ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the formulation of the two main European foreign policy initiatives towards the Mediterranean, in the early 1970s and in the early 1990s. It examines the actors (the policy entrepreneurs) and structural conditions (the policy windows) that facilitate the adoption of a common initiative. It suggests that the most effective policy entrepreneurship have been provided by a single member state, motivated by a recent reorientation of its national foreign policy. In the early 1970s, the policy entrepreneur in question was France, while in the early 1990s it was Spain. The policy window that made their action possible and likely is represented by a worsening of European perceptions of challenges originating from the Mediterranean. What matters most is the understanding by policy-makers and public opinion of Mediterranean affairs, rather than effective material changes occurring in the region. The worsening security perceptions lead member states’ governments to discuss how to interpret the phenomena and how to respond to it. The activity of the policy entrepreneur feeds the debate and stimulates the definition of a common European interest in the Mediterranean, until a decision is taken.
INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTIONS

The analysis of European foreign policy is shifting its focus. In the last decade, a substantial group of scholars have convincingly shown not only the existence of European foreign policy, but also its importance, its subtleties and its limits (e.g. Carlsnaes and Smith 1994; Regelsberger, Schoutheete, Wessels 1997; Nuttall 2000). Europe has been shown to have ‘a phone number’ in international affairs (apart from some limitations in using it) and a presence (though patchy) on the international stage (Allen and M.Smith 1990). However, the debate about its existence and its functioning has not yet led to a clear understanding of the conditions for European foreign policy. We still have little grasp on why European foreign policies are launched, and how they are developed and implemented. Explanation, when provided, has tended to focus on EPC/CFSP institutional developments or has been non-comparative in nature. Attempts to trace the policy process have not yet led to consistent generalisations. It is therefore all the more important to focus on the process and the mechanisms of European foreign policy making in order to fully capture how, when and why European foreign policy is formulated and implemented.

This paper analyses the formulation of European foreign policy, focusing on the actors and the factors that lead to the definition of a common European interest and to the adoption of a common initiative. Why does the EC/EU formulate a foreign policy? Why does it adopt and launch a new foreign policy initiative, innovating on the previous pattern of relationships with a non-member country or group of countries? Why at that specific moment in time? These questions focus on a particular moment of relations between the EC/EU and a third party. They examine the reasons for a specific type of change in European foreign policy, namely the change that innovates on the previous course of action or inaction. This can take three main forms. It can entail launching a policy initiative towards an area with which the EC/EU had no relations beforehand. It might lead to an upgrade of previously existing relations. Finally, the change might occur in the content of the European foreign policy towards a country or region, as the EC/EU opts, for instance, for more trade over aid or for imposing sanctions. Moreover, the European foreign policy, which is under

1 I would like to thank for comments on earlier versions of this paper Maurizio Cotta, Martin Dahl, Richard Gillespie, Adrienne Heritier, Thomas Risse and Karen Smith, as well as an anonymous referee.

2 Logically, we could also enumerate cases in which the attention devoted to a given area is diminished, i.e. initiatives that withdraw the previous level of commitment. However, this case rarely takes the shape of a formal initiative because what generally happens is that the previous initiative is not carried out or carried out with a lower level of commitment. It might
examination here, includes not only EPC/CFSP initiatives, but also more generally all external relations of the EC/EU. Contrary to those definitions that restrict the scope of the concept to purely diplomatic means, I will consider all available means that the EC/EU can put at use, ranging from economic measures to legally less well defined forms of cooperation, on issues such as migration and terrorism. However, I will not take into account national foreign policy systems, as the analysis of their Europeanisation has not yet led to uncontroversial conclusions. The adoption of a European foreign policy initiative, in the sense here defined, is therefore the dependent variable, i.e. the explanandum of this research. While I am aware of the various feedback loops, I take a different starting point when compared to researchers such as Ginsberg (2001) whose focus is on the impact of European foreign policy, thus analysing the implementation of an initiative and its effects. The two approaches are obviously compatible, but do not share the same analytical focus.

The question of why the EC/EU formulates a foreign policy initiative is particularly relevant for the case of its relations with its Southern neighbours, i.e. the Mediterranean non-member countries. Given the geographical proximity of the area, one would expect constant attention to it on the part of the EC/EU. On the contrary, the EC/EU has in fact shown a fluctuating interest in it. In the first period, from 1957 until 1970-71, the EC approached the Mediterranean non-members strictly on a bilateral basis. Thus, it negotiated bilateral agreements with most Mediterranean countries that were dissimilar in type and simply die out after being launched. Therefore, I am not going to focus on this type of change, which pertains to the implementation stage.

For analyses of the various definitions of European foreign policy, see Hill (1993, 322ss.) and White (1999, 43ss.).


For a typology, see K.Smith (1998).


For authors that do, see Hill (1993, 322-23; 1998, 18) and White (1999, 44).

The definition of ‘Mediterranean region’ has changed through time. In this research, the Mediterranean will be defined in the same way that the EC/EU has defined it, i.e. as comprising the countries which border the Mediterranean and are not members of the EC/EU. For the period before the Southern enlargement (1956-1980), the Mediterranean non-member countries were Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan (for its links to the Arab-Israeli conflict), Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and Greece. Libya never manifested an interest in the EC/EU. The Balkans, on the contrary, has generally been considered as belonging to Eastern Europe or as a separate region. After the Southern enlargement (1981-86), Greece, Spain and Portugal became members, thus since then the expression Mediterranean non-members no longer includes them. Since the Madrid Conference (1991), moreover, the EC/EU has allowed an increasing presence to the Palestinian Authority, with which several Interim Agreements have been signed.
produced in an uncoordinated manner. The EC first formulated a foreign policy approach towards the whole Mediterranean region in the early 1970s. In 1972, it adopted the Global Mediterranean Policy, which was complemented in 1974 by the Euro-Arab Dialogue. In the following few years, agreements with a very similar content were signed with the majority of Mediterranean non-members. Since then, the EC/EU’s interest declined sharply. It was non-existent during the 1980s and only renewed at the end of the Cold War. First in 1990, with the Renovated Mediterranean Policy, and then in 1995, with the much more ambitious Euro-Mediterranean Partnership when the EC/EU once again formulated and launched a foreign policy initiative towards the Mediterranean. Therefore, the history of European foreign policy towards this region shows two moments of lack of interest in the Mediterranean as such (the 1960s and the 1980s) and two moments in which on the contrary common foreign policy initiatives were formulated (early 1970s and early 1990s). What explains the shift from a period of disinterest to a period of activism? Why did the EC/EU formulate an initiative aimed at the Mediterranean region and why at that particular moment in time?

In order to answer these questions, I will focus on two key issues, namely the actors that lead the change and the factors that make their action both possible and likely. The first issue raises the point of who are the policy actors that, by their actions, precipitate the change I am interested in here. What type of actors are they, in the complex framework of the EC/EU and of its member states? Is it the Commission, a lobby group, a powerful member state, a network that comprises different actors? Second, we need to understand the structural context in which the actors precipitate the change. What kinds of conditions contribute to the mobilisation of actors for European foreign policy change? What type of structural conditions shapes their action and makes it possible and likely? By answering these two broad questions and by establishing the relationship between actors and factors, as it emerges from the Mediterranean case, I aim at contributing to a theory of change in European foreign policy making.

Borrowing from Policy Analysis, we can describe the two issues of actors and factors by using the metaphors of policy entrepreneurs and policy windows (Kingdon 1984/95). Two key elements define a policy entrepreneur. The first is the capacity to innovate on the previous course of action (King and Roberts 1996). Policy entrepreneurs seek to “initiate dynamic policy change” (Mintrom 1997, 739) by designing and implementing innovative ideas into public sector practice (Roberts 1992, 56). The second key aspect of policy entrepreneurship is
the intention to spend resources in order to achieve innovation. This is highlighted in Kingdon’s definition, according to which the characteristic of policy entrepreneurs are “their willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in hope of a future return” in terms of policy change (1995, 122). Policy entrepreneurs bring about change in two ways. On the hand, they reframe the debate, by generating new ideas and bringing new vision to a policy issue (Roberts 1992, 56 ff.). At the same time, policy entrepreneurs rally support in favour of their definition of the problem and preferred approach to its resolution. They organise networks of people and spend resources in order to put their issue on the agenda and achieve a positive decision on it (Giuliani 1998, 363). For policy entrepreneurship to be successful, however, a policy window must exist (Kingdon 1984/95), namely a certain set of “situational factors” (Checkel 1997, 9) must be in place. The emphasis here is on the “conditions for action,” or “structural contexts” in which the policy entrepreneur’s social activity takes place and on which it depends (Patomäki and Wight 2000, 230-31). This concept has been used in the literature to illuminate different types of contexts, drawn from “garbage can” models (Kingdon 1984/95) and from a more rational choice perspective. Here, I will use it as a tool to explore what kind of structural factors shape the action of which policy entrepreneurs.

This paper will offer a model for analysing European foreign policy formulation based on a constructivist understanding of member states’ action. I will show that, for the Mediterranean case, the policy entrepreneurs tended to be member states, but, contrary to intergovernmental explanations, they did not have a clear-cut predefined national interest guiding their action. Rather, they tended to define it through interactions with the other member states and with the Commission. Moreover, entrepreneurial member states acted in the context of ideational constructions, rather than of material interests, which were mainly composed of ideas about the alleged threats originating in the Mediterranean non-member countries. As security discourses changed throughout Western Europe, emphasising the alleged existence of new types of threats, member states reconsidered their previous stance in European foreign policy and developed a new position towards their Southern neighbours. This will be shown

9 Competing definitions stress risk taking as the defining criterion of policy entrepreneurship, as in Kingdon (Kingdon 1995). However, this aspect introduces several problems of operationalisation, which hinder the importance of innovation. See Giuliani for a thorough review of the concept and of the implications of its operationalisation (Giuliani 1998).

10 This approach is similar to the one advocated by the whole agency-structure debate (Wendt 1987). While I do not want to delve into the implications of this debate here, see the volume edited by Carlsnaes and Smith, which focuses on agency and structure in the case of European foreign policy (Carlsnaes and Smith 1994).
to be the pattern for the innovative changes undergone by the European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region.

First, the paper sketches the traditional answers to the two key questions under scrutiny here (what are the actors/what are the factors leading to a new European foreign policy initiative for the Mediterranean case?). Second, it outlines an alternative causal mechanism that explains why and how the EC/EU has launched new initiatives towards the Mediterranean. Third, I will review the empirical evidence to show support for my argument. In the Conclusions, I will offer some suggestions about how far to generalise from these findings.

TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR EUROPEAN (FOREIGN) POLICY MAKING

There are two main alternative hypotheses that have been traditionally used to explain the formulation of European foreign policy and, more generally, of European cooperation. The first set of hypotheses is derived from revised versions of neo-functionalism under the label of supranationalism (e.g. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). The second set relies on liberal intergovernmentalism (e.g. Moravcsik 1998). The two offer radically different answers to the two questions raised above (i.e. actors and factors) and to the issue of European foreign policy formulation. The polarisation is evident if we cross two continua. The first, related to the possible actors that precipitate the change, ranges from national actors (member states) to supranational actors (the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice). The second continuum focuses on the factors, i.e. the structural conditions that make the action of the policy entrepreneurs possible and likely. It reflects the relative importance of material and ideational factors that scholars have emphasised in their explanations. While the national-supranational debate has a long-standing tradition, this second debate has only recently emerged in International Relations and Public Policy (e.g. Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Jepperson et al. 1996; Wendt 1999).11

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Therefore, by crossing these two dimensions (national-supranational and material-ideational) as in Fig. 1, we obtain an analytical space that contributes to a specification of alternative hypotheses for EFP change. Within this analytical space, it can be seen that the traditional approaches to European integration theory have an opposite positioning. While supranationalism/neofunctionalism lies in the upper-right quadrant, intergovernmentalism sits in the lower-left one. The traditional intergovernmental explanation maintains the centrality of member states, responding to a changing material environment (Moravcsik 1998; Pijpers 1991). The liberal intergovernmentalist understanding of member states’ action derives from largely rational choice foundations. Member states act in the name of national interest, pursuing at the European level the goals that they cannot achieve at the national level. In particular, national governments are pushed to cooperate at the European level by the demands of national producers that wish to improve their export share in foreign markets. The material interest of national industries, therefore, is translated into a governmental effort at European cooperation (Moravcsik 1998).\textsuperscript{12} In this perspective, a European initiative for the Mediterranean would be motivated by the joint attempt of

\textsuperscript{12} Moravcsik does call for an exception in the field of CFSP, which is in his view more liable to interpretations and ideologies (1998, 478). However, he bases his argument on the absence of economic interests. Given the widespread belief, among scholars from different theoretical perspectives that economic factors led Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (e.g. Peters 2002), the original liberal intergovernmentalist hypothesis is worth scrutinising anyway.
member states to open up the markets of Mediterranean non member countries, so as to provide national producers with new outlets. The supranational/neofunctional explanation points in a different direction (Haas 2001; Jørgensen 1997; Øhrgaard 1997; K.Smith 1999; M.Smith 1998). The Commission is the key policy entrepreneur, providing the stimulus for innovation. The action of the Commission is made possible by the long-standing habit of consultation and mutual adaptation within the EPC/CFSP framework, as well as in the EC. Through continuous discussions and exchanges of views, member states have developed a set of norms and of common principles for actions (communauté de vue) which underpins common action (communauté d’action) (de Schoutheete 1986). Therefore, in this perspective, the structural conditions that lead to a policy window fall into the ideational domain.

Therefore, the traditional explanations of EFP either downplay completely previous cooperation (such as the liberal intergovernmental approach) or conflate the importance of norms crafted in previous cooperation to explain every policy initiative (such as in the supranational/neofunctional perspective). In other terms, the liberal intergovernmental approach oversimplifies history (“when there is a common interest, there is cooperation between member states”), while the supranational/neofunctional perspective depicts history as continuous progress (“as norms develop, policy initiatives develop”). Outside these two opposite views lie two analytical spaces on Fig. 1 that have not been fully explored. The upper-left quadrant (supranational + material) does not promise much insight. There have been attempts to explain changes in EFP as the consequence of conflicts internal to the Commission, as clashes for career purposes between General Directorates, but this entails a loss of focus on the relationships between the Commission and the other potentially relevant actors. I will focus instead on the fourth quadrant (national + ideational) to show the potential for analysis that addresses member states as policy entrepreneurs acting within a predominantly ideational context.

MEMBER STATE’S ACTION IN IDEATIONAL CONTEXT

The lower-right quadrant presents us with an unusual combination. On the one hand, it groups together all the approaches that place policy entrepreneurialism below the supranational level generally associated with EC/EU institutions such as the Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. The role of member states is, therefore, placed very much at centre stage. On the other hand, the importance of ideational conditions is emphasised in this quadrant over material factors, reflecting the “ideational turn” in Political Science. The model I will describe fundamentally depicts a situation of uncertainty (the policy window) which induces member states to reconsider their position. As member states perceive new security challenges originating from
the Mediterranean, the “received wisdom” of the previous policy approach is questioned and a debate about what to do ensues. In that debate, a member state (the policy entrepreneur) pushes a certain solution to the problems perceived by the others. That solution, after negotiations, becomes the basis for a common EFP initiative. Therefore, the formulation of a new EFP is due to the opening of a policy window (uncertainty due to worsening security perceptions) and the action of a policy entrepreneur (a member state with a particularly clear political vision). The reasons motivating the action of the policy entrepreneur belong to its domestic politics. Following this summary of my analytical model, this section now moves on to describe how a policy window opens and how it affects member states. Second, I will elaborate on how an entrepreneurial member state can play a crucial leading role in the formulation of a new EFP initiative.

When does a policy window open up? I argue that a policy window exists when a new issue is perceived to be rising on the scale from no-politicisation (an issue belongs to the private sphere) to high security (an issue is central to political debates, and it is presented as an existential threat). According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (and more generally to the so-called “Copenhagen school”), any issue can be located on

“The spectrum ranging from non-politicised (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicised (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations [...] to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).” (1998, 23-24).

Therefore, according to the place it has in relation to public action, an issue refers to politics, to security (i.e. politics about existential threats) or neither. What creates a policy window is the escalation of a new issue along this continuum, because this creates a novel situation, challenging states’ capacities to respond. When an issue becomes politicised or more importantly when it is perceived as an existential threat, i.e. when it enters a new realm, then it contributes to the opening of a policy window because member states are concerned about how to tackle it. A condition of uncertainty about how to interpret the new phenomenon and what to do then ensues. The previous policy approach is found wanting and the debate addresses the issue of what to do instead.

Therefore, my first hypothesis is that a window of opportunity opens up when new political and security challenges are perceived to exist and create a situation of uncertainty. This hypothesis relies on two assumptions. The first is that the definition of what is political and, more specifically, what is perceived as a security threat changes through time. The traditional geopolitical
explanation according to which threats and challenges originate from a fixed list of topics (mainly arms) seems unconvincing to me, especially in an area such as the Mediterranean in which contradictory interpretations abound.\textsuperscript{13} From a rough historical overview, the topics at stake have varied enormously, ranging from decolonisation to environmental challenges, from oil to migration. The findings of the Copenhagen school suggest a way to render more comprehensible this variety. The second is that the link between material conditions and perceived challenges (or, the ideational security construction about the alleged threats) can be quite loose. What matters for my analysis is the \textit{perception} of a newly existing problem, especially in the form of a security discourse and practices that substantiate it.\textsuperscript{14} In my opinion, there are two key indicators of an issue having become a security issue: 1) a discourse defining it as such, 2) a series of practices instantiating the discourse. The discursive element is crucial to single out the interpretation it receives by the relevant actors, thus clarifying its conceptual context and political relevance. Expressions defining an issue as a threat requiring emergency measures, signal the change of reference points an issue is connected to. The analysis of practices points to the fact that discursive elements are not always available as securitisation might occur in secret. Therefore, in order to detect the issues that governments have decided to treat as security threats, then practices such as regulations and laws can complement and in case substitute for discourses.

A factor that contributes to the opening of a policy window due to changes in security discourse is the perception that not only Mediterranean security is neglected by the US, but also that it is low on the EC/EU political agenda vis à vis other geographical areas. EFP making does not occur in isolation. The position of the most powerful actor in international affairs is most likely to be taken into account. However, contrary to the findings of the theory of hegemonic stability (Gilpin 1987; Gowa 1994), I hypothesise that European member states will not follow the lead of the hegemon, namely the US for the whole period under consideration. Their security concerns might be increased by US neglect of the area. This is the case especially when the Europeans resent the US disinterest about the European concerns (and preferred policy initiatives) towards the Middle East. In periods when worsening security perceptions are

\textsuperscript{13} Suffice it to take two examples. While Braudel offers a telling picture of homogeneity in the Mediterranean (1949/90), Huntington has put forward an opposite scenario wracked by deep fractures (1993, 1996). The debate on how to interpret the Mediterranean is almost boundless (see e.g. Halliday 1996).

\textsuperscript{14} There is no space here to analyse what leads to the securitisation of an issue. As I am taking the securitisation and politicisation of an issue as an independent variable impacting on the formulation of EFP, the analysis of why an issue changes status goes beyond the scope of this paper.
matched with a neglect of Europeans’ concerns by the US over Arab-Israeli relationships, then it is most likely that the Europeans will be more prone to consider a purely European initiative towards the Mediterranean. Moreover, a similar case can be made about the perception of where the issue stands on the EC/EU agenda. There are several cases we can imagine in which the attention of the EC/EU in international affairs is directed towards an area that is not the Mediterranean. A case in point is Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. In such periods, it is most likely that Southern European countries, more sensitive to Mediterranean affairs, will raise the issue of where the Mediterranean stands in the EC/EU list of priorities. If this occurs while there is a widespread perception that the Mediterranean presents the EC/EU with new security challenges, then Northern European countries will be more prone to consider a European initiative towards the Mediterranean. Therefore, a policy window is particularly likely to open when not only does an issue becomes securitised, but also when EC/EU policy makers estimate that the issue risks being neglected both by the US and by them.

When uncertainty prevails and member states do not have fixed national preferences, I argue that a lot of interaction goes on between participants in the EFP-making framework before formal negotiations begin. These are aimed at identifying the nature of the problem and the alternative options. The differences between hard-nosed bargaining at the negotiation table and prior stages of less clear-cut problem definition, proposal drafting, “getting to the table” and agenda setting have been recently put at the centre of analysis (Braun 1999 25-29; Risse 2000, 20-21). A key aspect that has been emphasised is that while during negotiations interests tend to be fixed, in the prior stage what tends to be at stake are often “both a collective definition of the situation and of the underlying principles and norms guiding the interaction (the “rules of the game”).” (Risse 2000, 20). Actors try to understand the facts, the relevant numbers, whether there is a real problem, if so then what kind of problem it is, what possible solutions are there, and what would be their appropriate behaviour as the issue becomes framed. As Checkel put it, actors are in a situation by which they are “cognitively motivated to analyse new information” (2001, 10). In my opinion, this occurs before member states decide to begin formal

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15 For the deconstruction of the neo-realist assumption of fixed national preferences, see Finnemore (1996), Walder (1996) and Moravcsik (1998).

16 For an earlier analysis, see Stein (1989). From the perspective of the contributions gathered in the volume, however, negotiations are meant to follow a conflict and therefore the prenegotiation stage refers to the conditions that encourage the parties that a political solution might be better than a military one. In the case under examination in this research, the shift that occurs in the prenegotiation is from no solution (or national solutions) to a common solution at the EC/EU level.
negotiations about a possible common initiative. Before arriving to the negotiation table, actors spend time and resources defining the situation in which they find themselves and identifying the best possible approach. Therefore, the focus of the analysis is on actors’ behaviour and interaction before formal negotiations start, when – in our case – there is a widespread understanding that a new security challenge is facing member states in the Mediterranean, but with neither a clear definition of the nature of the threat nor of the appropriate response to it.

The widespread concern would not become a concrete common policy initiative without the activity of a policy entrepreneur, whose role is crucial to turn a passive concern into a common decision rooted in a common understanding of the issue at stake. A member state that acts as a policy entrepreneur can both try to push a well defined national interest (and this is the way liberal intergovernmentalism would see its action) or if its own national interest is defined in broad and vague terms, stimulate the debate at the European level in order to determine the nature of the problem and the possible common solutions. What can lead to the latter option? The most plausible scenario suggests a reorientation of the foreign policy of that member state and an upgrading of national relations with the Mediterranean, the effects of which would be magnified by championing the Mediterranean cause at the European level. What I suggest is that the motives of the entrepreneurial member state lie in domestic politics and tend to mix two types of characteristics. First, they embody a well-defined material component. The reason for pushing in a certain direction might be increased financial returns on investments or more bargaining power in the negotiation of certain agreements. Second, they also display a symbolic component. The entrepreneurial state aims at a European recognition of the importance of the issue it has raised. Therefore, the rationale of a state’s entrepreneurialism springs from what Edelman has labelled as symbolic action, which refers namely to “do something” rather than “problem solving” (Edelman 1988). The material and the symbolic reasons account for the fact that the entrepreneurial state might have a strategic interest in “doing something” and might have a clearer vision about what can be done, without however promoting a specific national option. The entrepreneurial state indicates a direction, but it does not specify the form nor the content of the final proposal. Therefore, it is not fundamentally different from its fellow EC/EU companions.17 It only displays a stronger intention to “do something” for the Mediterranean and has a

17 This is contrary to what Risse (2000) and Checkel (2001) suggest, as they posit a fundamental distinction between the persuader and the persuadee. Here, on the contrary, I argue that the main difference between the two lies in the stronger intention of the former to reach a positive conclusion, rather than in the possession by the former of a ready-made solution that it wants to push through.
clearer understanding of the nature of the problem and what can be done accordingly. This perspective, while less elegant than the intergovernmental one, starts from similar premises to arrive at a different point of view. An entrepreneurial member state does act strategically to innovate in a policy area. But its strategy does not lead it very far if its national interest is not specific enough. There is, therefore, an instrumental component in the entrepreneurialism by a member state that is derived from its domestic politics. However, its effect is limited to triggering a wider process of interaction in which the initial proposal of the entrepreneurial state is most likely to be changed.

The entrepreneurial member state triggers a process of interaction among member states and with the Commission that analytically could reflect a “cycle of definition,” although in practice this might follow a more confused path. Sociologists and policy analysts that describe the construction of a social problem (e.g. Spector and Kitsuse 1977; Blumer 1971; Henshel 1990) have pointed out that it entails several stages, beginning from a group’s attempt to assert the existence of some problematic condition up to the repeated endeavour by the public authority to respond to it (Spector and Kitsuse 1977, 142-54). The classical sequence would be: 1) the emergence of a social problem, 2) the legitimation of the problem, 3) the mobilisation of action, 4) the formation of an official plan, 5) the implementation of such a plan (Blumer 1971, 301 ff.). “In real life,” actors tend to play all the cards simultaneously, both claiming the importance of an issue and casting doubt on the capacity of institutions to solve it (e.g. Henshel 1990). Analytically, however, it should be possible to distinguish among the various processes leading to the adoption of the common initiative. An important element is given by the fact that the setting in which these processes take place exceed the limits of the EC/EU scope of activity. Member states might exchange ideas both within and outside the multilateral EC/EU framework. Moreover, the member state acting as a policy entrepreneur is also likely to pursue its contacts with the other member states on a bilateral basis. Diplomatic meetings, joint seminars, exchange of information outside the COREU system, phone contacts, personal relations, participation in non-strictly governmental gatherings in other member states, all these are channels through which the entrepreneurial member state stirs the debate and pursues a new European vision of a given problem.
Summing up, therefore, I suggest that EFP changes, in the Mediterranean case, can be explained as follows. *First hypothesis:* when changes in the prevailing security and more generally political discourse about challenges originating from the Mediterranean occur, and they are coupled with the risk of neglect both from the US and from the EC/EU, a condition of uncertainty is shared between member states. Thus, a policy window is opened in order to discuss how to tackle the new challenge perceived to flow from the Mediterranean.

However, to turn this shared, passive concern into a common definition of the problem at stake and a common initiative to solve it, a policy entrepreneur is needed. Therefore, the *second hypothesis:* when a reorientation of a member state’s foreign policy occurs, setting broad but partly symbolic goals in the Mediterranean, that member state is likely to act as a policy entrepreneur. This includes sparking a debate about the area, contributing to a common understanding of the problem and its possible solutions, and lobbying to put the issue on the EC/EU agenda until a decision is taken.

Therefore, when a wave of insecurity throughout Europe coincides with a member state being generically interested in crafting common solutions about the Mediterranean, then a new EFP initiative towards the area is most likely to be launched. Several elements of this hypothesis are liable to operationalisation. First, political entrepreneurship by a member state is marked by the simultaneous presence of a domestic debate about foreign policy, new ideas about the Mediterranean, and the attempts to organise a debate throughout the EC/EU. If national interests are not well defined from the beginning, we will see the form of the proposal being changed along the way as the debate with the other partners develops, and only rarely side-payments being exchanged. Second, politicisation and securitisation, i.e. raised issue salience, mark a window of opportunity in public debate and governmental practices. This can be analysed through the mentioning of the issue in governmental speeches, as well as in police and in administrative practices.

**THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN**

The evidence of European foreign policy towards Mediterranean non members displays a neat pattern. While geographical proximity and consistent low-key request for action by Mediterranean countries are constant, the attention of the EC/EU towards the area has peaked in two points in time. We can distinguish four stages.
1. From its birth until 1972, the EEC did not consider the Mediterranean to be a homogenous region. Bilateral, mostly technical agreements were occasionally signed with most of the riverain countries, but they widely differed in substance. Greece and Turkey were largely favoured over countries such as Lebanon and Libya.

2. The first span of consistent attention came in 1972-1974, when for the first time the EEC addressed the area as a region. In early 1973, the EEC launched the Global Mediterranean Policy, offering an almost identical package of “trade and aid” to all Mediterranean non-members, from Spain to Greece. While the Global Mediterranean Policy was rooted in the EEC framework, an EPC initiative was launched in 1974, in the form of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. This initiative reached out for all states of the Arab League, thus defining in a slightly different way the Southern neighbourhood. However, by the late 1970s, the attention had faded and previous initiatives had lost their momentum.

3. The 1980s were a lost decade from the point of view of European foreign policy for the Mediterranean, as attention was focused on southern enlargement and adaptation to it. The Southern Mediterranean countries did not enter the picture.

4. Things started to change again after the end of the Cold War when a revision of the Global Mediterranean Policy led to the Renewed Mediterranean Policy in 1990-91 and, more importantly, to the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995. The latter formalised an ambitious framework consisting of new trade agreements, new and increased aid, new topics for discussion (ranging from human rights to media) and, in particular, an institutionalised consultation scheme that breached the divide between the first, second and third EU pillars.

Therefore, while during the 1960s and the 1980s the foreign policy making activity of the EC/EU towards the Mediterranean was almost non-existent, the early 1970s and the early 1990s were two periods of intense activism peaking in new initiatives being launched. The empirical evidence on which I focus, then, consists of those time periods in which inactivity turns into activism and then into formal decisions: from the late 1960s until 1974 and from late 1980s until 1995. This is the whole universe of cases, which makes it even more important to understand why, amid long periods of neglect, the EC/EU concentrated its efforts towards the Mediterranean in two periods. What can these two distinct periods tell us about the hypotheses outlined in the previous sections?
In the period before a European initiative towards the Mediterranean, perceptions of EC/EU governments and public opinion towards Mediterranean issues worsened, as a “Mediterranean problem” was perceived to emerge.

In the 1970s, terrorism and oil were the two new challenges that attracted the attention of member states, of public opinion and of the Commission. Terrorism first spilled over from the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1970. As the fight acquired a new dimension (Cooley 1997, 298), Europeans found themselves targeted both in bomb attacks on European soil and in spectacular skyjackings (Mickolus 1980). The issue reached the level of securitisation at the Olympic Games in Munich in September 1972 when European security forces displayed their vulnerability on worldwide television. Oil became “a matter of national security” (Lieber 1976, 15) with the oil shock in November 1973. However, hints of the European dependence on Arab oil were already visible in 1970, when imports (excluding movements in the European area) as a percentage of supply reached 96.3%, which meant that almost the totality of the supply came from abroad (OECD 1973, 68) and most notably from the Arab countries. Between 1968 and 1973 the Commission carried out a series of studies aimed at reducing dependency, although it did not provide any long-lasting solution. Therefore, between 1970 and 1973 the Europeans’ perception of Mediterranean issues focused on these two new and unmatched security issues, which could neither find a full solution at the domestic level nor by US intervention.

In the same manner, in the 1990s, migrations, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism (of a different kind) rose to the top of the political and securitarian agenda of European governments. Terrorism acquired a new momentum in connection with Islamic fundamentalism. Apart from the attacks in France in August 1995, however, the issue remained more at the level of a possibility rather than actual conflict between terrorists and European states. Islamic fundamentalism represented a new and broader challenge than terrorist attacks. While perceived only by a few in the early 1980s, the following decade saw Islamic fundamentalism identified by many as a substantial challenge to the preferred European political order both inside and outside European borders (Esposito 1999, 94; Huntington 1993, 1996). The crisis into which Algeria plunged in 1992 signalled the destabilising potential of radical Islam. Migration was the first and foremost problem felt by the Europeans in their relations with

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the Mediterranean non members. Although the history of migrations across the Mediterranean is very long, the early 1990s witnessed a worsening of European perception, as migrants became increasingly visible. In Northern European countries, the total amount of migrants inflows actually diminished, but the visibility of the residents increased, as well as the social problems which arose as societies (and no longer economies) struggled to accommodate the “new” settlers and to reject undocumented migrants (Hargreaves 1995, 18-19). In Southern Europe, immigration was a relative novelty (Montanari and Cortese 1993, 218-23; King 2000, 3). Therefore, although the percentage of both flows and stocks of residents on the total of the population was much less in Southern European countries than in traditional receiving countries, Southern Europe experienced a revolution in its traditional pattern of population flows, having to address for the first time issues linked to immigration. Therefore, for different reasons, in most European countries migration became a problem in the early 1990s and given that a large share of immigrants came from Southern Mediterranean countries, the Mediterranean was problematised too, at times even being framed as a security issue (Huysmans 1995, 59).

The overall perception of challenges from the Mediterranean is worsened by tensions with the US and by parallel initiatives affecting European external relations.

Although the point would deserve a longer treatment, the trend is clear in both periods under examination. The early 1970s witnessed a low point in Transatlantic relations concerning the Middle East, while the enlargement of the EC to include the UK created a comparison of the status of French and British former colonies. US foreign policy towards the Middle East during the Nixon administration increasingly privileged relations with Israel and high level contacts with the Soviets. The Europeans, to various extents, increasingly disagreed with the form and the substance of the US policy, which did not reflect their security concerns and was deemed to be too biased in favour of Israel (e.g. Campbell 1993, 349; Bell 1977, 98ff.; Soetendorp 1999, 98ff.). Moreover, the enlargement of the EC to include the UK was seen as bound to deprive the Mediterranean countries of an outlet for their products, as the British market would have been protected by higher tariff barriers after joining the EC (Henig 1976, 321). The accession of the UK clearly presented the EC with the problem of how to deal with former British colonies and with the Commonwealth (Grilli 1993, 21), while triggering a comparison of the conditions for accession to the EC offered to the former French colonies and,

19 While in 1990 the stock of foreign population in Italy was 1.37% in proportion to the total population and in Spain 1.06%, in Germany it was 8.2% and in Belgium 9.1% (Venturini 1994, 28).
more generally, to the Mediterranean countries. A similar situation occurred at the end of the Cold War, when the US marginalised the Europeans in the management of the Arab-Israeli problem, while the fall of communist regimes drew the attention of several member states towards the possibilities offered by Central and Eastern European countries. The marginalisation of the Europeans was most evident at the Madrid Conference, in October 1991 (Quandt 1993, 404; Khader 1997, 158; Aguirrebengoa 1998, 35). The overall framework set up at the Conference for the management of the peace process testified to the limited role of member states and the EU, which was appointed gavel-holder of the Regional Economic Development Working Group, a role with no real political importance. At the same time, the dynamics of the prospective Eastern enlargement and the energies it mobilised challenged the traditional position of the Mediterranean countries in the EC/EU’s pyramid of privilege in external relations (Barbé and Izquierdo 1997; Edwards and Philippart 1997, 469; Khader 1997, 80). In both periods, therefore, the securitisation of new Mediterranean issues was accompanied by misunderstanding with the most powerful actor in the region, the US, and tensions within the EC/EU about balance in external relations.

The role of the Commission in foreign policy innovation is limited, while a single member state stands out for its activism in defining a common approach. Especially in the early stages of negotiations, member states act out of a common concern, rather than of overlapping national interests.

In the first period under examination, the Commission kept a very low profile. While this could be expected in the discussion about the Euro-Arab Dialogue in the EPC framework, it is also true of the debate about the Global Mediterranean Policy. In this case, the Commission was permanently a step behind France, which acted instead as the policy entrepreneur of the initiative. The debate about new agreements with the Mediterranean non members had begun in a very suitable environment for Commission action as the prospective enlargement to UK, Ireland and Denmark had sparked it. The incorporation of the new members into old agreements required adjustment (Tsoukalis 1977, 429), which could have led to a rethinking of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Although the European Parliament had proposed some changes,20 “real business” started only

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20 For the Commission, see for instance the Memorandum on a Community Policy on Development Cooperation presented in July 1971 by the Commission. in Supplement to the EC Bull. 5/1971, summarized also in EC Bull. 9-10/1971. See also the speech given in May 1972 by Deniau, French Commissioner for developing countries, reported in EC Bull. 7/1972. For the European Parliament, see Doc. de Seance 246/70, Rapport de André Rossi sur la Politique Commerciale de la Communauté dans le bassin méditerranéen. See also EC Bull. 4-1971, 30ss. for a synthesis. The debate which followed is interesting for the lack of agreement
when France presented and argued in favour of a new approach to adjustments. The French vision developed in this way. At first, France only suggested to address Spain and Israel in the same way as Portugal, which had established a “free trade area” with the EC.\textsuperscript{21} “From that moment on the situation developed very quickly.” (Tovias 1977, 70). At a meeting of the Council of General Affairs at the beginning of June 1972, where the proposal was presented, the Netherlands and Germany reacted positively, the Netherlands immediately hinting to the possible developments of the plan in the sense of a global Mediterranean approach. In fact, Israel implied a parallel with the Arab countries. Italy, which opposed the initiative all the way through, raised objections.\textsuperscript{22} The Commission was charged with producing a proposal about the Maghreb, which it duly did in June 1972,\textsuperscript{23} but France soon relaunched the debate by putting forward a proposal for a free trade area with \textit{all} the Mediterranean countries\textsuperscript{24} and building a coalition with the EP (Grech 1974, 37), the Netherlands and Germany. The Commission took the side of the French proposal only months later, after a long period of indecisiveness.\textsuperscript{25} At the same time, other ideas were floating around, but they did not reach the momentum that France was lending to its proposals.\textsuperscript{26} When the decision-making stage began and negotiations started to focus on the details of the proposal, the debate became more heated, but while questioning single provisions, it remained centred on the French proposal and, thanks to the unrelenting French lobby which operated at all levels, it led to the adoption of a common Global Mediterranean Policy. Several ideas had been watered down in the debate, as

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Agence Europe}, (1.VI.72). Having negotiated within the framework of the EFTA agreements, Portugal and the EC signed a preferential trade agreement based on free trade of industrial goods.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Agence Europe} (7.VI.72), \textit{Le Monde} (9.VI.72, p.36).

\textsuperscript{23} EC Bull. 8/1972, 97. Agence Europe 15.VI.72.

\textsuperscript{24} Agence Europe, 19-20.VI.72.

\textsuperscript{25} See for instance this telling comment by Agence Europe: “La Commission Européenne n’a pas encore pris fermement position entre les différentes formules, et elle n’a pas pu, par conséquent, éclairer les débats ministériels, dont le substratum politique - sous les apparences techniques - est évident.” \textit{Agence Europe}, 28.VI.72.

\textsuperscript{26} See, for instance, the earlier proposal by Spain of a ‘pact méditerranéen,’ (Welles 1974, 128-29), the Algerian suggestion of a ‘Mediterranean conference’\textsuperscript{26} (Philippe Herreman “La France et le Maghreb. Un nouveau dialogue pour élargir la coopération” in \textit{Le Monde Diplomatique}, VIII.73, pp.1, 13), or the meeting in November 1972 between Italy, Malta, Tunisia and Libya, which instead of defining a common political posture of the Central Mediterranean states it exposed their divergencies (Silvestri 1974, 109).
was the case with an approach to trade relationships, which the newly joined UK vehemently opposed. The key concepts had however remained, among which the idea that the Mediterranean constituted a homogenous region, while before the formulation of the Global Mediterranean Policy there were no “Mediterranean countries,” but instead Spain, the Maghreb countries, the Machrek, Greece and Turkey, Yugoslavia, etc. The Global Mediterranean Policy was “the first successful attempt by the EC at preconceived foreign policy” (Ginsborg 1983, 160).

A roughly similar story occurred at the end of the Cold War. In this case, however, the Commission did act as a policy entrepreneur (Gillespie 1996, 210 fn.14), but its action only led to the adoption of a half-backed project, the Renewed Mediterranean Policy in 1990, while Spain led the adoption of a much more innovative and ambitious initiative, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995. In 1989, the Commission, and in particular Commissioner Abel Matutes, raised the issue of a new Mediterranean initiative, at the time when the Commission was asked to co-ordinate the PHARE programme (Pierros et al. 1999, 128). Having stressed the various factors that made the Mediterranean as important as Eastern Europe, the Commission prepared a Communication to the Council. Matutes then consulted with all the European institutions and actors, and toured the Mediterranean, visiting almost all non-member countries. The Council eventually approved the Commission’s proposal in December 1990. It innovated slightly, in the amount of funds and in the way they could be spent (Tovias 1996, 13-14).

However, a much more innovative proposal was already under way, with Spanish entrepreneurialism to the fore. The first substantial proposal for innovating on Euro-Med relations was not aimed at the EC/EU. Spain, together with Italy, presented in September 1990 a plan for a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), which, however, included a vast number of Western countries among which the presence of the US was particularly problematic. Moreover, France was pursuing its own project in the Western Mediterranean, on a more restricted scale than that advocated by Spain.

The Commission’s documents on which the RMP was based were: Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Community’s Mediterranean Policy (1975-88), SEC(89)1958, Brussels 10.X.89; idem, Redirecting the Community’s Mediterranean Policy, SEC(89)1961 final, Brussels 23.X.89; idem, Redirecting the Community’s Mediterranean Policy: Proposals for the Period 1992-96, SEC(90)812 final, Brussels 1.VI.90.

Agence Europe, 20.IV.90.

The paternity of the idea remains contested, with both Italians and Spaniards claiming the copyright of the initiative. If they were not fully original in their suggestions, we can agree that the Spaniards were primarily responsible for drafting it (Gillespie 1996, 205; contra Badini - an Italian diplomat - 1995, 112).
and Italy (Chérigui, 118-211). From the failure of the CSCM, Spain retained several lessons, among which the importance to centre future projects on a European dimension. Therefore, it began to present its ideas in the form of policy papers and official analyses for European leaders as early as March 1989 and throughout the following years. While at first it purposed to create a Euro-Maghreb partnership, it soon opted for a broader, Mediterranean approach, in order to accommodate Northern European (especially British) voiced Middle East interests. In parallel, joint diplomatic seminars with Italy and France took place after the end of the 1980s during which participants tested out concrete projects combining Spanish ideas with French and Italian experiences. By 1994, France was involved in the project almost as much as Spain. The small team encharged with the project within the Spanish ministry of Foreign Affairs complemented these diplomatic activities with speeches and conferences around Europe. Spain and Southern European countries passed several inputs onto the Commission, which contributed by elaborating on them and circulating them to member states. It did in fact help that in the new Commission’s staff, several Spaniards undertook responsibilities related to Euro-Mediterranean relations. From 1994 onwards, a period of frantic debates about specific proposals began, while the overall idea of an overarching initiative towards the Mediterranean took hold. When negotiations entered into the crucial decision making stage some tough negotiations took place that were, at times, resolved with the offer of side-payments. The final stage of policy formulation intentionally coincided with Spain’s semester of Presidency, which allowed for a coherent crescendo until the November 1995 Barcelona Conference formally launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The new initiative innovated greatly on the former pattern of relations, thus completely overshadowing the achievements obtained by the Commission with the Renewed Mediterranean Policy.

30 Since 1988, Mitterrand had organised a series of meetings, first under the label of ‘Mediterranean Forum,’ then 4+5 and later 5+5. It involved countries of the Western Mediterranean, thus representing a limited regional project.
31 One of the most influential was “Europa ante el Maghreb” presented by minister of Foreign Affairs Ordoñez to a Council of General Affairs in March 1992 (see Gillespie 1999, 149). It introduced a sense of urgency due to the North-African “time-bomb.” For the text, MAE, Actividades 1992, 877-91.
32 Marquina (1998, 237) and interviews in Italian and Spanish Ministries of Foreign Affairs.
33 Interview, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
34 In the Commission that begun its function at the end of 1992, the Commissioner for Relations with the South was Spanish (Manuel Marin), as was the Director General of DG1A (Juan Prat, who was formerly the Chef de Cabinet of Abel Matutes).
35 The nadir was reached at the Cannes Summit, in June 1995, when Gonzalez threatened Kohl that he would hinder the policy towards Eastern Europe if Germany did not agree to a higher financial ceiling for the Mediterranean countries. The excellent personal relations between the two leaders helped to overcome the impasse (Gillespie 1997, 39).
36 It was also useful that it came right after the French semester.
Member states acting as policy entrepreneurs were motivated more by changes in their national foreign policy than by producers’ interests or fixed geopolitical preferences.

While it is undeniable that the Euro-Arab dialogue had an economic component, economic evidence is not fully supportive of a liberal intergovernmental approach even in this case. In the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the oil shock did play a very important role, but not in the way that would be expected. The pressure of producers on the French government was indeed enormous, as it was the outcry of the whole population given French dependency on Arab oil (Hager 1974, 35-36). However, access to oil in the aftermath of October 16, 1973, was secured foremost through bilateral contacts. France and Britain were rivals in seeking to grab the attention of oil-producing countries to the extent that arms-for-oil deals were offered (Diallo 1992, 218-22). “Faced with a united OPEC, the consuming governments were thoroughly disunited” (Sampson 1975, 261). Therefore, even if French entrepreneurship in the Euro-Arab Dialogue aimed at managing solutions for the oil shock, the type of solutions France promoted focused on changing the relationship with the challenging Arab states, rather than buying oil, which France had already done. Moreover, oil had no role in French entrepreneurship at the time of the Global Mediterranean Policy, as the launching of the initiative came prior to the oil shock and its formulation before Arab countries had even threatened to use it as a weapon. More broadly, France’s trade with the Mediterranean countries, vis à vis total trade, declined in the period 1970-72, as shown in Table 1. Spain was in the opposite situation at the beginning of the 1990s. Its exports to key partners were slowly but steadily increasing (Marquina and Echeverria 1992, 49). No “ceiling” was in sight nor expected, as Spanish producers cultivated their relationships with the Mediterranean and especially with the Maghreb countries. Therefore, in no cases was there a detectable frustration on the part of national producers in doing business with Mediterranean countries on a bilateral basis.
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<th>Imports from Med countries</th>
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Table 1. Percentage of trade with Mediterranean countries on the total of imports and exports.\(^37\) Source: UN Yearbook of Trade Statistics, 1974

In both cases under examination, a reorientation in national foreign policy took place before policy entrepreneurialism within the EC/EU. Both France and Spain assigned more importance to the Mediterranean in their national foreign policies before promoting an initiative towards the region at the European level. In France, the election of Pompidou marked the end of the “de Gaulle era,” and thus a change in the way of sustaining France’s “grandeur.”\(^38\) He sought a larger basis for a slightly downscaled project. In his first presidential speech of December 15, 1969, Pompidou explicitly mentioned the “renforcement de la présence française en Méditerranée.”\(^39\) In spite of the difficult times,\(^40\) more substantial relations were soon established with all Western Mediterranean countries, at time cemented by questionable deals such as the sale of 100 Mirage fighter jets to the new Libyan regime of Gaddafi.\(^41\) A new discourse about the “natural” French vocation for the Mediterranean followed concrete gestures, envisaging all forms of cooperation: cultural,\(^42\) financial, economic, political and military. Pompidou also moved large part of the navy to Toulon in June 1971, where a grand military exercise was organised, thus showing to the world that “A tous les égards, la France a un rôle à jouer en Méditerranée” as Pompidou declared.\(^43\) The final aim, however, was not simply the reinforcement of France’ Mediterranean links, but the status of “big power.” Having acquired a

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\(^{37}\) For Mediterranean countries, in this case I mean Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Malta, Cyprus. I do not include Portugal because it was part of EFTA, Turkey and Greece because they had a free trade agreement. Libya, Albania and Yugoslavia are also excluded, given that they were never involved in any discussion about a European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean. Oil is included in the percentage.


\(^{39}\) Quoted in *Le Monde* 17.XII.69, p.2.

\(^{40}\) Between June 1970 and April 1971, Algeria nationalised 51% of French oil, while Morocco was pursuing a policy of ‘moroccanisation’ to regain control of its economy (See *Le Monde*, various dates).


\(^{42}\) For the width of the cultural cooperation, see the thorough summary made in “La coopération culturelle française avec l’Afrique du Nord” in *Le Monde* (3.VI.70, p.6), the chapter in the book by Balta and Rulleau (1973, 107-141) and Annex II (237-247).

\(^{43}\) Quoted in *Le Monde* (20-21.VI.71, p.1)
Mediterranean role, Pompidou aimed at demanding formal recognition of France’s global reach from its European partners and as such, Big Power status (Kolodziej 1974, 84-87).

Similarly, but over a longer time span, democratic Spain made the Mediterranean a priority of its national foreign policy, while deeply rethinking its relations with the rest of the world after a long period of isolation under Franco. Full integration in Europe was a fundamental goal for the new regime, and with it an enhanced position for the new democracy on the world stage. The strengthening of relations with the Mediterranean fitted into this plan. Although Franco maintained friendly relations with the Arab countries, Spanish policy towards the Maghreb and more generally the Arab world at the time of dictatorship lacked three things: vision, a clear perception of national interests and a strategy to reach them. At the beginning of the 1980s, the new socialist government set out to fix exactly those points (Gillespie 1999, 34-35; Tovias 1998, 217; Marquina and Echeverría 1992, 43). On the one hand, the government put in place a negative strategy, entailing a reorientation of its defensive apparatus and military alliances, its main goal being to secure Spain’s sovereignty on Spanish territories scattered around the Mediterranean, namely Ceuta, Melilla and the Balearics (Grasa 1993, 69-71; Santos 1985, 590ff.). On the other hand, a positive policy was adopted, which institutionalised bilateral relations with Southern countries, thus contributing to stability in the area and establishing the basis for cooperation in all fields (Moratinos 1996, 23; Marquina and Echeverría 1992, 43; Labatut 1995, 317ff.). But Europe and the Mediterranean were two sides of the same coin (Ortega 1995, 193) and in order to crown its new international status, Spain longed for a European recognition of the importance it had attached to the Mediterranean.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of the EU policy towards the Mediterranean has emphasised two elements, from which few conclusions could be drawn. First, political and especially security perceptions worsened shortly before the debate about a European foreign policy initiative begun. Europeans changed the way they looked at Mediterranean non member states on the eve of changing their policy to relate to them. In both cases, they perceived new political and/or security problems, which in different ways challenged states’ capacity to protect and intervene in societies. While in the 1970s the new issues were terrorism and oil,

45 For specific activities, see Actividades, Textos y Documentos de la Política Exterior Española, Año 1987; Labatut (1995, 326).
in the 1990s governments were worried about migration, Islamic fundamentalism and, in a new format, terrorism again. Therefore, they were ready to discuss reasons for and common solutions to what were perceived as new problems. The evidence of material changes in producers’ interests in both cases is very thin, as is the evidence supporting geopolitical materialistic views focusing on arms or military structures. It can be argued that changes in ideational constructions were in fact linked to changes in material conditions (more expensive oil, more immigrants, etc.). However, not only does this relationship require further research, but it also does not look entirely promising. Changes in the material context seemed not to be perceived until there was a change in security discourse. This offers ground to a constructivist explanation. What can be drawn from the evidence presented here is that the perception of an unsolved problem did feed a widespread feeling of uncertainty about what to do, thus opening a policy window for the formulation of a new policy initiative.

Second, the intergovernmental hypothesis about the centrality of states in policymaking was shown to be substantially correct, but the assumptions on which it was based and therefore the type of entrepreneurialism member states can provide has been shown not to hold, at least in this case. Contrary to the supranational/neofunctional perspective, there was very little Commission autonomy. In the only case in which the Commission did act as a policy entrepreneur, the effects of its action were marginal, although proper evaluation is hindered by the short time span that the Commission’s proposal had to leave a mark on history. Ideational innovation and associated networking were mainly carried out by a member state in both the cases that I examined. In the early 1970s France assumed a leading role while in the early 1990s it was Spain. Both countries underwent a prior reorientation of national foreign policies, while no substantial demand from domestic economic interests emerged. In both cases, the two countries did not start with the same proposal with which they ended up. Their proposal evolved along the way as they interacted with other member states and the Commission. Their main activity centred on the pre-negotiation debate. In the debate, proposals were at first circulated and discussed openly, while as the decision-making stage approached the negotiations were conducted in a more bargaining-like style. As entrepreneurial states raised the issue and the potential policy responses, both they and the other actors involved specified and redefined their national positions while at the same time defining the “European interest” in it. This point also shows the importance of focusing on pre-negotiation contacts to appreciate the supranational scope of member states’ entrepreneurship, although, as in the case of the early 1970s, it can be very difficult to collect empirical evidence outside institutional fora.

How far can we generalise these findings? What kind of “general lesson” can be drawn from the analysis of policy formulation towards the
Mediterranean? A first point that emerges from this analysis is the importance of analysing European foreign policy making in terms of policy entrepreneurship, policy windows, and policy process. Actors advocating change and conditions for the success of their action are useful in my opinion to frame the analysis, while a close focus on the different stages of policy processes is crucial to understand their underlying logic and thus to explain how change in European foreign policy comes about. A second point relates to the insights offered by an analysis in terms of ideational factors. Though more difficult to operationalise and pin down, perceptions and discourses add a very important dimension, which contribute to explain the type of world actors thought they were in at the time of EFP formulation. Third, and most importantly, the assumption that states’ action reflects predefined national interest has been shown to be an empirical question, rather than an *a priori* assumption, thus supporting a constructivist approach. This case has demonstrated that member states might define their position while interacting both within and outside the EC/EU framework, and while doing so, they define the European interest motivating a common action. Fourth, the possibility that the action of a single member state can drive the policy making process of the whole EC/EU, at times of uncertainty, raises a new research path: when and why can this occur? These conclusions have implications which go far beyond the case of European foreign policy.

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