Tolerance and Cultural Diversity
Discourses in Germany

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1. Overview National Discourses
Background Country Reports
Tolerance Discourses and Cultural Diversity Challenges in Germany

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Work Package 1 - Overview of National Discourses on Tolerance and Cultural diversity
Cultural Diversity Discourses
Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators’ Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country’s performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

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Executive Summary

The following report gives an overview of diversity challenges that have arisen in Germany over the last 30 years, and analyses contemporary tolerance discourses and practices of (in-) tolerance, (non-)acceptance and (dis-)respect towards ethnic, cultural and religious differences.

In the first chapter, the report gives an overview of the development of German national identity and describes how a specifically ethnic understanding of the nation has been an important factor for this development since the very beginning of the nation-building process. While Germany is not the only country to link ethnic origin to its understanding of nationality, some historians argue that this tie has been especially strong in Germany. Among the reasons given is the historical formation of Germany from very diverse principalities, which sustained strong power vis-à-vis the German emperor (Kaiser). This specific formation continues today, where the German federal states still have a strong position in relation to the national government. One example of this federative character is the educational system, which is in the hands of each respective federal state and thus in certain aspects varies significantly from region to region.

For some historians it is exactly the importance placed on local or regional identity over national German identity that has led to an even stronger emphasis on a constructed common German identity, almost overcompensating to keep the fragmented territory together and build one nation. In the process, other nations were constructed as inferior in relation to the German one and a specifically German idea of the Volk was developed, which lays particular emphasis on a common bloodline of all the members of the nation. This was far more ideological than the concept of ethnicity, and strongly linked ideology and (perceived) biological factors. Together with the devaluation of other nations and ethnic groups this concept of the Volk ultimately led to the National Socialists’ idea of a superior German ‘race’, which had to govern all other ‘races’ and even extinguish other groups and nations.

Although the National Socialist regime and its ideas have long been overcome and certain thinkers, like Jürgen Habermas, have argued that the only possible patriotism in Germany today could be patriotism towards the constitution, the idea of the Volk has not been completely jettisoned. As a result, German citizenship has, until recently, been closely tied to ethnic origin, which is explained in more detail in the second chapter.

The legal concept of ius sanguinis, which ties citizenship to bloodline and makes it impossible for a person with a different ethnic origin to become part of the nation, has, through the citizenship reform of 2000, been partially changed into ius soli, a doctrine that ties nationality to one’s place of birth and thus enables immigrants and their descendants to become German citizens under certain circumstances.

After outlining this historical and legal background, the third chapter of the report gives an overview of the last three decades – 1980s, 1990s and the years after 2000 – in relation to the most prominent ethno/religious groups that entered the public debate in these years, among them Muslims, Jews, Roma, but also ethnic German immigrants. In these three different periods, the same group of people sometimes appears under different names and labels, due to their changed perception in society. The Turkish immigrants are for example mainly perceived as ‘labour migrants’ or ‘refugees’ in the 1980s, as ‘Turks’ or also ‘asylum seekers’ during the 1990s, and finally mainly as ‘Muslims’ in the years after 2001. Because the changes in perception of specific groups accompany changes in attitude towards them and
The most important developments of the 1980s with respect to diversity were the debates about multiculturalism. Its supporters mainly sought to protect immigrants and minorities from any kind of forced assimilation or unfair treatment, especially in light of the country’s history of mass killings of Jews, Roma and many others during the National Socialist regime. However, with the number of refugees from Turkey and other conflict areas, together with the unresolved issue of many former labour migrants not willing to return to their countries of origin, and the growing immigration of ethnic Germans mainly from the former Soviet Union, more and more political voices emerged calling for limiting immigration. The attitude towards immigrants and minorities constantly deteriorated.

The most important event of the 1990s was the German reunification process. After the official reunification of Eastern and Western Germany, immigration to the Western parts both from the former East and from the former Soviet Union increased rapidly. Together with incoming refugees from war-torn countries, this development was rather challenging and caused a deterioration of attitudes towards immigrants in general, which was often fuelled by political leaders who wanted to restrict immigration and asylum laws. One consequence of this was several incidents of group violence and even murder of immigrants and asylum seekers in the early 1990s.

While ethnic German immigrants were generally granted citizenship directly after entering the country, and even certain minority groups – among them German Roma - were acknowledged as national minorities by the end of the 1990s, former labour migrants, most of them Turkish nationals who had been working in the country for more than ten or twenty years, were not given similar rights and still had to struggle to be granted citizenship.

The years after 2000, and especially after 9/11/2001, witnessed a heightened debate about Muslims and how and if they could be integrated into German society. Even Germans with a Turkish background, some of whom had been born as German citizens, were increasingly perceived as outsiders mainly because of their Muslim religion, whether or not they really adhered to it.

On the other hand, the citizenship law was substantially reformed in the year 2000, which opened up the possibility for children of immigrants who were born in the Germany to acquire German citizenship. Not everyone welcomes the fact that German society is becoming culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse, and will continue to do so in the future. While the anti-immigrant and even racist rhetoric that is currently gaining more traction are not at all exclusively geared towards Muslims, still, resentment towards them – and everyone who is perceived as Muslim – is the most comfortably uttered and garners the strongest support in society.

Other groups, like the Roma, are not as openly debated in public discussion, or are even, like certain Vietnamese immigrants, partially portrayed as ‘positively integrating’, but they often have to face rather restrictive immigration policies nonetheless.

While German Roma have been recognized as one of four national minority groups, guaranteeing them protection and support for their language and culture, Roma who are nationals of other EU countries, like Romania or Bulgaria or who came as refugees during the war in Kosovo and live and work in Germany, are not as welcome and are increasingly exposed to the risk of repatriation. The pleas of the Roma to the German government to grant
a certain quota of Roma refugees permanent residence in Germany due to their having been victims of the Holocaust has not been answered favourably.

In chapter 4 of the report, the discourse on tolerance in Germany, the different understandings of tolerance, and the way in which tolerance talk is used in public debates are related to the concept of integration and how it is understood by German government policies.

While tolerance is generally understood as the opposite of discrimination and racism, it can be observed in current public discourses that the concept of tolerance is also increasingly used to draw borders between those who are to be tolerated and those who are not, while the non-tolerance towards a specific group or individual is often legitimised with its own (perceived) intolerance towards others. This idea can best be understood from the slogan “No tolerance for intolerance”, which is partly rooted in the historical narrative of a too tolerant Weimar Republic that gave way to the worst face of intolerance, the National Socialists. The slogan is widely used in political rhetoric today, often concerning religious Muslim groups. Whereas ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims’ were largely perceived as the victims of intolerance during the violent attacks in the early 1990s, more and more, they have come to be portrayed as ‘intolerant’ themselves, whether towards Jews, homosexuals or liberal societies in general. By portraying – especially religious – Muslims in this way, they are labelled as foreigners with incompatible values and beliefs to whom too much tolerance would be a detrimental attitude.

Looking at tolerance not only as a normative value but also as a political discourse that marks insiders and outsiders of the society allows us to observe the unequal power relations between the subjects and objects of (in-)tolerance.

This kind of analysis also demonstrates how the heightened use of tolerance talk – especially in regard to certain groups - might be explained as an attempt to keep up perceived cultural homogeneity in a time of fundamental changes in German understandings of nationality. Similarly the concept of integration still mainly carries that implicit indictment that immigrants have to adapt to a culturally homogenous society, which is itself not to be changed by this process of integration.

Dealing with these issues in the near future will be decisive for the peaceful cohabitation of a diverse population and for developing a new and inclusive national identity. It will be interesting to further analyse normative as well as discursive aspects of tolerance in Germany as well as other related concepts.

Keywords
Tolerance, Germany, National Identity, Diversity, Muslims, Jews, Roma, Resettlers, Vietnamese, Labour Migrants, Turks, Arabs, Citizenship, Border Drawing
1. Introduction

This report gives a broad overview of the major German debates concerning cultural diversity challenges that have taken place during the last thirty years, and of the most relevant groups and how they were addressed within these discussions. After summing up historical developments with respect to German national identity, and the politics of naturalisation and citizenship, we present the major debates on issues of immigration and diversity and how they were framed in the different decades, starting with the 1980s, the 1990s, and into the first decade after 2000:

The public debates and political ideas around issues of immigration have long been discussed amidst a general rejection of the fact that Germany has been a de facto country of immigration since the beginning of labor immigration after World War II. The perception that immigrants would one day return home – upheld for a long time even by the immigrants themselves – made it possible to (for the most part) ignore important issues of diversity, the necessity to politically address the social participation of immigrants and their children, as well as the changing demographic structure and national identity of Germany becoming an immigration country.

It was only in the year 2000, when the reform of citizenship laws gradually enabled non-ethnic Germans to become citizens, that politics officially declared Germany a country of immigration and, at the same time, pointed out the necessity to urgently design integration policies.

Though ‘integration’ has become the key political term within a wide variety of diversity issues, immigrant groups often perceive the real concept behind the label as rather assimilatory1.

In 2006 the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel held the first Summit on Integration with representatives from most immigrant groups. However, growing debates about Muslims also caused the Ministry of the Interior to convene a summit about Islam, the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islamkonferenz), at around the same time.

Integration, as it is widely used in political rhetoric, is regarded as an attempt by the majority to ‘integrate’ minorities into the already existing society and ‘culture,’ also labelled ‘Leitkultur’ (leading culture) by mainly conservative politicians. The possibility that the majority culture and society would undergo change through this integration is hardly ever addressed.

The public debate on Leitkultur, in a tone that demanded rules for adaptation of immigrants to values and ways of life of the majority, was started by Friedrich Merz, then chairman of the Christian Democrat parliamentary group in the Bundestag in 2000, who perceived a “liberal, German leading culture” as an alternative to multiculturalism (Merz, 2000). Then president of

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1 Even the vice-president of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse (SPD) lately declared in an interview, that “there is no integration without assimilation.” http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/608313/Deutschland_Keine-Integration-ohne-Assimilation
the Bundestag Norbert Lammert (CDU) had repeatedly uttered his view about the necessity of a leading culture, which he extended, during the time of the Danish cartoon conflict, to include a European leading culture, and which he also decisively placed in opposition to multiculturalism. For Lammert, multiculturalism was “at best, well intended, but thoughtless on closer inspection” and had arrived at its “obvious end” (FAZ, 2006).

One leading principle of the Christian Democratic Party towards minority groups is ‘Fördern und fordern’ (Supporting and Demanding), a trope that has been widely quoted and applied in recent decades. This basic principle of the CDU represents the leading idea of a majority, which on the one hand supports its minorities, while on the other hand demanding adaptation to the ‘leading culture’ defined by the majority. The Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel lately interpreted this slogan of ‘supporting and demanding’ in such a way that emphasizes the demanding. At a party conference of the Christian Democrats in Mainz she said “whoever does not want to be supported has to be challenged, too” (“Wer nicht gefördert werden will, muss auch gefordert werden”) (Focus, 2010b). Here, she drew on one current discourse about immigrants, that they reject integration (Integrationsverweigerer), and gave the impression that even the supportive measures are to be carried out in a rather coercive context.

The idea of cultural diversity – describing an immigration society that is made up of citizens with different cultural heritages and religions, and is thus also changed and formed by these differences – is hardly used at all in the political sphere. While the concept of diversity is not referred to on the national level, local politics sometimes refer to it, such as the Berlin Senate, that called its latest integration concept “Supporting Diversity – Strengthening Cohesion”. Because of its link to the idea of multiculturalism, however, diversity has likewise been rejected by politicians throughout the last decade, long before the famous statement of the Federal Chancellor Merkel in October 2010, when she declared that the concept of multiculturalism had absolutely failed (sueddeutsche.de, 2010).

The concept of tolerance is also publicly used in anti-right-wing and anti-racist measures, where tolerance is seen as the opposite of discrimination or racist violence. One example of a political organisation that reflects this view is the ‘Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz – gegen Extremismus und Gewalt’ (Federation for Democracy and Tolerance – Against Extremism and Violence), which is linked to the Federal Ministry of the Interior and works against right-wing extremism and violence, attempting to create a network of initiatives against extremism and violence².

In light of this socio-political context, the following report will first outline the major diversity challenges that German society has been facing, and then describe the groups that have been most outstanding in public discourse on these challenges since 1980.

Throughout the period covered in this report, the primary object of public debate has been labour migrants coming from Turkey and their children and grand children. The process of labour recruitment ended in 1973, after which immigration largely consisted of families joining workers who had migrated earlier. Whereas in the 1980s the debate still turned on ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter), the perception of the Turkish immigrants within this group as problematic grew stronger and the reason for this was not infrequently seen in their cultural origin.

² Online-presentation of the Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz: http://www.buendnis-toleranz.de/cms/ziel/423616/DE/
After the terror attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the debate began to turn on Muslims, who were to a large extent replacing ‘Turks’ in the public imaginary. One could say that, more or less, this same group of immigrants was perceived not only as ‘culturally’ determined, but also religiously so. Public discourse both culturalised and essentialised this group of (former) immigrants as ‘Turks’ and ‘Muslims,’ widely portraying them as fixed entities, whose members are hardly differentiated and substantially determined by their cultural/religious belonging.

At the same time the debate about asylum seekers, who came from very different countries, but also partially from Turkey, grew very strong and incited strong negative feelings in German society, leading even to violent outbreaks and murder in the 1990s.

Therefore, cognizant of the ways in which the same groups were given different labels, this report chooses to discuss groups mainly in the way they are and were labelled within the public discourse. Therefore the immigrants from Turkey and their descendants are discussed as ‘labour migrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims’, depending on the respective time and issue.

Apart from Turkey, asylum seekers arrived in Germany in the 1990s from very different countries, many of them escaping violent conflicts in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or the Palestinian territories.

Some groups, such as Jews, the Roma, or Vietnamese were debated in different ways throughout the decades and in relation to different diversity challenges, whereas the labels hardly changed. In the 1990s, however, Jews were often discussed in the frame of ‘quota refugees’ (Kontingentflüchtlinge), a label they shared with ethnic German immigrants from Russia and other countries, but not with the Roma, who until today demand this status in light of the genocide committed against them during the Nazi regime.

Vietnamese also appeared in very different contexts in public debate, ranging from discourses that problematised asylum seekers, to the praising of their perceived positive example for integration – a quality that was especially highlighted during the debate around Thilo Sarrazin’s 2010 book and subsequent discussion about Muslims, which advanced the question of whether their culture and/or religion keep them from being integrated.

After pointing out the different debates and political measures concerning immigration and diversity in Germany over the past thirty years, this report sheds light on the ways in which tolerance is used in public discourse in Germany today and as a normative concept in relation to different groups and issues. It explains the use of a variety of other concepts, like integration or acceptance, which are relevant in this context of dealing with difference.

Definitions

The following definitions of terminology used within this paper are to be understood as proposed working definitions. As many of these terms are however defined in multiple and sometimes conflicting ways and the debates around these definitions are to a large extent mirroring the socio-political movements and discourses, closer discussion of the different definitions is provided within the respective chapters of this paper.
Different scholars have defined terms like ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ in various different ways. Throughout this paper we use a constructivist understanding of group identities. An ethnic group is thus mainly defined by the felt common identity, which is basically developed by boundary drawing towards other groups. These boundaries are not fixed but shifting and changing. Similarly the terms nation and national identity are not defining fixed groups, but flexible and shifting entities. A nation presupposes the notion of ‘national identity’, a ‘feeling of belonging’ to the nation, which is with Benedict Anderson widely determined by construction of common images and ideas (Anderson: 1983). The term ‘Nationality’ is however mainly used as an equivalent for legal citizenship.

The term ‘integration’ is understood by the EU Common Basic Principles (CBPs) as “a dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the European Union” (Council of the European Union: 2004). It is often differentiated from the term ‘assimilation’, meaning the one-sided adaptation of immigrants into the host society. That these terms however get blurred in public discourse and are often part of the conflicting debates will be further explained and defined throughout this paper.

A ‘migrant’ has been defined by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) as a “person who has moved temporarily or permanently to a country where he or she was not born and has acquired significant social ties to this country”3. In some countries however ‘migrant’ also refers to those who are born in the country where their parents migrated to. In German context the term ‘migration background’ is often used instead of migrant, including also the children of people, who were not born in Germany as well as naturalised immigrants.

The term ‘minority’ is not clearly defined by international law. In some countries a minority is that group, which is recognised as such by national laws. In this paper, the term mainly refers to ethnic and/or religious groups, which are not the dominant group in the respective society. Terms like tolerance and acceptance are discussed in the paper as their definitions in the specific German discourses are among the main objectives of this study.

### 2. Germany: State formation, national identity and citizenship

Citizenship outlines the borders of national belonging, of who is allowed to be an integral part of the society and who is not. The rules and regulations of citizenship thus reveal a lot about a country’s understanding of its national identity. The German citizenship law has until 1999 been dominated by *ius sanguinis*, that deems ethnic descent the major factor for national belonging. According to the political scientist and historian Werner Ruf, a specifically ethnic understanding of the nation has been an important factor of German development of national identity since the very beginning of the nation-building process.4 An understanding of the German nation as ethnically determined has thus supported border-drawing and exclusionary

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3 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Glossary; www.unesco.org/shs/migration/glossary
processes, that culminated in extreme degradation of ‘non-ethnic Germans,’ and finally in the unprecedented genocide of the Holocaust by the National Socialists.

a. Historical development of the German national identity

The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, plays an important part in the German historical memory. On the one hand, it ended decades of violent conflict that centred on issues of religious freedom between the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations by laying the constitutional basis for mutual tolerance. On the other hand, it strengthened the power of the individual principalities vis-à-vis the German emperor (Kaiser), thus laying the foundation for the strong position of the German federal states in relation to the national government, an arrangement that persists until today. The regional identities have long been more important than a common German identity. Still, a strong national identity developed perhaps precisely because of these strong local ties; there was a necessity to construct and support a strong common, unifying identity for the fragmented territory, which was supposed to comprise one nation since the foundation of the Deutsche Kaiserreich in 1871. This, together with the developments to create a common German identity against those of other nations, like France, which were gradually all constructed as inferior in relation to the German one, led to the idea of the Volk, a specific concept of community, which developed in close relation to the concept of ethnicity, gaining prominence in relation to the national project until very recently. The concept of the Volk especially stressed the factor of a common bloodline of all the members of the nation, which – like one big family – were all perceived as of a common descent, of which the common language is an important constituting factor. Germany thus developed an idea of ethnic origin and common identity, which was far more ideological than the concept of ethnicity and that strongly linked ideology and – perceived – biological factors. This concept was directly related to the devaluation of other nations and ethnic groups, which eventually generated the National Socialists’ idea of a superior German ‘race’, which had to govern all other ‘races’ and even extinguish other groups and nations.

Among the individual states that were members of the Deutsche Bund (German Federation) from 1815 to 1866, the questions of a common German nation and national identity were heavily debated. After the unification of all German-speaking territories (großdeutsche Lösung) was found to be unrealisable, the member states of the Deutsche Bund united under the Prussian king and without the Austrian territories, which was called the kleindeutsche Lösung. A common identity, however, was not yet established, and the question of the unification of all territories in which German was the national language would come up again in between the two world wars, and in the National Socialist regime.

Germany has existed as a nation-state since 1871, when the military federation Norddeutscher Bund (Northern German Federation) became the core of the Deutsches Reich after other independent states (Bayern, Württemberg, Baden, Hessen) had joined the federation under a common Kaiser. The monarchy ended in 1918/19 with the German capitulation and the end of World War I. The then proclaimed German Republic (Deutsche Republik) adopted a new constitution, which is also known as the Weimarer Verfassung.

The time of the Weimarer Republik is another important landmark in German collective memory, as the young republic, which had a short zenith in the 1920s before the world economic crisis in 1929, in the end was the precursor for the National Socialist dictatorship. The republic, which had already been under the pressure of reparations for World War I and
was extremely weakened by the economic crisis, was finally gradually taken over by right-wing extremist political powers, which had portrayed the German reparations and loss of territory determined in the treaty of Versailles after the end of World War I as a ‘humiliation of the German nation’ in order to gain votes from the economically suffering population. The important factor of the downfall of the Weimarer Republik, until today is the perception that it had been too open for all political powers – even the enemies of the republic and its constitution – which eventually led to the National Socialists coming into power.

The lesson learnt from these historical developments is the enduring conviction that the republic and the constitution may under no circumstances admit its own enemies into power, that no ‘tolerance’ may be shown to the ‘intolerant’, as explained in more detail in chapter 4.

From the very beginning, Hitler’s two major goals were the war of aggression and extermination for creating new ‘living space in the East’ (‘Lebensraum im Osten’) and the persecution and extermination of the Jews. This racist worldview of the Nazis and the attempt to create a ‘pure’ and ‘healthy’ common and superior ‘race’, the embodiment of intolerance in its most cruel form, targeted (apart from the Jews) two other minorities considered a ‘foreign race’ (Fremdrasse): the Roma, and members of Slavic ethnic groups, like Poles, Russians or Ukrainians. Other persecuted groups that were not considered a ‘foreign race’ but as a danger to the ‘health and purity of the population’ were homosexuals, disabled people and many other weak or minority groups, who were also victims of persecution, violence and murder. In the year 1941, the Nazis began with a systematic murder of Jews in specially constructed extermination camps. In the camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau alone, about one million people died in gas chambers.

The unconditional capitulation on the 8th of May, 1945, was circumvented by Hitler and other major responsible politicians and members of the military through suicide. Those major responsible persons that survived were convicted in the Nuremberg Trials (Nürnberger Prozesse).

After the allied forces occupied in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in the three Western zones and the German Democratic Republic in the Soviet zone. The Cold War and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 completely separated the Eastern and Western parts of the German population from each other. It was only in 1991 that Germany was completely reunified and regained its state sovereignty.

An important historical heritage is the collective memory that Germany incited and lost two World Wars. Ruf claims that this memory will probably have destroyed the perception of a German ‘cultural superiority’ once and for all (Ruf, 2000). Ruf argues that the cognizance of these historical events and developments broke the consensus of a superior German nation, on which both the Prussian-German Empire and the expansionism and racism of the Nazis had been based. As a result, considerable parts of the population are today deeply sceptical towards the militarism that was once the backbone of the state. Recent political developments, however, run counter to this view to a certain extent. Not only is German military engagement gaining international importance and intensity, but so are very recent debates about German (cultural) identity, especially in contrast to (mainly Muslim) immigrants. The influential book by Thilo Sarrazin (Sarrazin, 2010) – former member of the board of the Federal Bank, about ‘Germany doing itself in’ through the demographic rise of certain immigrant groups (namely Muslims), who are qua culture and/or religion less intelligent and economically effective than
others – has marked a new German self-perception of superiority. This feeling of superiority is marked not so much biologically – even if Sarrazin also refers to biological factors – but more to cultural and first of all of economic strength. It is nevertheless a nationally and culturally determined perception of superiority, where the understanding of culture is very essentialising, defining cultures as fixed and inflexible entities, and thus to a certain extent takes the place that was formerly inhabited by a similarly fixed and essentialising understanding of ‘race’.

After World War II, however, a certain ‘normalisation’ of the German national self-perception, the identification of the German citizens with the constitution, and the final acceptance of the borders of the Federal Republic made it possible to gradually leave the old concept of the ethnically and culturally determined nation behind.

Philosophers like Jürgen Habermas have been trying to introduce a specific understanding of the nation, called Verfassungspatriotismus⁵ (patriotism towards the constitution). The national belonging in this concept is based on common political values like democracy and freedom of opinion instead of common descent. It thus becomes an alternative to the ethnic identification of the state.

Partially following this concept, the latest reform of the citizenship law adds aspects of ius soli, but does not completely abolish the ius sanguinis. It is however an important step towards complete equality before the law, which enables the integration of immigrants without the assimilatory demand to give up cultural characteristics. Equality before the law would mean that the acceptance of and respect for the constitution would be the only necessary prerequisites for naturalisation. Significantly, the branch of the German intelligence service concerned with internal security is called the agency for the ‘protection of the constitution’ (Verfassungsschutz), as the constitution and the acceptance of it or even a certain ‘patriotism towards the constitution’ are perceived as lying at the core of the constitutional state.

However this process has not yet been completed; the citizenship law still contains many aspects of the ius sanguinis, and the understanding of national identity based on ethnic origin is still strong within society and politics. Although the general opening up of citizenship status towards non-ethnic Germans (most importantly children and grand-children of immigrants) has been a fundamentally important political step towards more equality before the law and an inclusive national identity, it can still be observed that immigrants and their descendents are often facing a conflicting situation today, as they are asked to identify with German national identity and even enabled to acquire citizenship, but are hardly accepted as ‘real Germans’ in everyday life. The currently heightened debate about integration is generally mentioning ‘Germans’ in opposition to ‘immigrants’ or ‘people with migration background’, thereby consolidating the foreignness instead of enabling a feeling of belonging.

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⁵ I owe to Jan Dobbernack the remark that Habermas has also framed another view towards German nationalism, which he called DM-Nationalismus. This concept also draws the attention to a German superiority complex, which is based more on a perception of economic superiority, productivity, business skills and the kind of intelligence those things require, which again introduces not only cultural but also biological aspects, as mentioned above about the book by Thilo Sarrazin.
b. Citizenship and access to citizenship

Since the reform of the citizenship law in 1999/2000, children of non-German citizens born in Germany have access to German citizenship, subject to fulfilling certain requirements. In part, this signifies recognition of the importance of citizenship for integration, and is partly based on major changes in the national self-understanding. For those born before 2000, however, access to citizenship remains more difficult. In particular, this is because new rules and regulations increasingly stress the economic potential of those aspiring to immigration and naturalisation. For example, the latest change to the naturalisation law of 2004 (enacted in 2007) requires young immigrants less than 23 years of age (mostly children of immigrant parents) to show proof of income sufficient for their own sustenance. This requirement is, however, waived where applicants are able to prove that their missing income is due to the lack of employment trainee and apprenticeship positions.

i. Development of naturalisation figures

At first, the introduction of the law led to the naturalisation of large numbers of people (Stahl, 2002). Recent statistics, however, suggest a steady decline in rates of naturalisation, which may originate from a combination of factors. These include: a corollary to the time it has taken to provide access to citizenship; the reluctance of immigrants to apply for citizenship due to the stigma of betraying one’s national background; the perception of growing hostility towards Muslims in Germany – who make up the largest part of the immigrant population - and frequent and far-reaching feelings of discrimination.

Apart from the positive changes in the law, especially the shift from an ethnic understanding of the nation towards one based on place of birth, the new citizenship legislation also explicitly forbids dual citizenship. Naturalisation dropped considerably after a number of cases demonstrated that Turks who retook their Turkish citizenship after having received a German passport would lose their German citizenship once and for all. This is one of the major reasons why, despite supportive attitudes from Turkish consulates and legal arrangements that allow former Turkish passport holders to keep most of their citizenship rights, many Turks in Germany think twice before giving up their Turkish passports (Mühe, 2010).

Another legal change that creates difficulties for those young people who hold dual citizenship is the requirement to choose one of the two passports when they reach the age of 18. Under the citizenship law of 2000, children born in Germany whose parents have lived there for at least eight years receive a German passport, even if they possess another

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6 A precondition for the children’s naturalisation by birth is a legal and unlimited residence permit of at least one of the parents for at least eight years. When aged 18–23, the child has to decide on German or another nationality. The latter is, however, challenged by several jurists, who doubt the compatibility with the constitution, which generally does not allow deprivation of citizenship in Art. 16 GG.

7 Those born before 2000 had the possibility for one year to additionally choose German nationality if younger than ten years old.

nationality. From the age of 18, however, they have to decide between the two citizenships. In 2008, this regulation affected 3,300 Turkish-Germans. Kerim Arpad, chairman of the European Assembly of Turkish Academics is among those who have criticised the double standards, noting that EU nationals with two passports are not required to make this kind of choice (am Orde, 2008).

ii. Exclusionary laws and regulations

Recent legal regulations may further aggravate this sense of alienation. As of September 2008, the naturalisation process requires the passing of a national naturalisation test, which demands detailed knowledge about Germany’s culture, history and society. The test, which will be applied throughout all of the federal states, is an improvement in comparison to certain tests in Baden-Württemberg and other federal states, which specifically target Muslim immigrants and ask questions about private attitudes in a discriminatory manner. (For a detailed critique of the naturalisation test, see Joppke, 2007.) Some of these are, however, still in use, even after the introduction of the national test.

Germany has also introduced language proficiency tests for spouses wishing to join their partners in Germany. The difficulty of obtaining the necessary language skills in rural areas of Turkey, combined with the fact that such requirements were not applicable to citizens from, for example, the USA or Japan, increased perceptions that this was targeted at especially preventing immigration from Turkey. Such perceptions are reinforced by comments from politicians such as Uwe Schinemann, the Interior Minister for Lower Saxony, during the discussion of changes to immigration laws, when he stated, that “Germany needs less people that abuse us and more that are useful for us” (Mühe, 2010: 46).

Other public officials like the CDU president of the federal parliament, Norbert Lammert, have recognised lately, however, that the fact that Germany is home to the highest number of third-country nationals in Europe, yet has one of the lowest naturalisation rates, represents a major barrier to civic participation. “Our problem in Germany is not too high an immigration rate, but rather too little naturalisation,” he said (Welt online, 2010a).

3. Cultural Diversity Challenges during the last 30 years

Most important immigrant groups

Germany has been a de facto country of immigration since it started signing labour recruitment contracts with Italy (1955), Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964) and Tunisia (1965). Until only a few years ago, however, official national politics denied the fact that Germany had since then been an immigration country. Instead, the idea that the former labour migrants, having come to the country for a limited period of time, would finally go back to their countries of origin – even if they had been in Germany for two and three generations – was held up together with an avoidance of working on real integration programmes focussing on the participation of immigrants and former immigrants in the society. It was only in 1999 that the citizenship law was reformed and the children of immigrants, born in Germany, were given German citizenship under certain
conditions. This reform marked a major shift from a ‘ius sanguinis’ regime, where citizenship was tied to ethnicity, towards an (at least partial) ‘ius soli’ approach, which places more importance on the place of birth than on mere ethnic affiliation. It also marked a major shift in political rhetoric. Whereas the long-time resistance of the political elites to regard Germany as a country of immigration also included a reluctance to implement or even debate integration measures, the reform of the citizenship laws changed the social reality, and a debate about the necessity to ‘integrate’ immigrant groups and their descendants gained importance.

Table: People with migration background according to origin, migration experience and gender, micro census 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region of origin</th>
<th>With own migration experience</th>
<th>Without own migration experience</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>absolute in %</td>
<td>absolute in %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>3,686</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>not included</em>: Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>240</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland¹</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania¹</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>4,813</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>not included</em>: Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kroatia</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation¹</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainia</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe in total</td>
<td>5,872</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td>8,499</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia, Australia and Oceania</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>not included</em>: Near und Middle East</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan¹</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South- and Southeast Asia</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Late-)Resettlers</em>³</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Poland</td>
<td>518</td>
<td></td>
<td>518</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from the Russian Federation</td>
<td>475</td>
<td></td>
<td>475</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Kazakhstan</td>
<td>320</td>
<td></td>
<td>320</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Romania</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from the former Soviet Union</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Information</td>
<td>2,904</td>
<td>1,682</td>
<td>4,586</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>People with migration background altogether</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,534</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,877</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,411</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Agency for Statistics); http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/; Quoted after Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees); Grunddaten der Zuwandererbevölkerung (Basic Data of the immigrated population);
The largest immigrant group numerically has always been Turks or their children and grandchildren. The public perception of this group has changed throughout the decades in relation to political developments and issues that gained prominence in public discourse. This report traces these different debates since 1980, and the concomitant adjustments to the labels that were given to Turkish immigrants (‘guest workers,’ ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims), as well as to other groups. As the different immigrant and national minorities were labelled very differently depending on the time period and the character of the public discourse – German Roma have for example not always been accepted as a national minority – the text discusses the respective groups in relation to the label they were given at the specific moment and in the specific debate.

Apart from labour migration, refugees from different war torn countries make up another set of important immigrant groups. The Afghan diaspora in Germany is the largest in Europe. There are also significant numbers of Pakistanis and Indonesians in Germany, as well as refugees from the Balkans. The German-Arab population numbered approximately 290,000 in 2002 (Blaschke, 2004). Many Palestinians enter the country as official refugees from other countries, making it difficult to obtain precise numbers for this immigrant population.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the borders, the number of ethnic German resettlers increased considerably. (For the different types of immigrant legal statuses, including refugees and asylum seekers, see also Ohliger and Raiser, 2005). The immigration consisted of both inhabitants of the Eastern German territories (Übersiedler) and of immigrants of ethnic German origin from the territories of the former Soviet Union (Aussiedler), who received the German nationality.

Another minority group is the German Sinti and Roma, who have not immigrated recently, but have in fact resided in Germany for several hundred years. After having been persecuted by the Hitler regime9, which attempted a complete genocide, about 70,000 German Sinti and Roma are living in the country today. However, large numbers of Roma are refugees from Kosovo. Since the end of that war, they are no longer accepted as legal refugees, and many are deported each year, or are in danger of being deported10.

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9 The National Socialists defined also Roma and Sinti as an ‘inferior foreign race’ (mindervwertige Fremdrasse) and murdered hundreds of thousands of them systematically with the aim of a complete genocide. The persecution of Roma and Sinti is therefore included in the term Holocaust or named the Roma Holocaust.

10 Referring to dpa the German Federal Minister of the Interior Thomas de Mazière had agreed upon the repatriation of about 14,000 Kosovars with his Kosovan counterpart Bajram Rexhepi. Around 10,000 of the persons concerned are Roma, who will be gradually repatriated. Newspaper articles quote de Mazière as saying that Germany is not planning mass evictions but will repatriate around 2,500 people each year. See for example “Abschiebung, Deutschland will 10.000 Roma ins
Jews have been living on the territory of contemporary Germany for about 1700 years. In 1933, about 515,000 Jews were living in the country. After the Holocaust, which killed around 6 million Jews, only 20,000 to 30,000 remained in Western Germany. In the German Democratic Republic, only a few Jews remained, and their communities gradually disappeared.

Since 1991, Germany admits Jews and their relatives from the former Soviet Union as so-called Kontingentflüchtlinge (quota refugees), which has led to considerable growth of the Jewish community, mainly due to immigration from Russia.

As of 2005, the population of Jews in Germany numbered around 105,000, most of whom are immigrants from the former Soviet Union and their descendants. Life in the communities reflects a growing diversity – from orthodox to liberal – of Jewish life in Germany. However, anti-Semitism has been growing again to a threatening extent. In addition, anti-Semitism within certain immigrant communities, especially the Muslim community, has been increasingly discussed in recent years.

In the past decade, debates about immigrants in general and Turks in particular have been supplemented by an overlapping discourse on Muslims as ‘problematic.’ Apart from rising anti-Semitism, other phenomena, supposedly specific to Muslims, such as forced marriages, headscarves or homophobia, are more or less continuously circulated within the public sphere. To the general tendency of culturalising social issues has been added the specific issue of religiosity, namely that of Muslims. Also populist and extremist groups, especially on the Internet, are increasingly dominating the debate and inciting and supporting anti-Muslim attitudes within the public perception.

a. The 1980s: End of the Cold War

Since the labour recruitment in the 1960s and early 1970s, the growing amount of immigrants from rural areas of Turkey and other countries has been one of the major sources of cultural and/or religious diversity. In the early years of labour migration the immigrants were mainly seen as workers, who were to remain for a limited time, but who had similar interests with the rest of the working class in Germany and often joined the same worker’s unions. At the same time, although in a fragile situation in general, the immigrants were important for the German economy and thus had a certain power to have their basic needs met.

The debate about multiculturalism has to some extent been imported from Anglophone discussions, but never gained the same importance. In 1989, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, member of the Green party, initiated with the support of his party the Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten (Agency for Multicultural Affairs) in Frankfurt/Main, that aimed to mediate between immigrants and the broader German society and mark the beginning of a change in immigrant politics. Supporters of the concept of multiculturalism at this time criticised the Federal Government for its negation of the actual reality of Germany having become an immigration country through the recruitment of labour migrants. With the memory of World War II and the racist ideology of the National Socialists having led to mass killings of Jews and Roma and other ethnic, religious and political groups, the supporters of the multicultural idea wanted to prevent any form of hostility or even pressure to assimilate directed towards immigrants.

(Contd.)

Kosovo abschieben” (Eviction, Germany wants to repatriate 10,000 Roma to Kosovo), welt.de, 18.09.2010, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article9721993/Deutschland-will-10-000-Roma-ins-Kosovo-abschieben.html
During the late-1970s and 1980s, however, the economic boom in Germany ended and with growing refugee-immigration from war-torn countries and inner-German migration from East to West the attitude towards the immigrants changed and political measures were taken to encourage immigrants to return to their home countries.

**Labour migrants**

The official end of labour recruitment in 1973, however, restricted the former labour migrants from travelling freely back and forth. Many responded by having their families – most of them from rural areas in Turkey – join them in Germany. Even if both German politicians and the labour immigrants expected the situation to be temporary, only half of the four million migrants actually left Germany. Due to this change in the character of migration, the so-called ‘guest-workers’ moved out of the workers’ accommodations and rented their own apartments, usually in run-down, inner-city areas (Schiffauer, 2005).

The settlement pattern of this time is still visible in the residential distribution of many people with Turkish background today. Formerly industrialised areas – such as Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Duisburg, Augsburg-Munich and others – are still centres of Turkish life in Germany, and only very few live on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. The labour migrants were usually concentrated in certain districts with low rent prices. This phenomenon was encouraged by official policies and supported by public opinion at the time; however today it is widely criticised in public debate as a manifestation of ‘parallel societies’ (*Parallelgesellschaften*).

Like in the housing issue, German politics generally perceived the former labour immigrants as temporary guests long after it became evident that a large proportion did not return with the end of recruitment. Thus policies to foster integration, like language courses or other measures, have been denied for a very long time.

In East Germany, the recruitment of foreign workers (from then-socialist states such as Algeria, Hungary or Vietnam) was on a far smaller scale than in West Germany. This might explain why few people with an Italian, Greek or Turkish immigration history live in the eastern parts of the country today (Ohliger and Raiser, 2005: 12).

**Refugees**

Another wave of immigration from Turkey was initiated by the second *coup d’ état* in 1980 and the civil war in South East Turkey (Schiffauer, 2005). Around 125,000 Turks and Kurds – mainly critics of the regime – came to Germany as asylum seekers. One major group were the Yezidis, who were granted collective asylum on grounds of religious persecution.¹¹ Kurdish asylum seekers also arrived from the Kurdish areas in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Compared to other Western countries, Germany has the highest share of Kurds amongst its immigrant population.

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¹¹ The Yezidis are Kurdish-speaking and practise the Yezidi religion. They come from Turkey, as well as from Iraq and Syria, with small numbers also from Iran.
About 35,000 Assyrians, a Christian minority in Turkey and other countries, fled from Turkey and from Iraq to Germany, where today they have communities mainly in Berlin and Wiesbaden/Mainz (Kleff, 1984).

Another religious minority that has been persecuted in Turkey are Alevi s, some of whom regard themselves as Muslims while others, like the secretary-general of the Alevi Community in Germany (Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland) Ali Ertan Toprak, claim acceptance in Germany as a religious community in its own right instead of being regarded as merely a liberal branch of Islam (Facius, 2007).

Apart from the large Turkish community, there is a considerable Afghan diaspora in Germany, constituting the largest in Europe. While between the 1950s and the 1970s Afghan immigrants were mainly students and business people, the second wave of immigration consisted of asylum seekers fleeing the Soviet invasion and communist regime after 1979.

At the same time, Vietnamese came to East Germany as labour migrants, having been recruited to substitute for the large numbers of emigrating Germans, and came to make up about two-thirds of its immigrants. They arrived in West Germany mainly as so-called ‘boat people’ – refugees who had reached Germany by boat. By 1985, they made up the biggest part of the 30,000 quota refugees (Kontingentflüchtlinge) who lived in Germany. However, up to 1989, refugees were not very large in number and caused no major public debate in Germany.

Roma and Sinti

Apart from Roma labour migrants, who arrived when labour recruitment was at its peak, about 60,000 to 70,000 Roma have been living in German territories for several hundred years. According to the Documentation and Cultural Centre of German Sinti and Roma in Heidelberg, ‘Sinti’ names that part of the minority that has been living in Western Europe since the late Middle Ages, while ‘Roma’ refers to those of south European descent. This distinction is only made in the German-speaking countries.

The Documentation Centre together with nine federal state and local associations form the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma, which was founded in 1982 and played an important role in generating recognition of the minority as victims of the Holocaust, in which around 500,000 Sinti and Roma were killed in concentration camps, aiming at their complete extermination. They also advocate for compensation and antidiscrimination.

Jews

12 http://www.welt.de/welt_print/article1023169/Zwischen_allen_Stuehlen.html
13 A quota refugee is someone who has already been granted a form of refugee status by the destination country before leaving the country of origin.
14 See: Dokumentations- und Kulturzentrum Deutscher Sinti und Roma (Documentation and Cultural Centre of German Sinti and Roma); http://www.sintiundroma.de/index/
15 Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma; http://zentralrat.sintiundroma.de/
During the Holocaust the Hitler regime killed between 5.6 (Pohl, 2003:109) and 6.3 (Benz, 1996) million people from many different countries, all of whom the National Socialist regime defined as Jews. This historically unique genocide aimed at exterminating all European Jews.

In the 1950s and 1960s, about 20,000 to 30,000 Jews lived in the Federal Republic of Germany, most of them old and sick people, unable to emigrate to the US or Palestine. Those who stayed in Germany or came back after the war were under considerable pressure from within the community to justify their decision to stay in the country of the perpetrators after surviving the Holocaust (Schoeps 1991). Especially in Eastern Germany the small number of Jews constantly diminished from 3,500 in 1945 to 350 at the end of the GDR. The Jewish community was also quite elderly. After the fall of the Eastern regimes and the German border since 1989, and after the reunification in 1989, about 28,000 Jews were members of the state-recognized Jewish communities, and another 20,000 to 30,000 Jews were non-members.

An open debate about anti-Semitism, the so-called historians’ dispute (Historikerstreit), was initiated by the historian Ernst Nolte in 1986 with his assumption that the German concentration camps had been a reaction to the mass destructive Gulags of Stalin. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas countered these assumptions, which he called “apologetic tendencies within German historiography” (Habermas, 1986). Habermas concluded from this debate that, “the only patriotism that does not alienate us from the Western world is a constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus)” (Habermas, 1987).

**Eastern Germans and ethnic German resettlers**

Even if emigration to Western Germany was not easy and the application for it could take 10 years and deteriorate the social situation of the person willing to leave the GDR, between 1961 and 1988 around 383,000 people managed to migrate to the Western parts of Germany, most of them through the exchange of prisoners – mostly for financial contribution from the FRG – or through the refusal to return from a legal visit to the FRG. In 1989, the year of the German reunification, around the same number of people – 344,000 – left the GDR for West Germany (Schroeder, 1988).

Also, descendants of ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern European countries – most of them through migration and displacement during the course of World War II – have had the right since 1950 to immigrate to Germany as members of the German nation (Volkszugehörige) and are directly given German citizenship. Between 1950 and the mid-1980s about 1.5 million resettlers came to Western Germany, mainly from the former Soviet Union. At the end of the 1980s the numbers of resettlers, together with inner-German migrants and asylum seekers, grew strongly (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2005). Somehow this process of large immigration, and the quite successful integration of large numbers of resettlers, could be viewed as a positive example for dealing with challenges of diversity. The growing economy after the war probably contributed to this positive integration to a large extent.
b. The 1990s: German reunification process, anti-immigrant rhetoric and violence

With the opening of the borders between Eastern and Western Germany, as well as the countries of the former Soviet Union, much immigration into the former Western parts of Germany happened in a very short time and challenged the quite unprepared society and its political leaders.

Between 1950 and 1999 the population of the former Western parts of Germany grew by 13.5 million inhabitants, while the former Eastern parts lost almost 5 million inhabitants (Münz, Seifert & Ulrich, 1999). As this new immigration was no longer accompanied by a growing economy in Western Germany, the integration of the new immigrants became more challenging then in the years before.

Both 1990 and 1991 witnessed the immigration of 1 million people each, most of them inner-German migrants and ethnic German resettlers. The immigration of the latter has however been reduced by administrative restrictions (Andersen & Woyke, 2003).

In light of this large immigration from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Germany as well as refugees and asylum seekers from different war-torn countries, the supporters of multiculturalism became weaker and anti-immigrant rhetoric became stronger in public discourse. The perception of the former ‘guest-workers’ (Gastarbeiter) turned into a ‘foreigner’ problem, most of these foreigners being Turks. Even the German resettlers – mainly called ‘Russian Germans’ (Russlanddeutsche), many of whom did not speak German – were less welcomed by the existing population than some years before, and were perceived as strangers, too.

The public debate thus focussed mainly around Turks who remained in the country and whose ‘foreign culture’ became more and more problematised, as well as around asylum seekers from different countries, who were often portrayed as an uncontrollable flood overwhelming Germany. In 1991, the weekly magazine der Spiegel presented a cover that showed Germany as a full boat about to drown in the sea of immigrants and refugees (der Spiegel, 1991) - the ‘full boat’ became a trope of increasing prominence, invariably reproduced within public discourse at this time.

Asylum seekers

Due to the wars and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, many refugees arrived in Germany during the 1990s from Albania, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and predominantly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of them Muslims. There were also many refugees from Afghanistan, who fled the civil war and the take over of the Taliban in the mid-1990s. Other refugees from Asia – with different rights and statuses –

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16 The metaphor “The boat is full” (Das Boot ist voll) was introduced by a cover story of the weekly Der Spiegel, that was titled “Ansturm der Armen – Flüchtlinge, Aussiedler, Asylanten” (Inrush of the poor – Refugees, Resettlers, Asylum Seekers”) on the 9th of September 1991 with an image of an overcrowded Noah’s Ark representing Germany, which was endangered by a growing “Asylantenflut” (Asylum Flood).

17 Applications for asylum peaked in 1991 with more than 430,000.
were Tamils from Sri Lanka, Ahmadiyas from Pakistan and Sikhs from India.

Additionally - beyond the group of labour migrants from Morocco and Tunisia - most of the Arab immigrants to Germany had arrived as refugees and asylum seekers (Schmidt-Fink 2001).

The rhetoric and violence wielded against immigrants in the early 1990s did not focus especially on Muslims or Turks, but concentrated on asylum seekers and repeatedly challenged their right to asylum by questioning the real necessity of their asylum and supposing mere economic reasons for seeking refuge in Germany.

Probably as a result of this anti-immigrant and especially anti-asylum atmosphere, the early 1990s witnesses several violent attacks and even murders of asylum seekers and other immigrants.

A year after the first attacks on foreign workers and asylum seekers in 1991 in Hoyerswerda, the city of Rostock witnessed the worst attacks against foreigners in Germany since the war, when several hundred right-wing extremists attacked the homes of asylum seekers under the eyes and with the applause of around 2,000 citizens altogether. Most of the people living there were Vietnamese, but also Roma and other asylum seekers from different countries.

At the end of 1992, the houses of Turkish citizens were attacked by neo-Nazis, and two girls and their grandmother were killed. Another attack in 1993 against the homes of people of Turkish origin in Solingen killed five people.

Not long after these outbreaks of violence, the Federal Government tightened the immigration laws and restricted the right to asylum in 1993\textsuperscript{18}, which led to a substantial reduction of asylum seekers and other immigrants. In 1997/98 net immigration rates were approaching zero because of the return of the refugees from war-torn Bosnia.

At the same time that Germany saw the abolishment of the right to asylum in 1993, however, the reform of immigration law also recognised a right to naturalisation for the first time.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Roma and Sinti}

Apart from the Sinti, who have been living in Germany for several hundred years, and those who immigrated during labour recruitment, a third group of 15,000 to 20,000 people came in the 1990s as refugees from war-torn Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} In the so-called \textit{Asylkompromiss} (asylum agreement) in 1993 the basic right to asylum for political refugees was substantially changed in order to limit the number of asylum seekers in Germany. The reformed version of the asylum law mainly gave the possibility to directly repatriate immigrants seeking asylum, if they had been travelling through a third country, that was perceived as safe by the German authorities (\textit{sicherer Drittstaat}). Due to Germany’s location within Europe, the only possible way to come to Germany without travelling through third countries regarded as safe is by air. The reform also contained a regulation that allowed an evaluation of the asylum seeker’s reasons upon arrival in the airport, and a faster repatriation of rejected asylum seekers. Thus, being granted asylum has since become very difficult.

\textsuperscript{19} Hagedorn, H. (2001) “Einbürgerungspolitik in Deutschland und Frankreich” (Naturalisation Politics in Germany and France), in: \textit{Leviathan, ZS für Sozialwissenschaft}, Nr. 1, 39.

\textsuperscript{20} \url{http://zentralrat.sintiundroma.de/}
In 1995, the German Sinti and Roma gained legal recognition as a national minority, the Charta of the European Council recognized German Romanes as a minority language. Their status as a national minority guarantees the continuous support of the Central Council as well as the Documentation and Cultural Centre of German Sinti and Roma.\(^{21}\)

This protection as a national minority, however, only includes Roma with German citizenship and of German descent.\(^{22}\) German Roma with origins from South Eastern Europe or Spain are thus not included in the status of national minority and its protective function.

Other national minorities that have been recognised in Germany since the late 1990s are Danes, Friesians, and Sorbs.

**Jews**

In 1991 the law mandating a refugee quota (Kontingentflüchtlingsgesetz) was passed, which, among other rights, guaranteed certain groups of immigrants the status as refugees, among them Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Within a span of 20 years, around 220,000 people came into Germany through Jewish immigration.\(^{23}\) Only about half of these were seen as Jews in the religious sense by the German Jewish community, while the others were people with Jewish families, but without a Jewish mother. Still, the latter had often been victims of anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union, mainly because of their Jewish names. Their non-acceptance as parts of the Jewish community in Germany led to some inner conflicts.\(^{24}\) Through this immigration of Jews and their families from Russia, the German Jewish community has grown to four time its 1989 size, numbering around 120,000 members today. In many cities new communities have been founded and new synagogues have been built.

**Turks**

Apart from the deterioration of public opinion about ‘foreigners’ in the face of massive immigration in the early 1990s, anti-immigrant rhetoric and violent attacks, Turks and other labour migrants, some of whom had been living in the country for around 10 years at the time of German reunification, mainly suffered from a setback in rights and social participation through the systematic preference for ethnic Germans. Although the resettlers from the former Soviet Union came into Germany as new immigrants and to a large extent spoke no German, they were treated as part of the German ‘Staatsvolk’ – the people who were ethnically assigned to the German nation – and preferred in rights and status to the labour migrants, who

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\(^{21}\) ibid.


were seen as foreigners, even if they had been living and working in the country for many years. Unlike refugees and former labour migrants, the resettlers, often called Russian Germans (Russlanddeutsche), were granted integrative support, German citizenship and language courses.

This ethnic understanding of nationality and ethnic determination of belonging formed a great barrier to integration and participation for large segments of those immigrants who had come into the country as labour migrants or refugees and could not claim any ethnic German descent.

**EU-foreigners**

Immigrants from EU countries – like the Poles, who, after people of Turkish origin, make up the second largest group of immigrants in Germany today – practically disappeared from the public debate and consciousness as soon as their countries joined the European Union, like Poland did in 2004. One might conclude that a corollary of disappearing from the lists of illegal immigrants is vanishing from public attention. This leads to an interesting question: could a future joining of Turkey to the EU have a similar affect on Turks in European countries, especially Germany?

c. Since 2000: Reform of citizenship laws, anti-Islamic rhetoric after 9/11

The citizenship reform of 2000 had far-reaching implications in terms of the self-perception of German society. For the first time, the ius sanguinis principle was partially replaced by ius soli, meaning that under certain circumstances, people who were born in Germany but did not have ethnic German origin could be naturalised as German citizens. Even if many regulations still created barriers to naturalisation for many immigrants - among them the non-acceptance of dual citizenship – this change in perception, which went along with the Federal Government calling Germany an immigration country after a long time of negating this fact, marked an important turning point for society and politics.

It was against this backdrop that a public – to a certain degree, populist – debate about a common German ‘leading culture’ (Leitkultur) was initiated at the end of 2000 by the conservative politician Friedrich Merz, who demanded an adaptation of immigrants to the German culture, if they wanted to stay in Germany for good.

This debate – which discredited any debate about multiculturalism and tried to replace it – can be perceived as an expression of a certain fear of losing cultural hegemony within the newly declared immigration country and an attempt to sustain a vanishing homogeneity.

The other turning point for public perception of immigrants was – as in many other countries - the 2001 terror attack on the World Trade Center. The public perception of the former labour migrants – earlier referred to mainly as ‘Turks’ – transformed into ‘Muslims’ and the two markers of difference – often deployed in an exclusionary way – became interchangeable and also partially reinforced one another. With the concentration on the religious background of the former immigrants, the problems grew more and more culturalised and essentialised. The factor of class – which plays an important role in the analysis, as the former labour migrants
were almost exclusively recruited from working classes – was almost completely blended out in the public discourse after 9/11.

As this culturalising of social problems went on with every new issue attributed to the Muslim community – arranged/forced marriages, homophobia, anti-Semitism, and others – the stigmatisation and exclusion of this group became less and less socially vexed. The concept of multiculturalism – although never really strongly influencing German politics – was harshly criticised as too tolerant towards cultural groups, equating this tolerance with naïve indifference.

At the same time, a major shift in the use of ‘tolerance’ regarding Muslim groups and individuals can be observed: intolerance towards Muslims and other immigrant groups – especially in light of the early nineties’ violent attacks and murders of immigrants – had always been stigmatised and easily connected to right-wing extremism and National Socialism, with Muslims and other immigrants as their potential victim. However, after 9/11, Muslims were increasingly perceived as the perpetrators instead of the victims of intolerance. While in the 1990s mainly right-wing extremists represented the intolerable in society, in the years after 2001 Muslims came to occupy this position more and more. Thus border-drawing in German society is increasingly done against the Muslim ‘other,’ which is forthwith perceived as intolerant and his/her right to being tolerated is at the same time challenged. This positioning of Muslims as the intolerant other can be seen as fulfilling diverse functions in German society, among them a certain relief for ethnic Germans of a kind of post-war burden. Muslims became the locus of different negative aspects in society – like anti-Semitism, homophobia or disadvantaging of women – which had been attributed to certain non-Muslim Germans before. This disburdening capacity even went so far as to equate Muslims with fascism, as the word-construction Islamo-Fascism indicates, which is widely used by anti-Islamic populism and even within mainstream media. With the widely held conviction that Muslims represent intolerance, issues of their exclusion and discrimination got blurred and the acceptance of their individual and group rights became a point of major debate. Also, essentialising discourses blurred the real reasons for social problems, while tolerance towards the Muslim minority generally diminished.

However, Turks and people with Turkish background are not the only Muslim groups – and many of them are not Muslims at all. Nor are they the only ethnic minority in Germany that has to fight for integration and inclusion. But even apart from the religious and cultural spheres, many (former) immigrants share the same obstacles and challenges that large parts of the German white socially deprived segments of the population face – a fact that is rarely taken into consideration within debates and political measures. Instead, the heightened media and political concentration on Muslims in the last decade has drawn a lot of attention and efforts for integration away from many other vulnerable groups, that transcend ethnic categories.

Jews

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Although Jewish immigration was encouraged after World War II, most of the immigration advantages for Jews were abolished with the EU-membership of the Baltic countries from the 1st of January 2005. The new regulations practically stopped Jewish immigration. In 2009, only 1,088 immigrants came to Germany, again 24 percent less than the year before.\(^{26}\)

Like in other European countries, anti-Semitic violence in Germany grew after 2001. Anti-Semitism debates have centred on the one hand around the demand to put an end to the debate about the past and German guilt (\textit{Kollektivschulddebatte})\(^{27}\), and on the other around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Also, anti-Semitism of the immigrant – in particular the Muslim – community has been strongly debated in recent years, and various conferences have been organised on this issue.\(^{28}\) On the other hand, discrimination against Muslims, or Islamophobia, is compared to anti-Semitism and stereotypes against Jews more and more, even if not to the specific and unique cruelties of the Holocaust.\(^{29}\)

The two minorities have on the one hand problematic relations towards each other, because of mutual prejudices and conflicting views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the other hand, they share certain interests and issues as two non-Christian minority religious communities, especially as far as religious freedom and religious group rights are concerned.

Especially Muslim representatives increasingly point towards similarities in the manner of discrimination of the two minorities, partially to give their demands for minority rights and anti-discrimination more weight and attention. This new solidarity is taken up by Jewish representatives in different ways. Even if certain parts of the Jewish community reject this approach of Muslim representatives as instrumentalising, others try to establish new bonds of solidarity.\(^{30}\)

The heightened debate about Muslim anti-Semitism – which has to a certain degree been more prominent than the debates on the anti-Semitism of ethnic Germans - can be regarded as part of the transformation of Muslims from victims of discrimination to perpetrators and thus from the ones to be tolerated to the intolerant ones, almost unable to claim tolerance for themselves.

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\(^{26}\) In 2008 1,436 came to Germany; see: BAMF (2010) Entscheiderrundbrief des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Newsletter of the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees), 5.

\(^{27}\) Critics of Daniel Goldhagen’s book “Hitler’s Willing Executioners” (Hitlers willige Vollstrecker) said that the author pleaded for a collective German guilt for the crimes of the Nazi regime, which the author denied.


\(^{29}\) In 2009 the Centre for Research on anti-Semitism organised a conference called “Feindbild Jude, Feindbild Muslim,” comparing and analysing different and similar ways of stereotyping of the minority groups.

Comparisons of (early) anti-Semitism\textsuperscript{31} with rising Islamophobia in German and European society, on the other hand, return Muslims to the position of objects of (in-)tolerance and through this comparison with anti-Semitism points to continuities in German intolerance towards religious minorities.

**Roma and Sinti**

The law about the Federal Budget (\textit{Bundeshaushalt}) states that since the year 2002, the law about the protection of national minorities and the European Charta for regional and minority languages ensures protection and support for the German Sinti and Roma. The declared aim is to provide for their equal participation in the political and cultural life of Germany, which is in part ensured by governmental support for the Central Council and the Documentation and Cultural Centre of the German Sinti and Roma.\textsuperscript{32}

Parts of the Roma population in Germany are thus under specific protection as a national minority. Although even this group has to struggle with discrimination in society and difficulties with equal participation in the labour market, the Roma are hardly ever openly problematised in public discourse as certain other groups are. The reason for this might be the history of mass murder and genocide of Sinti and Roma by the National Socialists, which could cause reluctance among journalists and others to negatively portray this minority group. The public repatriation and open mistreatment that the Roma are currently suffering in France is therefore unthinkable in Germany.

However, only one part of the Roma community in Germany is protected by its status as a national minority. Those not included in this status are the refugees from Kosovo, who fled the wars in the early 1990s and in 1998/99 and a third group of migrants from the EU-member states Bulgaria and Romania.

While the latter have freedom of movement within the EU, the former refugees have never had an unlimited right to stay and have always lived in danger of repatriation. In April 2010 the Federal Government signed an agreement with the government of Kosovo, regulating the repatriation of refugees from Kosovo, about 12,000 of whom are Roma and Ashkali- and Kosovo-Egyptians. Based on a UNICEF survey, the families in danger of repatriation have been living in Germany for an average of 14 years, and although almost half of the 12,000 people are children, the well-being of the children played no role in the agreement.

Critics of this agreement, including politicians like the senator of the interior of Berlin, argue, that the Roma refugees were well-integrated, working, and that their children were socialised in Germany. It would be a great hardship for them to be repatriated to Kosovo, where they could not speak the language and were still highly stigmatised and discriminated against.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} See also Schiffer, S. (2009) \textit{Antisemitismus und Islamophobie; ein Vergleich} (Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; A comparison), HwK-Verlag.

\textsuperscript{32} Zentralrat der Sinti und Roma, http://zentralrat.sintiundroma.de/

\textsuperscript{33} Kleine Zeitung (2010) Deutschland weist 10.000 Roma aus (Germany is repatriating 10,000 Roma), 18.10.
http://www.kleinezeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/2484617/10-000-roma-werden-deutschland-den-kosovo-abgeschoben.story
The UNICEF survey also stated that about 75% of the repatriated Roma children abandoned their school education in Kosovo.

One day after the public commemoration of the Holocaust on the 29th of January 2010, the NGO Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker (Association for Endangered Peoples) pointed to the difficult situation of Roma from Kosovo and their children (many of them raised in Germany) who had only been granted exceptional permission to remain in Germany for a limited time and were now in danger of being repatriated to Kosovo. The organisation asked for a residence permit quota for the 10,000 persons concerned, which had also been given to immigrants Jews in light of the crimes committed against them during the Holocaust.34

The German government is however determined to repatriate around 2,500 Roma each year, thereby avoiding the public attention that a mass repatriation like the one in France could attract, but nevertheless gradually carrying out the planned repatriation of Roma families, long resident in Germany.

Vietnamese

Similar to the Roma, Vietnamese immigrants and their descendants in Germany have very diverse histories of migration and social situations.

On the one hand, public discourse today often positions people with a Vietnamese immigration background on the opposite side of Turkish migrants on a scale of successful integration and educational achievement. This success is often attributed to their (postulated) greater efforts in education, captured in the latest debate surrounding Thilo Sarrazin, then board member of the Federal Bank, who attributed low intelligence to certain immigrants – like Turks – and high intelligence and integration to other immigrants – like Vietnamese and other Asians.

On the other hand, Vietnamese immigrants have gone through difficult times, when their positive welcome in the GDR gave way to rising discrimination and even racist attacks, reaching their peak in the attacks against an asylum seeker’s home in 1992 in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, where, among others, hundreds of Vietnamese asylum seekers feared for their lives.

But even today, many Vietnamese – who have been among the groups with the highest numbers of asylum seekers in Germany in the last ten years – have the same problems as other immigrants in terms of language and integration into the labour market. Additionally there are only very few Vietnamese asylum seekers whose reasons for applying for asylum are accepted by federal agencies, and so the large majority of them are repatriated again.35 In 2008, almost 1,300 Vietnamese applied for asylum, while the quota of acceptance


35 Gräßler, B. (2009) Vietnamesische Zweiklassengesellschaft in Deutschland (Vietnamese Two-Class-Society in Germany), Deutsche Welle-World, 05.06., http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4305014,00.html
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was 0.1 percent, which means that 99.9 percent must anticipate repatriation, although Amnesty International reports that torture, political imprisonment and capital punishment are widely practiced in Vietnam.

In June 2009, more than 100 Vietnamese from 12 federal states and Poland were deported to Hanoi, which, according to the federal police, was the first mass repatriation since the mid-1990s.

Although Vietnamese are portrayed quite positively in public discourse – especially in contrast to other immigrant groups – their reality in Germany is mainly that of two classes: those who arrived in the former GDR and who often had higher educational degrees, many of whom managed to make a living in Germany in spite of difficult conditions, and those who have been coming as asylum seekers since the fall of the communist regimes and who are often living as non-accepted asylum seekers or undocumented migrants.

While the former are portrayed as hard-working, education-oriented and well-integrated immigrants – thus contradicting the criticism against failures of German integration policies – the latter are portrayed as cigarette smugglers and petty criminals, misusing the asylum laws, who are rightly deported.

Inner-German migration

The inner-German migration from the five new federal states to the old federal states in the former West also produced debates and tensions. The pejorative naming of Germans from the former Eastern parts as ‘Ossis,’ along with a certain negative stereotyping, can be seen as indications of a culturalising of the German reunification process. Shortly after the reunification of Germany, socio-economic differences between the former Western and Eastern parts were perceived more and more in socio-cultural terms and mutual stereotyping took place. This culturalisation process remains salient: a German woman who had been denied a job with the (unintentionally uncovered) remark on her application that she was a ‘Ossi,’ sued for discriminatory hiring practices. In order to be regarded before the law as ‘discrimination,’ she had to appeal to the court to accept the category ‘Ossi’ as an ethnicity – a claim that the court ultimately rejected. Thus, socio-economic differences and difficulties are in some cases portrayed and perceived as fundamentally cultural or – in the case of Muslims – religious. This so-called culturalisation of social relations and challenges can be frequently observed in German public discourses, not only concerning immigrants from other ethnic backgrounds, but even so-called ethnic Germans who have historically belonged to different nations and political systems.

36 The ethnologist Thomas Bierschenk argued that the understanding of what makes an ethnicity (common language, tradition, religion, clothing and food) that was used in court was outdated and that the actual definition of ‘ethnicity’ being a strong common ‘we’-sense of the group, together with a symbolic boundary drawing towards other groups, could have helped the woman win her case in court (Interview in the German weekly Der Stern, 23.04.2010: Das Wir-Gefühl der Ostdeutschen, http://www.stern.de/panorama/ethnologe-widerspricht-ossi-urteil-das-wir-gefuehl-der-ostdeutschen-1561003.html) Another anthropologist, Urmila Goel (Goel, 2010) argued, that both the concepts of ethnicity and race were misplaced in this context, but forced on the victim, because her actual specific reason of discrimination, being an underprivileged position of people from the former Eastern parts in Germany towards the West, was not accounted for within the law against discrimination. Both scientists appealed for a new legal definition.
Ethnic German resettlers

The total numbers of immigrants, that balance immigration with emigration, were only 176,000 in the year 2000 and 275,000 in 2001 and ethnic Germans made up the biggest part, being 85,000 in 2001.

Although in public and political discourse the ethnic German resettlers from the former Soviet Union were often perceived as less problematic in terms of integration and assimilation than immigrants without a German ‘ethnic background,’ in the mid-1990s, about 80 percent had a Russian instead of German socialisation.\(^{37}\)

In spite of their many legal advantages in comparison to other immigrants, the resettlers were also confronted with high rates of unemployment – especially in the field of unskilled work – and with the non-acceptance of many of their professional and academic certificates.\(^{37}\)

A 2007 analysis from the Institute for Research about the Labour Market and Professions of the Federal Agency for Employment (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit) showed that the integration of resettlers into the labour market had to a certain degree been even less successful than that of other immigrants, especially among people with higher education.\(^{38}\)

Even if for a long time the public discussion about resettlers has been one of successful integration, in recent years the so-called ‘Russian Germans’ have repeatedly been debated as problematic, and as overrepresented in unemployment and criminality.\(^{39}\) In some debates it can be observed that ‘German resettlers’ turn into ‘Russian Germans’ as soon as problematic aspects are being discussed.

One example of this identity labelling in media coverage could be observed in 2009 after the murder of the young Egyptian woman in a courtroom, killed by a young German resettler with right-wing extremist political views. Not only was the Islamophobic motivation of the murderer not mentioned in the media until about a week after the killing, but also, the perpetrator was very quickly named a ‘Russian German.’ In the aftermath of the murder, the criminality and right-wing views of Russian Germans were heavily discussed in the media, while the growing Islamophobia in mainstream society was – in an evidently dis-burdening manner – almost entirely blended out.

4. Tolerance Discourses in Germany

The concept of tolerance is increasingly used in German public discourse about immigrants and integration. By far, the most heavily discussed issues concerning diversity challenges in contemporary German society concern Muslims and Muslim religious practices. The most


\(^{38}\) Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Agentur für Arbeit – IAB (2007) Spätaussiedler mit höherer Bildung sind öfter arbeitslos (Late resettlers with higher education are unemployed more frequently), Kurzbericht, Nr. 8, 02.04., http://doku.iab.de/kurzber/2007/kb0807.pdf

\(^{39}\) Die Zeit (2006) Fremde Heimat Deutschland (Foreign Home Germany).
widely used concept within this discourse is the concept of integration. Government figures
mainly talk about integration as the key concept to solving problems in society, which are
portrayed as the result of cultural and/or religious pluralism, mainly that of Muslims. Indeed,
most issues surrounding the Muslim community in Germany are connected to their cultural
and/or religious difference, even if socio-economic and other factors would in many cases be
the most relevant frames of reference. Government officials tend to accentuate the duty of
Muslim individuals and groups to work for their own integration, though they do also
frequently mention the failure of politics to look at issues of integration for many years.

As was made evident when the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel recently declared that
attempts at multiculturalism had failed, and at the same time demanded that immigrants
expend more effort towards education and integration, minorities are often portrayed as most
responsible for their own integration. The slogan ‘supporting and demanding’ (‘Fördern und
Fordern’) is at the core of integration politics of Merkel’s party, the CDU, but in practice
the demanding part seems to be more emphasised. Against this backdrop, we observe
increased use of the concept of tolerance in the discourse on Muslims and/or integration.

There are generally a wide variety of interpretations and ways to use the concept of tolerance.
It can, for example, be seen as the opposite of discrimination. Recent discourse and politics
shows, however, that it is more and more concerned with the limits of tolerance and with
drawing lines within society between those who are to be tolerated, and those who should not
be tolerated.

The slogan ‘no tolerance for intolerance’ is widely used in public debates around Muslims.
One striking example is an extensive dossier by Ulrich Greiner in the prestigious weekly Die
Zeit in January 2010. Under the heading “Islamismus: Toleranz für die Intoleranz?” (Islamism: Tolerance for Intolerance?) the author reminds us of a recent controversial media
debate about Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia, where different journalists had issued
conflicting views on how to frame the debate on Muslims and Islam in the media. The author
also takes a stand within this debate, arguing for a deep cultural conflict between Islam and
the West and cautioning the reader against too much tolerance in the face of violent Islamist
threats. This emphasis on the limits of tolerance is intended to call for a vigilant awareness
of the dangers for society, dangers that could be overlooked by too much tolerance. Even the
defenders of the concept of multiculturalism, like Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the founder of the Amt
für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten in Frankfurt, caution against “naïve” forms of
multiculturalism, that could lower human rights standards in society. Heiko Henkel explains
how Cohn-Bendit and also Habermas draw a line of tolerance against what they call
‘fundamentalism’ or ‘fundamentalist immigrant cultures’ (Henkel, 2008). This association of
a society putting itself in danger by tolerating the intolerant is a strong image within German
discourse, because it recalls an important part of national history; it was precisely the Weimar
Republic’s tolerance even towards its own enemies that boosted the rise of the Nazi regime.
For this reason too much tolerance is seen as a danger to democracy. The Weimar Republic

40 http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1287045499164.shtml
42 One example of this way of using it could be the name of a project of the Ministry of the Interior, called Bündnis für
Demokratie und Toleranz (Union for Democracy and Tolerance), which supports among others projects against racism
43 http://www.zeit.de/2010/05/Islam
was perceived as too weak because of its openness, and the lesson learnt from this is often summed up in the slogan “no tolerance for intolerance”.

For analysing the political function of the use of tolerance, Wendy Brown has provided a very useful concept, which regards tolerance as a “political discourse and practice of governmentality”, rather than a “transcendent or universal concept, principle, doctrine or virtue.” (Brown, 2006:4) In the German context, the increased use of the concept of tolerance works hand-in-hand with the general political approach towards the inclusion of others, framed as integration. Rather than discussing structural inequalities and discrimination against certain immigrant groups as a major barrier to participation and inclusion, the integration debate positions the minorities vis-à-vis the majority and the state in a situation of ‘the others’, who are to be supported, and also challenged, but who are not framed as an integral part of the society. The otherness of non-ethnic Germans, mainly Muslims, is thus reproduced and reaffirmed through the discourse on integration. The concept of tolerance supports this process of othering, at the same time that it positions the tolerating side above those who are to be tolerated or not tolerated – constructing both borders and hierarchies between in- and out-groups.

How are claims of toleration made and by whom? Under which conditions is toleration granted or withheld? In which cases is something more than tolerance – namely, respect or recognition -- demanded for specific groups? Most of the debates turn on a variety of claims by Muslim groups for recognition and acceptance of specific religious practices.

The demands made by Muslim individuals and groups themselves are generally not framed in terms of toleration, but in terms of granting equal rights, especially the right of freedom of religious expression, which is perceived as both a fundamental right of the German constitution, the Grundgesetz, as well as a fundamental human right. The claims are thus not made as demanding tolerance towards something alien to German society and culture but as the granting of basic rights, which is perceived as an integral part of Europe’s basic values. Muslim groups often especially refer to the German Grundgesetz, which they perceive as a guarantor of their freedom of religious expression. When Aygül Özkan was nominated Minister of Social and Integration Issues of the federal state Lower Saxony in April 2010 by the conservative party CDU, it was widely presented as the first nomination of a Muslim as Minister of a German federal state, and in this context as an act of tolerance. One of the major Muslim organisations, however, spoke about the nomination as “a sign of increasing normality and acceptance that all offices and positions of this country are also open for Muslims, just as for all other religious communities (...)."

44 Prof Dr. Carlo Schmids (SPD), who is among the fathers of the German constitution (Grundgesetz), declared in a speech before the plenary of the parliamentary council (Plenum des Parlamentarischen Rates) the 8th of September 1948: “Demokratie ist nur dort mehr als ein Produkt einer bloßen Zweckmäßigkeitsentscheidung, wo man den Mut hat, an sie als etwas für die Würde des Menschen Notwendiges zu glauben. Wenn man aber diesen Mut hat, dann muss man auch den Mut zur Intoleranz denen gegenüber aufbringen, die die Demokratie gebrauchen wollen, um sie umzubringen.” (Democracy is only then more than a product of a mere decision out of political convenience, if one has the courage to believe in it as something that is essential for human dignity. If one, however, has this courage, one also has to get up the nerve for intolerance towards those who want to use democracy in order to murder it.) Translation done by the author of this text. http://www.derhistoriker.de/deutsch/04+Rede_Parlamentarischer_Rat_von_Carlo_Schmid_08-09-48.pdf

45 Translation by author; German original: „Es ist im Weiteren auch ein Zeichen von zunehmender Normalität und Anerkennung, dass auch Muslimen genau wie allen anderen Religionsgemeinschaften alle Ämter und Positionen dieses Landes offen stehen (...); KRM (Koordinationsrat der Muslimen in Deutschland) (April 2010): “Ein Schritt in die richtige
But even if the minorities themselves are not arguing from outside but from inside the society and its legal institutions, public figures and media perennially refer to these claims as issues of toleration or non-toleration. After Özkan incited a controversy within her own party and beyond by stating in an interview with the weekly Focus that, herself following a secular rather than a religious view, she would prefer public schools to be free of all religious symbols, including headscarves but also crucifixes, a local newspaper printed a story titled “Aygül Özkan – Der schwierige Start einer Muslima” (Aygül Özkan – The difficult start of a Muslim woman). The paper argued that the nomination of Özkan, which had been intended as a sign of tolerance and cosmopolitanism, was quickly putting these same values to the test.

This can be seen as a clear example of what Wendy Brown calls a discourse of depoliticization, in which “tolerance can function as a substitute for or as a supplement to formal liberal equality or liberty; it can also overtly block the pursuit of substantive equality and freedom” (Brown, 2006:9). By using the concept of tolerance in the context of Muslim individuals or groups being granted rights, that are anyway guaranteed to them by the constitution, the issue is taken out of the realm of liberal equality or liberty and into the area of what Rainer Forst calls “allowance tolerance”, which – in contrast to his perception of “respect tolerance” - marks the relation between a powerful entity, in this case the political and social majority, and a less powerful minority, which is granted tolerance, but can also lose it by the will of the tolerant group (Forst, 2003:42). The precondition for the granted tolerance in this conception is generally the fact that the tolerated group does not challenge the given distribution of power.

In this sense it can be suggested that tolerance talk undermines the ‘pursuit of equality and freedom’ that Muslim groups and activists aim for, and reaffirms unequal distributions of power between different (ethno-religious) groups in society.

The discourses on tolerance and integration help not only to draw borders between an ethnic German in-group and out-groups with immigrant backgrounds, but also to differentiate between those parts of the perceived immigrant population that are more easily tolerated, and those towards whom tolerance has to be limited. The effect of border drawing of tolerance talk is thus both differentiating between in- and out-groups, but also within out-groups between those who are (more) easily tolerated and those who are grudgingly tolerated, or who should not be tolerated at all.

As the granting or denial of tolerance, and with it the granting or denial of certain legal rights, is within the discourse often linked to the (in-)tolerance of the respective group, the perception of a group as (in-)tolerant has substantive effects. Within this discourse, a certain tendency can be observed to regard secular Muslims and immigrants as more tolerant than religious ones, and at the same time to favour individuals over groups. This is quite symbolically reflected within the German Islam Conference, where the Minister of the Interior invites certain religious Muslim organisations, but limits their weight within the

(Contd.)


discussions through an even higher amount of participants, who are not organised and many of whom are not religious or are even outspoken critics of Islam.48

However, not all religious groups are perceived as equally tolerant or intolerant. While the major Sunni organisations are portrayed with criticism and often viewed as backward and patriarchal49, other communities, such as the Alevi organisations, are perceived as tolerant and liberal. The Alevi claims for specific religious instruction at public schools have thus caused far less resistance by public officials in different federal states than Sunni-Muslim instruction at schools has been causing for many years.50

Certain other ethno-religious minorities like the Jews or the Roma are today generally not discussed as receivers of tolerance, as tolerance talk would be viewed as absolutely inappropriate towards groups who have been major victims of the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. There have, however, been recent debates about Jews as victims of a rising anti-Semitism, which has lately mainly been portrayed as a phenomenon amongst Muslims, as described above in more detail. Another recent debate, in which prominent Jews, too, have raised their voices, is the debate about rising Islamophobia. There have been different public representatives who have opposed this perceived social development.51

The positioning of representative Jews is of specific importance within the debate about Islamophobia, because of the unparalleled German history of persecution and extermination of Jews during the Holocaust.

As the authors Bodemann and Yurdakul argue, tolerance was a term that in Germany “invariably evoke(d) the Jewish question and anti-Semitism” (Bodemann, 2008; 76). In the view of Bodemann and Yurdakul “the ideological labour of Jews in German society today encompasses the role of ‘guardians of memory’, not merely on their own behalf but also on the behalf of their German surroundings” and their mere presence in contemporary Germany was “‘proof’ that Nazism has been overcome and that German society is now truly democratic

48 The former general secretary, now chairman of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, Ayman Mazyek, declared, that those participants, who had a renunciatory attitude towards Islam, had been favoured even more strongly in the new composition of the Islam Conference in 2010, which in the end made a debate at eye level between Muslim communities and the state impossible. http://islam.de/15570.php.

49 See for example the statement of Lale Akgün, Commissioner on Islam of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), who commented the unification of four of the biggest Muslim umbrella organisations in Germany under the roof of the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany, that the four organisations together would represent a very conservative Islam, which would leave no room for liberal views any more. http://www.welt.de/politik/article805367/Neuer_Dachverband_als_zu_konservativ_kritisiert.html

50 One major reason for the public resistance to accept the major Sunni organisations as a religious community – the basic pre-condition for giving religious instruction at public schools – has for many years been the fact, that they represented only a minor part of the whole Muslim population in Germany. The same holds true however for the Alevi communities but has never been presented by politicians as a reason against Alevi religious instructions. See for example: http://www.taz.de/1/debatte/kommentar/artikel/1/aleviten-machen-schule/

51 The general secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany Stephan Kramer has together with the Ayman Mazyek, then general secretary of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany visited the family of the murdered Marwa El Sherbini in 2009 in Dresden and cautioned about rising Islamophobia in German society (http://islam.de/12733.php).

The former vice president of the Central Council of Jews, Michel Friedman, recently demanded ‘no tolerance for intolerance’ pointing at the debate around the anti Muslim arguments of the then board member of the Federal German Bank, Thilo Sarrazin, and called the latter a ‘hate preacher’ (http://www.fr-online.de/politik/friedman-nennt-sarrazin-hassprediger-/1/1472596/4596926/-/index.html).
and tolerant of outsiders.” (Bodemann, 2008; 78) As can be seen from this quotation, however, Jews are still always in danger of being perceived as outsiders; such adjustments are made more rhetorically than in practice, made evident by the frequent reference by German politicians to a ‘Christian-Jewish’ heritage of Germany and Europe. In their article Learning Diaspora: German Turks and the Jewish Narrative Bodemann and Yurdakul also describe how Turks and other Muslim groups in Germany increasingly refer to the Jewish history in Germany as well as to the handling of Jewish religious issues today – like the slaughtering of animals - in order to have their own claims for acceptance of religious difference met as well as their fear of Islamophobic developments better heard in German society.

Other immigrant groups like the Poles, or even more the ethnic German resettlers, have largely disappeared from public debates. It can be suggested that they are more and more becoming part of the ‘we-group’, maybe in line with the development of the stronger integrative character of the EU towards EU-citizens, which would have to be further investigated. It can, however, be observed that Poles are no longer debated in the context of tolerance or integration. The best example for the different debates is the German soccer team. The majority of the players in the team have an immigration background. While players with Polish background are, for example, not seen as ‘others’ any more, players with Arab or Turkish origin are heavily debated in regard to integration. In the positive sense, the team was portrayed around the World Cup in South Africa as a sign of an inclusive and multicultural Germany, while in the negative sense a politician of the far right called the national player with a Turkish background, Mesut Özil, a ‘passport-German’.

However even mainstream media made a difference between the players with different ethnic backgrounds by according Özil a prize for integration at the Bambi award 2010 in Potsdam, which was perceived by some as a sign of exclusion, as it expressly marked the Turkish background of the German player.

Here, we see an example of the general effect that the focus on the concept of integration, and the way in which it is perceived often as mainly a duty of the immigrants or their descendants, has an exclusionary rather than an integrative effect. Especially German citizens, raised in the country but whose parents or grandparents had once immigrated to Germany, perceive the strong political and discursive focus on integration, which they have actually been living all their lives, as marking them as outsiders. A young Muslim woman is quoted in the survey of the Open Society Foundation on Muslims in Berlin as stating that the integration debate made her feel “pushed into a corner” (Mühe, 2010; 51).
5. Concluding Remarks

Similar to other neighbouring countries, like France, the Netherlands or Denmark, German society is struggling today with the transformation of its population, a transformation that has become more visible and more accelerated in recent decades. The most important factor for this development has been immigration, which mainly started during the 1960s as workers were recruited from different countries – mainly from Turkey – in order to help build up the destroyed country after World War II, and continued with refugees and asylum seekers from war torn countries mainly during the 1990s. Unlike countries like France or the UK, Germany had hardly had any experience with immigration from formerly colonised countries.

Another difference in relation to some neighbouring European countries lies in the national identity and national self-perception of German society. Until very recently, the close coupling of national identity and ethnic origin stood largely unchallenged, and until today the idea that a non-ethnic German could not be a ‘real’ German is still widespread.

In this national atmosphere it is still difficult today for young people, whose parents or grandparents were immigrants, to feel as an equal part of the society and to identify positively with the country, especially as unequal treatment of non-ethnic Germans is widespread in various areas of life. The situation has become additionally difficult for people of the Muslim religion or with a Muslim cultural background54, since hostility against Islam has risen in many European countries. Different surveys show that Germany is especially affected by it. At the same time, the diversity in the country keeps growing, and since the citizenship reform of the year 2000, children of non-nationals can under certain circumstances become nationals, which means that more and more people with different ethnic backgrounds and/or different cultural or religious affiliations are being naturalised or are born as Germans. The necessity for social and structural changes becomes evident and is especially felt on the local level, as in certain regions and cities the diversity is higher than on the overall national level. (According to the micro census55, 26.8 percent of the population of Hamburg and 24 percent of Berlin has an immigration background56 compared to 19% on the national level57. In certain areas of big cities, the percentage rises to half or more of the population).

Therefore, projects and reforms that aim towards more inclusion are especially found on the local level.

Muslims are not the only minority community suffering from this lack of an inclusive national identity and unequal treatment in society. They have, however, both for national and for

54 In the recently published survey “At Home In Europe” of the Open Society Foundations on Muslims in European Cities the German cities Hamburg (22%) and Berlin (25%) had the lowest percentage of Muslims who perceived themselves as German (resp. British, French…) and even lower percentages of those who thought others would perceive them as such. (Mühe, 2010; 58 & Hieronymus, 2010; 55).
55 In comparison with a full census the micro-census surveys only a representative sample of 1 per cent of the households in Germany, covering 390,000 households with 830,000 people. Available at http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikrozensus
57 Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland: Press release Nr. 033, 26th of January 2010; http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Presse/pm/2010/01/PD10_033_122,templateId=renderPrint.psmi
international reasons, become the most important focus of public debates on integration, religious diversity and also discrimination and racism. This attention gives rise to strong effects on the situation of the community as well as individuals belonging – or seeming to belong – to this minority.

Research about Islamophobia and the effects of Islamophobic discourse on Muslims in Germany is still rare. Much of the academic work on Muslims concerns questions of whether they are more or less easily integrated than other groups, if their culture and/or religion keeps them from being integrated and makes them (in-)compatible with German values and norms, including non-violence, equality of women and respect of a secular legal constitution.

It is in this context that the discourse on tolerance becomes especially strong. It is, however, used not primarily in order to demand tolerance towards Muslim cultural and religious practices, but more as a discourse of border drawing between tolerant and intolerant minority groups, both within and between Muslim and other subgroups in German society. Naming certain minority groups – especially Muslim ones – as intolerant is within this discourse often used as an argument for not tolerating certain Muslim practices in return or creating stricter laws against religious practices, like the Muslim headscarf in certain public services or accommodations for prayer at public schools. Tolerance is thus used more and more often as a discourse that draws lines between in- and out-groups, between the ones to be tolerated and those who are only grudgingly or not at all to be tolerated. The most frequently used phrase in this context is ‘no tolerance for intolerance’ and reaches back to the national memory of historical experiences with the Nazi regime, that could, on this view, only come into power because the preceding Weimar Republic had been too open even towards the enemies of the republic.

Amidst this background, the discourse on tolerance is especially targeted towards Muslim groups – especially those that are religious -- and becomes at times even exclusionary.

Regarding this specific German context, it would be very interesting for the ACCEPT project to further investigate anti-Muslim rhetoric and its effects, as well as the general attitude towards ethnic and/or religious diversity, especially in fields of society that are at the heart of identity formation and inclusion, like education and political participation. Anti-Muslim discourse and practices are not the only issues of (in-)tolerance or (non-)acceptance in German society, but they are today the ones that are least restricted by political correctness and much more openly uttered and practiced than other forms of intolerance or discrimination, like the still prevalent anti-Semitism or racism against black people. They can thus be an interesting focus of research, as investigation into general inclusiveness, (in-) tolerance and acceptance of diversity of the German society might be most easily measured in regard to discourse on and practice towards Muslims or people perceived as Muslims.
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