POLITICS AND THE MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: THE EU AND THE ARAB SEM COUNTRIES

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Politics and the migration-development nexus:
the EU and the Arab SEM countries

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The Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) was created at the European University Institute (EUI, Florence), in February 2004 and co-financed by the European Commission, DG AidCo, currently under the Thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum.

Within this framework, CARIM aims, in an academic perspective, to observe, analyse, and forecast migration in Southern & Eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Countries (hereafter Region).

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Abstract

In the hope of regulating migratory flows, the European Council endorsed a “global approach” to migration in December 2005, an approach which is based on the correction of the “deep causes of migration”: poverty, unemployment and development gaps between North and South. Besides liberalising economies and trade systems, a set of measures are advocated in order to enhance home countries’ development by using “migration [as a] medicine against migration”: stimulating the remittance of funds back to the country of origin; expanding the role of diasporas settled in member states; reinforcing circular migration schemes and facilitating return movements; and improving the management of the emigration of the highly-skilled in order to curb “brain drain”.

The paper focuses on the Arab South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries. It challenges the views, implicit in EU migration policies, that migration is entirely rooted in economics and that migrants’ agency alone is able to spur development in the origin country.

Using the theoretical background of political economy with a neo-institutional approach to migration, it explores the stakes, the outreaches and the outcomes of the migration and development nexus. By so doing, it re-politicizes migration and development and emphasises the structural and contextual dimension of factors pushing on migration and hampering development: unemployment and high professional turn over; economic liberalisation and deregulation policies, and socio-political “blockages” (gender inequalities, patronage, clientelism and corruption, lack of public expression).

Moreover, the analysis of SEM country practices in the field of migration management and engineering migration for development shows how the design of policies and the channelling of flows respond to political and demographic stakes in the various national contexts. Migration patterns act as a political shield for regimes in the region that: allows these regimes to monitor political opposition; renews socio-cultural elites; and decreases the economic opportunities in national economies, due to corruption and patronage. Current policies also reconstruct state-society/expatriates relations, through (controlled) economic participation and socio-cultural solidarity. They do not, however, lead to political participation.

The paper thus concludes that amendments to macro-political contexts in the SEM countries are more likely than liberalisation policies to curb emigration flows, by engineering global social and political development. As a matter of fact, the onset and patterns of the Arab revolutions since December 2010 aptly confirm the need for political reform in the region.

Résumé

Une approche politique du lien migration-développement : l’Union européenne et les pays arabes du SEM.

Adoptée par le Conseil européen en décembre 2005, l’Approche globale des migrations est axée sur la correction des « causes profondes de la migration » (la pauvreté, le chômage, les écarts de développement entre nord et sud) afin d’en réguler les flux. Parmi les mesures préconisées figurent la facilitation de l’envoi de fonds vers les pays d’origine (transparence des coûts, développement de l’accès aux services financiers), l’encouragement du rôle des diasporas implantées dans les États membres (aider les pays en développement à identifier leur diaspora et à établir des liens), le renforcement de la migration circulaire et la facilitation du retour, une meilleure gestion des migrations de personnes hautement qualifiées afin de limiter la « fuite des cerveaux ».

Cette étude traite des pays arabes du sud et de l’est de la Méditerranée (SEM). Elle met en question les représentations, contenues dans les politiques migratoires de l’UE, de la migration comme facteur purement économique, mais aussi des migrants comme agents d’un développement à grande échelle dans leurs pays d’origine.

En outre, l’analyse des politiques migratoires menées dans les pays du SEM montre que ces mesures répondent aux enjeux politiques et démographiques particuliers aux divers contextes nationaux de la région. Elles permettent aux régimes en place de contrôler l’opposition politique, le renouvellement des élites socioculturelles et les conséquences de la contraction des opportunités économiques, due à la corruption et au clientélisme. Les politiques migratoires participent également d’une restructuration des relations États-sociétés-expatriés autour d’une participation économique (étroitement contrôlée) et d’une solidarité socioculturelle, mais excluant toute participation politique.

L’étude conclut donc que des réformes des contextes sociaux et politiques dans les pays du SEM seraient plus à même d’agir sur les flux migratoires que les réformes néolibérales. Le déclenchement des révoltes arabes en décembre 2010 confirme d’ailleurs l’urgence de ces réformes politiques.
Introduction

In the hope of regulating migratory flows, the European Council endorsed a “global approach” to migration in December 2005, an approach which is based on the correction of the “deep causes of migration”: poverty, unemployment and development gaps between North and South. Besides liberalising economies and trade systems, a set of measures are advocated in order to enhance home countries development by using “migration [as a] medicine against migration”: stimulating the remitting of funds back to the country of origin; expanding the role of diasporas settled in member states; reinforcing circular migration schemes and facilitating return movements; improving the management of the emigration of the highly skilled in order to curb “brain drain”. Projects targeting employment, education and social development are also conducted by the EU or its member states in all the SEM countries.

Two points are particularly striking in this approach: first, the power and responsibility to spur development in the origin country is granted to migrants alone. First, structural, background factors for facilitating this process are not addressed, beyond some words about the implementation of technical measures. Second, the non-economic aspects of development are largely ignored, beyond limited claims for the promotion of democracy in migrants’ countries. More specifically, beyond their remitting capacity in terms of finances, knowledge and skills, diasporas are hardly envisaged as political; able to amend the “blockage of societies” of origin and the lack of political expression. And, most importantly, politics as a spur for emigration is not envisaged.

Thus, the design of development-instead-of-migration policies, as applied to SEM countries, raises a whole set of questions: Do, for example, EU migration policies respond to an accurate assessment of the characteristics of migration flows from Arab Mediterranean countries? Are such policies able to curb the flows, and why? Do EU policies match SEM states’ migration policies? Do they share similar objectives? What are migration policies’ outreach, or expected outreach, beyond the realm of economics? What alternative policy outlooks and implementation patterns can be proposed?

In order to answer such questions and explore the stakes, the outreaches and outcomes of the migration-development nexus, my aim in this paper is to re-politicize migration-development processes, as well as the link between both.

I shall, (1), challenge the view that the migration-development nexus explains migration from the SEM countries, and the idea that it can curb its dynamics. Indeed, economic theory contradicts this assumption and politics acts as a major push factor for emigration from the region. Even economic uncertainties are, to a very great extent, rooted in socio-political factors, in, inter alia, the specific “social contracts” binding the region, states and societies.

(2) I shall shed light on the political stakes and ideological background of migratory policies implemented by the EU towards the SEM countries, as well as these policies’ expected impact on the polity and politics of SEM countries. Conversely, I shall also analyse the discourses towards expatriation and expatriates, the policies and institutions set up by SEM countries of origin and directed at their expatriates, with an emphasis on the political background and the direct or indirect outcomes of such policies.

(3) Consequently, some suggestions will emerge, regarding amendments to macro-political contexts in the SEM countries, likely to help curbing emigration flows, over the middle to long run. Re-embedding migratory flows and policy-designs into politics will emphasize the structural

1 This project takes into account Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Libya and the Palestinian Territories will be largely left out.
obstacles to development in SEM countries, of which unemployment and relative poverty are a mere consequence.

The theoretical background of the essay is that of political economy with a neo-institutional approach to migration. Since the mid-2000s, some authors have cast doubts on the success of “development instead of migration” policies, as conducted, for instance, in Latin America and Morocco. In their view, such measures, as illustrated above in the case of EU policies, are anchored in neoclassical theories of migration and development issues; moreover, they rest on the questionable assumptions that (1) migration is a mostly economic phenomenon and (2) that individuals (the migrants) have the means (agency) to implement a development process in their origin countries: i.e. change the structural context there (De Haas, 2007; 2008; 2009; De Haas/Vezzoli, 2010; Skeldon, 2008).

Indeed, in the view defended in this essay, purely economics-driven labour circulations, deprived of any effect on concerned societies and polities, do not exist. Migration has an impact on the demographic structure of sending, receiving and transit populations, bound to “affect the nature of the “social contract” (i.e. the core principles of society and the ways in which these are implemented) and the state system (i.e. the structures and functions through which a society is governed)” (Choucri, 2002: 118). Therefore, migration is a “total social fact” (“fait social total”), rooted in the global dynamics of social change, a fact demonstrated by S. Castles (Castles, 2008).

In other words, studying the migration process from the angle of the migrants alone (their agency) does not capture all dimensions of the phenomenon. Particularly, it does not allow an understanding of the construction patterns of migration policies and their outreach, not to mention the wider contextual factors influencing migration dynamics and policies. What spurs migration on is a specific structural context; migration stakes, outreachs and outcomes are, thus, also of a structural nature. This structural context acts upon individual agency, combines with it. Therefore, granting migrants’ individual agency with the power to amend structural contexts and to engage in large-scale development operations appears problematic. Consequently, not only is it necessary to re-envisionage migration as a structural issue; but development too has to be redefined and reframed. This essay proposes to link migration (taken as a part of global social change) and development, reconstructed along the “human development” paradigm.

More generally, the essay’s understanding of migration patterns and wide-ranging economic, social, cultural and political roots, outreach and stakes stems from political economy and neo-institutional approaches to migration. Neo-institutionalist theories look at how institutions intervene to bridge the individual and macro-social levels of analysis, institutions being defined as “the formal rules, processes and norms, as well as the systems of symbols, cognitive schemes and ethical models which build the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall / Taylor, 1997: 482-485). A “political economy” of migration trends and policies captures the history and the many implications and outcomes of migration. The topic of a political economy of population issues is the challenge these pose for national governments and international institutions, and the responses these bodies have arrived at or must formulate (McNicol/ Demeny, 2006). Here, challenges posed by migration issues and policies ought to be resituated within the wider framework of actors’ representations of their identity and social belonging, national belonging but also the other socio-spatial levels and scales they feel they belong to and act upon. Migration dynamics, policies and debates are thus to be analysed in light of the specificities of the institutional context (historical, economic, social and political), within which representations are built, within which policies are elaborated and implemented. This double theoretical framework reconciles agency and structures as complementary for engineering a comprehensive development process, migration being an integral part of human development and social change.

The case-study of SEM countries and EU policies will illustrate that need to explore wider dimensions of the link between migration and development in order to monitor flows.

In Chapter I, I will describe EU migration policies and the way they articulate with development policy-making, on the one hand, and with other policies directed at the SEM region, on the other. The
construction of migration from the SEM as a security issue, to be curbed through cooperation, as well as neoliberal reform, will be emphasized. In Chapter II, the ideological and scientific assumptions underlying EU migration-for-development policies towards the SEM region are assessed and critically examined: the link between neoliberal reforms and job creation, between economic reform and political reform; the concept of the “root causes” of migration; the shift from scientific debate to ideology within the field of migration for development. This means giving primacy to individuals (the migrants) over institutional structures in the development process, thus de-contextualising and standardizing migration and development patterns. Chapter III examines alternative ways of envisaging the migration-development nexus, based on theoretical re-examinations of the issue: migration systems theory; transnational networks and diasporas, as well as the political economy, social transformation and neo-institutionalist views. Development is also resituated within the development process, alongside the “human development” paradigm.

Chapters IV and V focus on migration issues in the SEM region. Resting on the new theoretical framework and outlook on migration constructed in the previous chapters, chapter IV briefly describes the emigration dynamics typical of the SEM sub regions and reassesses the “root causes” of Arab migration dynamics by emphasizing their socio-political background: unemployment and high professional turn over; economic liberalisation and deregulation policies; their role in the restructure of labour markets and in the reshuffling of the role of labour within SEM societies; socio-political “blockages” (gender, patronage, clientelism and corruption, lack of public expression). Chapter V examines migration and development policies run by the SEM countries along a political economy approach. It sheds light on the stakes of population issues for SEM regimes and examines how the design of policies and the channelling of flows responds to such stakes in the various national contexts. Finally, some elements of explanation emerge, regarding policy-makers’ reluctance to take into account political and, more generally, “structural” aspects of the migration-development nexus, i.e., the need for politically-strong states and ruling regimes in the SEM region if EU aims for the region are to be pursued.

By uncovering the institutional background to migration-for-development policies, explanations for their relative failure emerges clearly. Amendments to macro-political contexts in the SEM countries are more likely than liberalisation policies to curb emigration flows, by engineering global social and political development. As a matter of fact, the onset and patterns of the Arab revolution after the death of Mohammed Bouazizi on 17 December, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia went a long way to confirming these conclusions.

I. EU policies on migration

Migration for the EU: a central issue

Since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the efficient management of international migration has officially become one of the EU’s top priorities. After the Schengen Agreements (1985) which lifted the Union’s internal borders while reinforcing external ones, the Dublin Convention (1990) set the assessment patterns for asylum claims. The 1999 European Council Special Summit in Tampere, Finland inaugurated a new, all-encompassing “cross-pillar” approach to migration. It was “specifically devoted to the building and consolidation of a common EU asylum and migration policy” along four fields of action: partnership with third countries; a common European asylum system; the fair treatment of third-country nationals residing within the EU; the management of migration flows (which includes among other measures, the implementation of readmission and the inclusion of mandatory readmission clauses in any future agreements between the EU and third

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2 Not including the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark.
countries) (Cassarino, 2005: 7). This commitment was confirmed by the Hague Programme for 2005-2009 which harmonised the procedures for countering illegal immigration.

In December 2009, the European Council adopted the Stockholm Programme, the new strategy for dealing with matters in the Justice and Home Affairs sector that succeeds the 2004 Hague Programme and that defines the framework for EU police and customs cooperation, rescue services, criminal and civil law cooperation, asylum, migration and visa policy for the period 2010–2014. On migration issues, the Programme aims to enhance the harmonisation of rules (for instance, at reducing the disparities between approaches to asylum matters in the Member States), to strengthen migrants’ legal rights, and to share the responsibility for asylum applications more evenly. Attracting more immigrant labour to “eliminate bottlenecks in the labour market” is also on the agenda, along with the fight against cross-border crime. In order to promote an “open and more secure Europe”, the programme seeks to “strike a balance between, on the one hand, joint action to improve security, and, on the other, the rights of the individual”7. However, Article 30 of the Conclusions of the European Council on the Programme is clear about the issues of “legitimacy” as a precondition for entering the EU, and about the text’s focus on security for EU citizens7.

Such agreements are illustrative of the current EU approach to migration, constructed primarily as a security challenge, which may, though, bear (economic) fruit if carefully managed. As stated in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, proposed by France during its presidency of the EU and adopted by the Council in October 20086, a text which was criticised for its focus on fighting illegal immigration and its promotion of “security vs. rights” (Carrera / Guild, 2008), “[i]mmigration, a durable phenomenon which forms an integral part of international relations, is one of the principal challenges in the years and decades to come”. Yet, “[z]ero immigration is an illusion”7. Therefore, the challenge is to manage the flows so as to counter the security threats of (illegal) migration and, second, to ensure mutual benefit for the (legal) migrants and receiving countries. “Organised and regulated immigration can offer opportunities, as they are a factor in promoting human exchanges and growth, particularly for countries for which economic development and an ageing population reflect an increasing need for renewed legal immigration”.

By contrast, “[w]hen badly managed, immigration can have negative consequences for the host countries and for immigrants themselves. The majority of European countries have to cope with illegal immigration, which is an obstacle to the smooth integration of legal immigrants, and a cause of conflict”8. The dominant policy-lines implemented are, thus, based on promoting migrants’ return to

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4 “Access to Europe in a globalised world: Access to Europe for persons recognized as having a legitimate interest to access EU territory has to be made more effective and efficient. At the same time, the Union and its Member States have to guarantee security for its citizens. Integrated border management and visa policies should be construed to serve these goals”. Conclusions of the European Council for the Stockholm Programmes (10/11 December 2009), point 30. http://www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.27455!menu/standard/file/European%20Council%20conclusions%2010-11%20December.pdf
5 “At its most basic level, the concept of security can be understood as protection from violence and the maintenance of a society’s long-term political, social, and economic development. Therefore, the re-construction and maintenance of security is one of the central aspects in the field of development cooperation and crisis prevention. The EU recognized the link between socio-economic conditions and security, and has thus focused its efforts on solving issues of ‘soft’ or ‘human’ security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region” (Haddad, 2006: 5-6).
6 Point 31 of the Conclusions …(see above) stresses that the Pact is the reference for the immigration policy under the Stockholm Programme: “[…] Well-managed migration can be beneficial to all stakeholders. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum provides a clear basis for further development in this field. Europe will need a flexible policy which is responsive to the priorities and needs of Member States and enables migrants to take full advantage of their potential. […]”
7 http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Plaquette_EN.pdf
8 http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Plaquette_EN.pdf
their countries of origins (voluntary returns or forced returns in case of illegal entry), streamlining of incoming flows, as well as origin countries’ development schemes for “less migration”9.

Migration and development

The link between migration and development has been one of the key elements of international cooperation in the field of migration management since the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994. The topic of development remained at the centre of other multilateral initiatives aimed at enhancing regional and international cooperation on migration management10. At the European level, the tackling of the “root causes of international migration”, and the engineering of “more development at home for less migration” has been growing since 1973-74 matching the increasingly protectionist trend of migration policies. The notion even became one of the key concepts of the Tempere Conclusions in 199911. It is worth noting here, following Ferrucio Pastore, that the “root causes of migration” referred then not only to economic “push” factors, but also to political ones. Indeed, conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement doctrines were at the time all encompassed in the approach. This led the author to state that major political decisions taken during the political conflicts of the 1990s were actually “influenced, more or less deeply, by the undeclared aim to contain forced migration” (Pastore, 2003: 2)12.

However, this far-reaching approach was somehow narrowed in the text of the Hague Programme in November 2004: the rationale of the Programme puts forth the first assumption that “international migration will continue”, thus requiring a new comprehensive approach to the phenomenon. However, the Hague Programme approach “does not explicitly refer to development human rights and political issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. Rather, the Hague Programme presents the comprehensive approach as a framework involving ‘all stages of migration, with respect to the root causes of migration, entry and admission policies and integration and return policies’”. Similarly, the second assumption of the text which states that “asylum and migration are by their very nature international issues”, saw a taming of its effective outreach: the partnership which initially aimed at “addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries of origin and transit” became confined to “the need to enhance the capacity of these countries to deal more effectively with refugee protection, the fight against illegal migration, border controls, document security and readmission” (Cassarino, 2005: 13-14).

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9 It is to be noted that the apparent progressive closure of borders does not necessarily mean a drastic change of policies towards the integration of migrants in every host country. France, for example, one of the European countries with longest experience in migrants’ assimilation policies (Fargues, 2004), granted nationality to 108,000 persons in 2009 and such a policy seems to remain for 2010 even if procedures and laws may change in the near future. See http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ConferencePresse_13092010.pdf

However, the issue of migrants’ integration in the host societies is beyond the scope of this paper.

10 In 2003, the UN General Assembly voted the Resolution for a High Level Dialogue on international migration and development to be held in 2006. The resolution led to the setting up of the World Forum for Migration and Development which convened in Brussels (2007), Manila (2008) and Athens (2009). Also, UNDP 2009 Human Development Report had a focus on migration (Kabbanji, 2010).

11 “The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development” (Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Point 11).

12 The author here refers to the decision to establish a no-fly-zone in Northern Iraq in 1991, to the creation of “safe havens” in Bosnia in 1993, or the decision to trigger “Operation Alba” in Albania in 1997 (Pastore, 2003: 2).
This technocratic approach to migration, though, was brutally called upon for reasons of enforcement. “Following events in Ceuta and Melilla in September 2005, Heads of State and Government met at Hampton Court, discussed the challenges of migration and concluded that there was an urgent need for more action, both among Member States and in partnership with countries of origin and transit, in particular North and Sub-Saharan Africa”. Therefore, a more comprehensive view of migration, stretching beyond border control patterns was put forth, stating that “the only long term and sustainable response to migration pressure is not putting more barriers in place, sending people back or selective migration policies. The true response is investing massively in development”. Consequently, the Global Approach to migration was set up, with ambitions to gather countries of origin, transit and destination to develop actions tackling all aspects of the migration process at the same time.

The Global Approach to migration is defined as “the external dimension of the European Union's migration policy”. It “illustrates the ambition of the European Union to establish an inter-sectoral framework to manage migration in a coherent way through political dialogue and close practical cooperation with third countries”. The approach, therefore, addresses three thematic dimensions: the management of legal migration; the prevention and reduction of illegal migration; and the relation between migration and development (COM(2008) 611).

The Global Approach is based on the correction of the so-called “root causes of migration”: poverty, unemployment and development gaps between North and South. It is worth noting that the concept of the “root causes of migration” which takes migration as a “side effect” of development (or lack thereof) is often used alternatively with the concept of “co-development”, a “catch-phrase” for the idea that “well-regulated international mobility is conducive to development, at both poles of the migration movement” (Pastore, 2007: 5). In this approach, besides liberalising economies and trade systems, a set of measures are advocated in order to enhance home countries’ development and thus take away incentives to emigrate by using “migration [as a] medicine against migration” (De Haas, 2006: 16):

- stimulating the remitting of funds back to the country of origin by making transfers cheaper, faster and safer and by enhancing their development impact in recipient countries. Better development impact can be achieved by financial intermediation in developing countries or by the setting up of co-funding schemes for joint projects by diaspora organisations and local organisations so as to support local development.

- expanding the role of diasporas settled in member states for the development of their home countries. The first step is to help developing countries map their diasporas (through setting up databases, for instance) and by building links with them. Organisations representing diasporas involved in the development of countries of origin are also encouraged to set up a mechanism that could ensure appropriate representation of their interests at EU level. Another dimension explored is that of youth exchange schemes focused on migrant communities.

- reinforcing circular migration schemes and facilitating return movements, through assisted return programmes (the transferability of pension rights, the recognition of qualifications or mechanisms to ensure that professionals who have worked in the EU can reintegrate successfully are among the measures to be studied). Also encouraged is temporary or virtual return through e-learning schemes and incentives for networking between foreign researchers working in the EU and research organisations in their countries of origin. Policies have to identify and overcome obstacles experienced by entrepreneurs from migrant communities willing to contribute to the development of their country of origin. Best practices in areas such as secondments or sabbaticals, and the related social security aspects, that can facilitate temporary return, have to be identified.

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improving the management of the emigration of the highly skilled in order to curb the “brain drain” phenomenon by supporting better knowledge of their labour markets (including shortages or excesses of skills at sectoral level), disciplining recruitment, fostering partnerships between institutions in the EU and in interested developing countries by addressing the causes of brain drain (COM(2005)350).

Analysis of the theoretical outlooks underlying the Global Approach, taking into account the background of policies and the measures practised or advocated for, shows EU migration and development policies gathering around three interrelated poles: a clear neo-liberal orientation of development policies, i.e. a finance and market-driven approach to development, mainly resting on individually-owned private businesses; a neo-classical approach to migration as a positive able to develop origin and destination countries, owing to a strict management and streamlining of flows; and three, a “securitization” of migration (Huysmans, 2006). The three poles are interrelated in that development is not seen as an end in itself, but rather as a means to achieving a downsizing of the immigrants’ flows to and stocks within member states. Also, security is to be achieved by the implementation of (1) a neo-liberal style of development and (2) by the ideal mobility scenario staged by a neo-classic view on migration. Consequently, it is necessary to explore the question: how does this policy-set on migration intersect with global policies on economics and politics targeting our field of focus, the SEM countries?

EU policy towards the SEM countries: a bipolar security issue

Initiatives and targets

As we have seen, the Global Approach on migration and development first targeted Africa. As a first step to implementing the initiative, the European Council endorsed the Global Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean in its Conclusions of 16 December 2005. The agenda envisages priority actions in three areas: strengthening cooperation and action between Member States; working with key African countries of origin; and working with neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean region. The Rabat Ministerial Conference of July 2006 resulted in an action plan concerned with facilitating legal migration, combating irregular migration and promoting migration and development. This meeting was followed by an EU-African Union (AU) meeting in Tripoli in November 2006. Further high-level discussions occurred in Madrid in June 2007 and at the general summit in Lisbon in December 2007, which adopted the EU-Africa Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment. The first Ministerial Meeting on Migration was held amongst states belonging to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Albufeira in November 2007. In November 2008, France organized a second round of the Rabat Process, renaming it the Euro-African Process. The conference declaration largely kept to the three themes of the Rabat action plan (Collyer, 2009).

In the meantime, the Global Approach encompassed regions other than Africa. As of June 2007, the Eastern and South-Eastern regions neighbouring the European Union were included in the Approach, of which Eastern Mediterranean SEM countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria) “according to the

14 Based on “individualistic calculus of benefits and costs among would-be migrants” (Portes, 2008: 14)
15 A set of measures constructing migration as a security problem (as opposed, for instance, to a humanitarian or economic problem), “a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust” (Huysmans, 2006: xi).
16 The first theme, “organising legal migration,” emphasised bilateral and multilateral labour agreements and called for improved information exchange on possibilities for legal migration. The second theme, “the fight against irregular migration,” covered four sub-points: improving coordination and support for regional programmes in Africa; reducing document fraud; strengthening the control of borders, including the ambitious objective to “improve controls along all borders in Africa,” and finally readmission and voluntary return. The third objective, as in Rabat, was “strengthening synergies between migration and development.” (Collyer, 2009).
concept of ‘migratory routes’”. Also, “as regards Lebanon and Jordan, migration and related issues are discussed in the relevant sub-Committees on Migration and Social Affairs in the framework of the respective Association Agreements and the ENP Action Plans”, as well as within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the three countries (COM(2007) 247 final/2).

As regards EU policy towards the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, reaching beyond the issue of migration, they are first governed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), launched at the 1995 Barcelona Conference. The Barcelona Declaration established three baskets: (a) a political and security partnership (security on the basis of mutual confidence); (b) an economic and financial partnership (a zone of shared prosperity through economic integration); and (c) a partnership within cultural and human affairs (the rapprochement between peoples through social and cultural links leading to the creation of a Mediterranean civil society) (Malmvig, 2004: 5; Crawford, 2005:6). Migration issues cut across these three policy areas.

Another forum is the “5+5” focussing on the Western Mediterranean area and cooperation with the Maghreb. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia convene, on a yearly basis, with five “southern” countries of the EU: Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal.

Since 1995 the Commission has also negotiated and concluded Association Agreements with third countries, which serve as a basis for the gradual liberalization of trade in the Mediterranean area and set out conditions for economic, social and cultural cooperation between the EU and each partner country. Migration is discussed in two sections of these agreements and in various subsections, including the section on “illegal migration” and “non-discrimination between workers”.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, completes the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Also encompassing Eastern European countries, it offers the EU’s neighbours a privileged political relationship and economic integration on the basis of democratic values and market economy principles. In the area of migration, however, the aim of the ENP is border management and cooperation against illegal immigration, the management of legal migration and the implementation of migration plans specifically for North African countries and Egypt (Jaulin, 2010). Bilateral Action Plans contain an agenda for political and economic reform and recommendations and actions concerning issues of primary interest to the EU, such as border control and readmission agreements.

Last (but not least?), the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ (UfM) launched in July 2008, meant to “re-energize” the Barcelona Process, while continuing its objectives and areas of cooperation. The project is articulated around three principles: high level leadership with ministerial summits held every two years; a partnership, with a joint north and south secretariat and presidency; and a priority given to concrete actions in every sector covered17. Migration is one of the main issues addressed, in the continuity of the Barcelona Process, and rests on the Global Approach.

In seeking to explain the original design and purpose of the various initiatives run within the EuroMed Partnership, analysts put forth the issue of security as a main target. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact in the early 1990s raised new security challenges, namely, that of diverting Western attention and funding, from the socially-, politically-unstable and economically- weak countries of the

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17 Considered the leading project in the domain of foreign affairs for French President N. Sarkozy, the idea was to set aside the questions which hampered the EuroMed Partnership (human rights, regional conflicts) so as to move on more efficiently on the other files (six themes are covered: cleaning-up of the Mediterranean Sea; sea and land motorways; civil protection; energy substitution; the Mediterranean solar plan; higher education and research; euro-Mediterranean university; Mediterranean initiative for firms development). The two pillars of the project are technology transfers through the development of civil nuclear plants in the south, and the management of migratory flows. The original project was intended to gather only the countries of the south of the EU (bordering the Mediterranean Sea), which met fierce opposition from Germany (Interview of Alain Le Roy, diplomat in charge of the UPM question in Slimani, L. “Les défis de l'Union pour la Méditerranée”, L’Express, 12/06/2006). The project gathers 43 partners among which the 27 EU Member countries and the 10 countries parties of the Barcelona Process. The General Secretary appointed in January 2010 is from Jordan (he resigned in January 2011).
South of the Mediterranean Basin, to Eastern and Central Europe\textsuperscript{18}. These “soft” security threats and challenges could not be addressed by traditional political and military means, but called rather for a “long term”, as well as a “more comprehensive and liberal approach to security” (Malmvig, 2004: 4), characteristic of the Barcelona Process. However, the agenda of economic liberalisation quickly overtook its political counterpart. This policy shift is usually explained in terms of “a dilemma between security and democracy” in EU politics\textsuperscript{19}. Also, it is worth noting that sending countries are not passive actors in the process of migration policy-making. A comparison between policy focuses in Arab sending and Europe receiving countries showed (in the early 2000s) that “the government policies remain[ed] potentially conflicting – on the Arab side, optimizing the economic benefits drawn from emigrants and reviving their sense of belonging to their culture of origin; on the European side, restricting further immigration and integrating former migrants in the host society and culture” (Fargues, 2004). The design of the Global Approach policies and, especially, the focus on economics and on remittances suggest that SEM governments had a say in their elaboration.

However, we will, at least for now, remain descriptive in our approach. Following Helle Malmvig who applied Michel Foucault’s theories of discourse analysis to the EU official position papers on migration issues, we shall envisage the policies driven within the realm of the European Mediterranean Partnership as predominantly “a result – and reproduction – of the fact that the EMP is based on two different and conflicting discourses on which type of threats the Union face, how security is to be achieved, and what the Mediterranean is” (Malmvig, 2004: 6), namely, a discourse on security through cooperation and a discourse on security through liberal economic reforms.

\textbf{Security through cooperation}

The basic premise of that initiative was that the Euro-Mediterranean area constituted a “common space,” or at least that it possessed enough common material in terms of geographic contiguity, common values, traditions, or interests to make region building a possibility (Crawford, 2006)\textsuperscript{20}. Yet, at the same time, “the new security challenges facing the Union could not be seen in isolation from the regional and domestic security problems of the Mediterranean states. Conflicts and lack of development in the Mediterranean regions constituted shared security concerns” (Malmvig, 2004: 4). Official discourses put forth this double-edged notion of a common history among countries neighbouring the Mediterranean space and shared concerns hampered by unresolved past and present conflicts. As an illustration, we might quote French Foreign Minister B. Kouchner’s conceptualisation of the UfM project: “[…] The idea is clear: to reconcile at last the two banks of this sea, united and torn by convulsions of History, today confronted to the same hopes and to the same dangers. […] The Mediterranean Sea is at the heart of every major challenge of this turn of century. Development, migration, peace, civilization dialogue, access to water and energy, environment, climate change: our future plays in the South of Europe”. At the 2010 “5+5” Meeting “[…]. We have a culture in common, an often difficult history in common; this characterises the 5+5. […] those are people who are familiar

\textsuperscript{18} The launch of the EuroMed Partnership could thus be seen as a southern European attempt to balance the Union’s security agenda from an East-West to a North-South axis (quoted in Malmvig, 2004: 4).

\textsuperscript{19} Stemming from a short-term choice for security and stability, at the expense of long-term goals of democratisation and human rights’ norms; from fears that pressures for political reforms would lead to unrest and Islamist support; from the simple predominance of security concerns over democratisation (quoted in Malmvig, 2004: 6).

\textsuperscript{20} In 2004, while defining the need for a “European Strategic Partnership” with the MENA countries, the European Council observed that “Europe and the Mediterranean and Middle East are joined together both by geography and shared history. […] Our geographical proximity is a longstanding reality underpinning our growing interdependence; our policies in future years must reflect these realities and seek to ensure that they continue to develop positively.” European Council, Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and%20Middle%20East.pdf
with each other [...]”\(^\text{21}\). Hence, in this discourse on security through cooperation, challenges are common concerns and all partners are supposed to have a common interest in overcoming them. Indeed, the necessity of curbing migration flows, for example, does not suffer contradiction. The notion of cooperation and common history and interests, here, may, therefore, be a way of involving the Southern countries in the implementation of deeper objectives which remain are by the EU Member states.

Security through economic liberalisation

The Barcelona process aimed at encouraging “good governance” as an issue of security: namely democracy, human rights and respect for the rule of law. Indeed, terrorism, political and religious radicalism are challenges for the Partnership project to overcome. However, these threats are perceived as a consequence of the very nature of socio-political systems in the region, plagued by authoritarian regimes and plagued too by a lack of basic freedoms, thus feeding popular resentment and consequently, instability at the gates of Europe. Interestingly, a lack of economic opportunities is seen as a threat equal to that of political and social instability: “Authoritarianism and poor economic and social performance favour political marginalisation and provide fuel for radical movements and violence” (COM(2003)294: 4). In short, “the nature of the political and economic systems of the Mediterranean are implicitly defined as security challenges for the EU” (Malmvig, 2004: 14).

The progressive domination of the economic reform agenda over the political one, especially since the inception of the UfM, has already been noted above. The logic may be that economic liberalisation should lead to political liberalisation, under the assumption that liberal economic reforms, for example, limit the redistributive capacities of patrimonial states and promote the emergence of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie able to convene democratic claims (Anderson, 1992; Springborg, 1993 in Catusse, 2006). More generally, free trade is seen as the “best practice” to reduce migratory pressures (Martin / Straubhaar, 2002).

In any case, the second basket of the Barcelona Declaration on financial and economic reforms included, first, the establishment of a Free Trade Area between the Union and Southern Mediterranean countries by 2010 and the removal of their tariff and non-tariff barriers. The second instrument for helping to bring about the Declaration’s economic goals was a substantial increase in the financial assistance given by the EU, drawing on the Community's own budgetary resources. These agreements show the anchorage of the second basket (or project) in the neo-liberal ideas of the Washington Consensus (Tovias, 2004)\(^\text{22}\). Economies of the region have to become attractive for Foreign Direct Investment.

\(^{21}\) « L'idée est évidente : réconcilier enfin les deux rives de cette mer, unies et déchirées par mille soubresauts de l'histoire, aujourd'hui confrontées aux mêmes espérances et aux mêmes dangers. L'idée est évidente et c'est là sa grandeur. La Méditerranée est au cœur de toutes les grandes problématiques de ce début de siècle. Développement, migrations, paix, dialogue des civilisations, accès à l’eau et à l’énergie, environnement, changement climatique : c’est au sud de l’Europe que notre avenir se joue » French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, « Europe : l’avenir passe par la Méditerranée » tribune in Le Monde, July 10th, 2008. « Nous avons une culture en commun, une histoire souvent difficile en commun et c’est cela qui caractérise le 5+5 » Press allocation by B. Kouchner, 8th Foreign Affairs Ministers’ Meeting for the « 5+5 » (Tunis, April 15 – 16, 2010). However, this trend towards emphasizing the common heritage of both sides of the Mediterranean may be more characteristic of recent development of the EuroMed Partnership under the leadership of France, as H. Malmvig stresses that earlier discourses emphasized more the north-south differences (and respect thereof) than common identity. The Mediterranean is indeed a European and in particular, a French construction deriving from its colonial past (Holm, 2002, quoted in Malmvig, 2004).

\(^{22}\) The Conclusions to the Barcelona Conference state that “The participants decide to facilitate the progressive establishment of this free-trade area through the adoption of suitable measures as regard rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition:

- the pursuit and the development of policies based on the principles of market economy and the integration of their economies taking into account their respective needs and levels of development;
Investments (FDIs). Economic aid and loans from the European Investment Bank are also to benefit the Non Member Mediterranean Countries’ private sectors and to encourage structural reform and privatization (Crawford, 2005: 6).

Migration and development policies towards SEM countries are situated at the crossroads of migration and development policies and Euro-Med policies. Thinking of the conclusions of the two previous paragraphs, it can be said that policies on migration and development intersect with global policies targeting SEM countries on the issue of security. Schematically speaking, uncontrolled migration and terrorism/extremism/social “backwardness” are challenges to be countered, all the more so given that uncontrolled migration imports the latter into the EU. The first means envisaged for curbing the migration flows and export of socio-political violence is neoliberal reforms in the economy and development, more generally, of the SEM countries; migration management is to be allowed by the onset of (liberal) development policies. The second means for achieving security is the pressure for increased involvement with SEM partners, under cooperation within the European Mediterranean Partnership schemes. The purpose of the EuroMed Partnership scheme is to achieve political and social security for the EU region, as well as economic security: indeed, being part of a zone of “shared prosperity through economic integration” and common neo-liberal values guarantees, to a certain extent, export markets and the supply of necessary goods. Moreover, as far as migration is concerned, it is taken as a tool for economic development, in the SEM countries according to the Global Approach, and in the EU: in a neoclassical approach (emphasizing the migrant as an individual and rational actor) migrants are meant to fill sectorial job vacancies and to correct the demographic imbalance between actives and non-actives stemming from the northern populations’ aging process23. Migration thus appears as a multi-dimensional and multi-level element of security policy: a target of policies, it is also equally a tool of such policies, at the economic, social and political levels.

Migration and development in EU-SEM relations: policies and debates

To start with, it is important to note that this policy-design, as stated above, is not necessarily imposed on the sending countries’ governments. Aid is conditional on results attained in terms of policy implementation. However, the engineering of migration for security and the liberalisation of economies did not necessarily threaten the socio-political domination of existing regimes in the region. In certain cases, the regimes’ control over societal and political institutions was even (indirectly) reinforced by such reforms, while EU technocrats were lauding the voluntarism of leaders and the improvement of macroeconomic indicators (for a very informed political economy view on Tunisia, for example, see the writings of B. Hibou).

Policies run by the EU on migration from SEM countries separate, as noted above, the African SEM countries from the non-African Middle Eastern ones, for the Global Approach focuses on Africa and is yet to be extended to the Eastern and South Eastern regions neighbouring the European Union (COM (2007) 247 final). However, a new regional project on migration in the Euro-Mediterranean area, “EuroMed Migration II”24, which started its activities in February 2008, addresses the issue of

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- the adjustment and modernization of economic and social structures, giving priority to the promotion and development of the private sector, to the upgrading of the productive sector and to the establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy. […]"

23 See the United Nations’ (much debated) report of March 2000 entitled “Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Aging Populations?”. According to this report, all countries of Europe are expected to decrease in population size with a relatively rapid aging process over the next 46 years.

24 With a budget of 5 Million Euros, funded by the European Commission, the project is part of a wider programme on the Justice and Home Affairs sector, approved in 2006, comprising two other regional projects in the field of Justice and Police cooperation: “EuroMed Justice II” and “EuroMed Police II”. The purpose of this project is to strengthen Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the management of migration, so as to build up the Mediterranean partners’ capacity to provide an effective, targeted and comprehensive solution for the various forms of migration. That includes: setting up mechanisms to promote opportunities for legal migration, support for measures to promote the linkage between migration
“migration and development” at the level of MENA (Middle East and North African) countries under its Training module III. Its activities tackle: migration, diaspora and development; incorporation of migration into national development plans; regulatory and institutional practice on money transfers; diaspora and practices in development; remittances and development finance; the role of women in migration and development and “social remittances”; and contemporary practice and development tools utilized by international and regional actors involved in migration and development. Similarly, the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration reaffirmed the need to “address [the] root causes of migration, mainly poverty, unemployment and [the] development gap”, “encourage and promote Foreign Direct Investment in order to generate employment and reduce migration outflows”, “help to set up mechanisms and services and effective financial products to facilitate the transfer of migrants’ remittances and micro-credit opportunities […]”. Most recent views on the link between migration and development and any actions pertaining to it, are then increasingly limited to the realm of economics and finance, and promote a utilitarian outlook on specific subgroups (diasporas, women, actors in local development) as resources to tap. However, such a view might reasonably be termed “liberal securitarian” (liberal sécuritaire), considering that the issue of security underlies the development for less migration’ agenda, and the set of policies implemented, rests on a number of ideological and theoretical assumptions which need to be questioned and assessed.

II. Assessment of the approach and background of EU migration-development policies.

Official EU policies aimed at engineering a link between migration and development are articulated around the following assumptions: (1) a lack of development is (2) a cause for emigration; (3) migration can engineer development; (4) development will limit migration. Transversally, (a) the ultimate policy aim is to limit migration; (b) the purpose of such a policy is to achieve political, social and, to some extent, economic security in the North; (c) the means employed are neoliberal reforms. However, these ideological and scientific assumptions have to be contextualised, assessed and critically examined here in chapter II. This will lead us, in Chapter III, to propose alternative ways of envisaging the migration development nexus, based on recent theoretical re-examinations of the issue.

Neo-liberal reforms as conducive to employment

The first assumption to assess is whether liberalisation of the economy and the attraction of investments, notably foreign direct investments, will enhance the macro- and micro-economic situation of the SEM countries and create job opportunities, thus reducing citizens’ propensity to emigrate.

First, adjustment of economies to the international standards of productivity and competitiveness always leads to massive cutbacks in public sector employment; structural adjustment programmes are an extreme case. Similarly, economic sectors such as industry for example (whether public or private), if confronted with the necessity of becoming internationally competitive, usually restructure and “rationalise” by laying off employees to increase competitiveness.

(Contd.)
Second, liberalisation and deregulation policies in southern countries, structural reforms and the lifting of custom duties and taxes induced in the free trade agreements passed between, for instance, the US and the EU, and several developing countries, all channelled investments towards sectors that are characterized by relatively low-wage jobs. Indeed, high value-added jobs remain in the North and the developing countries are limited to their potential comparative advantage, available manpower: indeed, high rates of youth unemployment and a “young” demographic structure characterise most developing countries. In such a situation of economic restructuring, labour becomes devalued, especially in the SEM countries which almost all relied in the past on hyper-inflated public sectors granting small incomes but substantial social status. Low salaries offered now on the local work markets do not satisfy the financial, social and political ambitions of the professional class. Moreover, skilled and highly-skilled young nationals have high-reservation wages, “based on expectations of obtaining public sector or foreign jobs” (Razzaz/ Iqbal, 2008). Indeed, middle- or upper-class families in the SEM emigration countries often benefit from remittances sent by expatriate family members. Therefore, if economic liberalisation cuts more jobs than it creates and tends to devalue labour and wages (at least in the first phase of adjustment to international standards), it is doubtful that SEM citizens will emigrate less. On the contrary, such reforms may even accelerate emigration over the short to middle term.

Neo-liberal reforms, politics and migration

Moreover, at a more general level, “the liberal agenda of the Barcelona Process and of the ENP carries with it its own problems and contradictions that exacerbate the consequences of perceptions of exclusion. In the short run, economic inequities are exacerbated by the conditionality policies of economic liberalization. In this way, economic liberalization can undermine the process of political liberalization envisioned at Barcelona and in the ENP by exacerbating economic inequality and thus endangering liberal democracy” (Crawford, 2005: 15). Indeed, economic liberalisation can theoretically lead to political liberalisation, under the assumption that liberal economic reforms, for example, limit the redistributive capacities of patrimonial states or promote the emergence of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie able to convey democratic claims (Anderson, 1992; Springborg, 1993).

However, up till now, the hypothesis that the liberalisation of economies could be a pre-requisite for political reform has been shifted away. Moreover, of the SEM countries, studies abound which document states or regimes’ control over economic liberalisation, which hamper the expected dismantling of rentier systems, monopoly of power and accumulation process, as well as the processes of using international resources and rhetoric on reforms to justify increased political control (see Catusse, 2006: 231-234). On Algeria for example, Joffé has shown how economic liberalization facilitated the growth of an unaccountable elite, feeding on patronage and outside the control of a democratic state (Joffé, 2002).

As far as migration is concerned, such a resistance to political liberalisation and even, in some cases, the strengthening of political closure through the instrumentalisation of foreign financial aid and socio-economic reform rhetoric is not bound to decrease trends of emigration from southern countries. This questions the assumption that specific emigration trends such as, for example, that of the highly skilled, are chiefly driven by economic factors (here, wage differentials between origin and destination countries), a view characteristic of a neo-liberal outlook on migration. Such trends, indeed, also stem from the relations between policy-makers and intellectual elites, namely, from the characteristics of the social contract and, more generally, from local institutional setups. Individual prospects for social mobility and “reward” through decent wages are hampered by factors of a socio-political nature,

28 However, the idea that liberal economic reforms could progressively have an influence on politics cannot be denied: « s’il y a une possibilité de démocratisation, il faudra en chercher les fondements dans la crise de régimes incapables de réaliser les promesses sociales de l’État politiquement autoritaire et économiquement dirigiste de l’ére nationaliste » (Salamé, 1991: 341, quoted in Catusse, 2006: 232).
emigration flows being thus encouraged. This requires expanding migration explanatory schemes, and incorporating institutional, structure-centred approaches.

Moreover, the process, described above, by which the economy is embedded in politics could question the distinction usually made between “forced” migration, i.e. supposedly driven by socio-political violence, and “economic”, “labour” migration, supposedly involving rational individual decisions based on job opportunities or wage differentials between origin and departure countries. Indeed, the fact that socio-political factors and local social contracts may hamper certain citizens’ professional prospects, thus channelling them towards emigration, suggests that migration dynamics cannot be distributed in a clear-cut manner, between “forced” (political) and “labour-led” (economic) push factors. Migration and development schemes could, therefore, benefit from being more all-encompassing, pluralist and structure-centred.

The “root-causes approach” and the “migration hump”

The concept of the root causes of migration takes migration as a reaction to the lack of development in the region of origin, namely, poverty and unemployment, as well as violence. The assumption underlying the concept is that the beginnings of development in poor countries lead to migration, which sparks enhanced development, which leads to income equilibrium and the elimination of the “root causes” of migration, which ultimately leads to less migration (Castles, 2008: 4). This assumption is in line with the neo-classical theory of migration that emerged in the 1950s-1960s.

However, empirical evidence contradicts the concept of a lack of development as a “root cause” for migration. A low level of development, accompanying poverty and a lack of infrastructure rather limits international emigration. In line with many other accounts, Douglas Massey describes how early European migration to North America was made possible, from the nineteenth century onwards, by the onset of capitalist penetration, industrialisation and subsequent mutations, especially on infrastructures (transportation), and the structure of labour and economic activities. Such structural economic changes lead to backlashes on social structures, general knowledge and aspirations of people, and spur migration movements. Moreover, emigration is said to “become progressively independent of the economic conditions that originally caused it. Once a critical takeoff stage is reached, the movement of population alters social and economic structures within sending communities in ways that increase the likelihood of subsequent migration. Gunnar Myrdal (1957) has called this feedback process the ‘circular and cumulative causation of migration’” (Massey, 1988: 396).

The assertion that the onset of development spurs emigration instead of limiting it was pushed in Zelinski’s “mobility transition” theory in the early 1970s (De Haas, 2008: 12-15). This theory parallels the demographic “fertility transition” theory, hence stating that the beginnings of modernisation and industrialisation are often accompanied by an “increase in emigration, due to population growth, a decline in rural unemployment and low wage levels. As industrialisation proceeds labour supply declines and domestic wage levels rise; as a result emigration falls and labour immigration begins to take place” (Castles, 2008: 5). More recently, this process has been reconceptualised as a “migration hump”, whereby growth, development, and decreasing differentials with destination countries tend rather to have a J-curve or inverted U-curve effect on emigration, steeply increasing in the initial phases of development and only later gradually falling off (Faist, 1997: 268-269).

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29 Neo-classical theory emphasises the individual decision to migrate, based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining at home or moving. Neo-classical theory assumes that potential migrants have excellent knowledge of wage levels and employment opportunities in destination regions, and that their migration decisions are overwhelmingly based on these economic factors. Factors such as government restrictions are seen as distortions of the rational market. According to the neo-classical model, the mere existence of economic disparities between various areas should be sufficient to generate migrant flows. In the long run, such flows should help to equalize wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions, leading towards economic equilibrium.

30 Yet, this theoretical approach was rooted in the modernisation theory.
As stated by Nyberg Sorensen *et alii*, “the ‘migration hump’ suggests that some economic development generates both the resources and the incentives for people to migrate. By implication, poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy. As long as poverty reduction is the overriding goal of aid and development cooperation, there is no direct link between aid and migration control” (Nyberg Sorensen et al., 2002: 40). Therefore, attempts at tackling the “root causes” of migration in order to reduce the phenomenon are deemed unfounded, at least over the short run.

*Engineering migration for development: from scientific debate to ideology*

Another aspect of the link between migration and development which remains an “unsettled” one (Papademetriou / Martin, 1991), is the engineering of migration for development.

Economy-driven views on the relationship between migration and development most often revolve around the policy themes focussed on in the EU-SEM countries’ policy targets: the issue of skilled migration from the South; the issue of remittances sent by emigrants to their home countries and how such remittances could drive productive investments back home or, more generally, alleviate poverty; the issue of circular migration, return and co-development. The three issues are facets of the more general one of diasporas’ links with their origin countries and input in the migration-development nexus. The debates on those questions illustrate the pitfalls of economic approaches.

*Scientific debates*

The issue of skilled emigration has been mostly seen as negative for the sending countries by historical structuralists and dependency theory specialists, who coined the term “brain drain” in order to stress an assumed negative impact on the sending countries of the migration of the highly-skilled towards northern immigration countries. Educated people being scarce in developing countries, they would, therefore, be all the more useful for the southern sending countries’ economic development. And, of course, if they have been educated in their country of origin, their leaving represents a “lack of return on investment”. For it leads to an asymmetric growth process between sending and receiving countries, brain drain is one facet of unequal global exchange.

Following increasing questioning of the model and a resurgence of neo-classical views in economy and development, the concept of “brain gain” acquired momentum to illustrate policy positions emphasizing that destination as well as origin countries may profit from highly-skilled migrants (Stark, 2004; IOM, 2005). Beyond increasing financial gains through rising remittances, highly-skilled migration may also result in gains in human capital through a “brain chain” mechanism, due to technology or knowledge transfers made by emigrants. Moreover, “while the emigration of skills has a direct, short term effect of resulting in fewer skilled-workers, it may raise the expected return on education and have an indirect, mid-term effect in producing more educated people than opportunities for employment abroad, thereby elevating the level of education at home” (CARIM, 2009). As a matter of fact, a multitude of internationally- and nationally-conceived and funded programmes channel the return of expatriates educated abroad to their country of origin such as UNDP’s TOKTEN

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31 Typical of this trend is the “world-systems” perspective on migration, “grounded on the concept of structural penetration and ‘imbalancing’ of peripheral areas creating the conditions for mass displacements out of them” (Portes, 2008: 14), first developed by I. Wallerstein. Also rooted in Marxist political economy, the dependency theory refutes the linear process model of core-to-periphery diffusion of socio-political norms and industrialisation. It puts forth the argument that Western capitalism was actually engineering underdevelopment to the detriment of Third World states through capitalist international corporations’ penetration. As a reaction, import-substitution models of development were advocated (Portes, 1997).

32 Regarding emigration in general, the term “brawn drain” reflects the negative effect of the massive departure of young, able-bodied men and women from rural areas, therefore creating a shortage of agricultural labour, cultivated lands and agricultural innovation, affecting craft industries too (quoted in De Haas, 2008: 28).

33 Therefore, in order to compensate for the losses due to skilled emigration from southern sending countries, a controversial proposal for “taxing the brain drain” was issued (Bhagwati, 1976).
Programme, combining recognition measures and various incentives (Lindsay-Lowell / Findlay / Stewart, 2004: 20-23)

However, a more nuanced assessment of skilled migration is emerging: it envisages the phenomenon beyond “brain circulation” (Saxenian, 2002), as a “brain strain”, which can either be positive or negative for the origin countries. Indeed, “at the global level, the issue of brain strain highlights the need for multilateral approaches to managing migration that are underpinned by shared responsibilities”, namely, “not only [based] on economic arguments, but also [on] a rights-based approach to migration policy […]” (Lindsay-Lowell / Findlay / Stewart, 2004: 4; 6).

As regards migrants’ remittances, the debates range between the same two extremes and similarly call for a more comprehensive view of the migration-development nexus. Resting on the empirically-tested fact that “it is already the better-off who tend to migrate, […] the remittances and other benefits of migration thus go disproportionately to the better off” (Lipton, 1980), some state that migration will not alleviate the poverty of the worst off but will increase socio-economic inequalities between communities and regions within the sending countries. Indeed, remittances can be used for “conspicuous consumption” (imported goods), to “pay off debts”, to “reinforce status” (building luxurious houses or spending high sums for family or communal celebrations) or for “consumptive investment” (purchase of land, mechanisation of labour, finance education of siblings). Creativity and innovation productive investment needs are thus not met, while feeding “inflatory pressures” and soaring land prices, demand for imported goods at the expense of local productions and “leakages” of remittance investments exacerbate regional disparities in wealth (De Haas, 2008: 29-30). Also, labour force participation rates may fall in remittance-receiving households even if the incidence of entrepreneurial activities increase (Özden / Schiff, 2007). Another charge against remittances from expatriates is that it “may help perpetuate conflict by providing support for warring parties”, as suggested by the many wars which broke out throughout the developing world in the 1990s (Van Hear, 2003).

Nevertheless, the recent shift from pessimistic to more optimistic views on the issue of migration for development, partly spurred by the striking increase in remittance flows since the 1990s settled the belief that “remittances are a more effective instrument for income redistribution, poverty reduction and economic growth than large, bureaucratic development programmes or development aid” (Kapur, 2004). Also, for better or for worse, such financial returns usually escape governmental intervention: the very nature of migrant remittances (i.e. the fact that they constitute a flow in cash and kind that goes direct to the migrants’ families), makes it difficult for governments or for other development planning actors to channel such funds towards investment schemes that they themselves designed (Skeldon, 2008: 8).

By contrast, much less opposition and debate surrounds the implementation of circular migration schemes between SEM and European countries. From the point of view of receiving countries, circular, short-term professional mobility responds to concerns about how to ensure labour markets flexibility in terms of labour force supply; wage control; the competitiveness of labour-intensive sectors; and the prevention of settlement of migrants and their families in EU countries (Awad in CARIM, 2008: 18). The expected benefits for sending countries are meant to be: unemployment and poverty relief in the sending country; acquisition of financial remittances and skills; legal channels for remittances and legal employment; respect for human and social security rights; reduced “brain” (or

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34 This shows the slight theoretical shift from the pure neo-classical model in models underlying migration-for-development policy-making after the 1980s, as “neo-classical migration theory has no place for income remittances from migrants to the country of origin (Taylor, 1999: 65). It tends to view migrants as atomistic, income maximizing individuals, and disregard their belonging to social groups such as households, families and communities. If that were true, there would be indeed no reason to remit money” (De Haas, 2008: 25).

35 Now much larger than aid flows (World Bank, 2006).

36 Such a belief reflecting a “striking level of amnesia” of the very large body of existing studies and assessments on the role of migrants in the development process (De Haas, 2008: 1).
"brawn"37) drain from the South to the North. All such claims are in line with developing countries’ demands, even though questions remain over translating the theory into practice and making circular migration a really “transnationalist, interactive and symmetrical” movement (Carim, 2008: 14). Among these are difficulties: the feasibility of such policies, on technical (difficulty of regulating migration, by essence a transnational phenomenon) and institutional grounds (existence and implementation of enough built-in tools for success, i.e. agreements, measures, convergence mechanisms between various institutional setups and views, EU’s and national states’ for instance); clashing interests between the parties involved (EU, EU countries, third countries), which hamper the developmental impact of measures effectively taken: as noticed by V. Chetail for instance, “the European Commission as part of its Policy Plan on Legal Migration focus on very limited and selected categories of migrants (namely skilled workers, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees and remunerated trainees), whose impact on development remains dubious” (Chetail, 2008: 214)38; the perceived danger of the political instrumentalisation of circular migration, as a way of limiting migration from the South or as a way of perpetuating the economic and political hegemony of EU member states over sending countries (CARIM, 2008).

These four issues are part of the global concept of “co-development”, a “catch-phrase” for the idea that “well-regulated international mobility is conducive to development, at both poles of the migration movement” (Pastore, 2007: 5). Therefore, “co-development” seems to break with the notion of development as a “root cause” for migration flows, which introduced development as an instrument of migration policy rather than the other way round. “Within this approach, migration is considered as a primary fact and an opportunity for development rather than a problem in itself which has to be eradicated” (Chetail, 2008: 199). Notwithstanding the fact that the “root causes” approach still coexists in EU official policy-documents with the “co-development” one (see Chapter 1), and that controlling access to European territory, with the active participation of third countries, remains high on the agenda, the previous paragraphs describing the debates over the three “pillars” of the migration-development nexus do prove that attempts at engineering migration for development are genuinely conducted. However, many obstacles, both technical and political, hamper the success of migration for development schemes and targeted operations, of which some have been described above, for instance, over circular migration. On a wider institutional level, constraints on opening legal migration opportunities, which depend on each member state’s competence and good will, sometimes clash with European-level policy measures. More generally, receiving countries’ and EU’s security concerns predominate over third countries’ developmental attempts; this questions the overall credibility of the co-development concept as it is implemented by the EU. Opening borders to the free movement of people is, indeed, the only way of proving the EU’s commitment to the development of third countries, as advocated by a number of specialists (see for example Chetail, 2008; Pecoud/ De Guchteneire, 2007).

These measures, policy-trends or recommendations pertaining to the stimulation and channelling of migrants’ remittances, highly-skilled and circular migration schemes for successful “co-development” are all encompassed in the emphasis put on the necessity for origin countries to restore economic, social and political ties with their diasporas. Indeed, diasporas and expatriates constitute “a wide variety of groups, from humanitarian relief organizations and religious groups to affiliates of political parties and virtual networks”. Regarding their advocacies and engagements in the origin countries, they are also diverse in terms of claims, targets, scopes and scales: to a very great extent, expatriates’ advocacy “pushes for issues that affect diaspora members’ status in their countries of origin or destination, such as citizenship, migration status, and voting rights; those that affect the homeland, such as human rights,
good governance, and political participation; and those that have bilateral implications between countries of origin and settlement, including trade policy, humanitarian relief, and development policy. In general, advocates express identities, acquire influence or resources, present a strong ethnic group consciousness, and work for changes in policies or practices to yield conditions more conducive to development” (Newland, 2010: 2). Overcoming such diversity and opening channels for streamlining various diaspora’ inputs cannot but be a challenge for diasporas themselves and for origin countries, even if politically, socially and economically incorporating diasporas can be considered by source countries a legitimate duty, and a precious resource to tap. But conversely, “human rights”, “democracy”, as much as development goals may be seen by each party in subjective terms. Not only is the context of origin countries sometimes not prone to productive economic or political remittances; diasporas themselves may not all be necessarily sound economic development powers or, even, democratic actors working for peace and nation-building (Vertovec, 2005: 8-9).

This paragraph has shown that current certitudes about the nature of the link between migration and development should be questioned and debated scientifically. However, behind scientific theories and science-backed practices, lays ideology, a problem that we will now address.

**Agents vs structures, an ideological stance**

An increasing number of field studies and theoretical reflections are attempting to explain rather than merely describe the mechanisms involved in the success or failure of migrants’ input for development, and these same studies are trying to reframe the debate on the migration-development nexus. As an example, De Haas and Vezzoli in their study of Mexico and Morocco, notice the “mixed impacts of migration on development”, the successes and failures of migrants’ and of hometown associations’ inputs back home in relation to, for instance, the role played by local states and co-development schemes. The authors point, among other conclusions, to the need to reframe the debate on development towards “identifying how to make conditions attractive for migrants investments”, rather than asking what migrants can do to support development (De Haas / Vezzoli, 2010).

Indeed, micro-empirical evidence highlighting the often positive role of migration and remittances in households’ livelihoods is often “inaccurately taken as evidence that migration does stimulate development in more general terms and on the macro-level”. As aptly put by De Haas, “to argue from ‘migration and remittances durably improve households’ living standards’ to ‘migration stimulates national development’ is to commit an ecological fallacy by transferring inferences made on a micro-level scale of analysis to a macro-level scale of analysis. Obviously, development is a highly complex and multifaceted process, involving and requiring structural social, political and institutional changes, […]” (De Haas, 2008: 47). So to say, “it is unlikely that migrants and remittances alone can trigger sustained national development and economic growth. Although remittances play an increasingly vital role in securing and actually improving livelihoods of millions of people in developing world, it would be naïve to expect that remittances alone can solve more structural development obstacles, such as an unstable political environment, misguided macro-economic policies, unsafety, legal insecurity, bureaucracy, corruption and deficient infrastructure” (De Haas 2007).

Similarly, it might be asked whether sending countries do actually need highly skilled workers, or more generally, whether expatriates or circular migrants have “something […] to return to” (Skeldon, 2008: 13). Indeed, this puts the spotlight on broader domestic policies, such as education policies, the role of educated elites in the social and political setup and, more generally, the “social contract” underlying relations between state/government and society. K. Newland on diaspora advocacies and their diversity notes, for example, that “Diaspora groups in the United States have spoken out both for and against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Central American Free Trade Agreement, and other bilateral trade agreements” (Newland, 2010: 6). In order to understand the reasons behind such divisions (between expatriates and residents, between governments and social actors inside and outside the countries, between various expatriates’ groups) and, just possibly, to be able to overcome them, it is necessary to study stakes in these reforms and measures for each party,
i.e. how the diverging claims on the institutional setup and its ideal functioning are reflected in the diaspora stances, in the governments’ relations with their various components, etc. Moreover, advocacies and incentives set up to allow migrants to become agents of development and for countries of origin to reinforce links with their expatriates in order to maximise the benefits of migration for development have to take into account the nature of ties linking migrants and their origin countries.

Hence, broadly speaking, the institutional setup, the “structures”, have to be addressed as a cause, both for underdevelopment, and for the success or failure of migrant input on development. Development in migrant-sending regions is a prerequisite for successful return and/or investment rather than a consequence of migration; the general development context is of utmost importance in determining the extent to which the development potential of migration can be made a reality. Also, an in-depth knowledge of the actors involved, of their history from personal to the institutional, would be needed, in order to lay the groundwork for successful cooperation between actors in migration-for-development schemes.

Granting expatriates the power, and the duty to overcome structural failures hindering development shows the exaggerated primacy granted to the agency of migrants over structures and policies in theoretical views of the critical factors in development (Skeldon, 2008; De Haas, 2008). In practical terms, it also shows the disproportioned responsibility put on citizens as agents of development.

The current optimism over the development potential of migrants and migration, vs structural factors, also has a strong ideological background: it fits very well into (neo) liberal policy trends currently in vogue in EU development policy schemes and in international ones, as noted in the first chapter of the essay. Indeed, as Kapur (2004) summed up while writing on migrants’ remittances and development, the current optimism shown for migrant input fits in with a communitarian approach, and praises the principles of individualism and self-help: “Immigrants, rather than governments, then become the biggest provider of ‘foreign aid’” (Kapur 2004: 7).

Not only are diaspora actors meant to supply their origin countries with essential aid, financial, infrastructural, technical and scientific. By so doing, they not only carry out duties usually borne by states, they are also accountable before citizens, attached to such duties. Responsibilities in cases of failures would be, hence, blurred by blaming the emigrants for the losses in development rather than the structures and policies. Sharing or conversely, “diluting” responsibilities actually fits current policies run by the EU, as exemplified in the process of border control and the containment of illegal migrants and refugee flows’ externalisation, for instance. A reluctance to take on responsibility for migrants is also visible in the promotion of circular migration schemes, which among other factors allows that “migrants [and their families] do not settle in the EU, for settling causes financial, social and psychological costs deriving from the need for their integration in workplaces and in societies” (Awad, 2008: 18).

Consequently, a priori optimism regarding agent-led (individual and community) –development increasingly tends to depoliticise the issues of migration, of development, and the action of the former on the latter, in line with the progressive fading of the political ambitions of EU migration treaties and agreements from the 2004 Hague Programme, as noted above in chapter I. Presented as a “natural” movement, whether market-led or driven by poverty, migration is extracted from its economic, social, political, cultural context and from the combination of local, national, regional or even international, short- to long-term histories; its multifaceted background in terms, for example, of a power structure, of unequal allocation of resources and access to opportunities in the sending countries, of selective entry policies in the immigration ones, is thus ignored. For example, highly-skilled migration is reconstructed as an “egalitarian, polycentric globalised phenomenon where all countries and implicated actors have the same importance”, a “natural and a-cephalic” process which hides the

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39 And also paradoxically, as migration as a (short-term) movement (mobility) becomes disconnected from its corollary of migration as settlement in a new location.
structures of migrants’ networks and undermines “the central point of who has the power to manage and determine migration flows” (Levatino, 2010).

Indeed, actors are not equally powerful technocratic forces all working on an equal footing to implement standard, evident and unquestionable aims for development. Each actor in the migration process (an individual, a group, an institutional actor such as migrants, their families, expatriate and origin communities, IGO, NGO, receiving/transit/sending states, regions…) is situated at the intersection of various institutional setups; as such, the actor is embedded in a web of power structures, of diverging or converging political aims and interests. The above-mentioned example of Mexican expatriates’ positions towards NAFTA illustrates well the blind faith inherent in policies in the developmental potential of expatriate communities: as institutional actors, expatriates have their own migration history, resulting from diverse “that which has been lived”, institutional (real or perceived) belongings and, more precisely, links with local and governmental powers. Hence, they pursue their own goals, which rely on their subjective perceptions of how to define and implement development. Similarly, the political background and goals of institutional actors (IGO’s, NGO’s for instance) should not be ignored, even if they are hidden behind a technocratic rhetoric of “rationality” and “management” of flows (on IOM for example, see Georgi, 2010).

The very notion of migration “management” for development contributes most acutely to the depoliticizing of migration policy-making. The term “management” is indeed “characterised by its apolitical and technocratic nature. […] Policies would not result from political choices, but from ‘technical’ considerations […] on the most appropriate and successful ways of addressing migration. This depoliticization is further evident in the ‘triple win’ objective, which negates the existence of divergent interests, of asymmetries of powers and of conflicts (both between and within countries). It is also perceptible in the managerial/technical language used by migration management actors” (Geiger/ Pécoud, 2010: 11). Relying on the conceptual work of Michel Foucault, some authors have analysed how technocratic policy-discourses on migration shape the perception of the phenomenon, and, further, the perception of “real” issues to be addressed; hence, creating a “knowledge” in support of “rationality” of a political nature, which supports and justifies the exercise of power (Kalm, 2010).

Thus, the discourses and policies pertaining to the migration-development nexus finally expand through the setting up of normative assumptions and guidelines which aim at shaping the way people think and act on migration and development. Resting on the “governmentality” concept developed by Michel Foucault, such an apprehension of migration-for-development policies actually sheds light on the way they progressively spread to new social fields, and on the way they finally constitute a “global process of population control at the world level” (Geiger/ Pécoud, 2010: 16-17).

Migration being de-contextualised, its patterns standardized, and its actors taken as of equal agency capacity, this suggests that the engineering of migration for development can also be achieved with standardised means and aims. Hence, development is reconstructed along standardized characteristics, in line with the neo-liberal standards mentioned above (promote private enterprise, attract FDI, etc.).

A new, more balanced theoretical outlook on migration and on the migration-development nexus is needed, one that is not exclusively focussed on economic factors and one that takes structural features of the issue into consideration, alongside individuals’ agency. This is the subject of chapter III.

III. Alternative theories on migration and development: multi-level approaches

Indeed, the two schools of all-economic explanations for the migration initiation and perpetuation processes have been widely criticised by scholars. The neo-classical theories of migration have been taken as “simplistic” and deprived of explanatory and predictive power (Sassen, 1988; Portes/ Rumbaut, 1996), as being a-historical and drawing on “the – erroneous – sedentary notion that migration and development are substitutes rather than complements” (De Haas, 2008: 23). The individual and rational choice capacity of migrants is, indeed, contradicted by empirical evidence, which clearly points at the
major role played by external actors (typically, states and, especially, receiving states) in the migratory process. Conversely, historical structuralists have been criticized for drastically ruling out individual agency and for being too determinist in viewing individuals as passive subjects of macro-forces. In particular, economy as a driver to migration had to be completed by cultural, social or political factors: refugee and forced migration in particular could not be analysed through the lenses of economic self-interests and economic forces (Zolberg, 1981). Hence, there was a need to “reconceptualise multi-spheres of linkages between countries”, namely, cultural, ideological, humanitarian, political, etc. and not exclusively the economic sphere. Also, “major social actors, power blocs and interest groups which determine national policies with respect to immigration and emigration must be incorporated in new models” (Simmons, 1989: 160-161)40. Some authors advocated too taking into consideration several levels of analysis of the migration phenomenon, i.e. individual, familial, national and international, levels which include intermediary structural factors or “meso-levels” (Faist, 1997), such as social and family relations, circles of socialisation, institutions operating at the infra-national level. These levels are naturally not to be considered exclusively of one another.

Migration systems theory

The migration systems approach reflects this new trend of research aiming at a more interdisciplinary understanding of migration, covering every aspect of the migration experience. A “migration system” is constituted by two or more countries which exchange migrants with one another, a “set of places linked by flows and counter flows of people, goods, services and information, which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places” (De Haas, 2008: 21). “The basic principle is that any migratory movement can be seen as the result of interacting macro-structures and micro-structures. Macro-structures refer to large-scale institutional factors, while micro-structures embrace the networks, practices and beliefs of the migrants themselves. These two levels are linked by a number of intermediate mechanisms, which are often referred to as ‘meso-structures’. The macro-structures include the political economy of the world market, interstate relationships, and the laws, structures and practices established by the states of sending and receiving countries to control migration settlement. […] The micro-structures are the informal social networks developed by the migrants themselves in order to cope with migration and settlement. […] Informal networks include personal relationships, family and household patterns, friendship and community ties, and mutual help in economic and social matters.” (Castles / Miller, 2003: 26-27). Moreover, as emphasized by H. De Haas, “the fundamental assumption of this theory is that migration alters the social, cultural, economic, and institutional conditions at both the sending and receiving ends --that is, the entire developmental space within which migration processes operates. […] […] [m]igration systems theories draw a two-way, reciprocal and dynamic link between migration and development”. Therefore, as receiving and sending ends are both modified by the migration process, “causes and consequences of the migration process should not be studied separately, but as part of the same system and processes”; moreover, non-migrants should also be considered part of the process, as “migration tend to affect sending societies as a whole” (De Haas, 2008: 21-22). The concept of “social remittances” coined by Peggy Levitt (1998) illustrates part of this point. It refers to the migration-driven process of diffusion of ideas, behaviours and values which can affect entrepreneurship patterns, family formation and political factors, as well as the very perception of “relative deprivation” and aspirations of people. More generally, economic and social structures are affected, as “each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made” (Massey et al., 1993: 451). All these factors make additional migration more likely.

Consequently, as stressed by De Haas (2008: 23), “[…] the effects of migration cannot be properly understood by studying migrants alone, […], but also require considering the wider (development) context in which migration takes place”.

40 Here, the author advocates the “world system-linkages” model, an offshoot of the world-system theory.
Transnational networks and diasporas

The theory of “transnationalism” which focuses on the new linkages between societies based on migration and “transnational activities” may be contradicting such new trends in the study of migration. Indeed, the notion of transnational community emphasizes individual agency (Castles / Miller, 2003: 29) and points to the growing disconnection between national populations and territories, to the emergence of “de-territorialised nation-states” (Basch et al., 1994), which potentially questions the very power of states and the persistence of national identities. Moreover, assimilationist models of migrant integration in host countries are also challenged and categories such as “temporary” or “permanent” migrant or return migration thus lose significance, the lives of migrants being characterised by circulation and simultaneous commitment to two or more societies (De Haas, 2005). However, “[t]his has fundamental implication for the study of migration and development, because this implies that integration in receiving societies and commitment to origin societies are not necessarily substitutes, but can be complements” (De Haas, 2008: 38).

Indeed, beyond their financial remitting capacities, the role of diaspora communities in development and politics has been increasingly studied since the early 1990s, as transnational communities have tended to increase in number and volume. The role of expatriate communities in politics expanded and reinforced the process of “globalisation of domestic politics” (Koslowski, 2005) observed in studies on older diasporas, against existing regimes or, conversely, through institutions encouraging expatriate political participation in their origin country. Hence, the “de-territorialisation” of politics neither hinders the input of expatriates in global development, nor does it imply the collapse of states and state institutions as political actors and partakers. Transnationalism “from below” is actually complemented by “transnationalism from above”, inasmuch as transnational business communities (from large-scale to small, ethnic-based enterprises) complement political or culture-based transnational institutions in the fields of local and global development.

Political economy, social transformation and neo-institutionalist views

Back in 1998, Massey et. al. stated that: “international migration originates in the social, economic, and political transformations that accompany the penetration of capitalist markets into non-market or pre-market societies (as hypothesized under the world-systems theory)” (1998: 277). However, they also pointed to the interconnectedness of all migration theories in order to gain a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the migration phenomenon as a whole: “any satisfactory theoretical account of international migration must contain four basic elements: a treatment of the structural forces that promote emigration from developing countries; a characterisation of the structural forces that attract immigrants into the developed nations; a consideration of the motivations, goals and aspirations of the people who respond to these structural forces by becoming international migrants; and the treatment of the social and economic structures that arise to connect areas of out- and in-migration” (1998: 281).

As a matter of fact, new theoretical approaches, based on empirical field research, now emerge to reframe the study of the migration process, as well as its links to development: the necessity for interdisciplinary dialogue; the existence of interconnections between determinants and effects of migration for instance; between individual agency and structures affecting them; between human

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41 Due to the acceleration of the globalisation process and subsequent economic, social and political mutations, as well as the emergence of new global conflicts producing waves of refugees or nationalist claims, in Eastern Europe, for instance.

42 Existence of a democratic regime and free elections in the sending country; existence of sending country’s diplomatic missions in the host country; the possibility of retaining home country citizenship in the host country; opening of certain polling to expatriates; eligibility of the latter in sending countries; existence of financial and logistic channels allowing expatriates to promote certain candidates (Koslowski, 2005: 11-15).

43 Respectively, activities that are the result of grass-root initiatives by immigrants and their home country counterparts and activities conducted by powerful institutional actors such as multinational corporations and states (Portes, 2008).
action (individual or collective) and the broader processes of change in social structures; between broad contextual factors (including government policies), migration patterns and their effects on development; the evidence of dynamic and reciprocal links between migration and development; and the centrality of migration in the socioeconomic process. All these are established facts underlying recent views on migration and development.

Neo-institutionalist theories look at how institutions intervene to bridge the individual and macro-social levels of analysis. Institutions are defined as “the formal rules, processes and norms, as well as the systems of symbols, cognitive schemes and ethical models which build the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action”. In such a view, which is influenced by social constructivism, institutions do not only influence individuals’ strategic choices, but also their most fundamental preferences. Interaction between institutions and individual agency is thus reciprocally constitutive and the concept of “rational action” by an individual appears to be socially constructed. Also, organisations evolve and change their institutional practices, not so much for increased efficiency, but rather to allow these new practices to enhance the social legitimacy of the organisation or that of their members (Hall / Taylor, 1997: 482-485).

Such an approach of migration issues, for it appears rather sophisticated, seems promising in opening new channels in explaining migration and development patterns. However, this sophistication is precisely the reason why, according to some scholars, the theory appears to be lacking “testability and predictive power”, and constitutes a “pattern theory, which can at best help us to delineate the structures that shaped policy outcomes in past instances”, for it acknowledges structures at the expense of individual agency (Boswell, 2007: 76). Indeed, uncovering the combination of “institutional” influences underlying actions and choices would require extremely detailed and small-scale fieldwork. Therefore, generalisation of individual or small-scale communities’ experiences to a wider socio-spatial level seems rather problematic. However, the theory itself does not deny the possibility for individual agency. Beyond the idea of the “normative dimension” of the institutions’ impact on individual behaviour (interiorisation by agents of behavioural norms stemming from institutions), lays the “cognitive dimension” of the institutions’ impact. According to this view, institutions influence behaviour by proposing schemes, categories and cognitive models which are indispensable for action, considering that otherwise, interpreting the world and other actors’ agencies would be impossible. Institutions influence behaviour not only by prescribing actions, but also by displaying the possibilities and potentialities of actions conceivable in a given context (Taylor / Hall, 1997: 483).

At the level of policy analysis, this theory also benefited from strong explanatory power, though the theory’s embeddings in a given (spatial, socio-political) context impairs its generalisation capacities. In such a view, migration policies are a crystallisation of perceptions linked to “conceptions or myths about country, nation, history and origin, people, citizenship and welfare”, or “an expression of a country’s national interest” (Hammar, 2001: 19). Policies are designed in relationship to “national dynamics (tied to political and legal cultures of democratic countries)” and to “international dynamics (tied to the structure of the international system and to the role of these countries in this system)” (Hollifield, 1997: 10). In other terms, the existence of measures aimed at managing migration (directly or otherwise) and debates pertaining to the issue, stem from that, more or less articulated and consensual, face: a ‘reason of state’ (“raison d’État”) in Foucault’s terms, as well, of course, as the various actors’ sometimes conflicting representations of the nation-state, i.e. of the coincidence between a national territory, its population and its sense of shared identity. Conceiving migration policies and debating around the topic, therefore, stands at the core of the political and social transaction process between actors, and helps along the “imagined nation” (Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1990). The apparent “failure” of policies, therefore, can also be interpreted as an integral

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44 Within the framework of “sociological” neo-institutionalism, which defines institutions in a broader manner than “historical” and “rational choice” schools of neo-institutionalism (Hall / Taylor, 1997: 482).

45 Berger / Luckmann, 1966.
part of the process of transaction between actors, which would lead, for example, to a policy discourse actually contradicting implemented actions. Hence, the concept of “liberal constraint” coined by James Hollifield (1992), that refers to the contradicting trends between satisfying immigration restrictions demanded by the population, on the one hand, and liberalising foreign labour desired by business owners and investors, on the other. This example refers to the view of the state as “infiltrated” by societal interests and groups. Also, the interplay between national and international actors and norms has a similar effect on migration policies 46.

Political economy approaches stand in contradiction with neo-institutionalist ones. Gary Freeman’s model (1995; 2005), for instance, “assumes that migration policy is essentially determined by the content and relative power weighting of organised interests in a given society. Policymakers are conceptualised as brokers who have an interest in producing policies that mollify (influential) organised interests. In line with most political economy accounts, Freeman argues that the more strongly a group’s interests are affected by immigration, the greater incentive it has to organise” (Boswell, 2007: 77). This theory assumes individual agency, as it is situated within the realm of neoclassical political economy, against the neo-institutionalist model which emphasizes (in the terms of Boswell, 2007: 78) “the role of shared values and belief in shaping peoples’ behaviour”, as seen above. Against the notion of “interests”, neo-institutionalists also oppose the “symbolic role” played by immigration, which goes beyond a rational assessment of their real impact on host countries (see also Hammar, 2001). Also, political economists generally view the state as a “broker” and a passive actor reacting to various interests (Boswell, 2007: 79). However, many authors have reappraised the state as a major actor in the migration policy-making process in the sending as well as in the receiving countries, even in the context of globalisation and the emergence of transnational networks 47. A recent study by G. Menz is a good example of a “balanced” political economy accounting for the way non state actors, especially employer organizations, trade unions, and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, attempt to shape migration regulatory measures through intense lobbying activities and political struggles at the national and EU levels. The intense bargaining and progressive emergence of “common principles” between actors regarding “managed migration” also finally led to a toughening of asylum policies in Europe (Menz, 2009).

Other, still rare, “mixed approaches” combine several theories of promising analytical or predictive capacities in order to develop more holistic views on migration, and thus understand migration patterns and policies through several steps and aspects (departure/perpetuation/return for instance), socio-spatial scales and levels (local/regional/national/international/transnational; micro-/meso-/macro-level; agency/structure) or dependant variables (employment or wage differentials, structural changes, networks, etc.).

Sarah Collinson for instance, proposes an approach to researching and analysing migration processes that combines a livelihood approach to exploring local-level migration dynamics with a relational political economy perspective that deepens understanding of the broader social, economic and political processes, interests and power dynamics interacting with migration at different levels (Collinson, 2009).

S. Castles defines his approach on the issue as “a political economy and a sociology of international migration, built around the central concept of social transformation and the way this is brought about simultaneously in South and North by neo-liberal globalisation” (Castles, 2008a: 14).

46 Yasemin Soysal, for instance, supports the view that migration policies implemented by numerous states have been pursued, not because they were more efficient but, rather, because they appeared more legitimate. Hence, the conception of human rights forwarded by international agencies in the field of migration policies (Soysal, 1994). Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke emphasize the role of welfare bureaucracies and legal institutions in granting rights to immigrants against rival norms and interests.

As such, the author proposes to reintegrate both migration and development within the wider process of social change, thus postulating that migration is a normal part of social relations and social change (Castles, 2008 a; b).

Resting upon this synthesis of recent trends for improving analyses of migration patterns and processes, the approach advocated for in this report is a mix between social transformation, neo-institutionalism, classical politico-economic approach, and its variation as put forth by two major socio-demography specialists, which stands close to the neo-institutionalist approach. According to P. Demeny and G. McNicoll, a “political economy” of migration trends and policies successfully captures the history and the many implications and outcomes of migration. The topic of a political economy of population issues is the challenges the latter pose for national governments and international institutions, and the responses these bodies have arrived at or must formulate (McNicoll/ Demeny, 2006). Challenges posed by demographic events as well as by demographic policies (here, migration issues and policies) ought to be resituated within the wider framework of actors’ representations of what is not only “the national” but also the other socio-spatial levels and scales they feel they belong to and act upon, i.e. analysed in light of the specificities of the institutional context (historical, economic, social and political), within which representations are built and within which policies are elaborated and implemented.

Migration as an intrinsic part of development: the “human development” paradigm

Following such a qualitative leap in the understanding of migration patterns and wide-ranging economic, social, cultural and political roots, outreach and stakes, a similar effort should be made to redefine and reframe the very notion of “development”, in order to address the process of policy-making.

The definitions and understanding of development have evolved along the broader social theories described earlier. Nowadays, the “structural transformation process at the macro-level – commonly referred to as ‘development’ –” (De Haas, 2009: 17) is again envisaged within the realm of economic theories which were prevailing in the 1950s, at the time of the “modernisation” approach. The demise of the dependency theory has been clear since the mid-1980s, as “conditions created by the new global competition in industrial goods and later in financial services became increasingly incompatible with the theories that had previously dominated economic thinking, that is, Keynesianism at the centres and anti-dependency import-substitution in the periphery”. All the more so after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, these conditions helped resurrect the neoclassical approach to development, with the support of international agencies’ conservative pro-capitalist decision-makers (at the World Bank for instance) (Portes, 1997: 237).

However, this trend has been balanced from the 1990s onwards by the alternative views on development provided by the “human development approach” developed by economist and 1998 Nobel Price winner Amartya Sen.

Breaking with paradigms of development and ways to achieving human well-being solely focusing on economic performance, Sen addresses development challenges as multifaceted and requiring a multidimensional approach. Resting on the claim that “People are the true wealth of nations”, human development is “a process of expanding people’s choices”, or “capabilities” as well as “entitlements”, “the people’s basic right to these ‘choices’” (Fergany, 2002). The expansion of “capabilities” is the starting point towards development: “the purpose of development is to improve human lives by expanding the range of things a person can be or do, such as to be healthy and well nourished, to be

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48 Which claimed that “development was a question of instilling the ‘right’ orientations – values and norms – in the cultures of the non-Western world so as to enable its people to partake in the modern wealth-creating economic and political institutions of the advanced West” (Portes, 1997: 230).

knowledgeable and to participate in the community life. Seen from this viewpoint, development is about removing the obstacles to what a person can do in life, obstacles such as illiteracy, ill health, lack of access to resources, or lack of civil and political freedoms” (Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 303). The two central features of the people-development link are defined by Sen as its “evaluative” aspect and its “agency” aspect. The first “is concerned with evaluating improvements in human lives as an explicit development objective and using human achievements as key indicators of progress […]. The second is concerned with what human beings can do to achieve such improvements, particularly through policy and political changes” (Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 303-304).

Rooted in quantitative economics (W. Petty, F. Quesnay), in political economy’s approaches (Adam Smith, D. Ricardo, R. Malthus, K. Marx, John Stuart Mill) and in moral philosophy (E. Kant, John Rawls and his definition of individual well-being as the possession of “social primary goods”, for instance), the capabilities approach to well being and development initiated by Sen and later developed by other scholars like Martha Nussbaum, is pluralistic and multidimensional. It thus breaks with neoliberal approaches, which see human well-being as “utility maximization” and neglect political factors such as rights and freedoms. Economic growth is only a means and not an end in itself: focus is put on what people can do instead on what they have. “Moving the discussion away from utility and towards ‘capabilities’ allowed Sen and Nussbaum to distinguish means (like money) from ends (like well-being and freedom). […] While Rawls limited his analysis of social welfare to the ‘social primary goods’ that rational humans need or desire, and ‘negative freedoms’ that involve the absence of interference, Sen and Nussbaum expanded on this base to include ‘positive freedoms’ as well like freedom from being constrained by poverty or lack of education” (Stanton, 2007: 9).

Capabilities approach can thus be seen as the crossroad between economy and philosophy; it strongly states that “economy’s final aim is social and relies upon underlying forces political in nature” (Brouillet / Dubois, 2004). Moreover, “Sen and Nussbaum’s work stands out from that of their predecessors because of inclusion of human beings’ role as agents of their own well-being, and because of the centrality of human agency both as an end in itself, and as a means to other important capabilities or freedoms” (Stanton, 2007: 10). Human development and its conceptual framework was adopted as a development paradigm in an increasing number of international and national advocacy campaigns and publications, starting with UNDP Human Development Reports from 1990 onwards.

In such a view reconciling agency and structures as complementary for engineering a comprehensive development processes, migration is an integral part of human development. Yet, its effects range far beyond stimulating the remitting funds back to the country of origin, reinforcing circular migration schemes and curbing the “brain drain” phenomenon. Indeed, as stated by De Haas, first, “people can only move if they have the capability to do so and, thus mobility can be conceived as a way of exercising capabilities” and, second, “the act of moving in itself can add to people’s wellbeing. This is obvious in […] the desire for adventure and curiosity, […] the intrinsic argument why mobility is an integral part of human development. The more instrumental reason is that the act of migrating – the move to a place offering more opportunities in terms of work, education, political rights, safety, health care- may also give people the capabilities to increase their social, economic and political freedoms […]” De Haas (2009, 21-22). Indeed, considering “development as freedom”, the freedom granted by capacities is manifested in mobility (the “freedom of moving and working” (Sen, 1999)), as well as, alternatively, in non-migration, i.e. the freedom not to migrate. Conversely however, a lack of capacities accessible to citizens, or the impossibility to make use of them in a specific context, due to economic, social, cultural or political pressure, can lead to, what is, in one way

50 “In neo-classical economics ‘utility’ is a term that has come to mean an individual’s mental state of satisfaction, with the proviso that levels of satisfaction or utility cannot be compared across individuals. […] As measurement has become increasingly central to the field of economics, the accepted metric for social or aggregate welfare has been defined implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) in terms of money, or, more specifically, as national income per capita […] Sen points to a fierce opposition to pluralism of ideas as a defining characteristic of utilitarianism. Utilitarians insisted on having a single measure of human well being, as opposed to different and non-commensurable elements” (Stanton, 2007: 3-4).
or another, forced migration, which does not only refer to violent deportation but also to subtler cases where unequal access to opportunities subtracts from personal fulfilment. In such a case, capabilities may help the migrant increase his well-being, if political expression is allowed in the receiving country or, at least, if a receiving country grants material support to migrant category refugees, for instance. In other cases, discrepancies between, on the one hand, the capabilities of the migrants and, on the other, the categories targeted for support or opportunities available for implementing capabilities, may lead to the increased precariousness of migrants.

This shows how migration, as well as development issues, are both deeply rooted in social change, in ways which can be fully appreciated at local to global socio-economic level, by an embedded practice of political economy and neo-institutional approaches. Moreover, in terms of policy-making, it can help reframe the web of representations underlying the policy-making process, that is a narrow categorisation of migrants (“forced” vs “economic”) and ignorance of the very specificities of each migrant context at every step of the process.

IV. The socio-political context of emigration dynamics from the SEM countries

Resting on this new theoretical framework for migration, the purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, I will briefly describe the emigration dynamics typical of the SEM sub regions. Second, I will deconstruct the economy-based views on Arab migration dynamics by emphasizing their socio-political background and, more generally, their structural background and outreach. And third, I will follow a political economy approach of migration and development policies run by the SEM countries, in order to shed light on what is at stake in population terms for the SEM regimes. By uncovering the institutional background to such policies, I will be able to explain their relative failure and I will then conclude by suggesting some amendments to macro-political contexts in the SEM countries, amendments likely to help curb emigration flows.

Migration dynamics from the SEM region

Though plagued with approximations and inaccuracies, available data on emigration from SEM countries suggest resilience and even an increase in the phenomenon, which in the 2000s has included some 12 million first-generation emigrants (according to data from origin countries). It could then represent on average 6.4% of the total population of the countries envisaged here (see note), amounting to 188 million in 2009. However, some countries like Lebanon show a proportion of expatriates in the range of 15% of their population. In Jordan, where only the number of expatriates in the GCC countries has been estimated (roughly 600,000 to 700,000, De Bel-Air, 2010), the latter already make up more than 10% of a population of 6 million.

According to available data, Arab countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and the GCC states are the principal destinations for emigrants from Egypt, Syria and Jordan (70% of Egyptian emigrants; and, as noted above, 10% of Jordanians are estimated as residing in the GCC countries alone). Emigrants from Lebanon, on the contrary, mostly (53%) depart for other regions (including Canada and the US,

51 Data presented in this paragraph are taken from Fargues, 2005, unless otherwise stated.
52 Data can be missing (no data on expatriates from Syria, Jordan; no data on immigrants broken down by nationality from GCC countries, for instance). They also depend on who counts, for what purpose, according to which definitions of migrants (foreign nationals born in the country; naturalized migrants born abroad or in the country; nationals born abroad…) (Fargues, 2005: 1-5).
53 See for example Fargues, 2005: 25 (table 5), on Morocco (consular data series) which show an increase of 6.3 in the number of emigrants between 1993 and 2004.
54 96% of Egyptian labourers are in Arab countries in 2008 according to Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Education, http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=59&callTable=1700.
Françoise de Bel-Air

and old-time destinations such as Latin America and West Africa). Conversely, the most frequent destination for migrants from the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) is Europe (82.5% of Tunisian emigrants; 85% of Moroccan emigrants). However, destinations for migrants from the Maghreb are increasingly diverse: expatriate Tunisian competences are distributed as follows: 54% in Europe; 25.8% in North America and 15.8% in the Arab countries (Bel Hadj Zekri, 2009a). Gulf countries seem to attract a modestly growing number of North-African migrants: the number of Moroccans officially residing in the GCC countries increased threefold from 1993 to 2004 to reach 48,000 persons. Yet, this figure is grossly underestimated and, moreover, it does not take into account the sizeable number of military and security personnel among the migrants (Khachani, 2009). Tunisians, similarly, are encouraged to emigrate abroad and the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation is involved in the placement of skilled workers in the Gulf countries (Bel Hadj Zekri, 2009b).

Irregularity also characterizes some of SEM citizens’ migration flows. Egyptian official data for example recorded some 10.9% of their permanent expatriates, or 90,000 of their citizens, in Italy as of 2000. However, OECD records only reported a stock of 32,800 residence permits for Egyptians in the same year. This discrepancy thus suggested that some 60,000 undocumented Egyptians may have been living in Italy that year, which was confirmed by expulsion measures implemented in 2003-2004 (Roman, 2008: 3-4). Pendular movements between Syria and Lebanon are said to involve a stock estimated from 400,000 to 500,000 workers across the years (Kawakibi, 2008: 3). The deaths of “harragas” also drew attention to the growing migratory pressure within the societies of these countries (Labdelaoui, 2009). Yet, the cooperation of Maghreb police and coast guards with the European authorities in curbing such flows notably contributed to their redirection towards other circulation routes. Moreover, an estimated 3.6 million irregular migrants are stranded, and sometimes also illegally working, in SEM countries (Fargues, 2009), a share of them (Sub-Saharan Africans, Iraqis, Central Asians...) hoping to be able to transit from SEM countries to Europe, Australia and North America (on Lebanon, see Doraï / Clochard, 2005; 2006). As noted before, the EU’s concern is to involve the SEM countries in the withholding of migrants on transit to Europe, either within their borders or back in their origin countries.

In general, a logical outcome of this constant increase in emigration from SEM countries is the upsurge in migrants’ financial remittances back to their families in origin countries, over the 2000s. In the case of Algeria, for example, third generation-migrants started sending remittances from abroad after the onset of national reconciliation and voluntary economic development projects (PSRE) in 2000, in unprecedented amounts which peaked in 2004 (Musette/ Labdelaoui/ Belhouari, 2007). In general, remittances increased everywhere through the 2000s and they are crucial for SEM countries’ GDPs: in 2009, in Lebanon remittances made up 22% of the country’s GDP; 16% of Jordan’s GDP; 6.6% of Morocco’s; 5.3% of Tunisia’s; and 4% of Egypt’s. Yet, World Bank data only take into account officially recorded remittances. As regards their use in development, “The funds are

55 Consular section data, Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.
56 Illegal immigrants from the Maghreb, lit. “burners” of borders, who embark on light boats or hide in trucks and cars to access European countries.
57 For example, between Italy and Tunisia, Italy and Libya.
58 Algeria’s economic growth resumed from 2000 onward. It reached a yearly average of 4.7% since the “programme de soutien à la relance économique” (PSRE) was launched in 2001. Algeria’s main macro-finance indicators have improved in 2006: estimated GDP per capita which was around 1,457 US $ had more than doubled in 2006, to 3,443 US$ (Musette/ Labdelaoui/ Belhouari, 2007).
59 World Bank Migration and Remittances Factsheets, 2011. For 2001, Jordan’s remittances made 23% of its GDP. Remittances flows have increased steadily since then, yet, the total GDP increased more rapidly due to economic diversification (in industry for instance).
60 For Syria, for example, the low level of official remittances may be explained by the statistical “invisibility” of Syrian migrants to Lebanon, who do not appear in statistics and who do not use visible financial channels to remit funds (bank
intended primarily for consumption purposes. They are used to improve education, health and housing conditions and only a fraction is channeled directly into productive investment” (Femip, 2008).

This point raises questions as it seems to contradict the increase in migrants’ remittances: the apparent settlement abroad of expatriates. Traditionally, migration to the Gulf, for example, is said to be “temporary”, considering that most GCC countries do not allow for the naturalization of foreign nationals, or for the full ownership of businesses and real estate. Yet, it took the First Gulf War (1990-1991) to forcefully uproot the foreign Arabs from Kuwait and the other Gulf states: some had been residing there since the 1950s, and before the conflict most seemed to be settled in those countries (Fargues, 1991).

Similarly, some studies suggest that second generation SEM citizens may be less likely than their parents to resettle in the origin country of their family. A survey conducted in 1998 on Moroccans residing abroad (MRE) showed that only 82% of heads of expatriated households answered “yes” to the question whether or not they intended to return to the home country, along with 73% of the spouses and only 35% of their children. Interestingly, few years later in 2005, only 57% of heads of households, 53% of spouses and the same proportion of their children (35%) were answering “yes” to this question (Mghari, 2008: 5-6). This suggests a progressive anchorage abroad for Moroccan expatriates, as generations pass and socio-economic, as well as political difficulties persist in the origin country.

This issue of the migrants’ de facto settlement in host countries is important, in the sense that it feeds doubts and criticisms addressed to all-economic interpretations of migration, which suggest that migrant workers and their offspring would logically move back to their origin country upon retirement, with the onset of unemployment or at the end of their employment contracts. The necessary revision of migration theories in encompassing a wider range of explanatory and “structural”, background factors will now be documented, for the SEM countries.

Reassessing the “root causes” of Arab SEM migration and its resilience

Politics as a spur for emigration

Only a few SEM countries have experienced political violence as a spur for emigration, such as Palestine’s enduring state of armed conflict and wide-ranging crisis or the Lebanese wars of 1975-1989 and 2006. G. Hourani and E. Sensening-Dabbous suggest that Lebanon also saw increased trends of emigration following the 2006 war, and that there is a reluctance to return given the enduring political crisis and its effects on the perceived personal security situation in Lebanon (Hourani / Sensening-Dabbous, 2007).

In general, alongside economic factors, political and socio-political factors rank high in migration decisions, even if most often producing a generalised climate of “lack of confidence in the future” and a “general and political situation” favouring emigration (USJ / OURSE, 2008). In Algeria, the “degradation of the socio-political situation is so acute that emigration became an overwhelmingly accepted escape” (Khalfaoui, 2006: 10). In Tunisia, according to a longitudinal national survey carried out by the Ministry of the Youth in collaboration with the National Institute of Statistics, the

(Contd.) account transfers, money transfer services). They resort to credit letters (hawala) or deliver cash by hand (personal communications, 2000s).


61 35% of the young Lebanese aged 18-35 years surveyed in 2007 within the project “Young Lebanese emigration and their future projects” were intending to emigrate from the country. Out of these, 11% gave “lack of confidence in the future” (2%) and “the general and political situation” (9%) as a justification for wanting to move, i.e. 31% of the subgroup of potential emigrants (tab. 11, USJ/ OURSE, 2008).
proportion of young people (aged 15-29 years old) declaring that they wish to migrate has risen from less than a quarter (22%) in 1996 to more than three quarters (75.9%) in 2005. Moreover, this potential emigration trend concerns all individuals regardless of their age, sex, level of education and economic activity (Fourati, 2008), which suggests that economic poverty is not the only issue underlying such a trend. Indeed, many associations have highlighted the need to map out the real causes of emigration (Zekri, 2004: 16).

**Structural causes to migration and its perpetuation**

Indeed, objective poverty and lack of development is more of an obstacle to migration than a spur, as highlighted above in chapters II and III. The necessity to meet important purchase purposes, strategies for professional status enhancement and training, or the increasingly consumerist nature of the SEM societies, pushes emigration along so that citizens can face up to the raising prices of basic commodities and an increasing materialistic pressure more generally. However, a political economy perspective reintroduces economic factors in an institutional framework which gives them structural and socio-political outreach.

**First,** emigrating is undoubtedly a response to unemployment, under-employment or unstable employment, which particularly hits young people, educated or not, male and female in every SEM country. In Lebanon in 2007, 35% of the young people surveyed saw employment opportunities as the biggest positive reason for emigration (USJ/ OURSE, 2008: 7, tab. 12). Also, the same survey pointed to the fact that the labour market was less open to educated youth (holding baccalaureates and university degrees) than to the less educated ones (USJ/ OURSE, 2008: 6). In Jordan similarly, the rate of unemployment for holders of university degrees (baccalaureate and above) is the highest, standing at 18%, as compared to an average unemployment rate of 14-15% among the population aged 15 and above. For Tunisia experts note how the increase in the proportion of highly-skilled citizens did not see a parallel creation of skilled-employment opportunities, thus leading to an increase in unemployment, followed by a surge in graduate emigration (Fourati, 2010). Lastly, high turn over and the instability of employment in a context marked by the development of globalised firms relying on standardized technical skills (such as manufacturing and subcontracting for services), also contribute to the perception of the difficulty of accessing the labour market, as well as personal fulfilment. Such dynamics, however, reach out beyond economic, market-related sphere; general and selective (targeting the highly-skilled in the SEM countries) unemployment as well as the rapid turn over of jobs, are related to economic, as well as social planning in the framework of globalisation.

**Second,** the globalisation of the region’s economies and the subsequent massive liberalisation and deregulation policies have led to a complete reshuffle of the role and patterns of labour in economy. The globalisation process started with the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), and expanded with the free-trade agreements (FTAs) signed by almost every country in the region and implemented at various levels of intensity. These measures have had specific outcomes for young workers, both

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63 Following the progressive liberalization of all national economies, in the framework of the structural adjustment programmes and various politico-economic negotiations undergone from the mid-1980s onwards.

64 Unemployment rates for Jordanians aged 15+, by sex and educational level (Jordan Employment and Unemployment Survey 2005). Such figures are widely considered underestimates.

65 Structural adjustment programmes were negotiated with the IMF and the World Bank in many SEM countries: Morocco (1983), Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria (1986), Jordan (1988). Even Syria launched a process of structural adjustment (1991), yet without borrowing from IMF. Also liable to affect economies and, moreover, social and political institutions are WTO membership (every SEM countries have joined or are under negotiations except Syria), Association Agreements with the EU (ratified with Morocco (2000), Tunisia (1998), Egypt (2004), Jordan (2002), Palestinian Territories (1997); under ratification for Algeria (since 2001), Lebanon (2002) and Syria (2004)). The 2004 Agadir Agreement (a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt) was completed in January 2005 by the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and signed by most members of the Arab League. Within the ENP, Action plans are negotiated between the European Union and the partner states on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, thus progressively
men and women. SAPs have seen cuts in the provision of education and training, as well as, most importantly, in public employment: in Morocco for instance, the governmental sector used to create some 400,000 jobs a year until 1983, when the country signed up for its SAP; from then on, the provision of public sector employment fell to 14,000 jobs yearly (Sadiqi, 2007: 8). Privatisation schemes were implemented, in order to boost productivity but also to strengthen the stability of states faced with financial bankruptcy. Free-Trade Agreements also led employers to invest in sectors characterized by relatively low-wage jobs: manufacturing, for instance. In countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Syria where the economy was already based on small-scale, low value-added activities, there was the need to develop exports for the restructuring of such sectors, along with upgrading schemes with clear and pre-set objectives. In general, privatisation and liberalisation saw a contraction in public sector employment opportunities and the restructuring of public and private enterprises which suffered from competition with foreign firms, in the West and in Asia. As a consequence, many businesses were obliged to reduce their work force; moreover, “the work available was invariably at the low-skill, low-pay end of the spectrum, and […] economic opportunities were reduced” (Flynn / Kofman, 2004: 67).

This combination of factors had strong effects on the economic prospects of the young, such as in Jordan, where young nationals had high reservation wages, “based on expectations of obtaining public sector or foreign jobs” (Razzaz/Iqbal, 2008). Due to increasingly disappointing standards of living, and to the devaluation of labour, the emigration of the skilled and the highly-skilled accelerated.

In the case of unskilled or semi-skilled labourers liberalisation and deregulation policies had an effect on emigration trends. The world-system approach on migration by Sassen (1988) sheds light on how the movement of industrial capital to peripheral locations in search of cheap labour produces new dislocations in receiving societies. Local manpower is suddenly exposed to different, mainly western, cultural practices. Also, as jobs in those economic sectors are usually of short duration, this young manpower is, thus, quickly left unemployed, with a combination of aspirations and qualifications which it acquired during its period of employment. This situation can push young workers to emigrate, and to search for further opportunities abroad. In Jordan for example, young manufacturing workers originating from rural areas, women mainly, only recently gained salaried labour. Although the phenomenon is new and has yet to be assessed numerically, they seem increasingly to turn to emigration in order to pursue their self-achievement through labour, which is hampered in the

(Contd.)
Kingdom by the lack of available opportunities for their educational profile and by the burden of social conservatism towards women of modest rural origins (De Bel-Air, 2011).

Third, liberalisation and deregulation policies also led to a reshuffle of the role of labour in the state-society relations and in the social structure more generally: labour can no longer act as a socio-economic “safety valve”; neither does it absorb job seekers to guarantee a minimal level of income and social rank; nor, indeed, does it fulfill social and political ambitions. Many emigrate who are employed, but who perceive their situation as lacking future prospects, financial prospects, career-related prospects and also, more generally, the impossibility of acquiring a social existence and an active role71 (De Bel-Air, 2010). This difficulty ranges from not being able to get married or to access independent housing, which requires better financial means, to acquiring an influential position, able to promote personal and family status up to and including exerting political power, even if only at the local level.

Alignments of SEM economies on international standards of productivity, also bars most workers from achieving their ambitions in terms of social status within the private sector, now poorer in opportunities for clientelist72, or “personal”, patron-led recruitment. Cuts in public sector jobs had therefore a devastating effect on state-society dynamics. After all, this sector had traditionally absorbed most educated nationals and had given them a social position. In the authoritarian, (neo)patrimonialist73 regimes, typical of most SEM countries with the exception of Lebanon, the public sector dominated the economy; it provided a minimal income, but social mobility, to the middle class and to the increasingly qualified young. In return for such a neopatrimonial “redistribution” of resources by job creation, these governments could claim political allegiance from the population. Yet, today authoritarian regimes remain and continue to claim allegiance, while redistribution dried out. Therefore, the “rationalisation” of the economy is perceived in the population as an act of abandonment, even as treason by citizens. To some extent, the contraction of state sector is perceived as the end of “climbing up” in the system; with upward social mobility processes, now confined to a minority of foreign-educated technocrats and, particularly, to the ruling elites and their allies74. The socio-political outreach of labour and economy, in the liberal system, has changed. Yet regimes have not, as we will now see75.

This leads us to a fourth, more general argument for exploring the structural causes of emigration and its continuance. The justification given by many emigrants, of a lack of future prospects, whether financial, career-related or the difficulty in acquiring a position in the society and polity, points to the blockage of societies and the stagnation of the elite-renewing process.

One of the “blockages” is that of gender. Societies in the SEM region are conservative on gender issues: even though in most of the region women enjoy education rates similar, at least, to that of men, their level of economic participation is generally low. The generations born in the late 1960s inaugurated progressive gender equality in education. So much so that today SEM enrolment rates in

72 The clientelist relation is a “vertical, dyadic alliance between two persons of unequal status, power and resources; each one of the two sees a purpose and use in having an ally inferior or superior to himself” (Leca / Schemel, 1983: 455). Corporate, horizontal links of exchange of favours typical of bureaucratic, military societies may also be included within the realm of clientelism (Lande, 1983).
73 The patrimonial system reproduces patriarchal-like relationships at the level of the population as a whole: the Patriarch/leader/patron dispenses resources, social control and security, in return to his children/subjects/clients’ allegiance. “Neopatrimonialism differs from patrimonialism in that it variously combines and overlays the informal structures of patrimonialism with the formal and legal structures of the state […]” (Brynen, 1995: 24-25).
74 As will be developed later on in this chapter.
75 This imbalance in the “allegiance for food” (Tell, 1993) state-society relationship, due in part to neoliberal reforms and also to new engineering of corruption by the various regimes in the region, is usually undermined in policy-making writings on the SEM area. Even the last UNDP Report on Egypt, for example, does not mention such explanations for the young Egyptians’ continuous reliance on state apparatus for job creation (UNDP. *Egypt Human Development Report*, 2010).
primary and secondary levels are similar for girls and boys. At the university level (from BA to PhD) there are even 102 women for every 100 men in Jordan for 1975-1985\textsuperscript{76} generations; in Egypt for the 1970 generation, rates are 66 women for 100 men. However, the activity rates (corrected) of females aged 15 and more are only 27% and 35%, respectively. For the Arab region as a whole (including Yemen and the Gulf region), female activity is only 33%, lower than the world average (55%)\textsuperscript{77}. Moreover, delay in the age of first marriage and the emergence of female celibacy further reflects the tension between the enduring patriarchal domination (domination of age and gender) and increasingly educated and ambitious women (Fargues, 2000; 2003; De Bel-Air, 2008)\textsuperscript{78}.

More generally – though this may not be particularly well articulated by actors – emigration is also perhaps a reaction to a national context of nepotism, (neo)patrimonialism, clientelism, and corruption, which plague all countries in the region and their educational and professional environments. The stability of the region’s neopatrimonial clientelist regimes depended to an important extent on the redistribution by the state of rentier-type resources (i.e. not deriving from a productive economic system, bound to upset the neopatrimonial social order) which allowed for a citizen’s political participation by limiting direct levies and, moreover, by promoting passive consumerism\textsuperscript{79}. In the SEM region, the only rentier states are oil-exporting Algeria and Libya\textsuperscript{80}. However, every country in the SEM region benefited and still benefits from quasi-rentier incomes, to which recipient governments or regimes can resort in a way similar to that of the domestic redistribution of oil revenues, as stated by H. Beblawi. Foreign aid is the main source of such income: in the 1960s, Syria and Egypt for instance received important military and development aid from the USSR. Later on, Egypt again, as well as Jordan, started receiving sizeable amounts of US aid. As of now, these two countries with the PNA and Lebanon are still on the American aid list, Egypt being (with Israel) the world’s top- recipients of American aid\textsuperscript{81}. Until the First Gulf War, Arab aid, especially from the Gulf oil-producing countries and, after 1985, from the Baghdad Summit partners in the region, also flowed into Arab countries. Geographic and geopolitical situations also became an asset for channelling rent: Arab aid was particularly generous for countries bordering Israel and for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO); the Suez Canal revenues and oil pipelines royalties contributed to Egypt’s and Syria’s income. Egypt in 1990 offers a good example of the diversity of rentier-like revenues: in 1990, 45% of the country’s GDP was represented by exogenous elements (to be understood as ‘rentier’) in the form of oil revenues, workers’ remittances, foreign aid, Suez Canal revenues, and tourist expenditure. Moreover, “it also to be noticed that most of these revenues accrue directly to the state or the government” (Beblawi, 1990: 97)\textsuperscript{82}.

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\textsuperscript{76} According to the latest Jordanian national census, held in 2004. This figures covers up, however, for the fact that young males emigrate abroad to study, and young females more rarely.

\textsuperscript{77} Fargues, 2003: table 1. Activity rates displayed in the paper have been corrected by the UN, to include home-based activities.

\textsuperscript{78} Evidence from Jordan showed that young unmarried women (whether highly or less educated), and especially, the ones from popular and/or rural background, increasingly resorted to emigration to Gulf countries for work, in order to overcome the family and society conservatism, and to attempt self-fulfilment (De Bel-Air, 2010).

\textsuperscript{79} Summed up in the aphorism “no representation without taxation” (Beblawi, 1990: 89). Apart from tax exemption, resources are financial redistributions, goods and services. In the rentier system, it can be said that: “the state has reduced formal politics to the issue of distribution, and participation to the realm of consumption” (Singerman, 1995: 245).

\textsuperscript{80} Even in Syria, “the oil sector provides about 20 per cent of the government’s revenues and about 40 per cent of its export receipts, according to data from the World Bank. Oil, exports of services and remittances are the main sources of foreign earnings, and allow the government to finance its imports” (Roscoe, A. “Syria must follow Jordan’s economic example”, Supplement: Middle East Economic Review 2010).

\textsuperscript{81} http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB954.pdf

\textsuperscript{82} Indeed, expatriate workers’ remittances, the only external input to the balance of payments which is shared by all countries in the region, is a private income, thus to be distinguished from revenues accruing to the state.
The liberalisation of economies in the region, and their progressive incorporation into the global economy, did not, however, shake the characteristic seizing of resources by States in the region. Foreign aid and loans, which are now distributed within the realm of various schemes and providers (foreign states, federation of states such as the EU, international and intergovernmental agencies) and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) are sizeable enough to entice the structuring of state-societies links around patron-client relationships, though in evolving country-specific shapes and forms.

What is common to every SEM country is the blockage of social rise and professional advancement out of the channels of clientelism, in the public and private sectors. The resilience of state domination in the economic and socio-political spheres in spite of the ongoing liberalisation processes in the region, the collusions and exchanges of favours and the webs of influence between public and private sector for private entrepreneurs to be able to make business, and, more generally, the restructuring of power relationships and political competition patterns, as a reaction to the opening of new channels of financial inflow (e.g. EU aid for the restructuring of SEM countries’ economies) are attested by numerous studies on entrepreneurship in Arab countries. The “Dutch disease” and overinflated bureaucracies may have faded with economic liberalisation schemes, thus creating, as noted above, insecurity; yet in return for this, equal and skills-based access to opportunities is still hampered by the resurgence, resilience or reinvention of clientelist networks. As a matter of fact, the renewing of elites is made problematic in such a system. Not that patronage and clientelist networks do not evolve; certain elites, indeed, lost their pre-eminence with the onset of privatisation and liberalisation schemes. However, assets able to compete with the web of patronage networks, wealth for example, are not given to all and usually stem from a reliance on a personal network of support. If social and professional advancement request the support of patrons, skilful citizens deprived of such support will be barred from ever reaching their goals. Also, systematic recourse to patrons can discredit the successful candidate, in public opinion and within competing clientelist networks. Yet the main obstacle to the renewing of elites is, above all, that the fact that the reproduction of elites guarantees that of the clientele networks, and vice versa. Thus, innovation and change do not characterise SEM countries’ societies, caught between economic opening and political closure, aptly summed-up in the concept of “authoritarian liberalism” coined by C. Geertz (1973).

**Fifth**: Consequently, free political expression and functioning democracy are not characteristic of SEM countries. This is another of the structural causes for emigration from SEM countries and their perpetuation: emigration in general, and that of the highly-skilled in particular (“exit”), which remains the only outlet for public expression (“voice”) (Hirschman, 1970; Ahmed, 1997) on the part of the frustrated would-be middle-classes.

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84 Refers to the cases whereby the rapid development and over-exploitation of a natural resource give the latter a dominant share in a country’s exports, thus leading to the setting up of a State bureaucracy with unproductive expenditures.

85 Name, prestigious descent and social capital increasingly have to be sustained by economic and political capital. Competition and affairism developed at the expense of old, traditional elites, who did not always adapt to the changing and diversifying nature of available rentier resources in recent history. In Jordan, for example, loyalty to the Hashemites, a prosperity essentially based on land-ownership, stopped being sufficient for certain great families, most of them Tcherkess and Bedouin, to retain their prestige.
V. SEM countries’ migration-for-development policies: a view from political economy and neo-institutionalism

Migration and development policies in the SEM countries

After having explored the socio-political background of migration from the point of view of migrants from the SEM region, the question that must be asked is whether migration policies implemented in the SEM countries are bound to remedy such “push” factors. I will analyse the discourses concerning expatriation and expatriates and the policies and institutions set up by SEM countries of origin directed at their expatriates. By so doing, I intend to clarify the political stakes, outcomes and opportunities of the migration-development nexus, as conceived and addressed by the SEM regimes and by other socio-political actors.

1. Institutional design as a reflection of countries’ policy towards national migrants?

It is worth noting that no regional initiative or institutional setup is involved in the issue of migration: there is a “lack [of] a vision of regional integration in migration matters and neither the Arab League nor the Arab Labour Organization have been able to coordinate their member states in this regard” (Roman, 2006: 10). However, SEM countries all set up institutions and measures aimed at linking expatriates with their origin countries. But their designs show the divergences existing between countries in terms of the scope of their actions, in their policy outlook towards emigrants and more generally, in the way they incorporate or fail to incorporate expatriates into the polity.

Governmental institutions set up to deal with expatriate affairs are mostly of a high-profile, ministry-level bodies (in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria) and institutions (Algeria: Ministerial Delegate in charge of the National Community Established Abroad attached to the Ministry of National Solidarity and, since September 2009, the Consultative Council of the National Community Abroad, where 94 members represent the Algerian public administration and the Algerian community abroad; Morocco: Ministerial Delegate for the Prime Minister Responsible for Moroccans Resident Abroad (MRE) and the CCME, Council of the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad). Only in Jordan are these institutions split between two ministries’ (the Departments of Expatriates at the Foreign Affairs and Labour ministries).

The design and scope of institutions dealing with expatriates is important, in the sense that it signals the attention given (or not given) to “the increasingly multidimensional nature of the concerns of the communities: housing, education, social security, customs, personal status, investments and the law” (Brand, 2006: 75). Jordan’s attention in that matter can be seen as being limited to seeing its expatriates either as workers, or as mere passport holders heading abroad. At the other end of the spectrum, a country like Morocco displayed an evolving, yet constant attention to emigrants through its network of amicales and through task-specific institutions. One is the ANAPEC (Agence nationale de Promotion de l’Emploi et des Compétences) which deals with the management of labour

86 Information based on contributions to CARIM project and MPI, 2010.
87 Officially geared towards establishing contacts with the consulates and generally all the bodies concerned with the situation of the immigrants and their families, these associations of expatriates also served the purpose of control (of activists within the workers’ community, as supported by host countries’ business communities) and, more generally, control of the community abroad. It also served to convey information from the Moroccan government to the expatriate population in Europe and policy elements, such as the promotion of remittances by expatriates back to Morocco (Brand, 2006: 71).
contracts with Europe\textsuperscript{88}. Another institution is the Fondation Hassan II for Moroccan Resident Abroad, created in 1990 by royal decree\textsuperscript{89} (Brand, 2006: 80).

Information about migrants abroad also varies and appears in the representation of the national population, the definition of citizenship vs. nationality, as well as in the national borders, borders which will be discussed later in this essay. Statistical information on expatriates is regularly made available to the public and to policy-makers, for example by concerned ministries, by consulates, by ANAPEC, by CERED (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches démographiques) in Morocco, by some independent research centres and by CAPMAS in Egypt, by OTE in Tunisia. This contrasts with the paucity or even the absence of data available on migration issues from, for example, the Jordanian Department of Statistics, which does not upgrade and centralise existing data from the Labour Ministry regarding workers, or, indeed, from the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding general consular coverage of expatriates, nor does it organise comprehensive surveying on Jordanian expatriates’ issues\textsuperscript{90}. Lebanon, similarly, has no reliable statistics for its citizens (and former citizens having lost their nationality) abroad, for reasons pertaining to the political sensitivity of population counts and the demographic balance of religious and sectarian groups in the country, which forbid any such endeavour.

More generally, institution-setting signals the institutional acknowledgement of a social phenomenon and a socio-political policy-shift, hence the replacement of mostly labour-placement-oriented Direction de l’Emigration by the Office des Tunisiens à l’Etranger (OTE) in 1988 after Ben Ali came to power, with a body dealing with expatriates abroad in Tunisia in 1987. Professional training and placement was, from then on, to be carried out by the Office de la Formation professionnelle (for low- and unskilled workers), as well as by the Agence tunisienne de la Coopération technique (for skilled labourers and managers) (Brand, 2006: 116). A change in institutional setting also stemmed from the Moroccan authorities’ shift of views on expatriates in the early 1980s, and signalled an evolution of policies from a rejection of émigrés’ assimilation abroad to an acknowledgment that they were gradually integrating in Europe. Such an acknowledgement led to the above-mentioned institutional and policy shift, the setting up of the Fondation Hassan II and the progressive evolution of former control and placement policies into socio-political policies aiming at preserving or reconstructing ties of sovereignty with “real citizens” rather than “subjects” (Brand, 2006: 89).

The intensity of the ties, as well as the types, number and ambitions of governmental institutions and the measures directed at expatriation and expatriates vary greatly within the SEM region. Yet, these institutions are only an element of a discourse with citizens inside the country, with expatriates and, also, with foreign countries directly and indirectly involved in managing migration flows from SEM countries. Therefore, the institutional setup does not necessarily imply that policies run towards the expatriates will be efficient to spur development processes in the region.

Hence, discourses towards the role of expatriates in development will be further analysed through the lens of the policy-priorities defined in the Global Approach (stimulating remittances; enhancing ties with the diasporas; managing skilled migration to avoid brain drain; reinforcing circular migration schemes and facilitating return movements). Such targets are somehow addressed by every country in

\textsuperscript{88} Recruitment, training, legal advice, information on opportunities, placement of Moroccan workers in Europe, help upon reintegration to home country after return (ref.)

\textsuperscript{89} Its mission is for the promotion and protection of the Moroccan communities abroad which deals with “social” issues such as teaching Arabic, national culture, religion to expatriate children; organising summer vacation camps for them, granting financial assistance to needy MRE, financing cultural, associative and sport activities, for instance (Brand, 2006: 80).

\textsuperscript{90} Only estimates are (unofficially) aired from time to time, and this, even though Jordan has several institutions and higher education personnel to undertake such statistical studies. Yet, the only sample survey tackling expatriates was completed by the Royal Scientific Society in 1983. Currently, since 2009, a survey form is made available to Jordanian expatriates in the Gulf through Jordanian embassies’ labour attachés’ offices and websites.
the region, yet with a diversity of actors involved (states, associations, international organisations for
instance), a diversity of aims and policy focuses, as well as perceived successes.

2. Stimulate the remitting of funds and investment capital

Most initiatives are aimed at attracting financial input from expatriates.

Remittances

Some measures facilitate and reduce the cost of expatriate remittances transactions, while promoting
the use of banks for remittances for more secure transfers. Torres Ruiz and Lorca Corrons (2006)
provide examples of such measures, among which:

“- Lowering the high entry barriers to the remittances service providers, allowing alliances of new
comers with foreign financial institutions to use their branch network, promoting the integration and
modernization of the financial infrastructures supporting remittances” (for example, since November
2009, pre-paid Visa cash transfer cards allowing for money transfers to the Maghreb countries and
payment of purchases in more than 170 countries are available from Transcash Corporation91). Among
other measures, Torres Ruiz and Lorca also quote: “Allowing domestic banks to operate overseas can
also contribute to increase the alternatives for sending remittances; [provide] Incentives on the saving
of remittances: foreign currency and premium bank accounts, and special services targeted at migrants
needs, such as loans, pension schemes and bonds may encourage remittances indirectly; Tax
exemptions on incoming remittances”; “Travel and custom preferential treatment to migrants sending
home or bringing with them goods and equipment. For example, once a year, Tunisians are entitled to
import goods or services up to a custom value of a thousand Tunisian dinars without paying tax, and a
private vehicle, home equipment and furniture are tax free when they return.” (Torres Ruiz / Lorca
Corrons, 2006).

Another way of attracting financial input from expatriates is incentives for tourism: the necessity of
providing incentives for expatriates to spend holidays in their origin countries is one of the topics that
cuts across all discussions and debates between expatriates and governmental organizations.

Favour expatriates’ investments

Other measures aim at attracting and channelling funds and projects from expatriates to the origin
country, by: “Relaxation of exchange and capital controls. Some Mediterranean countries still limit
investment by non-residents, whether foreign or migrants living abroad, who in some countries have to
get authorization to even invest in certain real estate properties. For example, in Tunisia, non-residents
require prior approval from the Central Bank to purchase real estate and for investments that raise
foreign ownership to more than 50% of total capital. In Egypt, non-residents can own a maximum of
two real estate properties not exceeding 4000 square meters. In Lebanon, to register a company, local
residency and working permits are required, and to acquire real estate exceeding 3000 square meters a
permit is necessary. In Jordan, non-resident investment is limited to 50% of ownership in a given
sector of the economy, and approval is required for real estate transactions. In Syria, non-resident
investment cannot exceed 49% of invested capital, real estate ownership by non-residents needs
government approval, and residents are not allowed to open a foreign currency account” (Torres Ruiz/
Lorca Corrons, 2006. Active policies and institutional arrangements are in place to support the
diaspora and its engagement in the development of the homeland. Moreover, “[a]ccording to a recent
study commissioned by the European Investment Bank, a few Mediterranean countries have been
proactive in creating institutional support and incentive schemes for migrants such as:

91 http://www.webmanagercenter.com/management/article-83210-tunisie-immigres-transcash-une-solution-economique-pour-
les-transferts-d-argent
Training schemes. For example, the Algerian government has created knowledge transfer programs to engage groups of expert Algerian workers residing abroad in R&D and educational and training programs to improve productivity and to stimulate small and medium start-ups, particularly in high-tech sectors such as biotechnology for agriculture. The Tunisian government provides migrants and their families financing for studies to improve their skills.

Information campaigns on the different support and incentive schemes: fairs and reorientation visits for migrants and their families, and hotline for migrant investors in Tunisia” (Torres Ruiz / Lorca Corrons, 2006). Syria also organizes expatriate conferences on a regular basis, under the auspices of the Ministry of Expatriates. Apart from expatriate affairs, topics tackled are related to investments for development of Syria in the tourism, health, industrial, educational and R&D sectors. In Jordan, annual conferences were also organised by the Labour Ministry between 1985 and 1989, for the purpose of attracting their investment in Jordan. In 1998, the initiative resumed and conferences were held in 2001, in 2003, 2005 and 2008. They were put under royal patronage and involved high-ranking political and economic actors, including the Royal Court, various government ministries, the Jordan Investment Board and the Jordanian Businessmen Association (De Bel-Air, 2010).

“Support in legal and administrative disputes, and guarantees for investment. The Hassan II Foundation in Morocco, funded through donations from the profits of banks offering remittance services, supports residents abroad interested in investing in the home country, providing social and legal assistance, but also education and cultural exchange, cooperation, partnership and economic promotion” (Torres Ruiz / Lorca Corrons, 2006). Syria established in the mid-2000s an Expatriates’ Fund through which Syrians living abroad may safely invest in development projects, the main financing tool under the MOEX-UNDP project “With Syrian Expatriates For Development”. The Managing partners are the Ministry of Expatriates, the State Planning Commission and the United Nations Development Programme in Syria.

Yet, this impressive array of facilitation measures for expatriates’ financial involvement in the origin countries should not hide the fact that expatriates are not always privileged as investors. In contrast to the situation in Morocco and Tunisia, with the Jordanian 1995 Investment Promotion Law, the same legal, tax or other incentives are applied to Jordanian expatriates as to other investors from abroad (Brand, 2006), like in Algeria (Labdelaoui, 2009: 15).

3. Policies and institutional settings to tighten migrants’ socio-political links with the origin country.

Indeed, SEM states all try, though to various degrees, to establish ties with their expatriate communities. However, they also carefully measure the nature and scope of their commitments towards expatriates.

Discourses: discourses may not reflect effective measures focusing on emigrants; yet, they give a hint of the role granted to expatriates in the national population as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991). As stated by Laurie Brand for Lebanon, for example, Lebanon’s expatriates and residents are referred to as “a bird with two wings” (Brand, 2006: 133). Similarly, the Association des Algériens émigrés (AEE) was referred to as the “7th wilaya” until the mid-1980s (Labdelaoui, 2009: 8-92 http://ministryofexpatriates.gov.sy/cweb/MOEX_ENG/documentation_en/doc3_en.htm

93 The circular document for the Fifth Conference for Jordanian Businessmen and Investors, held in August 2008 under the title “Together We Build the Future Jordan”, states that: “because they are characterised by education and expertise, the business and investments Jordanian have been able to take up leading positions throughout this world, among the people of money and business in all sectors and keep up with scientific developments and adopt the highest levels of technology and modern skills. They have been able to build successful economic institutions by all measures, in the country and in the Diaspora”.

9) and, in Algeria the emigrants are now labeled “Algerian expatriate community”, which implicitly acknowledges the expatriates’ role as full members of the national population. President Bouteflika, calling on diaspora members to help fill the needs for competing urban, investments and modernisation projects, promised to put all efforts into “gathering necessary condition for [the diaspora] to find its real place in its country and to join Algeria’s elites, the builders of a societal project we all dream of” (Khelfaoui, 2006: 10-11). Even in Jordan, King Hussein’s speeches until the late 1980s referred to every Jordanian including expatriates as “al-Insan aghla ma namlouk” (the most precious human being we have) (De Bel-Air, 2003).

New views on the expatriate communities and the nature of their links with the homeland may be spurred by regime change and the redefinition of state-society links, as witnessed in the case of Tunisia: after Ben Ali’s access to power in 1987, the 1992-1996 Eighth Plan does not link unemployment and emigration abroad anymore, but emphasizes “the state’s claims to the loyalty of its expatriates, [the fact that] efforts were to be intensified to deepen Tunisian national identity among emigrants and to consolidate their ties with the home country”, a radical change of discourse regarding “what the state will do to preserve and reinforce [the expatriates]’ ties with the homeland and what the members of these communities abroad can do to contribute to the state’s development” (Brand, 2006: 102). By contrast, in Jordan, where until the 1990s, Five-Years Development Plans were always pointing at expatriates’ financial input to the GDP, under King Abdullah hardly any attention is given to expatriate citizens in recent official documents. The National Agenda released in 2006 only mentions emigration among measures likely to alleviate unemployment, through the creation of an “outplacement department” (HKJ, 2006: 26).

**Associations:** Migrant associations play a very important role in linking migrants abroad with their country of origin. However, it is not always clear to what extent such initiatives remain “private” (i.e. civil society creations), or whether, rather, they are set up and run under the supervision of sending countries’ governments.

In Tunisia, for example, migrant associations are classified along nine domains of intervention: social (support in the host country), cultural (promotion of the origin culture within migrants’ communities and host countries); female (dealing with migrant women and migrant families specific issues: integration; intergenerational dialogue); “new generation” (tackles youth issues and integration in the host countries, supports visits and exchanges with origin countries); schoolchildren and parents; sport; professional (economic sector-based groups of professionals in host countries, for placement, product marketing, information purposes); economic and investment (information on new legislations and investment opportunities in the origin countries); and scientific (network of expatriate scientists in host countries which also deals with advising on origin country’s scientific and educational policies). 556 such associations were registered as of 2008 (Bel Hadj Zekri, 2009: 4). In Lebanon, only 126 such associations were registered beginning in 2006, of which several stem from partisan concerns and have a political agenda linked to one or another of the Lebanese political factions (on the Maronite League, see Tabar, 2006). The Lebanese Cultural Union, for instance, even though its ambition was to gather Lebanese expatriates of every religion and background, has been paralysed since 1994 by the sectarian and political currents active in the country (Kiwan, 2008). More generally, emigrés’ associations may have political concerns over tightening political control over expatriates’ communities, such as in the case of Algerian and Moroccan amicales which first emanated from respective, the French branch of the FLN and from the Moroccan government, the latter also serving for information conveying and as a form of control over workers’ political activism (Brand, 2006). In other countries such as Jordan, by contrast, “national-cultural” or professional associations linking expatriates with the Kingdom do not display any political inclination likely to challenge the regimes in origin or host countries. They seem much rarer than in other countries, probably due to the fact that many Jordanian expatriates are of Palestinian origin and, therefore, may prefer to socialize or make business on the basis of solidarity ties based on Arab identity rather than common Jordanian citizenship. Close interaction with the host society and business
environment is also characteristic of Jordanian associations in the Gulf\(^95\) (De Bel-Air, 2011). Egyptians focus more on enhancing cultural (and religious) ties between Egyptians abroad, their descendants and Egypt (the General Union of Egyptians Abroad), while other associations provide an exchange of information and assistance in specific host countries (Egyptians abroad House, in the Gulf, the Association of Egyptians in Great Britain, Canada, etc.) (Sawi, 2005). It is important to note that host countries’ legislations can have an impact on the design and focus of immigrants’ national/ethnic/professional associations (Brand, 2006: 36).

**Socio-cultural integration of expatriates:** Social and cultural integration schemes between expatriates and their origin countries are not only performed by associations. SEM state institutions have increasingly ventured into making integration a policy. On Morocco and Tunisia, L. Brand suggests that such moves are part of the larger policy-shift stirred up by these countries’ governmental acknowledgement that their expatriate communities were progressively settling in Europe, at the end of the 1980s (Brand, 2006: chap. 3-4). Brand also linked the creation and the wide-ranging agenda of the OTE (Office des Tunisiens à l’Etranger) to the new Tunisian state’s will to better respond to the changed nature of problems faced by expatriate Tunisians. Also, the regime aimed at expanding the realm of control over the expatriate population by selectively targeting children (to help them integrate in the host country while maintaining their Tunisian roots); women (to help them counter social alienation abroad while encouraging the transmission of traditional values); skilled and well-educated businessmen (to enhance their role as potential investors in the home country); not to mention first-generation emigrants. The expected outcome of such programmes was to “develop[…] the community life of Tunisian abroad” and to “deepen[…] the sense of belonging to Tunisia among the younger generation of emigrants” (Brand, 2006: 118). Conversely, state intervention in the social realm also seems to be increasingly demanded by expatriates themselves. In Lebanon, as well as in Syria where expatriate conferences are held regularly under the auspices of the Expatriate Ministry, expatriate affairs always include claims for state cultural assistance: e.g. Arabic courses, summer camps, and homeland discovery trips for expatriates’ children\(^96\). Such claims are usually met by SEM governments. It must be emphasized here that these claims mostly emanate from expatriates in North America, Europe, and Oceania. In Jordan, whose migrants typically head to Arab Gulf countries and which considers its migrants to the West as permanent, state intervention in such fields is non existent.

As far as citizenship rights are concerned, expatriates usually claim that their being abroad complicates administrative procedures: the issuing and the renewing of official documents for example; the registration of civil-status events; exemption from military service… This naturally discriminates against them in terms of legal protection and access to social benefits and infrastructures: personal status laws; public university and higher education seats and scholarships; not to mention social security and retirement schemes. For Jordan the question of increasing expatriate children’s quota for the granting of public universities places has been requested for years by Jordanian expatriates’ families. Some initiatives emerge, however, such as the coverage of Moroccan women by the *Mudawana*, the new Civil Status Code. As the provisions of the *Mudawana* could eventually be applied to expatriates, Moroccan officials, including the Ministry in charge of MREs, the Justice and Social Development Ministries, partnered with the Ytto Foundation for women’s rights and other civil society groups. They toured Europe in autumn 2010, in order to promote the better understanding of the Code and its role in protecting the rights of every Moroccan woman abroad. In Jordan, measures were taken only recently to incorporate expatriates into social protection schemes. To reach Jordanian expatriates working outside the Kingdom and to facilitate their voluntary

\(^95\) Among these associations are the various Jordanian Associations abroad, and professional/ business associations (the Jordanian Engineers Association, or the Jordanian Business Council in Dubai and the Northern Emirates). Jordanian Association in Abu Dhabi: http://josad.com/ Jordanian Engineers Association: http://www.jea.org.jo/home/StaticPages/ArabicPages/AssComm/Coordination_Comm/main.html; Jordan Business Council: http://www.jbcdubai.com

\(^96\) http://ministryofexpatriates.gov.sy/cweb/MOEX_ENG/documentation_en/doc3_en.htm
contribution procedure to social security, the Jordanian Social Security Corporation has opened new windows abroad (in Kuwait in 2008, in the UAE in 2009 and, in the near future, in Qatar and Oman), through “Social Security Ambassador” scheme, a mobile branch for social security97 (De Bel-Air, 2011). Yet, investigation may show that these funds are also needed for present-day Jordanian workers retiring or leaving their employment. As for Maghreb countries, their expatriates’ host states in Europe provide social rights to workers and to some extent to their dependants, natives and foreign nationals alike providing that they reside in their host states. The issue of the Maghreb expatriates’ social rights (health insurances, retirements…) thus predominantly focuses on the schemes available upon return to the home country. The claims made on the home states are different for expatriates in countries where social protection schemes are available to non locals only at high costs, such as in some Gulf States.

Political integration between expatriates and the homeland: political citizenship rights are, in most cases, carefully ignored in public discourses and actions.

Algerian expatriates seem to have the least bad political integration scheme with the homeland. In terms of nationality rights, “Algerians abroad have enjoyed the advantages of the 2005 reform of the nationality law that grants Algerian women married to a foreign national the right to transmit Algerian nationality to their children” (Carim, 2010). On the contrary, other Arab nationalities can only be transmitted through the father; most SEM countries allow for dual citizenship (father’s citizenship and country of birth or residence’ citizenship), yet dual Arab nationality is officially forbidden in the region98. More generally, in the case of a long-term, multi-generational absence from the country of origin, administrative difficulties imposed on non-residents, as well as changing historical borders or parameters of citizenship, deprive some descendants from SEM countries from repossessing their parents’ or grandparents’ nationality. Jordanians of Palestinian origin are especially vulnerable to such uncertainties: the cutting of administrative and legal ties between Jordan and the West Bank in 1988 – a territory that Jordan had administered since 1950 – led to a reshuffle of nationality attribution patterns based on residency patterns. Some Jordanian-Palestinian expatriates settled in the Gulf since the 1950s, for instance, became stateless overnight (De Bel-Air, 2007). Long-term Lebanese expatriates, similarly, have difficulties proving their citizenship, lost over decades of absence and even since the time of Ottoman rule over the country: one of the major claims of Lebanese expatriate associations is the reclaiming of citizenship (Kiwan, 2008).

Algerians abroad have also participated, since 1997, in presidential and parliamentary elections, and they are represented by 8 out of 389 MPs in the National People’s Assembly. Moreover, as noted above emigrants are now labelled as the “Algerian expatriate community”. This acknowledges the expatriates’ full belonging to the national population (Khelfaoui, 2006: 10-11), as also reflected in the Algerian law defining the national population (Hammouda, 2005). Therefore, “such an acknowledgment makes possible a participation of emigrants differing from the traditional means such as remitting money to parents or building houses in the place of origin”, even if such precautions may also reflect the state’s worries about controlling the expatriates’ increasing political representation outside the country (Khelfaoui, 2006). Indeed, governmental attention towards expatriates is rarely politically neutral: some witnesses from Tunisia, for example, reported heavy pressures from their embassies abroad in the early 2000s for financial contributions to governmental bodies dealing with expatriates as well as for projects and social gatherings of community members99.

Unlike Algeria, other SEM citizens can vote from abroad only in presidential elections, if at all. Also, campaigns organized to entice expatriates to come back to the homeland to vote usually stem

97 Jordanian expatriates working there can apply for voluntary contribution for social security schemes in Jordan through cooperation with local or regional banks, in which employees have been trained on voluntary contribution procedures. Social Security Corporation (SSC). Annual Report 2009, Amman, p. 23.
98 1969 Arab League decision, which is, in fact, not implemented systematically by every country in the Arab region. League of Arab States, Decision no. 2491/Dal 51, March 3, 1969.
99 Personal communications.
from political strategies rather than from concerns for equal representation: in Lebanon for instance, expatriates are courted on sectarian grounds, political representation being based on sectarian affiliation. In Lebanon, the revision of the electoral law, in order to allow expatriates to vote and be represented, is a claim common to all sectarian groups.

It can be said that initiatives catering for links between national diasporas and origin countries are generally weaker on the side of the country. This restraint can be explained because of possible clashes between sending and receiving countries’ incorporation policies, especially as far as Maghreb migrants are concerned. However, implemented policies reveal the mistrust of origin countries towards expatriate communities; consequently, they seem to show a government’s will to channel contacts towards the economic and cultural spheres. Thus, one wonders how such limitations concerning a diaspora’s socio-political protection and involvement with origin countries can develop into a sustainable developmental input of these same communities.

4. Management of the Highly-Skilled Migration (HSM) and curbing of “brain-drain”

Such a remark also fits highly-skilled migrants, whose developmental input is, in one way or another, channeled and limited by origin countries’ governments.

Over the last twenty years, the emigration of highly-skilled migrants, “brain drain”, has progressively given ground to the perception that such an exodus is positive: apart from an increase in financial remittances, emigrants’ input can take the form of technology or knowledge transfers upon return after short-term migration (“brain chain”), or they can even represent a “brain gain”, whereby expected middle-to long-term benefits from migration promote increasing levels of education in origin countries (Carim, 2010). Yet, “[T]here are two ways to implement the brain gain: either through the return of the expatriates to the country of origin (return option) or through their remote mobilization and association to its development (diaspora option)” (Meyer/Brown, 1999). Every SEM country has clearly chosen the “diaspora option”, as nowhere is the physical repatriation of intellectual elites on the agenda.

Representations and discourses towards HSM

Moreover, nowhere in the region are official views on HSM negative nowadays: something that is not always true of SEM public opinion and the SEM popular press. Officials usually undermine the importance of HSM not in structural terms, but due to specific circumstances: for example, the mismatch between a rise in educational levels and employment opportunities, supposedly arising from short-term economic factors as suggested in Tunisia (Bel Hadj Zekri, 2009) as well as in Morocco (Belguendouz, 2010: 4-5). This avoids addressing the issue in structural, wide-ranging policy terms.

More systematically, however, the positive outlook on emigration sustains political benefits. The shift from a negative to a positive official perception of HSM from Morocco in the 1990s supported a “communication” operation, to improve the Moroccan diaspora’s image by pointing to the emergence of managers and elites within it. The profit expected was to justify a decrease in emigrants’ protection and assistance schemes (Belguendouz, 2010: 2). Similarly, in Jordan where an open-door policy to emigration supports a wide-ranging strategy of socio-political pacification and an ambition to make the Kingdom into a regional hub for information technology and (unofficially) a skilled manpower tank, a Jordanian member of the royal family involved in scientific and educational issues, speaking in a conference on Technology Commercialisation, suggested involving the Jordanian Diaspora in order to address the depletion of expertise in the field. Moreover, coming to terms with the fact that “the movement of human capital across borders is not a zero-sum game” and, rather, a “brain gain”, the Princess in question advocated “supranational thinking” 100.

Beyond the process of amending representations on migration, recent measures undertaken for the control of migration flows and the channelling of their outcomes for development mark the rapid emergence of international/ intergovernmental actors, as well as “civil society” actors, associations and networks in the field of migration management. Henceforth, states and governments will have to share their powers with these supra-national and popular institutions.

**Scientific Diasporas networks and associations**

Civil society associations and scientific diaspora networks gather expatriate capacities, and, therefore, are resources to tap for development at home. They are increasingly called upon in the framework of policies aiming at managing migration as the interface between governmental-international initiatives for mobilizing expatriate competences and the skilled diaspora. Their emergence also displays the considerable competences available from first, second and third-generation descendants of migrants from the SEM countries. Indeed, young entrepreneurs are frequently found among recent emigrants who benefitted from better education levels in most of the region or among bi-national sons and daughters of earlier emigrants who were educated in the host countries. Also, under the effect of neoliberal policies which reduce social benefits, as well as under the effect of persisting “ethnic” discrimination upon employment in host countries, the proportion of entrepreneurs is high among descendants of migrants (source).

Some of the scientific diaspora associations function at a regional level: the Tunisian Scientific Consortium (TSC); the Moroccan Association of Researchers and Scholars Abroad (MARS); and the Network of Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad (ASTA). These networks do have linkages to particular governmental agencies, the Higher Council for Science and Technology (Amman, Jordan) in the case of ASTA. Such networks aim at establishing and fostering communications and exchanges between members living abroad, linking them in this way to their counterparts in the country of origin. Their objectives include the educational, social, cultural and professional advancement of their members, as well as the economic, political and social development of the countries of origin, through conferences, seminars, workshops, focus group discussions, social events, short courses and training courses, publication of periodicals for disseminating research results and information and facilitating dialogue and discussion between members and between them and their counterparts at home (Meyer / Brown, 1999). Other such associations may have less leeway as they gather only one nationality, for example, the Moroccan association “Savoir et Développement” which promotes innovation and competence-sharing between expatriates and Moroccan businesses (Mghari, 2008: 4), the Network of Moroccan Students in ‘Grandes Ecoles’ while its Algerian counterpart (Réseau des étudiants algériens des grandes écoles, Reage), founded in 2005, has some 1400 members, students or graduates of the most prestigious French higher education establishments (HEC, Polytechnique, Mines, ...). Its declared aim is to build a strategic partnership between Europe, Algeria and the Algerian diaspora, in order to further Algeria’s development and influence in a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean space. Even Syria which does not have an articulated migration policy launched such an initiative, with the setting up of the association ‘NESTIA’ in 2001, which gathered Syrian expatriate and resident experts on specific issues. However, as in every other SEM country, the initiative encountered a lot of administrative obstacles, thus limiting its activities to a meeting on new technologies every two years (Kawakibi, 2009: 6).

**International programmes**

The Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) uses the expertise of highly-skilled expatriates by assisting them to return to their home country for short visits, during which the expatriates engage in various development projects or undertake teaching assignments at local universities. Palestine and Lebanon

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have started to set up more permanent structures to tap their expatriate human resources systematically through TOKTEN. The databases of people, organised by area for example, constitute embryos of real networks (Meyer/ Brown, 1999). TOKTEN-Morocco developed in 2004 into FINCOME (Forum des Compétences marocaines résidant à l’étranger), a strategy launched in cooperation with the UNDP and UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services). This initiative shaped the official Moroccan vision of HSM as a resource to implement national development, an alternative to “external” assistance. It was given a political base as it was conceived as a governmental initiative supervised by the Prime Minister’s secretariat. It was also given an operational base: the steering committee of this programme was handed over to the Ministry of Higher Education, while the CNRST (National Centre for Scientific and Technical Research) and R&D association ran and followed up on actions. Yet, efforts to anchor the programme institutionally and financially did not encounter success, due to a lack of institutional follow up and overlapping responsibilities between actors (Belguendouz, 2010: 12-13). Reliance on personal rather than institutional vision, efficiency and dedication, lack of institutional and financial follow-up are to be found in every country in the region.

**Bilateral management of HSM flows**

As an alternative to mobilizing expatriate competences for development, the short-term policy of seconding or sending abroad potentially-unemployed skilled experts allows, as noted above, a short-term alleviation of poverty through remittances and guarantees sustained levels of consumption, real-estate purchases, etc., added to the political benefits of channelling unemployable citizens. Such policies date back to the 1960s and gain in importance with demographic expansion, educational progress, economic globalization, and favourable circumstances such as the sustained levels of growth in labour-consuming regions like the Gulf countries. In Tunisia, for example, policies in the field of the management of highly-skilled migration flows have been progressively centred around two lines: promoting legal migration and organizing the placement of highly-skilled citizens. Agreements have been signed with Tunisia by France and by Italy, Italy setting a yearly quota for the entry of Tunisians into that country. The agreement with France pertains to the encouragement of mobility among highly-skilled migrants, doctors, lawyers, business men and women, artists, intellectuals and scientists, mobility which underlies the economic, commercial, scientific, academic, cultural relations between the two countries. And this takes into consideration the needs of the various social and economic sectors102 (Bel Hadj Zekri, 2010: 2). More generally, every SEM government in the region is confronted with high unemployment rates among skilled citizens. All have passed bilateral agreements for the placement/recruitment of skilled personnel. As noted above, Gulf countries are increasingly expected by traditional Middle-Eastern partners (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) to absorb this surplus Arab manpower into their booming economies. This is increasingly, true of Maghreb countries as well.

5. Implementing circular migration schemes

More generally, such bilateral and multilateral agreements are at the core of the “circular” migration schemes, which are now demanded by OECD receiving states and, especially, by the EU to regulate and “manage” SEM migration flows. This implies the definition of yearly quotas of migrants; set conditions of departure and patterns or duration of stay abroad (the necessity to return goes without saying) and the existence of agreements and economic development binding not only the workers and their employers, but also both the countries of destination and that of origin. Sending countries are increasingly involved in the control over national migration, to avoid and to combat illegal migration and to accept readmission.

However, other migration schemes in the region can fit the definition of “circular” migration, i.e. a back and forth regular movement between two countries, culturally as well as geographically close103.

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103 Named “embedded circular migration” by Cassarino, 2008: 3.
Temporary Syrian migration to Lebanon for example stems, to some extent, from a “blurred process of state formation” in Syria and Lebanon (referring to the two countries shared past in the Ottoman Empire) and from diverging economic systems driven to complement each other through migration (Kiwan, 2008). Such contexts led easily to the development of cross-border movements responding to seasonal manpower needs, especially in agriculture (Jordan-Palestine, Lebanon-Syria).

Circular migration can also consist in limited-duration migration abroad, whether it results from individual/family initiative or from organised public sector’s secondment or placement-abroad policies. Migration of Jordanian workers to the GCC countries is a case in point. Such flows have been perceived as temporary and rely, more often than not, on migrants’ personal contacts and exchange of information on job opportunities, accommodation patterns, etc. Such flows date back to the 1950s and the onset of oil exploitation in Kuwait. They increased after 1973 and the “oil-boom” which sparked demands for manpower, came slowly to a halt in the 1980s and resumed at the end of the 1990s. The GCC states’ enduring prosperity and the wealth of projects currently underway makes this region an essential outlet for Jordanian (and Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese…) workers. Some face unemployment at home but others simply wish to enjoy a higher salary than at home for a defined period, in order to finance a purchase (land, housing for instance) or a marriage, or in order to advance their professional status. Yet, for this reason and because Jordanians emigrate to export their know-how, remittance are more often financial rather than knowledge or innovation-based.

Employment opportunities in the GCC region has also been, since the 1970s, based on secondment contracts from the public sector in Jordan, Egypt, etc.. Through the 2000s, Jordan concluded conventions facilitating its citizens’ employment in Kuwait (2001), Qatar (1997, renewed in 2010) and the UAE (2006) and labour exchange agreements included also Bahrain (secondment of medical personnel) and the UAE (secondment of Armed Forces members) in 2009. Some discussions have also been underway for some years in several Arab countries, on the possibility of training manpower to respond to the future needs of labour-intensive economies such as those of the Gulf countries. This region, indeed, offers sector-specific labour opportunities: health workers, tourism sector specialists, accountants… Jordan has been raising this issue of training for external labour markets for some years now. Tunisia did the same in the 1980s as advocated in the Tunisian Sixth Plan for Economic and Social Development 1982-1986, after the diminishing opportunities available on the French labour market pushed the authorities to find new outlets in the Arab countries, especially in Libya, as well as in the Gulf (Brand, 2006: 99).

Placement in the Gulf as a strategy to overcome unemployment is resorted to in most SEM countries. France changed its immigration policies in 1974 and, as noted above Tunisia, as well as Morocco, had to look to the Gulf to place their manpower. Egypt has done the same since the 1960s. Throughout its history, and more intensively since 1973, Jordan has left the “door open” to emigration in order to alleviate unemployment and permit financial opportunities, professional advancement and social mobility. Yet, since the restoration of the Kingdom’s relations with the Gulf monarchies following the First Gulf War, when political ties were interrupted, Jordan has adamantly included placement in the GCC countries as a strategy to alleviate high unemployment levels and, especially, that of the highly-skilled. Among such measures, the Kingdom tried to better rationalise information and the supply of labour opportunities in the Gulf to Jordanians, by reviving the role of labour attachés in its embassies in the GCC. Lastly, a great effort was made, with the help of some international or foreign agencies, to promote job advertisement opportunities (through web sites, newspapers), where

104 On this period of the 1980s, Laurie Brand also states that “this was the period of Mohammed M’zali’s prime ministership, during which there was a greater opening to the Arab states, and greater influence from the Gulf on Tunisia, especially in the form of greater religious influence” (Brand, 2006: 100).
105 After Kuwait’s invasion by Iraqi troops, King Hussein of Jordan failed to side with the Gulf monarchies, under the pressure of his own population. Such constraints were also enforced on the Palestinian and Yemeni leaderships, which resulted in the expulsion of 300,000 to 350,000 Jordanians (mostly of Palestinian origin) and 800,000 Yemenis formerly employed and sometimes de facto settled in the Gulf region.
offers in Jordan lie side by side with offers from the Gulf countries. A regional labour market binding the GCC and Jordan is progressively emerging, which Jordan has been calling upon for years (De Bel-Air, 2008; 2010). This is a sign that circular migration is increasingly resorted to in SEM countries in the hope of alleviating unemployment at home or offering mobility to workers, thus contributing immensely to employment and remittances, if not, probably, to in-depth development. However, “loose” or a lack of labour agreements are bound to make circular migration sensitive to political tensions, as was seen during the First Gulf War or in 2005 after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in Beirut when tens of thousands of Syrian workers were forced back to Syria (Kiwan, 2008; Kawakibi, 2008). The danger of circular migration is that communities become financially dependent on it, in a volatile region.

In the 2000s, some migration management schemes were set up. For example, the IMIS (Integrated Migration Information System) project was launched in 2001 by IOM upon the request of the Egyptian Ministry of Expatriates. Its aim was: to design executive plans and policies to encourage Egyptian migration and to provide opportunities for them; to sponsor Egyptians abroad, their social activities and to familiarise second and third generations with the homeland; to channel expatriates’ potential for Egypt’s development; and to set up a database on Egyptians abroad, emigration markets and destination countries’ regulations. The IDOM (Information Dissemination on Migration) Project later aimed more concretely at reducing illegal migration between Egypt and Italy by providing legal and concrete opportunities: matching Egyptian labour offers with demand in Italy; setting up human resources development activities; launching media campaigns for raising awareness about the dangers of illegal migration (Roman, 2008, 4-5). The following IMIS Plus project proved constraining for both parties, as for 2007 and 2008 its quotas of respectively, 7000 and 8000 workers to be employed in the restaurant and tourism sectors could not be fulfilled, due to a shortage of skilled Egyptians available there (Sika, 2010: 5). The opportunity to train local workers in anticipation or reaction to Northern labour markets’ demands is discussed in several countries of the region and implemented effectively in others, such as Morocco and Egypt (Sika, 2010: 6). Yet, such policies may be economically frustrating, if not politically risky.

Moreover, such policies, as they also overemphasize the return of migrants, lead to questionable workers’ selection criteria: an example is the preference given in Spanish agriculture to women married with children, as opposed to single women as these are supposedly less likely to return (Cassarino, 2008: 6). Also, the strict definition of migrants’ rights and entitlements within circular-migration contracts raise fears of abuses among the workers (Khachani, 2008). Lastly, the enhancement of EU border control schemes and administrative constraints put, matter of factly, on circularity of movements, is widely seen as unsatisfying and counter-productive by SEM countries’ specialists. Moreover, questions could be raised as to whether the conditions which create unemployment and general conditions favourable to emigration will be amended by circular migration over the short term. In the short run then, generalisation of constraint in term of migration may thus be adding economic, as well as socio-political pressure to SEM countries. Careful policy-making and institution-building regarding migrants’ return is, therefore, as important, if not more so, than similar measures for organising departure and labour abroad (Cassarino, 2008).

Rather, SEM countries promote the view that such migration schemes create mutual obligations and commitments for both parties, especially within the wider framework of multilateral programmes and cooperation. Khachani on Morocco states that migration has to be envisaged “within a long-term perspective in the framework of a historical co-responsibility, as a means for Europe to contribute to the promotion of human resources in emigration countries, within the framework of a solidarity-based and sustainable co-development”, within the framework of the Barcelona Process, in order to achieve peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean region (Khachani, 2008: 11). This, once again, points at the comprehensiveness of issues embedded in migration as seen from the SEM, especially migration from the Maghreb directed at Europe. It is in sharp contrast with the technocratic approach, focussed on the interests of the EU in terms of enhancing border control, fighting illegal migration and promoting
returns, while at the same time alleviating punctual manpower shortages, and uncovering a growing shift of views between both banks of the Med.

Nonetheless, in general, what appears noteworthy here is the SEM economies and socio-political systems’ absolute dependency on migration and their overwhelmingly positive appreciation of the phenomenon. Why is that and what is the role of migration for the region’s regimes?

**SEM countries’ migration-for-development policies: a response to what stakes, for what outcomes?**

This essay has provided an overview of the web of interconnected policies and measures conducted in SEM countries by various actors, directed at improving the management of migration flows from within the countries’ national borders, as well as at incorporating their expatriate nationals into national development. Indeed, every SEM country has set up measures and institutions to this end: SEM governments launched measures articulated around encouraging investments and remittances; capitalizing on expatriate education and skills; addressing some of their needs for social and economic assistance; reinforcing cultural, economic and social links with migrants abroad; designing and improving information systems for SEM countries’ unemployed citizens with job opportunities abroad.

**A synthesis of SEM policy-discourses in terms of migration and development**

As noted above (chapter 1), Western States’ policies towards SEM immigrants were progressively aimed at restricting further immigration, and assimilation of former migrants into host societies and cultures. This progressive assimilation is acknowledged and accepted by the major emigrants’ sending countries to these regions, mainly North African countries. Yet, they have been seeking to revive, or reinvent, their citizens and their descendants’ sense of economic duty, and to a lesser extent, of cultural belonging to the home countries. Such measures stretched from barely informing on business opportunities in the homeland and promoting socio-economic networking (Lebanon and Jordan), emphasizing Arabic, Islam and Arab and national culture as well as investment opportunities (Egypt, Syria), to stimulating a sense of economic, cultural and national belonging (Muslim-Arab-Tunisian identity and duties), or even, in the cases of Morocco and Algeria (though in different ways), a sense of citizenship in the migrants’ origin countries witnessed in what may be first steps towards social and political integration between the homeland and its expatriates.

However, none of the SEM countries seem to aim at limiting emigration flows. Measures implemented stimulated bilateral agreements between labour exporters and importers and enhanced governmental and private sector’s capacity for connecting citizens with job opportunities abroad in order to stimulate flows. This is especially true of Jordan, but also of Egypt and the Maghreb: Lebanon and Syria, meanwhile, seem to apply a policy of non-intervention).

To sum up, it can be stated that the link tying SEM expatriates and their homeland together is designed by governments and regimes to be transnational, yet it is limited to economic participation and is, at best, socio-cultural integration with the homeland.

**Assessment of policies and their impact on development**

Is such a link likely to be compatible with expatriates’ participation in the development process? All accounts of emigrants’ input into home countries’ development and of the functioning of institutions pertaining to expatriates suggest poor results save in the case of remittances which, in some cases, plays an extensive role in filling budget deficits and increasing households’ incomes. As noted above, the share of remittances in SEM countries’ GDP ranges between 4% and 23%. Yet, all studies acknowledge the mostly private, consumption-driven use of such funds (family and basic needs), as well as education, housing, land purchase, which in itself contributes to families’ well-being and sense of security for the future. A survey conducted in southern Morocco showed some local economic improvements due to financial investments and expenditures from abroad including saffron production.
and the setting up of guest houses for tourists. Yet, the success of such small-scale enterprises is sensitive to the local context and its pre-existing opportunities: pre-existing roads and minimal commercial or tourist infrastructures and favourable global economic context. Investments from abroad will not be substantial enough to change an unfavourable local context in terms of infrastructures, let alone in terms of human capital. Moreover, “the study tours and background studies revealed that governments’ role in migrant initiatives is ambiguous, contested, and not necessarily desirable” (De Haas/ Vezzoli, 2010). This calls for “tempering the faith” regarding the input of expatriates’ investments and remittances in development, which depends upon a set of factors, as noted above ranging from local potentialities to more global factors, related to the general business climate in the concerned region and country. Among these factors, the confidence between investors and facilitating governmental bodies is essential, which also holds true as remittances in terms of knowledge and know-how are concerned. Yet, this is incompatible with the characteristics of SEM regimes as described in chapter IV: clientelism and, to varying extents, corruption which hamper structural improvements in the economy, distracts administrative management from citizens’ concerns and feeds authoritarian states and ruling elites increasingly cut off from their populations. Such a context abolishes faith in the institutions and confidence in the future and, above all, paralyzes the emergence of a sense of citizenship. This is illustrated in the persisting gap between expatriate demands and expectations from their homelands’ institutional setups, and the lack of institutional efficiency and concrete achievements from the latter. The effect of such structural factors on hampering developmental input from expatriates could be verified by focused case-studies, and may explain that, in spite of the great amounts of remittances channelled there (financial as well as intellectual, and possibly social), there is a dearth of success stories in migration-induced development programmes in the region, at least on a scale likely to create significant changes in local economies and wealth distribution. Conversely, comparing the success of such initiatives between countries may be a good measure of the functioning of polity and the development of citizenship.

Assessment of flows’ management

As far as the management of migration flows is concerned, through implementing circular migration schemes and to a lesser extent, limiting the “brains” haemorrhage from the region, it has been shown that the intensity of flows is sustained.

On a first look, “technical”, as well as historical factors make it difficult to control flows, especially under the constraining scheme designed by the Global Approach. Indeed, the lack of “in-built tools (agreements, supportive political stances, institutional approaches) in the region” (Fakhoury, 2010: 120), the mismatch between available qualified manpower and the demands of labour-importing countries as described for the IMIS and IDOM projects between Egypt and Italy, where the quota system implemented does not work, and, more generally, the rise of unemployment and its development into a structural phenomenon, due to the ill-adaptation of educational systems to economies in the region, are all factors demonstrating the technical difficulties in controlling emigration. For the same reasons, reintegration of migrants into home countries’ societies is problematic, as the reasons which spurred emigration are still present in every country.

Among the historical-political reasons explaining the difficulty of curbing emigration flows, are the porosity of borders situated in mountainous or desert areas, not to mention the weak sovereignty and capacities of law enforcement which hamper efficient border control. Bureaucratic efficiency is also problematic, long-term, institution-based planning and action being prevented by high rates of governmental turnover in the region; CARIM experts notice, for example, that the success of migration initiatives and measures in most cases relied on benevolent persons, and could not be sustained because of a lack of institutional continuity. As far as the management of migration within bilateral agreements goes, concerns over the sovereignty and sensitivity of the issue in public opinion can limit the implementation of control measures (Fakhoury, 2010). On a wider scale, “lingering political crises” in Lebanon (Kiwan, 2008), in Algeria, and even in Syria and Jordan since the beginning of the Iraqi
conflict in 2003 keeps migration flow issues off the urgent to-do list of governments. Also, shifting regional and international alliances, as well as armed conflicts, have made migration management highly difficult. We have mentioned the devastating effect on labour-sending countries, of the First Gulf War of 1990-91, which saw the expulsion from the Gulf States of the nationals of countries supporting Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait: Sudan, Yemen, Jordan and Palestine. An estimated one million Egyptians working in Iraq at the time also had to travel back to their country, thus challenging economic strategies based on emigration (Lafarge, 2005). Throughout the 1990s, before Jordan could restore relations with the Gulf monarchies, the Kingdom’s economy suffered a collapse, due in part to the drying up, after the mid-1980s, of remittances its migrants had been sending from the GCC states. Such funds amounted to up to a quarter of its GDP (De Bel-Air, 2007; 2008).

Yet, beyond these “technical” and historical-political factors, the effect of structural factors such as state-building and state-society patterns can also be spotted. Indeed, as noted in chapter IV, the provision of employment to citizens falls within the realm of redistribution, in exchange for political allegiance. Therefore, economic planning based on market dynamics, on the economic rationality of supply and demand, necessarily has a political outreach: it signals a failure of the social contract binding together state and society, as the regime is seen as being unable to grant citizens satisfying and rewarding opportunities for resources and capital. Thus, what is at stake is the nation-building process as a whole, the “redefinition of borders, and hence national sovereignty, is inextricably tied to the demarcation of internal and external labour markets, and to the leverage the state maintains in reconciling the two” (Morales, 1992). In the same logic of linking the design of labour markets and the issue of national sovereignty, the globalisation of the economy and the growing penetration of Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) into SEM economies, is a very sensitive issue, outside the sphere of the region’s enterprising business class.

As far as migration is concerned, the externalisation of labour markets through emigration cannot but have the political effect of suggesting a disruption in state-citizen relations, between citizens employed inside and those forced to employment outside106. Yet in such a context, as we have seen, neither SEM countries’ ruling regimes, nor their economic and political elites, really attempt to “compensate” this perception by voluntary policies for reintegrating émigrés in terms of citizenship with the partial exceptions of Morocco and Algeria.

Therefore, it can be said that the factors spurring emigration, described in chapter IV and rooted in a “political economy” approach to migration, are also the ones underlying state-expatriate relations. In Tunisia for example, governmental attitudes and claims towards expatriates, calling on their duty towards the homeland are similar to discourses made by governments towards residents. The Lebanese state’s delegation of migrant affairs to private, confession-based organizations mirrors that of the policies run towards residents, concerning basic socio-economic affairs (education and other basic needs, for instance). Moreover, the lack of political integration between expatriates and the homeland, in general, is also similar for expatriates and for residents, even though each national context controls citizens’ political participation for its own purpose and in its own way. Ultimately, policies conceived and run towards expatriates mirror the ones run within each country, towards resident citizens.

Therefore, it appears that the two characteristics common to SEM countries’ policies towards their expatriates: (1) the design of a home state-expatriate link, channelled towards an economic (segmented) participation and a cultural affinity, and (2) weakness of attempts at controlling flows, may both not stem from technical, historical and regional politics’ obstacles to a politically-

106 This perception is not fully articulated by citizens in the region, though. Emigration for better income, or for employment, is considered a “normal” phase in one’s professional life, especially when considering that emigration has become a survival strategy anchored for decades now in the region. However, deeper inquiries bring to the fore, in most cases, the feeling of political frustration at not finding opportunities in one’s country. This conclusion is based on field experience in the Middle East and on informal conversations held with locals, as well as with Arab migrants, in France, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Dubai and Oman, in the 2000s.
encompassing relationship with expatriates and of efficient management of flows. Such policies respond to political strategies, which diverge across history and geography but converge with domestic politics and relations with the Western States, for the promotion of their mutual interests.

Why such policies towards emigrants? Responding to diverse challenges

Even if policy aims for expatriates are similar, we saw that they differ geographically and schematically between the Maghreb and the Machrek. Maghreb countries have an impressive array of policies, measures and institutions, reaching out much deeper into the social life of their nationals abroad, while Middle East countries are mainly concerned over remittances sent home. As suggested by L. Brand (Brand, 2006), one explanation may lie in the fact that the bulk of Middle-Easterners (Jordanians, Syrians, Egyptians, and to a lesser extent the Lebanese) move to Arab countries. Thus, they had no problem in maintaining their language, religion, or culture, and consequently there is no need for the home state to provide services or institutions to reinforce these ties, unlike, of course, North Africans who chiefly migrate to Europe. Also, “competition” between the host and home states is not of the same nature, as in Europe, political integration in the form of the acquisition of various rights and, ultimately, citizenship, is possible for migrants. In the case of the Gulf States, on the contrary, there is much less possibility for the political assimilation or integration of migrants. Also, beyond the issue of “competition”, lays that of political control: Kuwait being an exception, as for a number of years socio-political organising among Palestinians was allowed, the Gulf States did not permit the emergence of any political activity and organised movement among expatriates. Therefore, sending states did not have to fear political opposition stemming from their expatriates in the Gulf (Brand, 2006: 216-223). As a matter of fact, it is striking that all SEM countries consider migration to Arab countries as “temporary”, while migration elsewhere is seen as “permanent”.

Each country also has some specific institutional background, which can explain its migration policies. We just raised the idea that policies towards expatriates were somehow mirroring the policies implemented towards residents, in terms of underwhelming States’ provision of citizenship rights and entitlements. It was noted in this essay that Jordan had the lowest level of state intervention in the fate of its expatriates abroad. As we pointed out above, their migrating mostly to the Gulf States explains this to some extent, but their being overwhelmingly of Palestinian origin also plays a leading role in the Jordanian state’s “policy of no-policy” (Olwan, 2009). Indeed, the massive emigration of Jordanians of Palestinian origin to the Gulf after the 1973 oil boom was spurred by a progressive closure of economic opportunities to this part of the population, following the “Jordanisation” of the public sector in 1975107. Emigration was then clearly the result of the deprivation of citizenship, which can explain the discretion of Jordan’s intervention directed at expatriates in the Gulf, even if since the Gulf War, the fading of the rentier state and persisting economic difficulties started pushing some East Bankers to resort to emigration to make ends meet. Given the high share of remittances in the country’s GDP nowadays (15-20% according to the year), and given too that the failure of the peace process deepens radical East-Bankers’ defiance towards Palestinian-Jordanians (De Bel-Air, forthcoming), this underwhelming attitude of the state may be aimed at securing such a revenue108.

107 The Rabat Conference of Arab states held in 1974 entrusted the PLO as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”, which infuriated King Hussein who was claiming this responsibility. From then on, Jordanian-Palestinian relations had to change, as socio-political integration of Jordanians of Palestinian origin was became, if possible, more problematic than before. The Conference in effect reinforces the obligation to guarantee 1948 refugees and 1967 displaced persons their right of return in Palestine. Yet most importantly, the entrustment of the PLO with the role of representing every Palestinian’s interests, even those of the holders of Jordanian nationality, raises fears of double allegiance. Following that event, a process of Jordanisation of the public sector was implemented, which progressively hampered Jordanians of Palestinian origin from reaching high levels of responsibility in politically-sensitive sectors such as the Army, Intelligence services, and high public functionaries (De Bel-Air, 2003).

108 Among his “recommendations towards remittances”, O’Neil sets forth that: “A light hand is needed. Concern was expressed that government intervention in remittances risks destroying the enormous benefits of remittances. The
In Lebanon, the dearth of institutional mechanisms is such that stimulating and streamlining remittances is not even advocated for. There again, as in Jordan, the state’s discretion goes along with success in attracting such funds, yet they remain in the private hands of families. However, as opposed to Jordan and to any other SEM country, the dearth of migration-related institutions probably comes from the weakness of the state and from the fact that confessional and sectarian affiliations surpass any feeling of collective national belonging. In such a context, conceiving a policy towards emigrants which requires a conception of national sovereignty, is as impossible as reaching a consensus on the design of economic, social, let alone, cultural and political institutions at the national level.

Yet more generally, the channelling of state-society relations towards (controlled) participation in the economy and cultural affiliation evidently has to do with the control of political activities typical of the SEM’s overwhelmingly authoritarian states. The design of distinct cultural identities between is an interesting phenomenon, which would require an in-depth study. Especially, the construction of national cultural traits and, also important, of national Islamic identity would most probably emphasize the nature of the SEM states socio-political challenges in securing their political domination. The streamlining of Islam from politics to culture and, in some cases, to social issues; the promotion of free enterprise and knowledge circulation, in effect channelled through states’ institutions in order to control its impact on local societies, are among the challenges of engineering expatriate input on home countries.

And, last but not least, at the level of international relations, even though the ultimate purpose of the migration development policies is not met, voluntarist discourses from SEM countries regarding meeting goals of the GA, or more generally attempts at controlling migration flows, designing GA-compatible initiatives, and, most importantly, the setting up of infrastructure and publicity or public advocacy for measures, all contribute to their international political credit. Notwithstanding the importance of political credit, it also has consequences in terms of aid or loans in migration management.

**Why promote emigration?**

Nevertheless, more generally, all SEM states agree on keeping an “open-door” on emigration, or even on promoting it.

Historical reasons for this have been explored by authors, such as pan-Arabist ideology and its translation into freedom of movement, labour and sojourn within the Arab region: Jordan promoted its understanding of pan-Arabism, which is grounded in the Arab Revolt heritage, through visa exemptions for tourism and lack of law enforcement regarding Arab labour immigration, particularly until the mid-1980s. Egypt, Syria and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon also translate this Arabist stance into their visa requirement policies.

Migration also sustained the then-perception of a common cultural and political heritage within the region. In the case of Egypt for example, “The little emigration that did take place until the mid-1960s was more relevant to a political project than an economic one, and consisted almost exclusively of highly-skilled workers, particularly teachers. The emigration of Egyptian teachers to the Gulf, Iraq, Libya and Algeria, was an important gesture of solidarity promoting pan-Arabism, and a sign that Egypt remained the cultural centre of the Arab world” (Roman, 2006: 1). Jordanian kings also regularly emphasized such perceptions in their speeches (De Bel-Air, 2003). As of today, Syrian government does have a role to play, in supporting migrants who would like to start businesses, invest in their community of origin or donate to public projects, for example, but caution is needed” (O’Neil, 2003).

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109 The Kingdom started imposing labour permits on Egyptian labourers in 1984. Legislation applied to Palestinians changed after 1988. Moreover, freedom of entry for Iraqis was also cancelled early 2006, for security reasons. Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco impose visas on Jordanians (for reasons related to their relations with Palestinians); a principle of reciprocity is thus now applied on their nationals.

110 Except for Iraqis between 2007 and 1 February 2011.
official discourse still promotes “Arabism as a national identity” and the vision of Syrian labourers in the Gulf as “missionaries to the Arab Nation” involved in the development of the Gulf states, distinguishes them from Syrian expatriates in the West (Kawakibi, 2008: 7-8).

On a bilateral level between the Gulf States and specific labour-sending countries such as Jordan, for instance, the regular supply of workers also sustained external aid from those countries in the 1970s and 1980s (De Bel-Air, 2003), which may also be true for other massive labour exporters in the region, such as Egypt.

More generally, reluctance to control flows and promotion of emigration can be explained, as noted throughout this essay, by the level of expatriates’ remittances and their significance to national economies and by the necessity to curb the swelling rates of unemployment, fed by the entry onto the labour-market of a steadily-increasing number of young people and the paucity of resources available in local public and private economic sectors described above. The political outreach of such a strategy of the externalisation of national labour markets on the design of citizenship in these countries has been described in this chapter.

However, an open-door to emigration, and to emigration of the highly-skilled especially, has a further effect on the political stabilisation of the exporting countries: the lack of attempts at controlling the “brain drain” poses the question of relations between policy-makers and intellectual elites, i.e. the question of the social contract and the distribution of roles within the decision-making process. Indeed, actors who assess the emigration of the highly-skilled in terms of a “brain drain” call in fact for the “nationalisation” of the political, social, economic and cultural issues linked to education. By discarding diverging views regarding its development process, be they economic, social or political, the political leadership ensures the reproduction of the economic, social and political elites inside the country. This can explain the half-heartedness of policies aiming at securing links with expatriate citizens, as well as the promotion of emigration. Also, more generally, “doors open” to emigration allows for a short-term strategy of political relief. Indeed, citizens evicted from economic opportunities who may express their frustration, and political opponents as well, can conveniently find an outlet in emigration. Therefore, it may be said that an open-door to emigration has a structural role not only in the political stabilisation of SEM countries, but also in the reproduction of their authoritarian and clientelist traits.

This last point appears to contradict the emigration policy called upon by the EU, which sets the monitoring of migration flows as a priority, even if, as noted above, part of the irregular movements are under control. It also contradicts the Barcelona philosophy of promoting the democratisation of regimes in the South and East of the Mediterranean. However, it must be acknowledged that the stability and power of those regimes over their populations allows for the realisation of one of the main priority targets of the post-Tampere agenda, that of pursuing the liberalisation of economies in this region. Moreover, strong SEM regimes sustain political alliances with the EU and ensure that common priorities (control of the Islamic opposition, for instance, in resident and expatriate populations) and EU demands (retention of transit migrants, from Sub-Saharan Africa and from Iraq, especially), will be efficiently addressed. Therefore, the Global Approach to migration, and the probability of its application to non-African SEM countries, entails a fundamental paradox, in the sense that the conditions of its success (a stable and strong polity) contradicts its ultimate aims (a decrease in migration flows and the global – economic, social, as well as political – development of sending countries). And this, at least over the short- to middle-term, before efficient democratic achievements are secured and deeply rooted in SEM societies and polities.

111 Speech by Dr Buthaina Chaaban, then Syrian Minister of Expatriates, May 16th, 2005.
112 The rates of population increase are still high in the region, due to the facts that birth rates increased up until the mid-1980s (with the notable exception of Tunisia). Yet the effect of the general decrease in birth rates after this is somehow tempered by the still impressive size of the fertile generations, themselves born before the fall of fertility rates.
Conclusion: Migration and political transition in the SEM region

As aptly summed up by Geiger and Pécoud, “in the ideal world of ‘migration management’, governments in sending and transit countries cooperate with destination states, IGOs and experts to adopt policies that take into account the interest of all; ‘good’ migrants are well informed, respectful of the law, flexible to market needs, ready to circulate and eager to contribute to the development of their home country; researchers develop policy-relevant knowledge to inform migration policies; NGOs contribute to migrants’ rights and well-being through properly steered activities; diasporas take ‘development-friendly’ initiatives with the help of intergovernmental and governmental agencies” (Geiger/ Pécoud, 2010: 17). We have seen that, in the case of the Arab South and East Mediterranean countries, the ideal was far from being achieved, for reasons essentially of a structural nature.

In this paper, we attempted to re-politicize the concept of managing migration for development. The theoretical background of the essay is rooted in political economy and in the neo-institutional approach to migration, as well as in Michel Foucault’s concept of “governmentality”. This has helped emphasize the political stakes, outcomes and opportunities of the migration-development nexus, as conceived and implemented by the EU towards SEM countries. Achievements of such policies remain modest or inexistent, as regards short-term development and also as longer-run ambitions of increased political participation and democratisation are concerned. Indeed, SEM practices in the field of migration management and engineering migration for development even appeared as a political shield for regimes in the region. We reached the conclusions that keeping the door open to emigration actually allows the monitoring of: (1) the political opposition; (2) the renewing of socio-cultural elites; and (3) the consequences of decreasing economic opportunities in national economies due to corruption and patronage (i.e. distribution of economic opportunities on grounds other than competence, as well as international competition in the framework of economic liberalisation schemes), by the exiting of opponents / emerging social and intellectual challengers / unemployed human capital. Current policies also allow the reconstruction of state-society relations, along with economic (controlled) participation and socio-cultural solidarity, but not political participation. Each country, with its particular historical context, displayed original ways and priorities in that matter. Mass migration, therefore, is revelatory of blocked SEM societies and polities, and also functions as a political strategy on behalf of local regimes.

Moreover, some elements emerged, explaining the policy-makers’ reluctance to take into account political and, more generally, “structural” aspects of the migration-development nexus. Indeed, politically-strong states and ruling regimes are needed in the SEM region, in order to pursue the liberalisation of economies in this region, to sustain political alliances with the EU and to ensure that common priorities (control of the Islamic opposition, for instance,) and EU demands (retention of transit migrants), are met. It thus appeared clearly that migrants’ agency was far from having the means to curb the structural contexts of SEM countries, in order to spur development.

Events which have occurred since 17 December 2010 in almost every country in the Arab World and that finally led to the overthrowing of Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak have clearly confirmed such results, and have shed light on the political outcomes of a strategy of exchanging democracy and social advancement in the SEM countries (thus limiting the pressure for emigration), for political control and security. Further confirming this scenario, Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi threatened Europe with uncontrolled immigration and an Islamist upsurge at Europe’s gates if his regime did not survive the present popular revolt113; and a few days earlier, French President Sarkozy had expressed similar concerns114.

Yet, how can migration be taken out of that spiral of socio-political reproduction and security concerns, to actually help amend SEM political contexts without jeopardizing the Mediterranean region’s political stability?

First, as already suggested by some migration specialists (De Haas et alii, 2009), migration is an intrinsic part of human development. A shift in thinking is thus needed on the very notion of development, which reaches out beyond economic free enterprise.

Second, another shift in thinking is required in conceiving the link between the two phenomena. Both a product of human agency and the institutional structures met by migrants through the process, they also interact with each other. Yet, they are not directly dependant on one another.

Third, as suggested by Skeldon (2008), this should imply a shift in thinking “towards more reactive rather than proactive policies. Accommodationist policies, or those that seek to respond to and plan for the kinds of migrations that are likely to occur in any particular development scenario, are likely to be more appropriate than proactive policies that seek to channel migration in a particular direction to promote development” (Skeldon, 2008: 15).

Re-conceiving the Global Approach and its application to the SEM countries along these three lines would thus also inevitably entail a shift in EU politics towards SEM regimes; and a shift in envisaging the mobility of SEM populations. It is now important to ensure that local contexts will progressively cease to be a migratory “push” factor. In the mean time, new developments to the south of the Mediterranean should question the distinction made between labour migration (i.e. economic) and forced migration (i.e. political), as access to resources proved politically driven. Consequently, acute unemployment, underemployment and low standards of living should appear as a legitimate spur for migration, as well as the desire for freedom of movement, of thought, of personal achievement in general. And this, all the more so now that demographic pressure is bound to stabilise, due to decreasing birth rates in every SEM country.

Also, it is equally important to come to terms with the fact that most SEM countries are linked to the EU within a migration system. Indeed, part of SEM migrants, some settled in the origin countries and others in Europe, shape transnational communities. Moreover, double nationality and the antiquity of migration flows shape a common history between various European countries and their former colonies within the SEM region. Yet, the promotion of cultural proximity and the enhancement of socio-political influence cannot but rest on a more balanced design of circulation patterns between the two regions.

Indeed, the EU may not have all the political resources needed to (politically) monitor such a deep policy-shift. At the same time, migratory pressure has to be addressed and to find outlets, for the sake of political stability and, in some cases, to smooth socio-political transition processes and the reconstruction of economies. For the time being, the Gulf region still displays expanding economic growth and offers employment opportunities, even though the GCC countries themselves have attempted to nationalise their workforce and curb their unemployment rates. However, facilitating mobility between the EU, the SEM and the GCC states may be a short-term solution, to alleviate migratory pressures.

As of today, attempts at disrupting migration flows can prove counterproductive in the delicate context of SEM political transition. Yet, at the same time, this context may constitute an opportunity for Europe, in which the EC can amend its historical relations with the South and East shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

(Contd.)


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