

**Final Report  
of the Reflection Group on  
The Long-Term Implications  
of EU Enlargement:  
The Nature of the New Border**

*Chairman:* **Giuliano Amato**

*Rapporteur:* **Judy Batt**



**The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies  
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE**

with

**The Forward Studies Unit  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION**



**ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES**  
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

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This report reflects the discussions at six meetings in 1998-99 of Reflection Group set up jointly by the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission and the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, Florence. The discussions were based on a set of expert papers commissioned for the Reflection Group. The report does not necessarily reflect all individual opinions of the Reflection Group members; nor does it correspond to the position of either the European Commission or the Robert Schuman Centre.

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## Summary

Eastward enlargement of the European Union poses the question of how increasing internal diversity can be managed without compromising the coherence of the Union, its capacity to sustain the momentum of integration, and its ability to meet its growing external responsibilities as the pivot of the new European order.

Increasingly, cultural diversity tends to be seen as a threat in the case of enlargement to the East, in contrast to previous enlargements. But to a significant extent, this is symptomatic of the “Wall in our Heads”: the mutual ignorance and prejudices built up during the decades of the Cold War division of Europe. Diversity has always been the hallmark of Europe, and is becoming more salient in political life in the West as well as in the East, as old territorial nation state borders are challenged by sub-state regional and minority identities, global cultural communications, and assertive cross-border interest groups. The EU will become more diverse, but whether the overall cultural distance between member states will grow or diminish is far from obvious. However, new member states from the East can be expected to bring with them an intense commitment to making the EU work, as their best hope for overcoming their unhappy histories of marginalisation and oppression by dominant Great Powers, socio-economic stagnation, recurrent national tensions and political instability. This commitment should be exploited as a force for revitalising the EU’s sense of its basic mission - to overcome historic animosities and build peace and prosperity.

The task of sustaining the EU’s sense of common political identity in the new circumstances has promoted efforts to define more explicitly and assert more consistently the basic political values and rules upon which its effective work depends. These values and rules can be realised in a variety of cultural contexts. Unity, however, presupposes not only toleration of difference, but mutual trust and the commitment to equal treatment. Existing member states cannot claim the right to prescribe and monitor the adherence of applicants and new member states to the EU’s basic political values and rules without being prepared to subject themselves to the same scrutiny. Avoiding this opens the EU to the charge of hypocrisy and double standards, and could engender a corrosive cynicism about the professed values and standards in the candidate countries. The EU itself suffers from a “democratic deficit,” and implementing democracy, the rule of law, human and minority rights is by no means perfect among current member states. Accelerating social and political change calls for innovation in longer-established democracies, as well as in the new democracies. Greater openness to mutual support, exchange of experience and the proliferation of the “best practice” among all member states and candidates is called for.

In particular, the area of minority rights seems set to reach the political agenda of an enlarged EU. There are several reasons why the EU should become more actively involved in minority rights. The basic principles of liberalism and democracy need to be constantly confronted in practice with the demands of changing, diversifying societies. History has left explosive psychological residues with a long “half-lives” in prospective member states from the East, which will take years, if not generations to de-activate. Many of these minority problems will continue to cut across the EU’s external border after enlargement, and thus will affect the EU’s external policy towards non-member states. The creation of a closed, restrictive border regime is likely to exacerbate minority tensions and complicate cross-border relations. In addition, increasing assertiveness of national minorities will highlight the unequal predicament of third-country nationals resident in EU member states. There is a particularly compelling reason for the EU to concern itself directly with the plight of Roma citizens, Europe’s largest transnational minority present in all existing member states as well as in the candidate countries, who have hitherto received inadequate attention on account of their social marginalisation and lack of political resources. Moreover, the inclusion of Estonia and Latvia as members of the EU will bring into the Union a considerable number of people of Russian origin (some holding Estonian or Latvian citizenship, some holding Russian citizenship, and some remaining stateless).

The Amsterdam Treaty’s anti-discrimination commitment justifies EU-level action in the field of minority rights. A useful institution would be an EU Minority Rights Ombudsman, reporting to the European Parliament on positive experiences and “best practice” among member states, as well as investigating the complaints of individuals and minorities collectively. The trend towards state decentralisation can be a means of easing many minority problems, as well as revitalising democratic legitimacy and bringing government closer to the people. This trend should be supported by increased EU funding of cross-border cooperation schemes, especially among Central and East European partners. All EU regional development programmes should include consideration of their impact on minority issues.

The socio-economic gap between existing and prospective member states is large, and no doubt larger than was the case in previous enlargements. While growth has now resumed in many applicant countries, the gap will remain for many years to come. The sustainability of high rates of growth over the long term is open to question. The terms and conditions of accession will have a major impact on this. Fears are expressed in many existing member states about the costs of taking in many more poor countries. There are widespread concerns

about the impact of competition from low-wage economies, and about the possible influx of cheap migrant labour. But in important respects the competitive pressures facing EU economies are part of an ineluctable global challenge; rather than attempting to shield themselves from competition from the new member states, EU governments and firms need to focus on adapting and reforming the EU economic system to enhance competitiveness. Enlargement, on the right terms, could provide a major boost to the EU's global competitiveness; in many respects, the reforms required to adjust to enlargement complement those demanded in response to global pressures. The costs of enlarging slowly, or imposing heavy regulatory burdens on the developing economies of new entrants, are likely to be higher: their growth will be held back, pressures to emigrate westwards will be intensified, and political tensions will rise, placing strains on new democracies. Political courage and leadership is required to explain to EU publics both the unavoidable costs of change, and the benefits to be gained from enlargement for the future prosperity, stability and security of Europe as a whole.

The management of the EU's external borders has now become one of the most pressing issues on the political agenda. The impulse to retreat into a "Fortress Europe" must be resisted. It is illusory to think that migratory flows can be stopped simply by tightening up border control - in practice, illegal migration would continue, with damaging political, economic and human consequences. The EU is obliged by its own moral values as well as by its international legal commitments to maintain openness towards asylum-seekers. A repressive border regime would set an unwelcome pattern for the administrative authorities of the new member states, only now beginning to tackle the authoritarian legacies of communist rule. Thrusting the burden of dealing with migration from the East mainly onto the weaker and poorer accession candidates is not only financially but politically ineffective. The misguided tendency to conflate the problems of immigration with the issue of transnational organised crime has to end. The latter requires special efforts to foster more effective police co-operation among member states, and between them and the prospective new entrants, in particular aimed at enhancing the level of trust among European police forces by setting up joint training facilities and, when possible, joint operations. The former calls for a coherent common policy on immigration.

The "Fortress" impulse would undermine the coherence, moral authority and international credibility of the EU as it gears up for its vastly expanded international role as the pivotal actor in Europe's emerging new political and security order. A common EU immigration policy should be conceived as a component part of comprehensive border management regime. This should not

be fixated on techniques of control at the border, but should aim to reach beyond it: to develop active engagement and partnership with the new eastern neighbours; to support their economic development, socio-political stability and administrative capacities; and to respect the close historical, ethnic and economic ties between states beyond the EU's eastern borders and the new member states.

Shifting the EU's external border eastwards thus tends to blur the distinction between the internal and external dimensions of policy. This calls for much better coordination between these fields within the EU, in particular by enhancing the possibilities to mount initiatives that cut across all three pillars of the Union.. It also calls for greater willingness on the part of the member states to deepen cooperation among themselves. At the same time, deepening cooperation should take into account the need for, and the possibilities of, flexibility, in the search for imaginative, innovative and mutually-acceptable approaches to new and complex problems of pressing common concern.

## INTRODUCTION

The momentous events of 1989-91 produced a common instinctive reaction among Europeans right across the continent: the collapse of communism was an historic opportunity to overcome the unnatural and repugnant division of Europe. The aspirations of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe were nicely encapsulated in the demand to “return to Europe,” simultaneously expressing the desire for “normality” in domestic affairs - democratic government accountable to the people and a prosperous economy providing social justice - and for a role in international affairs appropriate to independent and equal members of the European “family” of nations. Full membership of the European Union, as well as of NATO, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, was seen from the start as inextricably linked to these goals. West Europeans too felt that the EU should open its doors and eventually encompass the whole of Europe, in line with the commitment made in its own founding treaty. To raise the question of where Europe's border lay seemed out of place in the joyful euphoria of tearing down the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain. The essence of a “Europe whole and free” was the overcoming of borders.

The end of the Cold War bipolar division of Europe has placed the EU in a wholly new position, presenting it with the opportunity to assume the central role in constituting a new order for Europe free of the rivalry of hegemonic superpowers. Yet the constitution of the EU itself has hitherto been not only shaped by, but to a significant extent dependent on that old order and the Iron Curtain that was central to it - a fact whose implications it has been slow to recognise. Enlargement now cannot mean “more of the same.” It involves fundamental changes not only for the states of Central and Eastern Europe to adapt themselves to the requirements of EU membership, but also for the EU itself. Borders are not about to melt away, but they are shifting. While they are becoming less significant between member states of the EU, the external border between members and non-members is taking on many of their functions and so threatens to become a new dividing line in post-communist Europe.

Where the border of “Europe” lies has therefore not disappeared from the agenda, but has in fact become a more contentious a topic of debate than ever before. Borders, to those outside them, readily appear as at best an inconvenience, and at worst as a massive injustice. To those on the inside, however, they lay the foundations of political order, defining rights and opportunities to participate in power and material benefits. The potency of the idea of “returning to Europe,” moreover, lay not only in its implicit demand to share in the political and economic goods enjoyed by citizens of the European Union, but also in its deep appeal to a common identity. Being “European” means for many people in Central and Eastern Europe being part of the “civilised world,” escaping from “Eastern barbarism” and

backwardness. Exclusion represents therefore an affront to notions of the dignity and worth of national cultures, which are constituent elements of the identity of individuals and therefore deeply affect their feelings and psychological reactions.

The problem is not only that the “Europe” of the EU by no means encompasses all of geographical Europe, but also that both geographically and culturally the borders of “Europe” are fuzzy and elusive. “Europe” is correspondingly a contested concept, constructed differently in different parts of the continent out of myths, prejudices, claims and yearnings. Wherever the EU decides finally to draw its border will therefore be seen by some as arbitrary, unfair and insulting. Yet it cannot do without borders - its own internal political, legal and economic order require clarity here. Shifting the border eastwards through enlargement, moreover, will incorporate new states which in terms of sheer numbers, not to speak of the increased diversity they will bring with them, will deeply affect the that internal order and force important reforms of it. But at the same time, clear, firm and hard borders threaten the EU's capacity to manage its relations with the wider “Europe,” some parts of which will not be able to meet the conditions of membership for many years, and other parts no doubt will always remain outside.

The purpose of this Report is to present the findings of a series of discussions held over 1998-99 by a Reflection Group set up jointly by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute in Florence and the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission. In Part I of the Report, we examine the nature of the cultural and socio-economic diversity across Europe. In Part II, we offer an analysis of the challenges facing the European Union in the new European and global context.

## **PART I - DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN EUROPE**

### **Chapter 1: Perceptions and Reality: Divergence as a Structuring Element in the Eastwards Enlargement of the EU**

Enlargement of the European Union to the East has raised in a new way the question of increasing diversity as a challenge and a potential threat to the coherence of the Union and its capacity to sustain the momentum of integration. Previous enlargements were readily welcomed as a means of strengthening the European Community. The inevitable increase in diversity among the member states was not seen as an insurmountable problem but as a source of revitalisation, a stimulus to new efforts to achieve the goal of an “ever-closer Union.” By contrast, the prospect of enlargement to the East has evoked unprecedented fears of unmanageable conflicts of values and interests which could paralyse the Union and jeopardise its ability not only to move forward but even to sustain its achievements hitherto. Moving the Union's border eastwards will require adjustments not only to the institutions and their functioning, but also to the expectations and pattern of benefits enjoyed by the member states. Reforms are overdue, but are by no means welcome to existing members. The fact that the new round of enlargements to the East coincides with the issue of internal reforms, and in many respects forces the pace of these reforms, gives rise to the temptation to lay all the blame for the pain of adjustment on the peculiar difficulty of absorbing new member states from the East.

As the Czech President Vaclav Havel remarked, the years of Europe's bifurcation by the Iron Curtain have left a deep imprint on our psychological perceptions as well as on our political, social and economic arrangements. A “Wall in our Heads” persists long after the physical Wall has been torn down. Havel's point was that the attitudes and behavioural reflexes of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe continue to show the imprint of decades of communist dictatorship. But the division of Europe has also left its mark on perceptions in the West, reinforcing long-standing prejudices about the East as “backward” and less “civilised” than the West, not fully “part of Europe.” The prospect of enlargement to the East has brought these prejudices to the fore, further contributing to the tendency to portray the increasing diversity that it entails as a new and uniquely threatening challenge for the EU.

The EU has decided to enlarge despite these fears, recognising the historic opportunity enlargement offers to spread stability, prosperity and freedom across the continent. But the success of enlargement depends not only on the efforts of the Central and Eastern European applicants to prepare themselves for membership, but also on all of us overcoming the “Wall in our Heads,” in order to face the new challenges ahead for the European Union.

For this reason, the first part of this Report is devoted to an extensive appraisal of the nature of diversity and the degree of convergence between West and East in the fields of values and socio-economic circumstances. What we will discover is that while differences exist, they do not fall neatly into a simple “East-West” scheme, but form a complex and variegated pattern. Multiple “Europes” exist, with overlapping and cross-cutting features, common points as well as contrasts. There are good reasons to expect the communist experience to have left a distinctive mark on the eastern part of the continent, but nevertheless diverse historical legacies have resurfaced in some areas, while certain universal aspects of the processes of social and economic modernisation have brought about similarities of experience, values and problems across the continent.

Communist regimes in Eastern Europe expended more effort and resources than any regimes in history in their attempt to coercively remodel not only social and economic structures, but also the political culture and social attitudes of the societies they dominated. This had profound, but also uneven and unanticipated results. The communists found the societies of Central and Eastern Europe at the end of World War II in a state of disorientation and dislocation. Although Stalinist communism was nowhere in the region the political choice of the majority, nevertheless, these societies were vulnerable in significant respects to the promises of progress, modernisation and social justice offered by communist ideology. Inter-war Central Europe had been wracked by national and ethnic tensions, economic depression and social frustration. Young intellectuals, such as Czeslaw Milosz and Zdenek Mlynar (see bibliography), were disillusioned with much of what the West stood for: in their experience, liberal democracy had been elitist, unstable, corrupt, inefficient and, for the most part, short-lived. The market economy had brought external economic dependence and stagnation, rural impoverishment and widespread unemployment for the masses.

The appeal of communism lay in its goal of “catching up and overtaking” the West by means of a programme of state-led modernisation, nationalisation and rapid industrialisation. This brought jobs and upward social mobility, mass education and women’s emancipation, improved health, and welfare states as extensive as anywhere in the world. But the success of communism in rooting itself in Central and East European societies and winning genuine mass support was vitiated from the start by its inescapable association with coercion and external domination by the Soviet Union. This was an affront to the deep historical attachment of the peoples of the region to the goal of national self-determination.

By the 1960s, the communist system was already demonstrating its weaknesses. Communist-style modernisation had brought about some convergence

with Western society, but living standards still lagged far behind, while some of the most unwelcome aspects of “modernity” were fully apparent: the assault on traditional ways of life and religious values; the increasing precariousness of family life; urban congestion and social alienation. But communism was to prove progressively less able to live up to its promise of prosperity. It was unable to keep up with the rising expectations of mass consumerism, fuelled by the Western example which Central and East Europeans continued to take as a model and standard for measurement of their own well-being. Far from catching up with the West, in the 1970s and 1980s communist economies fell into more or less open crisis. The tacit “social compact” whereby the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe had given up their hopes for freedom and national self-determination in exchange for material security, fell apart, culminating in the revolutions of 1989.

The legacies of this experience in the present-day political culture, social attitudes, and economic conditions of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are highly ambivalent, unpredictable and inconsistent. It is important to remember that the communist regimes differed greatly from state to state. In Poland and Hungary, for example, communism took on a distinctive reformist character after 1956. Contacts with Western Europe were less severely impeded than elsewhere, and the regimes themselves were somewhat more open and responsive to the aspirations of their peoples. Czechoslovakia reverted to a repressive, bureaucratic neo-Stalinism after the “Prague Spring” of 1968. In Romania, the peculiarly oppressive Ceausescu dictatorship manipulated xenophobic and authoritarian tendencies in ways that continue to make themselves felt today.

It is therefore hard to generalise. Comparative quantitative survey data are available (see the tables in the Appendix), but these need to be set in context. This is the aim of the following brief survey. The following three chapters deal with popular values and attitudes, covering (Chapter 2) religious and social values; (Chapter 3) citizenship and national identities; and (Chapter 4) support for democracy and the liberal state in the region as a whole. In Chapter 5 we turn to look at the socio-economic gap between West and East.

## **Chapter 2: Religious and Social Values**

If we begin with religious values and practices, we will discover one area where there is a marked degree of convergence between West and East, despite the very different experiences of the recent past.

### *2.1 Past and Present Experiences Shaping Religious Attitudes*

The post-war decades have seen a marked falling-off in regular church attendance in most West European countries, even though a majority of people still profess some adherence to and respect for religious values. There has correspondingly been a secularisation of society, as the distinction between church and state has become accepted in most people's minds. More recently, however, there have been various symptoms of a revival of interest in religion in different guises: mass evangelistic movements, new religious sects, and “New Age” philosophies.

Religious observance also fell off markedly in Central and Eastern Europe during the communist period. In contrast to the West, however, this trend was actively promoted by the communist regimes. Although older people were not normally prevented from attending church, pressures were exerted on parents not to allow their children to attend religious education classes provided by the churches, and baptism was strongly discouraged. The school curriculum propagated an anti-religious ideological message. Much church property was confiscated, and resources for the maintenance and construction of churches, and for the training of young priests, were extremely restricted.

Nevertheless, it is probably true that the major forces for social secularisation were similar in Central and Eastern Europe to those in the West, albeit taking a distinctive and concentrated form. The massive shift of employment from rural areas to the towns and cities in the 1950s-1970s uprooted large numbers of former peasants from their traditional community life, centred on the church. The attractions of a materialistic, consumption-oriented lifestyle proved a potent challenge to traditional spiritual values. The spread of the notion of the “weekend” as a time for private family leisure - frequently spent away from the city in small cottages with attached allotment gardens - displaced church attendance on Sundays.

All the same, people in Central and Eastern Europe, as in the West, have not wholly deserted religion. In Poland in particular, the extraordinary status of the Catholic Church as the repository of national identity as well as moral values was confirmed repeatedly throughout the communist period, as demonstrated most forcefully in the Solidarity movement. A large proportion even of communist party members persisted in seeking the Church's blessing on marriage and had their

children baptised. In this respect, Poland is rather exceptional among Central and East European countries, but there are interesting parallels with one Western country in particular, the Republic of Ireland.

What was apparent in the later years of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe was a religious revival among younger people. This in part reflects the way religious values and observance became a vehicle for the expression of anti-regime sentiment. But the religious revival appears to have continued after the fall of communism. At least, survey data indicate that more people have begun to acknowledge their ascribed religion as part of their identity, even if they do not go to church and even if they profess not to believe. We also find that some religious energies have been diverted into similar unorthodox channels as in the West, to the frequent consternation of the traditional churches.

Table 1 (see Appendix) presents some research findings from 1991 which compare religious beliefs and behaviour between three EU member states from the original core (West Germany, Netherlands and Italy), three later EU member states (Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Austria) and three Central European applicants (Hungary, Slovenia and Poland). This table illustrates the considerable degree of convergence between the three groups. Interestingly, in many respects the Central Europeans seem to be closer to the original core member states in values and practices than are the three later member states.

## *2.2 Changing Social Values in Contemporary Society*

Another finding of recent survey research is that communism appears to have left relatively untouched certain elements of traditional culture in Central and Eastern Europe, or to have manipulated it in peculiar ways. This is most noticeable in the area of what can be called the value-system of “social liberalism.” In the West, the 1960s can be identified as the decade of youth rebellion, when traditional social values came under fire. Much decried ever since by conservatives in both West and East as the source of present-day “Western decadence” and social decay, nevertheless much of the value change of the 1960s has been absorbed and become a valued part of everyday life in contemporary Western society. The liberal value of individual freedom is now widely recognised as having a social dimension as well as a political one: namely, the rights of women, gays and ethnic minorities to equal status and opportunities to realise their full potential as individuals are now recognised. Substantial practical efforts have been made to weaken the constraints posed by traditional stereotypes and majority prejudices.

The 1960s in Central and Eastern Europe also saw the emergence of rebellious and critical youth, especially students and a new post-war generation of

intellectuals. Their impact was mainly evident in the political field, as challenges to communist rule erupted in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and less dramatic political change proceeded in Hungary. However, little attention was given to changing social values, mainly because political reform was the overriding priority for critically-thinking elites. So, for example, feminist ideas aroused little interest, not only because women's rights were seen as a secondary issue and a potential distraction, but also because the feminist cause had already been appropriated by the communist regime itself. And the experience was hardly regarded by women as a resounding success: women's employment had become a necessity as one person's wages were not enough to support a family. Although in practice sexual permissiveness became at least as widespread in Central and Eastern Europe as in the West, the official communist feminism propagated a prudish conservatism and suppressed public debate about gender roles. Access to contraception was limited, leading to distressingly high rates of abortion, with detrimental effects on women's health. Housework and child-rearing remained firmly defined as "women's work," and women thus took on a heavy "dual burden" combining work (often unmechanised, heavy manual work) and home-making duties. Although communist employers provided extensive childcare facilities (envied by many in the West), early and long separation of young children from parents, the exhaustion of parents after work, and the ready availability of cheap alcohol had devastating effects on family life which were deeply regretted. Many women in Central and Eastern Europe longed for the right *not* to have to work, and for a return to the "traditional" family roles. Encounters with Western feminism since 1989 have highlighted this as a major area of value difference between the West and the East, and indeed, have promoted new thinking in the west about the goals of the feminist movement (see Corrin 1992).

The issue of gay rights has only arrived on the public agenda in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of communism and remains acutely contentious in most societies, even where membership of the Council of Europe obliges governments to amend repressive and discriminatory legislation. Attitudes on this topic are more comparable to those found in the West before the 1960s, and open displays of homosexual behaviour are often met with ridicule, if not undisguised disgust and hostility.

Racism is another area where communist rhetoric and practice have been either ineffective or counter-productive. Communist regimes simply swept the issue of Roma rights under the carpet. Roma constitute the largest ethnic minority in many Central and East European states (and are also present throughout Western Europe - see Table 2). Efforts at integration consisted in no more than outlawing the nomadic way of life and prosecuting so-called "social parasitism," accompanied by policies of enforced settlement and bureaucratically-imposed assimilation. The

education system for the most part ignored the special needs of Roma children. The result has been the creation of urban ghettos, and employment, if at all, in the most menial occupations. Social marginalisation meant that prejudices against the Roma were simply further reinforced, and were as evident in communist officialdom as in the wider society. It should not, however, be forgotten that Western societies have also had mixed success in integrating Roma (the issue of ethnic minorities in general will be discussed further in the following Chapter).

### *2.3 Throwbacks of the International Pursuit of Communist Values*

Communist societies in general were far more closed to the outside world than those of the West, but communist regimes nevertheless paraded their “socialist internationalism” by offering scholarships to students from “friendly” countries in Africa and Asia. These third-world students often encountered xenophobic hostility from the host society, as well as patronising treatment on the part of the authorities. The practice of importing foreign guest-workers, notably from Vietnam, was undertaken by inter-governmental agreements to offset growing labour shortages in Central and Eastern Europe, but they were deliberately kept segregated in workers' barracks and given virtually no money to spend. Their chances for encountering, let alone integrating in, the host society were minimal.

Moreover, popular hostility towards third-world students and workers was in part derived from the fact that their presence symbolised the alliance with a “socialist world” with which Central and East Europeans felt little genuine affinity, and which kept them apart from the West, with which they did feel such affinity. The lack of affinity was reinforced by the suspicion that at least some of these foreigners were being trained for terrorist and subversive activities directed against Western democracies.

Racism was simply not acknowledged to exist under socialism, being a so-called “bourgeois” phenomenon allegedly confined to Western capitalist societies, and so no steps were taken to counter it. Indeed, at times of political stress, communist regimes often resorted to the manipulation of ethnic prejudices as a means of social control. For example, the Polish communist regime in the late 1960s deliberately reawakened popular anti-semitism as a means of undermining the influence of dissident intellectuals. Even though the Jewish population had virtually disappeared in Poland after the Holocaust of World War II and subsequent emigration, this tactic found quite widespread resonance in Polish society. Anti-German prejudices were kept alive in both Poland and Czechoslovakia, making life uncomfortable for the German minorities in those countries. The campaigns of the Ceausescu regime against the Hungarian minority, evoking old fears of “Hungarian revanchism,” proved to have an enduring impact on popular attitudes.

## 2.4 *Social Values, the State and Democracy*

The results of recent comparative research on the conditions for an effectively functioning democratic order has led to increased emphasis on *toleration of difference* as one of the basic principles of modern social life, and recognition of the vital role of *trust in others* as the underpinning of an effective civil society (see Putnam 1993). The idea of tolerance is one of the constitutive elements of liberalism. Tolerance means acceptance of others in their “otherness,” and its practice depends not only on legal and constitutional guarantees of basic human rights, but also on its embeddedness in the attitudes of the wider society. Tolerance is the precondition for the various groups and cultures which constitute a complex modern society to live together in peace, by creating the space for each to exist and to settle mutual conflicts co-operatively.

In addition to tolerance, trust in others contributes to such co-operation. Trust is the risky assumption that those trusted will behave in a predictable manner in unforeseen and uncontrollable situations. Such trust facilitates identification with other people as members of one's own community, and it facilitates co-operation with other groups and anonymous individuals in new situations. The stronger the trust between the members of a community, the more easily will conflicts between them be settled and the more effectively will collective goals be attained.

As the survey of Central and East European social attitudes presented above indicates, communist regimes deliberately or by default fostered intolerance of diversity. Moreover, totalitarian rule deliberately spread mistrust and social atomisation as means of controlling society, in particular by the pervasive presence of the secret police and recruitment of informers. This was by no means wholly successful, as the emergence of movements for reform, and especially the Solidarity movement in Poland in the early 1980s demonstrate. Nevertheless, certain illiberal social values were preserved or reinforced by the relative isolation of Central and Eastern Europe from cultural trends in the West from the 1960s onwards.

Recent comparative research on the social values of tolerance and trust in a variety of countries provides some indication of the extent of divergence between west and east in this respect (see Tables 3 and 4). “Tolerance towards others” was measured by responses to questions on a number of forms of behaviour: homosexuality, prostitution, abortion and divorce. Respondents were considered tolerant if they clearly regarded those forms of behaviour as justifiable. Respondents who clearly did not were classed as intolerant. Table 3 lists the countries studied in order of the degree of tolerance evinced by their citizens. Two natural breaks are apparent in this ranking. One is at the 30 percent mark. Above this mark we find the

two parts of Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. The second break is at the 18 percent mark. Between these two, five West European countries together with Croatia and Slovenia are listed. Supplementary research found a statistically significant negative correlation between religiosity and tolerance, suggesting that countries where religion plays an important role have greater difficulty in institutionalising the virtue of tolerance than countries where this is not the case. There is thus considerable overlap between west and east in the middle range of tolerance. But with one exception, all the countries below the 18 percent mark are former communist states. The difference between West and East Germany is particularly interesting, indicating the impact of forty years of communist rule on social values in the East.

Table 4 presents findings on trust. Respondents were asked: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” The proportion of people who trust in others is over one third in only a few western countries, and only in Sweden and Norway is more than half the population trustful. Surprisingly, trust in others seems to be higher in Yugoslavia than in Spain, and Turkey shows the lowest level of trust of the whole sample. Yet we also find a distinctive difference between West and East Germany, which seems most likely explained by the communist experience in the East. Despite overlaps between west and east, there is a clear clustering of post-communist states in the lower range of trustfulness.

## Chapter 3: Citizenship and National Identities

### 3.1 *Civic versus Ethnic Bases of National Identity*

The resurgence of nationalism in post-communist eastern Europe has reawakened the idea that national identities are fundamentally different in West and East, which could generate damaging tensions in the internal politics of an enlarged EU, and embroil it in unwanted conflicts beyond its borders. An important source of this idea is the “civic versus ethnic” paradigm (derived from the works of, for example, Hans Kohn, Anthony Smith and, more recently, Micheal Ignatieff - see bibliography). In the West, it is argued, nations have grown up within established states. National identity therefore is primarily “civic” in character, formed alongside the gradual democratisation of existing political institutions. The state thus became representative of and accountable to the “nation” understood as a political community of individual citizens enjoying equal rights by virtue of their permanent attachment to the given state's territory.

In the East, by contrast, national identity evolved as a challenge to dynastic empires controlling large territories inhabited by a multiplicity of oppressed peoples. Nations were thus defined as cultural communities pitted against existing states, challenging the stability of borders throughout Europe. The primary qualifications for membership in nations so defined were ethnic, that is, linguistic and cultural, attributes. The “right to national self-determination” in this context represented a claim of each ethnic nation to a state of “its own.” The corresponding assumption was that states should represent the nation as a culturally distinctive, more or less homogeneous collectivity. This inevitably placed the national minorities formed when nation states arose in the region at the end of World War I in an anomalous position, as “second-class” citizens who could not expect the state to represent and express their identity in the same way as it did for the titular majority. This problem has re-emerged with dramatic and, in places, destructive force in post-communist Europe (for details of the main minority populations in Central and Eastern Europe, see Table 5).

This contrast between “Western/civic” and “Eastern/ethnic” modes of national identity can, however, be overdrawn. Not all national identities in Central and Eastern Europe are purely ethnic in content. For example, Polish and Hungarian nationalism originated in the late eighteenth century, in claims to recover the independence of historic states and territories which had been conquered by foreign empires. Under the influence of the French Revolution, the idea of the “nation” was taken to include all inhabitants of the historical territory, irrespective of ethnicity. This apparently “civic” accent was subsequently modified by an infusion of “ethnic”

elements in the course of the nineteenth century under the influence of German romanticism, which glorified the “people” and promoted the revival of demotic languages and folk cultures. The attraction of this was that it allowed the Polish and Hungarian elites to attack imperial oppression for its ethnically alien character (German and/or Russian), and thus readily to mobilise “democratic” support among the masses. However, this provoked in reaction rival mobilisation on the part of the minorities (chiefly Ukrainians, Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs) who constituted sizeable proportions of the inhabitants of the historic Polish and Hungarian territories and who also claimed the “right to national self-determination.”

### *3.2 The State and the People: Crafting Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*

We need to remember that the ethnic dimension of national identity was closely linked to the spread of democratic ideas and mass participation in politics throughout Europe. After all, liberalism and democracy presuppose the existence of a “people” in whose name the state is constituted, but these principles do not in and of themselves define who “the people” are, and how the borders of the state are to be drawn. In a sense it was the exceptional good fortune of France and Great Britain that their statehood and borders had been more or less settled before liberalism and democracy arrived to claim the state for the nation. In these cases, the state could be said to have “created” the nation from above, a process which involved not only the progressive extension of the rights of citizenship to ever wider sections of society, but also the more or less coercive suppression and assimilation of diverse regional and ethnic identities. This took place long ago in an era when there were no international institutions to constrain the sovereignty of states and interfere on behalf of minorities. Yet despite centuries of assimilatory pressures, a wide variety of indigenous ethnic minorities nevertheless persists in Western Europe as well to this day (see Map 1).

West European “civic” patriotism in practice has also at times - especially in war - not shrunk from ethnic appeals to “blood and belonging.” The loyalty of the masses was secured by evoking the sense of membership in a tightly-knit, homogeneous community of common culture and historical descent transcending internal differences of class and privilege. The provision of mass education furthered the indoctrination of a uniform national culture in a single language, taken for granted to be those of the leading ethnic group in the state. While today there may be more readiness to recognise the pluralistic, composite nature of the political community, the enduring potency of the ethnic component of national identities in the West finds an outlet in widespread xenophobia and racist popular attitudes towards immigrant communities that have more recently come to settle in West European countries.

It has been remarked that “civic” nationalism is the nationalism of those who already have a strong state, while “ethnic” nationalism is the nationalism of those who are still seeking one. The lack of a well-established and secure framework of statehood provides the explanation for the peculiarly intense psychological anxieties characteristic of Central and East European national identities (see Bibo, 1947), affecting the larger nations at least as much as that of the minorities living alongside them. The possibility of a relaxed and open attitude to minorities, and to pluralism in general, depends on a degree of self-assurance and security on the part of the majority. These have hardly been fostered by Central and Eastern Europe's historical experience over the past two centuries of thwarted national aspirations, foreign intimidation and conquest, transient statehood and shifting borders.

The establishment of “normal” statehood, in the sense of stable borders and political institutions which can be trusted as both effective and representative, is still at an early stage in Central and Eastern Europe today. Many in the region see the “return to Europe” as an essential condition of consolidating statehood, arguing that integration into the EU and NATO will provide the stable international environment in which the psychological insecurities at the root of the region's nationalistic tendencies and the associated minority problems will progressively melt away - or at least, will prove no more unmanageable a problem than in West European societies today. It should also be noted that, outside the former Yugoslavia, nowhere in Central and Eastern Europe have post-communist minority conflicts degenerated into the violence seen in, for example, Northern Ireland or the Basque country.

### *3.3 The Impact of Global Trends on the Evolution of European Identities*

However, the image of “the West” as a international system based on strong states with clearly demarcated territorial jurisdictions and cohesive, contented citizenries may turn out to be a mirage. The very processes of deepening political and economic integration within the EU have eroded the meaning of “sovereignty” for its member states. The pressures of globalisation have reduced the scope for independent national economic policies, and EMU, designed to enhance the global competitiveness of Europe, will remove what has hitherto been held to be a defining feature of state sovereignty - national currencies. Both global competition and preparations for EMU have formidably reduced the resources for redistribution at the disposal of states which have hitherto sustained high levels of mass welfare and social cohesion. While old class distinctions have broken down, social and economic inequalities are growing, and people feel increasingly insecure and vulnerable, “let down” by the states which they expect to protect them. In this context too, uncertainties about national identity have emerged.

“Consensus politics” seems not only no longer affordable, but culturally much more problematic than before. Since World War II, immigration into Western Europe has led to increasing diversity (see Table 6). The second and third generations of settled immigrant communities, born and brought up in Western Europe, are better educated and more assertive than their parents. West European societies have been slow to recognise their demands and reluctant to accept them fully into the political community. Immigrant minorities have been expected to integrate by assimilation into the culture of the majority; “multicultural” policies have often encountered resistance on the part of the majority.

Deepening EU integration has provoked heightened anxieties about national identity and sovereignty in many member states, and these feelings do not seem likely to disappear. At the same time, resurgent sub-state regional and minority identities can seem to pose further unwelcome challenges to national cohesion, state sovereignty and the territorial integrity. Thus the “Europe” to which the Central and East Europeans seek to “return” is itself in flux, and may provide a less reliable support to the consolidation of their statehood than anticipated.

What we may be seeing is a convergence between East and West on terrain which is new and uncertain for both. Societies are increasingly open to cross-cultural contact as a result of international travel, labour mobility, the globalisation of mass communications and the spread of English as a *lingua franca*. What evidence there is for a common culture transcending national frontiers points to its being global rather than specifically “European,” and originating chiefly in the US: pop music, films and satellite TV now reach mass audiences irrespective of national borders. Whether this is leading or is likely to lead to substantive convergence in cultural values remains, however, a matter of doubt. These contacts tend to have a rather superficial effect, and in any case are likely to be assimilated into pre-existing cultural contexts. National identities are changing, but differences between them will remain. The longer-term effect may be one of cultural fragmentation, undermining the cohesiveness of state-promoted national homogeneity and replacing it with a plethora of transnational group links and identities.

In the West, political integration by means of assimilation is now giving way to the politics of identity and subjectivity, celebrating the values of diversity, the particular, local and small-scale. Some predict that in its “postmodern” condition, society will become a shifting kaleidoscope of diverse minorities, of competing, coexisting and ‘hybrid’ identities, each claiming the right to be recognised as of equal worth with all the others and each making corresponding demands on the state. Individuals have not one but multiple identities which they freely select and order according to changing circumstances and their own personal needs. In this scenario,

national identity, whatever it means, will become less compelling and less effective as an overarching, unifying idea.

In the East, it is not “post-materialism” but the everyday struggle to sustain a minimum level of material welfare, let alone satisfy burgeoning consumerist aspirations, which is the stumbling block in the way of mass nationalist mobilisation. While extremist nationalist and xenophobic populist parties have arisen in Central and Eastern Europe (as in Western Europe), outside the former Yugoslavia they have not won mass support. The view held by some of a Central and Eastern Europe rife with rampant nationalism is belied by survey data produced by the Vienna-based Paul Lazarsfeld Society's “New Democracies Barometer” (see Table 7). Among the twelve post-communist states covered in their 1998 survey, the mean average of respondents identifying primarily with their nation state was just 31 percent; 19 percent put “Europe” as their first or second preference identity; while 21 percent named only their region, city or locality among their first and second identities. Social atomisation, mistrust and evasion of the state, and endemic scepticism about its claims to embody the “national interest” - all trends well advanced under communism - are still deep, and are most evident among the young. At the same time, however, the characteristic Central and East European perception of ethnic minorities as a “threat” has diminished over the past decade (see Table 8).

While majoritarian nationalism may therefore be entering a period of uncertainty in both West and East, national and ethnic minorities seem likely to become stronger, more self-confident and sophisticated in their relations with states. Coercive assimilation is now internationally outlawed, while voluntary assimilation has become less respectable. Declining pressures to conform mean that more individuals feel more confident in proclaiming a minority identity, as is evident in national census data in post-communist Europe. The increasing ease of travel and communications across borders opens up new opportunities to publicise grievances on an international plane, to win political and material support from abroad, to draw on the fund of political know-how accumulated by minorities elsewhere. To some extent, these trends favourable to minorities may be offset by increased difficulties for minority leaders in sustaining the cohesion of their communities - especially of the young, drawn by the magnet of western pop culture; and of the more educated and articulate, tempted away by opportunities further afield in the melting-pot of the major cities of Europe or North America. But this does not mean that members of minorities will abandon their distinct subjective identity and cease to defend it. Minorities are more likely respond to perceived threats of numerical attrition or loss of recognition by increased stridency and redoubled efforts to retain the loyalty of their members.

## **Chapter 4: Support for Democracy and the Liberal State**

The American foundation, Freedom House, performs an annual assessment of the world's political systems using a “freedom scale” taking into account not only competitive elections but also the civil liberties necessary to make electoral competition effective. This seven-point scale defines three groups of countries: those countries which rate 1 to 2.5 points are free, those which rate 3 to 5 points are partly free, and those with 5.5 to 7 points are not free. All EU member states are 'free' according to this standard. In the mid-1980s, only the Hungarian and Polish communist regimes scraped into the category of partly free countries. The rest were unfree. By 1998, most Central and East European countries were rated as free, while others had moved up to join the partly free group. Some, such as Belarus, remained definitely unfree (see Figure 1).

### *4.1 Low Support for the Return of Authoritarian Leadership*

The practice of democratic politics is new to most people in Central and Eastern Europe, but support for free elections and a multiplicity of political parties has remained high, at around 60 percent on average (see Table 9). Although quite substantial minorities continue to give a positive rating to the former communist regime (around 40 percent), this does not necessarily mean these people would like to see the communist regime return. With the passage of time, and the economic upheaval of transition, a more balanced assessment of the good elements that existed alongside the bad in the past has become possible. This is particularly true of Hungary, the only CEE country that consistently shows more than half the population approving the former communist regime. This is fondly remembered by many as much for the social welfare and heavily subsidised consumption it provided as for its relatively open and relaxed political style. Even so, only around 20 percent would like to see it return. The high vote for the former communist party, the Hungarian Socialist Party, in the 1994 election, and similar results elsewhere in the mid-1990s (in Poland and Lithuania) did not signal a desire to change the regime, but rather the exercise of democratic choice to throw out the incumbent centre-right governments and replace them with what then seemed more “competent” and “professional” alternatives. Subsequent elections have seen dissatisfied voters dismissing these ex-communist parties in turn. However, the picture is quite different in the newly independent states of Belarus and Ukraine, where substantial majorities look back with nostalgia to the Soviet period, and over half in Ukraine would favour a return to communist rule.

If support for a return to communist rule is low in Central and Eastern Europe, so is support for other authoritarian alternatives, such as military dictatorship, or a “strong leader.” Among the minority expressing support for a

“strong leader,” many appear to want more effective government rather than a dictator. When asked whether they would approve closing down parliament and banning political parties, clear majorities were opposed in all twelve of the post-communist states surveyed by the New Democracies Barometer - including in Belarus, Ukraine and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (see Table 10).

Confidence in the persistence of democratic institutions has grown in Central and Eastern Europe. In the first NDB survey in 1991, 63 percent thought it unlikely that parliament and parties would be abolished; this had risen to 72 percent by 1996, and in the 1998 survey, to 83 percent (see Rose and Harepfer, 1998). “Confident democrats” - those disapproving of the suspension of parliament and parties and thinking it unlikely - were a clear majority in all twelve countries covered in 1998. The overall pattern of commitment to democracy and confidence in the durability of democratic institutions was remarkably close to that of Austria in the four Central European “front-runners” for EU membership, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (see Table 11).

#### *4.2 Widespread Public Scepticism towards Formal Politics*

Nevertheless, fully committed democrats - those clearly rejecting the former regime and approving the new one - remain a minority in all post-communist states (albeit with significant variations). They are outnumbered by sceptics (disapproving both past and present regimes) and compliant citizens (rating both past and present regimes positively) in every case except Poland (see Table 12). This less than enthusiastic appraisal of current politics may not be markedly out of line with that of citizens in most established Western democracies. A large-scale comparative study conducted by the World Values Survey, which asked respondents in a number of Western and post-communist states to rate how well the political system was functioning in their country on a scale of 1-10, found well under half of respondents giving a positive rating (6-10 points) in nearly all democracies, West or East. “Democratic deficits” are not, therefore, only a matter for concern in new democracies. Nevertheless, the lowest levels of satisfaction were found in the least successful post-communist democracies, and, interestingly, in Turkey (see Table 13).

A major problem for new democracies is establishing trust in political institutions, but lack of trust is also prevalent in established democracies. A comparison between Austria and four post-communist Central European countries found that, out of 14 institutions tested, only the police and the courts are trusted by more than half of Austrians, and only the state President was trusted by more than half of Czechs and Hungarians, while only the Army and the Church won the trust of more than half of the Poles (see Table 14). In post-communist countries, the

major reason (apart from dissatisfaction with the economic performance of their country) accounting for the low levels of confidence in new institutions is the very widespread perception that corruption has increased.

As a result, the willingness to become actively involved in political life is low. While people clearly value the freedom they have gained since the fall of communism, one of the freedoms they seem most clearly to appreciate is the right not to have to take part in politics and to preserve their distance from the state. Nevertheless, the ideal of civic activism is not one practised by a majority of citizens in Western democracies either, as the World Values Survey discovered (Table 15). Interest in politics, and willingness to take part in lawful demonstrations was found to be a minority pursuit in most countries. Most people in most countries are only moderately politically involved.

One area where we would expect to find significant differences between post-communist societies and those of Western Europe is in attitudes towards and expectations of the state. The role of the state was one of the aspects that most strongly distinguished the “capitalist West” from the “communist East” in the bipolar world of the Cold War. The World Values Survey identified three positions - libertarian, paternalistic and undecided - according to whether respondents favoured state or private ownership of business and industry; and whether they thought it was the state's responsibility “to ensure that everyone is provided for” or the individual's responsibility “to provide for themselves” (see Table 16). The comparative data reveal a difference between East and West. Almost all western countries in the survey have an above-average proportion of libertarians, and all eastern countries a below-average proportion. Exceptions were, however, Spain and East Germany. East Germany differed quite markedly from West Germany, confirming findings from other studies which demonstrate that East Germans prefer the model of democratic socialism to that of the liberal state. This seems to indicate quite clearly the impact of socialisation of East Germans over 40 years in the former German Democratic Republic. The same explanation no doubt lies behind the relatively low proportions of libertarians and the relatively high proportions of paternalists in all the post-communist states. The socio-economic stresses of economic transition are also a factor. It is quite marked that Poland and Slovenia - among the more successful transition economies - come closest to Western countries, while the highest proportions of paternalists are found in the least successful former Soviet states.

## Chapter 5: The Socio-Economic Gap

There is no doubt that there is a large socio-economic gap between the existing member states of the EU and the prospective new entrants from Central and Eastern Europe. It is, moreover, larger than that which existed between member states and new entrants at the time of previous enlargements which brought in Ireland (1973), Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986). But exactly how large that gap is, and whether it has narrowed or become wider and deeper as a result of the policies of post-communist economic transformation pursued over the past ten years, are questions of intense current controversy among economists.

### *5.1 Statistics paint a Sombre Picture*

Comparative data based on purchasing power parities give an impression of the differences in the standard of living between countries (see Table 17). The socio-economic gap is formidable, and while growth has resumed in most countries, reaching quite rapid rates in some cases (notably Poland and the Baltic Republics), the estimated level of real GDP is still below, even well below, its 1989 level in all countries except Poland and Hungary (see Table 18). In other words, in quantitative terms, the socio-economic gap appears to be wider today than it was ten years ago. Moreover, the sustainability of current growth rates is open to question in some countries. The Czech Republic seems set for at least a year or two of stagnation following its early apparent success in weathering the shock of transition, while Romania's economy has suffered a sharp downturn since 1996.

Average monthly wages at market exchange rates are very low indeed in comparison with those of existing member states, for example, US\$102 in Bulgaria, US\$282 in Hungary, US\$383 in Poland, and US\$897 in Slovenia, at the end of 1997. Unemployment has risen in all countries from virtually zero at the end of the communist period to levels approaching, and in some cases exceeding, the current EU average. Official figures almost certainly understate the extent of the problem. As also applies to unemployment figures in the West, the introduction of restrictions on eligibility to register as unemployed, and extensive use of early retirement provisions may deflate the real picture. Recent trends in some CEE countries to a halt or modest reduction in unemployment may not be sustained, given doubts about the sustainability of current growth rates; widespread evidence of continued over-employment in some sectors of industry and, especially, agriculture; the underdevelopment of active labour market policies and mechanisms; and the ever-increasing challenge posed by exposure to international competition.

The extent of officially-defined poverty in CEE is quite alarming: for example, in Poland, 36 percent of all employees were found to be below the poverty

line in 1994. According to household surveys, the number of people living below the subsistence minimum in Hungary reached 3 million in 1995, over one-third of the total population. A similar proportion was found in Romania in 1996, while in Bulgaria, over 70 percent were living below the poverty line in 1998. The low levels of economic development in general, and the specific problem of poverty, are undoubtedly factors influencing the wide discrepancies between East and West Europe in key social indicators such as life expectancy. For example, in 1993, male life expectancy was behind the EU average by 8 years in Hungary, 6 years in Romania, 4.6 years in Poland, and 4.3 years in Bulgaria.

## *5.2 What Statistics do not tell...*

What figures such as these actually imply for our assessment of the socio-economic gap in an enlarged of the EU, however, is open to debate. They have to be set in context by taking into account the extent of unregistered economic activity and the impact of informal social practices. The existence of a sizeable unrecorded 'second economy' in post-communist countries long pre-dates the transition to the market. Under communist central planning, endemic shortages and unreliable supplies of even the most basic goods and services drove consumers onto the black market. Low wages in official employment usually had to be supplemented by moonlighting, or outright theft of materials, components, etc., from the state employer, in order to buy or barter for goods unavailable in state shops and pay the bribes necessary to obtain services (e.g., housing allocation, health care) provided by state authorities. Throughout the region, urban households' food supplies depended vitally on family connections in the countryside, or on the cultivation of allotments on the edge of the city. Subsistence farming has been a vital factor in poorer economies such as Bulgaria and Romania.

In many respects, the state in "real socialism" proved an unreliable guarantor of the secure and steadily rising standard of living it promised. A well-known quip of the time was that "he who does not rob the state robs his own family." Habits of evasion of the state became at least as deeply entrenched as those of dependency on it. Learned self-reliance and individual resourcefulness are thus at least as characteristic of the peoples of post-communist Europe as "learned helplessness," and have clearly been called into play in the new conditions of transition to the market economy. Recent estimates in Hungary, for example, suggest that unregistered economic activity may account for 30-50 percent of GDP. Whether the unregistered economy has become larger or not with the transition to the market is hard to assess (unregistered earning activity abroad by migrant workers has certainly increased - and is discussed in more detail in Part II, Chapter 8, below). But without some reference to its mitigating impact on the social shocks of transition it is hard to

explain the extraordinary resilience and stability of the societies of the region during the 1990s.

To what extent does this modify the picture given by official statistics of the socio-economic gap between East and West? This depends on whether the level of unregistered economic activity is in fact higher in CEE countries than in the EU. It almost certainly is on the average, although high levels of such activity are also estimated in some south European member states. The New Democracies Barometer asked people in twelve post-communist states whether their earnings from their regular job provided enough money to buy what they really needed, and found that a majority replied negatively. In Ukraine, only 8 percent are able to earn enough, and in Romania and Bulgaria, one sixth. Across Central and Eastern Europe an average of 55 percent said they did not get enough (see Figure 2). But when asked how often they had to go without food, heating and electricity, and clothes they really needed, most people reported they never or rarely went without, while the proportions of those often going without in all countries surveyed - with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Ukraine - were very small. It appears, therefore, that most people manage with the help of a portfolio of additional earning activities.

This may modify the official picture as far as the distribution of incomes is concerned. While unemployment and poverty for some groups may be less intolerable than official data would imply, no doubt some of the poorest are still excluded from the “second economy” through lack of skills, resources and personal connections. On the other hand, the incomes of some of those in the highest income brackets may be even further augmented.

More important than the effects on the pattern of income distribution, however, is the close association between a large “second economy” and corruption in government and the state administration. States weakly embedded in societies that continue to mistrust and evade them, states captured by the interests of narrow self-serving elites, are not going to be effective guarantors of the rule of law, a basic condition for the security of private property rights, the enforcement of contracts, and the implementation of fair competition, upon which a well-functioning market economy depends. Nor will such states be in a position to devise or implement appropriate social policies to complement the development of the market. They are neither likely to be capable of gathering taxes effectively nor of allocating public resources efficiently and fairly. They are thus less likely to deal adequately with the immediate needs of their societies, let alone to meet the challenges of eventual integration into the EMU. Thus while in certain respects and in the short term, the unregistered economy may act as a safety valve for CEE economies in transition, taken in a broader perspective and in the longer term, it may signal a more

intractable source of divergence between East and West Europe than the statistically quantifiable gap itself.

Assessments of the prospects for closing the gap between East and West in the foreseeable future depend very much on prior assessments of what has so far been achieved in the economic transformation of post-communist Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic Republics, progress has been remarkable, while elsewhere, particularly in the former Soviet states, Romania and Bulgaria, there has been much marking time. The crisis in the Russian economy in 1998 was a major setback, not only for Russia. The conclusions of the EBRD's 1998 *Transition Report* are clear: growth and stability have been maintained in those countries where discipline in macroeconomic management and the depth of reform have been strongest. These correlate closely with progress in political reform: the quality of economic governance is higher where the consolidation of multi-party democracy is stronger, and progress in economic reform generally is linked to the formation of a political consensus within society in favour of change (see EBRD, 1998, pp 2-11). Stronger leadership, more effective administrations, and further expansion of professional training for key functions in modern market economies are required throughout the post-communist world if the key tasks of the coming years - rebuilding the institutional framework, implementing appropriate legislation, and countering corruption - are to be tackled.

There is an increasingly clear distinction between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states and those of the former Soviet Union in economic performance, as Table 18 demonstrates. Popular assessments of the present economic system as compared to that of the past remain sceptical, but there are also buoyant hopes for future improvement, suggesting that there is a reservoir of social resilience and patience which can be mobilised for the "long haul" to catch up with the West.

Catching up to the EU average by 2015 will require sustained levels of growth in the front-running states of 5-9 percent per annum. Economic growth is the key to closing the gap in incomes and standards of social welfare between East and West. It is important at this point to recognise that whether such levels are feasible has as much to do with the terms and conditions of the post-communist states' economic relations and eventual integration with the EU, as with their own domestic political circumstances.

## **Chapter 6: Conclusions: Reality and Illusions in the Enlarged EU**

While there may be good historical reasons to expect divergence between "West" and "East" in Europe, where precisely the line should be drawn remains as elusive as ever. As we have seen, the idea of an intractable East-West divide in values and

socio-economic circumstances is belied by the diversity which exists within, and cuts across, each group of states. What has indeed been evident in post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe has been the rapid re-emergence and redefinition of distinctive national and minority cultural identities. The differentiation between states in the pace and patterns of democratization and economic transformation has correspondingly accelerated.

At the same time, differentiation has persisted among the West European member states of the EU. A North-South divide in cultural values and political and administrative traditions continues to influence mutual perceptions. The socio-economic gap between northern and southern member states has narrowed, but divergent regional interests are reflected in the alignments and coalitions between member states that regularly form around key issues in the EU's internal politics. National identities have changed with the generations, but have not merged. Cultural differences remain a lively factor in politics within and between states.

We need to recognise and accept the inherent fluidity and constant change which is characteristic of contemporary European societies, their exposure to global influences, the contradictory trends towards fragmentation and pluralisation alongside integration and universalisation. Differences of national cultures and socio-economic conditions are by no means the only, nor necessarily the most problematic challenges facing the new Europe. One could point to increasing divergence between globalised regions, fully exposed to and successfully integrating into a new international economy, and regions “left behind,” unable to compete and benefit from it. The division between core and periphery in Europe is one which cuts across state borders and unites the experience and interests of sub-state regions across the East-West divide. Major non-territorial divides can also be identified along generational lines, and along educational lines, greatly affecting the capacity of individuals to adapt and thus realise their life-chances in a unified European economic space. For all European democracies, the gulf in attitudes, expectations and cultural adaptability between elites and masses poses continuing dilemmas for democratic governance.

The effort to define the borders of “Europe” in cultural terms is therefore doomed to failure: multiple competing definitions exist and will continue to compete on the European stage. We also need to exercise extreme caution in attempting to predict how the diversity of values and interests will play out in the future political dynamics of enlargement and within an enlarged EU. The EU will undoubtedly become more diverse, but whether the overall cultural distance between member states will grow or diminish is not obvious. The new member states from the east will bring with them the aspiration to prove themselves “good Europeans,” and, given their unhappy histories over the past two centuries, they see their most

fundamental interests in ensuring that “Europe,” in the form of the EU, continues to work for the stability and prosperity of the continent.

In emphasising the fluidity of values and interests, we should also bear in mind the important impact that the institutional structures of politics, economics and society can have in shaping them. Change in these structures can significantly modify values and interests by offering different incentives and opportunities. Thus, in joining the EU, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are not only asserting their identification with “Europe,” but are willingly subjecting themselves to the disciplines of a new institutional framework in order to entrench the values of freedom and democracy, and structures conducive to economic prosperity and security. In doing so, they look to the examples of post-war Germany and Italy, as well as those of newer West European democracies in Spain, Portugal and Greece.

However, the “Europe” that the Central and East Europeans seek to join is a moving target. Internally, the moves to monetary union and deepening political integration, and externally, the EU's growing responsibility for stability and security beyond its borders, in the continent as a whole, pose new challenges which presuppose greater coherence and unity of purpose across a wider range of policy areas than ever before. The implications of the material presented in Part I for an enlarged European Union is the subject matter of Part II. The increasing cultural diversity that the EU will span calls for more explicit definition of the bases of its future political unity, and the expenditure of more common effort in developing and deepening its political values in practice. This is taken up in Chapter 7. In Chapters 8 and 9 we turn to the complex policy challenges which confront the EU in the new context.

## **PART II: IMPLICATIONS FOR AN ENLARGED EU - THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW BORDER**

### **Chapter 7: European Identity and the Bases of Political Unity**

#### *7.1 From Implicit to Explicit: Political Values and Principles underpinning the EU*

The European Community was established in 1957 as a framework for promoting economic cooperation and integration, whose underlying political purpose was to secure peace and prosperity in Europe, above all by binding Germany into an enduring partnership with its western neighbours. It was conceived as a community of states based on shared, and institutionally entrenched, liberal-democratic principles. There was no reference to a common “European” culture underpinning the Community, beyond attachment to these broad principles.

These basic political principles did not seem to feature explicitly in connection with previous EU enlargements. For the first time, political conditions for membership were explicitly laid down at the Copenhagen Council in 1993, and now the Amsterdam Treaty embodies them, including a provision for suspending the membership of a state which departs from them. These political criteria merely made explicit what had hitherto been implicit; but the fact that it was found necessary to do this only now, in connection with eastward enlargement, has provoked certain misgivings in some circles in the applicant countries because it seems to imply a lack of confidence in their “European” credentials, reflecting West European fears and cultural prejudices about the 'barbarian east', as well as concealing self-interested tactics on the part of some member states to delay enlargement. The charge of “double standards” has also been made: the EU member states are seen as setting more rigorous conditions for new entrants than for themselves.

The Copenhagen criteria must, however, be welcomed as the first step to defining more explicitly and unambiguously the set of common basic standards expected of EU member states, and by which the performance of their political and legal institutions can be judged. These common political and legal standards are necessary precisely because of the great cultural diversity among the member states - what unites the “Europe” of EU is not so much a common substantive “European culture” and “European values,” but commitment to these basic rules and procedures. The need for an explicit restatement of these has become more necessary than ever as the EU enlarges and takes on new internal and external roles.

In principle, these rules and procedures can be and are implemented in practice in a variety of different ways in diverse cultural contexts. But they are not

wholly “culture-free”: the cultural context, especially the underlying political culture (in the sense of values, attitudes, and ingrained patterns of behaviour), does enter into the equation insofar as the stability of democratic institutions, the real enjoyment of rights and freedoms, and the quality of the Rule of Law in practice all presuppose an underlying web of more or less unspoken, taken-for-granted common understandings and assumptions. The practice of democracy may degenerate into demagoguery and authoritarian populism in the context of a society which defines the “nation” in collectivistic and homogenising ethnic terms, overriding the rights of individuals and minorities. The Rule of Law may be subverted by informal and corrupt networks of family, clan, party or business associates.

### *7.2 The Role of Culture in the European Integration Process*

The EU's adoption of an explicit political conditionality thus inescapably raises questions about the cultural compatibility of prospective new member states, and in doing so, it touches on some extremely raw nerves. In all the applicant countries to a greater or lesser extent we encounter a form of inferiority complex resulting from years of oppression, marginalisation and exclusion from the west European “mainstream,” which produces a hostile and defensive reaction to any suggestion that they are regarded as “second-class” Europeans. In order to have a positive, constructive effect, political conditionality needs to be applied, and to be seen to be applied, with scrupulous impartiality. But while the applicant countries are subject to constant monitoring and regular published assessments of the performance of their new democratic institutions, the existing member states are not. As the Freedom House surveys cited in Part I indicate, all EU member states are clearly “free.” But this does not mean that they are perfect. There is a wide variation not only in the forms, but in the functioning, of their democratic systems. If we are to demand that prospective new member states live up to high standards, we cannot avoid turning the spotlight on shortcomings of performance among existing member states. The credibility of the EU's political conditionality requires a willingness on the part of all member states to open up their own practices to scrutiny.

The question of whether the new member states will prove “awkward partners” for the EU begs a prior question: what reasons are there to suppose on cultural grounds that they will be more disruptive than many existing member states? One answer would be that, having only recently recovered their sovereignty, and in some cases having only just established themselves as independent nation states, the Central and East Europeans will inevitably find it more difficult than the longer-established and more confident states of Western Europe to accept new constraints on their sovereignty and are likely to be much more sensitive on issues affecting national identity. Their lack of experience in international affairs, and especially their ignorance about the full implications of EU membership, compound

the anticipated difficulties. How can states still grappling with the unfinished business of the nineteenth century be integrated with a Union on the threshold of twenty-first century “post-modernity”?

This question betrays a rather schematic view of historical “progress,” assuming that there is a linear path, marked out by stages which all states must pass through. For the Central and East Europeans, European integration is seen not as an alternative to national self-determination, but the means to securing it. They will bring with them an intense and idealistic commitment to “Europe” by virtue of the very fact of their insecure position at its periphery. More concretely, long and unfortunate historical experience of their “geo-political predicament” in between Russia and Germany has demonstrably forged deep motivations to do whatever is necessary to join the EU, and to help further develop it as the only viable alternative to the precarious position of a “buffer zone” of unstable and vulnerable small nation states. The idea of “common European values,” and the determination to live up to them, is correspondingly a recurrent feature of political discourse among Central and Eastern Europe elites.

By contrast, those long-established at the “core” of Europe may enjoy the “luxury” of indifference or scepticism towards the idea of a common European culture. Among West Europeans, the salience of the lessons of the past seems to be declining in the political imagination of the younger generation, not having had direct experience of the Second World War. For Central and East Europeans, the Second World War only ended in 1989. Their values and motivations in seeking integration with the EU are fully consistent with its original *raison d’être*. The influx of new members could therefore give a fresh impetus to integration, rather than impeding it.

This does not, of course, mean that “Euroscepticism” will not arise as they move closer to the reality of EU membership. As we already see in existing EU member states, a general and abstract identification with “Europe” does not automatically signify diminishing concern for national and regional identities. It is the prospect of deepening political and economic integration within the EU, as much as that of eastward enlargement, which has propelled the question of culture onto the agenda. It is already evident that the hugely ambitious project of monetary union has encountered as many culturally-based objections as technical ones. The Maastricht Treaty's reference to the goal of “political union,” and the traumatic ratification process itself, have brought out into the open the problems of the EU's weak political legitimacy and the lack of credible political mechanisms for consulting the people and winning their active consent in the integration process.

These problems have prompted some to argue in favour of an active campaign to promote a common European cultural identity. An integrated European polity, like any other state, it is argued, will need the underpinning of a “thick” consensus on values going beyond the “thin” one achieved so far on rules and procedures. Some would see the solution in strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, in the hope that a more active and assertive representative body would attract more interest, and ultimately more support, from the citizens of the Union. Stronger European institutions at the centre would eventually forge a stronger European identity, supported in the meanwhile by an intensified and more inspired propaganda campaign and new policies in the fields of education and culture.

But the EU is not, and will not become a state on the nation state model. There is little evidence that the European institutional framework has so far succeeded in moulding a coherent “European” cultural identity which could provide that instinctive feeling of political loyalty generated in the past by the sense of national identity. The EU has been notably ineffective in mobilising what common “European” feeling actually exists among European citizens to build strong support for its institutions and the project of integration. Further efforts at “European Construction” predicated on the model of the “nation-building” in the past two centuries are out-of-date, and likely to prove as ineffectual as the Grand Project of “Socialist construction” pursued in the East for much of this century because they embody the “top-down” assumption that the problem is to change European citizens and their views, rather than to improve and reform the institutions to meet people's needs.

### *7.3 The Foundations of a Political Identity for the EU in Light of Enlargement*

The emergent European polity can only rest on shared commitment to rules and procedures perceived as fair and efficient, on the principle of toleration and institutional guarantees of respect for diversity. This might be seen as a weak, “thin” form of legitimacy, in contrast to the “thick” common cultural identity which has underpinned powerful nation states; but this only poses insuperable problems if we envisage the EU as a nation state. What sort of identity Europe needs can only be answered in the light of what tasks we expect it to take on, and what powers we are prepared to see transferred to its institutions to carry out those tasks. Current trends point towards the evolution of Europe as a complex multi-level polity, in which tasks are shared between the Union, the member states, and sub-state levels on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. National identities and cultural differences will continue to be a potent factor in politics at the EU level, and eastwards enlargement will no doubt add fresh spice to the stew. The legitimacy of the EU, however, will be

built on quite different terrain, which has to do with effectiveness in performing tasks that are recognised as of common concern and best performed jointly.

Insofar as Europe needs an identity, it must be primarily a political one, and democratic values are at the heart of it. There is widespread discussion of the “democratic deficit” in the European Union today. The Amsterdam Treaty has made little impact here. Even though the increased powers of the European Parliament will enhance the democratic scrutiny of legislation and the accountability of the Commission, the people of Europe seem not as yet to be much impressed, to judge by low voter turnout in the June 1999 European elections in most member states. The problem seems to lie not so much in the limitations of the European Parliament, as in people's perceptions of all European institutions (including the Parliament) as remote from their everyday lives; operating according to obscure, impossibly complex and bureaucratic procedures; staffed by arrogant, pampered, and, at worst, corrupt elites. The latter two problems can be remedied by various institutional reforms, which are now in preparation and need to be implemented as a matter of priority.

The problem of the EU's “remoteness” looks more intractable, insofar as it also afflicts the popular legitimacy of many established democratic states, as well as that of the weakly-embedded institutions of the new democracies. In this context it is hardly to be expected that EU institutions will perform better. In other words, the “democratic deficit” is not just a problem for government at the European level, but also for the member states themselves. The question is whether, and in what ways, this can or should be tackled at the common European level, which is likely to be resisted as a “top-down” approach infringing the principle of subsidiarity and the political autonomy of the member states.

Nevertheless, the EU has already become involved in the “top-down” democratisation of prospective new member states, by specifying political conditions for accession, supporting reforms and scrutinising the performance of their democratic institutions and administrative structures. As the CEE subjects of these efforts frequently point out, there is a certain irony in this. It would help the popular credibility of the EU if “democratization” were acknowledged as an ongoing challenge for all member states and for the EU itself, as well as for the applicant countries. Instead of a one-way, West-to-East transfer of know-how, more emphasis could be given in the process to continual mutual exchange of views and experience in democratic revitalisation and innovation at all levels of the European polity. This process could be supported and facilitated as an EU-wide initiative.

#### *7.4 Minority Rights set to climb the Future Political Agenda of the EU*

One area where the danger of double standards seems most pressing for an enlarged EU is in the field of minority rights. It will become increasingly difficult for the EU to sustain its present agnosticism on minority issues as regards its own member states in the context of widening and deepening integration. The extension of EU activity into the minority rights field would be likely to encounter stiff resistance on the part of the member states. Indeed there is a strong argument for leaving member states to devise their own minority policies, according to the principle of subsidiarity and recognising diversity as the key to effective and locally acceptable solutions. It can also be argued that minority rights are already covered by the Council of Europe and the OSCE.

Nevertheless there are several reasons why the EU should become more actively involved in minority rights. The basic principles of liberalism and democracy on which it rests need to be constantly confronted with practice, and in the light of new realities and changing circumstances if they are not to lose credibility. States - including established democracies - may evade their responsibility to engage in dialogue with minorities in the search for mutually acceptable compromises. Prevarication is likely to result in increased frustration on the part of minorities and possibly to more extremist demands. Polarisation and the adoption of entrenched positions creates a problem which becomes progressively more difficult to resolve.

So far, the EU's emphasis on minority rights in its external policy toward the new democracies has been effective in checking majority-nationalist tendencies and prompting dialogue with minorities in those states which are determined to become full EU members in due course. It would be a pity, and indeed probably premature, to relinquish this once a country is accepted for membership, on the assumption that the minority question had *ipso facto* been "solved." History has left explosive psychological residues with a long 'half-life' which will take years, even generations, to de-activate. Moreover, some new member states will bring with them internal minority issues which impinge directly on EU external policy. The neat distinction between "internal" and "external" policy, which has hitherto characterised the EU's treatment of minority rights issues, will be more difficult than ever to sustain.

Probably the most significant minority to which this applies are the Russians of the Baltic. While satisfactory progress towards ending the statelessness of the Baltic Russian minorities is a pre-condition of Estonian and Latvian membership of the EU, the acquisition of formal citizenship will not put an end to the problem of their full integration. Even if and when they have acquired Estonian or Latvian citizenship, a large proportion of Russians is likely to seek to leave the rather inhospitable, and economically difficult, environment in which they find themselves. Their destination will not be Russia, but Germany, France and other richer states

and more open societies in the EU. But many Baltic Russians have in the meanwhile opted for Russian citizenship: Estonia today has the largest colony of Russian citizens living outside Russia - some 100,000 people. In accepting Estonia and Latvia as future members, the EU will also have to shoulder the burden of this issue in its relations with Russia, which will continue to take an active interest in its citizens abroad and could well choose to extend its purview to the fate of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in general, even when EU citizens. We are driven to the conclusion that an effective external policy on minority issues will require closer coordination among the member states' policies, and more coherence between the EU's internal and external objectives.

European integration in itself can be expected to ease the traditional type of majority-minority tensions in Central and Eastern Europe connected with territorial claims, insofar as it provides a secure environment and stable borders which have hitherto been lacking in the region, and promotes economic prosperity. However, the EU's own policy of phased enlargement to the East keeps these tensions simmering.

The most serious case is undoubtedly that of the Hungarian minorities in the states neighbouring Hungary (Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine and Serbia), none of which is included with Hungary in the first wave of the eastern enlargement. The Slovak "problem" could be eased quite rapidly by accelerating accession negotiations so that Slovakia can join at the same time as Hungary.

The case of Romania is more difficult. The Romanian government since 1996 has made some important gestures towards the Hungarian minority (although key issues remain unresolved), but its progress in economic reform has been slow. EU membership seems many years off. In the meanwhile, the continued imposition of a visa regime for Romanian citizens travelling to EU member states, and Hungary's adoption of the Schengen *acquis*, mean that members of the Hungarian minority will face unprecedented obstacles in visiting Hungary, which hitherto has been relatively simple for them. The same also applies to the Hungarian minorities in Ukraine and Serbia, both states whose eventual relationship to the EU has yet to be determined.

Hungarian adoption of the Schengen *acquis* without modification could constitute a breach of its treaty commitment with Romania to maintain free cross-border contacts across frontiers for minorities. This treaty won international acclaim as a major step forward in reconciliation between the two states. It was concluded in 1996 only after long and difficult negotiations, and, moreover, under strong pressure from the EU itself. The EU and its member states could also be held to be in breach of their own international commitments (under the 1990 CSCE Copenhagen Document, the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National

or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and the Council of Europe 1995 Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities) to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities have the right to establish and maintain unimpeded contacts across frontiers with citizens of other states with whom they share common ethnic or national origin.

While the EU may not need to involve itself directly in bilateral relations between Hungary and its neighbours, it should certainly take greater account of the negative impact its own policies may have on those relations. A somewhat similar issue arises for Poland and its eastern neighbours; and in the longer term, when Romania itself is ready to begin accession negotiations, the EU will have to take a greater interest in the acutely sensitive questions of Romania's relations with Ukraine and Moldova, which are coloured by difficult national, ethnic minority, and territorial issues.

#### *7.5 Existing Immigrant Communities' Situation in Light of the Claims of National Minorities*

The question of the rights of immigrant communities is now also becoming urgent for the EU. At present there is a fundamental distinction between "internal" migrants - persons who enjoy EU citizenship and the associated rights of free movement and non-discrimination - and "external" immigrants from third countries, who do not. Some international agreements concluded between the EC and third countries such as Turkey or Morocco grant limited rights to citizens of these countries in the employment sphere, but make no provision for the cultural rights of immigrants. The rising second and third generations of settled immigrant communities are likely to be less deferential and more demanding than their parents have been when it comes to their cultural rights, and this is beginning to be recognised as an issue which must be tackled by the states in which they were born and brought up. Other third-country nationals, whether or not they have permanent resident status in their host state, do not possess rights under Community law at all. In the Italian term, they are *extracomunitari* - that is, they come from outside the European Community, but for the same reason, they also remain outside the national "community."

It will be difficult for the EU to continue to ignore the questions of immigration and the integration of third-country nationals. The distinction between "privileged" foreigners who are EU citizens, and "ordinary" foreigners who are not, is inconsistent with the EU's commitment to human rights, which in principle apply to all individuals irrespective of status. In particular, the creation of an internal market conceived as an area without frontiers would seem to imply the power for the EU to legislate on the legal status of non-EU minority groups. Yet the strong

misgivings of most member states have until now blocked any major initiatives in this area.

The entry of new members from Central and Eastern Europe will inevitably confront the richer existing member states with substantial numbers of new 'internal' migrants whose needs and rights may not be adequately met by existing EU legislation, and whose integration may require additional policy measures. There is a particularly compelling reason for the EU to concern itself directly when the rights of such migrants are, or should be, a matter of common concern to all member states. This applies in particular to the case with the Roma, who now constitute the largest pan-European transnational minority, historically present in all existing member states and now emerging throughout Central and Eastern Europe as by far the largest, most marginalised and disadvantaged minority. They have received little attention because they have lacked the resources of education, political organisation, and powerful backing from an external "mother-country." Their needs have been ignored precisely because they have not threatened international order, and prejudice against them has been equally strong in both West and East. They have been treated simply as a "social problem" and a "nuisance."

Effective progress on minority problems through dialogue and negotiation presupposes that minorities possess the resources and capacities to formulate and voice their demands effectively. Where this is not the case, and where a minority is dispersed among several member states - both of which apply to the Roma - joint action is called for, and there would appear to be a role for the EU in support of initiatives by member states and NGOs. Further development of activities in this field already begun under the PHARE programme, backed by additional resources, should be promoted.

#### *7.6 Institutional Responses and Possible Future Developments on the EU Level*

The EU has already become involved in modest ways with internal minority issues. It has played a discreet role in support of the Northern Ireland peace process through its funding for socio-economic development. On the initiative of the European Parliament, it has provided some financial support for an action programme on regional and minority languages and cultures. This initiative has, however, not been approved by the Council of Ministers, and so its existence remains somewhat precariously dependent on the outcome of the annual struggle between the EP and the Council on the EC budget. If the political will could be found in the Council, such a programme could provide the basis for a more sustained and focused approach. The Maastricht Treaty itself signalled the willingness of member states to see the EU developing cultural and educational action programmes to promote 'the flowering of the cultures of the Member states,

while respecting their national and regional diversity' (Art.128). This provides a legitimate basis for further development of EU action in support of minority cultures.

The Amsterdam Treaty's new Article 6a gives the European Community competence to "take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation." This was clearly intended to benefit immigrant communities, but there do not seem to be good reasons why the Roma, or indeed the traditional territorially-based ethnic minorities, could not also invoke its protection. We could as a result see increased resort to the Court of Justice, as well as to the European Court of Human Rights, by members of minorities.

A useful complementary institution would be the establishment of an EU Minority Rights Ombudsman, reporting annually to the European Parliament on positive experiences and promising innovations, as well as problems in all member states. The rights of individuals and minorities collectively to petition the Ombudsman, coupled with the right of the Ombudsman to make investigations and recommendations, could avert the danger of overloading the Court of Justice and promote the mediated search for consensus rather than confrontation. This would not duplicate but complement the work of the OSCE's High Commissioner for Minorities and the Council of Europe, contributing to closer coordination and strengthening the principle of equal attention to problems as they arise in all EU member states.

Regional programmes are a well-established and substantial area of EU activity. Many regional issues comprise an ethnic minority dimension, and it may well be that the general trend towards greater regional autonomy evident in most member states will be replicated among new member states. Decentralisation of the state would go a long way towards easing majority-minority tensions in Central and Eastern Europe, where these involve territorially-settled minorities. Demands for "autonomy" should seem less threatening and less isolationist when they can be satisfied by increasing self-government powers for all local communities. Decentralisation can also help in revitalising democracy and strengthening legitimacy.

EU regional development funds could therefore potentially play a role that goes well beyond the strictly economic, and could be used to support both democratisation and minority rights objectives. The EU "Interreg" regional development programme, which has supported cross-border cooperation schemes among member states, has already begun to be applied with PHARE support to similar schemes between existing and prospective new member states (notably between German, Polish and Czech border regions; another is planned between

Austria and Hungary). “Interreg” schemes have not always been easy or successful, but the schemes in Central Europe have been impeded less by traditional sensitivities than by the inadequate resources of PHARE and the CEE governments, by comparison with their EU partners. There have been regrettable problems within the Commission itself: “Interreg” and PHARE are managed by different departments, leading to bureaucratic confusion, “turf-wars” and difficulties in coordination.

It should be standard practice to include research into the indirect implications for minority rights, and if necessary additional funding, whenever new EU programmes are planned. While money is by no means the “be-all and end-all” of minority issues, the scale of the new problems both within and beyond the borders of the enlarged Union calls for increased allocation of resources specifically targeted on the minority issues.

## Chapter 8: Economic Transition, Accession and Globalisation

In the economic field, the EU's existing member states and the transition economies of Central and East Europe face the challenge of adjusting to each other, while at the same time adjusting to intense global competitive pressures. These adjustments will be costly for both sides, but the costs are unavoidable, whether the EU enlarges or not, whether it takes in only some, or all of the Central and East European associates. The costs of not enlarging, or enlarging only slowly, are likely to be higher for all concerned; while the economic benefits of enlargement could well outweigh the costs and strengthen Europe's position in the world economy, if the terms and conditions of integration are right.

### 8.1 *Adoption of the Acquis and Economic Development in Candidate States*

None of the ten associates is currently economically ready for accession in the immediate future. This has not, however, prevented the EU and its member states from deciding to go ahead with enlargement. If economics - rightly - has not been allowed to decide the argument for or against enlargement, nevertheless economics does determine the pace and methods by which it can be achieved. The CEE economies could become the new “economic tigers,” a significant dynamising factor in the European economy, to the benefit of the whole. But question marks remain in the short and medium term about the capacity of large sectors of their industry and agriculture to withstand the competitive pressures of early full integration into the European single market. Rising unemployment could well afflict the east even more severely than the west. Stagnation in living standards and depressed opportunities could prompt emigration of the most valuable, highly skilled workers. Even if the socio-economic discrepancies between existing and new EU member states diminish as a result of enlargement, regional inequalities within new member states could well increase (as experience with past enlargements has shown).

The main task is to devise an appropriate transitional strategy of phased integration of the new entrants. It is too often taken for granted that the requirements of economic transition are the same as those for EU accession, but this is not always the case. It is clear that the general prospect of accession is a powerful motivating factor for governments to press on with painful economic transition measures, and much of the *acquis* of the EU's single market is appropriate for any market economy substantially dependent on trading with the EU. Nevertheless, the *acquis* has evolved for highly developed, sophisticated market economies, not for weak, underdeveloped economies facing huge structural problems. It takes for granted the existence of a plethora of well-functioning administrative institutions capable of implementing complex regulations and monitoring compliance. Yet the institutional

and administrative frameworks are key weak points identified by the Commission's *Agenda 2000* in all transition economies (see also Grabbe, 1999).

A clear schedule of phased implementation of the *acquis* would not only bolster the political commitment of the governments of new entrants to press on with painful reforms, but would also reassure producers and workers in existing member states that the transitional arrangements are finite in duration and will lead to a genuinely 'level playing-field' in the shortest possible time. While existing member states will no doubt be ready to accept this, the temptation to exploit the possibilities of, in particular, the social and environmental *acquis* to impose high barriers on the new entrants has to be avoided. The social and environmental standards set by the *acquis* are highly valued by citizens of existing member states, but the new entrants will not be able to afford them for many years and the costs involved could divert resources in the short to medium term and set back their chances of attaining rapid growth. Thus in the longer term this would lead to higher costs for the EU as a whole. Rather than imposing excessive regulation on new member states, the EU and its existing member states would do better to reform their own regulatory frameworks to meet the challenge of global competition.

## *8.2 Financial and Administrative Requirements for Enlargement*

Unavoidably, enlargement has implications for the EU budget. To Central and East European applicants it seems obvious that enlargement cannot be successfully managed without an increased budget, but this seems far from obvious to existing member state governments. Their reluctance to increase the budget has been matched by an equally frustrating failure of political nerve when it comes to reforming the structure of the budget. Budgetary reform, long overdue, is now underway. However, the pattern of the previous enlargements, which absorbed poorer new entrants by doubling the size of structural and cohesion funds, will not be repeated. It is no doubt true that the world has changed, and that global economic realities, as well as domestic politics, no longer permit resource transfers on previous scales. It can also be argued that the results of this expenditure were quite mixed - regional disparities within the EU remain wide.

But EU budgetary transfers remain a crucial issue. For all their failings, budgetary transfers have played an important role in sustaining the momentum of integration after previous enlargements. They brought benefits not only to the poorer new entrants, which were compensated for the costs of adopting the *acquis*, but also to the richer existing members, whose problems of sectoral and regional adjustment were alleviated. The current logic of budgetary politics in the EU may throw the baby out with the bathwater. Not only enlargement but also monetary

union would appear to require a substantial pool of resources for compensatory inter-regional transfers if integration is to be managed politically and economically.

Moreover, it is now clear that the costs of reconstruction in the Balkans after the war in Kosovo will fall largely to the account of the EU and its member states. This massive human tragedy has been an object-lesson to the EU member states in the costs of failing to engage actively and in good time with the emergent crises on their doorstep. New forms of association must now urgently be found to meet the specific needs of impoverished countries facing the after-effects of war, such as Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia. While the EU will be pressed by these countries to include a commitment to eventual membership in the Union for these economies, this cannot but be a long-term prospect. More important in the meanwhile will be the fullest possible political inclusion of the Balkan associates in EU institutions and processes, for example by means of joint sessions with the Council, membership with observer or non-voting status on appropriate EU bodies such as the Parliament, and secondment of staff members to the Commission, ECB, and EIB (see CEPS, April 1999).

The EU will be directly drawn in to the programme of reconstruction in Kosovo, and has to be ready to respond to the major internal crisis which will sooner or later break out in Yugoslavia. At the same time, these heavy demands must not be allowed to deflect attention from associated countries such as Romania and Bulgaria if the central purpose of EU engagement - economic and political stabilisation of the whole south-east European region - is to be achieved.

Not only additional financial resources, but high quality and experienced administrative manpower will be needed on a much larger scale, in the Commission as much as in the accession countries. The EU is already assisting the new entrants by means of the Accession Partnerships to prepare themselves for enlargement. The accumulated expertise and practical experience of the EU in education and training, the development of active employment and labour-market policies, institution-building and administrative modernisation will now have to be deployed in the much more difficult and demanding context of Balkan reconstruction as well.

This represents an unprecedented extension of the Commission's repertoire of activities, and implies a long-term commitment to much deeper involvement in the internal affairs of the new member states and associates than has been the case hitherto been necessary. Effective management of the stabilisation and eventual integration of the EU's eastern and south-eastern neighbours calls for deeper co-operation among the existing member states themselves. The scale and complexity of the task of managing the integration of such a diverse range of economies with the EU inescapably points towards the evolution of a multi-tier Europe of "variable

geometry,” making use in new and unanticipated ways of the Amsterdam provisions for “flexibility.” The difficulties and dangers of this have been widely discussed, but there is a need for more hard thinking about the limits of differentiation, and clearer definition of the priority areas for uniformity, in the new reality of an enlarged EU with vastly expanded responsibilities for the economic stabilisation and development of the Balkan region. At the very least, this will require political efforts on the part of member states to sustain the momentum of integration and the commitment to mutual support and co-operation.

Cross-border regional co-operation will play a pivotal role in economic development across Europe. This serves to accelerate integration of the first wave new member states by promoting growth, particularly in their poorer eastern regions; and contributes to averting the danger of new barriers, and therefore new political and economic tensions between the Central and East European associates, and between them and their neighbours to the East and Southeast. In 1996, unofficial cross-border trade was estimated to account for more than 25 percent of Poland's entire trade with its eastern neighbours, and nearly 50 percent of its trade with Ukraine. EU pressure to tighten up border controls in line with the Schengen system has caused substantial economic losses to Poland and its eastern neighbours. Similar difficulties arise between other “first wave” accession countries and their neighbours. A more flexible and productive approach has to be found.

The restoration of economic links among the former Yugoslav republics and the other Balkan states will be a primary concern for the recovery of the region. Incentives to support this will need to be built in to the economic programme for the Balkans. Hungary seems now to be willing to play a more active role in economic co-operation in south-eastern Europe, and is well placed to do so by virtue of its close ties with Croatia, Yugoslavia and Romania, and its experience in political and economic reform. Slovenia could also play a useful role here. The EU's efforts in this region could be much enhanced by the knowledge and expertise available in the neighbouring Central and Eastern countries, which should be drawn in as full and active partners.

### *8.3 Migration in an Enlarged EU*

The evident economic discrepancies between East and West in Europe, combined with crisis in the Balkans, and the general context of accelerating globalisation, have combined inexorably to stimulate new and larger migratory movements across Europe, mainly - but not only - from East to West. These have evoked alarm in the West at the prospect of uncontrolled waves of immigrants flooding western labour markets and making heavy demands on public resources. Yet all the data suggest that migration flows from Central and Eastern Europe candidate countries to the

west are not huge. They will probably remain stable at their present levels, and in some respects may decline (following the pattern of previous EU enlargements to the poorer countries of southern Europe). Rather more problematic and unpredictable is increasing migration to Central and Eastern Europe from further afield, driven not only by economic motives but by political oppression, crises and the breakdown of states. Some of the issues arising from the latter are dealt with in the following section, where they concern the EU's asylum, immigration and foreign policies and its approach to border management. In this section, we confine our focus to the economic aspects of migration in Europe.

The bulk of the movement (about 85 percent) at present into the EU from the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe is made up of “trader-tourists” and “worker-tourists” taking advantage of visa-free travel to EU countries to augment low incomes and acquire extra cash to purchase western consumer durables. Some 600,000-700,000 worker-tourists make several trips each year (averaging 2.5-3.0 months) to take up temporary, undocumented employment, while about 300,000 legally employed contract workers are present in western Europe at any given time of year. The border crossings of trader-tourists, almost wholly into Germany and Austria, are much more frequent, typically ranging from a few times each month for those supplementing their regular income to multiple crossings each day by so-called “ants” who have made these buying and selling trips their main occupation. These temporary, short-term, income-seeking migrants are unlikely to pose a financial burden on EU member states. Any public welfare provisions they receive, such as medical insurance, unemployment benefits and social security, will be drawn in their home states, not in the West. They leave their families behind during their stay abroad and thus make no demands on social welfare and public education in the receiver-states.

The remainder of the migrants comprise highly-skilled, predominantly young, professional managers of successful private businesses, including those owned by East-West joint ventures and multinational companies; and scientists, academics and researchers, including students in receipt of Western fellowships, some of whom subsequently find jobs in the West that offer greater professional opportunities and much higher salaries than those available at present back home.

Western comment on this trend often focuses on the “push” factor - the search for jobs and higher incomes by Central and East European workers - while neglecting the role played by “pull” factors emanating from West European economies, and the way in which immigration serves western needs and interests. Rigid, over-regulated labour markets have created a strong demand from western firms (most notably in the construction industry) for flexible, part-time and low-wage labour. The system of quotas operated by some highly developed EU member

states, allowing for contracted foreign labour, at lower rates of pay and on less favourable conditions than native workers, has been a response to this demand, but it by no means satisfies it. Where legal means are foreclosed, firms will resort to employing undocumented labour. Complementing this is the willingness of economic migrants from the east to take such jobs, a product of what can be called the *homo sovieticus* syndrome - patterns of behaviour and attitudes learned in the communist period which can now be turned to advantage in the new economic context. These include deeply ingrained habits of beating-the-system and bending-the-rules in pursuit of one's personal goals, and traditions of relying on patronage and informal networks.

The ageing of the west European population and the corresponding decline in the working-age population contribute to labour market tensions which draw in migrant workers. A period of labour shortage in western Europe is predicted for some years early in the next century. Moreover, the growing retired population and the relatively high incidence of full-time employment of women outside the home have generated a strong demand among the west European middle classes for inexpensive and flexible personal services in caring functions in the home.

Assessment of future trends in CEE-WE migration flows have to take into account not only likely continuities and changes in the “push” and “pull” factors listed above, but also the constraints on further increases. The sudden surge of cross-border movements in the first post-communist years has not been sustained. After the dramatic period when the borders were first opened, the flow has stabilised and is likely to remain stable even after accession to full EU membership. The major economic factors - transition and “catching up” in Central and Eastern Europe, global competitive pressures and the demand for more flexible and cheaper labour in the west - will continue for some time. But trader-tourists from the candidate countries will soon become an endangered species. Several projects are already under way along Polish-German, Czech-German, Czech-Austrian and Hungarian-Austrian borderlands to turn these underdeveloped areas into micro-regions with dense commercial and service infrastructures serving the populations on both sides of the border, undercutting the business of individual trader-tourists. These developments will generate jobs and thus produce an increase in the currently small numbers of cross-border commuters, and stimulate further cross-border shopping trips in both directions. Some types of informal cross-border trade seem likely to continue, however, particularly in second-hand goods and especially cars. Intra-regional migration among the Central and East European states will grow from its present rather low level.

The constraints on further increases in migration from the candidate countries have to be taken into account. Migration is a costly and stressful option for the

individual, and only a minority are sufficiently courageous and/or desperate to take the risk of searching for work abroad, in an often far from welcoming environment. Fear of exploitative working conditions and tales of the “bad experience of others” are also powerful deterrents to many potential migrants. The high cost of housing in the West, and the lack of foreign language skills prove formidable obstacles for many. Moreover, migrants from the candidate countries face competition from third world migrants, prepared to accept even lower wages and worse conditions. As wage levels in Central Europe rise and begin to approximate more closely those in the West, the balance of the costs and benefits of emigration will change in favour of staying home.

The candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe have themselves become countries of immigration since the collapse of communism. Major flows of worker-tourists and trader-tourists from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania, are driven by economic problems at home. It is estimated that 10-14 million crossings of the CEE-EE borders occurred in 1996. As with analogous CEE-WE movements, this figure in fact refers to multiple annual crossings by a smaller number of individuals. In contrast to their CEE counterparts, these temporary migrants from further east tend to be better educated, with a rather high proportion of college graduates. The largest number of the worker-tourists, about 700-800 thousand, come to Poland each year, working for about half the wages paid to natives and in unprotected conditions. Unofficial cross-border trade has been very sizeable, as noted above, and brings benefits to both sides of the border.

In order to complete the picture on migration flows in Europe we should not neglect the growing movement eastwards from the West. By 1996, officially-registered Western residents in CEE had risen to some 120,000. About half of these are returning communist-era émigrés from the region, either permanently settling or shuttling back and forth between their home and their adopted country. The rest are western expatriates. The great majority are college-educated with professional skills, employed in multinational companies and other foreign production and service firms, international organisations and EU agencies, consultants, lawyers and academics. The numbers of such migrants can be expected to grow apace as the Central and East European countries integrate into the EU and the global economy. “Push” factors are also at work in emigration from the West, where considerable numbers of highly skilled workers have been laid off. Their expertise is, nevertheless, still much in demand in the transitional economies. Interestingly, a growing number of Western migrants are undocumented - recent Polish and Czech estimates put their numbers at 50,000 and 40,000 respectively.

#### *8.4 Public Perceptions and Migration seen in a Wider Context*

Increased migratory flows are a global phenomenon, made possible by the spread of transport and communications, spurred on by economic disparities, crises and war, demographic change, and the emergence of a global markets. Migration flows are likely to continue with or without enlargement. The key question is not so much how large these flows will be, but the extent to which restrictive measures on the part of the EU force these flows into illicit channels, with associated high costs in political, economic, social and individual human terms.

To the extent to which migration flows are driven by the complementary economic interests of individual workers in the candidate countries seeking to supplement their low incomes and western firms seeking new sources of flexible labour, there is little economic justification for suppressing this. More appropriate responses would be to promote overdue reforms of excessively rigid Western labour markets, to devise more realistic quotas and appropriate employment terms for migrant workers from candidate countries, supportive of the acceleration of economic transition and integration of the candidate countries into the EU, as argued in the previous section.

A rigid insistence on the adoption in full of the Schengen *acquis* has clear detrimental consequences for most of the CEE candidates: the restriction of cross border economic and cultural links between the CEEs and their eastern neighbours inhibits economic development in the border regions, disrupts long-established links between societies and creates new and unnecessary tensions between their governments.

The effect of driving income-seeking migrants into illegal channels is to erect another type of border in the midst of our own societies - between the included and the excluded. The enhanced global competitiveness of EU firms will be achieved at the cost of creating a marginalised, insecure, and transient migratory labour force, unintegrated into Western society and with little stake in its fundamental values and rules of operation. The impact on these migrants' home societies, and in particular on families and children left behind, should not be neglected either.

In Western Europe immigration is widely perceived as a major problem, and a considerable amount of panic and hysteria is readily whipped up over this issue by unscrupulous populist politicians and the media. These reactions pose a far greater problem to policy-makers than is warranted by the actual size of the migratory movements. Reasonable public debate on the issue has become very difficult, leading governments to retreat into short-sighted restrictive policies. The situation could to some extent be improved by a determined public education campaign, although this cannot be relied on by itself to dispel the widespread fears and misperceptions that surround the issue. These are generated by the increasing sense

of uncertainty, insecurity and angst in societies confronting the new challenges posed by globalisation and the post-communist transition in neighbouring states. A coherent and explicit policy for immigration has to be formulated, and has to be “sold” energetically to western public opinion.

Exclusion from the EU undoubtedly slows the pace of economic transformation in eastern Europe; while offering a reasonable prospect of accession within a specified time-scale on clearly defined conditions plays an important part in sustaining the commitment of governments and public opinion to reform. The unquantifiable, but deeply influential psychological impact of being recognised as rightful and respected partners in the “Grand Project” of constructing a united and free Europe is evident in all the current associates, and the same motivation can be expected to strengthen with the prospect of closer association with the EU in Albania and the former Yugoslav states.

Public opinion throughout the EU has been deeply moved by the awful spectacle of war in the Balkans, and this reservoir of generous sentiment should now be tapped by political leaders in the west. There is an opportunity to offer a “New Deal” for Europe, presenting the case for enlargement and opening up to the East and Southeast in terms of an investment in stability and prosperity for Europe as a whole. The political and economic risks of excluding these states from integration with the EU are high. Delayed or diverted reforms, slow growth, chronic high inflation, stagnant or falling living standards in the East mean high motivation for emigration. The fear of uncontrolled flows of migrants seems much more likely to be realised if states are excluded than if they are included. Industrial relocation and new foreign direct investment, taking advantage of low labour costs in the transition economies, will happen to a significant extent even if enlargement is delayed - indeed much already happened even before enlargement came onto the official agenda. However, integration into the EU provides a framework which will accelerate foreign investment in the transition economies, encourage larger and more long-term investment projects, and enhance employment prospects, trade opportunities and the global competitiveness of the European economy as a whole. Public opinion in Western Europe has to be convinced that the costs of coexisting with fragile new democracies and weak transitional economies round its borders will be felt whether the EU enlarges or not. Economic openness is an inescapable part of meeting the challenge of global competition, and enlargement and deepening co-operation with the neighbours on its eastern and southeastern borders can contribute to gearing the whole of Europe up to meet that challenge.

## Chapter 9: Managing the New Eastern Border

The evolution to date of a common regime for the management and control of the EU's external frontier has been driven by two rather different imperatives: firstly, by the logic of completing the Single Market, creating within the EU an area of free movement of persons, goods, services and capital; and secondly, by mounting alarm in the member states at the perceived prospect of uncontrolled waves of economic migrants, asylum-seekers and transnational criminal activity in the wake of the collapse of communism in the east and the Balkans.

There has been a seemingly inexorable tendency for the deepening of EU integration and the enjoyment by its citizens of the associated economic benefits and political freedoms to be pursued at the cost of creating a “Fortress Europe,” confronting the EU's neighbours and would-be future members with ever higher and more rigid barriers. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the EU to maintain a clear-cut distinction between foreign and security policy, economic cooperation, and internal affairs, yet policies are poorly coordinated under the “Pillar” system. They tend to be designed and adopted in isolation in one field, undermining aims and objectives in the others. The Commission is only now building up its internal resources and competences to deal with the issues related to the old Third Pillar. What is needed is the recombination of expertise and services hitherto provided by several different parts of the Commission in order to be able to tackle the full range of challenges. In addition, the preoccupation among the member states with the immediate internal consequences for themselves of opening up to the East too often diverts attention from the EU's broader strategic interests and responsibilities in its relations with the wider Europe.

### 9.1 *Schengen as Migration Policy by Default*

The latest phase in the evolution of the border regime is the incorporation of the Schengen *acquis* into the EU framework with the Treaty of Amsterdam. This *acquis* consists in the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Convention, together with all the decisions and rules which have been adopted by the Executive Committee of Schengen. The objective is to create an area of free movement within the EU by removing controls at the common borders of the participating states, and in compensation strengthening controls at the external border. It is here that the key functions of customs and immigration control and security are now carried out. This is accompanied by an array of “flanking” measures designed to enhance security within the Schengen area. These measures include:

- strict control of the external frontier according to common rules contained in a Schengen Manual for the External Frontier;
- the exchange of information on prohibited immigrants, wanted persons, stolen vehicles, etc.;
- enhanced police cooperation between the participating states;
- measures facilitating judicial assistance and cooperation;
- movement towards a common visa, asylum and immigration policy.

One major problem in incorporating Schengen into the Treaty has been genuine difficulty in discovering the content of the Schengen *acquis*, largely because the Schengen Executive Committee's decisions and rules were only formally published in April 1999 immediately prior to the Treaty's coming into effect on 1 May. An additional problem has been the allocation of the various parts of Schengen across the First (immigration and asylum) and Third (police and judicial cooperation) Pillars of the Treaty. The considerable legal complexity of the system is further exacerbated by the British and Irish opt-outs from Schengen, the inclusion of non-EU states, and the Danish position as a member of Schengen but opposing the communitarisation of the competences falling under the Third Pillar. Indeed, the legal complexity of the system and intricate debates about competences and the implications for the institutional balance within the EU have tended to overshadow all else, to the point where the very purpose of cooperation tends to get lost.

The debate surrounding the incorporation of Schengen into the Treaty was heavily coloured by the increasing salience in many member states' domestic politics of the issues of rising numbers of illegal immigrants and also of asylum-seekers, as well as fears for the impact on wages in some regions and sectors of the influx of cheap labour from the East. In the process, issues of immigration became confused with those of security and crime, and concern to prevent illegal immigration was allowed to override fair consideration of the genuine claims of asylum-seekers. Overall, the emphasis has been unduly placed on repressive measures at the expense of humanitarian, liberal values and adherence to international commitments and standards in the field of asylum. Moreover, the high priority given to concerns about crime and immigration has tended to crowd out consideration of the crucial role the border regime plays in external relations and its implications for the development of a common foreign and security policy (the Second Pillar). While the Amsterdam Treaty made welcome progress in transferring competences in the field of visas, immigration and asylum to the First Pillar, the emergent common border policy still suffers from the legally convoluted and obscure *acquis*, institutional fragmentation and poor coordination between all three Pillars, and an underlying conceptual incoherence. Behind these shortcomings can be detected lingering concerns in the member states about the implications of a common border policy for national sovereignty.

The progressive inclusion of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU is transforming the nature of the borders, and thus the relations between states. What had hitherto been a “hard,” external border between the EU and its Central and East European neighbours will become a “softer,” internal one; while the borders between the new member states and their neighbours to the east are already becoming “harder.” Pressure from the EU is also strong on “second wave” accession candidates, and seems likely to increase. The effects are asymmetric: the new member states gain the benefits of inclusion into the EU's “area of freedom, security and justice,” but at the price of greater exposure to economic competition and potential emigration of their brightest and best educated young people to the West, perceived threats to traditional cultures and ways of life, and increasing difficulties in sustaining political, economic and personal relations with their eastern neighbours. In the West, anxieties are evident about the relocation of industries and jobs to the lower wage economies of the prospective new eastern member states, and about the impact on western labour markets of the potential influx of workers seeking higher wages. For those left on the other side of the EU's new eastern border, the political, economic, psychological and human costs of exclusion are great, and could have destabilising effects in the region which cannot be ignored by the EU.

The obscurity and complexity of the Schengen *acquis* itself is a source of confusion for the Central and East Europeans, as are the constant and rapid changes taking place all the while without consultation with them. Without having a chance as yet to influence the evolution of the *acquis*, the Central and East European states find themselves confronted by ever higher demands on the part of the EU. Even before accession, they find themselves required to take on primary responsibility - and the associated heavy costs - of managing the EU's eastern frontier. Unlike most of the political, legal and economic reforms necessary to prepare for EU membership, which can be represented as having beneficial effects for the citizens of the candidate countries, Schengen risks being regarded as an imposed system, set up to defend the interests of existing member states and which does not take into account the specific needs and interests of the new members in maintaining their existing links with their eastern neighbours. Existing member states are adamant that no opt-outs of the sort negotiated by some existing members will be allowed; while at the same time, some member states are demanding very long transitional arrangements before the right of free movement of persons from the new entrants is implemented.

### *9.2 Managing Pressures on the New Eastern Border*

Central and Eastern Europe finds itself increasingly taking on the unwelcome role of a “buffer zone.” Traditionally countries of emigration, the Central European states

are ill equipped to cope with their new role as recipients of large numbers of refugees displaced by the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in Africa and Asia (and potentially in Russia and the FSU). They have recently become the destination of significant numbers of illegal “transit” migrants, *en route* for the West. A sizeable proportion (up to 30 percent ) arrive in organised convoys, part of the burgeoning and highly profitable business of trafficking in human beings. When detained at the border, transit migrants usually request asylum, and then disappear to await an opportunity for clandestine passage to the West. This has become a major concern of the EU, which has exerted strong pressure on the “first wave” Central European accession states to tighten up controls. While this is likely to decrease the numbers of individual transit migrants, the well-organised and resourceful illegal convoys of migrants will no doubt prove more resistant. Tighter border controls will likely only drive up the price, and thus the profits, of this criminal trade.

The Central European accession states face far greater problems in this respect do EU members. The numbers involved far outstrip the resources and capacities of these states and economies in the throes of post-communist transformation. Readmission agreements for the return of migrants who have passed into the EU via Central Europe are regarded there as an unwelcome imposition, accepted only under pressure in order not to damage their chances of EU accession. The existing member states are perceived as exploiting the candidate members' urgent interest in EU accession in order to put their own interests first, and to shuffle off the unwanted burden of migrants and refugees onto their weaker partners. This has an obvious negative impact on public estimation of the EU in the region. Moreover, it is likely to provoke the same sorts of xenophobic, anti-immigrant and anti-refugee responses long evident in many western countries, a regrettable development for these fledgling democracies.

The problems of illegal migration, and the burdens of managing sudden influxes of refugees, have to be recognised as a pan-European responsibility for which common strategies have to be found. This means close consultation between the EU, the Central and East European associates, and their neighbours to the east, rather than the EU dictating terms largely to suit itself. The current lack of a clear common EU *acquis* in the field of migration policy is a source of confusion and ineffectiveness, and the demands the EU places on applicant states are contradictory. On the one hand, the EU – quite rightly - expects high standards in the field of human rights and the treatment of refugees on the part of prospective new member states. On the other hand, material support to help the Central and East European states cope with the burden of refugees has been far from adequate. The pressures to toughen up controls and policing on the eastern borders are hard to reconcile with the EU's declared aim of promoting democratic and liberal administrative practices in Central and Eastern Europe. The provision of high-tech

equipment to improve efficiency in border control and in policing more generally has, on occasion, been driven by the commercial interests of the security industries of the member states. In practice the effect may be to enhance the technical-repressive capacities of new democratic states at the expense of human rights norms which are still only weakly embedded in their administrative structures and cultures - and which, of course, the EU professes as fundamental values. The emphasis on the technical-repressive approach may also deflect the Central and East European administrations from genuine administrative and management reform, including changing the professional mentality and practices of their staffs.

Moreover, these pressures fly in the face of the recognised need for these countries to maintain good relations with their eastern neighbours. The various forms of “special relationship” between the Central and East European candidates of the first and second accession waves, and between them and their eastern neighbours, are potentially a valuable asset in the development of the EU's external policy strategy and should be nurtured rather than undermined.

The EU needs a common immigration policy, which has been signally lacking so far: all we have is a set of non-legally-binding instruments and an *ad hoc* summation of fifteen national policies, dominated by the domestic political imperative to stop immigration. The Schengen Agreement's original aim of promoting freedom of movement has become overshadowed by the overriding concern of the member states with securing tighter controls at the external border. As a result, it has turned into an instrument of an unstated, *de facto* policy of restricting immigration, to the detriment of mutual relations and beneficial economic exchange across Europe. A more coherent, explicit immigration policy should be defined that is attuned to the needs of a comprehensive “neighbourhood policy” for the EU, coordinating the many different but interrelated aspects of eastward enlargement and taking into account the special challenges of the EU's neighbours to the South.

### *9.3 East-West Police Co-operation Marred by an Unequal Relationship*

The sudden collapse of the communist straitjacket has inevitably led not only to a wholly welcome “return to normalcy” in the dimensions of East-West population flows, but also a certain increase in criminal activities which figure large in western concerns: cross-border thieves, mainly young men who operate over longer distances and on a larger financial scale, and organised gangs of international

smugglers dealing in contraband merchandise, drugs and, increasingly, people. “Organised crime” has become something of a bugbear in the domestic politics of some member states, reflecting rather more their societies' sense of insecurity in the face of change than the actual scale of the problem. The “fortress” mentality leads to preoccupation with erecting an impermeable “hard” border to the East, and diverts attention from the broader requirements of genuinely effective border management.

Tighter and tougher policing of the borders is not an adequate approach. Professional criminals will always find ways round border controls. The problem poses a deeper and more far-reaching challenge to the administrative, judicial and policing capacities of states, and to their ability to co-operate among themselves. Thus the most effective responses will focus on building up these capacities in the new democracies, on deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation among all European states in these fields, reaching well back beyond the borders. Active engagement with the eastern neighbours is essential because their co-operation is vital to the effectiveness of any measure to reduce illegal immigration or cross-border crime.

When it comes to police cooperation with the Central and East European candidate countries, endemic problems of lack of trust and reciprocity, readiness to invoke negative cultural stereotypes, and the absence of a common EU model of policing are all too apparent. Perhaps lack of trust is only to be expected at the start given the near-total lack of previous direct personal links between the police officers of the former communist states and their counterparts in the west. Negative stereotypes, however, further impede the development of trust. A new generation of police officers, untainted by the political attitudes and habits of the communist past, is now rising. A high degree of professionalism in the criminal police forces of Central and Eastern Europe is fairly long-established. Problems of corruption and penetration of their police forces by “mafias” and organised crime certainly exist, but perceptions of the extent and depth of these problems seem to be exaggerated, and generalisations across the board about the situation in Central and Eastern Europe must at all costs be avoided. If there are problems of corruption in some countries and areas, then specific programmes to combat it are called for, backed by financial and management support from the EU.

Police cooperation is further encumbered by the diversity of models of policing across Europe, which makes it difficult at the EU level to prescribe a single model for training the CEE police forces. There is much evidence of competition between, for example, French, German and British efforts to export their own model to the candidate countries, often backed by the interests of national security industries in exporting their technology. Training schemes are the key way in which officers get to know each other personally and build mutual trust. So far, the United

States' FBI, with its Police Academy training programmes, is making far more impact than the EU. A coordinated programme of police training offered jointly by the member states' forces, with each force taking on responsibility for delivery of a specific module, a "virtual" Police Academy, could be the first step to providing a more coherent EU presence and influence. In other words, in this field as in others, managing the challenges of enlargement calls for closer and deeper coordination and cooperation among the existing member states themselves.

The lack of trust and reciprocity in the sharing of information is noticed and resented by the Central and East European police officers as symptomatic of an inherently unequal relationship, and this inhibits the development of effective operational cooperation. Such cooperation has proved hard to achieve even among existing member states. But this is a more important problem in the area of criminal investigations than in security and border policing operations. Criminal policing is probably not the priority area for cooperation in connection with EU enlargement to the east, and is likely to continue to develop and work most effectively on a bilateral basis. But there is a pressing need for joint action in the field of border control and immigration. Here, it is easier to prescribe common standards and a common code of operation at the border.

#### *9.4 Towards a Comprehensive Border Management Policy*

There has been considerable reluctance on the part of member states to consider sharing the enormous burden of costs of policing and administering the external border. Both Italy and Greece have already unsuccessfully complained at the disproportionate costs placed on them by the Schengen regime, which explicitly places full responsibility on each participant state for its own part of the border. The new eastern external border is both physically complex and demanding to police, and politically very sensitive for the whole EU, and this task is to be left largely to its economically and administratively weakest members, and even thrust upon non-members prior to their accession. There are a number of projects financed by Phare that cover certain aspects of this problem, but the sums involved are very small in relation to the full costs of policing the borders.

Examples of extensive bilateral cooperation between EU member states and Central European candidates - for example, joint patrols on the German-Polish border - are already in operation. Support for these initiatives is already available from PHARE, and could well be extended. A major innovation here would be the development of multilateral EU border patrols along the eastern (and also the southern) external border, and joint immigration and customs services with multinational staffs. The flexibility provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty present an opportunity for such innovations.

The EU's external border cannot be treated simply as a physical line on the ground to be defended solely by the apparatus of repression. The attempt to make it impermeable is doomed to ineffectiveness and can increase instability by disrupting economic and cultural ties between neighbours. The external border has an enormous impact on the states on the other side, and this consideration should be at the centre of the Union's own foreign policy objectives. A concerted and coherent approach, reaching across the Union's three pillars, is necessary to deal with many of the problems related to border management that are at present dealt with as if it were possible to stop them at the border.

The EU must search for active engagement in the problems of the world beyond its own borders, whether or not and to whatever extent it enlarges. Border management - a broader, more encompassing concept than narrowly defined control at the physical border - implies deepening cooperation with the candidate countries and the new eastern neighbours in a wide range of fields: policing and judicial affairs, economic development, education and culture, cross-border links between local and regional authorities and communities. The internal weaknesses of the pillar structure and the complexity of the institutions will need to be addressed if proper relationships are to be built with third countries bordering the enlarged Union, and with the new entrants joining the Union. New forms of co-operation at the external border need to be developed by the member states to confront the tasks which none of them can hope to handle effectively alone. Past experience suggests that such challenges are best met by "flight forward," rather than retrenchment and retreat. This requires an improved institutional framework in terms of policies, instruments, expertise and human resources, all of which require additional funding. Better coordination between the institutions of the EU, and between them and the national administrations of the member states, candidate accession states and their eastern neighbours is required.

## **Chapter 10: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations**

EU enlargement to the East has profound implications both internally and externally, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a clear distinction between the internal and external policy arenas. Until the breakdown of the Cold War division of Europe, the EU enjoyed the luxury of concentrating overwhelmingly on its own internal development and interests. The legacy of this has been a tendency toward introversion, leaving the EU ill-prepared to take on new responsibilities in the wider Europe, and persisting in pursuing its internal agenda with insufficient regard to the wider, external ramifications of its policies. The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy has only slowly moved up the list of the EU's priorities, and still shows signs of reactive improvisation rather than clear vision based on consensus and commitment on the part of the member states. Institutional innovations, such as the appointment by the Council of a High Representative for CFSP, the absorption of the WEU into the EU framework, and rearrangement of Directorates within the Commission, are indeed welcome signals of change of approach. Yet their effectiveness will depend on deeper changes in the assumptions and the pattern of interaction within the EU and its member states. All aspects of the EU's activity need to become permeated by the awareness of the new external dimension of its role in the wider Europe. In particular, the member states face further challenges to their cherished autonomy as the borders between their domestic, European and foreign policy interests become increasingly blurred.

Leadership and coherence of vision have been lacking not only in the EU, but in the member states themselves, as consensus among member states and within them has come under strain. This is the main source of the scepticism and disillusion with the EU taking hold of public opinion throughout Europe. The primary challenge today for the political elites of the member states lies the level of reaffirming the basic vision and reworking the political consensus on which effective EU action at home and abroad depends. Enlargement to the east should provide a stimulus and an opportunity to renew the sense of the EU's original mission - that of transforming the pattern of European politics on the basis of reconciliation, cooperation and integration - by injecting new meaning and urgency into it.

This presupposes that the needs and views of the applicants will be respected, that the principles of trust and reciprocity will be extended in dealings with them, and that the existing member states will show themselves as ready to adapt and change as they are asking the applicants to be. Demands placed on prospective new members should be matched with courageous new initiatives by the EU and its member states.

In internal affairs, the EU and its member states need to look beyond the narrow questions connected with reform of the existing institutional structures of the EU towards the development of new areas of common activity. We have identified the need to address the problem of the “democratic deficit” as a broad area of common concern, touching on the fundamental issue of legitimacy not only for the EU, but for its present and prospective member states. We have also discussed the need for the EU to pay more explicit attention to the issue of minority rights. Hitherto, the EU has avoided issues of this sort, leaving them to the Council of Europe. Closer cooperation with the Council of Europe, with its accumulated experience and commendable record of activities in this field, is desirable, especially when interacting with other European states who are not yet, or not likely to be, candidates for EU accession. But there is also now a case for the EU itself taking on more responsibility. Given the new prominence of political conditions for membership in the Copenhagen criteria and the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU now needs to set up credible arrangements for monitoring adherence on the part of all member states (not just applicants and new member states), as well as for constantly developing new ideas and promoting “best practice,” among its members. It is worth recalling that one of the main weaknesses of the inter-war League of Nations was the unequal position within its membership of the new Central and East European states formed at Versailles, and the defeated states, as compared with the victorious Powers, which laid down the political and human rights “rules of the club” for the former, but avoided subjected themselves to the same scrutiny.

A major role should be taken in this respect by the European Parliament, but full participation of representatives of the national parliaments of the member states and associate members is essential in order to build consensus and mutual understanding. The Commission could play a useful supporting role, particularly in organising the participation of NGOs, the academic community and other “opinion formers” in regular specialist seminars for the exchange of views and experience. A standing specialist Commission could be set up, reporting regularly to the EU Parliament, on developments - positive as well as negative - in each member state; and recommending, where appropriate, joint action under the EU framework to answer changing needs.

We have also proposed the establishment of an Ombudsman for minority rights, appointed by and reporting to the European Parliament. This proposal complements the proposal for an EU Human Rights Ombudsman put forward earlier in 1998 by the Comité des Sages formed by Judge Antonion Cassese, Mme Catherine Lalumiere, Professor Peter Leuprecht and Mrs Mary Robinson (see bibliography). An EU Minority Rights Ombudsman could work alongside the latter, and would complement, rather than duplicate the work of the OSCE High Commissioner for Minorities, whose heavy burden of work necessarily tends to

focus mainly on crisis and pre-crisis situations involving minorities. The EU Ombudsman's work would focus on monitoring implementation of specific EU standards and Treaty commitments in all member states, promoting “best practice,” and pushing forward the agenda of debate within the EU on minority rights.

A major priority and a rapidly moving area in EU policy-making has become that of immigration. The problems in this field have been a central focus of this Report, being one of the most complex and sensitive areas straddling internal and external policy, and involving cultural, economic and political dimensions. It has become clear that the EU needs to develop an immigration policy which transcends short-term interests and the exigencies of national political calendars, to be fully coordinated with the EU's broader foreign and security policy objectives.

Formulation of a common policy in this field demands political courage on the part of the leaders of the member states in a field touching closely on sensitive issues of national sovereignty. An effective EU immigration policy will require institutional changes and better coordination between the Council and many directorates of the Commission. Unavoidably it entails the commitment of new human and financial resources. Member states need to display greater readiness to share burdens and to build mutual trust and cooperation among themselves, with the applicants, and with states further to the east. The policy will also have to take into account the special needs of the EU's southern neighbours, not likely future candidates for EU membership but economically dependent on European markets and investment, with established patterns of migration to and settlement in the EU.

Immigration policy must not be seen as starting and ending at the border, and a purely restrictive approach will fail. The economic and political “push” factors for emigration from the east and the Balkans to the west are too powerful to be effectively dealt with simply by repressive policing measures. Laws and regulations aimed only at restricting East-West migration would represent a failure to confront the realities, and would be unlikely to be implemented in practice. Migration involves both “push” and “pull” factors, and can bring short and long-term benefits to both sending and receiving countries, as we have argued above. In this light, a policy option to consider would be to extend new forms of “working visas” to citizens from the transition states, and to raise progressively immigrant labour quotas to more realistic levels. The EU's own actions can often unwittingly exacerbate pressures for emigration - for example, the decline in Polish-Ukrainian cross border economic exchanges caused by the implementation of the Schengen regime at the Polish eastern border have meant income losses for the large numbers of people on both sides of the border, intensifying their motivation to move westwards.

The burden of controls at the eastern border are massive and the financial, technical and human resources cannot be left to the candidate countries to find by themselves. Police training is one important aspect of the EU's assistance to candidate countries. This effectiveness of this could be enhanced by the creation of a “virtual” Academy of Police Training by the member states to deliver modular programmes of police training. This would also contribute to building contacts and personal networks among professionals in West and East, thus promoting greater mutual confidence among police officers throughout Europe. Policing the EU's new eastern border is an obvious matter of concern to all member states, as also applies to the policing of the southern border. The Reflection Group recommends the formation of joint EU border and customs services along the external borders of the EU.



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## **APPENDIX:**

Figure 1: Changes in Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe

Figure 2: Multiple Economies enable Households to Cope

Map 1 : Territorial Minority Languages in Western Europe

Table 1 : Religious Beliefs and Behaviours

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
Table 15: Political Involvement

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Table 17: Per Capita GDP on PPP Basis


Table 18: Growth in Real GDP in CEE, the Baltic States and CIS

FIGURE 1: CHANGES IN FREEDOM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE




Sources: R.D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), p.41; Freedom House, "1998 Freedom Around the World", *Freedom Review* (1998) p.605. From R. Rose and C. Haefliger *New Democracies Barometer I: A 12-Nation, Center for the Study of Public Policy*, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1998), p.10.

FIGURE 2: MULTIPLE ECONOMIES ENABLE HOUSEHOLDS TO COPE



Source: R. Rose and C. Haerpfer *New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey*, Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1998), p.29.

MAP 1. TERRITORIAL MINORITY LANGUAGES IN WESTERN EUROPE



1. Albanian (Italy)
2. Breton (France)
3. Catalan (France, Italy, Sardinia, Spain, Catalunya, Valencia, Balearic Islands), State/regional language (Spain)
4. Corsican (France)
5. Croatian (Austria, Italy), Schools/administrative language (Austria)
6. Danish (Germany), Schools/administrative language (Belgium, France, Spain), State language (Belgium)
7. Dutch/Flemish (Belgium, France), State language (Spain)
8. Euskara/Basque (France, Spain), State/regional language (Spain)
9. Føroyaki/Farønesø (Denmark, Faroe Islands), Regional language
10. Franco-Provençal (Italy, Piedmont and Foyria), Regional language (Belgium, Italy, Switzerland), State language (Belgium and Switzerland)
11. French (Belgium, Italy, Switzerland), State language (Belgium and Switzerland)
12. Frisian-West (Netherlands), Regional language
13. Frisian-North (Germany), Schools
14. Friulan (Italy), Schools/administrative
15. Gaelic Irish (Republic of Ireland, UK, Northern Ireland), State language (Republic of Ireland)
16. Gaelic-Scotts (UK, Scotland), Schools/administrative
17. Galician/Galego (Spain)
18. German (Belgium, Liege, Denmark, Stesvig, France, Alsace, Lorraine, Italy, South Tyrol, Switzerland), State/regional language (Belgium, Switzerland), Schools/administrative (Denmark, Italy)
19. Greek (Italy)
20. Italian (Switzerland), State/regional language
21. Latin (Italy)
22. Letzeburgesch (Luxembourg), State language
23. Occitan (France, Italy, Piedmont), State/regional language
24. Romanche/Romantsch (Switzerland), State/regional language
25. Sami/Saami/Same (Finland, Norway, Sweden), Schools
26. Sardu (Italy-Sardinia)
27. Slovenian (Austria, Italy), Schools/administrative
28. Sorb (Germany), Schools/administrative
29. Swedish (Finland), State language
30. Welsh (UK-Wales), Regional language

This chart is not comprehensive; you does it exclude non territorial minorities including new minorities, migrant workers, refugees etc) or travelling peoples (Romany gypsies), September 1991

Source: Minority Rights Group *Minorities and Autonomy in Western Europe*, MRCG, London (1991)

**TABLE 1: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND BEHAVIOURS: COMPARED BY RELATIONSHIP TO EU**

<b>EU Membership</b>	<b>Original<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Later<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Applicant<sup>3</sup></b>
<b>Question:</b>			
Those who do not believe in God are unfit for public office? (% strongly agree, or agree)	8.8	17.7	8.9
It would be better if believers held public office? (% strongly agree, or agree)	16.8	22.9	16.7
R's beliefs about God. (% God really exists)	32.2	41.6	28.4
R's belief in the Devil. (% Devil definitely, or probably exists)	28.2	31.0	18.6
R's believe about Heaven. (% Yes, definitely, or probably exists)	45.8	68.5	36.4
R's belief in Hell. (% Yes, definitely, or probably exist)	28.6	44.4	24.5
R's belief in Religious Miracles. (% Yes, definitely, or probably)	49.8	63.8	43.7
Life is meaningful because God exists? (% strongly agree, or agree)	25.2	36.8	24.2
How often does R pray? (% never)	29.5	19.1	38.3
How often does R take part in church activities? (% never)	58.5	50.3	66.1
Should there be daily prayers in schools? (% Yes, definitely, or probably)	35.8	74.4	30.0
Books and films attacking religions should be banned? (% definitely, or probably prohibited)	38.2	44.3	41.9
R often attends religious services? (% never)	32.6	20.4	35.0

1. West Germany, Netherlands and Italy
2. Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Republic of Ireland, Austria
3. Hungary, Slovenia, Poland

*Source:* D. Laitin 'Culture and National Identity: the "East" and European Integration', paper commissioned for the Reflection Group, September 1998.

**TABLE 2: ROMA/GYPSY POPULATIONS THROUGHOUT EUROPE**

State	Minimum	Maximum
Albania	90,000	100,000
Austria	20,000	25,000
Belarus	10,000	15,000
Belgium	10,000	15,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina	40,000	50,000
Bulgaria	700,000	800,000
Croatia	30,000	40,000
Cyprus	500	1,000
Czech Republic	250,000	300,000
Denmark	1,500	2,000
Estonia	1,000	1,500
Finland	7,000	9,000
France	280,000	340,000
Germany	110,000	130,000
Greece	160,000	200,000
Hungary	550,000	600,000
Ireland	22,000	28,000
Italy	90,000	110,000
Latvia	2,000	3,500
Lithuania	3,000	4,000
Luxembourg	100	150
Macedonia	220,000	260,000
Moldavia	20,000	25,000
Netherlands	35,000	40,000
Norway	500	1,000
Poland	50,000	60,000
Portugal	40,000	50,000
Romania	1,800,000	2,500,000
Russia	220,000	400,000
Serbia-Montenegro	400,000	450,000
Slovakia	480,000	520,000
Slovenia	8,000	10,000
Spain	650,000	800,000
Sweden	15,000	20,000
Switzerland	30,000	35,000
Turkey	300,000	500,000
Ukraine	50,000	60,000
United Kingdom	90,000	120,000
<b>Total Europe</b> (approximately)	<b>7,000,000</b>	<b>8,500,000</b>

Source: J.P. Liegeois and N. Gheorghe, *Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority*, Minority Rights Groups Report, London (1995).

**TABLE 3: TOLERANCE TOWARD OTHERS (IN PERCENT)\***

Country	Tolerant	Mixed	Dogmatic
West Germany	45.3	37.1	17.6
Sweden	39.7	49.3	11.0
East Germany	34.9	38.1	27.0
Switzerland	31.6	43.5	24.8
Spain	23.4	43.5	33.1
Norway	21.7	45.8	32.5
Croatia	21.6	42.3	36.1
Slovenia	20.1	38.8	41.1
Finland	19.9	44.0	36.1
Australia	18.5	46.8	34.6
Bulgaria	14.5	41.7	43.9
USA	8.9	35.6	55.6
Latvia	8.3	50.2	41.5
Estonia	4.8	46.1	49.1
Yugoslavia	4.5	39.4	56.1
Poland	4.5	30.3	65.2
Belarus	4.1	34.5	61.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3.4	25.8	70.7
Russia	3.3	31.7	64.0
Ukraine	3.3	31.7	65.0
Lithuania	3.0	27.4	69.6
Armenia	2.9	29.4	67.8
Moldova	2.7	26.0	71.3
Macedonia	2.0	28.5	69.5
Georgia	0.5	21.3	78.2

\*‘Tolerance’ was measured by responses to questions on homosexuality, prostitution, abortion and divorce.

*Source:* World Values Survey, 1995-97. Cited by D. Fuchs and H-D. Klingemann, ‘National community, political culture and support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe’, paper commissioned for the Reflection Group, September 1998.

**TABLE 4: TRUST IN OTHERS (IN PERCENT)\***

Country	Most people can be trusted	One can't be too careful
Norway	64.8	35.2
Sweden	56.6	43.4
Finland	47.9	52.1
Australia	39.9	60.1
West Germany	39.9	60.1
USA	35.2	64.8
Switzerland	34.5	65.5
Yugoslavia	28.8	71.2
Ukraine	28.8	71.2
Spain	28.7	71.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	26.9	73.1
East Germany	24.3	75.7
Poland	24.3	75.7
Latvia	23.9	76.1
Bulgaria	23.7	76.3
Armenia	23.4	76.6
Russia	23.2	76.8
Belarus	23.0	77.0
Croatia	22.8	77.2
Moldova	21.8	78.2
Lithuania	21.3	78.7
Estonia	21.1	78.9
Georgia	17.2	82.8
Slovenia	15.3	84.7
Macedonia	7.5	92.5
Turkey	5.5	94.5

\*Respondents were asked: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?'

Source: World Values Survey, 1995-97. Cited by D. Fuchs and H-D. Klingemann, 'National community, political culture and support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe', paper commissioned for the Reflection Group, September 1998.

## TABLE 5: MINORITIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

### a) Statistical Note

Minority statistics constitute a great illusion. Under the appearance of scientific certainty and mathematical precision they conceal, advertently or inadvertently, a world of differing degrees and conceptions of identity, diverging definitions, and unstable classifications. The uncertain or unreliable character of minority statistics holds true even if one discounts conscious falsification by state authorities, which has not been unknown in the past. Indeed, the obstacles to a reliable count come both from above and from below.

Census categories are established by state authorities and reflect their vision of the state. Instead of documenting reality, some interwar governments introduced the amalgamated categories of Czechoslovak and Serbo-Croatian to express a nation-building project. In the post-war period, states have sometimes been creative in inventing census categories, in order to avoid problems of attribution among established groups, to weaken these groups numerically, or to promote new groupings. This is the origin of the categories of Muslims, in the ethnic sense, and of Macedonians in ex-Yugoslavia. In Romania the authorities have distinguished between Szeklers and Magyars or German and Saxons to diminish the weight of the larger groups.

Authorities may ask a variety of questions to determine minority status. The most common criterion is language, but this is often problematic. For example, the main language of most Hungarian Roma is Hungarian, and therefore the number of Roma in Hungary is grossly underestimated. Nor, is language a straightforward criterion. Some countries ask about mother tongue, which may be a distant and irrelevant fact, whereas others inquire about language of daily use (Umgangssprache), which favours the majority language wherever minorities work among majorities. Historically too, usually religious, criteria and it can count individuals who identify with a group whose language they do not know.

Assuming the most open census questionnaires, minority statistics will still contain significant variations over time. As in all other polls, respondents often provide the answer which they imagine, rightly or wrongly, the questioner expects. They may do so because they are intimidated, because they wish to discourage prying into their personal lives, or because they seek to project a particular image of themselves. Self-identification will therefore depend on circumstances, political and other. For example, it was imprudent to define oneself as German in Poland for much of the post-war era. This ceased to be the case for individuals who wished to avail themselves of the possibility of emigrating to Germany. More recently, it has become a factor of mobility even for those who wish to remain in Poland.

Such variations of identity are all the more prevalent and understandable in areas where people effectively share more than one identity, whether because of personal factors, such as mixed marriages, or political considerations, such as border alterations and regime changes. The wisest respondents to questions about minority identity may well be those unsophisticated individuals who reply: “we are from here”. (Hiesiger, Tutejsi)

### b) Statistics

Further to the points we have made above (a), the following statistics provide a range of figures.

In some cases, we are giving the minimal and maximal plausible figures. In other cases, we are leaving open the minimum or the maximum (indicated with a question mark). In those cases where a single figure is provided it should be seen as an approximation.

<b>BULGARIA</b>	Population: 8,500,000	Area: 110,000 km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Armenians	20,000 – 40,000	
Greeks	approximately 7,000	
Jews	approximately 6,000	
Macedonians	? - 200,000	
Pomaks*	approximately 200,000	
Roma	450,000 – 800,000	
Tartars	6,000 – ?	
Turks	850,000 – 1,000,000	
*Pomaks are Bulgarian-speaking Muslims		

<b>CZECH REPUBLIC</b>	Population: 10,300,000	Area: 78,000 km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Germans	50,000 – 150,000	
Hungarians	approximately 20,000	
Jews	approximately 5,000	
Poles	approximately 60,000	
Roma	? – 200,000	
Slovaks	300,000 – 500,000	

<b>ESTONIA</b>	Population: 1,600,000	Area: 45,100km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Belorussians	approximately 30,000	
Finns	approximately 18,000	
Jews	? – 5,000	
Russians	approximately 485,000	
Ukrainians	approximately 50,000	

<b>HUNGARY</b>	Population: 10,400,000	Area: 93,000 km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Armenians	? – 3,000	
Bulgarians	? – 2,000	
Croats	? – 60,000	
Germans	65,000 – 200,000	
Greeks	? – 5,000	
Jews	80,000 – 100,00	
Poles	? – 010,000	
Roma	400,000 – 800,000	
Serbs	? – 005,000	
Slovaks	30,000 – 100,000	
Slovenes	? – 5,000	

<b>LATVIA</b>	Population: 2,700,000	Area: 64,000 km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Belorussians	Approximately 120,000	
Jews	? – 25,000	
Lithuanians	approximately 35,00	
Poles	approximately 60,000	
Russians	approximately 900,000	

Ukrainians	approximately 90,000
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<b>LITHUANIA</b>	Population: 3,700,000	Area: 65,000 km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Belorussians	approximately 65,000	
Jews	5,000 – 10,000	
Poles	approximately 260,000	
Russians	approximately 350,000	
Ukrainians	approximately 45,000	

<b>POLAND</b>	Population: 39,000,000	Area: 312,000 km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Belorussians	200,000 – 400,000	
Czechs	approximately 2,000	
Germans	300,000 – 800,000	
Jews	3,000 – 10,000	
Kashubes	? – 300,000	
Lithuanians	approximately 30,000	
Roma	15,000 – 40,000	
Ruthenes (= Lemokos)	? – 30,000	
Slovaks	approximately 20,000	
Ukrainians	200,000 – 400,000	

<b>ROMANIA</b>	Population: 23,000,000	Area: 237,000 km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Armenians	2,000 – ?	
Bulgarians	30,000 – 2,000	
Croats	7,000 – ?	
Germans	approximately 100,000	
Greeks	4,000 – 20,000	
Hungarians	1,600,000 – 2,000,000	
Jews	approximately 10,000	
Poles	4,000 – 10,000	
Pomaks	25,000 – 50,000	
Russians (and Lippovans)*	40,000 – 100,000	
Roma	800,000 – 2,000,000	
Serbs	35,000 – ?	
Slovaks	20,000 – ?	
Turks (and Tartars)	25,000 – 50,000	
Ukrainians	70,000 – 250,000	
*Lippovans are Russian Old Believers long settled in the Danube delta		

<b>SLOVAKIA</b>	Population: 5,300,000	Area: 49,000 km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Czechs	approximately 60,000	
Germans	approximately 5,000	
Hungarians	560,000 – 700,000	
Poles	approximately 3,000	
Roma	250,000 – 500,000	

Ruthenes	15,000 – 30,000
Ukrainians	15,000 – 30,000

<b>SLOVENIA</b>	Population: 1,900,000	Area: 20,000 km <sup>2</sup>
Minorities:		
Albanians	approximately 3,500	
Croats	approximately 55,000	
Hungarians	approximately 8,500	
Istrians*	5,000 – ?	
Italians	approximately 3,000	
Macedonians	approximately 4,000	
Muslims	approximately 27,000	
Roma	4,000 – 10,000	
Serbs	approximately 50,000	

\* The census allows for a regional self-identification

*Source:* A. Liebich 'Ethnic Minorities and the Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement', paper commissioned for the Reflection Group, June 1998. (appendix).


**TABLE 6: FOREIGN (NON-CITIZEN) POPULATION OF SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1990 ('000s)**

Country	Foreign population	% Total population
Austria	413.4	5.3
Belgium	904.5	9.1
Denmark	160.0	3.1
Finland	26.3	0.5
France	3,607.6	6.4
Germany	5,241.8	8.2
Italy	781.1	1.4
Netherlands	692.4	4.6
Norway	143.3	3.4
Sweden	483.7	5.6
Switzerland	1,100.3	16.3
United Kingdom	1,875.0	3.3

*Source: Continuous Reporting System on Migration, Trends in International Migration, OECD, Paris, 1992. From O. Waever, et al, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, St Martin's Press, New York (1993), p. 151.*

**TABLE 7: MULTIPLE IDENTITIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: LOCAL, NATIONAL, EUROPEAN**

Q. Whith which of these do you most closely identify yourself? And second? Europe, country (names), region, city or local community, other, don't know. (% choosing 1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup>.)



	Europe	Country	Region	Local	Other	DK
Bulgaria	15	83	20	47	6	18
Czech Republic	19	72	27	69	3	8
Slovakia	20	61	28	69	8	13
Poland	17	64	39	65	5	9
Romania	18	56	44	62	1	18
Slovenia	22	63	31	48	10	27
<b>CEE mean</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>15</b>
Croatia	24	48	24	55	8	41
Yugoslavia	19	72	15	52	15	24
Belarus	18	60	20	47	10	44
Ukraine	14	61	30	55	6	34

Source: R. Rose and C. Haerpfer, *New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey*, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1998), p.23.

**TABLE 8: ETHNIC MINORITIES: A DIMINISHING THREAT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE**

Q. Do you think that ethnic groups or minorities in our country pose a big threat, some threat, a little threat or no threat to peace and security in this society?

% perceiving big or some threat				
	1993	1995	1998	Change
Slovakia	53	49	43	-10
Romania	60	33	32	-28
Bulgaria	46	36	29	-17
Czech Republic	44	14	25	-19
Hungary	26	15	19	-7
Poland	35	8	17	-18
Slovenia	13	20	10	-3
<b>CEE mean</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-15</b>
Croatia	57	42	39	-18
Ukraine	24	15	15	-9
Belarus	30	14	14	-16

*Source:* R. Rose and C. Haerpfer, Trends in Democracies and Markets: New Democracies Barometer 1991-98, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1998), p.41.

**TABLE 9: APPROVAL OF CURRENT REGIME\***

Country	1991	1993	1994	1995	1998	Change
Poland	52	56	69	76	66	14
Romania	69	68	60	60	66	-3
Bulgaria	64	55	59	66	58	-6
Czech Republic	71	71	78	77	56	-15
Hungary	57	43	51	50	53	-4
Slovenia	49	68	55	66	51	2
Slovakia	50	58	52	61	50	0
<b>CEE mean</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>-1</b>
Croatia	n.a.	42	51	44	27	-15
Belarus	n.a.	35	29	35	48	13
Ukraine	n.a.	25	24	33	22	-3

\* % giving positive rating on a scale of +100 to - 100 in response to question: 'Where on this scale would you put our current system of governing with free elections and many parties?'

Source: R. Rose and C. Haerpfer *Trends in Democracies and Markets: New Democracies Barometer 1991-98*, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1998), p.29.

**TABLE 10: SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY**

Q: If Parliament was closed down and parties abolished, would you:												
Country	New Democracies Mean	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovenia	Croatia	Yugoslavia	Belarus	Ukraine
<b>Definitely approve</b>	5	5	5	4	4	4	8	4	2	7	5	12
<b>Somewhat approve</b>	19	18	17	20	13	15	20	23	9	25	23	33
<b>Somewhat disapprove</b>	33	28	45	40	28	45	29	35	19	17	46	32
<b>Definitely disapprove</b>	42	49	34	37	55	36	44	39	69	50	26	23

Source: R. Rose and C. Haerpfer *New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey*, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1998), p.65.

**TABLE 11: OPPOSITION TO SUSPENSION OF PARLIAMENT**

	Austria	CE Mean*
Confident democrats (disapprove of suspension of parliament, and think it unlikely.)	86	74
Anxious democrats (disapprove of suspension of parliament, but think it possible.)	3	5
Hopeful authoritarians (approve of suspension of parliament, and think it possible.)	3	8
Frustrated authoritarians (approve of suspension of parliament, but think it unlikely.)	8	12

\* Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia

Source: R. Rose and C. Haerpfer *New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey*, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1998), p. 87

**TABLE 12: REACTIONS TO REGIME CHANGE**

Country	New Democracies Mean	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovenia	Croatia	Yugoslavia	Belarus	Ukraine
<b>Democrats</b>	27	38	42	31	22	49	34	31	17	9	17	6
<b>Sceptics</b>	25	19	27	22	20	21	33	26	42	29	23	12
<b>Compliant</b>	20	20	14	19	30	17	21	19	10	24	30	16
<b>Reactionary</b>	28	22	17	27	28	13	11	23	30	38	30	67

Democrats: Non-positive evaluation of old regime (Q.22) AND positive evaluation of current regime (Q.23).

Sceptics: Non-positive evaluation of old regime AND non-positive evaluation of current regime. Compliant:

Positive evaluation of old regime AND positive evaluation of current regime. Reactionary: Positive evaluation of old regime AND non-positive evaluation of current regime.

Source: R. Rose and C. Haerpfer *New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey*, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1998), p.53.

**TABLE 13: SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF OWN COUNTRY (IN PERCENT)**

Q: Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today? (1 = bad – 10 = good: here scale points 6-10)		
Country	Percent	Freedom-House-Rating
Norway	67.3	(Free)
Croatia	44.6	(Partly Free)
West Germany	40.0	(Free)
Switzerland	39.7	(Free)
East Germany	38.2	(Free)
Bulgaria	35.8	(Free)
Poland	35.5	(Free)
USA	35.2	(Free)
Finland	34.4	(Free)
Bosnia-Herzegovina	31.6	(Not Free)
Spain	30.7	(Free)
Estonia	30.0	(Free)
Australia	29.8	(Free)
Lithuania	29.0	(Free)
Slovenia	27.8	(Free)
Sweden	26.8	(Free)
Georgia	25.6	(Partly Free)
Yugoslavia	24.3	(Not Free)
Latvia	23.6	(Free)
Macedonia	21.3	(Partly Free)
Aermeia	20.5	(Partly Free)
Turkey	18.3	(Partly Free)
Moldova	13.6	(Partly Free)
Ukraine	13.4	(Partly Free)
Belarus	12.0	(Partly Free)
Russia	7.4	(Partly Free)

Source: *World Values Survey, 1995-97*. Quoted by H-D. Klingeman and D. Fuchs, 'National community, political culture and support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe', paper commissioned for the Reflection Group, September 1998.

**TABLE 14: TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS**

There are many different institutions in this country, for example, government, courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this 7-point scale, where one represents no trust and seven great trust, how great is your personal trust in each of these institutions:<sup>1</sup>

	Austria	Central Europe	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovenia
<b>Parties</b>						
Trusts	17	11	15	11	9	11
Neutral	22	24	30	22	25	18
Does not trust	61	65	55	66	66	71
<b>Courts</b>						
Trusts	53	31	25	39	30	29
Neutral	19	26	25	25	28	25
Does not trust	28	43	50	35	42	45
<b>Police</b>						
Trusts	54	32	29	35	32	34
Neutral	19	28	25	26	31	28
Does not trust	26	40	46	39	38	38
<b>Civil Servants</b>						
Trusts	31	30	27	32	28	34
Neutral	30	31	31	29	31	33
Does not trust	39	39	42	39	40	33
<b>Government</b>						
Trusts	28	24	26	25	23	21
Neutral	27	24	23	24	29	21
Does not trust	45	52	51	51	48	58
<b>Military</b>						
Trusts	32	40	31	40	53	34
Neutral	23	28	31	28	27	27
Does not trust	44	32	38	31	19	39
<b>Parliament</b>						
Trusts	31	21	15	25	25	20
Neutral	23	23	21	21	31	20
Does not trust	46	55	64	54	44	60
<b>Churches</b>						
Trusts	26	35	29	37	51	22
Neutral	16	21	27	19	21	18
Does not trust	58	44	44	44	28	60

<sup>1</sup> For clarity, those in the three highest groups, 5-7, are classified as trusting; 4 as neutral; and 1-3 as does not trust.

<b>Trade Unions</b>						
Trusts	26	24	28	15	26	25
Neutral	21	29	34	21	30	30
Does not trust	53	47	38	64	43	45
<b>Television, Radio</b>						
Trusts	31	45	47	45	45	44
Neutral	29	30	31	30	30	28
Does not trust	40	25	21	25	25	29
<b>Press, Printed Media, Newspapers</b>						
Trusts	27	44	48	42	42	42
Neutral	29	30	33	27	32	29
Does not trust	43	26	19	30	25	29
<b>Private enterprise</b>						
Trusts	44	29	34	32	21	27
Neutral	28	29	31	29	29	26
Does not trust	28	42	34	39	50	46
<b>President of this Country</b>						
Trusts	41	50	60	53	40	45
Neutral	21	22	17	20	28	22
Does not trust	38	28	23	27	32	32
<b>Prime Minister of this Country</b>						
Trusts	45	39	50	33	36	36
Neutral	19	23	23	21	29	21
Does not trust	35	38	27	46	35	43
<b>Most people you meet</b>						
Trusts	77	52	55	52	52	50
Neutral	10	32	32	30	33	32
Does not trust	13	16	12	18	15	18

Source: R. Rose and C. Haerpfner *New Democracies Barometer V:A 12-Nation Survey*, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1998), pp.92-93.

**TABLE 15: POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT\* (IN PERCENT)**

Country	High	Medium	Low
West Germany	35.2	53.4	11.5
East Germany	33.5	54.5	12.0
Norway	25.7	61.1	13.2
Armenia	24.6	45.3	30.1
Sweden	22.6	58.4	19.0
Australia	21.9	50.7	27.4
USA	21.3	53.7	24.9
Belarus	17.9	53.8	28.3
Estonia	17.4	53.4	29.1
Georgia	15.3	46.8	37.9
Latvia	14.8	59.6	25.7
Turkey	14.5	53.7	31.8
Switzerland	14.2	48.8	36.9
Lithuania	13.2	54.2	32.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	13.2	59.6	27.3
Spain	12.6	37.0	50.4
Ukraine	12.6	49.7	37.7
Russia	12.4	50.4	37.2
Bulgaria	10.7	54.1	35.2
Poland	9.8	48.4	42.5
Croatia	9.7	55.3	35.0
Finland	9.6	54.3	36.2
Macedonia	9.1	53.5	37.4
Yugoslavia	8.6	47.0	44.4
Moldova	7.7	52.3	40.0
Slovenia	7.6	59.7	32.7

\*“Political involvement” was measured by: interest in politics and willingness to take part in lawful demonstrations.

Source: *World Values Survey 1995-97*. Cited by H-D. Klingeman and D. Fuchs, ‘National community, political culture and support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe’, paper commissioned by the Reflection Group, September 1998.

**TABLE 16: CONCEPTION OF THE STATE (IN PERCENT)**

Country	Libertarian	Undecided	Paternalistic
Switzerland	62.3	33.6	4.1
USA	56.9	40.0	3.0
Sweden	41.8	54.3	3.8
Australia	36.9	56.0	7.2
West Germany	29.9	63.8	6.3
Finland	26.7	66.9	6.3
Norway	21.9	71.0	7.1
Turkey	21.4	61.8	16.7
Poland	20.3	47.9	31.7
Slovenia	18.0	63.3	18.7
Lithuania	17.3	59.7	23.0
Macedonia	15.7	62.1	22.2
Bulgaria	14.2	61.3	24.5
Croatia	13.2	75.6	11.3
Spain	10.9	68.7	20.4
East Germany	10.9	62.8	26.2
Latvia	10.8	58.5	30.7
Yugoslavia	10.7	56.6	32.7
Georgia	10.0	52.3	37.7
Belarus	9.9	48.6	41.5
Ukraine	9.9	47.8	42.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	9.7	70.8	19.5
Estonia	9.3	55.3	35.4
Armenia	8.8	47.0	44.2
Moldova	7.2	38.5	54.3
Russia	6.8	43.7	49.5

Source: *World Values Survey 1995-97*, Cited by H-D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, 'National Community, political culture and support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe', paper commissioned for the Reflection Group, September 1998.

**TABLE 17: PER CAPITA GDP ON PURCHASING POWER PARITY BASIS (1995)**

	% EU average	ECU per captia
EU average	100	17,260
<b>EU member states</b>		
Luxembourg	169	29,140
Denmark	116	19,960
Germany	110	19,070
France	107	18,520
Italy	103	17,770
UK	96	16,580
Spain	77	13,230
Portugal	67	11,620
Greece	66	11,320
<b>CEE Group 1</b>		
Slovenia	59	10,110
Czech Republic	55	9,410
Hungary	37	6,310
Poland	31	5,320
Estonia	23	3,920
<b>CEE Group 2</b>		
Slovakia	41	7,120
Lithuania	24	4,130
Bulgaria	24	4,210
Romania	23	4,060
Latvia	18	3,160

*Source: Agenda 2000*

TABLE 18: GROWTH IN REAL GDP IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, THE BALTIC STATES AND THE CIS

Country	1992 (percent change )	1993 (percent change )	1994 (percent change )	1995 (percent change )	1996 (percent change )	1997 (percent change )	1998 (percent change )	Estimated level of real GDP in 1997 (1989= 100)	Projected level of real GDP in 1998 (1989=100)
Albania	-7.2	9.6	9.4	8.9	9.1	-7.0	9.0	80	87
Bulgaria	-7.3	-1.5	1.8	2.1	-10.9	-6.9	4.0	63	66
Croatia	-11.7	-8.0	5.9	6.8	6.0	6.5	4.2	76	79
Czech Rep.	-3.3	0.6	3.2	6.4	3.9	1.0	-1.0	98	97
Estonia	-14.2	-9.0	-2.0	4.3	4.0	11.4	5.0	73	77
FYR Macedonia	-21.1	-9.1	-1.8	-1.2	0.8	1.5	5.0	56	59
Hungary	-3.1	-0.6	2.9	1.5	1.3	4.4	4.6	90	95
Latvia	-34.9	-14.9	0.6	-0.8	3.3	6.5	4.0	56	58
Lithuania	-21.3	-16.2	-9.8	3.3	4.7	5.7	3.0	61	63
Poland	2.6	3.8	5.2	7.0	6.1	6.9	5.2	112	118
Romania	-8.7	1.5	3.9	7.1	4.1	-6.6	-5.0	82	78
Slovak Republic	-6.5	-3.7	4.9	6.9	6.6	6.5	5.0	95	100
Slovenia	-5.5	2.8	5.3	4.1	3.1	3.8	4.0	99	103
<b>Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States*</b>	<b>-3.8</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>99</b>

\*Estimates for real GDP represents weighted averages for Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and the Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The weights used were EBRD estimates of nominal dollar-GDP lagged by one year.

Source: EBRD *Transition Report 1998*, London (1998), p.50

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