion might imply with regard to the European Union. I will try to analyse to what extent the factors which have previously been individuated are present in the European context, and arrive at a tentative conclusion about the extent to which the European Court of Justice does indeed have, and can have in the future, an influence on the legitimacy of that sui generis polity that is the European Union.
The Concept of Legitimacy

“The question of the legitimacy or rightfulness of political authority is of central concern to both normative political philosophy and explanatory political science, yet a satisfactory definition of the concept remains elusive, and the connection between the respective concerns of political philosophy and political science is obscure” (Beetham and Lord 1998: 15).

Social Legitimacy

“Legitimacy” is indeed a colourful concept. What do we mean when talking about the legitimacy of the German constitutional order, the legitimacy of Italian court decisions, or the legitimacy deficit of the European Union? The term is extraordinarily difficult to define, and it is even more difficult to measure. This is not to say that we do not know what it means. Just as many of us instantly know, when looking at a piece of art, whether we like it or not, we intuitively also know whether a given political system or individual political decision is, in our view, legitimate. Just as we appraise, say, a Picasso painting at first sight, without asking for what exactly, which of its characteristics (colours, structures, form, etc.) makes us like it, we consider a polity legitimate or not without exactly knowing why.3 For our purpose, however, we will have to go beyond intuitive knowledge. In this section, I will distinguish between the connotations of “legitimacy”, elaborate a working definition of the term, and individuate its dimensions.

In his famous study on Economy and Society,4 Max Weber laid the foundations for social science research on legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy forms the cornerstone of his Herrschaftssoziologie. Departing from his definition of Herrschaft — the “probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons” (Weber 1968: 212) — Weber contends that “custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination [Herrschaft]. In addition there is normally a further element, the belief in legitimacy” (213). The “validity” (in German, Legitimitätsgeltung) of a given polity then depends on the extent to which such a belief in legitimacy (as opposed to mere custom, personal advantage and similar motivations) governs the “obedience” of the subordinates.

Every system of Herrschaft will therefore endeavour to foster its subjects’ belief in its legitimacy in order to endure. How it does this, and which effects result from this endeavour, will depend to a large extent on the “claim to legitimacy typically made by each” such system (213). The famous distinction of three “pure types” of legitimate Herrschaft — rational, traditional, and charismatic — builds upon that identification of claims to legitimacy and their different sources. In our context, what is more important is the relation Weber establishes between the belief in legiti-
macy, shared (to a certain extent) by the subordinates of a specific system of 
Herrschaft, the claim to legitimacy made by that system itself, and the validity of the 
system. To rephrase it: a political system commands validity if and to the extent 
that its citizens consider its interferences with their actions, their behaviour and 
their expectations, in short: with their daily lives, by and large justified. If we sub-
stitute “social legitimacy” for Weber’s Legitimitätsform, our working definition of 
social legitimacy may then be as follows:

The social legitimacy of a polity depends on the extent to which citizens accept as justified the fact 
that decisions which are binding upon them are taken by or in that system.\(^5\)

The crucial element of this definition is the acceptance as justified, or otherwise 
said: the belief in legitimacy. Social legitimacy is nothing more than the aggregate 
measure of individual beliefs in legitimacy. As such, “legitimacy converts power 
into authority — Macht into Herrschaft — and, thereby, establishes simultaneously 
an obligation to obey and a right to rule” (Schmitter 2001: 80); it is “the recognition 
of the right to govern” (Coicaud 2002: 10). Societal compliance, in turn, that is 
(once more, in Weberian terms) the extent to which the commands given by the 
system will be obeyed by the members of society, is a function with several vari-
ables, among them habits, the menace or the actual use of force — and social le-
gitimacy.

\[
L = f \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} B_{Li} \right) / n
\]

\(L\): Social Legitimacy 
\(B_{Li}\): Individual’s Degree of Belief in Legitimacy

This is clearly an empirical-analytical definition of “legitimacy”, marked as such by 
the word “social”. We are not primarily concerned with how government per se or 
how a certain polity can be normatively justified. Nor are we particularly interested 
in whether certain legal norms have been enacted according to pre-established 
rules, that is, in a concept of legality. Rather, we ask whether and to what degree 
people do de facto assume that the polity that produces legally-binding norms is l-
gitimate. We do not look at the polities we want to analyse from outside, applying 
“external” standards, but we take an inside perspective, asking for whether our sys-
tem is “congruent with the customs, beliefs, preferences and aspirations” of its 
constituency (Walker 2001: 34).

Our definition begs another, more precise question (cf. Luhmann 1983: 27): what 
makes people believe that the political system is legitimate? Put differently: why do 
people ascribe legitimacy to the political system? What exactly is it that makes peo-
ple accept as binding decisions of their government, even if detrimental to them-
selves, apart from menace of force, habit, custom, etc.?
Dimensions of legitimacy

If we are to identify the different factors which may or may not contribute to citizens’ belief in legitimacy, we will have “to cut the conceptual cake” (Walker 2001: 34) of the term, disaggregating it into dimensions of which this belief is composed. While we have, until now, not specified the type of society we are talking about, this step requires us to concretise our object somewhat. For when we analyse the medieval Sacrum Imperium Romanum, different dimensions would certainly come to the fore than when looking at, say, the supranational polity of the European Union. Given the objectives of this paper, our focus will be post-traditional, non-metaphysically bound, pluralistic polities: that is, polities in which “comprehensive worldviews and collectively binding ethics have disintegrated” and in which “the surviving posttraditional morality of conscience no longer supplies a substitute for the natural law that was once grounded in religion or metaphysics” (Habermas 1996: 448).

In this context, what are the dimensions of social legitimacy? The attempts at individuating them are burgeoning. One of the best-known approaches is the distinction between “input” and “output” legitimacy as suggested by Fritz W. Scharpf (Scharpf 1999). According to Scharpf, the legitimacy of a polity depends on the interaction between “input-oriented authenticity” and “output-oriented effectiveness” or, in other words, between “government by the people” and “government for the people”:

— Input legitimacy stresses that policies, in order to be (perceived as) legitimate, have to reflect the will of the people as a community. Input legitimacy does not stem from the mere existence of democratic institutions and processes like free elections, however. Rather, it presupposes what Weber called Gemeinsamkeitsglauben or a “belief in ‘our’ essential sameness”, founded on pre-existing features like language, culture, or ethnicity. Only then, asserts Scharpf, will minorities accept majority decisions (cf. 8; see also, albeit with different emphases, Weiler 1999: 83; Grimm 1995).

— Output legitimacy, on the other hand, emphasises that political decisions have to promote public welfare. “Government for the people” means that the legitimacy of a polity depends on its ability to solve problems which call for collectively binding decisions, i.e. problems that can neither be solved by individuals, nor by market mechanisms, nor by collective actions freely coordinated by civil society. Output-oriented legitimacy is founded on a common interest, not a common identity; it relies on (possibly very diverse) institutional mechanisms serving two purposes: they have to hinder the abuse of power and ensure that costs and benefits are spread according to principles of distributive justice (Scharpf 1999: 10-13). 

Scharpf argues that, in democratic nation-states, both forms of legitimacy — input- and output-oriented — coexist to varying degrees while, for example, the European Union lacks input legitimacy. However, the distinction he proposes is not fully
convincing. Scharpf enumerates four institutional mechanisms of producing output legitimacy — to which he assigns equal functional value: electoral responsibility; independent expertise; corporatist and intergovernmental agreement; and pluralist policy networks (13-21).

“[G]iven the instrumental nature of these mechanisms, there is no reason to rule out consideration of functional alternatives when the democratic accountability of office holders would generally lead to undesirable outcomes, or where it would be insufficiently effective because its societal and institutional preconditions are lacking” (14f).

From a normative point of view, this is a questionable assumption. But in analytical terms as well, the argument seems to be flawed. The notion of output legitimacy unnecessarily conflates two analytically distinct objectives: first, ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of decision-making and high quality standards of the resulting collectively binding decisions; and second, what Scharpf calls “hindering the abuse of power”. Moreover, it remains unclear why democratic structures and procedures would have to be classified under “output legitimacy”, and not, as common sense would suggest, as a contribution to input legitimacy. This distinction is even less convincing if one takes Scharpf’s own argument serious: that the viability of democratic institutions and procedures — which are supposed to produce output legitimacy — is dependent on the existence of “societal and institutional preconditions”, i.e. input legitimacy. This dependence, by the way, appears not to exist for the other three mechanisms listed.

Another approach which, in my view, is more convincing has been proposed by Neil Walker (Walker 2001: 34-39), albeit in a different context. Walker distinguishes between three dimensions: performance, regime, and polity legitimacy.

— Performance legitimacy is concerned with the efficiency and effectiveness of the system at hand. Performance legitimacy varies with the capacity of the political system to solve problems, mostly within a given framework of aims and values. For example, performance legitimacy will tend to be higher in a system that ensures economic wealth, social security, and high levels of employment, than in one that faces long-standing and serious problems in solving economic crises.

— Regime legitimacy refers to the “overall institutional framework through which the entity in question is constituted and regulated. [It] is concerned with the deep pattern of political organisation and ‘style’ of political engagement within the entity in question, with the role, ‘scope’ and representative quality of governing institutions and their mutual relationship” (35). In a post-traditional setting, regime legitimacy will be high whenever a political system is highly inclusive, i.e. when the processes at work allow for representation of as many societal interests and concerns as possible, while guaranteeing comprehensive individual liberties.

— Finally, polity legitimacy is the component which is most difficult to grasp. It refers to the “feeling of belongingness” (Weiler 1999: 83) felt by the citizens with regard to the entity in question. It requires some kind of attachment to the polity
as such and a degree of solidarity, a “web of mutual commitments” (Walker 2001: 37) between the citizens themselves. Polity legitimacy, in the final analysis, is about the citizens’ identity; it determines and claims the extent to which the polity shapes this identity. It is the aspect of legitimacy a polity enjoys qua existence and which is formed and maintained through a history experienced as common, by political symbols and a common cultural heritage.

The legitimacy of a polity, then, is composed of these three elements which are, to different degrees, present in any viable polity. However, it would be too easy to assume a priori that an increase in one legitimacy dimension could simply make up for a decrease in another dimension. For the degree of stability of these dimensions is very different: Whereas polity legitimacy, due to its nature, is extraordinarily stable and long-lasting, performance legitimacy is subject to rather frequent variations, with regime legitimacy taking the middle ground. Moreover, the three dimensions are to a large extent interrelated and influence upon each other (see Figure 2). For example, the performance of a political system — and thus its performance legitimacy — clearly depends on how its institutional matrix is organised. Performance

![Figure 2: Dimensions of legitimacy and their relations](image)

legitimacy may increase proportionally to regime legitimacy; but there may also be an inverse relationship: While an institutional design that favours the openness of the political process should enhance regime legitimacy, the downside of such a design might well be an adverse effect on the system’s “output”, and in that way, on regime legitimacy. Polity legitimacy, on the other hand, may for some time sustain a political system which lacks performance legitimacy or even regime legitimacy, but will in the long run be harmed by an enduring lack of the latter.
Is a European Demos Possible?

The most complex and at the same time crucial of these relationships is the one between regime and polity legitimacy. To what extent does regime legitimacy depend on polity legitimacy? In other words, do people really accept binding decisions only if they feel themselves as “belonging” to the polity? And how “thick” does this feeling of belongingness have to be? As this question is particularly intriguing when it comes to a supranational political entity, we will focus our attention on the European Union for some time in order to see more clearly the issues at stake.

In its famous and controversial 1993 decision on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (Maastricht-Urteil 1993), the German Constitutional Court seized the opportunity to set out its understanding of democracy, declared to be one of the inviolable and immutable principles of the German constitutional order by Article 79 (3) of the German Grundgesetz:

“Democracy, if it is not to remain a merely formal principle of accountability, is dependent on the existence of certain pre-legal conditions, such as a continuous free debate between opposing social forces, interests, and ideas [... ] out of which comes a public opinion which forms the beginnings of political intentions” (87).

At least for the foreseeable future, according to the Constitutional Court, these conditions are not given in the context of the European Union. Therefore, asserts the Court, significant spheres of activity have to be left to the states so that “the people of each [state] can develop and articulate itself [sic] in a process of political will-formation which it legitimates and controls, in order thus to give expression to what binds the people together (to a greater or lesser degree of homogeneity) spiritually, socially and politically”. Democracy, then, is dependent on the pre-existence of a Staatsvolk, a “people of the state”, and serves as a means for this pre-existent people, bound together “spiritually, socially and politically”, to express itself. Democracy without such a people, conceived of in the “thick” sense of the word, is impossible. Expressed in a different way: Regime legitimacy, insofar as it is attained through the self-government of the people, requires a very high degree of polity legitimacy, that is exactly those spiritual, social and political bonds the Bundesverfassungsgericht calls for.

In a similar vein, another former Judge on the German Constitutional Court, Dieter Grimm (who was not part of the Senate which decided the Maastricht case), has argued that Europe lacks the demos that would be the prerequisite for fully democratising the European Union (see Grimm 1995). Grimm carefully departs from the primordial view of a pre-existent, given people that the Bundesverfassungsgericht had employed at least in parts of its Maastricht judgement (such as the one cited above). According to Grimm, the problem lies in a lack of “mediatory structures” which would relate public opinion to parliamentary decision-making. Social cohesion, he argues, depends on such structures like mass media, parties, associations,
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or civic movements which are indispensable for creating social discourse. The institutions of the state alone can neither guarantee nor replace them (251). Grimm sums up:

“The requirements for democracy are here developed not out of the people, but out of the society that wants to constitute itself as a political unit. It is true that this requires a collective identity, if it wants to settle its conflicts without violence, accept majority rule and practise solidarity. But this identity need by no means be rooted in ethnic origin, but may also have other bases. All that is necessary is for the society to have found an awareness of belonging together that can support majority decisions and solidarity efforts, and for it to have the capacity to communicate about its goals and problems discursively. What obstructs democracy is accordingly not the lack of cohesion of Union citizens as a people, but their weakly developed collective identity and low capacity for transnational discourse. This certainly means that the European democracy deficit is structurally determined. It can therefore not be removed by institutional reforms in any short term” (255).

Although Grimm builds on less primordial and more constructivist premises, the consequence remains the same: Democracy requires a demos; in the terms of our own analysis: regime legitimacy is by no means independent of, but instead presupposes polity legitimacy.

The logic underlying Grimm’s (and many others’) analysis has recently been elaborated in an article by Lars-Erik Cederman (Cederman 2001). Following the constructivist approach in the abundant literature on nations and nationalism, he concedes that political identities can, to a large extent, be generated by intellectual and political activism. However, once created, these political identities become deeply entrenched in the cultural environment (cf. 143) and can hardly be substituted for by alternative identities — not least because they will be upheld by much the same policies and mechanisms which created them in the first place. These “locked-in” identities, then, are the defining elements of the constituent demos:

A “demos is a group of people the vast majority of which feels sufficiently attached to each other to be willing to engage in democratic discourse and binding decision-making” (144).

Only a demos thus understood can, in Cederman’s view, provide the legitimacy basis for majority rule and collectively binding decisions.

It has to be remarked that neither Grimm nor Cederman, not even the Judges who decided the Maastricht case in 1993, would go so far as to maintain that a European demos and with it, a collective identity beyond the nation-state, could not be created. However, all of them project such an identity creation in the distant future because it would require some long-term manipulation of cultural substrates which is not at all likely in present circumstances.

If this were the case, it would have important consequences for our inquiry. If indeed legitimacy were fully dependent on the existence of a strong collective identity — as the German Maastricht decision, Dieter Grimm, and Lars-Erik Cederman
would all, despite important nuances, suggest — we would have to focus primarily on whether courts can directly produce polity legitimacy by creating those very bonds that tie the members of the polity together. We would, in other words, have to analyse whether or not courts can contribute to "identity politics". In that case, the impact courts and other institutions might have on regime legitimacy — by fostering democratic governance and individual rights and freedoms — would be meaningless — unless, of course, on the basis of a preexistent and solid collective identity. Institutions could only develop the potential already inherent in the polity-as-community, but could not add any independent contributions. I will argue, however, that polity legitimacy and collective identities are not pure givens, fixed once and forever. Instead, I will argue that both are amenable to influence from the realm of regime legitimacy: Polity legitimacy can be moulded through institutions and processes.

This is not to say that Cederman’s, Grimm’s, and all the others’ empirical analyses are flawed. Quite to the contrary, most of their observations are obviously true. Indeed, the European Union does lack mediatory structures like mass media, truly European political parties and interest associations. It is true, there is no European political discourse; not even is there, beyond an utterly restricted élite, transnational political interest. And it would be difficult to neglect that national identities are persistent and deeply rooted in political and societal culture. A tradition of reasoning often termed “post-nationalist”, however, which finds its point of reference in the writings of Jürgen Habermas and his concept of “deliberative democracy”, contests not so much the diagnosis presented by these authors than their conclusions. Habermas himself, in a reply to Grimm (Habermas 1995), rejects the view that democracy and, consequently, the legitimacy of a polity are entirely dependent on the existence of a given collective (read: national) identity:

“I see the nub of republicanism in the fact that the forms and procedures of the constitutional state together with the democratic mode of legitimation simultaneously forge a new level of social integration. Democratic citizenship establishes an abstract, legally mediated solidarity among strangers. This form of social integration which first emerges with the nation-state is realised in the form of a politically socialising communicative context. Indeed this is dependent upon the satisfaction of certain important functional requirements that cannot be fulfilled by administrative means. To these belong conditions in which an ethical-political self-understanding of citizens can communicatively develop and likewise be reproduced — but in no way a collective identity that is independent of the democratic process and as such existing prior to that process” (305).

But is this not mere “wishful thinking”, as some of Habermas’ own remarks and the works of many of his followers (see for example Lacroix 2002) might suggest? This is indeed the reproach of many critics who consider identity-formation beyond the nation-state as a necessary and yet highly unlikely prerequisite for obtaining a higher level of legitimacy of the European integration process: Post-nationalists, they argue, are naïve and apolitical; their approach is highly normative, without offering positive proposals (cf. Cederman 2001: 157, 160ff). Habermas re-
futes objections like these: For him, collective identities are not “an historical-cultural a priori that makes democratic will-formation possible”, but rather “the flowing contents [Flussgröße] of a circulatory process that is generated through the legal institutionalization of citizens’ communication. This is precisely how national identities were formed in modern Europe” (Habermas 1995: 306f). In the same way, says Habermas, could European institutions and processes — he specifically mentions the context of a European Constitution — induce such a circulatory process (cf. Dellavalle 2002).

I agree with Habermas’ analysis. As the historical literature on the creation of nations between the 18th and 20th centuries has perfectly made clear, collective identities can be formed — can only be formed — by way of such circulatory processes between cultural background and political process. In such a circulatory process, the prerequisites for communication among strangers which in the beginning may exist only in a rudimentary form, will come into being as well. This basic assumption has four important consequences which, at the same time, serve as qualifications to the contention that institutions and procedures can create identities:

— First, identities certainly cannot be created ex nihilo. Even “solidarity among strangers” requires some basic feeling of commonness, of attachment to the polity. Yet, it need not be essentialist, based on a common ethnie, or even a common language. Nor need it be the dominant layer of identity of any of the polity’s members. Political identities can, and indeed do most of the time and in most cases, take the form of concentric circles. So in James Joyce’s novel A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the protagonist, Stephen Dedalus, can classify himself as a young man: “Stephen Dedalus, Class of Elements, Clongowes Wood College, Sallins, County Kildare, Ireland, Europe, The World, The Universe” (cf. Herz 2002: 129). What is necessary is only that people as least in part define themselves as belonging to that polity. In the case of the European Union it is quite clear that the large majority of its citizens does indeed feel “European”, at least in part (cf. Eurobarometer 2002b: esp. 59-62). In fact, there are elements of a common historical heritage and of a common culture, and there is the experience of “growing together”, obtained not last in the millions of trips European citizens have undertaken to neighbouring countries.

— Second, common identities can be strengthened and fostered by institutions (and not only by more clear-cut “identity policies” like the construction of a common history, the creation of symbols representing the polity, or the definition of boundaries and the exclusion of the Other — all of which have been pursued for some years now in the context of the European Union13). Let us consider money: The importance that, to take the most outstanding example, the Deutsche Mark, had for German post-war identity, is beyond doubt. At present, one can only guess what impact the introduction of the Euro will have on European identity, but it can hardly be questioned that it will have some such effect. The discussion need not be restricted to such clear material symbols like currencies, however. Take the United States with its undoubtedly high degree of patriotism:
to a large extent (though certainly not solely), that patriotism is “constitutional patriotism”, grounded in the values and reproduced every day in the institutions embodied in the Constitution of 1787.

— Third, in a circulatory process of mutually reinforcing collective identity formation and institutional development, both aspects have to keep up with each other. That is to say that institutional designs and the extent of decision-making powers must not expect too much of the level of social integration and identity formation attained thus far. Nor should they simply be acquiescent to the status quo. Identity formation and institutional development have to go hand in hand.

— Fourth, and finally, identity in a post-modern era cannot take the “thick” form it had in the early 20th-century nation-state. Even today’s nation-states are internally too differentiated, fragmented in too many different communities as that such “thick” identities could still form a sufficient basis for solidarity even on a nation-state level. This is even more true for a supranational entity like the European Union. “European identity can in any case mean nothing other than unity in national diversity” (Habermas 1995: 307).

Polity and regime legitimacy, to sum up, are undoubtedly interrelated. But it is not a one-way relation. Both dimensions are mutually reinforcing. And while it is true that at least some basic level of polity legitimacy will be indispensable for the system’s legitimacy as a whole, regime legitimacy has to step in where polity legitimacy is low. It has to assume, so to speak, the deficiency guarantee and strengthen polity legitimacy over time — a task which cannot, by the way, be performed via the third dimension of legitimacy, performance legitimacy, due to its more unstable and volatile character.

We have now prepared the ground for an assessment of the impact courts can have on the legitimacy of a polity. We have clarified the term “legitimacy”, defining it (in sociological rather than normative or legalistic terms) as an aggregate measure of people’s belief in the legitimacy of the polity, i.e. the extent to which they accept as justified the fact that decisions which are binding upon them are taken by or in that polity. We have then discussed possible classifications of the dimensions of a polity’s social legitimacy and identified it as including performance, regime, and polity components. We have furthermore discussed the relationship between regime and polity legitimacy and have asserted that regime legitimacy does have an importance in itself and does not presuppose a high degree of polity legitimacy. In the next section, we will ask for the role of courts more specifically: To which dimension (or dimensions) of legitimacy can courts make a contribution? By what mechanisms and for which reasons can they do so? In other words: Why do courts matter? And which factors determine how much they matter?
Why Courts Matter

Courts perform one of the basic functions of government. They “settle contests of interpretation over the application of valid but interpretable norms in a manner at once judicious and definitive for all sides” (Habermas 1996: 115). This task is a crucial one for any polity which claims the sovereign monopoly over the use of legitimate force. Because of this essential contribution to the functioning of the polity, it seems safe to assume that courts have an equally important role to play in the generation of legitimacy for that polity. The impact of courts on the legitimacy of the political system is based on a strong “rationality assumption”: While parliaments and other more openly political institutions are thought to be fora for party politics and often irrational, ideologically motivated debates, courts seem to be institutions in which “politics” remains excluded and where a more or less scientific interpretation of the law, done by those well-qualified for that kind of job, prevails. This rationality assumption is often emphasised by procedural mechanisms (the requirement to stand while judges enter or leave the courtroom, solemn oaths, etc.) and symbols (the robes worn by judges and attorneys, solemn inscriptions, ornaments, sculptures, or the grandeur of the court building itself) that emphasise the dignity of what is going on in the courtroom.

Courts, it seems obvious, do matter. But which courts precisely? The internal differentiation of the judiciary varies from polity to polity (cf. Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2001). Today, however, most liberal democracies know the institution of constitutional courts, be they specialised tribunals concerned with matters of constitutional adjudication only, or supreme courts which exert the prerogative of judicial review of legislative and administrative acts alongside with “ordinary” jurisprudence. These courts bear an especially high responsibility: Like other courts, they are designed to “settle contests of interpretation over the application of valid but interpretable norms”, but the norms they interpret are the constitution, and thus the supreme law of the land. It seems safe to hypothesise that constitutional courts will therefore be particularly significant in judicial legitimacy production. In the following analysis, we will pay attention not only to the judiciary in general, but will place a special focus on the role of constitutional courts.

In order to assess the impact of the judiciary on the production of social legitimacy, it is helpful to recall the different values that correspond to the three legitimacy dimensions we have distinguished above:

— Performance legitimacy is related to the values of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of decisions. The higher the efficiency and effectiveness of a polity’s decision-making, the higher its performance legitimacy.

— Regime legitimacy (in a pluralistic polity) essentially emerges from the realisation of two distinct values: the idea of self-government by the people, on one hand, and the safeguarding of individual freedom and human rights, on the other.
— Polity legitimacy, finally, is about the realisation of collective identities, “the politico-cultural self-understanding of a historical community” (Habermas 1996: 160). Different types of institutions reflect different values and thus produce legitimacy along different dimensions. Mechanisms of representation and checks and balances, for example, embody the principle of self-government and so are primarily meant to contribute to the regime component of social legitimacy. Often, the same institutional mechanism may have contradictory effects: while enhancing the polity’s legitimacy on one dimension, it may well endanger it on another. So, “expertocratic” regimes — like telecommunications control agencies, or, more prominently, central banks — are designed to enhance the quality of decisions in their area of concern and, in so doing, produce performance legitimacy; however, there is an inherent tension with the principle of self-government and thus regime legitimacy.

Now, how about the judiciary? As Figure 3 illustrates, the role of courts is no less complex. The connection to the values of efficiency and effectiveness, to begin with, is ambiguous. Court proceedings often protract the decision-making process (one just has to think of matters like road construction), thus undermining its efficiency. On the other hand, the involvement of courts ensures legal security in that it produces binding decisions and, at the same time, ensures that all interests concerned are indeed heard and taken into account; in that way, it may well increase the effectiveness of public policy.

*Figure 3: Dimensions of legitimacy, corresponding values, and the role of the judiciary*
of feelings of “belongingness”, of a community’s ideals, in sum: of a shared iden-
tity. Certainly, courts (and above all, constitutional courts) can have a part in clar-
ifying the “value basis” of the polity by, most importantly, further developing, in-
terpreting, and adapting a human rights code as part of the polity’s common heri-
tage. Moreover, courts symbolise the political community in one important aspect, 
namely in its “incarnation” as a legal community. Hence, the judicial system per se is 
a powerful symbol of the polity’s identity. However, there are clear limits to the 
role courts can play in this respect. As we have have seen, what Benedict Anderson 
has called “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) cannot be formed by fiat. Po-
litical identities are being born over long periods. Ultimately, polity legitimacy is the 
dimension of social legitimacy that is least amenable to direct institutional influ-
ence, including influence from the judiciary. The impact of courts in the realm of 
polity legitimacy thus is rather an indirect one, running (as the previous section 
should have demonstrated) primarily over the “detour” of regime legitimacy. It is 
the regime dimension of legitimacy that we will thus have to focus on.

The clearest relationship is probably the one to the value of human-rights and indi-
vidual-liberty protection. This relation is a rather unambiguously positive one: Safe-
guarding individuals’ rights (be it against other individuals or corporate agents or 
against the state) is the task classically entrusted to the judicial branch of gover-
ment; it is here that courts have their most direct contribution to make to the le-
gitimacy of the polity: through the protection and promotion of human rights, of 
civil liberties, and of the privacy of the citizens, even against the will of majorities.

It is the other side of the coin that, when looking at courts’ relation to the value of 
self-government, we are confronted with a different picture, above all when focus-
ning on constitutional courts. According to the rationale behind their very existence, 
constitutional courts have the effect of restricting, rather than enhancing, the prin-
ciple of self-government. Wherever courts with the prerogative of constitutional 
review of legislation exist, they are meant to defend the constitutional principle that 
the legislator (and with the legislator, the sovereign people) is not free to act as it 
wills. On the other hand, constitutional safeguards against a “tyranny of the major-
ity” may be regarded as means to uphold the principle of self-government against 
the danger that it be unconsciously undermined; the most prominent of these safe-
guards being constitutional jurisprudence. In a sense, the “dilemma” of constitu-
tional courts merely reflects the paradox of constitutionalism itself: The constitu-
tion “both constitutes and seeks to constrain the power of the State” (Walker 2003 
forthcoming: ms. 4). While the constitution emanates from the sovereignty of the 
people, it at the same time limits that very sovereignty. A polity with a Constitution 
is by definition a limited polity: The people are not free to set up any rules they 
want. The Constitution restricts or at least moderates the very democratic system it 
constitutes, and in essence this restriction or moderation resides in the fact that 
certain rules — institutional and procedural regulations as well as fundamental 
rights — are removed from the disposition of the legislator.
To sum up, while it is evident that the legitimatory effect of jurisprudence is for the most part concentrated in the realm of regime legitimacy, its extent is difficult to assess. We are faced with the fact that within the regime dimension, there is an inherent tension between the two values associated with it: the protection of individual rights and liberties on one hand to some extent conflicts with the principle of popular self-government on the other. And while courts certainly contribute to the realisation of the former, their relationship to the latter is ambiguous. Moreover, we have to consider the fact that courts, let alone constitutional courts, do not exist in an institutional vacuum. They are part of the larger constitutional structure and in multiple ways interrelated with other branches of government. This context to a large extent predetermines their impact on the legitimacy of the political system as a whole. In order to assess this impact, we will have to clarify how individual rights and democracy are related to each other, and how the different components of the constitutional structure reflect that relationship. On that basis, we should be able to locate the place of the judiciary and identify the factors, conditions, and limits determining the extent of the judiciary’s legitimatory function.

**Deliberative Democracy as a Framework of Analysis**

What I suggest here is that the concept of deliberative democracy and legitimacy through legality, as developed chiefly by Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1996; see also Habermas 1987, Habermas 1998, Habermas 2001a and Habermas 2001b), represents a fruitful framework for our analysis: It not only offers a solution to the dichotomy between individual rights and popular self-government, but also proposes the broader context we are looking for in order to assess the impact of courts on the legitimacy of the political system.

At first glance, it might seem inappropriate to make use of a clearly normatively grounded theory for explicitly empirical-analytical purposes. However, Habermas understands his thoughts about Facts and Norms precisely as an attempt at overcoming at least in part the divide between empirical analysis and normative theory. I shall therefore shortly sketch some essential traits of Habermas' theory, and then discuss its applicability and its explanatory force with regard to “real-world” phenomena, such as social legitimacy.

At the centre of Habermas' thinking about political entities and their legitimacy stands the law. Inherent to the law is a tension between Faktizität und Geltung, between facticity and validity: law demands de facto recognition and claims to deserve that recognition at the same time (cf. Habermas 2001b: 113). The law leaves the decision on which grounds to observe it to its addressees: They may choose to do so because they consider it as a de facto limitation of their own freedom to act and because they calculate the risks of non-compliance; or because they consider these norms as justified and valid. In order to be able to offer this freedom of choice, the law requires political power: “the state ensures average compliance, compelled by sanctions if necessary; on the other hand, it guarantees the institutional precondi-
tions for the legitimate genesis of the norm itself, so that it is always at least possible to comply out of respect for the law” (Habermas 1996: 448).

The origin of this dualism between law and power is to be found in the sacred norms of ancient societies: These norms, derived from religious worldviews shared by the society as a whole, had justified the exercise of social power which in turn had guaranteed its de facto implementation. Legitimate power and valid and effective laws had thus combined to political rule, organised in the form of the state. “Not only does law now legitimate political power, power can make use of law as a means of organizing political rule” (142). However, with the secularisation of the society and the accompanying profanisation of law, the latter lost its legitimating force: Law was positivised and thus at the disposition of whoever governed. How could such positive law command similar authority? Essentially, two answers were given:

— Natural law concepts tried to bridge the gap: “After the canopy of sacred law had collapsed, leaving behind as ruins the two pillars of politically enacted law and instrumentally employed power, reason alone was supposed to provide a substitute for sacred, self-authorizing law, a substitute that could give back true authority to a political legislator who was pictured as a power holder” (146). Natural law should serve as a functional equivalent to the sacred law which had lost its spell and restore a moment of indisposability of the law (cf. Habermas 1987: 5f).

— Legal positivism, on the other hand, defined law simply as the “order of the sovereign” and thus deprived it of its normative character. The indisposability of the law, if at all, was vested in the form rather than in the contents or the foundations of the law. Metasocial guarantees of the law's validity, therefore, were unavailable (cf. 3).

Yet according to Habermas, both these attempts essentially failed because they posit an antagonism between political power and law. Natural law concepts claim that there is a law prior and superior in relation to political power; the exercise of political power is thus bound to the respect of the principles enshrined in natural law. This position binds the sovereign: Legislation (or at least constitution-making) in that view amounts to discovering and positivising the “law as it is”. On the other hand, legal positivism unleashes the political legislator. Law is being dissolved in politics. Yet the insights of political philosophy from Locke to Kant suggest that some fundamental principles — which we can identify with a kind of “standard set” of human rights — should not be at the disposition of the legislator.

There seems to be an indissoluble contradiction. Either the legislator is bound by pre-existing norms and thus politics loses its function, or politics Trumps over the law and law loses its legitimising force. Yet “the idea of human rights, which is expressed in the right to equal individual liberties, must neither be merely imposed on the sovereign legislator as an external barrier, nor be instrumentalized as a func-
tional requisite for legislative goals” (Habermas 1998: 259). How can we reconcile these seemingly irreconcilable desiderata?

Habermas argues that positive law cannot derive its authority either from its form (as legal positivists would have argued) or from its content (the position held by proponents of natural law concepts), but can only be justified with reference to the democratic process of its creation.

“If legitimacy through legality is to be possible in our type of society, the belief in legitimacy, which has been deprived of the collective certainties of religion and metaphysics, must in some way be based on the ‘rationality’ of the law” (Habermas 1987: 11).

As neither the contents nor the form of the law can provide such a basis of rationality, its legitimising force must and can only be procedural. Habermas builds on his earlier work on discourse theory when he defines his “principle of democracy” (being a specification of the more general discourse principle): Just those legal norms are legitimate to which all possibly affected persons could agree in (themselves legally instituted) rational discourses, calling on pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral reasons. These discourses, in order to be rational, must not exclude anybody, be open to issues of every kind, and not be constrained by external pressures or dominated by participants who command social power (cf. Habermas 1996: 107-110).

Now, how does this principle of democracy dissolve the dichotomy between positivitiy on one hand, and the requirement of indisposability on the other? Put differently: How does it reconcile popular sovereignty and the rule of law? The legitimacy of law resides in everybody’s equal chance to participate in its formation. There are, however, prerequisites to this “public autonomy”, i.e. the right to participate in the formulation of decisions that bind society as a whole. Public autonomy is exercised through the medium, the “language” of law which, in turn, requires legal subjects who have decided to associate themselves with each other. Such an association cannot be conceived of without presupposing that the citizens have agreed to guarantee to each other a sphere of personal freedom — and that is, private autonomy:

One must “not forget that when citizens occupy the role of co-legislators they are no longer free to choose the medium in which alone they can realize their autonomy. They participate in legislation only as legal subjects; it is no longer in their power to decide which language they will make use of. [...] the legal code as such must be available. But in order to establish this legal code it is necessary to create the status of legal persons who as bearers of individual rights belong to a voluntary association of citizens and when necessary effectively claim their rights. There is no law without the private autonomy of legal persons in general” (Habermas 1998: 260f).

In this way, private and public autonomy presuppose each other. This means, at the same time, that popular sovereignty (the principle embodying public autonomy) and fundamental rights (those rights which are constitutive of private autonomy) do not contradict each other: Certainly, human rights, however well-grounded,
“may not be paternalistically foisted, as it were, on a sovereign” (Habermas 1998: 260f). Yet they are “necessary enabling conditions; as such, they cannot restrict the legislator’s sovereignty, even though they are not at her disposition. Enabling conditions do not impose any limitations on what they constitute” (Habermas 1996: 162).

According to Habermas, several categories of individual rights which define the status of legal subjects can be identified in abstracto (cf. 155-165). These abstract principles serve as a point of reference on which the people, when framing their constitution, orient themselves. They accord to each others equal individual rights and thus constitute the legal code. Yet these individual rights protecting everyone’s private autonomy have to be complemented by basic political rights to participate in legislation. “For as legal subjects, they [the citizens] achieve autonomy only by both understanding themselves as, and acting as, authors of the rights they submit to as addressees” (126).

How is it then that citizens can understand themselves as the authors of the law, that they can exercise their public autonomy — beyond the “metaphorical event” of a “reciprocal conferral of rights” (132)? In order to guarantee popular self-government over time, administrative (or executive) power has to be coupled back to the “communicative power” which generates law. This feedback requirement implies a highly demanding concept of democracy. At its centre is “a normative concept of the public sphere” (183). It is in this public sphere that a presumably reasonable collective will is being formed because, if at all, the demanding requirements for successful discourses are most likely to be fulfilled here: The public sphere excludes nobody, is open to issues of every kind, and is not constrained by temporal pressures (cf. Blätte 2001). The process of will-formation must not be limited to parliament, therefore. “Rather, the communication circulating in the various arenas of the political public sphere, of political parties and organizations, and of parliamentary bodies and Government leaders are intermeshed with, and reciprocally influence, one another” (Habermas 1996: 185). In order to be able to draw upon legitimacy through legality, the political system therefore has to provide “sluices” through which the communication flows within the public sphere can pass into the decision-making centres, so as to prevent administrative or social power from becoming independent and uncontrolled (356).

“If the communicatively fluid sovereignty of citizens instantiates itself in the power of public discourses that spring from autonomous public spheres but take shape in the decisions of democratic, politically accountable legislative bodies, then the pluralism of beliefs and interests is not suppressed but unleashed and recognized in revisable majority decisions as well as compromises. The unity of a completely proceduralized reason then retreats into the discursive structure of public communication. The reason refuses to concede that a consensus is free of coercion, and hence has legitimating force, unless the consensus has come about under the fallibilist proviso and on the basis of an anarchic, unfettered communicative freedom. In the vertigo of this freedom, there is no longer any fixed point outside that of
democratic procedure itself, a procedure whose meaning is already implicit in the system of rights” (185f).

All political power is thus derived from the communicative power of the citizens. Yet it is obvious that political decisions cannot be reached in the public sphere itself, not last because it is impossible that all citizens come together to deliberate and decide freely “face to face”. For this reason, laws have to be enacted by representative bodies which as truly as possible reflect the plurality of opinions present in the public at large. However, their very institutionalisation subjects parliamentary procedures to certain temporal, social, and substantive constraints. In order to deal with these constraints, decision rules (a majority rule, for example) have to be developed that supply “a procedural rationality that compensates for the weaknesses […] inherent in the process of argumentation” (179). The justification of norms is always a fallible and provisional one because argumentation has, under certain decision rules, been interrupted but can in principle be resumed at any time.

As we have seen, according to the principle of democracy, only those legal norms are valid (legitimate) to which all possibly affected persons could agree in rational discourses, calling on pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral reasons.¹⁹ Now Habermas is realistic enough to concede that even under ideal conditions there will be cases in which “it turns out that all the proposed regulations touch on the diverse interests in respectively different ways without any generalizable interest or clear priority of some one value being able to vindicate itself”. That is to say, there will be cases in which it will be impossible to reach a reasonable consensus in the discourse. “In these cases, there remains the alternative of bargaining” in negotiations (165). These negotiations, if instituted in a way that ensures fair consideration of all interests involved, does not “destroy” the discourse principle, but presupposes it: The rules for accordingly fair negotiations, set out primarily in the constitution, must have been agreed upon in rational discourses in the first place.

The Ideal of Deliberative Democracy and the Reality of Legitimate Policy-Making

The question we are now confronted with is this: Can we indeed make use of Habermas’ elaboration of deliberative democracy in non-normative, analytical terms (as many others have in fact done²⁰)? The study of John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse which I referred to in the introduction (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) may serve as a point of departure. I would argue that in at least three facets, their empirical-analytical findings about mass opinion with regard to the political system strikingly coincide with Habermas’ normative concept:

— Hibbing and Theiss-Morse convincingly show that “ordinary” Americans deeply distrust the way in which their political system operates from day to day. They would like to see less conflict, less interest-group lobbying and bargaining, less tradeoff and compromise. Instead, they would prefer dignified political style, convincing arguments, and agreements representing something more than the
lowest common denominator. They would, to summarise the argument, prefer a more discursive style of policy-making; they do not want power-based compromises, but rationally motivated and justified policies. The privileged position Habermasian-style deliberative democracy accords to rational discourse mirrors this empirical finding: Decisions, in order to be fully legitimate, have to originate in discourses, i.e. in non-coercive, power-free and argument-based “speech situations”.

— Despite popular criticism of day-to-day politics, Americans do nonetheless appreciate their political system per se. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse demonstrate that people distinguish well between the ideals set forth in the constitution and embodied in its institutional design, on one side, and its concrete modus operandi on the other. Again, an adapted deliberative-democracy approach is capable of explaining this difference: In this view, the constitution enshrines the principle of popular sovereignty and realises the “system of rights” which establishes the legal code. The realisation of these universal principles is the result of a discursive consensus of a vast majority of all citizens. While in this view, non-discursive, power-based negotiations play an important role in the polity’s everyday operation, the constitution per se cannot be the result of negotiations (for which the constitution itself creates the conditions), but has to come out of a combination of non-coercive pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral discourses.

— Finally, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (like many others) have pointed out that the American people view the “Washington system” as being distant and unresponsive to the people’s “real” needs. The capital and its political class appear like a spaceship, way above the heads of those whom they are meant to represent — a fact that heavily constrains the legitimacy of national decision-making. Our deliberative-democracy approach in this regard stresses the importance of administrative power being bound back to communicative power and, in turn, the latter’s dependence on informal public spheres. For political decisions to enjoy legitimacy, it is necessary for the political system to provide “sluices” through which popular opinion (as formed in public spheres) can enter into the political system and influence its agendas.

At this point, a caveat is in order. I do not propound that any “real-world” political system is living up to the ideal of deliberative democracy as developed by Habermas. Nor do I say that full-fledged fulfilment of its (indeed demanding) preconditions and requirements is possible. However, I neither contend the opposite. I would argue that the debate about whether deliberative democracy can be realised or not is of little relevance for our purpose. It may well be that deliberative democracy is an unachievable ideal. What I suggest, however, is to use the concept of deliberative democracy as a yardstick for assessing a polity’s regime legitimacy because it seems to reflect people’s feelings about political systems and their operation in many respects. In a sense, this means that we can compare and “measure” existing polities against a Weberian-style “ideal type” of deliberative democracy. In our case, it allows us to theoretically deduct criteria for assessing the degree to which courts
can contribute to the production of legitimacy; criteria which it should then be possible to verify in empirical research. Before developing these criteria, however, we will have to discuss more generally the role courts occupy in a deliberative-democracy framework.

**A Model of Legitimacy through Jurisprudence**

Let us tie together the different threads of argumentation we have spun so far: It is obvious that courts have a primary role to play within a framework that assigns central importance to the law — after all, it is the courts that have to implement it. In so doing, courts contribute to the legitimacy of a political system primarily along its regime dimension: first of all, by acting as guardians of citizens’ individual rights and liberties, i.e. of their private autonomy. Secondly, however, they also contribute to the realisation of public autonomy or self-government, the second value corresponding to regime legitimacy, in two ways: (1) precisely by guaranteeing the preconditions for its exercise, and (2) by serving as sluices between society at large and the political system.

**ad (1).** Regime legitimacy rests on two pillars — popular sovereignty and individual rights — which, in a deliberative democracy approach, are equally constitutive of the principle of democracy. There is some logic in maintaining that courts guaranteeing an effective protection of individual rights and parliaments embodying popular sovereignty are the institutional reflection of this dualism of values.

But what competencies can courts legitimately exert vis-à-vis a democratically elected legislature? In other words, what about the separation-of-powers logic? According to Jürgen Habermas, while it is for the legislature alone to justify and consequently enact norms in discourses of justification, the judiciary engages in discourses of application. This distinction sets clear limits to the extent of “judicial policy-making” (cf. for example Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002): Judges may not go so far as to substitute themselves for the political legislator. As judges — and be they constitutional judges — are limited to discourses of application, the problem is particularly vexing in cases of abstract norm control through constitutional courts: Habermas assigns this task generally to the legislator. He concedes, however, that it may be admissible for constitutional courts to overturn norms, as long as judges do not usurp the competence of giving positive mandates to the legislator. In any case, abstract norm control has to be understood as a “delegated power” given to it by parliament: for the court may actually only “reopen the package of reasons that legitimated legislative decisions so that it might mobilize them for a coherent ruling on the individual case in agreement with existing principles of law; it may not, however, use these reasons in an implicitly legislative manner that directly elaborates and develops the system of rights” (Habermas 1996: 262). The reason for this is that constitutional adjudication cannot be based on substantive values as this would contradict the very principles of deliberative democracy — any substantive values have to be agreed
upon in society-wide discourses and have to be implemented by the legislator, not the judge. Under this proviso, a substantial scope for constitutional adjudication nevertheless remains:

"Only the procedural conditions for the democratic genesis of legal statutes secure the legitimacy of enacted law. If one starts with this democratic background understanding, one can also make sense of the powers of the constitutional court in a way that accords with the purpose of the separation of powers: the constitutional court should keep watch over just that system of rights that makes citizens’ private and public autonomy equally possible. [...] Hence, the constitutional court must examine the contents of disputed norms primarily in connection with the communicative presuppositions and procedural conditions of the legislative process" (264).

Constitutional courts thus play a special role. They are a necessary element in a system based on deliberative democracy, taking into account the fallibility of parliamentary decision-making and the necessity for every norm to be justifiable in moral discourses. In a system of judicial review, “the new programs [laws] are examined for their fit with the existing legal system. The political legislature may use its law-making powers only to justify legal programs that — insofar as they do not immediately interpret and elaborate the system of rights — are compatible with this system and can link up with the corpus of established laws” (167f). Constitutional courts are designed specifically to “keep an eye” on the legislator in order that the latter will not transgress these limits to its competencies. As such, they do not only protect citizens’ individual rights and, thus, their private autonomy. Rather, they also keep watch over the conditions necessary for the realisation of their public autonomy. Given this double responsibility, it is evident that constitutional courts will be of particular importance for the legitimacy of the political system. However, even though to a lesser degree, each and every court faces the task of interpreting the “system of rights” and thus has its part in upholding the private and, under certain circumstances, even the public autonomy that democracy presupposes.

ad (2). The very existence of a judicial system not only enables people to seek effective remedy against alleged or real violations of their rights; it not only safeguards the preconditions for the exercise of popular self-government; but it also serves as a catalyst for popular concerns which are, through the court, fed into the political system. The judicial system represents one of the sluices through which societal communication passes into the political system. The importance of this sluice depends on which alternatives the system provides: To the extent that other opportunities to feed back are lacking or deficient, the significance of the court sluice increases, even though it cannot fully substitute other links between the political system and the “life world” (Lebenswelt).

This is not a one-way relation. Courts, and again particularly constitutional courts, in turn exert influence upon the opinion-forming processes in the life world itself; they constitute what Erik O. Eriksen and John E. Fossum have
called “strong publics” (Eriksen and Fossum 2002; see also Eriksen and Fossum 2001).21 While acknowledging the centrality of the public sphere for modern democracy because it forces decision-makers “to enter the public arena in order to justify their decisions and to gain support” (Eriksen and Fossum 2002: 403), they argue that “the” public sphere actually consists of several distinct public spheres. Among these, they distinguish between “strong” publics — spheres of institutionalised deliberation and formal decision-making — and “weak” or “general” publics, i.e. spheres of opinion-formation without decision-making powers (402). Both forms of public spheres are dependent on and influence each other; hence strong publics perform an important function in that they are essential links in the communication between the political system and the life world.

Eriksen and Fossum maintain that courts cannot be considered strong publics in the full sense of the term as they lack one important characteristic, namely accountability. Yet it is certainly the case that they represent fora for the discussion of common concern and joint decision-making, that decision-making is preceded by a process of deliberation, and that decisions have to be motivated and justified through reason-giving (cf. 406). Courts, in a way, are deliberative bodies par excellence: The facts which have been found during proceedings before the court are being normatively assessed in the judges’ legal discourse which is shielded from external influences. Moreover, the court is required to publicly set forth the reasons for its judgements. I would therefore assert that courts do constitute spheres of institutionalised deliberation and formal decision-making and can be classified as “strong publics”.

In certain cases, the fact that courts are “strong publics” may even lead to a “rationalisation” of the political process itself: As Alec Stone Sweet has shown, constitutional discourse as practised by constitutional courts tends to “spill over” into the parliamentary sphere (Stone Sweet 2000: 194-204). On the one hand, there certainly is the danger of constitutional adjudication being instrumentalised for political purposes in order to “prolong” the decision-making process for a further and ultimate stage. The question of judicial activism and judicial restraint, of judicial interference with the competencies of the legislator cannot easily be dismissed. But on the other hand, as legislators act under the shadow of constitutional court judgements, they are forced to engage in constitutional discourse themselves: they have to justify their decisions on constitutional grounds or at least demonstrate that the legislative proposal at hand does not violate constitutional law as it stands. In a kind of feedback loop, the existence of the constitutional court thus propels politicians to engage not only in power-based negotiations, but also in pragmatic, ethical and, ultimately, moral discourses; it forces them to use arguments in accordance with the universalistic principles of justice — as enshrined and realised in the constitution — in order to make their case.

Hence there are two major functions due to which courts — and with a special salience, constitutional courts — can, under certain conditions, serve as important
producers, rather than consumers, of legitimacy: First, they serve to strengthen both load-bearing pillars of a modern democratic polity: not only individual rights and freedoms, but also the procedural conditions of legislation in accordance with the principles of deliberative democracy. Second, they constitute fora of “strong publics”, institutionalised decision-making bodies characterised by processes of deliberation. They serve as communication links between Lebenswelt and political system and are an important part of the society-wide process of opinion- and will-formation. As such, courts even tend to induce an aspect of discursive rationality in other decision-making bodies.

To What Extent Courts Matter

We have now described the functions by way of which courts are able to produce legitimacy. Yet in performing these functions, courts are confronted with what Habermas calls a “rationality problem” (on the following see Habermas 1996: 193-237):

“The rationality problem [...] consists in this: how can the application of a contingently emergent law be carried out with both internal consistency and external justification, so as to guarantee simultaneously the certainty of the law and its rightness?” (199)

With reference to Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin 1977; see also Dworkin 1986), Habermas sees the task of the legal discourse as consisting “in discovering valid principles and policies in the light of which a given, concrete legal order can be justified in its essential elements such that the individual decisions fit into it as parts of a coherent whole” (Habermas 1996: 212). Of course, this would require a “Judge Hercules” who, in the real world, does not exist. In Habermas’ “discourse theory of law, which ties the rational acceptability of judicial decisions not only to the quality of arguments but also to the structure of the argumentative process” (226), it is judicial procedure that ensures that outcomes are “reasonable”. Like in parliamentary procedures, there are practical restraints which limit the ability to come to judgments which live up to the ideal of justifiability in a discourse: Not only are there temporal constraints. Besides, the very structure of judicial processes limits the inclusion of all those possibly affected; in court procedures, it is only the judge and the parties who are involved. However, the judge represents the perspectives of the uninvolved members of the legal community. Like “democratic procedures in the area of legislation, rules of court procedure in the area of legal application are meant to compensate for the fallibility and decisional uncertainty resulting from the fact that the demanding communicative presuppositions of rational discourses can only be approximately fulfilled” (234). Procedural rules and the quality of arguments, therefore, determine the discursive rationality of a court’s jurisprudence and thus its ability to live up to its tasks of effectively securing the foundations of democracy and serving as a relay between life world and political system.
Legitimacy through Jurisprudence?

Hence, if we want to measure in some way the extent to which courts have an influence on the legitimation of the political system they are part of, we will have to focus on both the quality of a court’s argumentation and the procedural rules applied by it. Moreover, and beyond Habermas’ insights (which, as we have seen, have largely been derived from normative concerns), we will have to consider a third factor: the extent of the court’s competencies and powers which determines to a high degree whether or not the public takes notice of the court and its rulings, whether or not, that is, the court is able to influence public debate.

In this section, we will briefly consider and specify in greater detail these three sets of criteria. In doing so, we will devote special attention to procedural rules: These are numerous and often highly technical in nature. We will have to individuate those sets of rules which are essential for the legitimatory function of courts, i.e. for their being able to act as guardians of the procedural preconditions of democracy and as “strong publics”.

1. Quality of justification. As we have seen, the court’s judgements have to serve two purposes: they have to be justified in accordance with both the existing law as it stands, and with the principles underlying the constitutional and legal order as a whole. The court has to convince public opinion that its decisions are not arbitrary, but deduced rationally from “the law”, while taking into account principles of material justice and equity, as well as the shared convictions and moral standards of society.

2. Procedural rules. Bringing these conflicting goals in accordance with each other is, as Habermas has demonstrated, a difficult and sometimes impossible task. For this reason, the court cannot rely exclusively on its own argumentative capacities in order to fulfil its functions. Procedural guarantees and safeguards must complement quality of justification, taking into account the fallibility of judicial decision-making.

   a) Openness of discourse. Closely related to the quality criterion is the need for procedural rules to ensure the discursive quality of the court’s decision-making process as a whole. This means that, first of all, proceedings should be open to the public unless compelling reasons (like the protection of any of the participants) exceptionally suggest closure. Likewise, the arguments put forward by any of the participants — parties to the case, court majority, dissenting opinions, etc. — should be made publicly available. In that way, the court not only ensures that its proceedings are characterised by discursive rationality as much as considerations of efficiency and effectiveness permit; it also takes account of its own decisions’ fallibility and allows for a continuing discourse on the matter at stake, providing the basis for future reversals of the judgement, either by way of higher-court review, or in the light of additional proofs, or because of a further development of “communicative reason”, for example in the form of newly emerged consensuses in the society’s social, ethical, and moral standards.
b) Access to court. Courts are deliberately counter-majoritarian institutions. That means that it is of utmost importance that a court is indeed recognised as a counterweight against the polity’s majoritarian political institutions. In turn, this requires that access to the court be as open as possible. It also requires that the judicial system as a whole provide for sufficient mechanisms of an appeal. The legal system must offer effective remedies against decisions by courts themselves: procedural rules must provide for judicial review by higher courts, while the principle of legal certainty calls for a hierarchy of courts, with a supreme court on top ensuring uniformity of jurisdiction. By the same token, the openness of access to the court affects the extent to which the court can function as a “sluice” for the general public into the political system.

c) Selection of judges. Popular confidence in the judicial system is derived not so much from whether individual cases have been decided in the “right” way, but rather from a basic trust in the neutrality, quality, and rationality of the judicial system as a whole. Procedures of selecting judges – i.e. of those meant to administer justice – thus contribute to conferring upon the court an assumption of rationality beyond the single case. The training and nomination of judges therefore is an important procedural mechanism compensating for the indeterminacy and ambiguity of the law and the principles underlying it.

3. Jurisdictional reach. A strong public serves as a relay station between the general public and the political system. The strong public therefore needs to be publicly visible. Hence the court must be able to exert influence on the public debate. In the same way, it must be perceived as a way by which to transport the concerns of the members of society into the political process, and it must be seen as an effective protector of individual rights. All this depends on the extent of the court’s jurisdiction, in other words: on the salience of issues it deals with, and on its ability to deal with claims of alleged rights violations before it.

These five factors determine the impact single courts as well as the judiciary as a whole will have on the legitimacy of the political system – premised, however, on two conditions:

— Independence. Only if the court (and the judicial system as a whole) are regarded as independent from interference by other institutions and social pressures of any kind, will the court — or indeed, the polity’s judicial system as a whole — be acknowledged as an effective means to defend the individual’s inalienable rights.
— Fairness. Court procedures have to be considered as generally fair and equitable. Plaintiffs and defendants must be convinced that they have a fair chance to win their case, and that the judgement that will be rendered has not been “written in advance”, i.e. does not depend on factors extraneous to the case and the proceedings, like wealth or other means wielding social power.

One might perhaps summarise these two conditions under a single heading: Justice must be rendered under conditions of the rule of law. Only if and to the extent that
these two basic preconditions are satisfied does it make sense to analyse the afore-
mentioned factors in order to assess the judicial system’s impact on the polity’s le-
gitimacy.

We thus take account of the fact that courts, as we have amply seen, do not act in 
an institutional, social, and cultural void. But apart from the preconditions just 
mentioned, we also have to consider the limitations and constraints courts en-
counter in producing legitimacy (see also Figure 4). These constraints derive from 
either of the dimensions of legitimacy we have identified earlier in this paper.

We have already dealt with one of the constraints (and potentially the one most 
difficult to overcome) when we discussed whether polity legitimacy was a prerequi-
site for regime legitimacy.\textsuperscript{22} Polity legitimacy, we found, can be fostered by an in-
crease in regime legitimacy (to which courts can contribute); however, a certain (if 
basic) level of polity legitimacy will be necessary to allow such a reinforcing process 
to operate: people have to accept that the polity can legitimately claim to produce 
collectively binding decisions. Of course, this is a question of degree rather than a 
simple yes-or-no question. That is, the decision-making powers vested in the polity, 
and hence the competencies of that polity’s judicial system, have to be in step with 
the degree of polity legitimacy. An expansion of powers for both the polity as a 
whole and its judiciary must not happen too fast for polity legitimacy to “catch up”;
only prime ministers and parliamentari-
ans have to be checked; the same is true for judges. There need to be mechanisms 
of control and appropriate appointment and, where necessary, impeachment pro-
cedures. And there need to be mechanisms (for example, provisions for constitu-
tional amendment) by which democratically legitimised decision-making bodies like 
parliaments — “quintessential strong publics” (Eriksen and Fossum 2002: 411) — 
can overturn a constitutional court judgement which has been found inadequate in 
a reasoned discourse. The separation of powers thus limits the extent of jurisdic-
tional powers as well as the free designation of judges based on qualification. It 
may also require to restrict the procedural and symbolic dignity accorded to courts 
in order to stress the equality of the three powers in terms of their dignity.
Finally, there is a third limit which affects predominantly the criterion of open access. Whereas judicial guarantees for individual freedoms and rights are, as we have seen, an important component of regime legitimacy, these guarantees often conflict with the interest in efficient and effective decision-making. High levels of judicial protection may endanger performance legitimacy. A balance has to be struck, therefore, between the individual’s right to challenge administrative and legislative acts by which she is affected before the courts, and the society’s interest. Of course, “only rights can be trumps” (Habermas 1996: 259). But there have to be provisions and mechanisms which ensure that access to court and judicial remedies are not abused, and that judgements can be rendered timely. Moreover, the legal system has to be sufficiently uniform to ensure that it produces legal certainty, and that individual judgements cannot, by contrast, undermine the coherence of the legal system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Ideal</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Constraints</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative quality</td>
<td>justification through arguments in line with existing law and principles of the legal order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness of discourse</td>
<td>all arguments are public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to court</td>
<td>everyone has access to effective protection of her own rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of judges</td>
<td>judges are selected according to qualification and merit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictional reach</td>
<td>every matter of public policy is subject to judicial control</td>
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**Figure 4:** The factors determining the legitimatory impact of the judiciary, and their relation to functions and constraints. = relationship of primary importance; = relationship of secondary importance; = no significant relationship

“With the Law, It Is Impossible to Lie”

In his latest novel, Umberto Eco tells the story of Baudolino, a son of North Italian peasants, who becomes one of the ministerials of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. In his young years, Baudolino’s education is entrusted to the bishop Otto of Freising who, shortly before his death, advises Baudolino to go to Paris in order to pursue university studies there. Otto, who has discovered Baudolino’s talent in inventing stories and changing reality in doing so, suggests that he read poetry, study the principles of rhetoric and even a little bit of theology. However, says Otto, he
should not poke his nose into the law: “because with the law, it is impossible to lie” (Eco 2000: 60).

It is essentially the belief in the “sincerity” of the law, well captured in Eco’s narrative, that renders courts important as producers of their polity’s legitimacy. It is the courts who apply and interpret the law, and it is in and by way of courts that the law becomes a “touchable” experience for the citizens. It has been the basic assumption of this paper that because of this, courts do have an important role in the legitimation of the polity: they contribute to making citizens accept as justified that binding decisions are taken by or in the political system.

Based on this assumption, we have tried to elaborate how exactly, under what conditions and factors courts can perform their legitimatory function. In doing so, we have asserted that courts are most likely to have an influence on the regime dimension of legitimacy in that they constitute “strong publics” which (together with other strong publics) ensure that the political system and the general public remain interrelated and connected. Moreover, courts can produce regime legitimacy acting as guardians of the citizens’ private autonomy as well as of the procedural preconditions of their public autonomy. While courts thus contribute to both values associated with regime legitimacy — self-government and individual liberties —, the same dimension also imposes constraints on the ability of a court to produce legitimacy as it requires it to be embedded in a constitutional system favouring democratic will-formation.

Likewise, the other two dimensions of legitimacy — the performance and polity dimensions — impose clear limits on legitimation through jurisprudence. Concerns for polity legitimacy delimit the extent of its decision-making powers and, in this way, its visibility; considerations of performance legitimacy, finally, call for restrictions on access to the court. Within these limits, and premised on the condition that the courts act in an environment characterised by the rule of law, a number of factors determines the extent to which they can produce legitimacy. These are (1) the quality of justification, (2) the discursive openness of procedures, (3) the access to court, (4) the selection of judges, and (5) the court’s jurisdictional reach. These factors, preconditions, and constraints determine the legitimatory impact of the judicial system as a whole as well as that of single courts within a system.

The European Court of Justice: Preliminary Reflections

“Tucked away in the fairyland of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe” (Stein 1981: 1).
Equipped with the instruments we have elaborated thus far, we can now dare to address the second set of questions we have asked ourselves in the introduction: Can the theoretical findings be applied to a supranational polity, and if so, to what extent? Has the European Court of Justice been able to provide legitimacy for the European Union and for the integration process? How large is its potential to do so in the future? Under what conditions could this potential be further unfolded in the current constitution-making process? This paper can only provide some tentative conclusions derived from our preceding discussion. Whether these derivative conclusions will be validated or falsified, remains a question for further, empirical research.

Can the Theoretical Findings Be Applied to the EU?

The answer to the question of whether our model of legitimation through jurisprudence can be applied to the European Union depends on whether we consider the European Union a “polity” or not. It has been generally held for many years now that indeed the EU is a polity, even if sui generis. Lawyers have described in detail the “constitutionalisation” of the European order (see e.g. Stein 1981; Weiler 1999). Although the outcome of this process of constitutionalisation can in many ways be regarded as a “Europe of bits and pieces” (Curtin 1993: 17), and although it certainly falls short of being a state, it undoubtedly constitutes a federally-structured political entity, “a new type of sovereign authoritative rule [hoheitliche Herrschaft] with comprehensive regulatory powers over a wide range of issues of high life-world significance; powers which have been developed, moreover, in a traditionally federalist, and not a functional, direction” (Bogdandy 1999: 37). It is a “supranational federation” (ibid.; cf. Weiler 2001).

Hence it is beyond reasonable doubt that the European Union is a polity. It is even a particularly interesting and challenging case precisely because it lacks the high degree of polity legitimacy common to nation-states. Moreover, its supreme (and for a long time, its only) court, the European Court of Justice, has played a major role in the very creation of the polity; the process of (legal) integration and constitutionalisation of what originated from international treaties. It has had an impact on the polity itself that hardly any other court could claim for itself.

The preliminary assumption that it might be worthwhile to have a closer look at the legitimatory impact of the ECJ is corroborated when we consider the two preconditions which we have identified in the first part of this paper: First of all, the European Court of Justice enjoys a level of independence that is comparable to that of national judicial institutions. Its judges are appointed by common accord of member state governments for a term of six years. Although the possibility of reappointment might, in theory, endanger the independence of individual judges, the history of the Court until now has not shown evidence for such a peril. Secondly, there are no indications which would contradict the assumption that proce-
dures before the ECJ and the Court of First Instance are fair and equitable. The ever-broadening use of procedures before the European Courts by individual or corporate plaintiffs bears witness to the trust Europeans (and in particular their lawyers) have increasingly vested in the judicial system of the European Union. Under these circumstances, it seems safe to conclude that our model can — and indeed, should — be applied to the European Union and its Court of Justice.

Has the European Court of Justice Produced Legitimacy for the EU?

At this stage, we can tentatively try to answer the question of whether the European Court of Justice has been able to produce legitimacy for the integration process and the political system of the European Union. Obviously, it is not possible to argue that because the EU enjoys low levels of overall legitimacy only, the Court has not been successful in providing support for the legitimation process. We rather have to ask the counterfactual question of whether the mere existence of the Court has made any difference, that is, if the EU's overall legitimacy would be lower if the ECJ did not exist.

In a series of articles, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira have argued “that although most EU citizens are reasonably satisfied with the performance of the Court, diffuse support for the institution is not widespread” (Gibson and Caldeira 1998: 90; see also Gibson and Caldeira 1993). How should a Court that enjoys little legitimacy in itself be able to strengthen that of the polity it is part of? As Anke Großkopf (Großkopf 2000: 157-159) has convincingly shown, Gibson's and Caldeira's studies suffer from considerable flaws. Above all, their distinction between what they term “specific” and “diffuse” support is not always clear and consistent. Großkopf argues that the ECJ does enjoy a considerable level of legitimacy and that it profits from a “legitimacy transfer” from other, long-established high or constitutional courts which are, in general, better known and serve as a model which people project also upon the European Court of Justice (159-162). Irrespective of whether the ECJ’s legitimacy is high in absolute terms or in comparison with comparable national courts, it is beyond doubt that the Luxembourg Court does enjoy considerable legitimacy in comparison with other EU institutions: Whereas, according to the most recent Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 2002b: 47-50, B.32), the level of “net trust” (i.e. the difference between who responded favourably and those who gave a negative answer to the question for the respondent’s trust in EU institutions) for the constitutional Convention is only +3 and that of the Council of Ministers is +15, the Court’s rating is +28. The only institution enjoying an even higher level of support is the European Parliament with +30. In five member states (Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Austria, and Sweden), the ECJ even is the best-rated of all institutions.

These numbers suggest that the influence the European Court of Justice has had on the legitimacy of the European order has been significant. Let us briefly con-
Consider our five criteria in order to assess this first impression (without prejudice to future empirical findings which will be crucial to validate the model which has been developed in this paper):

— Argumentative quality: It appears to be one of the ECJ’s objectives to convey the impression that the Court deduces its judgements from “the law”, that what the Court’s reasoning is about is indeed an “application discourse”. This perception which shall inform public opinion is supported by the lack of dissenting opinions; it is not even known how many of the Judges actually supported the judgement and how many dissented. The result is the impression of a lack of alternatives.\(^{25}\) The judgement rendered represents the only possible solution to the case. High levels of compliance on behalf of the member states (whose arguments have often been turned down by the Court in favour of a more integrationist reasoning) corroborate the intuition that the European Court of Justice has been successful in establishing itself as the guardian of legal reason in the Union.

— Openness of discourse: However, the appearance of judgements scientifically deduced from “the law” comes at a price: The Court’s judgements appear as if they had been taken by some uniform “black-box” body; future discourse cannot rely on judges’ dissenting opinions, with their more authoritative character than other participants’ reasoning. Nor can the Court itself when reconsidering an issue previously decided. Having said that, the style of judicial discourse applied by the European Court of Justice nevertheless appears to be a rather open one (cf. Lasser 2003 forthcoming). A judgement does not consist exclusively of the legal considerations of the Court, but includes the different views expressed during the proceedings and the factual background. Moreover, the opinion of the Advocate-General who is in charge of the case is made public as well so that societal discourse, where appropriate, can draw on a wealth of arguments. The preliminary reference procedure adds even more to this openness as it has established a transnational, multi-level judicial dialogue (cf. Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998).

— Access to Court: The access to the European Court of Justice for individuals is comparatively restricted. While everyone can address a constitutional complaint to the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, for example, the criteria set out in Article 230 §4 TEC are highly restrictive:

> “Any natural or legal person may […] institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.”

The jurisdictional practice of the ECJ has set forth demanding tests for assessing whether a “direct and individual concern” does exist. In the majority of cases, the direct way to the European Court of Justice is not available. Citizens have to rely on the preliminary reference procedure and thus ultimately on individual national judges who alone can institute that procedure. Hence, although the European legal system does, all in all, provide effective remedies
against alleged injustices incurred upon individuals, there are gaps in the system of protection.

Selection of judges: Article 223 § 1 TEC enumerates the conditions potential judges on the European Court of Justice have to fulfil: their independence has to be “beyond doubt”, they need to “possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries” or be “jurisconsults of recognised competence.” Despite an appointment procedure which happens behind closed doors in the Council of Ministers and in which democratically elected bodies are not involved, these norms ensure that only high-profile lawyers who are renowned as judges or academics can sit on the ECJ; and in fact, the rules seem to have worked in practice: Judges and advocates-general, by and large, have been held in high esteem by their professional peers. The ECJ has, therefore, enjoyed the assumption of rationality that is conferred upon a court by the professional standards required for becoming a judge.

Material reach of jurisdiction: Given that it acts in a limited polity, the ECJ’s competencies are limited as well (which is, as we have seen, in part a necessary consequence of the contested polity legitimacy of the EU). It means, however, that issues of a particularly high salience will only rarely appear before the European Court of Justice because of a missing legal basis to do so. In terms of substance, many of the cases with a high relevance for the construction of the European legal order had a stunningly low profile; recent high-profile cases like the ones dealing with the access of women to the military and with compulsory military service in Germany are only an exception to this general rule. Hence, it is difficult for the ECJ to build up public awareness of its existence and its work; low issue salience leads to low public visibility.

In the light of these first intuitions, we may conclude that the European Court of Justice has indeed had an impact upon the legitimation of the European Union. Its existence per se is without doubt an important factor for the regime legitimacy of the Union as it provides an important counterweight to the far-reaching powers of EU institutions and constitutes an important — if not the single most important — “sluice” for interaction between the citizens and the system. However, this effect has been mitigated by the Court’s low public visibility and the restricted access to it. Due to these constraints, the Court cannot, as it were, to the full extent perform its primary functions as a strong public and as a defender of the preconditions of democracy.

What could be done, then, in order to improve the efficacy of the European Union’s judicial system in terms of its contribution to the production of legitimacy? Applying the general constraints we have identified in our model to the European Court of Justice, the prospects appear rather limited:

Procedures before the ECJ tend to protract judicial proceedings before national courts, in themselves often lengthy enough. An extension of locus standi to individuals beyond what Article 230 § 4 TEC now grants would bear the danger of
having a negative effect on the effectiveness of the judicial system in the Union and thus on the performance dimension of legitimacy.

— More importantly, the EU enjoys, as we have found, comparatively low levels of polity legitimacy. A basic level of a European political identity certainly exists; yet it remains well below the levels known from a nation-state environment. The limitations of the ECJ's competencies we have so far encountered in our analysis thus seem well-grounded: Extending them too far at present would mean demanding too much of what a court can reasonably be expected to do in the realm of a political system's legitimation.

— Finally, the ECJ's potential to contribute to the EU's regime legitimacy is hampered by the fact that today's Union is certainly not an outstanding example of a political system based on deliberative democracy. A court is only one, even though an important, ingredient in the constitutional recipe; it is concerned with "application discourses", but it cannot assume the responsibilities of the legislator. Now, the ECJ is an outstanding example for judicial policy-making, having created an outright constitutional order that probably had been beyond the intentions of the European founding fathers (cf. Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998). It has thus assumed powers that would properly belong to a democratically elected legislature. The ECJ enjoys extraordinary leeway with regard to the other powers in the European polity: Parliament has no influence over it at all, not even in appointment procedures; its decisions can hardly be overridden due to the unanimity requirement for changing the EU's constitution. The European Court of Justice remains unchecked, and it acts within a system characterised by an embryonic democracy.

To sum up: The European Court of Justice has been a central part of the constitutional structure of the European Communities and the European Union since their very beginnings. As such, it has also borne a high responsibility for the legitimation of that polity in statu nascendi. However, due to a number of factors — limited access to it, limited jurisdictional reach, to name but the most important ones — have restrained the Court's ability to live up to that responsibility. These constraints, however, are for the most part grounded in the very nature of the European Union: The level of polity legitimacy it has acquired thus far, does not allow for a significant extension of its own and the Court's powers at present. Given the oft-lamented "democracy deficit" of the Union, strengthening the ECJ's role would in itself not be too promising for the EU's legitimacy, anyway: In order to be able to perform its legitimatory function fully, courts have to be part of a wider system characterised by a democratic style of policy-making, the separation of powers, and a polity-wide process of communication, concentrated not in the polity's institutions (as "strong publics") alone, but coupled back to the general public by means of intermediary structures. All these three conditions are not met by the European Union as it is today.
The European Court of Justice and the European Constitution in the Making

In view of these results, it is difficult to see what could be done in order to further develop the legitimatory potential of the European Court of Justice. Of course, in a more technical sense, the measures that would have to be taken are clear: Access to the Court would certainly have to be broadened, and its visibility increased. The future supranational Constitution, currently elaborated within the European Convention and the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference, might well bring about changes in that direction, by relaxing the rules of standing (as suggested by the Discussion Circle dealing with the issue of reforms in the system of judicial protection26) and by more generally extending the powers of the Union, particularly in the “area of freedom, security and justice”27.

But do these measures really make sense, given the limits to legitimacy production by the ECJ that we have identified above? Wouldn’t they endanger performance legitimacy (because of broadened access to court) and neglect a too low level of polity legitimacy (by extending the reach of jurisdiction)? A danger of that kind surely exists. However, the extension of the Courts’ powers that has been envisaged does not appear overly ambitious. It should not exceed what the present level of polity legitimacy can sustain, and performance concerns will primarily have to be addressed by increasing the Courts’ own efficiency and effectiveness — first steps in this direction were taken with the Treaty of Nice, making possible the creation of judicial chambers in order to reduce the workload of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance.

Yet in order not to demand too much of the legitimatory capacities of the Court, the reforms which have been discussed in the Convention will have to be counterbalanced: by the publication also of Judges’ dissenting opinions, for example; by the strengthening of checks and balances against the Court’s (already now) extensive powers; by increased democratic involvement in nomination procedures of Judges and Advocates General. After all, it is embedded in a democratic context only that courts, as we have seen, can contribute to the production of legitimacy. The European Constitution, if it is to be considered a step forward, will have to establish such a democratic context. Although some of the Convention’s propositions so far do indeed point in this direction — the clear distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts, for example, and the adoption, as a rule, of legislative acts (laws and framework laws) through a “legislative procedure”, involving the Council and the European Parliament on an equal footing — it remains to be seen whether indeed the result of both the Convention and the IGC will be a more democratic European Union.

Beyond all institutional measures, as sensible and important as they certainly are, the most important challenge for the present constitution-making process is a different one. The adoption of a European Constitution could represent an excellent opportunity to further a European feeling of belongingness, the lack of which is...
criticised precisely by some of the most fervent opponents of a European Constitution. It should be the occasion for Europeans in all the Union’s member states to discuss what they have in common, and what they want to have in common. It should be the occasion to discuss which powers they want to pool, and what competencies shall be exercised by their Union. This, however, requires increased public awareness of the work of the Convention, and it requires timely public information and discussion of the provisions of the draft Constitution. Until now, the signs are not too encouraging. Few people know about the Convention, and it is mostly in academic circles that its proposals are indeed being discussed. There is still time to change this. At the latest, a public debate would have to commence after the Intergovernmental Conference which, in the end, will have to adopt the final texts. Before ratification of the new Constitutional Treaty of the European Union — maybe with the help of referenda — the national publics would have to address the crucial question: What kind of Europe do we want? If such debates took place simultaneously in all of the by then 25 member states, the 25 national publics might, at least for the time of the constitutional discussion, merge and constitute, in some respect, a European public sphere. In that sense, the adoption of the European Constitution could indeed amount to the foundational moment of a United Europe. If on the other hand, the European Convention and national policymakers do not succeed in instigating such a debate, the legitimacy deficit will continue to weigh on the Union. It would be as if Europe’s leaders were thinking like Leo, the protagonist in Pier Vittorio Tondelli’s novel Camere separate:


Yet what may be true for an individual certainly will not hold for a political entity — even less so if it is a supranational one.

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1 It should be observed that, in the Eurobarometer survey, people were asked for their trust in their country’s “judicial system” as a whole, without any specific reference being made to the respective supreme or constitutional courts. Moreover, unlike in Hibbing’s and Theiss-Morse’s work, no distinction was made between the institutions as such and their day-to-day business.

2 Throughout the remainder of this paper, I will, unless indicated otherwise, subsume both constitutional and supreme courts under the heading “constitutional courts”, implying all courts enjoying the competence of judicial review of legislation.

3 Philippe Schmitter refers a similar, though less benevolent comparison, citing US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s remark about pornography. See Schmitter 2001: 79.

4 In general, quotations from non-English texts are taken from an authoritative current translation; where they are taken from the original-language version, translations are my own.

5 This definition of (social) legitimacy differs from Habermas’ (normative) notion of legitimacy. However, in spite of terminology, it does not necessarily contradict his basic argument. For
Habermas does establish a link between legitimacy (understood as normative justification) and "factual compliance". Although the former is independent of the latter, compliance is enhanced by a belief in legitimacy, which in turn is, according to Habermas, rooted in legitimacy-as-justification. Belief in legitimacy thus is a crucial catalyst in transforming legitimacy-as-justifiability into compliance. See Habermas 1996: 30.

In a sense, this classification follows Weber's distinction between Vergemeinschaftung and Vergesellschaftung.

Quotations from the judgement are taken from the translation in the Common Market Law Reports (1994 1 CMLR 57). For a (not always fair) critique of the Maastricht decision of the German Constitutional Court, see, among many others, Weiler 1995.

In the original text, this passage reads: "[...] um so dem, was es — relativ homogen — geistig, sozial und politisch verbindet [...], rechtlichen Ausdruck zu geben" (BverfGE 89, 155 (186)).

On the use of constructivist approaches in European integration studies, see the programmatic article by Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 1999, and the papers collected in Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001.

For abundant proof of this fact with regard to the processes of nation-building in the 19th century, see (among many others) the historical and theoretical analyses of Hobsbawm 1990; Schulze 1994; Langewiesche 2000; Thiesse 1999; Gellner 1983.

See below pp. 21-25.

After all, even the national languages were (at least in part) constructions for the purpose of unifying the nation. Probably the best-known anecdote in this context is that Giuseppe Manzoni "translated" his novel I promessi sposi from Lombard dialect to the "high language" (itself derived from the Tuscan dialect) in order to inspire in his fellow countrymen a sense of "Italianness" (cf. Herz 2002: 130).

The European Union has a flag which in many European countries is exposed alongside national flags. The twelve golden stars on dark blue ground not only symbolise perfection, as the European Commission's official explanation reads today (see http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/symbols/index_de.htm, as of 6 March 2003). It was originally taken from Christian symbolism: in Saint John's Apocalypse (12:1), the twelve stars are an attribute of the Virgin Mary; the European flag thus refers to the supposedly "thick" common cultural background of European integration. The same is true, albeit with different points of reference, for the European anthem, Beethoven's Ode an die Freude, and the stylised bridges and portals figuring, as representative symbols of European architectural eras, on the Euro banknotes. Cf. Shore 2000: esp. ch. 2 and 4; Herz 2002: 131f. On the problem of inclusion and exclusion on a European level and its relevance for identity formation see e.g. Geddes 2000; Huysmans 2000; Turnbull and Sandholtz 2001.

Examples: "Im Namen des Volkes" ("In the name of the people", Germany); "La legge è uguale per tutti" ("The law is equal for everyone", Italy).

One of the most prominent examples is the temple-style building housing the United States Supreme Court in Washington, D.C. Cf. Maroon and Maroon 1996.

Alec Stone Sweet labels these different institutional designs the "European" and the "American" model, respectively. Cf. Stone Sweet 2000: 32ff; see also Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2001: 134-147.

On the (normative) legitimacy of constitutional adjudication per se, see below pp. 30-28.

The Italian Constitution, for example, concludes with a Title on "Constitutional Guarantees". The Title's first Section is devoted to the Constitutional Court. Cf. Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, Art. 134ff.
On the different characteristics of pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral discourses (which I cannot expand on here) see Habermas 1996: 197-201.

Giving a comprehensive overview is virtually impossible. In the area of European Union studies, the idea of applying the concept of deliberative democracy stands at the heart of the project “Citizenship and Democratic Legitimacy in Europe” (CIDEL), co-ordinated by Erik O. Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, to name but one of the most outstanding research projects in this field. See (among others) Eriksen and Fossum 2003; Neyer 2003; Joerges 2003. Previous studies within the same research agenda have been collected in Eriksen and Fossum 2000. See also Schmalz-Bruns 1999; Joerges 2001.

In their article in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Eriksen and Fossum (Eriksen and Fossum 2002) elaborate the concept of “strong” as opposed to “general” publics and apply it to the European Parliament, the Charter Convention, and the system of “comitology”. A consideration of the European Court of Justice which was included in an earlier draft of the article (Eriksen and Fossum 2001) was omitted in the final version of the paper.

22 See pp. 13-17.

23 This is a concern expressed often and loudly by the current Italian government (and the political forces supporting it) with regard to the Italian judicial system. Their hypothesis is that a politicised and largely leftist judiciary is trying to overturn decisions legitimately taken by the other branches of government, and, in the final analysis, to revise the electoral decisions by forcing penal proceedings against leading government figures such as the Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. Whether this claim is founded or not (I would tend to maintain that it is not), is of little concern here. In any case, it shows the precariousness of the judiciary’s position within the system of government. Cf. e.g. Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2001, Pizzorno 1998. See also “Tipping the Scales: Italy, Its Prime Minister and the Law”, in The Economist, 1 February 2003: 32.

24 The literature on the ECJ’s crucial role in the legal integration of the European Communities and, later, the European Union is too abundant as that it could possibly be summarised adequately here. For one recent analysis which to some extent modifies the dominant view referred here, see Conant 2002. For a general presentation of the ECJ, its competencies, jurisprudence, and influence, see Dehousse 1998; while the articles assembled in Craig and de Búrca 1999 offer a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the “evolution of EU law”.

25 Of course, this is not to say that everybody is convinced that the Court’s judgement is indeed the only possible answer to a legal problem. It is certainly true that those who closely follow the Court’s actions — i.e. predominantly lawyers — know that the Court, particularly in its early years, has often rendered teleological judgements, the thesis being the construction of a supranational legal order. Yet it remains true that the impression the Court (like others of the kind) wants to arouse is that of strict neutrality, of reasoning based exclusively on “the law”. Prima facie at least it seems that the wider public — inasmuch as it takes notice of the Court and its judgements at all — has reasonably been convinced of this.


27 See the draft text of the Constitutional Treaty as proposed by the Convention Praesidium; documents CONV 722/ 03, 724/ 03 and 725/ 03, under http://european-convention.eu.int.

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Legitimacy through Jurisprudence?


