Tolerance and Cultural Diversity
Discourses in Britain

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2010/06
1. Overview National Discourses
Background Country Reports
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Britain

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Work Package 1 – Overview of National Discourses on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity

D1.1 Country Reports on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses
Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators’ Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country’s performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLULARISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

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Executive Summary

Comprising England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom’s multi-national composition has meant that national identity and cultural diversity have been matters of considerable historical concern. With devolution for Scotland and Wales, a process has been set in motion to accommodate claims to political and cultural self-determination among the British constituent nations. Another significant set of ‘diversity challenges’ can be traced to the beginnings of labour migration, notably after the Second World War from the Caribbean and South Asia. More recently, the arrival of immigrants from Eastern Europe has been perceived as both challenging and economically advantageous.

The long-term settlement of groups of immigrant and their descendents marks a salient area of diversity challenges. Public debates have emerged. The discussion of what types of difference can be accommodated, and how, occurs both nationally, in response to contested issues and events, and locally, where schools, councils and non-governmental actors seek to respond to the ethnic, cultural and religious mix in the British population. Regarding the national debate, cultural diversity is frequently considered to be problematic in relation to cultural identity, social order and integration. Locally, claims for non-discrimination in housing, education and public life as well as for respectful treatment, in relation to ethno-cultural and, in particular, religious claims have been put forward. Yet at both levels, some accommodation has taken place within an evolving and strengthened framework of legally enforced anti-discrimination.

The multicultural reality of contemporary Britain has been increasingly taken for granted and the presence of post-immigration groups considered a welcome addition to British life. The concern is with making Britain a place that acknowledges and celebrates diversity in its population and that reconsider its ‘national story’ to take account of its multicultural reality. Non-discrimination, equality, respect and recognition in relation to various dimensions of difference have been turned, albeit slowly and not unequivocally, into political commitments. Recent years saw such commitments coincide with new attempts to conceptualize an idea of ‘Britishness’ that identifies a set of shared values while acknowledging the diverse make-up of the British population. In line with such concerns and driven by palpable anxieties with issues of social disintegration, recent public policies have been designed to provide for a sense of ‘community cohesion’.

Against this broad background of practices, political commitments and beliefs, this report examines the historical and contemporary dynamic of debates on cultural diversity as causing problems but also as a fact that is both irrevocable and positive. It surveys the development of claims and grievances, responses from majority society and the mobilization and political activism of post-immigration groups with particular emphasis on the South Asian and Black Caribbean experience. The report outlines the historical formation of British minorities as well as contemporary challenges. What is considered to be a ‘challenge’ does not remain constant and thus this report is particularly interested in how the presence of post-immigration groups in British society has been considered problematic. For this purpose it retraces public debates on cultural difference, contested events, such as the ‘Brixton riots’ of 1981, and contestations, such as the mobilization of British Muslims around the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988/9. It reviews the scholarly literature on British race relations and gives a historical overview of the development of public policy measures. It then identifies, drawing on this historical background picture and on contemporary patterns, practices, ideas and institutional arrangements of accommodation, tolerance and respect that respond to the various diversity challenges that this report identifies.
The formation of British post-immigration groups, their particular experiences and the development of public policies responding to their presence, can be considered in three broad steps.

1) The decades after the arrival of immigrants in the 1950s and 60s was marked by the recognition of pervasive structures of discrimination and attitudes of racism. ‘Race Relations’ legislation, starting in the mid-1960s, expanded the concern with equality and non-discrimination. The recognition of wide-spread disadvantage suffered by minorities, however, occurred slowly and incrementally. Particularly salient issues in this process were the way in which minority populations experienced discrimination in housing and employment and how communities were subjected to discriminatory practices by the police. Stop and search (so called ‘sus’) laws and procedures meant that in particular black communities were disproportionately targeted and often universally suspected. While the rhetoric of equality and fairness was easily adopted, deep-seated structures of inequality, such as the institutional practices underpinning ‘sus’, were more reluctantly addressed.

The mobilization against ‘sus’ in the 1980s is marked by various outbreaks of urban unrest. The murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence, and the inadequate police response to the crime, further brought the experience of continued discrimination to the attention of a wider public. Racism, in coded and institutionally entrenched forms, continued to prevent public authorities from delivering an equal service to the members of post-immigration communities. The legislative response to the findings of the inquiry into the murder of Lawrence, the Macpherson report of 1999, was not least welcomed as it engaged with the deeper structures of British racism that had previously been left undisturbed.

2) While the history of British race relations up to the late 1980s was characterized by the idea of ‘political blackness’, a shared sense of identity based on colour among the various post-immigration groups, events in the 1980s put this notion into question. The demand for a kind of equality and public consideration that would take notice of significant differences among post-immigration groups was not only put forward but also recognized in various flashpoint events. One such flashpoint was the public contestation over Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses, when the political claims of (some) British Muslims for respect and recognition on the grounds of their religious beliefs were first acknowledged and debated. On the Muslim side it generated an impassioned activism and mobilization on a scale greater than any previous national campaign against racism. Many ‘lapsed’ or ‘passive’ Muslims for whom hitherto their Muslim background was not particularly important, (re)discovered a new community solidarity and public identity. Political blackness—seen up to then as the key formation in the politics of post-immigration ethnicity—was seen as irrelevant to an issue which many Muslims insisted was fundamental to defining the kind of ‘respect’ appropriate to a peaceful multicultural society, that is to say, to the political constitution of ‘difference’ in Britain. To some extent this division has since become a defining feature of the politics of British multiculturalism.

3) More recent times continue to be characterized by the remnants of this new constellation. The events of 9/11 and the suicide attacks of 2005 on London transport have made the presence of British Muslims, and the claims for respect that began to be voiced in the 1980s, appear increasingly problematic. While significant measures have been designed to counter the ‘radicalization’ among this group, the purview of measures designed to further equality
and respect has equally been increased, though not unambiguously and not without resistance. We note in particular different trajectories charted in the legal system between those characterized as racial minorities and those conceived in religious terms. This is something that has potentially left Muslims vulnerable because, while discrimination against, for example, yarmulke-wearing Jews and turban-wearing Sikhs was deemed to be unlawful racial discrimination, Muslims, unlike these other faith communities, are not deemed to be a racial or ethnic grouping. Equality in terms of the accommodation of religious beliefs and protection against discrimination on grounds of religion is an area where minority grievances – after long debates and in a process of tough lobbying – have been heard and codified such as, most recently, in the Equality Act 2010.

As one of the fields in which the ‘problematic’ presence of post-immigration groups has been thematized, the report considers the issue of ‘racial mixing’. Historically, mixing had been captured with the biologist notion of miscegenation and had been a hotspot for the racist imagination. In stark contrast, it has become common for policy-makers to celebrate the cultural diversity represented by the fact of inter-ethnic partnering and the presence of ‘mixed race’ children. Positive reference to Britain as a ‘mongrel nation’ mirrors the way in which some of the negative characterizations of the past have been embraced in everyday rhetoric. This does not mean, as we illustrate in the report, that the position of ‘mixed heritage’ people in Britain has become unproblematic.

The report further considers the prevalent paradigms that have been employed to make sense of the claims of post-immigration groups and the politics of cultural diversity in Britain. Following the decline of ‘political blackness’ since the 1980s, there are broadly two ways of considering the presence of British post-immigration groups, their claims and politics: multiculture and multiculturalism. The former emphasizes processes of cultural mixing and hybridisation. The latter considers in particular claims for recognition and respect, such as for the accommodation of religion in the public sphere. Multiculturalism, as concerned with the place and claims of ethno-religious groups, and multiculture, accounting for life, social practices and cultural production in urban diasporas, fit loosely and imperfectly to the experiences of South Asian and Black Caribbean post-immigration groups. Multiculture envisages the re-modeling of majority society’s standards of acceptance in a way that inscribes aspects of minority identity into majority culture. Multiculturalism is concerned with the reappraisal of difference as a positive fact instead of an unwelcome aberration. Its concern is with equal respect and with the need for Britain to adapt its regimes of citizenship, policies and laws to recognize cultural pluralism. Its concern is with making Britain hospitable to the practices and claims of ethno-religious groups. Multiculture, by contrast, is concerned with fashioning a form of equality that affords minority groups a place in the cultural representations of the nation. One achievement that has been captured with this paradigm of cultural diversity is the abolition of the stigma that was historically directed at ‘mixed race’ individuals not merely for their imagined inferiority or ‘problematic’ identities but for how they constituted a challenge to classificatory regimes of national belonging.

As was the case with the relative waning of colour racism, historical analysis suggests that prejudice, even when it is deeply entrenched, is not beyond change. Such change may be driven by the liberalization of new generations’ attitudes. It may also be prompted by new visibilities of cultural or religious groups and an appreciation of their place in the broader cultural, social and political context of the nation, its narratives and representations. While some of the examples highlighted in this report offer considerable hope, the contemporary
situation is aggravated by the amalgamation of global anxieties with local concerns. National debates continue to be at risk of being taken hostage by the ‘clash of civilization’ thesis and security concerns continue to be unhelpfully combined with questions of cultural pluralism.

Summarizing the way contemporary diversity challenges are perceived socially and dealt with politically, we can suggest that contravening tendencies are at play and that progress in one domain may well coincide with regressive trends in another. Moreover, achievements, such as in response to the Macpherson Inquiry, are not irreversible. An increasingly entrenched animosity against Islam mobilizes not only fringe groups but animates significant numbers within majority society. As illustrated by the changing discourses on ‘racial mixing’, the perception of ‘challenges’ has not remained constant. Where, historically, racism on grounds of colour has characterized and to some extent continues to characterize the British minority experience, new forms of discrimination draw negatively on culture and religion. The political responses that are required for making Britain a tolerant and accommodating society, this report suggests, need to take account of a moving picture. Recent responses, such as the Equality Act of 2010, go some way towards addressing new situations of discrimination. Public perceptions of Islam, however, will remain a concern and will continue to be an obstacle in the way towards the fair and decent treatment of British Muslims.

Keywords

Religion; multiculture; multiculturalism; ethno-religious communities; toleration; recognition; accommodation; pluralism; diversity; difference; respect; equality; Britain.
List of Abbreviations

BNP – British National Party
CRE – Commission for Racial Equality
CUKC – Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights
EDL – English Defence League
EHRC – Equality and Human Rights Commission
HRA – Human Rights Act
RRA – Race Relations Act
SLG – Starting Line Group
1. Introduction

Britain is one of the most diverse societies on the globe. Its colonial legacy, together with various migratory movements in the 20th century, has led to an unprecedented diversity of ethnicities, cultures and religions in the composition of its population. The most recent census counts 4.5 million inhabitants of ‘ethnic minority’ background (for a population of around 59 million and not counting 700,000 Irish). While the history of immigration, notably from the Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean, and the formation of ‘post-immigration groups’ in the 20th century have been explored variously, recent patterns of immigration are more difficult to consider. Estimates for the recent arrival of Eastern European immigrants from the ‘A8’ accession countries vary, and the patterns of settlement and work such as of Poles and Lithuanians in the UK are insufficiently documented. 1 ‘Cultural diversity’ in Britain today is thus multifaceted, complex and located in between old and established patterns of post-immigration diversity and newly emerging patterns of immigration, settlement and cultural difference.

The presence, in particular in Britain’s urban centres, of populations marked by unprecedented diversity, has been characterised as a new form of diversity, ‘super diversity’ (Vertovec 2007) or ‘hyper diversity’ (Muir and Wetherell 2010). It is suggested that this new diversity challenges conventional assumptions about how difference should be accommodated. Accordingly, new diversity, such as the presence of people of 179 nationalities in contemporary London, is seen to imply new challenges that require new and fine-tuned political responses. ‘Super diversity’ creates “gaps between policy and practice at all levels” (Muir and Wetherell 2010, 9) and, according to Steven Vertovec (2007, 1027-8), challenges an older version of multiculturalism that fails to recognize the increasing fragmentation of difference.

While new constellations of diversity are undoubtedly significant, this picture may be incomplete. Demographic differentiation in one urban sphere does not change that significant numbers of people, and in particular those who are less visible or interesting as specimen of ‘old’ kinds of diversity, continue to subscribe to overarching identities that show no sign of abating. The Fourth Survey, a large quantitative study of identity patterns of British minorities, established the significance of religious identities for British Asians (Modood et al. 1997). Such shared experiences of diasporic life continue to shape identities, not least in relation to religion, for groups that are ready to mobilize around grievances and common claims and in particular when shared value commitments are seen to be under attack. ‘Super diversity’, new immigration or the emergence of ‘hybrid’ identities in one domain of British life do not discount other, more consolidated and less differentiated, group positions. The ‘diversity challenges’ that this report explores, are thus both old and new—they arise in relation to claims for respect, recognition and equality made by or on behalf of ethno-religious groups as well as in relation to newly emerging, urban and more individualized expressions of cultural diversity.

For this purpose this report is predominantly concerned with the accommodation and more broadly the political negotiation of the difference represented by two British post-immigration communities, Black-Caribbeans and Asians, in particular British Muslims. Our

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1 Home Office figures for A8 immigrants are generally based on the number of applicants to the ‘Worker Registration Scheme’. This data suggests, for example, that 540,000 Polish citizens have been working in the UK labour market since 2004, which is very likely to be a serious underestimate (Burrell 2009). For the recent past, the same data shows a sharp drop of applications such as of more than 50% of Polish applicants between 2007 to 2008 (Home Office 2009), likely to be a result of the financial crisis.
concern with these two communities allows considering relevant debates on cultural diversity, claims for equality and accommodation and policy responses to such claims. In fact, most of the currently salient issues and conflicts over equality and cultural diversity can only be understood in the historical context of how these communities have made themselves heard and of how their claims and politics have been perceived as a ‘challenge’. The mobilization for religious equality and for the public accommodation of religion occurs against the background of concerns that have been raised and debated since, and even before, the *Rushdie Affair* of 1989/90. Contemporary struggles for racial equality are connected to the historical experiences of Black Caribbeans and to the mobilization and protest in response to inequality and discrimination, such as the Brixton uprising of 1981. While we do not wish to marginalize experiences and issues that do not fit these two narratives, we believe that a discussion of the most salient ‘diversity challenges’ of contemporary Britain needs to begin with these accounts.

In the first part of the report we thus prepare the ground for the discussion and introduce the historical context of current cultural diversity discourses (2). We offer a brief overview of the development of British debates on national identity, of British nationality law and race relations legislation. In the second part of the report, we provide an overview of the historical presence of the two post-immigration communities we are concerned with, Black-Caribbeans and Asians (3). We are particularly interested in moments of political mobilization and when claims advanced from minority positions were considered a problem. For the first community, Black Carribeans, this means that we are particularly interested in responses to varying problemsatisations of their presence in Britain and, in particular, in the stigma of ‘black criminality’. In relation to Muslim claims, we consider in particular the mobilization around claims and grievances in relation to the accommodation of religion in public life. We then proceed to discuss what the British experience of post-immigration diversity implies for ideas of acceptance, accommodation, recognition and tolerance and consider the place and development of such notions as public values, within law and institutions, and in everyday practices (4). We suggest that Britain finds itself in a position where there is the potential for post-immigration difference not merely to be tolerated but to be actively and positively recognized and respected. Britain shows potential to move beyond a situation where diversity is only a negative challenge, requiring toleration, but is turned into a positive experience through equality and respect. This, however, remains a potential that for its achievement depends on continued effort, political willpower and pressure from below. This report thus explores ‘cultural diversity challenges’ with a view to positive opportunities as well as to the obstacles and contravening tendencies at hand in contemporary Britain (5).

2. Great Britain: State formation, national identity and citizenship
Roy Jenkins, then British home secretary, famously defined integration in 1968 “not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Jenkins 1967, 267). Jenkins’ notion of respect for the differences represented by post-immigration communities forms a powerful ideal in the development of British multiculturalism. As an ideal, it hardly gives a full account of the realities of how cultural diversity has been recognized, debated and politically accommodated in Britain. It highlights, however, that (some) British policy-makers were ready to acknowledge and positively engage with the reality of post-immigration diversity. In view of this diversity, Stuart Hall (1999) coined the notion ‘multicultural drift’ which he considers as the “unintended outcome of undirected sociological processes” geared towards an increasing
visibility of post-immigration groups. In opposition to this drift, mono-cultural and racialized conceptions of ‘Britishness’ have been and continue to be articulated and to resonate strongly with significant numbers of the British population. Adapting the title of Enoch Powell’s infamous 1968 address, the pollster Ipsos Mori, in its ‘Rivers of Blood Survey’, finds that roughly 20% of the population admit to racial prejudices whilst significantly higher numbers consider immigration and its impact a negative (MORI 2008). While the subsequent parts of this report give a more detailed account of the historical formation of ethnic minorities in Britain in between those two poles, the ideal of multiculturalism and the ‘spectre’ of homogeneous nationhood, this part prepares the ground with some numbers, an excursion into aspects of the development of British identity, of British nationality law, race relations policies and, finally, theoretical and normative perspectives on cultural diversity in Britain.

a. Data

Reflecting the more than 200 languages spoken (CMEB, 2000: 236), the 2001 Census revealed that the British population is more ethnically diverse than ever before. Alongside the ethnic breakdown the Census shows that there are at least 1.6 million people in the United Kingdom who currently describe their religious faith as Islam. This represents 2.9% of the British population, and makes Islam the most populous faith after Christianity (72%); more numerous than Hinduism (less than 1%, numbering 559,000), Sikhism (336,000), Judaism (267,000) and Buddhism (152,000). Of the Muslim constituency, 42.5% are of Pakistani origin, 16.8% of Bangladeshis, 8.5% of Indian, and – most interestingly – 7.5% of other white. This is largely taken to mean people of Turkish, Arabic and North-African ethnic origin who do not define themselves in racial terms. It will also however include East European Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as white Muslims from across Europe. Black-African (6.2%), Other Asian (5.8%) and British (4.1%) dominate the remaining categories of ethnic identification in the census options. Even with this heterogeneity, it is still understandable—if inadequate—that Muslims in Britain are associated first and foremost with a South Asian background, especially since they make up roughly 68% of the British Muslim population.

Britain’s ethnic minority communities are not equally distributed but concentrated in England (95.5% as 9% of the population). In 2001, 45% of the ethnic minority population resided in Greater London (19% of all residents) and another 8% in region South East of London. 13% live in the West Midlands (conurbation of Birmingham), 8% in the North West (Liverpool, Lancashire), 7% in Yorkshire and Humberside (Newcastle) and 6.3% in the East Midlands, mainly Leicester, where they represent a third of the population. There are 23 constituencies with an ethnic minority population between 40.5% (Vauxhall) and 66.3% (East Harrow) (ONS, 2003). 85% of all refugees and asylum seekers reside in London or the South West. Immigrants and ethnic minorities form distinct, recognisable communities.

British public opinion generally seems appreciative of the fact of cultural diversity (MORI 2005), with a majority (77%) disagreeing with the statement that ‘to be truly British you have to be white’, though 18% agree (MORI 2009). Positive attitudes towards diversity however do not necessarily translate into support for multiculturalism. This might also be a result of the dichotomous framing of issues in public discourse (that is replicated in survey questions), such as a contrast between ‘celebrating diverse values’ (27%) and ‘developing a shared identity’ (41%) (MORI 2009, 3). What this then shows is a wide-spread appreciation of the fact of cultural diversity and a decline of colour racism that is particularly stark in its

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2 Hall (1999) contrasts this drift with the ‘banal’ realities of everyday repression and discrimination, as exemplified by ‘sus’ laws (see below).
historical dimension (Park et al. 2010). However, this positive spirit does not equally extend to a more specific attitudes of respect for concrete manifestations of diversity, such as respect for religious identities (Voas and Ling 2010).

Table 1: British population by ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Born Overseas</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
<th>% of all ethnic minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>58,789,194</td>
<td>4,900,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>54,153,898</td>
<td></td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>691,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ethnic minorities</td>
<td>4,635,296</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>677,117</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All black</td>
<td>1,148,738</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>565,876</td>
<td>238,000</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>485,277</td>
<td>322,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Other</td>
<td>97,585</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Asian</td>
<td>2,331,423</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1,053,411</td>
<td>570,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>747,285</td>
<td>336,000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>283,063</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>247,403</td>
<td>176,000</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>247,664</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ethnic</td>
<td>230,615</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2001

b. Britishness
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland came into being in a series of treaties between its constituent nations, England and Wales in 1536, with Scotland in 1707 and with Ireland, thus formalizing its long-standing occupation, in 1801. Not dissimilar to other nation states, its creation involved political, administrative and imaginative efforts. Such efforts, however, had to take account of the fact of internal diversity, represented by the

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3 The next census is scheduled for 2011 and will be available on http://2011.census.gov.uk/. See Appendix 1 for more current though less detailed data on ethnic diversity in England and Wales.
United Kingdom’s constituent nations of England, Scotland, Wales and (Northern) Ireland, and the legacy of empire.

Linda Colley (1992) suggests that British national identity, based on a Protestant culture and in opposition to Catholicism within and to the Catholic powers on the continent, was forged in relation to religious ‘Otherness’ and to the difference represented by the vast overseas territories of the colonial empire. Such repertories of identity have been lost along with the empire and in line with the declining political salience of Protestant religious identification.\(^4\) Devolution and the resurgence of national identities in Wales and Scotland have further put into question what a source of British identification might be.\(^5\) This sense of uncertainty about the content of British national identity has recently become the point of departure for political attempts to give new meaning to what it means to be British.

This has been a concern for Gordon Brown (2005; Green Paper 2007) who in numerous public statements since 2005 made the case for a new emphasis on ‘Britishness’. The content of ‘Britishness’, however, appears somewhat undecided.\(^6\) The definition of particularities that invite identification seems difficult. Historically, internal diversity had often remained unacknowledged (Pocock 1975; Crick 2008) and attributes that were considered British had been revealed as mere generalizations of cultural Englishness. Englishness, however, will be less than welcome in Scotland and Wales, and a comprehensive set of cultural attributes might be perceived as an obstacle in the way of post-immigration communities to subscribe to the idea of a national identity.

c. Citizenship and Immigration Law

Similar to the difficult negotiation of British identity, British citizenship had to catch up with changing conceptualisations of the nation state and with the legacy of the empire. One such legacy was the tension between broad principles of citizenship, which with the British Nationality Act 1948 granted some 800 million subjects the right to entry and settlement on the British Isles, and the growing salience of anti-immigrant sentiment. The 1948 Act created the category of “Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies” (CUKC) and encompassed all formerly or presently dependent, and now Commonwealth, territories (regardless of whether passports were issued by independent or colonial states).

One outcome was Caribbean immigration as migrants from the Caribbean were invited and recruited to assist in post-war reconstruction. During Winston Churchill’s post-war Caribbean tour, for example, he famously appealed to Jamaicans to “Come and help rebuild your Motherland!” (quoted in Murphy 1989, 88), whilst London Transport and the British Hotels and Restaurants Association set up recruiting offices in Barbados (ibid).

The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act discarded the principle of free entry for CUKC persons and introduced work voucher quotas. It continued to permit free entry only to those CUKC whose passports had been issued in Britain and not by a dependent or

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\(^4\) Even though some commentators highlight how the ‘phantom pains’ of the lost empire continue to underpin predominant conceptions of British identity (Gilroy 2004).

\(^5\) Recent survey data points to a relative decline of British national pride and attributes its causes to generational change (Tilley and Heath 2007). However, data equally shows that British self-descriptions, in addition to sub-national identities, persist across the UK and that, by international comparison, levels of national pride are fairly strong (Heath and Roberts 2009; Uberoi and McLean 2009).

\(^6\) Brown (2005) pointed in particular to values of “freedom, responsibility and fairness”. The new government with David Cameron has thus far not contributed to the Britishness agenda. This might be a result of the intricate tensions that appear to make it easier for a Scottish Labour politician to devise and placate Britishness than it would be for an English Tory (Runciman 2010).
protectorate territory. Later, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act restricted the unqualified right of British passport holding former dependents to enter the UK whilst the 1971 Immigration Act implemented a combination of *ius soli* (citizenship by territory) and *ius sanguine* (citizenship by descent) in order to severely curtail primary Commonwealth immigration by establishing a “partiality” clause (or the right to abode) as the legal basis of rightful belonging. Instead of replacing the CUKC with an exclusive definition of British citizenship, the Act put Commonwealth immigrants on the same legal footing as other aliens whilst prioritising entry from the ‘old Commonwealth’ if people from Australia, Canada and New Zealand could demonstrate British lineage (and others such as Anglo-Indians). The 1981 Nationality Act later withdrew a right to settlement to most Commonwealth citizens.

**Table 2: Main Minority and Immigrant Groups in Britain and their Dimensions of Difference**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of difference</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Racial</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
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<td>Native minorities</td>
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<td>Bangladeshis</td>
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<td>Black Caribbeans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
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<td>‘A8’ Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
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*d. Race-Relations Legislation*

The history of citizenship and immigration law thus shows a transition from imperial subjecthood to a ‘normalized’ version of national citizenship, Britain’s racial equality agenda

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7 The most recent survey finds that roughly 22% of all those residing in Wales, about 600,000 people, had some knowledge of the Welsh language. 57% of those considered themselves fluent speakers (Welsh Language Board 2006).
was developed in the context of such restrictions. In the first place, it took some time for policy makers to recognize that racial discrimination constituted an embarrassment and a normative, political and legal problem. In the 1960s, the ‘colour bar’ in British society, the widespread and open discrimination on grounds of race was increasingly perceived as a problem. The connection to restrictions of immigration rules was, as the Labour politician Roy Hattersley MP suggested, that “[w]ithout integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible”. The outset of the British racial equality agenda was thus conditionally tied to restrictions of immigration.

There has been legislation in United Kingdom outlawing discrimination on racial grounds since the mid-sixties. The Race Relations Act 1965 introduced relatively moderate legislation outlawing discrimination, based upon colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins, but not on grounds of religion or belief, such as in relation to access to premises open to the public such as hotels, bars and restaurants. Three years later, and running parallel to the aforementioned Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968, an additional Race Relations Act (1968) extended protection to employment, housing, education and the provision of further goods, facilities and services. The main legislation currently in force is the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended in 2000, which provides individuals with the right to bring civil proceedings for discrimination, defines permitted ‘positive action’, established the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), and covers all areas of employment, education, housing and, more recently, urban planning.

This legislation was substantially strengthened by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 after the inquiry into the London Metropolitan Police investigation of the murdered black teenager Stephen Lawrence, which extended its scope to cover nearly all functions of public authorities (for the first time including the police but still excluding the immigration service), simultaneously widening the remit of the statutory duty of public authorities to promote race equality. The way in which this Act relates to the longer history of British colour racism and, in particular, to the theme of ‘black criminality’ will be one of the concerns of the following (see 3.b), as well as the more recent efforts to update the equality agenda with the Equalities Act 2010 (3.c).

e. Multiculture and ethno-religious identities
There are contending perspectives on cultural diversity in Britain. The ‘super diversity’ theme that we have introduced previously points to a fragmentation of difference, as the sheer diversity of the various minority groups makes it difficult to lump them together. It contrasts with a continued interest in groups, their claims and their political agency. A related tension exists between, on one hand, ‘multiculture’ that prioritisises practices of mixing and hybridity, and, on the other, a perspective that considers and takes seriously claims geared towards the preservation of difference.

‘Multiculture’ has been coined in relation to situations of everyday cultural and ethnic diversity, ‘conviviality’ and particularly the Black-Caribbean experience in Britain. It captures moments of contact, mixing, cultural exchange and interaction often in, but not restricted to, urban settings. It is concerned with the hybridisation of culture and the creation of cultural and social spaces that allow for relatively effortless encounters. ‘Multiculture’ is

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8 Churchill remarked in this regard that “the laws of this country are well known, and … there is no need for new instructions” (quoted in Hiro 1992, 209)

9 The duty given to public authorities, under section 71(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976, to have ‘due regard’ to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity and ‘good relations’ between people from different racial groups.
generally not introduced as a programme of social change that would lend itself to implementation by policy makers and in public institutions. Paul Gilroy (1995, 4) suggests that it is not a “clearly delineated goal or a reified state”; rather, it is something that happens in the microcosm of urban life. It consists of the “promise and hetero-cultural dynamism of contemporary metropolitan life” (ibid).

While the history of immigration in the United Kingdom is one of hybridity and cultural change, it is equally marked by attempts to maintain ideas and practices, or to change them in a way that preserves the core of what is considered valuable. Where the goal of ‘multiculture’ is to transcend the mere presence of cultural difference in favour of a hybridization of minority and majority culture, the claims of ethno-religious difference are for public spaces that allow for, refrain from penalizing, and, ideally, respect the simultaneous assertion of claims for difference and inclusion. The goal is to transform the public sphere in order to turn negative into positive difference and to allow for the expression of religious beliefs and the accommodation of religious practices in the public rather than their confinement in the private realm (Modood 2007).

3. Cultural diversity challenges
In Britain the distinction between ‘multiculture’ and ethno-religious difference is despite the fact that a conventional view had assumed a unity of experience, claims and politics. With the fracturing of ‘political blackness’ in the late 1980s and in the course of a new Muslim assertiveness dissimilarities between the politics of minority groups became more apparent. Such dissimilarities have challenged the idea of a unified politics of multiculturalism and so they also challenge a one-size-fits-all type of tolerance.

This part of the report investigates how both types of differences have been made and re-made. It is concerned with moments of correspondence and separation and with coalition-building and political antagonism. It does not claim that the experience of Black-Caribbeans is synonymous with ‘multiculture’ while the claims of British Muslims correspond, in each and every case, with the preservation of ethno-religious difference. It does, however, suggest that the way British multiculturalism has developed over the last decades makes it reasonable to discuss ‘multiculture’ with reference to the Black-Caribbean experience and ethno-religious diversity with reference to British Muslims.

We need to take account of the Black-Caribbean presence and the Asian, and in particular Muslim, presence in the United Kingdom and of the claims to public accommodation and tolerance that have been put forward by members of these groups. The discussion is organised along three periods, 1948-1989 (with emphasis on the 1980s), 1989-2001 and from 2001 onwards. Rather than offering a detailed chronology and an in-depth account of post-immigration communities in Britain, it highlights crucial events of political mobilization that paved the way for new politicizations of difference, new grievances and new claims. Finally, it highlights social practices of ‘racial mixing’ and religious claims-making, in particular in the area of public education, and attempts a snapshot of the various responses such practices have elicited by majority society.

a. 1948-1989: The development of post-immigration communities
The British experience of ‘coloured immigration’ has been seen as an Atlantocentric legacy of the slave trade, and policy and legislation were formed in the 1960s in the shadow of the US civil rights movement, black power discourse and the inner-city riots in Detroit, Watts and elsewhere. It was, therefore, dominated by the idea of ‘race’, more specifically by the idea of a black-white dualism.
It was also shaped by the imperial legacy, one aspect of which was that all colonials and citizens of the Commonwealth were ‘subjects of the Crown’. As such they had rights of entry into the UK and entitlement to all the benefits enjoyed by Britons, from NHS treatment to social security and the vote. (The right to entry was successively curtailed from 1962 so that, while in 1960 Britain was open to the Commonwealth but closed to Europe, twenty years later the position was fully reversed.)

Socio-economically, ethnic minorities entered British society at the bottom. The need in Britain was for cheap, unskilled labour to perform those jobs in an expanding economy which white people no longer wished to do, and the bulk of the immigration occurred in response to this need. Research from the 1960s onwards established quite clearly that non-white people had a much worse socio-economic profile than white people and that racial discrimination was one of the principal causes.

Anti-discrimination legislation was introduced in 1965 and strengthened in 1968 and 1976. While this eliminated the open discrimination that was common up to that time (the ‘colour bar’), it did not mitigate its various less visible forms. The public appeal of anti-immigration rhetoric, its emphasis on themes of cultural incompatibility and conflict (Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ address; Britain, according to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, being ‘swamped’ by immigrants), did not contribute to an atmosphere of respect towards post-immigration communities. In line with anxieties over immigration that were (and are) open to be mobilized, the extension of racial equality was connected to restriction of entry: “without integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible” (Roy Hattersley).

Even though this logic furthered the expansion of rights for those post-immigration groups already present, it did nothing to change that the presence of ethnic minorities was seen as a problem. Despite the abolition of the open “colour bar”, racism persisted in crude and polite forms (Fenton 1999). The history of Britain as an immigration country is thus not only one of accommodation and increasing equality for settled communities, but also one of the changing ways in which the presence of ethnic minority groups is considered problematic.

**Black Caribbeans**

A symbolic moment in the beginning Black-Caribbean presence was the landing of the S.S. *Empire Windrush* in June 1948 with 491 Jamaicans on board responding to appeals by Winston Churchill, amongst others, to come help ‘rebuild the Motherland’. Annual arrivals from 1948 to 1952 numbered under 27,550. For several reasons including the United States Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (1952) (also known as the McCarran-Walter Act) curbing Caribbean emigration to the US; economic and political instability accompanying immediate decolonization; and the growing threat of immigration legislation in Britain, a dominant view arose that prospective immigrants had to leave the Caribbean immediately – ‘to beat the ban’ (Hiro 1992) - or not at all. By 1960 annual arrivals rose to 49,650 before increasing to 66,300 during the following year. By the time the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was introduced the number had decreased to 31,800. Soon after arrivals from the Caribbean numbered only 3,241 in 1963, but peaked at 14,848 in 1965 before falling rapidly to less than 10,000 in the average year. By 1976 the Caribbean immigrant and post-immigrant population had reached half a million people.

Black-Caribbeans arriving in Britain were highly anglicized (Hiro 1992, 19-25). Nonetheless, they encountered a hostile environment with ‘No Coloured’ or ‘Europeans only’ signs in frequent display. The ‘colour bar’ in British society and widespread attitudes of hostility made the early presence of Black-Caribbeans, and their position in employment,
housing and public services, marginal and problematic (Collins 2001). The characterization of what made their presence problematic, however, changed over time. In line with biological racism and powerful cultural conceptions, ‘miscegenation’, racial mixing and inter-ethnic partnering, was one such problem account. Laziness, drug use, prostitution and disease were additional notions applied in public discourse to characterize the Black-Caribbean population (Gilroy 2002). The 1970s saw in particular the discovery of ‘black criminality’ (see below).

The anti-racist mobilization of the 1980s, as well as various outbreaks of urban unrest (‘race riots’), was not least in response to the discriminatory exercise of police powers towards black people. Conflicts occurred frequently in the proximity of youth clubs, parties, reggae festivals and local fairs when police intervened to ‘restore order’. Observing that public disorder often broke out around such venues, a memorandum by the London police force, the Met, remarked in 1976 with a measure of surprise that “members of London’s West Indian community do appear to share a group consciousness” (quoted in Gilroy 2002, 118).

Inspired by the politicisation of black cultural expression and black pride in the United States, the quest for self-affirmation and the celebration of black identity occurred in the context of a discovery of new types of expression in art, music and literature. Arguably, the gradual normalization of the Black-Caribbean presence in Britain is closely connected to the development of these cultural forms and to their adoption in majority youth and popular culture (Gilroy 2002, 204-5). This route, however, has not been without setbacks and contradictions. In particular, the appeal of black culture and the development of hybrid cultural forms in black urban Britain did not mean that prejudices vanished, as, for example, in relation to how the theme of ‘black criminality’ became a widespread image in the media and public representation in the course of the 1970s (Hall et al. 1978).

**Asians**

The British Asian presence in the United Kingdom is a result of labour migration in the 1950s and 1960s, of the expulsion of Indians from East Africa in the early 1970s, and of the family unification that continued after the restrictions of the late 1960s and up to the mid-1980s. While ‘Asian’ refers to South Asian and, in particular, to Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins, the label covers a variety of backgrounds. It includes Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims as well as a variety of languages or dialects. It entails a variety of local backgrounds that are of importance for understanding how patterns of kinship and solidarity impact on political mobilization.

While the majority of Indians is of Punjabi or Gujarati background, some London boroughs, in particular Southall, are home to large numbers of Sikhs. Bradford Muslims, for example, originate in particular from the Mirpur district of Pakistani Kashmir. Diverse patterns of local settlement and the variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds point to difficulties with the label ‘Asian’. ‘Political blackness’ as a designator for shared Black and Asian experiences came under increasing strain in the course of the 1980s.

The category ‘Asian’, in turn, encompasses a variety of experiences and position that made this label too appear rather loose and increasingly meaningless for an understanding of political mobilization among differentiated communities. Majority perceptions of the difference represented by Asians and black Caribbeans further served to separate the two.

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10 The Notting Hill riots of 1958 were triggered off by white men protesting against the fraternisation of black men and white women, and while the first day involved indiscriminate violence against black people, it is symptomatic that the second day of violence began with an attack on a Swedish woman, Majbritt Morrison, that had been spotted the previous day with her Jamaican husband, Ray Morrison.
Michael Banton (1979, 242) captured such changing problematisations of difference in earlier decades of the post-immigration presence.

The English seemed to display more hostility towards the West Indians because they sought a greater degree of acceptance than the English wished to accord; in more recent times there seemed to have been more hostility towards Asians because they are insufficiently inclined to adopt the English ways.

More recently, Pnina Werbner (2004, 899) points to a further, internal differentiation that leads her to identify two diasporic spheres of British Asianness: “Whereas Asians are perceived to be integrating positively into Britain, contributing a welcome spiciness and novelty to British culture, Muslims are regarded as an alienated, problematic minority.” In addition, Werbner suggests that the way differences are negotiated within Asian communities is muddled and conflictual. Intellectuals and artists within the minority groups challenge customs and traditional structures of authority. Their contributions, such as Salman Rushdie’s writings or movies like Bend it like Beckham not only give accounts of the negotiation of difference in minority groups but are increasingly well received by British majority society.

This hybrid and, in Werbner’s terms, “impure” sphere of British Asianness contrasts with a second sphere of diaspora where differences are preserved and kinship groups continue to play a significant role. The average Pakistani in Britain, for instance, feels a sense of not only belonging to an extended family but also to a birādari (kinship group) of which a branch is in Britain but the centre of which is in Pakistan (Shaw 2000).

Such patterns and practices, for Pakistanis and other South Asian groups, are neither stable nor deterministic of individual behaviour. They do however constitute repertoires of identification that continue to be meaningful and important for significant numbers of people. For British Muslims such differences of kinship groups and the diversity of cultures, languages and national backgrounds have meant that a homogeneous version of British Islam has not emerged, nor is it likely that it will. Nonetheless, shared belief (as well as the shared experience of rejection on grounds of belief) have meant that in recent years Muslim identity has become increasingly salient.

**Political Blackness**

While the politics of difference in the United Kingdom underpins various kinds of political claims and types of cultural expression, there has been considerable reluctance to differentiate. The categories of ‘political blackness’ proceeded from the idea of a shared experience of discrimination across ethnic and religious backgrounds. The British population was thus divided into two groups, black and white. The former consisted of all those people who were potential victims of colour racism, though in both theory and practice they were assumed disproportionately to have the characteristics of the African-Caribbean population (Modood 1994). Thus a fundamental problem for political blackness came from an internal ambivalence, namely whether blackness as a political identity was sufficiently distinct from and could mobilize without blackness as an ethnic pride movement of people of African descent. This black identity movement, in a growing climate of opinion favourable to identity politics of various kinds, was successful in shifting the terms of the debate from colour-blind individualistic assimilation to questions about how white British society had to change to accommodate new groups.

But its success in imposing a singular identity upon a diverse ethnic minority population was temporary and illusory. What it did was pave the way to a plural ethnic assertiveness, as South Asian groups, including Muslims, borrowed the logic of ethnic pride and tried to catch up with the success of a newly legitimized black public identity. Indeed, it is best to see this...
development of racial explicitness and positive blackness as part of a wider socio-political climate which is not confined to race and culture or non-white minorities. Feminism, gay pride, Quebecois nationalism, and the revival of Scottishness are some prominent examples of these new identity movements which have come to be an important feature in many countries, especially those in which class politics has declined.

While anti-racism and political multiculturalism in the period up to the late 1980s operated and mobilized with reference to a unified position of ‘political blackness’, this position turned out less and less suitable for the actual issues of anti-racist concern. This became more apparent in the course of Brixton riots of 1981 and the ‘Honeyford affair’ of 1986.

New Cross Fire and Brixton Riots

We have already suggested that the Black-Caribbean presence in Britain has been associated with various and changing types of problems. ‘Miscegenation’ was one such problem account that we will return to below. Another one was black criminality. This theme was developed and extended in the course of the 1970s (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson et al. 1978; Gilroy 2002, Ch. 3). In particular low-level street criminality, mugging, was framed as a quintessentially black type of deviance. The police response was to identify ‘high risk’ neighbourhoods in which it would come down in a heavy-handed manner, using stop and search laws (so-called ‘sus’ laws) in a fashion that amounted, frequently, to racial profiling. The insensitivity, if not downright racism, of such operations precipitated hostility towards the police.

While ‘sus’ operations created tensions in a variety of British communities, 1981 saw a heightening of such tensions in London. A fire in New Cross, south-east London, that led to the death of thirteen black teenagers marked the starting point for remarkable episodes of unrest. It is contested whether, in an area known for racist attacks, the fire was deliberately set off or the result of an accident. It is clear, however, that the police reacted with insensitivity and indifference. The New Cross Fire, or—for those who took it to be arson—the New Cross Massacre, became the single largest moment of political mobilization, with 20,000 protestors marching through London (Howe 1999). Together with Operation Swamp ‘81, a particularly intrusive, heavy handed stop-and-search operation by the London Metropolitan Police (the ‘Met’) in Brixton, it marked the context of some of the most significant episodes of urban unrest in recent British history.

The Brixton riots of 1981, together with various other episodes of unrest such as in St. Pauls (Bristol), Toxteth (Liverpool), Chapeltown (Leeds) and Handsworth (Birmingham) are frequently regarded as a turning point in British race-relations as they brought into focus the response of newly assertive youth cultures to the experience of racism and deprivation. The Brixton unrest became the subject of an inquiry chaired by Lord Scarman. Identifying the immediate causes of the riots, the inquiry pointed to “spontaneous act of defiant aggression by young men who felt themselves hunted by a hostile police force” (Scarman 1986, 46).

Controversially for those who subscribed to the notion of ‘high risk neighbourhoods’ to justify ‘sus’ operations, it thus took notice of how police operations and discriminatory stop-and-search practices had prepared the ground for discontent. In its further diagnosis, however, Scarman fell short in identifying more fundamental causes for the police conduct: how, institutionally, the theme of ‘black criminality’ permeated the Met and made heavy-handed and discriminatory policing the natural response to the ‘problematic’ nature of the Black-Caribbean community (Solomos 1999). The report noted how economic deprivation had facilitated the unrest and it advocated a programme of urban renewal that, due to a lack of funding, did not yield tangible results.
**The Honeyford Affair**

An early conflict in which racial equality, ethnicity, and religion came to be combined was ‘the Honeyford Affair’ (Halstead 1988). Ray Honeyford was headteacher of a Bradford local authority school in which the majority of pupils were of Pakistani descent and Muslim. In a series of articles in 1983–4 in a national right-wing journal, the Salisbury Review, he argued that the education of children such as those in his school was being stifled by the cultural and religious practices of their parents. These, he argued, prevented Pakistani ethnicity children, especially girls, from becoming proficient in English, participating in the full curriculum (e.g. in sport, dance, and drama), from socializing with whites, and from succeeding fully in British education and society. He was particularly critical of what he said was the widespread practice of Pakistani parents taking or sending their children to Pakistan for weeks or months at a time, disregarding the school calendar. These comments—many of which were indeed the concerns of educationalists—were presented in an extremely critical, generalizing way that portrayed Pakistani working-class culture and aspects of Islam in a negative way and were augmented by comments about Pakistan as ‘obstinately backward’, plagued by ‘corruption at every level’, and the ‘heroin capital of the world’ (Honeyford 1984).

The articles were judged as racist by white anti-racists, locally and nationally, and some secular Asian activists, who initiated a call for Honeyford’s resignation, which soon came to be supported by most of the parents and the leading local Muslim organizations, including the Bradford Council of Mosques. The Bradford Pakistani community were agitated by the public airing of unflattering comments about them, exacerbated by the distribution of Urdu translations of Honeyford’s views by his opponents (Samad 1992, 513).

These communities, largely from of peasant Kashmiri background, culturally more conservative, and influenced by ties of kinship, began to stand up for itself against what it perceived to be insults to its culture and to its religious restrictions, especially as they applied to gender and sexuality. Leftwing anti-racists therefore came to mobilize alongside conservative Pakistanis on the issue of community honour and in due course the alliance was successful and Honeyford was pressured into early retirement. The wider and longer-term effect of the alliance and of other local developments of the time was to develop the Pakistani community, especially the mosque leadership, as a political force in Bradford, at the expense of white anti-racists and others rooted in a secular, multi-ethnic coalition, as the former considerably outnumbered the latter (Samad 1992).

The Honeyford Affair suggests that, by the late 1980s, the label of ‘political blackness’ had become increasingly unsustainable. Indeed, political blackness was unravelling at a grassroots level at the very time that it was becoming hegemonic as a race relations discourse in British public life (see Modood 1994).

**b. 1989-2001: New ethnicities, new claims, new politics**

While earlier events had shown cracks in the coalition, subsequent moments of political mobilization showed the extent to which claims and grievances of different ethnic minority groups in British society developed along different trajectories. In the period from 1989 and 2001, the Rushdie affair and the murder of Stephen Lawrence are two such moments of particular visibility.

**The ‘Rushdie Affair’**

The single event that most dramatically illustrated the emergence of new forms of ethno-religious actors—with again Bradford a scene of action, and damaged honour a cause of mobilization—was the battle over the novel, *The Satanic Verses* (*SV*), that broke out in 1988—
9, with Muslims protesting its portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad and other revered figures. This time the secular anti-racists were virtually absent from the conflict, for while many were sensitive to the racial stereotyping and divisions it was causing, they were unhappy that it was fuelled by religious anger (Modood 1989). Above all they saw it as a case in which freedom of speech should not be compromised, but reluctant to join in the chorus against Muslims they mainly kept a low profile.

On the Muslim side, however, it generated an impassioned activism and mobilization on a scale greater than any previous national campaign against racism (Modood 1990; 2005). Many ‘lapsed’ or ‘passive’ Muslims (Muslims, especially, the non-religious, for whom hitherto their Muslim background was not particularly important) (re)discovered a new community solidarity and public identity. This is movingly described by the author Rana Kabbani, whose *Letter to Christendom* begins with a description of herself as ‘a woman who had been a sort of underground Muslim before she was forced into the open by the Salman Rushdie affair’ (Kabbani 1989, ix).

What was striking was that when the public rage against Muslims was at its most intense, Muslims neither sought nor were offered any special solidarity by any non-white minority. It was in fact some white liberal Anglicans that tried to moderate the hostility against the angry Muslims, and it was inter-faith forums rather than political-black organizations that tried to create space where Muslims could state their case without being vilified.

Political blackness—seen up to then as the key formation in the politics of post-immigration ethnicity—was seen as irrelevant to an issue which many Muslims insisted was fundamental to defining the kind of ‘respect’ or ‘civility’ appropriate to a peaceful multicultural society, that is to say, to the political constitution of ‘difference’ in Britain (Modood 2005). The SV affair, then, divided anti-racists and egalitarians, giving rise to organizations like Women Against Fundamentalists, an offshoot of Southall Black Sisters, who turned up at Muslim demonstrations to publicly express their support for Rushdie. Other egalitarians tried to assimilate Muslim concerns into the equality movement and to some extent this division has since become a feature within the broad politics of ‘multiculturalism’ in Britain (for an attempt at reconciliation, see Phillips 2007).

Stephen Lawrence and the Macpherson Inquiry

On 22 April 1993, a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, was stabbed to death while waiting for the bus in Eltham, South-East London. Even though the attack was visibly racist in motivation, the Met operated under the assumption that drug-related violence among teenagers had led to the stabbing. The failure to consider evidence that did not accord with the foregone conclusion that an altercation among criminals had taken place meant that the five suspects were never successfully prosecuted (the testimony of Lawrence’s friend, Duwayne Brooks, who had been present during the attack was dismissed).

The murder of Stephen Lawrence, and the police handling of the inquiry, thus pointed to, as Stuart Hall (1999, 189) suggested “how racialized difference is … negotiated at a deeper level, where unreconstructed attitudes find a sort of displaced but systematic expression in places which the utopian language of ‘multicultural Britain’ cannot reach.” Only the efforts of Stephen Lawrence’s parents in pressing for an investigation into the murder of their son kept the issue alive in the following years, until the scandal attracted attention in the broader public and the mainstream media (Daily Mail).

An inquiry, commissioned by Home Secretary Jack Straw (promised when Labour were in opposition) and chaired by Sir William Macpherson, to investigate the Metropolitan Police’s handling of the investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, detected both
“incompetence and racism” (Macpherson 1999, para. 2.11) and noted the “hitherto underplayed dissatisfaction and unhappiness of minority ethnic communities [...] as to their treatment by police” (Macpherson 1999, para 2.15).

‘Institutional racism’, though no individually attributable racist conduct, were seen to prevail in some branches of the police and the report highlighted “the collective failure of an organization to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin” (Macpherson 1999, para. 6.34). Home Secretary Jack Straw promised to make the report a watershed (see McLaughlin and Murji 1999), and introduced the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 that imposed a set of obligations on public authorities to deal with internal discrimination and institutional racism (Schuster and Solomos 2004).

There are continuing concerns about the disproportionate exercise of stop and search powers against black and Asian people (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2010). However, the years from Stephen Lawrence’s murder and since the adoption of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 have seen institutional discrimination on grounds of colour become an established concern. This has led some commentators, for example Trevor Phillips (2009) and John Denham (Department for Communities and Local Government 2009), to diagnose the end of racism in Britain. While the last two decades have indeed seen great strides forward in combating discrimination on grounds of colour, such statements are blind to different forms of racism that do not fit the colour schema.

Considering black/police relations from Scarman to Macpherson, Stuart Hall pointed to processes of “differentiation” among ethnic minority groups. With reference to findings from the Fourth Survey (Modood, Berthoud and Lakey 1997), Hall noted that such processes undermined the tired notion of an undifferentiated block of ‘ethnic minority’ people, homogenously characterized by their ‘otherness’ (Them), versus an equally homogeneous white ‘majority’ (Us) to whose unified culture and ‘way of life’ the former must assimilate or perish. These fundamentally binary terms in which British race relations have been mapped have essentially collapsed. (Hall 1999, 191)

The discontent that had been articulated on the streets of Brixton was, in short, not what brought Muslims to the streets of Bradford. While this does not mean that, in principle, solidarity between such groups should have been impossible, it highlights that ‘political blackness’ did not lend itself as a unifying theme, particularly in light of new types of Muslim political mobilization. In a very short space of time ‘Muslim’ became a key political minority identity, acknowledged by Right and Left, bigots and the open-minded, the media and the government. This politics has meant not just a recognition of a new religious diversity in Britain but a new or renewed policy importance for religion.

c. Since 2001: Cohesion, Equality and Islamophobia

Turning to contemporary conditions of racial equality and ethno-religious accommodation, various forces seem to be at play. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 revealed a strong commitment on the part of the Labour government to extend and consolidate the field of racial equality. This commitment coincided with a new accentuation of civic commonality.
and shared lives, a priority that was reflected in the turn towards the concept of ‘community cohesion’. In the summer of 2001 various episodes of unrest in the north of England, and the involvement of young British Muslims in this violence, were generally seen as a case for how previous strategies of multicultural accommodation had led to separateness and segregation. This was then diagnosed as a root cause of unrest, an explanation that could be extended to cover, in 2005, the bombing of London buses and underground services.

Community Cohesion and the ‘Civic Turn’
In the summer of 2001 after civil unrest and ‘rioting’ that had taken place in some northern towns, home to both a small and large number of Muslims, David Blunkett (2001, 3) stated that ‘one of this government's central aims is to achieve a society that celebrates its ethnic diversity and cultural richness; where there is respect for all, regardless of race, colour or creed’. In the same statement he gave notice of Home Office-funded teams which would 'undertake an urgent review over the summer of all relevant community issues' (Blunkett, 2001, 3). A contemporaneous local Bradford report set the pattern for official questioning of multiculturalism by arguing that particular communities, widely understood as Muslim communities, were self-segregating (Ouseley Report, 2001), an alleged tendency that was described in another report as the phenomenon of leading ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle, 2001).

In charging Muslim communities with self-segregating and adopting isolationist practices under a pretence of multiculturalism (for an analysis see Hussain and Bagguley, 2005), these reports pioneered an approach found in other post-riot accounts, and which provided many influential commentators with the licence, not necessarily supported by the specific substance of each report, to critique Muslim distinctiveness in particular and multiculturalism in general. This has given rise to discourses of ‘community cohesion’ and a greater emphasis upon the civic aspects of integration, which have increasingly competed and sought to 're-balance' the recognition of diversity in previous discourse and policy (Meer and Modood 2009).

It is also important to understand, however, that in contrast to the ‘civic turn’ in much of North West Europe, the original interest in civic matters in Britain was not stirred by Muslim political claims-making. For following New Labour’s general election victory in 1997 a range of key actors, including politicians, pundits, academics, think-tanks and pressure groups, become increasingly concerned about a range of different problems, of which civic integration/participation was only one, but which mapped neatly onto the concerns of then salient social capital theorists such as Putnam with issues around trust, norms and networks (Kisby 2006).

These perceived problems included concerns about a ‘democratic deficit’ and low voter turnout and, in particular, about civic and political disengagement and cynicism among young people. And it is for this reason that citizenship was revived as an educational issue. What needs to be understood is that issues of Muslim integration initially came to rest in this mould before the mould would be later re-cast. Thus when the term ‘community cohesion’ enters the lexicon, following an inquiry into civil unrest or ‘rioting’ in some Muslim areas in the North of England, the commissioners conceive it as encompassing a ‘domain of social capital’ which facilitates ‘people [to] feel connected to their co-residents’ (Cantle 2001, 74).

Equality and Non-discrimination
We note the different trajectories charted in the legal system between those characterized as racial minorities and those conceived in religious terms. This is something that has potentially left Muslims vulnerable because, while discrimination against yarmulke-wearing Jews and
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Britain

turban-wearing Sikhs was deemed to be unlawful *racial* discrimination. Muslims, unlike these other faith communities, are not deemed to be a racial or ethnic grouping. Nor are they protected by the legislation against religious discrimination that did exist in one part of the UK: being explicitly designed to protect Catholics, it covers only Northern Ireland.

Similarly, incitement to religious hatred was unlawful only in Northern Ireland, while the offence of incitement to racial hatred, which extended protection to certain forms of anti-Jewish literature, did not apply to anti-Muslim literature. Many years after this complaint was first raised, the hand of the British government was forced by Article 13 of the EU Amsterdam Treaty (1999), which issued the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003 which made discrimination on the grounds of religious belief illegal in the labour market, but fell short of demands for a wider social protection against incitement to religious hatred.

Of course while the directive was issued by the EC, it has been argued that it’s provenance in British and Dutch models such that “in effect, the British framework has been ‘uploaded’ to EU level” (Geddes and Guiraudon 2008, 129). Indeed, it was not only the British but also some variation of the Dutch model, both of which are “linked to a network of actors including NGOs and academic activists with good links to European institutions, particularly the Commission and the Parliament” (ibid. 133). The Anglo-Dutch led Starting Line Group (SLG), although never present at actual negotiating tables, is illustrative of the way in which tested practises from British and Dutch contexts could be marshalled and mobilised to influence “the content of legislation because they had been fed into the Commission policy development process”.

This in Britain was, however, only a partial ‘catching-up’ with the existing anti-discrimination provisions in relation to race and gender. While religious discrimination was extended to cover the provision of goods and services in 2007, there was no duty upon the public sector to take proactive steps to promote religious equality as was created in respect of racial equality by the Race Relations Act (Amendment) Act 2000 and as also existed in relation to gender and disability, till the Equalities Act (2010). After considerable lobbying the government extended the public duty to include religion and belief and this was eventually included in this legislation that the recent Equalities and Human Rights Commission has been created to monitor.

As yet there is no prospect of religious equality catching up with the importance that employers and other organizations give to sex or race. A potentially significant victory, however, was made when the government agreed to include a religion question in the 2001 Census. This was the first time this question had been included since the inception of the Census in 1851 and was largely unpopular outside the politically active religionists, among whom Muslims were foremost. Nevertheless, it has the potential to pave the way for widespread ‘religious monitoring’ in the way that the inclusion of an ethnic question in 1991 had led to the more routine use of ‘ethnic monitoring’.

In sum, then, while original legal approach to anti-discrimination in Britain was the statutory tort of unlawful discrimination (created by the SDA 1975 and RRA 1976), subsequent developments, especially through European developments, have meant that this ‘public function’ of discrimination law has become more explicit (Malik 2007). Moreover, UK discrimination law has come to accommodate some of the provisions of the ECHR through the Human Rights Act (1998).

These developments have led to what is sometimes described as the ‘constitutionalising’ of discrimination law. In other words the incorporation of the ECHR through the HRA has proven to be catalyst in shaping recent changes to anti-discrimination measures. This is perhaps most evident in the decision to name the commission entrusted with the task of
monitoring the implementation and practice of all previous anti-discrimination legislation, as well as the two most recent EC Directives, as an Equality and Human Rights Commission and the move to recognize ‘intersectionality’ as a legitimate ‘ground’ in itself (Meer 2010). Most significantly, the new legislative developments have, on the one hand, created a duty of multi-faceted equality in the public sector, and on the other hand, included religion. Whilst the latter involved the utilisation of an EU directive, it has gone much further than the EU required. Hence, in less than a decade, mainly under pressure from a Muslim lobby, the UK government has moved from denying the existence of religious discrimination to the strongest legislation on the offence in Europe.


Theoretical and political perspectives on multiculture and ethno-religious diversity need to take account of the complexities and ambiguities that characterize most social phenomena. Where the former parts of the report have offered an events-based account of Black-Caribbean and Asian post-immigration communities, this part highlights social practices of ‘mixing’.

Phenomena of ‘mixed race’ have been a hotspot for the racist imagination (Bauman 1990). British history gives ample evidence for how such phenomena are perceived as challenges to racially constituted boundaries and, as such, trigger rejection and aggression. The extent to which (British) racism had defined itself in relation to the dangers of ‘miscegenation’ and ‘race crossing’ makes it all the more noteworthy how recent positions and debates appear to have moved. Inter-ethnic partnerships or the presence of ‘mixed race’ children as such are not particularly noteworthy and certainly do not provoke the level of resentment or paternalistic anxiety that marked the response of majority society just a few decades ago (Wilson 1987; Tizard and Phoenix 1993). Notions of racial purity are confined to the racist fringes, where, for example, the British National Party (BNP) offers a type of New Right ideology that rejects ‘mixing’ in order to “preserve the rich tapestry of mankind” (BNP n.d.).

In contrast, it is much more common for policy-makers to celebrate the cultural diversity represented by the fact of inter-ethnic partnering and the presence of ‘mixed race’ children. Positive reference to Britain as a ‘mongrel nation’ mirrors the way in which some of the negative characterizations of the past have been embraced in everyday rhetoric (Christian 2000). Trevor Phillips, head of the EHRC, recently suggested that the increasing number of inter-ethnic partnerships and ‘mixed heritage’ children represented a fundamental and positive transformation: “make way for the British Obama generation” (Phillips 2009).

Clearly, the positive discourse of racial diversity does not capture the various ways in which a problem perspective on ‘mixing’ persists, often wrapped in paternalistic talk of ‘identity crises’, and in which ‘mixed race’ individuals experience disadvantage. In fact, socio-economic marginalization continues to characterize the experience of significant parts of ‘mixed race’ groups. Moreover, racist violence towards ‘miscegenation’ still occurs, and

12 ‘Miscegenation’ played a significant role in triggering wide-spread riots in British port cities in 1919 as well as in the Notting Hill riots of 1959 (see Fn. 8).
13 Phillips responded to a report commissioned by the EHRC that highlighted, in particular, increasing numbers of inter-ethnic relationships (Platt 2009).
14 The 2008/9 British Crime Survey points out that the risk for adults with a mixed background to become victim of a crime is, at 35%, significantly higher than for those with an Asian (26%) or white (23%) background.
15 Among them in 2005 the murder of a Liverpool teenager, Anthony Walker, who had been seen to be holding hands with his white girlfriend.
parents of mixed-race children continue to encounter difficulties. A recent study by Harman (2010) points to difficulties for mothers of mixed-heritage children in their own families (mirrored in the overrepresentation of children of 'mixed' background on child protection registers, see Owen and Statham 2009). Tikly, Caballero et al. (2004) highlight how bullying that centres on the dual heritage of children is relatively widespread in schools and how curricula, schools’ policies and teachers’ practices are not always adequate to cater for the needs of ‘mixed race’ children. This all points to the caveat that the policy discourse of celebrating ‘mixing’ may not capture the variety of experiences of people from ‘mixed’ backgrounds.

There is evidence of this variety in particular across ethnic and class backgrounds. White/black Caribbean children experience similar measures of socio-economic disadvantage as their black Caribbean peers (Song 2010). As regards educational attainment there are differential rates for white/black Caribbean, white/black African, white/Asian compared to the white average. Whilst the achievements of the first group are, on average, lower, the second obtains similar grades to their white peers and the third, on average, performs better. The recent report of the National Equality Panel (NEP 2010, 76-8) confirms this picture but also highlights, among other factors (not least: gender), the role of religion as a statistical variable in educational attainment (Burgess et al. 2009) and employment disadvantage (Khattab 2009).

Generally, religion also appears as one factor that complicates the story of uniformly increasing rates of inter-ethnic relationship. For some groups, such as Muslims of Pakistani background but also Indian Sikhs, co-religionist preferences coincides with relatively high rates of religious affiliation (Platt 2009). The different significance attached to marriage is another feature that accounts for varying rates of inter-ethnic partnering across ethno-religious groups (Berthoud 2005). Accordingly, whilst inter-ethnic partnering has become wide-spread among Black-Caribbeans, patterns for other groups point much more towards preservation and homogamy, with less than 10 percent of inter-ethnic partnerships for men and women of Bangladeshi or Pakistani descent (Platt 2009, 42-3). There is thus no uniform movement towards ‘mixing’ and, in particular, the interactions between race, ethnicity, religion and socio-economic status are important but also difficult to account for and to disaggregate for their role in explaining such trends.

In line with such complexities, it is also difficult to draw more than loose connections between the occurrence and visibility of ‘mixing’ and the prevalence of racist stereotypes. Clearly, however, one significant insight has to be that ‘mixed race’ children face less discrimination than only a few decades ago and that inter-ethnic partnering has been gradually normalized. The British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) that collected data on attitudes towards ethnic minority spouses and ethnic minority bosses shows a striking trend of generational change (Ford 2008, 612-2). The rates of change and the relatively uneven participation of British post-immigration communities in the process of ‘mixing’ and partnering are, one may suggest, a footnote to attitudinal changes that, over the last decades, comprise all ethnic minority groups, though to varying degrees (Muttarak and Heath 2010).

Do the increasing prevalence of and the changing attitudes towards ethnic mixing then present themselves as an example of the types of “intermixture that appear to have evolved spontaneously and organically from … the ordinary multiculture of the postcolonial metropolis” (Gilroy 2004, 136)? It is no doubt problematic to cite complex social phenomena, such as the various dimensions and meanings of ‘mixing’, in support of rather abstract theories. It seems, however, that the gradual normalization of ethnic mixing in Britain is indeed connected to encounters that took place outside of the purview of official multicultural politics. The relationship between ‘mixing’, conceived as ‘transgressive’ and as a challenge to understandings of homogeneous nationhood, and the decline of previously pervasive
categories of colour racism is difficult to trace and substantiate. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that members of majority society that are inducted into cultural framework that is thoroughly multicultural in advertisement, music and the arts develop dispositions that attribute less significance to racial boundaries.\footnote{Which would be a simple application of Gordon Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis. Ethnographic research, however, points to more complex processes that are highly variable according to where inter-ethnic contact occurs and how it is mediated. This is, for example, what Coretta Phillips (2008) points to in a study of inter-ethnic relations in British young offenders institutions or Anoop Nayak (2003) in a study of ethnicity and inter-ethnic contact in British youth subcultures.}

4. Definitions of respect and recognition in Great Britain
With regard to claims advanced by post-immigration groups, we have pointed out some of the dissimilarities. Diverse experiences and social locations underpin particular concerns, responses to different experiences of stigmatization and different ideals of equality and respect. Beyond the practical specificity of this variation, we suggest that there are two broad versions of claims and that accommodation may take two basic forms, equal dignity and equal respect (Taylor 1994; Modood 2007).

Equal dignity requires the abolition of discriminatory laws and the incorporation of individuals\footnote{Which would be a simple application of Gordon Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis. Ethnographic research, however, points to more complex processes that are highly variable according to where inter-ethnic contact occurs and how it is mediated. This is, for example, what Coretta Phillips (2008) points to in a study of inter-ethnic relations in British young offenders institutions or Anoop Nayak (2003) in a study of ethnicity and inter-ethnic contact in British youth subcultures.} despite their differences into a horizon of universal rights. Equal respect by contrast suggests that identity markers are considered for the value they represent to their bearers and that because of such differences law and policy need to respond differentially to the nature of the difference at stake. Where equal dignity has not been achieved, this is more often than not a question of the inadequate application of principles of equality and non-discrimination. This, however, is not the case with some of the most contested demands for equal respect that are advanced in contemporary Britain. Here political debates often showcase fundamental disagreement over the respect and recognition that is due to ethno-religious communities in the public sphere.

Recent debates on cultural difference in Britain have tended to pit the two varieties of claims and the ‘two kinds of difference’ against each other in a binary manner. Various theorists have over the last two decades contrasted multiculturalism with multiculture, suggesting their practical irreconcilability and a necessary antagonism (e.g., Waldron 1996; Gilroy 2000). While to us such binary oppositions appear unnecessary (Modood and Dobbernack 2010), we need to recognize that a regime that unites equal dignity with equal respect requires considerable fine-tuning and will inevitably raise conflicts and misunderstandings.

Britain is undoubtedly a forerunner with regard to the two domains. There has been a quicker recognition than, say, in Germany that post-immigration groups were here to stay; a greater readiness than in France to make symbolic representations of the nation and the national story hospitable to difference; and a greater concern with equality and greater respect for differences than what has been achieved in comparable immigration countries. The following thematizes the achievements of the British case in relation to the horizon of public values that are present and discernible in British discourses on difference, as an institutional arrangement and in social practices. Such achievements, it may be worth restating, are neither unambiguous, nor irreversible. They should be seen as potentials that depend for their achievement on continued political effort, such as the pressure from minority groups and political actors’ willpower.
Values of the British regime of accommodation

Roy Jenkins, we have noted in the beginning of the report, conceived of integration 'not as a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' (Jenkins 1967, 267). A value horizon of what accommodation, ideally, should be about was thus formulated early on: it includes equality in a situation where partaking in the benefits of equal political and social citizenship would not require immigrants or their descendants to abandon cultural or religious attributes. We have suggested that this idea remains a powerful principle that despite problems in its implementation constitutes an ideal of British multicultural acceptance.

The accommodation of difference by means of equal respect, what Jenkins pointed to as the legitimacy of “cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”, has not been uncontested. It had to go against the idea of homogeneous white, protestant nationhood that Linda Colley (1992) points to as the past ferment of Britishness. In fact, as official discourse is ready to ‘celebrate diversity’, homogeneity continues to exert a pull such as when the space for religious difference is disputed or when economic crises reanimate racialized self-conceptions. The Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB 2000) highlighted how ‘rethinking the national story’, as the commission put it, was a necessity to open a space for post-immigration groups to find a place. This attempt to rethink Britain is not without ambiguities and continues to be marred by uncertainties as illustrated by Gordon Brown’s recent attempt to formulate a more tangible notion of Britishness (Brown 2005).

Policies and institutional arrangements

We have pointed to the successive consolidation and institutionalization of racial equality since the 1970s. It is arguably not merely a desire for standards of racial equity that underpinned this development. The agenda was partially driven, on the centre-left, by the guilty conscience of policy-makers wanting to compensate for increasingly restrictive immigration rules and, on the right, by the desire to counteract racist unrest.

In its early days as well as in its more contemporary development, the broadening of the equality agenda is characterized by successive ‘discoveries’ of problems of inequality, invariably in response to minority mobilization. The ‘colour bar’, the openly racist discrimination in the labour market, including the public sector, and open racism in housing and social services, were first ‘discovered’ as a scandal in the 1960s and early 1970 and the first Race Relations Acts were thus intended to put an end to openly racist discrimination.

The insufficiencies of these first responses and the continued presence of an underbelly of racism were again revealed and thematized such as in the uprisings in Brixton and elsewhere. A more engaged response to the persistence of racism thus had to take account of more subtle stigmatizations of post-immigration groups, such as of the (more or less) coded representations of black criminality that Stuart Hall (1978) brought out.

The mobilization against ‘sus’ in the 1980s is thus in line with the scandalizing of the police response to the murder of Stephen Lawrence in the 1990s. Racism, in coded and institutionally entrenched forms, made public authorities adopt racist practices and prevent them from delivering an equal service to the members of post-immigration communities. The new legislative response to the Macpherson inquiry was not least welcomed as it engaged with the deeper structures of British racism that had previously been left undisturbed.

Equality in terms of the accommodation of religious beliefs and protection against discrimination on grounds of religion is, as mentioned above, another area where minority grievances – after long debates and in a process of tough lobbying – have been heard and
codified such as, most recently, in the Equality Act 2010. Opening a place in British education for non-Christian faith schools or allowing for Muslim curriculum objectives are further challenges that continue to be politically contentious (Meer 2007).

As regards the political process, the adoption of equality measures rarely proceeded without pressure from below. Minority agency in various forms, through public protests, advocacy groups or party-political channels, played an indispensable role. The most recent elections showed for example that the British Muslim electorate, though politically heterogeneous and difficult to mobilize en bloc, was considered a force to be reckoned with and candidates from all three major parties went to lengths to vow Muslim constituents (Chapman and Versi 2010).

Acceptance and accommodation as social practice.

There is hardly an unambiguously discernible picture of the values that are embodied in the relations between British minorities and majority groups on a variety of social levels. While this report has pointed to differences among post-immigration groups, ‘majority’ is an equally unwieldy denominator that potentially conceals the diversity of interactions between minorities and different strata of majority society. With regard to ‘racial mixing’ we have suggested that this differentiation is highly significant. Differential everyday experiences of diversity need to be considered as well as the way in which various socio-economic groups may have different experience of the post-immigration groups and individuals they encounter.

In a different matter, the problematisation of ‘mixing’, with its long-standing history in the theme of miscegenation, has not been displaced but at least amended by the official theme of celebrated diversity. British diversity is in fact often presented as an ‘asset’, as was particularly discernible in the early years of the Labour government of the late 1990s or in the more recent run-up to the London Olympics 2012. Cultural diversity as an asset is however at least partially counterbalanced by the rhetoric on immigration that tends to present outsiders as a threat to British economic well-being. The previous Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who was not above giving voice to such resentments – ‘British jobs for British workers’ (cited in Summers 2009) –, experienced a backlash just before the May 2010 election when his remarks on the ‘bigotry’ of a staunch Labour supporter were accidentally recorded and subsequently made public. While immigration and asylum thus continue to be noxious political issues, such debates do not necessarily tarnish the more wide-spread appreciation of the fact of cultural diversity in Britain (MORI 2005; 2009).

Conceivably, the increasing acceptability of cultural racism and in particular of Islamophobic resentment may tarnish this picture, even though the significance of ‘culture versus colour’ in British racism is contested. Robert Ford (2008) uses the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey to advance a broader claim on the relative insignificance of cultural attributes. Other data, not least in the most recent BSA survey of 2010 (Voas and Ling 2010), appears to challenge his account (which still works with the unwieldy and imprecise category of ‘Asians’) in particular in relation to Muslims.

There is thus considerable evidence of how everyday interaction across ethnic and cultural lines is more common and less remarkable than it used to be, say, two decades ago. There are practices of conviviality that are certainly difficult to capture with a view to how majorities tolerate minority practices. Rather we need to take notice of how in such processes of everyday exchange, as suggested by Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall, culturally hybrid forms emerge and spread. The claims for respect and recognition that British Muslims put forward, too, are not predominantly about tolerance but for the public recognition and accommodation of religious belief.
5. Conclusion

Summary analyses of the British response to post-immigration difference run into difficulties. In fact, on the basis of the above we can suggest that contravening tendencies are at play and that progress in one domain may well coincide with regressive trends in another. Moreover, achievements, such as in response to the Macpherson Inquiry, are not irreversible (Younge 2009). An increasingly entrenched animosity against Islam mobilizes not only fringe groups but animates significant numbers within majority society (Bleich 2009). At the same time, the Equality Act 2010 points to the readiness to engage with the claims and positions of minority groups and to further develop the British agenda of multicultural accommodation.

Various scenarios are thus conceivable. The approach that was taken in relation to other types of differences could be carried forward and extended to ethno-religious groups; however, a second and equally conceivable path may involve a break from the better traditions of British multiculturalism and the rejection of identities and claims of British Muslims and other ethno-religious groups as impossible to accommodate. While there is the potential to ‘rethink the national story’ and to establish a kind of multicultural citizenship that has equality and respect written into it, there is equally the potential for regression even going back and beyond the norms of a more minimalist *modus vivendi* towards ethno-national parochialism.

As was the case with the relative waning of colour racism, historical analysis suggests that prejudice, even when it is deeply entrenched, is not beyond change. Such change may be driven by the liberalization of new generations’ attitudes. It may also be prompted by new visibilities of cultural or religious groups and an appreciation of their place in the broader cultural, social and political context of the nation, its narratives and representations. While some of the examples highlighted in this report offer considerable hope, the contemporary situation is aggravated by the amalgamation of global anxieties with local concerns. National debates continue to be at risk of being taken hostage by the ‘clash of civilization’ thesis and security concerns continue to be unhelpfully combined with questions of cultural pluralism (Huntington 1992; Prins and Salisbury 2008).

British cultural pluralism has been positively captured by two different approaches. Multiculturalism, as concerned with the place and claims of ethno-religious groups, and multiculture, accounting for life, social practices and cultural production in urban diasporas, fit loosely and imperfectly to the experiences of South Asian and Black Caribbean post-immigration groups. Multiculture envisages the re-modelling of majority society’s standards of acceptance in a way that inscribes aspects of minority identity into majority culture. Multiculturalism is concerned with the reappraisal of difference as a positive fact instead of an unwelcome aberration. Its concern is with equal respect and with the need for Britain to adapt its regimes of citizenship, policies and laws to recognize cultural pluralism. In particular the focus is on making Britain hospitable to the practices and claims of ethno-religious groups. Multiculture, by contrast, is concerned with fashioning a form of equality that affords minority groups a place in the cultural representations of the nation. One of its achievements, we have suggested, was the abolition of the stigma that was historically directed at ‘mixed race’ individuals not merely for their imagined inferiority or ‘problematic’ identities but for how they constituted a challenge to classificatory regimes of national belonging.

The demands of both for public accommodation are discernible in the various claims and grievances of post-immigration groups. On the whole, British policy-making has been responsive to such claims and law and policies have been adapted to make space for various post-immigration differences, though this has been not without contradictions and countervailing tendencies. This report then suggests that there is the potential in Britain to further forms of respect, equality and multicultural recognition.
What this report could not fully investigate is a further area of critical questions regarding toleration and respect. These are not merely thrown up in the relationship of minority and majority groups. They extend further to how different forms of difference can be brought together, coexist and acknowledge each others’ legitimacy. For Britain, this is the challenge facing multiculturalism and multiculture, as the two paradigms that have frequently put in opposition, rather than allowing for a meaningful relationship and a ‘conversation across differences’ (Modood and Dobbernack 2010). Too often this conversation is barred as the modalities of one are imposed on the other. Among contemporary cultural diversity challenges in Britain thus numbers the challenge to recognize that the reality of post-immigration groups requires a pluralized normative and conceptual vocabulary that makes space for coexistence and respect between two ‘kinds’ of difference.
Bibliography


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# Appendix


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<tr>
<td>Chinese or Other Ethnic Group: Other</td>
<td>384,100</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>