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
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**INDIVIDUALS AND PARTIES -
CHANGES IN PROCESSES OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION**

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Introduction

The discussion on political mobilization reached its highpoint about twenty years ago. Scholars of mobilization research were concerned with three main problem areas: First deserving mention are the well-known sociological studies made by Stein Rokkan on the historical processes of mobilization. His dominant interest was in the problem of how newly established parties manage to integrate non-politicized individuals into the political system. The analysis of mobilization was an analysis of processes in which new categories of individuals were included into the institutions of developing democracies. A second problem area of mobilization research in the sixties was the question if and how the Western European historical experience of mobilization could be transferred to developing countries of the Third World. This type of research, conducted under the label of "modernization research", was concerned with the applicability of institution building typical of Western European countries to less developed countries with different institutional settings and historical traditions. The source of a third problem area of mobilization was the appearance of political phenomena in the fifties and early sixties that not only attracted the attention of political scientists, but also the concern of professional politicians: the problem of how to reactivate passive citizens and motivate them to articulate their demands within the institutionalized channels of political expression. Research in this area concentrated on the parties' ability to attract apathetic citizens.

These three problems of mobilization research (inclusion, modernization, and activation) which were the focus of interest _____ in the sixties, have not lost their scientific or political relevance and still merit the attention of political scientists and sociologists. Yet very often, the questions which dominate scientific

debates are determined not so much by the urgency of the still unresolved substantial or theoretical problems they pose, but rather new subjects appear unforeseen on the scientific agenda and take precedence over the old topics. Similarly, in the late sixties and seventies the attention of political scientists and sociologists was drawn away from mobilization studies and attracted instead to other catchwords, such as "legitimacy crisis", "corporatism", "ungovernability" and, as seems to be the case for the early eighties, "new political movements". One of the consequences of these shifting debates is that, instead of scientific knowledge accumulating to form a more systematic framework, valuable insights are scattered over different fields of interest and survive no longer than the actual debate in question.

There are several reasons which justify the revitalization of the discussion on political mobilization. First of all, the three problem areas mentioned which were the concern of scholars of mobilization studies in the sixties, have by no means been solved. Parties have yet to succeed in including those categories of individuals to whom they want to appeal. This holds true, for instance, for women and parts of the working class, and for immigrant workers whose level of political participation is still considerably lower than that of middle class and upper class males.¹⁾ Furthermore, the optimism typical of the sixties concerning the applicability of the democratic model to newly developing countries has been proved unwarranted. It is of pressing importance to study in more detail why the historical phase of mobilization typical of the democratic development of Western European countries has not been repeated in developing countries of the Third World. The third problem area, activation, _____ is also still _____ worthy of further study; retreatism and passivity still constitute a severe challenge to large organizational bodies such as parties and unions, which in spite of their mobilization efforts, have consistently failed to motivate specific categories of individuals.

In addition to these still unsolved problems, new political problems have arisen which call for a resumption of the debate on mobilization. For the time being, let it suffice to mention briefly some of these new political phenomena. Recently, doubts have been raised from various sides as to whether the political parties are still capable of performing their traditional task as the main mobilizing agents. It has been pointed out that the importance of large political organizations for translating individual interests has been waning. Instead, it is maintained that alternative agents of mobilization have appeared on the political scene, whose main advantage lies in their low degree of organization and bureaucratization, enabling them to be more flexible and responsive to the "needs" of individuals. Action groups, ad hoc groups, social movements and other loosely structured organizations have taken over the role of mobilizing individuals. One future concern of mobilization research could be to investigate these assumptions about the new agents of mobilization.²⁾ Another phenomenon which calls for a resurgence of the study of mobilization is the claim made by many political observers, that the mass media are playing an increasing role, and threatening the monopoly of the parties and other large interest organizations to capture the attention of the public, raise political issues, supply information and interpret current events. In recent political literature, the allusions to the supposed role which (mass media, and especially) television plays in altering mobilization processes are as frequent as more specific explanations of the way the mass media mobilize the public are rare.³⁾ A final phenomenon illustrating the urgency of renewed research on mobilization processes is the so-called "unforeseen events", "affairs", "scandals" (such as Watergate), and environmental disasters (such as Harrisburg) which structure types of mobilization processes which, as might be assumed, are totally different from institutionalized mobilization processes, as they have neither familiar patterns nor fixed courses of development. Political scandals and affairs are not new in

themselves, yet it seems that they have achieved new importance, as institutionalized processes of mobilization become more routinized and inflexible. The clash between such non-institutionalized and institutionalized processes of mobilization creates considerable problems for the established political institutions; indeed, it would be worthwhile to study it in more detail.

These examples should suffice for the time being to show that, in addition to the still unresolved three problem areas of mobilization research typical of the sixties, there are new problems which demand the revitalization of the analysis of mobilization processes. The question is, however, whether the traditional way of conceptualizing mobilization is appropriate for the analysis of more recent political phenomena. In the first section of this paper, some conceptual problems are discussed which are associated with the traditional way of defining mobilization (I). The attempt is then made to reformulate in analytical terms what mobilization activities consist of more precisely. For this purpose, I will draw on some basic insights from the sociological classics: Marx, Weber, Durkheim (II). Subsequently, four different models of mobilization processes are presented (III), the last of which is then dealt with in more detail (IV).

It should be made clear from the start, that these problems are being treated from a very restricted point of view. In the following, the main concern is to specify the relationship between individuals and party (parties), other interest organizations have been excluded from the analysis. Moreover, it has not been possible to deal systematically with the repercussions of this relationship on the government.

I. Conceptual problems of defining mobilization

In the following four conceptual problems are discussed which are related to the way in which mobilization has been defined in the debate that went on in the sixties.

The first problem concerns the actors of mobilization; the second deals with the assumption about the direction of processes of mobilization; the third problem refers to the definition of the activities involved in mobilization efforts; and the fourth problem is connected with considerations about the theoretical framework within which analyses of mobilization have been discussed.

(1) At a most general level, mobilization has been defined as the development of relationships between individuals and the institutionalized representatives of the political elite.⁴⁾ Looking more closely at the types of actors that make up the "elite", one must distinguish between at least two different types of actors: the political parties and other established interest organizations on the one hand, and the government or state on the other hand. Taking into consideration this differentiation of the elite, one could say that mobilization is the development of processes of interaction between at least three types of actors: unorganized individuals, organized intermediary actors and the government. In some cases, certain types of actors are per definitionem excluded from the analysis. So, for example, Peter J. Nettl defines political mobilization as the "collective and structured expression of commitment and support within society" (Nettl 1967, p.123), and excludes quasi-groups because they do not show a "well-articulated structure" (ibid.). In other cases, the fact that parties have been historically the essential agent of mobilization can be interpreted in such a way as to talk of processes of mobilization only in those cases which involve parties. And in still other cases, only institutionalized actors who use institutionalized means of mobilization are included in the analysis. These definitional restrictions may have some justification; however, in using them, one has to keep in mind, that they exclude from the start specific empirical cases of mobilization which may be relevant to the question of changes in mobilization processes.

For example, excluding loosely structured groups from the study of mobilization prevents an analysis of the recent phenomenon of "action groups" initiating demands and pursuing them through the decision making process. One consequence of the exclusion of non-institutionalized actors from mobilization research is that an important phenomenon like terrorism, which has aroused broad sectors of the society in different Western European countries in the past is not treated as a case of mobilization. Furthermore, there are cases in which institutionalized actors, like parties, use non-institutionalized means of mobilization such as bribes or corruption .. It would be a severe restriction to exclude these cases from mobilization studies, not simply because they are important empirical cases in which specific categories of individuals have been motivated to support party leaders in elections, _____ but also because these cases illustrate that in some situations institutionalized actors do not consider the existing institutionalized means of mobilization adequate for pursuing their political goals.

As a result, it seems preferable to make no restrictions with respect to the type or the number of actors initiating or carrying on mobilization processes; nor should such mobilization activities performed through non-institutionalized means of mobilization be excluded from the analysis.

(2) A second conceptual problem associated with the traditional way of defining mobilization has to do with the description of the course of mobilization processes. Very often, these descriptions involve metaphors which depict the different actors as representing different "levels" in a hierarchical relation to each other. So, for example, processes of mobilization have been described as proceeding "from below" or the "bottom" of the social system (the individual level) to the "top" of the political system (the decision making level), after having passed through the parties and other voluntary organizations (the intermediary level), or, the process is described as proceeding the other way round.⁵⁾ _____

Such metaphorical descriptions can be of high heuristic use.

_____ In this case, the emphasis upon such vertical processes of mobilization leads one to consider the possibility of vertical processes of mobilization in different directions. Below, three different models of vertical mobilization are presented, each representing different empirical political problems of mobilization. However, one should not overemphasize the importance of vertical processes of mobilization and the hierarchical relationship which is established in the course of these processes. It will be argued later on that it is also important to take into consideration horizontal processes of mobilization which take place within different action units. A fourth model of mobilization is thereby presented and the empirical problems connected with the coexistence of vertical and hierarchical processes of mobilization are discussed in more detail, because it is assumed that it is this type of mobilization which is characteristic of many political phenomena of today.

(3) The third conceptual problem is related to the question of the kinds of activities mobilization efforts involve. There were varying answers to this question in the sixties. One way was in normative theoretical terms, according to which mobilization refers to the educational efforts of the institutionalized political elite, aiming at motivating individuals to participate in the institutionalized channels of political influence: that is, voting, contributing financially to the party, attendance at official party meetings, and so forth. A different explanation of the kind of activities performed when actors mobilize other actors, has been offered by theorists of structural-functionalism, who dominated the discussion on mobilization in the sixties. According to this view, each actor in the mobilization process performs certain functions: for example individuals perform the function of interest articulation, the parties the function of interest aggregation and the government the function of decision making.⁶⁾ Furthermore, it was assumed that the combined effect of the performance of these

different functions was to fulfill an overall systemic goal, that of "authority legitimation" (Nettl 1967, p. 123) or "system integration" (Lipset^{and}Rokkan 1967, pp. 4-5). One of the most subtle versions of functional theory, the "conflict-integration dialectic", was formulated by Lipset and Rokkan in their famous "Introduction" (Lipset^{and}Rokkan 1967, p.5). A more detailed look at this dialectical theory will follow later.

There are obvious shortcomings in both answers. First, the normative definition of mobilization activities has tended to neglect those types of mobilization activities which are performed outside the institutionalized political system and which aim at destabilizing or even transforming the existing political system altogether. However, a great deal of mobilization activities consist of attacks upon the prevailing order of political institutions. The weaknesses in this normative approach can not be overcome by simply defining

mobilization "as a significant rise in the level of peoples' participation in the transformation of society" - as Mats Friberg and Björn Hettne do.⁷⁾

Instead, normative implications should be avoided entirely, as it is one of the most challenging tasks of mobilization studies to research why and how the original intentions of the actors of mobilization (to either stabilize, defend or change the political system) are transformed in the process of mobilization itself, with the outcome that the actors are confronted with unintended effects of their actions.

This is not the place to go into criticism of structural-functionalism. Suffice, to say here, that the theoretical restriction of specific types of actions to specific types of actors has as a consequence, that the possibility of actors performing other activities than the defined ones is disregarded. An example is the government articulating a conflict, parties forming the decision and individuals then rejecting this alternative through active protest. This was the situation with debates on census in West Germany, where the "people" decided against the government's plans to

to conduct a census. This was one of the rare cases in which the protest of initially only a few individuals (mainly women), supported by efficient lawyers, made it virtually impossible for the government in power to carry through its plans.

(4) The fourth problem of conceptualizing mobilization is related to the obvious difficulties in defining more explicitly the theoretical problems with which mobilization studies were concerned. Of course, one dominant theoretical concern of the sixties^{which} can not be overlooked is the structural-functionalists' interest in the problem of system integration. However, the broadness and generality of this concept did not allow a more precise problem definition in the study of processes of mobilization. Very often, their interest in system integration was apparent only in the terminology used by these scholars to describe mobilization efforts.⁸⁾

In other cases mobilization studies have been lacking all theoretical reflection and the term "mobilization" is no more than a label for various types of ongoing political activities, ranging from regular election campaigns to sudden riots and demonstrations. This vagueness and the failure to define the theoretical problem under investigation in mobilization research may have been one of the reasons why the debate on mobilization waned as soon as structural-functionalism came under criticism in the late sixties. One lesson to be learned from the history of the debate on mobilization is that the justification for resuming the debate can not be derived from its relevance in analysing current political phenomena (such as the "new" political movements or action groups) and their impact upon mobilization processes alone; the renewed discussion also has to be justified explicitly in theoretical terms. An answer ~~must~~, therefore, be found to the question: To which theoretical problem discussed in political sociology does the study of mobilization contribute? I will turn to the discussion of this problem in the last section of this paper (V).

II. Dimensions of mobilization activities

In situations of theoretical uncertainty it is often useful to recall the insights of the classics of political sociology. If, as is done here, mobilization is defined as the development of relationships between different types of actors in the social and political system, then it is obvious that this problem has a long tradition in political sociology.⁹⁾ In spite of the considerable differences among them in their treatment of the problem of intermediation one could say that the classics were interested in specifying the conditions under which different actors are able to identify their interests, transmit them to other actors and pursue them into the decision making arena. Max Weber emphasized the importance of specific institutional constellations which promote processes of intermediation between the social structure and the political order; Emile Durkheim was concerned with the specification of the conditions under which professional groups are able to mediate the interests of the "economy" to the "state"; one of Karl Marx's intellectual interests was to specify the different conditions which prevented the working class from fulfilling its historical mission as the carrier of societal transformation. Looking more closely at the question what kind of transformative activities were emphasized in the classical sociological analyses of processes of intermediation, three different analytical dimensions of activities are distinguishable: first, the cognitive dimension (interest formation); second, the affective dimension ("Vergemeinschaftung"); third, the instrumental dimension("Vergesellschaftung").

(1) Cognitive dimension of mobilization

The cognitive dimension of mobilization refers to the process in which actors define their interests. They are confronted with the question: What interests do I want to pursue when relating to other actors?¹⁰⁾ Underlying this emphasis on the social processes of interest formation,

is the insight of the classics that interests do not arise automatically from the socio-economic structure, and do not present themselves as self-evident or given to the individuals. ¹¹⁾ The recognition and definition of interests is the result of common efforts to structure the awareness for specific problems and give them a cultural meaning in the process of interaction. For Karl Marx the recognition of interest was a necessary precondition for the transformation of "Klasse an sich" into "Klasse für sich"; Marx indicated in his historical works what the factors are that impede the recognition of interests for the working class, such as economic well-being, traditional orientation, an isolated workplace, lack of communication, and so forth. The emphasis Max Weber put on processes of cultural definition of interest is expressed in his conceptual differentiation between "class" in the sense of an individual's position in the economic structure on the one hand, and "class" in the sense of an action unit integrated by shared interests, on the other hand. According to Weber one of the preconditions for individuals to become aware of their class interests is the transparency of the causes and consequences of a certain class position; that is to say, the sharper and more apparent the contrasts between the positions held by different individuals in the economic structure, the greater the likelihood that interests will be recognized. For Emile Durkheim, interest formation is one of the main activities developed by individuals when they voluntarily associate themselves in small groups. Here, the individuals learn how to restrain their immediate egoistic needs and commit themselves to the norms and ideals of the group. Individuals become aware of their social interests in the moment they orient themselves to the norms and ideals of the group.

In applying these general insights to the definition of mobilization activities, it could be said that mobilization is a process of social construction of those interests with which the individuals are able to identify, in orientation to which they structure relationships with other actors and try to realize them. Although this formulation may sound very

familiar, and perhaps even trivial, the importance of the underlying substantial processes cannot be stressed enough. There are several reasons which speak for the importance of mobilization activities understood as processes of interest formation. First of all, interests are not found once and forever, but their formation is an ongoing process of reciprocal attempt to convince under changing economic, political, and cultural conditions. One of the mobilization efforts which party leaders pursue, for example, is to stabilize the interests of party members inspite of a changing environment. The stabilization of interests under changing conditions may be as difficult as the task of reformulating interests under stable conditions. Second, interest formation has to fulfill two opposing tasks: to stimulate the expression of the actual wants and needs felt by individuals; and to convey the realization that only a limited number of these expressed wants can be achieved in political process. In this sense, interest formation is an interaction process, in which interests are stimulated and constrained at the same time. Third, mobilization understood as the analysis of the processes of social construction of common interests has to take into consideration the means by which actors try to impose their convictions upon other actors. One of the most important means of mobilization is the management of information. According to Western European culture, the most convincing information is the truth; therefore, a large part of mobilization activities consist of collecting data, interpreting facts, and, perhaps most importantly, the intentional withholding of certain facts in order to create an image of "truth". It is exactly in this field of activities that the mass media have become so important as agents of mobilization. Not only has the tradition of mass media assigned them the task of discoverer of "truth", but they also represent an arena, in which different actors can publicize their standpoints. The mass media mobilize their consumers by making them participate in the very process of the social construction of truth, and, specifically television, by integrating its audience into different types of shows and games which have as their goal the discovery of "truth".

Instead of joining the new moralists in their indignation, it is suggested here that students of politics should be more realistic in facing the fact that mobilization consists to a large part of public contests for a successful definition of what is declared as the truth. To put it another way, the manipulation of facts and control of information, or even lying, are a part of mobilization activities performed in public. Until now, too little attention has been paid to the existence of this kind of activity, which, after all, is typical of the public sphere in contrast to the private sphere. Having witnessed the debates on nuclear and environmental politics, one can determine a growing sensibility to the political actors' attempts to mobilize by the management of information. The more unorganized individuals and laymen attain access to information, the more the mobilization processes will focus on the contests on the definition of the "truth".

Fourth, changes in interest formation can be observed in the new types of issues articulated by the different actors. More important, perhaps, than changes in the content of interests articulated, are changes in the point of reference to which the individual orients himself when he becomes aware of and articulates interests. As has been suggested by Max Kaase, interests today are articulated more towards an orientation to individual relevance (persönliche Betroffenheit) and less towards party lines (Kaase 1982 B, p. 12). As will be argued below, this shift towards individual relevance as a point of reference for interest formation has consequences for the types of relations that develop from this way of interest formation.

(2) Affective dimension of mobilization

The second contribution to an analytical definition of mobilization activities offered by the classics of political sociology deals with the affective dimension of interaction. A few comments should clarify what is understood under this label: According to Marx, a further precondition

for the development of "Klasse an sich" into a "Klasse für sich", is the creation of emotional ties of belonging, or, as Marx preferred to call it, class solidarity. One of the most important mechanisms for arousing feelings of solidarity is the identification of a class enemy, as positive emotional commitments are more easily established when individuals maintain definite hostile feelings towards the members of a negative reference group. Max Weber stressed the importance of the affective dimension of interaction in processes of intermediation in his discussion of processes of "Vergemeinschaftung". Individuals integrated into communities not only share feelings of belonging, but also a common way of life, which is visible internally and externally in the individuals' way of talking, dressing, eating, and so on. It was Emile Durkheim, who specifically stressed this last element of the symbolic representation of group solidarity. To him, symbols and rituals are not only means of expressing affection, but also means of reactivating emotional ties in times of loosening bonds and weakening solidarity.¹²⁾

Although many studies on mobilization have dealt with the analysis of affectivity involved in the relationship between masses and the elite, this analytical dimension has not always been mentioned explicitly and treated systematically.¹³⁾ In addition to those analytical approaches which analyse political action in terms of rational choice, one should also consider those types of political actions which individuals

perform in orientation to affectivity. In the terms used by Randall Collins one could call this type of mobilization "emotional production" (Collins 1975, p.58) and "management of emotions". There are several ways in which production and management of emotions become relevant for the analysis of ongoing political processes.

First of all, parties had and still have to motivate individuals to commit themselves emotionally for abstract ideas and impersonal relationships. One of the great achievements of historical mobilization efforts of the parties has been their success in arousing feelings of solidarity among individuals who do not know each other personally but who belong to the same social category, such as position, profession, income level, _____

and the like. One could say without exaggeration that one of the most important contributions of the early political parties and trade unions to modernization was to educate their followers to commit themselves emotionally to abstract categories of individuals and thereby, indirectly, to loosen the traditional affective ties to local primary groups. Furthermore, as a part of mobilization processes, individuals were taught by the party to differentiate between personal emotional investments in their peer groups, and impersonal emotional commitments to "the ideas of the party", the "integration of the organization", the "holders of positions" within the party organization, and so on. There is some proof for the claim that individuals today are less willing to let themselves be aroused by large organizations for abstract ideas and authority structures. On the one hand, deference for persons just because they hold an important position has decreased; on the other hand, individuals tend to commit themselves emotionally more to personal relationships than to impersonal ones. One could speak of a growing traditionalist reorientation when individuals today stress the importance of primary groups and personal ties. The large bureaucratic bodies of parties and trade unions are faced with the increasing difficulty of breaking this traditionalist reorientation and giving individuals incentives to reinvest their emotional resources in the party as an organization.

Second, mobilization understood as production and management of emotions has also to be done by parties in the sense of creating milieus of emotional belongingness among their members. This is even more the case with parties, which hold a minority position within the party system; it is a *conditio sine qua non* for those parties which are considered and treated as deviant. One could consider it an important historical achievement in mobilization, for example, that the Social Democrats succeeded in creating a subcultural milieu which

functioned as a shelter for the individual worker in times of severe social and political persecution of socialist ideas. Of course, a number of factors in the social structure facilitated the creation of a homogeneous working class milieu, such as housing conditions, the workplace, a low degree of division of labour, and so forth. But nevertheless, the construction of such party-oriented sub-cultural milieux was in no way a mere unintended by-product of interest formation, but was the result of the planned efforts by party leadership.

Many scholars have shown that the parties and unions today are finding it increasing difficult to create such emotional subcultural milieux. They point to a number of altered social and organizational factors which have contributed to the gradual disintegration of traditional homogeneous working class milieux. So for example, Wolfgang Streeck has shown for trade unions in West Germany, that by deciding to settle membership payment by regular billing for reasons of efficiency, the personal contacts were lost, and with them opportunities to strengthen feelings of integration.¹⁴⁾ In addition, changes in other structural conditions have led to an increasing heterogeneity of the working class, and hence the weakening of emotional ties among its members. The gradual disintegration of industrial communes¹⁵⁾, increased regional mobility, growing use of private means of transportation to and from the workplace - all these factors contribute to the dissolution of emotional ties within the working class. Among those factors which have an influence on the parties' capacity to mobilize their members in terms of affectivity the most important factor is probably the growing importance of the mass media, especially television, as a transmitter of cultural symbols and value orientations which cut across the traditional value pattern of the working class.¹⁶⁾

It is a field of utmost importance for researchers of mobilization to study in more detail what kind of cultural symbols are mediated by mass media, and what effect they have upon the traditional cultural identities of the working class.

Third, parties have not only to mobilize their members in terms of solidarity, but they must also, especially at election time, arouse feelings of sympathy for their party candidates, and, perhaps more important, feelings of antipathy for the candidates of the competing party. It would be worth while studying which mechanisms party leaders use when producing such feelings of love and hatred among the electorate and which means they use to de-emotionalize their supporters after the elections.

A fourth example pertinent to the production and management of emotions are the processes that go on when individuals try to influence representatives by calling their attention to certain problems. The individuals' indignation and rage over unsatisfactory living conditions, their alienation at work, their anxiety over their personal survival, - all these emotions must be mediated in such a way, that these complaints win the attention of the political representatives. Professional politicians have difficulties in responding to emotional outbursts. One indication of this is their attempt to define emotional behaviour as deviant behaviour in politics. According to Max Weber, one characteristic of the professional politician is that he engages in politics "with the head, and not with other parts of the body or soul." In contrast, it is typical of the unprofessional intellectual to exhibit a mere "sterile excitement" ¹⁷⁾. These observations are particularly relevant to the discussion of mobilization as the management of emotions: Aroused feelings must be managed in such a way, that they serve to structure relations between different actors, that is, to establish ———— and to destruct relations between political actors. A sociological treatment of this problem would benefit from the application of Goffman's theoretical perspective to the analysis of mobilization processes. ¹⁸⁾

Finally, the analysis of mobilization as processes of producing and managing emotions has to deal with what S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger call the "construction of trust" (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, p.19). Since trust is the affective basis of

modern democracies, it is of vital importance for the understanding of mobilization processes to investigate the mechanisms of arousing mistrust and of reestablishing credibility.

(3) Instrumental dimension of mobilization

It would seem that there is little need to go back to the classics when treating the third dimension of mobilization, the development of instrumental capacities¹⁹⁾. Until now, scholars of mobilization have been preoccupied with one type of instrumentality, the formation of associations, interest organizations and parties. As a result, the main focus of mobilization studies has been on institutionalized actors, such as parties, using institutionalized means of mobilization, such as party competition and election campaigns. There is no doubt that the formation of parties and the institutionalization of means typical of party activities are the most important achievements of historical mobilization. Parties still play a major role in mobilization processes, and campaigns and elections are still the most important means of mobilization used by parties. But it would be, to say the least, unrealistic to give the impres-

sion that parties are the only agencies of mobilization, and that their only means of mobilization are to convince individuals to vote for them. This obvious bias in mobilization research cannot be left unchallenged. Therefore, a rereading of the classics of political sociology recommends itself, because their view of politics was - in contrast to political scientists of today - not biased by the existence of a well-established party system and regular elections. On the contrary, their sociological analyses of political events were often written under the impression of the political violence and revolutionary upheavals of the time thus giving them a more differentiated view of politics. One has only to recall Max Weber's list of the different possible methods which parties can employ when trying to influence the existing distribution of power: anything ranging from the use of violence, to competing for votes which again can be done with crude or respectable means: money, social influence, power of the speech, suggestion, or simple deceit, to the more or less artificial techniques of obstruction within parliamentary bodies. ²⁰⁾

Marx's famous "18th Brumaire" cites the wide range of means available to political actors. Louis Bonaparte himself was a master of using the institutionalized parliamentary means in conjunction with non-institutionalized means such as bribery and deception. A consequence of this was that the other political actors involved lost their sense of judgement as to which means employed by Bonaparte were legitimate, and which illegitimate. Marx describes Bonaparte as a "fatalist" who was convinced that there are "higher powers" which men, and especially soldiers, cannot resist. Among these he includes, foremost, cigars and champagne, cold poultry, and garlic sausages. ²¹⁾

The first lesson to be learned from these examples is that when considering the instrumental dimension of mobilization, one should also take into account the actors' capability to mobilize means which are not institutionalized,

regarded as illegitimate or even illegal. In neglecting to do so, scholars of mobilization are either painting an idealized picture of politics, or they are excluding from systematic consideration a broad category of empirical instances of mobilization.

One example of the apparent use of such methods has come to light recently in West Germany, in the so-called party finances affair (the "Flick-Affäre"), in which party functionaries and government ministers have been accused of receiving under-the-table payments in return for certain tax advantages for leading business interests. Another example is the Italian Christian Democratic Party, some of whose members maintain close connections to the Mafia (or are in the Mafia), whose influence is used to sway elections.²²⁾

Second, the use of unconventional or even illegal methods of mobilization is not restricted to parties. Recent decades have seen a marked tendency toward innovative mobilizing activities by unorganized individuals and loosely structured action groups - an inheritance of the students' revolts in Western Europe in the sixties. Sit-ins, go-ins, or (as the variation used in the peace movement is called) die-ins, occupation of houses (squatting), as well as the spectacular demonstrations organized by the environmental organization "Green Peace", are all methods used widely today in order to attract public attention to such issues which, it is believed, would not otherwise receive sufficient public attention. A striking common feature of these new means is the use of the human body in mobilization. The most drastic form of political "body language" is to inflict suffering on one's own body, as in hunger strikes, or, the most extreme case, self-immolation by setting oneself afire. These forms of political demonstration have a long tradition, but, strikingly enough, are being used more

frequently in recent protests.

The emphasis on the use of institutionalized as well as non-institutionalized means of mobilization is made here, not only because it enables one to include a broader range of empirical cases of mobilization in the analysis, but also because the very discussion about the legitimacy or illegitimacy, legality or illegality, conventionality or unconventionality of various means used is itself a technique of mobilization. When, for example, the established political parties in the West German parliament try to depict the means used by the newcomer party, the "Greens", as illegitimate, this ——— could be interpreted as an attempt to prevent those parts of the population who are still uncertain as to the legitimacy of the "Greens" from voting for them. In fact, the use of mixed means of mobilization on the part of certain parties can provoke a more general discussion on the nature and legitimacy of certain means of mobilization.

One of the declared purposes of the "Greens" is to use both parliamentary and extraparliamentary means of political action, in accordance with its double role as an extra-parliamentary radical protest movement and as a conventional party in parliament.²³⁾ Metacommunication about the legitimacy of the means of mobilization has probably always been an important element in political contests.

(4) Definition of mobilization

More could be said to further specify the three different analytical dimensions of mobilization activities presented so far. Instead of going into more detail here, the question of the relationship between the three dimensions of mobilization activities should be confronted. Before doing so, however, a short definitional comment on the notion of political mobilization is necessary. In the literature dealing with this topic, several suggestions are made as to the distinction between political, religious, social, military and other types of mobilization²⁴⁾. In many cases the adjective "political" is used to indicate that mobilization refers to the processes of integrating individuals into the existing political system²⁵⁾. Here, political mobilization is understood more specifically as the actors' efforts to influence the existing distribution of power, encompassing not only mobilization activities aimed strictly at legitimating the existing distribution of power²⁶⁾, but also activities aimed at redistributing power or reshaping the basis of the power structure within a society, such as attacks on private ownership of the means of production in capitalist societies. It goes without saying that such attacks can be made from within or outside the political system, but they only become political when the actors attempt to influence the existing distribution of power in one way or another. Not all the actors have to be oriented from the start towards stabilizing or attacking the existing power structure, and it is not necessary that they share the same political goals in the political actions which follow.

The purpose of distinguishing the three dimensions of mobilization activities is not restricted to an analytical clarification of the concept of mobilization. One task of future mobilization research is to investigate the relationships between these different types of mobilization activities. An initial hypothesis could be that actors are only able to develop stable relationships on the condition that they structure interaction processes with reference to all three analytical dimensions, i.e. they are related to each other cognitively, affectively and instrumentally. In "successful" mobilization processes all three type of activities are involved. What are the preconditions for the actors to develop all three dimensions of mobilization activities ? One tentative answer to this question can be derived from Emile Durkheim's well-known hypothesis about the positive reinforcement of intense states of affectivity upon cognitive capabilities. Individuals who are in a state of "effervescence", as, for example, at times of revolutionary upheaval, have a sharpened perception of the political goals and ideals they want to realize; cognitive capacities are heightened by the experience of intense

feelings of solidarity²⁷⁾. One could extend Durkheim's hypothesis and assume that individuals who are in a state of high emotional excitement, and who have clear conceptions of the ideas and ideals they are fighting for, are very likely to promote the means for achieving their goals. In general terms, one can assume that there is a relationship of positive reinforcement between all three dimensions of mobilization activities.

Another problem which is connected with the question of the relationship between the three dimensions of mobilization activities arises when considering the possibility of an actor being ineffective on one dimension and attempting to find mechanisms of compensation on the other two dimensions of mobilization. An obvious instance of this is parties, which, as large bureaucratic bodies, have difficulties creating a milieu of solidarity among their members and compensate this weakness with inventing new goals to attract the members. Another case that comes to mind is the trade unions who received only weak support among their members for such proclaimed goals as the "35 hour workweek" (in West Germany) or, (as in Sweden) the goal of wage earners' funds and who compensated this failure with organizing meetings and demonstrations to propagate their goals. In all these cases the subsequent actions are characterized by the actors' compulsive efforts to overcome their initial weakness or failure. It is suggested here, that mobilization research should pay more attention to those phenomena which arise from the actors' efforts to find compensating mechanisms for their inability to be strong on all three dimensions of mobilization activities at the same time.

III. Models of vertical mobilization processes

In the following a problem is turned to which was mentioned already above, and related to the directional variable of mobilization. In specifying the direction of mobilization processes, it is possible to describe more precisely the type of relationship developed when actors mobilize each other. A scholar who has paid specific attention to the directional variable is Peter Nettl. He has (although without success), introduced the metaphor of stalagmite and stalactite mobilization, which adds to the well-known top-bottom metaphor the notion that in mobilization processes, relationships are gradually

developing, whereby the "push" for this growth can come either "from above" (stalactite) or "from below" (stalagmite)²⁸⁾ Or, to formulate it in terms of interaction theory, one actor is the subject of mobilization, the other the object of his mobilization efforts. Considering for the time being only vertical processes of mobilization, three different models can be distinguished. The first model (A) describes processes starting from the "top" and proceeding to the "bottom"; the second (B) describes processes going the other way round, and the third model (C) includes processes going on in both directions simultaneously. In the following, these simple models are used as a heuristic device for discussing more systematically some empirically relevant problems of mobilization.

Model A

In cases of stalactite mobilization, or, the term preferred here, downward mobilization, a party (or parties) acts as the subject of mobilization vis à vis the individuals as objects of their mobilization activities; that is, the parties get the individuals to share their way of interest formation, try to build up affective loyalties, and to motivate the individuals to participate in the institutionalized channels of political action, mainly voting. In the following, two cases of downward mobilization are distinguished: first, what could be called "historical mobilization", and second, the special case of a single party in non-democratic regimes; as an example of this case the "Leninist model of vanguard party" is presented here, because some interesting observations could be made which apply to problems of mobilization existing in multiparty systems as well.

A 1 Historical mobilization

Some of the main historical achievements of parties as agents of mobilization have already been mentioned above, but they deserve special attention here. First, as subjects

of mobilization parties taught the individuals to translate their grievances into the language and ideology of the party. Historically, interest formation could be seen as a process of defining into party politics such issues which were traditionally considered either the responsibility of other actors (such as, for example, care for the elderly by the church), or as belonging to the private sphere. As subjects of mobilization parties were predominant in interest formation. Second, as subjects of mobilization parties induced the individuals to commit themselves emotionally to the idea of the party, the cohesion of the organization, and the deference to position holders. In doing so, they prodded the individuals to loosen affective ties to their peer groups and superiors. Historically, processes of community building ("Vergemeinschaftung") consisted in educating the individuals to make emotional commitments to abstract ideas, principles, and impersonal relationships. Third, as subjects of mobilization, parties trained the individuals to participate in the political institutions invented by the newly founded political parties. It meant overcoming traditional forms of political behaviour and introducing new forms of political action, typical of democratic multi-party systems.

These three types of downward mobilization are, as Nettl has pointed out, often accompanied by processes of counter-mobilization: the parties have to oppose the individuals' traditional, regional, ethnic, and religious orientations and to motivate them to act against the norms and roles of their peer groups and superiors. Stein Rokkan has made the important point that the introduction of the institution of secret voting was one of the preconditions for the parties to succeed with countermobilization: the provision of secret voting made it, first, " p o s s i b l e for the voter to keep his decision private and avoid sanctions from those he d o e s n o t want to know"; and second, it made it " i m p o s s i b l e for the voter to prove how he voted to those he d o e s want to know". 29)

Thus, the guarantee of privacy in voting not only allowed the voters to avoid negative sanctions from their environment, but it also enabled the parties to mobilize counter the traditional convictions and ties of their potential voters. There are two important consequences of the introduction of secret voting mentioned by Rokkan. First, there is an "a s y m m e t r y in the system-voter relationship: the 'system' is pledged to the safeguarding of the secrecy of the vote but the voter is under no legal obligations to keep his secrecy private..." (Rokkan 1967, p.119). The second consequence of the introduction of the institution of secret voting is "a s t r a t i f i c a t i o n of the electorate in a 'privacy-publicity' dimension: from those who never reveal their vote to anyone to those who publicly take their stand on the alternatives set and openly proclaim how they will vote or have voted" (Rokkan 1967, p. 119). Since then, decisive changes have taken place concerning the two consequences mentioned by Rokkan. They are of importance for characterizing the relationships typical of model D which will be discussed below.

Another important contribution to modernization brought about by the parties' attempts at downward mobilization was that they taught the individuals to act politically at institutionally prescribed times. Downward mobilization implies that the parties succeed in disciplining the citizens to suppress their immediately felt needs, to postpone the spontaneous expression of their emotions, and to adapt their activities to the institutionalized time schedule, such as election periods, party meetings, and so forth. Equally important was stimulating the citizens to articulate their interests, to get emotionally involved and to participate in politics at times, when they were preoccupied with other matters of every-day life. Historically, countermobilization consisted to a large extent of imposing an artificial time schedule on individuals in order to attract their attention to political questions at times when they were engaged in different activities, to cool them off at times when, for strategic reasons, it was not

advantageous to be too involved in certain political matters. This task proved especially difficult in agrarian countries, and countries in which religion strongly influenced the rhythms of social life. The political control over time could be considered one of the main resources for structuring downward mobilization. A precondition for gaining control over — time is that parties themselves learn to adapt their activities to the institutionalized time schedule and procedures. However, in subordinating themselves to the institutionally prescribed rhythms of political activities they limit their own capacity for action. This opens a sphere for action which can be used by non-electoral organization and unorganized individuals. As will be discussed below when presenting model D, one of the strategic advantages of the new action groups consists exactly in their ability to fill this action space.

A 2 Leninist model of vanguard party

In spite of the fact that our concern here is with mobilization processes taking place in the context of multi-party systems, it might be useful to look at some of the mobilization problems arising for single parties in non-democratic regimes. Arthur L. Stinchcombe has made a highly interesting interpretation of the Leninist concept of the vanguard party and the communist movement. The model used by Stinchcombe to describe this concept consists of four concentric circles each representing different levels of activity. The core is made up of the professional revolutionaries (the party members), the surrounding circle consists of non-party bolsheviks (activists), who may take part in special events, such as demonstrations and strikes; the third circle encompasses the "most advanced sections of the proletariat", the "weekend revolutionaries", or, the fellow travelers. These people are "generally favourable to the purposes of the organization, but are unlikely to be active except when some particular issue excites them" (Stinchcombe 1967, p.190).


The fourth circle encompasses the "masses" who can only achieve "trade union consciousness" (ibid., p.191); they are potential sympathizers, "who adhere to the attitudes that might lead them to support the group, but who have no present commitment to the group". They respond to immediate issues (Stinchcombe 1967, p.190/1). To put it in the language of organization theory: party professionals - activists - sympathizers - potential recruits - represent different levels of activity, the control of which is one of the crucial problems confronting professional party politicians. If, for example, the activists develop a higher level of activity than the party members, the leadership risks losing control over their planned activities. Similarly, if the "masses" or potential recruits participate more actively in party politics than the smaller circles, the core group is threatened in its position. A second problem to be solved is "to keep a continuous flow of people from a lower level of activity to a higher level in order to replace those who lose interest" (Stinchcombe 1967, p. 191). Thus, the party leadership has to avoid both too high levels of activity for groups whom they wish less active, and too low degrees of activity for groups whom the leadership wants as potential party activists. Seen in this light, mobilization is a delicate enterprise manoeuvring between too high or too low levels of activity. Obviously, this risky task is not typical of a single party only, but of all kinds of voluntary organizations which have to rely on attracting individuals to keep the association going. According to Stinchcombe, the creation of talk is the main means by which this task of mobilization is fulfilled. He suggests a very simple measure to determine who belongs to which circle of activity: the amount of time spent on conversations about the organization. The subject-object relationship between party and individuals could thus be measured by the increased amount of time spent talking about politics by professional politicians in relation to party followers and sympathizers. It is one of the characteristics of the "new citizen" described by Samuel Barnes, that he spends more

time on politics.³⁰⁾ If it were found that "new citizens" approximate the time spent by politicians discussing politics, then this would be an indication of a change in the relationship between party professionals and political laymen.

B Grass-roots or populist model

Formally speaking, the second model represents the reversed case of model A: Individuals act as subjects of mobilization trying to dictate their demands to parties which are considered the mere executors of their wills. Stalagmite mobilization, to use Nettl's terminology, is based on social cleavages, like ethnicity, religion, region, language, and so forth. Individuals try to impose the demands, based on social cleavages on the parties without allowing them to transform them according to party lines. Purely "populist" demands pass through unfiltered by the parties to the decision making agents, using the parties as mere means of transportation of these demands. In contrast to model A, individuals in model B have a high degree of self-confidence: as subjects of mobilization they are autonomous in interest formation, community building and instrumentality. Scholars of recent political movements often give the impression that grass-roots mobilization is a new phenomenon; populist or grass-roots mobilization is in no way limited to the recent phenomena of nuclear, environmental, peace, womens' and other movements in Western European countries in the last decade. Historically, the foundation of the party system has often been paralleled by grass-roots mobilization processes or popular movements. So, for example, in Sweden the free-religious movement, the temperance movement, and the early womens' movement were among the main actors in shaping interests and motivating participation. The parties very often profited from the prior mobilization efforts of the popular movements. ³¹⁾

There are different ways in which established political parties can respond to populist demands. In his research on regionalist movements, Derek W. Urwin distinguishes between the following alternatives: a) Intensifying the pressures by deliberately appealing to regionalist sympathies³²⁾; b) ignoring the demands; c) consciously aiming at cross-regional mobilization; or d) simply tolerating the demands (Urwin 1983, pp. 248-249). Assuming an ideal type of populism the members of popular movements have not only votes but also other resources with which they are able to limit the different possible reactions by the parties. When analysing the relationship between popular movements and parties, it is of decisive importance to look at the means by which popular movements can influence party politics. In Sweden, for example, the "established" popular movements are given a regular voice in parliamentary commissions: they cannot be excluded from the decision making process. Furthermore, recent popular movements have succeeded in reviving the institution of referendum in the case of nuclear politics, although some of the main parties tried very hard to prevent a referendum on this issue. As soon as parties agree to extended participatory rights such as referenda, they risk a weakening of internal party cohesion and a loosening of the ties to their electorate, because the questions in referenda are not formulated according to party lines.³³⁾



C Ideal-democratic model

The functioning of the third model can be best described in terms of the "conflict-integration-dialectic" analysed by S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Conflicts are generated by parties and citizens in reciprocal interaction processes. The institutionalization of party competition induces the parties to transform these conflicts into different party alternatives and to present them to the voters in such a way as to motivate them to vote for that specific party. The institutionalization of secret and general voting is a mechanism which enables individuals to participate in the procedure of conflict resolution and in the selection of the political elite, thereby legitimizing the hierarchical relationship between elite and citizens. Political discontent is directed at the current set of office holders, and thereby diverted from the overall political system.³⁴⁾ According to this view the main processes of mobilization in ideal-democratic models are the following: two-way processes of conflict generation; processes of creating and approving legitimacy; processes of participation in the institutionalized channels of political action; processes of identification with party alternatives and candidates.

There are several conditions that must be fulfilled for this conflict-integration dialectic to function. One set of requirements applies to the role of the citizens. First, they must be "active", that is, they have to supply the parties with an adequate amount of conflicts; the "passive citizen" provides too few, the "new citizen" too many conflicts. In Stinchcombe's terms; the conflict-integration dialectic can only function if the parties are

are able to control the level of activity of the citizen. Second, the nature of these demands made by the citizens must be such that the parties are able to aggregate them according to party lines; third, the citizens have to consider the parties as being the right addressee for their claims; fourth, there must be no acceptable alternatives for the citizens to use to express their demands. The second set of conditions has to do with the parties: First, they have to be "responsive" and "responsible" parties in the sense of Giovanni Sartori³⁵⁾ which means they have to be able to listen to the demands made by the citizens and to aggregate them into _____policy alternatives which are then submitted to maximizing votes; second, they must be able to present solutions within an appropriate time period; third, party functionaries must prove to the voters that they are representatives of the political system and not personally attached to their positions, in that they step down from their positions now and then; and finally, the parties must exhibit a certain degree of integration in order to be able to act as unities. Obviously, not all of these preconditions are met by the actors in current mobilization processes; in addition, the functioning of this ideal-democratic model is impeded by other types of mobilization processes taking place to which we will turn now.

IV. Model D: Internal processes of mobilization

The models discussed so far dealt with vertical processes of mobilization only. The basic assumption made in constructing these models is that parties and individuals can be treated as unitary actors. There are several reasons which justify rejecting this assumption. As Hans Daalder has pointed out, "in the actual world of politics, it is hardly defensible to regard party as a unitary actor" (Daalder 1983, p. 21). There are different processes of mobilization going on within the party; these are called here internal or horizontal processes

of mobilization. It will be argued that horizontal processes of mobilization are also going on between individuals taken as an action unit. ———As a working hypothesis it is assumed in the following that both actors are becoming increasingly absorbed by horizontal processes of mobilization and therefore less involved in vertical processes of mobilization. As a consequence, the relationship between parties and individuals is weakened and more or less restricted to elections. The following should briefly explain what empirical phenomena are referred to in horizontal processes of mobilization.

(1) Internal processes of mobilization: The "new individualism"

One could argue that horizontal processes of mobilization are achieving a growing importance in respect to all three dimensions of mobilization activities: Individuals are becoming increasingly oriented to one another and to their selves in the awareness and articulation of interests, in constructing emotional ties and inventing methods of mobilization.

In regard to the first dimension, interest formation, a change can be observed in the point of reference according to which the individuals structure their awareness of certain problems. Individuals become aware of social problems when they affect them directly and personally, when they become individually relevant for them. For example, environmental pollution, nuclear weapons, or the violation of the private sphere by government bureaucracies, are "personally relevant", because they are interpreted as threatening the possibility for self-realization. Underlying the structure of this awareness pattern is an elaborate concept of the self and images about how to realize the self. Characteristic of this type of interest formation is not only the increasing importance of the self as a point of reference, but also the concrete nature of the problems the individuals become aware of and disturbed by: dying birds, polluted water, poisoned food, and so on, are immediately and easily

perceived and, therefore, do not require highly abstract cognitive conceptions. This material concreteness enables the "self-interpretational groups"³⁶⁾ to become more or less independent of the parties as interpreters of their interests. They are their own experts in defining what is good or bad for themselves. The new "awareness movement", as Christopher Lasch vaguely calls it³⁷⁾, articulates types of issues to which the parties find it difficult to respond, because what is personally relevant to all individuals is in Mancur Olson's term a collective good and as such does not lend itself to formulation as specific exclusive party alternatives. In addition, the way in which the individuals make public their grievances very often resembles a personal confession; to this type of interest articulation churches or sects are more prone to listen than traditional parties.

If it is possible to speak of a new ethic of individualism then one characteristic of this ethic is the tendency towards moralization of politics in the sense of each single individual feeling——morally responsible for the achievement of specific goals. Whereas the ethics of the sixties put the responsibility on collectivities (such as classes) and on the functioning of abstract processes (such as "capital accumulation", or "exploitation") the ethics of the eighties put pressure upon concrete individuals to develop, for example, the "right environmental consciousness" and to behave according to the new moral standards of "environmentalism" in daily life. This inner-directed morality is in essence apolitical, in that it stresses ego-orientation instead of other-orientation and particularism instead of collectivism. If the "new citizens" turn to the representatives of the political parties, then it is done with the intention of enlisting their support for these demands, but not to allow them to be transformed according to traditional party lines.

Regarding the second dimension, community building, it can be observed too that individuals are increasingly absorbed by horizontal processes of creating affective ties.

Feelings of solidarity develop not so much in orientation to large organizational bodies, but more towards small networks and loosely structured friendship groups. There is to observe a clear resurgence of importance given to personal communication, direct relationships and small memberships (Neidhardt 1983, pp. 12-34). This phenomenon is not necessarily identical with an increase in the importance accorded with the private sphere. On the contrary, it is striking to observe that the belongingness to specific groups is expressed in highly visible symbols, such as buttons, t-shirts, badges and so forth, which publicize not only the standpoint on specific current issues, but also a commitment to certain groups and the life style typical of the group. These impressions suggest that the privacy-publicity stratification mentioned above has undergone decisive changes. The new citizen deliberately avoids using the provision of secret voting, but communicates to his environment expressively and symbolically how he has voted or will vote, to which "side" he belongs and to which life style he adheres.³⁸⁾ Another indication of the increasing importance of internal or horizontal processes of emotion building is the observation that in many cases the strengthening of affective ties has become an end in itself. The experience of participating in demonstrations or other kinds of activities is often described in terms of "having a good time", "feeling good about oneself", or, simply, "we all had fun".³⁹⁾

If these impressions have some empirical substance, they can be described in Durkheimian terms as a resurgence of "mechanical solidarity" in modernized forms: individuals communicate directly face-to-face, they exercise strict control over conformity to each other, and develop strong sentiments of belongingness.

There seems to be little need to search for evidence for the claim that individuals, especially among the younger generation, have become more independent also with reference to the third dimension of mobilization activity, instrumentality. The development of new and unconventional means of

activity has as an effect that individuals are increasingly occupied with internal processes of inventing appropriate methods for making their self-defined interests public. In this context the distinction made by Peter Mair between "programmatic dissatisfaction" and "organizational dissatisfaction"⁴⁰⁾ might be useful. The phenomenon that can be observed in many Western European countries, the increase in instrumental capacity and creativity, could be one indicator of the individuals' "organizational dissatisfaction" with large bureaucratic bodies and its time consuming procedures and complicated decision making structures as practiced by traditional established parties and trade unions. In avoidance of the common fallacy of zero-sum argumentation one could at least assert that the rise of action groups, single-issue movements, "Bürgerinitiativen", different forms of demonstrations, and so forth, indicate that the conventional and institutionalized forms of political participation are not considered adequate and appropriate means for expressing the individualistic demands of self-interpretational groups. The new type of interest formation characteristic of the "new individualism" makes it necessary to develop new and more appropriate methods of political mobilization as well. The striking fact, that there has been no overall dramatic decline in election participation rates, suggests instead that "organizational dissatisfaction" has brought about an increase and a differentiation of means of political action, with the effect that political actors are confronted with the coexistence and simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional, institutionalized and non-institutionalized, legal and illegal means of political mobilization.

(2) Horizontal processes of mobilization within parties

As soon as an organization exists, its members become involved in different types of internal processes. Hans Daalder, for example, has mentioned such internal processes which concern the "congruence or disagreement between the

cabinet coalition, as represented by ministers of different parties, and the parliamentary coalition, which may not always follow a cabinet in specific actions or retain the same parties in any particular decision"; second, there are internal processes between that part of the "party in government and that outside it" (Partei - Fraktion); and third, "nomination processes within parties" (Daalder 1983, p. 22).

Other types of internal processes could be added to Daalder's list: such as, fourth, processes of integration between the younger and older generation; fifth, internal decision-making processes concerning the party's programme; sixth, processes of re-establishing trust for the party leadership after unfavourable election outcomes, and so on. What concerns us here, however, is not so much these types of internal processes which have always been more or less of importance for parties ever since they existed. Rather, we are concerned here with those types of internal processes which are caused by the high degree of institutionalization in the established party system. As a general working hypothesis the following proposition could be made: The higher the degree of institutionalization of the political system, the more the parties are confronted with the effects of previous institutionalization. M. Rainér Lepsius calls these effects "Eigenwirkungen des Institutionensystems" (Lepsius 1979, p. 196). As a consequence, highly institutionalized parties are increasingly engaged in processes of, as it will be called here, "built-in" mobilization which absorbs a great deal of their political energies and, therefore, distracts them from vertical mobilization processes. In the following it is only possible to outline such "built-in" mobilization processes.

Parties in highly institutionalized political systems are increasingly confronted with the effects of the institutionalization of particular party policies and programmes made by the government in the past. So, for example, one effect of the institutionalization of the welfare state

is that the parties are more or less continuously occupied with correcting the deficiencies of former policies, making supplements to welfare laws and trying to find ways of financing the welfare benefits in situations of economic crisis. In addition, some types of decisions concerning welfare policies have to be made regularly in parliament, so for example, the adjustment of the old age benefits to the rising level of the living standard. It could be assumed as a general rule that "built-in" mobilization processes have an increased importance in situations of economic crisis. The parties' innovative capacities are severely challenged by figures of rising unemployment and changes in the age structure. Yet the awareness of the urgency of these problems is very rarely structured by protests by welfare beneficiaries (which would be a case of vertical mobilization), but primarily by the principle of political opposition according to which oppositional parties react by attacking the party or parties in government in a situation of uncertain welfare provisions.

As a consequence, parties also become involved in affective built-in mobilization processes when questions of "trust" or "mistrust" in the welfare state are raised. It is typical of such situations that parties accuse each other of having made "false promises", of having "betrayed the pensioners", or of pursuing a policy of "de-solidarization" (Entsolidarisierung) as a ——— slogan of Social Democratic opposition went with which they attacked the ruling party coalition (Peter Glotz 1984, p. 123). Parties which present themselves in terms of the other parties' failings and which structure internal emotional bonds in terms of the disintegration of the other party, and which try to structure internal solidarity on the basis of the politics of unsolidarity made by other parties - such parties are involved in processes called forth by what we here call built-in mobilization.

One characteristic of such types of mobilization processes is the rhetoric in which they are carried out. Dominant in interest formation is the language of bureaucrats and

experts; in processes of affectivity it is the language of party functionaries, which consists in personalized accusations, suspicions, and intricate allusions to the political and private past of individual politicians. It is a rhetoric composed of the technical vocabulary of political bureaucracy and the secrete code typical of political intrigues. Obviously, this type of rhetoric is not appropriate for structuring relations with non-involved citizens. It could be taken as a sign of the weakened relationship between parties and individuals that two totally different types of rhetoric clash in public discussion: the language of political experts and functionaries on the one hand, and the language typical of the "new individualism" on the other hand. The individuals are more or less put in a situation of merely consuming the rhetoric presented to them via mass media without being able to participate in it; and the politicians are put in a situation of experiencing the excitements of a cultural shock when they are confronted with the individualistic and self-referring vocabulary of the self-interpretational groups. It would be worthwhile studying in more detail the effects of different public rhetorics for structuring the relationship between individuals and party politicians.

Without being able to go into more detail here, one consequence of the assumed increasing importance of built-in mobilization processes for the parties' capability to structure relationships with the individuals can be mentioned already: The more parties are drawn into processes of built-in mobilization, the more they are confronted with situations of "overload", and the more they will react as de-mobilizers in relation to the individuals. In contrast to the situation of historical mobilization (model A 1), in which the parties' mobilization activities consisted in defining into politics issues which until then had been treated as non-political issues, parties acting within highly institutionalized political systems invest mobilization energies into defining out of politics those issues which they, feeling overloaded,

are not able to take into their responsibility. Such issues are often labeled "excessive demands", and appeals are made to the individuals' own sense of responsibility to take care of their "personal" matters. One example of this is the area of health policy, where the present governing party coalition in West Germany defines out certain issues from the health programme by reminding the affected individuals to use traditional household remedies. Ironically, the politicians thereby inadvertently support the ongoing trend towards individualism. However, there are no household remedies for all the problems which the political parties try to define out of their area of responsibility. As a consequence, an increasing number of problems are left unmediated and do not receive the parties' more systematic attention. Unintentionally and sometimes even unconsciously the parties thereby create problems which facilitate the generation of new parties, the rise of new action groups, or the growth of the importance of already existing non-political organizations, such as, for example, the church. The production of such "party-generating" problems (Peter Glotz 1984, p.125) is not a mere "professional error" (Glotz 1984, p.126), but the systematic outcome of the parties' demobilizing efforts which in turn is a reaction to their increasing involvement with built-in mobilization processes.

V. Conclusion: The theoretical problem of mobilization research

In conclusion to the argument presented thus far, we must return to the question raised at the outset, which asked for

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an explication of the theoretical problem which mobilization research should deal with in the future. Yet before approaching this final question, a few summarizing remarks are in order.

Mobilization has been defined here as the development of a social relationship (in Weber's sense of the word) between two types of actors, the individuals and the parties. The analytical concept of mobilization activities (based loosely on the classics of political sociology) consists of processes of interest formation (cognitive dimension), community building (affective dimension), and employing means of action (instrumental dimension). Political mobilization has been defined as the actors' attempt to influence the existing distribution of power. The directional variable of mobilization has been introduced in order to define more precisely the type of relationship which develops between individuals and the parties. Three different models of vertical mobilization were then presented: two examples of models of downward mobilization, historical mobilization (A 1) and the Leninist concept of the vanguard party (A 2); grass-roots or populist mobilization (B), and the ideal-democratic model of mobilization (C). A fourth model, horizontal mobilization, incorporated the possibility of internal processes of mobilization taking place within the two types of actors (D).

In terms of these models one can describe the present situation as characterized by the coexistence of vertical and horizontal processes of mobilization, yet with an increasing predominance of the latter. It remains as a future task of mobilization research to investigate the assertion made here, that the institutionalized hierarchical relationship between individuals and parties (as depicted in model C) is weakening as a result of both actors' increasing orientation to themselves when becoming aware of and articulating interests; developing affective loyalties, and using means of mobilization.

Restated in more general terms, this situation can be described as a case of weak or insufficient intermediation. This formulation is reminiscent of the theoretical problems with which Emile Durkheim and, later, William Kornhauser were concerned. Yet the problem facing mobilization research in the future is not the same as that which Durkheim treated, nor the variant Kornhauser pursued. In contrast to their problem, the new problem of intermediation does not involve "mass men" or "self-alienated" individuals⁴¹⁾ who are unable to make their voices heard and therefore need strong intermediary organizations. Instead, the present situation is characterized by self-confident individuals or, to use Samuel Barnes' terminology, "new citizens" who have the cognitive, affective and instrumental resources which enable them to act as subjects of political mobilization. In contrast to Durkheim's and Kornhauser's view, the current problem of intermediation is not one of a weak intermediary structure; on the contrary, most Western European countries exhibit a strong intermediary structure, including a large number of organizations representing the interests of the individuals, and a high degree of institutionalization of these intermediary organizations. Whereas the situation with which Durkheim and Kornhauser were confronted was characterized by "self-alienated" individuals and weak intermediary organizations, the present situation is characterized by "new citizens" on the one hand, and highly institutionalized parties and other interest organizations on the other hand, both becoming increasingly involved in internal processes of mobilization. Weak or insufficient intermediation is the result, because the actors tend to restrict their orientation to each other to those situations in which they are merely seeking support for their preconceived interests, the individuals seeking support for their self-interpreted interests, the parties attracting support for the issues they have chosen to present in election campaigns.

Why does this modernized version of Durkheim's weak intermediation merit consideration, and why has it been proposed as a theoretical problem for future mobilization research?

In the preceding discussion some arguments have already been made which underline the importance of this problem. Two additional arguments will be presented which at the same time will serve as concluding remarks. First of all, a loosening of the relationship to the established intermediary organizations threatens the individuals with a loss of access to the decision-making arena, and therefore, they risk that their mobilization efforts will remain, in the long run, without decisive influence upon the existing distribution of power. A possible consequence of this is that highly mobilized individuals will ultimately not content themselves with activities that have no end other than themselves. It is therefore likely that in the future they will strive harder to achieve their demands. One could further conjecture that neither the established parties in their present form, nor the new ad hoc groups will be able to successfully channel this accumulated discontent and disappointment which will result, with the consequence that the government will be directly confronted with unfiltered, radicalized pressures "from below".

Secondly, parties that are not able to strengthen the relationship with the individuals will be incapable to function as mediators between the social structure and the government over a long period. This is not merely a problem of theoretical relevance for scholars of structural-functionalism, but an important political problem. Nor will the consequences of the parties' weakened relationship with the individuals be limited to the parties, but will also impair the relationship between the individuals and the government. According to Durkheim, the tasks performed by intermediary organizations included not only transforming and aggregating the interests of the social structure, but also the essential task of supplying the government with the necessary information on the individuals' needs.⁴²⁾

If the parties fail to present the government with decision-making alternatives which reflect the major demands of the individuals, the government will not be able to react with those decisions which create support "from below". In addition,

the parties pose a vital link, which the government depends on in pursuing its own interests. Parties which are only weakly related to the social structure will not be able to translate the decisions made by the government convincingly to the individuals. As a result, the government will be forced to resort to more direct forms of influencing the individuals in implementing its decisions.

A speculative and rather pessimistic outcome is that this might increase the risk of a confrontation between the radicalized demands of dissatisfied individuals and authoritarian pressures by the government. It is with the goal of preventing such a situation from becoming a reality that mobilization research should concern itself with the problem of how to strengthen the relationship between individuals and parties.

Notes

- 1) See, for example, Korpi 1983, p.77.
- 2) See Nedelmann 1984
- 3) This point has also been made by Hans Daalder 1983,p.23;p.25. The last work of the late Helmut Schlesky, Politik und Publizität, contains a lot of stimulating hypotheses concerning mass media and professional politics which are worthwhile considering in more detail in future research on the mobilizing effects of mass media. See Schelsky 1983.
- 4) See, for example, Barnes 1982.
- 5) Nettl has explicitly dealt with this directional variable to which I will turn later on.
- 6) See as an example of this approach Almond and Powell 1966,pp.27-30.
- 7) See Hettne and Friberg 1976,p.9.
- 8) This holds true for the book by Peter J. Nettl; his contribution, however, goes beyond a mere terminological translation of mobilization into the Parsonian terms of structural-functionalism.
- 9) In his work "From Mobilization to Revolution" Charles Tilly has made an interesting reinterpretation of the classics Marx, Weber, Mill and Durkheim. Tilly's focus is,however, on the question of the preconditions for collective action.
- 10) When putting this question one has to be cautious not to make an unrealistic empirical assumption. In fact, there are rare situations in everyday life in which the individual is confronted with the question of explicitly defining what he is interested in. More often he is confronted with situations in which he has to chose between prestructured alternatives.
- 11) This insight is not only important for political theory, but also for political practice as has been underlined by the manager of the West German Social Democratic Party, Peter Glotz:"As we have learned from the thirties, misery does not necessarily mobilize; it can also demoralize. Disappointed and deceived metal workers can also be driven to the right; they do not have to be the mobilization reserve of the left." Glotz 1984,p.127.
- 12) For a reinterpretation of the classics under the perspective of affectivity see Collins 1975, espec. chap. 2, pp.49.
- 13) One prominent exception is Robert E. Lane who explicitly dealt with the question "How Emotion is Expressed In Political Life", chap.10, Lane 1959, pp. 133.
- 14) See Streeck 1981,pp.107 et seq.
- 15) Walter Korpi has shown for the Swedish case, that in spite of the changes in urban housing patterns, the mobilization capacity of the Swedish Social Democrats has not decreased considerably in metropolitan areas. See Korpi 1983, p. 128.

- 16) See Streeck 1981,pp.53-77.
- 17) Weber 1958,p.51.
- 18) As far as I know, Peter J.Nettl has made the only attempt so far to integrate Erving Goffman's sociological theory into the analysis of mobilization. However, he limits himself to drawing an analogy between political processes and the theatre. See Nettl¹⁹⁶⁷, p.15;pp.265 et seq; see also Nettl 1968.
- 19) Tilly has restricted his definition of mobilization to this dimension of instrumentality: "Mobilization is the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action.... The analysis of mobilization deals with the ways that groups acquire resources and make them available for collective action." Tilly 1978, p.7.
- 20) Weber 1964,p.689.
- 21) Marx 1965,p.74.
- 22) See Raith 1983, especially page 102 showing De Mita with the Mafioso Flavio Carboni; and Arlacchi 1983.
- 23) See the article written by Joschka Fischer, member of the parliament for the "Greens", on the future of the "Greens", in:DER SPIEGEL Nr.9, 1984, espec. p. 87.
- 24) See Nettl 1967,pp. 115-120.
- 25) See for example Kaase 1982 A,p.1.
- 26) Nettl limits his definition of political mobilization to processes by which authority is legitimized; Nettl 1967,p.123.
- 27) Durkheim 1967,pp.150-151.
- 28) Nettl: 1967,p.261.
- 29) Rokkan 1967,p.117.;for secrecy as an institution see Nedelmann 1985,p. 41-42.
- 30) Barnes 1982,pp.36-39; and Kaase 1982 A,p.4.
- 31) Nedelmann 1975.
- 32) This alternative is propagated by Peter Glotz (see note 11) when he appeals to the left not to be afraid of the people and their wishes: "The left has to learn such type of 'populism' ". Glotz 1984,p.127.
- 33) See Nedelmann 1984.
- 34) Lipset and Rokkan 1967,p.4.
- 35) Sartori 1976,p.18; p.327.

- 36) This term has been invented by Alain Touraine. He uses it, however, in a slightly different sense. See Touraine 1982,p.235.
- 37) See Lasch 1980,pp.3-30.
- 38) Obviously, there has occurred decisive changes in this respect in the last twenty or so years; it would be interesting to update the findings made by Erwin K. Scheuch in 1965; see Scheuch 1965.
- 39) See the quotation by Lasch 1980,p.7.
- 40) Mair 1983,p.425.
- 41) Kornhauser 1965,pp.102-113.
- 42) See for a more detailed discussion of Durkheim's contribution to political sociology Kurt G. Meier 1981.


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