Robert Schuman Centre
for Advanced Studies

Israeli Interiors: Ethnic Tourism, the State, and the Politics of Space

REBECCA L. STEIN

RSC No. 2001/11
Mediterranean Programme Series

EUI WORKING PAPERS

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

EUI Working Paper RSC No. 2001/11

Stein: ***Israeli Interiors: Ethnic Tourism, the State, and the Politics of Space***

The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the European Forum to become the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE
FOR ADVANCED STUDIES

Israeli Interiors: Ethnic Tourism, the State, and the Politics of Space

REBECCA L. STEIN

University of California, Berkely

EUI Working Paper **RSC** No. 2001/11

BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

Printed in Italy in April 2001
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50016 San Domenico (FI)
Italy

Mediterranean Programme

The Mediterranean Programme was established at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The Mediterranean Programme has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are inseparable. The Mediterranean Programme will provide post-doctoral and doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research.

The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support for Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have guaranteed their support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, and Mediocredito Centrale. The European Investment Bank, Compagnia di San Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have offered generous financial support for four years for studies in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring 2000. In addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the City of Florence (Giorgio La Pira Fellowship for post-doctoral fellows).

For further information:

Mediterranean Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
via dei Roccettini, 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy
Fax: + 39 055 4685 770
http://www.iue.it/RSC/MED/

On a cold morning in 1996, I drove north from Jerusalem to the Palestinian village of Dayr al-'Asad with representatives from the Israeli Ministry of Tourism, in the backseat of a heated station-wagon. After several months of fieldwork in Ministry's central office in Jerusalem, shuffling through its disorganized archives and interviewing reluctant employees, I have become a familiar presence in its halls. My credentials as Jew and Hebrew speaker have perpetually eased my access, and my request to join this delegation has not been denied.

The village of Dayr al-'Asad, some fifteen miles west of Acre in the Galilee region of Israel, is our fifth stop of the day. In the course of a hectic six hours, we have visited restaurant owners that want to expand, families with rooms to rent, local authorities with plans for village development, all vying for government aid. Yosef Shwartz heads our delegation.[1] He oversees the activities of the Office of Rural Development under whose auspices "Arab-sector tourism" (thus labeled by the Ministry) is being managed and planned. A towering Ashkenazi Jew in his late forties, Yosef is a native of the Jerusalem area, and today he wears his favorite black cowboy hat from El Paso, acquired on a recent trip abroad. He speaks no Arabic, but carries the Arabic nickname by which he is popularly known: *Juha*, or wise fool. "It's his army nickname," his secretary explained several weeks earlier, when I inquired. "Everybody gets one."

We sit around a table in the mayor's office beneath a memorial photograph of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, discussing the future of Galilee tourism. After a round of introductions and coffee, the mayor tells the history of Dayr al-'Asad and discusses his vision, in rapid Hebrew, for a future rich in tourism. The only Arabic spoken at this meeting is enunciated as slang by the Ministry's Ashkenazi representatives, in keeping with Hebrew colloquial norms.

Walking to a corner of his office, the mayor points to a photograph of the oldest house in the village, framed under glass.

"Beautiful isn't it?" The photograph is passed around the table.

"We want to turn this house into a museum of Palestinian heritage and bring in an anthropologist to give lectures." His insistence on the term "Palestinian" is a bold rhetorical strategy among state officials who prefer the depoliticized term "Arab-Israeli."

The mayor lights another cigarette, as the Ministry's representatives examine the photograph. "It looks just like Istanbul, no?

He plans to market Palestinian culture to Jewish visitors, taking advantage of the recent local interest in cultural revival for purposes of Palestinian education and entertainment. The traditional art of lyric wedding poetry, for

which Dayr al-'Asad is famous, is currently experiencing renaissance in the Galilee. Such performances, he suggests, might form the basis of a monthly festival.

Yosef Shwartz is getting interested. "I like this. It's something I haven't seen in other villages...more *cultural*," he says, helping himself to more coffee. "Have you considered using the house as a seminar center?"

They discuss the kinds of structural renovation that might be required in Dayr al-'Asad (street repair, renovation of facades, installation of lights) and the potential content of cultural lectures and performances. The Ministry's representative from Haifa reminds us of the monthly open market, suggesting it might be included on a state-sponsored itinerary.

"It's your basic market, with kitchen goods, blue-jeans, olive oil..." He has visited the site and provides a first-hand account. "These kinds of local events will put the village on the tourist map."

The meeting has concluded, and we linger in the mayor's office before departing for our next village visit. In response to my query, Shwartz provides an historical overview of "Arab sector" tourism in the Galilee, speaking with his signature authority.

"After the Ministry intervened, historic things started to gain value. The people here used to destroy the old houses and build new ones. But you'll notice that today, local councils are talking about renovation." His narrative credits tourism as a force for cultural renewal against a history of self-inflicted neglect; the legacy of state-sponsored underdevelopment in Palestinian population centers inside Israel goes unremarked.

"They've finally begun to understand the value of daily things – the connection between *culture* and the houses they live in, between *folklore* and the tools in their kitchens. You understand?"

He pours another cup of coffee for the road. "It's our job to determine the most interesting elements."

Spatializing Ethnic Tourism

In 1994, under the Labor administration of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's Ministry of Tourism expressed an unprecedented interest in developing the tourist infrastructure of Palestinian villages in the Galilee for an explicitly Jewish-Israeli tourist population. When Ministry officials and planners got involved, Palestinian and Jewish entrepreneurs from the Galilee had already begun to develop the infrastructure of select villages (those particularly rich in architectural detail, picturesque landscapes, and a population willing to entertain visitors) and cater to the small, pioneering, clientele of Ashkenazi Jews. The Ministry was interested in the tropes of "folklore" and "tradition" -- in marketing local foods, customs, practices, and ways of life to a class of upwardly-mobile Ashkenazi visitors, whose interest in "Arab things" had been

piqued by advances in the Middle East Peace Process. State budgets for planning and development were only approved in 1995; yet the import of state's involvement exceeded the terms of its fiscal investment. Through the planning processes by which the Ministry of Tourism assessed the viability of villages qua tourist sites, rural Palestinian population centers became objects of state regulation and knowledge in new ways. State regulation in these places was anything but new; many of these villages had been rigidly and sometimes violently monitored since the founding of Israel in 1948, particularly during the period of the military administration (1950-1966) (Jiryis 1976; Lustick 1980). Yet through tourism, and practices of state-sponsored planning and development, the focus of regulation shifted to include *cultural* practices, objects, and sights. Through the intervention of the Ministry of Tourism, the intimate spaces of Palestinian daily life became objects of state scrutiny and regulation in new ways.

This paper investigates the ways in which the Ministry of Tourism and its private sector affiliates produced the Ministry's efforts to build "ethnic tourism" (a term exogenous to the Israeli state lexicon) within Palestinian villages of the Western Galilee during the mid-1990s. I am particularly interested in questions of *spatiality* -- that is, the ways in which *space* was imagined and produced as tourist commodity in and by official discourses and planning practices, and the attendant notions of Palestinian culture, subjectivity, and body enabled and produced by such spatial imaginations and practices. This paper will ask: How were Palestinian villages mapped and reconfigured in the process of state development? Which spaces acquired value on a state-sponsored map? What kinds of knowledges, bodies, and notions of the citizen-subject were produced through practices of space-making? I am interested both in sorts of spaces targeted and produced by the state, and those inhabited by state officials in the course of daily policy making and implementation.[2]

In the broadest terms, this paper seeks to investigate the ways in which the Ministry of Tourism sought to produce space as a part of a practice of governance during this period, and how space-making generated particular kinds of knowledges, notions of citizenship, stories about culture, and means of disciplining populations. I will focus my ethnography on the spatial practices, rhetorics, blueprints, and imaginations by which architects, policy-makers, and lower-level officials from the Israeli Ministry of Tourism planned and developed the ethnic tourism market during the mid-1990s. While planning was extensive during this period, only a small percentage of the blueprints produced would be implemented in the years that followed. Some were revised and discarded during the course of the planning process. Others failed to acquire sufficient state funding. When the Likud party took power in 1996, domestic development priorities shifted radically, and the Ministry of Tourism abandoned many prior

projects in the "Arab sector."[3] Yet this investigation is not scripted by the success or failure of implementation. Rather, I am concerned with the quotidian fabric of the state's practices and imaginations, and the knowledges and political histories of which development plans and blueprints were made.

While the state could regulate budgets for development, and could designate the permissible parameters of commercial zoning and construction within the market, it could not determine or demarcate the meanings and effects that ethnic tourism produced. As I will suggest, the knowledges, spaces, and meanings made through ethnic tourism could be mobilized and remarked in ways that exceeded state designs. I want to understand ethnic tourism as a highly *performative* domain – a site of meaning-making that that was not bound by state designs, but could be deployed as grounds for a *revision* of state logics, even through rhetorics and spaces sanctioned by the state itself. While I insist on the changeable nature of tourist meanings and effects, this analysis will foreground the material constraints that always attend, and sometimes frustrate, the labor of performative revision.[4]

Imagining "The State"

Also at stake in this paper is an attempt to think "the state" anthropologically, and consider how an ethnographic approach might complicate the ways "state" has been traditionally mapped and understood by social scientists and political theorists. Building on recent work by Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, I will ask: What would it mean to understand the state as an amalgam of everyday practices and tactics(Ferguson 1998; Gupta 1995)?[5] How might a portrait of the quotidian labor of lower-level officials, planners, and advisors unsettle the academic propensity to think the state as singular and univocal? As Wendy Brown suggests, the story of the state as singular and univocal should be understood as a fiction:

> Despite the almost unavoidable tendency to speak of the state as an "it," the domain we call the state is not a thing, system, or subject, but a significantly unbounded terrain of powers and techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules, practices, cohabitating in limited tension-ridden, often contradictory relation with one another (Brown 1995: 174).[6]

Following Brown and others, my project seeks to disaggregate the state by attending to the contradictions, pluralities, and polyvalences of which states are made (Coronil 1997; Gupta 1995; Mitchell 1989; 1991).[7] I aim to dispense with a notion of the state as ontologically prior, and to consider the more fluid ways in which state institutions and discourses produce citizen-subjects, practices, cultural formations and regimes of intelligibility, even as they are produced by and through them.[8]

Foucault's work on "the author" offer some productive tools for disaggregating and defetishizing the state.[9] In "What is an Author," Foucault asks: "Where should one stop" in an account of "the work" of an author?

> [W]hat about the rough drafts of his [sic] works? Obviously. The plans for his aphorisms? Yes. The deleted passages and the notes at the bottom of the page? Yes. What if, within a workbook filled with aphorisms, one finds a reference, the notation of a meeting or of an address, or a laundry list: Is it a work, or not? Why not? (Foucault 1984: 103)

Foucault aims to make visible the selective logic of inclusion and constitutive exclusion that governs that which may be properly called "the work" or the domain of "the author," with an eye to that which must be removed from "the work" in order for "the author" to function. These are the "deleted passages," the notes, the addresses, the laundry lists -- the artifacts of the quotidian, the private, and the domestic which must be repressed before the public eye in order for the proper name of the author to maintain its propriety.[10] By suppressing these intimate and less formal forms of writing, the author's work is contained, purified, and made knowable. In the paper that follows, I will consider the state in much the same way that Foucault has considered "the author," with an attention to precisely that which has been excluded from its domain in much recent scholarship in the humanities and social sciences in order for it to signify as knowable object. As in Foucault's investigation, I aim to deauthorize "the state," to contest the term as self-same signifier (like that of the author's proper name). I aim to investigate its more quotidian forms (its notes and laundry lists) and the myth of singularity (*the* state) that often attends its invocation. Following Foucault, I will ask: "Where has it been used, how can it circulate...? What are the places in which there is room for possible subjects? Who can assume these various subject functions?" (Foucault 1984: 120) How does one demarcate its domain? What spaces and processes have been traditionally excluded as the condition of its demarcation? I will argue that when one pluralizes its forms, allows the proper name of the state to be associated with these quotidian processes and spaces, one disarms the "fetish quality" of the state (Taussig 1992: 112).

My use of Foucault in translation -- that is, via his work on "the author" -- is partially an attempt to reconsider his 1970s scholarship on power and states in the post-monarchical era.[11] In his effort to rethink power as productive and not merely repressive, Foucault endorsed an analysis of the micro-practices and technologies of power "outside" the state's domain:[12]

> I don't want to say that State power isn't important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extends *beyond* the limits of the State. In two senses: first of all, because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations (italics mine) (Foucault 1980: 122).

In order to produce a theory of multiply situated and polyvocal power, Foucault seeks to imagine power "*beyond* the limits of the State."[13] In so doing, he reinstates the notion of a self-same, unitary "State" – an imagined entity which functions as the self-consolidating-other for more localizable sites and technologies of power as they cohere and are invested in "the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth." My project will turn Foucault's work against itself (in his own words, "to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest" under the weight of its own analytics) by considering the ways in which the micro-modalities of power might be thought without recourse to a theory of power outside or "beyond" the state's imagined limits (Foucault 1980: 54).

Together, the work of Brown and Foucault beg another set of questions about not merely the *what* but the *where* of the state, its locations and spatialities. Brown's work gestures towards the state's "domain" and "territoriality" but does little to investigate the spatial modalities of state power. Foucault's work on "the author" is even more suggestive in its attention to the places (the meeting, the laundry) which constitute the location from which "deleted passages" have been authored, or the sites to which they refer. Using the Israeli Ministry of Tourism as my proxy, the analysis that follows will consider both the (Israeli) state's production of spaces and the spaces in which the (Israeli) state is produced by lower-level officials and planners. The project is partially one of parochializing the state by making visible the deleted spaces in which state knowledges are made.

Histories of Tourism and Dispossession

The public discourse on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in both academic and activist domains has historically paid scant to the Palestinian communities that remained on their historic lands after the founding of the state of Israel in 1948.[14] Today, this community represents nearly 20 percent of Israel's citizenry and some 23 percent of Palestinians globally. Yet they have been all but rendered invisible within the dominant narrative about the "Arab-Israeli" conflict which casts "Israelis" as a homogenous ethnic-political constituency (Jewish, European, Zionist) and privileges Palestinian communities within the West Bank and Gaza Strip over those of Israel and the disapora.

By the end of the 1948 war, some 725,000 Palestinians had fled and/or were expelled from the territory designated as Israel – a territory which included nearly 80 percent of the area of historic Palestine.[15] During the course of the war, Israel's armies occupied more than a dozen of the major cities and towns inhabited largely or exclusively by Palestinians (including Acre, Beersheba, Bisan, Majdal, Nazareth, Ramle, Safad, Tiberias, West Jerusalem, and portions of Haifa), effectively destroying the infrastructure of the national Palestinian leadership and its economy. With the exception of Nazareth most these cities were emptied of residents and looted as their property was repossessed by Jewish citizens of the emerging state; substantive Palestinian populations remained in the cities of Jaffa, Acre, Haifa, and Ramle (Morris 1987). Israel's campaign on rural areas was no less violent. Hundreds of villages were destroyed and their residents expelled or forced to flee (Khalidi 1992). The refugee population included nearly all the political, social, economic, and intellectual elite of the population; only the population from the rural periphery remained, becoming an "instant minority" inside the state (Lustick 1980: 47-51). In the decades following the founding of the state (1948-1966), Israel governed the Palestinian population by means of a military government in an effort to contain the perceived "fifth column" within state territory. Through military rule, Israel severely restricted (often violently) freedom of movement, economic development, political organizing, and general social intercourse between and within villages. Massive campaigns of land confiscation in the 1950s, '60s and '70s radically delimited the population's ability to develop a territorial and economic base. By 1966, the state had confiscated or expropriated half of the remaining Palestinian land in rural areas; by the mid 1970s, the number had climbed to two-thirds (McDowall 1989: 127).[16] Cultural discrimination and symbolic violence has been no less severe in the decades since state formation. Palestinian histories were (and continue to be) systematically excluded from educational curriculum, Arabic cultural programming was actively marginalized from state media, and the prior Palestinian presence in Israeli cities and towns has been systemically erased from collective Jewish memory, despite enduring material traces on the Israeli landscape (e.g. decaying mosques in Jewish cities, villages ruins on Kibbutz grounds) (Adalah 1998).[17]

In the 1990s, some fifty years after the state's founding, Palestinians inside Israel continued to suffer from discrimination and the effects of decades of repression and underdevelopment, including inequitable access to water and electricity, lack of adequate housing, under-funded educational institutions and medical facilities, etc. (Rabinowitz 1997; Rouhana 1997; Yiftachel 1998). Campaigns of land confiscation continued during this decade, as did efforts to prevent the active integration of Palestinian communities and individuals into the nation-state, despite their legal status as full Israeli citizens.

How can one understand the state's unprecedented interest in ethnic tourism in the mid-1990s? The state's investment in this market, fiscally and symbolically, was part of the general shift in domestic state policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli population during this period.[18] State budgets for development and investment in Palestinian communities and institutions increased significantly between 1992 and 1996 -- particularly in the areas of education, health, and tourism -- climbing from New Israeli Shekel (NIS) 141.2 million in 1992, to NIS 480.1 million in 1996, in an actual growth of 240 percent (Prime Minister's Office 1996).[19] Under the previous government, led by Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (1989-1992), the Palestinian population had been virtually ignored, with negligible budget allocations for planning and development.[20] While budgetary gains under the Labor party were significant, they could not substantively compensate for years of forced underdevelopment. Many of the state's discriminatory policies, particularly those related to land-use planning and education, remained in place. These shifts in domestic policy were intimately related to the Middle East Peace Process.[21] Peace with neighboring Arab countries, and the public discourse of Arab/Jewish coexistence that it catalyzed, enabled the state to support domestic Arab populations and institutions in new ways. The state's official narrative on the Peace Process largely ignored the Palestinian diaspora, and the relationship between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians beyond Israel's borders. Yet the Ministry of Tourism perpetually explained and marketed ethnic tourism as a bridge for uniting "Arabs" and "Jews" in the spirit of "peace" and regional reconciliation.[22]

The state's interest in ethnic tourism also accorded with the domestic policies of the Ministry of Tourism and its new interest in the (so-called) "Arab sector" under Minister of Tourism Uzi Baram. Initially, only Palestinian urban centers were included on the Ministry's map of development priorities, and were imagined and developed as cultural markets.[23] The Ministry inaugurated projects in three Palestinian cities and waterfronts. The development of Nazareth was granted top priority with an 80-million-dollar project to renovate the Old City[24] and expand its tourism infrastructure, crippled by a legacy of governmental obstacles and land expropriation, in preparation for the millennial anniversary of the birth of Christ and the magnitude of anticipated pilgrimage.[25] In tandem, but with more modest budgets, the government pursued renovation projects in the Old City of Acre (of which the gentrification and subsequent demographic shift of Jaffa was imagined as precedent), and the Jisr al'Zarqa' beach front (initially hailed by the government as the first tourist development aimed explicitly at an Arab clientele).[26]

The move towards budgets for the Palestinian *village* was made possible by the simultaneous shift in Ministry priorities towards "rural tourism" (*tayarut kafrit*) in the Jewish sector -- an effort to develop places of country hospitality which might compete with the metropolitan sites which had historically monopolized government budgets and Israeli leisure itineraries (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Eilat). The etymology of the "rural" (*kafri*) with its roots in the Hebrew word for "village" is important here. The slide from noun to adjective, from "village" (*kfar*) to "rural" (*kafri*), performed an unmarked erasure in colloquial Israeli usage, in which the traces of "the village" were heard but unacknowledged. Even as it passed as "rural" in Ministry terminology, popular and market usage favored a more vernacular definition, in which *kafri* carried the rather ambiguous significance of "country-style" (of potato chips, interior design). As the "village" was, historically, a place of Palestinian-Arab dwelling, this rendering invisible of "the village" in "the rural" was the site of a deracination, a symbolic deterritorializing of Palestinians from the Israeli countryside. Ministry designs for "rural tourism" initially accorded with this colloquial norm by ignoring the Palestinian village, targeting instead *kibbutzim* and *moshavim* (Jewish cooperative settlements) which were turning to tourism after a gradual decline in agricultural productivity.[27] It was only after the success of this market that the Ministry turned to "the village" as a site of potential development. In 1995 and 1996, late in the Labor tenure, budgets were approved for development in a dozen Palestinian villages (including Daliyat El Karmel, Yerka, Pekein, Dayr Hanna, Sakhnin). While these budgets were approved concurrently, Ministry officials interviewed for this study would not discuss them as part of a single policy directive: Sakhnin and Dayr Hanna were deemed "Arab" villages, while the others (containing Bedouin and Druze populations) were not.

The politics of state nomenclature deserve attention. According to the state taxonomy, whose roots can be traced to the early years of state formation, Christians and Muslims have been understood as "Arabs," while Bedouins and Druze have not:[28] "Arabs" have been understood as potential state-foes, while the "non-Arab" minorities have been marked as tenuous allies, and conscripted and/or voluntary members of Israel's armed forces.[29] (At times of national crisis these boundaries have been more fluid; the chant "Death to the Arabs" has hailed Muslims and Christian alike.) The popular appellation "Arab-Israeli," by which Palestinians with Israeli citizenship were hailed in dominant Israeli discourse in the mid-1990s, functioned to obscure the ethnonational history of the indigenous Palestinian population that lives within the state's borders, and to diminish its oppositional potential as a unified body by fracturing its communities.[30] The companion term "Arab-sector" functioned as a spatial marker which worked to radically delimit the territory deemed "Arab" in the present (for example, Nazareth but not Haifa was mapped as of "the Arab

sector"). In its very selective cartography, the term has obscured both the magnitude of the Palestinian population and its land holdings prior to state formation, and the history of its violent dispossession.

In the 1990s, tourism policy obeyed the logic of state taxonomies: "Arab," "Bedouin," and "Druze" villages were grouped and developed according to separate (although related) blueprints and bodies of knowledge. Indeed, the Ministry's map of development have long followed the taxonomic logic. For while a small number of Bedouin and Druze villages have been places of internal tourism since the 1950s, and even selective recipients of government aid, Christian, Muslim, and mixed villages have been largely absent from the popular and state-sponsored tourist itinerary. Historically, the criteria for inclusion on this map have been multiple (including issues such as proximity to main thoroughfares, the quality/quantity of historic spots). But the political histories of prospective sites have also been critical. Population centers with a legacy of collaboration with the state had been favored as tourist locales (e.g. Abu Ghosh, Jisr al-Zarqa' in the 1990s)[31], while villages with histories of political activism have been consistently deemed less attractive.

Dayr Hanna, 16 February 1995

In the fall of 1994, the Ministries of Tourism and Housing approved joint budgets for cosmetic renovation in a handful of Galilee villages with "touristic potential." In the winter of 1995, planners were sent into the field to evaluate sites and asses development possibilities. On a cold morning in late February, I accompany architect Btsalel Rinot and his assistant to the Palestinian village of Dayr Hanna in the western Galilee. Rinot's firm, based out of Haifa, had been employed by the Ministry of Tourism to draft plans in several Galilee sites. At the time of our visit, Rinot and his associates had already prepared the initial blueprints for Dayr Hanna and merely awaited approval from state officials.

At 11:00 am, I meet Rinot in the offices of the Dayr Hanna local council where a meeting with the mayor and local deputy for tourism affairs is already underway. Rinot is leading the proceedings. With coffee in hand, he unfurls an aerial photograph of the village and begins to discuss its intricacies in animated Hebrew. Using the photograph as guide, he delineates the village's most impressive structures, its historic facades and walls, stressing the need to work with vernacular aesthetics rather than import those from outside. The political demographics of this scene of planning were typical of many I had witnessed: Ashkenazi Jews from urban centers design and plan while Palestinian representatives from the area consulted and approved when necessary. The Jewish professor of archeology, a consultant on issues of historic preservation, has already come and gone.

"We'll focus our energies here," Rinot explains, pointing to the center of the map, where most of the historic village structures are concentrated.

"First we'll renovate the periphery, where the old walls used to be." He leads our eyes with a pencil, to illustrate the path of a proposed walkway. "Then we'll guide the tourist into the heart of the village, *ha gareen ha kfar*."

"Looks good," the mayor is enthusiastic, envisioning an integrated market built in stages, expanding alongside its client-base. He appointed the village's tourism deputy only two months prior, to meet the anticipated promise of a growing tourism economy in Galilee villages. "Any idea on the timeline?"

"You know how it is..." Rinot is unable to provide specifics, as his progress depends on the speed of Ministry approval.

At noon, the meeting has concluded, and I join Rinot and his assistant on a tour through prospective sites of renovation. We walk briskly through the narrow alleys of the historic village center, winding past low stone houses built in close proximity, occasionally interrupted by small gardens and citrus trees. Rinot carries the plans which he annotates with notes and drawings.

"Most local councils want their villages to look like Tel Aviv," he explains, sketching a doorway of architectural interest. "But the tourists want to go somewhere they haven't been."

Even in the mid-1990s, Israeli-Jews are infrequent visitors to Dayr Hanna, and our party elicits the silent stares of residents from second-floor windows and courtyards. The sounds of Hebrew in these narrow streets cannot but recall the history of an Israeli army presence and its attendant violences in preceding decades. As a modern-religious Jew, head covered by a yarmulke, Rinot is an especially anomalous visitor, yet he walks with confidence.

"When I started this project, people told me not to come alone." Rinot swerves to avoid a soccer game of young boys in our path. "But these days, I walk on my own. No problem."

He pauses to sketch again. "I mean, they live here. But we uncover things about the village that they didn't know about."

Rinot leads us through backyards and into courtyard interiors to examine spots of architectural interest that will figure centrally in his development plan. We climb staircases and peer over walls to look for potential tourist sites.

"I'd put a drinking fountain here, and a shop for local crafts in that alcove. What do you think?" His assistant concurs, scribbling onto a pad as Rinot details his vision.

Walking through a private garden, and behind a housing compound, Rinot discovers a portion of the ancient village wall that he hadn't seen before. He points out places where cement has been applied as fortification and suggests methods for restoration, in a frequently disparaging tone. "They didn't even try to preserve it."

We pause to examine the ancient cistern.

"The thing is, most mayors want their villages to look like Tel Aviv. Or McDonalds. Everybody wants a McDonalds." He takes measurements, jotting down the numbers in his notebook. "But I try to work with the local elements. Of course if this was Europe, it would already be full of shops."

Near the village's southern heights, overlooking the valley below, we emerge onto a overgrown lot where a low stone compound with domed roofs is partially obscured by grass. This area will figure centrally in Rinot's blueprint.

"We could put a restaurant on this side, and illuminate the whole thing at night," he continues aloud, sketching as he walks. Their firm envisions a tourist site carefully integrated with the surrounding village to take advantage of local traditions, spaces, and daily practices. They imagine "authentic" Arab meals served in private gardens, crafts sold in the village square, and women baking bread the traditional way in picturesque alcoves.

"What do you think about a cafe on that roof?" Rinot points towards a white-washed stone house, facing the ancient Muslim cemetery. His assistant agrees. The view over the valley is excellent.

Planning "the Village"

I offer this scene as a way of considering the concrete spatial practices of Israeli state planners as they labored to reinvent the Palestinian village as a place of leisure and consumption for Jewish Israeli tourist populations. Through the optics of tourism, Palestinian villages within Israel were being reconceptualized by the state and its affiliates. Space had to be remade. As in Rinot's plan, rooftops and alcoves had to be reconceptualized as future sites of tourist value (village square as tourist market, courtyard as restaurant) [Figures 1 and 2]. Villages had to be made visible, intelligible, and consumable for Jewish tourists who had long regarded these places as loci of danger, requiring regulation. The fact of state intervention in these villages was nothing new, nor was the desire of state officials to make the village visible.[32] What changed in the mid-1990s were the techniques of making visible and the objects of the state's regulatory gaze.

What I want to consider in more depth are the ways in which ethnic tourist space was made and imagined as object by state planners, and the knowledges about Palestinian culture and persons that space-making produced. I want to argue that the ethnic tourist market was developed and made available to Jewish consumers according to a "geography of interiority." That is, Palestinian villages qua tourist sites were mapped by planners as a series of back-regions, of semi-private domains and objects, marked with the recognizable traces of "daily Arab living." Through this mapping, , villages were made visible and consumable for prospective Jewish tourists. As chains of concentric interior spaces, villages were imbued with "authenticity" and value as potential leisure sites.

The locus of state development was the "core" of the village -- *ha garin' ha kfar*, in the Hebrew lexicon.[33] The term was a both an historical and a spatial designator, referring to the original nucleus of the village around which residential and commercial expansion had proceeded in subsequent generations. Following Ministry dictates, state employed developers centralized their efforts here. In addition to cosmetic renovation of facades and public spaces in the village "core," the Ministry of Tourism typically worked in conjunction with the Ministries of Housing and Infrastructure to improve and/or install sewage systems, street lighting, and pipelines in these historic neighborhoods. This emphasis on the "core" meant that many neighborhoods were left untouched, often despite a lack of basic infrastructure, during the course of development. Nor was renovation always deemed valuable by state planners. The "authenticity" of the village, and thus its value as tourist site, could also be bolstered by landscapes of underdevelopment.[34] That is, broken roads and antiquated drainage systems could do the work of the "local" picturesque, even as planners often attributed such signs of underdevelopment to histories of internal neglect ("they didn't even try to preserve it.").

The location of these historic "cores" differed. In some villages, they were at the geographic center of present settlement. In other places, modern commercial centers had usurped their geographic centrality. Despite geographic variability, development plans for the "village core" followed a relatively standardized blueprint, favoring a stable set of historical and architectural elements: doomed roofs, stone walkways, ancient walls, etc. Of course, the ability to produce a standardized blueprint for development was made possible by the shared social, architectural, and cultural histories of Western Galilee villages. Yet it was also a product of a dominant Israeli imagination of "the Arab village" which, in keeping with an Orientalist epistemology, emphasized cultural equivalencies across heterogeneous "Arab" spaces and histories.[35] In all cases, the "core" was squarely within the village and still inhabited by residents, and was neither accessible nor necessarily visible to tourists on a drive around the village periphery. The maps included within Rinot's plan for Dayr Hanna illustrate this interiority clearly; the proposed "tourist path" would take the visitor into the very heart of the village center, past sites of historic interest and through its dense residential neighborhoods, rather than along its borders [Figure 3]. What was being made available to tourists by the state was not merely the flavor of the village, seen from the road, but the intimate spaces and knowledges of the village's inside.

As in the case of Dayr Hanna, the value of "the core" was articulated relationally. Many planners sought to emphasize its spatial and cultural difference from Israeli urban centers (notably Tel Aviv), even as they sought to capitalize on its proximity or accessibility for the Jewish-Israeli traveler. The

markers of difference were built into the market's infrastructure through the (imagined) tropes of "Arab," "Druze," or "Bedouin" culture. Value cohered in juxtaposition, in the "Druzeness" (for example) of the place, in contrast to the aesthetics of the Jewish metropolis. Yet even as Ministry planners sought to emphasize the difference between (Oriental) village and (Occidental) city, they constantly invoked and utilized European rural tourism as a model for successful "village" development (recall the words of Rinot: "If this was Europe, all this would already be shops.").[36] Indeed, policy papers and directives issued by the Ministry of Tourism explicitly positioned the European market in rural hospitality as development exemplar. What resulted was a doubly referential model, by which planners, architects, and policy-makers sought to develop a "village core" that would be recognizably Arab *even as* it mimicked the rural, European landscape. At this intersection, the state's imagination was irreducible to the normative epistemology of Orientalism.

Histories of Dispossession and Struggle

The politics of development within the western Galilee must be considered in historical perspective. At issue are the multiple legacies of state repression since 1948, and the ongoing struggle between Galilee Palestinians and the state over land, resources, and political representation. The collaborative production of ethnic tourism in the 1990s – that is, by the state, Jewish private sector, and local Palestinian entrepreneurs – emerges from this history in multiple and sometimes conflicting ways. Ethnic tourism could be explained (simultaneously) as the Labor administration's effort to redress the history of underdevelopment in the Palestinian sector even as it quelled political opposition through the promise of fiscal gains; as an effect of shifting popular politics within the Palestinian community in the post-Oslo era, in accordance with the shift from activism to economic opportunism; and/or (as I will suggest in the paper that follows) as a Palestinian tactic for continuing their historic struggles in other registers. My reading of the ethnic tourism market is situated at the intersection of competing political realities, and the histories from which they emerge.

Even after the flight and violent expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in 1948, and the subsequent scramble to settle Jews in "abandoned" villages, the Galilee remained the densest area of Palestinian Arab habitation inside the newly created Israeli territory.[37] In the mid-1950s, in response to the territorial and demographic threat posed by the indigenous Palestinian population, governmental and non-governmental agencies began an aggressive campaign of Jewish settlement in the Galilee – a campaign bolstered by a coextensive waves of land confiscation. [38] The state's settlement policy carried an unambiguous appellate: The Judaization of the Galilee (*Yehud Ha Galil*). The government sought to build a Jewish majority in the north of the country

even as it undercut Palestinian land-holdings and possibilities for future development (spatial, economic, and social) and disrupted territorial continuity. Through generous housing grants, and a pioneering ethos borrowed from the early-Zionist archive, the government sought to woo Jewish settlers to isolated population centers in the midst of dense Arab settlement. In the words of veteran Israeli hawk Ariel Sharon, they sought to "stem the hold of foreigners on state lands" (Lustick 1980: 258).

The Judaization project progressed in stages. Some forty Jewish rural settlements were established during the 1940s and 50s, largely around the periphery of the Galilee. Between 1950 and 1970, the territorial base of the Palestinian population was significantly reduced through massive campaigns of land-confiscation, abetted by demolition of "unauthorized" dwellings. In the late 1970s and early 80s, the government began rigorous promotion and financing of Jewish settlement within the Galilee's most populated regions. Despite widespread protest within local Palestinian communities, forty new settlements were established during this period with the assistance of the Jewish Agency (Yiftachel 1991; 1996). Many of the Jewish settlements established since the 1950s have been relatively small in population, yet they have enjoyed generous government subsidies and budgets for development, and have been granted vast land holdings for agriculture, industry, and residential expansion.[39] In the mid-1990s, Palestinians still comprised the vast majority of Galilee residents (74 percent) – this despite the radical shifts in the balance of demography, territory, and resources that had occurred in preceding decades. (Yiftachel 1996).[40]

The history of Judaization is also marked by struggle. On March 30 of 1976, in response to government plans to expropriate vast tracts of Palestinian-owned land in the western Galilee, communist-backed village committees organized a general strike and day of protest.[41] The army was called and instructed to repress protest at any cost. What resulted were a series of violent clashes that left several Palestinians dead and hundreds more wounded and under arrest. In the wake of these clashes, debate in the Israeli parliament focused less on the substance of Palestinian protest than on the need for heightened regulation of the population. In the 1970s and '80s, "Land Day" (as it was dubbed) was commemorated by popular demonstrations and strikes within the Palestinian sector. During the era of the Palestinian uprising (Intifada), Land Day became both an occasion to demand equity within the nation-state, and to display solidarity with the Palestinian national movement in the occupied territories.

How does tourism intervene in this history? Among the villages that joined the state-sponsored tourist map in the mid-1990s were Sakhnin, 'Arraba and Dayr Hanna. These villages were victims of the 1976 and 1982

confiscations and (in)famous centers of Land Day commemoration in subsequent decades. Given the state's propensity to develop tourism in places/communities with collaborationist histories, the decision to produce the western Galilee as leisure center is an interesting anomaly. Yet the political climate in these villages changed significantly since the late 1970s, thereby facilitating state interest. In the years following the Oslo Accords of 1993 and the end of the Intifada,[42] popular Palestinian politics inside Israel shifted away from the activism of '70s and '80s, and the coextensive critique of the Israeli occupation, towards increased state-identification and demands for socio-economic mobility and civil status in the nation-state.[43] The lure of future revenues from a tourist market also produced political effects. Villages were only deemed "attractive" by the state as sites of potential investment in the absence of public political struggle and opposition. Tourist dollars were at stake.

The Bureau of Small Businesses, 13 March 1996

Sixteen people crowd around a formica table over plastic cups of coffee at the meeting of the Bureau of Small Businesses for the Druze and Arab Sectors (MATI) in the Palestinian city of Sakhnin. Today's meeting is particularly well attended, including seven Jewish consultants, architects and planners from the private sector; four representatives from the Ministry of Tourism; two Palestinians employees of MATI's Sakhnin branch; and one Jewish-American anthropologist, scribbling into her notebook. The Bureau meets on a bi-monthly basis to discuss tourist projects currently under way under Ministry supervision, and to review initiatives from the local Palestinian community. In most instances, Palestinian entrepreneurs employ Jewish-Israeli consultants to do their bidding before the board. Sometimes the pair comes together; but often, only the consultant is present, speaking in Hebrew in the name of his client. The Ministry of Tourism, in partnership with the Jewish Agency, will provide preliminary funding for small-scale projects that meet their criteria. Funding for broad-based development requires more extensive review.

"Anyone want Ashkenazi coffee who didn't get?" Instant coffee is passed to those who request it. There are no Mizrahi Jews among us, nor any Palestinian state officials – indeed, the Ministry has no Palestinian-Arab employees. Save occasional jokes, these ethno-racial demographics are rarely remarked upon.[44] Today we are discussing touristic development in the "Druze sector" (thus the conversation has been delimited). The meeting on "Arab villages" is scheduled for next month.

Item 1: Kobi Birnack, marketing consultant from the Tel Aviv firm *Marktest,* provides an update on development plans for the village of Horfeish. He explains that his firm has completed a study on the village's touristic potential

and have determined that Horfeish is "ready for development." Save the shortage of parking, the primary problem stems from a lack of education about the nature of tourism itself: "They don't understand their own potential, simply because they don't know what tourism is."

Birnack circulates a xeroxed summary of his findings. "We have to go there and explain it to them -- to let them know that 'you can turn your grocery store into a restaurant,' or 'take the house where your parents used to live and make it into a cafe.'"

Birnack directs the group to the comprehensive booklet *Martest* has prepared, which includes a brief history of the village, an itemized list of proposed initiatives and anticipated costs, and discussion of the anticipated difficulties faced by developers. The firm recommends a development emphasis on restaurants and bed-and-breakfast facilities, and stresses the commercial value of folkloric aesthetics.

There is some dissension from the Ministry's consultant from Haifa. She is one of two women present (save the anthropologist) and a frequently oppositional voice in such meetings: "But these villages aren't only being used by tourists, which you people seem to be forgetting. Maybe it's not in a family's best interest to turn their grocery store into a restaurant..."

"But that's exactly the point." Birnack gets up to help himself to more coffee. "Part of the authenticity [*otentiut*] of these places is that people live there – they are living places, and the tourists are in the middle of it all. No question." There is no consensus from participants, and they table the plan and move on.

Item 3: Adnan Hussein, a Palestinian entrepreneur from the village of 'Arraba, has prepared preliminary blueprints for a tourist complex on his land. Last week the Ministry of Tourism sent their representatives to his property to asses its potential and today they are reporting back on their findings:

"Hussein wants to renovate the old house, bring tourists in on donkeys, and maybe set up a restaurant." The Jewish representative from Haifa lights another cigarette as he continues. "But the thing is, there's nothing touristic about the place. There's nothing to see."

The architect from Tel Aviv disagrees. He's also been to the site and thinks it has significant potential:

"In addition to the restaurant, this guy wants to set up a service for old-style photography. I think he's got something there..."

There are murmurs of interest, and he continues: "Look, I was one of the first people to tour Sinai. There was nothing there either." They approve preliminary funding and we break for lunch.

Item 10: The local council of Yerka village has employed the services of a Haifa-based consulting firm (Fellner Development Ltd.) to produce a master plan for tourism in the village.

The firm conducted a survey on touristic potential within Yerka, going door-to-door with Arabic speaking interviewers to elicit suggestions for development and asses the local population's interest in the project. Fellner, the firm's manager, has come before The Bureau of Small Businesses to make his recommendations and request Ministry funding. Based on the findings of his survey, Fellner advocates a focus on cultural projects and folkloric enterprises: traditional Druze restaurants, craft markets, home-based performances and services.

Yosef Shwartz, Minister of Rural Development: "But let's get serious. Is there something particularly touristic about Yerka? Is there something worth developing?"

Fellner: "From what I can tell, it seems to be crowded on Friday and Saturday for the old market. People come to buy things--you know, clothing, kitchen wares." The open market is utilized largely by Palestinian residents of the area, but Fellner notes that Jews from Tel Aviv and Haifa are starting hear about it. He recommends sustained and focused development of the area as a single unit -- a chain of touristic villages (Yerka, Kisra-Asmeya, Peke'in). Eventually, the Ministry might consider building a scenic drive between them. There are no "Druze restaurants" yet, he adds, but their success is virtually assured.

The discussion concludes and the project is approved; Shwartz will send planners to Yerka to evaluate its infrastructural need.

"But you know what I'm worried about?" Shwartz reaches across the table for the booklet Fellner has prepared. "You're talking about tourism but I'm not so sure they know what tourism is. People need to understand that a lot of foreign people are going to be wandering around. We're talking about buses, about daily visitors." They discuss the problem -- how to educate the local population about sustainable development, how to develop the infrastructure without destroying local sites.

Item 12: In the village of Kawcab, one of the first in the Western Galilee to attract Jewish-Israeli visitors, Yussef Faraj wants to expand his restaurant with the help of government funds. Birnack, who has visited the establishment, provides an overview: Faraj has been consistently denied government loans because his kitchen does not meet the nationally mandated standards outlined by the Ministry of Health. He explains that the restaurant began as a traditional "Bedouin tent" [*ohel bedu'i*] in which clients were seated on the floor for their meals. More recently, Faraj has installed tables and has stabilized the walls with metal siding. The restaurant currently relies on a generator, as the site is not connected to the local electricity grid, due to its failure to meet the national regulations for commercial establishments. As Birnack explains it, the problem rests in the need to comply with health regulations, even as the "authentic" nature of the tent is preserved. The case is unprecedented.

"The restaurant is doing well and Faraj wants to expand, but there are no clauses in the health regulations that provide for kitchens in tents."

The Tourism Ministry's representative, Yosef Shwartz, has been to the place, and attests that it's always crowded on weekends because the food is good and the reputation strong. "So it's a problem of putting a modern kitchen into a Bedouin tent."

"I heard about a Bedouin tent in Rahat with a full kosher kitchen," Birnack interjects, "approved by the Rabbinate."

Shwartz isn't familiar with this site. "Basically, it's an issue of refrigeration."

The representative from Haifa weighs in: "That can't be it. Have you been to the south of France? You've seen the way they leave cheeses outside...." The Palestinian representatives sit in silence, smoking.

Shwartz agrees to present the issue to the Ministry of Health. They'll follow it up at next month's meeting.

Culture on the Inside

How might we understand this scene? In the broadest terms, the quotidian details of planning and development are critical in unsettling the myth of a univocal state. Through this ethnographic portrait, one sees the perpetual negotiation over meanings and procedures of which official Ministry policy is made – a contest over which objects, icons, and spaces might carry the official mark of the state and enjoy its fiscal support. In this scene, the work of producing development blueprints, and determining the conceptual parameters for development, was continually tempered with joking asides and personal anecdotes. At this hazy intersection of policy-making and anecdote, of official knowledge and private memory, the state looks anything but stable, univocal, and omnipotent.

It is precisely the typicality of this scene that interests me here. For despite the wide variance between and among villages considered as sites of tourist developments (differences in culture, geography, and politics), the discourses and practices of state planners were remarkably consistent. The work of producing ethnic tourism turned on a stable set of institutions, attractions, and development priorities that accorded with state taxonomies and the logic of ethnic difference. Planning documents favored "Druze restaurants," "Arab markets" selling "traditional Arab goods," "Bedouin attractions," "Arab cultural centers," and "Druze style lodging."[45] An interesting pan-Orientalism was at work, by which these attractions or facilities were described through nearly identical narratives. Thus one sees "Arab markets" and "Druze markets" distinguished only by the adjective ("Druze" or "Arab") that marks their difference, and the practices and objects ("Druze clothing," "Arab coffee") that

authenticate them. "Difference" rested partially on a tautological repetition of ethnic signifiers. The emphasis on ethnic types also had a depopulating effect. The adjective "Druze" or "Arab" was rallied to modify things not beings (food, markets, tents), suggesting the possibility of ethnicity in the absence of persons.

Yet localness also had value to state planners. Even as Ashkenazi consultants sought to build a tourist market around a relatively stable set of ethno-cultural institutions, whose very intelligibility depended on their alocality ("*the* Bedouin tent," "*the* Druze market"), they also labored to exploit the unique features of prospective places ("Is there something particularly touristic about Yerka?").[46] The tourist value of a cultural institution cohered precisely at the intersection of the trans-local cultural institution, and the markers of "the daily" or "the local" – in the interplay, for example, of "the Druze restaurant" and "the house where your parents used to live."

What is the relationship between the cultural and spatial mappings of the ethnic tourism market, as dictated by the Ministry of Tourism? How might we understand the link between the dominant cultural script favored by planners and their efforts to centralize ethnic tourism in the "village center" [*gar'in hakfar*]? I want to argue that ethnic tourism was structured around a complex and polyvalent notion of *interiority* – what I will call a "geography of interiority" -- at the intersection of culture and space. This geography of interiority had several tiers. Architects and planners employed by the state aimed to develop villages as bundles of *consecutive* insides. The village core was the merely the container, the outer limit of this geography. *Within* the core, planners set their sights on the intimate spaces of Palestinian living behind gates, inside courtyards and backyards, within livingrooms. They sought to transform these interior spaces into cafes, shops, and places of leisure. Their aim was both to open private spaces for Jewish consumption, and to afford tourists with heightened degrees of *proximity* to ethnic cultures. Each successive tier of interiority would provide the tourist with a truer experience of Arab, Bedouin, or Druze culture – or so state discourse suggested.

The studies and blueprints produced by the Ministry's planners prioritized close encounters. That is, they consistently favored initiatives and projects that offered tourists an intimate experience with local persons and practices. Because of the sheer density of Palestinian dwelling in many village centers, the possibilities for acute intimacy were numerous. The following list of preferred development sites in the Druze village of Yerka, presented before the MATI board by Fellner INC., is one such example:

> Salon: [The client plans] to enclose his courtyard and convert it into a shop at a later date. At the present stage, it is possible to turn the courtyard into a salon that could seat between 8 and 12 people; includes grape-leaf trellis and view.
>
> *Guest Houses and Kiosk:* The client...is planning to turn [his] store into a kiosk and gallery. Immediately adjacent is an apartment of 140 square meters which the client intends to convert into guest rooms.
>
> *Guest Garden and Tea House:* Plans to construct a guest area in his large courtyard, surrounded with greenery. Guests will be served cold drinks, Druze snacks [*hatifim druzim*], and green tea from herbs grown on the premises (Fellner Development Ltd. 1994).

The spaces enumerated above deserve careful consideration. They are private, enclosed exteriors (courtyards and gardens), semi-public commercial spaces (the store), and private interiors (the apartment). Most are restricted domains, in close proximity to others, and in which capacity is limited (stores backing onto small apartments, courtyards next to private homes). All are enclosed, in some way, from the general public. Many require the transformation of a residential domain into a guest facility. In keeping with a dominant trope of development discourse, the aesthetics of ethnicity ("Druze snacks") are explicitly embedded in the leisure infrastructure (available to the visitor in the "guest garden and tea house"). What these initiatives share is a semiotics of intimacy – spatial and/or cultural. All of these proposed leisure sites are clearly ensconced within the lives of village residents, providing the tourist with highly proximate encounters with culture, bodies, and the quotidian details of everyday life.

Of course, intimacy was a byproduct of underdevelopment. The state's interest in small spaces and semi-private domains was partially due to the market's material constraints. Many Palestinian entrepreneurs had limited capital and land available for development, and Jewish planners were forced to work within these limits. And it was hard to avoid "proximity" in the heart of the Palestinian village because of sheer residential density. Policy makers from the Ministry of Tourism also sought to avoid rapid overdevelopment in areas that lacked the infrastructure to support massive tourist traffic, and thus favored small-scale initiatives that could be housed in pre-existing structures. Yet I want to suggest that the interest of policy-makers and planners in developing an "intimate" market based on proximate contact between hosts and guests exceeded the terms of these material constraints. The value and allure of ethnic tourism rested in its very location within the daily, living village.

The next successive interior favored by planners, following the semi-private spaces of "the courtyard" and enclosed garden, was "the living-room" -- a space made available to Jewish guests through the institution of "bed-and-breakfast." This was one of the central institutions of the ethnic tourism market, as it promised to provide tourists with access to everyday life inside the home, normally protected from the tourist gaze.[47] Surveys conducted by the private sector to asses the viability of tourism in particular locales, asked village residents: "Is there a room in your house for hosting guests? Would you (plural) be interested in hosting tourists in your house? Would you be prepared to set up tourist entertainment?" (Birnack Investments 1994a). Because most families who sought to open B & B facilities in their homes were relatively inexperienced entrepreneurs, state officials feared that proper "standards and regulations" would not be met, and recommended education by means of "courses and written materials" (Baran Designs 1994). The following list of "recommended criteria for guest units," included in an appendix to Rinot's plan for Dayr Hanna, illustrate the ways in which Palestinian space was regulated and produced in the course of planning and development:

> The subject of lodging in the Arab and Druze sector arose last year, and in our interviews we have discovered increasing openness to this branch [of the tourist sector]. It is clear that we have to design this branch in accordance with the lifestyle, culture and special customs of each place. After studying the issue we recommend adaptation of the following criteria:
> 1. Each holiday unit should include private bathroom facilities.
> 2. Each unit should have its own entrance, separate from that of the family house.
> 3. Components of the entertainment can be shared with members of the [host] family. The eastern mentality [*hamentaliyut hamizrahit*] will welcome shared meals, conversations in the living room, etc.
> 10. In the case of a family unit, there should be a division between the parent's room and children's room.
> 11. Every unit should be marked by signs in three languages.
> (Rinot Ltd. 1995: 29)

This is a blueprint for the regulation of space – of doorways and bathrooms, and the geographical relationship between the guest unit and the host's domicile. It mandates the construction of walls to separate children from parents, and installation of signs to produce a clear demarcation between the domains of guest and host. Through the regulation of space, "culture" is policed and shaped in particular ways. No less critical than the demarcation of domains and their inhabitants (guest from host, children from parents) is the interface between host and guest over a "shared meal." This cultural encounter is virtually built into the

space of bed-and-breakfast; "conversations in the livingroom" and "private bathroom facilities" are equally fundamental components of the tourist infrastructure.[48] In the blueprint above, this ritual of "sharing" is explained as a virtually organic feature of "the eastern mentality." Thus, the document both mandates the performance of hospitality, and insists that it be enunciated as an essential cultural practice. Through the regulation of space, daily Palestinian culture was not only monitored but *produced* according to a particular, state-sponsored script. Through the institution of bed-and-breakfast, the cultural and spatial interiors of Palestinian villages became objects of state regulation in new ways.

Portraits

What kinds of meanings does "interiority" hold in this context? How might we understand the coarticulation of culture and interior space as a heightened nexus of tourist value in the discourse of state planners? Like Dean MacCannel's "back region," the ethnic tourist market was developed according to a map of *consecutive* interiors – a chain of interior spaces that progressed inward from the village core to the enclosed courtyard to the living room of the bed and breakfast host. Culture and space were not merely simultaneous indices of tourist value. Rather, they were fundamentally imbricated. Cultural authenticity was thought to cohere within the inside spaces of daily Palestinian living, typically protected from the tourist gaze. Interiority promised both the truth and intimacy of culture on the "inside." The further one moved inside, the more real it became. The degree of "authenticity" accorded with the depth of penetration into these interior zones.[49]

The final zone of interiority within this state-sponsored geography, and the locus of heightened authenticity, was the very body of the ethnic subject. That is, the chain of consecutive interiors moved inward *within* the village core from courtyard to living room to the corpus of the ethnic subject. Amateur photographs of village inhabitants, either shot or collected by the architect or consultant, were often included alongside recommendations for infrastructural renovation and budgets for proposed development. Most were portraits featuring a single Palestinian subject. Some featured faces alone, others included full-figures. Many were posed, and implicitly offered as evidence of the tourist potential of particular places. The iconography of such portraiture was repetitive and predictable: the sitters tended to be dressed in "traditional garb," framed by an intimate and recognizably "local" landscape -- like narrow streets and private livingrooms. Traces of the more "modern" life (cars, cement facades, billboards) were typically expunged. Because of the desire for an iconography of "the traditional," such images tend to feature the older generation of rural Palestinian men and women among whom traditional clothing was still worn. Posed against

a picturesque wall or with a historic farming implement, these images told a story of pre-modern bodies in places where time stood still.

Such portraits carried meaning synedochically; that is, they were meant to be understood as snapshots of a community whose phenotypes were interchangeable. Read in the context of planning documents -- and their persistent depiction of "the village" as a container of self-same types and equivalent cultural institutions -- the photograph of "the Arab man" functioned like the architectural sketch of "the ancient wall"; both were offered as instances of *the* (singular) historic village. Photographs of faces did a particular work; the camera's close-up provided the viewer with a kind of spatial *proximity* that mimicked the intimate cultural encounter offered to the tourist in the living room of the bed-and-breakfast host. Through the recurring iconography of "the traditional," such portraiture did a kind of depopulating work. They produced a narrative about villages outside of modernity, whose inhabitants resided in the imaged past of "the village" rather than the present of the Israeli nation-state. Yet these photographs also functioned to bring bodies back into texts from which they have been virtually removed. For despite the explicit attention to vernacular cultural forms and practices, planning documents made little mention of the populations in whose midst planning and development would occur. Thus, although these portraits were constrained by an iconography grounded in the logic of ethnic typology, they also worked to reinstall people and bodies into villages from which they had been expunged.

How can the various modalities of interiority be understood together? The allure and value of ethnic tourism rested precisely in the relationship between interiority as space, culture, and ethnicity. The co-articulation of these registers produced the effects not merely of simultaneity but of isomorphism, whereby ethnicity and culture was mapped onto the interior (village streets, living rooms). That is, the interior functioned as the superlative (most authentic) site of culture or ethnicity itself. The reverse was also true: through this mapping, interiority itself acquired a ethno-cultural diacritics, produced as synonymous with Druze, Arab, and/or Bedouin-ness itself. What resulted was both a kind of incarceration of Palestinian culture within the village interior, and a mapping of spatial interiority onto Palestinian culture, such that the two were rendered virtually synonymous. A brief examination of "rural tourism" in the Jewish sector is instructive. "Interiority" was rarely at issue in this market. Indeed, the opposite was true; rural tourism in the Jewish sector (at moshavim, kibbutzim, and at private bed and breakfasts in rural settlements) sought to sell the outdoors, to provide urban Israelis with the opportunity to enjoy nature and the countryside on holiday weekends. In the shift from rural tourism in the Jewish sector to rural tourism in the Palestinian sector, nature was replaced by culture

as the primarily locus of tourist value. Simultaneously, exterior spaces were supplanted by interiors.[50]

What are the risks of this mapping? What kinds of presumptions were embedded within these respective geographies? The map of interiority generated by the Ministry of Tourism and its private sector affiliates told an *ontological* story, suggesting that Palestinian-Arab culture was *naturally* at home in the courtyard, the living room, the rural landscape. This coupling of Palestinian and "the rural" told a revisionist history about the nation-state, grossly obscuring the ways in which state-sponsored dispossession and deterritorialization of the Palestinian people within the borders of Israel, had produced "the village" as the central institution of Palestinian life after 1948. Moreover, this practice of mapping obfuscated the numerous modalities of Palestinian and/or Arab culture and history that were not circumscribed by the coordinates of village, portraiture, and "tradition": sites and practices that were cosmopolitan, well-connected, at the intersections of national and global flows of information, capital, and politics.

Dayr Hanna, 4 January 1996

I'm on my way to the village of Dayr Hanna in the aging Subaru of Ruti Shalev, an Ashkenazi Israeli in her late 50s, employed as an advisor to the Ministry's Office of Rural Development. Since the early 1990s, building on her personal history in the region, Ruti Shalev has traveled through the Palestinian villages of the western Galilee looking for ways to develop an ethnic tourism market. When I first met Ruti in 1994, she was trying to sell her vision to an incredulous Ministry of Tourism. In 1996, she was on the Ministry payroll. Yesterday, Ruti was contacted by a family that wants to develop a bed and breakfast unit in their home, and today we're driving to Dayr Hanna to assess the feasibility.

As Ruti explains it, Ministry officials in Jerusalem have little understanding of this market. They don't know the villages like she does, the private lives of its residents, the quarrels between families, its picturesque back streets, and touristic possibilities. Her official position is that of Ministry consultant. Although she makes a unimpressive hourly salary, her role is critical. She is invited to all the important Jerusalem meetings, and she's the Ministry's primary contact in the field, called upon to assess the viability of proposed projects, to serve as the architect of local festivals, and introduce national officials to potential entrepreneurs and influential local figures. Ruti doesn't have an office, and sometimes not even use of a car. She works mostly out of her kitchen, cluttered with handwritten papers, brochures, and unemptied ashtrays. For Palestinian residents of the western Galilee, she is the Ministry's local proxy.

When we stop for gas, Ruti offers a ride to two young Palestinian women who wait for the infrequent local bus. "Where are you going?" Ruti yells out the window in Hebrew. They are also traveling to Dayr Hanna, and shyly accept the ride, sliding into the backseat. "I wanted to ask, but I was embarrassed," says one, in a hesitant Hebrew. "If you don't ask, you don't get," says Ruti in a familiar tone as we drive on.

"Where are you from?" Ruti asks the women in the backseat. "Dayr Hanna" says one, as her friend sits silently. Ruti presses for details, and the woman describes the location of her family home, off a dead-end lane that tourists often enter by mistake, forced to make a noisy three-point turn under their window. Ruti knows the very spot. "I am working with the local festival committee," she explains. "How would you feel about having tourists come to your home? You could serve them coffee, talk to them about the village, and be paid for it." The woman seems interested. "But they wouldn't have to pay," she qualifies. "They would be our guest." Here, Ruti is insistent. "No, no. Business is business," and at Ruti's bequest, they exchange phone numbers before we drop them off. "I've met most of them from hitchhiking," Ruti says, as we drive on.

'Ilabun and Yod Fat, 11 February 1996

On a bitterly cold day, Ruti and I are scouting for tourist possibilities in the village in 'Ilabun, visiting a Bedouin family that wants to host meals to tourists during the festival season. We park and walk towards the entrance of their two-story home, where several men sit, smoking cigarettes and talking. Two are clad in uniforms of the Israeli army, holding issue weapons. Ruti introduces us, and asks where they serve.

"That's the same unit my son's in," she says, when they tell her. "He told me there were some Bedouin from 'Ilabun. Do you know him? David Shalev?"

They aren't sure, but it's possible. "Was he in Lebanon too?" They compare stories about army difficulties.

Amin Abu al-Hayja is our host, and he takes us behind his two-story cement house to a spectacular site overlooking the neighboring valley. Ruti has many ideas.

"Why not set up a tent here? You can serve coffee the traditional way." She draws on the tropes that define this emerging market. "You can put in mattresses, Bedouin style, or have people sit on stools..."

Amin agrees on the tent, but he's not interested in the traditional goat-hide weave. "We are thinking of buying a plastic one. Less smell that way."

Ruti objects. "What is important is the atmosphere. It should be Bedouin." She suggests applying for a loan from the local bureau of small businesses.

As Ruti tours the site, Amin tells the story of their forced relocation by the government in 1979, from their historic family land to this site. His rehearses a dominant national narrative replete with its telos, of the transition from a primitive Bedouin life, to one enriched by civilization.

"It was a bitter time then," he says, speaking of their resettlement. "But we forgot all that. If you were smart, you agreed to move. We are more advanced now, and this is a good time."

As we leave the village in her car, Ruti provides commentary. She has no tolerance for these stories, and doesn't want to hear them complain. They never owned the land they used to live on; that's why they had to move. "The Arabs don't know how to say thank you," she says, lighting a cigarette. "All they talk about is what they deserve."

Later, sitting at her cluttered kitchen table over yesterday's leftovers, Ruti tells a story I've heard before. In 1959, when she moved to the Galilee with a small community of pioneering Jews, there were only a few Bedouin tents where their moshav now stands. She used to hike through the area, and she eventually met the Bedouin residents, becoming friends with the oldest daughter, Ghaida. Visits to the tent became frequent, and she sometimes stayed the night. It was wonderful: she loved the tent, the evening fire, Ghaida's beauty. Ghaida spoke no Hebrew, and that's how Ruti learned her Bedouin Arabic.

It was merely by chance that they found themselves in the same hospital many years later, giving birth to their first sons. Of course, when she learned, Ruti arranged for them to share a hospital room. None of the Jewish workers could believe it. To know an Arab woman this well, they said to her, she would have to be your cleaning woman or your baby-sitter. But to know her as friend? Unbelievable.

State Interiors

It is precisely the heterogeneity of Ruti's portrait that I want to consider here. Cultural fetishism and political intolerance are mutually productive in her narratives and practices. She stages herself as an insider, an intimacy predicated precisely on her refusal of uncomfortable histories of deterritorialization. Yet the Orientalist label is inadequate, as it would produce a story of Ruti as an uncontested purveyor of power, consistent and stable, without ruptures. On the contrary, Ruti's work is often accidental, incomplete or unsuccessful, sometimes hindered by a broken foot and an unreliable car. She relies on chance encounters, on phone numbers distributed, and advice given; yet phone calls are sometimes unreturned, advice is not always heeded, and tourism can be used by Palestinians to advance precisely those political agendas that Ministry officials tries to repress. She is, simultaneously, a careful strategist. Her blueprint for the tourist market does not depend entirely on the particulars of the site, nor the

wishes of its inhabitants. Rather, her vision is largely prepackaged, scripted by dominant Israeli imaginations of Bedouin and Arab culture. Her personal and professional profiles overlap, both in the cluttered spaces of her kitchen-office, and in the ways her autobiography enables her work. Both depend on their constitutive exclusions -- on the histories of violent dispossession she will not tolerate. At the messy intersection of the personal and the professional, Ruti's work is critical to the Ministry of Tourism as it builds policy for this emerging market, determines it central cultural icons, and distributes budgets for planning and development.

My aim is neither to reduce the Ministry to the labors of Ruti Shalev, nor to suggest that state policy finds its origins in the biographies of its local employees. Rather, I am interested in the ways in which this quotidian profile might inform a theory of the state and complicate the Ministry's mapping of ethnic tourism onto the *Palestinian* interior alone. These scenes suggest that another set of interiors are at issue in the production of the market. They include Ruti's cluttered kitchen table and the front seat of her unreliable car, the intimate spaces in which state labor is done, knowledges are made, and political histories are negotiated. Like the Palestinian interiors produced by the state for tourist consumption, these interiors are also intimate domains, places of bodily practice, and sites of ethnic production— in this case, the production of Ashkenazi culture and identity. By mapping interiority back onto the state, I aim to disrupts the founding logic of the ethnic tourism market with its presumed isomorphism of Palestinian culture and interior space. According to this logic, interiority marks the place of secrecy, of that which has been heretofore hidden from public (i.e. Jewish) view, and which tourism makes available as an object of scrutiny. Palestinian spaces, cultures, and bodies are thus mapped as the domain of the secret; Jewish tourists are hailed as their discovers. The allure of ethnic tourism rests in the challenge of penetrating and unveiling these secret places and the cultures and bodies they contain. Through ethnography, I aim to turn this scrutinizing lens back on the Ministry of Tourism, to unsettle the relationship between Palestinian object and Jewish gaze, by discovering the interior spaces, cultures, and bodies of which the (Jewish) Israeli state is made.

How might Ruti's portrait challenge normative theories of the state? Much scholarship in the social sciences still represents the relationship between state and society through what James Ferguson calls a "vertical topography" -- a model of power borrowed from the official narratives of nation-states themselves. This model represents state power through a vertical spatial grid, in which the state is represented "above" the social in terms of "superior spatial scope," "supremacy in a hierarchy of power," and superiority of "interest, knowledge, and moral purpose" (Ferguson 1998: 6). This vertical relationship also relies on a notion of discrete, bounded spaces in which the state is reified

and free-standing. According to this model, the state is represented as homogenous and unitary, while struggle is polyvocal, fractured, and heterogeneous.

Building on Ferguson's work, I want to suggest other ways of spatializing and conceptualizing the state by dispensing with a notion of the state as ontologically prior and considering the more fluid ways in which state institutions and discourses produce citizen-subjects, practices, cultural formations, and regimes of intelligibility, even as they are produced by and through them. The point is not to reclaim the humanist, choosing subject that might refuse state power through its local proxies, nor to remove questions of power and material conditions from an analysis of state institutions. Rather, it is to consider the complicated ways in which state power is constituted, performed, and contested in daily spaces and practices – spaces and practices that have been traditionally "deleted" (to return to Foucault) from accounts of the state. To remap the production of state knowledges onto a kitchen table is to refuse the bounded model of state versus society, to suggest the ways state knowledges are produced in the uncertain intersections of the private and professional, of autobiography and policy. By insisting on these "deleted" interiors, I aim to offer a different portrait of the state -- to consider the ways it is made in and of its situated actors and daily practices in ways that frustrate the logics of a vertical topography.

I concur with Ferguson that a dismantling of the vertical topography requires a concomitant rethinking of the notion of the "below" which consolidates the state's hold on an imagined domain "above."[51] For Ferguson, "below" has been told as a story about "resistance" that challenges the state's repressive sovereignty. That is, "resistance" and "below" have been rendered isomorphic:

> "[W]e seem to hang on stubbornly to the very idea of a "below" -- the idea that politically subordinate groups are somehow naturally local, rooted, and encompassed by 'higher level' entities. For what is involved in the very idea and image of 'grassroots' politics, if not precisely the vertical topography of power that I have suggested is at the root of our conceptual ills? Can we learn to conceive theoretically and politically, of a 'grassroots' that would [be]...worldly, well-connected, and opportunistic?" (Ferguson 1998: 28)

My concern is slightly different. Rather than remap "resistance" onto more "worldly" sites, I would urge a disarticulation of the terms of resistance and "the local," subalternity and situatedness, as a way of bringing to visibility the cultural practices, forms, and subjects that are occluded from a vertical topography. At issue is the question of who can claim "locality" or the ability to be located. As Talal Asad has noted, although "all people most of the time are

'local' in the sense of being locatable," the term presumes a domain of non-local people who are "unlimited, cosmopolitan, universal, belonging to the whole world (and the whole world belonging to them)." What distinguishes these subject-populations? Asad answers: "An obvious difference between them is power." I concur with Asad that a persistent modality of "the local" is (relative) subalternity -- often that of a community "in struggle." But I would suggest that other modalities are also at play that co-articulate with issues of power. Popular usage of "the local" also carries a presumption of both temporality and geographic scale, whereby "local" also stands in for a story about "daily" practices in "small scale" localities (more often then not, "out-of-the-way places"). The "smallness" of scale is relative and often shifts, such that a village can be "the local" of the nation-state, while the "nation-state" can be the "local" of "the global." [52] The presumptions embedded in the local (about power, scale, time, and location) do not merely converge, they also blur, functioning both as a mutually inclusive set and as a chain of equivalents (subalternity = small-scale = daily). Locatedness becomes an almost ontological condition and effect of this imbrication.[53]

In part, my concern is for the ways in which a research agenda for the discipline of anthropology is both reproduced and naturalized in these slippages. Given the disciplinary call to study culture in its "local" sites and incarnations, it seems that a very delimited ethnographic field, replete with invisibilities and exclusions, is being naturalized. The question becomes: When anthropology demands a study of "the local," what cannot be seen? What are its spaces of constitutive invisibility? Who are its "deleted" subjects? The popularized mapping of "the local" threatens to produce the effects of an ontology, whereby subjects, communities, and spaces that fall outside its coordinates appear to have no "location" (and, by extension, no "daily" practices). What often escapes "local" visibility are the subjects whose stories and practices are less easily cast in terms of "struggle" or subalternity. In the case of my fieldwork, these are the quotidian discursive practices of lower-level officials, bureaucrats, planners, and consultants, at the instable interstices between policy and autobiography. In attending to their practices of knowledge-making, the fiction of a unified and incontestable "state" is destabilized, as are the normative limits of the ethnographic field.

Rebecca L. Stein
Department of Anthropology
University of California, Berkeley
E-mail:rlstein@sscl.berkeley.edu

References

Adalah. 1998. Legal Violations of Arab Minority Rights in Israel. Shfaram: Adalah.

Baram, Haim. 1996. Uzi Baram. *Col Ha'Ir*, 3 April, 1996, 46-49.

Baran Designs. 1994. Toknit Av LeFitua'h Tayarut beMa'aliya [Master Plan for Tourism Development in Ma'aliya]. Haifa: Baran Designs Ltd.

Birnack Investments. 1994a. Programa Lefitua'h Tayarut beHorfeish [Plan for the Development of Tourism in Horfeish]. Jerusalem: Kobi Birnack Investments.

Birnack Investments. 1994b. Village Survey. Jerusalem: Kobi Birnack Investments.

Brown, Wendy. 1995. *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Coronil, Fernando. 1997. *The Magic of the State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezula*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dean, Mitchell. 1999. *Governmentality*: unpublished manuscript.

Elgazi, Yossef, and Gabi Zohar. 1995. Psak Din Takdimi: Druzim Yekolim Leherashem Bit'udat Hazehut Ke'arvim [Unprecendented Verdict: Druze Can Register as Arabs on Their Identity Cards]. *Ha'aretz*, 20 November.

Fellner Development Ltd. 1994. Seker Zmani BeGar'in HaKfar Yerka [Temporary Survey in the Village Center of Yerka]. Haifa: Fellner Development Ltd.

Ferguson, James. 1998. Transnational Topographies of Power: Beyond "the State" and "Civil Society" in the Study of African Politics. Unpublished manuscript.

Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon.

Foucault, Michel. 1984. What is an Author? In *The Foucault Reader*, edited by P. Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1991. Governmentality. In *The Foucault Effect*, edited by G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gupta, Akhil. 1995. Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics and the Imagined State. *American Ethnologist* 22 (2):375-402.

Hajjar, Lisa. 1996. Israel's Intervention among the Druze. *Middle East Report* (26):2-6.

Jiryis, Sabri. 1976. *The Arabs in Israel*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Khalidi, Walid. 1992. *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*. Washington, D. C.: Institute for Palestine Studies.

Lustick, Ian. 1980. *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

MacCannell, Dean. 1976. *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*. New York: Schocken Books.

Massey, Doreen. 1994. *Space, Place, and Gender*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

McDowall, David. 1989. *Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Middle East Report. 1996. Palestinian Rights in Post-Oslo Israel. *Middle East Report* 26 (4):23-26.

Ministry of Tourism. 1996a. Ahalan Wasahalan: Brohim Haba'im L'kfarim Ha'aravim Vedruzim Bagalil Hama'aravi [Welcome to the Arab and Druze Villages of the Western Galilee]. Haifa: Western Galilee Tourist Trust.

Ministry of Tourism. 1996b. HaNofshim Ba'Erua'h HaKafri: Seker Ma'akav [Recreation in Rural Tourism: Follow-up Survey]. Jerusalem: Government Publishing House.

Ministry of Tourism. 1997. Tayarut L'Yisrael 1996: Dokh LiStatistikot [Tourism to Israel 1996: Statistical Report]. Jerusalem: Government Publishing House.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1989. The Effect of the State. *Unpublished paper*.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1990. The Invention and Reinvention of the Egyptian Peasant. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22:129-150.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics. *American Political Science Review* 85 (1).

Morris, Benny. 1987. *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morris, Benny. 1990. *The Case of Abu Ghosh and Beit Naqquba, Al Fureidis and Khirbet Jirs az Zarka in 1948 -- or Why Four Villages Remained*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mort, Rachel Harrison and Frank. 1980. Patriarchial Aspects of Nineteenth-Century State Formation. In *Capitalism, State Formation, and Marxist Theory: Historical Investigations*, edited by P. Corrigan. London: Quartet Books.

Prime Minister's Office. 1996. Gidul Mashma'uti Betaktsivey Hamemshala Lamigzar Ha'arvi [Significant Growth in Government Funding for the Arab Sector]. Jerusalem: Government Publishing House.

Rabinowitz, Dan. 1997. *Overlooking Nazareth: The Ethnography of Exclusion in the Galilee*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rinot Ltd. 1995. Dayr Hanna: Programa LeFitua'h Tayarut. Haifa: Rinot Ltd.

Robinson, Jennifer. 1996. *The Power of Apartheid: State, Power and Space in South African Cities*. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd.

Rouhana, Nadim N. 1997. *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Shohat, Ella. 1992. Reflections of an Arab Jew. *Emergences* 3 (4):39-45.

Taussig, Michael. 1992. Maleficium: State Fetishism. In *The Nervous System*. New York: Routledge.

Thomas, Nicholas. 1994. *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Yiftachel, Oren. 1991. State Policies, Land Control and an Ethnic Minority: The Arabs in the Galilee, Israel. *Society and Space* 9:329-362.

Yiftachel, Oren. 1996. The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel. *Regional Studies* 30 (5):493-508.

Yiftachel, Oren. 1998. Democracy or Ethnocracy: Territory and Settler Politics in Israel/Palestine. *Middle East Report* 28 (2):9-13.

Endnotes

[1] The names of persons discussed in this dissertation have been protected with pseudonyms, save those of national political figures.

[2] That state power is intimately bound up in processes of spatiality is by now a truism that owes much to the work of critical human geographers on the relationship between power, space, and identity (Robinson 1996).

[3] Although the Ministry of Tourism largely ceased to support the ethnic tourism market during the Likud administration (1996-1999), in keeping with the general shift in state policy towards the so-called "Arab sector" that attended the change in administrations, the Jewish and Palestinian private sector continued to develop the market. For an overview in the shift in government policy towards Palestinian citizens of the state during the first year of the Likud administration see Alouph Hareven and As'ad Ghanem (eds.), *Retrospect and Prospects, Equality and Integration: 1996-1997* (1997).

[4] I am thinking particularly of the work of Judith Butler. While Butler draws attention to the material constraints that attend performative revision, I would argue that her work is often quick to celebrate the radical changeability of language, particularly in a queer context, without adequate attention to the historical/contextual conditions of changeability. See *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex* (1993) and *Excitable Speech* (1997).

[5] I have introduced "the state" in quotes in an attempt to put the term under erasure, in a Derridian sense. I will henceforth omit quotation marks except when I want to draw particular attention to the term as reified object.

[6] Brown's work draws on two decades of feminist scholarship which has sought to theorize the gendered practices and forms of state power, and to think the state "as a differentiated set of practices and institutions" rather than as "a monolithic and unified 'subject'" (Mort 1980: 82).

[7] Critical work on the state has proliferated in recent years from across the disciplines. A partial list of such scholarship includes the following: M. Jacqui Alexander, "Erotic Autonomy as a Politics of Decolonization" (1997); John Borneman, "State, Territory, and Identity Formation in Postwar Berlin" (1992); James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine* (1994); Christina Gilmartin, Gail Hershatter, Lisa Rofel, and Tyrene White, eds. *Engendering China: Women, Culture, and the State* (1994); Achille Mbembe, "The Banality of Power and the Aesthetics of Vulgarity in the Postcolony," (1992); Diane Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound* (1999); Diana Taylor, *Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina's "Dirty War"* (1997). Despite the extensive engagement of cultural anthropologists with issues of state power, there have been few ethnographic studies of state bureaucracy and practices of governance to date. The work of Gupta (1995) and Nelson (1999) is exceptional in this regard

[8] Nicholas Thomas makes a related argument: "government is not a unitary work but heterogeneous and partial, and moreover...the meanings engendered by hegemonic codes and narratives do not exist in hermetic domains but are placed at risk, revalued and distorted, through being enacted and experienced" (Thomas 1994: 4).

[9] "State fetishism" is addressed in the work of Michael Taussig. He is interested in "the habitual way we so casually entify "the State" as a being unto itself, animated with a will and mind of its own" (Taussig 1992: 112).

[10] Note that the logic of deletion is highly gendered; the "deleted" passages are explicitly feminized ones (kitchen and laundry). For an overview of recent feminist scholarship on the gendered politics of state practice and discourse, see Brown (1995: 167).

[11] Wendy Brown argues that the paucity of critical writing on "the state" in recent decades has been partially due to the intellectual agenda outlined by Foucault. She writes: "If the state has ceased to be a substantial object of criticism among left sociologists and political activists, so

also has it been largely ignored by critical theorists as an object of study in the last decade. Impugned by poststructuralist critique for its tendency to reify and universalize rather than deconstruct and historically specify the state, the 1960s cottage industry in Marxist state theory was also derailed by Michel Foucault's historical-political argument that the distinctive feature of the post-monarchical nation-state is the decentered and decentralized character of political power" (Brown 1995: 17).

[12] See *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (1980), particularly "Two Lectures," "The Eye of Power," and "The History of Sexuality." Also see "The Subject in Power" in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, (1983).

[13] As corrective, Foucault offers his theory "governmentality" – whereby "government" is understood as a multiplicity of institutions, processes, and techniques that enable the regulation of relations between people and things. Foucault locates its origins in the sixteenth-century emergence of "the population" as a primary object of regulation (Foucault 1991). Mitchell Dean's work offers particularly clear discussions of "governmentality" and its implications (Dean 1999).

[14] The historical literature on the Palestinian population inside Israel includes several foundational works: Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel* (1976); Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State* (1980); Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestinian Arabs* (1958); Sammy Smooha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel* (1980) and
"Existing and Alternative Policy Towards the Arabs in Israel" (1982); and Elia Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel* (1979). More recent scholarship citizens includes Amina Minns and Nadia Hijab, *Citizens Apart: A Portrait of the Palestinians in Israel* (1990) and Nadim N. Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State* (1997).

[15] Historians disagree about the magnitude of the Palestinian refugee population that fled Israel as a result of the 1948 war. Benny Morris provides estimates of between 600,000 and 760,000 persons (1987: 298); Khalidi estimates 727,700 to 758,3000 persons (1992: 582); and Flapan 770,0000 persons (1987: 216).

[16] As Ian Lustick reminds, it is impossible to determine the precise amount of territory confiscated or expropriated by the state since 1958 as no official government figures exist (1980: 178).

[17] The suppression of Arabic culture and language by the state has also functioned to obscure the Arab cultural histories of Mizrahi Jew, as Ella Shohat has suggested (Shohat 1992: 42). Indeed, as Shohat argues, the Arabness of Jewish Mizrahi culture remains something of an oxymoron within dominant Ashkenazi culture within Israel, in which "Arab" and "Jew" are largely understood as antonyms (1997: 90).

[18] It should be noted that my use of the term "Palestinian" in this context does not accord with the state's 1990s lexicon, in which "Palestinian" was reserved for persons and places *outside* the 1967 borders of Israel. As I will suggest in the section that follows, the logic of the state's very *selective* investment in Palestinian communities and institutions during this period can only be understood through the terms of this hegemonic lexicon, and the ways it differentiated Palestinian communities by religion and ethnicity.

[19] For an overview and analysis of government budgets for the Palestinian sector during the Labor administration (1992-1996), see Alouph Hareven and As'ad Ghanem (eds.), *Equality and Integration, Retrospect and Prospects: 1992-1996.* (1996).

[20] A comparative look at government budgets for the city of Nazareth, Israel's largest Palestinian city, is instructive here. During its tenure, the Likud administration invested some NIS 600,000 in Nazareth; the Labor administration invested NIS 30,000,000 (Middle East Report 1996). State-sponsored infrastructural development in the neighboring Jewish city of Nazareth Illit has always grossly outpaced development in the Palestinian city. For a study of the relationship between these cities, and their inequitable treatment by successive

administrations, see Dan Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth* (1997) and Ghazi Falah, "Land Fragmentation and Spatial Control in the Nazareth Metropolitan Area," (1992).

[21] See Amiram Gonen and Rassem Khamaisi, *The Arabs in Israel in the Wake of Peace* (1993) for a study of the effects of the regional Peace Process on the Palestinian community inside Israel.

[22] Despite the shift in government policy under the Likud Administration, a rhetoric of coexistence continued to be mobilized by the Ministry of Tourism as a way to market ethnic tourism to Israeli Jews. Consider the words of Minister of Tourism Moshe Katzav in the introduction to a 1997 brochure on the "Arab and Druze villages of the Galilee": "The Ministry of Tourism supports the development of tourism in Arab and Druze villages...as a step towards bridging cultures, acquainting [different] religions, and drawing nearer in friendship" (Ministry of Tourism 1996a).

[23] During the Labor administration, the Minister of Tourism, Uzi Baram, was personally responsible for many of these shifts in development priorities. For discussion of Baram's dovish political history in the Labor party, see (Baram 1996).

[24] "Old City" is a historical term that refers to the ancient center of the city, often encircled by a wall (as in the Old Cities of Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Acre). Yet in the popular Hebrew lexicon, the term is often employed as a euphemism to mark places of *Arab* dwelling – past and present. The term functions both to euphemize the history of these cites ("old" standing in for "Arab") and to situate contemporary Palestinian neighborhoods and persons in historical time, outside of modernity.

[25] Christian pilgrims represented some 60 percent of incoming tourists to Israel during the 1990s (Ministry of Tourism 1997).

[26] "We're not going to expel the Arabs like we did in Jaffa, but if they want to move, they can," I was told by an employee of the Israeli Government Tourist Development Office in Acco. This gentrification project has already begun to raise real estate values in the Old City, forcing many lower-income Palestinian families to move. See Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt* (1995: 69-70) for discussion of the ways in which tourist development in Israel has functioned to obscure Palestinian history.

[27] The 1995 "Conference on Rural Tourism," sponsored by the Ministry of Tourism, made no mention of tourist projects within Palestinian villages. In subsequent years, the Ministry included "Arab sector tourism" within this rubric.

[28] In an unprecedented ruling from the Haifa District Court in 1995, it was determined that Druze citizens were legally permitted to register as "Arab" rather than "Druze" on their Israeli identity cards (Elgazi and Zohar 1995).

[29] Druze with Israeli citizenship, citizens of the Galilee, are conscripted into the Israeli army, while Bedouin serve on a voluntary basis. The Druze population of the Golan has an entirely different relationship to the state. Most of the population refused to accept Israeli citizenship after Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981 (Hajjar 1996). See Ian Lustick's work for discussion of the ways in which the Israeli state has worked to foster divisions within the Palestinian community (Lustick 1980, 82-149)

[30] It should be noted that this lexicon shifted considerably at the end of this decade, as the term "Palestinian" became acceptable in new ways.

[31] Of the tens of villages situated along Palestine's two major thoroughfares (the Tel Aviv-Haifa road and the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road), the villages of Abu Ghosh and Jisr al-Zarqa were among only ones spared violent expulsion by the Israeli army in 1948 (Morris 1990). In part, their fate can be traced to their respective histories of political collaboration with Zionist forces and neighboring Jewish communities during the early decades of state formation. Both

of these villages have been targets of state-sponsored tourist development. Since the early 1990s, Abu Ghosh has hosted a biannual music festival, attended by Jewish-Israeli visitors, and was targeted for substantive tourist development during the Labor tenure. Under the Labor administration, Jisr al-Zarqa' was partially developed for coastal tourism. Neither development plan was completed during the Labor tenure.

[32] Indeed, I would argue that the state's intervention in Palestinian villages inside Israel since the early years of state formation had been precisely about a labor of *making-visible* – that is, making visible political activists, sites of "illegal" construction, etc.

[33] The "village core" is referred to by two Hebrew terms that are used interchangeably in state documents: *galin hakfar* and *gar'in hakfar*. Translated literally, these terms refer to the "nucleus, kernel, or pit" of the village.

[34] For an earlier version of this argument, see Rebecca Stein, "National Itineraries, Itinerant Nations: Israeli Tourism and Palestinian Cultural Production."

[35] For critical analysis of "the Arab village" as trope in Israeli academic discourse, see Gil Eyal, "Bein Mizrah le'Ma'arav: HaSiah al Hakfar Ha'arvi Beyisrael," (1993). Also see Timothy Mitchell's work on "the village" in studies of Egyptian peasant society. Like "the Arab village" in Israeli discourse, peasant studies represents "the village" as a social/spatial zone outside of history (Mitchell 1990).

[36] At the 1995 "Annual Meeting on Rural Tourism" in Israel, the featured address by Minister of Tourism Uzi Baram was followed by a lecture on "the development of rural tourism in Europe."

[37] It should be noted that due to the density of Palestinian dwelling in the Galilee, the 1947 UN partition plan slated western and northern-central Galilee to become parts of Arab-Palestine.

[38] According to Jiryis, Prime Minister Ben Gurion began efforts towards the Judaization of the Galilee in 1959; the Jewish National Fund had proposed similar policies in 1953 (1976: 102-111). For a study of the geographic impacts of Judaization on the Galilee, see Ghazi Falah, *Galilee and the Judaization Plan* (1983).

[39] As Lustick notes: "[B]ecause of the rhetorical inconvenience of this stress upon Judaization, Labor government spokesmen tended to substitute other phrases, notably Lichloos Ha Galil [sic] (to populate the Galilee) and Liftoach ha-Galil [sic] (to develop the Galilee). Nevertheless, the crucial concern remains making and keeping the Galilee Jewish" (Lustick 1980: 333). In the mid-1990s, the term was all but absent from state discourse, although (arguably) policies of Judaization continued.

[40] According to 1995 statistics published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the Galilee housed nearly half of Israel's Palestinian population in the mid-1990s (47 percent). Geographer Oren Yiftachel has argued that most Jews moving to new settlements in the Galilee were not motivated by nationalist ideology. Rather, they sought increased quality of life. The same can be of Israeli Jews who settled in the West Bank, particularly the Greater Jerusalem area, during this period. See Oren Yiftachel, "The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel," (1996: 503)

[41] For a history of the Land Day struggle, see Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State* (1980) and Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt* (1995).

[42] The periodization of the Intifada is the subject of controversy. For although Yasir Arafat officially the end of the uprising in 1993, with the signing of the Oslo Accords, organized resistance had largely dissipated by 1991.

[43] Israeli Knesset Member Azmi Bashara refers to this process as the "Israelization" of the Palestinians. For discussion of changing political trends within the Palestinian-Israeli

population following the Intifada, see Middle East Report, "Palestinian Rights in Post-Oslo Israel" (1996).

[44] As of 1996, the Jerusalem Ministry of Tourism had no Palestinian employees. Very few Palestinians were employed by the Israeli government ministries during the 1990s. A small number were employed as advisors. These figures can be found in Sikkuy, *Equality and Integration, 1992-1996: Retrospect and Prospects*. (1996: 27).

[45] See Birnack Investments, Programa Lefitua'h Tayarut beHorfeish (1994); Ministry of Tourism, Tochnit Programit LeFitua'h Ta'asiyat HaTayarut Be'Abu Ghosh VeHasviva (1994); Yossi Klinger, Tokhnit Pitua'h Tayarut: Tuba Zangriya (1998).

[46] Consulting firms employed by the Ministry of Tourism went door-to-door with Arabic-speaking employees to determine the potential cultural offerings of individuals families. The questions were standardized: "Is there someone in the family with knowledge of folklore and/or arts (metal work, weaving, embroidery, baking, or other)? Is there somebody in the family who knows how to dance or play an instrument? Would he/she be willing to perform?" (Birnack Investments 1994b).

[47] Aside from diners and falafel stands, "bed-and-breakfast" was usually the first tourist institution to operate within any given village. If successful, the market would expand through restaurants and locally-guided tours. Such services, often based out of private homes, usually paved the way for state interest in infrastructural development.

[48] As a set of explicit instructions to the private entrepreneur, this document was highly unusual. Yet I would argue that the regulatory impulse that undergirds this list was present in most planning documents.

[49] Dean MacCannell argues that "modern" tourism and tourist desire is structured in terms of "front" and "back" regions, in which the "back regions" hold the promise of the real. MacCannell imagines "modern" tourism as an infinite series of back regions steeped in simulacra, each refusing to satisfy. This theory is highly problematic in many regards; the notion of the "back region" is founded on a structuralist nostalgia for an (imagined) "pre-modern" era, when it was still possible to separate "truth from lies." I want to suggest that MacCannell's mapping, minus its metaphysics of "pre-modern" presence, might be adapted as a way to understand the cartography of the tourist market imagined by state planners and officials. While MacCannell understands the difference between "front" and "back" in terms of "social" distinctions, I want to understand it in terms of space (MacCannell 1976).

[50] A 1996 survey on "rural tourism" in the Jewish sector, conducted by the Ministry of Tourism, found that most guests at kibbutz and moshav facilities were attracted primarily by the proximity of nature hikes and water sports. Shopping and restaurant-going were of secondary interest. Visits to museums and sites of archeological or historic interest were of tertiary import. No mention was made of local cultural attractions (Ministry of Tourism 1996b: 15).

[51] As Ferguson suggests, the "resistance" narrative prevalent in much social science literature of the 1980s and 90s often reinstates a "vertical topography" by telling a story of struggle emerging "from below" the level of the state.

[52] See Doreen Massey's discussion of the relationship between "locality" and "the local" (Massey 1994).

[53] In part, my concern is for the ways in which a research agenda for the discipline of anthropology is both reproduced and naturalized in these slippages. Given the disciplinary call to study culture in its "local" sites and incarnations, it seems that a very delimited ethnographic field, replete with invisibilities and exclusions, is being naturalized. The question becomes: When anthropology demands a study of "the local," what cannot be seen? What are its spaces of constitutive invisibility? Who are its "deleted" subjects? The

popularized mapping of "the local" threatens to produce the effects of an ontology, whereby subjects, communities, and spaces that fall outside its coordinates appear to have no "location" (and, by extension, no "daily" practices). What often escapes "local" visibility are the subjects whose stories and practices are less easily cast in terms of "struggle" or subalternity. In the case of my fieldwork, these are the quotidian discursive practices of lower-level officials, bureaucrats, planners, and consultants, at the instable interstices between policy and autobiography. In attending to their practices of knowledge-making, the fiction of a unified and incontestable "state" is destabilized, as are the normative limits of the ethnographic field.

EUI WORKING PAPERS

EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the
European University Institute, Florence

Copies can be obtained free of charge
- depending on the availability of stocks - from:

The Publications Officer
European University Instiute
Badia Fiesolana
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy

Please use order form overleaf

Publications of the European University Institute

To The Publications Officer
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) - Italy
Fax: +39-055-4685 636
e-mail: publish@iue.it
http://www.iue.it

From Name .....

Address .....

.....

.....

.....

.....

❑ Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
❑ Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
❑ Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 2001/2002

Please send me the following EUI Working Paper(s):

Dept, n°, author .....
Title: .....
Dept, n°, author .....
Title: .....
Dept, n°, author .....
Title: .....
Dept, n°, author .....
Title: .....

Date .....

Signature .....

Working Papers of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Published since 2001

RSC 2001/1
Hans-Jürgen WAGENER
The Welfare State in Transition Economies and Accession to the EU

RSC 2001/2
Ville KAITILA/Mika WIDGRÉN
Revealed Comparative Advantage in Trade Between the European Union and the Baltic Countries

RSC 2001/3
Olivier CADOT/Douglas WEBBER
Banana Splits and Slipping over Banana Skins: The European and Transatlantic Politics of Bananas

RSC 2001/4
Fanen SISBANE/ Assaad Elia AZZI
Identités collectives et tolérance de la différence dans les relations entre groupes sociaux

RSC 2001/5
Ronald L. JEPPERSON
The Development and Application of Sociological Neoinstitutionalism

RSC 2001/6
Wolfgang STREECK
High Equality, Low Activity: The Contribution of the Social Welfare System to the Stability of the German Collective Bargaining Regime

RSC 2001/7
Lucia VOLK
Everyday Lives of a New Generation: Growing Up Across *Continua of Cultural Space*

RSC 2001/8
Ronit LENTIN
Memory and Forgetting: Gendered Counter Narratives of Silence in the Relations Between Israeli Zionism and the Shoah

RSC 2001/9
Elsa HACKL
Towards a European Area of Higher Education: Change and Convergence in European Higher Education

RSC 2001/10
Alain ROUSSILLON
Déclin de l'islamisme ou panne conceptuelle du néo-orientalisme? En finir avec l'exception islamique

RSC 2001/11
Rebecca L. STEIN
Israeli Interiors: Ethnic Tourism, the State, and the Politics of Space

*out of print

Socio-political Research funded by:

ENI spa
Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze
Mediocredito Centrale

Political Economy Research funded by:

Compagnia di San Paolo
European Investment Bank
Monte dei Paschi di Siena