Globalization, State Formation and Generational Change: Foreign Policy in Syria and Jordan

Raymond Hinnebusch

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For further information:
Mediterranean Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via delle Fontanelle, 19
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy
Fax: + 39 055 4685 770
E-mail: lotta.svantesson@iue.it
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Mediterranean/Index.shtml
ABSTRACT

Expectations that globalization and leadership change would propel a convergence among Middle East states toward pro-Western foreign policies overlook how differential regime formation, particularly the social forces incorporated in the process, sets states on durable divergent tangents. Despite the rise of two young leaders with similar "modernizing" worldviews in Syria and Jordan, the differential impact of global forces and variations in regime constituencies has reinforced rather than overcome initial divergences. In Syria an undemocratic domestic politics has had a major impact on sustaining the old foreign policy of balancing while in Jordan the old foreign policy of bandwagoning has dictated the de-democratisation of domestic politics.
INTRODUCTION

The Middle East is in the process of a generational change in leadership and nowhere is this more striking than in Syria and Jordan where long-serving leaders have passed on power to their sons, arguably representative of the new generation attuned to the norms of globalization. This change follows profound international transformations accompanying the end of the Cold War, including American hegemony and the drive to incorporate the “periphery” into an Westcentric and liberal “New world Order.” Globalization proponents view this process as both benign and inevitable; liberalisation is expected to produce economic growth, government accountability and zones of peace in place of regional conflicts. It has been widely anticipated that the conjunction of globalization from without and the succession of a new generation of leaders from within could produce sea changes in the Middle East. In the words of Sheila Carapico: “sons of despot might turn out to be democrats” who would replace their fathers old cronies with “a counterelite of entrepreneurs” who would “reject xenophobia and protectionism in favour of globalism.” (Middle East Policy Sept. 2002, p. 110).

Expectations of the inevitable transformation of the region under globalization are consistent with the dominant views on the international relations of the developing states. Rosenau’s (1966) early discussion of foreign policy levels expected that in the weak pre- or non-democratic states of the third world, the most decisive determinants of state behaviour would be the international system and the leadership level. This is consistent with realist expectations that great powers dictate the rules of the international system, and with the structuralist view that economic dependency turns third world leaders into clients of the core; and it dovetails with the belief that no effective institutions or civil society exist in Middle East countries that could counter demands from the “core” for conformity to the West-centric order.

As against this, it is indisputable that the Middle East is the region that had been most resistant to globalization, although there is no consensus on the depth or the roots of this resistance. As to the depth, globalization enthusiasts might argue that resistance reflects a merely temporary blocking of pent up pressures for change by “gerontocratic” authoritarian regimes which leadership change could unblock. On the other hand, some see resistance as symptomatic of a deep-rooted Middle East “exceptionalism,” often attributed to culture or religion which locks the region into a “clash of civilizations” with the West. For others yet, resistance reflects the region’s subordinate structural position in the world hierarchy’s distribution of wealth and power: in the Middle East, globalization is often rightly seen as imposed and damaging—indeed the “highest stage” of Western imperialism (Dodge & Higgott, 2002:3, 13-16; Halliday 43). Area specialists and constructivists—who tend to privilege identity as a determinant of behaviour—may be more prepared to accept that the Middle East states have “constructed” their own region-specific patterns of relations.

The reality, of course, is yet more complex, for within the Middle East attitudes toward globalization vary between states, not least between Syria and Jordan. Although the forces of globalization tend to push both in a uniform direction, differentiation in their responses are actually accentuating certain divergences between them. Realists expect the differential power of states and the different threats they face to differentiate their behaviour—between bandwagoning and balancing. Revised versions of Marxist structuralism argue that a state’s strength and class composition may account for variations in its response to global-level structural forces. Historical institutionalists and sociologists insist on the importance of distinctive state institutions and state-society relations in shaping state behaviour. Recent analysis of the foreign policies of Middle East states supports the view that states do not respond uniformly to structural pressures but differentially, depending on the relative satisfaction (or not) of the interests and identities incorporated into regimes in their formation process (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2001:336-37).

Similarities and differences in the reactions of Syria and Jordan to globalization arguably provide a test case of these issues. The two states, starting off as severed parts of the same historical society, nevertheless embarked on quite opposing foreign policy tangents. The rise of a new more liberal generation amidst the homogenising effect of globalization, arguably provides the optimal conditions for any convergence, if one is likely to happen, of these states with each other and with the “core.”

I. REVISIONIST VS. STATUS QUO: STATE FORMATION AND FOREIGN POLICY DIVERGENCE

Regime Origins

A comparison of Jordan and Syria sharply underlines the importance of state formation in determining foreign policy behaviour. Both states started out small, poor, weak, and surrounded by more powerful, often hostile neighbours, and should, according to realism, have followed similar bandwagoning foreign policies. Once part of the same country, bilad ash-sham, these states also shared a similar Arab identity that might have made them natural allies. They were both products of the post W.W.I dismemberment of historic Syria which opened the
door to the Zionist colonisation of Palestine. Societal variations did dictate somewhat different responses to this external tour de-force: while Jordan’s predominately pre-nationalist and conservative tribal society soon accommodated itself to imperial power, Syria’s more complex society, with its large nationalist cities and massive aggrieved peasantry, was in chronic rebellion. But it was the specific contrasting origins of the two states’ regimes that hardened these differences into opposing foreign policy tangents — revisionist in Syria, status quo in Jordan.

In Jordan, the Hashemite regime was sponsored by imperialism and dependent on British arms and financing to consolidate its authority. The regime’s British subsidy was greater than any resources extractable from a resource poor society, ensuring that the state’s dependence on the outside would be matched by its autonomy of the inside (Piro 17-18, 24-31). Its strongest support in the least developed, pre-national sector of society, the tribal Bedouin, allowed it, under British pressure, to marginalise weaker urban nationalist elements. The pillar of the state was the army, British officered, recruiting from the tribes and Circassian minority, hence immunised to nationalist currents (Salloukh).

This state formation had inevitable foreign policy consequences. Although Emir Abdullah had, ironically, viewed Jordan as a launching pad for reuniting historic Syria under his leadership, his utter dependence on the British meant that this quintessential realist ended up acquiescing, not only in the permanent dismemberment of historic Syria but in the transformation of Jordan into a buffer state obstructing revisionist forces contesting this dismemberment and the Zionist colonisation of Palestine—from the Wahhabis to secular nationalists. Abdullah came to be regarded by the British imperial government as its most faithful client especially when, during W.W.II his army fought alongside the British in their suppression of the nationalist Rashid Ali regime in Iraq. It was Jordan’s buffer state role which entitled the Hashemite regime to Western aid and protection and which, therefore, set it from its founding moment on a permanent West-centric tangent at odds with its official Arab identity (Salibi, 73-119).

This was reinforced by Abdullah’s ambitions to assert his leadership over Palestine, leading him to collaborate with the Zionists in the partition of Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians. This ended in the incorporation of the Palestinian “West Bank” into Jordan, making a intensely irredentist and Arab nationalist population the majority in the new state. From this the Hashemite regime acquired a shared interest with Israel in keeping its big Palestinian population politically demobilised (Salibi, 144-167; Brand, 1995:157). If in rhetoric the dynasty continued to proclaim its Arabism, in practice it was the Arab regime most incompatible with and threatened by Arab and Palestinian nationalism, hence its very survival utterly dependent on external protection. The monarchy’s built-in challenge would be to bridge the gap between its regime interest as a buffer state and the Arab or Palestinian identification of the vast majority of its population.

If the Hashemite regime was the beneficiary of the fragmentation of historic Syria, Damascus felt itself victimised by the imposition of the states system in the region. The Syrian state was imposed by the French amidst the defeat of Arab nationalist forces who went into opposition and only won their independence after years of struggle. Imperialism, in radically truncating historic Syria, created a deep seated irredentism, expressed in the impulse to merge the Syrian state, seen as an artificial creation of imperialism, in a wider Arab nation. The Zionist colonisation of Palestine, viewed as a lost portion of historic Syria, deepened this irredentism, expressed in Syria’s utter rejection of Israel’s legitimacy.

For the first quarter century of its independent existence, the Syrian state, unable to count on the identification and support of its population, was weak, insecure and the victim of acute domestic instability. If the Hashemite regime benefited from the 1948 war with Zionism (by incorporating the West Bank), Syria’s republican oligarchy suffered a mortal blow to the precarious legitimacy won in the independence struggle against France for its perceived failure to defend Palestine. Syria’s permeable artificial borders and dominant Pan-Arab identification meant external penetration of Syrian politics: the main opposition parties rejected the truncated Syrian state and sought Pan-Arab support for their challenges to it, while rival Arab powers financed or armed Syrian clients and backed the coups that changed governments (Hinnebusch, 2001: 139-40; 143-145).

While no Syrian politician could hope to gain or keep power without affirming his commitment to Pan-Arabism and to the struggle with Israel, the state was too weak to be an actor rather than a victim of the regional power struggle. Hence, other than expressing a rhetorical rejectionism to appease the public, the regime’s only actual practical policy was the alliances it forged with anti-Hashemite Egypt and Saudi to preserve the Syrian state’s independence from King Abdullah’s ambition (backed by his stronger army) to restore Hashemite rule in Damascus. The threat from Israel was particularly keenly felt as Syrian-Israeli animosity escalated from 1948 onward, feeding on border skirmishes over the de-militarised zones left over from the war in which Israel regularly took the initiative and Syria was forced on the defensive. While Jordan kept its border with Israel pacified, Syria’s simmering border conflict with Israel radicalised and destabilised Syrian politics (Seale, 1965).
Political Mobilisation

The era of Pan-Arab political mobilisation impacted differentially on the two states, propelling them further in contrasting directions. Being artificial states with no history of statehood on which a secure Jordanian or Syrian identity could rest, both were uniquely vulnerable to the appeal of Arab nationalism as propagated from Nasser’s Egypt. Nasser and his followers demanded an end to dependence on the West and Pan-Arab solidarity against imperialism. The Arab nationalist mobilisation of the emerging middle classes soon went further and threatened the very foundations of oligarchic and monarchic rule. While Jordan, whose government was the more guilty in Arab nationalist eyes survived, in Syria revisionist forces seized power, freezing the two states into diametrically opposite positions.

While the youthful King Hussein may have aspired to an Arab identity, Nasser viewed Arabism and Jordan’s Western alignment as incompatible and Arab nationalists saw Jordan as an artificial and illegitimate obstacle to Arab unity and, later, to the formation of an effective Eastern front against Israel. They and Palestinian nationalists saw Jordan’s attempts to pacify its border with Israel as serving to deter the mobilisation of the Palestinian population in the struggle to recover their homeland. Arab nationalism was thus chiefly a threat against which Hussein was consistently on the defensive, not a role to be embraced (Lynch, 25).

As Arab nationalism spread, the regime’s British alignment became incompatible with domestic political stability and legitimacy. Each time King Hussein attempted incorporate the rising middle class into the regime through political liberalisation, the resultant mobilisation of Arab nationalist opinion threatened to force Jordan out of its Western alignment. Nationalist opinion in the army forced Hussein to dismiss the army’s British commander; then Jordan became a battleground over the Baghdad Pact when Hussein seemed prepared to join it and Nasser unleashed the voice of Cairo, stimulating riots in December 1955 which disrupted the country (Salibi, 187). To appease the public, free elections were permitted in 1956, resulting in a nationalist-leftist government under Suleiman Nabulsi. When the Suez war broke out, parliament abrogated the Anglo-British treaty and the Nabulsi government attempted to steer Jordan toward diplomatic relations with the USSR and China and into the Arab collective security agreement as a substitute for the Baghdad Pact. When Hussein’s dismissal of Nabulsi over his resistance to the Eisenhower Doctrine precipitated an attempted coup by nationalist officers, a general strike and massive demonstrations, the King suspended democracy and unleashed his repressive apparatus (Salibi 191-2). On the 1958 overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq, he called on British military intervention which enabled him to consolidate a royal dictatorship. Thus, a combination of repression and foreign intervention kept Jordan’s Western alignment intact. Yet no political normality was possible in Jordan as long as it stood against Arab—and the rising Palestinian—nationalism; as such, when Nasser moderated his hostility, Hussein seized the chance to appease him and his Jordanian constituency; this, however, ultimately dragged him into the rising conflict with Israel: the King was forced to enter an alliance with Egypt on the eve of the 1967 war, ending in the loss of half his kingdom. This showed how the Jordanian regime could be forced, when a crisis mobilised the powerful Pan Arab sentiment of the population, into policies profoundly at odds with the interests and normal disposition of the regime.

In Syria, by contrast, radical forces successfully challenged and swept away the old order. Oligarchic-dominated political institutions failed to absorb the political mobilisation of the middle class and to address the growing agrarian unrest from the country’s extremely unequal land tenure structure. In contrast to Jordan where conservative tribes dominated the army, in Syria, the military, expanding to meet the Israeli threat and recruited from the middle class and peasant youth, was a hotbed of populist dissent, radicalised by the conflict with Israel and Nasser’s anti-imperialism. The West’s backing of Israel inflamed the people against it and de-legitimised pro-Western politicians and the Western economic ties of the landed-commercial oligarchy. This fuelled the rise of radical parties—notably the Ba’th Party—and the military coups and counter-coups that de-stabilised the state and gradually pushed the oligarchic elite from power (Seale, 1965; Torrey, 1964).

Domestic instability coincided with perceptions of a rising threat from Israel as border skirmishes over the demilitarised zones escalated. Syria could not do without protective alignments, but Syrians were deeply divided between supporters of pro-Western Iraq, which advocated security through membership in the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact, and followers of Egypt’s Nasser, who opposed the Pact in the name of non-alignment and Arab collective security. Since the fate of the Baghdad Pact was believed to turn on Syria’s choice, a regional and international “struggle for Syria” took place (1954-58). The mobilisation of Syria’s nationalist middle class swung the balance in favour of Egypt while Nasser’s rising stature as a Pan-Arab hero, especially after Suez, weakened conservative pro-Western and pro-Iraqi politicians and strengthened those—above all the Ba’th party—aligned with Cairo. The result was the formation of Syria’s 1956 pro-Egyptian, anti-imperialist National Front government. The West’s sponsorship of several abortive conservative coups against it and a 1957 attempt to quarantine Syrian radicalism under the Eisenhower Doctrine, backed by Iraqi sponsored subversion and Turkish threats, precipitated Soviet counter threats against Turkey and a backlash of pro-Communist feeling inside Syria (Seale, 1965: 164-306; Mufti, 1996: 65-81. It
was this sense of interlocking external siege and internal polarisation that led Ba’th leaders to seek salvation in a short-lived union with Egypt.

The coup that brought the Ba’th party to power in 1963 was also an outcome of Syria’s nationalist mobilisation. However, the Ba’th, facing opposition not just from the oligarchy it had overthrown, but also from rivals such as Nasserites and the Muslim Brotherhood, suffered from a much narrower support base. On top of this, the regime itself was wracked by a power struggle along sectarian, generational and ideological lines in which “ex-peasant” radicals, in particular Alawis, assumed power at the expense of middle class moderates. Foreign policy was an issue in this struggle, with the Ba’thi radicals seeking nationalist legitimacy by sponsoring Palestinian fedayeen raids into Israel and a Pan-Arab revolution against pro-western monarchies like Jordan. This, however, ignoring Israeli military superiority, brought on the 1967 defeat, the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, and the discrediting of the radical Ba’thists.

The occupation of the Golan made Syria a permanently dissatisfied power and further locked into the struggle with Israel; yet, Syria had learned the hard way the costs of ignoring the systemic power balance. This dilemma provoked the rise to power of a new “realist” wing of the Ba’th under Hafiz al-Asad who was determined to pursue the struggle with Israel within the bounds of realistic goals and strategies. The “system” level had socialised the radical regime into the realist rules of international politics in which ideology had to be subordinated to power (Hinnebusch 2001: 52-57; Yaniv, 1986). The actual issue that precipitated Asad’s coup and which signalled the triumph of prudence over revolutionary zeal, was his opposition to the radicals’ attempted intervention in the Jordanian civil war of 1970 in the hope of protecting the Palestinian fedayeen and overthrowing the monarchy.

Regime Consolidation

In both states, the unstable regimes of the fifties and sixties were, in the 1970’s seemingly stabilised. This consolidation was, ironically, a product of the shared disaster of 1967 war and its consequences.

**Jordan**

In Jordan, consolidation was abetted by the discrediting of Arab nationalism in the 1967 war which neutralised the main ideological opposition to Hashemite rule. A decisive turning point was the regime’s successful smashing of the Palestinian guerrilla challenge to its sovereignty in 1970. The outcomes of this episode—the defeat of the only force able to balance the power of the state; the purge (sometimes expulsion from Jordan) of Palestinian and nationalist elements from the army and state, sharply reinforcing their tribalist East Bank composition; the American and Israeli threats which, in helping to defeat the Syrian intervention, reinforced the belief that outside powers would not permit the regime’s overthrow—all helped stabilise the regime. But qualitatively crucial, was the increasing availability of rent (Arab aid) after the post 1973 oil boom, allowing the state apparatus to significantly expand and incorporate a larger trans-Jordanian segment of the population, giving it—as a privileged element—an enhanced stake in the status quo against the opposition of the excluded Palestinians. However, the Palestinians, pushed into the private sector, thrived on the remittances of the oil boom years, and were allowed mobility through education and the professions, helping to reconcile them to the status quo. The Ikhwan was cultivated by the monarchy as a counter to the nationalist left. King Hussein was able to stand above and arbitrate between this divided society, protecting the weaker side and containing the stronger. The relatively mild version of Hashemite authoritarianism, by comparison to that in neighbouring republics, also allowed old enemies to be co-opted and old wounds to be healed (Piro 59-63; Shyrock 62-9; Salibi 243-49; Brand 1995:153-56).

King Hussein’s post-1967 foreign policy focused on coping with the loss of the West Bank, but his strategy was much more ambivalent than Syria’s drive to recover the Golan. Given Amman’s dependence on the U.S, there was no question of acquiring the military capabilities which could threaten Israel, perhaps in alliance with Syria and Iraq, into withdrawal. Amman did maintain its claim to the West Bank but not just against Israel; the PLO, which, by the mid-seventies, sought to claim the West Bank as the locus of a Palestinian state (with Gaza) was as much an obstacle to recovery of the lost lands. Indeed, Jordan, isolated by its 1970 repression of the fedayeen and left out of the 1973 war, lost, as a result, the legitimacy battle in the inter-Arab arena and the PLO was designated by Arab summits as having the sole legitimate claim to the West Bank. Thereafter, Hussein alternated between bowing to the Arab consensus and competing with the PLO for influence on the West Bank. After Sadat’s separate peace he alternated between sticking with the Arab consensus against further separate deals with Israel (for which Jordan was rewarded with large rent transfers after the 1980 Baghdad summit) and exploring one. Syria and Jordan were temporarily brought together in the mid-seventies by their common opposition to the Camp David accords and the PLO. But in the mid-eighties Hussein decided to explore the Reagan Plan, together with the PLO, which excluded Syria. Syria’s consequent wrath was a key factor in Amman’s 1980s alignment with Syria’s rival, Saddamist Iraq. In the Iran-Iraq war, King Hussein supported Iraq against Iran which he saw as a revolutionary threat to all conservative regimes and which put Jordan on the same side as Washington, at a time when Syria embraced Iran as a valuable counter to Israel and Iraq and was
deeply at odds with Washington. The thickening of Jordan's economic links with Iraq which became a market for Jordanian goods paid for by free or cutprice oil on which Jordan became heavily dependent, consolidated this alignment. Once Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait cost him his usefulness to the West, this would bring the King briefly into conflict with his Western patrons (Lynch, 26; Salibi, 250-63; Ryan).

A watershed in effecting a reconciliation between the Hashemites and the Palestinians was Jordan's 1988 relinquishing of its claim on the West Bank in favour of the PLO. The King calculated that the chance Jordan could recover the West Bank through negotiations with Israel was so remote that it no longer made sense to stand against Pan-Arab and Palestinian opinion. Another watershed took place when the decline of oil rent after 1986 forced the regime into IMF-imposed austerity measures which jeopardised the “social contract” with its own East bank constituency, unleashing the 1989 riots which shook the regime’s hard-won stability. But the regime turned a liability into an advantage, opting to trade acceptance of economic austerity for restoration of political liberalisation, a bargain in which the political opposition recognised in return, the legitimacy of the monarchy. The regime’s stand with Iraq against Western intervention in the Gulf war won the King an additional nationalist legitimacy and put at home. The very longevity of King Hussein’s rule had endowed him with a certain patriarchal prestige, acknowledged even by the opposition. As such the Hashemite regime entered the nineties relatively consolidated and more at peace with civil society than ever hitherto (Lynch, 71-165; Brand, 1995: 149, 159; Brynen, 1998; Shyrock, 60-1).

Syria

Consolidation took a somewhat different form in Syria's more intractable society: the Ba'th regime, facing powerful urban upper class and Islamic opposition, relied on a dual strategy to survive. In the first stage, the radical Ba'thists launched a revolution from above aimed at securing the social bases of power through land reform, nationalizations, and government control over the market. This turn to statist ‘socialism’ was also driven by the belief that a nationalist foreign policy could only be pursued by diluting dependency on the West and the world market. The regime also forged a strong ideological party which mobilised a largely rural base of support and which institutionalised the Ba'th's socialist and Arab nationalist ideology. The other pillar of the regime was the army, already radicalised by the conflict with Israel, increasingly became the preserve of initially property-less peasant minorities, especially Alawites. These minorities had embraced secular Arab nationalism as an ideology which gave them equal citizenship; yet because their Arabism was suspect to the Sunni majority, they had to prove it by being more militant than their Sunni opponents. (Hinnebusch, 2001: 67-88). After his 1970 seizure of power within the Ba'th regime, al-Asad added two other legs to the state, a security apparatus recruited from Alawi kin and a regime-dependent segment of the Sunni bourgeoisie appeased by economic liberalisation and state patronage. Crucial to the consolidation of the regime was the clientele networks which ran through its institutions, serviced by the rent from domestic oil revenues and aid from the Arab oil states. The regime harnessed the public sector and external rent to the construction of a huge national security state buttressed by Soviet arms and designed to confront Israel over the Golan Heights (Clawson, 1989)

As important as the regime’s structural consolidation was the basis of its legitimacy. In Syria, a mosaic society lacking a history of statehood, the main alternative identities were initially either sub-state sectarianism or Arabism, the main unifying ideology through which a cross-sectarian coalition needed to consolidate the state could be forged. Asad deployed both kinds of identities: while sectarianism was used to bind a tightly knit regime core around the president, the regime’s Arab nationalist role as the most steadfast defender of the Arab cause in the battle with Israel, became the basis of its domestic legitimacy and of the regional stature that entitled it to the financial backing of other Arab states. This legitimacy was contingent on the regime’s faithfulness to its Arab nationalist mission, further locking the state into the struggle with Israel.

The consolidation of the state was accompanied by the concentration of power in Asad's hands, accomplished by the presidency's ability to balance between the various pillars of the state and accepted within the political elite as necessary to confront the gravest threat the country and regime had ever faced, the 1967 defeat and occupation brought on by the recklessness of the previous factionalized regime. This consolidation would allow Asad to mobilize the capabilities and attain the autonomy of domestic constraints needed to pursue a rational strategy that turned Syria from a victim to a regional actor which had to be reckoned with by its much more powerful opponents, Israel and the U.S.

Syria's foreign policy after 1970 reflected Asad's new realism. First, Asad replaced Syria's impotent irreductism—the messianic goal of liberating Palestine—with the limited but still very ambitious goals of recovering the Golan and achieving a Palestinian state in the West Bank/Gaza. He pursued these goals with great tenacity, refusing for a quarter century to settle for less than a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan and eschewing a separate settlement with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. He matched a mix of foreign policy instruments—alliance formation, limited war, negotiations—to the changing and usually unfavourable balance of power. He struck the alliances, regardless of ideology—with both the Soviet Union and the

**Contrasting Regimes, Contrasting Foreign Policies**

Despite being carved out of the same geographical/cultural region, Jordan and Syria were set by the peculiarities of their initial formation on contrary foreign policy paths. Syria became the “beating heart of Arabism” and Jordan a buffer state against Arabism. In Jordan the a pre-nationalist tribal elite was consolidated around an increasingly cosmopolitan-oriented royal family subsidised from without, while in Syria ex-plebeian nationalists rose to power from below. King Hussein, the product of British boarding schools, was attuned to metropolitan culture and had internalised Western political discourse (Shyrock 60-61); Assad, a product of the Syrian village, school and military, who seldom left Damascus, saw the world through undiluted Arab eyes. In Jordan, the regime survived by demobilising (or exileing) the nationalist opposition, and with the assistance of core patrons which provided the resources or the intervention to counter both domestic and regional threats—but at the cost of domestic legitimacy. Syria’s Ba’th regime, unable to rely on external intervention to manage opposition, built a more institutionalised penetrative regime which more effectively incorporated and controlled mass society while trying to appease the opposition through a nationalist discourse that locked it into chronic conflict with its stronger Israeli neighbour. Ironically, the weaker Jordanian regime, being less dependent on domestic legitimacy than external support, has shown greater willingness to offend public opinion on foreign policy issues than the seemingly stronger Syrian regime which cannot similarly dispense with nationalist legitimacy.

These differing patterns of state formation were reflected in opposing foreign policy tangents: While Syria has chiefly balanced against stronger threatening powers, Jordan has chiefly bandwagoned with them. In the Cold War, each relied on the opposing superpower. Thus, Syria relied on the Soviets to balance American support for Israel and to achieve the military capability to deter Israeli power. Jordan tried, through a history of secret relations, to appease Israel and relied on a tacit Israeli guarantee of its independence and a US security umbrella against other regional threats. Both depended on rent, but Jordan received its from similar conservative Gulf and Western sources which expected it to play a status quo and buffer state role against radical forces, whether Palestinians or Arab nationalists; Syria, by contrast, received Arab rent to sustain its resistance to Israel while its sources were too diversified to give its donors leverage the leverage over its foreign policy that Jordan suffered. These differences usually put them on opposing sides on most regional issues and relations were more often bad than good.

To be sure, both regimes have been periodically forced by either external or domestic pressures to pursue courses at odds with their interests and identities. The Syrian regime found itself unnaturally in the Western coalition against Iraq during the Gulf war; Syria sought, with the decline of its Soviet patron, to bandwagon with the US in order to more effectively counter the greater threat from Israel and get American pressure on it to evacuate the Golan. But, as the US failed to deliver, Syria attempted to mix bandwagoning with alliances—with Russia, Iran, etc.—which might balance American hegemony in the region. Jordan, too, found itself unnaturally at odds with its Western and Gulf patrons in the Gulf war; a multitude of economic interests tied its business elites to Iraq while public opinion, newly mobilised and aroused under Jordan’s democratisation experiment, was overwhelmingly pro-Iraq. King Hussein tried to adopt a balanced position between external and internal demands, but his refusal to countenance the Western-led attack on Iraq won him legitimacy at home and cost him patronage abroad: a course at odds with the regimes historic choices. However, in the end, dependency on its traditional patrons evidently could not be dispensed with and, as before, when the crisis passed and the Pan-Arab ideological inflammation of public opinion settled down, the Jordanian regime reverted to its naturally conservative and pro-Western orientation.

The Syrian Ba’th’s alignment with the West was an tactical anomaly at odds with its broader Arab nationalist identity just as Hashemite Jordan’s alignment against the West was at odds with its pro-Western identity; once the exceptional situation of the Gulf war ended, both regimes began to disengage from such “unnatural” policies. This episode suggests that external and internal pressures can push regimes away from the original orientation incorporated during state formation, but, at least in the short run, not fully or permanently (Harknett and VanDenBerg, 1997; Hinnebusch, 1993, 2000; Brand, 1995; Salloukh, 1996). Deeper permanent change would seem to require a
transformation in the social bases, structures and identities of the regimes themselves; but is globalization and generational change, even when combined, enough to effect such a transformation?

II. LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION AND THE DETERMINANTS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

The Father’s Final Legacies: Peace vs. No-Peace

Perhaps the single most important factor differentiating the foreign policies which the new leaders would follow in Syria and Jordan was the fact that King Hussein reached a peace treaty with Israel and Hafiz al-Asad did not. This was by no means inevitable as both states entered the Madrid peace talks with an aim to reaching a solution. However, the outcome satisfied the Hashemite regime’s remaining grievances against Israel, the last qualification of its deeply rooted status quo orientation; by contrast, Syria, its territory still under occupation, remained a dissatisfied power, giving its revisionism, on the decline during the peace negotiations, a new lease on life.

The King’s Peace

Reaching a peace agreement between Jordan and Israel was, of course, much easier firstly because after Jordan abandoned its claim to the West Bank the issues in dispute were comparatively minor and because the two leaderships were not handicapped by the high levels of mistrust between Israel and Syria. As long as there was an Arab consensus against separate peace deals, Jordan had been reluctant to pursue one, but the Palestinian acceptance of Oslo released the constraints on Amman. Jordan could, however, have timed its peace agreement and even more so the normalisation of relations with Israel to that of its Arab partners and it could have opted for the sort of “cold peace” typical of Israel’s peace with Egypt, at least until a comprehensive peace was reached on all fronts. Moreover, as Lynch argues, Jordan’s treaty mostly served Israeli interests while Hussein seemed to follow the sort of “cold peace” only until a comprehensive peace was reached on all fronts. But equally, the Hashemite regime had come to define its identity and interests in almost purely state-centric, material terms: every regional state, the regime argued, was now legitimately looking out for its own interests unqualified by deference to any competing Pan-Arab interest and shaped by economic and security needs. King Hussein seemingly bought into Western (and Israeli) claims that an alternative order was emerging in the Middle East in which the community of Arab states based on identity would be superseded by one of states linked by economic interests and in which Israel would have a major role as an engine of economic development. He also insisted that Israel had changed from a threat into a friend and ally and that the new enemy had become the extremists who opposed peace (Lynch, 217, 225-6); indeed, Arab Iraq and Syria were now seemingly regarded as greater threats than Israel, a fact underlined by Jordan’s participation as an observer in 1997’s Reliant Mermaid naval operations, involving Israel, Turkey, and the United States and aimed at encircling Syria. Hussein gambled that the peace process would end successfully making such close ties with Israel unexceptional and non-controversial. Finally, the Transjordanian elite initially supported the treaty in the expectation that it would disengage Jordan from Palestine and consolidate Jordan for the Jordanians.

Economics appears to have the determining factor. In the short run, King Hussein was trying to appease Washington which was demanding a high price for Jordan’s rehabilitation after its defiance during the Gulf war. Given Jordan’s ruptured relations with the Gulf States and the economic crisis caused by that war, Jordan was more dependent on and vulnerable to American pressures than ever before. The regime was convinced the restoration of American aid and the foreign investment that peace and close Israel relations would attract would rescue the faltering economy.

But equally, the Hashemite regime had come to define its identity and interests in almost purely state-centric, material terms: every regional state, the regime argued, was now legitimately looking out for its own interests unqualified by deference to any competing Pan-Arab interest and shaped by economic and security needs. King Hussein seemingly bought into Western (and Israeli) claims that an alternative order was emerging in the Middle East in which the community of Arab states based on identity would be superseded by one of states linked by economic interests and in which Israel would have a major role as an engine of economic development. He also insisted that Israel had changed from a threat into a friend and ally and that the new enemy had become the extremists who opposed peace (Lynch, 217, 225-6); indeed, Arab Iraq and Syria were now seemingly regarded as greater threats than Israel, a fact underlined by Jordan’s participation as an observer in 1997’s Reliant Mermaid naval operations, involving Israel, Turkey, and the United States and aimed at encircling Syria. Hussein gambled that the peace process would end successfully making such close ties with Israel unexceptional and non-controversial. Finally, the Transjordanian elite initially supported the treaty in the expectation that it would disengage Jordan from Palestine and consolidate Jordan for the Jordanians.

While this may seem a dramatic transformation in Jordan’s identity, in fact arguably the Hashemites historic role as a buffer state against Arab nationalism was merely reasserting itself more overtly than heretofore in a period when Arabism appeared obsolete and impotent. It also reflected the fact that a cosmopolitan leadership was drawing its conception of its identity more from its renewed engagement with international elites, especially those in Washington, while shutting down its dialogue with Jordanian civil society (Lynch, 205).

The Jordanian opposition opposed the treaty as a separate peace concluded before Israel had withdrawn to the 1967 lines and while it remained
and the Madrid Peace process, but still faced hostile interests there. Syria also
had appeased Washington in joining the Gulf war coalition.

The balance of power had been upset with the collapse of bipolarity and the
wars which Asad had so deftly exploited Soviet-American rivalries. As Asad saw it,
the Gulf war was far less favourable to Syrian interests than the bipolar world in
which he figured as a minor player. Syria tried to blunt these threats by securing
arms supplies from Russia, building new links to Europe, and sustaining its allianc
with Islamic Iran. Nevertheless, Asad was also prepared to make the
best of a bad situation, hoping that he could extract an acceptable settlement
with Israel by exploiting Washington’s desire to secure its hegemony in the
region through sponsorship of an Arab-Israeli peace.

Asad’s entry into the Madrid peace process marked, not an abandonment
of Syria’s goals, but their pursuit by other means. These goals only changed
when the PLO opted for the Oslo accord, which relieved Damascus of the
responsibility to make its own recovery of the Golan contingent on the
satisfaction of Palestinian rights. In Syria’s negotiations with Israel, Asad aimed
to maximise territorial recovery and minimise the “normalisation of relations”
and security concessions Israel expected in return. Asad’s conception of peace
involved formally correct, state-to-state relations, not King Hussein’s warm
peace. He rejected the “Middle East” conception of the regional order in which
Israel would be a partner, not an opponent: rather, Syria continued to expect a
post-peace Israel to remain a threat, not just militarily, but as a political rival for
influence in the Levant (Scale, 1992). Moreover, Asad was explicit that
economic interests and interdependencies could not substitute for Arab identity
as the basis of regional order.

Nevertheless, once Israel signalled its willingness to return the Golan,
Syria made several concessions such as a willingness to open diplomatic
relations and acceptance of de-militarised zones on the border which would favour Israel. In fact, the two sides came very close to a settlement but Israel’s
demands to keep its surveillance station on Mt. Hermon and its insistence on
adjusting the pre-1967 boundary around Lake Tiberias to its advantage fell short
of Asad’s insistence on complete withdrawal; in the last failed negotiations at
the March 26 2000 Clinton-Asad-Barak Summit, the Israelis and Americans
mistakenly believed that Asad, anxious to settle the conflict before his son’s
succession to power, would agree to less than full withdrawal. In general, both
sides, playing realist hardball in the negotiations, missed the chance for a
settlement, but, given the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifadah, it is questionable
whether any agreement reached could have been implemented; for while Syrian
opinion would have welcomed a comprehensive peace involving full Israeli
withdrawal and a Palestinian state, the kind of settlement with the Palestinians
that appeared to be Israel’s last offer to Arafat in July 2000, would have been
difficult to legitimise in Syria.

The failure of the peace negotiations had important domestic
consequences. Hafiz al-Asad had been preparing, in the expectation that peace

Asad’s Last Stand

The "New World Order" which emerged from the end of the Cold War and the
Gulf war was far less favourable to Syrian interests than the bipolar world in
which Asad had so deftly exploited Soviet-American rivalries. As Asad saw it,
the balance of power had been upset with the collapse of bipolarity and the
"main winners have been the Arabs' enemies." (Middle East Mirror 1 April
1992, p 13). Syria had appeased Washington in joining the Gulf war coalition
and the Madrid Peace process, but still faced hostile interests there. Syria also
faced a new threat of encirclement from the Turkish-Israeli alliance—in which
Jordan figured as a minor player. Syria tried to blunt these threats by securing
arms supplies from Russia, building new links to Europe, and sustaining its alliance with Islamic Iran. Nevertheless, Asad was also prepared to make the
best of a bad situation, hoping that he could extract an acceptable settlement
with Israel by exploiting Washington’s desire to secure its hegemony in the
region through sponsorship of an Arab-Israeli peace.

While the public was at first willing to give the treaty a chance, it was
turned decisively against normalisation of relations by Israel's perceived
obstruction of peace on the other tracks, its confiscating of land and building of
settlements in Jerusalem and the West Bank; its invasion of Lebanon; its failure
to honour agreements with Jordan on water and market access and its attempted
assassination of a Hamas leader on Jordanian territory. What made King
Hussein’s efforts at identity transformation untenable was that Israel by its
actions showed itself to be manifestly a threat, if not to the Jordanian regime, to
Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims, hence the vast majority of Jordanians who
continued to identify themselves as one or the other.

The formation of a wide coalition against polarised society and the regime
which ignored societal objections to and repressed debate on relations with
Israel. Symptomatic of the depth of disenchament with the treaty, was the
1998 demand by 50 of 80 deputies in an overwhelmingly pro-regime parliament
(elections to which had been boycotted by the opposition) for the freezing of.
Insiste of increasing censorship and repression, the opposition so
overwhelmingly won the debate over that even the regime’s close constituencies
could not be brought to support it. The importance of public opinion was
indicated when 20 of Jordan’s 23 political parties successfully mobilised the
public against participation in an Israeli trade fair, frustrating the government's
goal of increasing economic ties with Israel (Lynch, 200-202; Shamm & Lucas).

The failure of the peace negotiations had important domestic
consequences. Hafiz al-Asad had been preparing, in the expectation that peace

was imminent, to push through major liberalising and anti-corruption reforms needed to take advantage of a hoped for major influx of (mostly Arab and expatriate) investment; indeed his son, Bashar, his right hand man in his last few years, had initiated such efforts. But with the failure of peace, this impetus to change was lost. Both the failure to reach a comprehensive peace (in Syria) and the success of a less than comprehensive peace (in Jordan) would obstruct liberalising reforms in both countries.

The failure of a comprehensive peace halted convergence between the two regimes. Syria remained a dissatisfied power, its land still under Israeli occupation, while Jordan has settled its differences with Israel. But this, itself, was an artifact of the different foreign policy tangents on which their initial state formation had put them: one committed to Arabism, the other not. For Syria, the Golan was lost in a battle for Palestine and the regime’s legitimacy was dependent on its recovery as part of a settlement which included Palestinian rights. Jordan’s regime, less dependent on Arab legitimacy, had already conceded the West Bank, redefining itself as an East Bank state, readily resolving its minor territorial differences with Israel, and leaving the Palestinian cause to an unequal Palestinian-Israeli struggle from which it remained aloof.

**Leadership Change: “Modernizers”?**

Succession in Jordan (February 1999) and in Syria (June 2000) brought to power leaders widely described as “modernizers.” Equally, however, both had served apprenticeship under their fathers during which they were presumably socialised into roles within the establishment: in both cases, they served time within the military, the ultimate source of power and an institution likely to be wary of liberalisation. Moreover, where power is inherited by sons, the father-son relation presumably provides a uniquely powerful socialisation mechanism. By all accounts, Bashar and Abdullah have at least partially reproduced much of their fathers’ differential—nationalist vs. pro-Western—viewpoints.

However, the new generation’s socialisation took place in a radically different environment. The fathers (and the old guard) were socialised in the era of Arab nationalism, war with Israel, and non-alignment while the sons came of age in an era in which state-centric identities were fragmenting the Arabs, American hegemony had become a fact of life in the region, the peace process with Israel was high on foreign policy agendas and economic globalization and democratisation had started to impact on public and elite opinion.

Moreover, King Abdullah II and President Bashar al-Asad had both lived in and acquired education in the UK and we therefore exposed to “globalization” and its liberal ideology, probably more so than most of their compatriots and much of the regime old guard. Bashar, for example, convinced his father to start opening Syria to the internet and realises that a closed economy and society is handicapped in the competitive world of globalization. While his father had remained hunkered down in Damascus where petitioners came to him and had little experience of the outside world, Bashar, as president, travelled widely in both the Middle East and Europe. It is worth cautioning, however, that Bashar’s year of study in the West does not compare with Abdullah’s (and his family’s) long and intimate links with Western elites, exposure to consumer culture, and the essentially cosmopolitan world view this has generated. That Abdullah reportedly is not fluent in Arabic suggests how far the Hashemites have been alienated from their own Middle East environment.

Nevertheless, both new leaders seemed to share a vision of “modernisation” which entailed, first of all, economic liberalisation, reduction of rent-seeking corruption, and opening to the world market. At the same time, both ideally hoped to begin or deepen political liberalisation and democratisation, albeit limited to the extent that these processes could be made to support rather than undermine regime legitimacy, economic reform and their own power positions. The initial personal rapport and shared understandings reached by the two young leaders suggested they recognised that they shared a modernising project. In their marriage alliances, there also appeared the possible influences making for convergence in their views: Bashar married a modern-minded British citizen of Syrian descent who is likely to reinforce his liberal aspirations; Abdullah’s marriage to a Palestinian woman could make him more sympathetic to the nationalist sentiments of much of his population.

The dissonance between the essentially liberal vision of the new generation and the values inherited from their fathers was likely to be much sharper in the case of Bashar al-Asad than Abdullah: Syria is much less advanced on the road to economic and political liberalisation and has yet to really come to terms in its foreign policy with the Western dominated “new world order.” The Hashemite regime has historically been comfortable with a close Western alignment, although Abdullah faces a public which is suspicious of the West.

Leaders can be expected to attempt to bridge the gap between reality and their own values through policy innovations. However, new leaders cannot simply translate their personal preferences into foreign policy change, especially if that means reversing long-standing enmities with stronger threatening countries. Even in authoritarian countries, leaders cannot act on their own and depend on the support of the power elite that surrounds them and, to a lesser extent, the mass public that can only be wholly ignored at some cost in legitimacy. They are only likely to prevail if qualitatively different kinds of
interactions with the leaders of the enemy state allows the reconstruction of its enemy image and of the self-identity shaped by its threat; however that requires an interlocutor in the threatening state who shares an interest in transforming relations, something outside the control of reforming leaders.

Both Bashar and Abdullah presumably seek the stabilisation of their countries by finding a way to reconcile the interests of their establishments and the identity of their populations with the realities of West-centric globalization. Bashar’s main challenge as a modernizer is arguably to initiate and give momentum to economic liberalisation in the face of vested interests while steering a foreign policy re-orientation that would overcome the residues of Syria’s past “pariah” status without sacrificing the country’s identity. Abdullah needs to consolidate economic and foreign policy changes already taken by adapting them to popular identity and making them compatible with democratisation—without which they will remain precarious; rooting them in a domestic consensus through democratisation would require the ruler make concessions to popular opinion—which may require he stand up to his U.S patron on key issues such as Palestine and Iraq. To the extent Bashar sought to incorporate liberal elements and Abdullah nationalist ones into their policies one might have expected a certain convergence in the policies of the two states.

Environmental Change: Pressures for and against Convergence

The likelihood of substantial regime and foreign policy change depends on the viability of the regime’s position in its economic and international environments. This status quo is comfortable for neither state, although whether either faces a crisis sufficient to force a transformation of policy or whether the risks involved are matched by sufficient positive incentives is very problematic.

Globalization and Economic Pressures

Chronic economic crises in both economies (the exhaustion of statist import substitute industrialisation, the decline of petroleum rent) have forced economic liberalisation issuing in growing need for foreign (including expatriate and Arab) investment and external markets with inevitable foreign policy consequences.

Both the Syrian and Jordanian economies are highly dependent: Jordan, its treasury dependent on external subsidies or workers’ remittances, and lacking the domestic oil revenues enjoyed by Syria, is arguably more vulnerable. For example, Jordan got 32% of its GNP from Gulf aid in 1976 and 46% in 1979; Syria got 16.1% in that year (Wilson, 285). In 1991, Jordan’s foreign debt was 208% of its GNP and Syria’s 75% (Siwan & Squire, 211). But for both states, there may be no long term solution except an influx of investment which depends on conformity to the standards of the global market. In Syria, stagnant growth combined with burgeoning population created an economic dead-end, if not an immediate crisis which is likely to become much more acute as domestic oil exports inevitably decline; the economy grew 7% 1990-95 and GNP/capita at 4.3%; but GNP growth fell to 2.2% in 1996, 5% in 1997 and –1.5% in 1998. In Jordan real GNP grew only 1.5% between 1996 and 1998 (The Middle East, March 1999, p 35; Sept. 1999, p. 27). In both states unemployment rates are high, perhaps 25%.

In both states there are obstacles to economic liberalisation: the main constituencies of both regimes are dependent on the state sector and state regulation of the economy; the Alawis in Syria and the East-Bankers in Jordan are similarly invested in the public sector while their rivals—the Sunni business class in Syria, the Palestinians in Jordan—dominate the private sectors. But while the monarchy has complied with IMF structural adjustment, even at the cost of periodic public revolts, Syria has refused to conform and the resistance of vested (statist or rent-seeking) interests, the social contract on which the regime is based and a residue of socialist ideology represent greater obstacles than in Jordan to integration into the global economy. Jordan has, thus, made much more progress in making its economy investor friendly than has Syria. Unlike Syria, In 1997, Amman signed a partnership agreement with the European Union as a first step toward achieving Jordanian-EU free trade area by 2010. In addition, Jordan was admitted to the World Trade Organization and signed a free trade with the U.S. (Sasley). It has been rewarded by higher inflows of foreign financing: in 1997-98, $584 million vs. $180 for Syria, $158 million in 1999 compared to $91 million for Syria. The accumulated stock of FDI in 1998 was 16.53% of Jordan’s GNP compared to 8% of Syria’s. Yet, neither country has been substantially integrated into the global economy: accumulated FDI amounted to a mere $1.2 billion in both states, and in the nineties trade as a proportion of GDP actually fell in both states, by half in Syria (UNCTAD, World Investment Report, New York 1999; World Bank, The Little Data Book, 2001, 9-12).

The fact is the Middle East as a whole remains out of globalization circuits, particularly the inflow of investment, lacking the large markets and stable political climate of other regions. Because economic liberalisation requires a stable/pacific investment climate, ruling elites and business classes have an interest in moving the Middle East out of the “zone of war (Solvingen).” Jordan made the decisive move in this direction—a peace with Israel that was expected to result in some economic benefits, but in the absence of regional peace it has made little difference. Jordan’s Western debt was cut (major creditor states including the United States wrote off $833 million of Jordan’s
to balance the greater threat from Israel. A main deterrent to Arab states moving pressure to “bandwagon” with— i.e. appease— the US hegemon, partly in order Israel in a period of post-Gulf war Arab fragmentation, put Arab states under pressure to "bandwagon" with—i.e. appease—the US hegemon, partly in order to balance the greater threat from Israel. A main deterrent to Arab states moving

Syria’s failure to achieve a peace with Israel stalled its movement into the zone of peace and the incremental liberalisation Bashar sponsored was not enough to encourage the significant new private investment needed to kick-start the economy. Traditionally, when the regime has faced similar economic crises, foreign policy has, fortuitously, extracted significant external rent to relieve the pressures for reform. Syria’s dilemma was that it could no longer access strategic rent as it did during the Cold War and oil boom, especially from the GCC states. It is in this light that Syria’s late 1990s opening to Iraq, taking advantage of the opportunity opened by Jordan’s relative disengagement from it, is partly to be explained. The revenues from the Syrian-Iraqi oil pipeline accrued to the cash-strapped state while the monopolies acquired in the Iraqi market by the regime’s business clients serviced its patronage networks. While this could not solve the wider crisis of the Syrian economy, it may be enough to preserve the regime while relieving pressures for domestic reform. This was less a personal preference of Bashar’s—indeed it went against his longer-term vision of modernisation—but the failure of the peace process and regime survival interests made it unavoidable.

The External Threat: The Unfavourable Power Balance

In realist thinking, foreign policy change responds, first of all, to shifts in the external power balance and specifically the increase or decline of external threats; as long as such threats remain high they are the decisive determinant of policy. Whether a state chooses to balance against or bandwagon with threats is thought to be determined by its power position: weak states have no option but to bandwagon.

In the Middle East changes in the power balance have been dramatic, largely heightening threats. With the collapse of bi-polarity and the emergence of American hegemony in the region, Arab states lost the option to balance between the US and the USSR; this, combined with the relative strengthening of Israel in a period of post-Gulf war Arab fragmentation, put Arab states under pressure to "bandwagon" with—i.e. appease—the US hegemon, partly in order to balance the greater threat from Israel. A main deterrent to Arab states moving beyond realist strategies (balancing or bandwagoning) toward the conflict resolution that could spread globalisation’s zone of peace, was the persistent lack of viable interlocutors in Israel and, to a lesser extent, Washington. In Israel the Likud, which frequently dominated government, closed the door on the peace process. Moreover after September 11 the region as a whole faced a US hegemon dominated by highly unsympathetic leaders and interest groups who showed little willingness to consider the interests of America's Arab allies such as Jordan, much less historically unfriendly states, such as Syria. Washington's deeply pro-Israeli bias during the intifadah in Palestine precluded the role of third party mediator needed revive the peace process while the US campaign against terrorism further raised regional tensions. Hence levels of external threat remained high and decisive determinants of foreign policy. Unfortunately for the visions of change entertained by both Bashar and Abdullah, they came to power precisely at a time when the Israel-Palestinian peace process was in reverse.

Yet Jordan and Syria were quite differently positioned in this new world order, and the two states responded differently to it. Jordan overcame its temporary alienation from the West over the first Gulf war and sought protection by deepening its historic bandwagoning with the U.S., to the extent of alienating its old Iraqi ally. For Jordan the biggest threats were the possible domestic consequences of the on-going intifadah and the prospect of a regional calamity in the event of an American war on Iraq. Jordan gambled that its appeasement of Washington would give it the influence to deflect such threats and get Washington to re-engage in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in a more even-handed way.

For Syria, relations the US were more complicated: as the main supporter of Israel, Washington was an obstacle to Syrian interests. As long as Syria and Israel were not at peace and as long as Syria backed radical Palestinians, the hostile interests which dominated Washington would keep Syria on the terrorism list, seek to impose economic sanctions and conceivably even militarily target it; moreover, after September 11, Washington abandoned any pretence of restraining Israeli bellicosity in the conflicts in southern Lebanon and began to directly threaten Syria. Yet, for Damascus, the US was also the one state in the post-Cold War period which could restrain Israel and conceivably broker an acceptable Syrian-Israeli settlement, should it consider it in its interests to placate Syria and the Arabs. Syria sought to neutralise the threats from Washington by tightening its inter-Arab, Iranian, Russian and European links, while, at the same time, seeking to appease the US by “assisting” it in its war on terrorism, so long as this did not sacrifice Syria's commitments to anti-Israeli "liberation movements."
While both the Syrian and Jordanian regimes therefore feel threatened by the current regional environment, they have responded in contrary ways. But these can only partly be explained by their relative power position. While Syria had a greater military deterrent capability, it had little hope of avoiding disaster in any military confrontation with Israel or the US; that the regime consistently sought to balance rather than merely appease these powers, as did Jordan, can only be explained by its deep investment in an Arab identity compared to the Jordanian regime’s disengagement from Arabism.

**Domestic Politics**

In Jordan and Syria the smooth succession engineered by state establishments, in spite of the seeming dependence of both countries on the personality of the deceased top leader, is evidence that state structures are, to a degree, institutionalised and hence constrain how the new leader deals with the outside world. Indeed in cases such as these where the new leader inherits a state constructed by his predecessor and is surrounded by the latter’s lieutenants and cronies, he is likely to be especially constrained and the sharing of power inevitable.

However, it is frequently argued that in the Middle East's patrimonial political culture, collective power sharing is transitory, power is ultimately personal, and new leaders will inevitably attempt to build personal power bases. They will use the exceptional appointment/dismissal powers of the supreme office—whether monarchy or presidential monarchy—to throw off their dependence on colleagues who are either removed or reduced to the status of lieutenants. Leaders who so opt to establish personal authority must try to mobilize new support to counter-balance opposition inside the establishment. This can currently most likely be done by some form of liberalisation or co-optation which appeases groups which have traditionally been on the margins of power. In authoritarian nationalist regimes like Syria, the key new groups to be appeased are the business class, arguably won over by a tilt toward the West needed to encourage foreign investment and partnerships. In a traditionally pro-Western monarchy, by contrast, the key excluded groups tends to be the Western monarchy, by contrast, the key excluded groups tends to be the Western monarchy, by contrast, the key excluded groups tends to be the

succession and intra-elite power struggle in Syria

In Syria, the main challenge faced by the new leader was to assert his authority within the collective leadership inherited from his father which had a powerful stake in the status quo. Bashar initially seemed prepared to pursue his modernisation agenda despite his inescapable need to share power within the elite. An anti-corruption drive, the placement of reforming technocrats in government, attempts to restrict the interference of the party and the security forces in economic administration, and legislation approving private banks—all expressed an attempt to reform and adapt the statist system he had inherited to the age of globalization. Change came slowly: crucially, the rent-seeking alliance between the Alawi military barons and the regime-supportive Sunni bourgeoisie, whose corrupt stranglehold on the economy alienated the public and deterred productive investment, was not directly challenged. Indeed, the Presidency was much reduced in power and surrounded by several centres of power—the party politburo, cabinet, the army high command and the security forces—the old guard leadership—with whom the new President had to consult and share power. Bashar’s strategy was one of incrementalism: retiring the old guard as it aged and promoting a younger generation in the army and security forces which was personally beholden to him; however it was far from clear that these “young Turks” were more friendly to the reforms he wanted than were the old guard.

While Bashar initially encouraged civil society to express constructive criticism, seemingly in an effort to foster forces which would strengthen his own position and reformist agenda, when this threatened to snowball into a wider critique of the regime—including the legacy of his father—from which he derived his own legitimacy—and when it threatened to put the spotlight on the corrupt activities of regime barons, the old guard and security forces insisted Bashar rein in the opposition. Syria’s brief democratisation initiative failed because no democratisation pact had been forged between the regime’s liberalizers and accommodative elements of the opposition, allowing hard-liners on both sides to seize the initiative. But this failure shut off a potential route by which Bashar might have restored the regime’s faltering legitimacy, consolidated his power on behalf of reform and encouraged the influx of expatriate and foreign capital the economy needs.

**Jordan: State vs. Civil Society**

Abdullah’s main challenge was not from within the elite but from civil society which opposed the foreign policy positions he inherited from his father, notably with Israel and the break with Iraq. This is a deterrent to democratisation which would empower the regime’s critics. Democratisation is also deterred by the fear...
among the tribal/transjordanian establishment that democratisation would empower the Palestinian majority at its expense.

Abdullah appeared to inherit intact the traditional support base of the Hashemite monarchy; the security forces, and the Bedouin tribes. Having married a Palestinian Jordanian, he also began with a fund of support among that community (Sasley). Indeed, Abdullah's popularity was very high in the first few months after becoming king, partly because of hopes that he would revive the frozen democratisation experiment, attack corruption in the state establishment dominated by his father's cronies, bring new blood into it and back the consolidation of the rule of law (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 1999). Additionally, he won applause for his efforts to improve strained relations with Arab neighbours, including Syria and Jordan’s traditional Gulf Arab donors, and for his initial stand against the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq.

However, no renovation of the top elite took place and democratisation remained stalled. The Islamic opposition had offered an olive branch to the new monarch but Abdullah cracked down on the Jordanian branch of Hamas, under American and Israeli pressure, after a suicide bombing in Israel. His government continued enforcement of the IMF-mandated structural adjustment that squeezed the middle class and increased inequality (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 1999). Moreover, in part because of the utter collapse of the peace process amidst the increasing anti-Palestinian violence of the Sharon government, ever more overtly approved by Washington, neither of relations with Israel, the close American alignment, nor continued observance of the sanctions against Iraq were acceptable to the mass public. The monarchy opted to sacrifice its main support within civil society to maintain its relations with Israel and the US. Once it became clear that Abdullah did not, despite his democratisation rhetoric, mean to make any concessions to public opinion on the regime’s foreign policies, the King’s honeymoon ended.

Thus, more than a year after the succession, there is little evidence that the new leaders have broke the deadlock in their countries or found a way of reinventing their regimes. As such, the original foreign policy orientation fixed in the state establishment remains largely unchallenged. Both leaders ended up being dependent on their establishments, because neither was willing to risk the changes—of domestic policy in Syria and foreign policy in Jordan—that would have been needed to win unassailable personal legitimacy and allow the consolidation of democratisation.

III. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER BASHAR AND ABDULLAH

Context and Strategy under Bashar and Abdullah

Syria

Bashar al-Asad inherited a deteriorating strategic situation from the late Hafiz period, including a Turkish-Israeli alliance putting Damascus in a pincer and a burst of opposition to Syria’s position in Lebanon following on the Israeli withdrawal from the south. The failure of the Syrian-Israeli peace process, (and the consequent souring of Syrian relations with the US), the outbreak of the Palestinian intifadah and the rise of the hard-line Sharon government in Israel, were, however, the watershed events shaping Syrian foreign policy in the first year and a half of Bashar’s Presidency. Constraints on policy change included the need to preserve the legitimacy which Hafiz’s demand for total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan had conferred on the regime, an inheritance which was Bashar’s own main claim to legitimacy; Bashar’s inheritance of his foreign policy team from his father with whom he had to share power; and a threatening and unyielding Israel which offered little hope for a breakthrough in the peace process which, it had been expected, would be the catalyst to unleash wider changes in Syria’s domestic structure and international alignments. Continuity, rather than change was, thus, most apparent in Bashar’s foreign policy. Indeed, as a result of the general collapse of the peace process, Syrian policy actually became less accommodating toward Israel than was that of his father in the late nineties. Bashar's main initiatives were his attempt to counter the greater threats Syria now faced, largely from Israel and the US, by deepening alignments with Iraq and with Europe.

Jordan

The new, Western-educated and-oriented king made it clear that his first priority was Jordan’s economic modernisation, not Pan-Arab issues. The consequent need to secure inward investment and continued rent flows, directly shaped foreign policy: the first was seen as advanced by economic integration with Israel and the second by close alignment with the US, and both were little compatible with Jordan’s history of close relations with Iraq. However, the breakdown of the peace process derailed the regime’s expectations that relations with Israel would no longer be controversial, and that peace would bring an influx of aid and investment, and hence that political and economic liberalisation could go ahead at limited risk. King Abdullah was caught between American and Israeli demands that he re-engage Jordan’s role as a buffer state and crack down on radical Islamic factions and the demands of his population to end and relations with Israel. The intifadah inevitably froze relations with Israel and
ended this potential alternative to Jordan’s dependence on Iraqi oil, hence constraining the full rupture in relations with Baghdad desired in Washington.

**Mending Regional Fences**

Leadership succession in both countries was an opportunity for both to mend relations with states which relations had broken down under their fathers.

**Jordan**

In Jordan’s case, this meant Syria and the Gulf states. Diplomatic relations with the Gulf monarchies were restored soon after Abdullah became king and they began transferring money to Jordan again, which helped stabilise its dinar (Sasley). After Hafiz al-Asad died in June 2000, Abdullah and Bashar exchanged state visits. In his speech to the October 2000 Arab Summit, Abdullah stressed that Jordan could no longer accept the international sanctions against Iraq. (Sasley). Yet Abdullah was nevertheless unprepared to rest Jordan’s security on amicable relations with other Arab States. On the contrary, the growing rapprochement between Syria and Iraq was seen as a threat to Jordan’s traditional ability to exploit their antagonism to get protection by one against the other. This led Jordan to continue its appeasement of Israel, despite its repression in Palestine and to encourage a greater US role in the region despite its increasing hostility to Arab interests (Sasley).

**Syria**

Bashar also seized the opportunity to mend fences with states with which Syria had been at odds, although this process had already begun under his father. Most important, relations with Turkey, with whom Syria had been on the brink of war in the nineties, rapidly warmed: while Euphrates water remained a main a bone of contention, Syria’s forfeited the PKK card it had used against Turkey in this conflict amidst Turkish threats in the 1990s; its fall back option was to establish friendly relations and it did not allow Turkish manipulation of water or Ankara’s relations with Israel prevent this. Several high level Syrian delegations to Turkey forged a series of economic agreements. Bashar’s relations with King Abdullah II also grew close although Abdullah rejected his call to sever ties with Israel; for example, Syria helped ease Jordan’s water crisis. Thus, Syria sought to remove any incentives for what had appeared in the late nineties to be an emerging Israel-Turkish-Jordanian encirclement. Bashar also attempted to improve the dismal Syrian-PLO relations he inherited from his father. He personally intervened to ensure Yasir Arafat was invited to his father’s funeral (MEI 16 June 2000, 21-22) and, after the eruption of the Al-Aqsa intifadah, Syria recognised the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority.

The alliance Bashar inherited with Saudi Arabia and Egypt nevertheless remained the centrepiece of Syria’s regional strategy. As the al-Aqsa intifadah began and tension mounted with Israel in southern Lebanon, Bashar made his first trip as president to Cairo and Egypt declared it would reconsider its relations with Israel if it attacked Syria. Saudi Arabia, which had welcomed and supported Bashar’s accession, also warned against Israeli attacks on Syria or Lebanon. After Sept. 11, Syria needed more than ever to be part of a Cairo-Saudi triangle to protect itself from US pressures. Yet, unlike them, Syria remained a dissatisfied power—as long as the Golan remains occupied—and this inclined it to an opposing alignment with Iran and Iraq. The Saudis had paid substantial monies to Bashar at the succession to prevent any tilt to Iraq and Syria’s increased ties with Baghdad no doubt disappointed Riyadh; but these ties, in providing a substitute for Saudi aid, which is trivial compared to the potential of the Iraqi relationship, give Damascus some leverage over the Saudis. Syria appears likely to continue to try to manipulate and remain at the centre of two regional alliance networks, both the traditional pro-Western one that ties it to Cairo and Riyadh and an emerging new anti-western one with Iraq and Iran.

**Relations with Israel**

**Syrian-Israeli Relations**

The hardening of Syria’s position toward Israel was, in the first instance, a reaction to Israel’s behaviour and only secondarily a function of Bashar’s need to establish his credibility as an Arab nationalist leader carrying on his father’s legacy. Indeed, even after the failure of the Geneva negotiations, Bashar remained conciliatory toward Israel until Sharon came to power. Bashar insisted that he was willing to resume peace negotiations with Israel but only on condition that Israel acknowledged what Syria took to be the commitment made under Rabin to a full withdrawal from the Golan, defined as his father had done as withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borders, leaving Syria access to Lake Tiberias. But with these conditions unlikely to be met as long as Sharon was in power and with the Intifadah inflaming public opinion against Israel, the settlement on the Golan that seemed so close under Hafiz was now off the agenda. Bashar insisted that “No matter how long it might take, this land will always be ours and will be returned complete to us one day, sooner or later” (Strindberg).

With no Golan settlement in the cards, Syria returned to its earlier insistence on a comprehensive settlement including a Palestinian state, Jerusalem and the Palestinian right of return. In Bashar’s words: “We always say the goal is a just and comprehensive peace and the word comprehensive means all occupied land...The (return of the) Golan and Lebanon is not a
comprehensive peace so there must be a balance between the Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian tracks.” Bashar attempted to co-ordinate positions with PA leader, Yasir Arafat on the basis that no peace settlement would be accepted that did not meet these conditions. Arafat was, however, unwilling to forego his freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre by linking Palestinian strategy to that of Syria (Middle East International, 6 April 2001, 7-8; 13 July 2001; p 5; al-Sharq Al-Awsat in February 2001; Makovsky 2001).

Bashar’s rhetoric toward Israel became harsher than that which prevailed during the decade of peace negotiations under is father. Indeed, far from seeking to appeal to the Israeli public “over the head” of its hard-line leader, Bashar castigated Israelis for their repeated election of hard-liners and electoral punishment of more moderate leaders whom they suspected of making concessions in peace negotiations. At the October 2000 Arab summit immediately after the outbreak of the intifadah, Bashar’s first appearance on the Arab stage, he advocated renewed support for the rejectionist Palestinian factions in Damascus and demanded Arab relations with Israel be cut and the economic boycott reinstated. This contrasted sharply with the effort of Egypt and Jordan to mediate between Israel and the PA. In line with his father’s traditional posture, Bashar insisted that Arab states should aim for the “peace of the strong” instead of the “peace of the weak”, such as the Oslo agreement, which had allowed Israel to evade a just settlement. Rather, peace must be based on mutual deterrence, ideally on a balance of power between the Arabs and Israel (Seale, 2001, Zisser, 2001). Nor did Syria bend before the increased US threat after September 11; at the post September 11 Cairo Arab summit, while the Egyptians, Saudis and Jordanians all wanted to dampen down the intifadah and appease the US, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq called for keeping it going as a way of making the costs of Israeli occupation prohibitive.

Nevertheless, if Syria had reverted to its previous policy of “steadfastness” against Israel, it had few means of inflicting costs on Israel for its retention of occupied territories, especially after the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. Lebanon had served as a surrogate battlefield as well as a buffer between Syria and Israel in an ongoing proxy war in which Syria was able to exert military pressure on Israel, at minimal risk through Hizbollah attacks on Israel’s so-called “security zone;” however with Israel’s withdrawal from that zone, bringing Hizbollah forces directly to Israel’s northern border, the stakes were raised immeasurably.

Syria’s links with Hizbollah remained close, aided by the personal rapport Bashar had developed while in charge of the Lebanon file with its leader, Hasan Nasrallah. Support for Hizbollah and the Lebanese claim to Shebaa Farms, the disputed border territory still occupied by Israel, was a way of ensuring that there would be no separate Israeli-Lebanese peace after the withdrawal. A certain amount of low-intensity carefully calibrated Hizbollah activity in the Shebaa farms area was seen in Damascus as one of the few ways it could send the message that Israel could not have peace while retaining Arab territory (Seale, 2000; Bronson, 2000). But this was a risky policy. By contrast to the conflict over the Lebanese security zone, Hizbollah activity in the Shebaa farms enjoyed no international legitimacy. The UN and the Western powers rejected Lebanon’s claim to the area and wanted the Lebanese army to pacify the southern zone still in Hizbollah hands. Israel warned the Syrians that it would consider them responsible for Hizbollah attacks. As long as the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations were on-going, Washington insisted that Israel refrain from responding to Hizbollah attacks on the security zone by striking at Syrian forces but the US now cautioned Syria not to authorise such attacks over the Shebaa farms (Young 2001).

Bashar was soon tested by events in southern Lebanon. Following several hizbollah operations which killed Israeli soldiers, Israel bombed a Syrian radar station in Lebanon in April 2001, killing three Syrian soldiers and wounding six, the heaviest Israeli military attack on Syrian forces in nearly twenty years. Syria refrained from immediate military retaliation on the grounds that Sharon wanted an escalation, but “Syria will not give him that present.” (Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), April 29, 2001; Felder 2001). According to the Syrians, the attack on the Syrian radar was an Israeli attempt to change the old rules of engagement established over the security zone in which its retaliation had to be against Hizbollah forces. According to journalist Ibrahim Hamidi, Syria warned that such escalation could lead to hizbollah attacks on Israeli territory and that if Israel attacked Syrian targets in Syria, the Syrians would have the right to launch missiles on Tel Aviv. This tacit brinkmanship aimed to get American pressure on Sharon not to change the ‘traditional rules of the game’ in Lebanon. Hamidi explained that the Syrian leadership saw Washington as the ‘equalising force for Israel’s military superiority” because of Washington fears that American interests in the Middle East might be damaged (Al Sharq al Awsat, London, April 30, 2001). Syria also wanted Washington to understand that any cooperation in its policy to isolate Israel would require it to restrain Israel. Indeed, Washington indicated its displeasure at the Israeli escalation. But Sharon seemed willing to ignore American calls for restraint: after a Hizbollah attack on 29 June 2001, a second attack on Syrian positions took place, with Syria again refraining from retaliation (Middle East International 13 July 2001, p 10-11) Israel’s decision to limit its retaliation to Syrian forces had the advantage of encouraging the growing opposition in Lebanon to Syria’s military presence. By seemingly ending Syria’s ability to sponsor attacks against Israeli forces from south Lebanon without suffering consequences, Israel deprived Damascus of a relatively cost-free means of pressuring the Israelis to return to the negotiating
normal relations with Israel as the continuing violence solidified anti-Israeli sentiment across the Jordanian political spectrum. Indeed, the regime had to brace itself for a “spillover” of unrest from Palestine which included: ten days of demonstrations demanding ending of ties with Israel and closure of its embassy (also involving non-Palestinian Maan, a regime stronghold), two shooting incidents against Israeli diplomats, the issuance by the professional syndicates of a blacklist of those businesses involved in the “normalisation of relations” with Israel and demands from parliament to debate the Israeli treaty (Sasley). The intifadah also had the effect of freezing the regime’s plans for economic co-operation with Israel and Jordan suffered a big slump in tourism, its second largest revenue source, after it marketed itself as a destination in conjunction with Israel (MEI 22 Dec. 2000).

The regime’s response was increased repression of the opposition, including the violent suppression of Islamicist-led demonstrations on the anniversary of the nakba, and a crack down on the professional syndicates (MEI, May 2001). The regime seemed to be further enervating its long standing understanding with the most powerful social forces outside the establishment and burning its last bridges to civil society (MEI 16 June 2001). Parliament was dissolved, and the king directed the government to draw up a new election law in its absence. Prior to the collapse of the peace process when it appeared that Palestinians would become permanent Jordanian citizens, Abdullah had favoured a law allowing fairer representation; this law, however, maintained the old system which underrepresented the urban middle class and Palestinians to the advantage of conservative and tribal forces supportive of the monarchy. Fair elections would only have given the country’s powerful anti-Israeli sentiment power in parliament (MEI 27 July 2001).

Abdullah’s foreign policy was conducted in defiance of public opinion. Against the growing Pan-Arab movement to freeze links with and to re-impose the economic boycott on Israel, in which Syria was a leading actor, Abdullah continued to urge that Israel be accepted “as a member of the neighbourhood.” Jordan and Egypt fought back an attempt at the Arab summit in October 2000 to demand that all states break relations with Israel. Where other Arab leaders, particularly Syria, argued that Islamic suicide bombings were legitimate resistance efforts, Abdullah argued that Israel was being subject to terrorism and that the Arab world “must address the security needs of the average Israeli” (Sasley). As the Israeli-Palestinian violence caught the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes between their dependence on Washington and their relations with Israel on the one hand, and the demands of their publics on the other, they jointly put forth proposals for ending the violence which they tried to make acceptable to both Israel and the Palestinians; but Israel rejected such mediation out of hand. In the end, when the Jordanian ambassador to Israel resigned, no successor was
sent and after Israeli diplomats were attacked on the streets of Amman, their families withdrew.

Relations with Iraq

Syria and Iraq: A New Strategic Relation?

The single most strategic shift in Syrian policy under Bashar was, without doubt, the deepening rapprochement with Iraq, although this was already in the cards under Hafiz. With the failure of the peace process, Hafiz decided to mend relations with Iraq, setting aside his long time enmity toward Saddam Hussein in order to confront the Israel-Turkish axis with a rival Iran-Iraq-Syrian one; he also aimed to send a message to the US that Syria had other options than peace with Israel and to find solutions to Syria’s economic stagnation. Low-level diplomatic ties, the first in twenty years, were established in February 2000 but relations did not progress far until Bashar’s succession when the outbreak of the intifadah, demolishing remaining peace hopes, gave restoration of the relation a new urgency (Global Intelligence Update 29 February 2000). In October 2000, following talks between Bashar and Tarik Aziz, a Syrian plane took humanitarian aid to Iraq and Syria began calling for sanctions to be lifted and Iraq brought back into the Arab fold. Damascus and Baghdad exchanged numerous senior-level visits, lifted visa requirements for one another’s citizens and stopped support for dissidents in the other state. During Syrian Prime Minister Mustafa Miro’s visit to Iraq, a first since ties were broken off in 1980, he delivered a letter from Bashar to Saddam, stressing the “support of the Syrian people for Iraq and its solidarity with the fight to lift the unjust embargo.” An Iraqi official announced in July that Baghdad would give priority to Syria in import contracts under the UN oil-for-food programme in return for its opposition to US and British proposals to impose “smart” sanctions on Baghdad.

The new alignment had geo-political significance. Bashar spoke of Iraq as Syria’s strategic, economic and scientific depth. Syrian-Iranian military cooperation in the event of an Israeli attack on Syria was also reputedly discussed when Qusay Hussein visited Damascus. If Syrian-Iranian hostility, a regional constant for decades, was replaced by a new strategic alignment, this, together with the Syrian-Iranian alliance, could transform the region’s power balance to Israel’s detriment. Indicative of how far this had yet to happen, however, was the fact that Syria, by contrast with Jordan, still did not even have full diplomatic relations with Iraq. It appears that for Damascus, Iraq was viewed as a geo-political card which Syria could play, notably as in return for concessions from the U.S. (Seale, 2001; Gambill, 2001; Markovsky, 2001; Ibrahim Hamidi Daily Star, 14/12/0).

The Iraq relation was however, even more a matter of geo-economics. The centrepiece of the new policy was the reopening at the end of 2000 of the oil pipeline from Iraq to Syria’s Mediterranean port Banias that had been closed during the Iran-Iraq war. Damascus was said to receive about 200,000 bpd of Basra Light crude from Iraq at below market prices (thought to be around $10-15 per barrel) enabling it to then export an equivalent amount of Syrian Light crude at much higher international prices. The pipeline had the potential to produce up to $1 billion in revenue for the Syrian government, about 5 percent of Syria’s gross domestic product. There were also plans to build a new pipeline to Iraq. All this would help stabilise the troubled Syrian economy while allowing the regime to replenish its coffers and service its patronage networks; it would also dampen the government’s appetite for economic reform and relieve pressures to conform to the neo-liberal demands of “globalization.”

In addition, Syria hoped to take advantage of the Iraqi market, a critical element in reviving its stagnant economy. To woo Syria to its side against the sanctions regime, Iraq began re-routing trade and switching import contracts from Jordan to Syria (MEI 28 July 2000, 14); Damascus, pressured by Syrian business who coveted the prospects of monopolies over the Iraqi market, sought to establish a foothold in the Iraqi economy at a time when an end to the sanctions seemed to be on the horizon. Contracts to provide Iraq with goods under the food for oil program allowed the private sector to export poor quality goods just as they used to do to the USSR. The gradual elimination of most trade restrictions between the two countries was expected to double or even triple the $500 million a year in trade in 2000. A huge informal commerce developed across the border.

The downside of the relation was that it opened Syria to accusations of sanctions busting which increasingly drew American attention. Washington’s post Sept. 11 determination on regime change in Iraq increased the risk that Syria’s Iraq alignment would make it, as well, a focus of American hostility. Unabashed, Syrian leaders went so far as to announce that an American attack on Iraq would be considered an attack on all the Arabs. Syria feared an attack could lead to the installation of a pro-American regime in Iraq, encircling it with unfriendly regimes. As insurance against this possibility, the regime simultaneously consolidated its links to Baghdad while continuing to cultivate its older ties to the opposition, the communists and Kurdish factions, so as to be in a position to retain or increase its influence in a post-Saddam Iraq, together with Iran, which had close ties to the Shia opposition. Syria hoped that any change in regime could be made to serve its, rather than Washington’s, interests.
Iraqi-Jordanian Relation: Abandoning as Old Ally

Jordan’s stand against the Western assault on Iraq in the Gulf war reflected a domestic consensus cutting across Jordan’s cleavages and had won the regime considerable support. After the Gulf war, the Jordanian public’s outrage at the misery imposed by US sanctions on Iraq, the double standards which targeted its violations of UN resolutions but not Israel’s, the economic loss imposed by the sanctions on Jordan, theafront to its sovereignty by international inspections of cargoes entering the port of Aqaba—all made Iraq policy a test of regime identity: was it an Arab state or a Western client (Lynch, 234)?

However, soon after the Gulf war ended, Jordan began, under American pressure, to reverse its decade-long alignment with Baghdad even though Iraq was Jordan’s biggest trading partner, much Jordanian business was dependent on Iraqi contracts and the country was dependent on Iraqi oil at concessionary prices. King Hussein’s welcome to Iraqi defector, Hussein Kamil, and his calls for regime change in Baghdad, were a watershed.

Society was widely hostile to this. During the US-Iraqi crisis of February 1998 there were riots (Lynch, 251) provoked in part by the government’s complicity in enforcing the sanctions against Iraq. King Hussein’s perception that Iraq was the threat, not Israel, exactly reversed public perceptions. Resistance even spread into the heart of the state establishment. In 1998 a pro-government parliament demanded a reversal of pro-Israeli/anti-Iraq policy (Lynch, 248); even the non-political Chamber of Commerce protested. Part of the regime elite which had interests in the Iraqi relation were purged and Abd al-Karim Kabariti, the architect of the turn from Iraq, was made prime minister.

What could have motivated the King to pursue so unpopular a policy? Brand argues that there was a cleavage between the rent-seeking state, whose treasury could not do without a Western replenishment, and the predominately Palestinian private sector which was invested in the Iraqi market (Brand). But, at a deeper level, it was the King’s strategic choice, as a part of its warm peace, to re-orient Jordan’s economic relations to the West and Israel (Lynch).

Jordan lacked the option, however, of cutting all economic ties with Iraq. Moreover, Iraq had counter-leverage: it began diverting its contracts and transit shipments to Syria and increased the cost of oil it had long sold to Jordan at subsidised prices (Sasley). Jordan had long profited from its ability to exploit the animosity between Baghdad and Damascus, its two closest and strongest Arab neighbours, but were they to combine against it, the regime would be put in the awkward position of relying on defensive alliances with non-Arab countries for protection (i.e. Israel, Turkey) against Arab neighbours.

Under Abdullah, Jordan sought to balance between Iraq and the U.S. In his first speech to parliament, he stressed that Jordan could no longer accept the international sanctions against Iraq. In January 2000, Iraq renewed Jordan’s subsidised oil deliveries (Ryan). Yet Abdullah continued to appease Washington, forcing down an Italian plane on an anti-sanctions flight to Iraq and carrying out zealous inspection of Iraqi bound cargoes. Amman was also unprepared to risk its US relations by claiming exemption from sanctions on the grounds its own economy was being badly damaged, as the Iraqis urged (MEI 28 July 2000). The collapse of the peace process, ending prospects of Israel-Jordanian economic integration, raised the costs of sacrificing Jordan’s Iraqi economic relations. Jordan began urging the US to lift the sanctions on Iraq. After September 11 and the entrenchment of a newly hawkish US administration seemingly bent on war with Iraq, Jordan was acutely sensitised to the threat this posed to its own stability and sought to persuade Washington against this course. The King himself denied reports that Jordan would permit US forces to stage an attack on Iraq from Jordanian bases. Pundits claimed that privately Abdullah did not oppose regime change in Baghdad, but even if true that this had to be publicly contradicted only showed how Jordan was being caught in a position where whatever choice it made would damage its interests.

The Great Powers

Syrian-US Relations

With the collapse of the Syria-Israel peace process—and in particular after Clinton blamed Hafiz al-Asad for its failure, US-Syrian relations soured. In a brief discussion in October 2000 with Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Bashar reportedly rejected U.S. requests to rein in Hizbollah and to cease flights to Baghdad (Makovsky, 2001). The Iraqi pipeline became both a bone of contention with the U.S. and a political lever Syria tried to manipulate against Washington. After the Los Angeles times reported that Syria was receiving Iraqi oil outside the oil-for-food regime (MEI 9 Feb. 2001, 12), US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Damascus. He claimed to have won Bashar's agreement to allow the UN to monitor the pipeline, to refrain from violating international sanctions on Iraqi oil and to put proceeds from Iraqi oil in UN escrow accounts. In reality, Iraq oil is largely bartered for Syrian goods shipped to Iraq, short-circuiting any escrow accounts. Ibrahim Hamidi explained that there was a "misunderstanding" between Washington and Damascus, as Powell mistakenly understood that Syria intended to include the existing oil pipe in the framework of the UN resolutions, while the Syrian president referred to the new pipeline it plans to lay down. Syria claims it merely assured Powell that it was committed to “all UN resolutions” and international legality, implying that its full compliance was contingent on Israel’s compliance with such resolutions.
Syria sought to walk a thin line: on the one hand, it did not want to defy the Americans whose pressure was needed to contain Israel; nor could Syria afford to be outside “international legitimacy.” On the other hand, it hoped to make the price of co-operation in keeping Iraq isolated, at the expense of its own economic interests in Iraqi ties, significant.

The Syrians also tried to balance between Washington and Baghdad as regards the American proposed “smart sanctions”. On the one hand, they did not want to officially oppose them but insisted that Syrian co-operation depended on “firm positions regarding the Israeli aggression against the Arabs.” (Feldner 2001a). However, while the US needed Syrian co-operation if it is to isolate Iraq and Syria needed U.S. restraint of Israel, neither seemed prepared to deliver on the terms of such an agreement.

Syria was quiet after the 11 Sept. events, with no demonstrations of joy in the streets. But hostility to the US “anti-terrorism” campaign cuts across all classes from the ruling elites to Westernised intellectuals to the marginalized Islamic-oriented petit bourgeoisie. None believe Bin Laden acted alone and all believe he was being used as a pretext by the US to impose its will on behalf of Israel in the region. All feared Iraq and possibly Syria were the next targets. Indeed, hostile forces in the US were trying to use the old image of Syria as a terrorist state to advance such a scenario. The US was insistent that the offices of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, responsible for suicide bombings in Israel, be closed, even though these were not operational bases. While there was an early expectation that Bashar would phase out Damascus’ role as such a haven and the factions were themselves anxious about it, in fact, at the Doha Islamic summit of November 2000, Bashar solicited funds for them (Strindberg, 33) and, in the wake of September 11, the regime reaffirmed its commitment to provide them safe haven (Al-Hayat, 28 September, 2001). Although Syria was said to have given the US intelligence information to fight terrorism, Bashar told US officials that its war in Afghanistan was simply revenge and that an effective war on terrorism meant dealing with the injustice that breeds it. Syria was threatened by American attempts to target Hizbollah by pressuring the Lebanese government to freeze its assets. Syrian leaders warned that an American attack on Iraq would be an attack on all the Arabs. Information Minister Omran argued that the Arab states had to raise with the US the “unbalanced relationship” wherein Arab friendship was met by US support for Israel’s violations of international law (BBC Monitoring 7 Jan. 2002). Meanwhile hostile interests in Washington tried to increase the pressure on Syria: the so-called “Syria Accountability Act” proposed sanctions against it because of its “occupation of Lebanon,” possession of “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (i.e. its chemically-armed missile deterrent against Israel), and its sponsorship of Hamas and Hizbollah.

**Syrian-Europe Relations**

A major alteration in Syria’s policy under Bashar was that Syria made European relations its strategic priority. The decision by French president, Jacques Chirac, to attend Hafiz’s funeral (the only western head of state to do so) indicates that France was committed to Bashar’s succession and to the alliance forged with his father as part of a long-running attempt to re-establish French influence in the Middle East. Bashar’s first state visits outside the Arab world were not to Moscow, the old ally, but to Western Europe—France, Spain and Germany. Nevertheless the deepening of relations was obstructed by several factors.

The Europeans were somewhat impatient with Syria’s slowness to embrace Western foreign policy positions. For example, the EU representative and Foreign Minister Shara’ disagreed over Syria’s insistence that national liberation against occupation must not be conflated with terrorism and was dismayed that Syria supported the hard-liner intifadeh factions rather than Arafat’s effo rt to calm the intifadah. Damascus boycotted the Euro-Med Marseilles conference on the grounds that Israel would be there.

Agreement on the terms of Syria’s adhesion to the Euro-Med partnership was stalled. The Euro-Med agreement potentially threatened Syrian industry, both public and private, as well as Syria’s right to subsidise agricultural producers and hence the very social bases of the regime. It also would virtually impose a European type economic framework on what was a statist-dominated economy. Yet the regime not only sought membership but also applied to the WTO. These initiatives by the liberal wing of the regime—Bashar and his economy ministers—were perhaps weapons to move entrenched interests toward the market economy; but Bashar’s economic team nevertheless sought major exemptions or adjustments of the terms of the agreement.

Finally, the close relations Syria sought with EU states, notably France, have been obstructed by human rights concerns, not least the arrests of leading dissidents and the reversal of Bashar’s brief political liberalisation experiment. European pressures to observe human rights arguably strengthened Bashar’s hand in attempting to constrain the old guard and the security forces. However, the new sense of siege after September 11, not to mention the US led campaign against Islamicists, tended to re-legitimise Syria’s national security state and its intolerance of its main opposition, political Islam.

Unless Syria could negotiate a middle way between European demands for conformity with “international” standards and its own practices, it risked sacrificing the deeper ties it needed with Europe for both geo-economic and geopolitical reasons.
Jordan and the Great Powers

King Hussein quickly returned Jordan’s relations with the West to normality after the brief estrangement during the Gulf war. The Amman establishment thereafter became highly receptive to Western, particularly American views and preferences (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe). Jordan became a partner in a number of US initiatives in the region beginning with its signing of its peace treaty with Israel. The regime used the peace treaty with Israel to improve access to American weapons and embark on a military modernisation program (Sasley). Jordan also let itself be seen to be pressuring Syria in alignment with the US, Turkey and Israel. In 1996 Jordanian and US forces conducted joint manoeuvres and in 1997, as a reward, Jordan was designed a major non-NATO ally of the US, the first Arab country to get this label. At the time President Clinton announced that US aircraft would be deployed to Jordan to monitor the no fly zone in southern Iraq (Ryan, 41).

Abdullah aimed to deepen Jordan’s Western alignment on the grounds that integration into the West-centric world economic order was essential for Jordan’s economic development and its dependence on the unstable Middle East too risky. Jordan’s adhesion to the Euro-Med agreements, the WTO and a free trade agreement with the US were manifestations of an attempt to literally re-position Jordan’s as a geo-economic extension of the West (Sasley). None of these agreements came without risks at home: thus, the trade agreement with the US was contingent on a portion of the content of exports to the US being of Israeli origin (Middle East International, 15 June 2001, p 28).

King Abdullah was one of the first world leaders to visit the United States after the September 11 attacks, where he declared that Jordan gave “full, unequivocal support” to America’s stand against global terrorism” (Sasley). In the post 11 September period, Jordan stood out alone among the Arab states in its enthusiasm for Washington’s “war on terrorism.” Jordan’s information minister declared that “Jordan supports the US campaign unconditionally” (MEI, 26 October 2001). Usama bin Ladin, who had previously tried to carry out attacks in Jordan, was, he declared, an “enemy of Jordan,” (Sasley). Jordan jumped on the anti-terrorism bandwagon by offering to send troops to Afghanistan, hoping to be economically rewarded by the US (MEI 21 December 2001). The government introduced a new anti-terrorism law, in the absence of parliament, which sharply restricted the media and especially criticism of American policy. Both Islamicists and the professional syndicates opposed the US and both were muzzled. Imams who attacked the “US crusade against Islam” were removed from their mosques. The public was cowed into quiescence during the campaign against Afghanistan.

Amman did repeatedly urge the US not to take its war on terrorism against Iraq, but it had little leverage with which to ensure that Washington would heed its interests in avoiding such a conflagration. What Washington did do was double military aid to Jordan to buttress it in its role of preventing arms smuggling to the Palestinian fighters engaged in the intifadah and to tightening the sanctions knot against Iraq (Guardian Feb. 5, 2000). In essence, Washington was using Amman, as the West had traditionally used the Hashemite state, to repress the political activism of its population and to weaken Arab nationalist forces in the region.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

IR Theory, Convergence and Divergence

Both Syria and Jordan have been profoundly affected by system-wide forces—imperialism, trans-state Arab nationalism, war, oil boom, and most recently globalization and American hegemony. But their responses to these forces, far from uniform, have been largely contrary and this, in turn has differentiated the way such transnational forces have impacted on the two states, sometimes further differentiating their responses.

How do alternative IR approaches account for convergence and divergence in Jordanian and Syrian behaviour? Realism insists that foreign policies are shaped firstly by the insecurity of the international system: when external threat is high, states, being rational actors, are induced, in order to survive, to balance against the threat by building up their power, striking alliances and following “realist”—rather than ideological—foreign policies. Alternatively, weaker states lacking the capability to balance or unwilling or unable to enter a balancing alliance may bandwagon—appease a threatening power. Jordan and Syria, both weak states which suffered territorial loss at the hands of the region’s strongest state, Israel, might well both have bandwagoned but, in fact, their responses were very different. Syria tried to balance Israel through internal power build-up and alliance formation. In Jordan, where the regime felt threatened not only by Israel but by stronger radical Arab neighbours, Hashemite leaders continued a tradition of relying on Western protection, while appeasing Israel and even tacitly relying on its protection against threats from Arab nationalist neighbours. But why did Syria and Jordan opt for such different strategies? Neo-realism’s stress on relative power to differentiate balancing from bandwagoning states does not appear adequate since both were initially relatively weak states, certainly compared to Israel, and Jordan was actually the militarily stronger of the two states until the seventies. The power position of the states in the system leaves much of their differential behaviour underdetermined.
In reality, the policies of both states was actually more complicated than neo-realism would suggest; according to the more complex realist analyses of David and of Harkness and Vanderberg, state behaviour is better accounted for if threats against which regimes react are understood to be on multiple levels — internal and transnational (in which external powers penetrate and threaten a state from within), as well as external. In such a situation of multiple threat, calculations of where the main threat is located shape regime reactions. States “omnibalance” between threats perhaps seeking to contain an immediate internal threat by aligning with — appeasing — a less immediately threatening external power (Jordan’s appeasement of Israel and the US); alternatively they could seek to appease internal opposition by balancing against a threatening external power, i.e. containing internal opposition by investing in nationalist legitimacy at home (Syria).

What these analysts tend to neglect is that effective balancing is not just a policy of walking a tightrope between threats, but also a matter of state-building, that is attempts to build up the institutional autonomy and capability needed to rationally omnibalance between threats. This is compatible with neo-realism’s expectation that survival imperatives mould states, via elite socialisation and imitation, into similar kinds of structures and with Tilly’s (1990) empirical demonstration of the similar effect of war on state-building in the European case.

Nevertheless, if survival imperatives impose certain broad similarities in state-building, there are obviously important differences between Syria and Jordan that have consequences for their foreign policy behaviour. According to Bassil Salloukh’s institutionalist comparison of them (1999), the Syrian regime was more successful at institution building and penetration of society and built up a much larger mass conscription military, and, as a result enjoyed greater capabilities and greater autonomy of society needed to conduct a rational foreign policy. But the opposite is also true, for if systemic forces shape states, systemic pressures must, as historical institutionalists hold, also be translated through the intervening variable of the “unit level” where the configurations of state-society relations and state institutions may shape its response. In other words the process of state formation is itself driven by threats and it, in turn, shapes the strategies adopted to cope with them. In other words, if systemic forces shape states, systemic pressures must, as historical institutionalists hold, also be translated through the intervening variable of the “unit level” where the configurations of state-society relations and state institutions may shape state responses. But what accounts for these differences in state-building strategies? Institutional capability accounts for what states can do but does not explain why they eschew or opt to develop certain capabilities. On this realism is silent.

Realism also arguably underdetermines the behaviour of third world states because it ignores the all-important consequences of their dependency on the core for their foreign policies: in economically weak states, acquiring the resources to sustain economies and the state revenue base is arguably as important a foreign policy priority as is dealing with security threats and could even be said to be a condition of addressing such threats. Laurie Brand has applied rent-dependency to the Jordanian case, arguing that the need to acquire subsidies for its treasury was the most immediate policy-shaping concern of the Jordanian regime. Syria also suffers from dependence on external resources, yet, by contrast to Jordan, its deliberate policy was to ease its dependency on sources whose demands could contradict nationalist imperatives, and to maximise its foreign policy autonomy by diversifying its dependence among several sources. Both behaviours are rational, but what determines which will be adopted?

Moon has shown that the foreign policies of dependent state are not just a product of response to the structure of economic incentives (rewards/punishments). Rather, they are the product of a “constrained consensus” between core patron and client resulting from the overlap of their economic interests, world views (through shared Western education) and threat perceptions (of radical movements). This points to the way the dependency system virtually constitutes the identity and interests of the dependent state elite. This fits Jordan, but not Syria where Westernised elites were overthrown by non-Westernised plebeian rural identities and threat perceptions (of radical movements). This points to the way the dependency system virtually constitutes the identity and interests of the dependent state elite.

According to constructivism, the leaders’ perceptions of threats or amity in other nations is a function of their own identities, and these are an outcome of their interactions with other leaders through which they construct their interstate environment and in part the result of an exchange with their own publics. The two regimes identities were shaped differently from the beginning: Syria saw its identity through the partition of a greater Syria; for the Hashemites, partition allowed the birth of the Jordanian state. In Syria, the West was the cause of
national disaster and Israel an enemy that frustrated identity and in border clashes showed itself to be a threat; the mobilisation of Arab nationalist identity by radical movements issued in a regime designed for the struggle with Israel. In Jordan’s case, from the beginning the West was perceived as the protector, Hashemite and Israeli leaders, in their secret interactions, constructed a less threatening environment and King Hussein’s interactions with Arab leaders such as Nasser made Pan-Arabism a threat rather than a cause. Crucially, because the Jordanian regime’s identity was ambiguous—pro-Western, conservative Arab, tribalist—it was less constrained from striking alliances with the less immediate threat (Israel) against the more immediate one (Arab nationalism). By contrast, the Syrian regime's Arab nationalist identity excluded the kinds of tacit alliance with Israel or the Western powers pursued by Jordan.

Yet, constructivism, too, begs the question: why should the identity of the Jordanian and Syrian regimes have been so different, particularly when the Arab identity of their publics was and to an extent remains so similar, if not identical? The weakness of constructivism is its neglect of power and interest, specifically of external power in structuring the situation the interests of weaker states and the role of these interests in the construction of regime identities; to paraphrase Marx, Middle East states may construct their identities but in situations not of their own making.

Ultimately, state foreign policies are most powerfully explained by the way their differential origins shapes how different interests (social forces) are incorporated or excluded and the way identities are shaped, satisfied or frustrated in the process of regime and state formation. Thus, both Syria and Jordan were initially set on differential tangents, as a result of imperial imposition of the states system from without and, specifically the quite different consequences it had: in one case the regime was established under imperial patronage; in the other it emerged in a struggle against imperialism. These differential impacts on elite interests, in turn, directly shaped identity. In Jordan, the Hashemites, the original proponents of Pan-Arabism abandoned or at least radically diluted this identity with a contradictory, pro-Western identification. In Syria, by contrast, the frustration of identity by a territorial imposition serving imperial interests led, in several waves of domestic struggle to the rise of revisionist forces whose identity dictated a challenge to the status quo. Arab nationalism was seen as a mission to be pursued in Syria and a threat to be countered in Jordan. Importantly, the two states were decisively differentiated as Arab nationalism led to revolution in one state and was turned back in the other. Had the Hashemites been overthrown in the Arab nationalist wave it is at least possible that the successor regime’s identity would have been very different, hence its threat perceptions and policies similar to Syria’s: most likely, it would have attempted to balance against Israel in alliances with other Arab nationalist states.

Differential origins and the consequent different perceptions of interest and threat perceived by the two regimes also drove the differing patterns of state consolidation observed by Salloukh (1999). Because the Ba’th regime, rising out of anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchy revolution from below, could not depend on external intervention for protection, it had to establish the corporatist institutions enabling it to mobilize and secure a social base among the rural majority against the already mobilised urban opposition and against hostile foreign pressures. The Syrian regime’s legitimacy, needed to consolidate its constituency and to counter the liberal and Islamic oppositions, depended on pursuit of an Arab nationalist foreign policy and this, in turn, was dependent on acquiring the military capabilities to defend the Arab cause.

Jordan, by contrast, could depend on Western protection and, facing a majority Palestinian population whose loyalty was suspect, lacked the option of mobilising and incorporating them. As such, it did not invest in society-penetrating political institutions. Nor could it create a mass conscription military capable of deterring Israel for incorporation of the Palestinians would have been a greater threat to the regime than that posed by the Israel. The Jordanian regime’s tribalist constituency did not normally expect it to follow an Arab nationalist policy, but, paradoxically, on those crisis occasions when the broader public was mobilised, the regime, lacking instruments of control comparable to Syria’s, had to appease it, even when this went against the interests of the regime itself—as in joining the 1967 war against Israel or its Gulf war alignment with Iraq—until such time as public inflammation subsided. In the much longer periods when the public was quiescent or divided, Amman enjoyed much the same foreign policy autonomy as Damascus acquired under Asad. Indeed, the supposedly less autonomous regime in Jordan has usually followed foreign policies at odds with the dominant sentiment of its population while the Arab nationalist foreign policy of the Syrian regime has usually been congruous with public opinion. The reason is simple: the Ba’th regime’s stability depended much more on its domestic power base and control apparatus, while the Jordanian regime has periodically benefited from threatened or actual foreign intervention against domestic threats.

Globalization

Is globalization simply the latest of the transnational forces to impact on Middle Eastern states? Analysts of globalization are divided over how far these processes are bypassing, weakening and forcing states into similar moulds—namely from buffers into transmission belts of global (liberal, capitalist) norms.
Certainly, the original orientation incorporated into the Syrian and Jordanian regimes in their formation could be expected to be altered (or reinforced) under the sustained systemic level pressures for conformity implicit in globalization, at least if these make help the status quo unsustainable. Yet the resistance of the Middle East to globalization appears to support the views of globalization sceptics such as Mann (1997) who argues that globalization must still be mediated through states and the way they do this varies widely.

Middle East resistance to globalization is, in part, inspired by rejection of the conformity demanded by the West’s triumphant liberalism (McWorld) at a time when Islam (almost uniquely), remains a viable, even expanding, alternative worldview (jihad). But resistance to globalization is by no means essentially cultural, otherwise there would be little variation within the region in responses to it. A more promising approach starts with the recognition that globalization will only be embraced where its constraints are accompanied by new opportunities which promise to resolve a regime’s dilemmas while protecting its core interests. However in the Middle East globalization is perceived as imposing a choice between conformity with Western defined norms or marginalization or even pariah status. While elsewhere globalization may denote the transnational inflow of finance and investment, in the Middle East it merely facilitates the export of capital from the region. It involves the imposition of a uniform neo-liberal model of economic liberalisation and structural adjustment which makes little allowance for states’ specific features or needs and threatens the interests of state establishments and publics alike without, at least in the immediate term, necessarily increasing productive investment or economic growth. Moreover, globalization has been manifest, not in authentic attempts at resolution of conflicts it ways that would meet the needs of both parties but in attempts to engineer settlements on terms which advance the interests of one party (as in Washington’s biased mediation in the so-called “peace process” on behalf of Israeli interests) or which spell the total defeat of regional powers (Iraq); it has therefore resulted in stalemates which leave the region outside the “zone of peace.” While globalization is supposed to advance democratisation, the Western attempt to harness regional states to impose unpopular economic policies and inequitable or partial peace treaties with Israel, or in the repression of “terrorism” has not been compatible with democratisation. Globalization of the region can never be legitimate unless local societies are allowed to craft their own particular insertion into the world system in a way which protects local autonomy and interests and allows for a synthesis between the global order and indigenous culture (Dodge & Higgott).

The chances of an opening to globalization arguably increase when leadership succession brings to power a generation of leaders that recognise the need to adapt their countries to the liberal world order. New leaders cannot, however, simply impose their preferences and their ability to effect policy change depends on the post-succession power struggle in which they must establish their authority among the elite and the mass public. Even if leaders have the autonomy of domestic society to impose policy changes in response to pressures from without, these cannot be consolidated or legitimised unless they can win the domestic struggle to “reconstruct” perceptions of national interest, threat and amity. In both Syria and Jordan, domestic constituencies for economic liberalisation and/or political democratisation have demands that potentially dovetail with aspects of globalization, but these are weakened by its asymmetric character. Reformers must, moreover, be able to point to partners in conflict resolution, utterly lacking in Likudist Israel, or a welcoming international environment, just the opposite of the ominous threats to the region issuing from Washington after 9/11.

While intense global pressures have been brought to bear on both the Jordanian and Syrian regimes, their responses continue to reflect the specific features of their internal politics. The Jordanian regime has tended to see opportunities in globalization to ease dependence on what remains for it a threatening and unstable region, while the Syrian regime is deeply suspicious of globalization’s threat to the autonomy and identity of the Arab world. This is in part because the lop-sided character of globalization has actually reinforced, rather than eased the factors that keep these states on their differential tangents, Syria’s conflict with Isra el and Jordan’s dependency on the West.

Jordan seeks to position itself as the most loyal of US partners, to acquire full membership in the world economy. King Abdullah explicitly seeks incorporation into the Western transnational elite: hence Jordan’s designation as a key NATO ally, a bizarre badge of identity from an Arab nationalist point of view. Abdullah’s dilemma is that the imposition of policies in defiance of domestic opinion is an insurmountable barriers to the democratisation which would make Jordan a true member of the dominant liberal democratic world. Moreover, whether he likes it or not, Jordan is a part of the Middle East and in that respect remains caught between the West and Iraq, between its peace treaty with Israel and a public outraged at Israel’s denial of Palestinian rights and the debilitating effect of the Iraq sanctions on the Iraqi people. Jordan seeks to defuse opposition to its continuing relations with Israel by mediating between an aggressive Sharon and an Arafat under siege; it enlists in the US war on terrorism, hoping that its loyalty will make heard its pleas against an attack on Iraq. The regime’s defiance of its own public can only be explained by the powerful combination of extreme security and economic dependency and Hashemite pro-Western identity—all fixed in the original formation of the Jordanian state and merely reinforced by globalization.
In Syria, globalization has partly diluted the regime's earlier orientations, manifest in Bashar's embrace of greater economic liberalisation and openness to the West. But in foreign policy Damascus still defies the West, militant toward Israel, supporting the intifadah, hizbollah and Iraq and criticising the war on Afghanistan. It has merely shifted its strategy from the exploitation of bipolarity under Hafiz to Bashar's attempt to use Europe and Iraq to balance against US pressures and to diversify Syria's economic dependency. Unlike in Jordan, Syrian foreign policy is congruent with public opinion; yet, still dependent on regime rent-seekers, Bashar has not used this foreign policy credibility to significantly advance the democratisation and economic reform that would win legitimacy among the middle class. Without democratic legitimacy or a powerful protector in an increasingly hostile world, Bashar has no choice but to continue to play the nationalist card which the country's identity demands.

Thus, in Syria an undemocratic domestic politics has had a major impact on sustaining the old foreign policy of balancing while in Jordan the old foreign policy of bandwagoning has dictated the de-democratisation of domestic politics. Globalization's image of a homogenising inclusive world order remains of limited weight next to the security threats stressed by realism (in Syria's case) and the unequal core-periphery power relations central to dependency theory (in Jordan's). Unless these realities change, the supposed liberalising impact of globalization on the region is likely to be very uneven and very long delayed.

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Abbreviations: MEI = Middle East International


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