

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

E U I W O R K I N G P A P E R N o . 20

DECISION PROCESS AND POLICY OUTCOME:
AN ATTEMPT TO CONCEPTUALIZE THE PROBLEM
AT THE CROSS-NATIONAL LEVEL

by

JÜRIG STEINER

SEPTEMBER 1982



BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

This paper is distributed for discussion
and critical comment and should not be
quoted or cited without prior
permission of the author

© Jürg Steiner

Printed in Italy in September 1982

European University Institute

Badia Fiesolana

I - 50016 San Domenico (FI)

Decision Process and Policy Outcome

An Attempt to Conceptualize the Problem at the Cross-National Level

Jürg Steiner

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
and University of Geneva

Abstract

Structural explanations of the policy outcome should be supplemented with a decisional approach. The units of analysis should not be entire countries but specific issues if one wishes to study the causal relation between decision process and policy outcome. To characterize the policy outcome it is not sufficient to look at monetary and manpower figures. It seems more interesting to ask to what extent a particular policy outcome fulfills the demands of the various societal groups and whether the outcome leads to further protests. With regard to the characterization of the decision process, broad labels such as pluralism and neocorporatism are too vague. The decision process should be conceptualized as a multi-dimensional phenomenon with many different decision paths. These paths are integrated in a simulation model. A theory is suggested which is based on the assumption that decision makers try to optimize the relation among the following four values: office seeking, policy goals, system maintenance and opportunity costs of time.

Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.

Most policy studies at the cross-national level take as dependent variable aspects of the policy outcome which are relatively easy to conceptualize and to measure such as expenditure levels or the number of personnel involved. As first steps in a research enterprise such variables certainly have their importance. But from a normative perspective, it seems more interesting to ask to what extent a particular policy outcome fulfills the demands of the various groups in a population. It is also interesting to see how the various societal groups react to a particular policy outcome: Do they accept the outcome or do they fight it in engaging in protests? Thus, I will suggest two dimensions for the policy outcome as dependent variable: (1) demand fulfillment of the various societal groups, (2) protest activities once a policy has been implemented.

With regard to the explanatory variables, most cross-national policy studies concentrate on structural aspects such as the economic development of a country, the party system or the degree of centralization. Here again, the advantage is that these variables are relatively easy to conceptualize and to measure. They often also have considerable explanatory power. The disadvantage of such structural variables is, however, that they are difficult to change on a short-term basis. Consequently, it is hard to derive relevant policy recommendations from such studies. I will suggest, not to replace, but to supplement structural explanations of the policy outcome with aspects of the decision process. These aspects are often neglected because they are so difficult to conceptualize and to measure. If it could be demonstrated that variation in the decision process indeed has some independent impact on the policy outcome, the practical relevance of such studies would be significant because many aspects of the decision process seem relatively open to short-term changes.

1. Level of Analysis

If we wish to study the impact of variation in the decision process on variation in the policy outcome, we must first determine the level of analysis of such studies. One possibility is to take entire countries as units of analysis. This approach is used in particular in the consociational theory¹⁾ and the theory of neo-corporatism²⁾. Consociationalism tries to argue that major aspects of the policy outcome, in particular political stability, are influenced by the prevailing decision mode in a country. Two decision modes are distinguished, a competitive mode based on the majority principle and a consociational mode in the sense of accommodation and compromise. The neo-corporate literature is interested in the decision patterns among the state and the major economic interest groups. Variation in these decision patterns are then linked to specific policy outcomes such as unemployment and inflation.

In another paper, I spelled out the two major difficulties of using entire countries as units of analysis (Steiner 1981). One difficulty is that a large number of decision processes take place in the various issue areas of a single country. No method has as yet been found to aggregate all these decision processes in a reliable and valid way for a country as a whole. Both the consociational and the neo-corporate literature proceed in a rather impressionistic way with the result that disagreements about the classification of particular countries are frequent. The other difficulty concerns the postulated direction of the causal flows. At the aggregate level of entire countries it is often hard to demonstrate in a convincing manner

that the decision process actually influences the policy outcome. In the consociational literature, for example, the problem arises how to interpret the simultaneous occurrence of consociational decision making and political stability. The latter is not necessarily the result of the former; the causal relation could also go in the other direction or both phenomena could be the result of a third factor such as economic affluence.

Causal relations between decision processes and policy outcomes can be studied not only at the macro-level of entire countries but also at a very micro-level of specific decision situations. Together with Dorff, I did this for the Free Democratic party in Switzerland. (Steiner and Dorffi 1980) The units of analysis were decision processes about specific disagreements which occurred in particular meetings. Over a period of 21 months we identified 466 such decision situations in the various party gatherings. We characterized each situation by the decision mode used to resolve the conflict. Four modes were distinguished: decisions by majority rule, decisions by amicable agreement, decisions by interpretation and postponements of the decision. The main emphasis of the study was to explain variation among the four decision modes. In addition, we also examined how the decision mode chosen influenced the policy outcome. We found, for example, that majority decisions are most likely to lead to innovative policy outcomes.

There are obvious advantages in using decision situations as units of analysis. First of all, no problem of aggregation arises because each decision situation can be characterized by a single decision mode and a single policy outcome. Secondly, with sufficient access, data collection is relatively easy. In our research of the Free Democratic party, we could study all meetings by participant observation, we could interview the actors and analyse all written documents. A

third advantage of working at this micro-level of analysis is that causal relations can be much better established because it is relatively easy to determine the temporal flow of the various variables.

Despite such advantages there are also severe problems if one studies the relations between decision processes and policy outcomes at the micro-level of specific decision situations. The biggest problem is that such studies do not reveal how a decision process evolves at the societal level over space and time. The focus is always on specific decision situations but it is not shown how these situations are dynamically interlinked. We need a level of analysis where we can appropriately specify and investigate this process character of decision making. Such a level may be found if we take particular issues as units of analysis. The history of an issue consists of all decision situations which are perceived to belong to the same topic. Issues may be defined in broader or narrower terms. Examples of broad issue definitions are how to decrease the dependence of a country on foreign oil or how to alleviate racial discrimination in a society. Examples of narrower issue definitions would be whether to increase taxes on gasoline or whether to grant tax exemption to racially segregated schools. I suggest that it is preferable, at least at the beginning, to work with relatively narrow issue definitions. In this way, the problem of measurement still seems fairly manageable. For a broad issue like the alleviation of racial discrimination in a country the overall policy outcome would have to be aggregated from a great number of more specific policy outcomes. If the issue is more narrowly defined, the aggregation problem is obviously less severe. The same holds true for the decision process. With a broadly defined issue there is likely to be an overwhelmingly high number of decision situations in a great variety of arenas so that the measurement process would be extremely cumbersome. But if the issue is narrowly defined such as the

question of gasoline tax it seems more feasible to delimit and to aggregate all decision situations dealing with the issue.

Taking narrowly defined issues as units of analysis does not preclude the possibility of later work on broader issues. For example, a large set of narrowly defined health issues can later be aggregated for the health field as a whole. As a general principle, I postulate as an optimal research strategy that work continues simultaneously at many different levels of analysis. This means

that despite my earlier criticism, work should continue at the macro-level of entire countries and at the micro-level of specific decision situations. Comparing decision processes and policy outcomes for entire countries certainly has the weakness that the data will be rather impressionistic and "soft". But as the literature on consociationalism and neo-corporatism indicates, working at the level of entire countries sharpens the eye for broad normative questions such as the conditions of political stability or the possibility of repression of the demands of certain groups. Small-group research at the level of specific decision situations, on the other hand, runs the risk that these broad normative questions are often screened out in the minute details of the analyses. But research at this micro-level helps us to sharpen our conceptual and theoretical tools because we are much closer to a "hard" data base.

Research at a middle level with issues as units of analysis has been severely neglected till now so that a certain emphasis at this level is needed. There were, of course, always case studies of particular issues, but they were mostly descriptive and atheoretical in orientation. What we need is a common conceptual framework which makes such case studies comparable across countries and also within

countries. In order to analyse systematically the causal relation between decision process and policy outcome, we should have studies which compare an issue X for a fairly large number of countries. It would also be fruitful if a large number of issues could be studied within the constant parameters of a particular country.

Having discussed the question of the units of analysis, we shall address in the next two sections the problem how to conceptualize and to measure first the policy outcome and ^{then} the decision process. The fourth and last section will conclude with a theoretical discussion of the possible casual linkage between decision processes and policy outcomes.

2. Policy Outcome

If the units of analysis are issues, how shall we conceptualize the policy outcome? The easiest solution is to seek the conceptualization at a very concrete level. This was done by Boulter (1980) who compared the issue of speed limits on highways in the US, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic after the oil crisis of 1973. With regard to the policy outcome, he simply asked whether and how quickly a country imposed speed limits, what form these limits took and whether they were removed again when the greatest emergency of the oil crisis was over. Variation in these aspects of the policy outcome were then explained by variation in the decision process in the various countries. A conceptualization of the policy outcome at such a concrete level seems useful and appropriate if one is merely interested in the question of speed limits.

But if we wish to generalize over more than one issue, a more abstract conceptualization of the policy outcome is obviously needed. One has to find categories under which the policy outcome of a large number of issues can be subsumed. An often chosen strategy is to compare public expenditure levels for different issues. To conceptualize the policy outcome in monetary terms has the


great advantage that data are usually readily available. Expenditure levels may also say something about the priorities of the decision-makers. Quite often, however, one has the suspicion that the policy outcome is conceptualized in monetary terms because the data are so easy to collect. I have no fundamental objection to such research enterprises but it should be carefully justified why it is interesting to conceptualize the policy outcome in monetary terms.

I have a similar complaint if the policy outcome is conceptualized in terms of manpower put into a program. Such studies may ask how many teachers a country has per pupil or how many doctors and nurses per patient. I recognize that such data may tell us more about what actually happens to the pupils and the patients of a country than if we are referred only to budget figures. The suspicion nevertheless often remains that this conceptualization of the policy outcome is mainly chosen because the data are easily available. Figures about the number of teachers do not tell us how good these teachers are and what they actually do with their pupils.

I wish to suggest two dimensions of the policy outcome which I will try to justify from the perspective of a normative democratic theory. This justification will be presented after the description of the two dimensions. One dimension derives from the view of the citizens, the other from the view of the political system. Seen from the citizens, a central dimension of the policy outcome seems whether it fulfills their demands. For the functioning of a political system it seems crucial whether a policy outcome is commonly accepted or whether it leads to protests and new demands. These are two separate dimensions because losing citizens will not necessarily protest and sometimes citizens may engage in protest behavior even if they got what they asked for. Figure 1 describes the space formed by the two dimensions.

Figure 1

Policy outcomes according to demand fulfillment and protests



Let us now take a closer look at the two dimensions and the four cells which form if we divide each dimension in two halves. With regard to the dimension of demand fulfillment, one has to identify at first the various groups which raise demands for a particular issue. For each group then, one has to determine what these demands are. Sometimes, this may not be an easy task because a group may speak with different voices. There is also the problem that for tactical reasons a group may exaggerate its demands. However difficult in a concrete case, careful investigations should reveal in a rough form what the various groups demand in a particular issue. The next step is to determine to what extent each group gets what it wants. This is all what is needed to classify the groups on this dimension of demand fulfillment. The groups may be far apart with clear losers

and winners or they may all win in some aspects and lose in others.

For the protest dimension one has to conceptually distinguish between protests during the decision process and protests which occur after a decision is made and implemented. For figure 1, only the latter aspect is relevant. We wish to know whether some of the groups react to the policy outcome with any kind of protest behavior. These protests may range from press releases to vast street demonstrations. For this dimension too, the classification of the individual groups is not easy but also not insurmountable because we can rely on empirical evidence.

It is easier to speak about the space formed by the two dimensions if we distinguish the four cells depicted in figure 1. Two of these cells, the non-protesting winners and the protesting losers, do not need further comments. An interesting category are the non-protesting losers. From a behavioral point of view, they form a single type characterized by the fact that they do not get what they wanted but that they do not engage in any big protests. The motivation for this common behavior, however, may be very different. One can think at least of the following motivational bases:

1. Acceptance of the formal and informal rules by which the issue was decided.
2. Confusion about who won and who lost.
3. Intimidation.
4. Resignation.
5. Lack of skills to organize a protest.
6. Low saliency of issue.

An interesting category are also the protesting winners. Why would a group engage in protests if it gets what it wants? In recent years, such occurrences were not too rare in most Western democracies. A youth group may raise the demand

for a publically-funded concert hall. Even if this demand is fulfilled, the group may continue to express dissatisfaction because this specific demand was merely a symbol for a much wider and diffuse dissatisfaction. Thus, it is conceivable that the winners for a particular issue show no satisfaction at all but continue to engage in protest behavior.

Having described two dimensions of the policy outcome, I have to justify why these dimensions allow to raise interesting normative questions. A first set of questions is raised by the distribution of the various societal groups in the four cells.

If we adhere to a harmony model of society in the sense of Parsons (1951), we probably wish that the losers accept their defeat and remain quiet. But from a conflictual model of society in the sense of Coser (1956) and Dahrendorf (1959), one would probably encourage the losers to continue the fight. Particularly intriguing questions are raised by the category of protesting winners. Their diffuse and perhaps anomic protests may appear to many as threatening the stability of a political system. But others may applaud these protesters who refuse to be co-opted by the establishment of the system. The argument could be that any society has the tendency to moderate marginal groups in allowing them some small victories in narrowly-delimited issues.

A further set of normative issues comes up if we question whether the demands of the citizens correspond to their true needs. Such questions may lead to doubts who the real winners and losers are. Take as an illustration a demand by young blacks in the US to increase the minimum hourly wage. If such a demand is met, one may ask whether young blacks are really the winners or whether such an increase conflicts with their true needs because it may put many of them out of the market.

On the other hand, one may argue that young blacks are exploited in the labor market if minimum wages do not keep up with inflation. Thus, where are the true needs of this group? We do not have to pursue this question in the present context. I simply wish to make the argument that demands do not necessarily correspond to needs and that our research should encourage a normative discussion about the relation between demands and needs. Such a discussion also allows to address the question of non-decisions in the sense of Bachrach and Baratz⁽¹⁹⁶²⁾. According to these authors we should be concerned with the mechanisms which prevent certain groups to raise their demands in the political arena or even to become conscious what their demands should be.

3. Decision Process

For some time now there has been a heated debate in the literature about the relative importance of political and socio-economic variables for the explanation of policy outcomes. The socio-economic variables are often referred to as structural, the political variables as dynamic. This distinction leads to a meaningful theoretical question, namely to what extent the policy outcome is determined by underlying structural features or by day-to-day dynamic processes. Answering this question would tell us more about the means to influence the policy outcome. Can the policy outcome ^{exclusively} be influenced in the long-run through a slow change in the structural features of a country, or is it also possible to arrive at significant short-range changes through manipulation of process variables?

Although the distinction between structural and process variables is meaningful, it is not altogether clear which variables belong in the two categories.

I agree with Castles' (1981 p 129) recent critique "that the type of political factors often analysed in the 'politics matters' debate are as structural in character as the socio-economic factors with which they are contrasted." The party system or the degree of political centralization for example, have to be considered as structural features because they are usually not open to short-range changes. Political process variables should refer only to the day-to-day interactions among the decision makers, how they move an issue from arena to arena, the coalitions and bargains they form, the modes with which they make their decisions and the way these decisions are implemented. Such process variables have largely been neglected for the explanation of policy outcomes. A first reason for this neglect is that it is so difficult to conceptualize and to measure political process variables. This point is explicitly made by Castles^(p.129) whose "view is not that agency is unimportant, but rather that it is frequently difficult to come to grips with its manifestation in individual choices, strategies and manoeuvres by means of the inherently generalizing methods of the social sciences. It is quite impossible in the context of cross-national comparative studies, which seek to describe and explain highly aggregated patterns of political behavior." Castles concludes that "this leaves the proper study of policy outcomes as the description of varying patterns of policy and the location of the structural relationships which underlie them." My answer to Castles is that we could lower the level of aggregation in comparing not entire countries but specific issues, a research strategy which I outlined in the first section of this paper. With issues as units of analysis, it should be easier to come to grips with the problem of how to measure political process variables.

A second reason for the neglect of political process variables is that many authors assume that these variables are rather irrelevant for the explanation of policy outcomes. According to this view, the manoeuvres of politicians are a

surface phenomenon which is relatively unimportant compared with the structural features of a country. Such authors often feel well above the work of journalists who are supposedly concerned merely with the everyday trivia of politics. The academic should at least be open to the possibility that political process variables matter for the policy outcome.

From a third perspective, political process variables are neglected because they are assumed to function merely as a transmission belt between structural variables and the policy outcome. According to this view, process variables are not trivial but they are so much a product of the structure that they have no independent effect of their own. Consequently, studying process variables has no great practical significance because they can anyhow be influenced only through changes in structural variables. Thus, the causal linkage between structure and policy outcome is often treated as a blackbox. I do not deny that the structure often places strong constraints on the decision process. But the strength of these constraints may vary from situation to situation. In my research with Dorffi (Steiner and Dorffi pp.79-83), we found that in small groups of high-status actors there is a strong social pressure to resolve conflicts by amicable agreement and not by a majority vote. In such situations, the actors seem to be exposed to strong constraints by structural features. But, we found other situations which were much more indeterminate in their constraints so that there was more room for random factors and free choice by the actors. We should be interested precisely in such decision situations with


a high degree of indeterminacy by structural factors. In this way, we can identify the cases where it is worthwhile to recommend to the politicians a particular decision-making behavior in order to reach a particular policy goal.

Thus, my overall position is not that decision-makers are at liberty to choose whatever behavior they wish. There are certainly always structural constraints. But I assume that in some situations the constraints are sufficiently weakened so that it makes sense to look at the decision process as an independent variable in its own right.

My overall arguments lead me to the following framework for the explanation of policy outcomes.

Figure 2

Framework for the explanation of policy outcomes.



The arrow from the decision process to the policy outcome indicates the postulated causal relation which is my prime interest. But the figure shows also that the policy outcome may be influenced directly or indirectly by structural variables. The influence of the structure may by-pass the decision process altogether. Here it is of particular interest that structural features may determine the issues put on the political agenda, an argument already discussed in the context of the writings of Bachrach and Baratz (1962).

What is the distinction between structural and process variables? Compared with the day-to-day dynamic of the decision process the structure is relatively stable although in the long-run it will of course change too. In my conceptualization, structure is a very broad umbrella factor with the nature of a residual category to the process factor. Structure encompasses (1) the political institutions, (2) the socio-economic setting, (3) the culture, and (4) the international context. These various structural features are certainly related with each other but this is not of immediate interest in the current context. I merely wish to indicate that there are many competing explanations to the postulated causality between the decision process and the policy outcome.

So far, I referred to the decision process in a relatively unspecified way. If we really wish to open this "black box", we must make it much more specific how we wish to conceptualize the elements of this process.

In a first attempt I started with broad labels such as pluralism and neo-corporatism which are often used in the literature to characterize decision processes. In our research group we tried to classify the decision process about specific issues according to such labels.³⁾ Unfortunately, this was a frustrating and ultimately fruitless enterprise. We found that labels such as neo-corporatism have a great number of different definitions and that many of these definitions are too vague if applied to concrete decision processes. Consequently, it was impossible to determine in a reliable way which cases corresponded for example to a pluralist or a neo-corporatist decision process.

We then decided to take another research strategy. Rather than to characterize an entire decision process by a single label, we recognized that such a process is a multidimensional phenomenon with many possible combinations among its elements. For the time being, it seems useful to call these combinations simply by neutral numbers such as decision path 1 and decision path 2. This strategy should open the

way to a more general theory of decision making than many of the current theories which are often too much linked to specific labels.

In order to reduce the complexity of the decision process, we selected eight variables which we thought to be of greatest importance. There is of course nothing sacred about this choice, and I present this solution merely as an illustration of the general approach. The combination of these eight variables leads to specific decision paths. These paths are integrated in an overall simulation model. Like in any simulation, the logical order is important in which the variables follow each other. Here again, different choices are possible and I give our specific choice only as an illustration.


We assume that the first step in the decision path is the identification of the societal groups which are the dominant actors in the decision process. We distinguish (1) political parties, (2) functional interest groups, (3) regional groups, and (4) cultural groups. As second step in the simulation model, we ask for the major cleavage among the societal groups identified in step 1. For political parties, for example, the distinction is between (1) left/right, (2) clerical/anticlerical, and (3) traditional/modern. The third step deals with the level of participation within the individual societal groups. This participation may be (1) limited to the top leaders, (2) extend to the activists, or (3) encompass also the masses. Fourthly comes the question to what extent the state participates through its bureaucracy in the decision process. The role of the state bureaucracy may be (1) dominant, (2) co-equal to the societal groups, or (3) weak. The next two steps have to do with the arenas of the decision process, and here we inquire to what extent these arenas are institutionalized and visible to the public eye. The seventh step asks for the prevailing decision mode in the decision process, and here we can fall back

on the four categories already mentioned in section 1 of this paper: (1) decision by majority rule, (2) decision by amicable agreement, (3) decision by interpretation, and (4) postponement of the decision. The last step covers the phase of implementation and asks to what extent the societal groups identified in step 1 participate in the implementation of the decision.

Figure 3 gives two hypothetical decision paths derived from the simulation.

Figure 3

Two hypothetical paths of the decision process



From the perspective of a parsimonious and elegant theory, one may object that such a simulation model will result in an unwieldy high number of different decision paths. To this critique I have two answers. First,



many paths are empirically empty or near-empty so that they can be neglected. If the main actors are regional groups and the state bureaucracy is heavily involved it is unlikely in most Western democracies that the decision process will take place in highly institutionalized and publicly visible arenas. Thus, these paths may be disregarded for further analysis. Secondly, it is not necessary for each path to include the information on all eight variables, because a lower number of variables may already sufficiently determine the policy outcome. Eliminating in this way redundant information reduces strongly the number of decision paths which have to be included in the analysis.⁴⁾

4. Theory


Theoretically, the task is to find logical arguments which can link variation in the decision paths to variation in the policy outcome. This logic must be based on some basic assumptions about the values which the decision makers try to maximize. I assume that the following four values are of prime importance to decision makers.

- Seeking political office.
- Implementing policy goals.
- Maintaining the political system in which they operate.
- Minimizing the opportunity costs of time invested in a particular decision process.

It is further assumed that the relative weight of the four values is not a constant but varies as a function of the path which a particular decision process takes. In addition, structural features may have to be introduced as parameters into the theory. These assumptions are depicted in figure 4.

Figure 4

Framework for the causal relationship between decision process and policy outcome




Within this framework, we currently test a set of hypotheses using about 70 issues from the energy field in seven Western countries. 5)

In the present context, space does not allow to present these hypotheses in detail. But to indicate the direction in which we go, figure 5 gives the policy outcome which we expect for the two decision paths described in figure 3. The dots in the two-dimensional space represent the societal groups which participate in a particular decision process.

For both examples there are six societal groups.

Figure 5

Expected policy outcome for the two hypothetical decision paths of figure 3



For decision path 1, there are three clear winners and three clear losers and the losers protest against the policy outcome. For path 2, on the other hand, there are no clear winners and losers and no group engages in protests against the outcome. The explanation for this difference is derived from the different values which are maximized

in the two cases. It is hypothesized that office seeking is the main value for decision path 1, system maintenance for decision path 2. In the present context, it is not necessary to further justify these hypotheses because they serve merely illustrative purposes. To finish this theoretical discussion, I wish to make a short reference to the potential importance of structural parameters. The hypotheses which are formulated at first in a universal way may hold for some countries but not for others, for example only for small countries but not for large ones. This would mean that we would have to introduce the size of a country as a structural parameter into the theory. 6)

I hope that the introduction of such parameters will help to formulate relevant recommendations for the decision makers of specific countries. At first, one would have to discuss with these decision makers the desired policy outcome. According to temperament, the scholarly adviser may or may not wish to influence these goals from a normative perspective.⁷⁾ Once the policy goals set, the adviser may refer to other countries with similar structural features and indicate for what decision paths these goals were reached. Because many of the elements of the decision process are relatively open to short-term changes, such a collaboration between political scientists and political decision makers may have an immediate policy impact.

Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on the Future of Party Government, Convened by Rudolf Wildenmann, Florence, June 1982. The paper is based on research supported by a grant of the Swiss National Science Foundation. I received helpful comments from Robert Dorf, William Keech, Peter Lange, Franz Lehner, Arend Lijphart, Duncan MacRae, Bingham Powell, George Rabinowitz, Ford Runge, Donald Searing and James White.

Notes

1. For the most detailed presentation of the consociational theory see Lijphart(1977).
2. For a good review of the literature on neo-corporatism see Diamant(1981).
3. See in particular the unpublished papers by Daniel Gerber and Patrick Nussbaum, graduate students at the University of Geneva, and Claus Hofhansel, graduate student at the University of North Carolina.
4. For an application of this method see Steiner and Dorff(1980).
5. The time framework is 1973 to the present and the countries are United States, Great Britain, France, Federal Republic, Italy, Austria, and Switzerland.
6. For the importance of the size of a country as a structural parameter see Dahl and Tufte(1974).
7. For a discussion of such influence see MacRae(1976).

References

- Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton S. " Two Faces of Power". American Political Science Review 56(December 1962):947-52.
- Boulter, Douglas R. "Setting Speed Limits... and Comparing Public Policy-making". Comparative Politics 13(October 1980):79-102.
- Castles, Francis G. "How Does Politics Matter ? Structure or Agency in the Determination of Public Policy Outcomes". European Journal of Political Research 9(June 1981): 119-32.
- Coser, Lewis. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: The Free Press, 1956.
- Dahl, Robert A., and Edward R.Tufte. Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974.

- Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.
- Diamant, Alfred. "Bureaucracy and Public Policy in Neocorporatist Settings". Comparative Politics 14(October 1981): 101-24.
- Lijphart, Arend. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- MacRae, Duncan, Jr. The Social Function of Social Science. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951.
- Steiner, Jürg. "The Consociational Theory and Beyond". Comparative Politics 13(April 1981): 339-54.
- Steiner, Jürg, and Robert H. Dorff. A Theory of Political Decision Modes. Intraparty Decision Making in Switzerland. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980.

EUI WORKING PAPERS :

- No. 1 : Jacques PELKMANS : The European Community and the Newly Industrialized Countries
- No. 2 : Joseph H.H. WEILER : Supranationalism Revisited - Retrospective and Prospective The European Communities After Thirty Years
- No. 3 : Aldo RUSTICHINI : Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest Rates
- No. 4 : Mauro CAPPELLETTI / David GOLAY : Judicial Review, Transnational and Federal : Its Impact on Integration
- No. 5 : Leonard GLESKE : The European Monetary System - Present Situation and Future Prospects
- No. 6 : Manfred HINZ : Massenkult und Todessymbolik in der nationalsozialistischen Architektur
- No. 7 : Wilhelm BÜRKLIN : The "Greens" and the "New Politics" Goodbye to the Three-Party System?
- No. 8 : Athanasios MOULAKIS : Unilateralism or the Shadow of Confusion
- No. 9 : Manfred E. STREIT : Information Processing in Future Markets - An Essay on the Adequacy of an Abstraction
- No. 10: Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI: When Workers Save and Invest : Some Kaldorian Dynamics
- No. 11: Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI: A Neo-Cambridge Model of Income Distribution and Unemployment
- No. 12: Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI: On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution

EUI WORKING PAPERS:

- No. 13: Gunther TEUBNER : Reflexive Rationalität des Rechts
- No. 14: Gunther TEUBNER : Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law
- No. 15: Jens ALBER : Some Causes and Consequences of Social Security Expenditure Development in Western Europe, 1949 - 1977
- No. 16 : Ian BUDGE : Democratic Party Government: Formation and Functioning in Twenty-One Countries.
- No. 17 : Hans DAALDER : Parties and Political Mobilization : An Initial Happening.
- No. 18 : Giuseppe DI PALMA: Party Government and Democratic Reproducibility : The Dilemma of New Democracies.
- No. 19 : Richard S. KATZ : Party Government : A Rationalistic Conception.
- No. 20 : Jürg STEINER : Decision Process and Policy Outcome : An Attempt to Conceptualize the Problem at the Cross-National Level.
- No. 21 : Jens ALBER : The Emergence of Welfare Classes in West Germany : Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Evidence

3h
SCHJFI
S107776