Understanding Collective Security in the 21st century: A Critical Study of UN Peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia

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Abstract

This thesis is motivated by the puzzle that while the practice of collective security continues to grow and expand with more and bigger peacekeeping operations, the system is struggling increasingly to address the threats and stabilize the global world. Thus to find out more about the justificatory background of the reinvention of collective security after the end of the Cold War, an in-depth critical analysis is conducted of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent peacebuilding missions. Question are asked about whether in fact the problems of multidimensional peacekeeping are limited to bureaucratic and technical flaws that can be corrected through institutional and instrumental adjustments, or if they also relate to more fundamental normative problems of collective security in a global world.

As such, the thesis has two main trajectories: collective human security and multidimensional peacekeeping. On the one hand, it addresses the relationship between security and world order, and on the other, the correlation between peace and collective security. By bringing security and peace studies together within a critical analytical framework that aims to inform theory through practice, divides between the discourse and the system of collective security are highlighted and connected with the practical problems of multidimensional peacekeeping and collective security in a global world.

Three main sets of findings are made that indicate that multidimensional peacekeeping amounts to an institutionalization of internal conflicts that requires a practice of peace-as-global-governance that the UN is neither technically let alone normatively equipped to carry out. First, the policies of multidimensional peacekeeping have perverse consequences in practice whereby peacekeeping comes at the expense of peacebuilding. Second, in order to terminate multidimensional peacekeeping successfully, the UN is forced to compromise the initial aims of the operations to accommodate practice. Third, the aim of multidimensional peacekeeping is in the doing or in the ritual, rather than in the end result.

Against this background, the argument is made that there are conceptual incoherencies between the practice and the system of collective security, which assumes that collective security is a sphere of influence in its own right that can tackle delicate normative dilemmas, both making and enforcing decisions about which processes and needs should be upheld and satisfied at the cost of others.
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Abbreviations

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
Close air support (CAS)
Commission on Human Security (CHS)
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Consultative Task Force (CTF) in BiH
Correlates of War Project (COW)
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)
European Community (EC)
European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM)
European Union (EU)
European Union Common Foreign and Social Policy (CFSP)
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH
European Union Stabilisation and Association Process (SaP)
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (HR)
Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDG)
Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) in BiH
International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC)
International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY)
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
Multinational Military Implementation Force (IFOR) in BiH
New World Order (NWO)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Office of the High Representative (OHR)
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Peace Implementation Council (PIC)
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)
Reform Process Monitoring (RPM) in BiH
Republika Srpska (RS)
Serbian Democratic Party (SDA)
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in BiH
United Nations (UN)
UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG) in Croatia
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO)
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East (UNEF I)
United Nations Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in BiH
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
United Nations Organizations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
United Nations Peace Force (UNPF)
United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters (UNPF-HQ)
United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices (PKBP)
United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PKBPS)
United Nations Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (PETD)
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)
United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA)
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the former Yugoslavia
United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG)
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)
United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East (UNTSO)
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
Yugoslav National Army (JNA)
Zone of Separation (ZOS)
Acknowledgements

This thesis is far from only one person’s making over the last four years. It began as a general curiosity about how the world works and why we insist on fighting with each other, which over the course of numerous lectures and seminars at the University of Kent, especially with Professor A. J. R. Groom and Mervyn Frost, developed into a slightly more focused interest in foreign policy and international organizations. Eventually I came to write an MPhil thesis on UN peacekeeping and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) with the support of Professor Samy Cohen at Sciences Po Paris. But it was not until two years later, after having worked side by side with Dr. Jean-Marc Coicaud at the United Nations University Office to the United Nations (UN) in New York, that I decided to pursue a PhD after all. I wanted to bring attention to a disconnect between academia and the real world and its costly consequences, but also consider how this state of affairs could be remedied. I was lucky enough to be accepted to the European University Institute (EUI) to pursue my idealistic ambition under the supervision of Professor Friedrich V. Kratochwil.

There are several people without whom I would never have been able to finish this thesis for different reasons. First of all, in hindsight I realize that the piece of advice for which I am probably most grateful is the one that Jean-Marc gave me already back in New York. He told me ‘Jibecke, everyone is smart enough to do a PhD, but very few people are strong enough’. And indeed, the further I got into writing my thesis, the more these words made sense and helped me push on, and while I am not sure that I have become much smarter, I know for sure that I have become stronger. On that note, it goes without saying that I owe a great big thank you to my supervisor Friedrich V. Kratochwil. Without his support, guidance and subtle but genuine encouragements and sincere support, and most importantly, without his criticism, I would have never been able to translate my curiosity into somewhat comprehensive ideas for thought called research. From the EUI, I am also grateful for the guidance and encouragement that I received from Professor Pascal Vennesson, Professor Christine Chwaszcza and Professor Michael Keating. I am equally grateful for the interest that my two external jury members, Professor Ramesh Thakur, the University of Waterloo, and Professor Lene Hansen, the University of Copenhagen, have been willing to take in my ideas. Their comments and advice have allowed me to improve...
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I have not always been the nicest of person to those who are dearest to me during these last four years, and for that I wish to apologize. I thank all you lovely people who are still my friends for having waited for me on the other side. However, I have to warn you all, because it seems as if there might just be a few more questions that I have yet to try my very best to answer.
Introduction. The Reinvention of Collective Security for a Global World

The transition from the Cold War to the global world order has been neither smooth nor natural. While open wars have steadily decreased, there has been a rapid emergence of complex security challenges beyond military aggressions that span the entire globe. The international community has become wary of an international security agenda that may undermine states’ sovereignty, violate human rights and destabilize the world at any given time. The United Nations (UN) is struggling to come to terms with the unprecedented importance that this grants the Organization. The difficulties of managing the unpredictability and providing a sense of order in this fluid and rapidly moving global world are particularly clear in the context of peacekeeping. More, bigger and increasingly encompassing multidimensional operations are deployed without clear strategic directions, integrated responses or viable exit strategies. The operations institutionalize rather than solve conflicts, stretching the UN’s limited resources thin without necessarily implementing the mandates. As a result, the gaps between the Organization’s apparent authority and its actual power, and between promises and performance, appear to be greater than ever before. Some have even spoken about a ‘crisis of expectations’ and of ‘contradictory expectations’, causing a world disillusionment with the UN, and UN turmoil.1 The destabilizing effects that this state of affairs has on the world, and the implications that it has for international legitimacy, cannot be ignored.

Both international leaders and scholars have compared the significance of the end of the Cold War for collective security to the end of the two World Wars.2 As power was diffused, collective security was released from the superpower rivalries. The international institutions were no longer bound to the alliance patterns. It was described as an unprecedented window of opportunity for collective security to reinvent itself, in order to once and for all make dialogue the only viable and beneficial means of interaction; “the end

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of a great-power conflict has caused policy makers and scholars to take collective security seriously”.

The world was seen to have grown both closer together and increasingly interdependent, with international relations internalizing and states’ internal affairs externalizing. But as collective security was no longer reliant on peace between states but also on peace within and across states, most of the traditional international institutions became obsolete. Hence in 1991, then UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, reported to the General Assembly that collective security was at “a unique juxtaposition of promise and peril”, where promise was expansive but peril only partially perceived. It was a confusing time. The UN turned inwards to concretize what the new global world order meant for collective security, and how the international institutions and structures could be adapted. Threats were redefined as processes that could undermine states’ liberal-democratic nature, and were often referred to as risks so as to underline their constant yet contingent nature. UN Member States agreed that a global world calls for reform to enhance international cooperation, extend the shared responsibilities and institutionalize a more proactive sophisticated practice.

In 2005, the UNSG presented a ‘vision of collective security’, which was subsequently embraced by UN Member States. The vision outlines a wide and deep notion of human security, including a peacebuilding norm, together with a number of new institutions and structures that aim to ensure the UN’s internal cooperation as well as the external coherence of the Organization’s efforts. Based on the notion of legacy, the UN becomes involved in processes and relations that play out within its Member States, taking the lead in an expanding practice of peace-as-global-governance. International institutions have been established to uphold international rules and norms, human rights and individual freedoms through wider and deeper multidimensional peacekeeping. Just as liberalization is expected to lead to democratization, humanitarian aid is expected to lead to peacekeeping, and democratization to peacebuilding. In other words, it is assumed that peacekeeping will

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3 Ibid., p. 213.
7 For more about the ‘vision of collective security’, see In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 March 2005 (A/59/2005), especially paragraphs 74-86.
lead to self-sustainable peace processes between, within and across states. Unfortunately, however, practice suggests that the collective security discourse is overestimating the stabilizing effects of negotiated peace agreements and UN multidimensional peacekeeping under the current collective security arrangements.

In the last decade, more international agreements regarding internal conflicts and international transitional administrations with executive authority over post-conflict states have been made than ever before. But efforts to actually end and prevent open wars and implement processes of political and economic liberalization have required forceful military interventions followed by intrusive practices that have proven to undermine democratization and peacebuilding, not to mention the legitimacy of collective security overall. The UN has repeatedly been forced to compromise its objectives to match the little success that has actually been achieved in practice. Conclusions about the successful termination of operations are made based on complex exit strategies that transfer unfulfilled responsibilities to other external actors that remain on the ground. Not only are international transitional administrations made almost permanent but they also tend to become more powerful after the operations end. This suggests that instead of strengthening the post-conflict states from within, the multidimensional operations are feeding an international culture of dependency in which the internal stability of weak states is increasingly dependent on external assistance. Thus there is a clash between the short- and long-term aims of multidimensional peacekeeping, and a gap between the UN’s authority and power to act, as well as between the collective security discourse and the actual global world order. With peacekeeping in a catch-22 in which operations may stabilize weak states at the cost of state sovereignty and unfulfilled expectations, the UN is struggling to stabilize the global world. Collective security

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9 It is often the case that military enforcement is outsourced to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), election observation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and increasingly also administrative tasks to the European Union (EU). The transitional administrations are often set up outside the UN framework, but with the blessing of the Security Council. This can be a way for the Organization to avoid the actions of previous peacekeeping operations in undermining the success of the international transitional administrations. This was, for example, the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the failures to prevent genocide in Srebrenica and elsewhere, the UN chose to outsource the responsibility of overall peace implementation to an Office of the High Representative, which was established by and answered to the United Nations Security Council.
is increasingly sidestepped by powerful coalitions of the willing that insist on enforcing their own peace around the world through their own multilateral arrangements.\footnote{David Kennedy, \textit{The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism} (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004).}

The fact that multidimensional operations continue to multiply and expand despite our awareness of their limitations suggests that peacekeeping success is not only about mandate implementation. Rather it is also about processes that ensure the international community of its common aspiration for a certain world order in which war and violent conflict is unlawful, and its mutual commitment to collectively promote peace and provide collective security. In other words, collective security is just as much about \textit{trying} to do something as it is about the actual end result. But for such a practice to have stabilizing effects in the global world, UN Member States have to be willing to face the implicit choices or trade-offs—the dilemmas—that this implies. The international community has to agree on two series of questions: if, how and when to compromise the traditional organizing principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention; and what regulatory, structural and institutional changes have to be made in order to allow the UN to act in the same normative context in which the vision of collective security persists? Thus, the problems of multidimensional peacekeeping are not only technical or instrumental, but they also relate to a large political puzzle of normative preferences that comes with the reinvention of collective security and a practice of ‘peace-as-global-governance’, a puzzle of multilateralism and a world order organized for human solidarity. The puzzle, which the UN and its Member States began building long before the end of the Cold War, amounts to connecting strategic, security and welfare interests.\footnote{See Donald Steinberg, ‘Tackling State Fragility: The New World of Peacebuilding’, Keynote of the Deputy President of the International Crisis Group to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference on Peacebuilding, London, 1 February 2010; Martha Finnemore, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’, in Peter J. Katzenstein, \textit{The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics} (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 153-185; and Desmond McNeil and Asunción Lera St. Clair, \textit{Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights: The Role of Multilateral Organisations} (New York, Routledge, 2009).} A puzzle, which I set out to analyze.

Against this background, I argue that the UN is expected to carry out practices of human security within a system of collective security that is still organized by the traditional principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, and that this causes not only unfulfilled expectations and disagreements, but also instability and self-perpetuating policies with costly consequences for practice. I do not deny the success of UN peacekeeping whereby the number of operations and negotiated peace agreements have continued to grow while the
number of inter-state and civil wars have declined. Nor do I argue for a particular system or particular practices of collective security. Because, in the words of Arnold Wolfers, “[f]ar be it from a political scientist to claim any particular competence in deciding what efforts for national security are or are not morally justified. What he can contribute here is to point to the ambiguities of any general normative demand that security be bought at whatever price it may cost”. I merely point out that the discursive developments are giving rise to changes in practice which are having destabilizing effects that are largely overlooked by both the international policy-making community and international security and peace studies. Informing theory through practice, I highlight implicit choices, prioritizations, and trade-offs that come with the ‘vision of collective security’ for the global world, including broad generalizations about multidimensional peacekeeping, and identify what they can mean for practice in terms of an international institutionalization of internal conflicts. All in all, I conduct a critical analysis along two main trajectories that intersect at the reinvention of collective security for the global world, namely human security and multidimensional peacekeeping. On the one hand I trace the relationship between security and world order, and on the other I analyze the correlation between peace and collective security. But most importantly, I connect the two.

Collective security: an international discourse and framework for a universal peace project
Collective security is most commonly attributed to the European modern state-system, and the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648, perceived as the result of, one the one hand, “a pressing reality […] that has tied all the peoples of the earth together in an unprecedented intimacy of contact, interdependence of welfare, and mutuality of vulnerability”14, and on the other, a liberal move to rationalize conflicting normative demands in material as opposed to religious or ideological terms. As such, collective security is both “a functional response to the complexities of the modern state system, an organic development rooted in the realities of the system rather than an optional experiment fastened upon it”15, and an ideal or

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15 Ibid., p. 6.
humanity’s collective aspiration and moral indignation to peace understood as a procedural norm for collective wellbeing and human betterment through multilateral forums. Either way, it in practice represents the evolution of an international community based on the codification of the principles of non-intervention and a reasoned discourse on the definition of threats, and is predominantly analyzed as international, rule and standard-making procedures, or the processes of international organizations. The holistic as opposed to ad hoc nature of the commitment to outlaw war and rule state relations by reason, makes it different from traditional collaborationist policy-making and multi-lateral action for self-defense whereby states join forces to protect their national interest against a specific offender.

Based on the assumption that war is inherent to human co-existence, collective security is primarily to maintain peace by continuously reaffirming states of their mutual commitment to both the idea and a framework for non-coercive international interaction—that is, multilateralism and international organizations. By agreeing on what constitutes legitimate behavior and on certain common institutional arrangements, states form an international community that is committed to defending any member from any aggression and any aggressor, allies and friends included, at all times. To replace the balance of power with a common authority, states renounce the unilateral use of force or the ‘going it alone’ policies, and commit to ‘going it with others’ policies equal in rights, only using force on behalf of and directed by the collective. Shared understandings are established, and then institutionalized in organizational structures and procedures, to preserve the common discourse and unite the members in action. Whatever their relationship to the issues at stake, the states commit to making available the necessary resources for translating the discourse into practice. Although it is the states that make the decisions and that enforce them, it is all those who live by and contribute to the international community that constitute the actors of collective security.

A distinction is often made between judicial and political collective security, between the institutional legal frameworks for the allocation of international values, the upholding of rights and enforcement of obligations, and states’ ideological commitment to a collective legitimization of international policies and authoritative prescriptions. Whereas theories of judicial collective security focus on the application of those shared understandings and norms to particular situations, theories of political collective security predominantly map shared understandings and norms. As such, collective security is analyzed either as agreements to partially centralize security arrangements in an international forum, or as an expression of states’ rejection of the laissez-faire approach to security and their unrestrained practice of power politics and competitive alliances’ formations. This is somewhat problematic because, in the real world, the two closely overlap and are of equal importance without, however, necessarily being mutually reinforcing. The result, as Inis Claude pointed out almost half a century ago, is that collective security is either reduced to a passive political function described as that of a theater stage on which actors perform, or the judicial role of collective security is exaggerated in analogies of the governmental apparatus in zero-sum games with states. In both instances, an important part of collective security is neglected in terms of the relationship between the discourse and its implementation, which makes for conclusions that suffer from a “problem of educated expectations” with destabilizing effects for the world. Therefore an analysis of collective security must examine both political and judicial collective security, and more importantly must connect the two to study the balance between legality and legitimacy.


While the goal of collective security is to rationalize human behavior and interaction, like any other policy-making activity, collective security cannot escape the normative dilemma of prioritizing some values over others and therefore also, sacrificing some values for others. It evolves around normative questions or demands about inclusion and exclusion, about the divided perceptions of the self and the other, and about the relationship between individual and collective conceptions of security. To make these political decisions about how to organize societies, collective security establishes norms that confer legitimacy, mediate power relationships, and accomplish political change. States and their peoples are encouraged to pursue certain goals for collective welfare, challenge assertions that might bring about inequalities, and justify their actions. It is a commitment to, and aspiration for, the ideal security policy “which would lead to a distribution of values so satisfactory to all nations that the intention to attack and with it the problem of security would be minimized”. This makes for a wide and deep notion of collective security that I suggest is analyzed through the common aspirations and the mutual commitments that are constantly redefined and occasionally transcribed to practice. In other words, it is about bringing to the fore, discussing and clarifying questions to which there are, and cannot, be any ‘right’ answer only heuristics.

Situated at the intersection of law, politics and norms, I understand collective security as both common ideas and understandings, and as a framework for the implementation of those. But I also understand collective security as a practice in terms of allocating authority and an international legitimization. It takes the shape of a discourse which serves as the justificatory background for states actions, and interactions, all three of which are equally important. Rules, norms, laws and other shared institutions are established to provide a form and a forum in which, states come together to collectively draw the lines.


for: what values and therefore also who deserves protection where and when; what level or standard of protection do these deserve; and with what means should they be protected.\(^{24}\)

The aim of collective security as I see is to minimize the unknowns by specifying the procedural norms of deliberation and reflection that should be followed and the factors that the international community should take into account in order to rule the world by substantive reasoning. By regulating, facilitating, maintaining and even enforcing a common discourse on what constitutes threats and ‘the security from what’ question, states aim to avoid clashes of ideas or conceptions of peace and security that contest each other through what amounts to a global stabilization project. Thus my definition of collective security is procedural and it has to be discovered and systematized before it can be analyzed. More specifically, my analysis of collective security is about identifying types of stabilization processes, and considering their coherence in various contexts and under different circumstances.

*The United Nations: the organization and peacekeeping*

Following the First World War, US President Woodrow Wilson pushed for the establishment of the League of Nations, binding states together to solve their disputes through a rationalistic and legalistic approach. As a result, in 1919, 44 states made a contract among themselves for collective security, granting the international organization the authority to coordinate, institutionalize and implement multilateral policy-making while holding on to the enforcing powers that would give the organization attributes of an international government. However, as the US never became an official member, the idea was perhaps global but the system was largely confined to Europe and did little to enforce its agreements in practice.\(^{25}\) During the Second World War, the League was redefined and

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\(^{25}\) The Covenant was initially signed by 44 states. However, the founding members are often counted to be 42, with an additional 6 joining the founding year, and another 15 throughout the existence of the League. When it dissolved in 1945, however, only 23 (or 24 if you include Free France) members remained. The US was never officially a member. See F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: its Life and Time* (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1986). For more about US President Woodrow Wilson’s support, see Woodrow Wilson, ‘A Final Statement in Support of the League of Nations’, delivered in Pueblo, CO, 25 September 1919, [http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/wilsonleagueofnations.htm](http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/wilsonleagueofnations.htm) (accessed 2 April 2007).
finally replaced by the United Nations in 1945. Fifty-one of the most powerful states, including the US, signed the UN Charter, collectively proclaiming their united aspiration for peace and their common commitment to an international community ordered by human rights and international law for progress and human welfare. Thus, while the League did not outlive the Great Wars as a system, the idea of collectively promoting peace in the world by outlawing war did. In other words, the discourse was perhaps a functional failure but the framework was a normative success.

In the years that followed, the United Nations General Assembly was set up to discuss the world’s problems, resolve disputes and articulate norms; the UN Security Council was created to make decisions about the enforcement of those international agreements and norms; and a Secretary-General was appointed together with a Secretariat and specialized agencies to facilitate, coordinate, oversee and also lead the practical implementation of those international agreements, norms and decisions. The system was clearly distinguished from its ancestor by the fact that it was made for the purpose of not only negotiating but also enforcing peace in case any one of the Member States suffered an external attack. In 1950, the UN Security Council for the first time authorized some of its Member States to act against North Korea as a result of its attack on its southern neighbor. But as the true ‘collective’ character of this intervention and its actual purpose and beneficiaries came under much scrutiny in the years that followed, the practice of peace enforcement was soon reduced to keeping peace by peaceful means, with the consent of the Member States concerned. However, the UN was still able to replace power politics by international law enforcement and communal police action to the extent that the organization remained the unquestioned principal provider of collective security throughout the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War was quite overwhelming for the UN. Almost overnight, the Organization was expected to have evolved into a truly global institution that with a near enough authentic voice of humanity, could approximate uncertainty at all levels and spheres

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26 The Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 by the representatives of 50 countries, soon to be joined by Poland, which although it was not represented at the Conference, later became one of the original 51 Member States. Charter of the United Nations (New York, United Nations, 1945). For more about the set-up and practice of the UN and the Security Council, see Basic Facts About the United Nations, updated ed. (New York, the United Nations, 2004); and An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, A/47/277-S/24111 (New York, United Nations, 17 June 1992); and Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006).

of human life. Thus, in 2003, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) commissioned a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to help address “the burning question of the new century”, namely, the ‘security from what’ question. The Panel presented its Report the following year and UN Member States embraced it in 2005. The wide range of global threats has been divided into two main categories: (i) man-made transnational and multidimensional threats that go deeper and beyond states’ external relations and processes, and (ii) unconventional or asymmetrical threats directed against the Achilles’ heel of the strong, which are as such ambiguous in both time and place. All together, the international community has agreed on a wide and deep international security agenda, populated by inter-and intra-state war, local and transnational terrorist activity, a range of less physically violent actions that deprive persons of goods and commodities, as well as issues related to natural resources and the environment—a fluid and uncertain agenda that includes both intentional and non-intentional risks.

While the UN Charter has hardly been amended since its initial signing in 1945, the Organization’s regulatory and structural set-up as well as its institutional architecture have changed considerably. The wars that the peoples are determined to save succeeding generations from are no longer limited to traditional violence between states, and a peaceful state is not defined exclusively by its external relations but also by its internal liberal-democratic nature. The aspiration for peace has widened and deepened, the collective responsibility to prevent mass atrocities against people has been elevated to the same level as preventing states from carrying out armed aggressions against each other. The common space shared by the states is stretched to a global amorphous social realm that cuts beyond and across the traditional national-international dichotomy. The realm both constitutes and transcends states in the sense that it constructs and maintains a complex array of interactions.

29 There have been only five amendments to the UN Charter since 1945, all in relation to the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. However, international law has made important progress, especially in terms of international customary law, towards the ends of collective security. For more information about the UN and international law, see Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, 3rd rev. ed. (Leiden, Boston, Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005). For a discussion of customary international law, see Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also Charter of the United Nations (New York, United Nations, 1945), and An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, A/47/277-S/24111 (New York, United Nations, 17 June 1992).
and relations, as well as a variety of institutions and structures, between and across states and non-state actors.\textsuperscript{31} As the UN is making important decisions about the legitimate use of force and the progressive advancement of human rights across states, and turning agreements on ideas about global welfare into international public policy, the collective security discourse has become a separate sphere of influence in its own right.\textsuperscript{32}

With the UN evolving into the framework that coordinates and implements the rules of the global world’s governing networks, the regulatory, structural and institutional changes which this implies have put UN peacekeeping and the encompassing practice of peace settlements and ambitious multidimensional operations, at the core of collective security and the stabilization of the global world. First, the regulatory changes have opened up the locus of authority to the multidimensional operations themselves. Transcribing and implementing an intense agenda of international public policy in practice, UN peacekeepers have become an important body of international civil servants that is both a part of and separate from its Member States. Second, as the goal of peacekeeping is no longer exclusively to help specific states to protect peoples but also to empower peoples to protect themselves against their states, the structural changes have given the peacekeeping operations a dual responsibility towards the states on the one hand, and the peoples, seen as individuals or humans as opposed to citizens, on the other. Third, by introducing an increasing number and types of actors, both state and non-state, to the implementation process, the institutional changes have given the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) a leading role in the growing epistemic peacekeeping networks that cut across traditional boundaries and resemble something of a global civil society.\textsuperscript{33}

But despite the UN’s serious efforts to reform the Organization for the global world, the devastating failures that have occurred in the last 20 years in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Rwanda, Somalia, and now in Afghanistan, suggest that “\textquotedblleft[a]s a pre-Cold War organization operating in a post-Cold War world, the UN has struggled to be relevant and


\textsuperscript{32} 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005; Implementation of decision from the 2005 World Summit Outcome for action by the Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/430, 25 October 2005.

If the collective security discourse defines threats as risks to human security, and the standards of protection by a project to ensure states’ sovereignty termed by their liberal-democratic nature, then UN Member States must empower the Organization so that it can address what Ramesh Thakur refers to as ‘a policy trilemma’: simultaneously answering to the needs of the people or situations and implementing its normative and operational mandates, while taking into account the political realities of the collective. The international community has to ask whether they want to maintain the UN Charter and the organizing principles of the world as drafted in 1945, or whether they want to legitimize the type of project of ‘peace-as-global-governance’ which the reinvention of collective security for the global world seems to require. In other words, it is not enough to reinvent the discourse. Rather to stabilize the world, the project must also be enabled and legitimized to follow.

Analyzing collective security: the stabilizing effects of the UN discourse and peacekeeping

To analyze collective security and draw conclusions about its stabilizing effects in the global world is far from a straightforward exercise. It not only involves observing what is out there, but this also has to be put into context—that is, into the system that defines the collective’s common ground and interactions. It is about unpacking and systematically organizing the wide amount of information that constitutes the justificatory background and discourse which condition what we understand by peace and order, and what collective security debates are about. While any analyzes of collective security must start with the discourse of collective security, this has to be coupled with a systematic review of practice. With the UN being by far the most influential form and largest forum of collective security in the global

34 Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, ‘Divided on Being United’, Financial Times, Weekend, United Kingdom, 6-7 November 2004.
world, the Organization can reveal a great deal about the justificatory background and discourse of collective security. And as one of the Organization’s most visible contribution to, and benchmark of, the stabilization of the world, a review of UN peacekeeping can link the two.

UN peacekeeping is predominantly reviewed in either (i) micro-analytical studies of conflict and post-conflict states and practical aspects of peace implementation, or (ii) macro-analytical studies of either peacebuilding as a concept or a norm, or on internal institutional or organizational aspects of collective security and the UN. The UN’s micro-analytical reviews focus on the extent to which specific peacekeeping operations were able to implement their mandates—that is, whether the institutional and organizational means matched the ends. In the literature, the micro-analytical studies are carried out in liberal or realist institutionalist peace research, with the focus on technical or instrumental aspects of peace implementation. Levels of GDP and development, sequencing and timing (such as timelines for elections and privatization), and coordination of the many projects involved in peace implementation, are defined to establish standardized benchmarks for the peace processes.

Neither the UN nor the literature have been able to adjust the analytical framework for peacekeeping to the inter-subjective international security agenda of the global world. Although there is a recent trend to include ethics and constructed realities in the analysis, and to look for explanations to practical problems in conceptual incoherencies, collective security to a large extent continues to be analyzed by the absence of wars and specific technical and instrumental problems of individual peacekeeping operations. The stabilizing effects are measured by benchmarks that correspond to only a limited and even misleading understanding of what is meant by failure rather than what is actually meant by success. Based on simple and general definitions, large n evaluations, and cross-comparison between cases, fail to take into account structural violence and the stabilizing effects of the global project of collective security as a whole.37

The fact that we know so little about the role effects of the expanding practice of peacekeeping in world order, and therefore why these operations are such worthy pursuits is

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37 Misleading terms that undermine the shifts in collective security and overlook the full picture are termed. An example is ‘new wars’ which describe conflicts within states that are not necessarily new global phenomena but they are only new to collective security. See Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999).
not only confusing but it is also increasingly undermining collective security. Short of coherence, unclear policy recommendations provoke disagreements within the international community and unfulfilled expectations among the peoples. We can see a divide gradually returning to the world between the weaker or developing states in the south, and the stronger or developed states in the north. The most powerful States are increasingly returning to ‘going it alone’ policies and traditional multi-lateral action for self-defense governed by a few capitals rather than by the international community.\(^{38}\) Thus for the UN to survive in the global world, it is not enough for states to agree that although the UN is likely to fail in waging war against aggressors of collective security, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are worthwhile pursuits. They must also have shared understandings about why and when providing conflicting parties with alternative political, economic and legal institutions, for fighting their conflicts with non-violent means, is a success. But this requires a sophisticated optic for the analysis of collective security that can establish educated expectations about success that openly and clearly weigh the virtuous outcomes against the horrendous costs of collective security in the global world. Given its inter-subjective and context dependent nature, this means identifying a series of questions with regards to those choices, rather than establishing general benchmarks.

**Discourse analysis and case study criterion: the stabilizing effects of collective security and UNPROFOR**

To transform theory of collective security into analysis, I suggest that we couple critical discourse analysis with rigorous empirical assessments. The focus of the analysis is collective security as a discourse, and the research design is built around the review of UN peacekeeping. It is *critical* because the ambition is not to make causal arguments, or establish ‘facts’. Rather, it is to ascribe meanings to realities, identify dominant discourse, and draw some policy relevant conclusions based on a systematic analysis of a wide variety of theoretical and practical knowledge. Moreover, it has a post-modern normative commitment to politicizing social problems and relativizing sweeping generalizations about states’ and peoples’ actions and interactions.\(^{39}\) By linking the discourse of collective security with the

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practice of multidimensional peacekeeping, I try to uncover subjective and narrative forms of knowledge that justify the evolution of an increasingly forceful and intrusive United Nations, and compare these to the outcome. By analyzing the conceptual framework together with the practical ramifications of collective security, the dots of the global world are connected, uncovering assumptions upon which the reinvention of collective security relies, and relating these to a number of unintended destabilizing effects that multidimensional peacekeeping operations suffer in practice. My aim is to conduct a systematic yet historically and empirically sensitive analysis that generates depth as well as an overview of the challenges but also the stabilizing effects of collective security in the global world.

I start by framing or situating my puzzle by mapping the conceptualization of the framework or forum in which meanings are ascribed to collective security according to different perimeters or filters. I identify fundamental concepts that have been turned into standards for and practices of states’ behavior, and trace their genealogy. I follow the modern conceptual evolution of the ideas, discourse and practice of collective security together with key events and political forces for world order, such as the beginning and ending of major wars and the organizing principles of state sovereignty and non-interventions. While this means consulting security and peace studies, a large part of my analysis relies on the official discourse of collective security understood through international agreements and the background material against which they were made. More specifically, I depart from the Covenant of the League of Nations and the UN Charter, Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, and key UNSG reports and speeches. To this I add, particularly influential reports and other materials published by international commissions and other actors or institutions which have been commissioned by the UN Security Council or the UNSG to inform collective security discourse. Thus my method of analysis is at this stage more deductive than inductive in that I depart from primary texts to trace the origins, justification and meanings, of adopted legislations and policies.40

Once I am familiar with the discourse, I can set out an analytical framework in which to empirically operationalize my reading of collective security in the global world. It is just as much about establishing what constitutes success in the global world, as it is about reviewing

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the effects of peacekeeping operations. By joining together security and peace studies with the discourse and also practice of collective security, in a triangular analytical framework, the aim is to connect judicial and political collective security, and legality and legitimacy, through practice. A third type of success is added to the analysis of collective security—‘projectual’ success—referring to the system of collective security as a holistic project of collective security to: reassure the collective that we are all part of a world of risks that is equally dangerous to all; convince us all that these risks can be contained only by a wider and deeper practice of collective security at the center of all states’ national security strategies; and, continuously ensure us all that this is indeed the case through an international practice of peace-as-global governance. Within these three types of conceptual, practical and conceptual success, I study the actual implementation of discourses to establish indicators for success that are case-specific yet not disconnected from the overall practice, and that are not counterfactual. As such, the analytical framework is sensitive to the fact that while what is understood as stabilizing effects is likely to vary quite a lot from one context to another, they are still defined by certain general procedural norms across practices. It is able to make sense of the larger patterns in particular circumstances, and weave the specific empirical ascertained facts into the larger context, identifying general assumptions about causes and comparing these to the effects of unique cases.\footnote{For more about understanding foreign policy as a discursive practice see Lene Hansen, \textit{Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War} (Oxon and New York, Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-92.} In other words, it is able to inform theory by looking closer at the specific problems of practice on the basis of what success \textit{is} as opposed to what it is \textit{not}.

Based on an in-depth review of multidimensional peacekeeping operations including peacebuilding missions and international transitional administrations, I redefine the challenges of collective security that preoccupy both international leaders and scholars in terms of political problems and normative dilemmas which the UN deals with on a daily basis. While I use the general official discourse to ascribe meaning to the system in terms of types of success, rather than establishing a certain set of indicators for stabilizing effects across practices, I use the specific and often less official or marginal discourse of the implementation for individual operations to establish indicators for these types on a case by case basis. The analyses becomes more inductive that deductive in that I systematically study patterns such as inter-textual and cross references in the mandates, their implementation or
action plans, and progress assessment reports and evaluations. The texts come from the UNSG’s and his representatives, but also from other actors and institutions that the UN Security Council and the UNSG have granted with the authority to implement specific collective security policies, including missions of the European Union and the Organizations for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and other international institutions that have been created solely for the purpose of solving the particular cases under investigation such as the Contract Group and the Office of the High Representative in BiH. I also draw upon interviews that I have conducted with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other relevant actors at headquarters and in the field.

Given the in-depth and explanatory nature of my analysis, and the ambition to identify and include implicit assumptions about the effects of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, I suggest that at this stage the analysis be limited to one multidimensional peacekeeping operation, but that it follows this operation through to the eventual peacebuilding missions and international administration that termed its successful termination. Like with the selection of texts with regards to the reinvention of collective security, the choice of my case-study also expands exponentially. Since I am not looking for a replication logic across operations, but for types of stabilizing effects that can help us understand how specific events are interpreted within the bigger picture, the single-choice is not a problem but rather a practical requirement. But the single-choice also has heuristic reasons in terms of finding a way in which to study problems of collective security in the global world in their entirety. Again, the aim is not only to know more about a specific problem, but also to understand why that is a problem in the first place and therefore, what is required to tackle it.

To this end, I have chosen the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the former Yugoslavia, and the peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding missions as well as international transitional administrations with which it was replaced to implement the peace agreements that had been made at the end of their mandates. This includes the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO); the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP); the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia; and the United Nation Mission in BiH (UNMIBH) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). I begin at the outset of UNPROFOR, continue to the complex peacekeeping operation that developed, and finish with the peacebuilding missions and international administrations by which it was succeeded. The detailed understanding of the post-conflict states provides an idea of peacekeeping success and as such, what collective security is all about in the global world.

The main reasons for choosing this case are the width and depth of the overall mandate of these operations, missions and transitional administration as a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, for a large region and complex conflict that stretched the conceptual framework of collective security and the empirical scope of UN peacekeeping to its limits. Part and parcel of the reinvention of collective security, they reflect and reproduce, or explain and change, the collective security discourse of the global world. Thus my choice is motivated by its timing, longevity and influence on the reinvention of collective security for the global world. UNPROFOR was deployed after the Cold War had ended and, as one of the widest, deepest and most well-known multidimensional peacekeeping operations, it has been widely reviewed and evaluated. It was a truly multidimensional peacekeeping operation with goals evolving from military and civilian to economic and political. Since it took place at a place in time when collective security was in the process of defining its role in the global world, the changes it went through mirror key debates and shifts in what shaped the reinvention of collective security for the global world. It suffered some of the biggest and most painful failures of UN peacekeeping to date and many of these can be traced back to clashes between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but it also achieved several important successes. It was terminated by complex peace agreements and succeeded by some of the most powerful, international administrations that collective security has ever seen.

Although UNPROFOR itself has long been terminated, its legacy lives on to still have a direct impact on the region as well as on collective security and world order at large. This is especially for BiH as the operations continues to inform multidimensional peacekeeping and the international administration is still very much active today. As such, it allows me to follow the dominant discourse of collective security in the global world, the background against which it was defined, as well as its implementation and how it was

perceived. But most importantly, the international community continues to closely follow the developments in the region to get an idea of how collective security can and cannot stabilize the global world under the current circumstances. Thus while the indicators for success are not to be generalized across operations, they are very helpful pointers for where to start a review of other peacekeeping operations, and analyze other challenges which the UN and the international community are struggling with in the global world. They help us identify the general questions that security and peace studies, and the discourse, have to address if collective security and the UN is to survive in the global world.

Chapter outline
To approach the puzzle of collective security in the global world, Chapter One investigates the concept of security. Do less inter-state wars mean that the world is perceived as more stable? Based on the dialectic process between security studies and the international security agenda—that is, between the literature and discourse—I map out commonly shared understandings of security. On the one hand, the formation of the concept of human security is summarized in three overlapping theoretical traits. On the other hand, the international security agenda is explored through four waves of threats that have brought us to a world of risks. First, human security is a procedural and therefore holistic conceptualization of what is likely to occur rather than what is. Second, human security includes human development, defined as the ability and opportunity of people to fulfill their basic needs. Third, human security depends on an international human rights practice, a product of a ‘judicial globalization’ in the making that assumes an interdependent world has responsible and mutually vulnerable actors.

As for the international security agenda, the first wave refers to the immediate post-World War period when security was analyzed based on traditional warfare between states. During the Cold War, a second wave appeared as political warfare and structural violence were gradually added to the agenda. Collective security was analyzed by measuring the balance of power between the two superpowers in states’ armament and disarmament, and by estimating the consequences of their ideological clash. Then as the Cold War was coming to an end, young and weak states were added to the agenda in a third wave of threats, and collective security was increasingly analyzed by development and democratization indexes.
As the Cold War ended and a fourth wave developed, the agenda opened up to risk within and across states and collective security was analyzed by probability calculations such as early warning indexes for complex socio-political processes. Finally, I look at the combination of the conceptualization of human security and the international security agenda, and consider what the shift from traditional security to human security means for collective security. I argue that making international agreements based on benchmarks and standards for what were till now the internal affairs of states, and translating these into practice, is a threefold rather than a twofold challenge—an analytical, a practical and a normative challenge. This indicates that the global world requires the justificatory background and discourse to go through fundamental changes and shifts.

Since a critical analysis of security sheds doubt on the extent to which a world without war between states is necessarily a world that feels more secure, Chapter Two turns to peace both as a practice and a concept. Do fewer inter-state wars mean a world that is perceived as more stable? To this end, I first trace the conceptualization of peace as an ideal type, following it from the early liberals of the Enlightenment to the democratic peace paradigm and peace studies in the 20th century. The analysis reveals claims about human sameness that have been translated into assumptions about collective security on which the UN and UN peacekeeping have been formed, taken shape, and are currently being implemented. This brings me to the development of peace studies—the concept and practice of positive peace—that underpins the vision of collective security for the global world, and what the implications are of trying to make such complex and inter-subjective concepts into universal solutions and international standards. I turn to the practice of collective security to see what UN peacekeeping can reveal about the shifts in what is understood by peace.

Starting with the first UN operations in the 1950s and following the course of the practice throughout the Cold War, I map out a development from traditional peacekeeping based on non-intervention, consent and the non-use of force, to the embrace of the UNSG’s vision of collective security in 2005. I find that throughout six decades of UN peacekeeping, a peacebuilding norm has gradually been translated into practice via a complex concept of multidimensional peacekeeping based on three principal activities that interact and overlap in a dialectic dynamic: conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This norm has redefined the principal aims of collective security in terms of a long-term commitment to
conflict management and humanitarian efforts within and across states, including responsibilities to protect and rebuild. On some occasions, it has also shifted the legitimizing principles for the world order.

Finally, I consider how to evaluate the peacebuilding norm in practice, and thus what peace can tell us about collective security in the global world. I revisit the evaluations on which the commonly shared understandings of collective security are formed: macro-analytical research on UN peacekeeping operations on the one hand, and micro-analytical research on conflict and post-conflict states. I find that while there have recently been some promising attempts to link the concepts with the problems experienced in practice, a number of key questions to collective security in the global world are not only unanswered but also unarticulated. I try to identify what those questions are by drawing upon insights about the liberal peace from comparative politics about weak states and democratization. This allows me to draw some preliminary conclusions about what more specifically is excluded from the analysis of collective security in the global world, in terms of a normative commitment whereby the aim of the peacebuilding norm goes beyond actually building peace within states to confirm states mutual commitment to collective security in the global world.

Based on what we have learned about the type of peace that stabilizes the global world in theory, Chapter Three turns to UN peacekeeping to consider how the concepts of human security and positive peace translate into the practice of collective security. What constitutes successful multidimensional peacekeeping? First, I follow the UN reviews from an ad hoc report writing exercise to a more systematized reviewing process that culminated in the institutionalization of a Best Practices Division within the UNDPKO. Then I turn to the literature and show how from the first descriptive evaluations to the current complex analytical models, there are three main findings about the success of UN peacekeeping that have been established as ‘facts’. However, as these findings only tell us that the UN is keeping peace and not building peace, I see these findings as somewhat contradictory and therefore confusing when it comes to what constitutes success, that is, how human security and positive peace translate into practice.

On the one hand, weak track records of the individual operations are established, but on the other, there is an overall consensus that multidimensional peacekeeping has positive effects that are strong enough to make them worthy pursuits. I argue that this can be explained by the fact that the reviews and evaluations do not take the full range of aims of
multidimensional peacekeeping into account. Therefore, they draw their overall conclusion on the basis of implicit assumptions about a mutually reinforcing relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding that are at the heart of the UNSG’s vision of collective security. As such, I suggest that we attempt to find out what the reviews and evaluations do not say about successful multidimensional peacekeeping, in terms of the positive effects that are justified by such assumptions made in theory. A third type of success is added to the commonly used types for success of peacekeeping: ‘projectual’ success. This refers to multidimensional peacekeeping’s role beyond specific operations, and aims to analyze how the implicit assumptions about a mutually reinforcing relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding play out in practice. I end by outlining a tri-part or triangular analytical framework that can be used to revisit practice and present the criteria for the case studies. Using these criteria, I draw conclusions about the success or stabilizing effects of multidimensional peacekeeping.

Chapter Four analyses the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the former Yugoslavia (and the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation, UNCRO). Using the critical analytical framework, I try to fill the gaps identified in the UN reviews and the peacekeeping literature’s evaluations regarding whether the international policies had the anticipated stabilizing effects. What were the operation’s aims and role, and how did they change over the course of the operation? In other words, the multidimensional peacekeeping operation is analyzed according to what the UN, the international community and the peacekeeping literature consider success, including implicit assumptions and unarticulated agreements. By looking not only at the actual mandate, but at the processes on the basis of which the mandate was formed, renewed and terminated, I find that there are clashes between fulfilling the many aims of multidimensional peacekeeping that have been decisive in this process.

These are problems that have predominantly been perceived as technical but that amount to incoherence between the system and the practice of collective security that first delayed the deployment of the operation, then undermined its mandate, thus preventing the means from matching the end, and finally leading to a premature termination of the operations. All in all, I try to make sense of how this operation ended up pitting its many different aims against one another, by showing how the mandate was shaped by a number of trade-offs that the UN was forced to make between types of success in order to implement
the mandate. While some of these decisions were made by the Security Council, most were made in practice. Therefore, I give a considerable amount of attention to the plans of action of the operations and missions involved in the implementation of the multidimensional peacekeeping mandates. Rarely do I pay attention to the particular stance of one particular state unless it clearly had an impact on the system or practice of collective security at a given place in time, the main reason being that, given the fact that states are interdependent, singling out the influence of specific states require a lot of attention, which is currently beyond my analytical framework.

The Fifth and final Chapter continues to fill in the gaps in the UN reviews and peacekeeping literature’s evaluations by looking at what happened after UNPROFOR in terms of peacebuilding and the implementation of the negotiated peace agreements in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. What can practice tell us about what constitutes self-sustainable peace? Within the critical analytical framework I follow the UN peacebuilding missions, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), as well as the other institutions including the Office of the High Representative in BiH and the NATO stabilization forces, to which UNPROFOR transferred its mandate. I find that the current system and practice of collective security makes it very difficult, and arguably even impossible, to successfully implement the ambitious mandates that the Organization is given. While the UN may be able to conceptualize and envision means by which a world of risks can be addressed, their outcome is bound to be limited by the outdated system of collective security. It puts those who are in charge of implementing practice in a difficult predicament that is best described as a legitimacy dilemma that in practice translates into a challenge of bridging a discrepancy between the international security agenda, and multidimensional peacekeeping—that is, between the need to conduct peacebuilding within a system in which only peacekeeping is legitimate. As the full success of multidimensional peacekeeping operations cannot be expected, a range of difficult choices and prioritizations has to be made between aims. This brings me to the question of whether our global world is in fact stabilized by multidimensional peacekeeping within the current system of collective security, and what is required for the world of interdependent states to perceive world order stable?

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Finally, I share some concluding thoughts about what our critical study has revealed about the success of multidimensional peacekeeping and collective security in the global world. I argue that the fact that the United Nations remains committed to peacebuilding despite its pessimistic track record and predictions for the future shows that collective security is more about protecting the universal commitment to peace than it is about actually building more self-sustainable peace within states. In other words, the consensus behind collective security in the 21st century amounts to this: the idea of all states making a commitment to human collective security and positive peace in theory is perceived as stabilizing enough. That this commitment is not confirmed in practice is not perceived as destabilizing enough for the system of collective security to leave the principles of self-determination and state sovereignty behind once and for all. As a result, the UN is instructed to act as if it were in charge of a practice of peace-as-global-governance, without the UN Charter or the international organizing principles and frameworks being amended accordingly. It would seem that the states of the world are not yet ready to pay the price for human rights if it comes at the expense of states’ rights, nor to pay the price for human security if it comes at the expense of state security. I ask whether this means that collective security in the global world is a zero-sum game where one gain must come at the expense of another, or if in fact there is a way in which interdependency can as predicted organize a world in which we are all winners, or if there is a middle way of compromise that is yet to be identified.

This opens up a series of questions and dilemmas for future research to address regarding the changing normative context of collective security in terms of whether peace-as-global-governance is a practice in which the UN could and should play the role in the 21st century, or whether the Organization could and should lower its ambitions regarding the ‘vision of collective security’ based on the mixed track record of multidimensional peacekeeping operations.
Chapter 1. Security in the Global Order: A World of Risks

International security oftentimes departs from the observation that since the end of the Cold War, the world has been suffering less from traditional large-scale conflicts; that is to say from violence-prone states that threaten to invade and wage war on each other.\textsuperscript{43} What then tends to follow are optimistic interpretations about what this means in terms of a new global world order which, based on a liberal concert, benefits from a stronger, wider and deeper commitment to collective security that is limiting especially the human costs of war.\textsuperscript{44} The picture is explained by a victory of liberal democracy, and conclusions about how the fact that democratic states are interdependent makes inter-state wars and major cases of successful territorial aggrandizement of little or no interest to the world. As the assumption is that the world has become truly interdependent, feelings of mutual vulnerability are meant to bring states’ interests closer together.\textsuperscript{45} But is the decrease in inter-state wars indicative of states’ commitment to collective security, and the success of collective security? In other words, does the fact that certain threats are less prominent necessarily mean that the international community is finding the world more predictable, more stable and therefore, less hostile?

Since the end of the Cold War, increasing attention has been given to the ‘security from what question’. As the international community embraced the wider and deeper concept of security—that is, human security—the international security agenda has opened up to also include non-conventional warfare and non-traditional violence. The extent to


\textsuperscript{44} The ‘new world order’ is a term coined in the aftermath of the breakdown of the USSR. It was first used by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in an address to the 43\textsuperscript{rd} session of the UN General Assembly on 7 December 1988. A year later U.S. President George H. W. Bush also famously used the term in one of his presidential speeches; “Presidential Address: Gulf Crisis an Opportunity for a ‘New World Order’, transcript, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Volume 48, Number 37, September 1990, pp. 2953-2955. Since then, these ideas have been widely discussed, supported and contested. A wide range of ideas have been developed on the basis of conclusions about a global and therefore interdependent world. These can be summarized in a debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians. Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Beth A. Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (London, Sage Publications, 2002).

which these ‘new’ threats have come to cause states concern and disagreements is not necessarily an anticipated outcome of the reinvention of collective security. Neither is the extent to which the threats to the global world have come at different costs for different actors. For a world that has agreed that collective security in the global world is upheld by mutual vulnerability, it is confusing times. The soul-searching that it has triggered within the international community is having increasingly destabilizing effects on the world. Not only is collective security struggling to identify and address threats but, the universal consensus on what security is all together is becoming increasingly challenged. The unfamiliarity of the global world, together with doubts and disagreements with regards to the extent to which states’ interdependence and the reinvention of collective security actually makes them mutually vulnerable, are reinforcing feelings of insecurity, in some cases even to the level of paranoia.\footnote{This can be seen in how states in recent years have been prone to carrying out increasingly stricter security policies, both nationally and internationally. Borders seem to close and states’ fear of the unexpected is growing progressively into a culture of paranoia in which the world is more and more subject to surveillance and control, which closes rather than opens states and societies, and limits rather than promotes freedom. See for example Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘Quest for International Security: Benefits of Justice versus the Trappings of Paranoia’, in Hans Günter Brauch, eds. et al, 

In this light, the world seems to be suffering more from a new insecurity dilemma or from insecurity 

Security is far from a clear or natural concept. It represents a value or a state of mind or order of persons, societies or states, in which feelings of insecurity are both controllable and under control. In other words, security is both subjective, a condition of individuals and states, and objective, a relationship between individual and states or societies.\footnote{See Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol’, Political Science Quarterly, Volume LXVII, Number 4, December 1952, pp. 481-502; and Emma Rothschild, ‘What is Security?’, Daedalus, Volume 124, Number 3, Summer 1995.} On its own, without specification, security has very little meaning and as such, it leaves much room for
confusion—for uncertainties and unknowns—which in turn generates instability. Therefore it also represents solutions for collective organization and a means of influence, a political arena that is key to understanding and justifying boundaries, rules, authority and legitimacy. It is about managing the unexpected by making agreements that create and uphold certain shared understandings and routines, a certain order—within and across collectivities. This requires continuous discussions and negotiations about reality, about what is out there, or rather about what is not out there, about threats. Thus the meaning of security continuously changes and evolves in relation to historical processes, political thought and particular problems. States will have different understandings and experiences of security, even if they are constantly faced with the same threat and the same degree of danger. Therefore analyzing security on the basis of records of wars is far from satisfactory. An investigation of the concept and theories, as well as the discourse and its implementation is also required. Not until we are familiar with the commonly shared understanding of security—the empirical and abstract threats and challenges and how they relate to each other—can we consider to what extent collective security is actually installing the sense of there being a certain order in the world.

Against this background I argue that there are reasons to revisit the prophecies for collective security in the global world in light of what is threatening it, and the challenge of addressing these threats. I suggest that we do so by investigating the discourse—that is, the dialectic process at play between the conceptualization of security and the international security agenda. The chapter begins by revisiting the concept of security since the beginning of the 20th century according to international security studies and the human security approach or international policy-making agenda. In the second section, the chapter explores the international security agenda, and the threats that the world is organized to avoid. A shift from conventional warfare and traditional violence to asymmetrical warfare and structural violence is analyzed in four waves of the international security agenda since 1945. How this relates to the understanding of a new global world order at risk is considered. In the third and final section of the chapter, the humanization of security and the shift in the international security agenda are connected with practice—that is, with the implementation of the discourse. The challenge of collective human security in a global world at risk is analyzed through a three-part classification: analytical, normative, and practical. We ask, what do the humanization of security and the re-conceptualization of threats in terms of risks
mean for collective security? With the help of some insights garnered through practice, some preliminary conclusions are drawn about a new international framework or global system rather than the predictions of the prophecies for collective security in the global world order seem to depend on, but that is yet to materialize.

1. Stabilizing world order: from traditional to human security

The concept of security revolves around key political themes of order that have heavy historical legacy and deep cultural roots. Throughout the 20th century, and even more so in the 21st century, the meaning and content of the concept have been increasingly contested. Based on dialogues and debates between the international security academic and policy community, security is expanding from an exclusive focus on national interest and state sovereignty, territoriality, and traditional geopolitics, to a focus on more human values and priorities of the wider world community. The technical and practical changes that this implies relate to fundamental normative shifts in the commitment to a certain order that is at the centre of the concept.

The minimalist definition of security has widened and deepened into a notion that is threatened by structural violence. The referent object has shifted from states to individuals; from an external to an internal understanding; from an observable to a non-observable intersubjective concept of security. This cannot only be explained by definitional, analytical, technical or practical change. It also relates to a normative shift where rights and obligations are individualized, and security is humanized. In other words, “although international security studies has evolved through engagement with particular policy events, it has not treated all events as equally important”.

We begin by looking at the growth of a field of international security studies, following its close relationship to the ‘three great’ debates within international relations.

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Second, the way in which the UN understands security is explored through the international institutionalization of a human security approach. Three conceptual traits are highlighted. Third, we look to practice for more input with regard to reinvention of the discourse of collective security in the global world. Also here three changes are identified, this time in the framework or system of collective security, which allow us to draw some preliminary conclusions about the challenge that the global world poses for collective security.

*Security studies*

International security studies revolves around concepts with historical roots going back to the formation of the modern territorial state-system and national government with supreme sovereignty. It analyzes and asks questions about war and peace, conflict and order, and how the world functions and its parts co-exist, and it has a distinct commitment to inform policy and stabilize the world. Its evolutionary process can be followed in shifts in the referent objects and in the means of analysis through the ‘three great’ debates of International Relations between realism, liberal institutionalism and critical theory, or constructivism. Here they have evolved around the status of states and dichotomous constructions or security constellations and conceptions such as the individual versus the state, military versus non-military threats, external versus internal security problems. But just as important as the theoretical shifts, are the changes in the ‘real’ world such as great power politics, technology, key events, internal dynamics of academic and institutionalization, which have been identified by Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen as key forces to the evolution of international security studies.  

Security studies began as an independent field of study in the early 20th century based on the longstanding general assumption that war is more natural to man than peace. By the end of the Great Wars a distinct literature had developed, which focused predominantly on national military defense. Some treated wars as constants, others as variables, and some have even focused on wars as particularities. But security studies was soon absorbed by international relations where it grew into one of the disciplines sub-fields with increasing

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variations in theory, methodology, ontology, and empirics. In the spirit of realism, security studies as its own field of thought is often said to have begun as a reaction to the utopian nature of the Wilsonian idea of international law for peace, and debates about how to protect the state against external and internal threats. Studies departed from the pessimistic assumption about how the human condition limits states’ prospects for a peaceful international order.

To address concerns with the novel problems of the Cold War and nuclear weapons, a positivist approach, often labeled Realist Strategic Studies developed at the intersection of military expertise and social science research. Observing states’ external behavior in terms of military power and the dynamic interaction of opposing armed forces, the analysis was more explanatory than analytical. Neither the internal set-up of the units of the system—the states, nor non-state actors—were considered, and very little if any conceptual reflection was made. Security was seen to rely on a system of states defined by states’ self-interest, bound to an anarchic structure and maintained by means of traditional violence and power politics. It was analyzed by considering states’ short-term security needs in relation to worst-case scenario logics, drawing upon deterrence theory or logic, and debates about the rationality of states in the nuclear condition. Although different types of knowledge were combined to include also non-military aspects in more integrated assessments of security, domestic cohesion and the collective values to be protected were largely excluded. Notwithstanding, Wolfers already in 1952 made an epistemological distinction between objective and subjective concepts of security to underline the intrinsic meaning of security, yet its rhetoric and political force. Objective security was defined as the absence of threats to the acquired values, and subjective security as the fear of attacks upon these values; the former referring to predominantly states material capabilities and the latter to the importance of history and norms, psychologies of fear and misperceptions.


As the Cold War unfolded, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism began to study security in terms of a society of states—that is, as international rather than national security studies.\footnote{For a neorealist account see Kenneth Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics} (Reading MA, Addison-Wesley, 1979), and for a more neoliberal account see Robert O. Keohane and Jospeh S. Nye, eds., \textit{Transnational Relations and World Politics} (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1971).} A questioning of the methodology and epistemology added explanatory variables.\footnote{This was perhaps first pronounced in the so called ‘English School’, see for example Hedley Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics} (London, Macmillan, 1977). However, it has developed into several directions that today we could group together under critical post-modern thought or the constructivist school. See Wendt Alexander, \textit{Social Theory of International Politics} (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Kratochwil Friedrich V., \textit{Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs}, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989).} The internal set-up of the units—that is of the states—was introduced to security; and actors other than states, as well as their relations, were considered. Social phenomena as well as norms and rules gradually gained importance in the analysis.\footnote{With the introduction of the social to international relations, and the social within states rather than just in between, notions such as consciousness and identity were increasingly investigated. See Jack S. Levy, ‘War and Peace’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds., \textit{Handbook of International Relations} (London, Sage, 2002), pp. 350-368.} It was increasingly recognized that security is not an objective term that can simply be observed, but rather it is a subjective concept that cannot be understood without sophisticated interpretations. The exclusive focus on causal relationships between levels was replaced by theories that investigate the effects of interactions in growing dialogues with other social sciences, including economics, sociology, psychology, as well as with physicists. The internal-external distinction became increasingly blurred and attention turned to the peaceful potential of international security based on the connection between democratic peace research and institutional theory on economic interdependence. As more non-military issues were taken into account, basic human needs and structural violence were gradually included in deeper security analysis, addressing wider societal and civilian issues. However, as the debates did not stretch beyond contesting explanations of states’ behavior, the conceptual framing of security itself remained quite thin.\footnote{See Jack S. Levy’s note on how non-war between democratic states represents something of the first ‘empirical law’ of international relations, ‘The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence’, in Philip Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern and Charles Tilly, eds., \textit{Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War}, Vol. 1 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 270.}

The unexpected end to the Cold War engaged security studies in meta-theoretical critical investigations of the rationalist idea of autonomous actors and the unproblematized and Western biased nature of the concept of security. A series of sociologists, feminists theorists, philosophers, development theorists, anthropologists and media theorists joined
the debate. With more non-positivist considerations came the idea of constructed meanings preceding intentionality which does not lend itself to causality and quantification. Departing from the assumption that little, if anything, is given, and nothing is constant, critical lines of thought multiplied. Both the objective and subjective approaches were replaced with an analysis of security in terms of discourses or constructs that are sustained through shared meanings, language and rules. Security was connected to politics and certain methodological commitments grew into a third approach under the title of constructivism. However, a theory of its own equivalent to realism and neo-liberalism did not follow. Rather, from shared inter-subjective and ontological assumptions, more and more diverse critical lines of thought have emerged. The accounts depart from the assumption that subjects (and their objects) are affected by the knowledge that is generated by studying them. Thus instead of conducting empirical testing, “the meta-theoretical issues of what can count as a test” are studied. This way, the relationship between theory and practice—that is, the power of ideas—has gradually been added to the study of security, and agency has been


60 Maya Zehfuss notes how a social constructivist branch can be separated from a linguistic, where the former bases analysis on signal while avoiding normativity, and the latter on speech with much normative consideration. For a social constructivist account see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), and for a linguistic account see Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules Norms, and Decisions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), or Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For more about constructivism in general, see “Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil, in Karin M. Fierke and Knud Jorgensen, eds., Constructing International Relations: the Next Generation (Armonk and London, M. E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 54-75, and Stefon Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations”, European Journal of International Relations, Volume 6, Number 2, pp. 147-182.


One of the best known critical accounts is the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization or societal security. Security is treated as a self-referential practice that is the outcome of a specific social process rather than as a ‘given’ in the external world. Issues are ‘securitized’ by speech acts that not only convey information, but in saying something, also do something for societal cohesion in terms of convincing the relevant audiences. The relationship between argument, action and ethics through which threats manifest themselves on the international security agenda is at the center of analysis.

In the 21st century, security studies tend to leave constant dichotomous definitions of security behind for multi-faceted understandings. Social and cultural contingency, longstanding methodological, epistemological and ontological assumptions are questioned, revised and occasionally abandoned. Security studies are no longer limited to studies of war. Rather, conclusions about security increasingly include considerations of the conditions for peace; not as an antithesis of war, or as an ideal state of affairs, but as social constructs. Roland Paris maps the field in a fourfold typology based on the state and non-state actors and beneficiaries, and military or non-military threats. First, realists continue to dominate the field with a focus on states, national interest and traditional military threats. Second, redefined security remains pre-occupied with the state but adds considerations for environmental and economic security to the analysis. Third, intra-state security pays attention to military threats and violence aimed at actors within a state, executed by state or non-state actors. Fourth, human security focuses on the policy-making agenda and the most

65 For example, Emanuel Adler suggests a three-layered understanding of social reality and social sciences, and their dynamic mutually constitutive effects. First, as a metaphysical stance of what research seeks to know, and the knowledge by which they can do so; second, as a social theory about the role of knowledge and informed agents in the constitution of social reality; and third, as a theoretical and empirical perspective for international relations based on the two former layers that maintains that international relations should be based on sound social ontological and epistemological foundations. Emanuel Adler, “Constructivism and International Relations”, in Walter Carlsnea, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London, Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 95-118.
66 For more on considerations of war and peace in constructivism, see Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic foundations of International Relations (Oxon, Routledge, 2005).
disadvantaged, combining military with nonmilitary considerations, and states with non-state actors, within and across borders.  

Overall, this reveals a field of studies with multiple labels and approaches that is unified around a concept—security—which itself has little or no common conceptual grounding except for its civilian strategy character. While this makes for an ‘unbalanced’ field of studies, Lene Hansen and Barry Buzan point out that this is also what makes it capable of blending adjacent subjects from international theory and international political economy to foreign policy analysis and political theory, across dynamic and flexible ‘frontier zones’. But the divide between the ‘three great debates’ remains, with the more traditional realist approach at one end of the spectrum, critical security studies at the other, and the liberal institutionalist strand floating in between. Whereas the realists draw increasingly upon empirics from comparative politics and democratization to advice policy, the critical studies emphasize ethics and theoretical tools for analysis, and the two contest rather than complement each other. This is where the ambiguous discourse of human security and the reinvention of collective security resides; between theoretical foundations, normative commitments and different conceptions of the real world. It is here that we find the notion of security in which I am interested, the procedural discursive concept of security that justifies the reinvention of collective security and the practice that comes with it.

Security according to the UN: human security

The process of international institutionalization plays an important part in the shaping of the collective security discourse. With the signing of the UN Charter in 1945, an international project of an unprecedented size in terms of numbers of states cooperating for collective

security began. It was the only conceivable way for the states’ to answer to the normative demand for security policies that set out what represented rational means toward an accepted end, and the best course of action in the new post-World War world. From the very outset, the understanding of security that was agreed upon was closer to human security than to the traditional realist understanding that dominated international security studies and discourse at that time. Although the term human security does not appear in the Charter, the institutionalization that follows has played a crucial role in the development of some of the key concepts of human security thinking, whereby domestic legitimacy and cohesion has become just as important to the international security agenda as force and control.\textsuperscript{71}

By engaging the member-states in discussions and facilitating international agreements about collective security to the benefit of all peoples, the UN established important benchmarks and standards for the humanization of security defined by a set of universal rights—civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and human rights.\textsuperscript{72} In other words, it carried out the normative groundwork by codifying norms and rules in international law. Once the Cold War had ended, human security was overtly embraced in reports, agreements and declarations from all corners of the UN and elsewhere. Two decades later, a vision of collective security for the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is being formed based on assumptions about the correlation between security, development and rights. As such, it is often said that human security is more a product of the field of policy which has then moved into international security studies rather than the reverse.\textsuperscript{73}

The concept of human security, with development as the key to a stable world order, was articulated and universally agreed upon at the 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development.\textsuperscript{74} Gradually practices adapted to the new concept and eventually


\textsuperscript{73} See Human Security for All. Integrated Responses to Protect and Empower People and Communities: A Look at Nine Promising Efforts, Human Security Unit (New York, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2006).

\textsuperscript{74} The concept of human security around which the 1995 Copenhagen World Summit was organized is particularly well articulated in some of the background material prepared for the conference, namely the \textit{Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security}, the United Nations Development Programme (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994). However, not until 2001 was a Commission on Human Security set up. Its work represents one of the most comprehensive and influential sources of information for the
institutions were also formed to advance the consensus. While development projects were fairly successful in incorporating security aspects, it proved more difficult for peacemaking efforts to incorporate development. The problem was explained by a conceptual incoherence. In 2001, an independent Commission on Human Security (CHS) was established to prevent the consensus and meaning of security from eroding by bringing clarity to the multi-faceted concept and the twin goals of the vision of collective security for the global world based on the ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’. After two years, the Commission submitted its Report, Human Security Now, which defines the concept in terms of a new security framework that centers directly and specifically on people, and urges the UN and its members to form a new paradigm for security on the basis of its findings.

The Commission on Human Security’s definition of human security: to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.

An independent Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS) was set-up in 2003 to make the concept more accessible to practice and the following year, a Human Security Unit development of the concept of human security since the end of the Cold War. See Human Security Now (New York, Commission on Human Security, 2003).


78 The ABHS was set up to with seven experts to service the UN system as a whole, as well as the Secretary-General more specifically. Its first set of recommendations concerned the management of the Trust Fund. It then turned to more precise aspects of implementation. See ‘Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS)’,
(HSU) was established in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). From then on, the concept or framework reached deeper into development as well as into security. As activity increases and experience is generated, the dominant understandings of security continue to humanize.  

Against this background, three overlapping traits of human security can be noted. First, human security represents a procedural conceptualization of security. This means that security is just as much about potential future threats as it is about actual or immediate concerns, about what is likely to come rather than about what is. Second, human security is closer to the concept of human development than to traditional understandings of security. As such, security takes into account things or situations that may disempower people and undermine the extent to which they can protect themselves, as well as traditional violence. And third, human security is taking the shape of an international rights practice that assumes an interdependent world with responsible, and mutually vulnerable, actors.

*Human security – a procedural or continuous and holistic concept:* Human security is defined by an ambitious aim to not only counter-act violence once it takes place but to continuously prevent it from occurring all together; creating universal peace between peoples. This holistic conceptualization of security is concerned with causes and consequences, and with future threats that may be pervasive. The past and the present are connected with the future, and security is extended over time. It is about the processes that influence and shape the feelings of insecurity that lead to violence as well as the processes that shape perceptions about the likelihood of violence in relation to its anticipated impact. In other words, violence does not actually have to occur for security to be threatened. A wide range of processes are added to the threats of security, which influence the relations and interactions between humans, that is, the conditions and perceptions under which we exist, co-exist and interact. These include environmental degradation, massive population movements, scarcity and depletion of resources (natural resources as well as goods and services), inequality in terms of long-term

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and systematic oppression and deprivation, and public health and safety. "What defines a menace to human security is its depth, not only its swift onset".

Human security – as much about human development as about human survival: Human development emphasizes a positive relationship between development and order. Conclusions are drawn about causal relations between poverty, deprivation and conflict, and conversely, about opportunities for fair progress and peace. The definition of security extends to include peoples’ well-being, dignity and capability to fend for themselves, as well as their survival. Primary attention is on the fulfillment of ‘basic needs’ and the ability of people to fulfill these. Not only do people have to be given certain opportunities, but these opportunities also have to be seized. This means that security is threatened by states that fail to provide their citizens with the appropriate means to ‘develop their potential as individuals and as communities’, that is, by states that do not empower the individual and ensure human fulfillment. In other words, security is threatened by people’s inability to make informed decisions about the causes and interests of their security needs and aspirations.

Human security – a global protection of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights and freedoms: Human security is both a product of international law and a producer of an international rights practice, or a ‘judicial globalization’ in the making. Based on human rights and the right to dignity of all individuals, and on freedoms from want, fear, and of future generations, this right practice is individualizing international law.


Judicial globalization is a term used by Ann-Marie Slaughter to describe the growth of a global legal system based on an analysis of the way in which national courts, especially US and EU courts, are increasingly relying on international and foreign legal materials in the interpretation of domestic law. See Ann-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004).


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84 The ‘freedom from want’, the ‘freedom from fear’, and ‘the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy and natural environment’ are outlined as one the main building blocks of human security. See *Human Security Now: Protecting and empowering people*, The Commission on Human Security (New York, Commission on Human Security, 2003), p. 11.
individualization is gradually altering the absolutist concept of state sovereignty. More and more attention is being given to the idea of individual sovereignty as a concept of sovereignty in its own right, against which state sovereignty has to be weighed and balanced. It is explained that as security is humanizing, the notion of sovereignty that organizes the world becomes dual-faceted, ‘shared’ between the state and the people. AAs such, while states have always been instruments at the service and security of their peoples and not vice versa, human security expresses a different understanding on what qualifies this service. State sovereignty does not guarantee human security. The peoples also have to be empowered. Thus for human security to be upheld, a balance has to be struck between the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the peoples, without one undermining or dominating the other.

The practice of collective human security
Practice also has an important influence on the collective security discourse. In the dialectic process the discourse is shaping practice on the one hand, and practice is discourse on the other. Thus, an analysis of collective security has to be based on both, allowing the changes in practice to inform theory. While key events such as the end of the Great Wars apply pressure for change by challenging the international community with significant questions, these changes in collective security have not appeared overnight. They have played out in a continuity of transitions—regulatory, structural and institutional—that have gone back and forth, driven by a number of forces. In parallel to the evolution of human security, collective security has operationalized human security through an intensification of the ratification of international norms and rules.

With new concepts and policies or discourses come a new criterion of legitimation and new rules. Addressing security in connection with development, traditional threats in connection with human security and states’ interests in connection with individual well-being is altering what constitutes international legitimacy and legal policy preferences and actions. In order to protect the peoples’ core values, international duties such as the ‘responsibility to protect’ are added to states’ right to self-help. In other words, not only does collective security have to be able to act without states asking for it, but it should also do so.

As the ‘self-help’ approach is gradually replaced with a ‘help-to-self-help’ logic that is about ensuring and enhancing individual empowerment and human fulfillment collective security has to be able to help develop diverse individual capabilities, and engage in transnational preventive development efforts that often involve some sort of intervention in states affairs. With the notion of shared state sovereignty, collective security is conditioned by a dual responsibility; an external responsibility to states (and their people), and an internal responsibility to the dignity and well-being of the people. Powers and authorities that have long been reserved for states are transferring or diffusing and extending to collective

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88 At the outset of the United Nations, the function of collective security was limited to the principle of self-help. States were allowed to resort to violence if their state sovereignty was violated, and collective security could only act if states asked them to do so. In other words, the only way for states to receive help was to help themselves either through reprisals or by asking collective security for help. See Hans Kelsen, ‘Collective Security and Collective Self-defense under the Charter of the United Nations’, The American Journal of International Law, Volume 42, Number 4, October 1948, pp. 783-796.

89 The idea of ‘help-to-self-help’ in international security is closely related to the mode of development assistance which in turn is based on the ancient idea that the best way to help people is to help them help themselves. In the practice of collective security, this has given rise to a concept that is increasingly referred to as ‘help-to-self-help’, particularly within peacebuilding. For more about the origin and logic about this approach, see W. C. Baum and S. M. Tolbert, Investing in Development: Lessons of World Bank Experience, the World Bank (New York, Oxford University Press, 1985); D. Ellerman, Helping People Help Themselves: From the World Bank to an Alternative Philosophy of Development Assistance (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan University Press, 2005); and Edward Newman and Roland Richmond, eds., The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2004).

security. A structure of global governance is evolving that is acquiring a certain independence to shape and implement collective security policies.\textsuperscript{91}

States and societies are undergoing important institutional changes in accordance with human security but also to develop human security.\textsuperscript{92} Some institutions adapt more than others, some more successfully than others, and few in the same way.\textsuperscript{93} But overall change can be noted in the making and implementation of defense and foreign policy, and in military alliance configurations moving away from traditional security practices towards safeguarding and promoting socio-economic integration and cooperation, civil and humanitarian assistance, and peaceful collective conflict resolution, reconstruction and state-building. Actors, policy areas and contexts that were previously separated are connected in a multi-dimensional and global framework for the practice of collective security.\textsuperscript{94} Collective security has come to include an ever-widening range of stakeholders engaging in ever-deepening epistemic networks. The means for security are changing into transnational policing institutions for a policy community that stretches beyond the state.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{91}For more on global governance, see Ann-Marie Slaughter, \textit{A New World Order} (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004) and Sandra Jean Maclean, David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., \textit{A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralism} (Ashgate Publishing, 2006).


\textsuperscript{93}Overall states have struggled to adapt to the ‘new security agenda’ and threats such as terrorism and intra-state conflict. Changes in policies to the end of humanizing security and addressing structural and asymmetrical threats have been accused of being counter-productive and even paradoxical. This is especially true for large Western powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom. See for example Michael C. Desch, ‘America’s Liberal Illiberalism: the Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy’, \textit{International Security}, Volume 32, Number 3, Winter 2007, pp. 7-43.


Together the regulatory, structural and institutional changes in the system of collective security indicate how the new global world order is turning out to be more problematic and challenging than anticipated for collective security. While the procedural concept with the inclusion of development and individual rights may provide useful building blocks for security analysis and a handy label for a broad category of research, the definitional vagueness and ambiguity of the concept is likely to undermine its practical value. Though it may be theoretically possible to outline the goals of human security in a relatively straightforward fashion, their operationalization is creating a transnational normative pluralism with unclear effects and meanings. Rather than there being more agreement or sound political counsel, and a more stable and harmonized world, competing understandings of security are becoming a potential breeding ground for conflict between political groups, within or between states. And unfortunately the problem cannot be remedied by simply narrowing the definition because it goes beyond this. The problem is also inherent to the concept and the tension between collective and individual security. “While a moral case for making individuals the ultimate referent object can be constructed, the cost to be paid is loss of analytical purchase on collective actors both as the main agents of security provisions and as possessors of a claim to survival in their own right”. Operationalizing a procedural, developmental and individualized concept of security in collective security arrangements that are justified by claims of an essential ‘human sameness’ is highly problematic. Collective security is legitimised by the fact that it is protecting fundamental core values that we all share by virtue of being human, based on the assumption of human integrity. If the universality of these core values is brought into doubt, collective security is likely to be accused of political bias, causing its legitimacy to be in limbo. The core values that justify collective human security are human rights and


individual freedoms. In other words, the assumption is that a person perceives his environment as ordered and therefore not threatening if he or she can enjoy these rights and freedoms. It follows that if we do not want to claim our human rights or enjoy our individual freedoms, there is something missing in our ability to realize what is in our best interest. The blame is placed upon the state for not fulfilling its responsibilities towards its citizens without considering whether the rights and freedoms defined in human security do indeed express everyone’s best interest. What starts out as a project to humanize security is likely to fail in its ambition to take the particular circumstances and opportunities of each and every individual into account.\(^{100}\)

2. The international security agenda: threats and risks

Drawing conclusions about the collective security discourse the understanding of threats must also be subject to analysis. What is perceived a threat changes over time according to the shifts in the understanding of security. In a dialectic process, the concepts of threats and security constantly define and redefine each other in international agreements and institutions influenced by states’ history, geographical and structural positions as well as their interactions with each other. On the one hand, what is considered a threat shapes security, and on the other, security shapes what we feel threatened by. The interplay between the two can be summarized in the international security agenda.

By revisiting the international institutionalization of security since the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century, four waves of the international security agenda can be identified; one post-World Wars, the next during the Cold War, another at the end of the Cold War, and the fourth at the turn of the century. Rather than diminishing, the international security agenda has grown with the development of the concept of human security. While intra-state wars have almost disappeared, new threats often conceptualized as risks, have appeared.

First, after the two World Wars, the fear of traditional warfare between states breaching state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention was the agenda’s main concern. Second, with the bipolar order settling in, political warfare or structural violence

was added little by little to the traditional items on the international security agenda. Third, as the end of the Cold War removed the greatest threat to collective security, the international security agenda reflected an unprecedented optimism for collective security. Fourth, as the global world unfolds, optimism is replaced with an international security agenda of risks, marked by ambiguity and uncertainty.

Two World Wars and a Cold War: first and second waves of the international security agenda

The world for which the UN was established was a world understood as anarchical either as a result of human nature or the sovereign state. World order played out as states joined together around the organizational principle of the primacy of state sovereignty protected by the universal principle of non-intervention—the backbone of the UN. In other words, as long as states did not wage war on each other, they did not constitute a threat to each other. Feelings of insecurity were contained by a zero-sum game where a certain balance of power was maintained by means of organized violence and force. Threats were exclusively wars between states, inter-state wars. This is the first wave of the international security agenda where threats are traditional warfare resulting from, and targeting, states. Security was understood in terms of official war declarations by one state against another, or by ‘attack’.

The picture of the world soon changed as two growing powers gradually split the world into what was to become almost half a century of bipolarity. At the end of the 1950s, the international security agenda evolved around nuclear threats and power politics. World order had to accommodate both the arms race and the more political deterrence game between the two superpowers. Through channels of communication and transparency, the world was reassured that if the two superpowers could play their game unchallenged, the situation would not escalate into open warfare and all parties involved would be less likely to suffer insecurities. The second wave of the international security agenda is therefore quite paradoxical, as total destruction is both the greatest threat and what saves everything from eternal destruction.

The international security agenda was increasingly defined by the bipolar set-up through the dominant foreign and international security policy of the two superpowers, and the limits that it put on collective security. The superpowers breached state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention on numerous occasions claiming to act in the name of
collective security. Together with the fact that the rivalry between the two superpowers made it well-nigh impossible to reach a consensus in the UN Security Council, the two states throughout the Cold War undermined the exclusive power of the Security Council to mandate interventions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus during the Cold War, enabling the two superpowers to put their interest and preferences at the top of the international security agenda reassured the world. This was the second wave of the agenda in which security is measured by states’ armament and disarmament, while underpinned by a constant ideological clash that hinders institutional and political, as well as practical, progress.

The end of the Cold War: a third wave of the international security agenda
The end of the Cold War marked a third wave of the international security agenda in which security is released from a tug of war between two camps that seemed to have been set in stone for half a century. When an end came to the world’s bipolar antagonistic set-up, a rapid military showdown took place. Francis Fukuyama famously proclaimed the ‘end of history’ meaning that now the ideological battle had come to an end. The world united around the victor and the universalization of Western liberal democracy. A year later, US President George H. W. Bush gave a now famous speech about the birth of a new world, free of the ideological battles of the past and with a future in which all nations are bound together to share benefits as well as costs. The conclusion, which was subsequently embraced by the international community, stated that in an interdependent world where we all are mutually vulnerable, prosperous and harmonious partnerships will take root, grow and blossom. As such, the third wave of the international security agenda is framed by the new

101 Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives the UN Security Council the power to determine when to intervene in the affairs of a state in order to address threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. It is often understood as the most powerful action that the United Nations can take. It is the only one that mandates the UN to military action. It gives rise to much controversy and it is meant to represent an exception, an occasional necessary evil that is only used when all other means have been exhausted. See Charter of the United Nations (New York, United Nations, 1945).


103 In a presidential address on September 17, 1990 to the US Congress regarding the Persian Gulf crisis, then US President George H. W. Bush spoke in favor of an international intervention in Iraq to protect a newly
global world of liberal democratic states, populated by threats to democracy. Feelings of insecurity are contained by liberal policy-making and democratization.

In 1992, then United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutrous-Ghali saw a ‘time of opportunity’ for security in the world, as states expressed an unprecedented commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. With the perception of mutual vulnerability spreading across the globe, the stakes of all parties involved in world order presumably rise. With new doors opening for the formal international institutionalization of security, universal peace seems within reach. The UN tried to seize this opportunity for collective security by reinventing itself in a framework of extensive international rules and norms. But because this widened and deepened the perimeters of the international agenda, it ended up adding new threats, rather than diminishing old ones, to the institutional framework. Hence, as the global world unfolded, the optimism diminished.

The end of the Cold War made security the subject of more debate than it had been since it was first internationally institutionalized and agreed upon, and with this, the raison d’être of collective security was also contested. This means that once the wind of change calmed down, things appeared as unclear, or even more unclear, as they had after the two World Wars. With threats no longer confined to states’ external relations, non-intervention alone no longer guarantees security. As the new world order settles in, rather than fostering trust and consolidating confidence, it gradually plants a wariness between states marked by suspicion rather than trust. That any actor or activity could potentially cause international insecurity induces feelings of insecurity, not security. As such, the post-Cold War reinvention of collective security ends up being driven by and fostering, feelings of uncertainty. The

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105 See In Larger Freedom where UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is drawing conclusions to this end. In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 March 2005 (A/59/2005).
106 Within days after the UNSG’s suggestions for reform were presented in 1997, staff and budget cuts were also announced in line with heavy pressure that especially the US had put on the Organization. The commitment to collective security, at least through the UN seemed to have faded as the overall view was that rather than enhancing more peace, the UN was not a very efficient or useful element for international security post-Cold War. Member-states in general, but especially the most powerful permanent five of the Security Council, expressed little trust in the UN as a vector of international security in the coming 21st century.
international security agenda is fuller than it was during the Cold War, and with threats that cut across and beyond state borders, is also more vague and ambiguous.

What war, which wars?: the fourth wave of the agenda

Not long after the end of the Cold War, the world began experiencing problems in managing the uncertainties of a global world. The UN suffered devastating failures when trying to address violence within states. Extreme civilian suffering played out under the eyes of the Organization. Among the worst are the genocides that took place in Rwanda and Srebrenica in 1994 and 1995, respectively. The international security agenda once again began to fill up. As the world entered the new millennium, two sets of threats stood out. One was related to the uncertainty of transitional states and, more precisely, to how new or young states turn out to be more war prone than the states that they replace. Rather than being peaceful states, they often develop into unstable entities that are potential breeding grounds for non-traditional violence. From this comes a second concern related to the unfamiliarity of the global world, and how it implies an uncertainty that induces insecurity rather than promotes security.  

What in the third wave began as an optimistic era for the resurrection of ‘new’ and freer states is gradually replaced, as we enter into the fourth, by a wariness of ‘weak’ states. The international security agenda is predominantly concerned with vague and invisible threats—asymmetrical rather than conventional threats—and with civil violence—structural rather than traditional violence. Feelings of insecurity come from expectations proven wrong about an interdependent world that is fully-inclusive, equitable and, as such, a positive force

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for all. The new global world order now really plays out to distinguish security in the 21st century from that of former eras. And unfortunately, the fluid and uncertain agenda that is taking root is not proving to be the source of security that was previously hoped for.

Already in 2003, UNSG Kofi Annan in his speech to the General Assembly, noted that states are not agreeing, let alone implementing, a global consensus regarding the nature of threats in the global world, or the extent of their implication. The world seems to neither know how to contain feelings of insecurity, nor what induces them in the first place. The UNSG therefore announced the appointment of a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change to answer the ‘burning question of the new century’. That is, what are the threats and challenges to world order in the new millennium? Two years later, the Report *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* summarized the threats of the fourth wave in five categories: intra-state and internal conflict; terrorism; transnational organized crime; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; and poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation. What these threats have in common is that they are transnational and multidimensional, they go deeper and beyond states’ external relations and processes. They are primarily man-made, but they may also be naturally induced or a combination of the two. Collective security can be threatened by actors as diverse as rogue states, terrorist networks and other private actors, or by activities ranging from non-state radical ideologies to transnational criminal elements, technologies and environmental disasters. However, this is not to say that threats cannot come from states.

The intentional fourth-wave threats consist of unconventional tactics, ambiguous in both place and time, that are directed against the system’s stronger powers. This makes them

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111 The report was released in 2004, two years after it was commissioned and the year when the UN celebrated its 60th anniversary by reviewing the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. The lengthy and detailed report identifies the main threats and provides some policy recommendations regarding how the UN is to come to terms with the international security agenda for the 21st century. See *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565 (New York, UN General Assembly, 2 December 2004).

asymmetrical. They are based on an idea of warfare that is not new to the 21st century, which pits one’s limited strength against a more powerful enemy’s weakness. Asymmetrical threats are about identifying and hitting an Achilles’ heel, which, in global order where international security is upheld by interdependence is mutual vulnerability. While attacks by one state on another have become more or less useless, the damage of violence directed at smaller civilian targets goes far beyond the context of any state. It is in these circumstances that the international security agenda is populated by non-conventional warfare and more precisely, by asymmetrical warfare.

Asymmetrical warfare is not confined to traditional violence but instead includes a wide variety of tactics ranging from suicide bombers to information warfare. It gains its strength from its un-conventionality. Using interdependence to induce feelings of insecurity and surprise, the unexpected is achieved by unfair fighting that breaks with military etiquette. Violence predominantly targets civilian infrastructure, not through wars between operational capabilities but between institutions and organizational arrangements, between rules and norms, between social forces. By capitalizing on the system’s weaknesses, asymmetrical warfare turns interdependence into a source of insecurity rather than security, by targeting the vulnerable—civilians and especially the poor, as well as women and children. This way, it incites states to take security measures that infringe on the freedoms and rights of an open global society. In other words, by weakening states, security is disrupted in a way that places the blame on interdependence, and the aim of the warfare to contradict the conclusions about the securitizing effects of a global world order. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, the London bombings on July 7 2005, and the Mumbai bombings on July 11, 2006, are all prime examples of this type of violence, especially in light of the retaliatory measures that states have taken in response to these attacks both at home and abroad.

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113 There is not one conceptual definition of asymmetrical threats and warfare. This, however, represents an inclusive summary of the term that is borrowed from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., published in 2006 as part of a series the explores international security in the 21st century in terms of Seven Revolutions, of which one is Conflict. See “Revolution 6: Conflict”, 7R: Seven Revolutions (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006). http://7revs.csis.org/pdf/conflict.pdf (accessed 3 June 2008).


115 For more about the threat of terrorism and world order post-9/11, see Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Moles, Martyrs and Sleepers: The End of the Hobbesian Project’, Ethnologia Europaea, Volume 33, Number 2, pp. 57-
The non-traditional violence of asymmetrical threats is structural, not in the sense initially defined by Johan Galtung where indirect violence is imposed by a powerful few on the weaker masses through structures and institutions to constrain them from progress. But it is structural in the sense that it is carried out by socio-political and economic means, through structures and institutions of a system that is perceived as imposed. Violence is practiced through an already existing system, by the ‘victims’ of that system, on that system. Not only does it cause inequality and a deprivation of rights, but the violence is also motivated and driven by perceptions about inequalities and rights deprivation. It amounts to sophisticated asymmetrical warfare that makes the enemy its own worst enemy. More concretely, new war theory outlines three characteristics of this structural violence based on how it plays out in practice. It (i) goes beyond traditional forms, (ii) applies new modes of warfare, and (iii) is financed by different non-state resources.

The uncertainty of the global world: a world of risks
As we enter the 21st century, an international consensus is taking root about how asymmetrical threats and structural violence are expanding to fill the void left behind by earlier threats. To describe security in the global world, both academic and policy discourse are increasingly labeling what I have referred to as fourth-wave threats as ‘risks’, and are trying to generate knowledge about the stakes and possibilities of collective security in a global world of risks. Qualitative security studies are drawing conclusions about how ‘being at global risk is the human condition’ in our world, and quantitative security analyses are carried out on ‘a world of risk’. The international security agenda is divided into intentional

117 The use of the term ‘New Wars’ comes from New War theories, most commonly connected to Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999).
118 “Being at risk is the way of being and ruling in the world of modernity; being at global risk is the human condition at the beginning of the 21st century”, Ulrich Beck, ‘Living in The World Risk Society’, HobHouse Memorial Public Lecture, London School of Economics, 15 February 2006, p. 2. For more about the policy discourse, see Alyson J. K. Bailes, ‘Introduction: A world of risk’, Sipri Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007), p. 1. SIPRI is an independent foundation established by the Swedish Parliament to conduct scientific research on questions of international peace and security. SIPRI has published an annual yearbook since 1968/1969 that addresses the following questions: (i) security and conflicts, (ii) military spending and armaments, and (iii) non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. The yearbook is based on wide-ranging data combined with sophisticated contextualization, and it is widely consulted by policy-makers and academics. The way in which it frames
and non-intentional risks; the latter cannot be prevented but only treated once they have occurred. Intentional risks include (i) direct military attacks by one state on another, (ii) internal armed conflicts, (iii) local and transnational terrorist activity, and (iv) a range of less physically violent actions that deprive persons of goods ranging from vital supplies and commodities to human and civic rights. Non-intentional risks include accidents, disasters and epidemics, both local and international, that relate to changes and trends in the (v) global environment. While this definition does not necessarily give us a clear and concrete picture of fourth-wave threats, it highlights the complexity of the collective security challenge in the new millennium that the UNSG set out to address in 2003. It also indicates that an international security of risks relate to fundamental shifts in collective security.

In a global ‘risk society’, the world is exposed to a constant risk assessment of the unknown in terms of what processes and relations, what actors, and what contexts may induce feelings of insecurity. It shifts the attention from how to address, as well as how to actually remedy threats, to complex negotiations on the definition of threats. As such, one of the key challenges for collective security in a global world is coming to terms with a reality in which anybody who takes a plane constitutes a risk and is therefore a potential threat; one may spread an infectious disease, one may decide to hijack and crash a plane, or, as a regular civilian traveler on a plane, one may give somebody else the opportunity to do so. In other words, with these threats on the international security agenda, collective security is not only threatened by risks themselves but also by the conceptual implications of an international security agenda that can neither be observed nor counted, let alone predicted, but rather only estimated, at best.

3. Human security and fourth-wave threats: the analytical, normative, and managerial security challenge of risks

If the system of collective security in the global world is about the advancement of human security, then the practice of collective security—that is, collective human security—amounts to reassuring the world that interdependence comes with the same benefits, and at the same

international security in the introduction’s heading is rather telling. For more information, see http://books.sipri.org/index_html?c_category_id=1 (accessed on 17 March 2008).
price, for all. As such, the international security agenda to the global world has been framed in a world of risks from which no one state can protect itself without the collective. \(^{119}\) To manage these risks between, within and across states and maintain order, an ambitious practice of collective human security is developing.

The last two decades of collective security have shown that managing risks is more of a challenge than initially anticipated. The agenda of risks is turning out to have unexpected destabilizing effects that have required the UN to engage in a practice of global governance which clashes with the organizational principles of the world. This opens up a series of questions with regard to agency that tell us that in the global world, collective security is not only a technical or analytical challenge, but also a normative one.

To inform theory, we look closer at the practice of collective security in the global world through a three-part classification of the security challenge of risks. First, a world of or at risk(s) is an analytical challenge for collective human security in terms of forming a multi-risk analytical model for the assessment of security. Second, it is a normative challenge to ensure that the assessment is relevant to those who are not directly involved in forming it. And third, it is a managerial challenge because of how it seems to require an international prescriptive and proactive policy stance.

**The analytical challenge of risks: forming a multi-risk analytical model**

With risks, the definition of threats is extended from the deliberate ending of human lives to the violation of rights that may be man-made or naturally caused. It is also extended to include the probability of spill-over and domino-effects beyond their direct location, in both space and time. Risks are everywhere and appear on a continuum with degrees rather than as opposites in a dichotomy. In the same way that any person taking a commercial flight may be a risk to you and me and to collective security, the weakness of any state may be a risk to all other states. Therefore, to grasp risks, a vast amount of in-depth information and knowledge about complex socio-political economic processes, natural phenomena and behavior must be collected. It must be identified and generated and then, so as to reveal anything about security, it must also be brought together. Risks must be contextualized and

their overall degree of ‘riskiness’ must be estimated in terms of impact and probability. This renders world order dependent upon sophisticated parameter techniques that are able to make comparisons in a complex yet comprehensive multi-risk analytical model. The unprecedented expertise that is required comes with the side-effect of enhancing the observer’s influence—his preferences and sense of responsibility—on the forming of the international security agenda.120

To this date there is no universal multi-risk analytical model that comprehensively defines, identifies and assesses threats in the 21st century. International organizations and states draw upon several different models depending on the purpose, and hence on the department or agency. Rarely do these models refer to each other or to the international security agenda or risks. They are, for example, needs assessments of states in transition, early warning indexes for weak states, or other models that try to measure risk, vulnerability and capacity in terms specific threats such as terrorism or natural disasters.121 In the absence of a global consensus on a free state, the accounts differ by choices and assumptions concerning democracy and liberalism. In essence, they differ based on the underlying ideal type, which means that they are formed on ideational rather than informational grounds. Overall, models build upon recent trends in comparative politics to compare and assess democracies rather than on international security studies and the security discourse. Analysis about degrees of democratization and transition are translated into degrees of security threats, i.e. into risks. But little consideration is given to which of these risks are more destabilizing for the world, when or how addressing one of the risks affects the other. This limits the analysis to the assumption that the positive relationship that has been noted between peace and democracy in the West is valid for not only world order but also for the system and practice of collective security.

The normative challenge of risks: universalizing the particular
Risks cannot be observed, but rather estimated, assessed, or possibly measured, because they are concerned with potential uncertainty that involves possibilities of undesirable outcomes, such as suffering harm, loss or danger. This means that risks cannot be traditionally defined

by listing fundamental characteristics of a precise meaning, or in dichotomous terms. They cannot be defined in object-subject constructions that juxtapose peace and war based on numbers of causalities and armaments, or in dimensions based on territoriality. Rather, they must be defined in the context in which they exist, which is a ‘this-as-well-as-that’ world rather than an ‘either-or’ world.

To form a multi-risk analytical model, agreements on cost-benefit calculations have to be made based on estimates about the probability of a risk occurring, multiplied by the estimated impact of the risk if it occurs. The analytical challenge that these calculations pose represents not only a technical but also a normative challenge. Choices have to be made between feelings of security and insecurity in particular contexts, and in relation to world order. The challenge amounts to a process of constantly defining and redefining threats on the basis of countless context-specific scenarios, but from a global point of view. It is about establishing benchmarks for specific risks that are threats in specific contexts at specific times, as well as for specific risks that are to be prioritized over others.

What is a risk to me is not necessarily one to you, or at least not to the same extent. Societies that are more at risk—for example, societies with a violent past—are more vulnerable and hence more likely to experience feelings of insecurity than societies with a stable past. This means that the challenge of setting universal benchmarks and standards as the only way to define security is enforced by how those that are most vulnerable are generally less able to take part in the global epistemic networks that provide the information on which these agreements are based. Decisions about security are most commonly made by those that are stronger, based on information that also comes predominantly from those that are the stronger. This means that societies at risk are likely to pay a higher price for collective security while being less likely to enjoy the benefits of participating in making any of these choices in the first place.

The cost-benefit calculations that go into understanding order in a world at risk make it difficult to deny that collective security is about mental constructs and preferences rather than about natural facts and observable processes. In a world organized around a concept that, due to its inherently subjective and pronounced reflexive nature, should logically not be defined universally, it becomes difficult to uphold collective security in a
system that justifies the demarcation of social settings and geographical areas by apolitical claims.\textsuperscript{122} This challenges the justificatory background of collective security.

The managerial challenge of risks: collectively strengthening states to combat feelings of insecurity

The analytical and normative challenges that a world at risk represents for collective security give rise to managerial challenges, which can be seen in three types of UN efforts to address risks which often all come together in multidimensional peacekeeping operations: military interventions, peacebuilding missions and electoral assistance. All of these are defined and investigated in detail in the subsequent chapters; however, let us now briefly consider why it is important for us to allow these practices to inform theory so as to identify questions for our analysis with regards to the normative dilemmas of collective human security.

Amidst the ambiguities of the world at risk, it is proving quite challenging for collective security to not become a system in which a powerful few are dominating a weaker mass. With the broader concept of human security, which includes more responsibilities, the practice of collective security is acquiring more means of enforcement. Multilateral military intervention to end wars as well as political regimes within states is one of these means. Since the end of the Cold War, these types of interventions have been increasingly initiated and led by the most powerful states. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is one of the more recent examples, as is NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo. To put it bluntly, non-traditional warfare prioritizes a certain collective security over national. Practice can inform us, however, that these interventions are more likely to transfer rather than eliminate the risks; it is for this reason that they have recently been referred to as ‘risk-transfer wars’. They are causing disproportionate suffering in the weaker states, both in terms of casualties and socio-economic and political losses, for the benefit of the stronger states that are in a position to act in the name of collective security.\textsuperscript{123}

Peacebuilding missions are deployed after intra-state wars as a follow-up mechanism to peacekeeping operations, ensuring the implementation of the peace agreements that have


been made within these states. Oftentimes the peacebuilding missions are confronted with societies that obstruct rather than contribute to the process. In order to achieve progress, they are therefore granted the authority to be directly involved in the national affairs of the post-conflict states. This way, the missions are be able to stabilize the post-conflict states to a certain extent, but at the cost of building weak states that are dependent on international assistance. As such, the means seem to put the end at risk, i.e. practice ends up weakening the state that it is meant to strengthen.\(^\text{124}\)

Electoral assistance is one of the key means by which the UN tries to strengthen post-conflict and other weak states, through democratization. But the securitizing effects of this assistance are not straightforward either. The results of elections that the UN has helped to organize and monitor tend to mirror old party divisions and are often contested. The legitimacy of the elected party is questioned and the results. The UN is left with the options to lead intrusive international policies to implement the election results, and dismiss some of the elected officials. In other words, to institutionalize rather than solve the conflict and undermine genuine democratization. Together with the fact that post-conflict states tend to have only limited democratic experience, the assistance often ends up leaving the electorate in a destabilizing state of confusion and alienation.\(^\text{125}\) Thus, while the assistance might make it possible for a post-conflict state to hold elections so as to reassure the world that it is on the path to democratization, for the state in question this often means holding premature elections that lock the state into an international dependency in which it makes little to no progress. In this light, collective human security appears to be a zero-sum game in which the system is confronted by practice, by managing some threats, it is creating new ones.\(^\text{126}\)

All of these practices are established to stabilize the global world and make it more predictable. However, in practice, they all seem to be doing the opposite, first, because they


\(^{126}\) Following the decision to accept the results of the Kenyan presidential elections held in December 2007 as a result of pressure from the international system, the benchmark for democratic elections was compromised in order to avoid an escalation of violence. In the aftermath of the Zimbabwean elections in March 2008, similar tendencies were noticed. The elections had put leaders who clearly committed electoral fraud in power. See Ola Säll, ‘Valfusk lönar sig för Afrikas ledare’, *Svenska Dagbladet*, 17 April 2008, www.svd.se/nyheter/utrikes/artikel-\_1148703.svd (accessed 18 April 2008).
all go against the principle of non-intervention, and second, because they all re-create or build weak states rather than eradicate them. In other words, practice tells us that human security is likely to undermine what remains the main unit of analysis and referent object for collective security, namely, the sovereign state. This ambiguous picture reveals an underlying incoherence that causes confusion about what is occurring and what is expected in the world. The incoherence is between understandings or conceptualizations of security and the organization of the world, between individualized human security and traditional collective security, each with its own justificatory background in terms of international rules and norms. Thus to organize a world of risks is far from just a definitional challenge for collective security. Rather, it is also a complex normative matter according to which the intensification of the intertwining of politics and security is perhaps the largest threat to the reinvention of collective security in the global world.

*Human security and the fourth-wave threats: a new system of international security?*

This brief look at the practice of collective security in a world of risks has given us indications that the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty no longer seem to be the ultimate priority on the international security agenda. States’ rights are increasingly outweighed by individual rights according to an individualized global or transnational frame of reference, better known as human security. The new understanding of security is based on the international community’s conclusion that the benefits of interdependence outweigh the accompanying costs of vulnerability because they are mutually shared. However, the cost-benefit calculation that this conclusion rests upon is experiencing some trouble as practice is showing that this price does not in fact come at the same cost for all. Post-Cold War developments indicate that mutual vulnerability is not upheld by the idea of a global world alone. Rather, international organizations such as the UN have had to try their best to reassure the world that it is interdependent and therefore, mutually vulnerable. But the task of managing feelings of insecurity in the global world is proving to be a highly political balancing act involving bridging two notions that used to be joined but which have only just separated, namely state sovereignty and individual sovereignty.

Collective human security implies a system that can grasp a state’s internal and external affairs in a wider transnational framework of reference that includes and sees
beyond, within, and across the state. On the one hand, the internal must be externalized, and
on the other, the external internalized. All processes and relations that have an impact on
the permanent risk of any state to disintegrate from within have to be included and
combined with estimates of what this means globally. In other words, the consequences of
all relations between representers and represented, between claims for representation, self-
determination, and ownership, in any given context, have to be considered. A whole
spectrum of state functions have to be overseen, ranging from public services to the rule of
law, in order to ensure that domestic policy is carried out according to international
standards. Collective security arrangements that function on an ad hoc basis are no longer
sufficient. Prescriptive agreements and constant proactive implementation have to be
undertaken in efforts that cross the borders and boundaries that traditionally frame security.

Since human security is defined by feelings of insecurity experienced by both
individuals and states, alternative channels of representation have to be available to states.
This burdens the global world with a problem regarding a dual representation of a national
and a world citizen, which is engendering competing views. State leaders indeed
acknowledge a shift in security, and draw conclusions about how “it is vital to our [the US]
national security that states be willing and able to meet the full range of their sovereign
responsibilities, both beyond their borders and within”. However, they are less willing to
admit to the importance and potential power that this grants international organizations. In
academia and among international policy-makers on the other hand, discussion about
security to a large extent revolves around the need for a legitimate agent that can consider

127 Internal violence is not new in the sense that it did not occur for the first time only 50 or 100 years ago.
Neither do all intra-state conflicts threaten international security. The same goes for terrorism. They are,
however, new on the international security agenda because of the externalization of the internal and the
internalization of the external. See Christopher Coker, ‘Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first
Studies (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002) and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, The
128 Friedrich Kratochwil, The Functions of International Organizations: Peacekeeping, Mediation, and Global
Policies, in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, International Organization: A Reader (New York,
129 For more about the global citizen, or the citizen of the world, see Diane Sabom, ‘U.N. Wants to Rule New
130 See Condoleezza Rice, ‘Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World’, Foreign
Affairs, Volume 87, Number 4, July/August 2008; Andrew Grice, ‘Transformed UN proposed to create ‘new
powerful leaders came together to discuss “Searching for a New World Order”,
when (as well as how or what) sovereignty is and is not violated. This role is most commonly ascribed to the UN but with different accounts of recommendations of how to take on such a role. Overall, a need is emphasized for the UN to be able to forcefully implement and enforce policy against the will of states. This involves overcoming a legitimacy dilemma of either failing to uphold security or going against the principle of non-intervention. It puts collective security, and more specifically the UN, at an important crossroads where in order to satisfy the global world’s high expectations, it must renounce the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty, and acquire agency strong enough to compensate for the loss of the backbone of its justificatory background. Some steps have already been taken to this end but they have not necessarily met expectations, nor have they played out without complications.

The last two decades have seen a fundamental restructuring of the world and the understanding of security. A global human frame of reference is evolving against claims of governance that compromise the organizational principles of world order without replacing them with new ones. Hence while traditional institutions and political landscapes are gradually being eradicated, the agreements on alternative or new collective organization arrangements remain largely absent. Until the UN member-states agree on the meaning and purpose of sovereignty in the global world, rather than a dual or shared sovereignty, we can identify a sovereignty void that is causing world insecurity. Summa summarum, the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty have not disappeared but parallel and interdependent organizational principles have also evolved. Together this gives rise to a world in which rights frameworks co-exist. And these rights frameworks not only compete, but they also clash. The consequences are costly, both in terms of monetary and human loss, and they come first and foremost at the expense of the most vulnerable. Therefore, it does not seem farfetched to draw the conclusion that given the way in which the world currently perceives itself, interacts, and functions, collective security in the global world requires: a transnational


system of global governance that can lead a practice that upholds the states’ mutual vulnerability, including international rights practices with universal standards for context dependent uncertainties; and guidelines for how to address the unforeseeable while ensuring that the costs are mutually shared. In other words, a system and a practice of collective security at the service of the human or the global citizen. It remains however, to see whether the international community is willing and able to agree upon, legitimize and implement such a system.

**Conclusion**

It was not long after the end of the Cold War that the nearly empty security agenda became one of the greatest security challenges. While international agreements have been made on the international security agenda, the practice of collective security that this has given rise to has opened up a virtual Pandora’s Box that haunts the global world with asymmetrical threats and structural violence. And as the two are confronted with each other, the high expectations that replaced the Cold War are increasingly contested by an insecurity dilemma of the world of and at risk.

The UN is largely unable not only to manage the fluid and uncertain fourth-wave agenda of international security, but also to grasp and define it. Collective security is faced with new complex analytical, normative and managerial challenges that put the Organization in the middle of a legitimacy dilemma involving competing rights frameworks. The UN is developing into an actor in its own right for the protection of the global citizen by means of international law, customary international law, and other forms of ‘soft power’, but the Organization also remains at the service of states. As such, it is faced with a task of bridging a clash between two justificatory backgrounds when it comes to defining and addressing the international security agenda. The ambiguity leaves security more open to being politicized—that is, more open to political manipulation of a powerful few.

Despite the problems that the practice of collective security is experiencing in the global world, neither the humanization of security, nor the system of collective security is under scrutiny. The two pictures of a world at risk and human security do not seem to match in a system of collective security that is underpinned by state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. This incoherence is resulting in an increasing number of costly efforts that are established to block new sources of risks but end up doing more damage than their
necessarily imperfect results can justify. As a result, the UN is not only undermining its own *raison d’être*—that is, its legitimacy in the global world—but is also undermining the legacy of collective security all together.

Against this background, I argue that the practical problems of collective security in the global world are not limited to the means. They also relate to the end in terms of unrealistic expectations that overlook discrepancies between human security and the justificatory background of collective security. If we look at the last twenty years of the practice of collective security, human security cannot be upheld in a world that is divided by traditional state boundaries or in a world that is left completely open, because mutual vulnerability does not seem to be natural. It requires regulations and governance. In other words, collective human security requires a system of collective security in its own right, a system of global governance that can ensure the mutual vulnerability of actors and organize the interdependent world peacefully.

In Chapter two, we turn from the system to the practice—that is, from security to peace. We look closer at the consequences of the legitimacy dilemma under which the UN operates to implement collective human security in a world of risks. What is meant by the success of collective security is analyzed on the basis of peace—how peace is defined and evaluated—in order to assess collective human security in subsequent chapters. The assumptions about the stabilizing effects of the global world, and the organizational potential of interdependence and mutual vulnerability are found to be reproduced in multidimensional peacekeeping. Conclusions about their practical consequences are drawn and put into the context of the challenge of reinventing collective security in the global world.
Chapter 2. Peace in the Global Order: A World of Weak States

Collective security is assessed by peace—that is, the more peace there is in the world, the more successful collective security is. The prophecies about collective security in the global world were justified by conclusions about an unprecedented commitment to peace defined as a future in which states ‘prosper and live in harmony’, and assumptions about how this commitment would translate into practice.\textsuperscript{133} The democratic peace paradigm about liberal states not fighting wars with each other was combined with theories about the ‘end of history’ and the liberal victory, to make predictions of how the world could very well be on its way to reaching the end of war all together.\textsuperscript{134} These conclusions about a universal solution to peace have since been supported by numbers with regard to a rapidly growing activity of the United Nations, with more peacekeeping operations deployed and more staff employed. The encompassing practice is taken as an indication of peace.\textsuperscript{135} But do more and wider reaching peacekeeping operations necessarily mean that the ambitious definition of peace as a project between states and progress within states is being successfully implemented between, within and across states? In other words, are numbers and size of peacekeeping operations alone indicative of how much peace there is in the world?

The common sense understanding of peace to a large extent comes out of the Christian and Western tradition. Based on the assumptions that war is more natural to man than peace, peace is an \textit{ideal} type in terms of the absolute absence of overt violence. Defined as the opposite of war, peace is considered so ontologically solid that there is no need for conceptualization. Rather, conclusions about peace are drawn on the basis of war.\textsuperscript{136} Thus as long as a state is not at war with another state, the situation is defined as peaceful. However, as we saw in the previous Chapter, while traditional wars between states may have decreased,


\textsuperscript{136} Oliver P. Richmond, \textit{The Transformation of Peace} (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005)
the threats on the international security agenda are increasing and demands upon collective security are growing. This suggests that the absence of traditional war no longer necessarily means peace. If we evaluate peace in terms of inter-state war, a state that suffers from civil conflict qualifies as peaceful while multilateral interventions represent a peace breached, neither of which is coherent with the aims and means of collective human security. Thus until we have identified how the peace with which the peoples are determined to leave succeeding generations translates into practice, we cannot establish whether peacebuilding is successful and hence, whether there is more peace in the world.\(^{137}\)

To draw conclusions about peace in the world, mainstream peace research looks at the overall peace in the world, while peace studies considers specific cases of peace within states. Whereas mainstream peace research focuses on international institutional aspects of peace as a universal project, peace studies tends to examine peace as a concept or a norm. If we try to combine these two analyses, we are left with little optimism about the prospects for peace, neither as progress within states encouraged by external factors, nor by peace as a universal project. Rather, a picture emerges that suggests that what was seen less than two decades ago as an unprecedented opportunity for peace, is proving to be a burden in terms of unattainable high expectations, which are, as such, creating uncertainty and instability. But despite track records that reveal how the UN is largely unable to ensure that the ambitious aims of peace are actually achieved in practice, more and more is being invested towards this end, both in terms of financial support and the power vested in the UN. The growing awareness of the costly consequences of the multidimensional peacekeeping operations being formed seems to be strengthening rather than weakening the commitment to peace.

This leaves us with the open question regarding what type of peace do we have to evaluate in order to assess collective security: peace as progress or peace as a project? I argue that with the help of insights from practice, we can see that it is a combination of the two, which neither peace research nor peace studies has been able to evaluate yet.

Against this backdrop, we first we turn to peace research to get a better idea of the conclusions and assumptions that underpin the idea of peace as a project and as a justificatory background for a system and practice of collective security to uphold a certain

\(^{137}\) As with the previous question, this question is asked based on the UN Charter, specifically the second section of the Preamble which states: “And for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security […].” *Charter of the United Nations* (New York, United Nations, 1945).
world order. We begin by tracing the intellectual roots of the liberal peace back to the classic liberals. We then continue through the Enlightenment via Europe’s political landscape to see how these thoughts, by encouraging states to cooperate for peace, led to almost one hundred years of peace between states in the 19th century, and in turn, how these developments fed into the evolution of the liberal notion of peace. We end up in the 20th century when we follow how the liberal peace outlived its greatest enemy—that is, the two World Wars—and emerged even stronger, as peace research formed the democratic peace paradigm on which the UN was established. In the second section, we look at the evolution of a practice of peace as a project that developed during the Cold War. The aims, objective and role of UN peacekeeping are analyzed in relation to the changes in the international security agenda and the political landscape. Conclusions are drawn about how the UN, through the practice of peacekeeping, has since 1945 gradually established a peacebuilding norm that extended the justificatory background of collective security from peace as a project between states, to peace as progress within states. Third and finally, we arrive at the evaluation of peace. We begin by identifying the general trends in the evaluation of peace and UN peacekeeping. Then, on the basis of a wider critical conceptualization of peace—a ‘positive peace’—we revisit the assumptions about the relationship between states’ commitment to peace and their practice. We end on a note about what constitutes peace in a global world order and draw some preliminary conclusions about the securitizing effects of the peacebuilding norm.

1. The project of universal peace: an international institutionalization of peace

Peace is not a new concept, nor is it an uncomplicated one. To the contrary, the meaning of peace has changed and shifted, and has been an integral part of conclusions about security and order since antiquity. In Plato’s polis we can find one of the earliest understandings of peace. The philosopher defines it as an ‘ideal form’ where there is an absolute absence of war between or within states. This is the understanding that underpinned the unfolding of European history until the Enlightenment movement began questioning the many givens of the world in the late 17th century. Until then, peace and war were studied together but as opposite concepts.

During the Enlightenment, a field of organized and purposeful scholarly activity with regard to peace gradually took shape. Distinguished by its research program and normative agenda and underpinned by a commitment to scientific rationality and analytical knowledge, research took shape based on active interactions with practice. Starting early on the findings were applied to politics and order, justifying certain socio-political orders and regimes for projects for peace driven by reason and proven facts, rather than by myths and superstition.\textsuperscript{139} What began with investigations of peace focusing on the causes of war has since evolved into inter-disciplinary studies of the causes of peace at the crossroads of theory and practice.\textsuperscript{140}

First, we revisit the dialogue between peace research and peace action or the institutionalization of peace to see how, together with the emergence of liberalism, peace evolved from a traditional clear dichotomous concept into a process. We begin with the roots of the classic liberals in Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, and move on to Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s thoughts about peace in the world. Second, we examine how the ideas about the liberal peace emerged together with the geopolitics of Europe at that time, and a growing interest of European states in collective security arrangements. Third, we arrive at the 20\textsuperscript{th} century ambition to institutionalize peace beyond Europe, the beginning and end of the League of Nations, the establishment of the United Nations and the forming of a democratic peace paradigm.

\textit{Peace according to the classic liberals: the beginning of peace research}

The Enlightenment was a time when classical liberals began what is today considered a trait of modernity, namely questioning authority and the justificatory background of rule. Faith in divinity was gradually replaced by human reason. Based on a materialist view of humanity, secular, liberal and democratic ideals emerged, and a utilitarian approach to the ethics of human coexistence developed. There was an optimism about human progress that made the possibility of avoiding war and establishing peace a subject worth looking into. Peace was increasingly viewed as achievable as long as the legal mechanisms were put in place that distributed rights and freedoms in such a way that individual liberty was guaranteed. But it

\textsuperscript{139} Hugh Miall, ‘What do Peace Studies Contribute Distinctively to the Study of Peace?’, Paper prepared for the 18\textsuperscript{th} International Peace Research Association Conference, Tampere, Finland, August 2000.

\textsuperscript{140} Oliver P. Richmond, \textit{The Transformation of Peace} (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).
was also, however, the responsibility and moral duty of all humans to seize this opportunity for peace. Based on a belief that human reason was key to resolving differences through non-violent negotiations, classical liberalism made peace into a project and set the agenda for future peace research.\textsuperscript{141}

As with all ideas, classical liberalism is not only a product of its time but also of its heritage. At least two ideas are worth mentioning. First, classic liberalism embraced Hugo Grotius’s discourse on the natural law of ‘war and peace’, and the idea of a universally binding law. The discourse is based on a belief in human uniformity according to which there are universal desires that are shared by all, thus making them fundamental rights. When upheld, these rights have pacifying effects. In order to uphold them, laws and regulations must be established that allow citizens and states to coexist according to a dual principle of coexistence and non-interference. Classic liberalism continued this search for a rational solution to war and a peaceful world order by drawing conclusions about ‘the universal’ based on individual morality. However, since Grotius focused on war—when and how war is just—it is somewhat misleading to refer to his work as peace research. But it remains that the Grotian idea of ‘just war’—its being or not being—is a central question for peace research today, leaving scholars divided into Grotians and non-Grotians.\textsuperscript{142}

Second, classic liberalism departed from the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’, exploring the circumstances under which man can escape nature and make war the exception rather than the rule. More precisely, on the one hand, classic liberals analyzed the sovereign closer, and on the other, they explored the ways in which the collective should be governed in order to satisfy human reason and make peace permanent.\textsuperscript{143} Unlike Hobbes, classical liberals did not see the solution to war in a hegemonic order with an absolute sovereign because to give up all freedoms would not be rational. Rather, for peace to be upheld, a central authority was to play the dual role of both an effective and a restricted government, that is, a government that both enforces the rule of law and defends its citizens against internal and external


\textsuperscript{142} Hugo Grotius, \textit{The Rights of War and Peace: Including the Law of Nature and Nations} (New York, Cosimo, 2007), originally published in 1625 with the title \textit{De Jure Belli ac Pacis}. See also Richard Tuck, \textit{The Right of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant} (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).

threats without imposing undue restrictions on human liberty. The balance and tension between these two functions still preoccupies liberal thought today. This implies another divergence from Hobbes in the view that liberals took of rationality as not necessarily conditioned by self-regarding ends and closed political communities.\textsuperscript{144} Thus, all in all, as Roland Paris concludes, “the classical liberals did not entirely dispense with the Leviathan. They domesticated it”.\textsuperscript{145} And they did so in order to move beyond it—that is, to normalize peace.

The idea that there is a positive relationship between the enjoyment of rights, the upholding of responsibilities and duties, and peaceful coexistence, formed the basis for the definition of peace as a project that developed throughout 18\textsuperscript{th} century Europe. One of the first people to recognize this correlation was John Locke. Already in 1690, he proclaimed that a ‘Glorious Revolution’ was in the making, as states governed by the people meant peaceful states. Peace would be achieved if states were bound by laws that could ensure effective and forceful action to satisfy the needs and emergencies of citizens. While the natural right to revolt had to be respected and protected, certain matters had to be left to the sovereign.\textsuperscript{146} From that time on, the conclusions about internal order became more and more sophisticated with increasingly specific accounts of the internal set-up of representative and firm government. What constitutes natural rights was an area for discussion and even dispute, and with it came different projects for peace.

The Enlightenment’s belief in reason and what it could achieve in terms of social organization engaged Europe in a search for the peaceful mode of government. This can be seen in how for example Alexander Hamilton and James Madison tried to convince the United States of America to establish a federal union. In a series of essays, they gave a detailed account of a permanent system of institutionalized checks on the exercise of the sovereign power.\textsuperscript{147} Others saw the need for regulating mechanisms other than the sovereign. Adam Smith, for example, argued that peace is also dependent upon a distribution

\textsuperscript{144} Andrew Linklater, \textit{Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations} (London, Macmillan, 1982).
of possession and property, which is better ruled by the ‘invisible hand’ of the market.\textsuperscript{148} John Stuart Mill also saw it necessary to limit the sovereign through the distribution of moral freedoms—that is of human liberty—by granting the individual the right to self-determination and making the legitimacy of the state dependent upon consensual processes of a free and intellectually vibrant civil society.\textsuperscript{149}

Conclusions about closed communities were gradually externalized and brought into a framework that considered the organization of states first in Europe and eventually in the rest of world. Theories about the legitimate political regime were applied to draw conclusions about universal peace. While William Penn saw a project of peace in a European parliament, a United States of Europe, guided and ruled by justice, Abbé de St-Pierre suggested a federal union that bound sovereign states together by treaty, to not intervene with each others’ affairs unless for reasons of self-defense.\textsuperscript{150} And in this way, many more underlined the importance of mutual defense arrangements in order for peace to be upheld between liberal states.\textsuperscript{151} Immanuel Kant presented one of the first elaborated accounts of this internal-external understanding of peace—that is, of the liberal peace.

Kant researched both the laws and rules of stable and just societies in terms of republican regimes, and the relations between these regimes, their connection to others and a universal peace. According to Kant, it was only the rational choice of man to live under the authority of his state as long as he is convinced of it being the rational choice of all other men to live under the authority of their state. Therefore, for man to leave the state of nature is not only dependent upon certain internal arrangements, it is also dependent upon the external, on man being continuously reassured of the fact that he is governed by universal principles. This reassurance can only come from mechanisms of influence, such as a constant flow of information. It requires a positive program for practical action that Kant envisioned as a system of states bound together by an ‘eternal peace treaty’ in a ‘pacific


\textsuperscript{150} William Penn, \textit{The Peace of Europe, the Fruits of Solitude: And Other Writings} (London, Everyman, 1993), pp. 5-22, originally published in 1693; and Abbé de Saint-Pierre, \textit{A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe}, 1714-1738, originally published in 1713.

\textsuperscript{151} An example often mentioned in this context is Baron de Montesquieu, \textit{Spirit of the Laws}, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, Harold S. Stone, eds. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1989), originally published in 1748.
federation’, or a ‘pacific union’ of states. As such, Kantian peace is an eternal project Toward Perpetual Peace in which globalization-like processes ensure that we are not just national citizens but also global citizens. Kant’s conceptualization of peace as a permanent union of particular polities to a large extent set the agenda for peace research on the ‘conditions of peace’. It is also important for security studies and the justificatory background of collective security.

**Researching to institutionalize peace: a project for peace**

The classic liberals did not only set an agenda for research on peace but also for an institutionalization of that project—that is, for collective security. In theory, it represents a larger ambition than that of institutionalizing security because of the progressive nature of the liberal peace. The task amounts to constructing a universal peace in which norms of domestic governance and international relations rule states and their citizens by mutual consent and a firm set of secular regimes and principles. It represents a reformist and progressive political project with a normative commitment to human uniformity and universalism, which translates into policies that connect private man and public citizen, or in other words, that connects particularism and universalism.

Throughout the 19th century, the liberal peace gradually altered state legitimacy. It was no longer enough for states to show that they controlled war. They also had to show that they were actively trying to overcome the behavior of war all together. European leaders increasingly justified their policies—both at home and abroad—in the name of a universal project for peace. Colonization and European imperialism were justified by liberal claims that were utilitarian on the one hand and normative on the other. While the utilitarian claims promoted the mutual benefits of free trade and the peaceful effects of the market, the normative claims argued that it was the moral duty of liberal states to civilize the less

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civilized for the benefit of universal peace. Great European powers engaged in projects for peace that in hindsight have been described as 'liberal benevolence' and 'thin domination'. Colonization and European imperialism did not exactly practice peace by peaceful means, nor did their result match up to what they had promised—individualism, egalitarianism and progress. And in addition, the more the benefits of territorial acquisition and control were realized, the more the non-peaceful means generated hostility and antagonistic feelings. Thus while Richard Bellamy identifies the 19th century as the era of liberalism, Andrew Williams notes how this is a time when the liberal consensus suffered perhaps its greatest defeat.

The great European losses in wars, famine, and other hardship meant that progress came at costs that had not been anticipated. Short of the liberal promises of equality, universality and amelioration, attention was turned to what had gone wrong and to an ‘ontological’ debate about what liberalism in practice meant. Debates departed from reservations regarding the liberal peace that had been achieved in the previous century with regard to the high expectations that were put upon universalism and rationality. One of the critics was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who early on raised concerns regarding how the responsibility of guaranteeing external moral behavior was likely to clash with fostering the internal bonds of national identity, which create loyalty between citizens. Rousseau saw humans in terms of their differences rather than their commonalities or unity and therefore, he saw the need for different conditions and different rules and laws. And although he did envision a solution in a firmer union between states and citizens in terms of a ‘social contract’, he also raised several reasons for why such arrangements would not necessary enhance the prospects for peace. The debate that emerged is crucial to how the liberal

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157 See John Gray’s definition of liberalism in *Liberalism* (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1986) p. 10
159 Jean-Jacques Rousseau ended up almost rejecting the assumption of human uniformity and contributed to Romanticism, the next philosophical trend marked by a rejection of reason and, a return to the heroic. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Ware, Wordsworth, 1998), originally published as *Du contrat social* in 1762. See also Stanley Hoffman, ‘Rousseau on War and Peace’, *The American Political Science Review*, Volume 57, Number 2, June 1963, pp. 317-333.
peace project in the 19th century shifted from capitalizing on the universal to remedying a tension between universal, natural and moral claims, and particularist communities.\textsuperscript{160}

In 1815, the major powers of Europe met at the Congress of Vienna in an attempt to construct a new peace in contrast to the Napoleonic wars (1803-1815), the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire (1806), and the previous century’s widespread incessant warfare in Europe despite the 1713 Peace of Utrecht.\textsuperscript{161} The solution was found in using territorial rearrangements as a way to uphold a balance of power—that is, to institutionalize peace. Throughout the negotiations, protests were made against the Congress’s procedures as only the Five Great Powers—Austria, France, Prussia, Russia and the United Kingdom—took part in the actual Congress. Moreover, the status quo arrangements of the Congress were also widely criticized for their radical anti-liberal nature. The Great Powers justified the set-up and focus of the Congress by choices that they were forced to make between peace and stability on the one hand, and liberties and civil rights on the other. But despite the ideological conflicts that the Congress triggered between the conservative aim of preserving the existing order and the liberal aim of continuing progress and the right to self-determination, peace was upheld among the major European states for nearly a century.\textsuperscript{162}

This is not to ignore, however, the inability to extend peace beyond the European states, nor the internal violence that took place within the European states during this time. But it remains that the Congress of Vienna is predominantly seen as a success for liberal peace.\textsuperscript{163}

The project for a European peace also played out in other institutional developments. In 1864, based on the ideas of Henri Dunant, the Geneva Convention set standards for the conduct of war and behavior during conflict, and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) was established as an international non-governmental body. In 1899 and 1907, the Hague conferences inaugurated an International Court of Justice, thus adding a legal dimension to the project of peace. Gradually, the liberal peace

\textsuperscript{160} Richard Bellamy, Rethinking Liberalism (London, Continuum, 2000), p. ix


\textsuperscript{162} Henry Kissinger is only one people after the First World War who came to praise the Congress of Vienna for maintaining peace in Europe. In fact, at the Paris Conference in 1918, a considerable amount of time was dedicated to the arrangements of the Congress. For a comparison between the Congress of Vienna and the Treaty of Utrecht, see Branislav L. Slantchev, ‘Territory and commitment: The Concert of Europe as self-enforcing equilibrium’, Security Studies, Volume 14, Issue 4, pp. 565-606.

\textsuperscript{163} See how for example Andrew Williams refers to this time as ‘the first great liberal century’. Andrew Williams, Liberalism and War: the Victors and the Vanquished (Oxon, Routledge, 2006), pp. 11-37.
became shared and supported by an international audience. However, the project focused on identifying the causes of war rather than the causes of peace. The liberal ambition of addressing the roots of conflict and eradicating war were restricted by the conservative order to a more modest aim of restoring the pre-war conditions and making war more human. While the idea of an institutionalization of peace engaged practice, it did so on the basis of a status quo ideal peace, rather than a progressive one. The liberal peace became key to European geopolitics but without fully convincing the leaders.\footnote{Oliver P. Richmond, \textit{The Transformation of Peace} (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), pp. 33-35.}

\textit{The universalization of the liberal peace: the democratic peace paradigm}

It was not until the 20\textsuperscript{th} century that the project of peace or collective security took off with international meetings, congresses and treaties, and included states beyond Europe as well as non-state actors.\footnote{In 1910, the Universal Peace Congress discussed the right to self-determination, colonialism and international law, and in 1913 issues of disarmament was the topic of discussion at the inauguration of a Peace Palace in The Hague.} It remained a subject for discussion, as well as for policy, before, during, between and after the two World Wars. Thus although the century of ‘total war’ reinforced some of the skepticism with regard to the liberal peace, it also gave incentives for extending the project. The increasing attention dedicated to peace in the world evolved into scholarly discourses, social movements and international think-tanks.\footnote{Andrew Williams, \textit{Liberalism and War: the Victors and the Vanquished} (Oxon, Routledge, 2006), pp. 38-69.}

With the establishment of the League of Nations, the efforts and attention to generating knowledge about peace grew significantly.\footnote{For more about Woodrow Wilson and his ideas regarding the establishment of the League of Nations, see the speech that is his last attempt to try to convince the US Congress to ratify the treaty: Woodrow Wilson, ‘A Final Statement in Support of the League of Nations’, delivered in Pueblo, CO, 25 September 1919, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/wilsonleagueofnations.htm (accessed 2 April 2007).} US President Woodrow Wilson was at the forefront of both of these developments. During the First World War, he revisited the Kantian idea of the institutionalization of peace based on the concepts and arrangements of the Congress of Vienna to explain the overwhelming challenge that the liberal peace had suffered at the height of its success. Rather than defeating the idea that human reason and morals come hand in hand, his belief in the peaceful potential of democratic states not only stood firm but it extended beyond the European states to a ‘Progressive Internationalism’.\footnote{For more about the Wilsonian vision, see Thomas J. Knoch, \textit{To End all Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order} (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992).}
Departing from assumptions about the outbreak of the First World War, such as “the nature of [industrial] warfare had outstripped liberals’ understanding of how to control it”, peace turned to quantitative research and scientific answers.169 In the systematic analysis of the historical experiences and causes of war, causal relations were established between societal developments and the onset of war, as well as between global governance, centralized state authority and war.170 But the accounts ended up being too scientific and too abstract to convince the world that international covenants would reassure mutually independent states and territorial integrity and as such, alter human nature and normalize peace. The League fell and the Second World War broke out.171

The signing of the UN Charter in 1945 represents the most global agreement on peace ever made; “we the peoples of the United Nations determined to save all succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, and “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours”.172 With these words, the UN Charter extended the understanding of peace beyond the contracting parties to a universal concept that included commitments to liberal causes such as human rights and self-determination. But peace research continued to pursue its empirical ambition focusing on issues of disarmament, arms control, and nuclear and chemical warfare, rather than examining the conditions of peace in terms of the distribution of certain freedoms and rights across borders.

In the post-war period, peace research became “an essentially social science area of mathematics and natural scientists”, driven by scholarly research and educational networks.173 Realists researched peace as a consequence of war, thus making war the ‘origin

169 Andrew Williams, Liberalism and War: the Victors and the Vanquished (Oxon, Routledge, 2006), p. 44. It is, however, slightly unfair to simplify a debate about the reasons for the outbreak of the First World War to this extent. After all, Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points from January 1918, which outlined the reasons for the outbreak of the war and the ways in which to end it, acknowledged that there may indeed be some structural problems of the system that the liberal peace has given rise to.

170 Studies differed with regard to the indicators for development, with some focusing on cultural elements, for example, and others on legal-political institutions. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics: Fluctuations of Social Relationships, War and Revolution, Volume 3 (New York, American Book Company, 1937), and Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1942).


172 See the preamble of the Charter to the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations was signed on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco, by the representatives of 50 countries. It was later signed by Poland to become one of the original 51 Member States. Basic Facts About the United Nations, updated ed. (New York, the United Nations, 2004).

of peace’ because of how it prevents its own continuation by exhausting participants and resources. One of the best known definitions of peace in this spirit is that of Hedley Bull, who describes the absence of war among states in a world order as being subordinated to the self-preservation of states. Peace could only be achieved by altering the natural course of things, organizing the world according to certain principles that, when upheld, make peace the rational choice over war. But liberal commitments soon made their way back into peace research, joining rather than replacing the scientific ambition, and developing into what can be described as a normative empirical enterprise. While the strategy of war remained a topic of research, it was considered in relation to, and eventually also in terms of, the bipolar ideological clash, development and global disparity and inequality.

It was not long into the 20th century before peace action had become a mobilizing force that connected people across the world in sophisticated networks for peace. International research centers, think-tanks and journals dedicated to peace were established, linking peace action to peace research and vice versa. To think and act with regard to peace became a discourse of its own, unique in the way in which it was situated and played out at the crossroads between action and research, and between the local and the global. The concept of peace was liberated from an internal-external dimension dichotomy and opened up to a multi-level framework in which the national was connected with the international and the international with the national.

As the notion of interdependence became relevant to peace, liberal institutionalists began to apply regime theory to conduct system analyses to draw conclusions about the

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176 It is often said that with the end of the Cold War, peace movements have unified to now be a concept of their, with the peace movement referring to one ideological and organizational form. As such, the peace movement in the 21st century is a unified global movement made up of complex and wide transnational networks that promote the idea of a universal peace not too far removed from the democratic peace paradigm in theory and practice. For more on social movements, see Donatella Della Portra and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2006), and April Carter, *Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945* (London and New York, Longman, 1992).
177 The official history of the institutionalization of peace is commonly said to have begun with the establishment of the Journal of Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan in 1957, and the founding of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) in 1959 and the Polemological Institute at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands in 1961.
relationship between states’ internal rule and peace in the world. Alongside realist peace research, large \( N \) studies were increasingly conducted on what regimes and circumstances serve peace better than others. The focus was on the preventive and transformative effects of specific regimes on the one hand, and on the role and impact of individual actors on the other. The analyses served to support the conclusions about democracy encouraging peaceful interactions among states through systematic empirical observations on the occurrence of war in the world. In 1964, the conclusion that “no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments” was drawn by Dean V. Babst, based on 116 major wars fought between 1789-1941, which had been generated by Quincy Wright already in 1942. Babst, a criminologist, made findings using methodologies unusual to international relations, thus attracting little attention. It took another decade before Melvin Small and J. David Singer confirmed Babst’s work and applied them to peace research. Despite the fact that Small and Singer denied the statistical significance of Babst’s account, the debate about a democratic peace had begun.

In the 1980s, a second round of debates about the democratic peace paradigm played out, this time with a considerably larger audience. The paradigm is often said to have been articulated first in a discussion between Rudolph J. Rummel and Michael W. Doyle, among other participants. All differences aside, the authors agreed that although democratic states are perhaps still engaged in war, they do so in territories other than their own, and not with other democratic states. The declaration of a ‘grand finding’ in terms of the democratic peace paradigm was made and a uniqueness of history proclaimed. Traditional violence was officially connected with structural and empirical with normative concerns.

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183 The democratic peace paradigm was proclaimed one of the most significant empirical finding of international relations. See Jack Levy: “the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations”. “Domestic Politics and War”, in Robert I. Rotberg, Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 88. But the democratic peace paradigm is also greatly contested. Disagreements are often expressed as
The democratic peace paradigm meant global fundamental changes to world order. It made peace a heated topic not just as war’s opposite, but in its own right, and the reason for forming of a progressive program of action for peace as opposed to avoiding and ending war. In 1984, peace was even made a fundamental human right—the right to peace. But at least three caveats can be noted with regard to conclusions about a commitment to universal peace as a project. First, the paradigm has not been able to reverse the world order organized by assumptions about war being more natural to man than peace. Peace is still discussed as a potential, and even though it is a very possible potential, it never defeats war as the constantly looming threat that man cannot escape. Second, although the paradigm proves that democratic states do not fight each other, it has not found a difference in the overall participation of democratic states in war. Thus as long as there are non-democratic states, the democratic peace paradigm cannot deliver universal peace. Third, the definition of democracy on which the data for the conclusions of these accounts are based is only minimal. Moreover, the definition of war that it uses is a traditional one. Therefore, conclusions about a democratic peace are drawn based on states that do not necessarily benefit from all the liberties and freedoms that define a full-fledged democracy, nor a peace beyond the absence of war. Many attempts have been made to remedy these weaknesses with little success. Hence, although the democratic peace paradigm has been embraced, the liberal peace project and its assumptions about human sameness and a universal solution to war remain to be confirmed by practice.

2. The progress of universal peace: United Nations peacekeeping

a divide between those who emphasize a liberal rather than a popular state and vice versa. Discussions are grounded in the normative assumptions of statehood where, in very general terms, the divide is between the realist Westphalians, who give priority to the principle of non-intervention, and the liberal post-Westphalians, who give priority to the upholding of human rights. For a general overview about the debates surrounding the democratic paradigm in the 20th century, see Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and, Steven E. Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1996).

The right to peace was institutionalized through the adoption of the *Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace*, by the UN General Assembly (GA/RES/39/11) on the November 12, 1984. The Declaration was initiated by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/73.htm (accessed 10 June 2008).

Recently a ‘realistic peace theory’ has been developed that parts with the idea of the security dilemma being systemic, instead ascribing it to particular sets of actors. See, for example, Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006).

This view is particularly clear in realist thought. See John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, *International Security*, Volume 15, Number 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56.
The United Nations represents by far the largest international commitment to peace that the world has possibly ever seen. The Organization is also the spearhead of what has become the largest international policy for peace that has ever been collectively enforced, namely UN peacekeeping. From the outset, it was foreseen that the UN should be able to reassure the collective of their mutual commitment to peace by sanctioning states that undermine peace. As such, there is a great deal to learn about peace from UN peacekeeping.

Charged with implementing the UN Charter, the UN has an important role in defining what is understood by peace. While it can do little to change the Charter, through practice the Organization has considerable influence over the aims, needs and means of peace. As such, the conceptual shifts in UN peacekeeping from peace enforcement, to peacekeeping, conflict prevention and peacebuilding within, between, and across states should not be overlooked.\textsuperscript{187}

First, we trace how the practice of peace as a project was conceptualized over the first six decades of UN peacekeeping. Second, we consider how the ambitious practice of UN peacekeeping developed around the end of the Cold War relates to shifts in the institutionalization of peace as a universal project. Third, we look closer at the ambitious concept of peacebuilding that is at the heart of UN peacekeeping today and therefore at what constitutes the universal project for peace in the global world order.

\textit{The practice of the UN since 1945: six decades of peacekeeping}

At the very outset of the UN, the Organization set out to enforce peace defined as the absence of inter-state wars. Initial attempts to this end led to little activity and were short-lived. As the Cold War developed, the UN gradually took on a different role. Increasingly, it brokered international negotiations between the two power blocks to create transparent diplomatic spaces. In the 1950s, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) of the time, Dag Hammarskjöld, introduced the term ‘peacekeeping’ together with the idea of interposing independent forces between parties in tension prior to a breakout of violence. Not mentioned in the UN Charter, there was from the outset an ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of such a practice. Hammarskjöld described it as the non-existent ‘Chapter-six-

and-a-half' of the Charter, at the crossroads between 'pacific settlement of disputes' (Chapter VI) and more forceful 'action with respect to [...] acts of aggression' (Chapter VII). Peacekeeping began to take action through truce supervision and encompassing mediational measures, but questions regarding when it was legitimate as well as what actors could legitimately carry it out continued to be raised. The practice was set out to be mandated only through the unanimous vote of the General Assembly, meaning all UN Member States.\footnote{The term peacekeeping comes with the concept of 'preventive diplomacy', first discussed by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. See Secretary-General's Report to the UN General Assembly, September 15, 1955 (A/2911), and the United Nations, signed on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco, Chapter VI and Chapter VII.}

In 1956, the first formal UN peacekeeping mission was deployed in the Suez Crisis in the Sinai peninsula (the UN Emergency Force, UNEF I).\footnote{But the UN was already present in conflicting states before formal peacekeeping missions. In 1948, a UN mediator and a group of UN military observers were placed in Palestine (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, UNTSO) to supervise the truce between the two newly established states and their neighbors. Within a year, a similar UN Military Observer Group was deployed in India and Pakistan. Both remain active to this day. Moreover, the UN has also been engaged in peace enforcement, such as in the 1950s when the US was authorized, under the auspice of the UN flag, to command forces in support of South Korea and later send civilian components. For more about the history of UN peacekeeping, see Norrie MacQueen, The United Nations Since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War (London, Longman, 1999).} The terms of engagement were consent, impartiality and a minimum use of force. Supported by an increasing number of political and operational conventions, these three principles became the 'the holy trinity' that defined traditional peacekeeping and termed practice.\footnote{For more about the 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping, see Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).} In the operations that followed, the UN gradually became more involved in the peace that it was initially only supposed to keep. In 1960, the largest, most complex and costliest operation up until that time, UN Operation in Congo (ONUC), officially deployed a civilian component alongside troops.\footnote{Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 172-183.}

The extended mandate soon proved to be much more politically complicated than expected. As a way to cope, peacekeeping was removed from the general UN budget and made dependent on the agreement of the more exclusive Security Council and the consensus of the Permanent Five.\footnote{The only five states among the 192 UN Member States that hold veto power on Security Council Resolutions are also called the Permanent Five. They are China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. For more about the set-up of the UN and the Security Council, see Basic Facts About the United Nations, updated ed. (New York, the United Nations, 2004).} However, fewer decision-makers did not lead to more decisions. To
the contrary, less UN peacekeeping operations were deployed in the 1970s than in any other
time in UN history, a trend that continued well into the 1980s.\textsuperscript{193}

With the Cold War winding down, the 1980s represent an important time of change.
It was not until 1988 that the first new peacekeeping operation was deployed. However, in
1989, one was established for verification and another for transitional assistance. The way in
which these three operations shifted from observation to verification to transitional
assistance reflects the political changes that were taking place as the world shifted from the
bipolar to post-Cold War order. As the world connected, the UN gradually moved away
from focusing exclusively on states’ external relations and interactions and increasingly
considered internal violence. The UN found itself faced with collapsed states, human rights
violations and humanitarian emergencies, all of which undermined the commitment to
peace. The Organization began to develop multidimensional operations that have been
labeled second-generation peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{194} These represent a shift in terms of the
operation’s political and social aims and their role in the field. Increasingly the role of the
UN took on a progressive character as opposed to keeping a \textit{status quo}. Not only was it set
up to monitor cease-fires but also to help develop the requisites for a stable peace.

Ironically, in the 1990s, an era hailed the most secure since the end of the Great
Wars, the willingness of states to support UN initiatives for peace took a drastic turn.
Peacekeeping operations doubled in number from those that had been established during the
Cold War, and staff numbers soon reached record highs.\textsuperscript{195} The Organization combined
peaceful means with the possibility of forceful management and protection. Together with
troops, it deployed flexible civilian components in peacekeeping operations that expanded or
retreated, and moved from classic to more preservative approaches, to pro-active change

\textsuperscript{193} Only three new missions were deployed (1973, 1974, and 1978): in 1973, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF
II), following in the footsteps of UNEF I, which was terminated in 1967.; in 1974, the UN Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF) to maintain and supervise the cease-fire and areas of separation between Israel and
Syria, following the Yom Kippur War; and in 1978, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm
Israeli withdrawal, restore international peace and security, and help Lebanese government restore effective
of Penguin Group, 2005), pp. 274-276. In 1988, the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group was established; in
1989 the UN Angola Verification Mission I; and also in 1989, the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia.

\textsuperscript{194} For more about second-generation peacekeeping, see J. Lewis Rasmussen, ‘Peacemaking in the Twenty-first
Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (Washington DC, United States Institute of

\textsuperscript{195} For more information, see www.un.org/dpko. See also, Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin,
adapted to each particular conflict. Shifts from observation to verification, transitional assistance and forceful management and protection brought together preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in encompassing peacebuilding projects. Peace enforcement was once again included in peacekeeping as the possibility of intervention in sovereign states was added to the practice of what had become third-generation peacekeeping. In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Peace Operations, also known as the Brahimi Report—a landmark for collective security—officially established three principal UN activities, namely: conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.¹⁹⁶

Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin note a triple transformation of UN peacekeeping in the 20th century in terms of quantity, quality, and normativity. By relating the means to the end, Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin analyze a dialectic process over and across different types of peacekeeping in a dynamic rather than unilinear manner. The process is framed by a fivefold typology. The first type is peace enforcement that, as originally envisioned in the Charter, imposes the will of the Security Council. Second, traditional peacekeeping on the basis of the holy trinity promotes liberal peace between states by creating a political space for negotiations. Third, peacebuilding missions or transitional administrations that manage transitions within states by facilitating the implementation of a political settlement. Fourth, wider peacekeeping with ad hoc responses to ongoing conflicts after the breakdown of a previous peace agreement. Fifth, wide peace-support that enforces a political agreement within states with robust military force combined with a strong civilian components.¹⁹⁷ The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the former Yugoslavia, established in 1992, pioneered these efforts.

Peacekeeping and the UN in the new Millennium: a ‘vision of collective security’ for the global world
The entry into the new millennium was a confusing time for the world. For the UN it brought fundamental practical changes as well as doctrinal shifts. An ambitious global

project for peace had emerged in which, “the UN increasingly finds itself in operations that seek to build or re-build the institutions of a state”. The core principles or the ‘holy trinity’ of classical or traditional peacekeeping were increasingly overshadowed by a much wider project for peace. Broadly speaking, the notion of consent was replaced with responsibility; impartiality with political state-building aims; and a minimum use of force with an encompassing and deep-reaching framework of guidance and assistance. The task of deploying operations within a state assumed a certain independence of the UN as an international actor in its own right. Over six decades of peacekeeping, the Organization had acquired a role that meant that it was expected to help solve complex state crises where there was no peace to keep and a role of defining peace within states by filling legitimacy voids in weak states with international legal and judicial tools.

At the 2005 World Summit, held on the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, the Member States embraced the UN’s suggestions for ‘a vision of collective security’ based especially on the concept of peacebuilding outlined in the UNSG Report *In Larger Freedom*. A commitment to long-term conflict management and humanitarian efforts within and across states was made and peacebuilding was firmly established as one of the principal aims of collective security. At the center of this vision was a dedication to ‘the responsibility to protect’ and ‘the responsibility to rebuild’. By embracing this vision, Member States

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199 The World Summit is the annual High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly that has been held since the Organization was first founded. For more about the ‘vision of collective security’, see *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, adopted by the UN General Assembly on March 21, 2005 (A/59/2005), especially paragraphs 74-86, and *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565 (New York, UN General Assembly, 2 December 2004), paragraphs 261-269.

recognized the need for the possibility of individual sovereignty trumping state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention when necessary, if peace were to be upheld in the 21st century. As such, the concept of peacebuilding has become one of the norms underpinning collective security in the new millennium. It grants the UN unprecedented powers in terms of defining and qualifying reality and distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate practices and actors. The Organization is seen as the most suitable actor since no other body has the legitimacy, impartiality or ability to draw on the broad cultural understandings and experiences of a wide range of administrative systems or organize transitional administration and transitional authority operations. These are all qualities and abilities that the Organization has consciously developed since its first day of activity but which it has only recently been mandated to actually carry out in practice.

When peacebuilding was established as a norm of collective security, most UN departments and agencies had already set up focal points for the project at headquarters. Some peacebuilding support offices had also been established in the field under the supervision of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA). But there was not yet a standing capacity for peacebuilding with the necessary authority to lead such a project. The institutional void with regard to peacebuilding was already noted in the Brahimi Report, which pointed out that the closest that the UN came to such a body was the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). The ECPS was established by the UNSG in 1997 to encourage inter-departmental and inter-agency horizontal and vertical cooperation and communication, between development and conflict management communities. But the Committee fell short of having the decision-making power that was initially envisaged and was unable to assume the role that it was intended to have. Early on the UN Department

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203 One of the first focal points for peacebuilding is the Emergency Response Division of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), established in 1994 to develop and coordinate the UNDP’s role in peacebuilding. In the field, peacebuilding support offices were set up in for example Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, the Central Africa, Tajikistan and ex-Yugoslavia. See, for example, Michele Griffin, The Helmet and the Hoe:
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) firmly underlined it intended to contribute to the project by securing the appropriate environment for building sustainable peace; but the project was not theirs to lead. Therefore, the Summit established two inter-connected inter-governmental bodies for peacebuilding at the heart of the UN Secretariat. By implementing structures for the institutionalization of peacebuilding at the highest levels, the Organization demonstrated a determination to establish the necessary authority to fulfill peacebuilding aims.  

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office (supported by a permanent Peacebuilding Fund) was charged with: coordinating and providing the UN system with coherent information and advice regarding the wide range of tasks involved in peacebuilding; mobilize and reassure sustained resources for peacebuilding; and actively ensure that peacebuilding was carried out in respect of the rule of law and human rights. Whereas the Commission was instituted more as a political body in the sense that it is comprised predominantly of representatives from Member States, the Support Office was instituted as a bureaucratic body run by international civil servants. Rather than creating a new means of peacekeeping, the two bodies were to increase the efficiency of the means already available. With the appropriate information, they were mandated to assure transparency and communication, sustained financial assistance, clear and consistent mandates, and the well-informed military and civilian personnel needed for rapid deployment and effective action. Moreover, in 2007 DPKO was restructured. With the

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The two concurrent resolutions that established the bodies are the ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 60/1. 2005, World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 (New York, United Nations, 24 October 2005), especially paragraphs 97-105; and ‘Security Council Resolution 1645(2005), S/RES/1645 (New York, United Nations, 20 December 2005). The bodies were inaugurated in June 2006.

Their mandates clearly show a dedication to the future by how they include aims such as: “integrate strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery”, “help ensure predictable financing”, “extend the period of attention by the international community”, and “develop best practices”. More precisely, they are set to: i) propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; ii) help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment; iii) extend the time of engagement in post-conflict recovery; and iv) develop best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration among political, military, humanitarian, and development actors. For more on the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, see http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/ (accessed 16 May 2007).
establishment of a Department of Field Support and a number of senior management posts, the Department and thus peacekeeping expanded to an unprecedented size and scope.\textsuperscript{207}

While the peacebuilding commission and support office were being set up, the DPKO presented a new reform strategy, \textit{Peace Operations 2010}, that focused a considerable amount on the correlation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The strategy aims to institutionalize a process of reflection with regard to collective security and the fundamental changes to the needs and tasks facing the Department. Two main types of recommendations are made, one to review the past and the other to revise the present.\textsuperscript{208} From this, the DPKO aims to better capitalize on the lessons that can be learned from experience and improve their understanding of the current state of affairs by engaging in a different kind of report-writing exercise. It has put in place the framework for the institutionalization of a self-assessment and self-evaluation process. From now on, a living Report is to be the authoritative guide and support for all peacekeeping activity—civilian, police, and military—at headquarters and in the field. The first Report published in 2008, the \textit{Capstone Doctrine}, includes recommendations for operations to “result [note, not build] in a sustainable peace”, specifying the areas in which progress is necessary. A particular emphasis is put on strengthening and professionalizing the planning, management and conduct of operations.\textsuperscript{209}

While DPKO endorses its ‘catalytic role’ in certain peacebuilding activities, it maintains that it has neither the budget nor the expertise or mandate “to comprehensively implement effective peacebuilding programmes”\textsuperscript{210}.


\textsuperscript{208} The Reform Strategy is part of a larger DPKO Report following the Brahimi Report, reflecting on the manner in which ‘tasks are performed, achievements accomplished and lessons learnt during the past five years’. The focus is on the following five key areas; personnel, doctrine, partnerships, resources, and organization. For more about \textit{Peace Operations 2010}, see \textit{Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Budget Performance for the Period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and Budget for the Period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007}, Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, A/60/969 (New York, United Nations, 24 February 2006), paragraphs 6-21.


Peacebuilding according to the UN: the concept and practice

The peacebuilding norm underpinned the practical and institutional changes of UN peacekeeping. The concept was already introduced in 1992 by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali but the ideas and normative commitment on which the concept was based were always present in the Organization. In An Agenda for Peace, peacebuilding was first mentioned as a practice used in the post-conflict phase to avoid a relapse into conflict by identifying and supporting the structures that strengthen and solidify peace. Three years later in Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, this rather practical description was rearticulated and was added to the principal strategies for peace and security alongside preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and disarmament, to name a few.\(^{211}\) Rather than being limited to a particular phase of a conflict, peacebuilding extended across a conflict spectrum in a framework of international security that is defined by long-term consolidation and “the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace” [emphasis added].\(^{212}\) It is an ambitious project that connects pre-conflict prevention with peace enforcement and peacekeeping.

In 2001, the Security Council established the working definition of peacebuilding for the Organization as: “preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict”.\(^{213}\) Whereas traditional peacekeeping is to maintain a condition, peacebuilding is to reverse weak states’ deterioration into failed states, by addressing the root causes of conflict and (re)constructing political and socio-economic structures for sustainable peace.\(^{214}\) This requires a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs, mechanisms and actors that depend on operational categories, mandates and structures that are different from past international practices or institutions. These come together in international administrations that makes it difficult to establish where peacebuilding begins or ends. The degree of direct governance that this peacebuilding project involves was


recently confirmed by the General Assembly adopting a Resolution to strengthen the capacity of the UN to manage and sustain peacekeeping.  

Using international rules and norms, the UN began to implement peacebuilding by peace agreements. It was not long before the Organization developed its own practice. Each peacebuilding effort includes multiple peace agreements—procedural (how), substantive (what), and organizational or institutional (who) agreements—that gradually connect ceasefires to political and legal arrangements. The agreements are based on direct negotiations between states and non-state actors about how to end a conflict and transform a peace process, and represent the beginning of negotiations rather than proof of their success. Fen Osler Hampson explains how “[a] negotiated peace agreement is little more than a road map to the peace process”. This way, the UN assists states in forming strategies that stretch from the immediate, temporary peaceful conditions to long-term reconstruction in line with international standards, and also in recognizing and responding to individual needs and particular processes of socio-political order. As such, the UN is setting out a standardizing framework in which civil order is consolidated and ‘a process of constitution making’ begins. The practice departs from the assumption that legitimate representation generates peace within a collectivity, which in turn makes for an externally peaceful actor—that is, a peaceful state, which is the foundation for a stable international as well as global order.

Within this framework, the practice of peace agreements predominantly follows a democracy sequencing strategy. The strategy gives rise to a model that through a certain sequencing and pacing of democratic processes prescribes transition from a weak to a stable state, based on the relationship between institutional frameworks and successful elections. A particularly crucial sequence of this model involves agreements on elections, the market and civil society. The emphasis is on holding elections and opening up both the market and

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society as a way to encourage the growth of an active and participatory civil society. This way, the UN aims to form incentive systems that can join conflicting representational claims around collective socio-economic goals. In essence, the Organization is prescribing a particular brand of participatory politics, a ‘one-size-fits-all model’ for democratization, to weak states defined in terms of a dual crisis of security and legitimacy.

An alternative model that is receiving increasing attention is democracy gradualism. Within the same practice of peace agreement framework, this model aims to establish several processes that facilitate the building of a democratic state simultaneously rather than in a certain sequence. The approach grows out of a growing skepticism towards the extent to which causal relations of a or the successful strategy exist, and recognition of how peace is the result of mutually reinforcing processes that interact in different ways in different contexts rather than a linear process. While democracy sequencing aims to establish electoral democracy, democracy gradualism aims for a libertarian democracy. The two models share the idea of universalism in terms of assumptions about how democratic government and a free civil society generate legitimacy within states.

Against this background, it becomes rather clear why the expression ‘liberal peacebuilding’ is increasingly used to describe how the concept of peacebuilding has been translated into practice. One of the authors of this term explains: “international organizations seem to have willingly embraced liberalization as the ‘natural’ solution to civil conflict and strategy for peacebuilding”. This ‘natural solution’ formula that underpins

peacebuilding, as well as all peacekeeping practices, is justified by the democratic peace paradigm, and assumptions about how the conclusions that have been drawn on the basis of states external relations can be extended to their internal affairs.

3. How to evaluate global peace: strengthening or breaching peace?

To evaluate peace in the global world is easier said than done. The evolution of the concept has been described as ‘acquiring the qualities of an intellectual black hole’. The ambiguities of the concept increasingly undermine the universal commitment to peace. The UN is accused of leading an illegitimate project and practice of peace motivated by norms rather than empirics. An important part of the problem lies within the difficulty of understanding, and therefore evaluating, a global peace that is both external and internal, but not universal—a positive peace.

Although peace is about so much more than war, evaluations of peace focus on either inter-state and intra-state wars. However, the two are not connected. Thus while conclusions are drawn about international peace between states or about internal peace within states, little is said about the relationship between the two—that is, about global peace. Questions regarding whether an external actor intervening in a state or post-conflict states where order depends on external assistance represents a breach of peace remain unanswered.

To get a better idea of what is meant by peace in the global world, we turn to conclusions drawn about the outcome of peacekeeping. First, we try to get an overview of the general trends in the evaluations of peacebuilding in practice. Second, we look to the more critical peace studies accounts to see how a more sophisticated conceptualization also gives us a more elaborate understanding of the problems, and therefore also different ideas about how to solve them. Third and finally, we draw some preliminary conclusions about the ways in which peacebuilding is failing, by briefly reviewing what the UN has achieved in the states that were part of the former Yugoslavia.

The burden of the ‘vision of collective security’ for the global world: the uncertainty of peacebuilding

There is a general consensus among academics and in policy discourse that the results of external actors’ attempts to strengthen peace within states have at best been mixed. Failure is the norm as peace has been strengthened on only a few occasions. The UNSG himself has noted that thus far the UN has a “[r]ecord of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements [that] is sadly blemished by some devastating failures”.223 Yet there is no clear understanding of what type of peace these operations are failing to implement. In other words, there is no criterion for success. Rather there is a range of accounts that use different conceptualizations of peace and apply different yardsticks, thus in different analyses of the problem.

Oliver Richmond identifies an artificial divide between studies on conflict and post-conflict states on the one hand, and studies on peace and peacebuilding on the other.224 Either a micro-analysis is conducted on practical aspects of implementation in response to particular conflicts or macro-analysis evaluates peacebuilding as a concept or norm and considers the raison d'être of peacebuilding as a project all together. Evaluations predominantly fall into the micro-analytical camp, conducted as part of realist or liberal institutionalist peace research investigating the causes and state of conflict rather than peace. Macro-analytical evaluations are a more recent trend, predominantly performed in peace studies, that focus on ethics as well as questions about constructed realities.

Micro-analytical evaluations focus on the instrumental or technical aspects of the implementation of peacebuilding. Peace is evaluated by standardized benchmarks in the shape of predefined targets, such as GDP levels and election time-lines. Problems are identified in terms of policy flaws in the sequencing and timing of peace agreements, as well


as in implementation coordination. While forms of electoral assistance, funds and policy advice are criticized, the standardizing framework—the practice of peace agreement and an international rights practice—is excluded a priori. Thus, any potential implications to the framework are overlooked, as are the model approach that they give rise to.\textsuperscript{225}

Macro-analysis approaches, on the other hand, see peacebuilding as a grand strategy and identify problems in the concept of peacebuilding or in the peacebuilding norm. In systems analysis of the overall experience of different peacebuilding projects rather than of individual case studies, the aims and goals set by policy are compared to practice. The evaluations are not so much about individual flawed international policies as they are about the general practice of multidimensional peacekeeping. Policy flaws are related to institutional or organizational weaknesses of collective security. Problems are identified with regard to the complexity of addressing internal state-society relations and particular institutional needs of states from an external, international and multilateral standing. It is highlighted that while the majority of conflicts end through negotiated settlements, wars reoccur within less than five years. But the less the UN is involved in peace, the less peace is sustained.\textsuperscript{226}

The way in which these evaluations are made based on different conceptualizations of peace leaves us with an incomplete picture of peace in the world. From this we can conclude that peace is no longer a solid, set and pre-defined concept and that this has destabilizing effects. It encourages us to look for a conceptualization of peace that is not necessarily founded on the basis of conflict and inter-state wars before we evaluate peace. In other words, it encourages us to find ways in which to conceptualize peace in the global world—that is, peace between, within and across states.

\section*{Peace studies}

Peace studies is a recent trend peace research that fully rejects the security dilemma, considers war as an unnatural and dysfunctional behavior, and conceptualizes peace on the

\textsuperscript{225} For such an evaluation, see Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, \textit{Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations} (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2006).

basis of meaning, conditions, and prerequisites of a positive peace, not war.\textsuperscript{227} It is far from a unified and coherent field of thought, but it brings together peace research that shares a normative commitment to a non-traditional understanding of peace—positive peace, and a dual concern with regard to the close relationship between realist and liberal institutionalist peace research and UN peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{228} At the outset the concern was with the simplified conceptualization of the liberal peace on which universal conclusions were drawn. More specifically, on the one hand, the concern was with how the UN was developing a practice to keep peace as the basis for an analysis of the causes of war. On the other hand, peace studies was concerned with the way in which a practice of keeping a particular peace was justifying a universal project that gradually put in place structures to the benefit of the West.\textsuperscript{229} This dual concern developed into sophisticated debates about positive peace that have become key to collective security.

Positive peace is defined on a continuum with two endpoints rather than as the opposite of war in a dichotomous framework. It is a learning and emancipatory process involving communication flows and value agreements, for example.\textsuperscript{230} “Peace does not exist outside of thought, interest and resultant policymaking, but is actually a result of them”.\textsuperscript{231} Harald Müller defines the positive notion with five main components. First, a positive peace requires the absence of traditional violence. Second, it is characterized by justice. This complicates the notion considerably since violence may be used to establish justice, and there are several concepts of justice. Third, a positive peace also relates to a concept of social relations within and between collectivities. Fourth, it includes the notion of time since it

\textsuperscript{227} Oliver P. Richmond, \textit{The Transformation of Peace} (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).


depends on a model process of declining violence and increasing justice. Fifth, a positive peace is both a state and a process that together enables interaction between individuals, social collectivities, and political units.  

With the structuralist understanding of a positive peace comes an understanding of the world in terms of socialized behaviors. War and peace are both learned behaviors. As such, peace studies tries to identify what legitimizes certain behaviors in societal structures based on what is considered by peace rather than what is normal and natural. Peace at all organizational levels of life is analyzed by decoding the deep assumptions of civilizations and the collective.  

In an anti-positivist vein, essential assumptions are challenged by identifying new questions with regard to present political conditions, and turning these questions into researchable propositions. The outcome is interdisciplinary dialogues that highlight cultural, ecological and gender aspects of peace. By drawing parallels with other applied sciences, natural science is combined with social science in a broad and deeply humanistic framework that integrates data and value. Studies are open to both quantitative and qualitative research, as well as comparative empirical studies, combined with what are often new methodologies.  

The ambition is to devise theory about how to build peace through peaceful means based on practice on the one hand and a normative commitment to a positive peace on the other.

Similarly to how critical security studies conceptualizes human security, positive peace studies purposely does not provide one definition of peace. Rather, it tries to form an all inclusive maximalist research agenda that fully grasps the encompassing processes of peace, each according to their particular context—that is, according to their political context. Since evaluations of peace must take into account the normative contingency of

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what represents peace in that particular society, they cannot be performed based on a certain fixed set of standards. One way of doing this is to evaluate peace on the basis of factors that may be enhancing or spoiling peace. These factors include a broad range of actors, such as rebel groups, insurgents, diasporas and governments, and processes and tactics ranging from natural resources to corrupt governments or even peacebuilding policy. Without one general template, the point is to allow each particular evaluation to be done based on its particular conceptualization by informing the evaluator of the wide variety of processes and relations that are likely to have an impact but may also not have an impact.237

Two debates regarding the problems of peacebuilding can be noted. First, one of the perverse outgrowths of the democratic peace paradigm involves reintroducing the just war theory to collective security. The debate revolves around whether the responsibilities and rights of the peacebuilding norm such as ‘the responsibility to protect’ and ‘the right to peace’ can and should be used to legitimate war by the right peace—that is, the democratic peace justifying war in terms of intervention.238 This is closely connected to another big debate on peacebuilding in regard to the ‘one-size-fits-all-model’. The model is not only discussed as a flawed practice but increasingly also as a project of European imperialism that is developing under the guise of a rights-practice in the name of peace and democracy.239

Although critical evaluations of peace are honorable attempts to come to terms with the practice of peacebuilding, they also leave many questions open and few general policy recommendations emerge from their evaluative framework. However, peace studies also teaches us that because the peace of the peacebuilding norm cannot be generalized, we should not try to do so. Thus far, the critical evaluations have inspired the idea of a toolbox, as opposed to a model approach to peacebuilding, from which tools in the form of information about ‘spoilers’ and ‘spoiling’ of peace are mixed and matched in models of


238 This situation is both a product and a producer of the notion of just war against the justificatory background of the liberal democratic peace paradigm. For more on this, see Jean Bethke Elshstein, Just War Theory (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991), or Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).

democracy gradualism. But the approach assumes that an international peacebuilding actor is equipped with both the sophisticated knowledge and power needed to independently make and implement decisions, which is a role with which the UN, from what we have seen, is likely to struggle and for which few recommendations are made.

The success and failure of peacebuilding
By combining micro- and macro-analysis in a critical framework, some preliminary conclusions about peace in the global world can be drawn, which can serve as a point of departure for more in-depth analysis. Since the UN first became involved in the former Yugoslavia, encompassing peacebuilding efforts have taken place in the region. Already in the 1990s, speculation was made about flawed interventions into these states, especially those in Srebrenica in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. And more recently, evaluations have helped to draw conclusions about peace and the longstanding international administrations that still do not appear to have viable exit-strategies. If we look at the states of the former Yugoslavia where the UN is still present, we see that what has been classified as ‘mixed’ results or relative success represent at best nothing more than states stagnated in transition with empty or non-responsive institutions.

The majority of the states of the former Yugoslavia remain weak states. They are dependent on the international community for legitimate statehood rather than on their own state. Individuals and societies are reduced to subjects that are protected by and must answer to international institutional arrangements rather than the domestic audience. Without active citizens, the processes that allow a participatory state to grow remain absent and thus the states fall short of ownership and self-determination. Socio-political behaviors fail to legitimize the state, responsibility is not taken and participation is not exercised. Perceptions


of insecurity and feelings of exclusion and alienation are likely to undermine the emergence of the responsive and representative state that underpins liberal peace.

With these citizenless weak states, which despite longstanding efforts neither become stronger nor more stable or predictable, we end up with a world that David Chandler has described as marked by a growing ‘culture of dependency’. Weak states are stuck in a deadlock, incapable of acting fully as international equals or as sovereigns in the domestic context. Another way of perceiving these states is as victims of ‘a sovereignty gap’, states that are trapped in a situation of poverty and misgovernment, which excludes them from the liberal peace and globalization. These states are far from benefitting from the internal conditions that define the liberal, let alone the positive peace on which conclusions about the democratic peace and the global order have been based. They are weak and illegitimate states. If this is what is meant by building peace, then not only are the aims set out in the concepts not met in practice, but peacebuilding is adding rather than subtracting items from the international security agenda. Moreover, it confronts the UN with complicated normative questions about whether the supervised stagnated post-conflict states are strengthening peace even as human rights are being violated and the right to self-determination is being infringed upon.

With the practical implications of peacebuilding at hand, it seems a fair question to ask what type of peace the global world is actually committing to? Conclusions drawn in comparative politics about democratic states and democratization can tell us more about what these problems are. First of all, the fact that there is not one general definition of democracy sheds doubt on how state-building can be a universal project. Established democracies range from parliamentary republics to constitutional monarchies, all with individual internal institutional set-ups that have been established according to the particular needs and resources of each state. Second, keeping in mind that democratization within established democratic states is a one-time transition but rather a long-term process within


particular settings, and often involving violence, brings this point home. In fact, the early liberals warned that if freedom is imposed upon a foreign people who are themselves not in a position to win it, they will not have the political capacities needed to hold on to it. Third, comparative politics warns about how state-building that is carried out based on assumptions and conclusions about rationality, which have been made independently of the individuals or societies concerned, is likely to distance the representers from the represented and lead to politics that manufacture the will, interest and fate of the people rather than vice versa.

Surely, however, this is something that the UN and other international peacebuilders are aware of. Hence there must be another side to global peace. If we consider post-conflict states that are short of ownership or of self-determination as peaceful, we can draw the conclusion that even though the ambitious aims of positive peace are not achieved, within states peacebuilding is a success. Moreover, it suggests that weak dependent states are more peaceful than weak independent states and therefore, that failed peacebuilding is more of a success for collective security than failed states. This firmly reveals a normative commitment whereby peacebuilding is not only about actually building peace but is also about reassuring states that the world is committed to the idea of trying to do so collectively. In other words, the commitment to peace that the expansion of the peacebuilding norm expresses is a commitment to the pacifying idea of collective security rather than to the actual practical pacification. Thus the normative commitment of the peacebuilding norm lies perhaps not so much in practical results of positive peace as it does in collective security and a universal project for peace. Peacebuilding is not so much about protecting peoples as it is about protecting the idea of a universal commitment to peace. Hence the positive conclusions about peace refer to the universal commitment to positive peace and the peacebuilding norm. How otherwise could a practice insist on a project with a success rate that is so close to non-existent?


Conclusion

Peace was long one of the few uncontested ontologically constant concepts of the world. Once this began to change with the international institutionalization and practice of peace, the stabilizing function of the concept was undermined. The implications of a practice that is trying to achieve a certain type of progress within states have become quite serious. Both the project and a practice are likely to work for something that is unknown or possibly even perceived as wrong. As a result, a vast amount of resources are invested in a practice that is struggling to deliver the project. Some estimates suggest that a quarter, or even half, of all peace agreements that have been made by states with the help of external assistance have failed within the first five years after signing.\textsuperscript{249} Thus, in order for the commitment to universal peace to be sustained, we need to connect the internal and external order of states to draw conclusions about the global world that reassure the peoples of their peaceful intentions.

Since the revival of the democratic peace paradigm, collective security has struggled to negotiate a consensus on what constitutes peace that can replace the Cold War justificatory background based on the war-peace distinction. In other words, the world has agreed to expand the understanding of peace by moving away from the traditional one. It has not, however, agreed on what to replace it with. The resulting disagreements are causing confusion and instability. The UN is not only mandated to uphold peace between states but also to uphold and promote an ambitious understanding of peace between, within and across states. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the UN to match words with actions. Without agreements on where the problem lies, the international community is divided between a traditional camp and a more human or structured one, the realist Westphalian peace that gives priority to the principle of non-intervention and the liberal post-Westphalian peace that gives priority to upholding human rights.\textsuperscript{250} A clash arises between peace as a project and

\textsuperscript{249} For the approximate 50\% failure of peace agreements within five years of signing, widely cited in academia and policy circles, see Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott, Harvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, \textit{Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy} (Oxford, Oxford University Press with Washington, the World Bank Publications, 2003). However, the number has more recently been challenged by the much lower and more precise estimation of 23\%; see Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset, ‘What’s in Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War’, \textit{International Peacekeeping}, Volume 14, Number 2, April 2007, pp. 195-203.

peace as progress. Hence, depicting the world and forming an idea about its current state in terms of peace and security has become a serious security challenge in and of itself.

Against this background, we must become better acquainted with peace in post-conflict states and how it relates to collective security. I suggest that we consider what comparative politics reveals about how peace as a project is translated into practice. More precisely, studies of democratization and state-building can also help to understand peace as progress that is based on the aims of human security and positive peace—that is, peace from the specific context of post-conflict states but in compliance with certain international standards and rules. These two aspects can then be combined to shed light on the nature of the problems of peace and security in the global world. To this end, we now turn to a review of multidimensional peacekeeping operations in order to outline an analytical framework in which the practice for peace can inform the theories about security.
Chapter 3. Collective Security in the Global Order: The Positive Effects of UN Peacekeeping

In Chapter One, we saw that the fundamental shift from a bipolar to a global world order has been interpreted as the reinvention of collective security. In the subsequent Chapter, we investigated how the humanization of security relates to changes in the international institutionalization of peace. We found that a vision of collective security and a practice of multidimensional peacekeeping have evolved through extending the liberal democratic peace paradigm to states’ internal affairs and a peacebuilding norm. But we also found that a new insecurity dilemma has arisen in terms of a growing international security agenda, which the UN is struggling to address. While multidimensional peacekeeping operations may be able to keep peace between states, they do not seem to be building self-sustainable peace within states. This left us with a number of questions regarding collective security in the global world. I suggested that we tackle this puzzle by looking at the assessment of collective security and, more precisely, at the review and evaluation of multidimensional peacekeeping. Thus, in order to get a better idea of what stabilizes the global world, we now ask what are the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping? In other words, what constitutes successful peacekeeping in the global world order?

In the last decade, both international practitioners and scholars have come to the conclusion that despite some devastating failures, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are worthwhile pursuits. Broadly speaking, these conclusions are justified by observations about the decrease of inter-state wars and traditional violence, and the unprecedented growth of UN peacekeeping and negotiated peace agreements—that is, by findings about states.251 However, as we have seen, collective security in the global world goes beyond ‘saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war[s]’ between states, by also regulating claims for self-determination and violations of human rights within and across states.

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Thus the conclusions about the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping are drawn based on assumptions about what states’ behavior says about the peoples that they represent. First, certain peacebuilding processes are expected to follow the successful termination of the peacekeeping mandate. Second, these expected processes within post-conflict states are expected to extend beyond the post-conflict states and also stabilize relations between states. Third, independently of the processes within the post-conflict states, the multidimensional peacekeeping operations are assumed to consolidate peace across states by reassuring the global world of its mutual commitment to collective security. But if we look at the weak and internationally dependent post-conflict states that multidimensional peacekeeping has left behind, we find little indication that these assumptions are actually confirmed by practice.

While security studies has recognized that collective security has undergone fundamental shifts, both UN and peacekeeping literature have been largely unable to develop the sophisticated analytical tools that are required to assess this ambitious peace in practice. In superficial problems-solving analyses of the mandate performance, the UN reviews predominantly institutional and organizational learning, and the literature evaluates peace within the post-conflict states, five years after the termination of their mandates, with types and indicators that are established based on traditional war-peace dichotomies. Little room is left for a more holistic analysis using degrees and variations that takes into account changes and shifts over time and across borders. Only part of the processes of the post-conflict states—peace as progress—and the process of the UN and collective security—peace as a project—are reviewed and evaluated, and very rarely are they connected to each other. As a result, many of the problems that multidimensional peacekeeping face are

252 The question is based on the first paragraph of the Preamble of the UN Charter. It reads: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Charter of the United Nations (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1945).


254 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006) is the perhaps best known and most encompassing study of post-Cold War peacekeeping, conducted from a liberal point of view. Roland Paris is more critical of current...
overlooked and the challenge that they constitute for collective security is poorly perceived and, as such, underestimated. Thus until peacekeeping is connected with peacebuilding and put into the context of collective security in the global world, the important structural and normative challenges of collective security as a system and as a practice of peace-as-global-governance will continue to be mistaken for institutional or organizational and instrumental or technical problems.

Against this background, I argue that the assessment of collective security in the global world suffers from an analytical gap related to the processes of a global world. The gap manifests itself in lofty assumptions about a mutually reinforcing relationship between international peacekeeping and internal peacebuilding. As multidimensional peacekeeping continues to grow, the gap is reinforcing a knowledge void regarding the success of these operations, which is increasingly taking its toll on collective security. UN peacekeepers are left to deal with normative dilemmas involving implementing competing and sometimes even conflicting securitization aims, and the UN, as an organization of international civil servants, is put in charge of a project and a practice of peace-as-global-governance that are undoubtedly political. When in charge of a project and a practice for universal peace, an aim that was articulated as far back as in the Enlightenment, the UN is frequently accused of breaching international legitimacy and the Member States increasingly question their mutual commitment to peace. In order for the failures of multidimensional peacekeeping to not become the failure of the reinvention of collective security, it is crucial that we understand the justificatory background for collective security and what is perceived to stabilize the global world. More precisely, we need to get a clearer idea of the analytical gap related to multidimensional peacekeeping and then consider ways in which to fill the knowledge void;

peacekeeping practices, advancing his own vision of how peace is better built after civil war through what he calls 'institutionalization before liberalization'. Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004). Finally, Michael Barnett also criticizes liberal peacebuilding and proposes a third way in which to help states recover from war and foster stability and legitimacy. Like Paris, he underlines the importance of stable institutions but he also emphasizes that these are best established through the republican principles of deliberation, constitutionalism and representation. In other words, his approach is even more open to improvisation and local varieties as he notes that republican peacebuilding does not necessarily result in the liberal model, and that this alone does not mean that the mode has failed. Michael Barnett, ‘Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War’, *International Security*, Volume 30, Number 4, Spring 2006, pp. 87-112.

we must revisit the notion of success that the UN lessons learned and peacekeeping literature are reviewing and evaluating, consider to what extent it is representative of what has been agreed upon in theory, and outline an alternative analytical framework that aims to inform theory by practice.

First, we look at how the UN has reviewed peacekeeping since the deployment of the first operation. Rather than settling on one definition of successful peacekeeping that is evaluated across operations, the UN has developed a set of revisionary processes through which success is continuously redefined. These processes generate lessons learned on the basis of which policy recommendations are made for collective security. How are the lessons learned, what is their role and what do they say? Second, we turn to the peacekeeping literature that has developed alongside with the UN reviews. Based on three findings that have emerged in the literature, the evaluations predominantly depart from a general consensus about positive impacts of multidimensional peacekeeping, despite devastating peacekeeping failures like Srebrenica, for example, and the highly debatable success of peacebuilding throughout this region. Where does this consensus come from, how it is articulated in the current literature, and what are its consequences?

Third and finally, I argue that this leaves us with a limited analytical framework with which to review multidimensional peacekeeping and analyze collective security in the global world. In an attempt to inform theory by practice, I split the understanding of success into three separate yet interlinked categories, namely: peacekeeping as a concept, peacekeeping as a practice—both of which are about peace as progress—and peacekeeping as a project. Using this three-part or triangular analytical framework, I hope to gain some clarity regarding whether the growing international ‘culture of dependency’ is a threat to, or a threat of, collective security in the global world; do ‘phantom states’, ‘hybrid polities’ or ‘pseudo-state polities’ threaten or stabilize the world? All in all, I use the evaluation of multidimensional peacekeeping as a way to analyze collective security in the global world.  

1. The UN reviews of peacekeeping: international revisionary processes

Since the UN is not expecting war to disappear, collective security is just as much about ensuring the Member States of their mutual commitment to peace as it is about working towards universal peace. Reassurance comes from the UN generating and disseminating information about the effectiveness of collective security. An important part of this information comes from reviews of UN peacekeeping and their conclusions about the collective benefits of peacekeeping operations.

As there is no clear definition of peacekeeping in the UN Charter, and the UN itself explains that peacekeeping by nature defies simple definition, what constitutes the success of an operation is continuously redefined in a dialectic process between practice and theory. What constitutes success is dependent both on the crisis at hand and the lessons learned from past operations. While the contingency of success helps the UN to create more realistic expectations, it also makes it difficult to draw general conclusions about the effects of peacekeeping across operations.

UN reviews of peacekeeping have developed from ad hoc report-writing qualifying success by the ‘holy trinity’, to continuous systematic reviewing of the implementation of the individual peacekeeping mandates, to revisionary benchmarking processes that try to combine the conceptual and practical aspects of peacekeeping success. As such, three overlapping phases can be identified. First, the UN defined its practice based on the experience of the League of Nations to then in a similar way review its peacekeeping operations in ad hoc reports throughout the Cold War. Second, as peacekeeping operations multiplied and became wider and deeper, the UN engaged in encompassing efforts to review the Organization's work much more systematically. And third, as the UN is currently more about ‘pseudo-state polities’, see Michael Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, International Peacekeeping, Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2004, pp. 39-58.

257 The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was not established until 1992. DPKO traces its roots back to 1948 with the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan and the UN Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East. Until 1992, peacekeeping operations were operated by six officials in the UN Office of Special Political Affairs, United Nations Peacekeeping. Therefore, the UN itself has pointed out that the practice by nature defies simple definition. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ (accessed 11 November 2008).

institutionalizing revisionary processes that allow success to be determined by general yet specific criteria.

Reviewing UN peacekeeping during the Cold War: an ad hoc report-writing exercise

To ensure its Member States that collective security benefits the global public good, the UN must generate coherent conclusions and facts about collective security that can facilitate international agreements. To this end, the UN Charter releases the UNSG from the predicament experienced by his predecessor, the League of Nations Secretary-General. Instead of simply performing administrative functions and describing events in a chronological and bureaucratic order, the role of the UNSG is to issue recommendations, voice opinions and even cast judgments regarding international affairs and the work of the Organization. First, the UNSG is given the responsibility of providing an annual Report on the Organization’s work to the General Assembly, a balance sheet of the success and failures in the Organization’s practice. Second, the UNSG has the right to bring any concern “which in his opinion [emphasis added] may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” to the attention of the Security Council. And third, the UNSG should benefit from the support of a staff that possesses “the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity” to fulfill this role that amounts to one of an international leader. All in all, this gives the UNSG significant influence over the system and practice.

The first UNSG, Trygve Lie, was faced with the daunting task of generating international agreements that would enable the UN to engage in a practice of collective security at a time when the world was recovering both physically and morally from the consequences of what was seen as a failure of collective security. To arrive at an agreement about how to stabilize world order, the divide between the world’s two superpowers had to be overcome. To Liberals, a successful practice meant collective operations that could guarantee the unlimited promotion of freedom of the individual and the market. But to Communists, the only thing that could stabilize world order were operations that ensured the international community that it was made up of strong organized governments, namely sovereign states. Thus whereas the Liberals understood success in terms of progressive peacemaking that opened up and connected states and markets, anything that breached state

borders and undermined state sovereignty was considered a threat to collective security by the Communists. In essence, to develop a practice of collective security, the UNSG had to engage the Member States in negotiations about the meaning of democracy. As the two sides were adamant about the fact that only their ideas would have mutually beneficial effects, it was on the basis of compromises rather than agreements that the peacekeeping practice took shape. This resulted in the legitimacy of the missions and operations being under constant doubt and scrutiny by either the one or the other.\textsuperscript{260}

The first situation for which the Member States were able to agree on a format for UN peacemaking activity was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As the international Palestine Mandate dating back to 1922 was about to terminate in May 1947, the UNSG followed the request from the UK government to put the issue on the General Assembly agenda.\textsuperscript{261} A UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was established with representatives from 11 Member States not representing one of the Permanent Five of the Security Council. Based on three months of hearings and surveys with Palestinian and other officials, the Panel published a Report in August 1947 with the unanimous recommendation to grant Palestine independence.\textsuperscript{262} Using this Report, the General Assembly was able to agree on an internationally supervised Partition Plan in the shape of a non-binding recommendation for the termination of the Palestine Mandate and the division of the territory into an Arab and a Jewish State.\textsuperscript{263} But the Security Council never mandated the UN to enforce the Plan. Not until six months later when the last UK forces withdrew and violent conflict broke out in the region was the UNSG able to appoint a UN mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, and deploy UN observatory forces, the Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East

\textsuperscript{261} The Palestine Mandate, signed in London on July 24, 1922, gave effect to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations regarding decolonization. Moreover, it departed from a declaration that had originally been made on November 2, 1917 by the Government of His Britannic Majesty with regard to a shared Palestine between Jewish and non-Jewish populations.
\textsuperscript{262} The UN Special Committee on Palestine Summary Report, the United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 31 August 1947.
(UNTSO), to supervise a four-week cessation of hostilities in line with Chapter VI.\(^\text{264}\)

Reviewing the UNTSO, the UNSG concluded that to take timely and adequate action, the UN had to find ways in which to better systematize the relevant information for the management of wars.\(^\text{265}\)

By the time Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UNSG, was appointed, the difficult task of separating collective security from Cold-War international politics of sophisticated peace rhetoric had become a security challenge in its own right. To escape the political battle holding collective security and UN peacekeeping hostage, Hammarskjöld laid down a criterion for successful peacekeeping based on agreements that had already been made regarding past collective security practices. He returned to the experiences of the League of Nations and reexamined the conclusions that had been drawn in 1931 about the determining factors for the success of peacemaking activities.\(^\text{266}\) Based on conclusions about the terms of engagement, the ‘holy trinity’ became the first definition and criteria for a practice of

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\(^{265}\) The main concerns that the UNSG raised were problems of speed and efficiency and a lack of mission enforcement power that seriously interfered with UNTSO effectiveness. The problems were ascribed to how the Western powers were insisting on obtaining consent in advance for every single movement of UNTSO in the field. The UNSG also recommended a United Nations Guard be established but the plan was not endorsed by the Member States. After considerable revisions in response to Member State objections, a UN Field Service was established instead. A Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation was also established as a result of this Report. However, little systematic review and few clear conclusions about the effects of peacekeeping resulted from this attempt at peacekeeping. The influence and size of this service was only marginal and it soon developed into a technical support group rather than a more practical defense unit as originally intended. See the Study of Methods for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Political Field, UN Press Release M/446, 10 June 1948, issued in relation to the Harvard University commencement exercise; the UNSG Report to the UN General Assembly, A/656, 29 September 1948; and David W. Wainhouse, International Peace Observation: A History and a Forecast (Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 480-485, 612-613.

\(^{266}\) See the Study of Methods for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Political Field, 268(III) adopted by the UN General Assembly during its third session on 28 April 1949, and Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War, Report by the Third Committee to the Assembly, Document A.78.1931.IX, Geneva, 24 September 1931. As the title suggests, the Convention provided recommendations for how the means of preventing war could be improved based on the League of Nations’ track records. Although the Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War never received a sufficient amount of support to enter into force, it had an important impact on the shape and direction of collective security. The conclusions that were drawn showed that: impartiality guarantees neutral operations and guarantees the mutual cooperation of all parties involved prior to the launch of the effort; non-coercive force was less likely than coercive action to result in perverted effects such as an escalation of violence. It was when all of these criteria were fulfilled that peacemaking was most likely to be successful; and the prospects of success were considerably enhanced when the League Council agreed on the more precise details of the intervention and when the intervention took place prior to the break-out of open warfare.
collective security.\textsuperscript{267} Thus, by drawing upon past experiences and agreements, the UNSG generated a consensus with regard to a collective peacekeeping practice. The UN was able to deploy its first impartial international force to keep peace through non-coercive means in response to the Suez crisis, in line with the consent granted by all parties involved—UN Emergency Force (UNEF I).\textsuperscript{268} From that point on, international agreements on what could be expected from the practice of collective security based on conclusions about the experiences of UN peacekeeping distinguished legitimate from illegitimate international policies.

Throughout the Cold War, UN reviews of peacekeeping were conducted in Reports published by the UNSG (in the annual Report or in specifically called sessions) by the Special Representatives of the UNSG, and by \textit{ad hoc} committees, commissions and high-level panels appointed by the UNSG.\textsuperscript{269} In descriptive accounts of specific operations, peacekeeping was predominantly reviewed in terms of the extent to which the peacekeeping mandate complied with the ‘holy trinity. But as the operations soon became quite unique, the UN reviews increasingly focused on the extent to which the individual peacekeeping mandates were implemented. As a result, the operations were neither connected with each other, nor with the wider context of collective security, nor with peace as a project. Moreover, after an operation was terminated, it was the UN headquarters staff and international scholars—people far removed from the actual operations—who pieced together into rough pictures a wide range of documents and agreements regarding the complex social and political processes involved in the operation.\textsuperscript{270} Despite several attempts to establish channels and institutions that could facilitate a more systematized analysis of the

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\textsuperscript{267} The League of Nations peace observation missions were established to achieve an end to hostilities between two states, nothing more and nothing less. The content of the actual settlement was on all occasions a secondary goal. Moreover, the assistance of auxiliary bodies—an early version of non-state actors—could be a useful component in creating favorable conditions for the League to carry out its tasks. Whether or not the League would be able to deal with several threats simultaneously was also something that the Convention left unanswered. See David W. Wainhouse, \textit{International Peace Observation: A History and a Forecast} (Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 77-85.


\textsuperscript{269} The first Commission, a Peace Observation Commission, was appointed by the General Assembly in 1950 on the United States’ suggestion, to specifically review the UN’s involvement in the Korean War. The first

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operations’ actual effects, the reviews continued to be made on an *ad hoc* basis from operation to operation.²⁷¹

Reviewing peacekeeping in the post-Cold War: systematizing 40 years of practice

After the end of the Cold War, the UN tried to make sense of more than 40 years of peacekeeping practice. “Even as we celebrate our restored possibilities, there is a need to ensure that the lessons of the past four decades are learned and that the errors, or variations of them, are not repeated”.²⁷² But in order to do so, the UN needed those systematized mechanisms to collect and analyze information on the various missions and operations, which UNSG Trygve Lie had discussed already in the 1950s. In 1995, a Lessons Learned Unit was established in the DPKO with the aim to take the UN’s lessons learned capability from *ad hoc* fact-finding missions and anecdotal reports, to systematic and analytical lessons learned. The Unit was to issue clearer as well as more nuanced policy recommendations regarding the planning, management and execution of peacekeeping. Five years later, only four Reports had been published and had received limited attention. Three of these Reports evaluated specific multidimensional peacekeeping operations, namely those deployed in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda in the 1990s, and one evaluated the overall experience of post-Cold War multidisciplinary peacekeeping. None of these Reports went beyond describing specific peacekeeping operations in detail.²⁷³

In 1996, the DPKO published an 800 page Report on the 41 UN peacekeeping operations deployed so far: *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*

²⁷¹ The US proposal, *Uniting for Peace*, underlined the importance of the UN paying considerable attention to the lessons that could be learned from the Korean War for future operations. The Commission was mandated “to observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security”. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council could utilize the Commission, and the Commission also had the authority to appoint sub-commissions and call upon observers for assistance. The commission was only used once, in 1951, when it established a Balkan Sub-commission with the authority to dispatch observers to the Balkans for collecting information. See *Uniting for Peace*, A/RES/377(v), 3 November 1950. See also David W. Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation: A History and a Forecast* (Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 613-618.


Based on the definition of peacekeeping as an instrument that “can serve as catalyst, framework and support mechanism for parties to seek peace and can help when hostile factions are prepared to work toward this common goal”, the report reviews peacekeeping as both a concept and a practice. In it, peacekeeping as a concept refers to the extent to which the peacekeeping mandate complies with the rules of deployment; peacekeeping as a practice refers to the extent to which the mandate was actually implemented. The mandate performance of every UN operation ever deployed is individually reviewed. However, only in the introduction are conclusions drawn about the overall experience of the practice of collective security. Here, the UNSG points out that while the UN can be proud of what it has achieved, it also has to be wary of the fact that the price of peacekeeping has been very high. On the one hand, the practice has brought hope to people in crisis, saved lives and eased the suffering of peoples. On the other hand, however, the securitizing effects of the many operations have been quite inconsistent. The UNSG explains the weaknesses by the lack of Member States long-term support.

In preparation for the Millennium Summit, UNSG Kofi Annan convened a High-level Panel on UN Peace Operations to translate the reviews of UN peacekeeping into specific, concrete and realistic conclusions about the aims and role of peacekeeping. The Panel, composed of mainly non-UN staff, produced a Report of the Panel on United Peace Operations, also known as the Brahimi Report after its Chair, Lakhdar Brahimi. The Report concludes that in order to better match ambitions with the available resources, the UN has to improve at feeding accumulated field experience back into long-term development. The Report recommends reforms of the decision-making processes and the international institutional machinery for the planning and supporting of peacekeeping operations. But rather than clarifying practice, the Report ends up reinforcing the ambiguities, because it

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confronts the international community with difficult choices between competing and even incompatible aims which the UN normally has to make in the field. The Report also emphasizes the scope and extensive time frame of the practice of peacekeeping.

The post-Cold War systematic review efforts highlighted the importance of realistic expectations. They also underlined the importance of well-informed agreements on the specific aims of the operations and an overarching criterion for successful peacekeeping. The UN returned to the drawing board, revisited the aims of collective security and considered whether the UN is adequately equipped to carry out multidimensional peacekeeping. What had started out as a decade with a focus on the concepts, celebrating the triumph of the liberal peace, ended with a return to practice and, more precisely, a concern with whether collective security could be successfully based on wider and deeper concepts of human security and positive peace.

The institutionalization of the UN peacekeeping reviews: peacekeeping best practices

If the 1990s was a time for review, then the 2000s is a time for encompassing institutional, organizational as well as strategic or operational reforms. Following the Millennium Summit, the Lessons Learned Unit was replaced with a substantially enhanced and revamped Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PKBPS), later renamed Peacekeeping Best Practices (PKBP): Policy, Analysis and Lessons Learned for the Peacekeeping Community, and a Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (PETD). Best Practices is mandated to conduct a

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278 At the Millennium Summit, the DPKO presented a new reform strategy, *Peace Operations 2010*, that aims to institutionalize a process of reflection with regard to collective security and the fundamental changes in the needs and tasks facing the Department. Two main types of recommendations are made, one to review the past and the other to revise the present. From this, the DPKO aims to better capitalize on the lessons that can be learned from experience, as well to improve their understanding of the current state of affairs, especially the interdependent relations between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, by engaging in a different kind of report-writing exercise. It has put in place the framework for the institutionalization of a process of self-assessment and self-evaluation. It has made a living Report the authoritative guide and support for all peacekeeping activity—civilian, police, and military—at headquarters and in the field. The first Report, the *Capstone Doctrine*, which was not published until 2008, includes recommendations for operations to “result [note, not build] in a sustainable peace”, specifying the areas in which progress is necessary. A particular emphasis is put on strengthening and professionalizing the planning, management and conduct of operations. Remarks of Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (New York, the United Nations, 19 October 2006), www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/article191006.html (accessed 27 June 2008).

broad range of activities that can be summarized as knowledge management, policy analysis and policy advising as regards collective security. It is charged with evaluating peacekeeping, comparing operations, and conducting overall assessments of collective security. The Section’s role is threefold: capture the wide range of UN experience related to peacekeeping; summarize and translate this knowledge into practical policy advice; and disseminate as well as promote policy recommendations at UN headquarters and in the field. In other words, encourage a culture of learning and sharing across states conducting policy and problem-solving analysis, and engage in policy development.\textsuperscript{280}

To this end, the Section tries to integrate and coordinate the practice of peacekeeping better, both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, permanent best practices officers are engaged in headquarters as well as in most peacekeeping operations in the field. Horizontally, the Section fosters collaboration between UN departments and agencies, as well as with external peacekeeping actors including states, NGOs, and scholars. In September 2005, the Section launched the Best Practices Toolbox with four methodologies for organizational and institutional learning that serve to link lessons learned to guidance and doctrine. These tools are best described as standardizing Report writing exercises. They include: the Handover Note that each UN peacekeeper who is about to leave his or her position must write for his or her replacement; the End of Assignment Report that the more senior peacekeepers have to write regarding the implementation of their mandate and UN managerial practices; the After Action Review, which is a collaborative review of a project action conducted at the end of an operation; and the Survey of Practice where snapshots are taken of how overall practitioners carry out certain tasks and processes that are similar across peacekeeping operations. Although the tools are intended to be used by all UN staff, the two first ‘tools’ are more relevant to those in the field and the latter two to the UN staff at headquarters.

\footnote{August 2000), paragraphs 229-230. The Section was later also specifically set out to serve the Department of Field Support that was established on the recommendation of UNSG Ban Ki-moon in 2007. For more information, see http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/AboutUs.aspx (accessed 8 January 2009).}

To ensure that the UN and all the states and other actors involved in peacekeeping learn the lessons that are to be learned, the Best Practices has a wide-ranging dissemination plan for both headquarters and the field. One of the most important dissemination channels is the institutional brain-map of peacekeeping that it has developed in the form of a peacekeeping intranet, meant to foster communities of peacekeeping practices across UN operations and actors. However, the voluntary approach that is taken, involving asking questions and making suggestions rather than more forcefully presenting actors with solutions, is falling short of policy development. Thus, beginning in 2009, Best Practices, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), began developing a UN practitioners’ handbook for benchmarking peace consolidation efforts. This is another way to influence the overall practice of peacekeeping by establishing additional structures for institutional learning. So, as a way to deal with the relativity problem regarding what constitutes peacekeeping success, the UN is trying to develop a methodology for how each mission can better establish its own benchmarks within the overall framework of collective security. The focus of the handbook is twofold: the SG planning directory and the integrated mission planning process.

Thus far, the Best Practices toolbox has brought together a wide variety of information on topics ranging from child protection, HIV care and the coordination of mine action in peacekeeping operations. The information is compiled and presented in four types of documents: policy directives, standard operating procedures, guidelines, and manuals. The recommendations are predominantly concerned with institutional learning in terms of the extent to which the UN is capitalizing on the resources at its disposal. In other words, success is established based on how the UN performs rather than on developments within hosting states. Three types of lessons learned figure throughout the guidance materials: strategic, operational and technical. It has been concluded that since there are no clear causalities in peacekeeping, the focus is on correlations. Based on this, performance metrics are presented for the aspects of peacekeeping that the UN and more precisely the DPKO can control. This means that what we can learn from the UN’s in-house evaluations is still very much limited to a specific operation’s mandate performance and institutional growth. To assess collective security, the task remains to connect these conclusions to each other and

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engage in analysis of the relationship between the individual operations and collective security at large—that is between collective security as a practice or progress, and collective security as a system or project.  

2. Evaluating multidimensional peacekeeping: the peacekeeping literature

Together with the UN reviews, a peacekeeping literature has emerged that analyzes collective security and issues policy recommendations based on evaluations of the peace that is kept or built. Like the UN, the literature does not expect universal peace to actually be established; however, it is committed to progress and the continuous improvement of human coexistence. With a focus on empirically testing the mandate performance of specific operations, the evaluations have developed from descriptive accounts of peacemaking activities based on traditional war-peace dichotomies, to complex statistical models that combine a range of sophisticated quantitative and qualitative tools.

Whereas the first evaluations of peacekeeping concluded quite pessimistically, the literature has recently come to conclude that these operations, despite some obvious failures, are worthwhile pursuits. But we will struggle to find what those positive effects are in practice. It therefore seems that rather than being based on progress in the post-conflict states—that is, on conceptual or practical success—the recent positive wave must be explained by the relationship between these operations and peace as a project. In other words, the positive wave relates to a redefinition of peacekeeping which accommodates the limited outcomes of multidimensional operations.

We first follow how peacekeeping literature has developed together with the practice of collective security, adjusting the benchmarks for success to the complexity of addressing intra- as opposed to inter-state wars. Second, we identify three findings in peacekeeping literature dealing with the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping. Third, we look

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282 Since much of the PBPS materials are available for internal use only, most of the insights regarding Peacekeeping Best Practices come from interviews, specifically one with Sebastian Lapierre, Head of the Knowledge Management Team at United Nations headquarters conducted in New York, 19 February 2009. See also ‘Peacekeeping Best Practices’, Report of the Secretary-General, GA/62/593, 18 December 2007, paragraph 20-22.

closer at two of the most well-known evaluations of multidimensional peacekeeping for an idea of the current debate in peacekeeping literature between problem-solving and critical theories.

The peacekeeping literature: from descriptions to analytical models

Security studies has been analyzing collective security since the UN’s first intervention. This was long done by applying war data to conduct empirical testing with regard to peacekeeping. One of the first and better known evaluations are the Wainhouse compendiums, published in 1966. They outline all the missions undertaken in the first half of the 20th century by the League of Nations, the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and recapture the reviews carried out by the Organizations themselves. The Compendiums analyze the operations in detail and the doctrines of the Organization more generally. 284 Using information on some seventy missions, Wainhouse notes that “considerable progress has been made in peace observation notwithstanding the absence of advances in the field of disarmament”. 285 Based on a notion of success that is defined as an internationally assisted peaceful settlement that ends hostilities between the conflicting parties, Wainhouse establishes a positive correlation between the international institutionalization of peace and peace observations. He predicts that peacekeeping operations are likely to remain the “indispensable device in moving toward the control of violence in the international community” that they have become. 286 However, he also notes that this depends on the future role of the UN in collective security and whether the UN is able to mount a Peace Observation Corps. 287

Increasingly efforts were put into translating Wainhouse’s conclusions about positive correlations in UN peacemaking into causal mechanisms supported by empirical findings. A peacekeeping literature gradually took shape with types, models and criteria that adhered to

286 Ibid., pp. 480-485.
287 Ibid., p. 537.
the standard definitions and operationalizations of international relations.\(^{288}\) By the end of the 1960s, peacekeeping success was most commonly determined by the occurrence and recurrence of war between independent or sovereign states according to types and categories laid down by the Correlates of War (COW) project.\(^{289}\) If the parties—states with a population greater than 500,000 in a particular operation—enjoy a fair degree of sovereignty and independence, this was taken as an indication of conceptual success; and if there were less than a 1,000 battle fatalities among all parties involved in a particular operation, this was an indication of practical success.\(^{290}\) In other words, the meaning of success was adopted pretty much at face value from the COW project rather than being defined based on the aims of the actual mandates, let alone the role of peacekeeping operations in world order.\(^{291}\)

With the changes in UN peacekeeping, criteria based on traditional war-peace dichotomies became outdated. The more humanitarian aims and goals that emerged could not be integrated in models that classified an operation a success solely based on the absence of traditional wars. Thus, as the Cold War was winding down, the literature turned to the relationship between internal and external conflict. The first conclusions made in this regard established that while UN multidimensional peacekeeping increases the chances for establishing cease-fires in intra-state conflicts, it can do little to prevent these types of wars from re-erupting.\(^{292}\) This dual faceted success problematized the evaluation of peacekeeping.


289 The Correlates of War (COW) project was founded in 1963 by J. David Singer of the University of Michigan to systematically accumulate scientific knowledge about war. The project set out to assemble accurate data on the temporal and spatial variation of inter-state wars since the Napoleonic period (since 1816) and identify factors that could explain this variation. The project continues to this day but since 2001 it has been officially transferred to Penn State, and as of January 2005, the project Director is Paul Diehl. See David J Singer and Mervin Small, *The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* (New York, Wiley, 1972); see also Paul F. Diehl, ed. *War* (London, Sage, 2005).

290 War was defined as more than 1,000 battle fatalities on all sides, involving independent states as entities with a population greater than 500,000 that are “sufficiently unencumbered by legal, military, economic, or political constraints to exercise a fair degree of sovereignty and independence”. Moreover, the post-1920 definition of independent states was extended to also include the requirement that the entity be member of the League of Nations or the United Nations, or one that has received diplomatic missions from one of the two superpowers. See J. David Singer and Mervin Small, *The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* (New York, Wiley, 1972), pp. 20-21 and 35.


slightly. The ambiguities with regard to what constitutes success left the literature struggling to issue policy recommendations on how the UN could reverse the dysfunction of these operations.²⁹³ As a result, by the end of the 1990s, some evaluations even turned to ask if we should ‘Give War a Chance’.²⁹⁴

Since the end of the Cold War, the literature has focused on multidimensional peacekeeping and new types of war. To some extent it has returned to Wainhousian problem-solving analysis to identify positive correlations rather than causalities. The first general conclusion that comes out of the post-Cold War literature is that because of the nature of the ‘new wars’, multidimensional peacekeeping is necessarily more difficult than traditional and therefore also more likely to fail. This has replaced the question about how peacekeeping prevents war from recurring with a question about whether and how peacekeeping can limit the risk of the recurrence of civil war. Frameworks with combined rankings of peacekeeping are constructed to identify weak and strong points or aspects of peacekeeping. More nuanced understandings of success are evaluated within conflict spectrums that go from complete to partial failure, from moderate to complete success.²⁹⁵

Conclusions are increasingly drawn about relative success rather than about complete failures. All together, this means that the literature has concluded that intra-state wars are technically more complicated for collective security to control than first anticipated, and therefore, the benchmarks for success have to be altered accordingly.


²⁹⁴ It was Edward N. Luttwak who in 1999 published an article with the provocative title ‘Give War a Chance’, which was followed by considerable debate on the subject. See Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’, *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 78, Number 4, 1999, pp. 36-44.

Three findings of the peacekeeping literature: civil war and UN peacekeeping

At the turn of the century, the pessimistic trend of the 1990s was reversed by the consensus that although multidimensional peacekeeping operations are not very likely to achieve all of their aims, UN involvement in solving intra-state conflict is a good thing. This consensus is based on three quantitative findings: civil wars have increased; civil wars are very likely to reoccur; and the risk of civil war is limited through internationally—or more specifically UN—brokered and managed cease-fires. Although all three findings have been individually challenged on more than one occasion, they represent a common point of departure for the peacekeeping literature, established as robust empirical collective security facts, in no need of further discussion. As such, they have also become central to the justification of the reinvention of collective security with the peacebuilding norm and the practice of multidimensional peacekeeping at the centre.

First, the finding that civil wars have increased is most commonly based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Since the mid 1980s, the UCDP has collected and codified data on patterns of both inter- and intra-state war as defined by the COW project. This data shows that while inter-state wars have decreased, civil wars have increased. More precisely, the UCDP has established that 94% of the wars in the 1990s were civil wars. Second, the finding that civil war is likely to reoccur within five years of its termination, even if a peace agreement has been signed by all parties involved, comes from Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s studies on the determinate of the onset of civil war. They first discussed this finding in an article published in 2002 based on African case studies. Here they argued that “shortly after a conflict on average, countries face a 50% risk of renewed conflict during the

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297 The High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change suggested the high risk of civil war recurrence as one of the main reasons why the UN needs to be reformed. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565 (New York, UN General Assembly, 2 December 2004), p. 70. A year later, the Secretary-General restated the reasoning with specification as a justification for why he recommended that a Peacebuilding Commission be established to UN Member States. See *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, Report of the Secretary-General, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 March 2005 (A/59/2005), paragraph 114.

next five years‖. The argument was applied to a larger context in the World Bank Report *Breaking the Conflict Trap* the following year. As such, the finding was extended and updated to all civil wars, be they African or other: “[t]he typical country reaching the end of a civil war faces around a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five years”.

Third and finally, the finding that an internationally brokered cease-fire lowers the risk of the recurrence of civil war is established over a number of different data sets, models and time periods. One of the first studies, however, to establish that UN peacekeeping has a statistically significant effect on the duration of peace after civil war was by Doyle and Sambanis. In an article published in 2000, they examined 124 post-World War II civil wars to test whether international peacebuilding could improve the prospects that a civil war will be resolved. They found that UN peacekeeping is “usually successful in ending the violence”. They also argued that UN peacebuilding is “positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war”. In other words, although the UN is more likely to fail than succeed in preventing civil wars from recurring, peacekeeping ensures a certain stability of states that is conducive to peacebuilding, and which would not be achieved otherwise. Together, these three findings have reversed the pessimism and skepticism regarding multidimensional peacekeeping that marked the literature from the 1990s. The disillusionment has been replaced by an interest in secondary questions regarding the effectiveness of various operations and settlements, namely why do some multidimensional peacekeeping and peace agreements prevent civil war from recurring when others do not?

Questions on this topic vary widely, as do the ways in which they are answered.

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Recently, a critical strand of thought has appeared in peacekeeping literature that questions the three findings, or ‘facts’, and the resulting implicit assumptions about a positive correlation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As such, the literature is dividing into two camps, focusing on ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theories, respectively. These two camps can be differentiated by their position on three key issues: purpose, the nature of the social world, and the relationship between theory and practice. As we have seen, problem-solving theories are instrumental but involve implicit normative assumptions and do not take the relationship between theory and practice into consideration. Critical theories, on the other hand try to move beyond estimation and form models that take practice into account. But they both have an explicit normative agenda in terms of a clear commitment to a positive peace. Debates between the two are gradually replacing the objective world-view with the idea of world order as being constructed. Increasingly studies set out to uncover the ideological preferences of the dominant theories, investigate their relationship to practice, and form alternative peacebuilding models.  

The success of multidimensional peacekeeping: the UN might be keeping the peace, but is it building it?  
Given the three ‘facts’ of post-Cold War peacekeeping literature, the attention is no longer on whether the UN can establish cease-fires but on the actual settlements and their management— that is, on peace agreements and peacebuilding. Two of the most encompassing and well-known peacebuilding studies are those by Michel W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, and by Roland Paris. While the former is an example of problem-
solving theories, the latter is more critical in its approach. The two studies are motivated by the fact that peacekeeping literature to date has been largely unable to make coherent, realistic or useful policy recommendations. However, they disagree on the source of the problem and thus on how to solve it. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis identify flaws in the neorealist and neoliberal civil war theory. They suggest that social-constructivist studies of peacekeeping are introduced to quantitative research in order to answer: are transitional authorities creating a self-sustaining space for peace within post-conflict states? Roland Paris, on the other hand, critically examines the liberal peace thesis in a more qualitative framework. Based on an analysis of the world polity with the help of international sociology he asks: are the liberal peace assumptions of peacebuilding borne out of practice?

Doyle and Sambanis pinpoint two aspects with regard to peacebuilding that they find have been largely overlooked in the literature; multidimensional peacekeeping is not only about halting violence, but also about building peace in terms of reversing failed state legitimacy, and therefore does not only involve states, but also civilians. These are both aspects that relate to an internal-external dimension that comes with the vision of collective security for the global world and, more precisely, the international aim to build peace within states. Against this background, Doyle and Sambanis set out to build micro/macro-level analytical models that combine neoliberal analysis of collective security at large with constructivist analysis of the interactions in particular conflicts—that is, international relations theory with civil war theory. By comparing the initial causes of war with the post-war failure of peace, Doyle and Sambanis establish three key determinants for peacebuilding: local capacity, international capacity and hostility. Together, these form an ideal model for multidimensional peacekeeping in the form of a peacebuilding triangle. The bigger the triangle, the more successful the peacekeeping operation.

With their peacebuilding triangle, Doyle and Sambanis define peacebuilding success by the estimated risk for failure of the operations. Based on two types of failures—flawed mandate performance and flawed peace process—there can be sovereign peace or participatory peace. Mandate performance is evaluated using quantitative statistical analysis of transitional authorities, both UN and non-UN; if an external transitional authority

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If the operation successfully implements its peacekeeping mandate, then the operation successfully established sovereign peace. The peace process is evaluated by qualitatively analyzing a few select case studies in which the UN has been involved; if the peace process is sustainable, then the operation successfully achieved a participatory peace. With this dual classification of success, Doyle and Sambanis recognize that there can be different types of success and then open up the possibility for relative or partial success, meaning that two operations that did not achieve the same objectives may both be classified a success depending on the particular context. Out of the 121 cases of civil war that they triangulate, 84 operations are classified as participatory peace failures and 68 operations as sovereign peace failures. Thus while an externally supported transitional authority has a 50% chance of establishing a sovereign peace after civil war, it is much more unlikely that it will actually be able to build peace within that state.

Roland Paris departs from the observation that while the design and conduct of peacebuilding has been extensively reviewed since the early 1990s, the literature has done little to analyze the conceptual foundations of this ‘new’ practice. This means that a key aspect of peacebuilding is excluded from the evaluations in terms of underlying implicit assumptions about correlations. Thus, according to Paris, the first task is to deconstruct peacebuilding and identify the assumptions about how to build domestic peace that underpin these operations. He asks on what grounds the rapid and encompassing doctrinal shifts in UN peacekeeping have taken place. Behind the technical assistance, he identifies a political and economic organizational model of liberal market democracy that relies upon implicit assumptions about how the liberal peace thesis also remedies civil war. But this positive correlation between peace, development and democracy upon which the peacebuilding logic is based is, according to Paris, not analyzed in the literature. Only the technicalities involved in the implementation of these ambitious mandates are evaluated based on the necessary resources and so on. Thus, by finding a way in which to evaluate both of these dimensions of success, Paris expects to find aspects of peacebuilding that are generally overlooked in the literature. Once he does so, he revisits the current UN peacebuilding model and suggests an alternative model. In his own words, he ‘discovers theory from data’.

To assess whether liberalization builds peace, Paris analyzes post-conflict states where UN peacebuilding has taken place. The difficulty of isolating and measuring the effect of liberalization on peacebuilding brings Paris to use counterfactual analysis as well. With
controlled comparison, he outlines three negative questions on the basis of which the case studies are analyzed. First, to investigate whether marketization fosters the conditions for a stable and lasting peace, he asks: “is fighting caused to resume”? Second, to look closer at the different effects that peacebuilding may have in different states, he asks: “are the pre-existing conditions that lead to civil violence exacerbated by the operation”? And third, to create new hypothesis and theory about peacebuilding he asks: “are new conditions that are likely to spark fighting created by the operation”? Like Doyle and Sambanis, Paris also considers two types of success: traditional peace in terms of the absence of large-scale violence, and stable peace as something that falls between a cease-fire and the resolution of all ills—a functioning government. Based on 11 out of the 14 UN peacekeeping operations deployed from 1989-1999, Paris concludes that while the UN has been quite successful in establishing a traditional peace, it has been much less successful in establishing a stable peace. And what is more, the keeping of a traditional peace more often than not has unintended consequences that not only hinder but also lower the chances for building a positive peace. Thus Paris identifies a certain trade-off at stake in multidimensional peacekeeping between keeping a traditional peace and building a positive peace.

These two evaluations of multidimensional peacekeeping operations clearly mirror the current debates in the peacekeeping literature. They acknowledge the limited success of multidimensional peacekeeping operations in establishing a ‘participatory’ or a stable peace and yet they also establish that there is value in the UN pursuing multidimensional peacekeeping. In other words, they question the current models and approach, only to replace them with altered or new models that end up relying on the same assumptions about a positive correlation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding that they criticize. Thus the disagreements between the two camps that are taking shape in peacekeeping literature are limited to technical and instrumental matters about how multidimensional peacekeeping is best carried out. Doyle and Sambanis find that the operations have a statistically significant positive impact on post-conflict societies because sovereign peace increases the chances for a participatory peace. Paris, on the other hand, identifies unintended consequences of the operations that hinder the peace that the UN keeps—a negative peace—to develop into a sustainable stable peace within that state—a positive peace. But neither of the camps investigate, let alone question, the correlation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and whether the UN can, in the current system of collective security, build peace within states.
3. Evaluating multidimensional peacekeeping: peacekeeping, peacebuilding and world order

With institutional and organizational learning and the patterns of civil war as the main indicators for success, the UN’s reviews of its operations largely focus on peacemaker performance, that is whether the means matched the end and the operation respected international principles. Progressive aims that go beyond the operation in both space and time are excluded. More precisely, the long-term peacebuilding processes within the states and their relationship to collective security and peace as a project are not taken into account.

The literature’s evaluations of multidimensional peacekeeping are also limited to a compromised understanding of peace as progress, but based on the internal effects of specific post-conflict societies rather than the performance of the UN peacekeeping operation. Although the analysis is extended to the more long-term peacebuilding processes that go beyond the operation and questions about whether peacekeeping actually leads to peacebuilding, it does not take into account what weak peacebuilding processes and long-term international involvement mean globally for collective security.306

Against this background, we set out an analytical framework for collective security in the global world of informed by practice. First, we consider why it is important to deepen and extend the analysis of multidimensional peacekeeping. Second, we outline three types of success: conceptual and practical success, as well as peacekeeping as a project of peace-as-global-governance—projectual success. Third and finally, we consider how to operationalize this tri-part or triangular analytical framework without resorting to counterfactual analysis. For an idea of what this third type aims to reveal, we conduct a brief analysis of two of the first UN peacekeeping operations.

The missing link in the analysis of peacekeeping operations: stabilizing the world

While we know that multidimensional operations are likely to conduct successful peacekeeping in terms of helping a state to avoid the recurrence of civil war, the only thing that we know about successful peacebuilding is that the UN is not doing much of it. In fact, rather than peacekeeping and peacebuilding representing mutually reinforcing processes, there seems to be a clash between the many aims and overarching global role of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. It might even be stated that peacekeeping comes at the expense of peacebuilding. Although this is a topic that is increasingly highlighted in both reviews and evaluations of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the analysis that follows is somewhat narrow and limited. The focus is on the direct practical results in the specific states, in terms of cease-fires, peace agreements or weak states. Their relationship to each other and to the world beyond the operation, however, is not included. As such, little thought is given to what the consequences of post-conflict states stuck in a deadlock where they neither suffer from civil war nor benefit from full state sovereignty are for collective security. But if peacekeeping does not lead to peacebuilding, are multidimensional peacekeeping operations actually promoting human security and consolidating positive peace?

Conclusions drawn about multidimensional peacekeeping based on either institutional learning, civil war recurrence or mandate performance are made using under-problematized notions of success. They fail to take into account the assumptions and agreements about the interdependent nature of states' internal and external affairs that justify multidimensional peacekeeping in the first place—that is, peace within states is key to collective security. As UNSG Boutros-Ghali pointed out in the post-Cold War reviews of peacekeeping, “[o]perations in the field are only the most visible part of a larger set of international political affairs⁶⁰⁷. It is not only the extent to which the operation fulfills the specific aims outlined in the peacekeeping mandate that determine success. It is also how the operations affect collective security, whether they help stabilize the global world. These two aspects of peacekeeping as progress and as a project are closely interlinked and mutually constitutive.

The role of peacekeeping in collective security has changed with the reinvention of collective security. Based on implicit assumptions about a mutually reinforcing relationship between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and world order, all the aims of peacemaking outlined in the UN Charter—promoting equality, reaffirming rights, establishing justice and promoting progress—have been brought together in the one project of peace-as-global-governance. This opens up a range of complex questions with regard to the internal and external dimensions of interdependent states in terms of a global dimension and collective security. What constitutes success has become more complex and open to interpretation, making the UN more vulnerable to political manipulation. Whereas during the Cold War, it was clear that when states were not directly involved in war with each other there was peace, the UN Member States and the world have yet to agree on what justifies and stabilizes collective security in the global world. That a multidimensional peacekeeping operation fails to strengthen peace within states does not necessarily represent a failure of collective security. In fact, the recent expansion of DPKO and UN peacekeeping suggests that it is enough for the UN to be involved. Although the operations might not build peace and generate progress within particular states, they seem to reassure the international community that war is and will be contained, for their mutual benefit. Conversely, an operation that is able to prevent genocide is not necessarily a success. If for example the operation engendered lasting international disagreements regarding the operation’s legitimacy, this may undermine collective security and as such, have destabilizing effects for world order. Thus whether collective security is a success or failure also depends on the commonly shared understandings and international agreements about collective security and world order.

In order to clarify some of the ambiguities with regard to the relationship between states’ internal affairs and collective security in the global world, we must address the analytical gap in the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, that is the peacebuilding strategy. In other words, we must get a better idea of what costs and trade-offs between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding role and aim of these operations are involved in practice. By addressing the lack of attention given to the relationship between the conceptualization of collective security, peace and world order, and what is (or is not)

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308 Here I refer to the four points that the Preamble of the UN Charter lists as the aims that the peoples are determined to achieve by uniting. See Charter of the United Nations (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1945).
achieved in practice, we hope to clarify some of those ambiguities as to the success of multidimensional peacekeeping operations which destabilize the world. We hope to bring to the fore some of the clashes between peacekeeping and peacebuilding within, between, and across states, that force the UN to engage in an illiberal international practice. We ask: do post-conflict states that neither suffer from civil war, nor benefit from civil peace, promote human security, consolidate positive peace and as such, stabilize world order? In other words, does recent practice confirm the reinvention of collective security? Doing so requires an analytical framework that reviews and evaluates the aims as well as the role of multidimensional peacekeeping. To form such a framework poses a methodological challenge in terms of joining theories and disciplines in a wide and deep analytical framework that can incorporate both quantitative and qualitative information and connect processes across borders and boundaries. We must evaluate not only the extent to which operations keep peace but also the extent to which they build peace. In addition we have to find a way in which to evaluate the relationship between the two and how it feeds into the project of peace-as-global-governance.

Three types of peacekeeping success: conceptual, practical and ‘projectual’

Since both the conceptual and practical success of multidimensional peacekeeping is already extensively reviewed and evaluated, we can focus on a third type of success in the project of peace-as-global-governance: the role of operations in the securitization of the world. For ‘projectual success’ to make sense, it must be evaluated together with conceptual and practical success in an analytical framework that takes their close interdependent relationships into account—that is, the ways in which they complement each other or clash. All three types of success will require their own sets of indicators and will vary from one operation to the next based on changes that take place as mandates are renewed, doctrines are changed and international administrations take over from UN peacekeeping operations. Conceptual and practical success is analyzed based on the most commonly used indicators in the UN reviews of peacekeeping operations, but complemented with aspects from the recent critical strand of peacekeeping literature. To analyze ‘projectual success’, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are joined together with the help of peace and security studies, and are placed

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in the larger context of world order. While this is likely to result in a problematized notion of success, it is also expected to explain and clarify correlations in multidimensional peacekeeping and help us ask questions that are not necessarily negative or counterfactual in nature.

**Conceptual Success** – Conceptual success is predominantly evaluated using indicators of the extent to which the aims of the operation and their implementation conformed with the peacekeeping doctrine and the terms of engagement. Did the end match the means? Conclusions are drawn based on more qualitative research, mostly conducted in discourse analysis. The mandates, cease-fire agreements, plans for implementing the mandate (Plan of Action) and the peace accords are compared with the peacekeeping doctrine of that time and the international support for the implementation of the mandate or accords (economic and rhetoric). In essence, this type of success has to do with the operation’s legitimacy. What needs to be added is the dynamics between the UN and the Member States, which can explain the mandate to a large extent—that is, what choices, comprises and trade-offs lie beneath the mandates? To this end, we can compare the mandate and its implementation plan with the background material on which they were based, including NGO shadow reports.

**Practical Success** – Practical success is predominantly evaluated by indicators of the extent to which the operation has actually fulfilled its specific aims. Did the operation implement its mandate(s)? The indicators are more quantitative than those involved in conceptual success, and include data on everything from war recurrence patterns and hostility levels and types, to economic growth and democratization. While peacekeeping aims are measured by numbers of deaths and displacements, hostile incidents and crime rates, factions and human rights abuse, peacebuilding aims are measured by electricity consumption per capita, the annual rate of change in real per capita income, resource dependency, election results and behavior. What we need to add are those aspects of democratization that, from the center of multidimensional peacekeeping mandates, link peacekeeping to peacebuilding within and between states. Did the former lead to the latter? To this end, we draw upon studies in comparative politics that observe and measure democracy consolidation in terms of encompassing shifts in political culture; the internal legitimation of a ‘new’ state is assessed by indicators of institutionalization, and the democratic nature of governments by the depth and authenticity of the commitment to
democracy. All in all, it is representation, accountability and responsibility that we add to the analysis in order to include aspects regarding laying the foundations for future self-sustaining peacebuilding processes.  

Projectual Success – Projectual success must be evaluated using indicators of the extent to which the operation confirmed the reinvention of collective security—that is, the new vision for the global world. Rather than asking questions regarding how things were at the termination of the operation mandate, this type of success must be established based on what has come to be, both in the post-conflict state that the operation left behind and in the larger context of collective security. Did the operation set off self-sustainable peacebuilding processes, and thus contribute to the securitization of the world? To evaluate the relationship between these two levels in terms of specific and general processes over time, and across borders and boundaries, we draw on Lisa Morjé Howard’s analytical framework for post-Cold War peacekeeping. More specifically, we draw on her idea of analyzing organization learning at two mutually constitutive levels: first-level learning is interested in what goes on within each operation once it is established in the post-civil war environment—“ability to engage in multidimensional peacekeeping”; and second-level learning focuses on what goes on at UN headquarters in between operations—“the organization’s overall means, structures, and goals, in response to new understandings of problems and their causes”. Both levels are understood as social constructions of reality made up of ongoing processes that start before and continue beyond the particular operations. We take this type of organizational learning and apply it to a two-level analysis

310 More precise examples of indicators of democratization are: the coherence, capacity and autonomy of institutions; the efficiency of the governments’ in addressing of societal problems; the behavioral and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and methods by a widening range of actors who assume democratic order; a growth in trust and cooperation among competitors; and a democratic socialization of the general population. See Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 64.

311 Using a method of ‘structured focused comparison’ (similar to Roland Paris’s), Howard measures the success of ten of the most complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations deployed between 1989–2008 in two simple yet comprehensive types of success. Rather than conducting counterfactual analysis, ‘unwritten stories of success’ are identified and explained in four necessary (but insufficient) conditions or sources for success: (i) permissive situational factors of the internal dynamics of civil war; (ii) two dimensions of security council interests in the shape of dynamics that lie behind the ‘consensus’ and the ‘intensity’ of the expression of interest; (iii) the ‘rules’ of peacekeeping in terms of the ‘holy trinity’; and (iv) two levels of organizational learning, within the peacekeeping operation in the field, and at headquarters between actors and across operations. The fourth and final condition, organizational learning, is of most interest to us. Lisa Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008).

312 First-level learning is evaluated by four indicators: the collection and analysis of information; the coordination of the different divisions involved; the engagement with the post-war environment; and the
of projectual success: (i) peacebuilding in post-conflict societies, and (ii) peace-as-global-governance. On the one hand, we ask questions about post-conflict societies and, more precisely, about implicit assumptions about a ‘symbiosis’ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. “What does the ‘peace’ that is being installed in conflict zones around the world through UN peace operations […] entail?”

Is it self-sustaining? On the other hand, we ask questions about the project of peace-as-global-governance, that is, the implicit assumption that “UN peace operations contribute to the construction of a liberal international order made up of democratic states”. How does the peace that is installed by multidimensional peacekeeping operations relate to collective security and affect world order? For both of types of projectual success, our main interest lies in the transitional period of post-conflict states, which in peace studies is referred to as the zone of peace, preliminary peace, illiberal or virtual peace.

Finally, while most reviews and evaluations are based on a fixed time period, usually set to five years after the official termination of the mandate, it is crucial to follow processes over longer periods of time in order to evaluate projectual success. Since the UN is usually present in the post-conflict states long after the termination of a peacekeeping mandate, the operation cannot be considered something of the past while the peacebuilding project is still very much in the making. Although the period of cease-fire and the subsequent five years are important, we must also take into account the current status of these states, as well as the international efforts by actors and agencies and through policies, still involved in these countries. Depending on the particular circumstances, a state that has successfully maintained a cease-fire for more than a decade may be at a similar stage as another state that has enjoyed cease-fire for less than half a decade. Therefore, peacekeeping should be evaluated in a framework that selects and qualifies cases based on processes instead of fixed targets.

leadership of all parties. Second level learning is evaluated by three indicators: the social construction of reality, actors and success; the ability to engage with the environment of post-intra state conflict; and changes in the organizational structures, such as the procedures, routines, strategies and goals of peacekeeping. Lisa Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 14-20.


314 Ibid., p. 18.

A brief revisit of UNTSO and ONUC: operationalizing the triangular analytical framework

To gauge what problematizing the notion of success means for the analysis of peacekeeping operations, we take our triangular analytical framework and briefly revisit the outcome of the UN’s first observer mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East, and the first second-generation peacekeeping operation, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Since our goal is to move away from a standardized understanding of successful peacekeeping, we do not ask a set of specific questions across operations. Instead, we on the basis of practice identify some broad indicators for the three types of success that we are evaluating. What we hope to gain is a preliminary and more practical idea of how projectual success can change the review of peacekeeping and as such, the analysis of collective security.

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East – As we saw earlier, in May 1948, the Security Council ordered “a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks”, and the UN Mediator Bernadotte was instructed “to supervise the observance” of the Resolution, and more precisely supervise the armistice agreement and prevent an escalation of violence. With no element of enforcement included in the mandate, the UN’s presence and the moral suasion was meant to deter the conflicting parties. At the outset, the Operation was to be deployed for four weeks. But with little hope for a solution to the conflict, the time frame was soon extended indefinitely and came to include a territory of five host states, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. As circumstances changed, so did the observers’ role. The operation is still deployed today and is therefore generally considered a failure rather than a success. But this analysis is not necessarily final.316

The implementation of UNTSO’s restrictive mandate followed the traditional peacekeeping doctrine and respected the general principles and terms of engagement of collective security at that time. Since then, the operation has only used force for self-defense, has acted with the consent of the parties directly involved, and has maintained an impartial position. Moreover, it has not undermined states sovereignty or violated the principle of non-intervention. Thus, according to its original Cold War mandates and traditional peacekeeping, UNTSO can be classified a conceptual success. That said, an evaluation of the operation based on the current peacekeeping doctrine is likely to give a different picture.

316 The first Resolution for UNTSO dates from May 29, 1948, S/801 and the last was 339 (1973) issued on October 23, 1973. For more about the operation, including staff numbers, see www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/untso (accessed 11 November 2008).
In June 2009, UNTSO employed 159 military observers, 96 international civilian personnel and 127 local civilian staff in Palestine. For most peacekeeping operations, the fact that the operation has been ongoing for more than half a century would mean that the Operation is not a success. But in the case of UNTSO, this is not necessarily true as none of the Resolutions include any reference to a time frame for withdrawal or any aim beyond an armistice agreement. In other words, successful peace according to UNTSO is nothing more and nothing less than a monitored cease-fire. Thus, due to its limited mandate, UNTSO can also be classified a practical success. Although weapons have been fired and there have been numerous fatalities, there has been no outbreak of open war that could be classified as a new civil war.317

Since UNTSO is not mandated to conduct peacebuilding, first-level projectual success is of little relevance in this case. As for second-level projectual success and peace-as-global-governance, UNTSO has after six decades of conflict management become a permanent feature of the UN’s efforts in the Middle East. The way in which UNTSO has continued its efforts despite repeated crisis represents an important sign of the world’s strengthening commitment to peace. Moreover, an increasing number of UNTSO-related missions have been established in the nearby region, meaning that more and more international agreements have been made with the goal of governing the world through peace.318 In this light, the operation’s long term of service appears to be more a sign of a global commitment to collective security than one of non-commitment, and is therefore likely to have some stabilizing effects on the world. In the years immediately following the beginning of the operation, the number of interstate armed conflicts in the world decreased, and it was not until two decades later that this number rose above the 1946 level.319 As such, UNTSO can in fact, be considered a conceptual, practical and projectual success.

317 Only four months after his appointment, Count Folke Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948. As of mid-2009, another 48 UN staff members had died in service. Credible numbers of military and civilian deaths on the ground are not available but they are likely to be quite high. For more information, see http://untso.unmissions.org, (accessed 20 August 2009).

318 In November 1956, an interpositionary UN peacekeeping force was established in Egypt, the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Egyptian territory and to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. UNEF I was withdrawn in 1967 at Egypt's request. However, later that year, UNEF II was deployed. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unefi.htm (accessed 14 November 2008).

319 Conflicts by type, Charts and Graphs, Datasets, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, www.pcr.uu.se (accessed 6 September 2009).
The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) – ONUC was established in anticipation of the civil violence that might erupt as the Belgian forces were ordered to withdraw from the Congo at the end of the 1950s. Deployed under chaotic circumstances, the Operation had to assume responsibilities that departed from traditional peacekeeping. It has been described as “a milestone in the history of the United Nations peace-keeping in terms of the responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operation and the manpower involved”.

In 1960, the Security Council authorized “the UN Secretary-General to take the necessary steps [...] to provide the Government [of the Congo] with such military assistance as may be necessary until [...] the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their task”. The objective was twofold: to restore law and order, and the speedy withdrawal of the Belgian forces, the two being closely related. Six months later, violence had escalated and the Security Council issued another resolution to authorize the use of force as necessary and extend the role of ONUC to ensuring law and order and providing technical assistance. But the internal situation continued to worsen and the Security Council had trouble agreeing on further mandates. Finally after the UN began to suffer casualties, the Council agreed (February 1961) that preventing civil war in the Congo meant maintaining territorial integrity and political independence, which in turn required ONUC to use force. At its height, 20,000 peacekeepers were engaged in a bloody conflict that led to the secession of the disputed area of Katanga. Despite the fact that many uncertainties and tensions remained, ONUC’s mandate was terminated in 1963 as the newly appointed Congolese Government did not request its extension and the UN Security Council could not agree on another intervention. When the final Belgian forces withdrew in June 1964, the operation was internationally heralded as a job well done.

ONUC’s ambitious mandate stretched the terms of engagement of traditional peacekeeping in more than one regard. UN peacekeepers used force to take control of conflicted areas, and they did so in cooperation with the Congolese National Army. Moreover, in order to implement the national reconciliation plan, including a federal system, UN civilian staff was placed at the heart of government ministries, provincial offices as well

as infrastructure operational facilities. Despite the fact that ONUC mandates were supported by both Security Council resolutions and consent from the Congolese government, it clashed with the traditional peacekeeping doctrine. In other words, the conceptual success of ONUC was undermined by a determination to pursue practical success. But the extent to which the operation was a conceptual failure depends on whether the international community agreed to pursue practical success over conceptual success, or whether the trade-off was an unintended consequence of faulty assumptions about the outcome of the initial mandate—that is, about a mutually reinforcing relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.³²³

Although the Resolutions issued regarding ONUC did not specify a date for withdrawal, it is clear from the mandate that practical success required the departure of UN forces. The list of aims began with protecting the national territory of the Congo against external aggression and restoring internal stability, and it ended with a sovereign Congolese state that could ensure the respect of the principle of non-intervention without external assistance. As Congo was reunited under a centralized administration, the UNSG concluded that most of these aims had been fulfilled and therefore, practical success had been achieved. Stability was restored and the territorial integrity and political independence of this newly decolonized state was established and maintained. Civil war had been prevented, and all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and mercenaries had been removed.³²⁴ But without further detailed reference in the mandates to what was meant by political independence and national integrity, the actual outcome and effects of the operation were ambiguous. The fact that the UN itself classified ONUC a success indicates that in this particular case, under its specific circumstances, undermining the holy trinity was a price worth paying. In other words, contrary to UNTSO, practical success took precedent over conceptual success. However, in light of the somewhat abrupt termination of ONUC’s mandate, and the inefficient and highly corrupt government that the UN left behind, there are reasons to question what the effects of that choice have been for projectual success.

The ambitious mandates of ONUC brought complications that had costly consequences for collective security as a global project for peace. Beginning with first-level projectual success, while the final ONUC forces withdrew in 1964, civilian aid and

³²⁴ See the Secretary-General Report to the Security Council from 4 February 1963, S/5240 and the Secretary-General Report from 29 June 1964, S/5784.
development programs not only stayed but grew into the largest assistance project undertaken by the UN to that date. Although democratic elections were held in May 1965, a staged military coup took place six months later and the nationalist military rebel Mobutu installed himself as the country’s leader. Mobutu firmly ruled the country for more than thirty years in a one-party system, drawing the benefits from what developed into one of the most corrupt states in Africa. In the 1990s, tensions surfaced once again and eventually erupted into another devastating civil war that lasted even longer than the first one, and was the deadliest conflict since 1945, resulting in approximately 5.4 million casualties. The UN returned to Congo in 1999 with the United Nations Organizations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and as of June 2009, the operation was still in existence with 18,691 uniformed personnel—the largest and most expensive operation to date. This sheds doubt on the extent to which ONUC established the types of peacebuilding processes that according to the democratic peace paradigm were meant to contribute to a liberal international order.

At first glance, ONUC’s second-level projectual performance comes across as slightly more successful given that following the termination of the operation, many predictions were made for the beginning of a new age of international interventions. The operation proved that there was a willingness to conduct wider and deeper peacekeeping within states even though this meant compromising the terms of engagement of traditional peacekeeping and, as such, undermining the conceptual success of the operations. But the many and serious complications suffered by ONUC, as well as the longstanding problems of the state that the UN helped to build, also made states wary of peacekeeping, especially in the context of conflicts within states. It made states skeptical of the UNSG’s advice and recommendations, undermining his international leadership. Peacekeeping fell into a financial crisis and years passed without the deployment of new operations. At the same time, the number of interstate armed conflicts in the world during the course of the operation doubled; three years after ONUC was terminated, the all-time high number of casualties was approximately 5.4 million.

325 The operation was deployed Security Council Resolution 1291 (2000), S/RES/1291, 24 February 2000, (based on Security Council Resolution 1279 (1999), S/RES/1279, 30 November 1999) with a strength of 16,700 military personnel, 475 police personnel and at least as much civilian staff. On June 30, 2009, the strength of the operation was all together 18,691 uniformed personnel of which 16,921 were troops, 692 military observers, 1,070 police personnel, 973 international civilian personnel, 2,483 local civilian staff, and 619 UN volunteers. At the time of deployment, it was by far the UN’s largest, widest and deepest operation of the UN. For more information about this operation, see www.monuc.unmissions.org (accessed 21 August 2009). See also Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality (London, Zed Books, 2007).
interstate conflicts during the Cold War era was reached. Thus while the operation is seen to mark an important milestone in the beginning of a new phase “which would give greater emphasis to civilian operations and technical assistance”, ONUC also undermined the international commitment to the immediate practice of collective security. In other words, the operation might have benefited the long-term evolution of the concept of peacekeeping but ONUC’s stabilizing effects on world order during the Cold War were limited. However, if we were to state that multidimensional peacekeeping operations today confirm states’ unprecedented commitment to collective security, then the long-term positive effects of ONUC can arguably be weighed against the immediate negative ones.

This brief review of UNTSO and ONUC in the triangular analytical framework confirms our speculations that complex peacekeeping operations are likely to be successful in one area at the expense of another, and that oftentimes there are trade-offs between long- and short-term aims and needs. This in turn suggests that the implicit assumptions about a mutually reinforcing relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding do not necessarily apply to practice. By stretching and bending the terms of engagement of traditional peacekeeping, UNOC may have established some self-sustaining peacebuilding processes within the Congo. However, this occurred at the expense of undermining the international community’s commitment to UN peacekeeping and to collective security and as such, destabilized the world on the whole. Conversely, the way in which UNTSO’s more narrow and limited mandate without any doubt respected the terms of engagement ensured a global support for the operation which reinforced the commitment to collective security and as such, stabilized the world. However, UNTSO modest aims undermined the impact that it had on the actual tensions between Israel and Palestine. This suggests that a wider and deeper peacekeeping concept and more ambitious mandates do not necessarily equate to a more successful practice of collective security. Rather, it emphasizes the contingency of what constitutes successful peacekeeping, and the extent to which the criteria changes not only from operation to operation, but also from mandate to mandate, and from one analysis to another.

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326 Conflicts by type, Charts and Graphs, Datasets, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, www.pcr.uu.se (accessed 6 September 2009).
Conclusion

UN reviews and peacekeeping literature agree that the practice of multidimensional peacekeeping began with some of the most devastating failures ever suffered by the UN, a situation that has continued with successive international administrations that are struggling to build and, in some cases, even to keep peace in post-conflict states. Yet they both come to the conclusion that despite unacceptable peacekeeping failures and weak dependent post-conflict states, these operations have enough positive effects that this practice should not only continue but should also be expanded and strengthened. While this is in itself slightly perplexing, it becomes even more so when we consider how both the UN lessons learned and the peacekeeping literature have also concluded that in the global world, one of the biggest threats to collective security are the weak states that do not benefit from self-sustaining peace processes. If both civil war and weak states constitute threats, then given the outcome of multidimensional peacekeeping, what positive effects make these operations worthwhile pursuits?

The confusing conclusions about the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping indicate that there must be aspects of these operations that are not taken into account and that the understanding of success is based on assumptions about post-conflict peacebuilding that are not confirmed by practice, and on implicit agreements about the stabilizing effects of these operations for world order. As such, I have suggested that we complement the types of conceptual and practical success that are generally reviewed and evaluated in light of the changes in the understanding of peace as progress, and that we form a third type of success that can help catch those positive effects that are assumed to compensate and outweigh the conceptual and practical failures of multidimensional peacekeeping. This third type of success must stretch beyond the aims of the specific operations to the larger project of ‘peace-as-global-governance’.

With the tri-part or triangular analytical framework that assesses degrees rather than absolutes within a context-dependent framework, we have tried to reach a more complete and clearer idea of the challenge of implementing more ambitious peacekeeping mandates in practice. We have seen that this is likely to require a stretching and bending of the terms of engagement and as such, that one type of success is likely to be achieved on the expense of another. This means that the conclusions about the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping operations reflect some sort of unarticulated consensus about their acceptable
costs, that is certain prioritizations between their aims. The differences between what has been agreed upon in theory and what is actually implemented in practice indicate that the positive effects outweighing the failures of multidimensional peacekeeping operations are found in processes rather than in the outcome at a certain place in time, that is in peace as a long-term global project rather in the progress of specific post-conflict states.

Although multidimensional peacekeeping operations are likely to undermine state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, and they are likely to keep but not build peace within states, they are still seen to have stabilizing effects that make them worthwhile pursuing. This implies that the positive wave is based on assumptions about how the compromised success of these operations confirms the international community’s collective commitment to peace. In other words, the justificatory background of the reinvention of collective security for the global world is based on a consensus that amount to nothing more than assumptions about the peacebuilding strategy, that is a mutually reinforcing relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Looking closer, these assumptions mirror those of the democratic peace paradigm regarding how liberalization will lead to democratization. Neither, however, seems to have been confirmed by practice as of yet.

The ambiguities surrounding the outcome of multidimensional peacekeeping operations confront the UN with complicated and politically loaded questions with regard to what stabilizes the global world. This ambiguity of collective security arguably constitutes a failure in its own right because of its delegitimizing and desecuritizing effects. The less clear states are about the benefits and drawbacks of the practice of collective security, the less likely they are to fully support the UN, let alone adhere to its institutions and structures. Moreover, the less they agree on those benefits and drawbacks of practice, the less coherent their involvement in the deployment of peacekeeping operations will be. Thus we hope that with our third type of projectual success for UN peacekeeping, analyzed at two mutually constitutive levels within the triangular analytical framework, we are able to gain a better understanding of the challenge that the securitizing effects of multidimensional peacekeeping and the stabilizing logics of the global world represent for collective security. We turn to practice and more precisely UNPROFOR to investigate what cost of multidimensional peacekeeping operations is considered to be acceptable.
Chapter 4. The Positive Effects of UNPROFOR: Forceful and Intrusive Peacemaking

Although there is no doubt that the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the former Yugoslavia suffered some of the most devastating UN peacekeeping failures to date, the operation serves as one of the most important models for multidimensional peacekeeping in the global world. Already upon the termination of UNPROFOR’s mandates, United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali underlined that while the operation had serious costs—human, political and monetary—it provided invaluable information and knowledge about peacekeeping.\footnote{UNSG Boutros-Ghali also found that UNPROFOR deserved credit for successfully protecting humanitarian activities, leading negotiations and assisting in implementing cease-fires and other military arrangements. See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), S/1995/1031, 13 December 1995.} The negotiations, agreement and decisions involved in this operation are key to understanding collective security in the global world as well as the justificatory background of multidimensional peacekeeping. Therefore I suggest that we continue by investigating the aims and role of UNPROFOR within the triangular analytical framework. We ask what were the aims and role of the operation, how did they change over the course of the operation, and to what extent were they fulfilled? In other words, what choices and/or compromises where made in order to successfully terminate UNPROFOR’s mandate, and what do they reveal about the stabilizing effects of multidimensional peacekeeping?\footnote{The Commission on Human Rights held its first ever special session on the former Yugoslavia on August 13-14, 1992, when it also appointed a Special Rapporteur for the region, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The Special Rapporteur was to investigate firsthand the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in BiH, systematically gather information with regard to possible human rights violations and war crimes from various sources, and make recommendation on how to end and prevent these events. The recommendations issued in the first report amounted to immediate action be taken by the international community to create safe havens within the republics as well as in the neighboring countries for the many refugees. A second Special Session on the Human Rights situation was held November 30-December 1, 1992. When Tadeusz Mazowiecki resigned, he was replaced by Elisabeth Rehn on July 27, 1995. The Commission on Human Rights is one of the}
of 1992, the UN reported that Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) had become “the most recent explosion in the violent break-up of post-Tito Yugoslavia”. In addition to internal disagreements about the future status of the Republic, BiH was also increasingly suffering from conflicts between external parties. Croatia was supporting groups of Bosnian Croats, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was supporting the former SFRY groups of Bosnian Serbs, and the international community was supporting Bosniac groups (also referred to as Bosnian Muslims). Located at the very center of the SFRY, with a population of mixed origins that was widely dispersed over the country and that did not necessarily share a national identity, BiH came to be something of a central playing board for the violent dissolution of the former SFRY. It was here that some of the worst violence took place, and it was also here that the conflicts were settled.

The international community struggled to come to terms with the many conflicts playing out as the former SFRY dissolved, as well as how to define and address them. From February 1992 to March 1995, UNPROFOR’s initial mandate was renewed eight times, it expanded more than ten times, and it developed at least a dozen cease-fire agreements and peace plans. It included numerous overlapping military and civilian components, spread

UN’s oldest standard-setting international institution. It has underpinned collective security ever since it concluded its landmark work on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. But it was in May 1990 that the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1990/48 of 25 May 1990, first authorized the Commission to meet between its regular sessions, provided that a majority of the members of the Commission so agreed. See Commission Resolution 1992/S-1/1. The reporting continued for many years and human rights field offices were set up throughout the region. In 1993, human rights field offices were set up in Zagreb and Skopje, and later in Sarajevo and Mostar. For more about all the special and periodic reports issued with regard to the former Yugoslavia (all together 18 reports), see The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peacekeeping, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 501-505.


331 In 1991, Slovenia’s population was 87.6 percent Slovene, Croatia’s population was 78.1 percent Croat, but BiH’s population was 43.7 percent Muslim (or Bosniac), 31.4 percent Serb, 17.3 percent Croat, and 7.6 percent Yugoslav or other. See Susan L. Woodward, The Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 33-34. For more about the BiH’s multiethnic history, see Steven M. Weine, When History is a Nightmare: Live and Memories of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1999).

332 For the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively by the Peace Agreement, see A/50/79c, S/1995/999, 30 November 1995.

out from Croatia in the northwest, through BiH and the SFRY, to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in the southeast. It responded to a wide range of interactions between international, regional and state actors, as well as local and transnational, governmental and non-governmental actors, and deployed more peacekeeping troops and UN personnel than ever before. UNPROFOR’s aims and role changed according to both how the conflicts developed on the ground and to the international agreements on the reinvention of collective security for the global world that addressed how to define threats and consolidate peace. Three overarching changes to UNPROFOR’s aims and to how they were implemented can be identified, corresponding to shifts in the type of success that the operation aimed to achieve.

UNPROFOR was initially deployed to limit the humanitarian sufferings caused by the violent dissolution and democratization of a complex federal republic with a longstanding history of internal friction and authoritarian rule. First and foremost it set out to achieve conceptual success by addressing the violence in the SFRY without undermining its state sovereignty. But when this had limited results in terms of calming and ending the conflicts in ways that were understood to have stabilizing effects on world order, the Security Council considered how it could raise the belligerents’ costs of fighting—both military and political—so as to achieve more practical success. It decided to recognize the internal claims for self-determination in order to conduct peacekeeping, and eventually also peacebuilding, between the internal factions, even though doing so came at the price of conceptual success because of how it undermined the SFRY’s state sovereignty. However, as the Security Council established that the threat posed by these conflicts was persisting, its attempts to balance conceptual and practical success were overridden by its determination to make UNPROFOR a projectual success that would stabilize the global world. UNPROFOR


was authorized to forcefully intervene without the consent of all the warring parties in order to separate the aggressor from the victim.

The successful termination of UNPROFOR was brought about by peace being enforced from above with air strikes and from below with international transitional administrations. And more than a decade later, peace is to a large extent still enforced. This implies that the positive securitizing effects that the literature and discourse find multidimensional peacekeeping to have are different from the effects of traditional peacekeeping, and that they do not stem from the fact that the ambitious aims outlined for the practice of the new vision of collective security based on 'strong' states with self-sustaining peace have been fulfilled in practice. In other words, although multidimensional peacekeeping operations are not likely to achieve collective human security and establish positive peace within states, they still are seen to have stabilizing effects on the world at large that outweigh their conceptual and practical failures. Thus the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping operations can be found in the process rather than in the outcome at a certain place in time, meaning in collective security and not in specific and isolated post-conflict states. Therefore, we look to practice to get a better idea of the stabilizing processes by trying to identify and analyze some of the choices and trade-offs between different aims and types of success that were achieved throughout UNPROFOR.

Against this background, we look closer at the interplay between the conflicts that played out on the ground in the SFRY, together with the reviews and evaluations, decisions and choices that informed, established, shaped, terminated and justified UNPROFOR. First, we look at the implementation of UNPROFOR’s initial mandate and examine how the aims of the force soon changed. While it was initially deployed to provide humanitarian aid in response to an intra-state war, the force was soon mandated to carry out peacekeeping between at least three independent states. Second, we turn to the many renewals of the mandate and find that the aims of the operation became so wide and so deep that both the UN peacekeepers and the warring parties were struggling to understand its aims. Not only was UNPROFOR conducting peacekeeping between several states, it was also trying to build peace within most of these states, even though the two were not reinforcing one another. Third, we arrive at the culmination of the violence in the SFRY and the termination of UNPROFOR and see how what is understood as projectual success was brought about by mandates that were less open to compromise and more supportive of enforcing peace,
both from below and from above. In other words, it was peace enforcement or peace-as-
global-governance rather than peacekeeping that allowed UNPROFOR to successfully
terminate its mandate.

1. UNPROFOR’s initial mandate: from a civil war and humanitarian relief, to inter-
state war and peacekeeping

The war in the SFRY did not come as a surprise. The European Community (EC, now the
EU) supported by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)), had been involved in the
region since the early 1980s, trying to tame the tensions that were developing by helping
Belgrade to regulate its transition to democracy. But once the war broke out, the EC made
the important decision in the name of collective security to go against Belgrade and
recognize the claims for self-determination of the newly established Republics.

In 1993, having agreed that since the EC’s efforts to resolve the crisis in the SFRY
was proving unsuccessful, the Security Council decided it had to act to protect civilians.
Reluctant to intervene in one of its Member States, a humanitarian operation was deployed
to the SFRY in 1992. But as the conflict escalated, the Security Council declared that the
violence in the SFRY had become a serious threat to international peace and security. The
UN recognized the dissolution of the SFRY and engaged in peacekeeping between the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the former SFRY (today
known as the Republic of Serbia).

In order for collective security to address the violent dissolution of the SFRY in a
way that stabilized the global world, the crisis was internationalized. First, from the outbreak
of violence, the EC tried to externally regulate the violent dissolution of the transitional
state. Second, as the violence escalated, the UN defined the crisis as a civil conflict for which
UNPROFOR was deployed to provide humanitarian relief and mediation. Third, as the

336 The development of European states previously under Communist rule has been crucial to the development
of the Common Foreign and Social Policy (CFSP); the second pillar of the EU agreed and signed upon in
overview of the history of the EU’s involvement in peacekeeping, see Vincent Kronenberger and Jan Wouters,
conflicts only worsened, the UN redefined the civil conflict within the SFRY as an inter-state war between Belgrade and the JNA, and its neighboring states.

The EC and the violent dissolution of the SFRY: democratization assistance and mediation

When the President of SFRY Josip Broz Tito died in May 1980, the country embarked on the daunting project of democratization. Without authoritarian rule, it was proving more and more difficult to organize the coexistence of the six republics—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia—the two autonomous provinces—Kosovo and Vojvodina—and six constituent nationalities—Bosniacs, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes. Heated internal debates developed regarding the future of the non-aligned federation and its exceptionally complex balance of power, with one Federal Presidency and six rotating Presidents. The political center of gravity gradually shifted away from Belgrade and by the end of the 1980s, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was the only institution left operating at the federal level. Social uncertainty grew stronger and collective anxiety about the future surfaced. It triggered and reinvented a long history of wary, vigilant and competitive attitudes between the different nationalities and groups in SFRY. Not only were the republics and provinces becoming potential rivals to Belgrade but also to each other.

In 1990, all six republics held individual, competitive multiparty elections that reinforced the disintegrative and antagonistic processes throughout the region. The communists were defeated across the Republic by newly created de facto parties that mobilized around nationalist agendas based on claims for self-determination. The winning parties in Slovenia and Croatia opted for a confederal solution that in essence meant independence, while the majority in Serbia and Montenegro insisted that Yugoslavia remain

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337 The arrangements with the six republics dated back to 1974 constitutional amendments that established Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The two autonomous regions were Vojvodina and Kosovo, both within Serbia. The constituent nationalities were Croatian, Bosnian (also referred to as Muslim), Serbian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovenian. However, all of these communities are Slavic and their internal dispersions rarely coincided with demographic borders and boundaries. See Susan L. Woodward, *The Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1995).

united under Serbian rule. Slovenia and Croatia began to secretly mobilize national police and armed forces in anticipation of the violence that succession might trigger from the JNA. In BiH and Macedonia, however, the elections set off internal disagreements about the future status of these two states and their relationship to the external environment and especially to Belgrade. This is often explained by the fact that unlike Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, neither BiH nor Macedonia had a recent experience of independence to draw upon, nor one clearly dominant ethnic group. In BiH, propositions for independence were discussed in the National Assembly in Sarajevo, while a Serb National Council was created in Banja Luka, the Serbian capital of BiH, and autonomous Croatian administrative units or divisions known as oblasts were established on the border with Croatia. In Macedonia, political life was marked by heated internal political discussions.

In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia went ahead and announced their independence. As expected, the Serbian government was unwilling to give up on its idea of a unified SFRY under Serbian rule, and therefore the JNA immediately violently resisted the secession of both Republics. Reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of a fellow sovereign, the UN did not recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia but instead expressed its full support for the external as well as internal borders of the SFRY. The EC, on the other hand, was more receptive to internal claims. The regional organization sent a Ministerial Troika to Zagreb to present to the warring parties a proposition for the establishment of a cease-fire and some arrangements for further negotiations. On July 7, 1991, a joint declaration, the Brioni Declaration, was signed by the governments of Croatia, Serbia,

339 In Croatia, Franjo Tudjman and his anti-Serbian Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won. In Slovenia, a newly formed coalition of political parties, DEMOS, won the elections. In Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic won the majority with his Socialist Party of Serbia. Since Montenegro consisted of a fairly homogenous ethnic population that had close and longstanding ties with Serbia, independence was never really a subject of discussion, let alone disagreement there. Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996, p. 27.

340 While Alja Izetbegovic, the leader of the Bosniac dominated Party for Democratic Action (SDA) who had been previously imprisoned by Tito, won the Presidency of BiH, his party shared the assembly with the Serbian Democratic Party (SDA) and a Bosnian sister party to the Croatian HDZ.

341 Oblast was the name for administrative units of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes between 1922 and 1929. It is an organizational unit that reemerged later in most Slavic countries. For more information, see Peter Radan, The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law (London, Routledge, 2002), pp. 138-139.


Slovenia and Croatia agreed to freeze their declarations of independence for three months and abide by certain principles when it came to settling disagreements. The first ever European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) was deployed to monitor the JNA withdrawal under the lead of the EC Special Representative, Lord Carrington.

Ten days after the Brioni Declaration was signed, the Slovenian war of independence ended with less than 70 casualties. But in Croatia, the independence movement continued its activities underground and the JNA remained mobilized in anticipation of a return. Less than a month after the Brioni Declaration had been signed, police, paramilitary groups and citizens in ethnically mixed towns resumed violent conflict. Croatian leaders requested international assistance to defend the Republic against the JNA. Meanwhile, the Presidents of BiH and Macedonia joined forces to settle the internal debates regarding the status of their Republics, and to mediate between their objectives and Belgrade’s commitment to a united Yugoslavia. In response, the Serbian government invited the two Presidents to Belgrade in August 1991 to discuss a new plan for a Federation of Yugoslavia under Serbian rule without Slovenia and Croatia—the Belgrade initiative. But a month later, Macedonia

344 The Brioni Declaration, Ljubljana, 8 July 1991 (see annex II). Also see Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith, European Foreign Policy: Key Documents (London, Routledge, 2000).
345 The ECMM was established by a decision that was made by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, then the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)) in July 1991 and then almost immediately handed over to the EC. Missions are appointed by the EC Presidency for a period of six months and are directed by a Head of Mission, a senior diplomat of ambassadorial rank. The initial ECMM mandate deployed 50 observers to monitor the peaceful withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Slovenia. But as the conflict spread throughout the region, the mission was faced with more and more requests for assistance. The ECMM expanding to Croatia, added another 500 monitors, and went from having purely monitoring functions to also being engaged in preventive diplomacy and confidence-building activities throughout the region. On 22 December 2000, ECMM became the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM, see 2000/811/CFSP), and the mission was completed on 31 December 2007. However, the EU’s role in the region remains perhaps stronger than ever. See http://www.eubih.org/ (accessed 16 April 2009) and Lieutenant-Colonel Rémi Landry, ‘The European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) in former Yugoslavia: Lessons Learned for OAU Civilian Missions’, the African center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, Occasional Paper, Number 5, 1999. There were also discussions of sending EC military forces under the auspices of the Western European Union; however, these never materialized.
347 Following the meeting in Belgrade on 12 August, the Bosnian assembly issued a resolution that proclaimed sovereignty and that they would only participate in a Yugoslav federation if Slovenia and Croatia were also members. Should their succession receive official recognition from the international community, BiH would begin the necessary processes for the realization of self-determination. Effectively, Sarajevo removed the Bosniac BiH from the Yugoslav federation. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Sharp, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 69-79. Macedonia issued a Declaration of Sovereignty on 17 September, and approved a new constitution on 18 November 1991. Henryk

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held a referendum that resulted in a declaration of independence on September 17, 1991. The Belgrade initiative was abandoned and in BiH, there was still no consensus on the future of the republic.  

The EC went on to set up an arbitration commission, the Badinter Commission, to lay down common criteria for the independence of the Republics of SFRY. The Commission represented an important turn in the EC’s understanding of the conflicts, as well as in its foreign policy. From then on, the internal violence in the SFRY was, in the eyes of the EC, a threat not only to Belgrade but also to international peace and security. To deal with this threat, rather than consolidating state sovereignty, the EC agreed that an external regulation of internal claims for self-determination was the better option. Granting Croatia independence on the condition that it uphold and respect certain rules and rights was expected to compel both parties to stop all violent conflict with their neighbors and allow peaceful settlements. To uphold their international legitimacy as sovereign states, Serbia was expected to respect the Croatia’s integrity as a fellow sovereign, and Croatia was expected to reintegrate its Serbian population. The EC convened a Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, chaired by Lord Carrington, which was to establish arbitration procedures that could issue binding decisions on the ethnic and nationality divisions in SFRY, and expanded the ECMM to Croatia.

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348 In November 1991, the Serbian forces from FRY took siege of Vukovar. After having completely destroyed the city, executed a large part of the Croat population and driven out the remaining population, the town was made a symbol of Serb domination in the region. Vukovar remained Serbian throughout the war. Not until 1998, after two years of a UN international administration, was Vukovar reintegrated into Croatia. Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanić, eds., *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995* (Oxon, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001).

349 Discussions regarding whether or not to recognize declarations of independence of ‘new’ states was nothing new to the EC. Already in the previous year, it had established a common policy on these matters in relation to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Easter Europe and the Soviet Union (1992)31 ILM 1486, 16 December 1991.

The UN and civil war within the SFRY: humanitarian relief and mediation

On September 25, 1991, the first UN Resolution with regard to the violent dissolution of SFRY was issued, imposing an embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the SFRY. While the Resolution did express its full support for the EC’s collective efforts for peace and dialogue, the UN made it clear that it would not get involved with the SFRY’s internal affairs, addressing the civil conflict exclusively through Belgrade and making no reference to the Badinter Commission. UNSG Javier Pérez de Cuéllar appointed a Personal Envoy for the SFRY, Cyrus Vance, to report on the situation on the ground and mediate between the internal factions. By the end of November 1991, Vance had convinced Serbia and Croatia to sign a cease-fire agreement, the Geneva agreement, that also declared the warring parties’ commitment to peacefully resolve their competing claims. The UNSG requested the establishment of a peacekeeping operation to oversee the implementation of this agreement, but as violence soon resumed, the Security Council agreed that practice should be limited to damage control as opposed to risk aversion. This left the UNSG with no other option, in response to estimates of more than 500,000 refugees, displaced persons and other victims, than to send humanitarian relief through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and place a team of UN staff in the field to assist Vance.

Despite the UN’s firm position, the EC’s Badinter Commission went ahead and outlined, in accordance with the principle of uti posseditis, a minimum general set of conditions for independence in mid-December 1991. Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia

352 Vance Owen was appointed on 8 October 1991.
356 At first, the standing point of the EU was to condemn all unilateral change of borders by force and only recognize states in which the claim for statehood was the result of agreement by all parties within that state. However, as this soon proved to be impossible in the ‘new’ republics of the former Yugoslavia, these terms were altered so that some sort of authorities and order could be established. Germany especially pushed for this policy, while the UK was concerned that this would simply shift the conflict to the remaining republics of the...
immediately presented their application. BiH also applied while the Bosnian Serbs issued a declaration of independence for a Republic of their own in southeast BiH. On January 15, 1992, the EC went ahead and recognized the independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia. The BiH’s application, however, was rejected since it failed to provide convincing evidence that independence represented the true will of the majority. The EC recommended that BiH hold a referendum on the matter and sent a delegation from the Peace Conference to Sarajevo to in a series of peace talks present the conflicting parties with, a plan for an independent BiH divided into three ethnic regions or cantons —the Carrington-Cutileiro or Cutileiro plan. But the plan never received the official signatures that it needed to enter into force.\footnote{The ECPC peace talks on BiH, during which the Cutileiro Plan was discussed, held six sessions in Sarajevo starting on 14 February 1992. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Sharp, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 92-127.}

Meanwhile, Croatia and Serbia had under the auspices of the UN signed a second cease-fire agreement, the Implementation Accord.\footnote{Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), S/23280, 11 December 1991, Security Council Resolution 743 (1992), S/RES/743, 21 February 1992.} The UNSG urged the Security Council to help ensure that this cease-fire was more successful than the previous one by immediately deploying a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the former Yugoslavia. The force would be strictly humanitarian and set out to protect the sovereignty of individuals rather than the sovereignty of Croatia or the SFRY. He explicitly asked the Security Council to not let the absence of a political agreement prevent it from authorizing the force. Two months later, on February 21, 1992, the Security Council authorized the immediate deployment of UNPROFOR as a 12 month “interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiations of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis”. More precisely, the force was to provide humanitarian relief and stabilize the two cease-fires that had been brokered by Vance, as well as assist with the EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia.\footnote{The ECPC peace talks on BiH, during which the Cutileiro Plan was discussed, held six sessions in Sarajevo starting on 14 February 1992. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Sharp, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 92-127.}
Before the end of February 1992, the first peacekeepers were deployed to Croatia to supervise demilitarization, oversee the return of refugees and monitor human rights in three United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) that had been established in towns where inter-ethnic tensions had resulted in armed conflict—Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and Krajina. A UN Force Commander was appointed and the UNSG completed a first round of consultations with regard to the composition of contingents. While the UN was implementing the cease-fire in Croatia, the peoples in BiH were called to the polls despite serious opposition from both within the Republic and from Belgrade. With the Bosnian Serbs boycotting the referendum, the results were 62.68 percent in favor of an independent Bosnian state. Sarajevo went ahead and declared independence on March 3, 1992. The EC and the US but not the UN recognized BiH as an independent state in the beginning of April. Rather than resulting in the pacifying effects anticipated by the EC, the internationalization of the conflict reinforced the tensions between the internal factions in BiH, as well as the conflicting interests of Belgrade and Croatia in BiH, and caused disagreement between the UN Member States.

At the end of 1992, war had broken out in the Mostar region between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats supported by Croatian forces on one side, and the Bosnian Serbs supported by the JNA on the other. The internationalization of the conflicts within the SFRY gave the JNA and Croatia additional grounds on which to fight out their differences and additional actors to play to their respective advantage. While they adhered to the UN cease-fire in Croatia, they fought each other in BiH by supplying their respective allies with weapons and other strategic and technical support. A confusing mishmash of conflicts emerged between military and paramilitary groups, between, within and across newly formed transitional states, which all culminated in BiH; this was closely interlinked with and key to the development of the war in Croatia, as well as Serbia’s future plan for the SFRY. UNPROFOR was unable to deliver humanitarian relief to the most vulnerable areas. The UNSG redeployed 40 military observers from Croatia to BiH to prevent another humanitarian crisis from developing. But less than a month later, they were forced to

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withdraw along with the ECMM observers as the situation deteriorated and posed serious threats to their lives. With the violence spreading, and the UN increasingly unable to limit humanitarian suffering, it was clear that UNPROFOR did not have the necessary means to fulfill its humanitarian or mediation aims. In other words, while UNPROFOR may have been able to claim some conceptual success at that point, it was without a doubt a practical failure.

The internationalization of the wars in SFRY: from humanitarian relief to peacekeeping

With the humanitarian crisis deteriorating in BiH, the Security Council had to find a way to provide UNPROFOR with the means to address the civil violence within the SFRY without suffering complete conceptual failure. As such, after much negotiation, the Security Council agreed to interfere by demanding that the JNA and the Croatian Army respect BiH’s territorial integrity. It then proceeded to recommend that the General Assembly recognize the memberships of Croatia, Slovenia and BiH, and not automatically transfer the SFRY’s UN membership to Serbia and Montenegro. Finally, it declared that in ‘the very complex context of events in the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia all parties bear some responsibilities for the situation’. As a result, UNPROFOR was no longer involved in a

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361 The observers were deployed against the background of a Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Resolution 749 (1992), S/23836, 24 April 1992.
363 The Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia were admitted as members of the United Nations on 22 May 1992, A/RES/46/236, A/RES/46/237, A/RES/46/238. On 19 September 1992, the UN Security Council agreed that the membership of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia could not be automatically continued by Serbia and Montenegro. Hence SFRY’s membership was discontinued even though it was a founding member. Security Council Resolution 777 (1992), S/RES/777, 19 September 1992. The General Assembly agreed that the state had to reapply for membership and, until it had done so, would be excluded from the work of the General Assembly as well as that of the Economic and Social Council. Resolution of the General Assembly, A/RES/47/1, 19 September 1992, and Resolution of the General Assembly A/RES/229, 29 April 1993. Because of disagreements regarding its official name, Macedonia was not recognized a Member State until 8 April 1993 under the name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/47/225, 27 April 1993.
364 See Security Council Resolution 757 (1992), S/RES/757, 30 May 1992. A year later, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to hold the leaders of all warring parties accountable for the serious violations of humanitarian law that were carried out in the former SFRY. The ICTY was established on 25 May 1993 on the recommendation of the UNSG as an international institution, independent of political consideration and authority, under Chapter VII of the Charter. It was to prosecute “persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the Security Council upon the restoration of peace”. Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), S/RES/827, 25 May 1993. See also Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704/Add. 1, 19 May 1993; the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the activities of the
civil conflict within the SFRY but in an inter-state conflict between Croatia, BiH and the JNA. This meant that any attack by the JNA as well as the Croatian and Bosnian national armies outside their respective borders was without doubt a threat to international peace and security and therefore, a legitimate reason for the Security Council to authorize UNPROFOR to implement peacekeeping aims. As sovereign states, the three warring parties could all be individually sanctioned and implementation did not depend as much on Belgrade’s consent. This way progress could be made in terms of practical success without undermining conceptual success.

Over the summer months of 1992, in a series of Security Council resolutions, UNPROFOR’s aims and means were extended and adjusted to peacekeeping between the former SFRY, Croatia and BiH. First, a number of sanctions were imposed exclusively on the former SFRY in response to JNA presence in BiH territory. Second, peacekeepers were deployed to BiH to: monitor a security zone established around Sarajevo’s airport to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance; monitor a no-fly zone that was established for all military flights in BiH airspace; and support the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief and protect convoys of civilian detainees released on the request of the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), throughout the country. Third, more UN peacekeepers were also deployed to Croatia to: oversee and monitor, together with the ECMM and local authorities, the restoration of authority in so-called ‘pink zones’ established outside UNPAs where the JNA had until recently been in occupation; control the entry of civilians in the UNPAs and perform immigration and customs functions at their borders; assume responsibility for monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula; and ensure control of the Peruca dam, a key position situated in one of the pink zones. Fourth and finally, peacekeepers were deployed to the FYROM and the former SFRY to monitor the newly established international borders and report on movements and potential

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365 The sanctions were on trade and air service, sporting and cultural exchanges, and scientific and technical cooperation. Security Council Resolution 757 (1992), S/RES/757, 30 May 1992.
spill over between the region’s conflicts. In addition, a UN liaison office was established in Slovenia. From then on, UNPROFOR was in charge of implementing a wide range of aims in connection with at least three different yet interlinked conflicts between Croatia and the JNA, Croatia and BiH, and BiH and the JNA.

While the radical turn in UNPROFOR’s mandate appeared to have some stabilizing effects on the situation in Croatia, the violence in BiH not only continued but also intensified. Humanitarian relief efforts were persistently obstructed and the ‘no-fly zone’ was continuously violated. Within weeks of the recognition of BiH’s independence, Bosnian-Serb paramilitary groups supported by the JNA were in control of about 70 percent of the territory, and the Croatian national army occupied several vital border crossings. But since the violence in BiH was predominantly carried out by paramilitary groups, it was a matter of civil violence and not violence between the ‘new’ sovereign states that the Security Council had condemned. Without a mandate to address the internal conflicts in BiH, UNPROFOR was faced with the same problem of being deployed to provide humanitarian relief to its victims, not to address violent conflict. It was becoming clear that what UNPROFOR was dealing with was neither a civil conflict nor a clear-cut inter-state war. On the one hand it was an inter-state war between one state who was a UN Member State—Croatia—and the JNA who claimed to represent a state whose membership was suspended—Serbia and Montenegro. On the other hand, it was an intra-state war in one of its Member States, BiH, with the two neighboring states closely involved in the conflicts. UNPROFOR was working towards keeping the peace between Croatia, Belgrade and BiH, protecting the Croatian population from the JNA, and protecting the Bosniac population from the Croatian army and the JNA. But these actions were not enough to make the warring parties resolve their conflicts and agree to peace.

As UNPROFOR’s mandate began to approach the end of its initial 12-month deployment, the EC and the UN were both coming to the conclusion that unless all the warring parties agreed on the dissolution of the former SFRY, including the border between

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Croatia and BiH, (as well as the border between the FYROM and Slovenia), violence was likely to continue in the region. If not in Croatia, then in BiH. This meant that it was not enough for UNPROFOR to carry out peacekeeping between the three states. It also had to carry out peacekeeping within BiH and bring the internal factions, as well as Croatia, Belgrade and the JNA, to sign the one and same peace agreement. The Security Council was back to the problem that it had tried to avoid by recognizing the BiH’s independence, namely addressing civil conflict within a sovereign state. It was wary of the international destabilizing effects of authorizing UNPROFOR more than humanitarian means with which to address BiH’s internal conflicts. However, it also agreed that allowing the violence to continue meant reinforcing a threat to international peace and security. Thus UNPROFOR’s failure in BiH confronted the Security Council with a number of questions with regard to the reinvention of collective security for the global world, questions that were not only practically but also conceptually complex. The challenge involved making decisions about finding the balance between practical and conceptual success that define projectual success, fulfilling human needs and respecting international principles, meaning protecting individual and state sovereignty.

2. The renewal and strengthening of UNPROFOR: adjusting to the problem and deploying a multidimensional peacekeeping operation

The complex multi-front war that developed in BiH increasingly overshadowed the success that UNPROFOR could claim in Croatia and by February 1993, violence had reached unprecedented levels in both Republics. The costs of achieving conceptual success in BiH became too high. But agreeing on more than humanitarian relief was proving difficult as there were different understandings of the balance between conceptual and practical success that stabilizes the world—that is, of what UNPROFOR’s aims should be and how these would be best implemented in order for projectual success to be achieved. UNPROFOR developed, balancing on a fine line between being a force that provided humanitarian relief and an operation that both kept and built peace between states as well as within and across states.
For UNPROFOR to stabilize the global world, the Security Council had to agree on how to make practical progress within the states of the former SFRY without undermining the conceptual success of UN peacekeeping. Alongside the peacekeeping force, the International Conference on Yugoslavia was established as an integral part of UNPROFOR, focusing on the political differences and democratization processes. While the Force Commander was instructed to protect the different groups on the ground, the Civilian Head of UNPROFOR was mandated to facilitate peace agreements that could settle the violent dissolution of the SFRY by establishing liberal-democratic states. By the time UNPROFOR's initial mandate was up for renewal, the warring parties were clearly distinguished and a full-fledged multidimensional peacekeeping operation was deployed.

The changes in the definition of the conflict and the shift in UNPROFOR’s mandate can be mapped in three stages over which practical success was increasingly prioritized over conceptual success. First, the UN concluded that since BiH’s internal affairs constituted a threat to international peace and security, UNPROFOR had to be involved in keeping as well as building peace within BiH. Second, as peace negotiations did not have the expected outcome on the ground and, therefore, did not have the anticipated stabilizing effects, ‘safe areas’ were established in BiH under Chapter VII. Third, the Security Council authorized the use of force to ensure the no-fly zone in BiH and implement the safe areas, as well as to protect the UN peacekeepers and staff in Croatia.

The International Conference on Yugoslavia: a civilian mission alongside the protection force

While the Security Council was focusing on addressing the escalation of violence on the ground in BiH, the UNSG called upon the EC for help in negotiating peace between the JNA, BiH and Croatia. Subsequently, the EC invited the UN to London on August 26-27, 1992, where the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was established. In a statement of thirteen principles, the UN and the EC confirmed their joint commitment to negotiating peace until “a final settlement of the problems of the former Yugoslavia has been reached”, and agreed on a joint framework in which to do so.\textsuperscript{369} It was just as much


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about providing the warring parties in SFRY with a framework to negotiate joint agreements and build confidence, as it was about bringing together the external actors involved in these conflicts.\footnote{The ICFY also established a civilian mission of its own to observe, assist and, to a certain extent, regulate one of its settlements, namely the one between BiH and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (or Serbia and Montenegro), completely closing its 300-mile border to everything except food, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs. But this was not until September 1994. Within a week of the Security Council Resolution to deploy the civilian ICFY mission, more than 50 observers were already present in the field. At its highest point, the mission deployed 152 international personnel at over 20 major border crossings 24 hours a day. The mission was headed by a Mission Coordinator, a position initially held by Bo Pellnäs and later Tauno Nieminen. There were three field sections, one in Montenegro and two in Serbia. Security Council Resolution 943 (1994), S/RES/943, 23 September 1994.}

An international institution was set up under the dual head of the EC President of the Council of Ministers and the UNSG, who in turn appointed two Chairs of the ICFY.\footnote{The first UNSG Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia was Thorvald Stoltenberg. With his appointment, he also became co-Chair the ICFY Steering Committee after Cyrus Vance. Stoltenberg was succeeded by Yasushi Akashi in January 1994.} The two co-Chairs were informed by a steering committee that consisted of six working groups and a small Secretariat located at UN headquarters in Geneva, staffed with both UN and EC personnel.\footnote{The Steering Committee was in turn also led by two co-Chairs: a Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General and an EC mediator. The Committee consisted of six working groups, including: (i) Bosnia-Herzegovina Working Group, for the cessation of hostilities and constitutional settlement in BiH; (ii) Humanitarian Issues Working Group; (iii) Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities Working Group, including a special group on the province of Kosovo; (iv) Succession Issues Working Group; (v) Economic Issues Working Group; and (vi) Confidence and Security-building and Verification Measures Working Group. The first UN Special Envoy was Cyrus Vance, who was succeeded in May 1993 by Thorvald Stoltenberg. The first EC mediator was Lord David Owen, who was succeeded in June 1995 by Carl Bildt. See The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peacekeeping, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 492; and Betrand G. Ramcharan, ed., The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers, Volume 1 (London, Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 4-5.} The UN co-chair of the ICFY was also appointed the civilian head of UNPROFOR to lead alongside the UN Force Commander, and the protection force was joined by a civilian mission.

While the situation in Croatia seemed to be stabilizing, the attacks carried out on civilians in BiH were becoming more and more frequent. The ICFY suggested that safe areas, similar to the Croatian UNPAs or pink zones, be established for Bosniacs in the most vulnerable villages with the consent of Bosnian Serbs. The concept was received with some reservation, the fear being that such areas would institutionalize population segregation and create human enclaves that would encourage rather than deter a policy of ethnic cleansing.\footnote{See the Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, E/CN.4/1992/S-1/1, 27 October 1992.} The Security Council agreed that the conventional humanitarian safe area based on consent and voluntary demilitarization was not adequate for the violence playing out in BiH. But...
neither was it prepared to authorize a new type of shelter safe areas under Chapter VII. Instead, it instructed the ICFY to facilitate and, if necessary, lead negotiations between the internal factions in BiH on the constitutional arrangements for their Republic, which UNPROFOR could then enforce.\(^{374}\) This way, the Security Council tried to address BiH’s internal problems without undermining its state sovereignty and destabilizing world order; it attempted to strike a balance between practical and conceptual success that would also ensure projectual success.

In January 1993, after three months of difficult negotiations between the three warring parties in BiH and their external allies—the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Bosniacs, as well as Croatia and the JNA—the ICFY presented a 10-province peace plan for BiH, also known as the Vance-Owen plan. The plan was for a single state with separate communities that all enjoyed significant autonomy within their respective territories. While the relative authority of the single state vis-à-vis its ten semi-autonomous entities remained contentious, the basic structure was outlined in four complex and rather lengthy separate agreements: the Agreement on Interim Arrangements of the civil authority (annex I), the nine Constitutional Principles (annex II), the provisional provincial map (annex III) and the Agreement for Peace and the restoration of law and order in BiH (annex IV). The fact that the peacekeeping responsibilities and peacebuilding obligations that the implementation of the agreement required exceeded UNPROFOR’s planning capability and means at that time implies that the international community was now more willing to not only prolong UNPROFOR’s mandate but also deepen and extend its aims and role to include what, in essence, was liberal-democratic state-building.

As UNPROFOR’s mandate came to an end in February 1993, all three warring states, BiH, Croatia and the former SFRY, had withdrawn from the negotiations on an overall settlement regarding the violent dissolution of the SFRY. With organized discrimination and abuses of human rights across the region, the overall atmosphere was one in which terror and intimidation reigned. UNPROFOR in BiH was left to continue humanitarian relief while the violence continued to escalate. In Croatia, although

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UNPROFOR was successfully implementing the cease-fire, it had not been able to secure the border controls, nor the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. The UNPAs were far from fully demilitarized and authority in the pink zones had not been restored. The unfulfilled expectations resulted in the Croatian government informing the Security Council that it would not agree to an extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate unless the international community got more involved in solving the political impasse in relation to the UNPAs and pink zones.

The Security Council agreed that if UNPROFOR was to achieve projectual success, practical progress had to be made and this required more than powerful diplomatic means. For UNPROFOR to have stabilizing effects on world order, the civilian component and the ICFY had to be supported by force, even if this might come to undermine conceptual success. However, the Security Council kept insisting that without the warring parties all agreeing to the Vance-Owen plan, and without international agreements on what was meant by more powerful and forceful means, the UN could not enforce the single-state BiH solution. Thus the Council renewed UNPROFOR’s mandate for four weeks during which time the ICFY was instructed to intensify the negotiations on the future of both BiH and Croatia between the warring parties, and inform the international community about the possibilities for more forceful peacekeeping in this region. Within weeks, violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in the region reached unprecedented levels. In BiH, the first incidents of ethnic cleansing were carried out and the first aircraft bombs were dropped on two villages east of Srebrenica. In Croatia, the national army


376 In addition to affirming all of UNPROFOR’s previous agreements, the Security Council demanded the full respect for the unimpeded freedom of movement of all UN personnel in the field, that no forces be positioned in proximity of UNPROFOR’s units, and that the warring parties would at least attempt to reach a final settlement for the region. Security Council Resolution 807 (1993), S/RES/807, 19 February 1993.


returned to carry out offensives against UNPAs, and the JNA reclaimed most of the weapons that it had previously surrendered.

The international community struggled with three main questions with regard to the use of force as doing so meant clearly breaking with traditional peacekeeping. The disagreements can be summarized in three questions regarding the type of peace that was aimed for: the rationale, the strategy and the purpose of force. First, the rationale: what type of force was likely to bring what type of peace? To use force for peacekeeping clearly went against the principle of ending war by peaceful means. And thus far, UNPROFOR’s experience suggested that the use of force was not guaranteed to result in practical success. The use of force had proven just as likely to encourage new violence and make the parties less willing to sign the agreement that was being enforced. Second, there was the question of strategy: who should use force against whom and how? Using force to protect one of the warring parties from another would force the UN to separate the victim from the aggressor and leave the principle of impartiality behind and, as such, UNPROFOR would clearly fail conceptually. Third and finally, there was the question of purpose: what type of peace was the enforcement meant to achieve? Although at first this seemed quite straightforward in terms of protecting the safe areas and ensuring that they received their humanitarian aid, this meant going ahead without the consent of all the parties, as the safe areas were in fact enforcing a certain idea of a unified yet disintegrated BiH that not all of the parties had agreed to.  

UNPROFOR goes from Chapter VI to Chapter VII: the no-fly zone and safe areas in BiH

At the end of March 1993, in a series of mandates, the Security Council extended UNPROFOR for another three months, adding a number of more specific aims for BiH and Croatia, respectively. Although signatures were still missing, the Vance-Owen plan was now endorsed by the Security Council. The ICFY was instructed to continue working with the warring parties so as to convince all parties to sign the agreement, and UNPROFOR was instructed to take a more active role in helping the ICFY in doing so. In addition, for the

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first time, a resolution was issued for UNPROFOR under Chapter VII instead of under Chapter VI that authorized “all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations to ensure compliance with the ban on flights.” Enforcement was not, however, to be carried out by UN peacekeepers, but by UN Member States or regional organizations in close coordination with the UNSG and UNPROFOR. An agreement was made with NATO according to which it would, on the request of the UN, carry out air strikes to shoot down planes that violated the no-fly zone. Under no circumstances were attacks to be carried out on ground forces and a warning should precede any military engagement.

Two weeks later, Bosnian Serb paramilitary carried out severe attacks on civilians in Srebrenica, BiH. The Security Council agreed that it was now left without much choice but to establish the first ‘safe area’ under Chapter VII. The rationale was to force the warring parties in this area to separate until they had been able to reach a peace agreement. The understanding of force was a non-traditional or ‘soft’ one that amounted to diplomatic means. The rationale translated into a strategy of using forceful diplomatic means to put a considerable amount of pressure on the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units placed around Srebrenica to withdraw from the town, and on the JNA to cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services. More precisely, the Security Council: imposed a number of financial and trade sanctions and embargos on the Bosnian Serbs in BiH and Belgrade; expressed grave concern with regard to the Bosnian Serbs refusal to sign all four agreements of the Vance-Owen plan; and declared “its readiness to take all the necessary measures to assist the parties in the effective implementation of the peace plan once it has been agreed in full by the parties”. UN peacekeepers were deployed to act as unarmed civilian police monitors and military observers in the area, and report back to the UNSG. The purpose of the use of force was threefold: to immediately stop the deliberate interdictions of humanitarian


382 From 12 April 1003, aircraft from France, the Netherlands and the US were ready to conduct attacks. Liaison cells were established within UNPROFOR in Kiseljak, BiH, but also in Zagreb, Croatia. The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 521-531.

assistance convoys, so as to gradually free but not defend the area ‘from any armed attack or any hostile act’ including ‘ethnic cleansing’, and to set the stage for a unified BiH as envisioned in the Vance-Owen plan.\textsuperscript{384}

After continuous violent attacks on civilians in several villages in the eastern parts of BiH, five new safe areas were established in BiH—in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac—on May 4, 1993.\textsuperscript{385} The Security Council authorized the deployment of another 50 military observers to these areas and declared its readiness, in the event of the failure of any party to comply with the present resolution, to consider immediately the adoption of additional means of enforcement.\textsuperscript{386} A month later, the Security Council remained concerned about the violence in these areas and therefore agreed to change the rationale for the safe areas to a more forceful one. It extended “the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief”.\textsuperscript{387} Consequently, the strategy became more forceful. UNPROFOR was authorized to act “in self-defense, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties”.\textsuperscript{388} Similar to the no-fly zone, it was the Member States acting nationally or through regional arrangements that were to supply the force in terms of air power under the authority of the Security Council, in close coordination with the UNSG and UNPROFOR. The UNSG took it upon himself to define the rationale for the use of air power based on UNPROFOR’s request for support, the strategy together with the Force Commander, and the purpose in agreement with the Security Council.

Despite their similarities with the UNPAs and pink zones in Croatia, the safe areas had some key differences. The rationale of the safe areas was to separate the warring parties rather than reconciling and reintegrating them. From this follows, that the strategy of the

\begin{itemize}
\item Less than a week after UNPROFOR’s mandate in BiH had been renewed and extended, the UN Force Commander reported that Srebrenica was successfully demilitarized based on an agreement for demilitarization signed with the warring parties. The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 525-526.
\item The BiH government requested that a safe area be established in Zepa. Letter dated 4 May 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/25718, 4 May 1993. The letter asks for assistance in response to the attacks in Zepa.
\end{itemize}
safe areas was to impose demilitarization policies only on one of the warring parties within that area, namely the Bosnian Serbs. It was not so much assisting the parties in negotiating peace as it was about forcing the Bosnian Serbs to agree to a peace that had been defined by the ICFY and agreed to by its adversaries. Hence, whereas the UNPAs were established for reintegration purposes, the safe areas were intended to bring the parties to an early implementation of the Vance-Owen peace plan, that is to internally organize BiH as a segregated yet unified Bosnian state. Thus, the establishment of safe areas in BiH clearly forfeited the holy trinity of traditional peacekeeping operations by giving UNPROFOR the role of a peace enforcer, the freedom to treat warring parties differently, and the ability to impose a certain internal organization of the state, all in the name of peacekeeping. This undermining of conceptual success led to widespread unfulfilled expectations and accusations of illegitimacy that fuelled the antagonistic relations on the ground and reinforced questions and disagreements about collective security in the global world. The operation seemed to be failing in terms of all three types of success.

On the ground, the establishment of the safe areas on the one hand allowed Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs to accuse UNPROFOR of being biased and of singling out the Serbs as the guilty party by refusing them their right to self-determination while protecting that of other parties. On the other hand, until UNPROFOR was able to actually stop the violent attacks on the safe areas, the Bosniacs had reason to denounce the policy of safe areas as an acceptance of certain ethnic cleansing. In other words, both parties questioned the legitimacy of the safe areas as a peacekeeping means. In addition, both parties saw the establishment of the safe areas as a way for the UN to retreat from its efforts to actually solve the conflict. Against this background, the Bosnian Serbs, supported by the JNA, justified their attacks on the safe areas from the outside, and the Bosniac forces that were not demilitarized justified their repeated violations of the safe areas from the inside. UNPROFOR found itself increasingly in danger and, therefore, less able to carry out its mandate. By the summer of 1993, only 50 percent of the humanitarian relief to BiH reached its destination.

The establishment of the safe areas also widened the gap between the international negotiators and implementers that has a tendency to develop in peacekeeping operations. While the ICFY continuously threatened the parties with air strikes, the UN Force

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Commander was reluctant to request military support due to the dangers that the attacks posed to peacekeepers on the ground in terms of them becoming targets for retaliatory actions. Instead, the Force Commander requested 34,000 troops to ensure the safety of the UN peacekeepers. But the Security Council only deployed 7,600 UN troops to increase the chances of reaching “a comprehensive political solution to the conflict”. Moreover, the safe areas reinforced divides within the international community between those who were in favor and those who were against forceful intervention in states. It also emphasized the many uncertainties facing collective security in a global world. Slowly states began bilateral efforts to address specific conflict issues rather than actively supporting the efforts of collective security.

Enforcement in BiH and Croatia: UNPROFOR supported by NATO close air support

By the end of the summer of 1993, UNPROFOR’s mandate had been extended for another three months, the ICFY had given up on the Vance-Owen plan, and the ICFY was nowhere closer to a plan for the normalization of the UNPAs and pink zones in Croatia. In mid-August, the UNSG informed the Security Council that the operational capability for NATO air strikes had been put in place. The fact that the international community was more prepared to use force in a complicated internal conflict than in the more clear-cut inter-state conflict that was playing out in Croatia, drove the Croatian government to threaten to request that UNPROFOR leave its territory if its mandate did not provide for a more

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390 In his Report on the requirements for implementation, the UNSG noted that a minimal troop reinforcement of at least 7,600 troops was required for a ‘light operation’ to continue. But to implement the previous resolutions, the UN Force Commander estimated that another 34,000 troops were required. See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 836(1993), S/25939, 14 June 1993, especially paragraph 5; and Security Council Resolution 844 (1993), S/RES/844, 18 June 1993.


392 Security Council Resolution 847 (1993), S/RES/847, 30 June 1993. While BiH and the Bosnian Croats had signed all four agreements by the end of March 1993, the Bosnian Serbs never signed the two agreements on the interim arrangements and provincial boundaries. Cyrus Vance resigned as co-Chair of the ICFY in June 1993, and the ICFY returned to one of its previous ideas, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, involving a Bosnian union with three mini-states or republics. Vance was replaced by Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Owen-Stoltenberg plan was presented early in the summer of 1993. It granted 52 percent of the Bosnian territory to the Bosnian Serbs, 30 percent to the Bosniacs and 19 percent to the Croats. This time, the Security Council held consultations with NATO from the outset regarding its implementation. See The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping, ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 493-494.

energetic implementation in Croatia as well. Belgrade also proved to be less and less willing to cooperate once the means of enforcement were put in place, as it refused to allow the CSCE mission to continue international peacekeeping in sensitive areas, including Kosovo.\footnote{Letter dated 24 September 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/26491, 24 September 1993. Serbia and Montenegro refused the continuation of the CSCE mission in Kosovo, Sanajak and Vojvodina in August 1993. This resulted in the Security Council expressing its concern for the fact that the conflicts in former SFRY might continue to expand. Security Council Resolution 855 (1993), S/RES/855, 9 August 1993.}

In September 1993, the UNSG recommend that the Security Council seriously consider either completely withdrawing the force or extending its means of enforcement to Croatia and dividing UNPROFOR into three separate yet interlinked forces under one integrated military, logistical and administrative structure.\footnote{Additional Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 743 (1992), S/26470, 20 September 1993.} Following intense negotiations, the mandate was renewed for 24 hours on September 1, then for four days, and then finally for another six months on October 4. Rather than separating even more between UNPROFOR in BiH and UNPROFOR in Croatia, the Security Council authorized the force in Croatia to “take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to ensure its security and freedom of movement”. In addition, the Security Council declared that continued noncooperation by any of the parties from any of the Republics in the former SFRY would have serious consequences.\footnote{Security Council Resolution 869 (1993), S/RES/869, 30 September 1993; Security Council Resolution 870 (1993), S/RES/870, 1 October 1993; Security Council Resolution 871 (1993), S/RES/871, 4 October 1993.} But violence continued on all fronts until the end of December 1993 when Croatia and Serbia agreed to sign a Christmas Truce Agreement in Croatia. However, without an obligation to withdraw their support to their respective allies in BiH, they continued to fight the war here.

After severe attacks had been carried out on civilians in Sarajevo on February 4-5, 1994, the UNSG informed the Security Council that preparation should urgently be made to enforce the safe area. However, as the violence in Sarajevo was playing out between groups that were much less clearly divided than in other safe areas, the rationale was slightly altered. Instead of banning one group from the area, NATO was instructed to destroy any artillery or mortar positions used for attacking civilians in and around Sarajevo. The strategy was also different from previous proposals. The offensive air strikes for pre-emptive or punitive purposes were replaced with a strategy of on preventive grounds using close air support
(CAS) for self-defense on behalf of UN peacekeepers in the field.\footnote{See letter dated 28 January 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1994/94, 28 January 1994. See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, \textit{Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga} (London, I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), and Neil Fenton, \textit{Understanding the UN Security Council} (Hampshire, Ashgate, 2004, pp. 148-180. Already on 12 January 1994, the UNSG had redefined the safe areas as he instructed his Special Representative to undertake an urgent preparatory study of the foreseen violation against UN personnel in the safe areas. The concept was subsequently communicated to the Security Council. See \textit{The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 527-528.} Within days, NATO declared that it would, at the request of the UN, launch air strikes ten days from February 10 unless the parties agreed to the cease-fire that was presented to them. As expected, the ultimatum triggered immediate accusations regarding the illegitimacy of such measures, both from the warring parties and other states. However, within days, the cease-fire was in place and the weapons were withdrawn from the designated exclusion zones established in and around Sarajevo. A senior civilian official was appointed to maintain the city united and pluralistic, draft a plan of action for the restoration of essential public services in Sarajevo, and assist the government of BiH in its implementation.\footnote{Security Council Resolution 900 (1994), S/RES/900, 4 March 1994.} Thus on February 20, the UNSG informed the Security Council that close air support was no longer necessary. However, a week later, repeated violations of the no-fly zone in BiH resulted in NATO’s first military engagement in support of UNPROFOR when four warplanes were shot down over BiH.\footnote{The four war planes were shot down on 28 August 1994. From that point on, the international community agreed to launch attacks on several occasions, including on the Sarajevo area in August and September, and then again on a Croatian airstrip from which forces were sent into BiH in November. For more about the deployment of force in BiH, see Dan Saroshi, ‘The Security Council’s authorization of Regional Arrangements to use force: the case of NATO’, in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Walsh and Dominik Zaum (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 226-247.} 

On March 1, 1994, the leaders of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats and the Croatian government agreed to a cease-fire as well as a framework plan for a Bosniac-Croat Federation with ten autonomous cantons—the Washington accords.\footnote{The agreements including the boundaries of this federation were first laid down and signed on 1 March 1994, although the federation was not established until May of that year. United States Institute of Peace, Peace Agreement Digital Collection, \url{http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html} (accessed 30 April 2009). See also \textit{The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 494-495.} However, as the accords were made under the auspices of the United States rather than the ICFY, and they excluded the Bosnian-Serb part of BiH, they did not benefit from the consent of Belgrade. As such, while the violence calmed down in the Western parts of BiH, it escalated in areas of eastern BiH dominated by Bosnian Serbs. At the end of March, the Croatian government also signed an agreement with regard to Eastern Slavonia. This time, the negotiations had
been facilitated by the ICFY but in cooperation with the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States. It established a lasting cessation of hostilities with the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs based on two previous temporary cease-fire agreements, whereby the two parties agreed to end hostilities, withdraw forces behind fixed lines of separation and place their heavy weapons in UNPROFOR-monitored store sites.\footnote{The two earlier temporary cease-fire agreements between Serbia and Croatia were signed on 15 September and on 17 December 1993, and the later one on 29 March 1994. Security Council Resolution 908 (1994), S/RES/908, 31 March 1994. By the end of May 1994, UNPROFOR reported near total compliance by the two parties with this agreement in Croatia. See The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping, 3$^{rd}$ ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 519.}

As UNPRFOR’s was coming to an end, the force was left to safeguard a range of different agreements made under the auspices of different actors on various military and territorial arrangements between a number of groups. While different types of peace had been established in different areas of the former SFY, an overall solution for the violent dissolution of this former sovereign state was perhaps further away than ever. The focus was no longer exclusively on defining and consolidating the external borders of sovereign states. Rather, UNPROFOR’s aims also revealed a clear interest in the type of peace that was reigning within and across those states. The way in which UNPROFOR’s aims changed from strictly humanitarian ones to aims of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation indicates important changes in the understanding of success, which reflects a fundamental shift in the understanding of collective security in the global world. The consequences of this shift for the practice of collective security was still to come as most of these aims remained to be implemented.

3. The end of the war and UNPROFOR: enforcing negative peace from above and positive peace from below

While the use of force had resulted in some compliance and some hope for a peaceful future and, as such, enhanced practical success, it had also undermined the force’s legitimacy and UNPROFOR’s conceptual success, as well as the UN Member States’ commitment to peace within the former SFY. The leaders of the warring parties were increasingly reluctant to cooperate with UNPROFOR and the civilians had less and less confidence in the force. In other words, implementing the ambitious multidimensional peacekeeping mandate was going
to require more than forceful means. UNPROFOR also had to find ways in which to regain its legitimacy in the former SFRY and at UN headquarters.

In the last year two years of its deployment, the Security Council outsourced the more coercive role of enforcing peace through force, and focused on implementing the civilian aims through the international institutionalization of liberal democratic state-building projects. Together, the UN and the international community pursued two-track coercive diplomacy that enforced peace from both above and below. As a result, UNPROFOR’s mandate was successfully terminated at the expense of some of the worst failures in UN peacekeeping up to that time.

First, UNPROFOR and the ICFY called upon other organizations and actors who were not limited by the same criteria for success, for help with both the protection of peacekeepers and the enforcement of an overall peace settlement among the leaders of the warring parties. Second, UNPROFOR’s top-down strategy was reversed to focus on civilian aims and the peoples rather than on their leaders, meaning peace was enforced from below. Third, extreme conditions on the ground provided the motivation and justificatory background needed for the international community, the UN and the warring parties to agree to the enforcement of peace in the former of SFRY, from both above and below.

Outsourcing peacemaking and peace enforcement: the Contact Group and NATO

As Belgrade was mobilizing the JNA with the intention of integrating the Serb areas throughout the former SFRY territory into one Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, the UNPAs were becoming destabilized and violence was brewing in BiH’s safe areas; the Security Council extended UNPROFOR for another six months on March 31, 1994. The mandate emphasized “the need for a negotiated settlement accepted by all the parties” that takes into account the interlinked nature of the conflicts, especially the connection between the safe areas in BiH and the UNPAs in Croatia.\(^2\) It brought together all the aims and roles that the force had acquired and developed over the previous year in one mandate and authorized the deployment of an additional 3,500 troops. While the mandate confirmed that the overarching ambition remained the same in terms of settling the violent dissolution of the SFRY indefinitely, it clearly reflected a shift from consolidating state sovereignty from

the outside to strengthening new states by helping to establish certain structures and institutions from the inside, notably liberal-democratic sovereign states. However, for a force that had been deployed for strictly humanitarian purposes and an Organization that had little experience in multidimensional peacekeeping, implementing this mandate was not only overwhelming but also legitimately problematic.

As violence was escalating in BiH, the Security Council repeatedly demanded a cease-fire and NATO issued warnings for close air support. But the parties only continued to harden their positions and intensify the severe attacks, with the Bosnian-Serb paramilitary groups attacking safe areas from the outside and Bosniac armed groups fighting from the inside.403 In April 1994, the Security Council gave the Bosnian-Serb groups in the safe area of Gorazde an ultimatum to comply with a cease-fire agreement that had been presented to them by UNPROFOR within next 24 hours or NATO would conduct close air support in protection of UN peacekeepers and personnel. Humanitarian relief was finally allowed in and two days later full compliance was reported. Thus rather than authorizing the use of force, the Security Council authorized the deployment of another 6,550 troops, together with 150 military observers and 275 civilian police monitors. This suggested that for the safe areas to be a practical success, they were bound to suffer certain conceptual failure in terms of clearly going against the traditional principles of peacekeeping. The question, therefore, was which scenario meant more projectual success? Which one had more destabilizing effects for the global world, more practical than conceptual success, or vice versa?404

With the escalation of violence on the ground, UNPROFOR and the ICFY were increasingly preoccupied with immediate dangers such as protecting civilians from isolated outbreaks of violence. Thus the ICFY Steering Committee co-Chairs asked the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation for help.405 Together, the Member States

405 On the one hand, an agreement was made at the end of May regarding the freedom of movement and demilitarization the Mostar region and was successfully implemented. As such, it allowed the EC to establish an administration in Mostar on 23 July 1994. On the other hand, however, a cease-fire agreement that was made at the beginning of June in Sarajevo according to which neither party was to engage in offensive military operations or provocations, lapsed after numerous violations. In Croatia, the ICFY and UNPROFOR managed to generate the necessary agreement for the Croatian government to end their blockade at 17 out of 19 crossing points into or within UNPA's by September, and the warring parties had agreed to establish eight expert groups that were to prepare for cooperation on specific economic issues along with the ICFY and
agreed to establish the Contact Group, not as an alternative peace negotiator, but as a ‘new’ means for more forceful peacemaking. The Contact Group was to agree among themselves on a peace for the region that it was ready to stand by and implement even if it required enforcement. Instead of holding open multilateral negotiations among the warring parties, the idea was for the members of the Contact Group to each undertake private bilateral negotiations with one of the warring parties. The Russian Federation was to convince the Serbs, the US was to convince the Bosniacs, and the EC was to convince the Croats to agree to the Group’s peace plan. Thus the focus was not necessarily on finding the best solution for the parties but on identifying a peace that would have stabilizing effects for the global world according to the Contact Group and the international community. All in all, it amounted to an indirect agreement between the UN and the international community that the warring parties would not without a considerable amount of military and civilian assistance be able to reverse the international risks that the internal disorder of the states of the former SFRY represented. In other words, from then on, projectual success took precedent.

In late May 1994, the Contact Group called the warring parties together—the Bosniac-Croat federation, the Bosnian Serbs, the Republic of Croatia and Belgrade, or the JNA—at a meeting in Talloires, France. It presented the parties with a map of BiH that had been embraced by the Security Council, which allocated 51 percent of the territory to the Bosniac-Croat Federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs—the 51-49 partition plan. For the violent dissolution of the SFRY to be settled in a way that stabilized the world, BiH was to be split into two coequal democratic entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Bosniac control, and Republica Srpska under Bosnian-Serb control. Both entities were allowed to have parallel special relationships with neighboring countries but their international borders were established as those of a unified BiH. The Group made it clear that the plan was not open to negotiation apart from changes that the parties could

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agree upon among themselves. It envisioned two possibilities for how to bring all the parties to agree to the plan. Either one of the parties could be favored by indirectly strengthening the military advantage of this party, and as such allowing a victor’s peace to be fought out. Or political pressure could be put on all the parties to cooperate. Whereas the former option would unambiguously place UNPROFOR on one side of an ongoing conflict and “fundamentally shift from the logic of peace-keeping to the logic of war”, the latter would require some new innovative means whereby the consent of all parties was motivated by everybody’s cooperation rather than by external coercive force.

At the end of the summer of 1994, the Bosnian Serbs were the only party that had not accepted the Contact Group’s plan despite the fact that Belgrade was urging them to do so. Without much hope for a political settlement, civil violence persisted in BiH, as did the political impasse in Croatia. On August 5 and September 22, UNPROFOR once again requested NATO’s support, this time to prevent Bosnian-Serb groups from seizing a number of heavy weapons from weapon collection sites around Sarajevo, and stopping a Bosnian-Serb tank that was approaching the city. The Security Council and the UNSG agreed that with the Contact Group and NATO enforcing peace on the leaders of the warring parties, UNPROFOR should concentrate on fulfilling its humanitarian and civilian aims on the ground.

Reversing UNPROFOR’s strategy: enforcing positive peace from below
In September 1994, the Security Council renewed UNPROFOR’s mandate for another six months. The force was instructed to reverse its top-down strategy and focus on regaining public support rather than on trying to impose humanitarian concepts on their leaders. The idea was that if UNPROFOR could find ways in which to empower the civilians to protect

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407 The idea was already discussed by US negotiators in May 1993 in the context of the short-lived ‘Joint Action Program’. In February 1994, a meeting had been held in which the US, Russia, the EC and the UN had agreed on a division of labor that stated that the US was to bring the Bosniacs to the negotiating table and Russia was to bring the the Serbs. The Contact Group still exists today. It has been central to the international community’s efforts in Kosovo and it is widely supported by the UN, the EU, and other governments and organization throughout the world. See The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 494-495, and Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Sharp, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 298-307.


themselves through cooperation rather than violence, the peace that the Contact Group was trying to enforce from above would be indirectly imposed from below. To this end, the Security Council instructed UNPROFOR to continue to support humanitarian activities, facilitate local cease-fires and foster reconciliation and cooperation between the warring parties. It also, however, authorized the force to expand two of the securitizing policies that the UNSG had begun to develop together with UNPROFOR during the last mandate period, namely mine clearance and policing. By raising mine awareness, UNPROFOR would improve the normalization process, and by monitoring the local police, the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) would promote the protection of human rights and a multiethnic police force. An independent UNPROFOR radio station was established to limit the effectiveness of the warring parties’ harmful propaganda and disinformation about UNPROFOR’s role by providing unhindered access to impartial, factual and timely information about the peace process. In addition, in a few selected villages in the zones of separation in Croatia, UNPROFOR was to try out a pilot project for providing displaced people with the assistance they needed for their voluntary return.\footnote{The Security Council also issued a resolution a week before the mandate was renewed that demanded that the Bosnian Serbs stop all practices of ethnic cleansing and requested that the UNSG arrange for the redeployment of UNPROFOR troops and monitors to several areas of concern throughout BiH. Security Council Resolution 947 (1994), S/RES/947, 30 September 1994. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 908 (1994), S/1994/1067, 17 September 1994, and Security Council Resolution 947 (1994), S/RES/947, 30 September 1994.}

A month after the mandate was renewed, it would seem as if the new strategy was paying off as the conflict took a somewhat unexpected turn when two of the warring parties begun their own forceful implementation of the 51-49 partition plan. The Bosnian government’s army, with the support of Bosnian-Croat units, launched an offensive attack that pushed the Bosnian-Serbs frontlines in the Bihac pocket back to the partition line to which the Contact Group’s plan referred. In response, the Bosnian Serbs with the support of JNA forces from Croatia launched a major counteroffensive including two days of air raids carried out by aircraft taking off from a field in Croatia. As the attacks advanced into the UN safe area, the Security Council on November 21, authorized NATO to conduct close air support to destroy the airfield in Croatia.\footnote{Security Council Resolution 958 (1994), S/RES/958, 19 November 1994.} Two days later NATO planes patrolling the area were attacked by Bosnian-Serb surface-to-air missile sites in the Bihac area. NATO returned fire, yet only two days later Bihac suffered renewed severe shelling. An ICFY three-point
peace plan for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the Bihac safe area was presented to the warring parties but had little success. Instead of authorizing more force, the Security Council pursued its reverse strategy by giving the warring parties the authority to agree on the strategies for demilitarization and the cessation of all hostilities including provocative actions within the Bihac safe area, and by providing UNPROFOR with the authority to define its operational boundaries.\(^{412}\)

Meanwhile, the Contact Group had been increasing coercive diplomatic pressure on the warring parties by sending its leaders to the region to mobilize support for the 51-49 partition plan. Finally, on December 23, 1994, there was a small breakthrough. A cease-fire agreement was signed in BiH, which a week later was replaced with a four-month cessation-of-hostilities agreement also signed by the Croat leaders on January 2, 1995.\(^{413}\) Moreover, Croatia signed an agreement with Belgrade on economic issues and agreed to engage in discussions with regard to the UNPAs. However, things remained unstable throughout the region. The Bosnian government made it clear that unless the Bosnian Serbs had agreed to the Contact Group’s 51-49 partition plan by the time the cease-fire ran out, they would not renew it. In addition, the Croatian president informed the Security Council that Croatia would refrain from renewing its consent to UN peacekeeping until more progress was made regarding the political impasse and the deployment of international monitors on Croatia’s international border with BiH.\(^{414}\) But if the UN was to deploy an operation specific to Croatia separate from UNPROFOR, he would reconsider this position.\(^{415}\)

By the time UNPROFOR’s mandate was up for renewal in March 1995, the UNSG recommend to the Security Council that it reduce UNPROFOR’s military force and increase its civilian components with more humanitarian assistance and demilitarization aid, a larger presence at borders, and an intensification of confidence-building activities and local political

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\(^{412}\) UNPROFOR called for protection of the Bihac area again but since NATO was unable to identify targets free of civilians, attacks were not carried out that time. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 959 (1994), S/RES/1389, 1 December 1994.

\(^{413}\) The outstanding issues upon which the warring parties had not been able to agree were therefore excluded from the cease-fire and cessation of violence agreements; these issues included the separation of forces, the interposition of UNPROFOR troops and the withdrawal of heavy weapons. As time went by and little progress was achieved on these issues, the prospects for a peace agreement suffered. With the Bosnian-Serb refusal to sign the Contact Groups peace agreement, the Bosniacs grew increasingly nervous.

\(^{414}\) Negotiations on the political settlement the ICFY together with the the Russian Federation’s Ambassador to Croatia and the United States—the Zagreb Four. However, it was not until the end January that this resulted in an actual plan for negotiations.

negotiations. Moreover, the UNSG presented a plan for UNPROFOR to be restructured into three separate missions or operations tailored to the specific needs on the ground but within the overarching aims of multidimensional peacekeeping and the partition plan. Given the interlinked nature of the conflicts and the risk of duplicating existing structures, he suggested that a joint theatre headquarters led by one civilian and one military head be established for the three operations in Zagreb—United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters (UNPF-HQ). The name of UNPROFOR together with the mandate of the previous resolutions would remain in place for BiH. But the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) would be established in Croatia and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the FYROM. The Security Council as well as Belgrade, Croatia and BiH endorsed the plan on March 31. UNPROFOR’s mandate was renewed to the end of November 1995 and the three separate operations were established and linked together under the United Nations Peace Force (UNPF). The UN was now clearly focusing on the immediate specific situations within each of these states, leaving the long-term relations between them to other international actors and institutions, mainly the Contact Group and NATO.

The culmination of the wars, peace agreements and the end of UNPROFOR: enforcing negative peace from above

Skeptical of what the restructuring would actually be able to achieve, the JNA and Croatia both resumed discreet military mobilization in parallel with their public commitment to military and economic agreements. The following month, the cease-fire agreement in Eastern Slavonia, the UNPAs zones of separation and the weapons withdrawal were all violated on several occasions. Large numbers of civilians were killed and even larger numbers were forcefully displaced. Soon, heavy military violence took place and the worst humanitarian crisis in Croatia thus far developed. At the end of August 1995, 98 of

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419 Croatia carried out two intense military operations with tragic consequences: Operation Flash in May 1995, and Operation Storm in August 1995. Large numbers of Serbs were killed during these two operations and
UNCRO's observation posts had been overrun, between 150,000 and 200,000 Serbs had been driven out of Croatia, genocide had been committed, and UN peacekeepers had been deliberately attacked and killed. Yet NATO had not been asked to enforce peace here as had been the case in BiH and the Security Council did not condemn the Croatian offensive. It was in self-defense that NATO acted in August 1995, responding to fire that came from Serbian sites in Croatia. Thus in Croatia, conceptual success was prioritized over practical.

In BiH, the cessation-of-hostilities agreement expired in May 1995 without the Bosnian Serbs having signed the 51-49 partition plan. Fighting resumed and military activity reached unprecedented levels. Within a month, Sarajevo was completely isolated, peace negotiations were at an absolute standstill, only a fraction of the humanitarian relief was delivered, and over 300 UN personnel were taken hostage. On May 25-26, NATO conducted close air support to destroy ammunition depots outside Sarajevo. Less than a month later, the Security Council authorized a military rapid reaction force (RRF). Two out of three UN peacekeepers in the world were now located in the former SFRY. The US indicated that it would take a proactive role in establishing a peace agreement and supplying the troops to enforce it through the RRF. However, the effectiveness of this initiative was again undermined by the skepticism and lack of confidence of those it was meant to help.

Things continued to worsen. Within weeks, both the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa had been overrun, with genocide taking place, and five mortar attacks on civilians in Sarajevo. It was now clear to the world that situations were taking place in Europe that had not been seen there since World War II. The Security Council had no choice but to call upon NATO close air support to attack the Bosnian-Serb paramilitary ground targets from which the safe areas had been attacked. A series of air strikes, or ‘deliberate force’, were carried out between August 30 and September 14, 1995. On July 22, the Presidents of BiH and Croatia

more than 200,000 were driven out of Croatia. They are key to the defeat of the FRY. See Ozren Žunec, ‘Operations Flash and Storm’, in Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanić, eds., The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995 (Oxon, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), pp. 67-83, and Amnesty International Public Statement, EUR 64/002/2005, 4 August 2005.


See Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1995/32, 14 July 1995; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999. It was also when the UN suffered the most casualties thus far in the history of peacekeeping.

Fatalities Statistics, (4) Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type up to 30 April 2009, United Nations 187
renewed the Washington Accords and signed the Split Declaration whereby Croatia officially committed its forces to assist the Bosniacs in answering Serbian attacks on the ground. Soon the JNA suffered defeat after defeat, gradually loosing strongholds in both Croatia and BiH.

In early September, the Bosnian Serbs signed the 51-49 partition plan and the Foreign Ministers of BiH, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to a number of principles for the negotiation of an overall settlement outlined by the Contact Group in a Joint Statement and Agreed Basic Principles. A system of arbitration was put in place for solving disputes between the two entities in BiH, and three commissions were established for settling cross-regional questions regarding (i) displaced persons, (ii) human rights violations and the preservation of national monuments, and (iii) joint public corporations.  

A month later on October 5, 1995, a countrywide cease-fire agreement was secured with the help of a US delegation and included non-military components such as freedom of movement and the return of displaced persons. Immediate measures were taken to maintain the agreement in terms of demining activities and the release of prisoners. The following day, UNPROFOR reported that the 51-49 balance of the partition plan had been reached in BiH and on October 11, 1995, the fighting ended in BiH. Three weeks of intensive proximity talks followed under the auspices of the Contact Group but in close cooperation with the ICFY, at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton Ohio. On November 20, all the warring parties in the former SFRY and their regional guarantors for BiH agreed on The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively by the Peace Agreement), commonly referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The Agreement included 11 annexes of specific and separate agreements.


Letter dated 8 September 1995 from the representatives of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, A/50/419, S/1995/780, 8 September 1995. When it comes to the FYROM, however, Serbia and Montenegro still did not recognize its independence. On 13 September 1995, Greece and the FYROM agreed on a wide-ranging Interim Accord according to which the two countries agreed to respect each others’ sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, as well as establish a liaison office in each other’s capitals. This was the result of negotiations that had been facilitated by the UNSG’s Special Envoy since July 1993. See Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1995/46, 15 September 1995, and Henryk J. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace, 2003).
on a broad range of issues, both civilian and military, that established a unified BiH divided between two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS), and a special district around the city of Brcko outside the jurisdiction of BiH under international administration.\textsuperscript{423}

On December 8-9, a Peace Implementation Conference was held in London that resulted in 'the London conclusions', which set out the details for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the territorial partition based on the BiH’s complex constitutional arrangements, and established a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) accompanied by a Steering Board to mobilize international support for the Agreements and its implementation, and face out the ICFY.\textsuperscript{424} A week later, on December 14, 1995, a finalized 150-page peace agreement was formally signed in Paris and the new BiH constitution entered into force. Its overall aim was twofold: ending the fighting in the region and rebuilding a viable Bosnian state based on the somewhat ironic logic of one BiH, two Entities—that is, uniting BiH by dividing it.

The Agreement amounted to a broad commitment to fully respect each other’s sovereignty as well as territorial integrity or political independence, and to settle disputes by peaceful means. The military aspects of the settlement included the establishment of a Multinational Military Implementation Force (IFOR) and a Joint Military Commission to ensure the regional stability during and after the termination of UNPROFOR, the UNPF and the safe areas in BiH. It also outlined the exact position and terms of the ‘Inter-Entity Boundary Line’ that divided BiH into the two entities. While these arrangements did not diverge much from the standard peace agreement, its civilian and political aspects with provisions on holding of democratic elections, and constitutional and jurisdiction matters, implied an unprecedented long-term international involvement in the economic, political,
legal and social rehabilitation and reconstruction of BiH. To this end, article VIII, annex X outlined the establishment of an Office of the High Representative (OHR) with executive powers, authorized by the UN Security Council to oversee the civilian implementation, mobilization, guidance and monitoring of the coordination, liaison and staffing of the agreement on civilian implementation of the DPA.425

Meanwhile, the UNSG Special Envoy had, in close cooperation with the US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith, led negotiations between the parties in the UNPAs that resulted in the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium.426 The agreement foresaw the peaceful integration of the eastern parts of Croatia under a Transitional Administration supported by an international force to be established and authorized by the Security Council for the duration of 12 months, and possibly 24 should one of the parties request it. However, with a provision specifying that international human rights monitoring and reporting should continue after the authority was transferred from the region to the Croatian government, the Basic Agreement also relied on long-term international assistance.427 Although much shorter and less intrusive than the DPA, the aim of the Agreement was also twofold: demilitarize and demine the region, and ensure the safe return and respect for international human rights of refugees and displaced persons. It foresaw the establishment and training of a temporary police force and assisting the region in holding democratic elections for all local government bodies no later than 30 days before the International Administration handed over the authority over Eastern Slavonia to Zagreb. However, how this was to be translated into practice differed in BiH as the executive authority over both civilian and military implementation was joined under one UN International Administrator in the Basic Agreement.

On November 22, 1995, all sanctions in the former SFry were suspended, apart from the ones that applied to the Bosnian Serb forces since they had not yet completely

withdrawn from the zones of separation. All the parties agreed on a plan for UNPROFOR withdrawal and for the deployment of the foreseen IFOR composed of ground, air and maritime units, together with a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF). The Security Council extended UNPROFOR’s mandate for one last time until January 31, 1996, and in a separate resolution on December 20, 1995, UNPROFOR’s authority was officially transferred to IFOR under the control of both NATO and non-NATO states and a United Nations civilian office deployed for an initial 12-month period. The states involved were authorized to take all the necessary measures to guarantee the overall implementation of the two peace agreements in the former SFY, ensure compliance with the Military Aspects of the Peace Agreement (Annex 1A) and defend themselves. A new UNSG Special Representative and Coordinator of UN Operations in BiH, Iqbal Riza, was appointed, as well as a High Representative (HR) for BiH, Carl Bildt. In January 1996, the first Police Commissioner, Thomas Fitzgerald, was appointed and the IPTF set up. Together, the UN civilian office and the IPTF became the United Nation Mission in BiH (UNMIBH), operating alongside UNPROFOR and the HR.

Conclusion

Carrying out multidimensional peacekeeping to stabilize the global world proved to be a difficult and ambiguous exercise. On the one hand, UNPROFOR had to recognize the republics in the former SFY as independent states and confirm their sovereignty. On the other hand, it had to intervene to keep peace within these states. The operation pushed both for certain internal state arrangements and an international regulatory approach to finding a just solution in terms of sovereignty. The two strategies translated into contradictory

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431 It is, for example, argued that there is a strong correlation between how the war in Croatia was ended through recognition of the independence of the state, and the outbreak of violence in the neighboring state of BiH within less than two months. Moreover, the fact that Croatia was no longer part of Yugoslavia left the
policies working at cross-purposes in practice. While both might have been successful strategies had they been applied alone, the fact that they took place simultaneously made it so that they were serving rather than defeating the conflicts.\textsuperscript{432} It allowed the conflicting parties to play the UN against itself to their own advantage. This left UNPROFOR with many different and even conflicting expectations to fulfill and therefore also with expectations and criticism for not performing tasks that it was not equipped, staffed, financed, let alone authorized, to carry out. The expectations that were put on peace in the region with regard to self-determination and a democratic future made it more difficult to move beyond cease-fire agreements.\textsuperscript{433}

The DPA installed a large international presence in the region that was foreseen to outlive UNPROFOR. It is laid out in a complex and vague 100-page agreement that specifies many details regarding BiH’s internal affairs, including the exact wording of its constitution. The political impasse was never resolved. It was institutionalized. “The Dayton agreement stopped four and a half years of terrible conflict, but it did not foreclose either of the ultimate options for Bosnia and Herzegovina: reintegration or partition.”\textsuperscript{434} Rather it was assumed that in the same way in which during UNPROFOR the humanitarian relief was to encourage the warring parties in former SFRY to reach a peaceful solution to their conflict, the initial securitization that the DPA provided was to encourage the former warring parties to work towards a united BiH. What was not taken into account, however, was that in order for the DPA to be achieved, UNPROFOR had had to forcefully intervene with the balance on the ground.

The DPKO in its review of UNPROFOR underlines that although the operation gradually came to include certain elements of enforcement, it was not deployed to end the

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\textsuperscript{433} Z. Papic, ‘The general support in B-H and international support policies’, \textit{International Support Policies to South-East European Countries: Lessons (Not) Learned in B-H}, (Sarajevo, the Open Society Fund B-H and Müller, December 2002).

war, nor was it deployed to fight the war. While the former was the task of the peacemakers and the latter that of the peace-enforcers, the UNSG in hindsight identified three main purposes of UNPROFOR: alleviating the consequences of war by helping in the provision of humanitarian aid; containing the conflict and limiting its consequences by imposing constraints upon the warring parties through ‘safe areas’, for example; and promoting the prospects for peace by negotiating local cease-fires and other arrangements aimed at political settlement. Moreover, he underlined a gain in terms of lessons learned for future peacekeeping. Thus UNPROFOR was not an end in itself, but barely a mean to enable the peacemakers to reach an overall solution on the basis of which a peaceful future could be built. And according to the UN, “UNPROFOR had considerable success in fulfilling these purposes”. The UNSG even went so far as to strongly dispute the widely held allegations about the UN’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia not being a success. But the extent to which a country with more than half of its population internally or externally displaced, rising levels of communicable disease and infant mortality, an unemployment rate of 90 percent, and significantly reduced infrastructure, industrial production and capacity for energy generation, is stable and peace prone is disputable. The ultimate criterion for success, self-sustainable peace, was still far from achieved.

The choice that underlines the authorization, deployment and successful termination of UNPROFOR is limiting the civilian suffering even if this comes at the expense of reaching a negotiated solution to the conflict. It can be traced back to a recommendation that was made by the UNSG in 1992: “the danger that a United Nations peace-keeping operation will fail because of lack of cooperation from the parties is less grievous then the danger that delay in its dispatch will lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration in Yugoslavia”. The same choice can be found in the peace agreements that ended the wars and the decisions that established the international administrations that followed. The choice reflects a prioritization of political stalemate over open war and the assumption that peacekeeping success in terms of a certain level of traditional security will

lead to peacebuilding processes that will stabilize states internal and external relations and reassure the world of its mutual commitment to collective security. These choices, compromises and assumptions that lived on in the region’s subsequent peacebuilding missions and processes continued to influence the peacebuilding process for many years to come.

Richard Holbrooke, one of the most prominent international diplomats involved in ending the wars in the former SFRY concluded that the “international response to this catastrophe was at best uncertain and at worst appalling.”\textsuperscript{439} There was no doubt that serious violations of human rights, such as genocide and other war crimes, had played out under the nose of the international community. But also, UNPROFOR brought about what has been referred to as the worst crisis of transatlantic relations since the Suez crisis and some of the most serious challenges to collective security in the global world.\textsuperscript{440} Carl Bildt, the former high representative in BiH, clearly states that the political differences of the international community were just as damaging as those of the conflicting factions.\textsuperscript{441} And although the UN’s inexperience in dealing with the types of conflicts that were fought in the former SFRY can be blamed for some of UNPROFOR’s failures, the disagreements and ambiguity with regard to the operation’s aims and role are key to why international attempts to prevent and halt some of the most devastating cruelties of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century failed so seriously.\textsuperscript{442}

All in all, we have followed a mandate that reveals the story of a peacekeeping operation that initially only had humanitarian aims, and then gradually took on peacemaking aims that eventually forced the operation into wide and deep peace enforcement. In other words, this was an operation that was never able to move on to peacebuilding. Instead, its mandate was transferred into three new peacekeeping operations followed by three international administrations and a number of UN peacebuilding missions in the region. Thus conclusions stating that UNPROFOR’s mandate was successfully terminated are based on assumptions about projectual success that have largely been drawn in theory. Therefore we now turn to the peacebuilding missions that followed in UNPROFOR’s footsteps. Instead of ending the analysis of the operation with the termination of its mandate, we

\textsuperscript{441} Carl Bildt, \textit{Uppdrag Fred} (Stockholm, Nordstedts Förlag, 1997).
continue by tracing the consequences of coercive diplomacy and forceful peacemaking for peacebuilding. We examine how peacebuilding projects in the former SFRY have developed and draw conclusions about the compatibility between the military and civilian aims of multidimensional peacekeeping operations—that is, between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In other words, we analyze and connect the assumption upon which the justificatory background of the reinvention of collective security and the growing practice of multidimensional peacekeeping rely with practice.
Chapter 5. The Peace after UNPROFOR: International Administrations and the Implementation of Peace Agreements in Croatia and BiH

When UNPROFOR and UNCRO ceased to exist in 1996, they were replaced by large and deep international peacebuilding missions. These were to assist the post-conflict states in translating the peace agreements into practice—that is, establishing self-sustainable peace. In order for the peace process to progress without reversing the initial securitization of the region, the UN found it necessary to use more and more coercive diplomacy and at times even forceful peacebuilding. But instead of closing the sovereignty gap, the efforts undermined the peace process, preventing national ownership and reinforcing the international dependency of the post-conflict states. I therefore suggest that we look closer at the UN missions and some of the other international peacebuilding institutions that were established in Croatia and BiH after UNPROFOR. On the basis of a more in-depth analysis of the implementation of the peace agreements in Croatia and BiH, we ask what peacebuilding process did UNPROFOR set off? In other words, how were the peace agreements translated into practice and what can the outcome tell us about the self-sustaining peace or peacekeeping success that stabilizes the global world order?

UNPROFOR may have provided humanitarian relief and enabled the warring parties in the former SFRY to reach negotiated settlements that ended the violence on the ground. But for the operation to be a success, a transitional period had to follow during which the initial stabilization would lead to a consolidation of peace that resulted in self-sustainable peace. Since the negotiated settlements alone were not seen as a sufficient guarantee for this transition, the Security Council established peacebuilding missions and international transitional administrations supported by NATO-led multinational implementation forces in both Croatia and BiH. The expectations placed on these temporary international institutions were high. With short-term solutions and temporary ad hoc arrangements, the succeeding states were to be both reconstructed and reconciled from within. In the spirit of multidimensional peacekeeping, the multinational force was to demilitarize and securitize the region, while the international transitional administrations were, in close cooperation with local and national leaders, to reconstruct the infrastructure of a functioning state, including institutions and structures ranging from railroads to telephone lines to electoral
constituencies and courts. The needs and preferences of the local populations had to be accommodated so as to induce mutual trust and confidence between the peoples and their leaders. At the same time, the international community had to be reassured of the peace progress in the region and its stabilizing effects for the world at large.

Given the leverage power of the Contact Group during UNPROFOR, together with the loss of legitimacy that the UN had suffered, especially in BiH, the Security Council early on agreed that the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding could not be entrusted to the UN alone.\textsuperscript{443} Gathering the skills, resources and most importantly, the political will and commitment to the peace processes needed to stabilize the region required a cooperative and forceful effort. While the \textit{General Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia} requested “interested countries and organizations” to promote the accomplishment of the agreement in Croatia, the \textit{General Framework Agreement} clearly specified which third-party actors were to implement the different provisions in BiH.\textsuperscript{444} Both agreements foresaw a long-term international presence of a range of external actors in the region, including the UN, the OSCE, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the EU and a number of non-governmental organizations. In BiH, two new international institutions were also to be established outside of the UN system, with executive authority over the implementation of the military and civilian provisions, respectively. Thus, the peace agreement did not reduce international presence in the Western Balkans. On the contrary, the physical presence increased and the executive authority deepened.

To ensure the success of UNPROFOR in Croatia and BiH, the international transitional administrations used their executive authority to put in place the power-sharing rules and arrangements outlined in the Peace Agreement. They also imposed international standards and solutions on the internal affairs of these states. This amounted to a complex practice of peace-as-global-governance with international transitional institutions upholding peace through external military, economic, as well as political structures. The transitional institutions and structures gradually became permanent rather than temporary. This in turn alienated the peoples from their states, rather than creating a united national ownership that


could reconcile the divided groups. A catch-22 developed in which the more efforts that the UN and the international community invested in building peace within Croatia and BiH, the further away self-sustainable peace appeared to be.

The UN peacebuilding missions in Croatia and BiH caused a lot of frustration and disappointment, both within the post-conflict states and the international community. This in turn gave rise to disagreements and tensions in the region and the world. It came to a point where the UNSG warned that the consequences of the UN failing to securitize as well as to set off sustainable peace processes in the Western Balkans would be incalculable, not only for peace in the region but for collective security in the global world. As the UN and its Member States came to realize the stakes involved and the limitations of the mutually reinforcing relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the benchmarks for success were gradually lowered. Moreover, the UN’s mandates were transferred to other international and regional actors. In other words, during the course of these missions to ensure the international community’s commitment to the reinvention of collective security for the global world, there was a shift in the overall criteria for success of multidimensional peacekeeping operations based on what was happening in practice. While this is perhaps not surprising, it is rarely taken into account when multidimensional peacekeeping is reviewed or successfully terminated, nor when the reinvention of collective security is justified. Therefore I suggest that we look at the differences in the understanding of self-sustainable peace over the course of the peacebuilding missions for some final insight into the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and the stabilizing effects of multidimensional peacekeeping.

Against this background we look closer at the international administrations and the implementation of the peace agreements that followed UNPROFOR in Croatia and BiH to get a better idea of the overall positive effects that the peacekeeping literature and discourse agree make multidimensional peacekeeping worthwhile pursuit. First, we consider the implementation of the General Agreement on the reintegration of the region of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia and the settlement of an outstanding dispute in relation to the international borders on the Prevlaka peninsula between Croatia and Belgrade. We follow the interdependent development of these two peace processes from initial securitization to

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the holding of the first democratic elections in 1997. Second, we look at BiH and the implementation of the General Framework Agreement, also from initial securitization until the first democratic elections in 1996. Third, we arrive at the post-election peace consolidation phase in both of these states. We examine how many of the anticipated securitizing, democratizing and therefore also stabilizing and pacifying effects were in practice undermined by unintended consequences that added a number of risks or insecurity dilemmas to the international security agenda.

1. Implementing the Basic Agreement and the Vance-Owen plan in Croatia: the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia and the Prevlaka peninsula

When UNCRO’s mandate lapsed on January 15, 1996, the Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), and the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP). Whereas UNTAES was based on a brief yet encompassing peace agreement regarding antagonistic relations within Croatia, UNMOP was based on a quite straightforward demilitarization agreement that was to encourage Zagreb and Belgrade to settle their last unresolved bilateral issues. Both were to address contesting claims for self-determination and aimed to build self-sustainable peace in Croatia.

To avoid repeating the past years’ practical failures, the Security Council and the UNSG tried to make the mandates and action plans of these two missions as clear and coherent as possible, with the means matching the ends and with enough flexibility to adapt to the peacebuilding processes as they unfolded. Both missions benefited from firm international economic and political support and their success was closely interlinked. In order to neutralize relations between the warring parties and avert the risk of war resuming in Croatia, the international community not only rewarded compliance but also punished non-compliance.446

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First, we look at the establishment of UNTAES and UNMOP, their mandates and action plans, and the initial outcomes of immediate demilitarization and a certain normalization of Croatia’s internal affairs. Second, we see how Croatia arrived at a sort of standstill as the anticipated peacebuilding progress failed to follow the initial securitization. Third, we note that to put Croatia on that transitory path from short-term and superficial peacekeeping, to long-term and sincere peacebuilding, the international community pushed for the holding of democratic elections.

**Demilitarization and setting up a transitional administration in Croatia: initial securitization**

As agreed in *The Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium*, UNTAES was deployed for an initial period of 12 months in the Danube region in Croatia. The Mission was mandated to recreate and peacefully reintegrate a multiethnic region, including the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbia Krajina, into Croatia’s legal and constitutional system—that is, under Croatian sovereignty. It had an ambitious but also powerful mandate for peacebuilding with a number of military and civilian aims that amounted to helping Croatia avoid relapse into conflict by identifying and strengthening the structures that were thought to solidify peace. The role of an International Administrator was outlined with executive authority over mandate implementation, as well as over the governing of the region. A large well armed force with up to 5,000 troops and 100 military observers led by a UN Force Commander and supported by IFOR, was deployed under Chapter VII. The first International Administrator, Jacques P. Klein, interpreted his mandate as a minimal baseline rather than a ceiling. To strike a balance between the preferences of the concerned parties and what UNTAES could achieve, Klein set up a transitional council including representatives from Croatia’s government, local Serb and Croat authorities, and other local minorities. He established that economic rehabilitation was the best basis for peace in Croatia and therefore, that implementation should begin with setting up public services and coordinating plans for development and economic

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448 Jacques P. Klein was appointed the International Administrator on 17 January 1996, Major-General Jozef Schoups, the Force Commander of UNTEAS on 1 March 1996, and a headquarters was set up in Vukovar.
reconstruction with other external actors, public and private. A step-by-step implementation plan was developed, today known as democracy sequencing, and 600 civilian police, 317 international and 686 local civilian staff were mobilized.

UNMOP was deployed to take over monitoring the implementation of a demilitarization agreement that the Croatian government and Belgrade had already signed in 1992, known as the Vance-Owen plan. Deployed for an initial period of three months, to be extended for another three if necessary, the mandate listed only three reporting tasks of the UNSG: the situation on the ground, progress made by the conflicting parties to peacefully resolve their differences, and the possibility of extending or handing over UNMOP to other international organizations. The UNSG deployed 28 military observers, appointed a Chief Military Observer and instructed them to establish an environment that improved the prospects for the conflicting parties to settle their differences. The Chief Observer in Prevlaka maintained frequent contact with Zagreb and Belgrade, and held meetings with local authorities on a regular basis. A security regime was drawn up for the peninsula according to which a demilitarized area was established on the border between Croatia and the FRY—the yellow zone—and a UN-controlled zone on the coast (including the waters in the direct vicinity)—the blue zone—and the monitors were instructed to carry out daily patrols, hold weekly meetings with local military and police, and attend higher level meetings of political, religious and cultural leaders. A few months later, when UNMOP’s mandate had been extended, the Chief Observer also proposed practical procedures for how the conflicting parties could reduce tensions and normalize the international borders in Prevlaka, which the Security Council embraced.

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450 See Chapter 2 of this thesis.


452 The first Chief Military Observer to be appointed was Colonel Göran Gunnarson. UNTAES reached its maximum strength in October 1996, when the administration deployed 5,561 uniformed personnel, including...
During the first six months of their deployment, the strategies of both UNTAES and UNMOP were quite successful thanks to considerable local and international support. The Administration had established a public affairs office that facilitated the reopening of Zagreb’s highway, the reconnection of the Adriatic oil pipeline and telephone lines, set up ‘neutral’ public information channels including UNTAES radio broadcasts and a UNTAES Bulletin, and supported a survey of the UN Electoral Assistance Division. Meanwhile, the forces had demilitarized Eastern Slavonia, established the Transitional Police Force as well as border monitoring units, and assisted the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the exhumation of one of the region’s mass graves. Together, the administration and the forces had established an open-air meeting area between two opposing towns, where they organized a weekly market for the local inhabitants to trade their produce, and launched a number of pilot projects to reconstruct entire villages.\textsuperscript{453} Also, in Prevlaka, the relations between the conflicting parties and the UN had improved. Both governments had expressed their commitment to the Security Regime by withdrawing their heavy weapons from the yellow zones, carrying out some mine clearance, and requesting that the mission continue beyond its initial mandate.\textsuperscript{454} In addition, the Croatian government and the FRY had signed two agreements on the normalization of their relations with each other, which underlined a mutual support for UNTAES and demonstrated a commitment to the overall peace process.\textsuperscript{455}


\textsuperscript{455} The agreements between Croatia and the FRY were made in August 1996 on the normalization of their relations. The Croatian-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Joint Declaration, Athens, 7 August 1996, and Agreement on Normalization of Relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 23 August 1996.
Moving from the initial status quo to long-term progress: reintegration and international borders

With both reconstruction and securitization under way, the UN could shift its attention from the immediate to the future—to the deeper and more fundamental underlying sources of the conflict. UNTAES concentrated more on the provisions of the Basic Agreement, which focused on reintegration and the future of the region. UNMOP became more involved in trying to settle the outstanding political differences between Zagreb and Belgrade with regard to the international borders around Prevlaka. However, as UNTAES tried to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons in Easter Slavonia, and the Chief Observer in Prevlaka tried to move from defensive military deployment ‘to a normal border-security stance’, they were both faced with situations where neither of the conflicting parties were prepared to go beyond the minimal requirements for cooperation and participation, let alone act unilaterally for peace. The fact that demilitarization had been achieved and economic reconstruction was under way did not seem to have created the anticipated environment where the parties were more willing to settle their political differences and start building peace. Nor did the fact that the parties were cooperating with the UN mean that the relations between them had improved or that they were closer to seeing eye to eye. In other words, successful peacekeeping was far from a guarantee for successful peacebuilding.

To carry out demilitarization and establish a minimum of public services, UNTAES and UNMOP had developed policies that were possible to implement without the conflicting parties having to compromise much on the deeper issues dividing them, out of hope that the success of the former would facilitate the latter. But as the differences between the conflicting parties resurfaced and attention was turned to peacebuilding, the UN discovered that not only did the antagonistic feelings and divides remain, but they seemed to have been reinforced. The problem was that the conflicting parties each had their own understandings of what their outstanding differences were, and therefore how the agreements that they had made about peace translated into practice. Despite the success that had been achieved so far, none of the parties were willing to compromise their particular understandings. The closer UNTAES and UNMOP were coming to the end of their mandates, and the closer Croatia came to holding elections, the stronger the polarization grew between the Serb and Croat authorities in Eastern Slavonia, and the deeper the divide between Zagreb and Belgrade became. The disagreement over the mandate was increasingly bringing the parties to work at cross-purposes, obstruct reintegration and spread distorted
information about the opposition’s plans for the future. The violent conflict had not so much been solved as it had been replaced with a political battle over ethnic identity, justified as a battle over territory by Belgrade, and over security by Zagreb. UNTAES and UNMOP had no choice but to rely increasingly on coercion to contain the mounting violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms that seemed to go hand in hand with the implementation of what had been defined as self-sustaining peace in Croatia.

Although both Zagreb and Belgrade supported the extension of UNMOP’s mandate, the Croatian government made it clear that since Croatia was indeed a sovereign state and Prevlaka had been successfully demilitarized, it did not see why it was necessary for the security regime to remain on the peninsula. Belgrade, on the other hand, insisted that there was an outstanding territorial question between Croatia and the FRY in Prevlaka, which meant that without the presence of the UN, the demilitarization would have to be reversed. Thus, on 15 July 1996, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate for another six months and urged the parties to abide by their mutual commitment to the 1992 Vance-Owen plan. But instead of bilateral negotiations, the tensions escalated to a point where the FRY mobilized tanks from the Yugoslav Army in the immediate vicinity of the borders with Croatia, triggering similar movements from the Croatian army. Although UNMOP was able to convince the armies to withdraw, the incident showed how fragile the peace in the region was and that it still was a threat to international security. The parties were neither demining, nor implementing the Chief Military Observers’ practical procedures, let alone demonstrating any willingness to compromise their firm positions. A certain status quo installed itself where the Vance-Owen plan was neither seriously violated nor fully implemented, and tensions were quite high. This is pretty much how things remained until Eastern Slavonia was reintegrating and the end of UNTAES was actually in sight.

While the Croatian government had cooperated to demilitarize Eastern Slavonia and begin reconstruction, it that obstructed the reintegration of Serbian persons with complex administrative and bureaucratic procedures. As a result, the success of the UNTAES

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mandate was undermined, in particular with regard to the Transitional Police Force, the border monitoring units, and the issuing of national documents and citizenship papers, and voter registration. In addition, the Croatian government refrained from upholding its commitment to finance the local administrations in the region. It demanded that democratic elections be held no later than December 1996, UNTAES be terminated 30 days after that, and the region be fully returned to the authority of the Croatian government at the end of April 1997, with nothing more than regional monitoring missions present in Croatia. The government even threatened to take military action if the UNTAES mandate was not terminated. Yet, at the same time, it had already begun the election campaign and requested democratization assistance from the OSCE. On the other hand, the Serbian authorities, rather than preparing for elections, requested that the Security Council extend its mandate in June 1996.

In November 1996, the Security Council decided to authorize an early six months extension of the UNTAES mandate beginning on 16 July 1997, to “avoid a period of pressure and political turmoil”. This time the parties were not only urged to cooperate with UNTAES but also to take the necessary steps for local elections to be held in the region, especially steps focusing on respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all and promoting an atmosphere of confidence among all local residents irrespective of their ethnic origin. The Serbian leaders together with the FRY maintained that elections could not be held and, therefore, UNTAES could not be terminated until the substantial bureaucratic obstacles and unequal socio-economic and political conditions that continued to inhibit the return of refugees and displaced persons had been removed. The Croatian government, however, insisted that “the completion of the peaceful reintegration of the region under the Transitional Administration” had been achieved and, therefore, national

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460 On the request of the government of Croatia, the Permanent Council of the OSCE decided, on 18 April 1996, to establish a mission in Zagreb that began working on 4 July 1996, for an initial duration until 31 December 1996. The mission was mandated ‘to provide assistance and expertise to the Croatian authorities at all levels, as well as to interested individuals, groups and organizations’. It was also to promote reconciliation by advising and monitoring the full implementation of legislation. From the outset, the mission closely cooperated with UNTAES as well as with the ECMM and other external actors. See Decision Nr. 112, Permanent Council, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, PC.DEC/112, 18 April 1996.


The first democratic elections: transferring UNTAES authority to the Croatian government

Following several consultations between the International Administrator and local leaders, as well as a significant amount of international pressure, the Croatian government and the Serbian authorities agreed to hold elections on 13 April 1997. The UNTAES actively engaged in establishing the conditions for free and fair elections in the region, and the ECMM together with the OSCE were requested to do the same throughout the country. Their primary tasks were to ensure consistency in the issuing of national documents and voter registration, train electoral officials, and provide the general public with electoral education. In addition to these logistical and technical challenges, the deep fear and mistrust of especially the Serbian leaders and the non-cooperative stance and obstructionist bureaucratic maneuvers of the Croat leaders had to be reversed. Finally, the problem of registering the many voters who had fled Croatia during the war and not yet returned had to be resolved.\footnote{See Election Report to the Chamber of Counties of the Parliament and of Representatives of Local Government and Local Self-Government Bodies of the Republic of Croatia, OSCE/ODIHR Report, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 13 April 1997. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration for Easter Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, S/1997/148, 24 February 1997. See also Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1066 (1996), S/1996/1075, 31 December 1996, and Report of the Security Council on the United Nations Mission in Prevlaka, S/1997/311, 14 April 1997.}


Despite an unprecedented number of international observers and electoral assistance, the first democratic elections in Croatia involved quite serious technical and
bureaucratic problems. They began during the election campaigns when the Croatian government resisted in providing the international observers with the transparency that was necessary for them to guarantee that the parties were given equal possibilities to mobilize voters. Then the government made last minute changes in the election regulations, which caused confusion regarding constituency borders, voter registration and voting in absentia. Moreover, the fact that Croatia was a post-conflict and a transitional state meant that the training of the election officials and voter education were limited. As a result, the International Administrator on election day found it necessary to redraw the municipal boundaries and extend the elections for another day in order to deal with a number of technical problems, such as misprinted and mixed-up ballot papers, and make sure that everyone with Croatian identity cards was given the possibility to vote. But the problems did not end here because while the ruling nationalist Croat party had won a clear majority in the national parliament, the electors in Eastern Slavonia were split between the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDG). To settle the ruling arrangements in the region, UNTAES had to take decisive action to persuade the parties to accept sharing power in a coalition rule.

On 30 April 1997, the Electoral Appeals Committee announced that the Croatian elections had fulfilled the international criteria for free and fair elections. Despite the fact that the elections were proof of persisting weaknesses in the parties’ commitment to the multiethnic Croatia envisioned by UNTAES, the international community saw the elections as an essential and reassuring step for the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia.465 Determined to reintegrate the Danube region before the end of the year, the Croatian government shortly after the elections signed and ratified an agreement with UNTAES and UNHCR for the establishment of a Joint Working Group on the Operational Procedures of Return, and set up a Joint Council of Municipalities (JCM), both of which were foreseen in the Basic Agreement. But in practice, the police force remained divided along ethnic lines, anti-ICTY campaigns figured in the media, the principles and mechanisms for the safe and

dignified return of Croat-Serbs continued to be highly flawed and on several occasions there were even violent reactions to the return of Serbs. In addition, many of the chairs in the Parliament allocated to the SDG were still empty and the party was clearly disadvantaged in the presidential elections that the Croatian government organized in June 1997. But most noteworthy was perhaps the fact that the voter registration identified all Croatian citizens according to their ethnic rather than national identity. Not only did this policy or bureaucratic maneuvering by the Croatian government go against the commonly held international standards for democratic elections, but it also had discriminatory and intimidating consequences.

As the mission’s mandate was coming to an end, the UNSG warned the Security Council against prematurely finalizing the institutional reintegration of the region. People’s apprehension and anxiety together with the lack of confidence between the leaders were likely to result in a mass exodus of Serbs, which would set back the process of normalization of relations between all the succeeding states. The administrative and legal obstacles and ambiguities with regard to reintegration still had to be eliminated and a country-wide public reconciliation program had to be carried out in order to truly promote ethnic confidence among the local population. The international pressure on the Croatian government to improve the human rights situation and the processes for the return of refugees and displaced persons rose. In response, the Croatian government argued that as long as UNTAES exercised authority over the region and the military component interacted with the local population, it did not have the power to implement any reconciliation programs of that were likely to be effective. Nevertheless, the local Serb community again requested that UNTAES be extended.

On 14 July 1997, the Security Council extended the International Administration’s mandate for another six months. However, the Resolution endorsed the UNSG’s two-phase

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467 The Serbian-Croats who lived as refugees outside of Croatia were disenfranchised by being prevented from registering to vote, while the ethnic Croats who had fled the country during the war were encouraged to vote. As a result, the sitting President, Franco Tudjman from the nationalist Croat candidate from the HDZ, won by an overwhelming majority. Statement: Presidential Election in the Republic of Croatia, Observation Delegation to the Croatian Presidential Elections 1997, 15 June 1997, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14451.html (accessed 27 October 2009).

exit strategy for the gradual devolution of the civil administration’s executive responsibility, the drawdown of military forces, and the reassignment of UNTAES’s responsibilities to other international and regional organizations. This gave the Croatian government six months to prove that it would indeed stand by its commitment to the peaceful reintegration of the Danube region. Like the implementation, demobilization was to progress in sequences, the pace of which was to be decided by the Croatian government’s demonstrated ability to reassure the Serb population. First, a strategy for the gradual transfer of executive responsibility to the Croatian government was to be set out, but without fully revoking the International Administrator’s authority to intervene if the situation were to deteriorate. Second, the International Administration’s remaining executive functions were to be devolved, including the demilitarization of the region and the integration of the Transitional Police Force. Finally, the Security Council welcomed the renewal of the OSCE’s mandate in Croatia whereby a build-up was foreseen for a long-term full mission of 250 expatriates to be deployed to Croatia by 15 January 1998, with a focus on democratization and, more specifically, the two-way return of all refugees and displaced persons and the protection of national minorities.469

2. Implementing the General Framework Agreement for BiH: uniting a divided state in a complex state-building project

On 15 December 1995, the Security Council authorized the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR and the High Representative (HR) for BiH. Both were new international institutions established outside the UN framework with the executive authority in theatre, granted by the Security Council to implement the General Framework Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR the military provisions and the HR the civilian).470 In addition, a UN civilian police force was established together with a UN civilian office, known as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), to contribute


to its civilian implementation and, more specifically, to the strengthening of the rule of law. The Mission grew to an unprecedented size, deeply involved in a wide range of areas including democratic policing, humanitarian relief, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, demining, human rights, elections, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and economic reconstruction.\(^{471}\)

Given the complex institutional set-up for peacebuilding in BiH, it was key that all the external actors involved worked within a coherent framework that clearly defined the relationship between the external actors, as well as their particular roles in the overall peace process and the novel collective security arrangements of which their mandates were a product. As the peace process unfolded, the arrangements only became more complex, revealing and, perhaps, also opening new questions that needed settling, rather than eliminating old ones. The parties’ commitment to the full implementation of the DPA, and the structures and organizations outlined therein, grew increasingly ambiguous and inconsistent.\(^{472}\)

First, we look at the formation of the plan of action for the implementation of the DPA in BiH, and the complex institutional and structural framework that was set up between the UN, NATO, the HR and other international and regional organizations. Second, we turn to the operationalization of the plan of action and the initial securitization to establish the necessary conditions for the holding of democratic elections in BiH. Third, note how following the inauguration of the first state institutions in BiH, the peacebuilding strategy in BiH took a more proactive and intrusive direction.

_The Peace Plan of Action for BiH: IFOR, the High Representative and UNMIBH_

The overarching goal of the 11 separate, specific and detailed peace agreements included in the General Framework Agreement for BiH was “to restore peace, security and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina as an integrated and internationally recognized State, albeit with considerable decentralization of governmental authority and with a certain degree of autonomy granted to its two constituent entities”.\(^{473}\) The two entities—the Federation of


\(^{472}\) C-P Devin, _La guerre et la paix: Approches contemporaines de la sécurité et de la stratégie_ (Paris, Presse de Sciences Po, 2000).

Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic Srpska (RS)—were to be united in one state, with one new government of BiH. In other words, three authorities in two parallel entities in charge of key state responsibilities ruled by the same constitution.\textsuperscript{474} To make sense of this somewhat contradictory logic of a united but not unified or unitary BiH, the PIC was set up to meet on a monthly basis to support and directly run the peace implementation process financially, strategically and politically. At its first meeting, in December 1995, two mutually reinforcing plans—one military and one civilian—were outlined within a framework of a number of overlapping implementation phases on a spectrum from initial peacekeeping to long-term peacebuilding. In the spirit of multidimensional peacekeeping, the former was to provide the basis for the latter. More precisely, the PIC prescribed international troops to create a climate of stability and security conducive to the establishment of an organizational structure for democracy and the rule of law, as outlined in the DPA.\textsuperscript{475}

With more traditional means of peacekeeping, the force was to first make sure that the cessation of hostilities was respected, the forces separated and militarily disengaged, and that the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) that divided BiH between the Federation and the RS was respected. It was also to balance the military power on the ground and prevent renewed hostilities by serving as a buffer between the conflicting parties. Thus the Security Council authorized “the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the multinational implementation force (IFOR) […] to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A [Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement] and Annex 2 [Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues] of the Peace Agreement”. The international force was deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, for “a period of approximately one year”.\textsuperscript{476} With all necessary measures, including ground, air and maritime units, coming from

\textsuperscript{474} The responsibilities of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina outlined in the Constitution agreed upon in the Peace Agreement include: foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, finances of the institutions. The international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina include: immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation, international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol, establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities, regulation of inter-Entity transportation, and air traffic control. See Annex 4: Constitution, of The General Framework Agreement, see A/50/79c, S/1995/999, 30 November 1995.


NATO as well as non-NATO states, the force was set to ensure the compliance of the parties and to protect, as well as defend, all peace implementation agencies and actors. There was a clear change in the aim and strategy of the safe areas, as the force was clearly instructed to apply the same rules equally to all parties involved. Details such as how to regulate civilian and military air traffic in BiH, as well as how to implement these policies, were left up to the decision of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander.

The Security Council endorsed the PIC’s request that Carl Bildt be named as the High Representative of BiH to, in accordance with the Agreement on Civilian Implementation (Annex 10), “monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies involved”. The institutional framework that had been designed for the OHR provided for a role of international governance for building a certain peace within BiH based on the concept that is today known as democracy gradualism. The political leaders and civil society were to be assisted in kick-starting the economic reconstruction, addressing the issues of infrastructure, employment and production, while also promoting human rights by helping to ensure the return of refugees and displaced persons, the establishment of a democratic police and law enforcement, and the holding of free and fair elections. In addition, local disputes between Bosniacs and Serbs regarding the IEBL in and around the Brcko district were yet to be settled, the authority of the Sarajevo suburbs that were ruled by the RS had to be transferred to the Federation, and the self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia needed to be reintegrated into the Federation. The Security Council also endorsed this part of the PIC’s action plan. The HR was appointed and granted with “the


478 The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was a part of the Bosnia and Herzegovina around Mostar and Grude, which since 18 November 1991 claimed to be a separate “political, cultural, economic and territorial whole” in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the entity never officially declared independence from BiH, nor functioned under a separate constitution, it insisted on using Croatian currency and practicing the Croatian language only. The entity was declared illegal by the Bosnian Constitutional Court in Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York, Random House, 1998 September 1992 but continued to function as a separate entity until the signing of the General Framework Agreement. Since the idea of a separate Croat-Bosnian entity has returned to the political scene in BiH on several occasions, especially around the holding of elections. See A Tale of Two Cities: Return of Displaced Persons to Jajce and Travnik, International Crisis Group Bosnia Project, Report Number 34, 3 June 1998; and Francine Friedman, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Polity on the Brink (London, Routledge, 2004), pp. 38-41.
final authority in theatre regarding the interpretation” of the civilian implementation. In
difference from NATO, the HR was given the ability to impose sanctions on individual
parties by making the granting of financial aid and other benefits such as travel visas
contingent on compliance.

The PIC envisioned the UN holding several key roles in the peace implementation
process. First, in accordance with Annex 11, the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations was put in charge of establishing the International Police Task Force, to assist
the Parties in planning the reduction, restructuring and reform of the police and judicial
systems in BiH, so as to help the parties establish the social conditions for free and fair
elections. This included: monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities
and facilities; advising and training law enforcement at a central, regional and local level; and
assessing threats to public order, as well as advising the government and the public on how
to best address these. Second, UNHCR was in accordance with the Agreement on Refugees
and Displaced Persons (Annex 7) given a leading role in the coordination of humanitarian
relief, which included drafting and implementing a repatriation plan for BiH. Third, the
United Commission on Human Rights (the Human Rights Council since 2006), together
with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, were, in accordance with the
Agreement on Human Rights (Annex 6), requested to contribute to the close monitoring of
the human rights situation in BiH, along with local offices, observers and rapporteurs on the
ground. Fourth, the UNSG was to ensure: the coordination of all the UN actors and provide
logistical support to them; IFOR and IPTF’s demining efforts; and the OSCE’s
implementation of the Agreement on Elections (Annex 3), the World Bank and the

480 Most of the international assistance provided to the warring parties was conditioned by compliance with the
General Framework Agreement. For example, as the Republika Srpska declined the invitation for its
government to participate in a Ministerial Donors Conference held in Brussels by the World Bank and the
European Commission on 12-13 April 1996, it was automatically cut off from funds designated for specific
economic projects in the territory. But the High Representative could also report to the Security Council via the
UNSG on any specific case of non-compliance, and unless any of the permanent Member States of the Security
Council objected, the reporting automatically triggered a reimposition of the sanctions. See Conclusions of the
Peace Implementation Conference held at Lancaster House, 8 December 1995: Letter dated 11 December 1995
from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, S/1995/1029, 12 December 1995; Security Council
Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Office of the
High Representative, 10 July 1996, paragraph 21. For the extensions of the High Representative’s powers, see
5th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Office of the High Representative, 16 April 1997, especially paragraphs, 77,
109, 128, 145 and 146.
European Commission’s rehabilitation of the infrastructure and economic reconstruction, and the ICTY’s prosecution of war criminals.

Against this background, the Security Council established a UN civilian police force and a UN civilian office on 21 December 1995, for “a period of one year from the transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection Force to the multinational implementation force (IFOR), a United Nations civilian police force to be known as the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to be entrusted with the tasks set out in Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement”, and welcomed the UNSG’s intention to appoint a UN Coordinator with executive coordinating powers over all UN actors in BiH.\(^{481}\) The IPTF was mandated to provide assistance for civilian securitization by helping to establish the rule of law and democratic policing in terms of a professional and effective multiethnic police force for the security of the individual rather than the security of the state. Based on a calculation of 1 UN monitor per 30 local officers, 1,721 civilian police monitors were authorized together with a Police Commissioner who answered to the UN Coordinator and UNSG Representative for BiH. The police monitors were not granted executive law enforcement functions or authorized to carry arms.\(^{482}\) The UN Civilian Office was mandated to support all the UN actors in BiH through political advising, political reporting, human rights work, confidence-building and problem-solving measures, and public outreach. And finally, the Coordinator was on behalf of the UNSG to ensure the overall coherence of the UN’s work in BiH, liaising between UN actors and preparing assessments for the HR and the Security Council on local political events and trends that were of common concern to the various UN agencies operating in BiH.\(^{483}\)

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The operationalization of the peace plan: establishing the conditions for the holding of democratic elections

By the beginning of February 1996, IFOR had reached full deployment with a considerable force of 60,000 troops. The HR had begun the establishment of the many transitional institutions and coordinating bodies outlined in the General Framework Agreement, including a substantial office in Sarajevo, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), supported by a Secretariat in Brussels. The UNSG had appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of the UN Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRSG), Iqbal Riza, together with a Police Commissioner, Thomas Fitzgerald, and was planning to establish a relatively small headquarters in Sarajevo with less than 100 civil affairs officers, but with a deep nationwide presence in the field. Similarly, the OSCE was in the process of setting up a smaller headquarters in Sarajevo while establishing 14 field offices throughout BiH. The idea behind this organizational set-up was that the OHR would deal with the central authorities while UNMIBH and the OSCE would work with municipal and local leaders. Moreover, the World Bank and the European Commission organized international donor conferences, established a trust fund for the reconstruction of BiH and adopted a major reconstruction program based on an exceptional two-pronged strategy,

484 To get an understanding of the extent of this force, it can be compared to two of the largest NATO deployments since IFOR, namely the 50,000 troops that were initially deployed by KFOR in Kosovo in 1999, and the 71,030 troops that NATO deployed to Afghanistan in October 2009. See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm (accessed 17 November 2009).

485 Whereas the Sarajevo office was to coordinate and oversee the actual implementation, the Brussels Secretariat was to coordinate the international aspects of peace implementation. In its first months, OHR established an Economic Task Force, a Human Rights Coordination Centre, a Joint Interim Commission (JIC) on the political and constitutional implementation of the Peace Agreement, a Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, and a public Voters List. 1st Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, High Representative's Reports, Office of the High Representative, 14 March 1996.


487 The first joint meeting of the major implementation agencies involved in BiH was held by the High Representative in Brussels on 17 January 1996.
whereby it provided the entities with the immediate funds necessary to help jump-start the reconstruction efforts and make BiH a member of the World Bank Group.\textsuperscript{488}

After three months of full deployment, IFOR informed the international community that BiH had been successfully securitized. The transfer of territory between the Bosnian entities had been completed and the new Zone of Separation (ZOS) had been established along the IEBL.\textsuperscript{489} Moreover, the IPTF was successfully carrying out regular inspections of weapons and prisons, monitoring crime and traffic, and patrolling particularly sensitive areas. In addition, UN civilian police had been co-located at Interior Ministries, Public Security Centers and local Police Stations. Thus the HR announced that the peace implementation process was ready to be moved into its second phase, shifting the focus from securitization to the operationization of the police reform and making the necessary preparations for the holding of democratic elections.\textsuperscript{490} The problems that needed to be tackled included: the high numbers of human rights violations committed by local police; the low levels of returnees, especially to minority areas; genuine democratization and reintegration; reconstruction and economic development; the adoption and implementation of the national constitution; and the establishment of a number of state institutions and structures such as a common currency, a citizenship law, passport regulations and diplomatic representation. In addition, the outstanding questions with regard to the Brcko area and the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia had to be resolved.\textsuperscript{491} In other words, the structures and institutions that

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{488} The first emergency reconstruction project was approved on 1 March 1996, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted into the World Bank Group on 1 April 1996. \textit{Bosnia and Herzegovina: Toward Economic Recovery}, A World Bank Country Study, the International Bank for Recovery and Development, the World Bank, Washington, June 1996.
\item \textsuperscript{489} The military peace implementation process begun already before the DPA had been finalized. On 2 December 1995, NATO sent an advanced Enabling Force of 2,600 troops in preparation for the anticipated peace implementation process. Once the new zone of separation had been established, IFOR focused on the demobilization of heavy weapons and forces. \textit{Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience}, contributing editor, Larry Wentz (Washington, Vienna, Command and Control Research Program, 1997).
\item \textsuperscript{490} 1\textsuperscript{st} Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, High Representative’s Reports, Office of the High Representative, 14 March 1996, paragraph 99; Report By the High Representative On Compliance With The Peace Agreement, High Representative’s Reports, Office of the High Representative, 23 March 1996; and 2\textsuperscript{nd} Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Office of the High Representative, 10 July 1996, paragraphs 26-29.
\item \textsuperscript{491} In numbers, there were 900,000 estimated refugees and 1.2 million displaced persons—that is, more than half of the pre-war population. More than 60 percent of all housing needed repair, of which 18 percent needed to be completely rebuilt. UNHCR set the goal of 500,000 displaced persons and 370,000 refugees returning from abroad in 1996, although it expected the number of actual returnees to be considerably lower. See 1\textsuperscript{st} Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, High Representative’s Reports, Office of the High Representative, 14 March 1996, and Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 1035 (1995), S/1996/210, 29 March 1996.
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had been established and operationalized had to acquire substance in order to function enough for the transfer of the final authority over BiH to Sarajevo to begin.

For the UN, this meant shifting the attention from a broader understanding of the freedom of movement to more focused efforts on democratic policing, and the establishment of the rule of law. This was in practice translated into institutional restructuring aimed at setting up strict rules on the representation of the different ethnic groups in the police force, and rigid procedures for equal opportunity recruitment processes with sanctioning mechanisms for non-compliance. The IPTF began working toward a more democratic police force by giving general basic training on human dignity and transition, as well as more advanced training for commanding and senior officers. UNHCR identified key target areas for return based on a criterion of majority areas with economic potential. It started to gradually scale down its humanitarian relief and, with the support of other UN actors and agencies, increased its support to the newly returned individuals in these areas. In addition, a Mine Action Centre was established on the request of the BiH government, as an integral and distinct unit of UNMIBH, to provide advice and assistance on how to plan and implement a nationwide mine clearance program and awareness campaign.

492 UNHCR maintained their offices in Sarajevo and expanded their presence throughout the country, as did the UN Commissioner for Human Rights and a number of other UN programs, funds, agencies and institutions including. In June 1996, it announced 22 key target areas in majority areas in BiH (19 in the Federation and 3 in the RS) as part of an international reconstruction effort that with the help of investments in shelters, homes and community infrastructure, was foreseen to help up to 165,000 people return to their pre-war homes. As UNHCR scaled down its humanitarian relief, other international actors took over. For example, the World Food Programme implemented a food aid strategy, providing grain for local milling, etc., the World Health Organisation provided humanitarian assistance and development support, and UNICEF prepared for the national immunization of children. Moreover, the UNDP, which established an a UNDP Resident Representative in Sarajevo, supported by a multisectoral UN systems mission, worked to establish a number of area based development programs that combined physical rehabilitation and socio-economic infrastructure with community development efforts within a Country Cooperation Framework, shared with UNHCR. UNESCO was put in charge of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments established by the OHR, and set out to plan the repair and reconstruction of cultural and educational institutional. The International Labour Organization (ILO) drafted a post-war labor code and advised the OHR on how to deal with the war-affected labor force and mass unemployment among former soldiers and police. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), S/1995/1031, 13 December 1995; Security Council Resolution 1035 (1995), S/RES/1035, 21 December 1995; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 1035 (1995), S/1996/210, 29 March 1996; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 1035 (1995), S/1996/460, 21 June 1996; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1035 (1995), S/1996/1017, 9 December 1996; and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), S/1997/468, 16 June 1997.

By the end of the summer, local police still not only tolerated ethnic harassment, but in some places even encouraged it. Arbitrary arrests and other forms of civil violence continued, especially on minorities. In the RS, the authorities openly prevented the IPTF from reforming and training the police; in Sarajevo, the Federation failed to prevent civilians from harassing and intimidating the few Bosnian Serbs who decided to stay in the suburbs that had until recently been under the authority of the RS; and in both entities, the international community was denied access to prisoners of war, the numbers of missing persons increased, and the exhumation of the mass graves sites remained to be done. As for the issue of return, neither the confidence-building measures nor the organized house repair projects had been very successful in encouraging people to return to their homes. With nationwide mutual mistrust in combination with a lack of confidence in the freedom of movement and expression, the majority of the few who did return moved back to areas where their ethnic group was in the majority. What was more was that neither of the entities took any steps towards making constitutional amendments or towards implementing the national reforms outlined in the Peace Agreement. In the Federation, the dual organizational structures of the two Federation partners—the self-proclaimed Croat Republic of Herzegovina and the Bosniac communities—persisted in key policy areas, and the RS strengthened its internal state structures and engaged in an overt and insidious nationwide campaign to induce all Serbs to move to the RS.494

To speed up the pace of recovery and normalization and to avoid the peace process reaching a dead lock, the PIC recommended that peace implementation move swiftly on to the next phase and that the Agreement on Elections be implemented.495 It underlined that “[the preparation of the aftermath of the election is a prerequisite for the successful outcome of the elections itself”, and therefore instructed the peace implementation actors to


dedicate as much time to planning the post-election period as they did to preparing for the actual elections.\textsuperscript{496} The OSCE certified elections for 14 September 1996, at state, entity and cantonal levels, but postponed the municipal elections due to serious voter registration flaws. Together with the OHR and UNMIBH, the Organization began setting up arrangements for closely monitoring the electoral campaigns, as well as for the actual elections, for the appointment of the first Presidency of BiH, and for a two-year peace consolidation phase. In order to prevent the political leaders from mobilizing their voters on the basis of secessionist and other extra-electoral messages contrary to the spirit of the DPA, the HR established a set of regulations regarding the format and content of the political campaigns whereby any political party represented by a person under indictment by the ICTY was deemed ineligible to stand in the elections, and conversely, democratic campaigns were rewarded by support and possibly by even seeing sanctions lifted. In addition, an Elections Appeals Subcommission was established to which people could present their complaints. The UN and NATO both provided their staff on the ground with additional resources to keep the country as stable as possible throughout the election process.\textsuperscript{497}

\textit{Peacebuilding and the first democratic elections: proactive and intrusive peace consolidation}

On the day of the first democratic elections in BiH, almost 1,000 international observers were deployed to over 3,000 polling stations. Although voting was reported to have been conducted properly at 97 percent of the stations, the five basic conditions outlined in the Agreement on Elections (Annex 3) were only partially met: a political neutral environment, the right to vote in secret, freedom of expression of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of movement. Manipulations to the effect of achieving an ethnically divided electorate resulted in considerable problems in three key areas: registration, absentee polling

\textsuperscript{496} Second Statement of the Coordinator for International Monitoring (CIM), The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, 14 September 1996.

stations, and freedom of movement. The outcome was a repeat of the 1990 elections, as the
three elected candidates for the tri-Presidency all prioritized nationalist agendas and ethnic
separation over pressing economic and social issues and reintegration. But given the
exceptional circumstances of a fragile post-conflict state holding three elections in one day,
the HR interpreted the fact that the elections had gone ahead in “a calm, orderly and
dignified manner” as an important step towards implementing the common institutions of a
united democratic BiH. At the same time, however, he underlined that just as the election
process did not end on polling day, the elections alone were no guarantee of
democratization. The ultimate yardstick was in the post-election period. This was when it
would become apparent whether or not the disintegrative climate had been turned around. Thus the HR used his final authority to decide that all the governmental bodies of the state
of BiH would “perform their functions on a caretaker basis until regulated by new bodies”.

As the initial mandates of the external actors in BiH were coming to an end, the PIC,
together with the Presidency of BiH, redrew the guiding principles and priority areas for a
two-year Civilian Consolidation Plan. The main problem to be dealt with was the fact that
for each step forward, a number of new problems appeared. Judging from practice, the
sincerity of the parties’ formal commitment to peace and reconciliation was weaker now
than it had been at the time of the signing of the DPA. The elections seemed to have had
neither stabilizing nor democratizing effects. Rather they had underlined, and as such
reinforced, the fact that BiH had come to some sort of peacekeeping stalemate that was a far
cry from genuine peacebuilding. Thus in two one-year Action Plans, ‘Making Peace Work’

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498 The elected Serb candidate from the RS was Momčilo Krajišnik, and the Croat and Bosniac candidates
elected from the Federation were Krešimir Zubak and Alija Izetbegović, respectively. The outcome was the
same in the new Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly, which, in accordance with the Peace
Agreement, were both also equally divided between the three parties of the two entities. The Preliminary
Statement of the Coordinator for International Monitoring (CIM), The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
499 3rd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Office of the High Representative, 1 October 1996.
500 The Preliminary Statement of the Coordinator for International Monitoring (CIM), The Elections in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, 14 September 1996.
501 3rd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Office of the High Representative, 1 October 1996.
502 The overall priority areas were: regional stability, security, human rights, democratization, elections, freedom
of movement, refugees and displaced persons, war crimes, reconstruction, market economy, reconciliation,
education, and mine removal. See PIC Paris Conclusions: Guiding Principles of the Civilian consolidation plan,
Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board and of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 14 November 1996.
for 1997, and ‘Self-sustaining Structures’ for 1998, the post-elections period was redefined with more intrusive and detailed targets. Rather than providing the population with the opportunity to rebuild their lives, the PIC asked the international community to take “the radical steps necessary to restore a multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina”. It endorsed the extension of the HR’s executive powers over BiH and confirmed that from then on, the HR could single-handedly impose rules and decisions on the parties, and remove persons in positions of public authority if they failed to meet their obligations under the DPA. Subsequently, all external actors gradually got more and more deeply involved in BiH’s internal affairs, acquiring more executive authority over different public services and offices.

On 12 December 1996, the Security Council also reconfirmed the final authority of the HR. In addition, it authorized a Stabilization Force in BiH (SFOR) to, under the same rules of engagement but with a smaller force, succeed IFOR for a period of 18 months, and extended UNMIBH’s mandate for 12 months. The link between compliance and financial assistance was reconfirmed and the UN Member States were asked to refrain from cooperating with any party that failed to comply with the DPA. With a mandate to reassure the peoples of BiH of the peace progress and the world of its mutual commitment to the project for universal peace, UNMIBH’s influence on the outcome of the peace process was increased. The UN Coordinator was given the possibility to apply different means to the different parties or regions; UNMIBH was instructed to get involved in the constitutional implementation process, assuming more responsibility for the functioning of the state, and more actively encouraging reconciliation, as well as economic, political and social regeneration among the peoples of BiH; and the IPTF was mandated to monitor the local


504 For the extensions of the High Representative’s powers, see 5th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Office of the High Representative, 16 April 1997, especially paragraphs 77, 109, 128, 145 and 146.
police and investigate allegations of human rights abuses, assisting the HR in removing persons who obstructed the peace consolidation process from their official roles. Following the renewal of their mandates, the UN Coordinator identified a number of specific targets and aims by which peacebuilding was from now on to be progressively benchmarked, and the Force Commander developed the IPTF from a generalist into a specialized police force that focused on special investigations and expert advice.

The IPTF was divided into two main components, an Operations and a Development division. The Operations division focused on monitoring activities on the ground by, for example, developing a checkpoint policy that increased the freedom of movement. It established a UNMIBH Human Rights office to help carry out investigations into human rights violations by law enforcement agencies, and inform the OHR of such. The Office monitored investigations at the state level and entity level, and deployed special response teams to conduct interviews and inspections of police premises and examine investigation files. The Development division focused on restructuring the police. Any police force that was still operating in a canton where the restructuring of the police force had not been completed was deemed illegal and therefore to be dealt with by SFOR. The Development division established a Legal Office to provide all the involved parties with legal and political expertise on judicial reform and to help the ICTY investigate war crimes on the ground. UNHCR continued to work on the target areas for return of refugees and displaced persons and developed an Open Cities Initiative aimed at encouraging areas where

505 To this end, the number of police monitors increased twice that year. First, following a decision that the arbitral tribunal on the disputed portion of the IEBL had made regarding the restructuring and retraining of the police in Brcko, another 186 police and 11 civilian personnel were authorized in March 1997. And two months later, when the Security Council instructed the IPTF to undertake more complex and specialist policing tasks such as fighting organized crime, drugs and crowd control, another 120 police personnel were authorized. By the end of 1997, there were a total of 2,004 police monitors present in BiH from 40 different UN Member States. Security Council Resolution 1088 (1996), S/RES/1088, 12 December 1996; Security Council Resolution 1103 (1997), S/RES/1103, 31 March 1997; Security Council Resolution 1107 (1997), S/RES/1107, 16 May 1997; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), S/1997/468, 16 June 1997; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/1997/694, 8 September 1997; and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/RES/1997/966, 10 December 1997.

506 The checkpoint policy meant that the local police did not hold static checkpoints for longer than 30 minutes unless prior approval had been obtained from the IPTF. The structures and working procedures of the Human Rights Office were finalized in October 1997. The decision with regards to illegal local police forces was put in place on 31 August 1997. The office consisted of 120 IPTF monitors and 10 civilian staff. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/1997/694, 8 September 1997.
progress in reconciliation had been demonstrated to publicly encourage minority groups to return to their pre-war homes and participate as full members of the community.\textsuperscript{507}

Once all the international peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates had been renewed, the first Presidency of BiH was appointed. The country entered the fourth and most sensitive phase of the peace process—the post-elections consolidation period—when the future destiny of the country was to be set out. Given the electoral result, there was a high risk that the post-elections period would serve to institutionalize a peace that, contrary to the DPA, was nothing but “the continuation of war by other means”.\textsuperscript{508} Not only did the appointment of the Presidency of BiH legitimize the old ethnic politics of the war based on exclusion motivated by fears rather than on reintegration for a democratic future, it also made the partition of BiH more permanent than transitional, and undermined the functioning of the complex power-sharing arrangements outlined in the DPA before they had even been fully put into place. The major challenge was now to find an effective yet legitimate way in which to tackle the gap that had appeared between the commitments that the parties had made on paper and how the peace processes unfolded in practice.

3. The UN’s peacebuilding exit strategies in Croatia and BiH: lowering the benchmarks and outsourcing peace implementation

Almost two years after the end of the wars in the former SFRY, Croatia insisted that UNTAES be ended before the end of the year whereas in BiH, none of the three parties seemed to be particularly interested in seeing UNMIBH terminated anytime soon. The two scenarios were problematic for the UN because of the risks involved in a premature transfer of the executive authority to the Croatian government, and for collective security because of the risk of provisional international peacebuilding institutions and structures becoming


permanent. They brought to the fore complex questions with regard to multidimensional peacekeeping and whether it could actually be achieved as envisioned.

With the outcome of the first democratic elections it became clear that the technical success that the UN had achieved in both Croatia and BiH had not been matched by political progress. Furthermore, as the post-elections period unfolded, the technical success did not have the anticipated effects on political progress—the elections had neither reintegrative, democratizing nor pacifying effects on Croatia or BiH. The same seemed to be true for most peacebuilding processes in these two post-conflict states. Thus in order to successfully terminate the international mandates and let the world also know that the global world could be stabilized by a UN-led practice of collective security, what was meant by success—by self-sustaining peace—was once again gradually redefined.

We follow the developments in the post-election period in Croatia and BiH to see on what basis the UN formed the exit strategy that allowed the Security Council to successfully terminate UNTAES, UNMOP and UNMIBH. First, in Croatia, the elections brought out rather than resolved the deeper issues that had been left out by the General Agreement. Second, in BiH, the strategies of effective conditionality and addressing the immediate needs seriously undermined the long-term peacebuilding processes. Third, in order to exit the indefinite international state-building project that the implementation of the DPA had become in BiH, UNMIBH transferred most of its mandate to other external actors rather than to the new state of BiH.

The termination of UNTAES and UNMOP: implementing the election results and mediating borders

In preparation for the termination of the UNTAES mandate, the sitting International Administrator, Jacques P. Klein, was in August 1997 replaced by a less fiery high-level international policymaker, William G. Walker. An exit plan and strategy were drafted based on a series of benchmarks for the devolution of UNTAES, drawing specifically on the OSCE and the EU’s monitoring standards for democratization and confidence-building. The challenge amounted to ensuring that the peace process would continue to progress rather than reverse without the presence of UNTAES and an International Administrator. The focus was on the freedom of movement and the right to return. By the end of October, the

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509 In July 1997, the US government nominated Jacques P. Klein as Principal Deputy High Representative of the OHR in BiH.
Human Rights Unit foreseen in the Basic Agreement was established to actively promote ethnic confidence and reconciliation, hundreds of thousands of national identification documents had been issued, and over 5,200 displaced people had returned to their homes, of which almost a thousand had come in UNHRC-organized convoys. Half of the uniformed UN personnel were withdrawn and a month later fewer than 800 uniformed UN personnel remained in Croatia. But despite the technical progress, Croatia still had a long way to go in terms of the broader task of reconciliation and genuine political reintegration and democratization.

As the UNTAES mandate was coming to a close, the UNSG acknowledged that “some commitments clearly cannot be fully implemented within the two-year transitional period envisaged in the Basic Agreement”. Therefore, it was absolutely key that the restructuring plan for external peacebuilding assistance be put in place prior to UNTAES termination and the performance of Croatia’s governing institutions and structures continue to be internationally monitored. The International Administrator established a comprehensive political and institutional framework of guarantees, whereby the Croatian government made itself internationally accountable for the full implementation of the Basic Agreement. To take over from UNTAES, a UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG) was established, with up to 180 monitors deployed for a single period of up to nine months. In addition, a long-term OSCE mission of 250 expatriates was set up to focus on democratization and more specifically the two-way return of all refugees and displaced persons, and the protection of national minorities.

On 19 December 1997, the Security Council decided that since UNTAES had successfully fulfilled its basic objective, the mission should be terminated on 15 January 1998. However, the peace progress that had been made on the national level had still not

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been matched at the local level. Croatia remained very much a divided state between the
majority population of Croats and a disadvantaged minority population of Serbs. Deep fear
and mistrust prevailed among the Serb leaders, while the Croat leaders insisted on their non-
cooperative stance and bureaucratic maneuvering, resulting in an overall lack of confidence
and trust between the Croats and Serbs throughout the country. This was worsened by the
considerable amount of human rights abuses, especially ethnic harassment and misbehavior
and unprofessional police, that were still being reported. As a result, the situation was still
very precarious for Serb displaced persons, especially in Easter Slavonia.\textsuperscript{514} Furthermore, the
success of the return of refugees and displaced persons was established based on the
numbers of new refugees that were exiting Eastern Slavonia. When it came to the influx of
refugees and displaced persons to the region, the number was far below expectations. In this
light, the success that was recorded particularly in the last year of UNTAES was not so
much based on actual peacebuilding in practice but rather on a lowering of the benchmarks
for the exit strategy according to what had actually been achieved in practice, as well as what
was anticipated would happen in the future.

Once UNTAES was terminated, attention was once again focused on UNMOP, hoping that the successful termination of UNTAES would provide also the Prevlaka peninsula with the stability needed for Croatia and the FRY to normalize their relations and enter into increasingly cooperative bilateral agreements. However, while the peninsula was no longer seen to represent a significant threat to the demilitarization regime, tensions remained high and both parties insisted on a selective approach to the security regime. On several occasions, the UNSG offered the parties to establish confidence-building mechanisms or provide third-party mediation but the assistance was repeatedly rejected. Finally, in June 1998, Zagreb made the first formal proposal for a settlement with Belgrade on the Prevlaka peninsula. Bilateral negotiations continued between the parties until March 1999. As a result of the NATO military action against Kosovo, negotiations were suspended and both parties proceeded to seriously violate the security regime. But a few weeks later, they returned to their bilateral exchange of letters until 10 December 2002, when Croatia and the FRY signed an agreement regarding the southern borders. Although the parties signed only a protocol on an interim regime—that is, a provisional cross-border regime—the

UNSG reported that “the closure of another chapter in the tumultuous recent history of the Balkans is within reach” and five days later UNMOP was successfully terminated. The provisional protocol on an interim regime indicates also how UNMOP’s exit strategy and successful termination were based on benchmarks set according to what had actually been achieved in practice rather than the end of the initial mandate.

In his review of UNTAES, the Secretary-General noted that “the success of the UNTAES in the entire reintegration processes is a positive precedent for peace throughout the former Yugoslavia”. The fact that UNTAES had provided Croatia and the FRY with the necessary stability to normalize their relations and reestablish their commercial and traffic links outweighed the fact that there had been little progress in the peacebuilding process within Croatia. This indicates that projectual success takes precedent over both practical and conceptual success, and that it is more important that the multidimensional peacekeeping operations confirm the reinvention and vision of collective security in the global world, than they are provided with the means to match the end, or that they respect the traditional terms of engagement. The triangular analytical framework shows us that the conclusions about the positive effects cannot be based on democratic peace in and of itself, but rather on the idea that democratic states are more peaceful states together with the fact that collective security is willing, prepared and able to help states establish a certain level of internal democracy, if necessary. It would seem that deterrence is still an important element


of security, only the threat has become more political than military, and international legitimacy is slowly shifting away from state sovereignty and non-intervention towards an intrusive practice of collective security. This however, is neither articulated in the peacekeeping literature, nor in the discourse of collective security and therefore, breeds uneducated expectations.

Post-elections peace consolidation in practice: handing over sovereignty to BiH

For the transfer of authority from the HR to BiH to take place, a considerable amount of progress had to be achieved. The HR defined a strategy whereby to ‘make peace work’, UNMIBH was to focus on immediate practical needs with regard to which they were likely to achieve notable progress in the short-term, while the OHR was to tackle the inefficiency of the major state institutions and the obstructionist politics of separation. The IPTF intensified police training, implementation of the checkpoint strategy, and its demining assistance, and UNHCR concentrated on identifying specific target areas to establish ‘open cities initiatives’ in especially friendly towns. Having been postponed three times, the first municipal elections were held on 13-14 September 1997. Thanks to a 100 percent supervision, there were technical improvements with less large-scale manipulation and fraud than in previous elections. But the fact that the vast majority of municipal administrations had still not been appointed by the end of the year indicates that the technical progress was not matched by the political.517

While the environment for cooperation and problem-solving as well as the economy and security did improve in 1997, the overall peace process made slow progress. The entities did little to deliver on their promises at state level, the public authorities’ discriminatory practices continued, and public fear and distrust prevailed.518 In other words, peace was

517 By the end of December 1997, only 15 out of the 196 municipal administrations had been certified. Bosnia and Herzegovina Municipal Elections 13-14 September 1997, Election Observation, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organization for Co-Operation in Europe.

518 A number of incidents of violence occurred, mostly in connection with returns in the RS, but also in ethnically mixed towns in the Federation. One of the most infamous incidents occurred in Mostar in February 1997, when the Bosnian-Croat police fired upon a group of Bosniac civilians at a graveyard. From this follows that only 1,500 out of the 120,000-150,000 refugees that returned to BiH in 1997 moved across the IEBL. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1035 (1995), S/1996/1017, 9 December 1996; Security Council Resolution 1088 (1996), S/RES/1088, 12 December 1996; 5th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, High Representative’s Reports, Office of the High Representative, 16 April 1997; and Report...
largely dependent upon the willingness of the international community to intervene at both the political and military levels. Furthermore, since July 1997, the RS had been suffering from an internal political crisis, and the peace process in the Federation was stalled by the inability of the Croat and Bosniac leaders to reach an agreement on the internal distribution of responsibilities and minority representation in the police force.\(^{519}\) Given the fact that the large majority of the reported misconduct and unprofessional behavior of police officers and policy-makers was in the RS, and that international assistance was dependent upon compliance, a substantial part of the reconstruction efforts and schemes took place in the Federation.\(^{520}\) While the police had been restructured in more than half of the Federation’s cantons, police reform had hardly begun in the RS, and the same was true for the return of refugees and displaced persons.\(^{521}\) Thus, peacebuilding was not only limited but also increasingly unequal and incoherent. Still, at the end of the year, the PIC confirmed that there was no alternative to the DPA, there was only more forceful implementation.

The strategy for the 1998 peace consolidation plan outlined a more focused and forceful approach to strengthening the BiH state at the expense of the entities. All external actors involved in peace consolidation had to show their long-term commitment to the implementation of the DPA. But at the same time, they had to encourage national and local authorities to take responsibility for the developments in BiH, and the public to reclaim

\(^{519}\) In preparation for the national parliamentary elections in the RS, an opposition to the obstructionist attitudes of the hard-line nationalist Bosnian Serb leaders grew strong enough to cause a constitutional crisis in the summer of 1997. Because while the new voices were a positive sign that there were issued other than ethnic separation, and profiles other than former war criminals, that could mobilize the public, the disagreements blocked any decisions from being made, let alone implemented, and triggered isolated outbreaks of violence. The crisis was first resolved in January 1998, when a new government was appointed based on the November elections that had been classified as technically correct but democratically flawed. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/1997/966, 10 December 1997; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/1998/227, 12 March 1998; and Bosnia and Herzegovina Republika Srpska National Assembly Elections, Elections Observation, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 22-23 November 1997.


\(^{521}\) In the spring of 1997, 13 local police officers were disciplined for failing to prevent Bosnian Serbs from burning down houses and attacking Bosniacs. In addition, two Bosnian-Croat senior police officers were replaced after they had failed to respond to clear patterns of ethnic crimes. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), S/1997/468, 16 June 1997; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/1997/966, 10 December 1997.
ownership of their state. The HR’s authority was extended to what became known as the Bonn Powers whereby the international community became even more involved in the vetting of public appointments in BiH, increasingly imposing legislation and removing recalcitrant officials. UNMIBH was given an important role in key areas of public security, including leading a major program of legal reform. Minority returns, justice, state elections and a national election law were outlined as the main benchmarks for stabilization. Thus, in June 1998, the Security Council not only extended UNMIBH’s mandate first until 21 June 1998, and then until 21 June 1999, but also expanded it. UNMIBH, together with the Council of Europe and the OSCE, created specialized units to carry out a program of judicial and legal reform under the coordination of the OHR, including assessments and monitoring mechanisms of the court system, training for legal professionals, and institutional restructuring. Another 30 posts were authorized, as was the hiring of local personnel as required. SFOR’s mandate was also renewed for another 12 months and around the same time, the EU issued a Declaration on BiH and established a Consultative Task Force (CTF) (renamed Reform Process Monitoring, RPM, in 1996) intended to become a central forum for technical and political exchanges between the parties.

In 1998, BiH received more international assistance than any other country in the history of UN peacekeeping. With the help of the international community, basic institutions had been established, key laws put in place, state elections had been held (12-13 September 1998), freedom of movement and returns improved, media reform was well under way, all of which were considered indicators for a more pluralistic and tolerant climate. However, this rapid progress had also generated political resistance and civil violence, which had in turn reinforced BiH’s international dependency. The entities had still not agreed on a national election law and the political debates continued to be dominated by ethnic politics.

Furthermore, the more control the international community had over the peace consolidation, the more the political leaders distanced themselves from the unintended and negative consequences of the peace process, and the more alienated the public became from their new state in the making. All in all, this made the outcome of the post-consolidation phase ambiguous, as practice suggested that rather than being mutually reinforcing, the short-term success of making peace work had come at the expense of establishing self-sustaining structures. In other words, peacebuilding might have been slowly moving forward but it had required robust action that had not only been proven to increase security needs and therefore BiH’s international dependency, but also reduced the willingness of both the local and international partners to continue investing in the DPA.

After two years of peace consolidation, the international community and the three parties agreed that it was necessary to continue the international military and civil presence in BiH. The PIC presented another two year plan—the Peace Implementation Plan for 1999-2000. But the international community was becoming increasingly reluctant to sustain the high levels of assistance, let alone increase them. Thus the focus shifted to how to make the state and local authorities assume more responsibility and prepare the public for life without reliance on foreign aid, by ensuring a smooth transition of power from international to state and national institutions. The two-level strategy—peacebuilding at the state and local level—was extended to also include goals regarding BiH’s external relations, its relation with the EU and its representation in international organizations and in UN peacekeeping. This was meant both to promote a multiethnic state of BiH and develop a strong and active civil society. But the institutional deficiencies, political disintegration and social disagreements were not expected to be remedied by legislative change alone. The OHR revised the non-compliance policy of effective conditionality in order to exercise more intrusive pressure on the political system in which the legal system was rooted. UNMIBH was instructed to develop more targeted operational tools for immediate needs, while the non-UN actors were

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requested to get more involved in long-term peacebuilding and democratization.\textsuperscript{526} As a result, UNMIBH shifted its focus from assessment and monitoring to proactive and assertive advising on how to improve immediate shortcomings. The main aims set out included establishing a Border Service and finalizing the policy on common license plates. In June 1999, the Security Council extended SFOR’s mandate for another 12 months, and UNMIBH’s until 21 June 2000.\textsuperscript{527}

Overall, 1999 as compared to 1998 was a slow year for peacebuilding in BiH. Attacks on returning minorities continued in both entities and the number of returns decreased compared to that over same period in the previous year. While the Presidency of BiH and the State Parliamentary Assembly held their inaugural sessions and began holding regular meetings, narrow nationalistic and sectarian political interests continued to impede progress and reinforce the dysfunctionality of the judicial system. With the killing of the Bosnian-Croat Deputy Minister for Interior Affairs in March 1999, it was clear that the political developments were still very much a threat to the establishment of the rule of law. The HR removed more political leaders and decertified more police and public officials than he had in any previous year. Thus, overall, 1999 strengthened and reinforced BiH’s international

\textsuperscript{526} The OSCE not only took a more prominent role in long-term democratization with an ever expanding presence throughout BiH, but it also took increasingly forceful measures to battle the ethnic politics of separation. From summer 1999 and onwards, it regularly banned particularly obstructionist candidates and parties from the electoral campaigns. The EU also took on an important role in the peace implementation process based on the Stabilisation and Association Process, which was signed on 19 June 1999. The process was both an institutional framework and a strategy for relations between the EU and the region, including trade relations, economic, financial and democratization aid, cooperation of justice and home affairs, and the development of political dialogue. By terming the future prospect of BiH’s European membership on democratization, human rights and a market economy, the EU tried to tie the parties to a comprehensive platform for peacebuilding in terms of liberal democratic state-building. It represented the development of a new conceptual framework for solving internal problems of states by working together with the parties towards normalizing their relations, and strengthening their cooperation. Moreover, the EU was also working closely with the IPTF in view of taking over the responsibility for police reform and monitoring after the termination of the UN’s mandate in BiH. The countries in the region that signed the PSA were Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, the SFRY, Turkey, as well as Canada, Japan and the United States. It was also signed by the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, NATO, the OSCD, the World Health Organisation, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction, and Development. Zarko Papic, ‘The SEE Region and Stability Pact’, International Support Policies to South-East European Countries: Lessons (Not) Learned in B-H (Sarajevo, the Open Society fund B-H and Müller, December 2002), pp. 41-42.

dependency as well as the alienation and dislocation of the political leaders, the public and societies from their state. Peacebuilding was undoubtedly fragile and superficial.\textsuperscript{528}

For 2000, the final year of the large-scale post-war reconstruction period in BiH, the PIC replaced the set benchmarks for progress with relative ones established based on practice. More precisely, success was from then on defined by whether the political leaders in BiH worked more with the external peace implementation or peacebuilding actors than they worked against them. As the support from the UN Member States was gradually decreasing, the HR encouraged UNMIBH to intensify its cooperation with the EU. The underlying idea for this was that the prospect of integration into the European structures could be another element of conditionality that, together with the promise of assistance, might encourage the parties to make a stronger commitment to the DPA. The EU laid down a number of specific conditions for the Stabilisation and Association Process (SaP) that would allow BiH to take a step closer to European integration in terms of the Stability Pact, while UNMIBH began to work on a two-year exit strategy based on six core programs, with a number of specific aims for reforming and restructuring the police force, the law enforcement institutions and the relationship between the police and the public.\textsuperscript{529} The Security Council welcomed the PIC

\textsuperscript{528} In 1999, the violent developments in Kosovo also had important destabilizing effects on peace in BiH, not only because of the movement of peoples that this triggered and the political differences that were reinforced, but also because international staff from BiH was redeployed to the province. Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998), S/RES/1203, 24 October 1998, and Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999.

\textsuperscript{529} The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process in BiH involved drafting agreements with the view of: the development of economic and trade relations with and within the region; the development of the existing economic and financial aid; aid for democratization, civil society, education and the development of institutions; cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs; and the development of political dialogue. The Stabilisation and Association Process, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/western_balkans/r18003_en.htm (accessed 18 December 2009). The UN’s six core programs and their main aims were: i) Police Reform – final certification of all law enforcement personnel on track, and sustainable institutions and structures for police training; ii) Police Restructuring – full accreditation for the implementation of basic standards in police administrations, the appointment of independent police commissioners in all Cantons and the deployment of minority police officers; iii) Police/Criminal Justice System – a fully functional police force operating within a coherent legal framework and a multiethnic court police force; iv) Institution Building and Inter-Police Force Cooperation – a multiethnic functioning State Border Service, statewide and regional police cooperation and an efficient combating of trafficking; v) Public Awareness – a transparent police force that benefits from public trust and confidence; vi) Participation in United Nations peacekeeping – harmonizing police and military cooperation by giving BiH a role in collective security. Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council, Peace Implementation Council Main Meeting, Office of the High Representative, Brussels, 24 May 2000, and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/2002/1314, 2 December 2002.

\textsuperscript{528} Joensson, Jibecke H. (2010), Understanding Collective Security in the 21st century: A Critical Study of UN Peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/20470

In April 2000, municipal elections were held throughout BiH. To encourage more parties to participate and create greater accountability, an open system ballot was used this time. The elections were certified as free, fair and more politically plural than those previous. But this was to a large extent the result of the HR, UNMIBH and the OSCE’s adoption of a stricter policy sanctioning, removing and decertifying obstructionist candidates, parties and other public officials, including police, in preparation for the elections. In November 2000, BiH once again went to the polls, this time to elect members of the House of Representatives at state and entity level. While for the first time a coalition of non-hard line parties, including the Alliance for Change, gained a substantial numbers of votes in the Federation, the result at state level was in favor of policies of ethnic separation. Against this background, the PIC drew the conclusion that a demand for more responsive, transparent and accountable leaders was emerging in BiH after all, but its growth was dependent on a considerably robust international presence, that is, on a continued international governance of the states’ internal affairs.\footnote{Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council, Peace Implementation Council Main Meeting, Office of the High Representative, Brussels, 24 May 2000; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/2000/529, 2 June 2000; Security Council Resolution 1305 (2000), S/RES/1305, 21 June 2000; and 17th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Middle of April 2000-beginning of October 2000, High Representative’s Reports, Office of the High Representative, 17 October 2000.} Thus, five years after the end of civil violence, war may not have returned to BiH but the peace process presented the international community with a number of insecurity dilemmas, namely, what constitutes more of a threat to the global order, non-democratic practices within states or the intrusive permanent international administrations that are necessary to reverse these?

\textit{Five years after Dayton: the exit plan and successful termination of UNMIBH}

In preparation for the last year of the two-year peace implementation phase, the UNSG underlined that the mission in BiH was a vital test case for collective security in the global world. UN failure would have serious destabilizing effects on the region and the world.

Major challenges remained in terms of ethnic reconciliation, democratic institution building, reconstruction, economic reform and the full implementation of human rights for all. But there had been some progress reported in the returns and in police reform. The UN Coordinator suggested that the responsibility for judicial reform be handed over to the OHR while UNMIBH proceed with a plan for the gradual devolution of UNMIBH, including the transfer of responsibility to the local authorities under the appropriate international monitoring mechanisms. A two-year exit strategy was outlined with a new standard of unity of purpose for a more dynamic practice and more efficient internal resource management. The plan included specific timelines and benchmarks for 57 individual projects divided into six core programs. The IPTF was to focus on leadership and training structures for the police—‗Manage the Managers’—and on civil society and the relationship between the police and the public through publicity campaigns such as ‘Your Police Serving You’, for example. Together with the OHR and the Council of Europe, UNMIBH was to continue pushing for an agreement on an Election Law for BiH. UNMIBH’s plan was endorsed by the HR and the Security Council extended UNMIBH’s mandate until 21 June 2002, as was SFOR’s mandate for another 12 months.

In the summer of 2001, the OHR for the first time imposed amendments on the federal law on Judicial and Prosecutorial Service as a short-term measure for combating political obstruction. In addition to suspending officials, the HR also increasingly reached out to the public, encouraging local ownership with the possibility for the individual citizens to build a better future inside Europe, and reconstructing important landmarks and raising memorials. At the end of August, an Election Law that was intended to favor small parties and a united multicultural BiH was finally passed, opening the country up to further discussions for European integration and what the HR saw as a future of democratic governance.

In December 2001, UNMIBH launched a nationwide systems analysis to complete the restructuring of key areas of internal police administration with a particular

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emphasis on sustainable inter-entity and interregional cooperation. In February 2002, the EU officially offered to provide an EU Police Mission (EUPM) starting on 1 January 2003, to take over after the IPTF as part of a rule of law program coordinated by the OHR, to ensure that the professional development of the police forces in BiH be continued for another three years. UNMIBH began the final stages of certification, replacing provisional authorizations to exercise police power with permanent qualifications and handing over the formal training to local police instructors.536

By early June 2002, the UNSG reported that UNMIBH was “rapidly moving towards the completion of its core tasks”.537 Local police administrations were increasingly assuming responsibility for restructuring and the number of reported interethnic incidents and serious crimes were on the decline. Police and municipal officials were more willing to condemn interethnic violence, and UNMIBH’s work on establishing mechanisms for inter-entity and interregional cooperation—Operation Common Purpose—had given impressive results with the establishment of a shared data bank and a joint program to combat human trafficking, for example. However, police investigations into high-profile interethnic crimes and subsequent judicial follow-up remained largely inadequate. Also, many of the cantons’ Laws on Internal Affairs still had to be brought in line with UNMIBH model legislation and the recruitment of minority police had to improve.538 The Security Council extended UNMIBH’s mandate one last time for another six months until 31 December 2002, and extended SFOR’s mandate for another 12 months.

During the last six months of deployment, UNMIBH focused on putting in place mechanisms that could shield the police from political influence by ensuring that each police administration had an independent Police Commissioner and making the State Border Service fully operational. To bring all cantons in line with UNMIBH legislation, the UN

536 Based on a decision made by the EU General Affairs Council, the EU presented the offer to have the Steering Board of the PIC take over the mandate of the IPTF on 28 February 2002. For more information about the details of the offer, see 2406th European Council Meeting, General Affairs, 5636/02 (Presse 16-G), Brussels 18/19 February 2002, pp. 21-22; 2409th European Council Meeting, General Affairs, 6247/02 (Presse 30-G), Brussels 18/19 February 2002, pp. 16-17; Communiqué of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, Political Directors Meeting, Brussels, 28 February 2002; and Security Council Resolution 1396 (2002), S/RES/1396, 5 March 2002.


Coordinator requested the HR impose a package of Laws on Internal Affairs and help mobilize the resources needed to compensate for the fact that there was almost no state budget to fund national public services. The actual downsizing and liquidation of the Mission, however, did not start until the end of September when the European Commission and Council declared that BiH had made important strides forward in the Stabilisation and Association Process and the first democratic elections based on the National Elections Law of BiH had been held.

When BiH went to the polls in October 2002 based on their own national election law, the stakes were higher than in any of the previous elections. It was described as a watershed moment. In one day, BiH was to elect all national and entity offices, as well as ten Cantonal Assemblies and one municipal council. This meant that in the lead-up to the elections, seven electoral races of different kinds played out, which on election day translated into four ballot papers in most polling stations, and an overall total of 23 different ballot paper combinations nationwide. But what was perhaps most noteworthy was how the electorate was, in their choice for the State presidency, limited by their ethnicity and place of residence; voters in the RS could only vote for Serb candidates and voters in the Federation could only vote for Bosniac or Croat candidates. Conversely, candidates who did not identify themselves as one of the three constituent peoples of BiH—that is, Bosniac, Croat or Serb—were, contrary to the international standards for democratic elections, effectively barred from the Presidency. In other words, the electoral law, although part of the Constitution of BiH, ended up conflicting with its provisions on non-discrimination and a multiethnic state. Thus given the complex nature of the electoral system, the same substantial international presence was required for these elections as had been for previous elections. Moreover, several disagreements arose between the authorities on the interpretation of specific issues and appointments of the system, causing public election fatigue. As such, the HR ended up intervening to shape several key aspects of the electoral system on the account of public confidence and ownership, and the election turnout was about ten percent lower compared to the previous general elections. While nationalism was less of an overarching theme in the electoral campaigns, the HR made more candidates and parties ineligible to stand than in any of the previous post-war elections.539

539 Declaration of the Political Directors of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, Peace Implementation Council, Office of the High Representative, 24 September 2002; Report to the European
On 2 December 2002, the UNSG informed the Security Council that UNMIBH had successfully completed all the landmark projects of the six core programs outlined in its two-year exit plan. By laying down the foundations of a modern, democratic police force, UNMIBH had enabled BiH to put in place mechanisms and institutions that had contributed to the project for universal peace and as such, stabilized the world. During the last year especially, several encouraging indicators of a more democratic and professional police has been noted, police preparedness to act, a decrease in the amount and intensity of ethnically related violence, and more minority returns. That said, the UNSG underscored that the post-election scenario in BiH still very much required close monitoring for the progress to not reverse, especially since the ad hoc nature of state funding still had to be corrected, and the full establishment of the rule of law and comprehensive judicial and legal reform were far from guaranteed. Thus, to ensure a seamless transition, UNMIBH undertook a final campaign to reinforce the Mission’s message and activities in BiH before the transfer to the EUPM on 1 January 2003. A full 460 IPTF officers together with a small UN office in Sarajevo were to remain in BiH for six months, 119 IPTF officers were to be transferred to the EUPM, and the IPTF Commissioner was to become the first EUPM Commissioner. Most of the other UN actors in BiH remained active for at least another year, without, however, the UNMIBH’s overarching coordinating body.  

The end of UNMIBH did not mean that the IPTF had successfully carried out its mission, for rather than handing over the long-term responsibility for the rule of law to the BiH state, it had handed police monitoring over to the EU and judicial reform over to the OHR. With the considerable institutional and judicial systematic weakness and the continued obstruction, interference and illegal activities of entrenched political extremists and criminal organizations, peace in BiH required long-term encompassing international attention. Although SFOR was restructured, in January 2003, into smaller, more agile and capable battle groups involved in law enforcement activity (10 groups with approximately 750 troops each), the operation was not successfully terminated until 2 December 2005, when the responsibilities were transferred to the EU and an implementation force, EUFOR-ALTHEA

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with 12,000 troops. NATO maintained its headquarters in Sarajevo in support of EUFOR and to assist BiH with the defense forum.\textsuperscript{541} In other words, the short-term solutions that were intended to lead to long-term developments had in practice translated into permanent as opposed to temporary or provisional arrangements. As long as the pinnacle of BiH’s legislative framework was in the DPA, the country would be subject to supranational legal structures that grant the international community extraordinary powers to exercise ultimate authority over the state, and make BiH’s new state structures only transitional.\textsuperscript{542} Is this what constitutes self-sustainable peace?

\textit{Conclusion}

Overall, the UN’s peacebuilding missions in the Western Balkans, despite their many weaknesses and failures, seem to have had long lasting positive institutional effects on the region, and therefore also on the world. There is no doubt that both Croatia and BiH, as well as Serbia and the FYROM, have enjoyed a considerable amount of progress in terms of economic growth, return of refugees and displaced peoples, reforms of the public services, elections, and so on. However, this progress has been concentrated to these missions’ first mandate periods, and the more superficial and technical areas of the peace agreements. All of the post-conflict states reached a certain level of stability fairly quick but none seemed to be able to move on to the deeper issues without running into problems that multiplied rather than reduced the more advanced the implementation process became. Most problems were rooted in obstructionist political leaders with nationalist agendas supported by a public marked by fear and distrust, as well as by a communist past. In other words, the technical progress was not matched by political progress.

With the old war politics of separation not only present but also ruling Croatia and BiH at the end of UNTAES, UNMOP and UNMIBH, there was little internal guarantee of war not returning. The states were a lot less war-prone than their predecessors, but they were also largely dysfunctional states that depended on international assistance, BiH more so than


Croatia. The progress that had been made, had been made with the help of a considerable amount of international assistance and presence, upon which these states were still dependent. The international presence and involvement was larger and deeper than it had been at the beginning of UNPROFOR. While the wars had not re-erupted, reintegrating the conflicting parties into ‘new’ united states by separating them had not had the anticipated stabilizing and democratizing effects. As the States were still ruled and organized by antagonistic relations, and divided within the population, the war may have ended but very little peacebuilding was taking place. Yet the UN peacebuilding missions in Croatia and BiH were both ‘successfully terminated’. This suggests not only that multidimensional peacekeeping requires a system and a practice of peace-as-global-governance but also that the world is indeed moving closer to shifting international legitimacy away from state sovereignty and non-intervention towards implicit agreements with regards to the benefits of such a project based on assumptions that are yet to be confirmed by practice.

While UNTAES, UNMOP and UNMIBH helped the former warring parties to make a number of agreements, they were not able to resolve and settle the deeper issues that had divided them in the first place. Thus the assumption that solving the more superficial, less complex and less deep-rooted disagreements, first will eventually lead to the solving of the deeper issues, did not necessarily prove to be true, at least not within the anticipated time frame. As a way out of the peacekeeping deadlock, we saw how the international community decided to take more forceful, proactive and intrusive action. This, however, had a number of unintended consequences that confronted the UN and the other external actors involved with a number of insecurity dilemmas. While the numerous elections that were held in this region during the time of the peacebuilding missions led to civil disorder in the short-term, even more destabilizing was the fact that by adapting the international standards for free and fair elections to the exceptional circumstances of these post-conflict states, the international community ended up legitimizing the politics of separation.

The pre-mature elections legitimized the old war politics in both Croatia and BiH, emphasizing rather than bridging the divides and alienating rather than encouraging the peoples and society to take responsibility and national ownership. The conflicts were not reversed but they were institutionalized to become part and parcel of everyday life. Peacebuilding became more dependent on external assistance and enforcement even. In other words, it provided the parties with a format and a way in which they could keep the
conflict alive. Thus it is quite clear that peacekeeping is by no means a guarantee for peacebuilding, nor does the holding of elections necessarily result in democratization and civil order. This is a serious problem for collective security in the global world, given the fact that it is the end of peacebuilding that justifies the military means of peacekeeping, and the political intervention of peacebuilding.

By revisiting the implementation of the peacekeeping operations, peace agreements, the peacebuilding missions and international administrations that terminated the violent dissolution of the SFRY within the analytical framework, we have seen that the key to the success of multidimensional peacekeeping lies in the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding—that is, the transition from initial securitization to long-term self-sustainable peace processes. We have also seen that this transition has thus far been measured by indicators that have been lowered and adjusted to what the UN peacebuilding missions were actually able to achieve in practice. This way the UN was able to reassure the world that collective security was able to stabilize the global world despite the devastating failures that occurred in practice. However, it also means that what is understood by self-sustaining peace is likely to differ from one operation to the next and change during their implementation. This can explain many of the ambiguities of collective security in the global world but can also give rise to misunderstandings and disagreements. Questions about what constitutes more of a threat—non-democratic practices within states or the intrusive permanent international administrations needed to reverse them—are likely to have destabilizing effects on world order.
Conclusion. Collective Security in the Global World

We have seen that the same way in which the reinvention of collective security is justified by assumptions about the pacifying effects of a global world, multidimensional peacekeeping is justified by assumptions about how negotiated peace settlements set the scene for political compromise and peacebuilding within states. All together, liberal democratic institutional frameworks are assumed to prevent traditional violence and to ensure peace progress between, within and across states. As such, the UN and the international community provide weak states with humanitarian aid to help satisfy immediate needs and with democratization assistance to help solve the less sensitive technical matters of state-building. The stabilizing logics being that as long as the peoples feel secure and are convinced that they enjoy equal opportunities for human development, traditional violence will lose its value and the world will become more committed to compromise and to building and consolidating peaceful liberal-democratic states. However, as we have seen, realizing these predictions in practice depends on forceful and intrusive third-party guarantees, which undermine genuine peacebuilding and give rise to a growing international culture of dependency of weak post-conflict states. Where does this leave the reinvention of collective security and multidimensional peacekeeping? In other words, what does it tell us about collective security and the stability of the global world?

Ten years after the UN had proclaimed the successful termination of UNPROFOR’s mandate, the governments in the region were still drafting half-hearted reintegration policies to at the same time please the nationalist right and the international community. In Croatia, while the international administration had been successfully terminated, the internal affairs were under close international monitoring, the political impasse with regards to the UNPAs had not been resolved, the return of Serb refugees to the areas remained a contentious issue, and the involvement of external actors in the states’ internal affairs was high. As such, the country was still quite dependent on international assistance, and Croatia’s memberships in

the EU and most other international organizations were repeatedly postponed. In BiH, national reforms were unraveling, corruption flourished, local administrations were collapsing, and state authority was eroding. Trust and confidence were weak throughout the state apparatus and the parties continued to implement only the provisions that did not compromise their respective nationalist stance, while overtly ignoring those that required their more genuine commitment. The civil forces had not yet been replaced by one multi-ethnic state army and the inter-ethnic national constitution had yet to be adopted. Thus peace in BiH was even more dependent on the international community performing long lists of tasks that were pretty much identical to their initial mandates. In other words, international dependency was the price that both Croatia and BiH paid for a non-functional state structure, which they essentially saw as having been handed down to them by the international community.

The success of UNPROFOR, the peacebuilding missions and the international administrations that followed not only required, and continue today to require, a considerable amount of international military and political force. The peoples in the former SFRY remain divided between antagonistic nationalistic groups with competing claims for self-determination, making a return to traditional violence in a moment of weakness a constant risk. In 1998, violent conflict broke out in the long troubled province of Kosovo in Serbia, between Serbian forces and Kosovo Albanians over the future status of the province. Hence another multidimensional peacekeeping operation was deployed in the region.

Although the operation has now been terminated, deep and widespread disagreements with


546 The principal objectives of the OHR in 2004 were: (i) reinstall the respect for the law and uphold human rights; (ii) reform the economy; (iii) reinforce the local capacities of good governance through civil society training rather than forcing the state level; (iv) reform the defense and security sectors to facilitate the integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures. OHR Mission Implementation Plan 2004, OHR Mission Implementation Statement, February 2004, p. 2. See also Twenty-eight report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General, 1 January-30 June 2005, United Nations Security Council, S/2005/706, 8 November 2005.

547 See statement by H.E. Ivo Miro Jovic, Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 60th General Assembly High Level Plenary Meeting, New York, 16 September 2005.
regards to the province remain, reinforcing the divides in the region as well as within the international community. In 2001, violence also re-erupted in the Albanian-inhabited villages in the northern parts of Macedonia, undermining the interethnic compromise there as well. Even more recently, there have been isolated outbreaks of civil violence in Belgrade and elsewhere in Serbia as a result of disagreements over cooperation with the EU in relation to the debates about the independence of Kosovo. This has also reignited the old conflict over the status of the RS in BiH, causing BiH to ask the PIC for room to re-negotiate both the DPA and the peace implementation plan so that they actually address the underlying complex political disagreements.

By reviewing the practice of multidimensional peacekeeping in the former SFRY, I have tried to bring some clarity to the justificatory background of the reinvention of collective security in the global world and the normative dilemmas involved. To the ‘security from what’ question I have added a ‘security for what’ question and formed a tri-part or triangular analytical framework that aims to connect the analysis of the international security agenda with multidimensional peacekeeping and international legitimacy so as to form more educated expectations with regards to the reinvention of collective security in the global world. Informing theory by practice enabled me to identify an incoherence or disconnect in the analysis, assessments and reviews of collective human security on the one hand, and the practice of multidimensional peacekeeping on the other. Contrary to the conclusions about

548 From the outset, Slobodan Milosevic informed Serbs in Kosovo that they were under assault from the Albanian Muslims who represented the large majority in this province. Estimates from the early 1990s, suggest that only ten percent of the population in Kosovo where Serb. As early as 1992, the UN Special Rapporteur had raised concern with regards to the human rights situation in Kosovo and the discrimination of the ethnic Albanian population. In 1999, the Contact Group was able to help the parties reach a negotiated peace which NATO enforced in a 78-day long air strike campaign, followed by the establishment of a United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) supported by an international NATO-led force (KFOR). In December 2008, the large majority of UNMIK’s outstanding responsibilities were transferred to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Report on the Human Rights Situation in Former Yugoslavia, E/CN.4/1992/S-1/1, 27 October 1992, especially paragraph 20-22; *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 501-505; and Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999.


551 The request was turned down after the debate had triggered tensions and fractures in the region, as well as within the international community; the RS threatening to hold a referendum on independence, the Bosnian-Croats calling for a separate entity within the broader state, the Bosniacs asking for a new Constitution, and the UN Member States disagreeing on a possible exit strategy for the OHR. Srcko Latal, ‘Bosnia Faces Critical Challenges in 2010’, *Balkan Insights*, Sarajevo, 21 January 2010.
collective human security, multidimensional peacekeeping does nothing more and nothing less than help bring about a certain willingness to stop using traditional violence. While it might increase the cost of war, it is unlikely to increase the gain of peace. Humanitarian aid and liberal-democratic state-building assistance only lead to peacemaking and peacekeeping because of how the international community, through quite intrusive political and military means, helps govern the internal affairs of post-conflict states long after the successful termination of the UN peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding missions. In other words, the positive effects that make multidimensional peacekeeping a worthwhile pursuit amount to an institutionalization of intra-state conflicts that implements power-sharing arrangements that replace traditional violence with structural violence, but at the cost of a permanent rather than transitional international culture of dependency.

Against this background, I argue that multidimensional peacekeeping and therefore also the reinvention of collective security are justified by contingent and procedural understandings of success that are defined by compromises struck between the vision of collective human security and what the UN and the international community are actually able to achieve in practice at a certain place in time. This represents not only a considerable change for the practice of collective security but it also implies an important shift for the system of collective security that is not only overlooked by the collective security literature and the discourse, but which the international community has not yet agreed upon. As a result, the reinvention of collective security ends up being justified by targets and therefore expectations that are set too high, which are likely to make collective security self-defeating.\(^5\) All in all, the disconnect between system and practice tells us three things about the global world’s security challenges:

- First, the practice of collective security in the global world is justified by concepts that are based on assumptions about security and peace, and about peacekeeping and peacebuilding and how they relate to each other; these assumptions have been made in theory without taking into account the context in which they are operationalized. Not only does practice fail to confirm the postulated links between concepts but it

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also has unintended perverse consequences that undermine the success of multidimensional peacekeeping and destabilizes the global world;

- Second, the system of collective security in the global world is about more than managing threats between or within states. It is about continuously upholding certain processes between, within and across states. This requires collective security to engage in a proactive practice of peace-as-global-governance that breaks with traditional principles. Forceful interventions are deployed and the aims of collective human security are compromised to accommodate practice. The outcome is an unexpected and therefore destabilizing international culture of dependency for which collective security has neither the means nor the leverage or legitimacy;

- Third, collective human security ambiguities have both conceptual and practical implications for the global world order. The actors of collective security are forced to make uninformed difficult compromises between the ambitious aims of human security and the traditional principles of collective security, which makes it unclear what the securitizing effects are of a world organized by interdependence. This undermines collective security in the global order and as such, destabilizes the world instead of stabilizing it.

**Flawed analysis and faulty assumptions**

The practice of multidimensional peacekeeping indicates that in order for international assistance—be it humanitarian, diplomatic or political—to bring about the anticipated behaviors and processes within states ultimately depends on forceful and intrusive third-party guarantees that have unintended perverse consequences for the overall success of multidimensional peacekeeping.\(^{553}\) Like in the case of the violent dissolution of the former SFRY, multidimensional peacekeeping operations often start out as humanitarian operations but terminate as forceful peacekeeping operations with strategies based on just war theories that seriously undermine the liberal-democratic ambition of the vision for collective human security. After the limits of the humanitarian assistance have been tested, strategies for the ideal termination of civil war and reconstruction take over and focus on military support and

security sector reform. These are followed by intrusive peacebuilding missions that, by means of effective conditionality, continue to systematically favor or disfavor certain groups, behaviors and processes. As encompassing state-building projects take shape, the international community tends to become more and more, rather than less and less, involved with the internal affairs of the post-conflict states, increasingly denying democratically elected officials and other civil servants from public appointments.

Instead of bridging the divides, the forceful implementation of the power-sharing arrangements and majoritarian democracy provokes civil disorder and reinforces the extent to which the non-majority communities feel disenfranchised as opposed to reintegrated. While the more intrusive democratization policies might enable some reforms to move forward, they put in place a passive and politically irrelevant leadership. Old war-time leaders are provided with new political grounds on which to mobilize their supporters against other groups, as well as against the international community, in illegitimate parallel or shadow political and economic structures. In the former SFRY, the obstructionist attitude from the Serbian peoples still undermines the outcome of the international assistance that is provided to the region today. The victim rhetoric that developed in response to the international policies of effective conditionality remains. Serbian leaders to a large extent continue to portray the UN, collective security and ‘the world’ as being against them, while other leaders use the unequal distribution of aid to reinforce the image of the Serbs as perpetrators and also portray themselves as victims. Rather than strengthening the state structures, the just war peacemaking and peacekeeping policies and the one-size-fits-all peacebuilding models have provided the warring parties with a framework in which to legitimize and develop their politics of separation without anybody taking responsibility for the grave crimes committed during the devastating civil war. This has in turn reinforced the need for third-party security guarantees, and as such has forced the UN to increasingly go against the traditional principles of collective security and undermine the liberal-democratic nature of the state-building process.

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations that result in international liberal-democratic state-building are more likely to fuel rather than tame intra-state conflicts. Not only do the conflicts outlive the humanitarian, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, but they also become wider and deeper. Thus in order to terminate the operations and missions, the UN ends up lowering the benchmarks for success and outsources international responsibilities to other international and regional actors. Yet peace and security studies, as well as the UN, continue to assume that making, keeping and building peace within states are all natural processes that can be encouraged and guided, as opposed to governed, by external actors. Policy recommendations are made about how international aid can be a substitute for deficiencies in local capacities based on conclusions that have been made in theory about how international institution-building can help post-conflict states to gradually become liberal-democratic states. The focus is on how to ensure that the external actors are well informed and that they have the right technical and institutional means even though practice shows that the challenge is of a much deeper socio-political and normative nature in terms of collective security leading a project that in practice translates into a project of peace-as-global-governance that struggles for legitimacy. As a result of too high expectatins, the UN runs into complex normative dilemmas. Collective human security runs the risk of becoming self-defeating, applying means that defeat their ends unless the international community agrees on a new framework or system of collective security in which a practice of peace-as-global-governance is legitimate.

An international culture of dependency and the global world order
That BiH has still not been united, Croatia has not reintegrated, and that the relations between the former warring parties across the region have not been normalized, together with the reinvention of collective security and the continued expansion of multidimensional peacekeeping, indicate that although the institutionalization of the conflict is likely to create alternative internal battlefields for the parties, it reassures the global world. Thus the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping that are justifying the reinvention of collective security are not so much about the post-conflict states reaching the same targets defined by numbers, such as death caused by civil violence or GDP, nor are they about the extent to which the peace processes within post-conflict depend on international assistance. They are
about projectual success and the relationship between conceptual and practical success, rather than about one of these categories individually. They are about certain processes and practices taking place within, between and across states, about the world coming together to make agreements with regard to collective security, which it then tries to implement in practice. In other words, the stabilizing effects of collective security are predominantly in the doing or in the ritual, and multidimensional peacekeeping is justified on an ad hoc basis in relation to what can be achieved in practice. The practical experience of collective security thus far suggests that the international community has already made unofficial agreements about acquiring and promoting certain universal values even at the price of state’s internal stability and independence. This emphasizes the normative commitment of collective security to liberal democratic states and global governance, and therefore reinforces the need for the international community to discuss, negotiate and make agreements with regards to the normative dilemmas which this implies.\footnote{556 Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol’, \textit{Political Science Quarterly}, Volume LXVII, Number 4, December 1952, pp. 481-502.}

The practice of multidimensional peacekeeping indicates that the understanding of self-sustainable peace that justifies multidimensional peacekeeping is defined by a range of context-dependent processes of securitization, liberalization and democratization. The benchmarks function as guidelines rather than as concrete targets; they provide a sense of direction instead of direct instructions. Thus that a post-conflict state is dependent upon international assistance, or that its internal affairs are closely monitored by the international community, does not necessarily mean that the state does not benefit from self-sustainable peace. According to practice, an international culture of dependency should stabilize rather destabilize the world. It confirms the interdependence of the global world and reinforces the international community’s commitment to collective security. However, the international culture of dependency is in both peace and security studies, as well as in UN reviews of multidimensional peacekeeping, portrayed more or less as an illegitimate practice that is part of a practice of peace-as-global-governance that turns the UN and collective security into ‘a colonial administrator’, or even ‘a benevolent dictator’.\footnote{557 Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel, \textit{Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development} (London, Frank Cass, 2002); Roland Paris, \textit{At War’s End: Building Peace After Violent Conflict} (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, \textit{Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations} (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006).} The fact that the international culture of dependency is in the assessments of collective security identified as a problem and...
something destabilizing, while in practice it allows multidimensional peacekeeping operations to proclaim their successful termination, indicates that the system and practice of collective security do not share the same justificatory background.

The system of collective security is still justified by the traditional principles of collective security—that is, by state sovereignty defined by the principle of non-intervention, whereas practice is justified by collective human security—that is, contingent and procedural understandings of self-sustainable peace. Thus while the world of risks cannot be addressed with one particular type of peace, the system can only prescribe one particular type of peace. The UN is left to build liberal-democratic states against a justificatory background defined by universal pre-defined standard-setting policies. This means either ending and preventing threats within and across states and as such undermining traditional state sovereignty by violating the principle of non-intervention, or refraining from managing risks within and across states. As we saw in the case of the former SFRY, both scenarios are likely to cause civilian suffering and destabilize the world. Therefore, collective security in the global world has to be understood as a continuous compromise between the two. This makes multidimensional peacekeeping not only a technical, institutional or strategic challenge for collective security, but also a normative challenge. The UN has to constantly bridge the old and new principles of collective security by making difficult decisions about trade-offs between different types of aims and success—that is, between satisfying some needs at the cost of others. These choices have to be brought to the fore and become subject to international negotiations, and eventually also international agreements on the reinvention of not only the practice, but also the system of collective security for the global world.

Collective human security in the global world
Our review of the multidimensional peacekeeping operations in the Western Balkans has given us an idea of the amount of resources—military, economic and political—that the reinvention of collective security for a global world requires in practice. As such, it has also indicated the scope of the system of collective security that is necessary for these resources to be channeled into one coherent peace project for effective peace progress. The system has to be flexible enough to adjust to the specific conflict, wide and deep enough to simultaneously grasp processes between within and across states, and powerful enough to
make the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate claims for self-determination and state sovereignty. It has also, however, indicated that this system has yet to be agreed upon and operationalized. Thus the challenge of the practice of collective security cannot be addressed only in terms of the technical or instrumental flaws of multidimensional peacekeeping, nor by the institutional or organizational weakness of the UN as the collective security literature and discourse suggest. It also relates to a compromise between the traditional system of collective security and the ‘new’ practice of collective security.

Thus far, deploying humanitarian aid has been a way for the UN to indirectly address the internal affairs of its Member States without going against the principle of non-intervention by undermining state sovereignty. However, practice reveals that by addressing a political conflict as a humanitarian crisis and deploying a humanitarian force for political motivations, UNPROFOR was left not only without the political means needed to end the conflict, but also without the military means necessary to provide humanitarian assistance to all groups.\(^{558}\) Thus respecting the state sovereignty of its Member States by not interfering with their internal affairs is likely to come at the cost of protecting civilians, and effective conditionality to come at the cost of genuine peacebuilding. This sheds doubt on the promises about the securitizing effects of a world organized by state sovereignty defined by interdependence rather than by the principle of non-intervention. What is more costly for collective security or what has more stabilizing effects for the global world: negotiated peace agreements that leave conflicting parties within states to effectively agree to disagree on the type of peace that is to be built, interpreting the agreement in ways that fit their particular interests rather than a common understanding of peace and as such, create a long-term international dependency of post-conflict states? Or decisive military victories that exhaust rather than solve internal conflicts and establish a victor’s peace rather than try to help build liberal-democratic states? In both cases, the traditional principles of collective security are challenged and the normative ambition of collective security is undermined as upholding the global order comes at the price of human development.

As long as the legitimizing principles for the traditional framework of collective security are around, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are likely to continue to cause just as much if not more destabilizing effects. A project that amounts to peace-as-global-

governance will continue to result in a practice of an international culture of dependency that is seen to undermine rather than to improve the success of collective security. The UN and other external collective security actors are left to perform a delicate balancing act of managing risks to collective human security that cut across the traditional borders and boundaries without violating the principle of non-intervention so much that it is seen to undermine state sovereignty and as such, destabilize the world. Humanitarian forces will continue to be deployed to address political conflicts, using means of effective conditionality to address the internal affairs of sovereign states without actually intervening, which means that international assistance will continue to be indirectly politicized. The serious unintended consequences of leading a practice that is justified by assumptions about mutually reinforcing processes that have been made in theory will repeat themselves rather than be averted. In other words, collective security will continue to use means that defeat rather than reinforce the reinvention of collective security for the global world based on liberal democratic institutions, structures, and processes.

The technical or instrumental and the institutional or organizational problems of multidimensional peacekeeping cannot be considered without taking into account the challenge that this practice poses for the system of collective security. The analysis of collective security has to move away from assessing only the mandate performance of the external actors of collective security. It is not enough to review whether multidimensional peacekeeping operations build peace within states, or whether the international policies and strategies for addressing internal conflicts and post-conflict societies stabilize the world. Because while the former overlooks the larger context in which international policies of collective security must be carried out, the latter ignores the context in which the external actors have to build peace within states. As such, in both cases the context-independent analysis overlooks an important part of the challenge of the practice of collective security in the global world in terms of the relationship between the system and the practice of collective security. More concretely, it is the fact that humanitarian aid is used to address a political conflict and that liberal-democratic state-building assistance is used to make and implement internationally negotiated peace agreements to build peace within states in ways that stabilize the global world that are overlooked. In other words, the analysis fails to contribute to the reflexive analysis and discussion of which collective human security is part.
and parcel, and is therefore largely unable to help clarify the problems, risks and possibilities that collective security is facing, as well as to contribute to its social and political praxis.\footnote{559 See Bent Flyvbjerg, \textit{Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again} (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001).}

Where to go from here

To be successful in the global world, the UN has to be able to address violence between, within and across states in ways that confirm the expectations of the reinvention of collective security, or alternatively, the expectations have to be lowered. The contingency and the political nature of collective human security have to be recognized. The world has to tackle the problem of collective security moving away from the idea of a neutral project for peace based on naturalist claims and universal concepts. It has to come to terms with what the democratic peace paradigm and the theory of moral sentiments with all sorts of assumptions about human nature and the collective from which it stems mean for the world Organization. The system of collective security has to be adjusted to the concepts of human security and a positive peace, not only institutionally but also structurally and normatively, and the practice has to be adjusted to the system. The UN has to be able to lead an international rights practice and a practice of peace-as-global-governance for context dependent uncertainties and it has to be able to do so legitimately.

Thus our findings with regard to the justificatory background of collective security suggests that to understand the challenges of the global world and contextualize threats as well as the means with which to deal with them, such as multidimensional peacekeeping, the incoherence between the practice and the system of collective security has to be at the center of the analysis. It has to become better acquainted with the wider and deeper system upon which the success of multidimensional peacekeeping depends to then reconsider the reinvention of collective security based on what practice reveals about the positive predictions for the global world order that were made at the end of the Cold War. Thus the analysis has to go beyond the rules and concepts, and bring out the implicit assumptions that are currently justifying multidimensional peacekeeping operations at three different levels.

First, the analysis has to see to what extent the practice of collective security is addressing asymmetrical threats of structural violence and risks. It can neither be confided to states’ internal or external borders and boundaries. It has to see beyond, within and across
the state. Policy recommendations have to be made with regard to what issues the international community, and more precisely UN Member States, need to discuss and make agreements in order to stabilize the global world. Questions that must be asked include: If the UN successfully terminates an operation but the peace process within the state is still dependent on international assistance, is the multidimensional peacekeeping operation successful? Does structural violence within a state constitute less of a threat when it is closely monitored by the international community? Are post-conflict states in the international culture of dependency more likely to build peace than post-conflict states in which multidimensional peacekeeping has not taken place?

Second, the analysis has to consider what the addressing of weak states and the processes that risk disintegrating and weakening states from within mean for the system of collective security. The important crossroads at which multidimensional peacekeeping puts the system of collective security has to be acknowledged and questions have to be asked with regard to the redefinition of state sovereignty that has gradually occurred over the course of the development of UN peacekeeping. In other words, what according to practice is required from the system of collective security has to be clarified in order for threats to the global world to be reversed in ways that stabilize the global world order. Questions that must be asked include: What are the effects of the growing international culture of dependency for collective security? Is an international culture of dependency an indicator for success or failure?

Third, the analysis must look at what a world of risks and human security means for collective security as an actor or sphere of influence in its own right. More precisely, it has to be considered whether it is actually possible and desirable to leave it up to the actors of collective security to compromise on the need to adjust to a particular context, with the requirement of abiding by international standards. Questions that must be asked include: Has the world agreed on an international institutionalization of internal conflict and a proactive and prescriptive practice of peace-as-global governance, or is it an unintended consequence? Is a practice of collective human security possible, and should the UN have means at its disposal that go beyond humanitarian aid and negotiations so that it can enforce negotiated peace agreements and liberal-democratic state-building processes from the outset? Do and should collective security actors acquire agency strong enough to satisfy the high expectations of the global order?
To answer these questions and allow for a new thinking to develop that sees beyond the just war peacemaking and peacekeeping policies, and the one-size-fits-all peacebuilding models, it is essential that we focus on how to better inform theory by practice rather than on some aprioristically conceived assumptions that are typical in the analysis of collective security. Thus, while I am certainly unable to provide solutions for these complex practical and conceptual puzzles, I hope that with my tri-part or triangular analytical framework and the notion of projectual success, I have contributed to the ongoing debates about the challenges of collective human security, with ideas about what constitutes educated expectations for collective security in the global world. Furthermore, I hope that by doing so, I have also contributed in some way to the normative project to not only ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’, but also ‘to establish conditions under which justice’, and the promotion of ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’ can be maintained as the collective aspiration of all peoples.\footnote{See the Preamble of the 
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