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Regional Bases of Party Politics:
A Measure and Its Implications for
the Study of Party System Consolidation
in New Democracies

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Political parties vary not only in their electoral strength and stability of their support bases, but also in how territorially uneven these bases are. Indeed, more or less significant regional effects in party support have been detected in most countries of the world.¹ The major purpose of this study is to construct a new numerical indicator of what may be called 'party system regionalization'. In the first section of the analysis, we will discuss the existing measures. It will be demonstrated that these measures are not fully appropriate for the purposes of cross-national research, which justifies our attempt to develop an alternative indicator. To test the implications of the proposed measure, we will use it to examine the dynamics of party system regionalization in eight countries that have experienced or are experiencing transitions to democracy – Austria, Bolivia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Venezuela. In the course of this inquiry, we will systematically relate the observed levels of party system regionalization to the dynamics of another party system property, fragmentation. Thus in the subsequent sections of the analysis, the use of the proposed indicator will allow us to address a well-recognized theoretical issue in the comparative study of party systems. The issue is whether the rise of 'national', not 'regional', political parties can be associated with party system consolidation. Richard Rose and Derek Urwin plausibly hypothesized that party system development involves trends towards less regional differentiation in party support.² At the same time, excessive fragmentation is often viewed as an important property of unconsolidated party systems.³ Hence it can be expected, first, that party system regionalization is associated with party system concentration, and second, that party systems become less regionalized as they consolidate. These theoretical expectations may or may not be correct if applied to the well-established democracies. Apparently, recent developments in several western countries brought about increased levels of regionalism and fragmentation in party politics. For the study of new democracies, however, the intuitive appeals of these hypotheses remain largely intact, which justifies testing them by analyzing empirical evidence generated by the application of the new measure. In our conclusion, the results of statistical analysis will be reported alongside with several findings derived from the qualitative case studies.

The Problems of Measurement

Measurement is essential for expressing differences among party system formats in a compact numerical form. Not surprisingly, there were several attempts to develop an index expressing territorial dispersion in party support. The earliest of these attempts can be found in the pioneering work of Rose and Urwin. They employ several different measures of dispersion in party vote.⁴ One of them is simply the standard deviation of the vote for the given party in each region from the mean share of the vote received by the party in all regions, that is, from the

'regional mean', as it will be further referred to. The second measure, labeled 'the Index of Variation', is the mean deviation. It can be obtained by subtracting a party's percentage vote in each region from its regional mean, summing the absolute differences, and dividing by the number of regions. Both indices are calculated in percentages. The third index, that of 'Cumulative Regional Inequality', is obtained by subtracting the absolute share of a party's national vote that it obtains in each region from the absolute share of the voting population found in that region, summing the absolute differences, and dividing by two.

Each of the proposed measures, however, is biased. Because the standard deviation and the Index of Variation are computed from deviations from the party's mean vote, small parties with low overall levels of support are likely to record only small deviations in most regions.⁵ Therefore, the indices attribute low levels of regionalization to purely regional but very small parties. Yet another disadvantage is that they attribute higher values to those parties which operate in countries consisting of small numbers of regions. In fact, it is not altogether clear why Rose and Urwin chose to employ two measures so closely related to each other; the high level of correlation between their values suggests that either of them would suffice. Both measures are non-standardized and they do not have upper limits. The Cumulative Index of Inequality, which runs from zero to one, lacks such a shortcoming. This measure, however, gives too much weight to differences in the sizes of the regions. Consider a hypothetical party operating in a country that consists of three regions. One of them comprises 70 per cent of the population, another 20 per cent, and the third – 10 per cent. If the party receives corresponding shares of the vote in each of the regions, the Cumulative Index of Inequality describes it as a purely national party. Intuitively, however, we would rather describe it as a party with a strong support base in the largest region.

The 'variability coefficient' employed by Svante Ersson, Kenneth Janda, and Jan-Erik Lane can be obtained by dividing the standard deviation by the regional mean.⁶ The obvious purpose of this operation is to produce an index adjusted for the variation in individual party sizes, and it cannot be denied that the values of the index published by the authors are much more plausible than those yielded by unadjusted standard deviation. However, the index yields larger values for those parties that operate in countries consisting of large numbers of regions. Additionally, as a measure of territorial concentration in party support, the proposed measure has a shortcoming of being a non-bounded index. As a result, its values are widely dispersed. In the selection of cases provided by the authors, they run from 0.104 to 3.484 without any theoretically set upper limit whatsoever. This allows employing variability coefficient as an individual-level

measure, but it is scarcely possible to develop a system-level measure on this basis.

Table 1 gives the values of the three indices discussed above for four hypothetical parties. All of them receive all of their support in one region only. For any practical reason, they are purely – and equally – regional parties. Parties A and B operate in countries consisting of five regions each, C and D – in countries consisting of ten regions each. Parties A and C receive 50 per cent of the vote in the regions of their prominence, while B and D – just 10 per cent. None of the indices produces intuitively correct – that is, maximal and equal – values. Relative sizes of the regions are not taken into account, which makes it impossible to illustrate the Index of Cumulative Regional Inequality. But from the example given above, it can be inferred that this index also has undesirable properties. It can be concluded that none of the existing measures can be safely used in cross-national research on party systems.

Table 1. The values of different indices of regionalization for four hypothetical cases

	Standard deviation	Index of variation	Variability coefficient
A	22.4	16.0	2.2
B	4.5	3.2	2.2
C	15.8	9.0	3.2
D	3.2	1.8	3.2

The indices observed above share an important property – they all employ the concept of deviation, defined in this or that way, as their core expressions. Indeed, there is no other way to measure distinctiveness of any kind but to examine to what extent the observed set of values deviates from our norm or expectation. In case of regionalization, the ‘norm’ is obviously the regional mean of the vote cast for the given party. As we have seen, the major problem with measuring this property is that to serve its purpose, any proposed index has to be adjusted both to the size of individual parties and to the number of regions. Then it cannot avoid a “multi-storey” form. But exactly for this reason, the core expression must be very simple, a condition better satisfied by the sum of absolute deviations from the regional mean, rather than by standard deviation. Thus, for any individual party, the core of the regionalization coefficient can be obtained by subtracting the party’s absolute share of the vote in each region (r_i) from its regional mean (r_n), summing the absolute differences, and dividing by two to eliminate double counting: $\Sigma|r_n - r_i|/2$, where sigma stands for summation.⁷

Turning back to our hypothetical parties, this operation yields the values of 0,4, 0,08, 0,45, and 0,09 for parties A, B, C, and D, respectively. Dividing the core expression by the sum of the shares of the vote in individual regions (Σr_i) provides control for party size, thus yielding much more realistic results – 0,8, 0,8, 0,9, and 0,9. But this time, parties operating in countries with many regions appear to be more regionalized. In order to adjust the index for the number of regions (n), it is sufficient to multiply it by $n/(n - 1)$. In our hypothetical example, this yields the intuitively correct values of 1,0 in all four cases. Finally, we find it useful to standardize the coefficient by taking its square root. The rationale for this (unnecessary) operation is that it reduces the numerical dispersion of the values without altering their substantial contents. The resulting formula,

$$R' = \sqrt{n \Sigma |r_n - r_i| / (2(n - 1) \Sigma r_i)},^8$$

yields zero if the party receives exactly the same share of the vote in each region. It yields one if the party receives all its support in only one region, irrespectively of how strong this support is, and how many regions there are. It is not defined if there is only one region or if the party receives no votes at all.

R' is the index of individual party regionalization. It is not directly convertible into a system-level measure. Obviously, a party system where all existing regional parties are very small cannot be viewed as a 'regionalized' one. Adjusting each of the individual parties' regionalization coefficients (R_i') for their shares of the national vote (p_i) can solve this problem. The synthetic formula can be calculated quite simply on an additive basis: $Reg = \Sigma (R_i' p_i)$. Reg equals zero if all parties are evenly supported throughout the nation, and it equals one if each of the individual parties receives all its votes in only one of the regions. It cannot be defined if regions are not defined or if none of the parties receives any votes. While the latter is an impossible condition, the former requires some more consideration.

Theoretically, the problem of what constitutes a region is complex. The proposed measure does not imply any specific solution, and indeed in the extreme version, each citizen can be considered as a 'region' voting exclusively for one of the parties. In a mathematical exercise of very little practical utility, it can be demonstrated that in this case, the value of Reg approximates $\Sigma (p_i \sqrt{1 - p_i})$. For the purposes of real-world research, however, it seems quite appropriate to agree with Rose and Urwin in that 'administrative boundaries are derived from politically meaningful judgments, and... the very existence of those boundaries will encourage political organizations to conduct activities with some respect for regional boundaries'.¹⁰ In federations, the definition of regions poses particularly little problem. But in nominally unitary states, the largest administrative territorial units are also not very difficult to identify. Of course, so defined regions vary tremendously in their numbers and degrees of political distinctiveness. The former aspect, however, is directly addressed by the design

of the proposed index. The degrees of political distinctiveness remain different, but this is exactly the kind of differentiation the proposed index cannot be adjusted to. In cross-national research, we characterize overtly different entities as nation states in our (not always fruitless) attempts to derive useful knowledge from comparing them to each other. Cross-regional research cannot avoid similar advantages; nor it can be expected to avoid similar limitations.

The Data and Preliminary Findings

Before turning to the case studies of the dynamics of party system regionalization in seven countries, we would like to approach the problem from a broader comparative perspective. Tables 2 and 3 provide the values of *Reg* and one of the indices of party system fragmentation, the Herfindahl – Hirschman coefficient (*HH*),¹¹ calculated for 20 “old” democracies and for the same number of “new” democracies, respectively, with each coefficient corresponding to one election only.¹² In our selection of “old” democracies, we relied, with a couple of omissions, on the list provided by Arend Lijphart.¹³ Since the mid-eighties, several of these countries (most notably, Italy and Japan) have experienced profound party system change. For the purposes of this study, however, it is important to observe the well-established party systems in their stability, not in flux. That is why we chose to focus our inquiry on the elections held in 1982-1986 rather than on the most recent ones. In our selection of “new” democracies, we attempted to present the widest geographical and chronological range of cases fitting into the category of ‘transitions to democracy’. While the scope of the inquiry had been deliberately limited to elections held after 1945, in practical terms, the major limitation stemmed from low data availability. It was primarily for this reason that we failed to include any of the African or Asian cases of regime change. Hence no claim can be made that the sample is representative of all modes of post-authoritarian political developments.

Table 2. Party system concentration (*HH*) and regionalization (*Reg*) in “old” democracies (in the descending order of regionalization)

	<i>HH</i>	<i>Reg</i>
Switzerland, 1983	0.167	0.565
Belgium, 1985	0.221	0.454
Japan, 1983	0.273	0.405
Iceland, 1983	0.236	0.390
Finland, 1983	0.183	0.376
New Zealand, 1984	0.335	0.372
Norway, 1985	0.288	0.352
Italy, 1983	0.221	0.346
Luxembourg, 1984	0.274	0.344
Canada, 1984	0.364	0.339
United Kingdom, 1983	0.321	0.314
Denmark, 1984	0.191	0.311
Austria, 1983	0.415	0.303
Netherlands, 1982	0.236	0.303
France, 1986	0.295	0.300
Sweden, 1985	0.284	0.290
Ireland, 1982	0.368	0.237
Germany, 1983	0.392	0.251
United States, 1984	0.511	0.232
Australia, 1984	0.506	0.204

Table 3. Party system concentration (*HH*) and regionalization (*Reg*) in “new” democracies (in the descending order of regionalization)

	<i>HH</i>	<i>Reg</i>
Ecuador, 1984	0.096	0.488
Venezuela, 1963	0.182	0.481
Russia, 1995	0.099	0.452
Slovakia, 1994	0.172	0.428
Croatia, 1995	0.264	0.421
Bolivia, 1993	0.214	0.412
Hungary, 1990	0.149	0.411
Spain, 1979	0.232	0.405
Portugal, 1980	0.346	0.392
Germany, 1953	0.302	0.382
Peru, 1995	0.303	0.368
Italy, 1953	0.240	0.367
Argentina, 1985	0.316	0.343
Bulgaria, 1990	0.363	0.340
Austria, 1953	0.362	0.328
Czech Republic, 1996	0.188	0.293
Uruguay, 1984	0.338	0.281
El Salvador, 1994	0.287	0.277
Greece, 1985	0.387	0.251
Dominican Republic, 1982	0.445	0.243

The comparison of the values of *Reg* presented in the tables shows that on the average, the well-established party systems tend to be less regionalized than the inchoate ones. The average values of *Reg* are 0.334 in ‘old’ democracies and 0.368 in ‘new’ democracies. Furthermore, the well-established party systems tend to be more concentrated than the inchoate ones. The average values of *HH* are 0.304 and 0.264, respectively. However, none of the observed differences is statistically significant. Therefore, the data do not allow for inference that party systems mature by becoming both more concentrated and less regionalized. At the same time, the linear correlation between *Reg* and *HH* is rather strong: -0.72 for “old” democracies, -0.76 for ‘new’ democracies, and -0.75 for the whole selection of cases.¹⁴ This means that, in general, party system concentration explains more than half (56 per cent) of the variance of *Reg*.¹⁵ In the following analysis, these preliminary findings will be subjected to an in-depth test by examining seven cases of party system development in ‘new’ democracies.

The selection of cases for this study followed several formal criteria. First, we selected only those countries that, during the periods of observation, experienced transitions from authoritarian rule. We did not ascribe to this category transitions from colonial rule (India), re-democratizations after foreign

occupation (several West European countries after the Second World War) or brief authoritarian interludes (Costa Rica, 1954), transitions from one democratic regime to another (France, 1958), and partial democratizations (Colombia, 1958). Second, we limited the chronological scope of inquiry by not considering transitions to democracy occurring earlier than in 1945. Several cases from the 'second wave of democratization', however, have been willingly included. While it cannot be denied that contextual differences between the 'waves of democratization' are profound, we are inclined to agree with Maurizio Cotta in that the heuristic payoffs of such 'cross-wave' comparisons outweigh disadvantages rooted in the highly heterogeneous nature of the data.¹⁶ Third, in order to trace the dynamics of party system regionalization over time, we included only those countries that experienced uninterrupted democratic development for no less than 15 years, with four or more free elections being held after the 'founding' elections (in this analysis, we used only the data from parliamentary or congressional elections).¹⁷ These, for the narrow purposes of this study, have been considered as analogous to the events of regime change.

The third criterion disqualified several transitions to democracy that occurred in West Europe and Latin America after the Second World War, and all East European and a considerable number of Latin American and other cases from the 'third wave' of democratization. This left me with three cases from the 'second wave of democratization' – Austria, Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy; with four cases from the 'third wave' – Bolivia, Greece, Portugal, and Spain; and with one case that can be chronologically located somewhere in between, Venezuela.¹⁸ Cases satisfying the criteria set above but not included into the study are few – Japan, Ecuador, and Peru. In all three cases, the reason for their non-inclusion is the lack of reliable data on the early post-authoritarian elections. Thus the selection comprises 72,7 per cent of the formally available cases. The time limits for each of the case studies were set to minimally satisfy the third criterion outlined above. Table 4 gives some factual information about the cases, including the numbers of regions (N_R) and elections (N_E).

Table 4. Factual information about the cases

	Time	N _R	N _E	Definition of Regions
Austria	1945-62	9	6	Bundesländer
Bolivia	1979-97	9	6	Departments
Germany	1949-53	9	6	Länder
	1957-69	10		
Greece	1974-93	56	8	Electoral districts
Italy	1946-63	19	5	Regions
Portugal	1975-95	20	9	18 districts and 2 autonomous regions
Spain	1977-96	52	7	50 provinces, Ceuta, and Melilla
Venezuela	1958-78	23	5	Federal district, 20 states, and 2 federal territories

Notes: The Portuguese 1976 legislative elections did not take place in the autonomous region of Madeira. In our case study of Spain, we chose to employ provinces rather than autonomous regions as basic units of analysis simply because regional autonomy was legally established throughout the nation only by 1983.

Cases from the 'second wave' of democratization

A rather simple model of party system development, displaying continuously decreasing levels of both fragmentation and regionalization, emerges from the case of West Germany (Tables 5 and 6).¹⁹ However, a closer look at the regionalization indices of individual parties reveals that the mechanics beyond this process were rather complex. The high level of party system regionalization observable in the 'founding' elections of 1949 can be only partly explained with reference to the presence of purely regional parties like the Bavarian Party and German Party. More importantly, the largest party of the 1949 elections, the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union,²⁰ was rather highly regionalized in comparison to its major rival, the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Indeed, at the outset of the new German party system the Social Democrats were the only truly national party, and it is interesting to note that in this respect, the small Communist party rather than the Christian Democrats was in the second place. In 1953, this situation started to change. Small parties with fairly regional bases of support were still capable of capturing a significant share of the vote. But, while the level of regionalization of the Social Democratic Party increased, the support base of the Christian Democrats became much more nationalized. This trend persisted thereafter, probably facilitated with the electoral demise of minor parties that effectively took place in 1957-1961. By 1965, the indices of regionalization of two major parties became almost equally low, with the Social Democratic Party retaining its initially national profile and

the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union firmly establishing itself in this capacity. The third electorally important actor, the Free Democratic Party, apparently survived by widening its national appeal rather by consolidating its regional bases. The only new organization that attracted some noticeable electoral support in the sixties, the extreme right National Democratic Party, was much less regionalized than its predecessors in the fifties. In 1965-1969, the German party system comprised no regional organizations altogether. It achieved the level of regionalization so stable that it remained virtually the same twenty years later (Table 2).

Table 5. Party system concentration (*HH*) and electoral returns of major parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-69

	1949	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969
<i>HH</i>	0.204	0.302	0.363	0.355	0.391	0.4
CDU/CSU	31.0	45.2	50.2	45.4	47.6	46.1
SPD	29.2	28.8	31.8	36.2	39.3	42.7
FDP	11.9	9.5	7.7	12.8	9.5	5.8
KPD	5.7	2.2	-	-	-	-
BP	4.2	1.7	-	-	-	-
DP	4.0	3.3	3.4	-	-	-
BHE/GB	-	5.9	4.6	2.8	-	-
NPD	-	-	-	-	2.0	4.3

Legend: CDU/CSU – Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union; SPD – Social Democratic Party of Germany; FDP – Free Democratic Party of Germany; KPD – Communist Party of Germany; BP – Bavarian Party; DP – German Party; BHE/GB – Bloc of Expellees and Refugees / United German Bloc; NPD – National Democratic Party of Germany.

Table 6. Party system regionalization (*Reg*) and regionalization indices of major parties in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-69

	1949	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969
<i>Reg</i>	0.459	0.382	0.353	0.298	0.257	0.255
CDU/CSU	0.417	0.337	0.307	0.308	0.254	0.262
SPD	0.269	0.297	0.313	0.273	0.249	0.240
FDP	0.460	0.444	0.452	0.260	0.294	0.296
KPD	0.336	0.427	-	-	-	-
BP	1.0	1.0	-	-	-	-
DP	0.791	0.687	0.654	-	-	-
BHE/GB	-	0.544	0.582	0.592	-	-
NPD	-	-	-	-	0.315	0.272

Legend: as for Table 5.

The Austrian party system, with its remarkably stable levels of both concentration and regionalization, differs from the case discussed above quite sharply (Tables 7 and 8). The major parties in the 1945 'founding' elections, the Austrian Peoples' Party and the Socialist Party of Austria, did become less regionalized over time, but by no means to the same extent as it happened with the German Christian Democrats. In fact, they were already national parties when they entered the electoral arena. Apparently, the major factor responsible for the specificity of the Austrian model was the emergence of the Freedom Party of Austria (then the League of Independents) in the 1949 elections. The new party was not only rather highly regionalized itself. Probably of more importance, its appearance facilitated the increased regionalization of another non-clerical party, the Socialists, in 1949, and of another right-wing party, the Peoples' Party, in 1953. By 1956, however, both major parties managed to reverse these trends towards their increased regionalization, and they expanded their national appeal beyond the limits set in 1945. At the same time, two minor organizations, the Freedom Party and the Communists, retained their initial levels of regionalization. By 1959, the Austrian party system assumed a specific structure that could be called 'congruent' in sense that there were two large 'nationalized' parties, representing the country's major political and ideological alternatives, and two small 'regionalized' parties representing alternative forms of political radicalism. Just as it happened in Germany, this structure proved to be remarkably stable over time. The electoral demise of the Communist party did not bring about any change in party system regionalization.

Table 7. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in Austria, 1945-62

	1945	1949	1953	1956	1959	1962
<i>HH</i>	0.452	0.360	0.362	0.403	0.403	0.406
ÖVP	49.9	44.0	41.3	46.0	44.2	45.4
SPÖ	44.7	38.7	42.1	43.0	44.8	44.0
KPÖ	5.4	5.1	5.3	4.4	3.3	3.0
FPÖ	-	11.7	11.0	6.5	7.7	7.0

Legend: ÖVP – Austrian People's Party; SPÖ – Socialist Party of Austria; KPÖ – Communist Party of Austria, normally in coalition with the left-wing socialists" (Austrian People's Opposition in 1953); FPÖ – Freedom Party of Austria (League of Independents in 1949-53).

Table 8. Party system regionalization (*Reg*) and regionalization indices of major parties in Austria, 1945-62

	1945	1949	1953	1956	1959	1962
<i>Reg</i>	0.311	0.342	0.328	0.314	0.299	0.303
ÖVP	0.298	0.293	0.308	0.287	0.281	0.277
SPÖ	0.306	0.338	0.309	0.295	0.279	0.287
KPO	0.480	0.445	0.435	0.495	0.486	0.510
FPO	-	0.492	0.429	0.502	0.438	0.479

Legend and source: as for Table 7.

The most salient peculiarity of the case of Italy is that in the second free elections, both fragmentation and regionalization of the country's party system sharply decreased. Before long, however, high fragmentation made its new and persistent appearance, while regionalization remained stable thereafter (Tables 9 and 10). On the level of individual parties, the initial picture was not qualitatively different from that observed in the German 'founding' elections. There was only one national party, the Christian Democrats. What makes the case of Italy so different is the continuous lack of single, albeit regionalized political alternative to the only party of national appeal. True, in the elections of 1948 the Italian party system approximated the German situation of 1949 quite closely. But as the short-living coalition of the Italian Communist Party and left-wing Socialists collapsed, both parties (although the latter more than the former) retained their regional profiles. Moreover, by 1963 the Communist party became more regionalized than it was in 1953. Trends towards nationalization were more apparent in the development of the second largest left-wing party, and indeed, in 1963 only the Socialists could claim the role of the national alternative to the Christian Democrats for themselves. This claim, however, would not have been sustained by the party's modest electoral performance. While the internal structure of the conservative ideological bloc remained almost perfectly congruent throughout the formative phase of party system development in Italy (with the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement representing a continuously deviant case), the left-wing bloc became increasingly incongruent over time. On the systemic level, a remarkably stable level of regionalization echoed this peculiarity. From Table 2, it can be inferred that in 1983, the Italian party system remained almost exactly as regionalized as it was in 1958.

Table 9. Party system concentration (*HH*) and electoral returns of major parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in Italy, 1946-63

	1946	1948	1953	1958	1963
<i>HH</i>	0.213	0.340	0.240	0.259	0.241
DC	35.2	48.5	40.1	42.3	38.3
FDP	-	31.2	-	-	-
PCI	18.9	-	22.6	22.7	25.3
Socialists	20.7	-	12.8	14.2	13.8
Social Democrats	-	7.1	4.5	4.6	6.1
Liberals	6.8	3.8	3.0	3.5	7.0
Monarchists	2.8	2.8	6.9	4.9	1.7
MSI	-	2.0	5.8	4.8	5.1

Legend: DC – Christian Democratic Party; FDP – Popular Democratic Front (a coalition of Communists and Socialists); PCI – Italian Communist Party; Socialists – Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity in 1946, Italian Socialist Party thereafter; Social Democrats – Socialist Unity in 1948, Italian Social Democratic Party thereafter; Liberals – National Democratic Union in 1946, National Bloc in 1948, Italian Liberal Party thereafter; Monarchists – National Bloc for Liberty in 1946, National Monarchist Party and National Democratic Alliance of Labor in 1948, National Monarchist Party in 1953, National Monarchist Party and Popular Monarchist Party in 1958, Italian Democratic Party of Monarchist Unity in 1963; MSI – Italian Social Movement.

Table 10. Party system regionalization (*Reg*) and regionalization indices of major parties in Italy, 1946-63

	1946	1948	1953	1958	1963
<i>Reg</i>	0.445	0.358	0.367	0.342	0.342
DC	0.314	0.230	0.252	0.231	0.262
FDP	-	0.422	-	-	-
PCI	0.494	-	0.373	0.388	0.393
Socialists	0.482	-	0.443	0.376	0.324
Social Democrats	-	0.490	0.492	0.505	0.394
Liberals	0.626	0.652	0.469	0.421	0.432
Monarchists	0.771	0.738	0.628	0.612	0.589
MSI	-	0.574	0.438	0.442	0.421

Legend: as for Table 9.

This brief analysis of three 'old new democracies' indicates that party system regionalization is a parameter that changes unevenly over time and across nations. In all three countries, the most dramatic changes occurred in the second free elections. But in Italy, it was also the last instance of change; in Austria, a stable pattern of party system regionalization was established only in the third elections; and in Germany, in the fifth ones. It can be noted, however, that in the time span of no more than fifteen years, all three party systems achieved certain levels of regionalization that did not change thereafter. It appears that at some moment, each party system achieves a level of regionalization that is 'natural' for it and can be sustained until substantial voter realignment arrives. In this study, we will not subject this preliminary finding to any theoretical interpretation. What is important to emphasize for our immediate purposes is that as far as party system regionalization is concerned, timing does matter. Patterns observable at the outset of party system formation may pass away before long, but this is not the case with the levels of regionalization stemming from later developments. They are likely to persist. Given that the further analysis will be focused on 'new new democracies', for which no retrospective judgments are feasible, this hypothesis seems to be comfortable even if not fully substantiated.

Perhaps more importantly, one can expect that rather than being unique developmental trends observed in 'old new democracies' can make their appearance in more recent instances of party system formation. But, as we have seen, the cases from the 'second wave of democratization' are very different from each other. The linear pattern of continuously decreasing regionalization in Germany contrasts quite sharply to the curvilinear developmental pattern of Austria and to Italy with its persistent regional bases of party politics. What path of party system development prevails in the 'third wave' democracies?

Cases from the 'Third Wave' of Democratization

In certain respects, the chronologically intermediate case – that of Venezuela – carries important similarities both to Germany and Austria. Similarly to what we have observed in Austria, the Venezuelan party system became both more fragmented and more regionalized in the second free elections. And similarly to Germany, it experienced sharp declines of both parameters thereafter, eventually to become one of the least regionalized party systems in the world (Tables 11 and 12). In the 'founding' elections of 1958, only one party, the center-left Democratic Action, emerged as a truly national organization. Its major rivals, the ideologically similar but politically antagonistic Democratic Republican Union and the Christian Democratic COPEI (Committee of Independent Political Organization), displayed much higher levels of regionalization. The

dramatic rise of system-level regionalization in the 1963 elections can be explained with reference to the constellation of three interdependent factors. Those were the electoral defeat of the Democratic Action; the successful performance of COPEI which, while widening its electoral appeal, remained a fairly regionalized party; and the arrival of the new competitors, the right-wing Independents for the National Front and the left-leaning Democratic Popular Force, both of which had regional support bases. All these developments took place against the backgrounds of the electoral defeat of the Democratic Republican Union. In 1968, with COPEI establishing itself as the major opposition party nationwide, system-level regionalization started to decrease. But major change took place in 1973, when the Democratic Action regained much of its support lost in the sixties, COPEI consolidated its positions, and the share of the vote captured by small parties, including the Democratic Republican Union, fell to about 25 per cent. The shape of the Venezuelan party system observed in the 1978 elections was almost perfectly congruent. Within each of the ideological blocs, there was one national party and an array of very small heavily regionalized parties. Among the cases discussed so far, COPEI is unique in that over time, its electoral success invariably coincided with the decreased levels of regionalization. Hence it can be considered as the very model of national party formation.

Table 11. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in Venezuela, 1958-78

	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978
HH	0.317	0.183	0.166	0.298	0.302
AD	47.5	30.6	25.6	44.4	38.5
COPEI	14.6	19.5	24.2	30.2	38.6
URD	25.7	16.3	9.3	3.2	1.6
PCV	6.0	-	-	-	-
IPFN	-	12.5	2.6	-	-
FDP	-	9.0	5.3	1.2	0.3
CCN	-	-	11.0	4.3	0.2
MEP	-	-	13.0	5.0	2.2
MAS	-	-	-	5.3	6.0

Legend: AD – Democratic Action; COPEI – Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization; URD – Democratic Republican Union; PCV – Communist Party of Venezuela; IPFN – Independents for the National Front (National Democratic Front in 1968); FDP – Democratic Popular Force; CCN – Civic Nationalist Crusade; MEP – Electoral Movement of the People; MAS – Movement to Socialism.

Table 12. Party system regionalization (*Reg*) and regionalization indices of major parties in Venezuela, 1958-78

	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978
<i>Reg</i>	0.436	0.481	0.446	0.341	0.282
AD	0.355	0.362	0.317	0.265	0.258
COPEI	0.573	0.495	0.446	0.312	0.247
URD	0.482	0.477	0.478	0.644	0.684
PCV	0.545	-	-	-	-
IPFN	-	0.597	0.361	-	-
FDP	-	0.698	0.531	0.445	0.510
CCN	-	-	0.631	0.556	0.435
MEP	-	-	0.476	0.581	0.533
MAS	-	-	-	0.502	0.407

Legend: as for Table 11.

The Portuguese party system also became less fragmented and less regionalized in the course of its development (Tables 13 and 14). Like in the cases of Germany and Venezuela, the underlying mechanics can be described in terms of gradual development of the second national party. In the 'founding' elections of 1975, only the Socialists acted in this capacity. Both right-wing organizations, the Social Democratic Party (then the Popular Democratic Party) and the Democratic Social Center, were highly regionalized, and even as a coalition receiving the largest shares of the vote in the 1979 and 1980 elections, they could not match the level of nationalization attained by PS. After the coalition collapsed, the Democratic Social Center remained a regionalized party. The developmental path of the Social Democratic Party, however, was very similar to that of the Venezuelan Christian Democrats. Starting with 1983, the Social Democrats continuously increased their share of the vote, while the party's level of regionalization fell quite significantly. It was only by 1996 that the Portuguese party system finally became congruent in the sense that its largest party became its least regionalized party. But, in contrast to 1975, the distance between the regionalization levels of the leading parties was not very large. The case of Portugal displays two peculiarities that are worth mentioning in this discussion. One of them is the meteoric appearance of the Party of Democratic Renewal, the 'presidential' party that captured 18.5 per cent of the vote in 1985 to fade away in the subsequent elections. In contrast to the Bloc of Expellees and Refugees in Germany, the Freedom Party in Austria, and an array of 'new entrants' observed in Venezuela, the Party of Democratic Renewal was relatively evenly supported across the nation at the time when it emerged. This, however, did not facilitate its sustainable electoral success, and it is possible to

speculate that the lack of regional support bases actually contributed to its fast collapse. The second peculiarity is that in 1975-1985, the level of regionalization of the second-largest left-wing party, the Communists, did not correspond to the relatively large size of its electorate. Such a combination, not observed in the previously discussed cases, is therefore practically possible, even though the case of the Portuguese Communist Party also indicates that in the long run, it may be difficult to sustain it.

Table 13. Party system concentration (*HH*) and electoral returns of major parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in Portugal, 1975-91

	1975	1976	1979	1980	1983	1985	1987	1991	1995
<i>HH</i>	0.273	0.250	0.333	0.346	0.253	0.200	0.320	0.351	0.329
PS	40.7	36.7	28.2	28.7	36.1	20.8	22.2	29.1	44.2
AD	-	-	46.3	48.3	-	-	-	-	-
PSD	28.3	25.2	-	-	27.2	30.0	50.2	50.6	34.3
CDS	8.2	16.7	-	-	12.6	10.0	4.4	4.4	9.2
MDP	4.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCP	13.5	15.3	19.5	17.4	18.1	15.5	12.1	8.8	8.7
PRD	-	-	-	-	-	17.9	4.9	-	-

Legend: PS – Socialist Party (Republican and Socialist Front in 1980); AD – Democratic Alliance (a coalition of PSD, CDS, and Monarchists; includes votes separately cast for PSD and CDS in Azores and Madeira); PSD – Social Democratic Party (Popular Democratic Party in 1975-79); CDS – Democratic Social Center (CDS-Popular Party in 1995); MDP – Portuguese Democratic Movement; PCP – Portuguese Communist Party (United People's Alliance in 1979-85, Union of the Democratic Coalition in 1987-91, PCP and the Greens in 1995); PRD – Party of Democratic Renewal.

Table 14. Party system regionalization (*Reg*) and regionalization indices of major parties in Portugal, 1975-96

	1975	1976	1979	1980	1983	1985	1987	1991	1995
<i>Reg</i>	0.464	0.426	0.394	0.392	0.398	0.391	0.354	0.313	0.320
PS	0.351	0.295	0.287	0.305	0.271	0.263	0.263	0.243	0.226
AD	-	-	0.366	0.363	-	-	-	-	-
PSD	0.501	0.438	-	-	0.393	0.362	0.311	0.287	0.352
CDS	0.549	0.471	-	-	0.459	0.476	0.410	0.404	0.341
MDP	0.419	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCP	0.675	0.663	0.605	0.611	0.616	0.596	0.630	0.649	0.648
PRD	-	-	-	-	-	0.367	0.483	-	-

Legend: as for table 13.

In Spain (Tables 15 and 16), trends facilitating party system regionalization were strong and persistent. Like in Venezuela, one of the leading parties failed to survive the pressures of the formative phase of party system development. The difference is that in Spain, no party was quick to assume national prominence. In the 1977 'founding' elections, there were two parties of national appeal, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the Union of Democratic Center (UCD), and two more or less regionalized organizations representing alternative forms of political radicalism, the Spanish Communist Party and the Popular Alliance. In addition, the Spanish party system contained a plethora of purely regional parties, the largest of them being the conservative Convergence and Union in Catalonia. This situation changed dramatically when in 1982, the organizational and electoral collapse of the Union of Democratic Center pushed the Popular Alliance into the position of the largest right-wing party. But, with its 26.5 per cent of the vote, it was far from being the legitimate heir of all the votes once cast for the Union of Democratic center. And, although its level of regionalization decreased quite drastically, it remained larger than that of the Socialists. In 1989, the Popular Party and the most viable rump of UCD, the Democratic and Social Center, were still almost equally regionalized. It was only in the nineties that the Popular Party finally squeezed out the 'centrists' and finally managed to become not only the largest, but also the truly national party of the right. But it still remains much more of a regional party than the Socialists. In fact, the decreased regionalization of the Socialist Party in the 1993 and 1996 elections can be viewed as the most important factor of system level dynamics. The Communist-led coalition continues to enjoy fairly large electoral support while retaining its regional profile. This, combined with the uninterrupted presence of regional parties, contributes to the persistence of a relatively high level of party system regionalization.

Table 15. Party system concentration (*HH*) and electoral returns of major parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in Spain, 1977-96

	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996
<i>HH</i>	0.221	0.232	0.312	0.278	0.240	0.284	0.306
PSOE	29.2	30.5	48.3	44.3	39.9	39.1	37.5
UCD	34.5	35.0	6.5	-	-	-	-
CDS	-	-	2.9	9.2	8.0	1.8	-
PP	8.1	6.0	26.5	26.1	25.1	34.6	38.9
PCE	9.4	10.7	4.0	4.5	9.1	9.3	10.6
CiU	2.8	2.7	3.7	5.1	5.1	5.0	4.6

Legend: PSOE – Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (including votes cast for the Party of Socialists of Catalonia); UCD – Union of the Democratic Center; CDS – Democratic and Social Center; PP – Popular Party (Popular Alliance in 1977 and 1982, Democratic Coalition in 1979, Popular Coalition in 1986); PCE – Spanish Communist Party (United Left in 1986-96; including votes cast for the Unified Socialist party of Catalonia in 1977-82, the Union of Catalan Left in 1986, and the Initiative for Catalonia in 1989-96); CiU – Convergence and Union (Democratic Pact for Catalonia in 1977).

Table 16. Party system regionalization (*Reg*) and regionalization indices of major parties in Spain, 1977-89

	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996
<i>Reg</i>	0.416	0.405	0.394	0.400	0.413	0.380	0.361
PSOE	0.342	0.328	0.309	0.301	0.303	0.286	0.269
UCD	0.378	0.346	0.503	-	-	-	-
CDS	-	-	0.506	0.444	0.419	0.513	-
PP	0.423	0.493	0.346	0.366	0.404	0.347	0.331
PCE	0.510	0.497	0.531	0.511	0.464	0.419	0.415
CiU	0.970	0.970	0.970	0.970	0.970	0.970	0.970

Legend: as for Table 15.

The case of Greece (Tables 17 and 18), with its initially moderate and continuously decreasing levels of regionalization, reminds of both Austria and Germany in these particular respects. And, like in Venezuela, the failure of one of the largest parties to sustain its national appeal resulted in an immediate increase in regionalization. In Greece, this was caused by the replacement of the second largest party, the Union of the Democratic Center, with the center-left Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement both in terms of its overall electoral support and national appeal. The 1981 elections largely completed this process. An effectively two-party system that comprised the New Democracy and the

Socialists fully took its shape, leaving the relatively small Communist party on the margins. This trend progressed in the following elections. It was the corruption scandal of the late eighties that undermined the national appeal of the Socialists. In the 1990 elections, system-level regionalization increased correspondingly. What is important is that at this moment, no strong newcomers entered the electoral arena. In the end, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement managed to survive the challenge. When the populist Political Spring tried to exploit the anti-corruption theme in order to establish itself as an electoral force, it was already too late, for by 1993, the Socialists fully recovered to reassume their role of the leading national party. Similarly to what we observed in Portugal, the Greek communist movement remained highly regionalized throughout the period of democratization, but it was too weak in electoral terms to alter the unusually low level of party system regionalization achieved by the country.

Table 17. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in Greece, 1974-93

	1974	1977	1981	1985	1989(1)	1989(2)	1990	1993
HH	0.365	0.268	0.372	0.387	0.367	0.391	0.380	0.380
ND	54.4	41.8	35.9	40.8	44.3	46.2	46.9	39.3
PASOK	13.6	25.3	48.1	45.8	39.1	40.7	38.6	46.9
KKE	-	9.4	9.4	9.9	-	-	-	4.5
KKE-es	-	2.7	1.3	1.8	-	-	-	2.9
Left	9.5	-	-	-	13.1	11.0	10.3	-
EDIK	20.4	12.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
EP	-	6.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
POLA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.9

Note: Elections 1989 (1) and 1989 (2) took place in June and November 1989, respectively. Legend: ND – New Democracy; PASOK – Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement; KKE – Communist Party of Greece; KKE-es – Communist Party of Greece (“Interior”) and related formations (Alliance of Progressive and Left-wing Forces in 1977, Progressive Left Coalition in 1993); Left – coalitions that included both communist parties (United Left in 1974, Progressive Left Coalition in 1989-1990); EDIK – Union of the Democratic Center (Center Union – New Forces in 1974); EP – National Front; POLA – Political Spring.

Table 18. Party system regionalization (*Reg*) and regionalization indices of major parties in Greece, 1974-93

	1974	1977	1981	1985	1989(1)	1989(2)	1990	1993
<i>Reg</i>	0.325	0.338	0.268	0.251	0.245	0.249	0.292	0.241
ND	0.269	0.267	0.270	0.241	0.225	0.219	0.224	0.230
PASOK	0.375	0.287	0.217	0.215	0.214	0.236	0.333	0.204
KKE	-	0.490	0.448	0.434	-	-	-	0.473
KKE-es	-	0.508	0.584	0.413	-	-	-	0.402
Left	0.547	-	-	-	0.408	0.417	0.451	-
EDIK	0.338	0.437	-	-	-	-	-	-
EP	-	0.515	-	-	-	-	-	-
POLA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.366

Legend: as for Table 17.

The development of party system in Bolivia (Tables 19 and 20) displays a unique pattern. Not only the initial level of party system regionalization in the country was very high, but it also increased over time. This can be explained with reference to the fact that none of those parties which, at this or that moment, managed to widen their national appeal, succeeded in sustaining it. The initial "two-party system" consisting of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and the left-wing coalition, Democratic and Popular Unity, collapsed, as the Nationalist Democratic Action became electorally stronger, while the left-wing coalition fell apart to be only partly replaced with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. In the 1993 elections, however, the short-lived coalition of Nationalist Democratic Action and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left failed as well. Finally, the defeat of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement in the 1997 elections epitomized the failure to develop a political party of national appeal. Every single claimant for this role survived, but none fulfilled this promise. Against these backgrounds, the rise of populist anti-corruption parties (the Conscience of the Fatherland and the Civic Solidarity Union) resulted in the increased level of party system regionalization. In contrast to Greece, where the Political Spring entered the electoral competition only to discover that the traditional parties were too strong to be squeezed out, the Bolivian populists succeeded in their undertaking. In general, Bolivia represents a dramatic exaggeration of all trends facilitating high levels of party system regionalization, when the lack of sustainable parties of national appeal adds to a plethora of successful new entrants into the electoral arena, and to the persistent presence of minor regional parties. Such trends were observable in nearly all the cases discussed above. But Austria, Italy, and other countries overcame them, albeit by no means with equal success. What is clear from the

case of Bolivia is that insofar a party system fails to become consolidated, high levels of regionalization in party support are likely to be sustained.

None of the 'third wave' democracies presents a picture of continuously decreasing regionalization. In Venezuela and Greece, the rise of nationally based parties reduced party system regionalization to very low levels only after second free elections. In Portugal and Spain, the national bases of party politics emerged more steadily but also much more slowly and indecisively. Thus in a wide comparative perspective, the case of Germany turns out to be no less unique than that of Bolivia. As it often happens in social research, the empirical data suggest neither linearity nor chaos as dominant trends. Reality lies somewhere in between.

Table 19. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in Bolivia, 1979-97

	1979	1980	1985	1989	1993	1997
<i>HH</i>	0.285	0.230	0.218	0.200	0.214	0.169
MNR	35.9	20.1	30.4	25.6	35.6	18.2
ADN	14.9	16.8	32.8	25.2	-	22.3
AP	-	-	-	-	21.0	-
MIR	-	-	10.2	21.8	-	16.8
MBL	-	-	-	-	5.4	3.1
UDP	36.0	38.7	-	-	-	-
MNRI	-	-	5.5	-	-	-
VR-9	-	-	4.8	-	-	-
IU	-	-	-	8.0	1.0	3.7
PS-1	4.8	8.7	2.6	2.8	-	-
APIN	4.1	-	-	-	-	-
CONDEPA	-	-	-	12.3	14.3	17.2
UCS	-	-	-	-	13.8	16.1

Note: In 1997, shares of the vote cast for party lists.

Legend: MNR – Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR-Alliance in 1980, in coalition with Tupac Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement in 1993); ADN – Nationalist Democratic Action; AP – Patriotic Accord (a coalition of ADN and MIR); MIR – Movement of the Revolutionary Left; MBL – Movement for a Free Bolivia; UDP – Democratic and Popular Unity (included MNRI, MIR, Communist party, and minor left-wing groups); MNRI – Nationalist Revolutionary Movement of the Left; VR-9 – Revolutionary Vanguard-April 9; IU – United Left (the Communist party and minor left-wing groups; in 1989 also included MBL); PS-1 – Socialist Party-1; APIN – Popular Alliance for National Integration; CONDEPA – Conscience of the Fatherland; UCS – Civic Solidarity Union.

Table 20. Party system regionalization (*Reg*) and regionalization indices of major parties in Bolivia, 1979-97

	1979	1980	1985	1989	1993	1997
<i>Reg</i>	0.456	0.468	0.401	0.430	0.406	0.465
MNR	0.396	0.509	0.371	0.362	0.265	0.395
ADN	0.439	0.375	0.335	0.342	-	0.379
AP	-	-	-	-	0.403	-
MIR	-	-	0.485	0.327	-	0.425
MBL	-	-	-	-	0.546	0.561
UDP	0.472	0.454	-	-	-	-
MNRI	-	-	0.445	-	-	-
VR-9	-	-	0.616	-	-	-
IU	-	-	-	0.533	0.519	0.763
PS-I	0.678	0.571	0.526	0.502	-	-
APIN	0.569	-	-	-	-	-
CONDEPA	-	-	-	0.825	0.714	0.693
UCS	-	-	-	-	0.379	0.373

Legend: as for Table 19.

Conclusion

Is party system regionalization associated with party system concentration? Do party systems become less regionalized as they consolidate? When answering these questions from a statistical perspective, treating each of the fifty-two national elections discussed above as a separate party system configuration would not be appropriate unless we took into account the time variable. Otherwise, the correlation between *HH* and *Reg* might get inflated due to the autocorrelation effect. We coded each of the elections according to its temporal distance from the event of transition to democracy, so that the 'founding' elections received the value of zero, elections that took place five years after – the value of five, etc. The resulting variable *T* proved to be associated with *Reg*. Even though the association is not very strong (linear correlation coefficient – 0.56; 32 per cent of the variance explained), it is still statistically significant.²¹ The multiple regression equation $Reg = .595 - .651HH - .00405T$ explains about 80 per cent of the variance of the dependent variable, all coefficients being highly significant. A still better equation is the one that takes into account the interaction effect between *HH* and *T*, $Reg = .559 - .531HH - .013(HH*T)$. But then the coefficient of the *T* variable itself becomes insignificant. These statistical tests demonstrate that high levels of *HH* are associated with low levels of *Reg* and, as democracies mature, this relationship gets even stronger.

The reason for the strong linear association between *Reg* and *HH* becomes quite obvious upon an examination of the relationship between *individual parties'* sizes and their regionalization indices.²² Small parties are more likely to be regionalized. Linear measures of association between party size and its regionalization index would not be appropriate here because of heteroscedastic variance. In particular, the variance of R' depends on the level of p , where R' is the individual party regionalization index and p is the party's share of the vote. Small values of p are associated with high variance of R' . Whereas all large parties have very small values of R' , the regionalization index of small parties varies from very small to very large values. Intuitively, this makes sense, as one would expect a party winning the national vote to have a strong support across all or most regions. This need not be the case for small parties. A simple independent samples T-test confirms the difference of average R' for large and small parties, whereas the Levene's test for equality of variances shows a highly significant difference of variances for the two groups.

From the case studies, it can be inferred that four important within-system factors influence the scope and dynamics of party system regionalization. The first of them is the presence or lack of national parties in the 'founding' elections. True, at least one such party could be registered in each of the cases. But what appears to be especially important is whether each of the ideological blocs contains a party of national appeal. In Austria, where this was exactly the case, party system regionalization remained relatively steady over time. In West Germany, Venezuela, and Portugal, the initial absence of national right-wing parties contributed to quite turbulent patterns of development, although in the final account, all these party systems achieved lower levels of regionalization. In Greece, it was a left-leaning party, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, which widened its appeal to form one of the cornerstones of the national party system. The case of Italy, where the regionalization of the largest left-wing party remained high at the point of system-level stabilization, appears to be exceptional in this respect; Bolivia displays something of a similar pattern, though.

The second factor is the sustainability of national parties. Very much like the Austrian party system, those of Bolivia and Spain initially contained national parties representing major political alternatives. In both cases, however, subsequent developments brought about voter realignments resulting in the electoral demise and/or increased regionalization of at least one of the original national parties. From the evidence presented above, it can be inferred that the resulting path of development is conducive to high regionalization on the systemic level. The third factor is the continuous presence or lack of small national parties deriving their support from a limited number of regions. Apparently, the Communist parties of Portugal and Spain, as well as the minor

right-wing parties of Italy, played some role in maintaining high levels of party system regionalization. Finally, the cases of Austria, Bolivia and Venezuela suggest that new entrants into the political arenas can influence the processes occurring on the systemic level quite substantially.

Obviously, the factors identified above do not exist in isolation from each other. It is their interaction that, in the final account, determines the pace and direction of system-level processes. In this study, we will not suggest any interpretation of how they interact, although admittedly, such an interpretation can be essential for the further research on party system regionalization. Our study demonstrates that in every inchoate party system, we can expect to find strong factors facilitating the increased nationalization of political competition. Apparently, these factors work together (or coincide) with trends counteracting party system fragmentation. However, factors impeding this process also exist, and sometimes they prevail, which is also testified by the statistical results reported above. At the same time, both quantitative and qualitative parts of our analysis agree in that relatively mature democracies with high party system concentration are more likely to have low levels of political regionalization than new democracies with the same high level of party system concentration.

NOTES

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1. Kenneth Janda, "Regional and Religious Support of Political Parties and Effects on Their Issue Positions", *International Political Science Review*, 10 (October 1989), 349-370.

2. Richard Rose and Derek W. Urwin, *Regional Differentiation and Political Unity in Western Nations* (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), pp. 40-45.

3. See Grzegorz Ekiert, "Democratic Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration", *British Journal of Political Science*, 21 (July 1991), 285-315; and Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, "Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America", in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 1-34.

4. Rose and Urwin, Op. Cit., pp. 24-30.

5. P. J. Taylor and R. J. Johnston, *Geography of Elections* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), pp. 152-153.

6. Svante Eärsson, Kenneth Janda, and Jan-Eric Lane, "Ecology of Party Strength in Western Europe", *Comparative Political Studies*, 18 (July 1985), pp. 175-176.

7. For examples of similarly constructed measures, in addition to the Cumulative Index of Inequality characterized above, see Mogens N. Pedersen, "On Measuring Party System Change: A Methodological Critique and a Suggestion", *Comparative Political Studies*, 12 (January 1980), 387-403; and Derek J. Hearl, Ian Budge, and Bernard Pearson, "Distinctiveness of Regional Voting: A Comparative Analysis Across the European Community", *Electoral Studies*, 15 (May 1996), p. 175. The Pedersen index has received particularly wide circulation in cross-national research on political parties and party systems. See Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1995* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).

8. In Excel, $=\text{sqrt}(((\text{avedev}(a1:x1)*(n^2))/(2*\text{sum}(a1:x1)*(n-1)))$ is the equivalent formula, assuming that the party's shares of the vote in individual regions are located in row (a1:x1), and n is the number of regions. In this equation, n is squared because the standard expression beyond 'avedev' is already adjusted to the number of units of analysis.

9. In many cases, the exact values of R' (and, indeed, the shares of the vote) cannot be attributed to very small parties simply because their electoral returns are not reported in the sources. In our calculations, we tried our best to take into account as many parties as possible. At the same time, to adjust the indices for the missing data, we used a slightly modified formula: $Reg = \Sigma(R_i/p_i)/\Sigma p_i$. This adjustment, based on the logical assumption that very small parties in the given system are no less regionalized than the large ones, does not alter the

values of *Reg* significantly; if the electoral data are complete, the results yielded by both formulae are the same.

10. Rose and Urwin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

11. The optimal way of expressing differences among individual party sizes, defined as shares of the national vote, had been vividly debated in political science literature for about a decade (see Douglas Rae, *Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Raimo Väyrynen (1972), "Analysis of Party Systems by Concentration, Fractionalization, and Entropy Measures", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 7 (1972), 137-155; and Rein Taagepera and James L Ray, "A Generalized Index of Concentration", *Sociological Methods and Research*, 5 (February 1977), 367-384). This discussion lost much of its intensity after it had been proposed to use the reciprocal of the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration coefficient (HH , the sum of the squared component sizes) as the 'effective number of parties' ($ENP = 1/HH$) (Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "Effective Number of Parties, A Measure with Application to West Europe", *Comparative Political Studies*, 12 (April 1979), 3-27). The 'effective number of parties' has been productively employed in several important studies (see, for instance, Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989)). In fact, there are many situations when HH , the 'effective number of parties', and such simple transforms of the Herfindahl-Hirschman coefficient as the Rae index of fractionalization ($1-HH$) can be used interchangeably. They contain exactly the same amounts of information. The 'effective number of parties' has an advantage of being an intuitively appealing way of expressing any given distribution of votes in terms of the number of equal size components to which it is equivalent. At the same time, it tends to yield very numerically large values if applied to fragmented systems, thus creating outliers that are less than desirable in correlation analysis. In this study, several correlation coefficients will be reported. For this reason, HH with its values running from zero to one is a more suitable measure.

12. See Appendix for the sources of the data presented in Tables 2 – 20. In all calculations reported in Tables 2 and 3 except for the case of the United States, we used the results of national legislative elections. For Belgium, the Dutch- and French-speaking Socialists, Liberals, and Christian Democrats were counted as single parties. Counted otherwise, the value of *Reg* for Belgium rises up to 0.859. For France, the Union for French Democracy and the Rally for the Republic were counted as a single party. While corresponding to the political realities of the 1986 elections, this probably undervalues *Reg* for that country. For new democracies using "mixed" electoral systems, only proportional sections of the vote were taken into account. For Russia, indices are calculated on the basis of vote totals cast for party lists; votes cast "against all parties" are discounted. For Uruguay, the value of *Reg* would be probably higher if we counted "sublemas" as individual parties.

13. Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

14. Unless otherwise stated, all correlations reported in this study are significant at 0.01 or less.

15. One can logically expect that strong party system regionalization is associated with federalism. We statistically tested this expectation by calculating a correlation coefficient

between a dummy variable representing federalism (0 – unitary, 1 – federal) and *Reg* for the available poll of 40 cases. With the coefficient as low as 0.01 (insignificant), there appears to be no association whatsoever, although the sample is obviously not very representative.

16. Maurizio Cotta, "Structuring the New Party Systems after the Dictatorship: Coalitions, Alliances, Fusions and Splits during the Transition and Post-Transition Stages", in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, eds., *Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 69-99.

17. For a useful conceptualization of the 'founding' elections, see Vernon Bogdanor, "Founding Elections and Regime Change", *Electoral Studies*, 9 (December 1990), 288-294.

18. This study is focused on a very narrow aspect of party system formation. For informative in-depth analyses of the formative phases of post-authoritarian party system development in Austria, Bolivia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Venezuela, see Anton Pelinka and Fritz Plasser, eds., *The Austrian Party System* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); Eduardo A. Gamarra and James M. Malloy, "The Patrimonial Dynamics of Party Politics in Bolivia", in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, 99. 399-433); Tony Burkett, *Parties and Elections in West Germany: The Search for Stability* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975); R. Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987); Paolo Farneti, *The Italian Party System: 1945-1980* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985); Thomas C. Bruneau and Alex Macleod, *Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986); Ramón E. Arango, *Spain: Democracy Regained*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); and Michael Coppedge, *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Patryarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), respectively.

19. The values of *Reg* given in the tables below are not derivable from the indices of regionalization attributed to individual parties because, due to space limitations, we do not report information on the following minor parties (normally receiving less than two per cent of the national vote): in Germany, Center Party, Federal Union, Economic Reconstruction Union, and German Rights Party / German Empire Party; in Italy, Italian Republican Party; in Portugal, People's Democratic Union; in Spain, Basque Nationalist Party and Herri Batasuna; in Venezuela, Union for Progress and Communist Party of Venezuela (1973-78); in Bolivia, Indian Movement Tupac Katari, Tupac Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement, Democratic Revolutionary Front, Authentic Revolutionary Party-A, Front of the United People, and Bolivian Renewal Alliance. The values of *HH* presented in the tables are calculated on the basis of maximally complete electoral returns obtainable from the sources.

20. In this analysis, each unit for which electoral returns are separately reported in the sources is referred to as political party, although in actuality, it may be a coalition.

21. It is interesting to note that the coefficient of linear correlation between *T* and *HH* is much lower, 0.23 (insignificant), although it fits into the theoretically predictable pattern.

22. The following findings are based on the data taken from Table 5 through Table 20. Parties with more than 25% of the national vote were considered "large" for the purpose of this test.

APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES

Table 2. Dick Leonard and Richard Natkiel, *World Atlas of Elections: Voting Patterns in 39 Democracies* (London: Economist, 1986).

Table 3. Dominican Republic and Ecuador – as for Table 1; Austria, Bolivia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Venezuela – as for Tables 5-20; Argentina – Rosendo Fraga, *Argentina en las Urnas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría, 1992); Bulgaria – *The June 1990 Elections in Bulgaria* (Washington, DC: National Republican Institute for International Affairs and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1990); Croatia – Final Official Results, Internet source, <http://www.sabor.hr/izbori/rezultat>, 1998; Czech Republic – *Statistická Ročenka České Republiky* (Praha: Český Statistický Úrad, 1996), and ČSU, Internet source, http://www.volby.cz/_ASCII/_volby; El Salvador – *El Salvador, Elections of the Century: Results, Recommendations, Analysis* (Cambridge, MA, and San Salvador: Hemisphere Initiatives, 1994); Hungary – Gábor Tóka, ed., *The 1990 Elections to the Hungarian National Assembly: Analyses, Documents, and Data* (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1995); Peru – *Perú, Elecciones Generales 1995: Resultados Nacionales* (Lima: International Foundation for Electoral Systems and United States Agency for International Development, 1995); Russia – *Vestnik Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, No. 1 (1996); Slovakia – Elections 94, Internet source, <http://www.eunet.sk/slovakia/elections-94>, 1998; Uruguay – Angel R. Venturini, *Estadísticas Electorales: 1919-1989* (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1989).

Table 4. As for Tables 5-20.

Tables 5 and 6. Gerhard A. Ritter and Merith Niehuss, *Wahlen in Deutschland, 1946-1991: Ein Handbuch* (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1991).

Tables 7 and 8. Rodney Stiefbold et al., *Wahlen und Parteien in Österreich, Band III: Wahlstatistik* (Wien: Österreichischer Bundesverlag / Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1966).

Tables 9 and 10. V. Capecchi et al., *Il Comportamento Elettorale in Italia: Una Indagine Ecologica sulle Elezioni in Italia fra il 1946 e il 1963* (Bologna: Società Editrice il Mulino, 1968).

Tables 11 and 12. *La Estadística Evolutiva de los Partidos Políticos en Venezuela*, 2nd ed. (Caracas: Consejo Supremo Electoral, 1983).

Tables 13 and 14. Lijphart Elections Archive, Internet source, <http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij>, 1998; Eleções Legislativas 1995, Internet source, <http://www.stape.pt/resultados.htm>, 1998.

Tables 15 and 16. Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio M. Mujal-León, eds., *Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1985); Lijphart Elections Archive, Internet source, <http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij>, 1998; Elecciones 93, computer file produced by the Spanish Ministry of Interior (courtesy of Jorge Rodríguez Menés); Elecciones a Cortes, Internet source, <http://www.indra-ssi.es>, 1998.

Tables 17 and 18. Ekloges-96, Internet source, <http://www.hol.gr/ekloges96/apotel>, 1998.

Tables 19 and 20: *Anuario Estadístico 1994* (La Paz: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1994); Corte Nacional Electoral, Internet source, <http://ns.bolivian.com/cne/hal-r.html> 1998.

Note: All Internet sources mentioned above were accessed in March through April 1998.



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