Negotiating Limits of Tolerance in Public Debates in Denmark: The Case of Political Meetings arranged by ‘ Radical’ Muslim Actors

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Executive Summary

This report analyzes negotiations of toleration boundary drawing as they play out in two recent public debates in Denmark, both concerning political meetings arranged by or involving controversial Muslim actors. The two meetings – one arranged by the organization Hizb ut-tahrir, and one involving the Canadian Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips – generated intense public debate about the limits of tolerance and the room for illiberal and anti-democratic views and practices in the public sphere.

First, the report maps and compares the different toleration positions and arguments in the two debates, building on analysis of the media coverage. This analysis finds that while the debate surrounding Hizb ut-tahrir’s meeting was skewed towards toleration, the debate about Bilal Philips’ visit to Denmark was skewed towards intolerance. The reason for this difference in toleration boundary drawing is explained with reference to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad in the two selected cases. Despite these differences the analysis also shows that the same toleration positions and arguments of boundary drawing are found in the two debates. These recurrent positions include: ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’, ‘toleration-but-protest’, ‘toleration-because-intervention-is-counterproductive’, ‘intolerance-due-to-threat-and-harm’, ‘intolerance-because-of-liberal-perfectionism’. The analysis shows how the support of these different positions of toleration boundary drawing cut across the traditional political spectrum in Denmark.

Second, the report investigates the discursive strategies put forward by different actors in pushing exactly their version of boundary drawing and the coping strategies of dealing with pressures of taking a stand on the limits of tolerance in the two cases. This analysis, building on media data as well as interviews with engaged actors, identifies three significant and recurrent strategies; 1) the strategy of pushing boundary drawing from the political to the legal arena, 2) the strategy of securitization, which pushes boundary drawing into the realm of the extra-political and extra-ordinary, and 3) the strategy of reframing, adaptation or avoidance of boundary drawing. The central argument in this section is that the interactive nature of public debates generates relative positioning of actors, which co-determines the toleration boundary drawing of actors and the discursive strategies used to legitimize it and cope with pressures.

As a last step, the report focuses on how toleration boundary drawing in public debates may affect Muslim actors’ possibilities for engaging in political debates in the Danish context. The report argues that although the controversies regarding the two meetings did not generate any concrete policy implication, which directly altered Muslim actors’ possibilities of using public meetings as a platform for political claims making, there seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, it is argued, with the fundamental interdependence of tolerance boundary drawing and processes of othering. Tolerating boundary drawing implies othering, as it functions to differentiate the realm of the recognizable normal and tolerable from the foreign and intolerable. When drawing toleration boundaries we are at the same time constructing in-groups and out-groups. In the analyzed debates Muslims in general are often designated as the ‘other’, covering up important differences within the Muslim community, which may potentially serve to delimit the possibilities of being tolerated as legitimate participants in public debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims.

Keywords
Tolerance, respect, accommodation, integration, intolerance, political participation, secular politics, political representation, public debate, public deliberation, Islam
1. General Introduction

This report focuses attention on toleration of ethno-national, cultural and religious differences in political life in Denmark. It investigates what kinds of limits to tolerance are expressed in public debates regarding issues of minority political participation. Thus, it focuses on the active citizenship of immigrants and their descendants in Denmark, and the challenges to toleration this produces.

Generally speaking political integration of minorities in Denmark is high and acceptance of this is widespread. A recent survey of active citizenship among immigrants and their descendants in Denmark, concluded that the political integration and participation among ethnic minorities is in fact in many regards comparable to that of ethnic Danes (INM 2011). Thus, citizens with immigrant background share with ethnic Danes to an equal degree basic citizenship virtues, such as finding it important to vote in elections or to be informed about current affairs. Also when it comes to perceived opportunities to achieve political influence through presenting opinions to politicians, citizens with immigrant background on average believe their opportunities to be as high as do citizens with Danish background (INM 2011: 22). General trust in fundamental institutions – parliament, public administration, police and the court system – is likewise high among citizens with immigrant background in Denmark. On average citizens with immigrant background have only marginally less trust in such fundamental institutions than citizens with Danish background (INM 2011: 25).

A study of the level of participation by ethnic minorities in the last local election in 2009 shows that the level of participation in the election was considerably lower among immigrants (47% voter turnout) and descendants (36% voter turnout) than among to ethnic Danes (68% voter turnout) (Bhatti & Møller Hansen 2009). For eligible voters who were not Danish citizens the level of participation was only 33%. However, other research shows that this level of participation among immigrants and descendants in a cross national comparison is relatively high. Lise Togeby (2003, 2006) has convincingly argued that this pattern of participation should be understood as an effect of the specific election rules in Denmark, which gives the opportunity to personalize votes so that votes are cast for a specific candidate and not a party. Participation in national elections for parliament in Denmark requires Danish citizenship. As it has become increasingly difficult to obtain Danish citizenship over the last decade, it has become more difficult for foreign nationals to become fully integrated in Danish politics. The patterns of participation in national elections for parliament among citizens with immigrant background seem to be parallel to the patterns at local elections (Mikkelsen 2008: 156-157).

A range of non-institutionalized ways of political participation is, in principle, also open to ethnic minorities in Denmark. Through freedom of organization, ethnic minorities have set up a large number of civil society organizations/associations (social, cultural, religious). If we look at the level of membership and participation in associational life among immigrants and descendants in Denmark we find that they are very active, although to a lesser degree than ethnic Danes (INM 2011: 36). On average an ethnic Dane is member of twice the number of associations as a Dane with immigrant background. The extensive right of freedom of expression and assembly in Denmark also gives ethnic minorities an opportunity to influence the public debate and indirectly political decisions. Ethnic minority members as individuals and as a collective often make use of these opportunities. Out of seven forms of non-institutionalized political participation, which have been investigated, citizens with immigrant background scored higher or as high as ethnic Danes on five parameters (wrote letters to the editor; posted on a debate forum; signed an online petition; participated in public demonstrations and strikes). Only when it comes to participation in political meetings and signing regular petitions do ethnic Danes scores higher.
1.1 Main Challenges to the Toleration of Participation in Political Life among Danes with Immigrant Background

The results presented above, indicating a relatively high degree of active citizenship among Danes with immigrant background to some extent contradict generalized media descriptions of immigrants and descendants, in particular Muslims, as passive and marginalized citizens living in parallel communities isolated from majority society, its institutions and political life (see Hussain 2003). Thus, participation is not always recognized. Furthermore, it is fair to say that political participation among immigrants and descendants in Denmark is not always appreciated, or believed to take an appropriate form. On many occasions the nature of issues raised, opinions put forward and the norms and values that underlie these opinions among citizens with immigrant background have been challenged in the media and by majority society in general as being ‘too different’. This has been the case in particular regarding demands and views put forward by individuals or collective actors who are identified (or identify themselves) as Muslims (Hervik 2011). Recurrently public debates have evolved around questions such as: Is orthodox Islam a threat to secular democracy? Do religious argumentation and values have a place in public debates in a secular society? How to deal with the few, but at times rather outspoken, Muslim actors who do not accept majority society standards of gender equality or who preach non-integration? Should we tolerate the intolerance of some Muslim actors regarding homosexuals? What to do about Muslims who openly speak against liberal democracy and endorse forms of terrorism? All these questions pertain to the way fundamental political rights are exercised by Muslim actors, rather than the fundamental rights to participation. Thus, at the core of debates are the norms and values displayed in political life by some Muslim actors, and questions of how much difference can and should be tolerated in political life without undermining cohesion and allowing intolerance to flourish. Put another way, what is characteristic about these debates is that they all turn the political mobilization and participation of ethnic minorities into a political problem. In most cases the ‘cultural baggage’ of Muslim actors is framed as an obstacle to legitimate exercise of these actors’ political rights. Debates of this kind, I argue, are the most common way tolerance of political participation of immigrants and descendants in Denmark is problematized and has been challenged in recent years.

1.2 The Two Case Studies: Overview, Relevance and Key Questions

The two case studies selected for investigation in this report regard two recent episodes of public meetings/conferences involving ‘radical’ Islamic actors that have questioned the limits of toleration in regard to Muslim minority articulation of controversial views in the public sphere in Denmark; views that are not prohibited by law, but in conflict with majority norms and values. Common for these two public controversies has been discussions of what kind of norms, attitudes and values displayed by Muslim minority actors can be tolerated in the public sphere, and which ones are considered a threat to public order, social cohesion and secular democracy. As such both debates offer a prism for studying the unwritten limits to non-institutional political participation of Muslim actors in the form of public meetings, conferences, etc. Both episodes highlight what kind of norms, attitudes and values Muslim actors, implicitly and explicitly, are asked to subscribe to and denounce in order to be accepted as legitimate actors in public debates.

1.2.1 Case 1 – Hizb ut-Tahrir’s public meeting at the Danish National Library (January 2011)

In January 2011 an intense debate evolved around a public meeting arranged by the Danish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir under the title ‘Afghanistan: Scandinavian Governments in the service of the US’. Hizb ut-Tahrir has previously held similar public meetings in Denmark, always generating extensive public
debate. However, this time the debate reached new heights for two main reasons: the nature of the invitation to the meeting, and the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir had chosen the Danish National Library as the venue for their meeting. In the invitation for the meeting Hizb ut-Tahrir wrote:

_In this meeting we will focus on the obligation of armed resistance that falls upon Muslims in Afghanistan and surrounding areas. We believe this resistance to be fully legitimate. We will also discuss the attempt by authorities to criminalize and intimidate any kind of opposition to the war in Afghanistan_ (Ritzau 28-12-2010).

Next to this text the invitation showed a map of Afghanistan, on which was placed coffins draped in Danish, Swedish and Norwegian flags. To many the invitation suggested that Hizb ut-Tahrir condoned the killing of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan and that they were inciting violence against Danish troops. Regarding the National Library as venue for the meeting, many voices found that Hizb ut-Tahrir are free to have their meetings, spread their intolerant views, but that the National Library as a publicly funded institution and historical symbol of enlightenment should not have hosted the meeting and thereby indirectly legitimize Hizb ut-Tahrir. Indirectly tax money was used (although Hizb ut-Tahrir paid to book the venue) to give voice to people who were (potentially) inciting the killing of Danish soldiers.

Among the political elite protest against the meeting was very visible, both at an arranged counter-demonstration, and in the public debate prior to the meeting, which included representatives of all major political parties, including several ministers. In addition, a number of representatives of NGOs, Muslim organizations and think tanks participated in the debate, including representatives of military veterans associations.

On January 21 2011 the meeting took place as planned, despite different political attempts to stop it.

1.2.2 Case 2 – The visit of the ‘radical’ Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips (April 2011)

In April 2011 the Canadian Muslim convert and preacher, Bilal Philips, was invited to give a public talk on ‘Islamophobia – is Islam a threat to the West?’ in Copenhagen. The conference was organized by the youth branch, MUNIDA (Muslim Youth in Denmark) of the Danish Islamic Faith Community, which was the Muslim organization primarily responsible for the protests against the Muhammad cartoons published in 2005. Bilal Philips’ visit became an issue of great public controversy due to his controversial and intolerant views on homosexuals and Shia Muslims, his endorsement of Sharia (e.g. the beating of women) and of violent jihad expressed in a number of books, public lectures and performances posted on Youtube. In addition, Philips’ name has appeared in a number of terrorism trials, including the trial regarding the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. Paradoxically, Philips was invited to talk about islamophobia, intolerance and discrimination vis-à-vis Muslim minorities in the West, while he himself is an exponent of quite intolerant views.

In the public debate prior to his visit different discursive positions and arguments both for and against toleration of his public lecturing were articulated. To a large extent the public debate on Philips’ visit was also centered on the role of the Islamic Faith Community in inviting Philips to Copenhagen. The question was to what extent they shared Philips’ views. On April 16 2011 Bilal Philips arrived at Copenhagen airport under great media coverage. The day after Philips spoke to an assembly of about 1000 Danish Muslims. Outside the meeting venue a demonstration was arranged which counted between 200-300 people. Philips has previously been denied entry into Britain and Australia, and few days after his visit in Denmark he was denied entry to give a similar speech in Germany.
1.2.3 Situating the case studies: relevance and questions

The two instances described above highlight how tolerance as a boundary drawing activity is taking place vis-à-vis concrete instances of Muslim non-institutionalized political participation in the public sphere. I find that these episodes offer interesting perspectives into the negotiations of the limits of tolerance of divergent views and practices as the play out in public debates regarding controversial statements by Muslim actors. As such the case studies deal with less conventional and institutionalized forms of immigrant political participation and representation. As already indicated, it is this form of political participation among citizens with immigrant background that has caused most challenges to tolerance of difference in political life in recent years in Denmark. Furthermore, I believe that these debates offer good insights into the different discursive positions on tolerance in the political sphere in the Danish context, the dynamics and strategies of positioning in such debates as well as the effects of boundary drawing on Muslim actors’ possibilities for participation in public debates.

As mentioned, the two cases regard the boundary drawing between intolerable and tolerable norms, attitudes and values. Nobody in the debates argued for the recognition, respect as equal or admission to the realm of normal for the views raised at the meetings. Arguments were either for intolerance of the views, however for quite different reasons, or for some kind of ‘teeth-grinding’ tolerance. The episodes also highlight issues of ‘principled’ or ‘liberal’ intolerance, i.e., the way interventions and limitations to tolerance are based on arguments for the need to create a ‘liberal state for liberal people only’ (Mouitersen & Olsen 2012). Furthermore, the episodes show how such intolerance of illiberal values in the public sphere contribute to actively endorse ‘good’ liberal citizenship and integrationist views a prerequisite for the participation of Muslim minority actors in political debates in the public sphere.

Building on this, the report uses the two selected cases to address the following key questions:

1) What were the main discursive positions of toleration articulated in the public debate in regard to the two cases?
2) What are the unwritten limits to non-institutional political participation of Muslim actors, as articulated in the two cases? And are they the same in the two cases?
3) How does tolerance as a boundary drawing activity play out in practice in the two public debates analyzed, i.e. how are limits to tolerance negotiated in the public sphere, and what kind of discursive strategies do different actors make use of in promoting exactly their boundary drawing?
4) How, and through which mechanisms does the toleration boundary drawing in the two public debates affect Muslim actors’ exercise of political rights?

1.3 Methodology

The public debate regarding the two episodes evolved from December 1 2010 to about May 1 2011, which will be the time-frame of investigation. The basic research design of the report is a comparative case study, including within case comparison (comparing across types of actors and discursive strategies in the debates).

As indicated, the two cases do not concern instances of direct Muslim claims making on Danish authorities, for example raised claims of building mosques, establishing Muslim burial grounds or introducing halal food in kinder gardens. I expect this circumstance to weigh on the side of intolerance as authorities are less committed to finding practical solutions and more free in these cases to engage in principled boundary drawing. In addition, the two cases concern issues of Danish foreign policy (Danish engagement in Afghanistan) and the visit by a foreign controversial preacher. Especially in the case of Bilal Philips, I expect this ‘foreign’ element to make toleration boundary drawing skewed towards intolerance. This has to do with the limits of tolerance historically being more narrowly defined regarding non-citizens.
The case studies build upon analysis of the press coverage of the two episodes as well as interviews with central stakeholders in the debates. The newspaper articles have been selected using the Danish media archive, Infomedia. The searches included all nationally distributed newspapers in Denmark as sources, including broadsheets, tabloid and free-of-charge newspapers as well as the largest news wire Ritzau. The sources of the articles collected are the following newspapers: Jyllands-Posten, Politiken, Berlingske Tidende, Information, Weekendavisen, Kristeligt Dagblad, B.T., Ekstra Bladet, MetroXpress and Urban. The collection of articles resembles that of a ‘population study’, as all articles regarding the two cases from the mentioned sources have been included in the constructed database. However, articles of less than 200 words have been omitted as have article ‘duplicates’, for example Ritzau telegrams published in more than one newspaper. Furthermore, letters to the editor regarding the two episodes have also been omitted in order to keep the number of articles at a manageable level. This sampling strategy resulted in a data corpus of 112 articles, 59 articles regarding the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting (case 1), and 53 articles regarding the Bilal Phillips meeting (case 2).

The collected newspaper articles have been coded using Nvivo 9. First all articles were coded classifying the articles regarding source, data, length, and case number. Then the units of analysis, the particular individuals who in the articles express a tolerance view, claim or stand regarding the two cases, were identified. All statements made by a particular actor during the course of the episodes were collected in one ‘node’, rendering it possible to look at all the interventions of one actor, and compare it to others.

The coding of the actual content of statements followed a strategy of combined closed (deductive) and open (inductive) coding. From the general conceptual framework of toleration as identified by Modood and Dobbernack (2011) a number of closed categories of toleration positions were deduced and applied. Thus, statements and standpoints on the respective cases were in an initial step coded and categorized as expressions of either a) recognition/inclusion to the realm of the normal, b) tolerance or c) intolerance. This crude categorization was then refined using further theoretically deduced sub-codes and supplementing with inductively driven sub-codes stemming from the material itself. The coding scheme for this analysis of instances of toleration boundary drawing can be found in Annex I.

In addition to the newspaper material the analysis is based on interviews with central stakeholders in the two episodes identified on the basis of the newspaper material. These stakeholders include: Political elites; Muslim organizers of the meetings/conferences; organizers of the counter-demonstrations; NGOs and venue owners/representatives. The interviews were carried out using semi-structured interview guides, and evolved around tapping the interviewees’ toleration boundary drawing and arguments in regard to the particular episode as well as their reflections on the dynamics and effects of the debates. In total seven interviews were conducted – two with actors involved in case 1, two involved in case 2, and three involved in both (see Annex II). In combination with the newspaper material this amount of interviews proved sufficient to flesh out the main discursive positions of toleration in the debates, and I found that further interviews would have added little to the investigation. The interviews were transcribed, and transcriptions imported to Nvivo where they were coded using the same coding scheme applied to the newspaper material. This procedure made it possible to collect all material regarding one actor (newspaper statements and interview transcriptions) in one node.

The descriptive and comparative analysis of toleration positions in the two cases building on Nvivo-coding was supplemented with elements of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis was applied in order to delve further into how specific arguments and meanings in the debates are constructed, discursive coping mechanisms enacted and analyze the effects different toleration positions have on the opportunities for Muslim political participation in public debates.
2. The main discursive positions of toleration boundary drawing in the debates

In sections 2.1 and 2.2 the main discursive positions of toleration boundary drawing in the two cases will be mapped and analyzed. The purpose is to investigate what political practices are considered tolerant or intolerant, and what values/norms are considered to promote or undermine tolerance in the particular cases. Section 2.3 compares the main positions in the two cases, and explains important differences in toleration boundary drawing. Section 3 focuses on the dynamics of toleration boundary drawing as it plays out in the two cases with a view to explaining the different strategies of positioning in the debate employed by actors promoting exactly their version of boundary drawing. Finally, section 4 explores how the public toleration boundary drawing of the two cases affect Muslim actors’ exercise of political rights.

2.1. Case 1 – Hizb ut-Tahrir’s public meeting at the Danish National Library

In the 59 newspaper articles collected focusing on the Danish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting at the Danish National Library in January 2011 the coding procedure applied returned 101 identifiable instances of toleration boundary drawing. By instances of toleration boundary drawing I mean articulated positions by an individual either for toleration or intolerance of the meeting, accompanied by a discursive rationale or argument for the boundary drawing. Table 1 below shows the basic distribution of instances of toleration boundary drawing according to types of argumentation.

Table 1. Main arguments of toleration/in-toleration in case 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toleration/intolerance code</th>
<th>Number of appearances in material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toleration as a must due to the rule of law</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, but active protest</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because we need to challenge and reconfirm our values</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because intervention would be counterproductive</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, but no obligation to promote intolerant views</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration as long as now physical harm is likely (Mills harm principle)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because of autonomy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of perceived threats and harm</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of liberal perfection and harm</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of concerns vis-á-vis cultural cohesion</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance of liberal intolerance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance of illiberal intolerance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows that more instances of toleration boundary drawing in the case were arguing in favor of toleration than of intoleration (62 vs. 39). Obviously, we cannot conclude anything substantial about the general toleration boundary drawing among Danes on the issue based on this result. Only that among the actors given voice in newspapers, boundary drawing was skewed towards toleration. However, the distribution also indicates that arguments of intolerance were not marginal, but substantial in the debate. This distribution is partly a product of the media’s balancing norm – the
tendency of journalists to collect quotes for an article from both actors who are ‘for’ and ‘against’ a particular issue – but also indicates a substantial line of conflict and disagreement, which was the driver of the intense public debate.

In the following sections I will substantiate the different toleration boundary drawing positions presented in table 1.

2.1.1. Positions of toleration

The most frequent argument in the public debate for tolerating Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting, despite its provocative nature and illiberal views, simply stated that as long Hizb ut-Tahrir had not done anything illegal or could be reasonably expected to express views that would be illegal, the practices of gender separation and the indirect legitimation of killing Danish soldiers must be tolerated. In a democracy, liberal freedoms of organization, assembly and free speech must apply to all, and cannot be limited due to feelings of unrest and outrage, but only by stipulated legal regulation. One central exponent of this position was the director of the National Library, Erland Kolding Nielsen, who argued to uphold Hizb ut-Tahrir’s booking of the venue on the grounds of liberal freedoms, even though the Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller, asked him to reconsider the decision twice. In support of Kolding Nielsen the legal advisor of the liberal think tank CEPOS, Jacob Mchangama, said:

In Denmark we hold freedom of speech to be a core value, and this is why politicians should not dictate cultural institutions’ decisions on meetings and debates, according to whom they like and don’t like. Because politicians exist who would in one case argue for unlimited freedom of speech and who would be ready to reduce freedom of speech in others. We should not sort and categorize opinions and views in this manner (Interview 5)

Such arguments involve an element of ‘liberal absolutism’ stipulating that the same kind of toleration boundary drawing must apply to all groups.

Other actors argued for toleration on these classic liberal grounds, including most newspapers in the sample, which in editorials stressed liberal democracy’s unavoidable dilemma of having to tolerate organizations, views and practices of which the large majority strongly disapproves:

It is characteristic of a democracy like the Danish one that it makes room also for voices and views, which most find distasteful. It is not illegal to be against the war in Afghanistan, although the resistance of Hizb ut-Tahrir is not driven by pacifism. And it is likewise fully legal to arrange public meetings about the issue as long as there are no concrete incitements to violence against Danish soldiers. In Denmark we have freedom of organization, assembly and speech. We hold these rights dearly. Thus, no matter how provocative Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting may seem, we cannot compromise these fundamental rights and principles (B.T. 20-01-2011)

These classic liberal arguments were in the debate found across the political spectrum, constituting a common argumentative platform and position in the debate bringing together otherwise political opponents. Thus, politicians and commentators adhering to both the then liberal-conservative government and the centrist-left opposition used arguments of a pre-toleration legal ‘must’ to legitimate non-intervention.

In many ways the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position argues that toleration in this case is not a matter of moral judgments and boundary drawing, but narrowly a question of legal boundary drawing. If intervention against Hizb ut-Tahrir is found to be necessary then politicians need to change the legal framework. In fact, several actors in the debate, most significantly members of the Danish People’s Party, called for exactly this.

Many of the actors adhering to the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position would occasionally develop
the argument to include a call for explicit airing of protest and disagreement with the views of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Just as Hizb ut-Tahrir has the right to speak their views in public so do we, the argument goes. We must tolerate, but we must also publicly challenge what we find to be outrageous and wrong. This was the general attitude of the people who participated in the counter-demonstration on the day of the meeting. In the words of the main organizer of the demonstration, Lars Aslan Rasmussen (city counselor for the Social Democrats):

*Hizb ut-Tahrir should not be allowed to spread hatred and incitements to violence against Danish soldiers without anybody resisting. We will do this in a peaceful and calm way. Political fanatics’ and extremists’ hijacking of religion should not be fought with bans and threats. They should be met with protest and visible counter-reactions (JP 21-01-2011)*

At the counter-demonstration politicians from across the spectrum stood side by side marking a rare united front in Danish politics on issues of value pluralism and management of difference. After the demonstration chief editor of Berlingske Tidende, Lisbeth Knudsen, wrote:

*The demonstration yesterday outside the National Library showed that the statements and attitudes of Hizb ut-Tahrir and likeminded are not just met by an ‘ohh well’ in Denmark. It is something which we in a democratic manner will sharply protest. The demonstration showed that whether you are for or against the war in Afghanistan, leading Danish politicians, public intellectuals and ordinary citizens were able come together in protesting Hizb ut-Tahrir’s incitement to kill Danish soldiers (Berlingske Tidende 23-01-2011)*

However, as we shall see below, not all participants in the counter-demonstration identified with the ‘toleration-but-protest’ position.

A more sophisticated, but in many ways related argument stated that the meeting should be tolerated, views discussed and counter-arguments displayed. Not so much because marking disagreement is important in itself, but because by airing disagreement and debating views we disapprove of are forced to reconfirm, reconsider and refresh our commitment to our own basic values and beliefs. This Millian argument of the need to tolerate and engage with views we find wrong rests on a logic of potential ‘dead dogma’ – that is the belief that the values and norms we live by and hold dear will become empty and meaningless if they are not at times questioned, debated and defended (Mill 2009). In this perspective the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting can be said to serve an important and positive function of normative integration and re-confirmation. From an editorial in the centrist-left newspaper *Politiken*:

*There is one good thing to say about the meeting the darkened Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir is hosting today at the Danish beacon of enlightenment, The Royal National Library: As a society we are forced to actively engage with an ultra conservative, freedom denying and fanatic movement, which challenges our modern values. Values that are not challenged disintegrate and disappear. By having the madness brought into daylight, we are at least forced to think about what kind of anti-democratic and anti-Semitic phenomenon Hizb ut-Tahrir is, and what we in common can do to fight the party’s reactionary attack on enlightenment freedoms (Politiken 21-01-2011)*

In addition to these toleration arguments stressing legality, toleration but open protest and the need to actively reconfirm and rearticulate values, I shall mention two further arguments of toleration that appeared fairly frequently in the debate (coded five times each). The first argument connects to the public/private divide and concerns the degree to which public institutions are obliged to be equally open to all groups of citizens. This argument, which was aired by the Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller, as well a number of legal scholars, stated that although Hizb ut-Tahrir has the right to hold their meeting at the National Library and we, thus, should tolerate it, this does not mean that a public institution like the National Library is obliged to accept all bookings. There is scope for moral judgment within the legal framework of self owned public institutions, and the National Library could legally have said no to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the argument goes. This argument, on the border of intolerance,
tries to connect the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position to an element of individual moral judgment. The reasoning is that although Hizb ut-Tahrir has the right to preach hatred and provoke feelings we should not actively support them in promoting their views. Legal rights do not translate into an obligation for public promotion.

Finally, we find in the public debate an argument for toleration and non-intervention, which in a pragmatic manner argues that political intervention (outlawing Hizb ut-Tahrir or forcing the National Library to cancel the meeting) would be counter-productive in terms of fighting unwanted views and practices. In this perspective, what matters is neither legal nor moral boundary drawing, but pragmatic boundary drawing in terms of what will and what will not work to combat illiberal and potentially dangerous views. For example, Karen Hækkerup (Social Democrats) argues that by suppressing such views ‘support and mobilization for Hizb ut-Tahrir would only intensify due to a massive media coverage’, and turn Hizb ut-Tahrir into ‘martyrs’. Intolerance would make the views of Hizb ut-Tahrir an interesting ‘forbidden fruit’, which would be counter-productive (JP 19-03-2011).

2.1.2. Positions of intolerance

The argument of toleration because of counter-productive effects of intervention was in the public debate used in contrast to the most common argument of intolerance and intervention, reasoning that Hizb ut-Tahrir and the meeting should be stopped due to the potential security threat posed to Danish society and Danish soldiers in Afghanistan. The potential physical threat that the diffusion of Hizb ut-Tahrirs views would pose to Danish society and soldiers is enough to justify preemptive/preventive intervention. A concrete example of this line of reasoning:

*It testifies to a sick and anti-democratic mind when Hizb ut-Tahrir is inciting armed resistance. To me there is a hidden threat in this message, and it terrifies me to think of how Hizb ut-Tahrir might influence young people* (Karen Lorentzen, Socialist People’s Party: Ritzau 29-12-2010)

Common to this position is a discourse of radicalization and terrorism. In short, this position is characterized by using security as boundary marker for toleration. Hizb ut-Tahrir and the concrete meeting is ‘securitized’ and seen as a threat to society (see also section 3 below). Not necessarily an imminent or concrete security threat, but a potential threat that we cannot afford to just tolerate. Thus, it is not current demonstrable harm that defines the limit of tolerance, but increasingly potential future harm (see Schiffauer 2012: 17). Discursively a scenario is built that suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir through their rhetoric, glorification of terrorism and meetings is radicalizing youngsters so that eventually somebody will respond to their call for armed resistance, maybe even interpret it as legitimizing terrorist attacks in Denmark. Preventive intervention is therefore needed. This position of intolerance due to potential threat and harm had in the debate exponents from most political parties.

A variant of the ‘intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm’ argument emphasizes not the potential physical, but rather the more imminent psychological harm of the meeting. In particular, a number of actors in the debate point to the psychological distress caused to Danish veterans and families of fallen soldiers by the content of the meeting. This was the position taken by e.g. the Association of Permanent Military Personnel:

*It is not right that families where spouses, kids or loved ones are away in battle, and those who have lost family or friends in battle in Afghanistan, should have to listen to this* (Interview 6)

Here non-tolerations are argued on the grounds of the distress toleration would mean to a rather small, but vulnerable minority. Often this line of reasoning is further strengthened by invoking elements of a nationalistic discourse of ‘treason’, ‘fourth column activity’, and ‘national pride’. In the light of what veterans have done for their country, the argument goes, we as a society, should show our appreciation by shielding them from the distress caused by the meeting.
The second most common position of intolerance found in the material (covering twelve instances of toleration boundary drawing) argues that intervention is needed and legitimized, not only because of the content of the concrete meeting, but also because Hizb ut-Tahrir and its members in general are exponents of illiberal and fundamentalist attitudes, practices and identities, which are unsuited for a modern liberal democracy. What matters to toleration boundary drawing is not just the legality and content of concrete statements, but also the larger identity of those making the statements. In this perspective, the illiberal attitudes, views, practices and goals of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir – their way of life – is believed to justify intervention. Often the gender division at Hizb ut-Tahrir meetings is the concrete hook for this kind of reasoning. This practice is seen as ‘medieval’, ‘gender apartheid’, ‘insane’, and ‘in opposition to everything Danish’:

Hizb ut-Tahrir with their medieval gender practices and antidemocratic views represent the antithesis to enlightenment values. Should we tolerate that they spread their hatred and way of life through public institutions? No! We should prevent them from doing so, and insist on Danish values and Danish culture (Pia Kjærsgaard, Danish People’s Party: Berlingske Tidende 9-03-2011).

This position of intolerance forms part of a larger ‘liberal perfectionism’ discourse where the end-goal of integration and the yardstick of good citizenship is not just labor market integration, educational integration or active political participation, but also forming a liberal identity and a liberal way of life. In line with this discourse of ‘liberal perfectionism’ then Minister of Integration, Søren Pind (Liberals), used the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting to publicly formulate a demand for assimilation among immigrants: ‘There exist in Denmark norms and culture, which you should basically respect and adopt if you come here as a foreigner. You should not mock or disrespect these basic values and norms’ (JP 16 January 2011). Denmark is a liberal society with room for liberal people only, the argument indirectly seems to say. This kind of intolerance has been referred to as a form of ‘liberal intolerance’, as boundary drawing here is tied up with evaluation of the liberalness of norms, practices and identities, and intolerance accompanied by liberal reasoning stressing the lack of autonomy, free choice etc. (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012).

A closely related variant of ‘liberal intolerance’ found in the material (coded four times) elaborates on why Danish society should insist on liberalness as a threshold/boundary for integration and participation in political life. The core of this argument is a concern with societal cohesion and parallel communities in the light of too large cultural, religious and normative differences, as exemplified by Hizb ut-Tahrir. Without a common ‘leitkultur’ and shared basic liberal democratic principles, society will disintegrate and social conflict escalate. Here two examples of this argumentation:

Hizb ut-Tahrir is in no way concerned about world peace or the well-being of Danish society, and they constitute a threat to social cohesion in our otherwise harmonic society (Fathi El-Abed, Muslim intellectual: JP 21-01-2011)

The power of Islam has become a part of our reality. It is the tribal culture, which continually plays a role in Muslim countries, and which to a large degree influences Muslim immigrant communities in European countries. The tribal culture means that you will always take side with your family or tribe against other families or tribes … […]… We know from research that young Muslims in Europe often feel more Muslim than Danish, German or French. They will side with other Muslims against non-Muslims (Karen Jespersen, Liberals: Berlingske Tidende 21-01-2011).

In the last quote Hizb ut-Tahrir is made an exponent of a wider problem of lacking societal cohesion and shared identity, which is perceived to be rooted in the proliferation of Islam following immigration in general. Here mobilization and political participation based on a Muslim rather than a Danish identity is seen as problematic and as a barrier to rational deliberation and peaceful coexistence. In this perspective, intervention blocking Hizb ut-Tahrir from spreading their illiberal views in the public sphere and intensifying ethno-cultural conflict in society become minimum
requirements in terms of boundary drawing. However, the position is connected to much wider calls for boundary drawing, and has been used to legitimize a range of integration policies and requirements, which aim at securing social cohesion, common values and liberal outlooks among immigrants in Denmark (see Jensen et al. 2010). In the case material arguments of ‘liberal intolerance’ of either kind are predominantly found among representatives of the Danish People’s Party and the Liberals. But also individual Muslim actors and other protesters of the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting interviewed express such views.

The final type of boundary drawing, which I shall highlight here, marks an outer limit of legitimate forms of intolerance expressed in the public sphere. This kind of boundary drawing was expressed in particular in connection with the counter-demonstration outside the National Library. As mentioned, although the demonstrators stood united outside the venue they did not protest for the same reasons or used the same kind of argumentation. Some had come to mark their disagreement and disgust with the meeting, but recognized Hizb ut-Tahrir’s basic right to hold the meeting, while others had come to mark intolerance of Hizb ut-Tahrir and believed that the meeting should have been stopped for some of the reasons discussed above. During the demonstration such differences in positioning came to the fore, as a group of skinhead activists started to shout racist statements at Muslims who were entering the National Library. This led to internal quarrels among the demonstrators, and the skinheads were ‘loudly told to shut up and go home’ by fellow demonstrators (BT 21-01-2011). In his speech at the demonstration one of the organizers, Lars Aslan Rasmussen said that ‘any racist or intolerant people at the demonstration should cross the street and join their friends inside the National Library’ (Interview 3). Thus, a boundary was drawn between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for non-toleration, excluding the racist positioning of the skinheads to the realm of the intolerable. Put in a different way, we can say that a boundary was drawn between liberal and illiberal forms of intolerance.

2.2. Case 2 – The visit of the ‘radical’ Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips

In the 53 articles collected on the Canadian preacher Bilal Philips’ visit to Copenhagen in April 2011, the coding procedure returned 91 instances of toleration boundary drawing. In contrast to case 1, the arguments in the public debate on Philips’ visit were skewed towards intolerance (52 vs. 39). The possible reasons for this difference are discussed in the comparative section 2.3. below. However, also the relative distribution of toleration and intolerance positions is somewhat different from case 1, as indicated by table 2. Nevertheless, it is basically the same kind of arguments of toleration boundary drawing that were put forward in the two public debates, which is not surprising given the two cases’ proximity in time and nature. For this reason, the following discussion of argumentative positioning in case 2 focuses on main differences and nuances as compared to case 1.
Table 2. Main arguments of toleration/intolerance in case 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toleration/intolerance code</th>
<th>Number of appearances in material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toleration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, but active protest</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because intervention would be counterproductive</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration as a must due to the rule of law</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because we need to challenge and reconfirm our values</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration as long as now physical harm is likely (Mills harm principle)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, but no obligation to promote intolerant views</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because of autonomy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of perceived threats and harm</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of liberal perfectionism</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance because of danger of slippery slope</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of concerns vis-à-vis cultural cohesion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance of illiberal intolerance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of need to maintain secular divide</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.1. Positions of tolerance

As indicated by table 2, the public debate surrounding Philips’ visit to Denmark showed much less importance of the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position, which was the dominant position of toleration in the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting. From a legal point of view, this is probably because the existing legal possibilities for intervention in the case of foreigners are larger than with regard to national citizens. As pointed out in the debate by legal scholar Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen: ‘It is always the sovereign right of states to deny entry on grounds of for example disturbance of public order’ (Berlingske 11-04-2011). Thus, there was no hindrance in the existing legal framework of having Philips stopped at the airport upon arrival and returned to his destination of departure, as it had happened to him in both Australia and Britain on prior occasions. As indicated, this did not happen in Denmark, although a number of actors, including MPs, local politicians, public intellectuals and newspapers, argued for exactly this move, among them Mayor of Children’s Affairs and Culture in Copenhagen, Pia Allerslev (Liberals): ‘When I realized that other countries, with which we normally compare, had denied him access I appealed to the government for the same reaction in Denmark. Because why does Denmark always have to be the ‘nice guy’ on these matters?’ (Interview 2).

One of the primary reasons that the legal possibilities of stopping Philips from speaking was not utilized was probably the strong advocacy of the position in the debate that such a move would be counter-productive. Here the memory of Geert Wilders denial of entry to Britain in February 2009 played an important role. Karen Hækkerup (Social Democrats) argued along these lines:

*Imagine that he is denied access, but turns up and pulls a ‘Geert Wilders’, making a media stunt which would only further diffuse his views. It will be much more effective to meet his views with protest and argumentation* (Information 12-04-2011).
As indicated by the last part of the quote and table 2, the ‘toleration-but-protest’ position also played a significant role in the debate on Philips’ visit. The main organiser of the counter demonstration outside the meeting venue was again Lars Aslan Rasmussen (Social Democrats), who like with the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting argued a need to visualize to Muslim adolescents ‘that an alternative to radical views exists’ (Interview 3). However, in this case Lars Aslan Rasmussen had done anything ‘politically possible’ to stop the meeting with Philips from taking place, thus, demonstrating as a last resort (Interview 3).

2.2.2. Positions of intolerance

In terms of intolerance positions it was in case 2 the same two dominant positions – ‘intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm’ and the modalities of ‘liberal intolerance’ – as in case 1. Thus, one basic conclusion to be drawn is that these modalities of intolerance are fundamental to the boundary drawing vis-à-vis Muslim non-institutionalized political participation in Denmark today.

In terms of ‘liberal intolerance’, arguments that Philips represents ‘backwards’ and ‘illiberal’ views, practices and identities unfitted for modern liberal democracy – arguments very similar to those raised against Hizb ut-Tahrir – were relatively common in the public debate (coded ten times) and in interviews (Interview 2, 3, 5, 7). Philips’ views on women, homosexuals and Jihadism cannot be tolerated, it was argued, as they undermine fundamental liberal principles of equality, autonomy and secularism.

Although the basic argumentative figure of the ‘intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm’ likewise was the same in the two cases, a difference can be identified in the threat scenarios constructed. Where the risk of direct physical harm against Danish soldiers was highlighted in the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting, the threat from Philips was more seen to stem from future radicalization among Muslim adolescents who would be inspired by his views. Furthermore, several actors stressed that it was an aggravating circumstance that the Islamic Faith Community was the sponsor of the event, as it is often perceived as a relatively mainstream and integrationist Muslim organization. Later Minister of Equality, Manu Sareen (Social Liberals) argued:

*When the Islamic Faith Community is the organizer, it can seem like an approval of Philips’ views. Marginalized, young Muslim adolescents can all of a sudden get the impression that it is okay to hate Jews and homosexuals* (Ekstra Bladet 11-04-2011).

As I shall argue below this perceived aggravating circumstance was one of the main reasons boundary drawing was skewed more towards intolerance in case 2 than in case 1.

A last argument of intolerance, which I will highlight here (absent in case 1), is the position that by tolerating Philips spreading his views in public we will enter a slippery slope which will slowly erode the liberal democratic society we praise (coded eight times). In many ways this argument is the intolerant counterpart of the classic liberal argument for toleration that if society intervenes to stop practices that are disliked, pressure will build to repress more and more practices, in the end undermining freedoms and liberties. With regard to Philips it was argued that non-intervention in the name of ‘misunderstood tolerance’ would allow repression of women, homosexuals and more moderate Muslims to flourish, eventually leading to ‘Sharia zones’ and ‘ungovernable spaces’ (Interview 3; Interview 7; Berlingske 15-04-2011). One reason this particular position is found to be influential in case 2, and not in case 1, could be the perception that Philips as an internationally renounced authority of Islam would be more likely to influence wider circles of Muslims than Hizb ut-Tahrir (see also next section).

2.3. Comparing Main Positions in the two Cases

Reading across the two cases, and the main discursive positions on toleration boundary drawing articulated, what springs to mind immediately are the many similarities. I will reflect on four such
similarities here, before turning to the most important differences. First, it is striking how closely public debates on the limits of tolerance are linked to issues of free speech in the Danish context. This has to do with the kind of cases investigated here – public meetings where controversial views are articulated – but also with Danish political culture, which has traditionally been characterized by strong endorsements of free speech. The 2005-2006 Danish cartoon controversy to a large degree reaffirmed this tradition (Lindekilde 2009). This coupling of toleration and free speech regulation helps explain the prominent position of the toleration-as-a-must argument in the two cases. In this perspective toleration becomes a matter of legality rather than moral considerations, political opinions, etc.

Second, both cases exemplify the importance of radicalization scenarios to debates of toleration vis-à-vis Muslim actors’ political participation today. In both cases the views articulated at the meetings are construed as radical, posing a threat to integration, social cohesion and potentially to security (providing the breeding ground for violent extremism). In the radicalization scenarios constructed a direct line seems to run from attitudes and opinions to actions. Thus, the young Muslims attending the meetings are accordingly constructed as both ‘at risk’ in terms of integration and potentially ‘risky’ in terms of security (see Heath-Kelly 2011). This is the underlying logic of the intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm position playing a prominent role in both debates. In this way radicalization scenarios work to narrow the room of toleration by excluding to the realm of intolerance, practices and views, which are not forbidden by law, due to their potential destabilization of security.

Third, the absence of a particular position in both cases is striking. A prominent position, when debating in Denmark similar public meetings and marches arranged by the far right, at least until the terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya in June 2011, has been the view that such racist and neo-Nazi views should be met with silence. The best way to combat such ideas is not intolerance or tolerance-but-protest, but simply to ignore the events and meetings. However, when it comes to controversial meetings arranged by Muslim actors it seems as if the marking of toleration boundaries has become increasingly important. This, I believe, has to do with the interdependence between toleration boundary drawing and mechanisms of ‘othering’ (see also section 4 below). Islam, and in particular radical Islam, serves in Denmark, as in many other Western countries today, as the main ‘other’, which constitutes the negative opposite of the ‘us’ and its positive traits (Schiffauer 2012: 2). In this perspective marking the boundaries of toleration becomes also an issue of necessary identity maintenance, and ignoring the meetings become unfeasible.

Fourthly, the interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing in the two cases and othering of Muslims in Denmark, also helps to explain the prominent role played by ‘modalities of liberal intolerance’ in both cases (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012). These arguments of intolerance are exactly characterized by reference to not just the illiberal views and practices articulated at the meetings, but to the illiberal identities and ways of life they exemplify, which are deemed in opposition to ‘our’ liberal and democratic norms and principles. In this way toleration boundary drawing becomes entangled with the prescription of particular liberal virtues and identities which must be shared. By highlighting the liberal way of life and enforcing it on others these arguments squeeze the room of toleration.

Despite these significant similarities across the two cases, important differences also exist, not least regarding the overall distribution of toleration boundary drawing in the debates with case 2 being more skewed towards intolerance than case 1. What can explain this observed pattern? A number of interviewees pointed to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad regarding the two meetings.

At the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, the senders of the invitation and the message entailed are, despite the problematization hereof, Danish citizens. Bilal Philips is a foreign citizen, who came to Denmark to speak only to leave again right after. This seems to make a difference to toleration boundary drawing. The mayor of Children’s Affairs and Culture in Copenhagen, Pia Allerslev (Liberals) puts it this way:
Negotiating Limits of Tolerance in Public Debates in Denmark

You should not just be allowed to come and stir up emotions and then leave again. I have more respect for Hizb ut-Tahrir, because they have stakes in this. They will be held accountable for what they say tomorrow and in a year (Interview 2).

The quote shows, maybe not very surprising, how the limits of toleration are dependent on the subject of toleration’s citizenship position and embeddedness in Danish society. However, the comparison of the two cases also shows that the limits of toleration are linked to the tolerator’s expectations to the subject of toleration. Thus, the fact that the organizers of Bilal Philips’ visit, Islamic Faith Community and its youth section, are involved in a number of collaborations with local authorities and like to present themselves as integrationists bridging cultures, led to disappointed expectations hampering toleration of their engagement with Philips. In fact, it was by many deemed to be an aggravating circumstance that the Islamic Faith Community by being conceived of and treated as a relative ‘mainstream’ Muslim actor was legitimizing the views of Philips.

Regarding the intended and perceived message of the two meetings, several interviewees point to the difference between raising issues of homophobia, gender inequality and endorsement of terrorism (case 2) and challenging Danish engagement in Afghanistan (case 1). The difference highlighted is that if you disregard the provocative invitation to the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, the articulated criticism of Danish foreign policy resonates with significant parts of the majority population in Denmark, while Bilal Philips’ views resonate with very few in majority society (and within the Muslim minority). As indicated by one interviewee; ‘I think it is legitimate to question Danish engagement in Afghanistan and believe that there should be room to air criticism’ (Interview 3). In short: Toleration boundary drawing seems also to be dependent on distribution of support for the issue/object of toleration.

Finally, a difference in the targeted audience of the two meetings is pointed out:

With Hizb ut-Tahrir we know more less who they appeal to. But with Philips the Islamic Faith Community legitimized that a much broader crowd of young Muslims could come and listen out of interest. When you show up at HT meetings you declare much clearer that you share their views (Interview 2)

In other words, the fact that the Bilal Philips meeting targeted a much bigger audience of ‘ordinary’ young Muslims than the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting was by many believed to make boundary drawing more acute in case 2.

3. The dynamics and strategies of toleration boundary drawing in the two cases

When trying to understand why particular actors draw toleration boundaries and legitimate boundary drawing as they do, important explanatory elements have been found to be the value system/ideology and the life world/experiences of the actor. Research has shown correlates between individuals’ general political orientation and beliefs, and their propensity to tolerate particular practices (Bang Pedersen, Slothuus, Stubager & Togeby 2007). Likewise, research has shown, although less clearly, a connection between individuals’ lived experiences with particular practices and their propensity to tolerate them (Frølund Thomsen 2012). Other research has shown how the context and specificities of practices (e.g. public vs. private; Christian vs. Muslim symbols etc.) matter to toleration boundary drawing in practice (Aarøe 2012). However, much less researched and understood is how the dynamics of engaging in public debates help to shape toleration boundary drawing and positioning.

And, in addition, how discursive strategies are employed to legitimize positions, cope with pressures of boundary drawing and refute counter-arguments. Thus, my argument in the following section is that the interactive nature of public debates generates relative positioning of actors, which co-determine the toleration boundary drawing of actors and the discursive strategies used to legitimize it and cope with pressures. In the following I will highlight across the two cases three such dynamics or discursive strategies of dealing with toleration boundary drawing.
3.1 From Political to Legal Boundary drawing

The first prominent discursive strategy of dealing with toleration boundary drawing can be seen by looking at the argumentative strategies of the two primary ministers involved in the debates – Minister of Justice, Lars Barfoed (Conservatives), and Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller (Conservatives). When the news of the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting first broke, journalists approached the ministers for a comment and asked about their view on toleration boundary drawing in this specific case. Lars Barfoed initially responded by stating his disapproval of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting, but argued that any substantial boundary drawing had to be done by legal experts and the courts. Thus, he asked the State Attorney’s office to look into the matter. This move had at least two strategic advantages for the minister. First, by asking the State Attorney to investigate (like it had been done on two earlier occasions) if Hizb ut-Tahrir could be banned, he signaled action and a degree of intolerance of the meeting, while at the same time upholding basic liberal freedoms and the rule of law. Second, the move shifted the responsibility for boundary drawing from the political to the legal arena. In doing so the minister avoided having to choose between either ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ or ‘intolerance-because-of-threat-and-harm’, which were the two main positions he was trying to balance. Interpreted as a strategic move, the transformation of a political issue into a legal one, helped the Minister of Justice bypass a decision, which would most certainly be criticized no matter what position he ended up taking.

In a very similar manner, the Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller, responded by shifting the responsibility of boundary drawing from the public and political arena to the semi-private arena. This was done by calling upon the venue owner, the National Library, to reconsider the decision to rent the venue to Hizb ut-Tahrir. Again, this move seems strategically favorable from the perspective of the minister as it signals action, shifts responsibility and avoids difficult political decision-making here and now. The director of the National Library, Erland Kolding Nielsen, responded by trying to shift responsibility back to the politicians by calling for clearer policy guidelines for such situations. Kolding Nielsen argues: ‘Drawing the limits of tolerance and freedom of speech is most certainly a political responsibility. You cannot expect a public employee to do this on behalf of the Minister, the government or the majority’ (interview 1). In the interview Kolding Nielsen links this strategy of pushing responsibility downwards in the bureaucratic system to a more general tendency, which he refers to as ‘the syndrome of increasing responsibility avoidance’ (interview 1).

In both debates this kind of strategic shifting of responsibility for boundary drawing and blame avoidance, was criticized by several actors, not least the Danish People’s Party. Representatives of the party on several occasions called upon the two ministers to ‘step up’, ‘take responsibility’, ‘be more proactive’ and, thus, intervene to stop the meeting (Ritzau 10-04-2011; Berlingske Tidende 9-03-2011). If necessary the relevant ministers should change the legal framework to make it possible to intervene, it was argued. Through their outspoken criticism of the political handling of the meeting, The Danish People’s Party tried to position itself as the only ones with the political courage to clearly draw boundaries and intervene to stop Hizb ut-Tahrir. However, others, like Lars Aslan Rasmussen (Social Democrats), shared the view that toleration boundary drawing was in fact a clearly political responsibility, which should not be delegated to legal or private arenas; ‘Of course politicians should have an opinion as to whether or not this is okay. That is our job’ (Interview 3).

This dynamic positioning in the debate, I will argue, exemplifies how the two ministers used their political power and position to sidestep a politically controversial issue, while The Danish People’s Party, as well as members of the central-left opposition, embraced the issue to score political points by drawing boundaries, either for or against toleration of the meetings. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s strategy in the debate was clearly to provoke a public outcry and thereby force the political elite to react and negotiate limits of tolerance. The invitation to the meeting and the choice of venue was, as indicated, deliberately designed to stir up emotions. From Hizb ut-Tahrir’s perspective this strategy of deliberate provocation created a ‘win-win situation’ for the organization. Either the political elite would intervene and stop the meeting, which would make possible an argument of victimage and freedom of
speech violation (cf. the ‘intolerance-as-counter-productive’ position). Or the political elite would tolerate the meeting, giving Hizb ut-Tahrir a public and heavily medialized platform to spread their views.

3.2 Securitization: Pushing boundary drawing into the realm of the extra-political

Securitization is another central discursive strategy of removing issues at hand from the realm of politics that is employed in both cases. In line with the Copenhagen School of security studies, securitization can be seen as ‘speech acts that frame the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). Thus, by making an issue a matter of security, securitizing actors close down politics and push the issue into the realm of ‘exception, emergency and decision’ (Waever 2011: 651). Through the creation of particular radicalization scenarios of the two meetings, a number of actors across the political spectrum argue that the matter at hand is really not about toleration of dissident views, but about security and risk management. Although the Danish Intelligence Service in both cases found no imminent risk connected to the meetings, these actors stress the potential threat to security posed by allowing the meetings to take place, and thereby attempt to push the issue of toleration boundary drawing out of normal politics. Here securitization functions as a discursive strategy which constructs decision making and boundary drawing as necessary and extra-political. The meetings pose potential security threats and therefore they must be avoided. When successful, securitization functions as a conversation stopper – the debate of the limits of toleration become irrelevant as the issue at hand is framed as calling for extra-political measures. As shown, strategies of securitization were linked to the position of ‘intolerance-due-to-threat-and-harm’, which was the main position of intolerance in both cases. However, the securitization of the two meetings was not complete, and in several ways challenged, as testified to by the diverse arguments put forward in the debates.

In the case of the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting the strategy of securitization was easily applied with reference to the direct and existential threat posed by the supposed appeal to violence against Danish soldiers in Afghanistan. But the strategy of securitization is, as exemplified clearly by the constructed radicalization scenarios in the two cases, not limited to imminent existential threats. Thus, more indirect and lagged threats to integration and social cohesion can also be securitized. In fact, the Bilal Philips case shows how securitization can work to problematize, not just the direct exponent of radical and supposable security-threatening views (Bilal Philips), but also anybody engaged with such actors (The Islamic Faith Community). Despite all arguments by the Islamic Faith Community that they had invited Philips due to his expertise on islamophobia, and repeated public statements distancing the community from homophobia and violence against women, the invitation of Philips was securitized, said to show ‘the true face of the Islamic Faith Community’ (interview 2). In this way the Islamic Faith Community was found ‘guilty by association’, and accordingly constructed as a latent security threat due to its ‘two-faced Islamists’ who pose as tolerant, but who in fact have a ‘hidden agenda’ of using the principles of democracy to undermine them (Interview 3). By introducing doubt vis-à-vis the sincerity of statements and motives of Muslim actors the strategy of securitization poses serious challenges to Muslim actors’ possibilities to participate at face value in public debates and engaging in rational discussion (see also section 4 below).

3.3 Strategies of Coping among Muslim Actors: Reframing, Adaptation and Avoidance

In terms of the discursive strategies used by the main Muslim actors in the two cases – Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Faith Community – three strategies can be identified that seek to counter securitization, shift responsibility, perform safety and avoid boundary drawing.

The first coping strategy I will call ‘reframing’. For example, as a response to the argument that the organization was inciting violence and putting Danish soldiers at risk one spokesman of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Sharif Redji, said: If there is anybody to blame for the fact that Danish soldiers are dying in a
pointless battle in Afghanistan, it is Danish politicians who have cynically chosen to send them on a mission, which only serves American strategic interests in the regions (Ritzau 28-12-2010). Here the spokesman is trying to shift responsibility and blame to the political elite, and recast the object of debate and toleration from Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting to politicians’ decision to send troops to Afghanistan. In a similar manner, another spokesman, Chadi Freigh, argued that: When the people of Afghanistan defend themselves against aggressions from the occupying forces you cannot blame them. It is their right to defend their lives (Ritzau 21-01-2011). By reframing the armed resistance of the Afghan people away from terrorism and towards legitimate self-defense, Hizb ut-Tahrir is tying in with and challenging dominant arguments and positions in the debate. In a way the securitization strategy is turned upside down by recasting the threat to security as caused by decisions made by the political elite.

The second coping strategy employed by Muslim actors – which I will call ‘adaptation’ – is most visible in regard to the Bilal Philips meeting. Faced with intense criticism, securitization attempts and a public debate skewed towards intolerance, the Islamic Faith Community, personalized in their spokesperson, Imran Shah, was under severe pressure to distance itself from Bilal Philips. In the hours before Philips’ speech this was done by publicly declaring that the community regretted having invited Philips. Imran Shah said:

*If we could do it all over we would not have invited him. It is not fruitful for the dialogue here in Denmark that we have demonstrations outside Korsgadehallen [the venue of the meeting]. On the other hand we will not be dictated* (B.T. 18-04-2011; Interview 4).

This move can be understood as an attempt to cope with intense pressure by acknowledging mistakes and adapting to articulated boundaries. In this perspective regretting the invitation is seen as a sign of learning and readjustment to mainstream formulations of the limits of tolerance. However, critics argue that it is a purely strategic move designed to maintain privileges, because ‘if they [the Islamic Faith Community] are cut off from close dialogue with politicians at the town hall they lose all their power and influence in the community’ (Interview 2).

Besides airing remorse for having invited Philips, the Islamic Faith Community also tried to adapt to pressures by ‘performing safety’ (Mythen 2011). Performing safety is a discursive (or behavioral) strategy meant to signal safety in the face of securitization. One example is the move of the Islamic Faith Community to arrange for coffee and cake for the demonstrators outside the meeting venue (Interview 4). Nobody who meets their opponents with coffee and cake can be truly dangerous. Rather they signal peaceful coexistence and respect. The ability to perform safety seems important as a way of countering securitization and trying to influence negotiations of the toleration boundary drawing among Muslim actors in public debates today.

The last identified coping strategy has to do with Muslim actors who avoid drawing boundaries essential to toleration/non-toleration. In the debate regarding Bilal Philips, spokesperson of the Islamic Faith Community, Imran Shah, was heavily criticized for not answering directly if the community supports the beating of women or the view that homosexuals should be punished by death, as suggested by elements of Sharia law. In a number of interviews he argued that these questions were irrelevant as ‘we are in Denmark, and here the Danish constitution applies and not Sharia’ (Interview 4). By insisting on a fundamental distinction between evaluating certain practices and views in a Muslim versus a non-Muslim context, Shah is avoiding having to either dismiss aspects of Sharia law or openly endorse Bilal Philips’ views. However, the lack of clear boundary drawing was by many commentators read as constituting support of Philips’ views. In the words of former Minister of Integration, Birthe Rønn hornbech (Liberals):  

*As long as the Islamic Faith Community does not speak out against the views of Philips, but instead refuses to answer simple questions, believing that these vital questions are irrelevant, we can only conclude that that the Islamic Faith Community accepts these views* (Berlingske 14-04-2011).
4. Effects of public boundary drawing on Muslim actors’ exercise of political rights

In this section we shift focus from the content and strategies of toleration boundary drawing in the debates, and focus instead on the effects this boundary drawing can be said to have on Muslim actors’ possibilities for participation in future public debates. My basic argument is that although the controversies regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting and Bilal Philips’ visit did not generate any concrete policy implication, which directly altered Hizb ut-Tahrir’s or the Islamic Faith Community’s (or other Muslim actors) possibilities of using public meetings as a platform for political claims making, there seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, I argue, with the fundamental interdependence of tolerance boundary drawing and processes of othering (Schiffauer 2012: 2-3). Tolerance boundary drawing implies othering, as it functions to differentiate the realm of the recognizable normal and tolerable from the foreign and intolerable. When drawing toleration boundaries we are at the same time constructing an in-group and an out-group. As the differences that generate public debate and activate toleration boundary drawing today primarily are differences of Muslim views and practices, the main out-group constructed is that of the ‘Muslim other’. Often it is Muslims in general who are designated as the ‘other’, covering up important differences within the Muslim community.

One way this interdependence between toleration boundary drawing and processes of othering affects the Danish Muslim community was suggested by Per Ørum Jørgensen from the Christian Democrats among others:

_I believe that the statements of Hizb ut-Tahrir and all the attention their meeting has received is most harmful to the many liberal, peaceful Muslims in Denmark, who too often are equated with extremist Islamists like Hizb ut-Tahrir. And after all, peaceful Muslims constitute the majority_ (Kristeligt Dagblad 19-01-2011)

The thrust of this argument is that the intense focus on toleration boundary drawing in regard to specific views/practices can lead to a lack of boundary drawing vis-à-vis internal differences in the Muslim community. The public drive to cast Hizb ut-Tahrir and its views and practices as intolerable, may implicitly lead to misrecognition of variation in views and practices within the Muslim community. Likewise, it was argued that the Islamic Faith Community by inviting Philips and not clearly denouncing his views e.g. on homosexuals ‘was taking moderate Muslims hostage’ and ‘undermining general trust’ (Interview 2). This indirect othering of all Muslims as potentially problematic may serve to delimit the possibilities of being tolerated as legitimate participants in public debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims. In the case material, the tendency to equate particular views and practices to all Muslims is in particular connected to the position of ‘liberal intolerance’, as boundary drawing here is less concerned with specific statements/practices, and more with liberal identities and general challenges posed to societal cohesion by cultural difference.

In a similar way, Zubair Butt Hussain, spokesman of the Danish moderate Islamic umbrella organization, The Muslim Common Council, used the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting to raise a principled issue of excommunication of Muslim actors through the labeling of actors as ‘radical’. Butt Hussain was arguing how he dared not go to the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, or other controversial arrangements or mosques in the Muslim milieu, as he said to ‘hear with his own ears what kind of nonsense they were preaching’, as this would most certainly lead the media and certain politicians to label him as ‘radical’ (Politiken 28-02-2011). Thus, the argument was that important limitations on Muslim actors’ maneuvering in public debates are inflicted through mechanisms of ‘guilt by association’. In other words, the fear of the label ‘radical’, which can have great consequences for Muslim actors with ambitions to participate in political life, leads to self-censorship in terms of argumentation and participation in particular events. At a more general level, the debate highlighted how the discourse of radicalization and connected strategies of securitization may shrink the room of tolerance for Muslim actors participating in public debate (see also Lindekilde & Kühle 2012).
A further effect of the great outrage regarding the two meetings on Muslim actors’ possibilities for participation in political life was suggested by Butt Hussain. Asked about the possibilities of participating in public debates as a Muslim he answered:

*I would say that a different set of premises or unwritten rules apply to Muslims in public debates as compared to others. When I speak about radicalization, terror or integration, I do so from a predefined vision of what Islam is about and how it should be practiced. This is why I am constantly asked to distance myself from a range of scary interpretations of Islam and Muslim practices before I am allowed to talk about the particular topic in question. This is really constraining* (Politiken 28-02-2011)

As a Muslim actor you are, Butt Hussain argues, expected proactively to endorse central liberal values (freedom of speech; gender equality; non-violence; secularism; rule of law etc.), and dismiss certain illiberal ideas and values (Sharia; support of violent jihad; gender segregation; homophobia etc.) as a prerequisite for participation in public debates and political life. If you fail to do this or dismiss it as irrelevant to the question at hand, Muslims risk being excommunicated and having their ‘moderateness’ or ‘liberalness’ drawn into question. Thus, an indirect effect of the intense public debate about the illiberal views and practices of Hizb ut-Tahrir or Bilal Philips is that more liberal Muslims are forced to spend time and resources distancing themselves from certain views and practices, and endorsing others, before they are certified as tolerable and legitimate public debaters. Put another way, Muslims are forced to discursively ‘perform safety’ and certify boundaries in order to be accepted as part of the in-group. In this way the boundary drawing regarding ‘radical’ Muslim actors in public debates generates special conditions for participation vis-à-vis also ‘moderate’ Muslims actors.

That special conditions for participation and argumentation exist for the out-group of Muslim actors is further underlined by the fact that toleration boundary drawing in practice often varies from group to group. As pointed out in several interviews, the same kind of views and practices seem to be unimportant and tolerable differences when practiced by in-group actors, but significant and intolerable differences when performed by the out-group (see also Schiffauer 2012: 11). Concretely it is pointed out how the gender division at the two meetings, and in Muslim communities in general, is pointed out as intolerable, while the same practice in Jewish communities is rarely problematized (Interview 4). Likewise, while the tendency to isolate and create parallel societies among some Muslims is securitized, the same practice among Chinese immigrants is left uncommented (Interview 1). In practice this means to Muslim actors that certain practices and views cannot be defended without the actors losing legitimacy, although such practices and views are tolerated in other contexts.

Finally, as stressed in an interview with Lars Aslan Rasmussen, there can be negative effects on moderate Muslim voices of not drawing the boundaries of toleration clearly enough vis-à-vis ‘radical Islam’. Because if the majority society does not communicate boundaries clearly, e.g. by stopping Philips from entering the country or by outlawing Hizb ut-Tahrir, it ‘signals that anything goes, and then it becomes the most extreme voices within the Muslim community who dictate the direction’ (Interview 3). In other words, the absence of external boundary drawing affects possibilities of internal boundary drawing.

5. Conclusion

This report has argued that in Denmark the limits to tolerance of ethnic and religious difference in political life have been most significantly challenged in recent years by the non-institutionalized political participation of ‘radical Muslim’ actors, who through public meetings have pushed controversial views and practices into the public sphere. The report has investigated the negotiations of toleration boundary drawing as it plays out in public debates by comparing the arguments and
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discursive strategies put forward in regard to the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting at the Danish National Library and the visit of the Islamic preacher Bilal Philips to Copenhagen both in 2011. Based on this comparison a number of conclusions can be reached. First, it is found that despite the proximity in time and resemblances of the illiberal and undemocratic views aired at the two meetings, the public debate regarding the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting was skewed towards tolerance while the debate regarding Bilal Philips’ visit was skewed toward intolerance. In explaining this difference the report points to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad of the two meetings. The significance of intolerance arguments in connection with Philips’ visit is connected to the fact that 1) Philips is a foreign citizen, 2) his views on homosexuality and gender equality resonated purely with audiences in Denmark (as compared to the criticism of Danish engagement in Afghanistan aired by Hizb ut-tahrir), and 3) that the audience at Philips’ lecture was perceived to be much wider than the audience at the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting, due to Philips’ international status as an Islamic authority, and because of the perceived ‘mainstream’ status of the Islamic Faith Community, who invited him to Denmark. Thus, it can be concluded that toleration boundary drawing is shaped significantly by the citizenship status and the perceived impact of the object of toleration.

Secondly, the comparison shows a number of recurrent positions of tolerance/intolerance across the two cases and involved actors. In both cases the two most prominent positions of tolerance are what I have called ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ and ‘tolerance-but-protest’. The prominence of these positions, it has been argued, are linked to the importance of free speech considerations in Danish political culture, which connects toleration boundary drawing narrowly with legal limitations on free speech, and a widespread view that views and practices which are disapproved of are best challenged by debating them in public and marking opposition. However, it is also found that the public marking of opposition depends on who is the object of toleration, as views and practices deemed controversial among Muslim actors are left uncommented when practiced among other groups. This has to do, the report argues, with the important interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing and mechanisms of othering, with Islam and Muslims, especially ‘radical’ Islam, posing as the significant other in a Danish context today. Regarding the most dominant positions of intolerance these are in both cases found to be ‘intolerance-due-to-perceived-threat-and-harm’ and modalities of ‘liberal intolerance’. In both cases radicalization scenarios of the meetings are constructed and linked to a discursive strategy of securitization, which attempts to push toleration boundary drawing out of the political arena and into the realm of the extra-political. The meetings hereby become, it is argued, not a matter of political or moral boundary drawing, but of security concerns, and toleration is therefore not an option. The prominence of the modalities of ‘liberal intolerance, I argue, has to do again with the interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing and mechanisms of othering. These arguments of intolerance are exactly characterized by reference to not just the illiberal views and practices articulated at the meetings, but to the illiberal identities and ways of life they exemplify, which are deemed in opposition to ‘our’ liberal and democratic norms and principles. In this way toleration boundary drawing becomes entangled with the prescription of particular liberal virtues and identities which must be shared.

Thirdly, the comparison of the two cases points to a number of recurrent discursive strategies of positioning and coping with public pressures of boundary drawing. Here the report highlights three such strategies: 1) the attempts by leading politicians to make boundary drawing a matter of legality rather than politics, 2) the attempts to securitize the meetings by especially actors on the political centre-right, and thereby remove boundary drawing from normal politics, and 3) the attempts by some Muslim actors to reframe the issue at hand, perform security in the face of securitization and avoid clear boundary drawing by recasting the terms of debate.

Finally, the report points to a number of potential effects that public toleration boundary drawing may have on the room of maneuvering of Muslim actors in political life in Denmark. Most importantly it is showed how the marking of opposition to certain illiberal views and practices, and connected mechanisms of othering, may squeeze the room of tolerance for also more ‘moderate’ Muslim actors in the public sphere. Often opposition and boundary drawing in public debates are made in regard to
Islam in general, not paying attention to the important internal differentiations of the Muslim community in Denmark, which forces also ‘progressive’ Muslim voices to confirm certain liberal views/practices and disconfirm specific illiberal ones in order to be accepted as legitimate participants in public debates. Even if this is done, the report shows, the prospect of having ones arguments taken at face value as a Muslim actor is challenged by a widespread view that Muslim actors speak with ‘two tongues’.
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Berlingske Tidende, 09.03.2011. Pia Kjærgaard: Jeg ved, at Per Stig Møller kan, men han gider sgu ikke.
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Kristeligt Dagblad, 19.01.2011. Skal offentlige institutioner lægge hus til ekstremisters møder?
Politiken, 28.02.2011. Skal jeg tage afstand fra stening resten af livet?
Annex I Coding Scheme

a. ‘Recognition/inclusion to the realm of the normal’: Arguments that a certain practice/view is valuable, and within the limits of normality. It should be more than just tolerated – it should be recognized and respected.

b. ‘Teethgrinding tolerance’: Arguments that a certain practice/view should be tolerated and intervention avoided, even though one disagrees and finds the practice/view wrong.

Six modalities:
- **Rule of law**: as long as a particular practice, speech act or organization is not prohibited by law we **must** tolerate it.
- **Mills harm principle**: A certain practice or speech act should be tolerated as long as it does not pose any physical danger.
- **Autonomy**: a practice or view should be tolerated as long as the participants have chosen to participate out of free will. Individual liberties cannot be bent or applied with double standards.
- **Pragmatism/avoiding backfire**: certain practices/views should be tolerated because outlawing/intervention might not work – it could even be counterproductive and create more societal conflict.
- **Free market of ideas**: we should tolerate practices and views we do not like, and let them into the public in order to let the ‘invisible hand’ of free ideas deal with them. Also, we can never be 100% sure that our ideas are the ‘right’ ideas.
- **Dead dogma**: We should tolerate practices/views we do not like, in order to keep our own values alive by having to defend them, test them etc.

c. ‘Intolerance’: Arguments that a certain practice/view is intolerable and intervention legitimate.

- **Intolerance based on perceived threats and harm**: We know it can be potentially dangerous and this is enough not to tolerate and to legitimize intervention. It is a threat to us. Or: practices/views should not be tolerated as they disturb public order and create an outcry, hurt feelings etc.
- **Intolerance based on danger of a slippery slope**: If we tolerate this then what will be next? Intervention is legitimized because boundaries will otherwise be pushed too far.
- **Intolerance on illiberal grounds**: prejudice, islamophobia, racism, neo-nationalism. Our values/practices are simply superior which needs no further legitimation

**Liberal intolerance** – three different sub-modalities:
- Intolerance based on concerns regarding cultural cohesion in society, parallel societies, the need of leitkultur etc. Calls for shared values, outlooks and practices, not just the acceptance of shared institutions and laws.
- Intolerance based on concerns of keeping the public sphere neutral/universal, and maintaining the secular divide between a (religious) private sphere and a (irreligious) public sphere. Intolerance based on perceptions of how citizens should act/be in the public sphere. Individuals should fit with this ‘privatised’model.
- Intolerance as liberal perfectionism: intolerance of citizens who do not qualify as liberal people, who do not practice liberalism as an identity, who are not sufficiently autonomous,
reasonable, deliberative and religious in the right reflective, individualistic way. Legitimation of intervention, disciplining and shaping of citizens in a liberal direction.
Annex II List of interviewees

1) Erland Kolding Nielsen, Director of the Danish National Library. 23-03-2012
2) Pia Allerslev (Liberals), Mayor of Children’s Affairs and Culture, Municipality of Copenhagen. 11-04-2012
3) Lars Aslan Ramussen (Social Democrat), Member of the City Council of Copenhagen. 12-04-2012.
4) Imran Shah, Spokesperson for the Islamic Faith Community. 20-04-2012.
5) Jacob Mchangama, Chief legal advisor in the liberal think tank CEPOS. 20-04-2012.
7) Martin Henriksen (Danish People’s Party), MP. 21-04-2012.