Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Turkey

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1. Overview National Discourses
Background Country Reports
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in

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Work Package 1: Overview of National Discourses on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity

D1.1 Country Reports on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses
Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators’ Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country’s performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

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# Table of Contents

**Executive Summary** .................................................................................................................................................. 8  
1.**Introduction** .......................................................................................................................................................... 4  
2.**Nation, State and Citizenship in Turkey** ............................................................................................................ 5  
3. **Cultural Diversity Challenges** ............................................................................................................................ 15  
   3.1. The Rise of Political Islam in the 1980s: Islamist Forces becoming integral parts of the regime .................................................................................................................................................. 9  
   3.2. New Challenges in the 1990s: Ethno-Religious Claims ....................................................................................... 10  
      3.2.i. Political Islam as a Challenge to the Kemalist Regime ............................................................................... 11  
      3.2.ii. Alevi Revivalism ........................................................................................................................................... 12  
      3.2.iii. Kurdish Revivalism ................................................................................................................................. 20  
   3.3 2000s: European Integration and Euroscepticism ............................................................................................. 21  
4. **Discourses and Practices of (In)Tolerance in the Age of Euroscepticism** ..................................................... 25  
5.**Conclusion: The Myth of Tolerance in Turkey** .................................................................................................... 28  
**Appendix: Information on Minorities** ..................................................................................................................... 22  
**Bibliography** ........................................................................................................................................................... 26
Executive Summary

The report is designed to portray the ways in which ethno-cultural and religious diversity has been so far managed by modern Turkish state with regard to the usage of the discourse of tolerance. Explicating the construction of the Turkish national identity and the modern Turkish state, the report primarily delineates the constitutive elements of the state machinery as well as the technologies of citizenship. Turkey’s process of Europeanization is also scrutinized in order to pave the way to a throughout analysis of the transformation of the Turkish polity from the Cold War years to the Post-Cold War years. In doing so, major challenges against the traditional Kemalist nation-state building process such as political Islam, Alevi revival, Kurdish revival and Europeanization/globalization are discussed. Subsequently, some information is given regarding the major ethno-cultural and religious minorities in Turkey.

The term ‘minority’ is a very polemical concept in Turkey, and has a negative connotation in the popular imagery as it is often recalled as the main source of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The popular assumption of the Turkish nationalist myth-making is that it is the non-Muslim minorities collaborating with the colonial European powers who contributed to the death of the Ottoman Empire through the syndrome of ‘enemy within’. The report deploys the term not only through its legal definition but also its sociological/anthropological connotations.

The definition of tolerance is confined to the acceptance of Sunni Muslims and their secular counterparts under the banner of the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish nation. However, it does not mean to embrace all different kinds of ethno-cultural and religious minorities. Tolerance in the Ottoman context as well as in other imperial contexts refers to the “absence of persecution of people but not their acceptance into society as full and welcomed members of community”. This report argues that tolerance is actually nothing but a form of governmentality, designed to maintain peace and order in multi-ethnic and multi-nominal contexts. The Ottoman imperial experience and the Turkish national experience approve that the Turkish nation tolerate those non-Muslims, non-Sunni-Muslims and non-Turks as long as they did not disturb or go against the Sunni-Islam-Turkish order. If ethno-cultural and religious minorities did transgress, their recognition could easily turn into suppression and persecution.

The concept of tolerance has a very long history in the Turkish context tracing back to the Ottoman Empire. It also has a very popular usage in everyday life. Turks are usually proud of referring to the Millet System of the Ottoman Empire, which is often portrayed in the popular imagery as the guarantor of tolerance, respecting the boundaries between religious communities. Such an official discourse is still vibrant in contemporary Turkey. However, this report tries to argue that tolerance is nothing but a myth in Turkey. The myth of tolerance has been functional to conceal the mistreatment of ethno-cultural and religious minorities other than the majority of Sunni-Muslim-Turks in Turkey. Those remaining outside the boundaries of the holy trinity of Sunni-Muslim-Turks are bound to be subject to the patronizing and tolerant gaze of the majority nation.

The report claims that there is no problem of (in-)tolerance in Turkey as long as those non-Sunni, non-Muslim, and/or non-Turkish minorities accept to be second-class citizens. The
celebration of the Armenian millet in the Ottoman Empire as the “millet-i sadika” (loyal nation) is actually a confirmation of the fact that loyalty to the Empire paves the way for the non-Muslim minorities to toleration. On the other hand, those non-Turks (Kurds, Circassians, Laz etc.) and non-Sunnis (Alevi), who claim to be the constitutive elements of the modern nation in Turkey, are not in search of tolerance from the majority nation. Turkish nation-building process based on the collective acts of various constitutive elements (mainly Muslims) vis-a-vis Christians (mainly Greeks and Armenians) and their European allies in the course of the Independence War in the early 1920s became more exclusionary in the course of time, and it excluded Kurds, Circassians, Alevi, Arabs, Laz and several other Muslim origin minorities in a way that ethnicized the nation. Ethnification of the nation since the early 1930s is a common practice in Turkey, alienating the non-Turkish and non-Sunni groups of Muslim background, who are still engaged in the discourse of ‘constitutive element of the nation’ and who do not want to be considered as ‘second class citizens’. This is still an unresolved issue.

The term tolerance has become more viable in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of the European Union in 1999. The report also claims that there is a parallel between the neo-liberal form of governmentality and the rhetoric of tolerance, both of which lead to culturalization of what is political and social. Against this background, it is maintained that Turkey’s European integration process undertaken by the Justice and Development Party rule seems to go in line with this neo-liberal form of governmentality, underlining that Turkey’s moderate Islamic character can be used as a bridging element between the so-called Christian and Islamic civilizations at the expense of reducing civilization to religion.

**Keywords**

Tolerance, Turkey, EU, Europeanization, Ethnicity, Religion, Diversity, State, Society, Kemalism, Nation and Citizenship
1. Introduction

Having the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey, with more than 72 million inhabitants, is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, housing approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethno-cultural groups: Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds, Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians etc. (Andrews, 1992). However, leaving aside the attempts made for democratisation of the country in the last decade, the Turkish state has been far from recognising the ethnically and culturally diverse nature of the Turkish society. Ethno-cultural and religious minorities in Turkey have been subject to homogenising state policies.

As Turkey is a republican country, one could not find official figures about the numbers of ethno-cultural and religious minorities. The draft report is designed to portray the ways in which ethno-cultural and religious diversity has hitherto been managed by modern Turkish state within the framework of the discourse of tolerance. Explicating the construction of the Turkish national identity and the modern Turkish state, the report will primarily delineate the constitutive elements of the state machinery as well as the technologies of citizenship. Turkey’s process of Europeanization will also be scrutinized in order to pave the way to a detailed analysis of the transformation of the Turkish polity from the Cold War years to the Post-Cold War years. In doing so, major challenges against the traditional Kemalist nation-state building process will be scrutinized such as political islam, Alevi revival, Kurdish revival and Europeanization/globalization. Subsequently, some statistical information will be given regarding the major ethno-cultural and religious minorities. The term ‘minority’ has a delicate history in Turkey, as it often has negative connotation in the popular imagery. In the text, the term ‘minority’ will be used in both legal and sociological/anthropological framework.

Ottoman multiculturalism was usually coupled with the term ‘tolerance’. The popularity of the term ‘tolerance’ is still to be found in the contemporary Turkish context, whereby Turks are proud to be vocalizing their toleration vis-a-vis ethno-culturally and religiously different groups and individuals. However, the very etymological meaning of ‘tolerance’ jeopardizes the idea of multiculturalism. The etymology of the term ‘tolerance’ is also very illustrative to understand what it contains. It does not seem to be accidental that in most languages in which tolerance has been historically debated, the words tolerance (or its synonym, sufferance) and suffering have the same source. The Latin word tolerantia comes from tolerare, to bear, and tolerate, to suffer, endure, and the same link exists in English (through the synonym, sufferance), in French (souffrir), Italian (soffrire), and even in Hebrew (sevel--sovlanut). This etymological fact happens to be philosophically significant. It indicates that there is no tolerance without suffering and its overcoming. Tolerating someone means recognizing an irreducible difference, a gap of alienness separating us, which nevertheless is accepted (Yovel, 1998). This implies a concealed hatred or contest between the tolerating and the tolerated party. By this very otherness, the other represents a challenge to the self in the form of a potential competition over goods, power, moral values, and so on.
In French, there are many words revolving around ‘tolérer’ such as permettre (permission), souffrir (suffrance), endurer (endure) and accorder (accord). The word ‘tolérer’ was first used in France in 1562 by the Catholic French King to somehow let the Protestants stay in the country. The term was basically suggested by the King to set up a policy toward many types of evil and heresy like the Protestants and Jews. The term ‘permettre’ had even more positive connotations than the word ‘tolérer’, which was very negatively loaded. However, both terms revealed common assumptions about the nature of political power vis-à-vis the Church: control from above, surveillance of individuals’ beliefs, and organized pressure. Furthermore, the term Toleranz was used in German, and tolerantie in Dutch before tolerance became common in France, the Low Countries, and Switzerland. Against this background, this paper shall claim that ‘tolerance’ is nothing but a myth in Turkey as in other countries.

2. Nation, State and Citizenship in Turkey

Since the beginning of the nation-state building process, the primary goal of the main constituents of the Turkish Republic had been the establishment of a homogenous nation and a unitary state. In order to achieve this goal, Mustafa Kemal and the military/political elite equipped the state with a superior power over the civil society. Serif Mardin (1975) puts special emphasis on the statist and centralist character of the Republic in its founding years. He underlines that the Republic was ‘diffident’ in integrating the social forces into the central political system although the local notables, who took part in the National Independence War, and formed a significant component of the first Grand National Assembly, were incorporated into the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the bureaucracy (Mardin, 1975: 22-27). To this aim, some religious, ethnic and local claims such as Kurdish Sheihk Sait rebellion (1925) and the Islamist Menemen revolt (a district of Izmir), were suppressed by the state elite on the ground that the social forces were regarded as the sources of decentralisation and political rivalry (ibid., 23). Therefore, Mardin argues that rather than integration of the social forces into the centre through mobilisation of the masses, the Republican idea to restructure the society was confined to the bureaucratisation and regulation (ibid.). Hence, the Kemalist elite preferred achieve the goal of forming the unitary state and a homogenous nation by means of preserving the state’s raison d’être, and adopting policies to suppress, assimilate and exclude diverse societal groupings along religious, ethnic and cultural lines.

In order to maintain the dominance of the state in political and social structuring over its social rivals, Mustafa Kemal and the state elite adopted policies and programmes to homogenise linguistic, historical and cultural features of the Turkish society and to construct a ‘new national identity’. Ataturk defined the Turkish nation as “the Turkish people forming the Turkish Republic”. By this statement, he elucidated that every individual who participated in the establishment of the Republic and took a share in the future of it is a Turk (Özbudun, 1981: 18). Ataturk’s definition of the Turkish nation embraces all the people who live in the lands of Anatolia and Thrace, and feel to be a part of the past and the future of the Republic. That is why, his conception of Turkish nation avoids the distinction of any social segment along with religion, ethnicity, and sectarianism. In this sense, the republican Kemalist elite were difference-blind, and did not recognise ethno-cultural diversity of the Turkish nation (Kaya, 2007).

For further debate on the early history of the word ‘tolérer’, see Huseman (1984).
The defining distinctiveness of the early Republic was Turkification policies, which sought the dominance of Turkishness and Sunni Islam as the defining elements in every walk of life, from the language spoken in the public space to citizenship, national education, trade regime, personnel regime in public enterprises, industrial life and even settlement laws (Aktar, 1996). Having an imperial legacy, many such new regulations and laws referred to a set of attempts to homogenise the entire nation without any tolerance for difference. It is highly probable that the underestimation of ethno-cultural diversity among the Muslim population of the Republic was due to the preceding Ottoman Millet system borrowed by the republican political elite. The Millet system did not consider ethnic differences among Muslims. All Muslims, regardless of their other differences, belonged to the one and the same ‘Muslim nation’. Paradoxically, the successful nature of the Turkish revolution/rupture lays in the continuity of the Ottoman notion of millet.2

In the years to come following the formation of the Republic, assimilationist and/or exclusionary policies of the state elite, which sought to erase social and cultural diversity, continued to render the national identity based on Sunni Islam and Turkishness a dominant role in social and political spheres. The social forces affiliated with diverse religious, ethnic and cultural values were frequently faced with and suppressed by the homogenising policies such as the nationalist Turkish history thesis of 1932, the Sun Language Theory of 1936, the unitarian nationalist education policies (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu, 1924), banning the use of mother tongue and of ethnic minority names, discriminatory settlement policies put in effect on the exchange minorities and new migrants (İskan Kanunu, 1934), discriminatory citizenship laws granting citizenship exclusively to Muslim origin migrants, the imposition of Wealth Tax in 1942, especially on non-Muslims, and the forced migration of Kurds in the east and southeast of Turkey (Kaya, 2007). Ethno-cultural minorities adopted different means to cope with the challenge of the state’s homogenising policies. They generated their own individual identities in accordance with these assimilationist and/or exclusionary policies. Within the framework of the majority nationalism, ethnic and cultural minorities chose to be involved in the project of the construction of a homogenous Turkish nation, disguised their ethnic identities in the public, and identified themselves as a constitutive element of the Turkish nation.

Subsequent to the primary goal of the formation of a homogenous nation and a unitary state, the state elite pointed at the modern and secular character of the state.3 Without a macro socio-economic transformation, a total cultural change through the adoption of the Kemalist version of Westernisation and secularism required the state elite to construct ‘an imagined Turkish nation’ in line with the interests of the unitary and bureaucratic state (Sakallıoğlu, 1996). In its configuration of secularism, the Kemalist elite did not only accommodate the Islamist identity of the individual but also dispersed the individual identity under the banner of the modern and secular Turkish nation (ibid.). In doing so, they ensured that the individual will was secondary to national will, and also precluded that Islam as a social power could be

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2 Similarly, Ibrahim Kaya asserts that Kemalism did not achieve an absolute rupture with the Ottoman legacy, and “it did not bring about a completely new Turkey- a Western nation” (Kaya, 2004: 149).

3 For the Kemalist mode of secularism as a means to the project of modernist nationalism see Göle (1997), Keyman (1995), and Cizre (1996).
organised as a challenge to the unitary and bureaucratic state (ibid.). Relying on the ‘bureaucratic code’, the state elite instrumentalised secularism, which was conceptualised as the separation of politics and religion both in public and private spheres, in order to consolidate the central state power against the potential threat of social forces affiliated with Islamic values and aims.

It should be noted that there is a debate over the definition of Turkish citizenship, for instance “while some argue that the formal definition of Turkish citizenship is based on territoriality rather than ethnicity (Kirişçi 2000), for some, Turkish citizenship oscillates between political and ethnicists logic (Yeğen 2004; Kadioğlu 2007). The historical evidence shows that citizenship policies of Turkey were civic republican in rhetoric. The first citizenship law of 1928 gave citizenship to all those residing within the boundaries of the republic on the basis of jus soli principle. However, it has gradually become ethno-cultural in nature embraced by *jus sanguinis* principle. Retrospectively speaking, ethnic groups in Turkey such as Kurds, Circassians, Alevis, Armenians, Lazis and Arabs have developed various political participation strategies *vis-à-vis* the legal and political structure and delimitations.

Turkey’s Europeanization process has also brought about various challenges against the prescribed definitions of the nation and citizen, a point we will come back shortly. However, the process of modernization and Europeanization of Turkey dates back to the early 19th century. The journey has always been full of impediments as the process was a rather politically oriented one leading to the emergence of social divides/faultlines within the nation. The rise of the JDP in Turkey has made some remarkable changes in the western oriented-civilizational discourse of the Turkish political establishment. Having a pro-Islamist discourse, the JDP is now trying to generate a multi-level governance in both domestic and international platform, and willing to become a soft-power in her region embracing all the countries in the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans and North Africa. It seems that such an attempt, which makes the Islamic inclinations of the JDP very apparent, is also appreciated by the European Union circles. However, it is uncertain if such inclinations of the JDP are destined to make Turkey a member of the EU in the end.

Turkey has experienced one of the steadiest periods in the history of the Republic between 1999 and 2005. At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the European Heads of State and Government for the first time offered Turkey the concrete prospect of full membership of the European Union, more than four decades after its application for association with the European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959. Subsequently in 1963, Turkey had signed the Ankara Agreement, which foresaw the establishment of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EEC. Although the Customs Union was an economic cooperation model, Article 28 of the Agreement stipulated to Turkey’s membership as a long term goal. Accordingly, this stipulation had reflections on the political realm; economic interests of elites had a “conditioning effect” on democracy (Keyman and Öniş, 2007: 61). In 1987, Turkey applied for full EEC membership. Although Turkey was deemed eligible for membership, in 1989 the Opinion of the Commission stated that the there were several economic and political difficulties that needed to be addressed before membership, “such as the expansion of political pluralism, the state of democracy, the persistence of disputes with a Member State (namely Greece), the lack of a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, relative economic backwardness, especially in macroeconomic terms, the Kurdish question, and problems related to human rights (Müftüler-Baç, 2000: 23). However, the official reason for this rejection was the internal dynamic of the EEC, namely the undergoing process of establishing a single market.
Table 1: The Main Minority Groups in Turkey and their Dimensions of Difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions Of Difference</th>
<th>Indigenous people of Anatolia</th>
<th>Ethnically Different from Turks</th>
<th>Religiously Different from Sunni Muslims</th>
<th>Linguistically Different from Turkish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim Minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>(Gregorian Orthodox, Chatolic, Protestant)</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td>(the Sefarad Jews)</td>
<td>√ (Ladino)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Greek Orthodox)</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyrians</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Syria Christians)</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>diverse</td>
<td>diverse</td>
<td></td>
<td>diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Minorities and Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Arabs</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alevi Arabs (the same minority as Arabic speaking Alevis)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alevis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azarbaijani speaking</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>(similar to Shia)</td>
<td>√ (Azerbaijani dialect of Turkish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic speaking (the same minority as Alevi Arabs)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√ (Alevi belief of the Syrian Nusayri community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen Alevi (Turkish speaking)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zazas (Zaza and Kurdish speaking)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√ (Zaza or Kurdish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaza Kurds (the same minority as Zaza Alevis)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√ (Alevi)</td>
<td>√ (Zaza and Kurdish speaking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds speaking Kurmanci</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√ (Kurmanci dialect of Kurdish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnians</td>
<td>√ (Slavic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bosniac-Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomaks</td>
<td>√ (Slavic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgarian-Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torres</td>
<td>√ (Slavic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>√ (Slavic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Albanian-Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma community</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>Roma-Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circassians</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adigey, Abkaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laz</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>Laz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Cultural Diversity Challenges

In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, Kemalist ideology encountered various challenges originating from ethno-cultural and religious groups. This was the time when the Kemalist rhetoric of nationalism, which was based on a retrospective narrative holding the Muslim origin nation together against the syndrome of common enemy of imperialist European powers, was challenged by its major taboos: Islam, Kurds, Alevis, globalization and liberalization. In what follows, these challenges will be scrutinized.

3.1. The Rise of Political Islam in the 1980s: Islamist Forces becoming integral parts of the regime

State-centric Kemalist regime was confronted with the challenge of ethno-cultural and religious groups in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup (Keyman and Önis, 2007:16). The military coup and the policies undertaken by the military government until 1983 revealed that the military elite made a profound attempt to eradicate the sources of social strife emerging from the conflict between the rightists and leftists, and between diverse ethno-cultural communities in the 1970s, and to rebuild the social-political cohesion (Cizre, 1996: 245-246). For this purpose, the military elite began to pursue a project of restructuring the society in a way that the conservative and Islamist sources of culture were accommodated into the homogenous modern Turkish national identity (ibid.).

In parallel with the invocation of the Islamist aspects in the national culture, the policy of economic liberalisation was regarded as a necessary means to structure a new social and economic order. Both the accommodation of the Islamist forces and the economic liberalisation were expected to avoid the polarisation and fragmentation among the political parties supported by the diverse social forces contesting to obtain resources and to shape the social order (ibid.). It is in this political context after the 1980 coup that it became possible to see the Islamist forces, values and themes more pervasively involved in various areas of formal political and social spheres. For instance, the Islamist orders and communities (sufi tarikats) infiltrated into the political parties, government, civil service, and the business and banking sectors. Moreover, the Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who was backed up by the military in the formation of the new conservative and economically liberal order, met the leaders of some Sufi tarikats for the Friday prayer. Mandatory religious instruction in primary and secondary schools was introduced by the military regime led by Kenan Evren (ibid., 244).

However, the state’s project of restructuring the political society was embedded in an implicit ‘double discourse’. One aim of the military government in the project of reorganising the society was the integration of social forces into the political system, and the other was the enhancement of the state’s role in politics. To put it differently, the military government undertook a macro socio-economic transformation, whereby it attempted to create a homogenous and cohesive society unified in Islamic and nationalist identity under the circumstances of liberal economy, on the one hand. On the other, it was committed to strengthen the state’s control over the political and social realms. That is to say that although the introduction of free market economy both in economic and social spheres such as the
privatisation of mass media stimulated the mobilisation of social forces and the proliferation of civil society, it also impeded the democratic consolidation by containing the political activity of the civil society within the channels of political participation (Toprak, 1988:126-127).

In order to enhance the state’s role in politics, the military government initiated the enactment of an electoral law, by which it adopted the 10% national threshold in order to preclude the participation of the ideologically oppositional parties in the competitive politics (Özbudun, 2000: 75). The military government also enacted some articles of the 1982 constitution and other laws, whereby it outlawed cooperation between political parties and other civil society institutions aiming at demobilising the working class and depoliticising the civil society (ibid., 27). Therefore, it can be argued that the enhanced state’s control over the political and social spheres eliminated a civil society autonomous from the state, in which social forces could be mobilised into major oppositional groups organised along ethno-cultural lines as a challenge to the unitary state and the republican regime (ibid.).

The Islamist forces incorporated into the new socio-economic order in which the big business circles in the centre and in the peripheral Anatolian petite bourgeoisie circles integrated and coexisted within the structure of liberal economy (Shambayati, 1994: 316). Hence, they were used by the new state elite to counterbalance the leftists and highly mobilised urban working class (Özbudun, 2000: 26-27). The Islamist forces did not emerge as a challenge to the secular and republican regime, they rather became an integral part constituting and maintaining the status quo of the liberal and capitalist order, which enabled the military and state elite to sustain the political regime.

3.2. New Challenges in the 1990s: Ethno-Religious Claims

The political context of the 1990s showed a different character from the 1980s, whereby the enhancement of the state’s role in politics proved to be counter-productive. While the state’s control over the political and social realms prevailed, ethno-cultural and religious minorities mobilised a politics of identity in reaction to the state’s restriction of political participation. Ethno-cultural and religious communities, which were already integrated into the regime in the 1980s, could not participate in the political process to the extent that they could manifest their dissidence against the inequality and injustice in the distribution of resources within the restricted liberal system.

Due to the lack of the political will and capacity of the coalition governments of the 1990s in management of the economic liberalisation in technological and organisational terms, the opportunities of the open and free market economy did not assure sustained economic growth and were not equally allocated to every segment of the society (Keyman and Önis, 2007: 136). Both the rapid integration to the world economy and the poor management of the economic liberalisation gave rise to economic crises and problems of inequality and poverty (ibid., 244). Social segments which were marginalised and deprived by the unjust features of the liberal economy protested against the deteriorating effects of the socio-economic structure such as poverty, unemployment, corruption, social injustice and ‘the moral decay’ (Kaya, 2007).

Another factor which played a significant role in the rise of the politics of identity by which political mobilisation was stimulated and formed along ethno-cultural and religious lines was the process of globalisation. The transformation to the free market economy and broader
interaction with the world societies also created an impetus for the proliferation of liberal, democratic and pluralistic ideas in the political realm as well as to the cultivation of social mobilisation in civil society.

However, the Turkish political regime based on the priority of state and the restricted political participation was not able to respond to the demands for fostering a political system promoting democracy, pluralism and civil society required by the liberalisation process. Fragmentation embedded in the globalisation process provided the marginalised and oppressed social groups with an informal social-economic structure by which they were able to mobilise in the political context of restricted participation and devalued left-right axis and to fight against the inequalities of the liberal economy and the complexities of the urban life (Özbudun and Hale, 2009:35). Hence, it is crucial to present that his period has witnessed three major social movements challenging the authority of the traditional political centre: political Islam, Alevi revivalism, and Kurdish nationalism.

3.2.i. Political Islam as a Challenge to the Kemalist Regime

The emergence of the Welfare Party with an Islamic social base and political agenda posed a profound challenge to the state-centric, republican and secular regime in both political and cultural terms. The Welfare Party (WP, Refah Partisi) and the broader social network of the Islamist movement sought to respond to the inequalities of the global and liberal system by transcending the state and mobilising the marginalised and underprivileged social groups within an expanding Islamic civil society (umma) and the framing structure of identity politics. The WP tried to generate its electoral support from a broad Islamist social network both by supporting the socio-economic opportunity structures for the social integration of the Islamist forces into the growing liberal economy and the competitive urban life and by channelling their interests and demands to the national politics through political parties. Like the Islamist movements in the other Middle Eastern countries, Islamist communities, Sufi orders (tarikats) and Islamic welfare associations provided a network for the marginalised classes, in which they were provided with sources of social services including employment, religious and secular education, health services, food, cloth and coal supplies which the nation-state failed to provide to a large extent thanks to the unmanaged transition to the liberal economy (Özbudun, 2009: 16-18).

It should be noticed that the Islamist political mobilisation appealed both to the winners and losers of the global and liberal economy in the sense that the newly emerging Islamic bourgeoisie, which underwent a continuous integration into the liberal system since the 1980s, distributed to the poor the wealth raised from the publishing houses, private media channels, university preparation courses, Islamic banks and financial institutions and holding companies (ibid., 13). Through its connections with these Islamist communities, the WP attracted the votes of the Islamic bourgeoisie, the upper middle class and the marginalised lower class and also stimulated political mobilisation of the conservative and Islamist social forces, which dramatically challenged the republican and secular segments (ibid.).

In regard with the unacceptability and intolerance of the dominant regime towards the Islamist forces, the military elite and the coalition government led by the WP in 1997 confronted some crises. The WP posed some challenges to the secular regime with its demands articulating Islamic values and purposes in the political life involving the exercise of the Islamic law, the segregation of sexes in social life, religious education and the headscarf
issue. Analysing the demands of the WP for the incorporation of Islam into formal politics, it should be underlined that what the WP was seeking was the acquisition of state power and the formation of an Islamic social order from above rather than mere **toleration** for the recognition of freedom of religion and conscience and the protection of religious rights such as the wearing of headscarf and religious cloths in public places (Özbudun, 2009: 7-9).

Within the legal and institutional framework, the military/bureaucratic state elite made it explicit that the WP’s Islamist demands cannot be tolerated as the military gave a harsh ultimatum to the party in the meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on the February 28, 1997 and the party was closed down on the January 16, 1998 by a Constitutional Court decision in the following year (ibid., 4). The WP and the Islamist forces constituted a religious and cultural challenge to the republican and secular dominant regime and segments of the society. Their challenge was manifested in the legal and institutional frameworks in that the WP suggested the introduction of a new legal implementation, whereby each legal community would be governed in accordance with its own religious rules. In doing so, it asserted a return to the **Medina Covenant** of the Prophet Muhammed’s time, the age of happiness (**asr-i saadet**), whereby a kind of multiculturalism based on religious differences was experienced (ibid., 7-8).

In the social and economic spheres as an everyday practice, the WP also attempted to undermine the secular and Western order and to alter it in a way that it could also embrace the social forces, which had a religious and Islamic way of living. Therefore, the WP and Islamist forces posed a religious and cultural diversity challenge both in their attempt to stimulate social integration and political participation of the Islamist segments into the republican and secular establishment and to Islamize the society and culture in the legal and institutional framework and everyday practices. However, the state elite and dominant secular segments reacted to this challenge of the WP immediately, and showed their **intolerance** towards the Islamist forces by purging them from the formal political sphere.

3.2.ii. Alevi Revivalism

The other challenge to the republican state and the myth of homogenous nation rose from the Alevi community. After the adoption of the caliphate institution by the Sublime Port in the 16th century, the Ottoman Sultan, Yavuz Sultan Selim, imposed the dominance of the Sunni Islamic tradition over various religious groups in Anatolia (Erman and Erdemir, 2008). As a consequence of these assimilationist and suppressive policies, Alevi were compelled to develop a protective attitude towards their own community and identity by living in small social enclosures in rural areas (ibid.)4. In the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire, Islam was the main constitutive element (Yıldız, 2001). The Millet system did not distinguish between the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman with regard to ethno-cultural differences. All Muslims, regardless of their differences, belonged to the one and the same ‘Muslim nation’ (ibid.). Thereby, Alevi were also imagined as the integral subjects of the ‘Sunni Muslim nation’ (Kaya, 2004a).

Throughout the nation-state building process, the state elite also followed the Ottoman heritage of the ‘Millet system’ imposing the dominance of the Sunni Islam (ibid.). In order to achieve the goal of the Kemalist mode of modernisation, the republican political elite

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4 For more information about Alevi, see Appendix.
implemented policies for the secularisation of the political and social life (Göle, 1997). One of these policies was the abolishment of any kind of place for religious communion and practice other than mosques without taking into consideration the Cemevis, dervish lodges and special places for Alevi communion (Erman and Erdemir, 2008). For this reason, Alevi communities were deprived of the places where they could be organised into a religious community as an alternative to the Sunni communities (ibid.).

Moreover, by the entitlement of all the religious affairs to the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) accountable to the Prime Minister’s Office, the Alevi were subject to the decisions made by this institution on all matters of religious life (ibid.). It is also worth noting that the Directorate of Religious Affairs gradually turned into a state institution instrumentalised to impose and diffuse the values and practices of the dominant Sunni Islam (ibid.). The transition to the multi-party politics did not bring about a radical challenge to the dominant republican and secular regime based on the homogenous Sunni-Turkish nation. Rather, the Democrat Party which emerged as the opposition to the Kemalist Republican People Party, had embraced the dominant Sunni Islamic discourse, mobilised the Sunni conservatism, made connections with Sunni sufi sheikhs and returned to the Arabic prayer’s call (ibid.) in 1950s.

Thus, we can draw the argument that throughout the Republican history, both the state and the society regarded Alevi as intolerable or difficult to tolerate or accept as they posed a challenge to the dominant Sunni Muslim order.

In order to overcome the marginalising discourses and practices of the dominant classes of the urban life, Alevi who migrated to the big cities attempted to reproduce their communities and to build solidarity networks through ‘hemsehrilik’ (fellowship) associations and affiliations, and became intensely engaged in identity politics (Erman and Aydemir, 2008). Furthermore, in 1990s, a slight change in the state discourse for the re-alignment with the Alevi against the emerging political Islam and Kurdish nationalists also contributed to the ‘awakening of the Alevi’, who mobilised through social networks, solidarity associations and identity politics. In parallel with the shift in the state discourse, one case to show the rise of tolerance is that Alevi and Sunni intellectuals signed a ‘declaration of being Alevi’, which was published in the Daily Cumhuriyet (Yavuz, 1999:180-199). Similarly, in the 1999 local elections, the Alevi took an initiative to form a ‘Democratic Peace Movement’ led by a businessman, Ali Haydar Veziroglu, and later a political party called ‘the Peace Party’ (Erman and Erdemir, 2008).

Despite the state discourse for the re-alignment with the Alevi and the common initiatives of the Sunni secularists and Alevi to accommodate cultural and religious diversity, in this decade, one could also find obvious examples illustrating the cases of intolerance and conflict. As an ethno-class group, the Alevi community living in the squatters of the shanty town Gazi at the periphery of Istanbul emerged as a resistance grouping, which considered their Alevi identity superior to the Turkish national identity as opposed to the moderate Alevi seeking a democratic, pluralistic and peaceful movement (Kaya, 2009a). The Alevi community of Gazi neighbourhood identified themselves with aspects such as distrustful and sceptic of the bureaucracy, the state authorities, the politicians and the municipal governments, which ignored the grievances and the lack of social services there as a result of their ‘Othering’ the ‘poor and different’ Alevi (ibid.).

This conflict between the dominant classes and the culturally and religiously different underclass Alevi of the urban life took place in an armed clash in Gazi neighbourhood. In March 1995, an unknown person fired at the people in three coffee houses and one of them died and 20 of them were seriously injured. The neighbourhood people were involved in an
armed conflict with the police forces, which were late to intervene and thus seen as responsible for the attack. At the end of the clash between the Alevi and the police in the neighbourhood, 15 people were killed by the policemen (Kaya, 2001). This case of armed conflict between the security forces and the marginalised Alevi revealed that the level of social intolerance, suspicion and hatred increases when the dichotomy between Sunni-Muslim-Turkish majority and the ethno-religious groups and minorities such as the Alevi was re-emphasised, and the gap between the rich and the poor was widened.

3.2.iii. Kurdish Revivalism

At the end of 1980s, political parties which represented the Kurdish identity and defended the Kurdish cultural and political rights began to enter the formal political sphere. Under the Ozal government, the abolition of the articles of the law 765 of the Turkish Penal Code, which restricted the freedom of expression, laid the ground for the formation of legal ethnic and religious parties (Sahin, 2008:134). In addition, departing from their alliances with the leftists parties of the 1970s, the Kurdish political and intellectual elite abandoned the old communist slogans, the socialist economic programmes, and the aim of forming an independent Kurdistan, and replaced them with the seizure of the cultural rights for the Kurdish people and the democratic consolidation of the democratic republic (Sahin, 2008: 134). During the 1990s, the attempts of the Kurdish political elite to represent the Kurdish cultural and political rights by participating in the national politics through political parties were undermined by closure cases of the Constitutional Court and the public debates on the legitimacy of a party, which was founded on the basis of the recognition of ethnic identity (ibid., 138-139).

Ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the state has never been tolerant to the expression of Kurdish identity in the public space. The Kurdish population was considered by the Kemalist elite as the most formidable threat against the formation of nation-state based on the republican, secular, modern and bureaucratic principles as well as on the homogenous Turkish national identity (Kaya and Tarhanlı, 2008). First, as it was evidently revealed in the Sheikh Sait Rebellion (1925), the Kurdish tribal leaders and religious leaders, sheikhs, who maintained control over the local community, constituted a potential source of rivalry to the central political authority. Second, the Kurdish people were also perceived as a rigorous impediment to the project of the Kemalist mode of modernisation and Westernisation due to their ‘backward, pre-modern and inprogressive’ communal and primordial lifestyle based on Sufi order (tarikats), tribes, sheikhs, landlords, warlords and rebels (Sahin, 2008). Consequently, the increasing affiliation of the Kurds with the PKK, the Kurdish Workers Party (Partia Kerkeran Kurdistan) is even making them more intolerable for the majority Turkish nation and the state.5

Since 1984, the PKK has been leading an armed struggle against the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in the southeastern region. In order to defend the Turkish territorial integrity and the national security, an urgent implementation of excessive military and authoritarian control over the governance of some cities (Martial Law) in the eastern and South Eastern regions was introduced in 1987, and was extended for 57 times until its abolition in 2002. Moreover, since 1985 the military adopted another strategy, whereby they supported and armed the village guards of some Kurdish tribes allying with them to counterattack the tribes involved in armed attacks (ibid., 137).

5 For more information about the Kurds, see Appendix.
The rise of the Kurdish ethnic nationalism, which involved the attempts of the Kurdish representation in the national politics, on the one hand, and the armed struggle, on the other was perceived as ‘a low-intensity war’ between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish state. The armed conflict has resulted with an increasing tension between the Turks and the Kurds in a way that leads to the mental division among the Kurds. Kurds are now willing to stay in their home cities despite the difficulties in getting jobs. Racism and institutional discrimination towards the Kurds in the big cities and in western Anatolia is growing day by day. Since the mid-1980s, the Kurds have been coupled by the majority Turkish public with separation, division, disintegration, terror, violence, drug trafficking, informal economics, and gun industry.

3.3. 2000s: European Integration and Euroscepticism

As stated earlier, Turkey was granted the right to candidacy in the Helsinki Summit of the European Union in December 1999. Later in 2002, the Copenhagen Summit introduced new concerns and discussions regarding the nature of European identity, the notion of Europeanization and the borders of Europe, which led to identity-based concerns regarding Turkey’s place in Europe and the situation of Islamic identity in European societies. According to Keyman and Öniş, the main concern was whether the EU aspired to become a global actor or rather preferred inward-oriented integration. Subsequently, while the former aspiration was accommodating towards Turkish membership, the latter perceived Turkey as a liability given the social, political and economic disparities between the EU member states and Turkey (Keyman and Öniş, 2007: 48-50). For the first time the Copenhagen Summit and the subsequent discussions linked the question of culture with European enlargement and the EU’s capacity to embrace cultural differences. “The discussions over Turkish accession reveal yet another dimension of ‘absorption capacity’, that of ‘cultural’ and ‘social’ absorption, which are directly related to the ‘identity’ of the Union. Jean-Louis Bourlanges, an MEP from a French centre-right party vocal on Turkish accession, has argued that the accession of Turkey will not only have a huge economic impact on the EU, but will also introduce a great deal of cultural and social heterogeneity that will endanger the formation of a solid and democratically organised political community” (Emerson et al., 2006: 3.) In the course of European integration, the JDP adopted a conservative democratic ideology with an emphasis on secularism, social peace, social justice, the preservation of moral values and norms, pluralism, democracy, free market economy, civil society and good governance (Cınar and Duran, 2008: 31). By using such a pragmatist discourse, the JDP aimed to mobilise socially and economically marginalised classes, which reacted to the inequalities deriving from the processes of globalization and urban life (Kaya, 2004a: 16-17). Moreover, the JDP also became attractive for the liberal and secular bourgeoisie, upper middle and middle classes, who were disenchanted with the political system because of the political and economic instability (Özbudun and Hale, 2009: 37). The JDP immediately took an initiative to raise toleration and respect for the freedom of religion and conscience, and for the protection of religious rights such as the right to practice religion in public and private space.

Whether the JDP’s discourse on conservative democracy and Islamic liberalism achieved to transform the society into a more tolerant society with respect to the recognition of religious freedom and rights is not certain. However, it is clear that the JDP government made profound attempts to force the state and the society to recognise cultural and religious
differences. The protection of religious freedoms and rights became a heated debate between the Islamist and secular segments of society. One of the cases, where the JDP sought to increase the tolerance vis-à-vis the social integration of Islamist forces and to foster the respect for religious freedom is that the JDP government proposed a draft-law, which enabled the Imam Hatip (clergy high-school) graduates to study not only in the faculty of Islamic theology but also in other faculties (Özbudun and Hale, 2009: 86). By doing so, it made an attempt to eradicate the constraints, which gave rise to the social and economic segregation of religious and conservative segments.

Moreover, between 2002 and 2008 the JDP made several attempts to initiate the amendments and decisions in the legal and institutional framework for the lift of the ban on headscarf (Kaya, 2009b:18). The JDP government proposed to the Constitutional Court an amendment on the articles of the Constitution concerning the ban on wearing headscarf in universities with the expectation that this amendment would lead to the lift of the ban in 2008. Following the constitutional amendments, the newly elected head of the Board of the Higher Education (BHE), Yusuf Ziya Özcan made an announcement to the universities and stated that according to the constitutional change, the ban on wearing a headscarf in the Turkish universities was lifted. However, the Court repudiated the lift of the ban ultimately. As a consequence, the appearance/ existence of conservative and Islamist segments in the socio-economic sphere was recognised/accepted as an everyday reality although (in)tolerance/(dis)respect for the expression of faith and wearing religious clothes still remained as a highly debated topic in the public.

On the other hand, it should be thoroughly questioned whether the quest of the JDP for the recognition of religious freedom and rights through the adoption of the discourses on conservative democracy was equally carried out in every social cleavage, and particularly, in the case of religious minorities. Before the 2007 elections, even though the JDP took an initiative to accommodate the Alevi in the Sunni-dominant order, the party was primarily concerned with gaining more votes from the Alevi (Kaya, 2009b:17). The Alevi were not equally treated in the JDP’s policy to transform the society to become more tolerant for the expression of faith and religious rights. The JDP failed to accommodate the Alevi into the social sphere and continued to retain the Sunni-dominant social order since it did not recognise the Cemevis (Alevi communion houses) as places of worship in addition to mosques, and insisted on the inclusion of the Alevi children in the assignment of the compulsory courses of religion in the secondary school education (ibid., 18). Therefore, one should contend that the JDP’s policies to stimulate the social sensitivities for the toleration and recognition of the religious minorities and the protection of religious rights were confined to the Sunni conservative and Islamist segments.

In the legal and institutional framework, since February 2002, it is also possible to find various reform policies for the recognition and protection of ethnic minority rights, which manifested a great shift in the discursive position taken by the political elite. Since the Accession Partnership Programme and the National Programme (March 2001) addressed at the recognition of ethno-cultural diversity, the former coalition government and the JDP government enacted and enforced reform packages and policies to accommodate ethno-cultural diversity, and in a broader sense, to secure the individual rights, liberties and human

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rights within the framework of the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. With the initial reform packages put into force between 2002 and 2004, first, they reduced the role of the military in politics by removing the military origin judges from the State Security Courts, and eventually abolishing these courts, removing the military members from the High Audio Visual Board (RTÜK) and the Board of Higher Education (BHE), weakening the military impact on the judiciary, civilianising the National Security Council (NSC) and restricting its role to a consultative body, and by bringing the extra-budgetary funds of the military under the general budget of the Defence Ministry (Kaya, 2009; Sahin, 2008).

Secondly, they reinforced the individual rights, liberties and human rights versus the authoritarian and unitary state by loosening the law on the freedom of association and demonstration, abolishing the death penalty and all means and practices of tortures by the security forces, revising the Penal Code, abolishing the term of ‘forbidden language’ from the Press law, permitting limited broadcast in Kurdish in the private radio and TV channels, introducing limited broadcast in Arabic, Circassian, and various dialects of the Kurdish such as Kurmançî and Zaza on the national radio and TV channels, and by allowing the ethnic languages and dialects to be taught in private courses (ibid.). Consequently, the reform packages, which were adopted to raise the social awareness of tolerance and acceptance of ethno-cultural minorities, encouraged ethno-cultural groups to vocalise their claims through legitimate political channels.

Since 2001, the governments took initiatives to remedy the civil and cultural rights of non-Muslim minorities through legal amendments. In accordance with the Copenhagen Political Criterias, the constitutional amendments expanded the individual rights and liberties to every citizen and provided the structural arrangements for democratic consolidation and the enhancement of the rule of law and human rights (Oran, 2004). The EU Reform Packages partially and gradually restored civil and cultural rights conceded to the non-Muslim minorities with the Lausanne Agreement (LA) (ibid.).

In the nation-state formation process, the state elite of the Republic inherited from the Ottoman the discourse and practices of the homogenous nation based on the Sunni Islam and the exclusion of the non-Muslim minorities. The Kemalist definition of nationalism was also discriminative against the non-Muslim minorities since it incorporated the element of Islam into the so-called modern secular national identity. The configuration of the majority and minority elements of the Turkish nation were also inscribed in the (1923) during the foundation of the Turkish Republic. According to LA, the non-Muslim minorities were officially categorised and recognised as ‘minorities’ resting upon their ethnic and religious differences whereas Kurds, Alevi, Circassians and other Muslim elements belonged to the Turkish nation (Türk Uyruklu) constituting the majority (Oran, 2000).

With the EU Reform packages, the ban on establishing associations for the preservation and diffusion of languages and cultures other than Turkish and traditional to minorities was abolished; the use of the ‘forbidden language’ was re-legalised in the law of associations; the restrictions on learning and publishing in different languages and dialects other than Turkish were abandoned; the right to acquire intangible property of the foundations belonging to the non-Muslim minorities was restored by a change in the law on foundations and was initially

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8 For more information about Greek, Jewish and Armenian and other non-Muslim minorities, see Appendix.
9 For more information about Circassians, see Appendix.
subjected to the decisions of the cabinet and later to the General Secretary of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Mudurluğu), and the limitation on the names other than Turkish was abolished by a change in the law on population. Furthermore, recently the European Union General Secretariat in Ankara has decided to drop the use of the term ‘non-Muslims’ in identifying officially recognized minorities in Turkey. Seeking to update the government’s terminology for the 21st century, Turkey’s chief negotiator for European Union affairs has announced a decision to use the term “different belief groups” instead of “gayrimüslim” (non-Muslim) in official EU correspondence. The decision was taken after the Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis received a letter from the vice patriarch of the Ancient Syriac Orthodox Church, Yusuf Çetin, who pointed out that “Muslim” means “believer” in Aramaic, a northwest Semitic language used in ancient times as the everyday speech of Syria. As such, the term “gayrimüslim,” which has been the preferred term for non-Muslims in Turkey, implied “nonbelievers.”

Furthermore, the discursive shift from ‘majority nationalism’ to ‘diversity as an ideology’ fostered by the governing party created an incentive for a change in the every-day life for the social motivation toward toleration of ethno-religious rights of non-Muslim minorities. The political elite, the Turkish and Armenian intellectuals and civil society organisations were induced to open public discussion on the taboo issues involving the Armenian ‘genocide’, the Armenian ethnic minority rights, the Armenian-Turkish diplomatic relations and the impact of the Armenian Diaspora on the problems related to the Armenians.

Strikingly, the debates on the Armenian ‘genocide’ both at the state and society levels have been good examples of the rising aspiration of toleration for the Armenian ethnic and cultural rights. One of these cases of the rising toleration was the highly debated and polemical conference on ‘Ottoman Armenians during the Demise of the Empire’ held at Istanbul Bilgi University in 2005 (Kaya, 2009b). Although some ultranationalists brought a lawsuit on the organisers of the conference and the court partly considered their claims rightful and lawful, this conference became a good indicator of eradicating the biased views on the Armenian issue (ibid.).

On the other hand, it should be also pointed out that the EU Reforms on civil and cultural rights of non-Muslim minorities could not be brought into practice in an immediate and effective way because its application was obscured and delayed by bureaucratic obstacles and the interference of National Security Council, the intelligence agencies and the Security Forces (ibid.). Since 2004, none of the applications for the approval of non-Muslim foundations has been approved, and 18.66% of the applications for the acquisition of intangible properties belonging to the existing foundations have been approved (ibid.). By looking at the constraints in bringing the EU reforms on non-Muslim minorities into practice, one could maintain that the dominant discourse of ‘non-Turkish’ and ‘foreign’ non-Muslim minorities is still prevalent, and therefore, the Turkish state is still reluctant to accommodate toleration, recognition or acceptance in everyday life.

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11 For more information about Armenians, see Appendix.
12 For more information on the developments of the establishment of non-Muslim foundations approved by the government see Oran (2004:133-134).
4. Discourses and Practices of (In)Tolerance in the Age of Euroscepticism

From 17 December 2004 to 3 October 2005, when EU state and national government leaders decided to start negotiations with Turkey, tensions began to rise between nationalist, patriotic, statist, pro-status-quo groups on the one hand and pro-EU groups on the other hand. This was the time when the virtuous cycle of the period between 1999 and 2005 was replaced with the vicious cycle starting from the late 2005. A new nationalist and religious wave embraced the country, especially among middle-class and upper middle-class groups. The actual start of the accession negotiations in 2005 was a turning point towards Euroscepticism. This was also observed in several previous cases during the accession negotiations of the 2004/2007 entrants. Political elites and the government come to realize that accession negotiations are not in fact “negotiations” but rather a unilateral imposition from the EU. The only “negotiable” matters that would benefit the candidate are generally some minor exceptions and hardly bargained transition periods. Furthermore, this reality of actual accession negotiations is often abused by politicians to unfoundedly blame many governmental actions onto the EU. Be the “blaming of Brussels” honest or not, the overall impact on public support is almost surely negative.

Euroscepticism, nationalism and parochialism in Turkey were triggered by the disapproving sentiments towards the American occupation of Iraq, the limitations on national sovereignty posed by the EU integration, the high tide of the 90th anniversary of the Armenian “deportation”/“genocide” among the Armenian diaspora (2005), the “risk of recognition” of Southern Cyprus by Turkey for the sake of the EU integration, anti-Turkey public opinion in the EU countries (e.g. France and Austria) framed by conservative powers, and Israel’s attacks on Lebanon in 2006. Against such a background the state elite has also become very sceptical of the Europeanization process. The best way to explain the sources of such a kind of scepticism among the state elite is to refer to the “Sévres Syndrome”, which is based on a fear deriving from the post-World War I era characterized with a popular belief regarding the risk of the break-up of the Turkish state (Öniş, 2004: 12).

Against this background, the JDP immediately set back from its pro-European position as it was perceived by the Party that the EU no longer paid off. Actually, it is not the nationalist climax in the country which turned the JDP into a Eurosceptical party, but it was the decision of the European Court of Human Rights vis-a-vis the headscarf case brought by Leyla Sahin v. Turkey challenging a Turkish law which bans wearing the Islamic headscarf at universities and other educational and state institutions. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) heard a particularly monumental case called Leyla Sahin v. Turkey. It was monumental because the Grand Chamber agreed to hear Sahin’s case at all. And two previous admissions to the European Human Rights Commission concerning the Turkish headscarf were ruled inadmissible. In Sahin’s case, however, the outcome equalled temporary defeat for headscarf supporters. The court ruled that there had been no violation to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion); Article 10 (freedom of expression); Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 2, Protocol No.1 (right to education) (ECHR, 2004). In short, the Grand Chamber concluded that the interference/violations of fundamental rights concerning headscarf were acceptable and

13 Sévres Syndrome derives from the Sévres Peace Treaty signed by the Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire in 1920 in the aftermath of the World War I, leading to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
legitimate. In addition to these rulings, Grand Chamber stated that the interference to her education triggered by her wearing a headscarf was found to be necessary for protecting the rights and freedoms of others and maintaining public order. While the Chamber recognized that the ban interfered with Sahin’s right to publicly express her religion, it stated that the ban was acceptable if it was imposed to protect the rights of third parties, to preserve public order, and to safeguard the principles of secularism and equality in Turkey. Since the ECHR is an institution within the framework of the Council of Europe, to which Turkey is a member since 1949, it could be difficult to see how its judgment could have an impact on the support for the EU membership. The only way, then, could be that Euroscepticism is understood as a general perception and attitude towards Europe, not only towards the EU and the prospect of membership. This is actually a remarkable phenomenon indicating that Europe and European Union are often interchangeably used in Turkey.

The Eurosceptic attitude towards the EU-accession could be found not only in the JDP government and among Turkish nationalists and pro-status quo groups. Rather, after 2005, the Kurdish people also became ardously critical of the EU reforms with a growing sentiment of Euroscepticism (Kaya, 2009b). In parallel with the suspicion of the sufficiency and the efficiency of the JDP attempts to recognise the Kurdish identity, the revocation of the concept ‘minority’ in the Progress Report in 2004 provoked some of the Kurdish nationalists to reemphasize their position against the Turkish majority nationalism. A considerable fraction among the Kurds claimed that they denounced the concept ‘minority’ because it rendered them a ‘degrading’, ‘inferior’ and ‘unequal’ status versus the Turkish people (Sahin, 2008:144). Rather, this fraction defended their claim that the Kurdish people were one of ‘the constitutive elements’ of the Turkish Republic, and therefore, had a status equal to that of the Turks. Considering themselves as the ‘constitutive element’ rather than a minority, the Kurds fervently alleged that their characteristics which distinguish them from other minorities should be recognised, and the equality to the Turkish majority in living conditions should be secured (ibid). In other words, even though this demand gives the Kurds a distinctive status in comparison to the other ethnic and religious minorities, it is sound in the sense that it remarkably denotes to the right of ‘equal citizenship’.

It has also been suggested that although the EU reforms on the protection of ethnic minorities culminated in an open public debate, they did not achieve to take a concrete and significant step towards the settlement of the Kurdish problem (Somel, 2010). The Kurdish Democratic Society Movement (DTH) declared in 2004 that the objectives of the movement involved the support for the EU accession, the resolution of the Kurdish problem by peaceful and democratic means and with respect to territorial integrity, and the adoption of a new democratic and universal constitution (hurriyetim.com.tr, 22.10.2004). The DTH, which abandoned the secessionist and federalist claims, put forth its demands for the adoption of ‘constitutional citizenship’, the abolition of the 10% national threshold in the electoral law, the liberalisation of equal participation for all political parties, and social and economic development in the Kurdish populated regions (Radikal, 26.05.2004). Thus, considering the definition of ‘minority’ in the Turkish political context and on the Kurdish political party, one

14 For more information about the declaration of the DTH see “Eski DEP’lilerden Demokratik Toplum Hareketi (The Democratic Society Movement from the former members of the DEP) http://hurriyetim.com.tr, 22 October 2004 accessed on 13 June 2010

15 For more information on the demands of the Kurdish civil society acitivists and intellectuals see Y. Alatas “AB Eşiğinde Kürt Sorunu Yazi Dizisi” (The Series on the Kurdish Question on the Verge of the EU Accession), Radikal (27 May 2004).
should carry on debating whether the EU reforms adopted by the JDP government aim to merely tolerate cultural and individual rights of the Kurdish minority, or are designed as an initial stage drifting towards a national project for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and the recognition/acceptance/respect of the difference of the Kurds.

It was possible to find the examples of intolerance influenced by the upsurge of radical nationalism in the practices of everyday life. In March 2005, two Kurdish children allegedly burnt the Turkish flag during the Newroz celebrations (hurriyet.com.tr, 21.03.2005). Six month after the Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Diyarbakir in 2005 where he declared his full support of the solution of the Kurdish problem with respect to democracy, the Kurdish people in this city rioted in the funerals of four PKK members (Somer, 2010). In the following months, the casualties caused by the PKK attacks increased.

It should also be underlined that the Turkish majority nationalism increased as a response to the rising Kurdish nationalism as well as to Euroscepticism. In retaliation to the issue of flag burning in Mersin (21 March 2005), some public figures started flag campaigns in the name of ‘responsible statesmanship’ (Hurriyet.com.tr, 21.03.2005). The ‘waved and unwaved flags’ (Billig, 1995:10) obviously indicated the cases of the rise of intolerance where the nationalist and sceptic attitudes of both Kurdish and Turkish people were provoked in regard to the national and ethnic conflict. Hence, the intolerance, ethnic conflict and violence increased at the time when the Kurdish people became increasingly critical of the suitability and the sufficiency of the JDP government’s EU reforms for the recognition of ethno-cultural identity and the resolution of identity-related issues, and the sceptical and nationalist attitude towards the ‘Other’ was strengthened by the Turks and the Kurds.

Finally, it is also possible to find striking cases where the social intolerance, unacceptability, non-recognition and even hatred towards the Armenians reached its peak and even involved violent conflict. The most conspicuous of these cases was the assassination of the prominent Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink in January 2007. It was claimed by some journalists in the media that the assassination of Hrant Dink could be linked to a reaction of ultranationalists, who were agitated by the verdict of guilty for Hrant Dink on the denigration of Turkishness in one of his articles (ibid.). In 2005, Hrant Dink was sentenced to six months’ conditional imprisonment on account of ‘insulting Turkish national identity’ according to the article 301 of the Penal Code (ibid.). The article 301 of the Penal Code considers a criminal somebody who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and sentences him/her to imprisonment between six months and three years (ibid.). Moreover, the rise of Euroscepticism and the reinvigoration of national identity as a response to the upsurge of identity politics based on ethnic and religious difference after the articulation of the concept of ‘minority’ in the 2005 Progress Report also aggravated intolerance and conflict between the Turkish nationalists and the Armenian minorities. For example, in March 2005 the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli Victory was celebrated in an exaggerated manner in retaliation to the 90th anniversary activities of the Armenian exodus (hurriyet.com.tr, 17.03.2005).

16 For more information about the incident of burning flags see http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/21/616617.asp, accessed on 14 June 2010
17 For more information about the flag campaigns see http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/21/616617.asp, accessed on 14 June 2010
18 For more information on the celebration for the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli Victory on 19 March 2005 see http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/18/615296.asp, accessed on 14 June 2010
Hence, it is argued that the shift in the discourse from ‘majority nationalism’ to ‘diversity as an ideology’ through the EU reforms and the attempts of the JDP did not result in a substantial change in the attitude of the Sunni-Turkish majority towards the toleration and acceptance of ethno-cultural and religious diversity for non-Turks and non-Muslim minorities such as Armenians.

5. Conclusion: The Myth of Tolerance in Turkey

The concept of tolerance has a very long history in the Turkish context tracing back to the Ottoman Empire. It also has a very popular usage in everyday life. Turks are usually proud of referring to the The Millet System of the Ottoman Empire is often known to be the guarantor of tolerance, respecting the boundaries between religious communities. Such an official discourse is still carried out in contemporary Turkey, although it is evident that it is just a myth. The myth of tolerance was functional to conceal the mistreatment of ethno-cultural and religious minorities other than the majority of Sunni-Muslim-Turks in Turkey. The term tolerance has become more viable in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of the European Union in 1999. Whether a cultural diversity challenge is tackled in relation to the concept ‘tolerance’ or other concepts such as ‘recognition’/’acceptance’ or assimilation, expulsion and persecution, depends on the historical form of a particular state.

The definition of tolerance is confined to the acceptance of Sunni Muslims and their secular counterparts under the banner of the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish nation. However, it does not mean to embrace all different kinds of ethno-cultural and religious minorities. As Karen Barkey (2008: 110), a famous Ottoman historian, stated earlier, toleration in the Ottoman context as well as in other imperial contexts refers to the “absence of persecution of people but not their acceptance into society as full and welcomed members of community”. Tolerance is actually nothing but a form of governmentality, designed to maintain peace and order in multi-ethnic and multi-nominational contexts. The Ottoman imperial experience and the Turkish national experience approve that the Turkish nation tolerate those non-Muslims, non-Sunni-Muslims and non-Turks as long as they did not disturb or go against the Sunni-Islam-Turkish order. If ethno-cultural and religious minorities did transgress, their recognition could easily turn into suppression and persecution.

Appendix: Information on Minorities

- Armenians: Armenians are one of the indigenous peoples living in Anatolia and are mostly Gregorian Orthodox, less Catholic and Protestant. The Armenian population in Anatolia substantially decreased as a result of the massacres during the 1915 exodus carried out by the ‘Union and Progress’ government and of the streams of emigration. The Armenians who developed a distinct Armenian identity live mostly in Istanbul and number between 55,000 and 60,000. Gregorian Orthodox Armenians are committed to the Armenian patriarchy established by the initiative of the Mehmet II in Kumkapı, Istanbul in 1461. Armenians publish in Armenian two daily newspapers called Jamanak and Marmara, and in Turkish a weekly newspaper called Agos.

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19 For all of the statistical information on minorities see Oran (2004: 50-61).
- **Jews:** The Jews are not mostly of indigenous people of Anatolia, although there is a small autochthonous minority of Karai Jews. Rather, most of the Jews come from the Sefarad Jews who fled from Spain and Portugal and migrated to the Ottoman Empire at the end of 15th century. They speak Ladino, which is a dialect of Spanish. They have been known to be loyal to the Ottomans ever since they came to the Empire. There was a massive migration to Israel in 1940s after the establishment of the Israeli state. The conformist attitude of the Jews did not prevent them from being adversely affected by the incidents of 6-7 September 1955 and the 1942 Wealth Tax. It is estimated that there are approximately 40,000 Jews in contemporary Turkey. It is also known that the hostility towards the Jews has recently increased due to the killing of 9 Turks by the Israeli soldiers in the Gazza flotilla on 31 May 2010 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10195838).

- **Greeks:** Greeks are also one of the autochthonous populations of Anatolia, and are mostly Orthodox, and less Catholic and Protestant. The Orthodox Greeks of Anatolia were required to migrate to Greece according to the agreement on the population exchange signed with Greece in Lausanne, 1923. However, the Greeks living in Istanbul, Bozcaada and Imroz Islands were allowed to stay like the Turkish origin Greek citizens living in the western Trace. Therefore, as a result of the War of Independence and the population exchange, 1,190,000 Greeks migrated to Greece and only 110,000 Greeks stayed in Turkey. The disruption of the relations between Turkey and Greece as a result of the 1964 Cypriot issue also escalated the emigration of the Greeks, and their number decreased nearly to 3,000. The Orthodox Greeks are committed to the Greek patriarchy in Phanar, Istanbul. They publish two daily newspapers called *Iho* and *Apoyevmatini*.

- **Assyrians:** There is a common belief in Turkey, shaped by the official discourse and internalised by the society that the LA, by which non-Muslim minorities were officially recognised and acquired civil and cultural rights, mostly addresses at those ‘three large minorities’ among non-Muslim populations. On the other hand, Assyrians, Nasturis, Yezidis, and Protestants are also non-Muslim populations living in Turkey. The civil and cultural rights of the latter minorities were secured with the LA as much as those of the ‘three large minorities’. Severely affected by the armed conflict and the terrorist activities of the PKK in South Eastern Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, the Assyrians migrated to Istanbul first, and from there to Europe, mostly to Sweden. According to their own statements, the number of Assyrians decreased to 3,000 in the South Eastern region and to 50,000 in Istanbul. Besides the Assyrians, it has been discovered from their own statement that there are approximately 10,000 Bahai people and 1,500 Protestants.

- **EU Citizens:** Bianca Kaiser and Ahmet İçduygu (2005) state that there are more than 170,000 EU citizens permanently residing in Turkey. This number is likely to increase as Turkey is becoming more and more Europeanized in the accession process. Most of these EU citizens are the posted European personnel and their families, EU spouses of Turkish citizens, descendants of EU spouses of Turkish citizens who mostly have dual citizenship, retired EU citizens who are increasingly buying property and settling along Turkish sunbelt-coast (Bodrum, Marmaris, Antalya, Alanya), alternative life-style seekers, EU citizens of Turkish origin who mostly have ‘pink card’ (pembe kağıt), which gives them basically the same rights except political rights as Turkish citizens with respect to residence, access to the labour market, inheritance etc., Bosphorus Germans (and other Europeans) who are the descendants of tradespeople, military personnel and academics who came to Turkey during the Ottoman Empire, and finally Refugees fleeing Nazi Regime (1933-42/3) who were the Refugees of Jewish origin as well as political refugees
having large impact on Turkish higher education system (Istanbul University) in law, medicine, economics, architecture, biology etc.

- **Arabs:** The official research on population indicates that there are approximately 1,000,000 Arabs in Turkey. Of them, around 300,000-350,000 Arabs living in and around Mardin, Urfa, and Siirt are Sunni, and around 200,000 Arabs living around Mersin, Adana and Antakya are Alevi. The rest of the Arab population are diffused to various parts of the country. Sunni Arabs do not challenge the superior Turkish identity with their religious identity, whereas Alevi Arabs residing in the South emphasise their Alevi identity resting upon religious and ethnic difference.

- **Alevis:** Most of the Alevis are of the Turkoman origin. Alevi population is divided into four categories on the basis of the language they speak. The total population of Alevi living in Turkey approximately reach to 12,000,000: 1) Alevi who speak Azerbaijani dialect of Turkish: Their religious belief and practice is similar to the Shia religion in Iran. They live in Kars and have a small number of population; 2) Alevi who speak Arabic: Arab Alevi originate from the Nusayri community in Syria and live around Mersin, Adana and Antakya. They have no historical affiliation with other Alevis in Turkey and are different from them in identifying themselves with the Alevi identity prior to the Turkish identity; 3) Alevi who speak Turkish: This is the most influential and most crowded group. Although they are from the Turkoman ethnic origin, they have the strongest sentiment of being a religious minority; and 4) Alevi who speak Zaza and Kurdish: The population of this group number nearly 3,000,000. It is also known that 25% of the Kurdish population are Alevi. They form a minority within the Alevi and Kurdish origin populations.

- **Balkan and Caucasian Muslims:** Bosnians, Torbes, Pomaks and Albanians are the ethnic minority people who originate from the Slavic Muslims and come from the Balkans and the Caucasus. Roma people who come from the same region in an unknown date can also be added to this group. Georgians are an ethnic minority group who come from the Caucasus. There are no certain findings proving that the Laz community come from this region. Circassians and Georgians fled from the Russia and migrated to Anatolia in the 19th century. It has been claimed that the number of the Circassians is around 2.5 million, and they speak Adige language. Whereas the Balkan migrants do not have a particular consciousness of forming an ethnic minority, Circassians have begun to develop a separate identity in the 2000s with their cuisine, the declaration they publish in newspapers as regard to the conflicts in the Caucasus, the newspapers and magazines they publish such as Çveneburi, Pirosmani, Nart, Jineps, Ogni, and the Caucasian associations they establish (Kaya, 2004b and 2005).

- **Kurds:** The Kurdish population in Turkey is between 12,000,000 and 15,000,000. 75% of them are Sunni, and 25% are Alevis. The majority of Kurds speak the Kirmanç (Kurmanç) dialect of Kurdish and a minority speak Zaza. More detailed information about the Kurdish population and their relation with the Turkish majority and the Turkish state was given above.

- **Romas:** There is little information regarding the numbers of Romani or other groups. The most effective overview of the Gypsies of Turkey has been produced by a Romani scholar, Anna Oprisan (2002) working closely with the Roman communities themselves. On the whole, the Romas of Turkey do not respond affirmatively to the suggestion that they constitute an ethnic group, as this is clearly seen to be outside of the identity matrix Turkish/Muslim/Roman and family/clan/mahalle (community). Historically speaking, the
degree of integration experienced by Turkish Romas has been greater, until relatively modern times. During the Ottoman Empire they were well respected by the state as they had strong guild associations. However, there are a number of legal impediments to integration of Romas.

Secularist-Islamist Polarization in Turkey


Question: We often hear about "Islamists" and "Secularists" in Turkey. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

The data from the survey conducted in 2006, provides insight to the division of the polarization of the society with regards to secularism and Islam. According to the reports, while 20% of the participants placed themselves towards the secularist end, 49% places themselves towards the Islamist side.
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