Why the ‘Militarising’ of the European Union is strengthening the concept of a 'Civilian power Europe'

Stelios Stavridis

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) is developing its Common European Security and Defence Policy. New institutional structures have begun to work in Brussels and a 60,000 strong rapid deployment military force is being set up for 2003. The most recent literature, which builds on François Duchêne’s definition of a ‘civilian power’ Europe (short on weapons but long on economic power), argues that the militarising of the EU is rendering such a concept obsolete. This paper takes the opposite view: thanks to the militarising of the Union, the latter might at long last be able to act as a real civilian power in the world, that is to say as a force for the external promotion of democratic principles. The paper reviews the main characteristics of the civilian power model and offers a re-interpretation of the original Duchêne approach. It argues for the need to move from a civilian power ‘by default’ to a civilian power ‘by design’.
Introduction

The European Union (EU) is developing its Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). It is part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union, its so-called Second Pillar. The December 2000 Nice European Council has confirmed all the recent developments with regards to several new institutional bodies and a Rapid Deployment Force for the year 2003. Over the last decade many atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and other areas of the world, coupled with progress towards economic and political union, have acted as incentives for a truly European defence identity and capacity. The weaknesses of the EU as an international actor were there for all to see when the Americans had to intervene in the Balkans through NATO first in Bosnia in 1995 and later in Kosovo in 1999. There was also a shift in the UK’s policy towards European defence. Although it might be premature to conclude that there has been an Europeanisation of the British, it is equally true that without such a shift (Labour Party election victory in May 1997), there would have been no real progress on that issue, especially in such a short period of time. The decision to create a European defence capacity at the EU level is not without its critics. It is also unclear what the implications for a newly revamped and enlarged NATO will be. The wider debate about the future of the integration process, the so-called finalité politique, has also been relaunched with the May 2000 Fischer speech. There is also an IGC (intergovernmental conference) which is scheduled for 2004 as a follow-up to the new Treaty of Nice.

Over the last three decades the existing literature has regularly used the concept of a civilian power to describe the EU (then the EC or European Community) in its international relations. This approach can be summed up as follows: a civilian power is an entity that does have influence in the international system by using mainly economic, financial and political means, but not military

1 For the CFSP see Regelsberger, E., et al. (eds), Foreign Policy of the European Union (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1997). For a background to it, see Nuttall, S., European Political Cooperation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992). For the CESDP, see Survival, 42, no.2 (2000); see also Stavridis, S., European Security and Defence after Nice (Jean Monnet Working Paper No.31, University of Catania, March 2001).
4 See C. Joerges, et al. (eds), What kind of constitution for what kind of polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer (RSCAS/EUI, Florence, November 2000).
5 The Treaty was agreed in its draft form by the European Council in Nice in December 2000. The formal treaty was signed on 26 February 2001. It has yet to be ratified. However, developments in the CESDP are taking place without any delay.
power. In fact, the initial argument presented by François Duchêne\(^6\) was that, precisely because of the absence of military power, the EC could only be a civilian power (and not a superpower like the USA or the USSR). Nor was it desirable to add to the more traditional power politics model. The most recent literature argues that such a concept has been rendered obsolete because of the militarising of the EU\(^7\). This paper takes the opposite view. Thanks to the militarising of the Union, the latter might at long last be able to act as a real power in the world and more importantly as a real civilian power, that is as a force for the promotion of democratic principles in the world. In that respect, it builds on Maull’s recent similar application of the same concept to Germany after its military participation in the Kosovo War in 1999\(^8\).

The EU has now developed an institutional arrangement for military matters to be dealt with in Brussels, and it is in the process of setting up a rapid military deployment force. All EU states (minus Denmark because of its Maastricht opt-out) have now made the necessary troops commitments. A number of bilateral initiatives (the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration) and EU-wide decisions (European Council meetings in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, and Nice in 1999-2000) have put flesh to this new European commitment. This paper does not consider the implications of such a development for EU-NATO and EU-USA relations\(^9\). Nor does it deal with the wider question of the finalité politique of the integration process, or what kind of defence capacities should be deployed. It only considers the implications of these developments on the utility of the concept of a civilian power Europe.

In order to make this case, the paper consists of a review of the main characteristics of the civilian power model and also of the main criticisms levelled at the concept throughout the years. It offers a re-interpretation of the original Duchêne approach, which contained two elements, and not only the role of non-military means as stressed by the literature to date. The importance of the international system is also emphasised correctly in the literature but I argue that


it should be the intrinsic nature of the EU that determines its foreign policy and not the other way round. Thus, there is a need to move from a civilian power by default to a civilian power by design. The paper then offers a rationale for not accepting that the concept is obsolete, but instead that it is reinforced by current events. Because it argues that the militarising of the Union is an opportunity for the EU to act as a real civilian power, i.e. an international actor that promotes effectively democratic principles in the world.

Part 1: A Civilian Power or a Contradiction in Terms?

The Initial Debate

The concept of civilian power was first used with regards to Japan and West Germany. The reasoning behind the application of that concept to these two states was to contrast their growing power in the economic field to their historic defeats in 1945, their continued limited political independence (both legal and de facto) and overwhelming military dependence on the USA.

A number of observers of the European scene, in particular the Director of the London-based IISS François Duchêne, then expanded on the Japanese/German civilian power approach by applying to the European Economic Community (EEC). Their main objective was to speculate about future scenarios for international and European security. This was the time of détente, the Vietnam debacle, and the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system. It was also the time of the first European Community enlargement to include three new members, but most importantly the UK, with its vast international links. There was also the optimistic Report on European Union which included the possibility of European monetary union by the year 1980. The latter was seen as a direct challenge to the USA’s dominance in West Europe and the Western world.

10 I have no space here to discuss the ‘democratic peace’ argument (democracies do not fight each other) which is a sophisticated version of the civilian power as described by Duchêne for EC/EU intra-relations. There is little doubt that nobody expects a military confrontation between two (or more) EU member states. The same applies to a large extent to most applicant countries. This is part of the ‘civilianisation’ process described by many observers of the civilian power concept. But the link between the Kantian approach to international relations (see Russett, B., Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993); Kantian Peace? It Exists (RSC/EUI lecture, Florence, 15 May 1998) and the Duchêne thesis has not been made clearly enough in my view. However, it falls beyond the direct remit of this paper.

11 Hans Maull returned to the original use of the term to one of these two countries, Germany, in 2000 (see below).

12 Duchêne, ‘Europe in World Peace’; ‘The EC and the uncertainties of interdependence’.
There was also ample expectation of a possible US withdrawal from Europe because of the existence of nuclear parity between the two superpowers. Indeed, it was a constant argument of those supporting the idea of a civilian power to agree with those who instead supported a more militarised version that Europe needed its own foreign policy because US and European interests were diverging more and more in international relations.\(^\text{13}\)

There were two main characteristics of a civilian power: First, the absence of military means (both conventional and nuclear) and the presence of economic and financial importance in the international system. In other words, a `civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces` which is how Duchêne described the EC in 1973.\(^\text{14}\) In Kenneth Twitchett’s words, it is:

> ‘an international polity as yet possessing no military dimension, but able to exercise influence on states, global and regional organisations, international corporations and other transnational bodies through diplomatic, economic and legal factors.’\(^\text{15}\)

Duchêne only mentioned the second characteristic briefly: a civilian power promotes through its foreign policy the ideals of democracy, human rights, economic growth and international cooperation. To quote Duchêne again in his application of the concept to the Western Europe of the early 1970s,

> `[t]he European Community must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards’.\(^\text{16}\)

The general conclusion then was that the importance of military power was diminishing as fast as that of economics was growing. This prediction was ‘confirmed’ by the energy (oil) crisis of 1973 (and later that of 1979). In both cases it was not possible to use military force, especially nuclear weapons, to force a change of economic policy of a non-traditional international actor, namely, the OPEC cartel. The latter organisation’s growing influence was confirmed in Europe’s shift to a much more pro-Arab policy with regards to the Middle Eastern conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

Duchêne’s conclusion was also based on his prediction that the EEC could not, and would not, develop into a full federal state with a common army and a common government. He disagreed with the fundamental arguments of an alternative approach to the EC in the early 1970s: that it was a `super-power in


\(^{14}\) Ibid., 19.


\(^{16}\) Duchêne, 'The EC and the uncertainties of interdependence', 20.
the making. Duchêne stressed the impracticability of this approach: it was mainly due to the very limited nuclear capabilities of France and Britain. In addition, there was no real likelihood of a common decision-making process. A good illustration of the latter point could be found in a famous newspaper cartoon with a military officer still waiting to press on the nuclear button whilst one of his colleague on the phone, probably with Brussels, kept on telling him: 'Wait, it is still 6 member states for and 6 member states against'. Duchêne’s other prediction was that the EC could not and should not develop into an unarmed or armed neutral power either. Thus, an easier option (and a more realistic one) would be to promote world cooperation, based on trade and economics. In other words, the EC was a civilian power by default.

Duchêne also warned us about the need for the EC to promote democratic and civilian standards both internally and externally. Otherwise he predicted that the EC `will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself`. He also stressed the idealistic mission of the EC as summed up in the 1950 Schuman declaration. Thus, he was fully aware that his application of the concept of a civilian power contained both a descriptive and a normative dimension. The question of desirability (or not) of the concept itself in general, and as applied to the EC in particular, was rather neglected in the years that followed. The question of its desirability only reappeared in the early 1990s and again later in that decade.

The Realist Challenge: a Contradiction in Terms

There were a number of problems with the concept itself, let alone its application to the EC, which were highlighted at the turn of the 1970s/1980s years. They materialised in an oft-quoted attack on the concept made by Hedley Bull in 1983. He described it as `a contradiction in terms`. This was during the so-called `Second Cold War`, hence reinforcing further the possible charge that the concept is only relevant during periods of détente in international relations but very much less so during periods of high international tension. Bull argued

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18 I owe this example to Christopher Hill.
20 Ibid., 20-21.
that the existence of special international circumstances of lessened tension between the super-powers in the early 1970s had led to the mistaken view that military force did not matter any longer. He pointed to a number of problems in the world where force continued to play an important role and highlighted that the Soviet military threat continued unabated whereas the USA seemed to have more and more diverging interests with its West European allies. He called for a ‘European strategic policy’ which would include both a conventional and a nuclear dimension. That is to say a militarising of the then EC. This normative aspect of his analysis is generally missed in the wider debate that followed his attack on the concept of a civilian power.

Bull was not the only academic who contested the validity of the concept in the 1980s. Some stressed the limitations of the existing EC arrangements, namely that Europe and especially ‘EPC [European Political Cooperation] has some striking deficiencies in the field of security’, in particular in terms of crisis management mechanisms and with regards to a coordinated arms trade policy. Others reiterated the importance of the international system on the validity of the concept. Ifestos concluded that ‘the turbulences of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s [have] tended to discredit’ this approach.

The Counter-attack: Still a Useful Concept

However, a number of academics came to the rescue of the concept and argued that despite obvious limitations in the role the EC could play in the world, the civilian power approach did offer some useful insight in its international relations. Reinhart Rummel contrasted the moral approach taken by the Europeans to the more power politics view of the USA. Christopher Hill stressed that one should be less critical of the concept because power politics did contain some rather important limitations too. He mentioned the fact that not all international politics are exclusively about military power; that the use of military force in other countries has ‘a dubious record’; that the record of civilian power, especially in the EC, is rather substantial; and that it is a more desirable concept than a superpower. Here, Hill takes the view that any development in the direction of a super power would go against the intrinsic nature of the EC.

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24 Ifestos, European Political Cooperation, 68.
25 I do not consider two immediate responses to Bull because they more or less amounted to a reiterating of the importance of NATO and the Americans, see Moisi, D., in Tsoukalis, The European Community - Past, Present & Future, 165-167; Hacke, C. in Ibid., 166-170.
26 Hill, 'European foreign policy: Power bloc, civilian model - or flop?’.
27 This view was later repeated by Zielonka, see below.
There remains however the unresolved question about the relative importance of the two characteristics in the initial Duchêne definition. The emphasis was mainly on the first one, with the added dimension of the normative aspect of the whole question, that is to say, the desirability or otherwise of the civilian power concept. Thus on both descriptive and normative grounds there were several supporters and several opponents to the concept of a civilian power Europe.

By giving more emphasis to the first part of Duchêne’s definition of a civilian power, i.e. non-military means, rather than the second part on the promotion of democratic principles, the whole debate ignored the more problematic question of how to promote these principles without ever having to use force. This is more than just a theoretical question because it implies, though not explicitly, that democracies should never fight. History and reason point to a different direction of course. What would have been a civilian response to Hitler’s military takeover of Europe? It is clear that the question of military power as part of the civilian power concept remained rather under-studied. In that regard, there is also a certain slippage in Duchêne’s analysis between means and power. He seems to equate the two when in fact his own definition of power might imply the need for the occasional use of military means after all.

Part 2: The Post-Cold War Era: a Real Window of Opportunity for a Civilian Power Europe

A revival of the concept occurred with the end of the Cold War. Juliet Lodge’s contribution on civilian power Europe in 1993 is extremely important for two reasons, but only one will be developed here. First, she adds a new element to the concept of a civilian power Europe: the question of the democratic control of foreign policy making in Europe. Such a development has not received much attention. But I do not develop it here further as it is an important question for the EU’s foreign and defence policy irrespective of whether or not one applies the concept of civilian power.

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28 Duchene, 'The EC and the uncertainties of interdependence', 19.
29 Lodge, J., 'From civilian power to speaking with a common voice: the transition to a CFSP', in Lodge, J. (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, Pinter, 2nd ed., 1993), 227-251.
30 Christopher Hill has also correctly pointed out that because of its intrinsic nature, European foreign policy allows for more openness and therefore possibility of democratic control (and particularly parliamentary control by the European Parliament) than traditional national foreign policies (Hill, 'European foreign policy: Power bloc, civilian model - or flop?', 46-47). See also Beiber, R., ‘Democratic Control of European Foreign Policy’. European Journal of International Law, 1, no.1/2 (1990): 148-173; Stavridis, S., 'The "second" democratic deficit in the European Community: the process of European Political Cooperation', in Pfetsch F.
Lodge’s second element is a real contribution to the wider debate over the concept of a civilian power. She mentions that in the 1990 Paris OSCE Charter, there is clear evidence of an effort to give ‘a human face to security’, that is to say to move towards ‘a civilianization of security’31. This expanding definition of security to include human rights and other elements of international relations means that security covers more than just military aspects. She specifically refers to the European Parliament efforts to include issues of human rights, arms trade and disarmament as matters of general security interest 32. Lodge also mentions that a civilian power concentrates on an effort to limit, but not to eliminate the use of force33. This is an element in the debate over the utility of the concept of a civilian power Europe that is largely ignored. It only comes back to the fore in 2000 with Hans Maull’s study of Germany after it had participated militarily in the Kosovo War. It is a vital element in the argument I make in this part and one of the reasons why I still think the concept of a civilian power is relevant despite the current militarising of the EU (see part 3 below).

Renewed interest in the late 1990s was not limited to Lodge’s contribution. It also materialised in mainly three books, all published in 1998, respectively by Jan Zielonka, Richard Whitman, and Nicole Gnesotto34. Zielonka’s concern it to explain what needs to be done to facilitate the emergence of a real EU foreign policy. He complains about a number of deficiencies in the existing system. He argues that a civilian power Europe and a clear delimitation of its geographical (territorial) membership are needed urgently. He makes a case for the concept of a civilian power on the grounds that it is a much better alternative to that of a superpower in the making. His main argument is that the civilian, i.e. non-military, dimension of European integration is at the heart of this process. To diverge from it would mean to destroy its very soul. He sees NATO and national military forces as perfectly adequate for the provision of traditional defence tasks. He argues against any militarising of the EU. There are a number of problems with his interpretation, not least that his prediction is not confirmed by recent events. But more importantly he seems to fail to understand that to promote democratic principles in the world might sometimes entail the use of military means. This means that

31 Lodge, ‘From civilian power to speaking with a common voice’, 233-234.
32 Ibid., 235.
33 Ibid., 249.
there is a clear contradiction between his wish that the Atlantic Alliance and national defence policies continue to dominate the security agenda in Europe, and the need for an autonomous European force. A contradiction that is further complicated by his correct emphasis on the need to democratise the CFSP and the EU’s external relations. I fully agree with such a prescription but I fail to see how Zielonka can seriously call for a democratic debate about foreign and security policy in Europe without calling into question the USA’s predominance in Europe?

Whitman offers a different approach to the civilian power Europe debate by refusing the dichotomy between that concept and that of a superpower in the making. He uses a systems approach which he regards as superior to more traditional theories. This is not the place to argue that it is unclear to me what Whitman is actually adding to our understanding of the EU as an international actor. But his work is useful in his emphasis on the democratic dimension of the whole discussion, with a whole chapter dedicated to the role of the European Parliament in world affairs. He concludes that the current militarising of the EU is rendering the concept of a civilian power Europe obsolete. His is yet another analysis that concentrates in my view far too much on the means used in foreign policy, rather than on the ends. Perhaps there is evidence of this confusion when, only a year later, he appears to qualify his own prediction when he refers to the possibility a ‘rebirth of civilian power Europe’.

As for Nicole Gnesotto, her main interest is not so much the concept of civilian power itself. She deals with the concept of power and contrasts the current civilian power Europe to its potential political power. There are a number of problems with her approach, in particular her emphasis on the need for a *choc fédérateur* to create that political power. Indeed, there is very little evidence of such a development especially in light of recent development in the CFSP and in the creation of the CESDP. But she does offer a good account of why the French rapprochement with NATO (and vice-versa) did not take place in the mid-1990s. She says that NATO does not allow for an independent European caucus to develop within the Alliance and thus create a real European force. Her discussion of how effective, or otherwise, American foreign policy has been is also relevant because the USA possess both military and non-military powers. Also relevant is her reference to the role of parliaments in

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35 See note 30 above.
foreign and security issues\textsuperscript{38}, although she does not fully develop either of these points.

Therefore, we can see that once more the desirability or otherwise of the concept is given more predominance than its feasibility. Moreover, the incompatibility of military means with the concept itself is reiterated constantly. No one questions that assumption. What if military means were necessary to uphold civilian values? This return to basics materialises in the late 1990s and in 2000 with a \textit{de facto} militarising of the EU, but the dominant view then turned out to argue that we are witnessing the end of the applicability of the concept to the European case.

**Part 3: The Militarising of the EU: a Premature Announcement of a Death Foretold?**

The concept of a civilian power Europe is perhaps even more relevant today than it was probably during the 1980s and 1990s as the EU has decided to develop a European defence identity and capability. It is difficult to know when the so-called security taboo was broken. Some argue that it was well before then, possibly with the reactivation of the Western European Union (WEU) in the early 1980s and the use of the phrase ‘economic and political aspects of security’ in the Single European Act (SEA)\textsuperscript{39}. But the introduction of a CFSP, with the ‘eventual’ (Maastricht Treaty) and later ‘progressive’ (Amsterdam Treaty) ‘framing of a common defence policy’ leading eventually to a common defence, are key developments in the process of militarising the European integration process.

All these developments also mean that a non-military road for the EU is no longer the path integration in Europe is taking now. In other words, it is an empirical observation to note that such a development is actually occurring. What its implications are for the concept of a civilian power Europe are more of a normative nature. They have led to a renewed interest in the subject with mainly two opposing views: One represented by Hans Maull (with regards to Germany) which argues that even with the use of force there is still a civilian power in action\textsuperscript{40}. The other, dominant, view represented by Karen Smith argues on the contrary that the whole concept of a civilian power is regrettably over now that military means are being added to the integration process\textsuperscript{41}. What

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 88.
\textsuperscript{39} Lodge, ‘From civilian power to speaking with a common voice’, 231.
\textsuperscript{40} Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force’.
\textsuperscript{41} Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power Europe’; see also Whitman, \textit{From Civilian Power to Superpower?}; Edwards, \textit{Europe’s Security and Defence Policy}. 
follows considers the two arguments in turn, but I clearly favour Maull’s perspective.

Smith takes the view that the whole concept is no longer viable. She argues that the EU ‘despite the obvious current weaknesses of [its] defence dimension, […] is now abandoning its civilian power image’\(^{42}\). She offers the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the enlargement process as two of the best examples of a civilian power at work. However she laments the recent military developments. She argues that ‘the EU repudiates civilian power by acquiring a defence dimension’\(^{43}\). She questions the assumptions behind these recent developments in defence cooperation. The whole approach to develop a military capacity is too state-centric, based on an excessive expectation of the utility of military force, and will create more problems than it will solve. Because Europe is currently considered as an alternative to the USA precisely as a result of its civilian status. She therefore argues for a continuation of the division between the EU and the WEU, the latter covering military matters. She also considers that NATO is enough as far as territorial defence is concerned\(^{44}\).

All this in my view is a contradiction in terms. It becomes much clearer when she argues that military interventions will most probably be needed in the future but it does not have to be the EU’s job\(^{45}\). It is fine for an enlarged WEU to do the job but she denies this same right to the EU. Moreover, the fact that the WEU is disappearing off the scene seems to have been an option that Smith did not envisage at all.

However, she correctly points out that recent developments in the field of European defence are of much more importance than attempts at revitalising the WEU in the early 1980s. In that respect she is right to point to Tsakaloyannis’ rather premature announcement of the end of a civilian power Europe twenty years ago\(^{46}\). But where I fundamentally disagree with Smith is when she concentrates exclusively her use of a civilian power on the non-military means. She very quickly drifts into a position of ‘wanting her cake and eating it’ at the same time, to use a common expression in English: let us not have a European defence capacity because the Americans and NATO are still here and the United Nations should be more actively involved. But she does not address the question

\(^{42}\) Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power Europe’, 12.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 16, reversed order in original.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 22.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 25.

of what the EU should do in case the Americans are unwilling to act or the UN is unable to do so.

She also overemphasises in my view the `appeal` of the EU as only civilian. Many countries want to join the EU for economic reasons but also often for security ones. Finland is the first example that comes to mind in recent years, let alone the long list of Eastern countries, but one could go further back to the Greek accession which contained both an internal side (consolidation of democracy) and an external one (eventually the defence of Greek territory against Turkish aggression). The fact that the EU partners have not often supported Greece (most recently in 1996\textsuperscript{47}) does not invalidate the claim that Greece wanted EC membership for security reasons as well as economic and political. Greece’s push for recognition of national borders as EU borders and its constant quest for an EU-version of Article 5 (NATO) proves the case. The fact that when Greece joined the WEU it was denied automatic access to the WEU’s Article 5 confirms that security matters are very important for many an applicant country, past, present or future\textsuperscript{48}. A similar argument could be made for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary that decided to go full stream for NATO membership when they saw that EU accession was postponed \textit{ad calendas Graecas}. They still want EU membership because they realise that NATO only offers military security, but security covers more than just military affairs\textsuperscript{49}.

Smith also brings to the fore another important issue: the difference between the views of the neutral states and the big states in the EU. For the former, the Petersberg Tasks only mean humanitarian rescues and peace-keeping once the fighting is over and the UN allows it, whereas the latter have a much more general view of what constitutes peace-making action. This is an important discussion which relates directly to the question of a civilian power Europe after the militarising of the EU. It seems quite clear that the latter view is more consistent with the objective of a fully integrated Europe with its own defence policy and own defence. The former can only allow the USA to continue to dominate world affairs. This was painfully clear in the Balkans over the last decade.

\textsuperscript{47} Over the Imia incident, see E. Athanassopoulou, ‘Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations’, \textit{Mediterranean Politics}, 2/3 (1997): 76-101.
\textsuperscript{48} See also Heisbourg, ‘Europe’s Strategic Ambitions’, 14, for a similar argument about the defence peculiarities of some existing EU states, i.e. Finland and Greece.
\textsuperscript{49} I do not explore here the continued or otherwise viability of Article 5, be it from an American perspective or from that of the new NATO member states.
Smith is also right to mention the new debate about the civilian resources available in the EU which could be used in times of natural disasters and other emergencies. What she tends to ignore is that sometimes disasters do happen within civil war or international war situations. Then, the question becomes who would protect those civilian troops if there is no military capability available? Which brings me to one the conclusions of this paper: to use only one side of the Duchêne definition is not enough. Civilian power means nothing if it is only referring to non-military means. How one uses those means is what makes a civilian power. The second dimension of Duchêne’s definition, that is, the promotion of civilian values, is as important in my view. Of course this is re-interpreting the concept. But using only one half of the original approach was also a re-interpretation of the concept.

I very much prefer Maull’s interpretation of a civilian power Germany after Kosovo. It is ironic that it is his definition of a civilian power that Smith uses but she does not arrive at the same conclusion. In addition to the traditional elements used by Duchêne in the 1970s, Maull’s approach has the advantage of referring to the need to try and constrain the use of force\(^50\). In that respect it is reminiscent of Lodge’s contribution to the debate (see above). This is a much more rewarding definition because it allows for the possible use of force under extreme circumstances. But by doing so it means that the militarising of the EU is still possible under the civilian power à-la-Maull. Indeed, Maull argues that West Germany was a civilian power during the Cold War because even then its military participation in NATO actions within the context of collective defence was permissible. Now that the 1994 Constitutional Court decided that it was still possible, indeed desirable, for the Germans to participate in UN-authorised missions following prior approval by the Bundestag. Maull is right to point out that over the conflicts in Yugoslavia Germany chose ‘solidarity and the promotion of human rights over its desire to avoid the use of force’\(^51\). Thus Germany remained a civilian power despite the use of force.\(^52\) The importance of promoting human rights was reiterated as a key element of the civilian power approach. What I found of particular interest in Maull’s analysis are the theoretical implications of the militarising of the EU for the concept of civilian power Europe. His is a more convincing theoretical argument than Smith’s conclusion that regrettfully the concept is no longer viable.

\(^50\) Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force’, 56.
\(^51\) Ibid., 72.
\(^52\) There is also an element of policy justification. This is a debate I do not enter into here. It is common practice to see academic analysis sometime act as a post-facto justification of a foreign policy change. For an even clearer example see Wrede, H-H., 'Friendly Concern' - Europe's Decision-making on the Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia', *The Oxford International Review*, IV, no. 2 (1993): 30-32.
Maull also discusses the prospects of European integration in defence and appears rather pessimistic about such a move because all defence budgets are on the decrease (down to 1.5% of GDP in Germany\textsuperscript{53}), there is very little chance of a real common European defence procurement policy, and a supranationalisation of defence\textsuperscript{54}. It is interesting to note that although Maull’s article is a study of the domestic sources of recent German foreign and security policy, his empirical assessment of Europe’s future defence integration prospects are not very dissimilar to those expressed by Duchêne nearly three decades ago. There is another important point in this conclusion which I share overall: if the military budgets are declining and national markets remain closed to Europeanisation (which would means economies of scales), how efficient a civilian power the EU would be in the future?

Summing up the concept at the beginning of 2001, where does all this leave us with the concept of a civilian power Europe? Duchêne’s main contribution is of course to have put the concept on the academic agenda on what Europe is or should be in general and its international role in particular. His description of a limited military force mainly using national and non-EC/EU means remains valid today despite significant progress towards a military force at the EU level in the last couple of years. In my view however the second part of his definition is far more important: the EU must promote democratic principles in third countries and act therefore as a civilian power. Otherwise, as Duchêne himself had stressed such a long time ago, it runs the risk of being overtaken by traditional power politics. Integration in Europe is a negation of traditional power politics but it does not mean that power is irrelevant. It is how one uses it that becomes important.

Bull’s contribution was to show the limitations of an exclusion of military means. In other words, he helped us understand that a civilian power cannot be a pacifist power or a neutral power in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and beyond. Such an assessment is all the more relevant in the post Cold War era. Who was right, Duchêne or Bull? In my view, both. The former because of the attention he created around the concept, and the latter because he stressed quite early the limitations of concentrating exclusively on the non-military means. Perhaps now that the integration process in Europe is developing a military capacity both aspects will come to a fruitful coherent whole. Of course, there is no guarantee that such a development will take place. But the record to date has shown the limits of a civilian entity, as opposed to a civilian power.

\textsuperscript{53} Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force’, 70.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 73.
Hill was right to highlight that force is not always leading to the expected results thus emphasising also that how one uses its power, be it military or not, is as important, as what kind of power is available. Lodge’s stress on the need to view civilian power as a means for limiting, rather than eliminating, the use of force is particularly important. As for Smith she missed the real point in my view, concentrating too much on the military means rather than on the wider philosophy of a civilian power. Maull did a much better job in that particular respect although he did not apply it to the EU but to Germany.

**Part 4: The Concept Revisited: a Civilian Power Europe Mark II**

In this concluding section I sum up the main implications of the militarising of the EU. I argue that the use of military means can be of a civilian type if it promotes human rights and democratic principles. It represents a re-interpretation of the original Duchêne two-part definition. The emphasis is on the second part of his definition.

There are many examples of a civilian power Europe Mark I. Be it the enlargement process of the Union, or the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe\(^{55}\), or other smaller examples such as the EU administration of Mostar, or the use of the D-Mark in Kosovo. Bodo Hombach, the special coordinator for the Stability Pact summed it up well when he argued that by financially supporting it at the rate of $2.1 billion, the EU and its partners are consolidating stability, peace and democracy as well as economic progress\(^{56}\). But at the same time, the IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and the K-FOR in Kosovo are making these developments possible. To separate the two amounts to wishful thinking. It is also a normative statement: instead of having a civilian power by default, let us have a civilian power by design. This would confirm Duchêne’s view of how effective the European experience has been since the end of the Second World War. Peace, stability, democracy and economic prosperity have replaced constant tensions, conflicts, and wars. Thus, we have what I would call a civilian power Europe Mark II based mainly on the second of the two elements of the original Duchêne definition.

What matters is the output, that is the promotion of human rights and other democratic principles in the world. Non-military means must be favoured in so far as the use of force often creates more problems than it solves. But one should not totally exclude it as there are cases where force is necessary. This is an interpretation very close to Maull’s argument that Germany remains still a civilian power despite its participation in NATO-led military actions.

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This approach also raises a wider issue: can there really be a civilian power Europe without military means? Or, all you get then is just a civilian entity or presence, without any substantial impact on international affairs? In short, civilian power does not equate pacifism. Such a view considers military means to be on the one end of a long spectrum, with trade and use of economic sanctions on the other. This continuum also implies that sanctions should not only be seen as an alternative to military action but as a first step towards the extreme case of using force. This sounds very much like Bull’s argument on the limitations of the civilian power Europe concept back in the 1980s, but from a completely different perspective: instead of ignoring the concept, it builds on it, by stressing the link between military muscle and the export of democratic principles. A simple example might help us understand what I actually mean: to have an armed police force does not mean they have to use guns all the time, but the possibility of using them is always there. The same applies to unarmed police forces which always have a special unit provided with weapons. In other words, the possession of military means is necessary because it allows for the possibility of using them. It adds to the credibility of an international actor. Equally important is the fact that by not having a military option the range of possibilities becomes more restricted and less credible. Thus, the USA’s foreign policy has been as important in the past in areas of direct involvement as it has been in areas of non-involvement\textsuperscript{57}. But by having both military and non-military options, the Americans enjoy more freedom of manoeuvre when dealing with international issues.

Of course, this should not be seen a ‘call to arms’. Not all problems can be resolved by force. There is however a clear distinction to be made between short-term solutions and long terms ones. Sometimes, a rapid military action might prevent a worse bng-term problem. I am perfectly aware that one cannot prove that what did not take place might have worked, but for instance if the wars in the Balkans had been stopped by military force in 1991 perhaps the ten years of utter destruction would not have taken place. A similar argument would apply in my view to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

To use the NATO Secretary General (Lord Roberston) words, ‘\textit{Sans capacités militaires, l’Europe serait un tigre de papier}’\textsuperscript{58}. Again, the Balkans come to mind, and whether it is Bosnia or in Kosovo, there is little doubt that the Europeans did not have any real impact on events on the grounds, contrary to the USA (once it was decided in Washington that something had to be done). It is interesting to note that a military presence on the ground as was the case with West European national forces under the UN in Bosnia is not a guarantee of success. It occasionally allows for some influence but no real power. Of course,

\textsuperscript{57} Gnesotto, \textit{La puissance et l’Europe}, 37.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Le Monde} interview, 4 November 1999.
deploying troops without prior political agreement on what to do is not a good policy either. This is what seemed to be the case in Bosnia.\(^{59}\)

Furthermore, this continuum can be clearly seen in the introduction of civilian forms of action in the non-military field: police action and the like. In its July 2000 programme, the French Presidency declared that one of its main objectives would be as follows:

‘Strengthening the reaction capability and the synergy of non-military crisis management instruments is an aspect of the European Union approach to which the French Presidency will also devote considerable attention, since the Union's strength is vested in its capacity to make rational use of the full range of crisis management instruments at its disposal. The creation of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, decided on by the Council on 22 May 2000, should be particularly relevant for continuing the work already begun and making further progress in this area on the basis of the concrete objectives identified at Santa Maria da Feira, particularly as regards police capabilities.'\(^{60}\)

Of course, there is no evidence that such a programme, however desirable, will materialise without any problems. During 2000 the saga between Bernard Kouchner and Jean-Pierre Chevenement, respectively in charge of Kosovo and the then Interior Minister of France, over the need for more police officers in the NATO-controlled entity showed the discrepancy between rhetoric and reality. Chevenement argued that there was a need for more police officers in the French inner-cities and therefore it was not possible for France to send more policemen to Yugoslavia.

In the post-Cold War world, there might be less use for military force but this does not mean it is absolutely useless. What has probably changed in a dramatic fashion is the obsolescence of major war. But that does not mean, unfortunately, the end of violence\(^{61}\). There is a difference between 'total war' and intra-state conflict or 'limited war' (be it ethnic cleansing by machete à-la-Rwanda or by bullets-in-the-head or systematic rape à-la-Bosnia). After the end of the nuclear stalemate between the USA and the USSR in 1989-91, the prospect of a holocaust caused by a massive nuclear exchange has receded. Moreover, it is not completely clear if major war is totally off the international agenda or if it is just a lull. Thus, proliferation in nuclear technologies (India-Pakistan summer 1999) and in ballistic delivery systems (the so-called rogue states) has led to a revival of a ballistic-missile defence system (which has always existed since the creation of nuclear weapons but has been limited by


\(^{60}\) http://www.presidence-europe.fr/pfue/static/acces5.htm.

international treaty; latest effort before the current one was the famous Star Wars or SDI of Ronald Reagan). In short, military force continues to matter.

**Conclusions: What Next for the Concept of a Civilian Power?**

The main suggestion of this paper is that we need to move from the concept of a civilian power 'by default' to that of a civilian power 'by design' (or by conviction). That is to say to move away from a 'naked king' civilian power (no military capacity) which really amounted to a civilian presence in the international system. If ends, and not only means, are needed to be a civilian power, it would confirm that US foreign policy is not always one of a civilian type (characteristic number two) as the USA have supported dictatorships throughout the world in recent years, only disguising a non-democratic policy as a fight against communism. Forgetting thus that democracies must respect democratic principles if they are to remain such. The discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality of EU policy is similar: even without the defence dimension right now, there is a plethora of examples where the EU has refused to act to try and reverse a non-democratic regime or the military occupation of another country\(^\text{62}\). In brief, it the EU’s reality matched its rhetoric it would be acting like a civilian power even without military means. But that does not imply that the EU does not need those military means from time to time. Experience has shown the limits of EU action when military means were needed but not available. The best examples come mainly, but not exclusively, the Balkans over the last ten years or so.

The key conclusion is that, rather than seeing the militarising of the EU as the end of the concept of a civilian power, such a development makes the concept even more useful. But it also means that the EU will have to be very careful about how it will use its developing military capacity.

In short, it is hoped that this paper has reversed the trend towards the announcement of the premature death of a concept by showing that concepts have various dimensions and that only half of the initial definition was used in the past two to three decades. The emphasis on non-military means was perhaps useful during the nuclear stalemate and the predominance of the bipolar world. But this is no longer the case and it is hoped that a more ethical international system will allow for more civilian power with regards to the promotion of human rights and other democratic principles in the world.

Stelios Stavridis
JMF-RSCAS (EUI)
& Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Studies,
Department of Politics,
The University of Reading, UK
E-mail: stelios.stavridis@iue.it