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The Swiss and Norwegian
No to Europe

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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE

**Single Cases or a Unique Pair?
The Swiss and Norwegian No to Europe**

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Abstract

This paper compares the Swiss and Norwegian European policies. It combines an analysis of the sectoral interests among the elite, based on a qualification of Katzenstein's small-state/flexible adjustment thesis, and an analysis of the referendum behaviour, based on survey data. At the first level, it shows that the structure of each state's economic dependence on the European Union (EU), on the one hand, and the threat of liberalisation among domestic sectors of the economy, on the other, were more decisive than the 'liberal' or 'social' pattern of adaptation to international changes in shaping Swiss and Norwegian elite's attitude towards European integration. At the second level, it suggests that if taking part in the EU project – be it through full membership or through membership in the European Economic Area – is not perceived as an economic necessity, cultural and political factors can have a more decisive impact than economic factors on the voters' decision.

I. Introduction*

With the popular rejection of the European Economic Area (EEA) on December 6, 1992, and the disapproval of membership in the European Union (EU) on November 28, 1994, Switzerland and Norway became outliers in the process of European integration. This 'No' to Europe from two countries that differ so strongly from each other seems puzzling. At first sight the literature on small European states provides little help to solve this puzzle. Thus, Switzerland's and Norway's response to the European challenge does not fit Katzenstein's (1984, 1985) emphasis on the 'flexibility' of the small states, nor is it in line with his distinction between the 'liberal' and 'social' adaptation to international economic changes. We argue that Katzenstein's framework constitutes nevertheless a useful starting point to compare the Swiss and Norwegian cases, provided it is refined and extended. Firstly, Katzenstein did not pay enough attention to the division between externally oriented and domestic sectors of the economy. If this is taken into account together with each state's economic dependence on the EU, the two countries do not differ as strongly as his classification might suggest, at least in the context of European integration. Secondly, Katzenstein's framework fails to capture other societal cleavages that may be crucial for the determination of a country's European policy, especially if they are mobilised in popular votes.

In this paper, we combine analyses of sectoral interests among the elites, and of the voters' decision in the referendums to identify the determinants of the Swiss and Norwegian No to Europe. In the second section, we compare the attitude of Swiss and Norwegian elites towards participation in the EU single market in the light of a qualification of Katzenstein's small-state/flexible adjustment thesis. Then, we extend our framework with a discussion of the main cleavages in Swiss and Norwegian politics. This will help us to identify the economic, cultural and political factors that could have shaped the Swiss and Norwegian attitudes towards European integration. The last section is devoted to a detailed analysis of

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the referendums on European matters in Switzerland and Norway. As a first step, we recall the main features of the 1972 popular votes – the Norwegian vote on European Community (EC) membership and the Swiss vote on the free-trade agreement with the EC. We then give some insights into the most recent referendum campaigns, highlighting the stands held by the main political actors (government, political parties and interest groups) and the major arguments raised in the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ camps. On the basis of survey data, we examine how these stands influenced the voting behaviour, with a special emphasis on the impact of economic, cultural and political cleavages in the 1992 (Swiss) and 1994 (Norwegian) votes. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of our findings for both Katzenstein’s thesis and the Swiss and Norwegian European policies.

II. Switzerland and Norway in perspective

Switzerland and Norway, opposing cases of ‘democratic corporatism’?

In his study of the political economy strategies employed by the small European states to cope with international economic changes, Katzenstein (1984, 1985) characterised Switzerland as the paradigmatic case of ‘liberal democratic’ corporatism. According to him, Norway belongs to the other, ‘social’, variant of democratic corporatism, and employ accordingly a distinctive pattern of flexible adaptation.¹

The crux of Katzenstein’s small-state/flexible adjustment thesis can be summarised as follows. Because of their size, small states are dependent on world markets and therefore more open to the international economy than larger states. While protectionism is not an option for them, their small size makes them vulnerable to exogenous changes. In this context, internal conflict is a luxury that they can not afford. Rather, openness and vulnerability favours national consensus through corporatist arrangements, i.e. through voluntary and informal co-ordination of conflicting objectives through political bargaining among – relatively centralised and concentrated – interest groups and state bureaucracies in a policy network (Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 87-94). In turn, this permanent co-

¹ The Netherlands and Belgium also belong to the liberal variant, while Austria and Denmark belong to the social variant. Sweden combines features of both the liberal and the social variants.

operation between the major private and public actors allows for a flexible adaptation to international economic changes. The two variants of democratic corporatism differ both in where (globally or nationally) and in how (privately or publicly) the adjustment occurs (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 81). In liberal corporatist countries like Switzerland, adaptation is both offensive and global, and comprises aggressive and globally oriented responses to international challenges via foreign investment, private support of research and development policy, export drives, and so on. Domestic compensation for integration in the world economy relies primarily on market forces, i.e. on private strategies in the areas of economic planning, regional development or social welfare.² This pattern of adaptation mirrors the domestic power configuration, namely the domination of the internationally oriented business and the political right, and the weakness of both the left and the state. By contrast, in social democratic countries like Norway, reactive and national strategies of flexible adaptation prevail. The economy is more protected against international competition than in the liberal variant, and responses to international changes have proceeded by small steps, excluding major recourse to foreign investment, export promotion, and the like. Compensations for the costs of adaptation rely heavily on state intervention and public investments at the national level, which reflects the strength of the left.

In the light of Katzenstein's corporatist framework, the differences between Switzerland and Norway seem more salient than ever. However, both Katzenstein's theoretical framework and its application to the Swiss or Norwegian cases are questionable (Kriesi, 1986; Hicks, 1988; Midttun 1990; Sciarini 1994). A qualification of this framework leads to a more balanced conclusion regarding the structural differences between the two countries and their related strategies towards the process of European integration.

By focusing on the class cleavage, i.e. the cleavage between the business community and the labour movement, Katzenstein underestimates the impact of another economic cleavage, namely the one opposing export oriented to domestic oriented sectors of the economy. To be sure, Katzenstein (1984, p. 91, 1985, p. 84) points out that two different economic sectors have developed in Switzerland,

² The low profile economic policy of the government is in line with the general 'liberal evolution' (Hotz, 1979) of Switzerland. According to the subsidiarity principle, State intervention was called for only in the cases of emergency, i.e. when society could not solve the problems itself.

as in the other small European states: one externally oriented and competitive, the other internally oriented and protected. Surprisingly then, he does not really pay attention to the impact of these sectoral differences on the flexibility of the small states. In our view, the underlying diverging preferences of the two sectors form a central explanatory factor for the attitude of the Swiss and Norwegian elites toward a possible participation in the single European market.

Overall, economic openness is considerable in Switzerland. Foreign economic relations have been the main source of the country's prosperity and the Swiss economy is still of one of the most open with respect to many criteria. As a small economy, deprived of raw materials, Switzerland has had no choice but to support free trade in international negotiations like the GATT and to maintain low tariffs in foreign trade for industrial goods.³ Moreover, Switzerland has been a leading country in foreign direct investments since the beginning of the 20th century (Bairoch, 1990, pp. 114-115). It is also an important financial centre and one third of the earnings of Swiss banks comes from activities or services abroad. On the other hand, however, internationalisation of the economy has in fact focused on only some branches of industry and services. Besides these sectors, many others are mainly oriented toward the domestic economy, with high degrees of sheltering against international market forces.⁴ The most conspicuous example is agriculture, which is broadly supported and protected by numerous state measures (Sciarini, 1994).⁵ But agriculture is not a unique case. Regulation either by the state or by private contractual arrangements (cartels, price maintenance and monopolies) to eliminate – international, as well as domestic – competition is also

³ Exports of goods and services make up half of the national product (one third for the sole exports of products – machinery, electronics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, textiles, watches). In 1990, Switzerland was the fifth largest exporter of services in the world. Swiss openness with respect to trade of goods is, however, not an exception: the share of exports and imports to GDP is very similar to that of Norway and significantly lower than that of Belgium or the Netherlands.

⁴ While the existence of a dual economy is empirical evidence, there are many overlaps between the two sectors of the economy. Thus, talking of a division of the economy is admittedly a simplification, but is justified by the analytical purpose.

⁵ The history of Swiss agricultural policy has been strongly linked – and influenced by – the policy of neutrality: according to the strict Swiss conception of neutrality a neutral state should prepare for possible wars or import crises by securing a high degree of food self-sufficiency. Accordingly, farm production should be stimulated (i.e. subsidised) and sheltered from international competition in time of peace.

the rule in various areas of the secondary and tertiary domestic sectors (Rentsch, 1989, p. 1), even though the situation has evolved these last years.⁶

The Swiss dual economic policy reflected a sort of 'division of labour' inside the economy and allowed a peaceful resolution of conflicts for a long time; corporatist-driven arrangements have been favoured by the possibility of conciliating interests of both sectors of the economy. More specifically, externally oriented sectors could adapt without questioning support and protection of domestic sectors. However, the dual economic policy becomes problematic in a context of increasing international competition (Knöpfel, 1988): this shift highlights the need for structural adjustment that would improve the situation of the externally oriented sector but, at the same time, becomes a threat for the internally-oriented sector, inveigled into the deregulation and liberalisation process. The resulting conflict between the two sectors may turn out to be more significant than the traditional cleavage between business and labour.

This split attitude applied to the road toward participation in the single European market. While satisfying the interests of the externally oriented Swiss economy, joining the internal market was seen as threat by many protected domestic sectors that were unwilling to liberalise and face an increasing international competition.⁷ It should be added that the externally oriented sectors were themselves not as active in supporting the EEA treaty as might have been expected (Sciarini, 1992). One main reason for this was that exports are but one aspect of the internationalisation of the Swiss economy, whose most specific aspect is the strength of transnational companies. Oriented towards the world market, the latter were not so

⁶ Presumably, Katzenstein (1984, p. 91) underestimates both the size and the degree of protection of the domestic sector. Some scholars call the Swiss model a 'selective liberalism' (Danthine and Lambelet, 1987); they argue that it is mainly the absence of an effective anti-trust policy – which can in turn be considered as an adverse effect of the Swiss 'laissez-faire' – that allowed all sorts of cartels to flourish. Changes occurred only recently. Under pressure of European integration and the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, Switzerland had to reform its farm policy (Sciarini, 1994, 1995, 1996a) and its concurrence policy (adoption of new laws on cartels and on public procurements, and unilateral adaptation to EU technical standards – see Cottier, 1996).

⁷ According to an official study, most part of the expected 0.4 to 0.6 percent additional economic growth per year linked to integration in the internal market was due to liberalisation of the – thus far – protected domestic sectors of Swiss economy (Hauser, 1991, pp. 48-52).

dependent on the access to the European single market.⁸ The most fervent supporters of the EEA were the senior officials of the administration, who tried to use the EEA negotiation as a leverage to push for a reorientation of Swiss domestic economic policy (Sciarini, 1992).

A dual economy can also be identified in Norway, with oil and related industries on the one side, and the rest of economy with different degrees of sheltering against international market forces on the other (Midttun, 1990, pp. 310-313). Therefore, when studying adaptation, it is also necessary to differentiate between sectors of the economy. The huge economic surplus from its oil production has enabled Norway to subsidise a number of industries and to protect many sectors from international competition. In addition, the comparative advantage of cheap, abundant hydropower resources has given Norway a stable basis for industrial expansion in electrometal, electrochemical, paper, etc., and has also been used to soften international competitive pressure in the whole economy. This has, in turn, led to a structural conservatism, as well as to increases of wages, high income and price levels overall. Although a process of privatisation and deregulation was started in the eighties,⁹ structural adjustment and domestic policy changes were, as in Switzerland, key elements of the expected economic gains linked to integration in the EU (Haaland, 1990, p. 399). Not surprisingly, the less competitive domestic sectors, threatened by the prospects of liberalisation, opposed EU-membership.

The main difference with Switzerland lies in the fact that subsidisation of the domestic economy has not been achieved through activities of competitive industries or services abroad, but through territorially attractive petroleum resources. Indeed, the exclusive character of its resource endowments and the oligopolistic character of international markets have sheltered the oil and related sectors from normal competition and have allowed the country to reap super-profits without relying on competitive skills (Midttun, 1990, pp. 310-311). This structural differ-

⁸ 6 out of the 100 biggest multinational firms in the world are Swiss (only one is Norwegian). Moreover, if the EU is Switzerland's first trading partner, economic relations with non-EU countries are still highly significant.

⁹ For instance, state monopolies in telecommunications were abandoned, and international competition was introduced to new sectors. This also applies to agriculture, but only in a comparatively modest degree; Norwegian agriculture was still, with the Swiss, the most strongly subsidised in Europe at the end of the 1980s (OECD, 1990).

ence is, however, of little significance in the European context. In the same way that the Swiss export oriented sectors were not critically dependent upon the EU, there was no crucial economic pressure on Norway to join the European single market, at least as long as the EU energy policy was loosely co-ordinated and did not discriminate against outsiders. With its relatively strong economy and its reserves of oil and other resources Norway seemed less in need of EU membership than most of its EFTA partners (Wennerlund, 1994, p. 10).

To summarise, one could say that the structure of each state's economic dependence on the EU, on the one hand, and the threat of liberalisation among domestic sectors of the economy, on the other, were more decisive than the 'liberal' or 'social' pattern of adaptation in shaping Swiss and Norwegian elite's attitude towards European integration until the late eighties. Focusing on the economic factors would, however, lead to missing important aspects of the European policy in Switzerland and Norway. This is where Katzenstein's framework is again flawed. The author's priority is to explain the pacification of economic cleavages among the elite. Hence, his framework does not tell us anything about the impact of other political cleavages on the flexibility of small states. Moreover, by focusing on the elite, Katzenstein's model is of limited utility in situation when political decisions have to overcome the hurdle of a referendum. As recent votes on European integration show, public opinion can play a central role in foreign policy formulation.¹⁰ To study the determinants of votes, one has therefore to rely on a broader framework, taking into account the main societal cleavages that can be decisive in shaping the electorate's decision.

The cleavages in Swiss and Norwegian society

Rokkan's (1970) work provides a useful starting point to describe the general make-up of cleavages in Switzerland and Norway, and the way they have been organised by political actors.¹¹ He identifies four traditional cleavages that have

¹⁰ This holds particularly for Switzerland: historically, foreign policy almost totally escaped the mechanisms of direct democracy; however, the increasing inter-penetration of international and domestic politics that is associated with the process of globalisation, together with the partial revision of the Swiss constitution in 1977 that enlarged the judicial domain of foreign politics where direct democracy applies, enhance the electorate's influence on the determination of Swiss foreign policy (Germann, 1994; Sciarini, 1994).

¹¹ As Bartolini and Mair (1990) point out, social stratification or cultural dividing lines remain latent as long as they are not politicised. They result in political cleavages only when they are

been very important in the past: the centre-periphery, the religious, the urban-rural and the class cleavages. Usually motivated by a linguistic defence of a specific territorial identity against the nation builders, the centre-periphery cleavage is assumed to be relatively unsalient in the Swiss federal system (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 10; Kriesi et al., 1996). This is firstly because Switzerland has 'neither a true centre nor a true state' (Badie and Birnbaum, 1979, p. 212) which could try to impose its culture on the peripheries. Second, federalism helped to pacify internal relationships among the subunits and between the subunits and the federal state (Linder, 1994). More specifically, no party exists explicitly to defend the interests of a linguistic region in Switzerland.¹² Surprisingly then, Lijphart (1979) found that the linguistic cleavage was almost as prominent as the religious one in shaping the electoral behaviour at the beginning of the seventies; a recent study even argues that it has become the most important cleavage in the electoral arena (Trechsel, 1995). These results are, however, not due to the existence of a linguistic cleavage per se but, rather, to the fact that some parties exist mainly in one of the linguistic regions:¹³ for instance, the Liberal party is almost exclusively a French-speaking party, while the Swiss People's party or the Swiss Democrats are mostly German-speaking parties. Latent in Swiss politics, this cleavage can be mobilised through various channels, for instance in direct democratic votes where the opposition between the linguistic communities are increasingly frequent, especially in foreign policy, federalism (share of competencies) and transport policy (Kriesi et al., 1996).

In Norway, the tension between the political centre and the periphery is probably the most central theme of politics (Rokkan, 1967, 1970; Rokkan and Valen, 1964). This conflict has several causes. First, it is related to the issue of national independence as the resistance to the political union with Sweden was stronger in the countryside than in the cities. Second, the difference along centre periphery lines has been cultural, as parts of the peripheries – most notably in the South and

associated with a collective identity and political consciousness, on the one hand, and when they are 'mobilised' by political actors or institutions, on the other.

¹² Exceptions to this rule are the short-lived attempt of the Unitary Party (*Parti unitaire romand*), which attempted but failed to gain representation in 1967 (Steiner, 1974: 59), and more recently the *Lega dei Ticinesi*, a populist party created to defend the interests of the Italian-speaking canton. The *Lega* achieved even representation in National Council starting in 1991.

¹³ This, in turn, is the consequence of the decentralised organisation of the Swiss party system, which is mostly a collection of cantonal party systems.

West – have been aligned with the dominance of the counter-cultures: the Nynorsk language movement,¹⁴ the temperance movement, and a more fundamental form of pietistic Lutheranism. From the beginning the Liberal party ('Venstre') represented the interests of the periphery as well as the rural counter cultures of teetotalism, nynorsk and pietistic Lutheranism (Leiphart and Svåsand, 1988). As a result of a split of the Liberal party in 1921, the Centre party, which is the farmers' party, also tries to portray itself as the defender of the geographical periphery in Norway.

The religious cleavage takes different forms in countries dominated by Catholics, in countries dominated by Protestants or in countries which are religiously mixed (Gallagher et al., 1992, p. 92). In the latter case, as in Switzerland, the religious cleavage has traditionally opposed Catholics and Protestants. Reflecting an institutional compromise conceded by the dominant Radical Protestants to the Conservative Catholics,¹⁵ the creation of the Swiss federation in 1848 provided the cantons with a high level of autonomy and allowed the Catholics to preserve control of their subculture (Kriesi, 1995, pp. 318-320). Moreover, the Catholics were progressively integrated into national politics and the federal administration according to their proportional size. Similarly, the Catholic opposition voiced by the Christian Democratic party was ultimately bought off through participation in the federal government.¹⁶ Highly salient in the past, at least among the electorate (Lijphart, 1979), the religious cleavage was largely pacified by the mid-seventies in Switzerland, as in most European countries (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 12), and has lost most of its influence on the electoral behaviour (Trechsel, 1995).

Norway illustrates the case in which Protestants are dominant. Until recent years more than 90 percent belonged to the Lutheran state church. Religious conflict in

¹⁴ Based on dialects from the western parts of the country, the nynorsk language was launched to counter the role of Danish and later *rismål* as the official administrative and urban language.

¹⁵ Decisive builders of the nation-state, the Radical Protestants favoured national centralisation, whereas the Conservative Catholic cantons were hostile to any kind of centralisation. This issue was so controversial that it caused a short civil war in 1847. Winners of the war, the Radical Protestants were ready to share power with the loser.

¹⁶ The strong confessional foundation of this party is proved by the fact that its elite is still entirely composed of Catholics (Garcia, 1994a, p. 43). In contrast, Protestants are dominant in the Swiss People's party and, to a lesser extent, in the two other government parties (the Radical Democratic party and the Socialist party).

Norway has been of two types. The first is between various camps of Lutherans, where especially the strong lay movement has preached a more fundamental form of Protestantism which has been strongly critical of liberal theology and practice within the official state church. Second, the Lutheran lay movement and the official church have on occasion been pitted against the state, for example on the amount of compulsory teaching of religion in the schools.

Dominant in European politics of the 19th century (Rokkan, 1970), the rural-urban cleavage has lost a great deal of its significance since that time. This is partly due to the numerical decline of farmers, and partly to the economic support and protection they gained from the state. In Switzerland and Norway, as in most European countries, farmers have continued to show an impressive influence in the electoral channel and, even more strongly, in the process of corporate interest intermediation.¹⁷ While the political clout of Swiss farmers had been declining in the context of both the Uruguay Round talks in the GATT and the process of European integration, these challenges led the farming population to re-mobilise (Sciaroni 1994, 1995, 1996a).

The class cleavage is traditionally mirrored by the opposition between the political left and right. In Switzerland, the conventional right (the Radical Democratic party, the Christian Democratic party and the Swiss People's party) opposes the conventional left (the Socialist party and the Labour party). In addition, new far left and far right parties have emerged since the late sixties. With the narrowing of the traditional base of the labour movement, the increasing standard of living and the establishment of the welfare state, the mobilising capacity of the class cleavage has been weakened (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 16). This holds particularly for Switzerland where the Social Democrats have been part of coalition governments throughout large parts of the post-war period. Still, various studies have shown that the left-right cleavage remains very salient – perhaps the most salient – in Swiss politics, at least among the political and party elite (Finger and Sci-

¹⁷ This widespread evidence has been strengthened in Switzerland by the institutions of direct democracy, which provided the peak association of producers – the Swiss Farmers Union – with a veto power on the political process up to the beginning of the 1990s; in the party system, farm interests were supported by the Swiss People's party, created in response to the domination of urban interests inside the Radical Democratic party. At the end of the 1980s, almost 70 percent of the political elite working in the primary sector belonged to the Swiss People's party (Garcia, 1994b, pp. 33-35).

arini, 1991; Hug, 1994a; Kerr, 1981; Kriesi, 1980; Lehner, 1984; Sciarini and Finger, 1991). Among the public opinion, the impact of the class cleavages was also significant, especially in shaping the elector's decision (Inglehart and Sidjanski, 1975). While this impact weakened during the eighties, be it in the electoral or in the referendum arena (Kriesi et al., 1996, Sardi and Widmer, 1993; Trechsel, 1995), this picture could again be slightly modified given the increased polarisation that arose from the 1995 national elections (Caramani, 1996).

In Norway class interests have been dominant in politics, but the traditional working class has long been in decline, as has voting along straight class lines (Valen, 1981; Listhaug, 1989; Listhaug, 1996; Ringdal and Hines, 1995). The Labour party has been the dominant party of power since the 1930s, although in the last decade it has been in government more because of the lack of unity of the non-socialists than its own political strength. Labour, in line with the numerical decline of prevailing constituencies, has tried to broaden its appeals to the new middle classes. With the return to power in the second half of the decade, and continuing in the nineties, the 'modernised' social democrats have continued along the path of liberalisation started by previous Conservative governments.¹⁸

In response to the fading of some of the historical cleavages in Swiss and Norwegian politics, several attempts have been made to identify new emerging lines of conflict. We will test the impact of five of these on the European votes: education, gender, generation, sector of occupation, and environment. These new conflicts are also linked to party formation, but in a less decisive way than the old cleavage structure. This might at least partly be accounted for by the fact that some of the old parties have been able to accommodate some of the new cleavage interests on their agendas. In Norway, the Socialist Left have had some success in appealing both to old politics and new politics over the recent elections (Aardal, 1990). One notable exception of accommodation by the party system is provided in Switzerland by the environmental issue. Dissatisfaction with the way environmental issue was approached by traditional politics favoured the emergence of a

¹⁸ On the other hand, the Liberal party has never been liberal in the free-market sense. Extremely heterogeneous, it has always faced the problem of embracing numerous cleavages and having no clear ideological identity. Following a series of party splits, notably after the introduction of proportional representation in 1921, the party was gradually reduced in size to the point that, in the current Storting, it has only one MP.

green party in the seventies, first at the cantonal and then at the federal level (Hug, 1989, 1990).¹⁹

III. The Swiss and Norwegian votes on Europe

Historical background: the 1972 votes

On matters of European integration, the driving axiom of Swiss policy was to be economically as close as possible to Europe, while falling short of any political commitment. Up to the 1980s, the so-called 'median strategy' ('between' adhesion and isolation) has allowed Switzerland to adapt 'globally and offensively', to use Katzenstein's terms. The signing of the free trade agreement on industrial goods in 1972 provided Swiss export oriented sectors a better access to the European market while, at the same time, leaving both the fundamental institutions – neutrality, federalism, and direct democracy – and the internally oriented sectors untouched.²⁰ Therefore, it is not surprising that all the peak associations, as well as the unions and most of the political parties, supported the free trade agreement. On December 3, 1972, the agreement was accepted by 72.5 per cent of the electorate, with a 52.9 per cent turnout.²¹

The situation was totally different in Norway, where the 1972 referendum was not on free trade, but on EC membership. After a heated campaign 53.5 per cent voted 'no' on a turnout of 79.2 percent. The outcome was widely interpreted as a victory of mass over elites (Hellevik and Gleditsch, 1973). The major parties, Labour and the Conservatives, a strong majority in the Storting, and the national organisations of labour and business campaigned in favour of membership against an ad hoc movement created by farmers, left wing labour unions, minor left wing

¹⁹ Based on various cantonal formations, the Swiss green party was created at the federal level in 1987. The interesting point is that it quickly took a clear left stance (Sciarini and Finger, 1991; Hug, 1994a, p. 68). In turn, the ecological issue was progressively integrated into Swiss politics, which contributed to a shift in the meaning of the left-right cleavage (Finger and Sciarini, 1991; Sciarini and Finger, 1991).

²⁰ For instance, agricultural products were not included in the free trade agreement (Sciarini, 1994, pp. 109-111).

²¹ According to the federal Constitution, a referendum was not required. Given the political importance of the agreement, the Swiss Parliament, however, decided to submit its approval to a popular vote.

parties, the agrarian Centre party, and youth organisations that were against membership. The 'no'-vote was strongest in the rural areas and in Northern Norway and reflected in general the traditional cleavage structure of Norwegian society and politics (Valen, 1973).

1992 and 1994: The referendum campaigns

Switzerland has a very long tradition of direct democracy. However, the EEA referendum campaign was marked by a level of political mobilisation hardly met before (Kriesi et al., 1993, pp. 6-22; Longchamp, 1993). According to survey data, a majority of Swiss citizens was ready to endorse the EEA agreement at the time of its signing, in May, 1991.²² In the autumn, the EEA Treaty gained wide support among the political elite: accepted by an overwhelming majority in the two Chambers of Parliament (62 percent of 'yes' in the National Council, 85 percent in the State Council),²³ it was also unanimously supported by the states (cantons) governments. Among the political parties, three out of the four governmental coalition parties recommended the 'yes': the Radical Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Socialist Party. Only the agrarian and right wing Swiss People's party rejected the Treaty. Other opponents were nationalist parties (the Swiss Democrats and the Freedom Party), and some cantonal sections of the Greens. As usual, the political parties played, however, a minor role in the referendum campaign,²⁴ which was actually led by ad hoc committees and economic associations.

Within the economy, the peak associations disagreed on the EEA issue. They opposed along the line of conflict presented above, i.e. according to their interest as domestic or external sectors of the economy. The EEA Treaty was supported by the business community active abroad – represented by the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry (the so-called 'Vorort') – and by the Trade Unions. Rep-

²² 55 percent in favour, 30 rather against, and 15 undecided (Kriesi et al. 1993, p. 13). Note, however, that citizens were little informed about the EEA and its expected effects at this time: only one third of the electorate considered itself to be sufficiently informed; this proportion increased during the campaign to two third of the voters (Kriesi et al. 1993, p. 8).

²³ While the Treaty was almost unanimously supported by the French-speaking deputies, the German speaking deputies were more divided (only 55 per cent of the German-speaking deputies in the National Council accepted the Treaty).

²⁴ This is not surprising, since Swiss parties and Parliament have remained silent in the European debate during the 1970s and 1980s (Saint-Ouen, 1989; Sciarini, 1991).

resenting mostly the domestic sectors, the Swiss Association of Small Businesses was divided on the issue: the national association accepted the Treaty with a short majority, but some cantonal members recommended the 'no'. Finally, the Swiss Farmers' Union rejected the EEA, even though agriculture was almost totally excluded from the Treaty.

In the 'no'-camp, ad hoc committees such as the powerful 'Action for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland' were very active. Starting their campaign very early, they immediately took a decisive lead and compelled the partisans to a defensive role. According to a quantitative analysis of newspaper ads, the opposition have dominated the supporters on practically all arguments (Schneider and Hess, 1995). Furthermore, they tried to dramatise the debate with emotional arguments on the loss of sovereignty and neutrality, the decline of direct democracy, the threat of massive immigration and the resulting rise of unemployment, the decrease of wages, and so on. The success of this strategy has been favoured by the sudden turns of Swiss government: having repeatedly claimed that the EEA was not a good agreement since it lacked codecision procedures, it finally endorsed it, but only as a first step toward full membership in the EU.²⁵ The opposition did not miss the opportunity to use the resulting confusion between EEA and EU membership to launch – especially in the German-speaking region – a fundamental debate on the future of the country and its main institutions. The rational-based arguments of the partisans emphasising the economic advantages of EEA-membership were of comparatively limited effectiveness. The task of EEA supporters was all the more difficult since the Swiss government surprisingly decided to submit the Treaty to a compulsory referendum, namely a referendum that must win with a double majority of voters and cantons.²⁶

²⁵ This was done by two Ministers in October 1991 in the post-signing press conference in Luxembourg and later accepted by the government as a whole. However, the point is of more general application since the opposition to the EEA were able to play back previous government criticisms of the EU as such.

²⁶ Most legal experts argued that, since the EEA was not a supranational entity, its ratification should be subject to the optional referendum, i.e. it should be submitted to a popular vote only if one is demanded by 50000 voters. In that case, it must win with a simple popular majority. Other experts argued that the EEA was a supranational body whose acceptance should be subject to the compulsory referendum. Irrespective of the Constitution, the Swiss government did not take a position on the legal debate, but decided that given the political importance of the issue, a compulsory referendum was required.

Divided on the issue, with two out of seven of the Ministers repeatedly expressing their doubts about the EEA, the Swiss government had in addition limited means of leading the information campaign. For instance, Parliament prevented it from using TV for its campaign. Lastly, the government could not use the threat to resign as a strategic weapon to increase its impact: since the referendum arena is independent from the electoral arena in Switzerland, sanctioning the government in a popular vote has no effect on its composition (Hug and Sciarini, 1995a).

Already a member of the EEA, Norway did not view full membership in the EU as an economic necessity.²⁷ Its decision to apply for membership was based on three reasons.²⁸ First, the vitalisation of the integration processes within the EC towards the end of the 1980s appealed to the pro-EU leadership in the Norwegian Labour government. Second, the breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe increased the viability of the realisation of Europe as an idea which could transcend the divides between power blocs. Third, Sweden decided to move away from the traditional policy of neutrality, and started to drift towards a pro-EU position. This shift was a relatively strong pro-EU signal to Norway as Sweden had historically been much more negative to formal European integration than Norway. Despite a widespread fear that the issue might divide the party as it did in 1972, the leadership of Labour, headed by prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, succeeded in persuading a large majority of party members to support the application for membership in the European Union. In the spring of 1994 the conditions for Norwegian membership were agreed on, and the Storting decided to hold an advisory referendum on the issue.²⁹

²⁷ It could, however, be noted that some Norwegian officials worried about the possible effects of trade and investment diversion as its Nordic neighbours moved toward membership. In addition, for some who were opposed to membership in the Union, EEA was used as an argument that Norway had the basic economic market access, so that it did not need the broader political Union; among those who were more strongly against integration, the EEA agreement signalled all the evils of the Union. All in all, however, the EEA was not a significant issue in the campaign. Accordingly, it does not show frequently in the open-ended questions (see below).

²⁸ This sketch is slightly modified from an analysis by Hjelseth, Jenssen and Listhaug (n.d.).

²⁹ It became clear very early that a 'no'-vote would mean that the pro-EU majority in the Storting would succumb to the will of the voters, while a narrow 'yes'-vote in the referendum most likely would be blocked by a large enough minority in the Storting, as 75 percent of the MPs had to vote for the Treaty.

The debate over membership was to a large extent a repeat of the arguments from 1972. Among the opposition a core argument was that joining the EU would weaken Norway's political independence and democratic constitution. A political union along the lines suggested by the Maastricht Treaty evoked memories of the extremely unpopular union with Sweden, which was terminated in 1905. In the primary sector membership in the EU was seen as a threat to interests of farming and fisheries. The arguments concerning fish were partly framed in a resource perspective, as those opposed argued that it was unlikely that Norway as a member state in the EU could continue to set the regime for how much could be harvested from the various stocks of fish in the Norwegian sea territories.³⁰ The resource and regime control arguments probably strengthened the 'no'-side among the publics not employed in the fisheries as this way of reasoning evoked sympathy among environmentalists and appealed to national interests.

One of the arguments that was raised most strongly on the 'yes'-side was that a rejection of membership would weaken Norway's position within the alliance as the co-operation between the EU and NATO had become more vital. If Norway decided to stay outside the EU the role of the country in NATO would also most likely be reduced. Still on the 'yes'-side, co-operation within the EU was seen as an extension of democracy beyond the borders of the nation-state. Among social democrats this development was seen as a way of at least potentially extending democratic control in areas where national democracy could not work.

Besides economic arguments, questions related to international alliances and concerns of democracy, a long list of topics were linked to the EU-issue. Arguments pertaining to religion, alcohol, and language were evoked as well. Those holding fundamentalist positions in this area argued against membership, while liberals were in favour. Welfare state issues formed another key area of controversy. Finally, gender and sector were important issues in the 'no'-campaign, since the EU was seen as a threat both to the interests of women and public employees.³¹

³⁰ The minister of fisheries argued that the EU had agreed to support the Norwegian policy regime in this area, but this did not have much impact on the coast.

³¹ There was an overlap between the two arguments, since the rise of female participation in the workforce has been concentrated in the public sector.

The political parties took relatively clear positions in the EU campaign. Labour strongly supported membership but, in a shift from 1972, the party leadership chose a soft strategy to convince voters and party members. The prime minister did not threaten to resign if the outcome went against the party line, as prime minister Bratteli had in 1972. The party rhetoric tried to picture the EU as an institution that could control international big business and strengthen public policy in areas where national instruments and regulations could not be effective, like in the environment. With respect to the welfare state, it argued that some of the EU countries had more generous welfare arrangements than Norway, and that it would be possible to maintain national standards of social policy. In general, Labour stressed the regulating and public policy powers of the EU more than the free market nature of the union. The opposite strategy was chosen by the other major party on the left, the Socialist Left party, which took a strong stand against membership and presented the EU as a threat to the welfare state and as an institution that expanded the influence of market principles and capitalist interests in all areas of society. A minority in the Labour party formed an organised faction within the party, Social Democrats against the EU (SME). This was quite extraordinary in a traditionally centralist party.

The Conservative party was the second major party in favour of membership. This party was, however, seriously weakened, following disastrous losses at the preceding elections. The rightist Progressive party was the third pro-EU party, although not very enthusiastically, since a sizeable faction in the party had the view that membership would lead to increased immigration and criticised the EU's sizeable bureaucracy and desire to regulate the behaviour of its citizens.³² The remaining parties were against membership. Among these, the agrarian Centre party, under the leadership of Anne Enger Lahnstein, was the dominant actor. In the Storting election of 1993 this party increased its vote share to 16.7 percent from 6.5 percent in 1989. It has been shown that the strong anti-EU position of the party contributed to its success at the election (Aardal, 1994). Based on its heydays of opposition to the union with Sweden and support for the peripheries, the leadership of the Liberal party opposed membership, but not with any deter-

³² Both the Conservative party and the Progressive party stressed the market principles and the necessity of co-operation among the democracies of Europe.

mination. Finally, the Christian People's party also urged its followers to vote 'no', although it was less principled in its opposition than the Centre party.

The interest organisations in the primary sector were strongly against membership, business organisations were in favour, while labour unions were either against or neutral on the issue. In a major shift from 1972, a narrow majority in the national congress of LO, the main national labour union, which is traditionally very strongly linked to Labour, voted 'no' to membership.

For almost the entire period that the EU question has been on the agenda in Norway, opinion polls have demonstrated that those opposing membership have been in the majority (Gleditsch and Hellevik, 1977; Bjørklund, 1994). It has also been shown that Norwegians have comparatively weak identifications with Europe (Huseby and Listhaug, 1995). The early substantial gap in favour of the 'no'-vote demonstrates the deep-seated opposition towards European integration in Norway.³³ A significant shift in opinion occurred only in early October, when the 'yes'-side increased its share. The strong movement towards a more even distribution of opinion presumably reflects the strong pressure from elites, most importantly by the government and the prime minister, to move citizens from a position of scepticism or neutrality on the issue toward a pro-EU stance.

Cleavages and the European votes: An Analysis of Survey Data

On December 6, 1992, the EEA Treaty was rejected by 50.3 percent of the voters and 16 cantons out of 23, on a very high – for Swiss standards – 78.3 percent turnout. Two years later, on November 28, 1994, 52.2 percent of the Norwegian voters rejected membership in the EU, with a record turnout (89 percent). Analyses based on survey data will help us to assess the role of cleavages in the referendum votes (tables 1 and 2).³⁴

³³ At the time of the Storting election nearly 60 percent opposed membership, slightly less than 25 percent were in favour, while the remaining 15 percent did not take a position on the issue. Towards the summer 1994 the proportion 'against' fell to a level slightly below 50 percent. The 'yes'-side was strengthened but only reached a level close to 30 percent, about equal to the proportion of DKs.

³⁴ In Switzerland, the interview data were collected by the GfS-Institut on a combination of random and quota sample. Full results are reported in Kriesi et al. (1993). The interview data for Norway were collected by the survey division of Statistics. Based on a national probability

Model 1 (Table 1) shows that the opposition to the EEA Treaty is strongest in eastern, southern and central parts of Switzerland and in rural areas.³⁵ A majority of support only exists in the western part of Switzerland and to a lesser extent in the cities. Thus, there is a huge gap between the western part of the country, strongly in favour of the EEA, and the rest of the country, strongly opposed. Since the west of the country mostly corresponds to the French-speaking part, this result actually mirrors a linguistic cleavage between French-speaking cantons, on the one side, and German and Italian cantons, on the other. As model 2 shows, the French-speaking voters heavily support the EEA agreement ('no'-vote 37 percent lower), whereas the Italian-speaking voters, together with the German-speaking voters (reference category), lean towards rejection. We can also see from model 2 that the opposition to the EEA is strong among farmers and to a lesser extent among skilled/unskilled workers. While the religious factor does not have any effect in the EEA vote, support for the Treaty is surprisingly higher among moderate left-wing voters than among centrist and right-wing voters, or among those having no party preference.

The full impact of traditional cleavages is estimated in model 3 (the variable south of Switzerland disappears, since it corresponds exactly to the Italian-speaking region). Taking into account both the territorial and linguistic variables simultaneously confirms that the strong support for the EEA in the western part of Switzerland is mainly due to the attitude of French-speaking voters. Even controlled for the effect of living in a city, the effect of being attached to the primary sector remains very strong ('no'-vote 30 percent higher). The inclusion of gender, age, education, sector of occupation and ecological orientation (model 4) does not change the impact of the old cleavages. Only two of these new cleavages are

sample, the survey was funded by a generous grant from the Ministry of Local Government and Labour. In both countries, the vote result was very close to fifty percent. Therefore, the respondents are divided into two groups of equal size on the dependent variable. The estimates of OLS regression in this case will not be very different from those obtained with logit or probit techniques. Since the dependent variable is coded 'yes' = 0, and voted 'no' = 1, and the independent variable are all dummies, the unstandardized regression coefficients can be interpreted directly as percent changes in the 'no'-vote.

³⁵ The rural-urban cleavage is represented in model 1 by a dummy variable that differentiates between voters living in cities of more than 10'000 inhabitants and voters living in rural areas. The other five dummies represent the different regions, using the Zurich area as the reference area.

significant: the 'no'-vote decreases with the level of education and is slightly higher among voters with ecological priorities.³⁶

Table 1: The impact of cleavages in Swiss politics in the 1992 referendum on the EEA Treaty (voting 'no'). Unstandardized regression coefficients (N=985).

Theoretical variable		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Constant	0.57**	0.51**	0.47**	0.41**	0.42**
Territorial cleavage	Living in urban area	-.12**		-.07	-.05	-.05
	North-West Switzerland ^a	0.09		0.11	0.15	0.14*
	Centre	0.06		0.12	0.13	0.12
	East	0.13*		0.13*	0.15*	0.14*
	South	0.19**				
Classical cleavages	West	-.19**				
	French-speaking ^b		-.37**	-.25**	-.25**	-.24**
	Italian-speaking		0.07	0.20*	0.20*	0.22*
	Catholics ^c		0.06	0.02	0.03	0.04
	Protestants		0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03
	Working in primary sector		0.32**	0.30**	0.29**	0.25**
	Skilled or unskilled worker		0.15**	0.15**	0.12**	0.13**
	Far left		-.18	-.12	-.12	-.10
	Moderate left		-.17**	-.16**	-.15**	-.13**
	Moderate right		-.02	0.00	0.02	.03
New cleavages	Far right		0.09	0.11	0.13	.15
	Gender (female)				-.01	-.01
	Born 1930-1945 ^d				0.05	0.02
	Born 1946-1960				0.09	0.07
	Born 1961 or later				0.09	0.05
	High school ^e				-.09*	-.09*
	University				-.15*	-.13*
	Employed in public sector				-.04	-.04
	Ecological orientation				0.08*	0.09*
	Socialist party ^f					-.10*
Party identification	Greens					0.06
	Christian Democratic party					-.08
	Radical Democratic party					-.12*
	Liberals/Independents					0.24**
	Agrarian					0.12*
	Extreme-right					0.33**
	Adjusted R ²	0.08	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.17

^a Reference category: living in Zurich; ^b Reference category: German-speaking
^c Reference category: no/other religion; ^d Reference category: born before 1930
^e Reference category: primary school; ^f Reference category: no/other party
** significant at 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level.

³⁶ We have constructed a dummy variable where 1 is the code for voters who chose among a battery of six items the ecological item as first priority ("priority of the society is ..." "to protect the environment against pollution and catastrophes").

Finally, the results with respect to partisanship (model 5) are, overall, in line with party recommendations. However, party identification is a consistent predictor of the vote for a limited number of parties, and increases only slightly the explained variance of the model.³⁷ The 'no'-vote is 10 and 12 percent lower among identifiers of the Socialist party and of the Radical Democratic party, 12 percent higher among supporters of the Swiss People's party, and up to 33 percent higher among partisans of extreme-right parties (Swiss Democrats and Freedom party).

In short, our findings highlight the significant impact of the linguistic, rural-urban, class, and education cleavages in the Swiss vote on the EEA,³⁸ thus underlining a combination of economic and cultural considerations. The study of the arguments that the voters give for their choice will help us to clarify the role of these various cleavages. But let us first turn to the analysis of the Norwegian vote (Table 2).

In Norway, starting again with the territorial cleavage, we can see from model 1 that living in an urban area reduces the probability of voting 'no' by 13 percent. The effect of the various regions look rather strange as they are all positive. But it should be kept in mind that the reference category is the Oslo-area, which was the only main region with a majority voting in favour of membership. The strongest effect is found for Northern Norway with a regression coefficient of .36, followed by Mid-Norway (Trøndelag), Western Norway, the South, and the Eastern interior. The urban-rural pattern in the vote was similar in Finland, Sweden, and

³⁷ This result is in line with earlier findings in this field (Trechsel and Kriesi, 1996): studies based on survey (Kriesi, 1994; Trechsel and Sciarini, 1998) or aggregate (Hug, 1994b) data show that the impact of party recommendations on the electoral behaviour at referendums is rather limited. The main reason for this is the high fragmentation and the structural weakness of the Swiss party system; dependent on economic groups for the financing of referendum campaigns, the political parties usually have a low profile in this phase of the political process. On the other hand, recent analyses based on aggregate data underlines the impact of parliamentary consensus on the destiny of the legislative acts in the plebiscitary phase – submitted to a vote or not, subsequently accepted or not (Sciarini and Trechsel, 1996; Trechsel and Sciarini, 1998).

³⁸ Overall, these results fit analyses based on aggregate data at the commune level (Hug, Kummer and Vatter, 1993; Vatter 1994) that also stress the considerable impact of the linguistic factor, which alone explains 70 percent of the variance of the vote; in a multivariate analysis including all relevant variables, the linguistic factor has an impact on the outcome of the vote which is six times higher than that of the second factor.

Norway, although the balance between 'no' and 'yes' was different.³⁹ The results of model 2 are in line with predictions and show that almost all cleavages were active in influencing the referendum vote. The one exception is the working class cleavage which shows a zero impact on the vote. Affiliations with the three counter cultures all increase the likelihood for voting 'no'. The same is true for occupations in the primary sector (farmers and fishermen), which increases the probability of voting 'no' by 34 percent. While structural class location does not influence the vote, ideological left-right self-identification is heavily related to voting 'yes' or 'no'. Here, we note a somewhat asymmetrical effect, as a position on the right strongly reduces the probability for voting 'no', while a position on the left is only weakly related to a vote against membership.

Model 3 makes it possible to sort out the prior regional effects when we similarly control for both class structure and cultural structure. The statistical overlap between these sets of variables leads to a reduction in the impact of most of the variables in the fuller model. Living in the South does not show a statistically significant disposition to vote 'no' in this model, although the coefficient has a positive sign. The addition of new cleavages does not change the impact of the old cleavages (model 4). The youngest voters (born in 1961 and later) are more likely to vote 'no' than voters in the oldest generation (born before 1930). Women have a 9 percent higher probability of voting 'no', and public sector employees show a 7 percent higher probability in favour of a 'no'-vote. Persons with higher education are more likely to vote 'yes'. A positive ecological orientation goes with a 10 percent higher probability of voting 'no'.⁴⁰

³⁹ In Norway 14 of the 19 counties showed majorities for 'no' (Moses and Jenssen, 1995). A more detailed examination based on data from the communes are presented in Pettersen, Jenssen, and Listhaug (1996).

⁴⁰ We have constructed an index for ecological orientation. This is included in model 4 as a dummy variable where 1 is the code for voters who say that they strongly agree that Norway should not lower its environmental standards and that they strongly support a society that is friendly towards the environment even if this leads to low or zero economic growth.

Table 2: The impact of cleavages in Norwegian politics in the 1994 referendum on EU-membership (voting 'no'). Unstandardized regression coefficients (N=2427)

Theoretical variable	Empirical variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Constant	0.45**	0.52**	0.46**	0.37**	0.48**
Territorial cleavage	Living in urban area	-.13**		-.07**	-.07**	-.07**
	Northern Norway ^a	0.36**		0.30**	0.28**	0.24**
	Mid-Norway (Trøndelag)	0.20**		0.19**	0.18**	0.16**
Classical cleavages	Western Norway	0.16**		0.08**	0.08**	0.06*
	Southern Norway (Agder)	0.14**		0.08	0.08	0.06
	Eastern interior	0.13**		0.10**	0.10**	0.07**
	Teetotaler		0.19**	0.17**	0.17**	0.11**
	Writing in nynorsk language		0.14**	0.13**	0.13**	0.09**
	Member of religious organ.		0.12**	0.14**	0.13**	0.08**
	Working in primary sector		0.34**	0.28**	0.32**	0.17**
	Skilled or unskilled worker		-.00	-.00	0.01	0.03
	Far left		0.15*	0.12*	0.13*	0.10
	Moderate left		0.02	0.02	0.01	0.04
New cleavages	Moderate right		-.23**	-.21**	-.19**	-.13**
	Far right		-.36**	-.33**	-.31**	-.18**
	Gender (female)				0.09**	0.08**
	Born 1930-1945 ^b				-.00	0.00
	Born 1946-1960				0.02	-.01
	Born 1961 or later				0.10**	0.04
	High school ^c				-.09*	-.09*
	College, University				-.09**	-.11**
	Employed in public sector				0.07**	0.05*
	Ecological orientation				0.10**	0.06*
Party identification	Socialist Left party ^d					0.19**
	Labour party					-.25**
	Liberal party					-.06
	Centre party					0.30**
	Christian People's party					0.21**
	Conservative party					-.27**
	Progressive party					-.07
	Adjusted R ²	0.07	0.14	0.18	0.21	0.30

^a Reference category: living in Oslo, Akershus, Vestfold or Østfold (The Oslo-area)
^b Reference category: born before 1930
^c Reference category: primary school and additional education up to 11 years
^d Reference category: no party-identification
** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level.

The inclusion of party identification (model 5) increases the explained variance strongly. With the exception of the Liberals, the sign of the coefficients is consis-

tent with the position that the party took on the issue.⁴¹ The effect of identification with Conservatives is minus 27 and with Labour minus 25, showing that opposition to EU membership within the Labour did not appeal to the party's supporters. Among those who identify with the Centre party, the Christian People's party and the Socialist Left party a strong effect in favour of 'no' is observed. Thus, in sharp contrast with the Swiss case, party identification proves to be a strong and consistent predictor of the referendum vote in Norway.

According to our empirical results, the centre-periphery, rural-urban, counter-cultures, and the left-right cleavages, as well as partisanship, had a significant impact on the referendum vote in Norway. As it did in 1972, the EU-issue in 1994 revitalised the otherwise declining cleavages in Norwegian politics (Pettersen, Jenssen and Listhaug, 1996; Sogner and Archer, 1995).

The 'Yes' and 'No' Arguments

To further elaborate on factors that determined the voters' decision, we present in tables 3 and 4 (for Switzerland) and in tables 5 and 6 (for Norway) the arguments that the voters give for their choice. The classification is based on answers to an open ended question.

Table 3 shows that various arguments were invoked by the 'no'-side in Switzerland. While sovereignty and related issues were the most frequent arguments, criticism of the EU, fear of foreigners and more general reasons such as preference for the status quo were also significant. This wide category of arguments of the political culture, which enters for half of the arguments on the 'no'-side, mirrors a defence of Swiss traditions (Kriesi et al., 1993, p. 44), i.e. the fear that integration into the EEA would threaten the very existence of traditional Switzerland. A second category of arguments is oriented towards economic factors (economic policy, employment, agriculture). Some voters also mentioned the lack

⁴¹ The leadership of the Liberal party, although somewhat more coherent in its opposition to membership this time than in 1972, did not meet with success among its rank and file as their voters leaned more in the direction of 'yes' than 'no', although the effect does not reach statistical significance. It is also noteworthy to observe that the supporters of the Progressive party do not vote 'yes' in a statistically significant way. The existence of two wings of the party, a liberal, free market, faction, and a populist, partly nationalist and anti-immigration faction, made it difficult to take a strong position on the issue, which is reflected in the regression coefficient for the Progressive identifiers.

of information or the unclear message given by the Swiss government as a reason to reject the Treaty.⁴²

Table 3: Arguments given for voting 'No' to Swiss membership in the European Economic Area. Percent of all arguments given

Sovereignty, democracy, absence of codecision	16
Criticism of the EU and the EU system	12
Fear of foreigners/border control	8
Too fast, too early	6
We know what we have, but....	4
EEA automatically leads to EU membership	3
Economic Policy	13
Employment	9
Agriculture	3
Lack of information, government not clear	11
Environmental concerns	3
Other No-arguments	12

In the 'yes'-camp (table 4), economic arguments are at first glance decisive: economic policy and advantages related to the four freedoms are mentioned by one third of the voters. Including the arguments close to the political culture leads, however, to a more balanced conclusion. In fact, quantitatively, this second category is even larger than the first one. Altogether, arguments regarding the fear of isolation, the willingness to open the country to the outside world or to prepare the country's future enter for more than half of the 'yes'-arguments. Thus, cultural grounds have been decisive on the 'yes'-side, too.

Beyond economic considerations, two antagonistic conceptions of the country and its future, i.e. two different definitions of Swiss identity, clashed on December 6, 1992 (Kriesi et al., 1993, p. 47; Vatter, 1994, p. 37). While supporters of the EEA wanted to promote an open Switzerland, the opposition wanted to defend the traditional Switzerland that stands for its myths and venerates the courage of remaining alone. This result confirms the strengthening of a new cleavage that divides the Swiss electorate along a dimension of the desired level of open-

⁴² An analysis of letters to the editors underlines the widespread mistrust in the government in the 'no'-camp (De Martino and Pasquier, 1995).

ness versus closedness of the country. First identified in the analysis of the structural and cultural cleavages of Swiss politics that emerged on national referendums during the eighties on issues relating to the army, labour and foreigners (Sardi and Widmer, 1993), this conflict seems particularly salient in referendums on foreign policy (Sciarini, 1996b), as the popular vote against the creation of a Swiss blue helmets corps recently showed (Wernli et al., 1994).

Table 4: Arguments given for voting 'Yes' to Swiss membership in the European Economic Area. Percent of all arguments given

Economic Policy, four freedoms	27
Employment	6
Fear of isolation, impossible to remain outside	22
Participation, co-operation, openness	21
For the youth, its future	9
Against the nationalist 'no'	2
First step toward EU membership	1
Other Yes-arguments	12

Table 5: Arguments given for voting 'No' to Norwegian membership in the European Union. Percent of all arguments given⁴³

Sovereignty, democracy	26
Criticism of the EU and the EU system	12
Language, religion, alcohol	3
Border control, drugs, etc.	3
Know what we have, but....	3
Economic policy	10
Employment	7
Agriculture	7
Fisheries, fish quotas	5
Regional policy	4
Welfare state, pensions, etc.	3
Environmental concerns	7
Other No-arguments	10

⁴³ The classification was made by Anders Todal Jenssen from an open ended question in the interviews.

In Norway, we also find the two broad categories of arguments described above for Switzerland, namely political culture-driven arguments, on the one side, and economic arguments, on the other. Entering in the former, the most prevalent argument given among those voting 'no' is related to Norwegian sovereignty and democracy (chosen by about one fourth, Table 5). These voters saw EU-membership as reducing the impact of national democratic institutions. Criticism of the EU and the EU-system, counter-culture issues or border control are other expressions of this political culture-driven opposition. The second (economic) category of arguments contains issues related to economic policy, employment, agriculture and fisheries. A third category of 'no'-arguments is more closely related to specific Norwegian issues (regional policy, welfare state).

Again, on the 'yes'-side support for membership is driven by cultural and economic motives (Table 6). Participation and co-operation with other European countries, fear of isolation if Norway did not join, cultural integration and the creation of a United States of Europe represent about 40 percent of the arguments given. Support of the market principles of the EU and employment are mentioned by more than one fourth of the electorate. Defence and security issues were also significant in the eyes of voters. Finally, it is noteworthy that concern for the environment was of equal importance on the two sides. It was mentioned by 7 percent for 'no' and 6 percent for 'yes'.

Table 6: Arguments given for voting 'Yes' to Norwegian membership in the European Union. Percent of all arguments given

Participation, co-operation	21
Fear of isolation	10
Cultural integration	7
For a United States of Europe	2
Economic Policy, four freedoms	22
Employment	5
Defence, security	17
Environmental concerns	6
Cheaper food	3
Cut in subsidies to farming and fisheries	1
Other Yes-arguments	6

IV. Conclusion

In this article, we have tried to compare the factors that shaped the Swiss and Norwegian European policies. We argued that Katzenstein's framework fails to take into account important factors that influence the flexibility of the small European states. The bottom-line is that European integration, as a central dimension of the process of globalisation, is associated with new kinds of challenges that Katzenstein's framework is unable to capture. First, we showed that integration into the single European market threatened Switzerland's and Norway's dual economic policy. Second, the European referendums revitalised old cleavages in Norwegian and Swiss politics. According to Katzenstein (1984, p. 131, 1985), the economic and political success of the small European states lies in their capacity to combine economic flexibility with political stability. Switzerland's and Norway's difficulty in responding to the deepening of the European integration process suggests, however, that political stability may turn into political rigidity. Among other factors, direct democratic institutions, which Katzenstein did not include in his framework, can prove to have a crucial impact on the small states' 'flexibility'.

The Norwegian and Swiss referendums on Europe provide a case in hand in this respect. Here, we found some differences but also some strong similarities between the two votes. The two countries most clearly differ on the role of partisanship and the impact of left-right ideological orientation. While the Norwegian vote provides a clear support for those who argue that parties play a decisive role in shaping the voter's decision in referendums on Europe (Franklin et al. 1994, 1995; Hug and Sciarini 1995b; Pierce, Valen and Listhaug, 1983),⁴⁴ those who claim that parties are sidelined in European referendums (e.g. Bogdanor, 1994) will find some empirical support for their argument in the Swiss vote.

The left-oriented voters were the most fervent supporters of the EEA in Switzerland, whereas voters with centre and right-wing ideological orientations (or supporters of centre and right-wing parties), mostly chose 'no'. In Norway a per-

⁴⁴ Note that, according to Franklin and his colleagues, the influence of partisanship in European votes has little to do with Europe: they claim that these votes are mainly "second order elections", i.e. that they should be viewed in terms of domestic standing of the government that is asking for support.

fectly opposite pattern prevails. If one assumes that the EU project is mostly liberal in nature, or at least that liberalisation and deregulation have been the prominent policy achievement so far (Traxler and Schmitter, 1995, p. 210), the natural supporters of European integration should be located on the right side of the political spectrum. This is what can be observed in Norway. For instance, the Conservatives took a clear stance in favour of membership and were followed by their identifiers. This interpretation, however, raises two questions: First, how can we explain that in Switzerland and Norway the Social Democratic parties have been among the strongest promoters of EEA/EU membership? Second, how can we explain that Swiss supporters of right-wing parties or voters with rightist ideological orientation voted against the EEA Treaty? The response to the first question lies presumably in the fact that the EU construction can not be reduced to a liberal programme in economic terms, but is also an institution that promotes other kinds of liberal values like the free movement of people, individual and democratic rights, and so on. Furthermore, the EU is also interested in promoting values that seem attractive for the left, for instance in the field of the cohesion, structural and regional policies. As we mentioned before, the Norwegian Labour party tried to downplay the free-market nature of the EU in favour of the EU as a vehicle of regulation and control in domains where national governments and state were ineffective (multinationals, environment).⁴⁵ In Switzerland, the task was even easier for the left, since taking part in the EEA was expected to produce improvements of the social policy (defence of workers, social insurance, equality between sexes, etc.).

As for the second question, one reason why Swiss right-wing citizens voted 'no' to the EEA could be that, as was stressed in the second section, Switzerland is actually a model of selective liberalism, with many domestic sectors feeling threatened by integration into the EEA. Another, in our view more convincing, reason lies in the fact that economic factors were less relevant in the voters' decision than factors related to political culture, and more especially the defence of traditions and national sovereignty. This interpretation found strong empirical

⁴⁵ The fact that individuals with a centre-left ideology and those employed in the public sector voted against membership demonstrates, however, that the Labour leadership did not fully succeed in linking the European Union to a social democratic programme among some of its core support groups.

support in the arguments given by voters for their choice and in the impact of cultural cleavages on the voters' decision, in both Switzerland and Norway.

Thus, the centre-periphery cleavage and its several cultural underpinnings had a significant impact on the referendum vote in Norway. The resistance of the traditional minorities can be interpreted as a fear felt by these groups that European integration would strengthen the processes of cultural standardisation and secularisation and weaken minority cultures. In Switzerland, a somewhat similar conflict along cultural lines (the linguistic cleavage) was also the most striking cleavage in the EEA vote, although it can not be assimilated to a centre-periphery conflict. Here, it is the French-speaking minority that favoured European integration, while both the German-speaking majority – and more especially the small rural cantons – and the Italian-speaking minority rejected it. Differences between the linguistic communities are, of course, not simply linked to the use of a particular language, but are rooted in the culture that this language mirrors. More specifically, the linguistic regions hold strongly opposing views on the openness versus closedness dimension. It is commonly assumed that the European issue heavily contributes to the strengthening of the linguistic cleavage and is responsible for the current crisis of Swiss identity (Sciarini, Hug and Dupont, 1997).⁴⁶

In other words, both the Swiss and the Norwegian cases show that if joining the EU – be it through full membership or through membership in the EEA – is not perceived as an economic necessity, cultural and political factors may have a decisive impact. In such a case, voters tend to prefer the country to defend its specificity and traditions, and opt out of the European integration process. The positive Norwegian economic situation, together with the fact that it was already a member of the EEA, made it seem less necessary than in other Scandinavian countries to give up national independence, which in turn has a much higher status in Norway because of its long history of foreign occupation (Janh and Storsved, 1995, p. 33). The same could be said about Switzerland's secular tradition of neutrality and fight for independence. Given this similar profile towards European

⁴⁶ According to opinion polls, French-speaking citizens have felt more European than German-speaking citizens for several years (Kriesi et al. 1993, p. 11), and priority towards the European integration has been significantly higher among the former (Widmer and Buri, 1992, p. 367). One reason for this could be, in the German-speaking community, the fear of Germany, as well as the willingness to avoid losing leadership on Switzerland. The French-speaking community, conversely, could conceive of Europe as a way to "free" itself from the German-speaking cantons domination.

integration, Switzerland and Norway do not appear as single cases but, rather, as a unique pair, regardless of the relations that they may have with each other.

This does not, however, mean, that the EU is no longer an issue in Swiss and Norwegian politics. The reverse is true in Switzerland, where European integration has become a central – maybe the central – political issue. After the rejection of the EEA agreement the Swiss-EU talks were relaunched on a bilateral basis. Negotiations come up against two issues that were among the most controversial in the EEA talks: free movement of people and transport. Assuming that an agreement will be reached by the beginning of 1997, it will possibly have to overcome the hurdle of the popular vote: those who opposed the EEA have warned that they will call for a referendum against any agreement leading to free movement of people. Furthermore, three popular initiatives on EU matters are pending, the latest asking for full membership in the EU. However, given the polarisation of attitudes caused by the EEA vote and the specific constitutional provision that applies for a vote on EU membership (both the majority of the people and the cantons are required) there is little prospect for a 'yes'-vote in the next few years.

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Unemployment in Europe

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Political Economy of European Welfare
States*

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Firm*

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New Social Contract: Some Sceptical
Remarks*

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Conference Report

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The Swiss and Norwegian No to Europe



