Intolerant discourses about migrants in Catalan politics

Flora Burchianti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero
GRITIM - Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona – Spain
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FLORA BURCHIANTI AND RICARD ZAPATA-BARRERO

GRITIM-UPF
UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA, BARCELONA

Work Package 4 – National Case Studies of Challenges to Tolerance in Political Life

D4.1 Final Country Reports on Concepts and Practices of Tolerance Addressing Cultural Diversity in Political Life
Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators’ Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country’s performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLULARISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

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GRITIM – Grupo de Investigación Interdisciplinario sobre Inmigración, in English Interdisciplinary Research Group in Immigration (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, UPF) – is a multi-departmental group led by Professor Ricard Zapata-Barrero and made up of researchers from different disciplines interested in aspects of innovation in research and management of change processes arising from human mobility and immigration.

Ricard Zapata-Barrero is associate professor of political theory at the Department of Political and Social Sciences. His main lines of research deal with contemporary issues of liberal democracy in contexts of diversity, especially the relationship between democracy, citizenship and immigration. He is Director of the GRITIM (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration) and the Master Programme on immigration management at UPF.

For more see: http://dcpis.upf.edu/~ricard-zapata/

Flora Burchianti is post-doctoral researcher at GRITIM - Universitat Pompeu Fabra, for which she participates to the research project ACCEPT PLURALISM. She is also associate researcher of the Centre Emile Durkheim, Sciences Po Bordeaux, France. Her main research interests include social movements supporting immigrants locally and how immigration reshapes territorial belonging and citizenship in host countries.

Contact details:
Prof. Ricard Zapata-Barrero
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Political and Social Sciences
c/ Trias Fargas 25-27
08005 Barcelona, Spain
Telf: + 34 93 542 22 56
E-mail: ricard.zapata@upf.edu - flora.burchianti@upf.edu
http://www.upf.edu/gritim/

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Executive Summary

Aim of the report

Spain has become the first country of immigration in Europe and has received more than 4 million immigrants since 2000. But unlike other European countries, no important extreme-right party in terms of electoral results has existed in the country since the re-establishment of a democratic regime at the end of the 1970s. In addition Spanish policy toward immigrants settled in the country is said to be fairly progressive, in particular because of the usefulness of migrants for Spanish economy and welfare system. But the financial crisis experienced by the country since 2008 is setting up a new deal for how Spanish politics is managing migration issues and cultural diversity. This new situation deserves to be examined from the angle of political discourses. During the two last years, coinciding with the economic crisis in Spain and several electoral campaigns, anti-immigrant and intolerant political discourse in relation with migration have been at the forefront of public discourses. Intolerant statements have attracted differently media and public attention. While some have been almost ignored by media and other political actors, others have attracted a huge public and media attention and created important controversies. How to deal with the rise of non-toleration is undoubtedly one of the main challenges that face Spanish politics for the years coming.

Case study

The study focuses on Catalonia due to its particular position within Spain. Catalonia is the first autonomous community to have experienced important immigration flows, especially since the late nineties. It is still one of the autonomous communities with the main proportion of resident foreigners (15.7%) and the second community regarding the proportion of non-communitarian foreigners (11.7%). The Catalan policy toward migrants has always been considered as the most integrative policy in Spain and a model of acceptance at European level. The Catalan administration and its policies have always emphasised the acceptance of migrants, especially by recognizing equal rights between nationals and immigrants and pressing the Spanish State for a more inclusive policy and the empowerment of autonomous communities. It also succeeded in articulating the definition of the Catalan citizenship to the reception of non-Catalan people (foreigners or Spanish) in a civic-inclusive way and not in an ethnic-exclusive way. In December 2008, the parliamentary groups, except Popular party, signed the National Agreement on immigration, which reaffirms their commitment for building inclusion along three lines: “Management of migratory flows and access to the job market”, “Adapting public services to a diverse society” and “Integration in a common public culture”. But, despite its fairly progressive and comprehensive policy toward migrants, Catalonia has also experienced several important local controversies about migration in the last years. The report focuses on three of these controversies which serve as an entry to understand the discursive repertoires of intolerance toward migrants and also to understand the context in which these discourses are put forward. The three controversies are:

- The local exclusion from city census and basic welfare of undocumented immigrants in the city of Vic: In January 2010, the city council of Vic (Barcelona province, pop. 40,000) voted the ban of unauthorized migrants from the city census (padrón), which is the only way for them to access public welfare provisions and services (health, education, social services...). In Spain, this registration is a right and a duty no matter the administrative situation. The ban has raised an important debate in Spain about the right of municipalities to do so and about the possibility for undocumented immigrants to access basic rights.
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- **The “anti-Roma campaign” in the city of Badalona**: Candidates of the Popular Party to May 2011 municipal elections have put the anti-immigrant rhetoric at the centre of their campaign. This was particularly the case in the city of Badalona (pop. 215,000), a close suburb of Barcelona, in which the candidate and actual mayor of the town has based his campaign on targeting the Romanian Roma who have settled in the town for bringing insecurity, crime and incivility.

- **The “burqa” ban proposals in the city of Lleida and across Catalonia**: In 2010, several towns of Catalonia decided to vote proposals banning the wearing of religious veils covering the face, such as burqa and niqab, in public buildings. The first and most publicized case has been the one of the provincial capital of Lleida (pop. 131,000), ruled by the socialist party, and which ban has raised contention across the country. In this case, the contention was whether the ban proposals were stigmatizing migrants or, conversely, decisions enlightened by human rights values and ensuring security.

In addition, the absence of an electorate for far-right political parties in Spain is currently challenged in Catalonia, where a new far-right political party named the Platform for Catalonia (PxC), averse to migration and, above all, to resident Muslims, has been created in 2002. Although its electoral scores are still very weak in comparison with other European countries (2.4% voters at Catalan level), its audience is growing fast from an election to the next.

Catalonia thus undoubtedly appears as a “laboratory” for Spanish politics concerning issues related to cultural diversity.

**Method**

This report draws on a qualitative research methodology to study political discourses and policies which express intolerance toward migration and cultural diversity. The methodology chosen to research on this challenge combines a content analysis of secondary sources and semi-structured qualitative interviews.

Evidences from other scholars who demonstrated the non explicit and ambiguous presence of racism and prejudices in elite's public discourses have oriented the research towards the study of discourses accompanying policies and interviews rather than party manifestos or public texts which are much more controlled by the “political correctness” when it comes to migration and diversity issues. We also chose to examine altogether political discourses, policies and practices. What is the discourse accompanying the policy? Are all the policy-makers and representatives producing the same discourse on the topic? Is this discourse changing along the controversy which occurred? What are the counter-discourses and who is producing them? Focusing on controversies and policies and not only on explicit anti-immigrant discourse of far-right parties enables to emphasize the plurality of actors and topics involved.

The desk research has been conducted between September and November 2011 and consisted mainly in collecting secondary sources. Newspapers materials have been collected on the three cases studied for the period between January 2010 and June 2011 (end of municipal elections) in seven Spanish (3) and Catalan (4) newspapers. The second part of the desk research consisted in the collection and analysis of administrative, policy and civil society documents. We examined in particular: the minutes of the city councils of the case studies and Catalan parliament during the controversies, public positions of civil society organisations and public reports.

15 semi-structured interviews were carried out between November and December 201 with relevant actors who had taken part in one or more of the three controversies (10) and leaders of the main Catalan political parties (ICV, ERC, PSC, CiU and PP). The list of interviews and interview guide are provided in appendix.

**Main Findings**

The report focuses on two dimensions of intolerance embedded in political discourses on migration. Firstly, it focuses on the framing of the political discourses, especially during the three controversies...
studied. Secondly, it focuses on the role of political parties in the regulation of the discourse in Catalonia.

Framing processes offer a great resource to analyse the political discourses on migrants and cultural diversity in Catalonia. We have identified different modalities of what we call “intolerance” frames, defined as emphasizing the impossibility to maintain a tolerant attitude toward migrants (or particular groups of migrants) and the need to preserve the local society and its cohesion above the acceptance of migrants’ values, practices or accommodation. Intolerance is only one of the way in which migration and cultural diversity can be framed but we assume that this frame has been more and more present in public discourses since the economic crisis.

Each of the three local controversies appeals to different framing processes on the challenge which was supposedly faced by political representatives, each one being perceived as important for Catalan politics. Three principal “intolerance” frames are identified in the report.

1) Intolerance based on the perception of migration as bringing insecurity, delinquency and problems of coexistence.

2) Intolerance based on the definitions of migration as a threat for the cultural homogeneity of Catalonia and its fundamental values.

3) Intolerance based on a perception of migrants as competitors with locals for limited resources.

Through all these “intolerance” frames, migration is perceived as undermining the social cohesion and norms of civility that are attached to the local society. In the terms of non-toleration, the ones who are perceived as “others” then have to merge in the local society (if possible) or be excluded from it so as to preserve cohesion.

In the political landscape of Catalonia, two different discourses claim to halt the toleration that has been implemented so far toward migrants. They both start from considering that migration and cultural diversity come along with problems posed to the social cohesion, and cannot be only perceived as positive for the society. But while some express non-toleration to practices and values of migrants they deem problematic, the discourse of others go beyond non-toleration to express exclusion, rejection or hate toward (groups of) migrants or religious minorities (Muslims) per se.

The case studies evidence that non-toleration toward migrants is increasingly expressed by representatives of mainstream parties. Anti-immigrant statements would be a manner to test the limits of what can be said or not about migration in Catalan politics. Emerging political discourses stretch the limits of intolerance toward migrants. The second part of the analysis then focuses on party politics to provide elements which help understanding the rise of intolerance. Unlike other countries the influence of the radical-right remains limited and the demand for tough discourse and policy on immigration is ambiguous. However, the succession of electoral campaigns during the years 2010-2011 in Catalonia, in combination with the financial crisis, has undoubtedly created opportunities for a change of discourse toward migrants. The relative novelty of international migration and the rather tolerant discourse about the “usefulness” of migrants which prevailed during the years 2004-2008, are challenged now by the raise of intolerance frames. The most interesting feature of this situation is the laissez-faire policy and the trivialisation of the issue done by the political and administrative leaders.

We thus shift our attention toward the organisational dynamics of political parties that could influence the way in which the issue is framed. Firstly, the presence of racism in Catalan politics is discarded by political leaders who understand intolerance as an electioneering strategy. The trivialization of intolerance and racism then explains in part the laissez-faire policy. Secondly, the organisation of parties as stratacheries, with an important autonomy within the party of local and Catalan levels,
explains also the lack of mobilisation and sanctions against the representatives who express intolerance even if it goes against party's ideology.

This evidences the importance of the context and of partisan dynamics when it comes to understanding the use of intolerance frames in the political life. In Catalonia, we understand that intolerance toward migrants expressed by mainstream political leaders and representatives is allowed by the party as far as it does not undermine its core values or challenge its position within party competition. Frames must be coherent to the belief system and experience of the people who is mobilized but also to some extent, to the ideological system of the political party or leader. Denial of racism and the reference to the autonomy of representatives enables in our view the preservation of the position of the party, while testing at the same time the impact of a new discourse on migration. The attitude of laissez-faire also serves other purposes for all stakeholders: it appears as a strategy to marginalize these discourses by not letting them receive media coverage and it serves also to preserve the representation of Catalonia as a welcoming and tolerant territory. And indeed, expressions of intolerance tend to change the meaning of Catalan citizenship and notably make it pass from a civic-inclusive definition to a cultural-exclusive one. The backlash against multiculturalism is located around the question of civic behaviours and values that sustain citizenship in Catalonia. This takes the opposite view of the central political concept of “convivencia” (life together), which has been used in integration policies to stress the positive effect of the social plurality and of the coexistence of diverse cultures or religions.

The report ends by addressing two challenges on the path of the fight of intolerance and racism in the political life. Firstly, the tension between freedom of speech and the fight against hate speech and racism, which points toward judicial solutions. Secondly, the tension between laissez-faire attitudes and the institutionalization of anti-racism, which points toward the regulation of political discourses.

**Keywords**

Intolerance; migrants; diversity; political discourses; party politics; radical right; Catalonia.
Introduction. The raise of intolerance toward migrants in Spanish politics

As in all European countries, the raise in the xenophobic and anti-immigrant discourses is currently a great concern for Spanish politics.

Racism and anti-immigrant discourses have had a place in the public space since Spain is experiencing large-scale immigration flows (see SOS Racismo, 2002-2010). Yet, the weakness of far-right political parties in Spain contrasts with many European countries which have experienced an increase in their presence, as for the Front National in France, and even their participation to governmental coalitions, like the Freedom Party in Austria, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium or the Danish People's party in Denmark. In comparison, even if several far-right parties can be identified in the country, no member of parliament of these parties has been elected since 1979 and the sum of the votes for the radical right does not even reach 1% at Spanish level. But the financial crisis which is experienced by the country since 2008, directly following the settlement of more than 4 million foreigners since 2000 - 1 million of which in Catalonia -, is setting up a new deal for how Spanish politics is managing migration issues and cultural diversity.

Spain is entering in a new era regarding migrations, experiencing stability in migration flows, with a majority of immigrants living in the country since five years or more, and with the increasing presence of natives with immigrant background. Yet, the new economic cycle is affecting more migrants than natives. More immigrants have lost their job, especially because they were concentrated in sectors affected primarily by the crisis. At the end of 2009, unemployment was affecting 29.7% of immigrants (Pajares, 2011) and 37% during the first trimester of 2012 (National institute of statistics, 2012). Even if the activity rate of immigrants is still higher than the one of Spanish people, it has dropped from 68.3% at the end of 2006 to 53.5% at the end of 2009. In a country which has based an important part of its policies and political discourses during the years 2004-2008, on the idea that migration was positive because it was useful and profitable for Spanish economy and social security, this new situation deserves to be examined from the angle of political discourses.

The study focuses on Catalonia due to its particular position within Spain. Catalonia is the first autonomous community to have experienced important immigration flows, especially since the late nineties. It is still one of the autonomous communities with the main proportion of resident foreigners (15.7%) and the second community regarding the proportion of non-communitarian foreigners (11.7%)². But Catalonia has also experienced several important local controversies about migration in the last years (Garcés Mascareñas and Zapata-Barrero, 2011). In addition, the absence of an electorate for far-right political parties in Spain is currently challenged in Catalonia, where a new far-right political party named the Platform for Catalonia (PxC), averse to migration and, above all, to resident Muslims, has been created in 2002. Although its electoral scores are still weak, its audience is growing fast from an election to the next. In 2007, PxC obtained 17 elected representatives at municipal level and 67 at the last municipal elections of May 2011. They also tried to enter the Catalan Parliament in the past elections of November 2010, without obtaining political representation, but very near to have it with 75.134 votes representing a 2.4%. It also extended its electorate from rural regions of Catalonia toward the suburbs of the metropolitan area of Barcelona, both receiving an important foreign immigration since 2000. It has had a prominent role in several controversies on issues related to cultural and religious diversity in Catalonia, such as the building of Mosques and direct anti-Muslims rhetoric. The controversy on the building of a Mosque in the city of Premia de Mar, a coastal city of

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¹ The authors want to thank Juan Carlos Triviño, PhD candidate at GRITIM-Universitat Pompeu Fabra for his important contribution to the desk research (electoral data collection, collection of newspaper articles, bibliography) and his assistance for the fieldwork and the transcription of interviews.

27000 inhabitants situated at the north-east of Barcelona, made the Platform and its leader Josep Anglada notorious (Burchianti and Itcaina, 2007; Zapata-Barrero and de Witt, 2010). Catalonia thus undoubtedly appears as a “laboratory” for Spanish politics concerning issues related to cultural diversity.

Intolerant discourses are defined as political discourses which emphasize the impossibility to maintain a tolerant attitude toward migrants (or particular groups of migrants) and the need to preserve the local society and its cohesion above the acceptance of migrants’ values, practices or accommodation. This recalls previous analysis of “reactive discourses” on migration which can be defined as discourses which express a reaction against the historical process toward multiculturalism and the will to get back to culturally unified societies (Zapata-Barrero 2007, 2009). Our definition of intolerant discourses encompasses a variety of expressions, especially as it does not qualify ex ante who is object of intolerance and who is expressing intolerance, nor the degree of non-tolerance (from liberal intolerance or welfare protectionism to explicit racism and hate speech).

The object of intolerance is indeed different in function of the discourses. The “other” who is reputed to bring a (negative) difference to the society can encompass all immigrants; particular groups in function of their nationality, ethnicity, or religion; or practices and values associated to migration and perceived as problematic. Other intolerant discourses are also aimed at migrants in function of their socio-economic (poor) or legal conditions (unauthorized migrants). The one who expresses intolerance and the degree of intolerance can also vary greatly. In fact, intolerant political discourses aimed at immigrants or about migration are not only present in the discursive repertoire of explicit anti-immigrants parties but are also increasingly expressed by representatives of mainstream parties.

During the two last years, coinciding with the economic crisis in Spain and several electoral campaigns, anti-immigrant and intolerant political discourses in relation with migration have been at the forefront of public discourses. Intolerant statements have attracted differently media and public attention. While some have been almost ignored by media and other political actors, others have attracted a huge public and media attention and created important controversies. How to deal with the rise of non-tolerance is undoubtedly one of the main challenges that face Spanish politics for the years coming.

The first section presents the emergence of intolerant discourses in Catalonia. Despite the construction of a proactive policy on migration which seeks to develop the acceptance and respect of cultural diversity, the presentation of controversies which occurred of the years 2010-2011 evidences the development of anti-immigrant discourse and policies in Catalonia. The second section presents the different frames which appeared during the controversies and how intolerance is embedded in these discourses. It is argued that intolerance as a cognitive frame relies mainly on three different rationales about the preservation of culture and identity, the competition for resources between migrants and locals and the preservation of the security. The last section presents the tensions existing in the search of limits to intolerant political discourses and focuses on party politics. Political parties appear as key but ambiguous actors in regulating discourses and their handling of the issue helps understanding the use and limits of anti-immigrant discourses.

Section 1 – Political intolerance toward cultural diversity in Catalonia: a changing landscape.

The conflicts which occurred in Catalan context exemplify the diversity in the expression of anti-immigrant discourses: diversity in the topics (welfare provisions, security or values), diversity in the actors (extreme-right, conservative or socialist representatives), and diversity in the strategies (manifesto and public campaign or local policies). We will now proceed by contextualizing the three cases studies which have been chosen to exemplify the configuration of intolerant discourse toward migration and cultural diversity.
A backlash of intolerance in Catalonia?

Xenophobic and anti-immigrants political expressions are one of the main challenges to European societies under the terms of tolerance. Which limits is desirable or possible to lay down to such discourses, policies and attitudes, is one of the key practical questions posed to European policy-makers.

The relation Catalonia maintains with migration has always been special. Its self-conception as an historical immigration land and the confidence in its capacity to integrate non-Catalan newcomers into the Catalan nation have been key features of its migration policy since the 1990s. Pragmatically, the competence of the autonomous government on migration has also been at stake in the relations that Catalonia maintains with the State. During twenty years of regulation of migration, Catalonia has developed a comprehensive policy which makes a strong emphasis on reception but encompasses also all dimensions of the accommodation of social and cultural diversity. This policy is in theory conceived as more tolerant than State policy toward migrants, especially through the recognition of citizenship and the belonging to a same community. Catalan citizenship is based on a voluntary adhesion expressed through the election of Catalonia as a place to live and the use of Catalan language. In theory this implies the admission of newcomers as equals.

All major political plans toward migrants and cultural diversity include in their general statements this view on citizenship and the conception of Catalonia as an open and tolerant society. In late December 2008, following a long-term consultancy process and four different immigration plans since 1994, the National Agreement for Migration (Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració) was approved, along with a Law of reception (Llei d’acollida). It has been approved by a wide range of immigrant associations, pro-migrant organisations and the parliamentary groups of all parties except the Popular party (PP). This document is considered by many of the stakeholders as a fundamental document which aims at reorganising deeply migration policies.

The content of the agreement is also explicitly taking stand for a model of regulation for migrations. Its starting point is that immigration causes are structural and that it is time then to stress the importance of integration. Migration policy should therefore be efficient, ensuring that immigrants are not competing with the locals while creating one diverse society (and not “a diversity of societies”). It contains 112 different measures that include normative changes in autonomous and state laws, such as reducing the period to obtain the nationality from ten to five years. As regards to political discourses, the agreement introduces the idea of a code of conduct for political parties and refers several times to the need to introduce ethics and prevent public expressions of prejudices toward migrants.

But the process which led to the agreement had started before the economic crisis in Spain and the change in the context has dramatically changed the perspective and the public discourse toward migration. Yet, it is important to stress that despite the large amount of migrants who came during the 2000s in the country, and while Spain is now the European country with most third country nationals, its policy has been considered as advanced and rather tolerant in terms of reception, labour possibilities and rights in comparison with other countries (Huddleston, Niessen et al., 2011). It is especially the case of Catalonia. Furthermore, in the years 2004-2008, the Catalan and Spanish governments both articulated migration to utilitarianism, and promoted a very positive vision on immigration insofar as the country needed workers for its development and for “saving” its social security system. The link between the positive effects of migration and the socio-economic conditions of the country to promote the acceptance of migrants in the society has had a backlash effect when the economic crisis started and the unemployment grew dramatically. The discourses of local actors still recall the tolerance and openness of the Catalan society toward migrants. However, the economic crisis provides a new context, in which non-toleration is progressively growing up as a dominant repertoire when it comes to discussing migration.

Intolerance in political discourses and the perception of migration as undesirable were already present in Spanish political life. But intolerance affected mainly immigration policies and debates about the reception of migrants more than the immigrant policy which is designed and implemented in great part
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at meso and local level. Spain has become a strategic actor for the control of migration at the southern border of the European Union. During the years 2000-2004, Aznar government developed its discourse on migration around the idea of a country under siege and the need to preserve State sovereignty and power on migration. A change of discourse occurred in 2004 when, while pursuing the control policy at the borders and the cooperation with EU, migrants have been perceived positively, especially because of their usefulness for the development of the Spanish economy and its welfare system.

If the discourses on the limited capacity of Spain and the need to control migration are relatively ancient, what is new about intolerant discourses examined here is that they target resident immigrants and challenge directly the positive perception of cultural diversity in the Catalan society. This highlights that Catalonia and Spain are entering in a new stage in migration and diversity politics. But it raises concerns for the future of Catalan society and political life.

Dimensions of intolerance and controversies: the case-studies

We focus particularly on three different events of the years 2010-2011, taken as an entry point to investigate the forms and procedures of intolerant discourse toward immigrants in Spain. They have sparked off political expressions from different political and social actors which present different ways to frame “conflicts” related to migration and limits to intolerant discourses. These public debates related to immigration show how discourses on immigration are embedded in particular local contexts, but they tend to typify re-active or intolerant discourses about migration as a whole. They highlight the plurality of the challenges facing the acceptance of cultural and religious diversity which cannot be analysed through the same lenses.

Case 1: Undocumented immigrants' exclusion from municipal census in Vic.

First case refers to the decision at local level to exclude undocumented immigrants from municipal registers (padrón municipal) which give – among other things – access to basic social rights, and make visible people who are “invisible” for other administrations. In late December 2009, the city council of Vic, a city of around 40,000 inhabitants in the province of Barcelona, decided to forbid the registration on the city census of foreigners who cannot prove their regularity regarding immigration laws. To justify the need to take such measure, the local government highlighted that 2% of the new petitions for registration were issued by persons who could not prove the regularity of their administrative situation. It stated also that such motion would strengthen “social cohesion in the city, [and was] working driven by the need of order and peaceful coexistence”.

The fact that the decision of Vic triggered an important local and national media and social attention has a lot to do with the particular context of the city. It has been the first city with elected representatives of the radical right party PxC since 2003, and the Platform became the second most voted party in 2007 with 20% and five elected representatives. The rise of PxC in Vic soon became the symbol of the establishment of a “national populist” ideology in Catalonia (Casals, 2009). The situation of Vic is also particular as regards to immigration. The town received an important foreign immigration since the end of the 1990s, attracted by the development of food industry (pork slaughterhouses), farming and agriculture as well as construction sector, with the particularity of being in its majority from Africa (around 60% among foreigners). Migration to Vic and its region (Osona) is thus ancient in comparison with other parts of Spain and Catalonia. Furthermore, Vic's policies toward immigrants have frequently been cited as examples of good practices at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the years 2000, especially for the implementation of its pro-active school policy trying to put an end to the progressive concentration and segregation of immigrant children at school (Carbonell

3 City council of Vic, Press release, 29 December 2009.
4 There were 3,8% of foreigners residing in Vic in 1998 and 23% in 2008. Source: Spanish national institute of statistics.
and al., 2005). But since the apparition of the Platform for Catalonia, concerns about an increasing intolerance toward immigrants have been raised. This fact even let at the background the positive picture the city was having, for its commitment to diversity management in a positive way. Vic still deserves attention for its diversity policies. The intercultural cities network of the Council of Europe has even retained some of its best practices in integration policy. Yet the case of Vic is not isolated. Vic’s ban unleashed an important controversy on the rights of (undocumented) immigrants and the role of municipalities in migration policies. Other political representatives and cities have expressed doubts if not their disagreement with the registration of undocumented immigrants in the padrón and consequently have access to basic social rights and education. A city near Madrid, Torrejon de Ardoz, also voted the prohibition of municipal census to immigrants presenting a passport with only a tourist visa and those who live in a place with less than 20 sq. meters per inhabitant. The access to the padrón for undocumented immigrants is part of the debate on migration policy and law. Once in 2003, the right-wing government passed a law which allowed the police to access the data on undocumented residents for the purpose of an investigation. It also changed the rule by making an obligation to unauthorized immigrants to renew their inscription every two years (Gonzalez Enríquez, 2010). Vic’s case led to a legal battle on the interpretation of the law and ended with a report from the Spanish state legal service declaring illegal the local prohibition measure. The political side of the controversy has been even more important; as the motion has been voted by representatives of political parties who did not supported such measure. For example, even representatives of the Socialist party of Catalonia (PSC) and the Republican left of Catalonia (ERC), allied with the party at government Convergence and Union (CiU) in 2010, voted in favour of the exclusion of undocumented immigrants. This raised the question of attitudes and discourses of political parties regarding immigration, and questioned their capacity to provide coherent and comprehensive discourses and policies on migration regardless of electoral pressure, at all levels (national and local).

Case 2: Burqa ban proposals in Lleida and across Catalonia

The second case explores policies in relation with religious diversity in general and religious dress code in particular. It concerns the “burqa ban” proposals which spread in Catalonia during summer 2010. That year, several towns of Catalonia decided to vote proposals banning the wearing of the so-called “full veil” (which encompasses the religious veils that cover the face such as burqa and niqab) in public buildings or in public spaces. The first and most publicized case has been the one of the provincial capital of Lleida (130000 inhabitants), ruled by the socialist party.


6 In fact, this is not a right but an obligation in Spain to be registered where one's live. It serves primarily to demographic studies in the country, to establish the electoral census, to determine who has access to social and health services and education in a municipality, and also to calculate the amount of financial transfers between the State and the municipalities.

7 The motion has been voted in favour by the ruling coalition of representatives of the conservative Catalan nationalist party Convergencia i Unió (CiU), the socialist party of Catalonia (PSC) and the left-wing republican and Catalan nationalist party (ERC). It was supported also by the extreme-right and openly anti-immigrant party, the Platform for Catalonia (PxC) which is the second political force in the city council with 4 representatives. The only ones to vote against the motion were the representatives of the left-wing party Initiative for Catalonia - Greens (IC-V) and the Catalan separatist and left-wing Popular Unity Candidacies (CUP).

8 The debates and proposals all focused on prohibiting the wearing of the burqa and niqab and not the headscarf or hijab, which is the most common among Muslim women in Spain by far.
In May 2010, the plenary of Lleida's city council decided to vote a motion forbidding wearing religious veils covering the face in all municipal buildings (civic, cultural, education, sport and other buildings), making of Lleida the first Spanish city with such banning measure. It was extended to all “other pieces of clothes or accessories which cover entirely the face and hinder identification and visual communication”\(^9\). After a large public debate, in the aftermath of Lleida's ban, several cities of Catalonia adopted similar measures, including the major cities of Barcelona, l'Hospitalet de Llobregat and Tarragona\(^10\). Some voted a motion like in the case of Lleida and others, such as Barcelona, chose to pass the ban by municipal decree, due to the opposition of part of the governing partners. While the debate and vote in the city council of Lleida received an important attention from the media and public opinion, it has not been the case of those who chose to pass the ban by local decree, like Barcelona.

The right-wing cleavage does not explain the vote of these municipal decrees. Most of the cities were ruled by the socialist party of Catalonia, often in coalition with others, like in Barcelona, Lleida and Tarragona. However, the motions were often presented jointly with the centre-right nationalist party, Convergence and Union and with the vote in favour of the conservative popular party. PP is also at the origin of several motions in favour of full veil ban in all public spaces or of banning the headscarf at school, while all other political parties oppose such measure. The radical-right party Plataforma per Catalunya originated also several motions which were turned down in general, as they proposed to criminalize the wearing of full veil in all public spaces. Conversely, top representatives of the left-wing nationalists ERC took stand against the ban, following the recommendations of the bureau of Religious Issues of the Generalitat de Catalunya, led one of its representatives and its local representatives generally abstained in local votes. The green-communists of Initiative for Catalonia-Greens (ICV) were the only to constantly and publicly oppose the ban. The question of the banning or not of full veil in municipal buildings divided the socialist party as emphasized by the diversity of positions among its representatives and the opposed votes they have made at municipal level\(^11\). The heterogeneity of positions within a same party is one of the most interesting facts about the full veil issue (see Table in annex), together with the fact that the issue has been again raised from the local level.

The question of full veil prohibition also touched other levels of government. This issue has been immediately debated at the upper house of the Parliament (Senado) which approved a motion on the prohibition of burqa and niqab in all public spaces, presented by PP and supported by CiU, while the ruling party PSC and all other parties were against the motion. But this motion never led to an actual prohibition. The issue of full veil banning also played a role in the election campaign to Catalan parliament in late 2010. PP and CiU included full veil banning in their platform. This matter has been discussed in the Parliament during the two last years. PP motion in 2010 gained the support of CiU but did not pass due to the opposition of the left-wing majority. Another one was rejected in 2011, because of the opposition of CiU this time, who had obtained meanwhile the majority at the Catalan parliament\(^12\).

The debate and policies toward the full veil highlight the lack of consensus on this issue within part of the main political parties.

Case 3: Anti-Romanian Roma campaign in the city of Badalona

The third case focuses on the political discourses linking immigration to security and delinquency.

\(^9\) Motion approved by the city council of Lleida, 28 May 2010.
\(^10\) The following cities agreed on banning the wearing of the full veil in public buildings: Barcelona, L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, (Province of Barcelona), Lleida, Cervera (province of Lleida), Tarragona, Reus, Cunit, El Vendrell (province of Tarragona). Coin (Malaga, Andalucia) was the only non-catalan city to ban the full veil in summer 2010. The city of Girona is the only capital of province of Catalonia to vote against the prohibition of the full veil. (See table in Annex).
\(^11\) “La burca divideix els partits », Avui, 03.06.2010
\(^12\) “Cataluña rechaza vetar el ‘burka’ esta precampaña”, El País, 06.04.2011
Candidates of the Popular Party to 2011 municipal elections have made of migration issues a key element of their campaign, in part by linking migration to crime and insecurity. This was best exemplified in the city of Badalona, a close suburb of Barcelona, in which the candidate and actual mayor of the town has based his campaign on the designation of Romanian Roma who settled in the town as a source of insecurity and delinquency.\(^{13}\) In April 2010, Xavier García Albiol, an elected PP representative of the municipality of Badalona and candidate to 2011 municipal elections, published and distributed, in company with PP leader in Catalonia, Alicia Sanchez-Camacho, a flyer in which Romanians\(^{14}\) were stigmatised as a source of urban insecurity. The tract (see picture in Annex) was entitled “Is your neighbourhood safe?” and showed a picture of three supposedly Romanian Roma in first page. Inside the pamphlet, the four keywords “insecurity”, “dirtiness”, “delinquency” and “incivility”, were accompanied by pictures of gypsies and immigrants and by pictures of people holding placards criticizing the current mayor or claiming for dignity for the neighbourhood. The most controversial one was a picture of a sign on a balcony in which was written “We do not want Romanians”. The publication of this flyer took place at the very beginning of the regional and municipal campaigns and followed previous claims of the PP representative for more control over immigration and previous statements in which he accused Romanians Roma to be “a plague and represent a curse on the city” and to “come to Badalona only to commit crimes” (El Pais, 16.04.2010).

The flyer led immediately gypsy associations, associations of Romanians and pro-immigrant organisations to condemn the statements of X. García Albiol. The consul of Romania in Barcelona expressed his deep sense of unease in front of this campaign in a meeting with the Secretary of immigration of the Catalan government. Eleven political parties and organisations presented a “Manifesto against the rise of racism and xenophobia in Catalan politics” before the Catalan parliament. Even the proper Alicia Sánchez Camacho apologized to the persons who could have been hurt and the PP at Spanish level distanced itself from the flyer.

Months later, the expulsion of Romanian Roma by the French government gave a new occasion to put this group at the centre of the local electoral campaign. Alicia Sánchez Camacho invited Marie-Thérèse Sánchez-Schmid, a French MEP for UMP (French right-wing), to visit Badalona with X. García Albiol. This occasioned huge media coverage and both Spanish and French elected representatives made a parallel between the situation of France and Spain, where “immigrants from the East” had “only rights and no duty”. Even if all other political parties rejected the positions of X.Garcia Albiol, the PP at a national level gave this time its support to the action of the local representative.

Anti-racist and pro-immigrant associations were divided on the appropriateness of suing X.Garcia Albiol given the unfavourable jurisprudence in previous similar cases. However, two formal complaints were filed against X. García Albiol. One was addressed by ICV to the Public prosecutor office for Hate crimes and discrimination. The second, which replaced the former, was made later by the anti-racist association SOS Racisme and the Federation of Gypsy associations of Catalonia to the general Court of Justice. It has been classified on 14 March 2011. According to the Court, expressions of xenophobic ideas were not illegal if they were not a direct invitation to racist violence and hate crimes. X. García Albiol expressed his satisfaction in relation to the sentence and stated again that he

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13 Experts estimate Roma at around 20000 people in Spain and 2000 to 3000 people in Catalonia according to the Foundation Secretariado Gitano. The Foundation Secretariado Gitano is a non-profit organization which aims at developing services and programs for the gypsy community in Spain and in Europe since the 1960’s.

14 There was confusion in the discourse of the PP about the group who was accused of incivility and delinquency. In the flyer, the most controversial picture was the one of a sign stating “No queremos Romanos” / “We do not want Romanians”. But confronted with the controversy and the reaction of the Romanian community and authorities, PP leaders clarified that they were only accusing Romanian Roma who, in the words of Garcia-Albiol, “settled in this city to commit crimes and steal” and who “generate a lot of problems in the densest neighbourhoods of the city” (La Vanguardia, 24.10.2010).
would cut every aid to those immigrants who come to “be delinquents, steal, make neighbours’ life impossible and take advantage of social benefits”, and reaffirmed his compromise to limit the rights of immigrants if he was elected (La Vanguardia, 15.05.2011). The PP actually won the elections in May 2011 and X. Garcia Albiol became mayor of the city.

During these three controversies, major public discourses were based on intolerance frames about migration. Our purpose is, on the one hand, to evidence these intolerance frames, and on the other hand, to examine the question of the limits to such discourses and the key role of political parties.

Section 2 - Methodology

This report draws on a qualitative research methodology to study political discourses and policies which aim at limiting migration and cultural diversity. The methodology chosen to research on this challenge combines a content analysis of secondary sources and semi-structured qualitative interviews.

We have chosen to study political discourses through three controversies which appeared in the years 2010-2011 in Catalonia.

Studies on communication and language have shown that racism or prejudices against migrants and people perceived as different are not often explicit in discourses, in particular in the discourses of the political elites and the media (Van Dijk, 1995). This oriented our research towards the study of discourses accompanying policies and interviews rather than party manifestos or public texts which are much more controlled by the “political correctness” when it comes to migration and diversity issues.

We also chose to examine altogether political discourses, policies and practices. What is the discourse accompanying the policy? Are all the policy-makers and representatives producing the same discourse on the topic? Is this discourse changing along the controversy which occurred? What are the counter-discourses and who is producing them? Focusing on controversies and policies and not only on explicit anti-immigrant discourse of far-right parties enables to emphasize the plurality of actors and topics involved.

The desk research has been conducted between September and November 2011 and consisted mainly in collecting secondary sources. Newspapers materials have been collected on the three cases studied for the period between January 2010 and June 2011 (end of municipal elections) in seven Spanish (3) and Catalan (4) newspapers. In addition to providing information on the three controversies, relevant articles which contained or referred to political discourses on the topic of the controversy have been selected as a sample of discourses. This sample is of 48 articles for the case of the anti-Romanians campaign, 63 articles for the case on full veil prohibition and 68 articles for the case on undocumented immigrants’ exclusion from municipal census. In addition, a sample of articles on the municipal campaign of 2011 has been collected and analysed, especially when articles referred to migration issues in the campaign and to the radical-right political party, PxC.

The second part of the desk research consisted in the collection and analysis of administrative, policy and civil society documents. More precisely, we collected the minutes of all city councils assemblies of the three municipalities of Badalona, Lleida and Vic in which the topic selected was discussed, along with debates at the Catalan parliament. Public positions of civil society organisations on the cases studied and public reports elaborated at Catalan, state and European level on far-right parties and xenophobic expressions in politics complete the secondary sources.

Between November and December 2011, 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted with relevant actors who had taken part in one or more of the three controversies and leaders of the main political parties. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as this technique allows to collect elaborated discourses and to make a balance between freedom for the interviewee to develop complex and

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meaningful responses and the guidance of the researcher toward his research interests. The choice of the interviewees has been made following two different logics. Firstly, we chose to interview the political leader in charge of migration issues in each of the main political parties of Catalonia (ICV, ERC, PSC, CiU and PP). This was chosen according to one of our main research question which was on the role of partisan organisations in the production of intolerant discourses and in fixing rules and limits to such discourses. While secondary sources had provided us with extent discourses from local authorities representatives, we had very few discourses from party leaders (at Catalan level) and little information about the internal dynamics of the party to regulate political discourses. Questions on the three cases have generally been asked to party leaders. Secondly, we chose to interview leaders of public administration, social organisations and stakeholders which took part in one or more of the controversies. This selection was based on secondary sources analysis which highlighted the main participants to the debate. No major obstacle has been suffered to reach the interviewees and proceed to the interview. Yet, one limit of the research is due to recent changes in public institutions‘ and political parties’ organisation, which has made it difficult to reach persons who are no longer in charge, passed the elections. Another problem is due to the lack of information and historical vision of the respondents who sometimes were not in charge at the moment of the controversies. All interviews have been tape recorded and transcribed. A list of interviewees and the interview guide can be found in appendix at the end of the report.

Section 3 – Intolerance frames in political discourses about migration

Framing processes offer a great resource to analyse the political discourses on migrants and cultural diversity in Catalonia. In fact, discourses on migration rely on several frames that organize individual and collective experiences (Goffman, 1974). We assume that non-toleration/intolerance is one of the possible frames that serve as a matrix to structure the experience and discourse of individuals and political actors. This means that intolerance frames are not in theory crafted for some purpose but are instead a tacit code which helps understand a given situation. But, in the case of political discourses which accompany policies or political campaigns, discursive framing may also have another purpose and are oriented toward collective action and the mobilisation of the population (Gamson, 1992, Snow et al., 1986). This refers to a strategic use of frames. Active framing intends to mobilize and rally the majority of people to the type of definition or frame that is put forward by the speaker or organisation. In the case of intolerance as a political discourse, both senses of frames, passive and active, are helpful to understand the process. Intolerance frames, which are only one of the way in which migration can be framed, rely on basic and unconscious understanding, such as the perception of a difference or an opposition between “us” and “them”, or elements which appeal to the everyday experience of an individual: situation engendering sentiments of fear, of anxiety or of injustice for example. As for the political discourses (and all public discourses), intolerance framing is conceived as an active process which intends to strategically gain support and power, by making prevail a particular definition of the situation among others. What is pursued by the political organisations is to produce new alignments to their own framing of the situation and the apparition of a “frame resonance” with new individuals and groups (Snow et al., 1986). But this highly strategic view on framing processes must be offset by the importance of macro-cognitive structures which shape the understanding of the people. In other words, not everything can be said to anyone to make him/her rally one’s cause. Frames must be coherent to the belief system and experience of the people who is mobilized but also to some extent, to the ideological system of the political party or leader. The framing cannot be perceived as unfamiliar or as mining the core representations and beliefs of the individuals and organizations. In that sense, framing processes have limits and discourses appealing to intolerance frames too.

Each of the three local controversies appealed to different framing processes on the challenge which was supposedly faced by political representatives, each one being perceived as important for Catalan

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16 This element was also emphasized by Gamson (1992) as a basic component of the injustice frames of collective action.
politics. The three principal intolerance frames are identified: perception of migration as bringing insecurity, delinquency and problems of coexistence; definitions of migration as a threat for the cultural homogeneity of Catalonia; perception of migrants as competitors with locals for limited resources. Through intolerance frames, migration is perceived as undermining the social cohesion and norms of civility that are attached to the local society. In the terms of non-toleration, the ones who are perceived as “others” then have to merge in the local society (if possible) or be excluded from it so as to preserve cohesion.

Security: framing the association between migrants groups, delinquency and (in)civility

The linkage between immigration and insecurity is the more ancient and certainly the best documented framing in terms of intolerance toward migration in Spain (Ritaine, 2005, Santamaria, 2002). As well as immigration flows have been turned into a security issue for European societies (Huysmans, 2006), political discourses on resident immigrants increasingly stigmatise them, or determined groups among them, as being responsible of urban insecurity, delinquency and incivilities which disturb the peaceful coexistence of the inhabitants. This is frequently associated with discourses on the radical otherness of certain geographic origins and cultures – such as Romanians Romas, North-Africans or Muslims - which cannot be accommodated within the Spanish and Catalan societies.

The case on Popular party’s campaign in Badalona is the one that presents such framing in terms of insecurity. But the discourse about security is in this case closely linked to a cultural debate about the possibilities for certain groups of immigrants to integrate the Catalan society. For the Popular party of Badalona, the “culture” of the Romanian Roma and the practices that are associated to this culture are deemed incompatible with the local way of living and security. The discourse is built on cultural prejudices against Romanians Roma which state that robbery is an essential part of Romanian and Roma culture and economy.

This is the controversy in which the cleavage between conservative and liberal political parties seems to currently work. The stigmatisation of Romanians as the main source of delinquency in the deprived neighbourhoods of the city of Badalona by the local PP candidate has been condemned by almost all other political parties, except by radical-right party PxC which accused instead the PP to be copying its own discourse.

The flyer which was at the centre of the debate (see annex) clearly associated images of immigrant, an anti-immigrant statement (“we do not want Romanians”) and the words “dirtiness”, “insecurity”, “delinquency” and “incivility”. The PP representative for migration issues in Catalonia is supporting the discourse of the representative of her party, even if she does not want to take stand for him. But she is endorsing the general discourse on the existence of a problematic group who is threatening social cohesion and peaceful coexistence in the city. Her point is that this discourse has proved to be right as it has been supported by the majority of the population during the elections:

People said that this man [X. Garcia Albiol] was right, that they were tired that in two districts nobody could live, and of the harmful coexistence, and they were tired of Romanian Roma (gypsies), specifically. Even the lifelong gypsies do not want them, neither the Romanians. Those ones are outcasts, they are in the middle, and nobody wants them. I’ve been in those meetings with the gypsies and they told it to me, I am not saying it myself. Look at the Romanian associations, in Badalona, there they told me: “Mr. García Albiol does very well, and speaks well of what he is speaking about”. We could not live with them, and nobody, nobody until now has done something. What did García Albiol do? He has taken the lead and said what people wanted to hear. What does he say? That he do not want people go peeing or bathing in the fountains. If for that you have to remove the sources, remove the sources. Or the guys get out. What does he say about the apartments that are empty and are filled with squatters? It is clear that people are increasingly happy and this is what is happening. The thing of García-Albiol has been to have a discourse for a particular population that was tired of the permissibility and peaceful attitude of the Left, being
conformist and laissez-faire. And they have chosen someone who sets standards and who speaks clearly. [pp.2]

The most interesting part of the debate on the electoral campaign of PP representative in Badalona, especially for our purpose, has been the debate about what are the limits of what can be said about migration in political discourses. The anti-immigrant discourse triggered a debate on the tension between freedom of speech and the need to limit, or suppress, discrimination by speech and intolerant expressions toward migrants.

The framing in terms of security has been also an important component of the discourse about full veil bans. Firstly, local security was invoked as an explanation for demanding the ban of religious veils covering the face. For the councillor who presented the motion, “the use of any element that completely conceals the face of a person creates a real feeling of insecurity”. Many defenders of the regulation argued that municipal employees must be at any time able to identify the person who enters a public building. The main argumentation of the city of Lleida to defend the local regulation in front of the Court was the fact that it was a norm of security which, as being a collective right, could prevail over freedom and religious freedom which are individual rights. It argued also that every piece which covers the face such as helmets, face masks and balaclavas were mentioned in the ban, proving that it was not meant to target Muslims.

Another argument relating security and full veil is present among many supporters of the ban. It relates full veil wearing and radical Islamic supportive of terrorism and political violence. As such, it is considered important to prohibit burqa/niqab wearing as the society cannot tolerate the expression of ideas and values contrary to liberal-democracies and supportive of terrorism against their society. In the words of the leader of Democratic convergence of Catalonia (CDC)17 on migration issues, party which presented the motion in Lleida with the support of PSC:

Islamist and anti-democratic behaviour, or fascist, conflicts with the democratic values that we have in Europe and Catalonia, and as such we cannot accept them. And this is not a cultural feature that we should respect; this is an attack to democracy, to human rights, the rights of women also, but a clear attack to democracy. [pp.3]

Generally, the discourse about security is closely linked to the cultural dimension as well. The direct threat to social cohesion posed by delinquency and incivility is generally linked to the attacks to the cultural and moral dimension of social cohesion. But this argument appears as much more controversial among politicians and civil society organisations. For anti-racist organisations, the debate on the burqa has been a smokescreen to stigmatize the Muslim population, especially in that it has been framed in part as a debate on security.

Security? I, how many times have we seen a delivery man entering with a helmet, and nothing happens? So it was very violent, to us, what we thought being the more violent was to link it to security and identification. Because they were creating a context, which meant that under the burqa there are explosives. We know all what has happened with 9/11, 11M [Madrid metro’s bombing], and this is not all. We started talking to break it, we have never entered (in the debate) to go further. [civsoc.2]

Frames in terms of security are still important in the public discourses expressing non-toleration about migration or migrant groups. But in both cases in which this discourse has appeared clearly, it is

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17 CIU is a federation of two different organisations, one inspired by liberalism and supportive of Catalan independence (Democratic convergence of Catalonia, CDC), and one Christian and conservative, supportive of Catalan autonomy (Democratic union of Catalonia, UDC). The difference between representatives of the two organisations vis-à-vis migration issues is frequently underlined. The dominant party of the coalition has always been CDC, from which are issued all the president of the Catalan government. It influenced greatly the construction of a migration policy oriented toward liberalism and for which, cultural dimensions of migration have been secondary, although present and at the forefront at times.
merged with cultural, identity and moral dimensions. The centre of the concerns in both cases is the safeguarding of the social cohesion, as in terms of security as in terms of cultural and moral homogeneity. Migrants are required to be “civic-minded” in the standards of the local society.

### A challenged identity: intolerance frames about full veil wearing and “compatible cultures”

Culture is one of the components of intolerance frames. The definition of the situation which is made through this framing process is that immigrant’ culture and practices which are deemed opposed or incompatible to the local culture and practices, or disturbing the local society for being contrary to the system of values and beliefs of the people, cannot and should not be tolerated. This implies that the actor provides also a definition for the local culture and the values, moral system, beliefs and practices attached to it. But in many cases, actors dispense with defining the “local culture”. Targeted practices or discourses are simply opposed to “ours”, but the relation between “their” and “our” culture is not explained. This is especially the case for Spanish culture as there has never been a consensual definition of it, especially after the end of Franco’s dictatorship (Zapata-Barrero, 2010). The definition of the elements of “our” culture in Catalonia refers in fact to different dimensions of the life in society and to different cultural spaces. It may refer to liberal-democratic values as a whole, to human-rights values but also to the majority religion (Catholicism), the language (Catalan) and local traditions (celebrations, holidays, courteousness, culinary customs...) as well as general norms of civility (noise, respect for public equipments, and occupation of public spaces...). When it refers to global values and norms of civility, this frame is close to liberal intolerance, which perceives illiberal practices and values of immigrants or cultural and religious groups as threatening social cohesion (Dobbernack and Modood, 2011).

The intolerance frame referring to the safeguarding of the local culture has been especially present in two of the three controversies. Firstly, in the case of full veil bans, the intolerance frame relies on three different definitions of what cannot be accepted in relation with local culture, which is to harm gender equality, liberal-democratic principles and rules of civility. Secondly, in the case of the stigmatisation of Roma as a problematic group, the framing relies on a differentiation among cultural elements which are perceived as incompatibles with the local culture, such as auto-segregation, a “culture of delinquency” but also language or education principles. The question of Roma’s “compatibility” can be generalised to culturalist discourses of the conservative stream in Catalonia, especially within the Popular Party and the Democratic Union of Catalonia.

### The cultural dimension of full veil controversy

The local motion asking for the banning of full veil wearing in the city of Lleida, which was followed by motions and local rules in a number of Catalan cities, has been the occasion for all political parties – and many social organisations – to express their view on full veil and on the prohibition. This debate already occurred in several European countries and the Catalan debate does not differ much from the way it has been framed in other countries. Actually, the debate occurs just two months after Belgium was the first European country to ban full veil in public spaces and in the middle of important debates in France (leading also to a law banning full veil in public spaces) and in other countries. One interesting feature of this debate is that, unlike the two others which are clearly discussing a local policy and a discourse deemed anti-immigrant, actors are much more uncertain in qualifying full veil prohibition as an anti-immigrant policy. But the controversy clearly focuses on the intolerance to certain practices associated with religion and particularly Islam.

Several dimensions have been at stake during the controversy. Four types of justifications have been especially used to justify the non-toleration of full veil wearing:

1) Every person has the obligation to identify themselves for reasons of security.

2) Everyone has to act civilly by recognising common rules of presentation of self, such as showing his/her face.
3) Full veil wearing is endangering women's equal right and no discrimination and should not be tolerated.

4) The wearing of full veil is the expression of a rejection of liberal-democracy and Spanish/Catalan social contract, which cannot be tolerated.

The three last ones specifically refer to constitutive elements of what is perceived as the local identity, as opposed to what is perceived as elements of other cultures. An interesting fact is that these three elements have not been put forward as strongly as the intolerance frame on security, which is the one that legally supported the ban. However, all the dimensions and not only security are altogether presented in the original motion which justifies the ban:

There are three reasons which justify the presentation of the motion. First, defending a society that advocates strongly for the values of equality and non-discrimination. Secondly, considering that integration has both a collective and individual value. Thirdly, for security reasons. (City council of Vic, 28.5.2010)

And the majority of these arguments refer to the safeguarding of the local culture and norms of conducts.

Women's right attack is certainly the most consensual position among actors for condemning full veil use, whether they are in favour of the ban or oppose the regulation. The significance of full veil, burqa or niqab, as a mean to control and discriminate women is not questioned, even by the main Muslim organisations of Catalonia.

This is closely linked to codes of conduct and presentation of self in democracy and to issues of social cohesion. The wearing of a niqab is perceived as a lack of respect and courtesy. Transparency and thus identification are closely associated with the rules of the democracy and equality among citizens. Many public statements claim for the right to look at another person in the eyes and to see her face, not for security reason this time, but so as to feel respected and placed on an equal position.

But among full veil issue, many of political representatives in favour of its banning stated that attacking full veil was also a mean to attack illiberal practices in the society and to maintain social cohesion. Women who wear niqab are seen as members of families which deliberately exclude themselves, form a parallel society and are linked to radical Islamism:

It has been said that in Lleida there was no problem with the Burqa. The use of full veil is very minor in Lleida, however, is a sign that a group wants to perpetuate values that go against ours. (City Council of Vic, 28.05.2010)

For the leader of CDC on migration issues:

It is the tip of the iceberg of radical Islam. Who wears the full veil? Well women whose husbands, basically, are Salafists or radical Wahhabis, who are people with profoundly anti-democratic thoughts and make proposals for social segregation in Europe. It is these people, the women of these gentlemen. So, well, this behaviour or attitude has been detected, and we are against this behaviour or attitude. We do not want them to be part of the natural landscape of Catalonia, because it has never been the case, it needs not to ever be. We will fight against that, deeply, while at the same time we will support whatever is normalizing Islam as the second religion, which it is, of Catalonia. The implementation of the mosques, for this we have make the law on Religions which we are implementing, the Religious Freedom Act, all this is normal. [pp.3]

Politicians in favour of the banning of full veil wearing express repeatedly these concerns about radical Islamism as a threat for the cohesion of the society. This is about practices associated with radical Islamism that political discourses can be linked to liberal intolerance. The wearing of the full veil cannot be admitted as it is contrary to liberal-democratic values in the country. But this is not only democratic values that apply in that matter, reciprocity of the practices also matters. Intolerance in the
country of origin, in that case about no covering women’s head, is an argument to not tolerate practices which are not belonging to national – religious – culture. This refers mainly to an assimilationist conception of migration in which the settlement in a new country supposes the endorsement of all its culture, values and practices:

I as a woman, I can assure you, I am of the strongest advocates in this regard and I, getting back to topic, there are rules in the country where you live that you cannot infringe, and this is one of them. One cannot be covered from head to toe, because in her country this means I don't know which story, well no. I cannot go to Iran, Iraq or one of these countries and have a walk on the street because they would whip me, am I right? Well, it's the same. I cannot move as I want, am I right? (...) We cannot do this in their countries of origin, am I right? Well lady... and do not come to tell me that this is a secular country, the argument given by the left. This is a secular country, fine to me, but there are codes of conducts that I believe cannot be infringed. [pp.2]

The debate on full veil banning is the one which appeals more to identity issues in Catalonia and in Spain, especially when it comes to religious extremism and women's right. But this is interesting to note that no women association has raised voice to condemn full veil wearing. Indeed feminists have been strangely absent of the debate. This is also the controversy which has divided more representatives within a same political party, especially in left-wing parties.

The cultural dimension in conservative parties' discourse

Conservatism is the central ideology of two important parties in Catalonia: Popular Party (PP) and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC). UDC is one of the two organisations forming Convergence and Union (CiU), the main centre-right nationalist party, which governed Catalonia between 1980 and 2003. Even if the representatives of these parties are the ones who have raised publicly the idea that Catalonia could not tolerate any more practices of migrants, values and cultural features that they perceived as incompatible with the society, the majority of the social and political actors reject the idea that these parties have converted to anti-immigration ideology. They rather distinguish the party from sectors within it, which embrace these ideas.

I think that the people of CiU does not agree with that [declarations of Mr. Duran i Lleida on migration during November 2011 general elections], or it would be very serious. I believe that there is surely a Catholic conservator stream. Much more than CiU, Duran i Lleida is representing this sector, because he always links this topic with the Christian and occidental tradition, and the danger of Islam. So, there is a stream inside CiU, which is larger inside the PP and the Platform too, in the sense that Islam represents a danger for dignity, and islamophobia follows the same path. [civsoc.3]

UDC's Christian-conservatism is reluctant to the recognition of religious diversity and claims for a tougher policy toward migration and especially undocumented migrants. UDC representatives' discourses rely much more on the need to safeguard social and cultural cohesion of Catalonia and to prohibit practices and discourses of migrants which are not seen as forming part of the Catalan society. The influence of Christian conservatism in political discourses on migration is relevant to understand the controversy which occurred in the city of Vic, whose mayor is a leader of UDC. Even if it is the controversy in which the cultural dimension is less evident, several interviewees underline the importance of conservatism and traditionalism in the region of Vic to explain the ban of undocumented immigrants from the census.

The relationship between Christian-conservatism and re-active political discourse at Catalan level has also appeared during the recent campaign for the elections to Spanish parliament. Although migration issues have been almost absent of the campaign, the leading candidate for CiU, UDC leader J. Duran i Lleida, has made several statements which targeted migrants, especially through cultural and family dimensions. He declared that immigration should be considered a problem, that the excessive presence of immigrants in neighbourhoods was lowering the price of apartments and damaging the interest of
natives, and that immigrant students were lowering the results of Catalan schools (Ara, 3.10.2011). He later declared that in a region of Catalonia “more Mohamed are born than Jordis or Josés” and followed by stating that he was “concerned that among [the] native population, due to errors that had been done of no supporting the family and demographic policies, there are always more immigrant persons. I do not mind those who share a culture and values with what means Catalonia or Spain, I do not mind the Argentine, the Chilean, and even the Mohamed who integrate himself. But I am concerned by the fact that many Mohamed do not integrate and do not respect the values of this country” (El Periodico, 16.11.2011).

Despite these statements, intolerance toward migration is tempered by the permanent alliance of UDC with CDC party and by the fact that they are both governing Catalonia and the majority of the Catalan cities.

Conversely, due to its minority position in Catalonia and its hostility to Catalan claims for independence, the Catalan PP has always been more conservative than in other parts of Spain and has made of a tough policy and discourse on migration a key issue in the last years.

The argumentation of the PP representative in Badalona lies on the designation of a group who is perceived as radically questioning the way of life of the population in the neighbourhoods in which it settled. The Romanian Roma in that case are considered as an alien group who do not come to live and “make society” like others.

The discourse of X. Garcia Albiol is fundamentally based on the exclusion of the group which threaten the peaceful coexistence in the society. In the specific case of Badalona it draws on security issues, but connects security to culture. Even if the discourses of other elected representatives are lesser connecting migration and insecurity, it shares an essentialist view of cultures and identities.

They frame differently immigrant groups as regards to their possibilities or they will to integrate the local society. Immigrants coming from Africa and Muslim countries are perceived as less “assimilable” in the society than Latin-Americans who share the history and religion of Spain. This discourse is also embedded in the political opposition of PP to Catalan nationalist parties who have been governing Catalonia during large-scale immigration flows. Their policy is conversely accused to have discriminated Spanish-speaking immigrants (Latin Americans) for reason of language:

The Moroccan and African migration has settled in Catalonia, which is precisely favoured by the nationalist parties’ policy, who preferred that those who came, came and learn Catalan, disfavouring the others. But over the life time you realize that Latin Americans are easier to integrate than the Africans, so we have arrived to the stage in which we are now, in which there is a large rejection of the Moroccans and Africans, and almost no rejection, I can tell because I am monitoring it, of the Latin American group. [pp.2]

The analysis of the PP is that this policy is causing more problems of social cohesion and security in Catalonia because of the difference of proximity and integration among migrants groups. Latin-Americans are reputed to be of “easy integration”.

And that’s what we are saying in the Popular party, that we share with the Latin Americans the same values: first, the mother tongue, second, religion, family, the concept of the country, for us Catalonia is Spain, the concept of constitution, all Latin American countries have a constitution, which is respected and is above everything else. [pp.2]

Conversely, African immigrants are conceived as problematic in terms of social integration, for cultural reasons. When the distance between cultures is deemed very important, the practices and systems of values attached to cultures are considered incompatible and then require the abandon of the migrants’ system to adopt the local one:

We believe that the fundamental problem is that many times they do not want to integrate. Because sometimes “I'm here because I need money, I need a job, I have to send money over there, maybe I
will come back, I don't know. And what I do not like here is how women live, the freedom that the Western women have, I do not like this or that...” And of course, here we have a big problem, because it is you or me.

(...)Then there are rights that we believe are inviolable and which are the norms for living together (convivencia). So I go back to the beginning: why more acceptance [for some migrants]? And note that the question you are asking me, the society is asking the same to itself: why is there less rejection of the American collective and more rejection of the African one? [pp.2]

All party representatives and stakeholders condemned the electoral campaign of X. Garcia Albiol in Badalona and the discourse targeting a particular immigrant group. But when asked about their view on the compatibility of cultures, several interviewees do not deny that migrants groups, like Romanian Roma, are challenging accommodation policies more than others. But an important difference with the discourse of PP is that they generally explain this challenge by socio-economical factors and not cultural ones.

Then there are all parts of the whole concept around Gypsies, a great concept that is difficult to break. And the Roma people have historical roots in Catalonia... but they are always related to crime, to dirtiness. Now the Romanians are arriving, arriving in conditions that are dirtier, indeed, as being poorer, there can be more dirt there, and the poverty level also brings more delinquency. [civsoc.2]

Intolerance frame in terms of culture and identities is highly challenging when it comes to manage diversity in the society. Despite a powerful conception of Catalanity as a vector of integration and citizenship, and despite the emphasis on the building of a common public culture encompassed in the National Pact for Immigration, framing in terms of identity and culture and especially on the incompatibility of certain cultural values and practices with the local one have grown stronger in the last years.

Welfare: framing local exclusion of undocumented immigrants

One of the principal ways to justify non-toleration is to stress the existence of a competition between natives and immigrants, at the expense of the firsts. This is the fundamental rhetoric of a range of radical-right parties which appeared in Europe since the 1980s. These parties can be qualified as anti-immigration in the sense that they make of immigration the core of their platforms and are strongly in favour of a restriction of migration (Fennema, 1997). But, these new radical right parties do not only claim for a tougher control of migration and the closure of borders. They are making a strong connection between the preservation of the welfare state and the limitation of immigration. “Welfare chauvinism” (Kitschelt, 1997) put forward the idea that the members of the local community should have the priority on others. Kitschelt shows that this anti-immigration discourse is not based on the same assumption of cultural racism or ethnic essentialism and does not target the same migrants. In the case of welfare chauvinism, every newcomer, even those who are not perceived as culturally different, can be blamed for competing with locals. While framing in terms of cultural essentialism and incompatibility may be attached to elite perceptions, welfare chauvinism may be shared by direct competitors, especially lower-class natives. However, even if this discourse directly appeals to low-class and low-qualified workers and has been as such analyzed as a new form of populism18, evidences show that the electoral support of radical-right parties in Europe is much more diverse and more present among the self-employed petite bourgeoisie (Norris, 2005). Lower-class resentment against migrants due to the direct experience of unemployment and social problems is not the direct cause of radical right’s electoral support.

The discourse of PxC in Catalonia is a good example of new radical-right’s discourse. Directly inspired by Vlaams Block successful discourse in Belgium, it has been identified to national-populism

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18 For an analyze of this new populism and its history, see among others: Mény and Surel, 2002.
in the sense it is explicitly appealing to the support of native\"ethnic\" Catalan people by opposing their interests to the ones of immigrants settled in its territory (Casals, 2009). This is best exemplified by its main slogan \"Locals come first\" (Primer els de casa) which is reminding the \"national preference\" of the Front National in France. The discourse of PxC is always exemplifying this slogan in its propaganda by statements on the prejudices suffered by natives and an alleged preference to migrants at the expense of the \"locals\".

Last campaign video of PxC for general elections in November 2011, pictured a young blonde girl, \"Maria\", and a veiled girl, mute and hiding her face, on opposite sides of a table. Men representing each political party of Catalonia appear and take something from the blonde girl: \"health\" represented by an emergency kit, \"education\" represented by books and then a plate, her coat and, finally, almost all her clothes, to give it to the veiled girl with different justifications: \"they have more children\", \"they are cheaper for us\", \"it\'s cool, it\'s \'trendy lefty\". The video opened with the statement: \"Based on real facts\" and ends with a view of \"Maria\" with only underwear and crying while appears a message stating: \"Maria could be your mother, your daughter, your girlfriend, your sister...\" The logo of PxC appears while we hear \"who cares about \"locals\" (los de casa)?\" [see Público, 18.11.2011]

Yet, the rhetoric based on a supposed competition between natives and immigrants for scarce resources, has been retaken by representatives of other political parties and has gained force since the beginning of the economical crisis. According to several interviewees, the link between migration and economic crisis has been made at the very beginning of the crisis and came from representatives of mainstream parties. In particular, the discourse of the socialist Minister of labour and immigration at the beginning of the second office of J.L Zapatero government is perceived as problematic in that sense:

And here, I think, the first who sinned was the Minister of Labour at the time, Corbacho, when the crisis began and his first speech of the 2008 Legislature was \"I will change Immigration Laws, because we will be invaded by family reunification\" and so on, that \"there would come a million people and something\", \"This will affect pensions, social security\", etc, etc. \"We have to complicate family reunification\": first sin. The second one, unemployment linked to voluntary return to the country of origin. As a consequence, migration has soon been linked with the crisis.

One way or another it has created a climate in which migration is to blame for the crisis. [civsoc.3]

Popular party representatives also use rhetoric about the limited resources of the country and, thus, the need to limit migration so as not to damage the interests of the natives. The sentence \"We do not all fit in here\" has been used as a motto in 2008 by the leader of the party - and current Prime Minister - Mariano Rajoy, and has been retaken by the leader of PP in Catalonia, Alicia Sanchez-Camacho, and the mayor of Badalona, Xavier Garcia Albiol.

For most of the interviewees, this discourse has a special impact on the population, especially urban lower-class natives whose economic conditions are the closest to the lower-class immigrants. Most of the people with low economic conditions have immigrated to Catalonia from other parts of Spain during the second half of the 20th century.

The tradition of integration is continuous. The only difference with the last ten years is that immigration is more diverse, more plural, and that many people have come in no time. And what also happened is that many people have arrived and have occupied the empty flats of these uninhabitable neighbourhoods. Thus it has inevitably created conflicts, not with the Catalans themselves, but with the former immigrants who had stayed there. Because, in this country, the \"social elevator\" is functioning. Therefore, the children of immigrants who arrived in the seventies have prospered and bought a house in another more liveable place. And who stayed in these
neighbourhoods? Older people who bought their flats and do not move from there or people who have not been lucky and have not succeeded. So they clash with their new neighbours, from Morocco, Pakistan, Ecuador and such. And there you have what I call hot spots, dangers of conflict. [gov.1]

This situation of competition between migrants and lower-class natives has been especially highlighted for the case of Badalona.

In Badalona there was a situation where there was a discourse of “locals come first” (primero los de casa), of worrying about our stores, that others come to settle. Then with the discourse about the competition for resources that worked here... in Madrid perhaps this is not necessary because there is another dynamic with migration. [civsoc.1]

The rhetoric of competition between natives and immigrants seems to be especially articulated to the situation of deprived neighbourhoods. But this discourse has also been the one at the origin of the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the municipal census, which has been retaken mainly in cities situated in rural zones. Representatives of political parties seem indeed be using this kind of argumentation whether there is or not, a coexistence of lower-class natives and immigrants in the same neighbourhoods.

In the case of Vic's ban of undocumented migrants from municipal census giving access to social aid and education, the exclusion is not based primarily on intolerance to cultural difference, but on the rejection of people who are perceived as unfair competitors for limited public resources. Another justification for their exclusion was the necessity to enforce the law. The exclusion was justified as a way to “safeguard social cohesion” and the possibility of integration of legal immigrants. It was also said that this kind of measure was implemented to “give a sense of responsibility” to all newcomers.

All these rationales express a vision of undocumented immigrants as free-loaders which intent to make the most of the society without contributing to it. In that sense, it is also the preservation of social cohesion which justifies intolerance.

The exclusion of undocumented immigrants divided representatives of mainstream parties, but this time the cleavage was situated between local and Catalan or State representatives. Except for PP and PxC, all other political parties have positioned themselves against the exclusion of undocumented immigrants. But local elected attitudes have been much more ambivalent. In Vic, the motion has been agreed between right and left-wing parties, and voted by PxC, leaving apart only representatives of the red-green coalition ICV. The ban did not only intend to exclude undocumented immigrants. The policy was justified pragmatically in the framework of a rivalry between powers situated at different levels. Local governments complained that they lack of the means to integrate all newcomers, especially since the economic crisis has led to important cuts in the financial transfers between the state and the municipalities.

The problems posed to local governments are widely acknowledged among stakeholders and civil society representatives. Even if the policy is criticized by all the interviewees (except PP representative), they also highlight that municipalities cannot face the cost of the accommodation of immigrants at local level especially with less money due to the crisis. This is thus a way for Catalan nationalists to criticize Spanish government and claim for more political power to regulate this issue at autonomous and local level.

Of course, this also showed that there was a problem in many cities on the issue of local registration, and this problem is still tackled within the larger federations of municipalities of Catalonia [...]. But anyway, they will continue to work together to seek, say, improvements in the registration process, to make it more fair, to avoid problems for the mayors in their territory, due to the poor management capacity we have because of Madrid, which has cut out part of our competences. This too is an issue which is important to consider when discussing this topic. [pp.3]
Yes, we should also mention that the ones which have been more affected by the crisis are local administrations, then the autonomous ones and then the state ones. Local governments are the ones that have experienced cuts in all areas. Of course, and maybe it explains why it is here that xenophobic discourses and racism harvest more votes, because the people sees very directly that social services are not going as fast as they should be. That could be a reason. [vic.1]

This focus on the particularities of the municipalities has also an influence when political parties are facing local initiatives that political leaders do not support. Autonomy within the party and at local level is one of the main obstacles to fight against anti-immigrants rhetoric in the political parties.

The discourse opposing natives and immigrants in the access to welfare, jobs and upward social mobility has penetrated the political debate in Catalonia. Far from standing alone and replacing traditional discourses, it is often articulated to discourses on identities and cultural difference perceived as irreducible in the case of more or less larger groups of immigrants.

The following section will examine more particularly the tensions between what can be said or not about migration in the Catalan political life. Several dimensions have been highlighted through the framing processes, especially the tensions within mainstream parties and especially between local and Catalan/national representatives, and the tensions between freedom of speech and non-discrimination. Such tensions are configuring the debate on the limits of intolerant speech in political life. We especially pay attention to the role of political parties as agents of regulation – or not – of anti-immigrant political discourses.

Section 4 - Stretching the limits of intolerance in political discourses: Political parties at stake

Political discourses are increasingly stretching the limits of intolerance in the Catalan society and undermine the symbolic function of so-call “red lines” that discourses should not be able to cross. Within this framework, the role of the political parties in defining or expanding the boundaries of tolerance toward migrants is fundamental. It allows understanding the politicization of the issue and the way in which it is publicly framed. Party’s framing is not necessarily conditioned by the existence of a far-right political party or people’s demand for tough migration policy. What is more important is the way in which parties handle different streams on migration depending on their ideology, which can lead to different framing of the issue (Odmalm, 2011). The recuperation of an anti-immigrant or intolerant discourse by mainstream parties is of utter importance, especially because recent developments in the research show that tougher positions on immigration of mainstream parties are the ones that legitimize anti-immigrant parties and the radical right (Dahlström and Sundell, 2012).

Party politics and immigration in Catalonia

The influence of the success of a far-right party on mainstream parties and the party system has raised the interest of several scholars (Pettigrew, 1998; Minkenberg, 2002; Schain, 2002). They demonstrate that the far-right is influencing not only right-wing parties but all mainstream parties, and that opposition parties are more vulnerable to the contagion effect (van Spanje, 2010). But even if the growing influence of Plataforma per Catalunya is challenging mainstream parties’ strategies and discursive repertoires about migration, it remains weak in terms of electoral support, especially in comparison with many other European countries. PxC failed in its attempt to have representatives at Catalan and Spanish parliaments in 2010 and 2011, and is thus far from entering any government coalition. It is not involved in any local government either. Thus, the pressure of the radical right is not enough to explain why intolerance is raising in political speech about migration. Arguments about voters demand are problematic as well, as there is not a general agreement on the measure of the demand for tougher positions on migration. Furthermore, several studies put forward the role of the
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elite in the construction of opinions about migration (Van Dijk, 1993). Even if tolerance to migration has dropped between 1996 and 2002, accompanying immigration flows in Spain, it might not be only due to a direct contact with migrants but to the possible contribution of the media (and political elites) to the activation of xenophobia (Cea d'Ancona, 2004).

In order to understand better the way in which intolerance frames have appeared and are used in Catalan politics, we think that it is important to examine party politics, and not only political demand or inter-party competition. Political parties, as institutionalized organizations, are structured around a set of beliefs and norms that can be explicit or not, such as rules of behaviour and speech. As for any institution, political parties tend to avoid changes, in order not to loose electoral support, as well as to comfort the positions of its leaders. But the succession of electoral campaigns during the years 2010-2011 in Catalonia, in combination with the financial crisis, has created opportunities for a change of discourse toward migrants.

Political leaders, who frame migration (or migrants’ practices) as an issue that can no longer be tolerated, come initially from parties in opposition, such as PxC and then Popular party. This framing of migration is also the more coherent with their system of representations. PxC can undoubtedly be defined as an anti-immigrant party in the sense that, apart from claiming for a tougher migration policy, immigration is also the central topic of its platform (Van der Brug, Fennema, 2003). As for the Popular party, it has had a tough discourse on migration since the increase of migration flows, especially during the years 2000-2004 when PP had the absolute majority and governed Spain. But the change lies in the fact that several of its Catalan representatives claimed to get rid of “political correctness”. They switched the traditional discourse on borders closure and control, to explicitly target particular ethnic and religious groups such as Roma, or Muslims. This change can only be understood in relation with the particular position of PP in Catalonia. Catalonia is one of the few autonomous communities, with Basque Country, in which PP is not the main right-wing party. With the existence of CiU, PP is forced to remain in the opposition and is only the third or fourth force in Catalonia. It allows its representatives to make changes in the traditional ideological corpus of the party, and especially in their public discourse. National representatives and PP leaders who are governing other autonomous communities have taken their distance with the discourse of X. Garcia-Albiol during the anti-Roma campaign and did not follow the same path. But the electoral success of PP in Badalona and its relative success during 2011 autonomous elections have woken up the interest for the Catalan Popular party at national level.

Anti-immigrant statements would be a manner to test the limits of what can be said or not about migration in Catalan politics. The relative novelty of international migration and the rather tolerant discourse about the “usefulness” of migrants which prevailed during the years 2004-2008, are challenged now by the raise of intolerance frames. Emerging political discourses stretch the limits of intolerance toward migrants.

This evidences the importance of the context and of partisan dynamics when it comes to understanding the use of intolerance frames in the political life. In Catalonia, we understand that intolerance toward migrants expressed by mainstream political leaders and representatives is allowed by the party as far as it does not undermine its core values or challenge its position within party competition. This is especially the case of PSC and CiU, parties with an ambivalent discourse on migration which varies greatly between municipalities (Garcés-Mascareñas and al., 2012). This means in practice that for mainstream parties who do not openly support tough immigration policies and intolerance to migrants, an intolerant speech is tolerated as far as it appears as isolated within the party. That is why the impact of intolerant discourses is often minimized by party leaders. Two dimensions are especially interesting to explain the possibilities of emergence of such a discourse and to explain at the same time the justifications and the trivialization of non-tolerance in Catalonia: electioneering on the one side and intra-party organization, particularly local-national relations, on the other side.
Justifications for intolerance: not racism but electioneering.

Almost all party representatives and stakeholders discard the importance of racism and xenophobia in Catalan politics. But they agree on the fact that anti-immigrant statements and policies serve electoral purposes of mainstream and radical-right political parties. By making this distinction, they tend to preserve the original values of moderate parties who are not anti-immigrants and stress the importance of migrant’s rights and integration. They tend to preserve also the representation of Catalonia as a land of tolerance toward migrants. This is important in terms of strategy to limit intolerant discourse. Many fear that anti-racist campaigns, trials and public expressions which aim at blaming and shaming those who express and spread racism and xenophobia would lead in the contrary to amplify the penetration of these discourses in the population and give a wrong image about Catalans. As the director of Migration in the Catalan administration states:

Look, I think that the more you make anti-racism, the more it serves to create racists. In my view there is no racism […], and even PxC voters are not racists, this is my opinion. I think that we have to keep this topic under control as we can, from below, inform positively on what is going on with the rumours and strike effectively like suing Anglada. But I am not obsessed by this topic, because I know that the Platform voter is not racist. [gov.1]

Many interviewees therefore deny that racism is important in Catalan politics. Racism is generally admitted only for PxC leaders. Even if public statements of other representatives can be deemed xenophobic, for the vast majority of the interviewees, such statements do not reflect the political thoughts of politicians but have to be considered as strategic discourses to gain voters. Only the anti-racist association SOS Racisme and, to a lower extent, the representative of ICV, considered that anti-immigrant discourse was an important fact at Catalan level and corresponded effectively to a political ideology. But even them do not deny that anti-immigrant discourses are often used as demagogic discourses strategically used to gain votes in the electoral competition.

But the thing with the town council of Vic, is that not all of what it has done is negative but I think it was an electoral manoeuvre, it was obvious. When elections are approaching, and when you have the Platform for Catalonia, you have to do a shock action. I think it was an electoral manoeuvre, and in additional very little grounded in law, I told them it was unwise. Or perhaps it was well thought and strategically to generate all this... who knows? [vic.2]

Even on the explicit discourse of the candidate of Badalona, and even if he had received the support of his political party, the discourse is seen as “not xenophobic”, but “flirting with xenophobia” for electoral purposes.

But hey, when you go with this discourse flirting with xenophobia, but which is not a xenophobic discourse, which takes advantage of several factors: exploiting the desire of change of the city, the alternative to the PSOE was PP. It had therefore already several votes ensured, and afterwards, with this tough - and direct - speech on immigration... it is serious, it was not “we are tough on delinquency”, it was “we are tough on certain immigrants”. Besides, we have the misfortune that there is a specific group which is very controversial, who are the Romanian Roma... [gov.1]

Stakeholders and political leaders make a difference between anti-immigrant statements that were expressed by specific leaders and the discourse of the political party to which he/her belong. They take distances with these statements and disapprove them, and they tend to minimize their interest or their influence. Above all, they show that such discourses are not grounded on the party's ideology:

There have been statements within my own party, of politicians, who have made me unhappy. They are “week-end statements”, I do not know if you understand. Firstly, they do not build anything; secondly, they are sometimes silly things, personal opinions. But even if you are the party candidate... , because the party..., what interests me are the electoral manifestos. And the electoral programs I've read them all in relation to the issue of immigration, including the one of the Popular
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Party, which is a program generally acceptable, with some things that I do not agree with at all, but they do not say silly things, this is what matters. Those of Anglada's yes, they say silly things [pp.3]

This ambivalent discourse combines the recognition of an increasing use of anti-immigrant discourses in the political arena but only as a strategy and reject an actual reconfiguration of the belief system of the party. This is an interesting feature, especially when it comes to the reflection on the limits to such discourse. The National Agreement on Immigration, approved in late 2008, contains a statement on the political use of migration as an electoral strategy. The main political parties signed “a commitment for political parties with representation in Catalonia not to use migration in an instrumental way in election periods”19. But it is widely acknowledged that the change of context due to the economic crisis – and the blaming of migrants for it – has left this commitment apart during the following elections.

Local autonomy and intra-party competition

The vertical interactions within political parties are of great importance when it comes to defining and justifying positions during controversies related to migration and cultural diversity. Studies on political parties have now evidenced the importance of considering their internal dynamics. Catalan mainstream political parties tend to be organized as stratarchies (Katz, Mair, 1995), local and national (Catalan) organisations work rather autonomously one with the other. Furthermore, stratarchy tend to ease intra-party competition, and intra-party competition reinforces in return the greater autonomy of local and national organisations. When it comes to discourses toward migrants, we observed that local autonomy and the primacy of the local context authorize national leaders to take their distance with a policy or a statement without having to condemn it firmly. As the coordinator of migration in the socialist party states:

We have a framework programme, but afterwards it is true that the local reality, the relationships that are maintained in each territory are distinct. Surely, what is going on in Lleida is not the same as what is going on in Sant Pere de Ribes or in Sitges20. That is why the answers surely cannot be the same for all municipalities. In many cases, surely as well, an in-depth debate is necessary. And sometimes, as regards to politics and local issues – those who have worked in city council we are aware of that –, everything is going fast, the answers have to be quick and sometimes they are very influenced by the environment. That is why, we always focus on that there are no common answers for all and everything, there is a framework for thinking, for working and, starting from that, each one has to apply it to his context. [pp.1]

With such an organisation, in which the local context prevails over party's framework for discourses on migration, the national/autonomous level of the party tend to let the local elected free to determine the most adequate positions, and internal sanctions are not implemented frequently. Sanctions are a risk for the party as it would threaten the internal organisation and intra-party competition. So even if the national organisation, and especially secretariats or branches that are in charge of migration issues, disagree with statements and policies at a local level, they prefer to turn a blind eye or minimize the situation which is considered local and contextual and as such, does not challenge party's ideology, or prefer to create internal dialogue over sanctions.

In the case of Lleida, the Catalan direction of the socialist party prioritizes the local context and does not challenge A. Ros decision, even if they take their distance with it:

To say if we would have done [the burqa ban] or not is really difficult. It surely occurred in Lleida because there was an explosive that led to make this reflection. How much burqa do they have?

20 The three are cities of Catalonia, with different sizes and migratory context.
Maybe a few. In my town there is one. So, if there is an element that makes it difficult to identify people, you have to search a way out to make it possible to identify this person. I believe that Lleida tried to find this way out... not for the burqa but for particular elements. The focus has been put on the burqa because I suppose that it gives more media visibility. Whether the city council searched for it without ulterior motive... that I still do not know. But the media certainly focused on that, and there were certainly more people with helmets than with burqa. [pp.1]

That was also the attitude in the case of Vic's elected representatives, who do not govern the city but voted the ban of undocumented residents, even if a dialogue has been established with the socialist board:

Well, from the Executive committee we asked to the proper Vic's councilmen to come and explain their position to the rest of the council and, well, there has been a debate that enriched them in the end. When you are in a very concrete reality, you see all very differently, not better but differently. Because, certainly, we do not have the pressure of the population. [pp.1]

The autonomy of local and national scales is a common feature among many of contemporary political parties, especially cartel parties as defined by Katz and Mair (1995). But autonomy itself does not explain the emergence of discourses toward migrants that express intolerance while the party itself does not support such discourses. Local autonomy explains the discourse and the trivialization at party level only if we consider also that there are different political streams within the party. Oldmalm shows that left-wing and right-wing parties have to handle conflicting streams that can lead to adopt a more open or tough discourse on migration (Oldmalm, 2011). Centre-right parties are torn between value-conservatism and market-liberalism and centre-left parties might hesitate between international solidarity and job-market/welfare state protectionism (ibid.). The mainstreaming of intolerant discourses on migration, the unease among party leaders and strategies of trivialization can be explained by such difficulties to handle conflicting streams and interests within the party.

In the case of Convergencia i Uniò, the alliance between two parties which represent two poles of the right-wing, one conservative, the other liberal, makes the definition of a position on migration obviously conflicting. While CDC has always led the coalition especially as party in government at Catalan level, and has implemented a fairly open and inclusive migration policy, the representatives of UDC at local and autonomous level increasingly define resident migrants as a source of problems for social cohesion, as we have seen.

The left-wing PSC, and to a lower extent ERC, is not exempt of such internal conflicting streams. Angel Ros, the mayor of Lleida, is perceived as the leader of a new stream that would gain power in PSC and further in the Spanish socialist party (PSOE). Stakeholders perceive the situation of Lleida as an indicator of a (successful) political enterprise, connected to the renovation of the discourse of the party on migration:

Angel Ros is totally different [within PSC]. He has done a very tough policy on migration, very brute. [...] He is doing this since a while now. And I think that it is very curious because a few years ago [...] he did not have an important role within his party, and now he does. And he obtained it thanks to his tough policy on migration. [...] He did it in Lleida with this municipal autonomy. It was a laboratory, and it was very convenient for them. I do not know if this could be a model for the migration policy but Rubalcaba said that he would talk to him for migration policy21. [civsoc:2]

Indeed, the economic crisis and the reception of large scale immigration during the last ten years have given new opportunities for representatives and political party to express anti-immigrant discourses and statements. While the radical right remains very low in comparison with many other European

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21 A. Rubalcaba, the socialist candidate for Prime Minister in 2011, effectively asked to Angel Ros, the mayor of Lleida, to write the part on migration for the platform of the socialist party. See El Periódico de Catalunya, 8/07/2011.
countries, the mainstreaming of intolerance toward migrants is acknowledged by political leaders and stakeholders. The importance of such discourses, however, is often trivialised by political leaders. We have highlighted how tolerance for intolerant discourses has a lot to do with party dynamics in Catalonia and the will of many political leaders to preserve the representation of Catalonia as a tolerant and welcoming land. We will conclude by outlining the perspectives that such analysis offer for political action toward intolerant discourses.

Concluding remarks – Tolerating or limiting intolerance in political life: Toward the end of laissez-faire?

Analysing acceptance and intolerance in Catalonia's political life

The Catalan policy toward migrants has always been considered as the most integrative policy in Spain and a model of acceptance at European level. The Catalan administration and its policies have always emphasised the acceptance of migrants, especially by recognizing equal rights between nationals and immigrants and pressing the Spanish State for a more inclusive policy and the empowerment of Autonomous communities. It also succeeded in articulating the definition of the Catalan citizenship to the reception of non-Catalan people (foreigners or Spanish) in a civic-inclusive way and not in an ethnic-exclusive way. Citizenship is defined – and recognized – according to two pillars: the language (Catalan) and the residence. This orientation has been reasserted in each policy plans and framework programmes built by the Catalan administration and by the main cities of Catalonia such as Barcelona. This led to the signature of an Agreement between the main political forces (except popular party), civil society organisations and the Catalan administration, the National Agreement on immigration in December 2008, which reaffirms their commitment for building inclusion along three lines: “Management of migratory flows and access to the job market”, “Adapting public services to a diverse society” and “Integration in a common public culture”.

However, the agreement and the new plan for immigration 2009-2012 coincided with an aggravation of the financial crisis in Spain and with a series of European, autonomous communities, local and national elections during the years 2009-2011. During this period and especially since 2010, policies of exclusion and intolerant discourses toward migrants have taken over the public debate. In the political landscape of Catalonia, two different discourses claim to halt the toleration that has been implemented so far toward migrants. They both start from considering that migration and cultural diversity come along with problems posed to the social cohesion, and cannot be only perceived as positive for the society. But while some express non-tolerance to practices and values of migrants they deem problematic, the discourse of others go beyond non toleration to express exclusion, rejection or hate toward (groups of) migrants or religious minorities (Muslims) per se.

In Catalonia, the expression of hate or rejection in the political life, through explicit racism essentially, is still unusual. The raise of the Platform for Catalonia has led to reconsider the place of the radical right in the country, even if its electoral support remains low in comparison with European countries. The Platform's discourse explicitly targets Muslims and migrants, especially lower-class migrants, as being undesirable in Catalonia and rejects at the same time the idea and the possibility of their integration in the society. Several flyers targeting Muslims or North-African immigrants have been condemned publicly and at times sued, and the party is still perceived as an outsider with whom other parties would never associate. However, it was argued that in the new Catalan political context representatives of mainstream political parties, especially the Popular party of Catalonia but also Convergence and Union, and to some extent the Socialist party of Catalonia, retook the idea that intolerance was necessary to safeguard social cohesion threatened by the increasing diversity of the society. The discourses of these leaders are closer to liberal intolerance for perceived illiberal and uncivic practices attached to certain ethnic groups, migrants or religious groups. But the definitions of the situation made by these leaders also challenge the definition of citizenship in Catalonia.
Expressions of intolerance tend to change the meaning of citizenship and notably make it pass from a civic-inclusive definition to a cultural-exclusive one. The backlash against multiculturalism is located around the question of civic behaviours and values that sustain citizenship in Catalonia. This takes the opposite view of the central political concept of “convivencia” (life together), which has been used in integration policies to stress the positive effect of the social plurality and of the coexistence of diverse cultures or religions. So far, the discourses and policy documents were aimed at creating a common culture based on harmonious coexistence and mutual enrichment between cultures. What the debates on the limits of tolerance and the need to not tolerate some practices challenge is precisely that particular behaviours (of migrants), particular values (associated with minority religions or cultures) go radically against the “convivencia” because they are by nature uncivil, segregative or communitarian.

The dominant political and administrative response to intolerance and even discriminatory discourses so far has been an attitude of laissé-faire, in part because of a strategy to marginalize these discourses by not letting them receive media coverage, and in part because of the prevalence of the representation of Catalonia as a welcoming and tolerant territory.

On the path of the limitation of discrimination and hate speech, two tensions are not solved yet in the Catalan context. Firstly, the tension between freedom of speech and the fight against hate speech and racism, which points toward judicial solutions. Secondly, the tension between laissé-faire attitudes and the institutionalization of anti-racism, which points toward the regulation of political discourses.

Policy-relevant conclusions

1) Anti-racist campaigns have been implemented in Catalonia especially based on the need to fight rumours and hackneyed subjects about migrants. These campaigns have been developed by anti-racist organisations and retaken by the city of Barcelona and then the Catalan administration through the “anti-rumours network” and consist on the presentation of data and laws that explain the falseness of hackneyed subjects blaming migrants (“they steal our jobs”, “they do not pay taxes”). These campaigns are also part of the more general effort toward the building of a so-called “common global culture” in Catalonia. This policy can be considered as a model at Spanish level and European level.

2) However the anti-discrimination and anti-racist policies can be effective only if the elites and especially political leaders do not validate the clichés by integrating them in their discourses. The compromise stated in the National agreement on immigration has not been respected by all the parties. This compromise cannot be made only at party level but should involve also the local structures of the party. Political parties should use the means at their disposal to regulate and implement effectively this commitment. The ambivalence of political parties which officially disagree with anti-immigrant statements and intolerance but have a laisze-faire approach of controversies, is in part responsible of the multiplications of statements which test the red lines between what can and cannot be said.

3) The jurisprudence of Catalan’s courts still gives priority to the freedom of speech in political life to the sanction of discrimination by speech and prejudices expressed toward migrants. Only few cases of anti-immigrant discourses have been led to a condemnation for the speaker. Stakeholders agreed on considering the Law and courts' sentences lax on discrimination. This is problematic as it undermines the attempts to oppose actively discourses which are considered racists or discriminatory. Furthermore, the length of the trials makes it difficult to combat actively racism by the legal way.

Xenophobes are clever enough not to cross the red line. If they said “let's go and kill immigrants”, this means they would undoubtedly be convicted. But they do not say that, they say “immigrants are privileged and we are marginalized” or, “they want to build a Mosque on the bullring”, “we give 4000 Euros a year to each immigrant”, that cheque they made23. Of course this is not a direct incitement to violence. Incitement to hate, yes it is, because it is falseness. But in here the judges are quite benevolent and if there is not a direct incite to violence, or if there is no clear justification that it is racism – and they are also very smart to not handle this topic – the sentences are very benevolent. [gov.1]

4) Stakeholders agree in their majority on the fact that political rights of foreigners would be changing the regulation of political discourses. The rule of reciprocity is applied in Spain for local elections, which enable some foreigners (almost exclusively Latin-American countries) to vote. But the exclusion of several of the major communities in Spain (like Moroccans24) makes it difficult for resident foreigners to be represented in the political life. The absence of foreigners among voters and the fact that still few Spanish nationals are naturalised or born from foreign parents contributes to maintain electioneering strategies which target migrants.

23 The cheque refers to an initiative of the Platform for Catalonia which sent a cheque-like flyer to the inhabitants during the local electoral campaign of 2011. They were cheques of 4000 Euros addressed to “Mohamed Alcabir Samir”, with the fake logo and signature of the Catalan administration, supposedly to denounce the inversion in migration and social integration policies. The Catalan administration sued the Platform for the falsification of its logo and signature on the flyer.

24 Morocco has authorised the vote of foreign residents in its new Constitution the 1st July 2011 and, due to reciprocity rules, Moroccans should be authorized to vote at local elections in 2015. Still, this is raising the opposition of PP representatives, especially in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish enclaves in Morocco.
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Intolerant discourses about migrants in Catalan politics


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“Duran assegura que "la immigració és un problema" i que els nouvinguts "endarrereixen" el nivell de l'escola pública”, Ara, 3.10.2011
“Duran Lleida: "Me preocupa que haya muchos Mohamed que no se integren y que no respeten los valores del país””, El Periodico, 16.11.2011
“El partido xenófobo PxC cierra la campaña con un vídeo racista”, Público, 18.11.2011
“Un juez investigará al líder del PP en Badalona por su discurso xenófobo”, El País, 25.05.2011.
Methodological Appendix

1. List of interviews

Representatives of political parties

[pp.1] Teresa Llorens, head of the Socialist party of catalans (PSC) for migration issues, Barcelona, recorded, 1h20.

[pp.2] Susana Clerici López, head of the Popular party (PP) for migration issues, Barcelona, recorded, 1h30.

[pp.3] Àngel Colom i Colom, head of Convergenc and Union (CiU) for migration matters, president of the Nous Catalans Foundation, dependent of the party, Santa Coloma de Gramenet, recorded, 1h30.

[pp.4] Pere Culell, head of Republican left of Catalonia (ERC) for migration issues, Manresa, recorded, 1h15.

[pp.5] Luis Esteve, head of Initiative for Catalonia – Greens (ICV) for migration issues, L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, recorded, 50 min.

Stakeholder: general – Government

[gov.1] Xavier Bosch, head of Catalan administration's department on migration issues, Barcelona, recorded, 1h20.

Stakeholders: general – Civil society

[civsoc.1] Janet Vallejos, head of AMIC-UGT, pro-migrant organization within the trade-union UGT, Barcelona, recorded, 1h.

[civsoc.2] Alba Cuevas, SOS Racisme, anti-racist organisation, Barcelona, recorded, 1h45.

[civsoc.3] Ghassan Saliba, head of CITE-CCOO, pro-migrant organization within the trade-union Comisiones Obreras, Barcelona, recorded, 1h15.

Stakeholders: Case on undocumented migrants' exclusion of municipal census

[vic.1] Sergi Santacana, lawyer, former member of Col.lectiu Ronda and writer of a report on municipal policies of exclusion of undocumented immigrants, Barcelona, recorded, 1h15.

[vic.2] Joan Vera, head of the social and catholic organization Caritas in Vic, member of the coalition against the exclusion of undocumented immigrants in Vic, Vic, recorded, 1h.

[vic.3] Mohamadi Houzi, head of the amazhig association of Vic and head of the coordination of entities of migrants of the region of Osona, Vic, recorded, 1h15.

[vic.4] Antoni Iborra, lawyer and member of Veus Diversas organization which took an active part in the opposition to the policy excluding undocumented immigrants, Vic, recorded, 1h15.

Stakeholder: Case on anti-romanians and roma campaign

[bad.1] José Santos Silva, Cristobal Lasso and José Cortés Cortés, President, vice-president and treasurer of the Federation of gypsies associations of Catalonia, Barcelona, recorded, 1h30.

Stakeholder: Case on the prohibition of wearing full-veil

[llei.1] Mohamed Halloul, head of the Islamic council of Catalonia, Barcelona, recorded, 1h15.
2. Interview guide

The interview guide differs slightly between the interviews carried out with party representatives and general stakeholders or with stakeholders on a particular case.

Origins / Motivation

[Stakeholders]

Which were the reasons which have driven you / your party / your organisation to take part on the debate on: Vic-census / Badalona-anti-Roma campaign / Lleida – burqa ban?

[Party leaders]

You know about the different debates which occurred since 2010 about migration related issues (remind the three cases), do you think that the way in which politicians talk about migration is currently changing? How?

Presentation and justification of his/her role in the controversy

[Stakeholders/anti-racist and immigrants organisations]

Which are the ways to oppose anti-immigrant discourses that seem more effective to you in that case? Why did you choose to act as you did (media / public manifesto, manifestation, negotiation / reunions, legal action)? Which were the constraints?

[Party leaders]

How are managed in your political party anti-immigrants expressions by elected representatives? How do you concretely manage debates about migration in which local elected of your party are involved?

Is there institutionalized mechanisms or procedures which aim at regulating discourses or policies of members of your party which go against the ideas of the party on migration?

What is the relationship between local representatives and Catalan party leaders on migration issues?

Assessment of the situation in Catalonia

What is your opinion regarding the general framework in which politicians expressed themselves on this topic?

Do you think that this local debate has been relevant at Catalan/State level?

You know about this case (Vic/ Lleida / Badalona): what do you think about politicians’ attitude? Was it discussed in your own party? What was the analysis of your party?

Do you think the economic crisis has an influence on the discourses and policies about migration and cultural diversity? In your party / your organisation, did you concretely adapt your discourse to this new situation? How?

Limits to political discourses and solutions

Do you think that there are values or principles which are contrary to the practices of some migrants and thus justify political limitations?
Do you think that we need more instruments and efforts to limit anti-immigrant expressions? From what has already been done, what do you think is more efficient?

Do you think that the National agreement on migration (Plan nacional per a la immigració) has been useful?

What do you think is missing in fighting anti-immigrant discourses or which are the instruments you think more effective?

What do you think about legal actions to fight political discourses against migrants? What do you think about the current legal framework limiting racism and hate speech? Do you think it is efficient to fight racism and anti-immigrant discourses in politics? Do you think there is a problem in combining freedom of speech and the fight against hate speech/racism toward migrants?

Which solutions you think are more effective at short and long term?
Annexes

Annex1- Table: Local ban of full veil in municipal buildings, Catalonia (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Type of decision (party’s initiative)</th>
<th>Party’s vote</th>
<th>+ in favour - against o absence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ban from municipal buildings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lleida</td>
<td>PSC (maj),</td>
<td>Vote of motion (PSC, CiU, PP)</td>
<td>+ CiU, PSC, PP - ICV o ERC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>PSC (maj),</td>
<td>Decree (PSC)</td>
<td>- ICV, ERC, PP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'Hospitalet</td>
<td>PSC (maj),</td>
<td>Vote of Motion (PP)</td>
<td>+ PSC, CiU, PP - ICV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarragona</td>
<td>PSC (maj),</td>
<td>Vote of motion (PSC, CiU)</td>
<td>+ PSC, CiU, PP o ERC (modif)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cervera</td>
<td>PSC, ERC,</td>
<td>Vote of motion (PxC)</td>
<td>+ PxC, CiU</td>
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<td></td>
<td>INSE, PP</td>
<td></td>
<td>- PSC, ERC, INSE o PP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reus</td>
<td>PSC (maj),</td>
<td>Decree (PSC, 6 months after the rejection of two motions)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cunit</td>
<td>PSC, PP</td>
<td>Motion (PSC, PP)</td>
<td>+ PSC, PP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o ERC, ICV, CiU</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>El Vendrell</td>
<td>CIU</td>
<td>Motion (CIU)</td>
<td>+ CIU, PxC, PP, ERC (PSC left the plenary)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>“Regulation”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Manresa</td>
<td>PSC (maj),</td>
<td>Vote of motion</td>
<td>+ CIU, PSC, ERC, PP, PxC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERC, ICV</td>
<td></td>
<td>- CUP, ICV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabadell</td>
<td>PSC (maj)</td>
<td>Local regulation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend of political parties:
CIU: Convergencia i Unió (centre-right, nationalist)
PSC: Partit dels socialists de Catalunya (centre-left)
ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (left; nationalist)
ICV: Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (red-green coalition)
PP: Popüler part (right)
PxC: Plataforma per Catalunya (radical-right)
INSE: Independents de la Segarra (local party)
CUP: Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (alternative left; independentist)

Source: Own elaboration with media data.
Annex 2- Partido Popular's flyer, municipal campaign, 2010