

THE CRISIS OF THE SOCIETIES IN THE EAST AND THE RETURN TO A COMMON EUROPE



by the President of the
Italian Senate, Professor Giovanni Spadolini

Florence, 23 November 1990

EUROPEAN
UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE

THIRTEENTH
JEAN MONNET
LECTURE



THE CRISIS OF THE SOCIETIES IN THE EAST AND THE RETURN TO A COMMON EUROPE


by the President of the
Italian Senate, Professor Giovanni Spadolini

Florence, 23 November 1990



Contents

	<i>Page</i>
OPENING ADDRESS BY MR ÉMILE NOËL, PRINCIPAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE	5
THIRTEENTH JEAN MONNET LECTURE, DELIVERED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN SENATE, PROFESSOR GIOVANNI SPADOLINI, AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE	9



**Opening address by Mr Émile Noël,
Principal of the European
University Institute**

Badia Fiesolana, 23 November 1990

*Mr President of Senate,
My dear Professor Spadolini,*

The ordinary custom would have been for me to welcome you on behalf of the European University Institute on the occasion of your delivering the thirteenth Jean Monnet Lecture. But how can I welcome you to this house, when it is already your house? Are you not in fact, as you have been since the Institute's foundation, Italy's representative on our High Council? And have you not, throughout these 15 years, constantly shown your friendship and given your support to the Institute, at every stage of its development? Allow me to express here all of our gratitude for that.

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

It might seem superfluous to present Giovanni Spadolini at a meeting being held in Florence, his native city. But since our Institute is European despite its ties to Florence and to Fiesole, allow me briefly to describe what his career has been and what his personality is.

A politician of great ability, a brilliant journalist, an established academic and historian: these, Mr President, are three major aspects of your personality. Perhaps, though, in your secret garden, the most cherished flowers are those that recall the stages in your academic

career. Called to Florence in 1950 to teach contemporary history at the Cesare Alfieri Institute, and appointed full professor of contemporary history in 1960 after coming first in the first contemporary history competition organized by the Italian universities, you embarked on a brilliant career as professor — a career marked by many publications, notably *L'opposizione cattolica da Porta Pia al '98*, which has become the standard work on the subject. Moreover, you have throughout the last 40 years never ceased extending this theme of the relationships between State and Church, between Catholic Rome and lay Rome, not to mention your many other works on the history of modern Italy and the chief characters in it, particularly Giolitti, as well as on the political parties. The message you are about to bring before us is a political one — but sometimes the professor can be discerned behind the statesman. In the Italy of the immediate post-war years, a young, brilliant academic could not help being committed — and journalism (including political journalism) was your second commitment. From 1955 — at the age of 30 — you were editor of the *Resto del Carlino*. You left in 1968 to take over the editorship of the prestigious *Corriere della sera*, as the youngest of all its editors, which compelled you to take leave from the University. Not that we should forget, considering these two strong points of your journalistic activity, the numerous articles, essays and notes you have never ceased to publish throughout your active life.

Finally comes politics — great politics, to crown academe and journalism! You fought in the ranks of the Republican Party, that lay party, enamoured of reason and heir to the values of the Resistance, and were thereafter for long its national leader. Under the banner of that party, you were in 1972 elected Senator for Milan, and since constantly re-elected; you were Chairman of the Senate's Education Committee, Minister for Cultural Affairs, and Minister for Education, and in June 1981 became, using an expression you are fond of, 'il primo Presidente del Consiglio laico dell'Italia repubblicana' — the first Prime Minister who was not a Christian Democrat. Thereafter, for four years you were Minister for Defence. In these key posts you played an outstanding



part in the fight against terrorism — terrorism within Italy and international terrorism — and in the strengthening of Italy's Atlantic and European ties. In 1987, you were raised to the Presidency of the Senate of the Republic, with the confidence of every one of Italy's constitutional parties; a post where the one-time leader of the Republican Party, the party of the institutions, must feel very much at home. Today, in your position above the parties, you are, together with the President of the Republic, at the same time the sage of Italian politics and the fervent defender of democratic government and of the parliamentary institutions.

This exceptional position of yours in Italian political life is not something that dates from yesterday. I would like here to recall that it was you that Aldo Moro, during his long calvary, designated as his testamentary executor. It was on Giovanni Spadolini, who was also leader of the Republican Party, that the leader of the Christian Democratic Party called when in the hands of his gaolers who were to become his executioners. Can one imagine better testimony to trust, admiration and friendship, over and above political controversies?

It is on the basis of the experience you have thus acquired in academic research, in the journalistic and political fight and in the conduct of affairs of State that you are now going to be talking to us about the revolution in the East, the new prospects in Europe, and particularly the role that a united Europe, combining democracy and freedom, may henceforth play. We shall listen to your important message with attention and concentration.



**Thirteenth Jean Monnet Lecture,
delivered by the President of the Italian
Senate, Professor Giovanni Spadolini, at
the European University Institute
Florence, 23 November 1990**

**The crisis of the societies in the East
and the return to a common Europe**

*Mr President of the European University Institute,
ladies and gentlemen,*

1. FROM BUDAPEST TO WARSAW

At the highest, most tragic moment of the Hungarian revolt against Soviet tanks, in November 1956, there was an appeal by European intellectuals for the freedom of the Hungarian people.

It was signed on behalf of Italy by Luigi Einaudi, no longer President of the Republic, but nevertheless still in a position independent of public office bearing that mark of destiny that escapes any denial and all classification: he was an intellectual.

Europe was then counterposed as a hope, as an idea, I should like to say as a collective myth, to the desolate reality of the regions on the other side of the Iron Curtain, and those separated from the living core of the continent.


It is an inescapable finding that Europeanism represented a sort of clandestine opposition to the communist regime, side by side with the ideals of freedom and democracy.

From Budapest to Warsaw. In April 1982, a few months after General Jaruzelski's *coup d'état*, for the first time Italian intellectuals and Polish dissident intellectuals came together to ask about the prospects for *Solidarnosc*: the movement, a trade union but at the same time political, which was seven years later, in the free elections of 1989, to conquer political leadership of the country.

In that international meeting in 1982 — promoted by *Voce repubblicana* and opened by me as Prime Minister — we discussed the essential characteristics of the first opposition movement that was gradually to succeed in the East in combining social pluralism with political pluralism. It was to be an example for the whole of Eastern Europe.

The structural crisis of the collectivist type of economy had begun to grip the very Poland that was soon, and by no means coincidentally, to find itself at the head of a process of progressive abandonment of the communist system: the first country in the East that began the road to democracy after 40 years of real socialism, however much attenuated or corrected by a constant dialectic between the Catholic Church and the Communist Party.

In the 1980s that was a liberalization — Warsaw's — that was not without obstacles, brusque upturns, zigzags, contradictions and even dramatic interruptions. Among them were the *coup d'état* in December 1981, which was met with a firm, energetic response from all the countries of Europe, Italy at their head. 'We cannot do other than all call ourselves Poles', I said in the Chamber at Montecitorio on behalf of the Government, giving a new meaning to Croce's famous turn of phrase ('we cannot do other than call ourselves Christians'). Five years later in 1987, when I went to Danzig — those were still the times when going to that city meant a danger that had to be faced at one's own risk, against the controlling Polish



authorities — Lech Walesa, that amazing apostle of Polish insurrection, said to me in connection with the pseudo-reformers in his country: 'I don't know if you've ever had the chance to see what sheep do: when they're afraid of something they tap their feet, as some Polish rulers do faced with proposals of radical reforms in the country'.

Only three years ago, the *Solidarnosc* leader had no right of access to Polish television, and could not predict that one day the whole Polish electorate would be voting for his opposition movement in elections to the Senate: 99% of votes. And if there is still the odd communist in the Polish parliament today, that is only because the system adopted for the Senate — fully elective and representative — was not adopted for the Lower House.

A fortiori, Walesa could not in 1987 predict that in summer 1989 the victory of *Solidarnosc* was to be completed and underpinned by the birth in Warsaw of the first non-communist government in the history of the European countries linked to the Warsaw Pact: the Mazowiecki Government.

The free political elections led to the collapse of communist power: the first free consultation of Polish voters showed how much the actual country was remote from and differed from the legal country.

'We are prepared for great concessions, but not for pluralism', Walesa had said to me in that interview in 1987. 'Pluralism': the Polish leader was using a word that interlinks Catholic political philosophy with the secular laws of modern democracy. This pluralism amounts to the claiming of a platform of rights identified *tout court* with civil rights as they are understood in the West. Those civil rights and political rights centre around freedom of association, always denied by the Eastern regimes, as incompatible with a one-party system.

It was no coincidence that in January 1989 — at the very beginning of that revolutionary *annus mirabilis*, 1989 — Hungary began to follow the road and the example of the new Poland, starting with adoption of that law on freedom of association. It is the pre-condition for the move from one-party rule to a plurality of political parties.

2. GORBACHEV'S *VOLTE-FACE*

One thing is certain. For 40 years the imposition on the countries of Eastern Europe of parties all modelled on the Soviet Communist Party constituted the major obstacle to the birth within the Warsaw Pact of free national roads pointing the way forward out of real socialism. It is emblematic that in the capitals of Eastern Europe during 1989, freedom of political association and party pluralism were born at the very moment when Gorbachev announced the end of the doctrine coined by Brezhnev in 1968 to justify the Soviet intervention in Prague and guarantee the political compactness of the Warsaw Pact countries: the doctrine of 'limited sovereignty'. It was finally shelved by Gorbachev at the December 1989 Malta summit, thus recognizing the right of the countries of Eastern Europe to choose their own political system, their own order and their own destiny, freely.

This turn was taken by the Soviet leader at the very US-USSR summit called to put the seal on the end of the Cold War and particularly on the danger of a military confrontation between East and West, after the 1980s had opened in a climate of heightened tension between the two superpowers, and enhanced military imbalance in favour of the East (moderated and then neutralized by missile options).

The world thaw was linked immediately by Gorbachev with fundamental support for the democratic revolutions in the East that were breaking down the Iron Curtain. It was Gorbachev himself who declared that Iron Curtain outdated, allowing the removal in spring 1989 of the 250 kilometres of barbed wire separating Hungary from Austria.

Whole ruling classes are falling. In Budapest the renewal was heralded as radical from the outset: nor could it be stopped even by the cosmetic operation by the Communist Party of changing its name to 'Socialist', a word which, being less compromised by the ideological bankruptcy of the Eastern regimes, has not lost the savour and the fascination of the West. 'Real' socialism in the



Eastern regimes always meant communism, not democratic, European socialism.

It was the end of the communist political past. In Hungary, not even Karol Grosz was saved from democratic contestation. As Secretary and first successor of Kadar, he had in summer 1988 courageously looked to the United States with his historic journey to Washington: the first across the Atlantic by a Hungarian president since the one 40 years earlier, in 1947, by — not coincidentally — Ferenc Nagy, head of the last coalition government before Rakosi's merciless dictatorship.

I met Grosz at Budapest when he was just leaving for the United States. 'Until 1956', he said, 'we made lots of mistakes. They are years best forgotten'.

Years to forget. The East of Europe wants to turn the page: to abandon communism as a political system. Typical in this sense is the popular demand accompanying the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989: for recognition of civil and political rights in exactly the sense indicated by the United Nations' conventions and the protocols of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

'We are the people!', as the slogan of the young people who in October 1989 ran through the streets of Berlin to head the peaceful, democratic German revolution significantly averred. No concession to Marxist, class-based phraseology; no reference to the myth of the working class, too long used and abused by the dictatorships of the East to justify the rule of the communist bureaucracies.

The protagonist of the glorious democratic revolutions of the nineteenth century is returning: the people. We are seeing in the East the return of Mazzini's slogan linking Young Italy and Young Europe, in a Risorgimento that would unite the whole of the old Continent.

3. THE PARTY OF DEMOCRACY: FROM PRAGUE TO MOSCOW

The victory goes to democracy: an ideal 'party of democracy', developing in the capitals of the East beyond

Marxism and Leninism. Of the communist idea, in its complex and dramatic experience, in its myth that extended its fascination well beyond the Soviet frontiers, nothing remains.

Let us think of Czechoslovakia, which in 1968 had been the protagonist of a revolt still coloured by Marxist tinges. In December 1989, none other than the leader of the 'Prague spring', Alexander Dubcek, was denied the post of Head of State only because he was felt to be the bearer of an ideology that was nothing but communist revisionism.

The Czechoslovak Parliament instead called to the highest post in the State Vaclav Havel, who has never been a communist, not even a 'reform' communist, or one with 'a human face'.

During the 'Prague spring' Havel had even launched the ideal of a Democratic Party *tout court*, as an alternative to the ruling party: he was the first dissident figure to contemplate bringing out a political force of opposition. At least in embryo, it was what was, almost 10 years after the Soviet intervention in Prague, to become 'Charter 77'.

Today more than ever, Czechoslovakia's new President regards the word 'socialism' as entirely compromised in Prague by the misdeeds of Novotny no less than of Husak (the 'normalizer' who imprisoned Havel himself). But he does not forget the 'sentimental and moral' (his words) origin of European socialism.

He is an intellectual more than a politician. A playwright who acknowledges, indeed flaunts, his own debt to Kafka. He regards as legitimate and desirable a revolution that is purely 'existential': that is, able to restore dignity to the individual over and above bureaucracy and the dictatorship of the party.

He confessed a few years ago, when there was nothing to suggest that it would be none other than his opposition culture — gathered around 'Charter 77' — that would defeat the authoritarian regime in Prague, that:



'The intellectual is always, from the outset, already beaten'. Yet ultimately, 'he wins through his very defeat'.

That victory in Eastern Europe was just that: primarily the victory of culture and of ideas. That is, the victory of those opposition movements which, in their long struggle against the authoritarian regimes, always looked to civilized Europe, to Europe and to reason the way we understand it.

The only exception is Romania. There, all the questions about a new political phase that looks very like a *coup d'état* — that is a settlement of accounts within the old Ceausescu regime rather than a free choice by the people — still remain open.

From 1990's free elections in East Berlin, in Budapest, in Prague, there sprang the coexistence and cooperation of Catholic and lay forces that has been the characteristic of Western Europe from the beginning of the post-war period. Catholics and lay people, in the East too, can meet on the common ground of political democracy and the social market economy, as they did in Italy 40 years ago.

Eastern Europe is no longer for us Europeans *tout court* the abandoned or different segment that iron separations had relegated to the margins of the main lines of the continent's unity. The peoples that have again come to recognize themselves in Europe — in Europe as a civilization, as usage, as a way of life — are fundamentally and culturally European, through various and specific national transformations. These are quite unaffected by any desire for victory of one bloc over another. The problems have always remained internal problems; just as the forces, the torments, the results, have been internal.

'The common European house was not born in a committee room', wrote Mikhail Gorbachev once, 'but is the outcome of Europe's history, and has been engendered by the realities of the late twentieth century'. Yes: at the start of the 1990s, Europe is no longer the same as it was a few years or a few months ago. Great historical and political phenomena are in full swing, and we look at

them with full awareness of living through the most intense pages of this last period of the century.

More and better than any of his predecessors since the October Revolution, Gorbachev knows that Russia is in the first place Europe, knows that the frontiers do not stop at the Vistula (as was once said with whim half academic and half paradoxical by ex-Secretary of State Kissinger). Trans-European Russia has its roots in the development and propagation of the civilization born of the old continent (hence the attention to the common Christian matrix of Orthodoxy and of Roman Catholicism). The fundamental currents of European history and culture all meet in Russia.

4. CHRISTIAN EUROPE AND ENLIGHTENMENT EUROPE

Europe as a unifying idea was born in the eighteenth century as a continent-wide idea and as an organizing principle for the peoples, in the climate of cosmopolitanism and the Enlightenment. It was born of the re-discovery of reason, of the same spirit of Christian humanism that Erasmus codified in the 'Five essays' on peace, particularly in his *Dulce bellum inexpertis*. It was born in the same spirit of the scholar approaching other brother scholars linked by a humanist urge to tolerance and comprehension, by a method of persuasion that in itself has a European root — European because it is cosmopolitan.

'The whole world is a common motherland,' said Erasmus. But that world, for him as for his contemporaries of the sixteenth century, was a Christian, civilized Europe, the Europe that Dante had already called 'most noble region' in his *De monarchia*.

As it has developed in the modern world, the idea of Europe is born of the encounter between Christianity and the Enlightenment, between faith in Christian redemption and faith in the secular dignity of man, between the evangelical ideal and the democratic ideal, between the *civitas dei* and the *civitas hominis*.



From this derives the link, however provisional and instrumental it may be, between humanism and Europeanism. Hence comes the dream of building the 'radiant city', that is, the fraternal community of men in the world of Europe, the favoured continent, as it were predestined to achieve new forms of international collaboration without wars and without national hatreds: the idea that shines through Kant's 'Treatise of perpetual peace', the ideal that shines in the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, in Rousseau, in Voltaire.

From Voltaire's *Europe raisonnable*, the step was a short one to the Europe of nationalities, to the Europe struggling for the independence of States, but never losing sight of a set of principles and standards of life that can at all times be appealed to.

This is the meaning that Voltaire captured very well when he said that Europe could be identified with the continent where ambassadors of enemy countries could go back home, where if one sits around the table, one is sure of being able to go back home again.

It is no coincidence that Europe appeared to Voltaire as 'a sort of great republic, divided into various States, some monarchical, some mixed, some aristocratic, others popular, but all linked with each other, all with the same religious foundation albeit divided into various sects, all with the same principles of public law and policy, unknown to other parts of the world'.

Soon Europe was to arrive at the discovery of the democratic idea, on the old Enlightenment, liberal foundation. Saint-Simon had at the start of the new century already anticipated this nexus, this profound link, in saying and writing that: 'Europe's transformation towards unity can easily come about only once all the peoples enjoy a parliamentary system'.

5. GERMANY FROM FEDERALISM TO UNITY

Throughout the nineteenth century, Europeanism and democracy constituted a single whole. This was thanks

to the labours and struggles of those Risorgimento conspirators who believed in a Europe of the peoples, in opposition to the Europe of the dynasties and the autocracies.

Foremost among them was Giuseppe Mazzini. He was the first to speak of 'Young Germany' among the founder members of 'Young Europe': when in Italy the word Germany was almost unknown, and everyone still used the term 'Alemagna'.

Germany was a geographical expression much more than Italy: with its dozens of petty States, its principalities and free towns reflecting a history identified with the Holy Roman Empire. In Italy specifically, the word 'tedeschi' was used without differentiation for Austrians and Croats, for all the symbols of the power of the Viennese oppressor. Nor do many know that even the German Empire, proclaimed in the Hall of Mirrors in the Château de Versailles in 1871 after Napoleon III's clamorous defeat at Sedan, left in being quite a few local thrones and sovereign States, in the ambit of the German Confederation.

The German unification at present coming about in Europe is, then, to some extent, a new thing. It is something linked historically back to 1871 and also to the experience of the Weimar Republic, which included a democratic federal State. But its features include a people that has gone through a great range of internal developments, of levels of civilization, of points of reference and of encounter.

Hitler's obsessive centralism is beyond all the logic of German history; just as the lunatic crusade of the swastika cannot in any way be fitted into the main lines of Germany, not even those of the 'pan-Germanism' that was a quite different phenomenon and still savoured of the Europe of the empires and traditional civilizations, what we have come to call 'yesterday's world'.

The defeat of Germany in 1945 gave ground for many illusions or fantasies as to a sort of dissolution or dismemberment of the German people, to avoid its being lured off by a second Hitler at some stage or other of its



history. That was the time when Morgenthau was US Treasury Secretary: when the proposal was put forward of making Germany a pastoral State, and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Eisenhower, took a stance in favour of the Germans and of the community of German language and culture. His words remain almost unique in the essentially vengeful setting of the Nuremberg judgments.

Thus, the whole of the world's equilibrium was set up on a division of Germany that was supposed to last for centuries, with one part going as a pledge to the Soviet Union, against a repetition of 22 June 1941 — the date of Hitler's attack — and another zone of Western influence destined for integration into Atlantic Europe, as then came about with the Bonn Federal Republic.

Today European unity and the unification of the two Germanys represent two parallel paths, neither of which can do without the other. Germany, a single Germany, is entering Europe, requiring the rhythms and deadlines that the forward march of time is making clear to the eyes of us all. At the same time, the entry of a greater Germany into the Community should bring the other countries to take steps to strengthen themselves internally *vis-à-vis* the new, imposing German commercial and financial entity.

No one believes that the path of German unification could be pursued if detached from the construction of Europe as a whole, still less from the system of counterweights that the German question requires, in connection also with the legitimate interests of the confederation of the Soviet peoples and the peoples east of the Oder-Neisse line. These interests first and foremost impose the preservation of the present frontiers — laid down in 1945 — any renewed discussion of which would spark off a process that would be hard to control.

6. RUSSIA AS PART OF EUROPE

I have mentioned Mazzini. Mazzini was the prophet of the 'New Europe'. This had not least to do with his 1834

invention of 'Young Europe', picking out three nations as the supporting structures of the three European races: the Latin race, the Germanic race and the Slavic race. The father of republican democracy, the Moses of Italian unity, he expressed a great openness to the Slavic world, a thing unheard of. This openness is becoming topical again today at a time when the Old Continent is questioning itself about the project for a common European house.

To Russia, the Italian patriot assigned a role of civilizing Asia: Russia was regarded by Mazzini as part of the history of Europe. Mazzini felt as equally European the liberation movement of the southern Slavs — the Yugoslavs, the Bulgarians — linked as it of course was with the uprising of the non-Slavic nationalities like the Hungarians — who belong to a different stock — or the Romanians, who date back even to the age of the Romans and of the last outposts of the Classical world.

'The whole race', wrote Mazzini in 1857 in one of the most important of his *Slavic letters*, 'seems to divide into four sections, the likely cradles of four future great nations. The first, the Poles, are called upon to gather around themselves again what constituted Poland before its dismemberment, and to encroach on Prussia for Posen and Lemberg, and on Austria for Cracow. Second is that of the Russians: and a more rational policy than that of today's cabinets would turn its growing vigour towards Asia, where alone it can accomplish a civilizing mission. The third section, almost the vanguard of the Slav race, includes Bohemia and Moravia, to which no doubt the Slovak tribes of Hungary will ally. The fourth seems destined to an embracing political union, with a federative administration, of the Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgars, Dalmatians, Slovenes and Croats'.

All this is set by Mazzini in a very realistic framework: 'whatever the future may be, the importance of the Slavic factor is undeniable. It will be what will change the political map of Europe'.

That is why traces of the presence of the Italian patriot can today be met with in every country of Eastern



Europe: in Moscow, there is even a street named after the Moses of Italian unity.

Has Mazzini conquered Marx? Yes, if we look at the upheavals in Eastern Europe, which certainly cannot all be reduced to the essentially Polish scheme of a Catholic revival. It is the democratic conception of society and its institutions that has conquered. And if there is a word that today more than any other wins success and consensus in the countries of the East, it is the word democracy. 'Democratic platform' is, not coincidentally, the banner chosen by the political militants in the vanguard of the diaspora of the Soviet Communist Party.

Political emancipation and social emancipation must go arm in arm: this was Mazzini's great intuition. It is today confirmed by the upheaval in the societies of the East, which points, in the indissoluble links between rights of freedom and social rights, to the highway of modern democracy. That European democracy anticipates, in its essential values, the political union of the Old Continent.

Thanks to the reawakening of the Eastern countries, today's Europe is coming back to the centre of the pathways of international politics. It is a Europe in which awareness of the indefeasible solidarity that must link the West of Europe itself to its East must be increased, and the post-war barriers broken down, in the impetus of the great national movements and of the politics of the long view.

The economic difficulties the countries of the East are facing can find a solution only along the path of integration between the economies of those countries and those of the Western nations.

The primary impulse for this process cannot but come from the countries of the Community, who must face the task with which history faces them in unity and in conviction, and in the strength of the new means that will be made available to them by the single European market of 1993, in a prospect that sees economic and monetary union as part of a process that starts from distant roots and tends towards political union.

It is this comprehensive political union, which is the guarantor of German unity itself, that allows the overcoming of the historical and political divisions between the two Germanys to be located stably in a European context.

I should like to underline this with the words used by George Mosse, which appear in *Nuova antologia*. 'In the two Germanys', the great historian says, 'there are today good and sincere democrats who are proving as they have done in the past that they have learned the lesson of history. Our hope is that such men may today succeed in overcoming the challenge of exaggerated nationalism and the dogma of sovereignty — the two enemies that are threatening the new European identity — and may today advance in wholeness within the global village'. That is, the new Europe.

At the very moment when economic issues are again closely bound up with those of protection of civil and democratic freedoms, in countries which have for long moved along very different paths from those of Western Europe, we must forcibly reassert the validity and the exemplary meaning of the choices which in countries far from each other unite the democratic countries into the West.

Past experience must guide us in the difficult task awaiting us as regards the countries of the East. No short-sighted calculation based on immediate interest is admissible today: there must be an ability to grasp what the United States of America was able, after a disastrous, devastating war, to do for the defeated powers. That was to transform yesterday's enemies into tomorrow's best allies, by granting them full dignity and equality of terms.

The conclusions of the last summit of the Atlantic Alliance in London, and those, albeit in part disappointing, of the summit among the most industrialized countries in Houston, conserve that historic significance. They represent the best and highest synthesis of the tasks taken on by the alliance, and at the same time constitute the premise — more clearly in London, less so in Houston —



for reaching newer, no less essential targets in international relationships.

7. EUROPE IN EAST-WEST *DÉTENTE* AND IN THE NORTH-SOUTH CRISIS

What is needed in order to locate East-West relations in a new dimension is a stroke of the imagination, a new, revelatory intuition. Let us think of some location, some agency, that may be the most suited in its flexibility to bring together into a single common European forum the countries of the East, in their process of radical, continuing transformation.

Paris was a first important step in that direction. Some have called that Paris conference on security and cooperation 'a new Congress of Vienna'. Not in the reactionary sense that summit of European monarchs took on in the aftermath of Napoleon's fall: but to emphasize by that expression the new 'concert of Europe', the sole precedent for which in the history of the old continent is none other than the Congress of Vienna.

The Paris summit in fact reknitted the fracture that for more than four decades has divided Europe, now restored to unity in the prospect of freedom and democracy that is being affirmed in the Central and Eastern European countries too. It also significantly revamped the architecture of European security, which is increasingly taking shape round a number of institutions: institutions that may sometimes overlap, but can in any case work together towards the same objective of stability and cooperation.

I refer to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe itself, to the European Community and to the Atlantic Alliance. The latter is being regarded as a guarantee even by the Soviet Union itself following German unification and the *de facto* dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

It is significant that to those who accuse the Soviet leadership of having isolated the country and lost its old Warsaw Pact allies, Soviet Defence Minister General

Yazov, a Red Army soldier, replied as follows: 'Probably we have lost four or five allies, but it is equally true that we have gained 33'.

This points to the precise meaning of the new wind now blowing through Europe, fanning hopes that a mere 10 years ago would have seemed Utopian.

This road of European cooperation capable of extension to all the countries of the East is the only one that can conquer those nationalisms and exaggerated particularisms that seem to be the common characteristic of recent times, extending even to our country in the form of the anti-unity and anti-Risorgimento ferment. It is the only one that can chase back into the emptiness they came from the spectres of racism, anti-semitism, fanaticism, against which free Europe went to war 50 years ago. They are showing awesome signs of reawakening, particularly racism.

If this century, and with it the millennium, ends with the construction of a united Europe solid in its relationships with the other shore of the Atlantic and communicating in every way imaginable with the Soviet Union, then the dream of 'Young Italy', Mazzini's dream, will have come true.

If we manage to take advantage of these years in order to build a Europe united not only in economics, but also in the spheres of ideas and of freedom, then we shall enter the new millennium under the sign of ideals and strengths capable of contributing throughout the world to the advancement of civilization.

Still more, we shall be contributing to the advancement of that common idea of Europe as *res publica christiana* that has in equal measure influenced the development of both American society and Soviet society, as both daughters of Europe.

But this scenario opening upon Europe is interwoven with the hopes and fears that accompany the toilsome, trouble-ridden work of renewal embarked on by Gorbachev.



We must not be indifferent to the outcome of his efforts; that would be the ultimate error, fatal to the construction of the geography of freedom that is today no longer constrained by frontiers.

One thing is certain. The Western countries displayed deep wisdom in recent months in avoiding official recognition of the Baltic Republics that were the first to proclaim their own independence from Moscow.

That recognition — advocated by some — would have been regarded by Gorbachev as political interference in the internal life of the Soviet Union. It would have been an act which would, moreover, not even have facilitated the autonomous strivings of Lithuania, Estonia or Latvia; since official support from the Western democracies for the peoples and parliaments of the Baltic would have been very likely to have brought about a stiffening by Gorbachev against the demands for independence. They would have been seen as purely the effect of a presumed desire by the West for destabilization.

The political break-up of the Soviet Union would compel Gorbachev, already facing a conservative opposition and a radical opposition that is separating from the Communist Party, to put the brakes on his own policy of opening to the Western world. What would take over in Moscow would be a line of mere defence against the 'contagion' of the West: an infection regarded as a danger for the national integrity of the Soviet Union as such.

Our augury as European democrats cannot be other than that the Soviet Union may realize a new cohesion among the nationalities and ethnic groups that make it up, that will take over the experience of modern federalism. That federalism is a European one, born, not coincidentally, from the collapse of Nazism and Fascism, that has always proclaimed the need to interweave strong supranational authority with autonomy of the Member States of the new Community.

The idea of Europe is the idea that interweaves freedom and democracy. To democracy it attributes a universal value: 'as that political and social form', in Thomas

Mann's words, 'that more than any other is inspired by the sense and the awareness of human dignity'.

Democracy. That is the word which in this closing stage of the century is again pointing to the future of humanity, after having conquered the challenges of the past. That does not mean that it has already secured its final victory.

Never more than today has the warning by a great interpreter of Europe's civil conscience, Raymond Aron, been to the point: 'The States will accept the subordination of their conduct to the realm of freedom only if the rulers themselves accept submission to a similar discipline *vis-à-vis* the peoples'.

This is the augury of a new international law; it is the adumbration of the new law of nations. That law has taken further steps forward through the major action taken by the United Nations in the recent severe crisis of the Gulf started by Iraqi aggression. It is a crisis that threatens Europe as a whole.

The need of a world government for humanity is making itself ever more strongly felt. The *détente* taking place between East and West implies a *détente* that does not yet exist on the North-South axis assailed by endless local conflicts, threatened by forms of tribal nationalism (but tribal may in the limit mean nuclear), all subject to the reductive spiral of regional antagonisms and age-old hatreds, of race or of religion.

We must arrive at a world convention against terrorism, against oppression, against violence, so that peace and freedom may advance hand in hand as the fruit of solidarity and collaboration among peoples. That solidarity and that cooperation constitute the most effective, deep guarantee of a new world structure that we shall have to build day by day.

'Strive with all your being', runs, not coincidentally, the epilogue to Benedetto Croce's *History of Europe*, 'every day, every hour, in every one of your actions'.

This is the great mission, today more than ever, calling the European democracies: those born 40 years ago from the defeat of Nazism and Fascism and those reborn



in recent months from the defeat of communism. Let us be aware that these last years of the century may be decisive — if we so will, and if we are able to rise to our duties — for the new Europe. Let it be a common house for the peoples that believe in the undying values of freedom and democracy. Let it be a common house that takes its goal as openness to the 'global village' of mankind.

