NOTE ON DIASPORA POLICIES AND THE ROLE OF MUSLIM STATES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ISLAM IN IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES

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CARIM

The Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) was created at the European University Institute (EUI, Florence), in February 2004 and co-financed by the European Commission, DG AidCo, currently under the Thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum.

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All are studied as origin, transit and immigration countries. External experts from the European Union and countries of the Region also contribute to CARIM activities.

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The activities of CARIM cover three aspects of international migration in the Region: economic and demographic, legal, and socio-political.

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Introduction

There are many ‘diplomacies of international migrations’ between migrant countries and immigration States: bilateral and multilateral agreements over migration flows and overall returns and repatriations, in exchange for policies of development and reinsertion or for residence cards for the elites. There is also diplomatic influence among emigration countries through citizenship rights towards their nationals across several generations, the links with Diasporas abroad and the presence of departure countries in immigration countries through cultural or religious associations dedicated to migrants. Then there is the game of double citizenship. When emigrants have acquired double citizenship, these Diaspora policies can be fruitful in negotiating allegiances, influence and intrusions thanks to the migrants’ vote. There is, at the very least, the impact of emigration countries thanks to the management of the cultural or linguistic life of their communities. It is a tool of cohesion at a distance and sometimes of the renationalisation of transnational Diasporas. This attention paid by countries of origin towards their nationals in order to get a presence abroad in strong immigration countries is not, unlike in the past, a means to control their migrants’ political behaviour towards origin countries. This strategy of attention to gain diplomatic advantages in welcome countries is rather new. But this new trend may also have an impact on the integration of their emigrants in Europe.

Diaspora policies, an overview

For many years, countries of departure did not focus on emigration because they considered that emigration was an opportunity to get rid of political opposition, unemployment and any demographic surplus. Many migrants were considered to be traitors. They were controlled by the security services of origin countries as potential activists against these countries. The former Amicale des Algériens en Europe was the thirteenth wilaya (an administrative territorial unit), while Morocco controlled its nationals through the Amicale des Travailleurs et Artisans Marocains and many other emigration countries did the same. But, in the last twenty years, most departure countries have realised that their population should be a resource when abroad, economically (remittances), demographically (because of the importance of the young in the demographic profile of many immigration states, which also meet shortages of labour force), diplomatically (‘ambassadors’ of the country of origin in welcome countries useful for negotiating important claims), culturally (diffusion of religion, language and culture), and politically (through the vote in countries of departure and of settlement thanks to double citizenship, based on jus sanguinis in departure countries and jus soli for second generations in welcome countries). The community of migrants managed by countries of origin through transnational networks is maintained with strong links which sometimes define a ‘migration system’ of mobility: a complex supply and demand for migration defined by historical, geographical, family, colonial and language links.

The diaspora policies of emigration countries include the freedom of exit granted by countries of origin, while, during the 1970s and 1980s, it was severely controlled in some authoritarian states like Portugal (where most exits were illegal), many sub Saharan countries and all communist countries. There are also the policies of citizenship based on jus sanguinis, even after several generations of absence abroad: this is true of Muslim countries, Italy which undertook a representation of Italians abroad, and allowed them to keep or recover Italian citizenship thanks to jus sanguinis following on from the law of 1912, and Japan with its nikkeijins (returnees who do not have however the full access to citizenship). There is the vote of emigrants in national elections in their emigration countries: both Italy and Mexico since 2005. Then there is the acceptance of voting rights in immigration countries thanks to jus soli: an important issue in the United States. And, of course, there is the support of associations, subsidies for religion and cultural and linguistic learning. These policies of ‘nations at distance’ led by emigration countries is now an issue even in weak countries like the Philippines or Eritrea where diasporas offer a presence abroad.
The role of Muslim States in the management of Islam in immigration countries

We will focus here on the role of Muslim States in the management of religious affairs and its impact on the integration of immigrants in Europe. Since the 1990s, this role was thought to bring external and uncontrolled religious forms to secularised States and the support of Muslim States for the practice of Islam among their nationals was checked and curtailed by European Home Ministries. It was considered, indeed, a negative influence, ushering in ‘traditional’ behaviour contrary to universal principles such as male-female equality at school and in marriage. Moreover, the visibility of mosques, Muslim booksellers, foulards, hallal meat markets and Muslim corners in European cemeteries, in part subsidised by these States were viewed as an attempt against European and national identities. But Muslim countries have also been challenged by Islamic terrorism, fundamentalism and extremism and they have had to regulate, when they were able to do so, the management of the Islamic practice of their nationals inside and outside their homelands. Many sociologists have argued that this form of management, along with councils of representation and dialogue on Islam in welcome countries might actually have a positive impact on the recognition of Islam in secularised countries where there is an immigrant component. During the years 1990-2000, many European countries of immigration such as France, Belgium and Germany have had settled structures of dialogue with Islam in order to negotiate the practice of Islam: for example, the CORIF (Conseil d’orientation sur l’Islam en France created by Pierre Joxe, Home Minister in 1989) and then the CFCM (Conseil français du culte musulman, created by Nicolas Sarkozy, Home Minister in 2002). These structures do not represent Islam in all its diversity in welcome countries, due to the difficulty of giving equality of representation to all versions of Islam: some of them may have weak or wealthy supports from Gulf countries, for example. But they give legitimacy to Muslim claims such as the organisation of the market in hallal meat, the conflicts of law in, for example, rejecting woman and child care, Muslim corners in cemeteries, the big mosque-cathedrals (with or without towers) offering a religious site to several tendencies and nationalities away from uncontrolled prayer rooms in cellars and garages. They also oblige the biggest Muslim associations to negotiate with secularised institutions. In France, the rector of the Mosque of Paris, respectful of republican rules and long considered the natural interlocutor with the Home Ministry is representative of such a dialogue, like many other imams in big towns. These respect too the will of origin countries which also want to control Islamic deviance through the management of Muslim associations.

Turkey, while a secularised State, is an example of a country which tries to control religious organisations where Turkish immigrants are settled. The Turkish presence in Europe is the biggest non-European Diaspora, with over 3 million Turks, followed next by Moroccans. Its management of Islam through the Diyanet allows Turkey to be present in the Islamic debate in western countries and to preserve Turkish identity. This policy is present in Central Asia as well. There were few relations between these two regions before 1992. The integration of the religious factor as part of the identity of the new Muslim republics of the former USSR (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan), who speak a Turkish language (except, that is, for Tadjikistan), has allowed Turkey to lead a religious policy thanks to the pragmatic construction of an Islamic policy for export. In each Turkish embassy of Central Asia, an attaché for religious affairs facilitates the subsidised training of imams and the construction or reconstruction of mosques, even though central Asia is not a priority for Turkey. In western European countries, Turkey has an official policy of organising cultural practice, thanks to the Diyanet which is headed by the ministry in charge of religion. The Diyanet controls Muslim Turkish associations all over Europe and helps migrants with the organisation of religious feasts and practices, the teaching of Islam to children, the training of imams and dialogue with public institutions in immigration countries. It proposes an Islamic practice compatible with secularised European countries, but also an identification of Islam with Turkey.

This Diaspora policy uses the Turkish Diaspora as a tool of influence of Turkey in European countries through transnational links and the recent acceptance of double citizenship between Turkey and Germany. So, the Turkish Prime Minister delivered in Cologne, two years ago, a speech to second
generation Turks living there, stressing Turkish identity through Islam and the secularisation of the State. These Turkish-Germans vote in Germany and in Turkey. The Turkish in Europe are used as a lobby for Turkey’s application to the European Union and for the Europeanization of Turkey.

Another Diaspora policy for the organisation of Islamic associations is carried out by Morocco for the second, two-million strong, non-European Diaspora in Europe. The king of Morocco, as ‘Commander of the Faithful’ holds authority over all nationals who have a perpetual allegiance to Morocco, whatever their other citizenship. In France, Morocco controls the FNMF (Fédération nationale des Musulmans de France), which is the second federation of Muslim associations after the UOIF (Union des Organisations de l’Islam en France, a federation of over 190 Muslim associations controlled by Saudi Arabia). This support means subsidies for Muslim initiatives (building mosques, associations, dialogue on religious practices which may be in conflict with secularism). It led in 1989 to a speech of the king of Morocco Hassan II on the French TV during the first foulard affair where the king recommended forms of behaviour at school compatible with a secularised country.

Algeria is also very influential in France through the Algerian government’s influence over the Great Mosque of Paris, built in 1926 to thank the colonial troops who took the fort of Douaumont during the First World War. The present rector of the Paris Mosque, Dr. Dalil Boubaker is a double national who has been appointed by Algeria. He is the son of the first rector who was successively appointed by France in colonial times and then by Algeria after the independence of Algeria. Due to the number of Algerians in France – 600 000 foreign nationals and second and third generations – the Mosque of Paris cannot be ignored by French institutions. It represents a moderate trend, adapted to a diversified Islamic practice in Paris, open to many nationalities and France’s almost 7 million Muslims.

Conclusion: Positive inputs

In the last twenty years, Islam has become an important religion in many western European countries, due to immigration. In France it is the second religion after Catholicism, far ahead, numerically, of Protestantism and Judaism. According to all field studies and research polls, most second and third generation Muslims claim to be nationals of their welcome countries while being, at the same time, Muslim. They do not practice their religion in secret. They want to be openly recognised as Muslims in France, Germany, in the United Kingdom, in Italy and in Spain. Islamophobia is a crucial obstacle to integration because it means misunderstandings about integration between new nationals who consider that they are true nationals and another part of the population which consider them to be unlike the others particularly because they are Muslims. In Switzerland, the referendum of 2009 disallowing minarets on Swiss soil has been considered to have had a negative impact on the economic and cultural background in a country which attracts rich Muslim tourists and businessmen and has a 30% foreign population.

The place of Islam as a religion like others in European countries may give more legitimacy and more openness for immigration States threatened by intolerance and extreme rightist political parties. It may lead to a banalisation of Islam, particularly as it brings about dialogue with departure countries who wish to keep their nationals away from Islamism and terrorism. In the past, the influence of emigration countries may have been considered as an intrusion in the public affairs of secularised countries. Now it can be considered as a tool to build bridges, dialogue and recognition.