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**MINISTERIAL CAREERS AND THE NATURE
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT: THE CASES OF
AUSTRIA AND BELGIUM (1)**

by

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MINISTERIAL CAREERS AND THE NATURE OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT:
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Although, as a result of numerous studies, we now begin to know better the way in which cabinet government operates, many aspects of the structure and of the decision-making processes which characterise this form of government remain obscure. Moreover, as these studies are mostly single-country analyses, we still do not perceive the extent of the variations from one cabinet government to another; nor can we determine with precision the factors which account for these variations.

The question which raises most controversies is that of the nature of the decision-making process. In principle, in cabinet government, decisions are taken collectively: in this, cabinet government is unique, or almost unique in the contemporary world and it differs in particular from presidential government, let alone from authoritarian systems. Yet it is often pointed out in practice that the arrangements are often hierarchical and, in particular, that the head of the government has acquired a "presidential" stature; but this view continues to be challenged, in particular in Britain (2). It does indeed seem that the situation varies markedly and that many factors, including the nature of political norms, the character of the party system, and the personality of the prime minister account for these

variations. It is therefore manifest that a satisfactory answer to the question will be given only when the analyses become fully comparative.

The problem of the nature of the decision-making process in the cabinet is not the only matter which raises controversies with respect to cabinet government, however. The structure and composition of the executive also need to be examined, both because they form part of the comprehensive picture which we need to obtain and because they also have an indirect effect on the nature, collective or hierarchical, of the decision-making process. To begin with, cabinet government is also traditionally referred to as parliamentary government since the cabinet is responsible to parliament and can only survive as long as it can muster a parliamentary majority. But the question of parliamentary responsibility leads to the matter of the composition of the cabinet. In his Analysis of Political Systems, for instance, D.V. Verney goes as far as stating that, in cabinet governments, ministers are "usually members of Parliament" (3); indeed, if ministers are responsible to parliament, it seems politically wise that they should also normally be drawn from the legislature. The question therefore arises as to whether it is indeed the case that ministers are always drawn from parliament in substantial numbers and whether, for instance, the French Fifth Republic practice of appointing outsiders is limited to the peculiarly 'hybrid' character of that system of government. Yet the fact that ministers are drawn from Parliament is far from being irrelevant to the nature of the decision-making process, as

it can be hypothesised that men and women who have worked together in a parliamentary setting are likely to know each other rather well and behave towards each other in the Cabinet differently from the way they would if they were complete strangers, as might on the contrary be the case in a presidential system on the American model.

Other aspects of the composition and structure of cabinets are equally important to examine. The duration of ministers in office has indeed often been regarded as an indicator of the 'health' of the political system; it is manifestly important when the turnover is very high, as was the case in France under the Fourth republic and in Greece until 1952. But duration needs also to be examined for another reason: in cabinets where some ministers are of long-standing while others remain in office for very short periods, collective decision-making will tend to be impaired. Duration is not the only factor worthy of examination, however: at least two further aspects need to be considered. Ministers who come and go may play a larger part than would be suggested by the number of years in which they are in office, on the one hand; and, on the other, the duration in each post may be as relevant as the overall tenure. Thus the shape and complexity of the ministerial career are likely to be important elements in the nature of the decision-making process.

This matter in turn raises another problem, that of departmental influence v. overall influence within the cabinet. Someone who has headed the same department for many years may be more influential within a given field than someone who has been

more transient; but such a minister may play a limited part in the rest of the decision-making process. There seems to be a trade-off here: the longer a minister stays in a given position, the greater his or her departmental role, but the less his or her overall governmental influence. Moreover, departmental influence also depends on the extent to which ministers are 'amateurs' or 'specialists' in the departments of which they are the heads: it could also be hypothesized that specialists are likely to concentrate on their department and be little concerned with the affairs of the government as a whole.

As a first step towards a full examination of these career patterns in a Western European context, a look at the examples provided by Austria and Belgium seemed potentially rewarding. For these two countries appear to provide two different models of career patterns within the parliamentary system; they seem at first sight to be two of the most extreme cases along a continuum. To begin with, the Austrian system is markedly simpler and more stable than the Belgian system. For twenty years, between 1945 and 1966, Austria was ruled by a grand coalition; there were then four years of a single party populist government (1966-70); these were followed by a long period of socialist rule (1970-83); a 'small' socialist-liberal coalition came to power in 1983. There were only six chancellors during the period, and the average duration of ministers was between 5 and 6 years, still not very long in absolute terms, but substantially above the average for Western Europe. Belgium, on the contrary, has had many different types of governments (almost always of a coalition character, the

only exception being the CVP/PSC government of 1954-8); these governments rarely lasted beyond a few years (4). There have been fourteen prime ministers and the average duration of ministers has been of about 3.8 years, one of the lowest in Western Europe, though still equal to the world average.

Austria and Belgium seemed therefore to be two good cases to examine in order to assess the extent and character of the variations of cabinet government across Western Europe. If the ministerial composition in the two countries is basically similar, if there are only variations in duration and if these are entirely due to differences in the party system, it becomes permissible to conclude that there is basically one model of cabinet government; if, on the other hand, other differences are revealed in the nature and characteristics of ministerial careers in the two countries, it becomes reasonable to suggest that there are various types of cabinet government, these types in turn being likely to affect the characteristics of the decision-making process. We shall therefore first explore somewhat more in detail the variations in ministerial duration, before examining the 'shape' of the ministerial career in the two countries, its relationship with the parliamentary career and the extent to which the professional career, both before and after ministerial office, seems both to affect and be affected by the governmental positions held by members of the government.

1. The duration of ministers in office in Austria
and Belgium.

Between 1945, at the time of the constitution of the first regular postwar government, and the end of 1984, 97 different persons occupied a post of minister or chancellor in the Federal Republic of Austria; in Belgium, during roughly the same period, from the liberation of the country at the end of 1944 to the end of 1984, there were 213 ministers. Although Belgian governments were, in general, somewhat larger than their Austrian equivalents, and although the period under consideration is slightly longer for Belgium than for Austria, the bulk of the difference is due to the appreciably more rapid turnover of personnel in Brussels than in Vienna: on average, a Belgian minister was in office for under four years, and an Austrian minister for five and a half years.

Of course, in absolute terms, even the duration of Austrian ministers is not very long. Five and a half years is but a moment in someone's working life; and, as a matter of fact, as this 'moment' occurs typically at around the age of fifty, the ministerial career is often not the crowning of a political life, the last step achieved after having moved up a long ladder and before retirement (unlike, for instance, the situation which often prevails in the Soviet Union) (5). A ministerial position may be viewed by its holder as well as by others as the most prestigious which can be attained during a career in public life: it is

usually not the last. Ministers have therefore to find, after they cease being in office, positions which are both sufficiently rewarding financially and intellectually to compensate for what constitutes at least for many a loss of power and emotional excitement: we shall return to this point in the last section of this paper.

Yet, even if the average ministerial career is not very long in absolute terms in Austria, it is appreciably longer than in Belgium. The characteristics of the reasons for the differences are therefore clearly worthy of investigation. In both countries, the average summarises a fairly regular distribution, with the result that the proportions of Belgian ministers lasting under a year, between one and two years, and even between two and five years are larger than the corresponding proportions of Austrian ministers, while the reverse occurs among ministers lasting between five and ten years and over ten years (Table I). At both extremes, however, the difference is substantial, with only 9 percent of Austrian ministers having been in office under a year against 15.5 percent of their Belgian colleagues and, on the other hand, only 7 percent of the Belgian ministers having been in office ten years or more against 16 percent of the Austrian members of the government. Although the core of the ministers, in both countries, remained in office for substantial but not very long periods, the contrast at both ends is sharp.

As a matter of fact, the contrast might be felt to be even sharper among the 'transient' ministers, as four of the Austrian members of the government have had to be classified

within this group for the purely technical reason that they were appointed during the last year of this investigation: in reality, there were only five Austrian ministers who truly were in office for under a year throughout the period. However, a further element of distortion, this time to the detriment of the Belgian average, stems from the fact that early postwar Belgian governments had a larger than average proportion of one-year ministers, while the Austrian provisional government, which also lasted less than a year, was not included in the inquiry since it preceded the establishment of the parliamentary system. The percentages of 'transient' ministers are thus probably somewhat inflated for special reasons in the two countries, but a large difference remains.

A substantial difference also exists at the other extreme where 16 Austrian government members lasted in office ten years or more, as against 15 Belgian ministers in the same category, although the total number of ministers was more than twice as large in that country. These long-standing ministers remained on average in office for about thirteen years in both countries, Spaak and Kreisky being respectively the longest office-holders in Belgium and Austria. The extent of the difference between the two countries can be summarised by considering the aggregate proportion of all the ministerial positions occupied by long-term ministers. In Belgium, the 15 members of the government who stayed in office ten years or more jointly occupied a quarter of all the positions, not an insignificant proportion; but, in Austria, the 16 ministers

belonging to the same group took over two-fifths of the posts.

However, although ministers with long or very long experience are proportionately more numerous in Austria and 'transient' ministers proportionately more numerous in Belgium, the nature of the decision-making process may not be markedly affected for that reason alone. For there is in both countries a large group of members of the government who stay in office for periods ranging from two to nine years: indeed, the percentage in this category is the almost same in both countries - 56 to 58% -, although Belgium had rather fewer ministers lasting in office between five and nine years and rather more lasting between two and five years. From the point of view of the holder, five years may not be long; but it is a sufficient period to give substantial ministerial experience. There may be somewhat more ministers in Belgium who have little occasion to make their mark on the government; yet the proportions of those members of the government are sufficiently small not to have a major effect, per se, on the nature of the decision-making process and on patterns of interaction among the ministers.

Ministerial duration is shorter in Belgium than in Austria, but the distribution around the average is approximately normal in each case: what factors, then, appear to account for the difference? Should it be attributed to characteristics of the ministerial 'culture' which are sui generis or are general political variables at play? The Belgian party system is more complex than the Austrian: coalitions are therefore more difficult

to build and rather more fragile in Belgium. Does this affect the duration of ministers in office as well as the number of governments?

Although only a broadly-based comparative analysis can be expected to help to distinguish satisfactorily among the various elements contributing to variations in duration, the circumstances of the party composition of governments in Austria and Belgium help at least to throw some light on one important 'structural' aspect, the role of party dominance. For, while coalitions are more complex in Belgium, one party has been in office almost continuously throughout the period, the Christian Social party: it was excluded from the government only between 1954 and 1958. The Belgian Christian Social party has thus provided ministers for as many years as the Austrian Socialist party, which, too, was only out of office for four years, between 1966 and 1970, while, on the other hand, the Austrian Populist party ceased to be represented in the government after 1970. This party dominance comes to be translated in the composition of cabinets, both because the average duration of ministers and because the percentage of long-standing ministers is larger for the Belgian Christian Social party (4.9 years) and the Austrian Socialist party (6.4 years) than for other parties. At the other extreme, members of the Belgian regional parties were in office for substantial shorter periods: none stayed in office as many as three years while no 'non-party' minister stayed in office as many as four years, and overall, the average duration of the non-party, Communist, and regionalist ministers has been two years, almost

half the overrall average. Moreover, practically all the Austrian long-standing ministers are found to be Socialist (14 out of 16), and a substantial majority of their Belgian counterparts belong to the Christian Social Party (10 out of 15).

Party dominance has thus considerable significance. The influence of other general structural factors is less marked or less clear: for instance, contrary to what might have been expected, the turnover of prime ministers seems to have only a limited impact. It may have some effect at the lower end, in that the number of Belgian 'transient' ministers seems to be somewhat increased, in all parties, including the Christian Social party, as a result of changes of government. But the impact at the upper end is not very clear: there were seven long-standing ministers in Austria during the 1945-1970 period, as many as during the admittedly shorter period (13 years) of the Kreisky government.

The conclusions which can be drawn from the analysis of the ministerial duration in Austria and Belgium are therefore the following. (1) First, duration is longer among ministers of a dominant party than among other ministers. As a matter of fact, twenty years or more in office is essential if the proportion of long-standing ministers is to be relatively large. This conclusion applies to both countries, despite the impression that long-term ministers are 'naturally' rare in Belgium. (2) Even when there is a marked dominance of a party, the proportion of long-standing ministers remains relatively small: in the best case, that of the Austrian Socialists, about a quarter of the ministers did remain in office ten years or more; and only two of

these remained in office more than fifteen years, although the party was in the government for 35 of the 39 years of the analysis (a further two achieved 15 years in office since the end of this period, however). (3) These long-standing ministers are often not forced out of office by their age, though age appears to play a larger part in Belgium than in Austria: in the latter country, a majority of the long-standing ministers left office before they were 65; in neither country was more than a small minority still in office when they reached 70. (Table III). (4) At the other end of the continuum, dominant parties are less likely to have many transient and short-term ministers. In Belgium, there were proportionately fewer of them among members of the Christian Social Party than among Socialists and among members of both these parties than among Liberals. Clearly, the precise relationship between party dominance and duration needs to be examined systematically by considering its effect across Western Europe, but the existence of an influence appears to be without doubt. (5) The relative stability of coalitions appears also to have an effect on the proportion of transient and short-term ministers: ministers in both these categories are relatively numerous even among members of the Belgian Christian Social Party, as governments have been relatively shaky and the emergence of new prime ministers appears to open up the possibility for a relatively rapid turnover, even within a dominant party such as the Belgian Christian Social Party. Thus, overall, Austrian Populist ministers are bunched, so to speak, between tenures of one and nine years (87 percent of them are in these categories),

as against much lower percentages in the other major parties which are considered here, either because the percentage of long-standing ministers is high (Austrian Socialists) or because the percentage of transient ministers is high (Belgian Socialists and Liberals), while the Belgian members of the Christian Socialist Party occupy an intermediate position.

The examination of the ministerial duration in the two countries does not therefore provide evidence suggesting the existence of contrasting types of cabinet government. In the two countries, the core of the ministerial personnel stays in office for substantial, yet relatively limited periods, with the dominance of one party contributing to an increase in the average duration and to overall stability. If we are looking for different models, duration alone does not provide the answer, however large is the gap between Austria and Belgium in this respect.

2. The shape of the ministerial career in Austria and Belgium.

Duration in office is not the only characteristic of the ministerial career, however. Another important feature is the 'shape' of the career which results from the extent to which ministers change positions or come in and out of the government. While the profile of ministerial duration may not be sufficiently different in Austria and Belgium to provide a real contrast, the

shape of the career shows great variations. The Austrian ministerial career is simple and straightforward: someone is appointed to a post; he or she occupies that post for a number of years; and once he or she leaves the post, the ministerial career also ends. Only in a small minority of cases does a minister change the position held in the government; and only exceptionally is the career 'interrupted'. Out of 97 Austrian ministers, 78 (four-fifths) had one post and only one; only five ministers had an interrupted career, in two cases (one of whom was Kreisky) because, being Socialists, they could not participate in the single-party Populist government of 1966: they returned to office in 1970. By contrast, the Belgian ministerial career is markedly more complex. To begin with, less than half the ministers in that country held one post only: 107 out of 213 occupied at least two positions, and many of these had three, four or more posts in succession. Moreover, while only five Austrian Cabinet members came to office more than once, 68 Belgian ministers - a third of the total - were in government in at least two different occasions. (Table IV).

It seems therefore possible to speak of two truly different careers. This is indeed particularly the case because it is not just the career in general, but even more the successful career which is different. Not surprisingly perhaps, a large number of Belgian ministers who held one post only are to be found among the 'transient' or 'short-term' groups. It follows that only a relatively small minority of the successful, and indeed almost none of the very successful ministers had only one post or even

held office in a non-interrupted manner. Belgian ministers who had more than one post, on the other hand, and even more those whose career in the government was interrupted were in office more than twice as long (6.4 v. 2 and a half years) as those of their colleagues whose tenure of office was continuous; there is even a difference of two and a half years between the average tenure of those who were in office more than once and that of all other ministers who stayed in office over two years (6.4 v. 3.9 years). Thus the Belgian government is different from the Austrian government in two ways. First, ministers have to hold more than one post if they wish to stay in office more than two or three years; and, second, they have to accept to come and go in and out of office if they wish to be ministers for more than five or six years. This relationship between numbers of posts and duration is almost unknown in Austria.

In that country, the 'natural' way in which a minister develops a successful career is by holding only one position ever in the government. Admittedly, even if transient and short-term ministers are excluded, one-post ministers stayed in office only about the average for all Austrian ministers (five and a half years), but the range is substantial. While about half of them (29 out of 53) stayed in office less than five years, a third were in office for between five and ten years and even five (almost 10 percent of the group) stayed in office for over a decade; three of these even remained at the head of the same ministry continuously for thirteen years. While one-post ministers are sometimes transient or short-term, while they are often in

office only for an 'intermediate' period of time, it is far from unknown for them to remain in the government for long periods and it is even fairly common for them to stay in office for what was defined earlier as a 'substantial' period. There is no stigma attached to the one-post minister in Austria, quite the contrary; it is only that, in the nature of things, ministers who are relatively unsuccessful (or unlucky, for instance if they join the government shortly before a change takes place in the party composition of the Cabinet, as occurred in 1966 and 1970 in Austria), also are extremely likely to occupy only one position; therefore, the group of the 'successful' one-post ministers must be considered separately from the group of those who are transient. In Austria, 23 different persons had only one post and stayed in office five years or more - a quarter of all the ministers in the country during the period; these remained in office on average for about eight years, less than the 19 ministers who had more than one post, but surely a sign of success. This large group of truly successful one-post ministers has no equivalent in Belgium.

For, in Belgium, the one-post minister is one whose duration in office may be intermediate rather than short or transient, but is almost never substantial let alone long-term. Of the 39 ministers who were in office at least two years but had one post only, two remained in office for more than five years (in fact they were in office for under six years), while exactly half the others (19) were in office for less than three years. Not surprisingly, the average duration of this group of ministers in

office was only about three years (38 months) while the equivalent group remained in the government more than two and a half years longer in Austria (5.5 years). As a matter of fact, one finds within this group the same inter-party differences as those which we noticed earlier: while two-thirds of the Social Christian ministers in this category lasted more than three years in office (12 out of 18), the proportions are reversed for the members of the other parties, as nearly two-thirds of these were in the government between two and three years only. (Table V).

In Belgium, therefore, long-term ministers and even those who stayed in office for a substantial period only (between five and ten years) are found almost exclusively among those members of the government who had more than one post, whether in succession or with interruptions. These constitute of course a much larger proportion of the ministers than in Austria: together, these two groups form over half the total (107 out of 213, while the corresponding groups include only 19 of the 97 Austrian ministers). As a matter of fact, the duration in office is likely to be longer among those whose career was interrupted than among those whose career was continuous, even in more than one post (6.4 years against nearly 5).

This situation reflects again the extent to which coalitions and indeed individual governments are more frequently reshuffled in Belgium than in Austria. Indeed, the extent of the movement within the governments in Belgium is even greater if one takes into account the number of posts which each of the Cabinet members had held. As we saw, the relatively few ministers who had

more than one post in Austria almost never had more than two (in fact two cases only); in Belgium, on the contrary, both those who had different posts in succession and those who had an interrupted ministerial career often had more than two posts. Thus the 38 ministers who had more than one post in succession had jointly 89 positions - an average of two and a half posts per Cabinet member; the 71 ministers whose career was interrupted also held on average two and a half posts (2.56), at any rate if the cases in which the same post was held twice or more are counted as only one position, as, if one were to count these as different positions, the average would be raised to almost three and a half posts (3.37). A successful career in government in Belgium entails therefore being given more than one post, a situation which may be forced upon the ministers by the conditions of the political system, but one which probably also has the effect of precipitating the movement of Cabinet members from one position to another.

The relative 'success' of a career can be measured by the time spent in the government; it can also be assessed by examining the particular positions held by the ministers. It is often believed that there is a cursus honorum: ministers would first begin by holding relatively less 'important' positions before moving to the key jobs. Although it is difficult to test precisely such a hypothesis, as there are no definite criteria by which to 'grade' the ministerial departments, one can at least determine a rough ranking. Cabinet posts have thus been divided into three categories, namely the positions of prime minister and deputy prime minister, the 'influential' portfolios (foreign

affairs, interior, defence, justice, finance and economy), and the others. If there is indeed a cursus honorum, the first position a minister would achieve would tend to be one of the 'other' posts, the second, one of the influential positions and the third, those of prime minister or deputy prime minister.

The examination of the position held by ministers in succession in Belgium suggests that such a cursus honorum exists, though only to a limited extent. The positions of prime minister or deputy prime minister are rarely reached immediately, to be sure; but, while the proportion of ministers appointed to 'other' posts declines as one moves from the first position held to the second and beyond, there are also many cases when ministers hold an 'important' position as a first Cabinet job. Overall, the probability of obtaining an influential department increases only slowly from the first to the fourth post (from a little over a quarter to a little over a third); conversely, the proportion of ministers in other posts declines from two-thirds to a little over half from the first to the third position held in the government and only falls very sharply with the fourth and fifth positions. Some Belgian ministers have to wait to be given an influential department, but many reach these positions from the start. (Table VI).

The detailed examination of the ministerial career in Belgium does therefore show that, for the majority of the office-holders and especially for those who are fortunate enough to stay in government for a relatively long period, there is a career, in the sense that these do not stay in the same post, but

that such a career does not have a very distinct profile and in particular is often not based on the gradual movement to the top. Ministers move from one job to another, but the movement is usually sideways. While, unlike in Austria, it is not possible to make a real career in the government in Belgium without changing posts, it is the change per se which is the critical variable, not the character of the change.

The Belgian and Austrian ministerial careers are thus very different. A Belgian Cabinet member stays in the same post two or three years, and at most four or five, while an Austrian minister may stay in the same position for half a decade in many cases and for a decade occasionally. It does seem that some consequences must follow for the characteristics of the governmental and administrative life of the two countries. For the propensity to rotate (rather than move up or stay put) suggests an even greater degree of 'instability' in Belgium, by comparison with Austria, than the overall figures of ministerial duration suggest: there is an instability of the posts which are held beyond the shorter tenure of the ministers in Belgium. Overall, the 213 Cabinet members in that country held 445 different posts - an average of slightly over two positions per minister; the 97 Austrian office-holders held only 120 posts - an average of about 1.2 positions. There were somewhat over twice as many ministers in Belgium than in Austria during the same period; but there were nearly four times as many individual jobs held by Belgian ministers as by Austrian ministers.

While there is relative instability in the Belgian government, there is also greater knowledge, on the part of Belgian ministers, of the affairs of departments other than the ones which they are leading. Moreover, at any rate as far as those ministers whose career is interrupted and who constitute, as we know, a third of the total, the experience acquired is clearly of a different character from the one which is acquired in Austria by long-standing ministers who at most move posts only once throughout their governmental career. Belgian ministers remain in office appreciably less, on average, than Austrian ministers; but their experience is usually more varied and in many cases extends over a longer period than it does in Austria, because of the interruptions between posts. Perhaps this means that it is not realistic to make a straightforward comparison of duration: years outside the government may constitute periods of reflection during which further experience is acquired. What is clear is that we are confronted here with a different profile of career which in turn leads to a different model of cabinet government - a difference which patterns of duration alone did not manifest but which the shape of the career amply demonstrates.

It is of course impossible to state without an examination of governmental outputs whether the departments which were led on average for between one and two years in Belgium by the same minister were less well directed than their Austrian equivalents which were led on average by men and women staying in office in the same post for five years; but it is at least clear that the conception of the minister, rotating from post to post,

must in reality be substantively different in Belgium from what it is in Austria. These relatively rapid movements, linked to the parliamentary rather than ministerial character of the career, suggest that Belgian Cabinet members truly form political governments, while the Austrian experience of office-holders resembles more to a managerial team.

3. Ministerial career and parliamentary career.

Anyone familiar with the broad patterns of governmental coalitions in Austria and Belgium would probably expect Belgian ministers to have an altogether more complicated ministerial career than Austrian ministers, and in particular come in and go out of the government as a result of relatively frequent reshuffles; but this is not the only marked difference between the two ministerial careers. For, perhaps more remarkably, Austrian governments also differ from Belgian governments by the extent of the link between ministers and parliament. Both countries have ostensibly adopted the parliamentary system; but, if the parliamentary system entails, in Verney's expression, that ministers be "usually" drawn from Parliament, the Austrian system is only half-parliamentary and it resembles more the practice of the French Fifth Republic than the British model. 31 of the 97 Austrian ministers of the post-1945 period were not parliamentarians and a further 18 had not been in Parliament before becoming ministers, nine of whom, admittedly, because they

came to power in 1945 with the first postwar elections: thus about half the Austrian ministers did not have a parliamentary experience on coming to office. This is in marked contrast with Belgium where the large majority of members of the government are drawn from Parliament: only under 20 percent of the ministers were not parliamentarians on coming to office and two-fifths of these non-parliamentarians were appointed in the immediate post World War II period.

It is true that the other half of the Austrian ministers, those who came to office by the parliamentary route, had had a relatively long experience, even slightly longer, on average, than that of Belgian ministers. The average, which is 8.2 years in Austria and 7.1 years in Belgium, does conceal the real picture, however, as there is a considerable dispersion, with some ministers coming to office after a few years of parliamentary experience (a quarter of the Austrian ministers coming through the parliamentary route and a fifth of the Belgian equivalents had been in parliament under four years), while others had had to wait a decade or more before becoming ministers: nearly two-fifths (15) of the Austrian ministers who had been in Parliament and slightly under a third of their Belgian colleagues (53) were in this category. A substantial parliamentary experience does therefore count for about a quarter of the Austrian members of the government and for about two-fifths of their Belgian colleagues.

The Austrian ministerial career can therefore be deemed to be half-parliamentary, in that half the ministers do not

come to office via the parliamentary route. It is also half-parliamentary because it is normally unbroken, while it is broken, as we saw, in a third of the cases in Belgium. The interrupted character of the career of many Belgian ministers and, indeed, of the more successful of these careers, has the effect of increasing the duration of the parliamentary career in which this ministerial life is, so to speak, embedded. Almost all the Belgian ministers whose career was interrupted returned to Parliament during the interval: Spaak was an exception in having left Parliament to become Secretary-General of NATO. For these ministers, and in particular for those whose career was interrupted more than once (34 in all), ministerial life and parliamentary life are truly intertwined. It is difficult to dissociate the two and the fact that a career in government truly stems from parliament is obvious. Indeed, on average, for the 67 ministers whose career in office was interrupted, the number of years in office is slightly shorter than the number of years in Parliament between ministerial jobs. There is therefore, for many ministers, a career in and out of Parliament which has no equivalent in Austria. (Table VII).

Belgian ministers are thus overwhelmingly drawn from within Parliament and many of them are in and out of the government over a substantial period. They also tend to remain in Parliament, often for many years, and indeed until retirement, after the end of their ministerial career. This, too, occurs more rarely in Austria: in that country, half the ex-ministers do not remain in Parliament at all; of those who do, a substantial minority remains only a year or two. In reality, only a quarter of

the Austrian ministers appeared to settle for a substantial post-ministerial parliamentary career; only six of them were still in Parliament at the end of the period of analysis and a further six had left Parliament after having reached the age of 65.

This picture contrasts from that which describes ex-ministers in Belgium. Only a small minority of them (about 20 percent or 36) did not remain in Parliament after leaving office and only a further 10 percent (21) stayed in Parliament two years or less: thus over two-thirds had a truly substantial post-ministerial parliamentary career; a quarter were still in Parliament at the end of the period of analysis while another quarter had left Parliament only after they had reached the age of 65. These are about four times the proportions of the Austrian ex-ministers in the same categories. Perhaps because Belgian ex-ministers have a higher expectation than their Austrian counterparts to return to the Cabinet, a majority of these men and women remain in effect in Parliament until the end of their working life.

These differences in the proportion of ministers of the two countries coming from or returning to Parliament therefore build a picture of a 'parliamentary-ministerial' life in Belgium, against only a partly parliamentary life among Austrian ministers; for these, Parliament is a stepping stone, not a way of life. On the one hand, one finds a substantial group of Austrian ministers who never had any contacts with Parliament at all except in their capacity as ministers, while the Belgian counterparts are a very small group somewhat exceptionally selected. On the other hand,

the Belgian parliamentary career is, for the very large majority who are drawn from Parliament, much longer than the ministerial career; it precedes and continues it; at least for the large majority of Belgian Cabinet ministers whose duration in office is relatively short, the ministerial life appears to be an episode taking place in the midst of a much longer parliamentary career.

The difference between the two countries can be expressed in a quantitative form. Belgian ministers who stayed in office under a year stayed in Parliament, on average, for over twelve years, as also did the ministers who stayed in office for between one and two years: for these, the time in the government is truly insignificant compared to the time in Parliament. But there is a great disproportion even among those who stayed in office for longer periods. The 67 ministers whose ministerial career was interrupted by periodic returns to Parliament spent, on average three times as many years in the Chamber than in the Cabinet (17 v. 6.4 years); those who had only one period in office which lasted more than two years spent in Parliament, both before and after their tenure, about three and a half times as many years in Parliament as they did in the government (14 years v. 4 years). Very few are the ministers, even the long-standing ones, who spent less time in Parliament than in their Cabinet seats.

In Austria, meanwhile, the two-thirds of the ministers who had at least some parliamentary experience, before, or after, or both before and after their ministerial tenure, did not spend on average substantially more time in Parliament than they did in the government: the ratio is two ministerial years for

three parliamentary years. Of course, this ratio varies appreciably, in particular according to the duration in office of the ministers: the longer the period in office, the higher the proportion of ministerial years. At one end, the relatively few who were ministers one or two years only and were parliamentarians spent seven years in the Chamber for every year in the government; but those who stayed in office for longer periods spent more time, indeed two or three times longer, in the Cabinet than in Parliament. This means that, basically, only the unsuccessful ministers spent comparatively more time in the Chamber than in the government, a situation which contrasts with the Belgian experience where nearly all ministers, whatever their length of tenure in office, spent more of their active life in Parliament than as Cabinet members.

Thus it is not only that many ministers come to office in Austria without having to follow the parliamentary route; it is that the most successful of even the parliamentary ministers have a relatively limited career in the Chamber. While in Belgium the time spent in Parliament increases with the increase in the ministerial career, or, to put it differently, while, in order to have a relatively long ministerial career, Belgian ministers have to stay longer in Parliament, the movements go in an opposite direction in Austria: a long parliamentary career is therefore in that country normally the sign of a short ministerial career, of a failed ministerial career. Parliament is neither a precondition of ministerial achievement nor a help towards a long ministerial career. It may help to reach the

cabinet, but as a ladder helps to reach the top; it is not part and parcel of ministerial life, as in Belgium. It is a means, and indeed only one of the means, of becoming a member of the Cabinet.

4. Cabinet positions and the overall careers of ministers.

Even when ministers are members of Parliament for long periods, their working life starts long before their election to a chamber and often extends well beyond they cease to belong to it. Moreover, as we saw, especially for Austria, ministers are often not parliamentarians or are not parliamentarians for more than a few years. Someone reaches the Cabinet at fifty, after having been elected to a chamber at around 40; he or she is likely to leave the government at about 55 and to leave Parliament well before reaching the age of 65. What other careers, before and afterwards, is such a minister likely to have had and how far are these related to the ministerial job or jobs which he or she may have occupied? In what way, if at all, does the early career prepare future ministers for governmental office? To what extent does the ministerial career provide office-holders with further opportunities after they left the Cabinet?

There is no accepted wisdom as to what training and what occupations prepare best for a post in the government; but there is at least a debate between those who view ministers as

amateurs essentially needing political skills and those who view them as managers in charge of complex organisations often requiring specialised knowledge. On the surface at least, the image of the political minister appears embodied in the Belgian practice, while the managerial model appears much closer to the Austrian model of governmental life. Does this distinction correspond to different patterns of recruitment and are there also variations in the 'post-ministerial' life of Cabinet members?

There are indeed differences in the educational and occupational origins of Belgian and Austrian ministers, although they are perhaps not quite as large as might have been expected: Austrian ministers may thus be described as being somewhat more 'managerial' in origin than Belgian ministers, but the point cannot be put more strongly; and in neither country can office-holders truly be described as specialists.

If we consider as managerial those ministers who have a background in the public sector or in private business, just under half the Austrian ministers fall in this category while the equivalent proportion for Belgium is less than a third. (Table VIII). The difference is essentially due, as might have been expected, to a substantially higher proportion of civil servants becoming ministers in Austria: in Belgium, civil servants provide 7 percent of the ministers; in Austria, they provide almost a quarter. In Belgium, on the other hand, the largest single occupational group is that of teachers, and especially of University teachers, who provide a third of the ministers and who are proportionately two and a half times as numerous as in

Austria. Differences in the percentage of teachers and civil servants in the two countries account for practically all the variation, although there are also a number of journalists in Belgium and more manual workers in Austria among the ministers. The proportion of lawyers, on the other hand, is practically the same in the two countries.

One reason why the differences in the occupational background of ministers are not as large as might have been expected is because the recruitment of both parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians is relatively mixed in the two countries. In Austria, a little over a quarter of the non-parliamentarians have a civil service background, but as many as 16 percent of the parliamentarians were drawn from the same milieu and they are also more than twice as likely to come from the civil service than Belgian parliamentarians. In Austria, the civil service does constitute a substantial basis for a ministerial career, whatever route is chosen to reach the government; in Belgium, a civil service background does not appear to lead normally to a ministerial position. Conversely, while civil servants are not strikingly more numerous among non-parliamentarians than among parliamentarians in Austria, non-parliamentarian ministers come from a wide variety of other backgrounds, including the private sector, the law and, to more limited extent, teaching. As a matter of fact, private business is somewhat less represented among the parliamentarians than among the non-parliamentarians, while teachers are better represented among the parliamentarians.

Thus the Austrian government has a rather more 'managerial' character than the Belgian government not just because there are more non-parliamentarians among the ministers (and certainly not primarily for this reason) but because of a political tradition which appears to link politics and the civil service more closely than in Belgium. But it would be wrong to go much further and suggest that the Austrian government is composed of specialists, especially in contrast with the Belgian government. In the nature of things, Belgian ministers who often hold more than one more than one post in succession, as we know, are unlikely to be specialists of the affairs of every department which they happen to be in charge of; but, given that lawyers, educationalists, and indeed businessmen are present in relatively large numbers in Belgian Cabinets, these governments are not entirely staffed with amateurs. On the other hand, Austrian ministers are more likely to be managers than specialists: not many among them are engineers or social workers in charge of technical or social departments, while some trade unionists are occasionally heading social departments in Belgium. The picture is mixed; it suggests, on the one hand, that lawyers, businessmen and civil servants are more often in charge of departments corresponding to their background in Austria than in Belgium: the proportion of ministers whose position is truly closely related to their previous background is about a third in Austria as against a fifth in Belgium; but, given that many of those who have a background which is relevant to their ministerial position may have only a partial or limited knowledge of the whole governmental

sector of which they are in charge, the extent of specialisation has to be regarded as rather limited. (Table IX).

Yet the fact that ministers in Austria are more managerial and are in particular more drawn from the public sector than their Belgian counterparts both reflects differences in the characteristics of the parliamentary system and indeed in the size of the public sector, as well as accounts for variations in the 'postministerial' career of Cabinet members in the two countries. By and large, as we know, a governmental career is not the end of a working life: the number of ministers still in office at 65, let alone at 70, is small in both countries. It is small even in Austria, where, despite the relative longevity of the ministerial career, only 17 ministers were still in office at the age of 65, about the same number as had left office before reaching 50. Thus, for the large majority of the Austrian ministers, the question of a 'postministerial' career is clearly an acute problem.

It is indeed more acute than in Belgium. This is not so much because Belgian ministers leave office older, as only a small minority stay in office beyond the age of 65 (29 or 15 percent - about the same proportion as in Austria); but, first, Belgian ex-ministers are never entirely sure that their ministerial career is over, while Austrian ex-ministers must realise that the loss of their governmental position effectively means that they will never return, since only five returned and no case of a returning minister has occurred since 1971. This is of course an incentive for Belgian ex-ministers to remain in Parliament for a number of years after losing office. This in turn

gives a further advantage to Belgian ex-ministers with respect to their final career, for they are more likely, as we saw, to stay in Parliament until retirement age: about half of the former members of Belgian Cabinet were still in Parliament at the end of the period of analysis or had remained in the chamber until at least the age of 65.

The majority of Austrian ex-ministers, as well of course as a substantial number of their Belgian colleagues, have, on the other hand, to embark on a postministerial or postparliamentary career. Some return to the job from which they came, in law, teaching, business or the civil service: those who viewed the ministerial career as a stop-gap arrangement designed to solve a particular problem may have always intended to return to their previous occupation: this seems to have been the case for the few judges and military men who have held ministerial office in the two countries. But many probably do not wish to return to their previous career at the level at which they were, while other simply cannot, especially if they have spent a long period in Parliament as well as in the government.

There is unfortunately less satisfactory evidence with respect to post ministerial careers than for the pre-ministerial part of the working life of Cabinet members. No information was obtained about 14 Austrian and 12 Belgian ministers who were not members of Parliament after leaving the government as well as about four Austrian and 38 Belgian ministers who left Parliament before the age of 65; moreover, no information was obtained about a further two Austrian and 39 Belgian ministers

who did stay in the Government or Parliament beyond the age of 65 but who might have engaged in another career afterwards. (Table X).

Yet from the other cases a picture emerges which does help to provide a general impression of postministerial careers in the two countries. To begin with, it must be remembered that Belgian ministers have a high propensity to remain in Parliament until retirement age, unlike their Austrian colleagues; for many of them, activities in the Chamber fully constitute a career. This is reinforced by the fact that a number of these parliamentarians obtain national positions in their party in combination with their activity in the Chamber. Out of the 53 cases of occupations recorded for Austria and of the 79 cases of occupations recorded for Belgium, often alongside a parliamentary career, eight Austrian and 19 Belgian ministers obtained such party positions; these always went to parliamentarians, even in Austria, where, as we saw, the percentage of parliamentarians is low among the ministers. In some cases, the posts are likely to be more honorific than substantive, but they are probably always at least prestigious. This group can therefore be described as that of the 'true' politicians, who end their political life by a job which is, indeed, political. It is interesting to note that the group is proportionately of about the same size in the two countries, and, as it is fairly large, it does suggest that, in both countries, parties carry a considerable prestige.

The rest of the ministers whose postministerial occupation has been traced fall into two groups. The first

includes those who return to their old career: they constitute a substantial number in the two countries - about twice as large as that of the group of party officials (15 in Austria and 29 in Belgium). In the Austrian case, these ex-ministers remain rarely in Parliament (4 out of 15), while all except four of the 29 Belgian ex-ministers in this category did remain in Parliament after leaving office. This group includes ministers with a variety of backgrounds: in Belgium, many of those who returned to their previous occupation were University teachers, but they also included some businessmen as well as some public servants; in Austria, the spread is also wide: there were businessmen, teachers, civil servants, and lawyers. For these ministers, life seems to have run full circle. By choice or because they were unable to start a new career, these former Cabinet members do not appear to have benefitted permanently in their career from a position in the government.

Meanwhile, other Cabinet ministers do embark in a new career: it is with respect to this group that a significant difference appears to exist between Austria and Belgium. First, they are proportionately twice as numerous in Austria as in Belgium: 29 of the former Austrian Cabinet ministers - over a third of all the ministers of the country who are no longer in office were able to change their occupation after their passage in the government. In Belgium, the equivalent group has about the same absolute size (31), but the number of ministers, as we know, is more than twice as large; moreover, while twice as many Austrian ministers changed their occupation as returned to their

previous job, the absolute numbers are about the same in Belgium for the two groups. This does seem to point to a governmental position in Austria being better able to provide postministerial promotion than a governmental position in Belgium.

Moreover, the Belgian ministers who thus embark in a new career tend primarily to go to an international post or to a job in private business, international posts being often obtained in the context of the European Community; Austrian ministers, on the contrary, divide almost equally into those who go to a public organisation, to private business or to a business or interest group organisation. Posts in the public sector include directorships of various State services, such as the railways, while posts in the private sector are often in the banking sector. Only a small number of former Austrian Cabinet ministers (3) went to an international position, Waldheim being by far the most outstanding example. It seems therefore that, to an extent at least, the ministerial career helps a substantial number of Austrian ministers to find a genuine promotion from their original occupation at the end of their working life, although this is the case for only a minority, while Belgian former Cabinet members, on the whole, do not, except within their own party and perhaps in the European Community. To this extent also, the Austrian ministerial career appears to help ministers to move up a ladder throughout the whole of their working life, and to do so within the context of a 'managerial' rather than 'political' framework. Although it would be wrong to exaggerate the contrast, there is unquestionably a difference in the two models of postministerial

careers, difference which is consistent with and prolongs the profile which was delineated in both the ministerial and parliamentary parts of the life of the Cabinet members.

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The careers of the men and women who became ministers in Austria and Belgium are thus different in many respects. Belgian ministers are closely connected to Parliament, indeed to Parliament as a political organisation and a debating body. Their career in Parliament is indeed almost always much longer than their career in the government, often because they go in and out of Parliament. Their original jobs are also related to the opportunity to enter Parliament and, not surprisingly, teachers and lawyers are at a premium, as well as, to an extent at least, businessmen, while civil servants are on the whole not oriented towards a parliamentary life. As the ministerial career is embedded in Parliament in Belgium, it does not naturally lead to a further career afterwards: former ministers will therefore often wait in the chamber to see whether they receive a further call to the government; if this call does not occur, they will gradually settle in their parliamentary 'condition' while perhaps practicing, if this is possible, their original profession. Only rarely does ministerial office lead to a new career; and, if such a career comes the ministers' way, it is frequently in a political

party or in one of the European organisations, sometimes in private business, but rarely in a public agency in a managerial capacity.

Austrian ministerial careers, on the contrary, have a marked managerial character. Those who become ministers are given in this way an opportunity to run an agency of the State. It is true that they are often not specifically trained for the particular department of which they are the heads: it is probably assumed that the expertise can be acquired on the spot and the period during which ministers stay as heads of their respective departments is usually sufficiently long to ensure that such an expertise is indeed acquired. Once ministers have accomplished their 'mission' - either because they feel or because others judge that it is time to make a move (or because, as occasionally occurs, changes in the party in power force such a move) - they are likely to look for a new career: they are indeed often offered one. Occasionally, this new career may be in Parliament, and it indeed may include a national party position as well: but this is relatively rare. More often this new career takes the form of an important managerial job in a nationalised industry or a big private undertaking; it may also happen that the minister has to return (or wishes to return) to his or her original occupation, but this occurs less frequently.

The differences in the careers of ministers and in the shape of ministerial life between the two countries go therefore much beyond the simple recognition that Belgian ministers stay in office, on average, about two years less than

their Austrian counterparts. The fact that many Belgian ministers come to office more than once suggests that the duration of the ministerial career, in psychological terms, and perhaps even in governmental terms as well, cannot be merely measured in Belgium by the number of months spent in the government: if the ministerial career is embedded in the parliamentary career, if parliament is the point of departure and the point of return, the ministerial career is also the point of reflection and the signpost which parliamentarians consider even when they are out of the government. This is why the Belgian government can be truly deemed to be political and parliamentary, in contrast with the much greater distance between government and parliament in Austria.

The differences in the structure and composition of governments are thus considerable between Austria and Belgium. It does not follow that the reasons for these variations are exclusively cultural, national or historical. They often stem from characteristics of the party system, as these affect the nature and duration of coalitions as well as the expectations of the ministers themselves about the stable or relatively shaky nature of the governments. It seems probable, however, that cultural and historical factors also play a part: the relatively shorter parliamentary experience of Austria by comparison with Belgium, and the strong executive-centred and managerial tradition of the Habsburg Empire are likely to have left a mark on the shape of the ministerial profession and indeed on the image which, consciously or not, Cabinet members have of their role. These are matters

which can only be assessed fully by means of a broad comparative analysis extending to all Western European countries.

Whatever the origins of the differences in the shape and characteristics of ministerial careers in the two countries, these differences are so substantial that they must have an effect on the nature of governmental decision-making process. Purely 'political' and parliamentary ministers are likely to view their role in Cabinet in a different manner from 'managerial' ministers, even though the constraints of the position and of the legally collegial character of the government are naturally likely to provide a unifying framework. What thus becomes important is to assess the extent to which these variations in career profiles affect variously Cabinet decision-making in its several aspects and, in particular, with respect to the relationship of ministers to each other and to the head of the government.

These are matters which can be examined only by relating findings on careers to findings on governmental decision-making - a subject which requires further exploration before valid conclusions can be drawn. Meanwhile, the examination of the ministerial careers in Austria and Belgium does at least show that the conception of the parliamentary or Cabinet system as a single model is oversimplified and probably wrong, whatever tendencies there may be towards uniformity in contemporary Western Europe. The next step clearly must be to see to what extent ministerial careers in other countries resemble or differ from the patterns which have been identified in Austria and Belgium. It may be that

there are many models, resulting for instance from variations along more than one dimension, although it seems, from general impressions about Austria and Belgium, that the two countries differ probably more from each other than almost any other pair of Western European nations. The examination of the ministerial condition in the two countries thus opens up a fruitful line of investigation; but a broad-based analysis is a natural development, as only such an analysis can make it possible to discover the full range of the variations and provide an understanding of the origins and effects of these variations.

NOTES

(1) The present analysis constitutes a first step in a general study of structures and decision-making processes in Western European cabinets which is undertaken at the European University Institute in Florence in collaboration with a group of scholars from thirteen European countries. I am most grateful to Mr L. Dewinter for many comments and suggestions with respect to this paper.

(2) From a recent examination of the state of the controversy, see P. Hennessy, Cabinet, (1986), London: Blackwell.

(3) D.V. Verney, The Analysis of Political Systems, (1959), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 76.

(4) This is true even if one adopts a definition of 'government' which is based exclusively on two criteria: the same prime minister and the same parties in the coalition.

(5) J. Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, (1985), London and Los Angeles: Sage, pp. 92-3.

TABLE I

Distribution of Ministerial duration in Austria and Belgium

	Austria		Belgium	
	N	%	N	%
Under 1 year	9	9.3	33	15.5
1-2 years	16	16.5	46	21.6
2-5 years	31	32.0	79	37.1
5-10 years	25	25.8	40	18.8
10 years or more	16	16.5	15	7.0
TOTAL	97	100.0	213	100.0

TABLE II

*Distribution of Ministerial duration in Austria
and Belgium by party*

	Austria						Belgium							
	Overall		SPÖ		ÖVP		Overall		CVP/PSC		CVP/PSB		Libéral	
	%	N	%	N	%		%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
<i>Under 1 year</i>	9.3	6	12.0	3	7.5		15.5	9	10.7	9	14.5	5	13.2	
<i>1-2 years</i>	16.5	7	14.0	5	12.5		21.6	14	16.7	14	22.6	7	18.4	
<i>2-5 years</i>	32.0	12	24.0	18	45.0		37.1	29	34.5	25	40.3	17	44.7	
<i>5-10 years</i>	25.8	11	22.0	12	30.0		18.8	22	26.2	10	16.1	8	21.1	
<i>10 years or more</i>	16.5	14	28.0	2	5.0		7.0	10	11.9	4	6.5	1	2.6	
<i>TOTAL</i>	100.0	50	100.0	40	100.0		100.0	84	100.0	62	100.0	38	100.0	

TABLE III

Age of retirement of long-standing ministers (10 years or more)
in Austria and Belgium

	Austria		Belgium			
	(N=16)		(N=14)*			
	SPO	OVP		CVP/PSC	BSP/PSB	
Left Office						
before 65	6	2	8	3	1	4
at 65-69	4	-	4	3	2	5
at 70 or over	2	-	2	3	1	4
still in	2	-	2	1	-	1
	14	2	16	10	4	14

* The fifteenth Belgian long-standing minister was from the liberal

TABLE IV

Distribution of Ministers by number of posts occupied in Austria and Belgium

	A u s t r i a			B e l g i u m		
	N	%	Average duration (months)	N	%	Average duration (months)
1 post only	78	80,4	49	107	50.2	21
2 posts or more in succession	14	14,4	129	38	17,9	48
2 posts or more interrupted	5	5,2	143	68	31.9	77
TOTAL	97	100,0	65	213	100,0	44

TABLE V

The cursus honorum in Belgium

	First	Second	Post Third (percentages)	Fourth	Fifth
PM and Deputy PM	2.8	14.7	14.0	27.3	23.8
'Important' Ministers	27.8	31.0	35.0	36.4	48.0
Other Ministers*	68.6	54.3	51.0	36.3	28.2

* These are Foreign Affairs, Justice, Interior, Defence, Finance, and Economy

TABLE VI

Duration in office of ministers having had more than one post, by party,
Austria and Belgium

(Ministers having been in office two years or more only)

	Number	Average Duration (months)	Range (months)
CVP/PSC	18	41,5	27-70
BSP/PSP	10	36,2	24-55
Liberal	7	30,3	27-36
Others	4	36,0	29-44

TABLE VII

Duration of Ministerial and parliamentary career in Austria and Belgium

(in years)

	A u s t r i a		B e l g i u m	
Ministers having been in office	Ministerial duration	Parliamentary duration (excluding ministerial years)	Ministerial duration	Parliamentary duration (excluding ministerial years)
under a year	0,6	10,9	0,5	12,7
1-2 years	1,4	9,6	1,4	12,4
2 years or more in one post only	5,6	11,9	3,3	15,7
2 years or more in more than one post in succession	10,9	8,1	4,9	12,9
2 years or more with interrupt- ions	11,9	9,1	6,4	17,3

TABLE VIII

Occupational background of Austrian and Belgian Ministers

A) Numbers

	A u s t r i a			B e l g i u m		
	All Ministers	Non Parliamentary	Parliamentary	All Ministers	Non Parliamentary	Parliamentary
Managers/Business - Private Sector (including 'cadres')	20	13	7	38	9	29
Managers - Public Sector and Civil Servants	19	13	6	11	5	6
Lawyers and other professionals	20	12	8	33	5	28
Teachers and University Teachers	11	4	7	54	12	42
Other: (Journalists, white collars, manual workers)	16	6	10	31	2	29
Unknown	11	3	8	46	5	41
TOTAL	97	51	46	213	38	175
B) Percentages						
Managers - Private Sector	20,6	25,5	15,2	17,8	23,6	16,6
Managers - Public Sector and Civil Servants	19,6	25,5	13,1	5,2	13,2	3,4
Lawyers and other professionals)	20,6	23,6	17,4	15,5	13,2	16,0
Teachers and university teachers	11,3	7,8	15,2	25,4	31,6	24,0
Other	16,5	11,7	21,7	14,5	5,2	16,6
Unknown	11,4	5,9	17,4	21,6	13,2	23,4

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TABLE IX
Specialists among Austrian and Belgian Ministers

	A u s t r i a		B e l g i u m	
	N	%	N	%
Specialists	26	27	34	16
Partly specialists	19	20	31	15
Managers only	6	6	5	2
Not specialists	25	26	87	41
Unknown or not applicable				
(ministry unspecialized)	21	21	56	26

TABLE X

Post ministerial careers in Austria and Belgium

	A u s t r i a		B e l g i u m	
	N	%	N	%
Parliament only of who died in Parliament, retired after 65 or still in	10	10,3	83	39,0
	6	6,2	44	20,7
Became President	1	1,0	-	-
Became Party Official	8	8,2	19	8,9
New Career	29	29,9	31	14,6
of whom Private Sector	15	15,5	14	6,6
Public Sector	11	11,3	6	2,8
International	3	3,1	11	5,2
Returned to parties only	15	15,4	29	13,6
Died in office, retired after 65, unknown job	3	3,1	24	11,3
Unknown and not in Parliament	14	14,4	12	5,6
Still in Office	17	17,6	15	7,0
	97	100,0	213	100,0



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