EUROPEAN DEFENSE: PAST LEGACY, PRESENT CHANGES, FUTURE CHALLENGES

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Abstract

This working paper argues on European Defense issues, considering a triple perspective: Past Legacy, Present Changes and Future Challenges.

The first part looks at European defense from an historical perspective; from its European integration origins to the foundation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), reviewing its decade in existence.

The second part analyzes the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the most significant developments of a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP): solidarity clauses, mission enlargement, European Defense Agency (EDA), new forms of cooperation, CSDP democratic control.

Thirdly, this paper considers future challenges and concludes the need for new developments: at the institutional level, the strengthening of European defense parliamentary control through the creation of a CSDP inter parliamentary assembly and the EU’s external action inter and cross pillar coordination; at the capability level, the need to strengthen EDA and implement new cooperation mechanisms foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty; at the strategic level, the drive to clarify the EU’s international identity and define a new international strategy enabling the EU as a global security producer.

Keywords

European Union; Defense; Lisbon Treaty; Common Security Defense Policy (CSFP)
European Defense Origins

It may not be apparent but the security and defense strategic dimension lies at the beginning of the European integration process. In 1950, the Schuman Declaration, albeit technical, paved the way for a true political alliance between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, a fundamental step towards the consolidation of peace and the launch of European integration. Equally, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) came to lay the principles for supranationalism, by regulating founding member states steel and coal production, crucial for armament production in industrialized societies.

Following this first stage of a European community, the second step towards a community translated into a regional defense organization, as well as the framework put in place for the German Federal Republic armed forces, essential to reinforce the western alliance "vis-à-vis" the Soviet threat. These early stages of a European Defense Community (EDC), despite counting on the support of the six founding Member States, as well as the United States, turned out to be a failure. European conflicting interests, as well as divided opinions in France, culminated in the rejection of the project, resulting in a profound European crisis – on one hand, splitting the economic integration from the political integration of Europe, on the other hand, introducing the taboo of Security and Defense, banished then on from European integration.

This was to be overcome, on one hand, by the integration of Germany in the Atlantic Alliance, on the other, by the coming into force of the Treaty of Rome. From then on, with the European Economic Community (EEC), the European integration focused on the economic dimension, whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focused its efforts in ensuring a collective defense for Europe.

The end of the Cold War inevitably led to rethink strategic roles, pushing to a new relationship between the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance, as two multilateral pillars for the western order.

The Maastricht Treaty later came to reunite economical Europe and political Europe, under the same institutional framework; as well as break the taboo of security and defense in the European construction process, by recognizing the need for an international political dimension in the integration process, institutionalizing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as associating the Western European Union (WEU) to the European integration process, as an element for EU development, in articulation with the Atlantic Alliance.

Equally, it allowed to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the frame of NATO and the generation of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), enabling the EU to operate with NATO military capabilities, namely in the so-called “Petersberg” missions; a new type of mission encompassing humanitarian, crisis management and peace-keeping missions.

It should be noted, these small steps within a European defense framework revealed to be totally insufficient, to respond to the new strategic environment, as well as to Member States and the Union growing obligations in terms of regional security. This became tragically evident in the separatist wars in ex-Yugoslavia; firstly, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and later on, in Kosovo. In order to contain violence in both cases, it took a joint military intervention led by the US, and the main European powers, through NATO’s military instrument.

It can be argued Europe’s U-turn in terms of security and defense results directly from the Balkan wars, i-e, from the consciencialization of Europe’s incapacity to ensure security in its own territory.

The Saint-Malo Summit, in 1998, signals the moment when France and Britain agreed, for the first time ever, to constitute an European autonomous defense capacity, adopting a pragmatic approach of strategic and operational articulation with the Atlantic Alliance.
The Franco-British defense agreement turned multilateral within the European framework, and, in 1999, the Koln and Helsinki Summit laid the ground for the future European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), consecrated in the Nice Treaty, in December 2000.

In the follow-up of Nice, the Western European Union (WEU) was progressively integrated in the EU, which absorbed its responsibilities, institutions and capacities, paving the way for ESDP edification.

**European Security and Defense Policy**

ESDP emerged as the European answer to the Kosovo crisis, although its development occurred under post 9/11 international strategic changing environment. From Nice to the Lisbon Treaty, ESDP became one of the most dynamic European construction areas.

At the institutional level, ESDP pushed the institutions foreseen by the Nice Treaty, such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS), endowing the EU with response mechanisms necessary to ESDP decisions bearing military implications.

At the capabilities level, a document designated as *Headline Goal* laid down the formation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), designed to operate in the so-called *Petersberg Missions*. In 2004, a new *Headline Goal-2010*, updated and enhanced a European Rapid Response capacity by generating battle groups, fully operational since 2007.

At the doctrinal level, the European Council approved the European Security Strategy, (ESS), a groundbreaking document drawn in 2003, in which the EU defined a security strategy and a common European vision on the Union’s external action, reviewed and updated in 2008, under the light of the changing strategic international environment.

At the same time, at the operational level, the EU is already on the ground, operating civil and military missions since 2003; firstly, in coordination with NATO, under the Berlin Plus Agreements, and later on, in an autonomous mode in several operational theaters. The EU has so far promoted 22 ESDP missions, and is currently running 13, nearing a 7,000 staff deployment.

**The Lisbon Treaty and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)**

The Lisbon Treaty consolidated a decade of European Security and Defense Policy, opening up new development perspectives.

The first innovation brought about by the Treaty, in terms of European defense, is of a semantic nature, but it does carry a profound political meaning: changing the formal designation from European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The change in nature translates into the formal assumption, in the letter of the Treaty, that Member States share a common interest in security and defense which they wish to develop jointly, as well as the fact that a common defense becomes, in itself, not a mere possibility but a final destiny.

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2. Ex-Article 17 (TEU) stated a progressive framing of a common defense policy “could lead to a common defense if the European Council so decides”, whereas current article 42§2 TEU states that CSDP “will lead to a common defense when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.”
As ESDP was in the Nice Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty integrates CSDP in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Nevertheless, its specificity is reinforced with the consecration of an autonomous section in the CSFP chapter. It is precisely this degree of juridical autonomy which confers, at the political level, the importance of the European defense, embodied in the Treaty.

CFSP continues, nevertheless, to develop within the frame of CSDP, thus benefitting from registered innovations in the sphere of external EU policy, namely at the juridical, institutional and decision-making process levels. All of the latter translate into matters of security and defense.

Firstly, the recognition of the EU international juridical personality; secondly, the external representation via the new designated posts of President of the Council and, mostly by the High Representative, a dual-hatted position joining the Council Secretary-General and the Commission Vice-President. This allows for improved institutional articulation between the Council and the Commission, as well as external action tools coordination, shared between the first and the second pillar, namely, development aid and military instrument. Thirdly, the adoption of facilitating mechanisms in the decision-making process, namely the broadening of subjects required to be voted by qualified majority, with the exception of those bearing military implications.

Beyond general alterations mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty registers an equally significant set of alterations, of a specific nature in terms of security and defense, namely in four key areas.

**Solidarity in Security and Defense**

First and foremost, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces, for the first time, a mutual defense clause, specifically binding EU Member States “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power”. This clause replaces Article V of the Brussels Treaty (1954), which instituted the WEU, but, once extinguished, left Europe without a mutual defense clause in its territory. This clause is, in all, identical to Article V of the Washington Treaty (1949), which instituted NATO and its political significance: firstly, the recognition of a shared destiny and secondly, the solidarity between Member States in the event of an external threat. To sum it up, it translates into the political commitment of mutual help in the defense of the Union’s territory. At this point, the Treaty also introduces a significant clause reinforcement: unlike the Convention initial prediction, where mutual defense was only binding to ratifying states, the Treaty of Lisbon brought in a clause of mutual defense conveying all member states. Nevertheless, two restrictions moderate this clause: firstly, the mutual defense clause “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States”, specifically those which are traditionally neutral; secondly, the mutual defense clause ensures it “shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)”.

These dispositions were fundamental to reach a consensus between all Member States, notwithstanding the clause’s innovative character, consecrating for the first time the military commitment between European nations, regardless of the nature of their transatlantic bond.

This mutual defense clause is complemented by another solidarity clause, listed in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Whereas the first one concerns primarily traditional threats, aiming at territorial defense; the latter covers essentially new transnational threats, namely

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3 Article 42§1 TEU
4 Title V, Chapter 2, section 2, articles 42 to 46.
5 Article 42§7 TEU
6 Article 42§7 TEU and Declarations 13 and 14 on common foreign security policy
7 Article 42§2 and §7 TEU
terrorist attacks, natural or man-made disasters “the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the target of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States”\(^8\). Once again, to ease neutral member states, as well as reach a consensus, a decision by the European Council, in July 2009, determined that “each Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council”. The solidarity clause operating ways are clearly set out: the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council shall act in accordance with the Treaty, where this decision has defense implications, subject to unanimity rule\(^9\).

These two innovative clauses embody a significant advance, broadening to defense matters the fundamental principle of the Union, related to solidarity between Member States.

**Mission enlargement under CSDP framework**

The second groundbreaking innovation in the Treaty relates to CSDP operational framework and its mission tipification. The Treaty of Lisbon clearly sets out the main objectives of CSDP where the general aims of these missions are to ensure “peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”\(^10\). Insofar as these main objectives are concerned, the Treaty identifies and enlarges the EU mission tipification. Until now, the so-called “Petersberg Missions”\(^11\) encompassed exclusively humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management\(^12\). By broadening the EU defense scope in terms of objectives and responsibilities, as set in the Lisbon Treaty, the missions are reviewed under this light and drawn out extensively, adding on to this list new missions in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means “shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization”\(^13\). Taking into consideration the new post 9/11 international order, where the European territory became itself a terrorist target, with the bombings in Madrid and London, in March 2004 and July 2005, the Treaty underlines

“All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories”\(^14\).

The ruling principle of mission funding agrees on each Member State to finance its own participation. The Treaty also sets up an innovative mechanism, through a start-up fund, destined to finance urgent civilian or military operations. Endowed by Member State contributions, the fund aims to facilitate the financing of this type of mission’s preparatory activities, unpredictable by nature thus unaccounted for in the EU budget\(^15\).

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8 Article 222 TFEU  
9 Article 222§3 TFEU  
10 Article 42§1 TEU  
11 Named after the WEU Council of Ministers Declaration, in June 1992, in Petersberg (Germany)  
12 Ex- article 17§2 TEU  
13 Article 43.1 EUT  
14 Article 43§1 TEU. The Treaty clearly refers to “their territories”, excluding other states territories, i-e, operations such as the US-led operation in Irak.  
15 Article 41§3 TEU
European Defense Agency (EDA)

The Treaty brings in a third element of innovation by extending and listing the competences of the European Defense Agency (EDA), integrating for the first time European armament and defense industries in the Union’s sphere. In this sector, the EU has been running behind, especially when compared to other international players, namely the United States. Initial European attempts to enhance and coordinate efforts at the industry level, date back from the 90ies, albeit outside the framework of the Union, always registering limited success16.

Considering European defense industry was always left out of the Single Market, EDA offers an intergovernmental framework aiming to foster the emergence of a European defense industry basis, paramount to any common security and defense policy.

CSDP thus allows for Member States to allocate their civilian and military capacities to the EU, enabling them to “undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities”. This framework allows for the Treaty to set up a European agency “in the field of defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments” referred to as ‘the European Defense Agency (EDA)’17.

The Agency’s objective is to create an European defense industry and its missions are clearly defined: “contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States; promote harmonization of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; propose multilateral projects to fulfill the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programs implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programs; support defense technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defense sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.18 The Agency is open to all Member States willing to participate with the necessary political conviction, and technical conditions, in order to develop common projects19.

In this matter, reality surpassed paperwork, and the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty, as EDA was previously launched under the existing treaties20, by the Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP. It is fully operational since January 2005.

The Agency acts under the authority of the Council; it is endowed with a limited budget yet marked by the resistance of a few Member States in granting it real coordination competences. The Agency registers so far a positive, albeit mitigated, balance.

The Lisbon Treaty replaced the initial joint action by a decision of the Council, acting by a qualified majority, which adopted a decision defining the Agency’s statute, seat and operational rules21. On the other hand, the Treaty also expanded its competences in commercial and industrial armament related-issues, so far placed under the first pillar.

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16 Firstly, under the Western Europe Armaments Group (WEAG), created in 1992 under the WEU; afterwards within the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’ARMement (OCCAR) created by the sept 9th Convention, in1998, joining Germany, Belgium, France, Italy and the UK, in force in January 2001; finally, following the Letter of Intention (LOI), signed in Farmborough, July 2000, by the six major European producers: Germany, Spain, France, Italy, UK and Sweden.

17 Article 42§3 TEU
18 Article 45§1 TEU
19 All Members States excluding Denmark
20 Ex-Article 17 TEU already authorized the setting up of an Agency, non-binding as opposed to the current article 42§3 TEU
21 Article 45§2 TEU
Security and Defense Cooperation

Fourthly, the Lisbon Treaty brought about significant alterations in security and defense cooperation, introducing two innovative, and important, mechanisms: enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation. Enhanced cooperation is in no way a new mechanism, nor specific of security and defense policy. Quite the contrary, considering that until now, the Nice Treaty expressly excluded resource to enhanced cooperation in this sector. The entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty extended its application to enhanced cooperation in security and defense, as established in other areas, namely in CSFP.

Permanent structured cooperation emerge, on the other hand, as a totally new mechanism, specific to security and defense, abiding by a derogatory regime, more open and flexible than the common regime of enhanced cooperation. Under this framework, permanent structured cooperation is open to Member States “whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions.” Member States must be simultaneously willing to show, both political will and military capabilities in order to further develop efforts in terms of security. By that, one should read political will is not enough as military criteria should be met.

This new cooperation mechanism originated two distinctive perceptions; on one hand, the critical view that it will only generate opportunities for big countries, leaving remaining member states on the side. On the other hand, others advocate, inversely, it is an open and all inclusive mechanism, thus allowing for all to develop military capacities, whether small or larger countries, as long as criteria are met.

Needless to be said, permanent structured cooperation serve as a defining trigger in the development of European military capacities. It also states a clear objective: Member States are to focus its current defense budgets in a more optimized and oriented way towards European interests, namely deployment and sustainability of forces, as well as the promotion of research and development in the defense sector.

It remains to be seen whether political will can put to practice the mechanism which the Treaty of Lisbon has put down on paper.

The Treaty allows for a third mode of cooperation in terms of defense; which considers that “Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States.” These are military missions in a qualified majority vote led by the Council, delegating to “a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task.” Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task. Member States shall

22 Articles 42 and 46 EU Treaty and Protocol related to permanent structured cooperation established in article 42 EU Treaty
23 Article 20 TEU, articles 326 to 334 TFEU
24 Unlike enhanced cooperation which need a minimum of 9 Member States, permanent structured cooperation does not demands a minimum Member State number – see respectively articles 20§2 TEU and article 46§1 and §2. Equally, unlike enhanced cooperation, permanent structured cooperation does not consider excluded member states in deliberation and ruling, article 20§3 TEU and article 46§3
25 Article 42§6
26 Permanent structured cooperation mode and generic criteria are defined in Article 42§6 and 46§1 TEU and in Protocol (nº10) related to permanent structured cooperation established in Article 42 TEU
27 Article 42§5 TEU
28 Article 44.1 TEU
keep the Council regularly informed.\textsuperscript{29} It should be noted that such Treaty disposition has yet to be put into practice.

Lastly, regarding cooperation, the Lisbon Treaty refers to multinational forces: “those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defense policy”\textsuperscript{30}. In this context, existing Member State multinational forces, on the side of CSDP, may now be integrated in the Union framework.\textsuperscript{31}

\section*{Democratic Control}

A final word about a relevant unresolved aspect: CSDP democratic control. The Lisbon Treaty does not mention the issue of democratic control at Member State parliamentarian level. The extinction of the WEU made any inter-parliamentarian institution, able to exert political control, vanish from the European scene. Thus, this issue is of utmost relevance. CSDP parliamentary control comes out enhanced by the European Parliament regular consultation explicit reference “concerning the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defense policy”\textsuperscript{32}. This question remains to be solved and amounts precisely to one of CSDP major endeavors in the near future.

\section*{Future challenges}

CSDP currently counts a multitude of future endeavors of a complex nature. These are intertwined and can present themselves at three different levels; institutional, capability and strategic.

\subsection*{Institutional challenges}

From an institutional point of view, two main challenges arise as the most relevant, namely, democratic control and inter and cross-pillar coordination within the EU external action framework.

At the institutional level, the EU is definitely not a federal state, as well as supranational and intergovernmental fields cohabit at the heart of the union.

In this sense, security and defense falls precisely in one of these domains which Member States have chosen to keep under national control, consequently retaining CSDP essentially as an intergovernmental policy.

This explains why European Parliament competences in this area have always been restricted, as well as in the Lisbon Treaty - where albeit explicit, they remain limited. Also, the extinction of the WEU and consequently its parliamentary assembly, have left Europe with no CSDP democratic control institutional framework.

Thus, a two-fold reason for this issue to be as relevant as it is urgent, especially considering the increasing EU intervention in civil and military mission worldwide. This aspect raises two fundamental issues related to political legitimacy, as well as transparency and public opinion response.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Article 44 TEU
\item Article 42§3 TEU
\item Multinational forces such as Eurocorps (ground troops – Germany, Belgium, Spain, France and Luxembourg); Eurofor (ground troops – Spain, France, Italy, Portugal); Euromarfor (naval troops – Spain, France, Italy, Portugal) and the European Air Group (air force – Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, UK)
\item Article 36 TEU. The ex-article 21 made reference to CSDP main frame, although inversely it did not state security and defense policy. #
\end{enumerate}
As long as communitarization is kept aside, EU parliament competences will always remain limited. And, as long this policy stays intergovernmental, CSDP inter-parliamentary control is paramount.

This is why the creation of a European inter-parliamentary assembly destined to deal with security and defense issues\(^{33}\) amounts to the first institutional challenge.

Equally challenging is the cross or trans-pillar coordination within the Union external action framework.

Although the Lisbon Treaty places external action under the dual hat of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, its various sectors, namely development aid and foreign and security policy, remain separate between the formerly designated first and second pillar, i-e, abiding by separate rationale – respectively communitarian and intergovernmental - consequently translating into different decision-making processes and financing rules.

Taking this into consideration, in order to ensure the Union’s coherence and consistency in its external action, strengthening inter-pillar coordination, namely in security and defense missions, emerges as a priority.

Given the holistic nature of contemporary conflicts, simultaneously integrating security and defense, economic reconstruction and development as well as state-building elements, a global and integrated perspective of the conflict is as necessary, as a coordinated action on the ground. Despite the existing institutional separation between EU external action structure and functioning mechanism, mission success rates rely on a comprehensive approach, and an effective coordination of security and development tools.

**Capability Challenges**

The second great challenge lies on capability development.

Today’s transnational nature of global threats and risks disables any strictly national response, thus enforcing a cooperative security framework.

At the European level, this framework is reflected on the Lisbon Treaty, insofar as Member States recognize a common security and defense interest, committing themselves in developing military capabilities allocated to CSDP.

Overall, ESDP has generated 24 civilian and military missions, of which 13 are still ongoing. These missions bring together Member States armed forces, operating in various theaters, although their organization, equipment, planning and financing remains entirely separate, i-e, EU joint funding capabilities is practically non-existing.

In the armament sector, EU joint spending amounts only to 20%, which means it is an exception, not a rule\(^{34}\).

The absence of resource optimization results into output inefficiency. All in all, 27 Member States MoDs and EU military bureaucracy amount to an annual spending estimated around 20 billion euros, averaging 1.7 million soldiers, of which only 10% are effectively operational.

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\(^{33}\) The foundation of such parliamentary assembly is not only necessary from a political point of view, as well as justified and legally authorized by article 10, protocol 1, annex to the Lisbon Treaty, on national parliaments. On this matter, see Corine Caballero-Bourdot, *Le suivi interparlementaire de la PESC: possibilités pour le futur*, Ocasional Paper 94, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Octobre 2011.

Member States inability to optimize resources and coordinate defense policies, and its budget cycles, impacts inevitably on European capabilities generation, i.e., its shortfalls and limited operational international EU mission response.

Capability development encompasses generally a two-step process: armament and equipment phase; planning, organization, and armed forces management phase; i.e., capabilities generation.

Within the EU, capabilities development faces major obstacles in both steps, despite the fundamental issue lies in the inexistence of a real articulation between both phases, i.e., a direct relation between armament industry and capability generation.

The missing link is today led by the European Defense Agency (EDA), provided with limited competences, mitigated financing and resistance from some Member States.

It is thus of utmost importance to reinforce EDA, its coordination powers, pluri-annual financing and Member State commitment. Although EDA comes out reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty, which in itself foresees permanent structured cooperation mechanism possibly enabling, in time, to close the gap between an industrial defense base and capabilities generation, political will has fell short to go further or make these come true.

However, the current financial crisis could act as a turning point in terms of capability generation. The impact on military budgets is forcing Member States to significant cuts on military spending\(^{35}\), pushing the need for efficiency gains and economies of scale – i.e., resource optimization.

In order to meet this objective, it would be best to achieve the tools allocated to CSDP by the Lisbon Treaty. But quite the opposite has occurred, with the emergence of various bilateral or multilateral initiatives aside of CSDP, generally designated as pooling and sharing\(^{36}\).

It may still be early to measure if those initiatives will prove to be successful, namely, if they will strengthen or weaken CSDP. Nevertheless, the essence of the problem remains no different from permanent structured cooperation – it is essentially political, which means sharing sovereignties, as well as further integration in terms of security and defense.

Finally, one can argue that, as long as there is no defense single market, priority should be given to strengthening EDA, going for permanent structured cooperation rather than backing ad-hoc pooling and sharing.

**Strategic challenges**

The third challenge lies on defining a European security strategy.

Originally approved in 2003, the strategy was reviewed and updated in 2008. It underlines a common vision of the risks and threats overshadowing European security, as well as drafting an international European strategy\(^{37}\).

From 2003 to 2008, the strategy was reviewed and updated according to the same international paradigm. Considering the ongoing transition in the International system, the period 2008-2012 will naturally push for an update, taking into account the global balance of power, a shift affecting the Western World, namely Europe, where former unrivalled hegemonies witness their own decline and the emergence of new powers.

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\(^{35}\) Budgets cust may reach 30% in some cases. See *The impact f the financial crisis on European Defence*, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, European Parliament, 2011, p. 11.

\(^{36}\) It is the case for the Franco-British Pact, Nordic-Baltic Pact, South Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial Process, Visegrad Four, Wiemar Triangle, Franco-German Cooperation, Ghent Process.

This shift clearly sends out a strong signal towards the need of a revised international strategy for the EU. The Union’s discourse on security and defense has so far been split between two different narratives; liberal realism and a utopic idealism, which reflects Europe’s ambiguity on playing a role as a strategic actor, or defining its international identity.

The concepts of “civilian power” and “normative power” lie at the heart of the strategic debate, centered on the definition of a European International identity. The concept of “civilian power”, coined by François Duchêne in the seventies, emerged with the re-launch of European integration, destined to single out the exceptionality of the communitarian process, at a time when Member States would have given away the use of force in their relations. It was a legacy of Wilson’s League of Nations idealism, having indeed achieved peace, even if in a limited area of the European continent.

“Normative power” is a revised version of the traditional concept branded as “civilian power”. It was forged after the Cold War, at the time of the re-launch and enthusiasm about the European integration process.

Europe won autonomy within the international system with the fall of political and military blocs, whereas enlargement gave it a continental dimension, with the EEC affirming itself as a regional stabilizing pole. Moreover, it played that international role without the traditional tools of diplomacy and armed forces, which Member States (France, Germany and the UK), equipped with those tools, were not able to perform. Thus it can be argued the EEC successfully and peacefully managed the post-cold war crisis.

This seemed to point out the exceptionality of European integration, legitimizing the EU as a “normative power” – both as a role model for a developed regional integration and, as an international norm producer for a new world order, multipolar and multilateral.

Member States would have entered a post-sovereign phase, allowing the EU to enter a post-Westphalian era, as a model of the new world order – i.e; a regional version of Hegel’s Universal State and Kant’s Perpetual Peace.

Thus, the EU cannot be perceived as a regular power, unveiling a new model and a new paradigm for the world order, probably explaining why it never really comes to fulfill, fully, its military dimension, defining its international role as the promotion of an “effective multilateralism”.

But the latter scenario seems today to be far from reality, as the EU did not succeed in achieving “effective multilateralism”, as well as emerging powers persist on behaving as sovereign states, sideling global governance in order to promote national interest.

The EU should make it a priority to clearly define an international identity and formulate an international strategy, enabling a non-ambiguous status as an international strategic actor and international security producer, a paramount condition to overcome the current European crisis.

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41 Not even in internal framework the EU succeeds in effective multilateralism, as seen in the UN Security Council, where the EU’s absence contrasts with some of its member state permanent seat (France, UK)
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