Conceptions of Tolerance and Intolerance in Denmark: From Liberality to Liberal Intolerance?

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2012/19
5. New Knowledge
Country Synthesis Reports
Conceptions of Tolerance and Intolerance in Denmark: From Liberality to Liberal Intolerance?

Edited by

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Work Package 5 – New Knowledge on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe

D5.1 Country Synthesis Reports on Tolerance and Cultural diversity - Concepts and Practices
Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

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Executive Summary

In this report we draw together the results of three recent studies of Danish conceptions of acceptance, toleration and intolerance. The main focus is on cultural and religious differences and how they have been approached in Danish society generally, and more specifically in the Danish primary educational system and in Danish political life. These differences relate mainly to immigration based minorities and in particular to Muslims, who in a Danish context long has served as the main ‘other’ in terms of culture, religion and politics.

Chapter 1 analyses the cultural diversity challenges in Denmark and how they have been met with intolerance, tolerance, respect and recognition respectively. The chapter starts out by analysing the main traits of national identity and state formation, then moves on to Danish immigration history and the various ethnic and religious minorities resulting from immigration and from the changing of territorial borders, before it finally addresses how Denmark generally has handled cultural diversity challenges of the last 40 years. The main diversity challenges that Danish politicians consider important can be summed up in three core themes:

1. **Unemployment:** It is often emphasized that the percentage of non-Western immigrants on social security is out of proportion with the rest of the population. This is seen as a problem for the sustainability of the Danish welfare model.

2. **Parallel societies (ghettoisation):** It is often noted that we need to avoid a situation where Muslims are living in their own secluded communities impervious to the rules and institutions of the rest of society and that we are heading towards such a situation if something is not done now. The fear is one of parallel societies hostile and indifferent to one another, of Sharia law being de facto implemented outside Danish law, and generally the erosion of society’s social cohesion.

3. **Radicalisation/extremism:** There has been a growing concern with radicalisation within Muslim communities. In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference towards problematic beliefs and practices among minorities that in a worst-case scenario could lead to acts of terrorism. Concern for the democratic mind-set of Muslims is often expressed. However, both in order to counterbalance the symbolic exclusion of immigrant youth and thereby avoid radicalisation, and in order to counteract anti-Semitism in larger urban areas, the concept of toleration is being brought back onto the political agenda.

In the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic
and religious identities. The discourse of integration is explicitly set against the notion of multiculturalism. The latter is seen as synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and political failure to demand and further the integration into society of all its members. In general, cultural and religious differences are seen as illegitimate to the extent that they stand in the way of integration, understood as one’s ability of live up to one’s duty as an economically self-sufficient and taxpaying individual and as a participating citizen at all levels of civil society and political institutions.

In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities. This criticism of tolerance as indifference or naivété relies on a historical preference for ‘free mindedness’ or ‘liberality’ over ‘tolerance’. In the Danish debate about liberalty vs tolerance, tolerance is construed as form of moral failure: it implies giving up the forming of judgements over what is right and wrong. Liberalty, on the other hand, entails fighting for the values ‘you hold dearly’ while insisting on the same right for all others. The basis of this Danish interpretation of tolerance is, first, a strong commitment by all to equal citizen rights and to their protection by the state. Liberalty, secondly, implies criticising and even ridiculing all that you find wrong. Liberalty is a ‘republican’ virtue that enables you to participate in blunt public exchanges with a ‘thick skin’ so that you are able to reach negotiated, consensual democratic agreements with your opponents at all levels of society.

Chapter 2 focuses on how the Danish school system addresses challenges that arise from the presence of religious and cultural minorities with predominantly immigrant background. It looks at the extent to which differences are rejected, tolerated and recognised/respected in Danish public schools and the extent to which the structure of the Danish school system with its generous support to private schools allows for cultural and religious differences to persist. Chapter 2 hence contains two case studies. The first investigates how cultural and religious difference in public schools is discussed in the national political discourse and among school professionals and practitioners. The study takes its starting point in a political event in 2010 where a public school was heavily criticised for only inviting women to certain meetings on bullying because it was seen as an illegitimate accommodation of ‘medieval’ cultural norms among immigrant parents. The second case regards the structure of the Danish school system, its institutional toleration of diversity. At the centre is the debate about whether it is legitimate that the Danish rules facilitating the creation of private schools with a large state subsidy are used to establish Muslim or Islamic private schools whose democratic credentials are uncertain. The debate resulted in legislative changes mandating civic education at private schools, regardless of their cultural and religious basis. To some these changes represent reduced (institutional) toleration on the side of the state and the political majority which is likely to reduce diversity in the Danish school sector. The chapter looks at the debate, the legislative changes and the perception of the new legislative requirements’ effects on schools.

Chapter 3 analyses negotiations of toleration boundary drawing as they play out in two recent public debates in Denmark, both concerning political meetings arranged by or involving controversial Muslim actors. The two meetings – one arranged by the organization Hizb ut-tahrir, and one involving the Canadian Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips – generated intense public debate about the limits of tolerance and the room for illiberal and anti-democratic views and practices in the public sphere.

First, the chapter maps and compares the different toleration positions and arguments in the two debates, building on analysis of the media coverage. This analysis finds that while the debate surrounding Hizb ut-tahrir’s meeting was skewed towards toleration, the debate about Bilal Philips’ visit to Denmark was skewed towards intolerance. The reason for this difference in toleration boundary drawing is explained with reference to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad in the two selected cases. Despite these differences the analysis also shows that the same toleration positions and arguments of boundary drawing are found in the two debates. These recurrent positions include: ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’, ‘toleration-but-protest’, ‘toleration-because-intervention-is-counterproductive’, ‘intolerance-due-to-threat-and-harm’, ‘intolerance-because-of-liberal-perfectionism’. The analysis shows how the support of these different positions of toleration boundary drawing cut across the traditional political spectrum in Denmark.
Second, chapter 3 investigates the discursive strategies put forward by different actors in pushing exactly their version of boundary drawing and the coping strategies of dealing with pressures of taking a stand on the limits of tolerance in the two cases. This analysis, building on media data as well as interviews with engaged actors, identifies three significant and recurrent strategies; 1) the strategy of pushing boundary drawing from the political to the legal arena, 2) the strategy of securitization, which pushes boundary drawing into the realm of the extra-political and extra-ordinary, and 3) the strategy of reframing, adaptation or avoidance of boundary drawing. The central argument in this section is that the interactive nature of public debates generates relative positioning of actors, which co-determines the toleration boundary drawing of actors and the discursive strategies used to legitimize it and cope with pressures.

As a last step, chapter 3 focuses on how toleration boundary drawing in public debates may affect Muslim actors’ possibilities for engaging in political debates in the Danish context. It argues that although the controversies regarding the two meetings did not generate any concrete policy implication, which directly altered Muslim actors’ possibilities of using public meetings as a platform for political claims making, there seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, it is argued, with the fundamental interdependence of tolerance boundary drawing and processes of othering. Tolerance boundary drawing implies othering, as it functions to differentiate the realm of the recognizable normal and tolerable from the foreign and intolerable. When drawing toleration boundaries we are at the same time constructing in-groups and out-groups. In the analyzed debates Muslims in general are often designated as the ‘other’, covering up important differences within the Muslim community, which may potentially serve to delimit the possibilities of being tolerated as legitimate participants in public debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims.

Chapter 4 draws together the studies of conceptions, debates and arguments on tolerance and intolerance in Denmark. The chapter is structured in five main parts. The first part brings together the major insights from the presented studies in order to provide an answer to the question of to what extent current conceptions of toleration and intolerance are challenging or reproducing the Danish tradition of ‘freemindedness’ or liberality. The second part concludes on the degree to which the case studies show examples of the argumentation going beyond toleration in Denmark towards ‘positive recognition’ or inclusion to the realm of ‘the normal’ of particular cultural and religious differences. The third part likewise draws some comparative conclusion on the conceptualization and limits of toleration across issue fields (education and political life), in particular addressing the question of whether or not it makes a difference to perceptions of toleration if the issue at hand is one that demands practical solutions (concrete decision-making) or one that operates more at a symbolic level (more principled debates). The fourth part of the chapter discusses across the studies if Danish debates on limits of tolerance and policies of difference are excluding groups or making it difficult for them to participate in school or political life. Thus, it is discussed how toleration boundary-drawing impacts on not least Muslim minorities in these two spheres. Finally, the chapter concludes by giving some reflections as to what could be done vis-à-vis toleration of cultural and religious difference in the studies area in the future. The main focus is here on ensuring the security of rights of individuals as legal, political and moral equals.

Keywords
Tolerance, respect, recognition, accommodation, integration, intolerance, liberalism, secularism, freemindedness, civic turn, education, politics, political participation, Islam, Denmark
INTRODUCTION: TOLERATION IN DENMARK

By Tore Vincents Olsen and Lasse Lindeklide

In this report we draw together the results of three recent studies of Danish conceptions of acceptance, toleration and intolerance. The main focus is on cultural and religious differences and how they have been approached in Danish society generally, and more specifically in the Danish primary educational system and in Danish political life. These differences relate mainly to immigration based minorities and in particular to Muslims, who in a Danish context long has served as the main ‘other’ in terms of culture, religion and politics.

‘Freemindedness’ or liberality has been seen as part of Danish national heritage and constitutes a central discursive dimension of public debates on toleration and limits to tolerance in Denmark. At the general level, this concept equals toleration in that it consists in defending the rights of those who have different beliefs and practices to utter them publicly and continue to practice them although they are seen as misconceived and outright wrong. It is usually summed up in the phrase ‘freedom for Loke as well as for Thor’ where Thor denotes the good and the upright in Nordic mythology and Loke the evil and the deceitful. However, free-mindedness or liberality does not mean that those with whom you disagree are to be left in peace. On the contrary, it means that you engage with them – and they with you – in a frank and open public confrontation about what is right and wrong. Indeed for some, free-mindedness is contrasted with ‘tolerance’, the latter is seen as indifference, moral relativism, and as such representing a failing ability to build moral judgment. To debate in the manner prescribed by free-mindedness requires ‘thick skin’. Thick skin is a presupposed ‘civic virtue’. And eventually, it is presumed that despite your strong differences you will be able to live and reach common solutions together at all levels of society. The virtue of thick skin was notoriously appealed to in the Danish Cartoon controversy when it was argued that Muslims in Danish democracy had to be able to stand ‘mock, scorn and ridicule’ (Lindeklide 2009).

So historically toleration ought to have good preconditions in Denmark. In this report we trace through the study of societal discourses, debates on education and politics whether this notion of free-mindedness still applies and more broadly, what the conceptions of acceptance, toleration and intolerance are. For against the heritage of free-mindedness and in this sense toleration, we have seen other developments in the last 10 to 15 years, which could be regarded as an reaction to too much toleration or naïve laissez faire towards cultural and religious differences which (are perceived to) threaten the Danish society, its values and cohesion. Like many other European countries Denmark has witnessed a reaction to immigration and immigration based minorities. Not only have different forms of new nationalism and nationalist intolerance emerged, Denmark has also seen a ‘civic turn’ underlining the need to ensure commitment among the populace to key liberal democratic principles and values (e.g. democracy, human rights, gender equality, religious freedom) and induce all citizens in general, and immigrants in particular, to assume an active citizenship, again not just at the level at national political institutions, but in relation to all spheres of society, family, child care institutions, schools, voluntary associations, local democracy, public debate etc.

In a certain sense, this combined national and civic turn could be seen as reducing the space of toleration in Denmark, although the modalities in which are not simple and clear-cut since, again, the value of ‘free-mindedness’ is among the values oftentimes confirmed by people defending key national and liberal values. Indeed Denmark does to some extent experience a form somewhat paradoxical ‘liberal intolerance’ based on fears regarding non-liberal differences and their impact on social cohesion, on the constitutive divide in liberal democratic order between public and private and on the notion that the only good and productive life is liberal life autonomously and self-reflectively lived, or, in short, that liberal societies ought to actively promote and encourage the creation liberal people and eventually that they are ‘for liberal people only’.

Chapter 1 gives a general introduction to Danish national identity and state formation, immigration history and the diversity issues connected to various minority groups as well as it sums up
historical and current conceptions of acceptance, toleration, and tolerance in Danish society as they are evidenced the Danish integration regime, policies and institutional arrangements.

Chapter 2 studies how debates concerning toleration in education has unfolded in recent years. The chapter looks at both public schools and private schools. In particular public schools have by many been seen as the place where key national and liberal values should be transmitted to students and, to some extent, to their parents. The private schooling system, working on the basis of a generous state subsidy (voucher system), has for many been the incarnation of Danish free-mindedness, since it allows parents to choose schools for their children which teach in accordance with their (pedagogical, ideological, religious) worldviews. Nonetheless worries have been raised as to whether so-called ‘Islamic’ private schools have been teaching students to respect the principles of human rights, democracy and gender equality to a sufficient degree and thereby preparing them for a life in Danish society. The chapter traces the various conceptions of toleration in the debates on cultural and religious differences in schools and relate them to the traditional conception of toleration in Denmark.

Chapter 3 then turns to the conceptions of toleration and intolerance in Danish political life. The chapter analyses negotiations of toleration boundary drawing as they play out in two recent public debates in Denmark, both concerning political meetings arranged by or involving controversial Muslim actors. The two meetings – one arranged by the organization Hizb ut-tahrir, and one involving the Canadian Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips – generated intense public debate about the limits of tolerance and the room for illiberal and anti-democratic views and practices in the public sphere. At the core of these debates are the norms and values displayed in political life by some Muslim actors, and questions of how much difference can and should be tolerated in political life without undermining cohesion and allowing intolerance to flourish. As such both debates offer a prism for studying the unwritten limits to non-institutional political participation of Muslim actors in the form of public meetings, conferences, etc. The chapter first maps and compares the different toleration positions and arguments in the two debates, building on analysis of the media coverage. Secondly, the chapter investigates the discursive strategies put forward by different actors in pushing exactly their version of boundary drawing and the coping strategies of dealing with pressures of taking a (moral and principled) stand on the limits of tolerance in the two cases. Finally, the chapter focuses on how toleration boundary drawing in public debates may affect Muslim actors’ possibilities for engaging in political debates in the Danish context. Besides media coverage the last two sections of the chapter draws upon interviews with actors engaged in the two public debates.

Chapter 4 draws together these studies and debates and analyses to what extent current conceptions of toleration and intolerance are challenging or reproducing the Danish tradition of ‘free-mindedness’ or liberality. In doing so the chapter also draws some basic conclusions regarding the degree to which the case studies show examples of the argumentation going beyond toleration in Denmark towards ‘positive recognition’ or inclusion to the realm of ‘normal’ of particular cultural and religious differences. Likewise the chapter draws comparative conclusions on the conceptualization and limits of tolerance across issue fields (education and political life), in particular addressing the question of whether or not it makes a difference to perception of toleration if the issue at hand is one that demands practical solutions or one that operates more at a symbolic level. The chapter also discusses across the studies if Danish debates on limits of tolerance and policies of difference are excluding groups or making it difficult for them to participate in school or political life. Thus, it is discussed how toleration boundary-drawing impacts on not least Muslim minorities in these two spheres. Finally, the chapter concludes by giving some reflections as to what could be done vis-à-vis toleration of cultural and religious difference in the studies area in the future.
CHAPTER 1. TOLERANCE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY DISCOURSES IN DENMARK

By Kristian Jensen, Johanne Helboe Nielsen, Morten Brænder, Per Mouritsen and Tore V. Olsen

1. INTRODUCTION

Danes perceive Denmark as situated on the fringes of Europe, and not only geographically. At face value, this perception is a peculiarity, since Denmark has always been surrounded by and interacting with key players in the struggle for European dominion. Today, Denmark’s closest neighbours in cultural, political and economic terms, Sweden and Germany, also constitute its main trading partners (Danmarks Statistik 2008).

As Denmark’s role in the great European power struggles was gradually but inevitably reduced at the brink of the modern age, Danish national identity was more and more defined in accordance with its role as a minor European state. This transition is evident in Denmark’s two national anthems written within a time span of just 42 years – respectively in 1778 and 1820.¹ The first anthem, “Kong Christian stod ved højen mast” (King Christian stood by the lofty mast), praises the “victorious” 17th-century warrior King Christian IV as the embodiment of the lands he ruled. This anthem was written at a time when the king still ruled the most powerful navy in Europe and led a multinational “Composite State” (Helstaten), consisting of Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Norway, the islands of the North Atlantic and a number of overseas Colonies. The second anthem, “Der er et yndigt land” (a lovely land is ours) was written after the Napoleonic Wars and the loss of Norway. It is dedicated to the tranquility and fruitfulness of the Danish natural landscape, the purity of the national language and the people’s freedom. This anthem mainly serves as a warrant of the bonds of unbroken continuity between present and past, city and countryside, farmland, people and king. Here, powerfulness is only a memory of a long-lost past.

A national awakening in the 19th century fitted the political reality of the losses of Norway (in 1814, to Sweden) and Schleswig-Holstein (in 1864, to Germany) as well as the ideal of romanticism. The separation from its former lands created a Danish state without noticeable differences in nationality and language. The Danish nation and the Danish state eventually became so closely knit together that it to this day is difficult to think of the nation without the state.

In the early 20th century Denmark gradually became a social democratic Scandinavian welfare state formed by the non-revolutionary Social Democratic Party. This social democratic struggle was also built upon a rearticulation of ‘the People’ (‘Folket’) as the emotional and essential core of the nation. Their struggle to reform the state was linked to a perception of the political elite as out of touch with the backbone of the nation: the working class (Hansen 2002: 60-61).

After the Second World War welfare programs expanded significantly, and growth and equality were successfully united. Although this positive development came to a halt in the 1970’s, the fundamental social democratic vision of the welfare state had been largely accepted by even Liberals and Conservatives. Today all political parties (accept maybe one minor party: Liberal Alliance) operate on political platforms that essentially accept an extensive social safety net as the foundation of the Danish society.

This widespread solidarity has come under pressure in recent decades as the share of immigrants and descendants has steadily risen. The overshadowing concern with cultural and religious differences

¹ The following analysis owes much to Uffe Østergaard’s interpretation of the development from Composite to Nation State: Østergaard (2002).
in Denmark today pertains to post-immigration minorities with backgrounds in non-western countries, most of whom are (identified as) Muslims. National minorities and more settled religious minorities are today uncontentious and rarely raise claims themselves about special or equal rights, symbolic respect and recognition. Immigration from non-western countries, on the other hand, are very controversial because of (what is perceived to be) their low ability or willingness to integrate into the ‘modern’ Danish society and democracy.

In the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic and religious identities. This discourse of integration is explicitly set against notion of multiculturalism. The latter is seen as synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and political failure to demand and further the integration of all residents into society.

The strong focus on integration has changed the perception of Denmark as a country tolerant towards alternative lifestyles (first to legalize pornography and recognize gay marriages). The comparably liberal immigration laws of 1983 have been replaced through gradual reform since 1999 with one of the toughest immigration regimes in Europe. Among other things this has resulted in a two-tier system of social membership in which immigrants from outside the EU and the Nordic countries receive a special ‘introduction benefit’ the first three years of their residence. Hereafter they pass to another scheme termed ‘start help’ which applies to all – except non-Danish EU citizens – who haven’t resided in Denmark in seven out of the last eight years. However, for Danish citizens it only applies if they have been residing outside of the EU. On these schemes individuals who are, for example, unemployed, sick, pregnant or on maternity leave receive welfare payments that are roughly half of what you would receive on the scheme for Danish citizens who have resided in the EU in seven out of the last eight years and for other EU-citizens.

The developments above set the scene for studying the recent cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges in Denmark and the ways in which they have been addressed. Section 2 will expand on the current dimensions of Danish identity and the selective reading of historical events and figures related to this discursive construction. Section 3 will broadly describe Danish immigration history and the challenges that the most relevant minority groups of Danish society face today. Finally, before the concluding remarks, section 4 will expand on the dominant interpretation of tolerance in Denmark and on the values and arrangements of the Danish integration regime.

In this chapter we use the following working definitions. National identity refers to the identity that Danes see themselves as sharing as members of the national community. National heritage concerns the historical bases of this identity. Multiculturalism relates both to the fact that there are distinct socially salient groups in society that differ with regard to their cultural and religious backgrounds, and to the broadly conceived normative position which holds that these groups should be given positive symbolic recognition of their contribution to society and/or bestowed with a special status through specific polices and rights. Cultural, ethnic and religious diversity refers to the notion that there are non-trivial differences along cultural, ethnic and religious dimensions between different groups. Citizenship is both understood as legal nationality, and as a social and political ideal that implies that the citizen participates democratically in political institutions and the institutions of civil society. Integration means the equal participation of immigrants in all spheres of society and is in Denmark based on the notion of the adoption by immigrants of the practices and values of ‘active citizenship.’ It is hence not equal to a complete cultural assimilation and the demand that immigrants become like Danes on all cultural and identity dimensions. There are two forms of liberalism: 1) classical or laissez faire liberalism is based on the notion that the state should be neutral to different perceptions of the good life and provide the individual with the set of rights that give her the highest degree of freedom to pursue her own conception of the good life (if she so wishes), consonant with the equal freedom of all. 2) Perfectionist liberalism on the other hand stresses individual autonomy, i.e. the rational self-direction of one’s life, as the central aspect of a good life. In perfectionist liberalism, the state should promote individual autonomy. Republicanism emphasizes the ideal of citizenship as
democratic participation, because it is seen as part as a good life and/or because it is seen as essential for the maintenance of the institutions of liberal democracy. The doctrine of civic integrationism refers to the belief that integration of immigrants should be based on ‘active citizenship’ and includes elements of both republicanism and perfectionist liberalism. The concept of toleration implies not forbidding beliefs and practices that one finds wrong, because the reasons for not forbidding them are found weightier that the reasons for objecting to them. In the chapter, the terms of tolerance and toleration are used interchangeably. In Denmark there is a particular conception of tolerance that is called ‘free mindedness’ or ‘liberality’. Liberality entails fighting for the values ‘you hold dearly’ while insisting on the same right for all others. Proponents of liberality contrast this notion of tolerance with an understanding where the term ‘tolerance’ is taken to mean indifference, relativism and the failure to form moral judgements.

1.2. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE FORMATION

1.2.1. State formation

Through time Danish national identity has been influenced by the parallel and interwoven development of state formation and conceptions of the nation, each of which is connected to a series of key historical events.

The Lutheran reformation (1536) whereby church land was expropriated and church influence on state policy was diminished, coincided with the often heavy-handed creation by the state of a (protestant) Christian people. This proto-nationalist people-building emphasised individual loyalty to the Christian king, knowledge of and ability to read scripture and the catechism, and to this end extended the use of national language in churches and schools. Only later, with the liberal 1849 constitution, were freedoms of religion and religious worship in independent religious societies established, in conjunction with the creation of a state church, the so called ‘People’s Church’ [Folkekirken], with locally self-governing parishes under government administration. Despite declining membership a large majority of Danes remain members of this church today, although most do not practice. Culturally Folkekirken retains a privileged position today (Mouritsen, 2009: 7-8).

The 1750s saw a large debate on how to define the nation and citizenship. Enlightenment ideas in the modernising monarchy produced – for a brief period of time – a form of cosmopolitanism where a person’s motherland was the territory where he chose to live in loyalty and allegiance to the king, whether one spoke Danish, Norwegian or German. This civic-patriotic conception of the nation and citizenship was soon challenged by a growing national bourgeoisie that was hostile towards granting citizenship and state employment to foreigners. Criticism grew after an episode in 1770s, where J. F. Struense, a German-born physician to mentally ill King Christian VII, had seized power to initiate reforms before he was outmanoeuvred. This perceived German coup d´état provoked the Law of Indigenous Rights of 1776, whereby only citizens born in the King’s dominions (but still also German speakers) could assume office.

From the mid-19th century Danish politics changed significantly when the last stage of nation building coincided with the country’s relatively early democratisation in a way that still shapes contemporary delineation of national membership. When the king resigned in 1848 and the first free constitution was signed in 1849, all major political forces favoured comprehensive constitutional rights and (male) democracy. However, an internal conflict erupted between national liberals on the one hand and cosmopolitans and left-liberals on the other, who disagreed on the identity, in terms of language and territory (but not religion), of the new democratic people. The main controversies centred on Schleswig, i.e. whether to separate it from Holstein or incorporate both under the new constitution. The national liberals, who came to dominate, emphasized Danish language as constitutive
for the nation, and furthermore wished to include certain German speaking territories, which would then have to be rendered Danish-speaking (Hansen, 2002: 56). This policy was of course resisted in the affected territories. Over the next 20 years, two wars were fought over the question of Schleswig-Holstein, with the second in 1863-1864 ending in a miserable defeat where Lauenborg, Holstein and Schleswig – including the Danish speaking parts – were lost, rendering Denmark an almost pure ‘ethnic’ and Danish-speaking nation. This blow produced an inward-looking, nationalist re-awakening inspired by romanticism and based on the rural society and peasant virtues. The loss of one-third of the country, including the most developed cities and regions, was counterbalanced by cultivating the Jutlandic moor, development of co-operative farm movements, and the establishment of popular folk high school education for peasant youth.

Danish nationalism, emerging as a literary phenomenon in the early 19th century, evolved into political nationalism from the 1830s (Korsgaard 2004: 298), with N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783-1872) playing a prominent part in both movements. As a priest, author of hymns and songs, and church and school reformer, he laid the groundwork for a Danish populist nationalism that mixes ‘cultural’ and ‘civic’ elements within a Lutheran framework. Intensely concerned with the concept of the people and its spiritual roots, Grundtvig also introduced the idea of ‘liberality’ [frisind] as a particular kind of free-mindedness2 that differed, in his view, from ‘tolerance’ in accepting but not being indifferent to the difference of opinion (Huggler 2009).

Today, the dominant conception of the nation and national identity reflects a selective reading of Danish national identity history. In it five semantic and narrative elements can be identified (Mouritsen 2009: 23-25; Mouritsen 2010: 8-9). First, even though traditional religiosity is declining, cultural Christianity remains significant. In the Danish context Christianity, Lutheran individualism, secularism, and peasant liberation and spiritual awakening become intertwined. Underlying is a narrative about the Danish peasants escaping from rural class society to a status of independent peasant-citizens through an ‘awakening’ stay at the Grundtvigian inspired folk high schools. The idea of a special Danish brand of Lutheranism, tied to this narrative, presupposes the separation of religion from politics and the practice of religion in a worldly fashion. Thereby it tends to place Islam in an unfavourable light.

Second, Danish language has constituted an important element in national belonging. Today, immigrants are expected to master and use Danish at a level well beyond what is required to function in the labour market and ordinary communication.

Third, Denmark is often described as a small and culturally homogeneous country with a characteristic social ideal of tight knit ‘cosiness’, in part owing to homogenising processes through state schools and through a national television station that had a monopoly until 1988. Present debates on cohesion in Denmark, the valuation of sameness, and mistrust of cultural pluralism per se draw on these themes.

Fourth, smallness and homogeneity are connected to values of egalitarianism and a special way of understanding and organising democracy. The influence from Grundtvigianism created a tradition of anti-authoritarianism, social liberalism and appreciation of social levelling that have become linked to the comprehensive welfare state and its focus on social and cultural equality, as well as to the post-World War II construction of a civic nationalism of conversational, consensual democracy (Koch 1945). The notion that these values are really only genuine in Denmark (and other Scandinavian countries) often enter into debates on the civic (in)capacity of newcomers.

Fifth, the pride in the welfare society evident in government discourse translates to a requirement of reciprocity and solidarity, concretely manifested as an obligation to work and pay taxes, which may

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2 Literally ‘frisind’ is a compound of two elements ‘fri’ (free) and ‘sind’ (mind), and is often also translated as ‘openmindedness’ or ‘free-spiritedness’. We return to the cultural and political significance of this concept in the conclusion.
be seen as the key currency of symbolic recognition – i.e., the idea that membership depends on the ability to do one’s share.

Today, cultural diversity is often associated with the existence of inferior cultures (un-western, un-modern, un-civilised) in Danish society (Mouritsen 2009: 27). ‘Danish’ values of democracy, gender equality, and freedom of speech become presented, here, as universalistic concepts but with culturalist spins (Ibid: 19), producing a ‘particular universalism’, which is both seen as historically founded and bounded, and superior because it is liberal and modern. To a large extent, Muslims have become the defining ‘other’ of these peculiarly culturalised civic-liberal self-understandings. They are who the Danes are not (Mouritsen, 2006: 88).

1.2.2. Citizenship in Denmark

The term ‘citizenship’ bears different meanings in a Danish context. The concept of indfødsret was the first coinage of a citizenship concept and literally means ‘the right to be native born’. It was legislatively constructed in 1772 to ensure that only citizens born in the King’s dominions could discharge honorary offices (Ersbøll 2010). The purpose was not to reserve positions for ethnic Danes and, hence, indfødsret was originally understood in terms of a *ius soli* interpretation. The interpretation of the law, however, soon changed such that only children born of native-born parents acquired *indfødsret* at birth (Ibid.).

The concept of statsborgerskab denotes legal nationality, and in terms of citizenship it signifies the citizen’s status as subject of a particular (national) state. Today *indfødsret* and *statsborgerskab* are used interchangeably as they denote the same status and rights.

The concept of medborgerskab (*medborger* literally means ‘fellow citizen’) signifies a horizontal interpretation of what belonging to the same society entails – a form of compatriotism. It is not a legal concept but a normative concept pertaining to certain virtues the citizen ought to strive towards. In its contemporary use it is closely associated with the comprehensive Danish welfare state and the notion of Denmark as a social space inhabited by a population of active citizens who share the same public values.

Due to the development from a multi-national to a national state whose borders followed, by and large, the ethnic boundaries of the population, it became increasingly less meaningful to differentiate between the above meanings of citizenship. From the early 20th century onwards, the different terms were perceived as inseperable and both *indfødsret* and *medborgerskab* gradually fell out of use (Ibid.).

However, citizenship as *medborgerskab* gradually re-entered the public discourse during the 1990s in the wake of the Muslim immigration and has been a central concept in the public discourse since the liberal-conservative government took office in 2001. The current distinction between *statsborgerskab*/*indfødsret* and *medborgerskab* denotes how access to legal citizenship is now perceived as a prize at the end of the road of successful integration. One has to be committed to the virtues of being a ‘fellow citizen’ (*medborger*) before one can gain recognition as a full-fledged member of the community.

Danish citizenship is generally understood in terms of *ius sanguinis*. Accordingly, Danes today tend to perceive Denmark as a community rather than a society, as a *Gemeinschaft* rather than a *Gesellschaft*. For more than 200 years after 1776 immigrant descendants were entitled to Danish citizenship either automatically or since 1950 through declaration (though from 1976 conditioned on residence and from 1999 also on conduct). This general entitlement was repealed in 2004 with immigrant descendants now being required to apply for Danish citizenship by naturalization (Ibid: 26).

Since 2001 there has been a tightening on all fronts concerning permanent residence and naturalization. Both objective criteria such as years of residence (for naturalization: from seven to
nine years) and self-support (for naturalization: no more than 6 months on public benefits in the last 5 years plus no debt to the state) as well as what can be defined as a subjective criterion of belonging has been tightened. The last aspect is probably the most central. Initiatives like the signing of an Integration Contract and a Declaration on Integration and Active Citizenship, a harsh language proficiency test (excluding many from ever gaining citizenship) and a citizenship test examining knowledge of “Danish culture, history and social conditions” signals a turn towards a more subjective element of belonging where being Danish is not only a matter of submitting to Danish legislation or even to Danish norms, but of identifying with those norms.

1.2.3. Denmark and Europe

The opposition between being Nordic and being European was emphasized in the debate in the 19th century among romanticists and adherents of enlightenment ideology. The (liberal) left centering on Edvard Brandes and Viggo Hørup were condescendingly called “the Europeans” due to the fact that their emphasis on liberal values was less bound to a national or Nordic discourse. Being Nordic meant defining one’s identity in terms of being Danish or Scandinavian, while being European meant defining one’s identity in more abstract terms, as committed to more general ideas of the liberty and equality of man. As a result of this contrast, a significant discourse was established towards the end of the 19th century according to which a true Danish sentiment could only be nurtured by a genuine anti-European feeling.

The consequence of the tight conceptual coupling of nation and state in the 19th century has been that encroachments on political sovereignty have been perceived as threats to the nation. Since the early 1990’s Denmark’s relationship to the EU has been marked with skepticism expressed in the consistent high level of no-support in referenda from 1992 and onwards. This inability to distinguish between nation and state has locked the debate in such a way that the pro-Europeans primarily have focused on the economic prospects and argued that the EU does not exceed normal inter-state cooperation while the euro-skeptics have claimed that the EU is a new superstate that threatens national independence (Hansen 2002).

When the Maastricht Treaty was turned down in 1992, the solution was a compromise that would keep Denmark within the European Community and at the same time ensure that the process leading towards the “United States of Europe” (allegedly the main concern of the electorate) could be brought to a halt (Krunke, 2005: 341-42). Denmark ratified the treaty but was allowed to opt out of the integration process on four issues: Union Citizenship, the Common Defence and Security Policy, the Economic and Monetary Union and the new initiatives in the area of Justice and Home Affairs.

The last of the four opt-outs was from the very beginning framed as a means of securing national sovereignty regarding questions of immigration and integration. However, the European Court of Justice’s decision in the Metock case (2008), which allowed third-country nationals to obtain family reunification with their EU-citizen spouses whenever the latter had used their right to free movement under EU law, raised fears that the strict Danish immigration rules would be undermined. The Danish Government reacted strongly, with the Minister of Integration declaring it her goal to change the European legislation after the ruling. This testifies to the ongoing opposition to let the EU encroach on areas of importance to the national self-understanding.

1.3. CULTURAL DIVERSITY CHALLENGES
1.3.1. Immigration history of Denmark

Before the immigration wave of Turkish and Yugoslav foreign labour in the late 1960s (a result of the demand for workers for Danish industrial production) the question of cultural homogeneity in Denmark was, with a few notable exceptions, hardly ever raised. Denmark has been – and probably still is - one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the world. Danes have always been reluctant to perceive the nation and Danish history in relation to and as a result of immigration, which reflects itself in the fierce opposition the last 20 years to label Danish society as multicultural. Today 9.8 percent of Denmark’s 5.5 million residents are immigrants and descendants of immigrants, and 6.6 percent of the population are from non-Western countries (Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration 2010: 17).

Following the Reformation, Denmark was a Lutheran Protestant country where the principle of ‘cuius region eius religio’ was strictly pursued for decades: in the multicultural ‘Composite State’ there was strict church discipline, and Catholics, Calvinists and Jews were not allowed to settle here. However, due to economic needs a more tolerant view on religious differences began to show during the 17th century. The first tendencies emerged in the Schleswig-Holstein duchy where the cities of Glückstadt and Altona were opened to immigration, including religious minorities, in order to benefit from the diligence and Altona were opened to immigration, including religious minorities, in order to benefit from the diligence of these groups and take up commercial competition with Hamburg. After the wars against Sweden in the mid-17th century, non-Lutherans were also allowed to settle in Copenhagen, Fredericia and Nakskov in order to help restore these damaged cities. An extensive tolerance was now instituted by the King in these cities which allowed Jews, Calvinists and Catholics to practice their religions freely. The Danish Law of 1683 removed several of the strict regulations concerning non-Lutheran immigration from the time of the Reformation and allowed all but monks and Jesuits access to the kingdom. As a result, Jews settled in many provincial cities (Østergaard 2007: 264-65). The law also proscribed Lutheran priests from inciting hatred against other faiths. Nonetheless, it was still the King’s duty to protect his subjects against heresy and strictly forbidden to speak against the Lutheran church. Full religious freedom was not instituted until the ratification of the constitution in 1849.

In the 18th century the ideas of the Enlightenment slowly began to affect theological thinking and the relationship between the state and religious minorities. This led to greater tolerance among the different Christian confessions but the extension of tolerance to Jews was more difficult. When Bishops and other people of authority spoke of or decided on religious matters (e.g. the building of a synagogue) they often referred to the possible resentment of the general public. It was a common sight for Jews to be harassed in the streets (Ibid: 145). However, toward the end of the century the ideas of the Enlightenment also began to benefit the Jews. Within 30 years (1784-1814) the government started to ignore the views of the clergy when deciding on religious matters relating to minorities. The guilds were opened in 1788 and in 1814 Jews were given equal access to all occupations, their educational opportunities (including university) were greatly enhanced, they got the right to buy land and they were added to the military enrollment (Ibid.). At the same time, however, the special rights Jews had within the areas of family and religion were reduced. To an increasing degree, equality was conceived as the elimination of special rights and the attribution of the same rights and duties to all. This ultimately led to the assimilation of many Jews.

This Enlightenment view of the government was not accepted by all. In ‘the literary Jew feud’ of 1813 several works hostile to Jews were published. The hostility intensified in connection with the 1813 state bankruptcy for which the Jews were blamed. In 1819 during the two days of ‘the corporal feud,’ Jews were physically attacked by an angry mob in Copenhagen. Because of police passivity the government had to have the military stop the attacks.

At the end of the 19th century, approximately 3500 Jews lived in Denmark. In 1904-1917, following the violent pogroms in Russia this number doubled. The newly arrived Russian-Polish Jews were poor, had other customs, language, names and were often more orthodox believers than the semi-
assimilated Danish Jews. This led the latter to fear that the newcomers might provoke anti-Semitism among the majority population.

In the last part of the 19th century, the industrial revolution took place in Denmark and increased the demand for foreign labor. By 1885 8.1 percent of the population in Copenhagen was foreign born (Ibid: 284). The majority of foreign workers came from Sweden and took on the hardest and worst-paid jobs. The Danish workers' movement criticized the flow of Swedish labor for pressing wages and functioning as strikebreakers. Prompted by financial concerns, the government started sending home those foreigners who couldn't support themselves. In 1891 the Poor Law ("Fattigdomsloven") established that only Danish citizens were entitled to support from the state. At the same time, however, access to Danish citizenship was made easier, especially for Swedes and Norwegians. In combination with mixed marriages, a similar language and culture, this led to quick assimilation.

There was also a small flow of workers from Germany. Despite minor conflicts, the Germans were generally welcomed by the Danish Unions who placed great value on their international contacts. The demand for labor created by the cultivation of sugar beets that began in the 1870s and 1880s was met by Polish seasonal workers. In 1914 14,000 Polish workers came. However, the First World War led to a drastic decline, and after 1929 the flow of workers practically stopped. 3-4000 Polish men and women settled in Denmark. They stood out with their different language and religion (Catholicism). Harassment was not uncommon. The Catholic Church in Denmark supported the Poles and helped them adjust. It strived to assimilate them in order to avoid a Polish minority church and because it feared that the poor and alien Poles would diminish the Church’s reputation in Denmark. The Church generally succeeded in this endeavor as the following generations largely melted in with the Danish population (Ibid: 304).

After the Second World War less than 1000 of the approximately 30,000 non-German refugees from the war stayed in Denmark and did not noticeably stand out (Ibid: 332). Up until 1983 approximately 10,000 refugees arrived from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Uganda, Chile and Vietnam. They were perceived as unproblematic and largely welcomed with kindness and understanding.

The period after the Second World War was one of economic prosperity, with industrial expansion in Denmark in the 1950s and 1960s increasing the demand for labor. The first groups of guest workers came in 1967. Liberal immigration rules made it possible for them to come without work or residence permits. A spontaneous immigration of mostly Turks and Yugoslavs – and later on Pakistanis – took place after Sweden and West Germany tightened their rules. Immigration was first regulated with quotas for work permits in 1973. However after the oil crisis hit the country later the same year, all further labour immigration was suspended. Despite this the number of immigrants continued to rise as the foreign workers sought family reunification. Later on, their children often married people from their homeland.

In 1973, 12,000 guest workers resided in Denmark; family reunifications brought that number to 35,000 by 1978 (Ibid: 362). The realization that many guest workers planned to stay prompted the Social Democratic government in 1980 to make integration the explicit principle behind its immigrant policies: the goal was to make immigrants self-supporting and to strike a reasonable balance between assimilation to Danish language and culture and the preservation of the identity-carrying elements of the immigrant communities.

From 1984 the attention shifted to the flow of refugees coming from the Middle East and Sri Lanka, with 2,827 asylum seekers arriving in September 1986. This number drastically dropped to 137 in the following month after the law was tightened (Togeby 2002: 37). In 1992 it was decided to give Yugoslavian war refugees (approximately 9,000, mostly Bosnians) temporary residence in expectation of a rapid return to their home country. In 1995 when this turned out not to be possible, their residence was normalized. The good will of their surroundings contributed to a relatively smooth inclusion into society. In the mid-90’s a large group of Somalis sought refuge in Denmark. They were met with an
often intrusive attention from the public and much more attention than had ever been directed at comparable groups of Iraqi and Afghan refugees who had arrived throughout a longer time period.

Since the mid-1990s Denmark has seen a long period of politicization of integration and refugee issues particularly focusing on Muslims. At first the issues mainly revolved around welfare-state dependency, family reunification and the concentration of immigrants in ghettos. After 9/11 the focus was also directed at the (un-)democratic mind-set of Muslims, their loyalty to the Danish state and the lack of gender equality in many households. From the mid-90s the centre-left government came under increasing pressure to address immigration. This resulted in a number of revisions to the immigration and integration rules. It culminated in 1998 in a major revision that restricted the possibilities for permanent residence and family reunification and introduced a reduced ‘introduction benefit’ for immigrants. The latter entailed a break with the tradition of giving all residents the same rights. This introduction benefit was, however, raised again in 2000 after being met with political opposition and stories of refugees caught in poor living conditions. The discourse also toughened and deep cultural differences were targeted as a problem for the coherence of the national state – especially with appointment of the social democratic hawk Karen Jespersen as Minister of the Interior in 2000. It was often emphasized that Denmark should not become a multicultural country. Multiculturalism took on a negative connotation referring to parallel societies.

**TABLE 1.1 Immigrants and descendants in Denmark, 1 January 2010.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Descendants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of all foreigners in Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>32,255</td>
<td>26,961</td>
<td>59,216</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28,234</td>
<td>2,678</td>
<td>30,912</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>21,306</td>
<td>7,958</td>
<td>29,264</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>25,443</td>
<td>2,958</td>
<td>28,401</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,012</td>
<td>11,763</td>
<td>23,775</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>17,911</td>
<td>4,310</td>
<td>22,221</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>17,054</td>
<td>4,586</td>
<td>21,640</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>11,169</td>
<td>9,223</td>
<td>20,392</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>11,021</td>
<td>5,938</td>
<td>16,959</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10,127</td>
<td>6,704</td>
<td>16,831</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>14,663</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>16,067</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian countries</td>
<td>11,907</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>15,416</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>12,098</td>
<td>3,111</td>
<td>15,209</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>13,233</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>15,154</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>8,919</td>
<td>4,959</td>
<td>13,878</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>11,832</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>13,053</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>9,966</td>
<td>2,664</td>
<td>12,630</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>6,715</td>
<td>4,088</td>
<td>10,803</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>9,352</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>10,222</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>4,691</td>
<td>9,831</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8,506</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>9,688</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>8,773</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>9,681</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As this politicization of Muslims progressed, the right-wing Danish People’s Party (DPP) also became increasingly influential. In 2001 the new liberal-conservative government became dependent on the DPP for their parliamentarian majority, and the following years saw further restrictions and an even tougher political discourse. The new government made a wide range of changes aimed at reducing the number of immigrants, refugees and family reunifications, and at making it harder to get access to permanent residence and citizenship. Most recently, the government has proposed making family reunification dependent on the work experience, educational level and mastery of specific languages of both parties seeking reunification. But perhaps most notably, a host of initiatives have been undertaken to change the mind-set of immigrants – particularly Muslims – with the aim of modernizing their outlook on society (cf. section 3.2.4).

In brief, until the inflow of guest workers in the late 1960s immigration to Denmark was limited and often resulted in assimilation. Increasing cultural pluralism from the 1960s on, however, eventually led to politicization of the issues surrounding integration from the mid-1990s and resulted in more and more restrictive rules and a tough political discourse aimed primarily at Muslims. The table above sums up the composition of immigrants and their descendants in Denmark as of January 1st 2010.

The next section outlines the challenges that the main minority and immigrants groups have faced in and posed to Denmark. As an introduction table 2 below broadly describes the different minority and immigrants groups in Denmark and how they differ along six dimensions.

TABLE 1.2 Main minority groups in Denmark and their dimensions of difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of difference</th>
<th>Racial</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenlanders</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrants (non-Muslims)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavians</td>
<td>(Norwegians, Swedes, Icelanders)</td>
<td>(X)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Asians (Sri Lankans, Vietnamese, Filipino, Thai)</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants (Muslims)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iranians (Muslim)  X  X  X  X  X
Turks  X  X  X  X  X
Arabs (Iraqis, Lebanese, Moroccans)  X  X  X  X  X
ex-Yugoslavs (Serbs, Bosnians)  X  X  X  X  X
Asians (Pakistanis, Afghans)  X  X  X  X  X
Somalis  X  X  X  X  X

* In general Norwegian, Swedish and Danish are very similar. Icelandic however is not understandable for Danes.

The next section will focus on the Greenlandic minority, the German minority, the Roma minority, the Jewish minority and the Muslim minority as these groups have commanded the most public attention. The Muslim minority consists of many different nationalities (Turks, Iraqis, Lebanese, Bosnians, Pakistanis, Afghani, Somali etc.) but the tendency in the media and politics is to treat the Muslim group as a whole instead of differentiating between the different nationalities. The Muslim minority have by far received the most public attention. It is also clear from table 2 that the Muslim minority (regardless of nationality) is the group that differs most along the six dimensions.

### 1.3.2. Toleration of differences

#### 1.3.2.1. The Greenlandic minority in Denmark

Greenland, part of the Danish Kingdom since the 18th century, was a colony until 1953, when the (theoretically) equal status between Danes and Greenlanders was formally declared. Following growing Inuit political and national awareness in the 1970s that emphasized a distinct Greenlandic culture in contrast with Danish culture, Home Rule was established in 1979 (Togeby 2002: 120). In 2009 Greenland’s status was further enhanced with a declaration of the area’s political autonomy, also entailing the recognition of Greenlanders as a people under international law and of Greenlandic as the principal language in Greenland.

Characteristics of Greenlanders living in Denmark and their demands and relation to Danish society closely reflect the political connection between Denmark and Greenland. In the 1950s Greenlandic pupils were sent to Denmark for higher education as part of a sustained modernization policy. Later younger children (12-14 years old) also came. The idea to create a Danish-minded elite which could take on a leading role in Greenland upon returning was a complete failure (Ice News 2009). “The Experiment”, a Danish drama film premiered this year, recounts the fate of these children. A debate arose in its wake and Greenland’s Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist demanded an official apology which so far has been refused (Findalen & Hermann 2009; Nielsen & Korsgaard 2010). Apart from this recent example issues of Greenlanders in Denmark rarely appear in debates and on the political agenda, and Greenlanders seldom participate themselves (Togeby 2002: 157).

In the 1970s and 80s Greenlanders in Denmark were primarily young students, as well as a relatively small group of women married to Danish men (Ibid: 45). As education opportunities broadened in Greenland, the number of Greenlandic students in Denmark has decreased.\(^3\) In 2001 family relations were the main reason for Greenlanders’ settling in Denmark, and 75 percent of Greenlandic residents in Denmark had lived in the country for more than 10 years (Togeby 2002: 33-35).

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\(^3\) In 2001 13% of women and 19% of men of Greenlandic background state educational reasons for living in Denmark.
Whether born in Denmark or Greenland, Greenlanders have Danish citizenship and hence the same political, civil and social rights as Danes, but receive no special treatment on the basis of the European Framework Convention. That is, Greenlanders in Denmark are not recognized as a national minority, which has been criticized by the Council of Europe (2000; 2004). Further, as Danish citizens they are not entitled to subsidies targeted at immigrants (Ministry for Social Affairs 2003: 6).

Compared to ethnic Danes, Greenlanders in Denmark have lower levels of education and employment (Togeby 2002: 38). Approximately 40 percent depend on transfer incomes, compared to 20-25 percent of Danes. Greenlanders also have less political capital and participate less in electoral channels of democracy, whereas their participation in everyday civil society is equal to that of Danes (Ibid: 151). Compared to immigrants, they tend to be more integrated on several dimensions (in terms of having Danish friends, being married to Danes, residential segregation, stated preference for living in Denmark, reported dual identity/no identity problems (Ibid: 33-35, 121, 129, 153)). Many maintain an affiliation to Greenland through networks such as the Greenlandic Houses, located in the main cities, in which club meetings, lectures, exhibitions, personal guidance, consultancy, etc., take place; as such, these constitute regional meeting places for Greenlanders in Denmark (Ibid: 48-49).

Despite common attachment to Greenland, Greenlanders living in Denmark hardly constitute a single group. Togeby (2002) distinguishes between five groups, which differ in their national belonging. One of these, the marginalized, had a Greenlandic childhood and have lived in Denmark several years but are not self-supporting or married to a Dane.\(^4\) In 2002 the government initiated a number of policies to rectify the social problems of this group, many of whom are homeless, abuse alcohol, and feel isolation from society (Ministry for Social Affairs 2003). Even though the group of marginalized only make up a small percentage (5-10 percent) of all Greenlanders in Denmark, they are the most visible in the streets, have gained most public attention and hence constitute the stereotype (Ministry for Social Affairs 2003: 7; Togeby 2002: 45, 154). The grievance most often mentioned among Greenlanders in Denmark concerns discrimination, racism and general prejudices (Togeby 2002: 112-126). However, compared to Turks, Greenlanders report few incidents of discrimination. Still, the refusal of some Danes to accept Greenlanders as full or natural members of the national community remains an obstacle to Greenlanders’ becoming fully integrated equal citizens (Ibid: 152).

### 1.3.2.2. The German national minority in Southern Jutland

The only recognized national minority in Denmark are the Germans in Southern Jutland who are Danish citizens but identify with German culture. A corresponding Danish minority exists south of the Danish-German border. No German-Danish minorities existed before the war in 1864, which moved the border northwards, creating a Danish minority in the Prussian realm. Before that time, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were separately administrated in the multinational Danish ‘composite state’ (Kühle 2003: 125).

The Versailles treaty after World War I required two plebiscites in Northern Schleswig to establish boundaries of national belonging (Ibid: 127, 169). In the northern zone 75 percent favoured reunification with Denmark. A German majority emerged in the Tønder, Aabenraa and Sonderborg areas and in the southern zone 80 percent voted for German nationality. The line between the voting zones was ratified as the new border in 1920. Since then the border has not changed despite some

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\(^4\) The other four groups: 1) the Danish are children from mixed marriages which have spent the most of their childhood in Denmark, 2) the integrated have a Greenlandic childhood but have lived in Denmark several years and is now self-supporting and married to a Dane, 3) the partial integrated have same characteristics as the former but is dependent on social security benefits, 4) the newcomers have only lived in Denmark for few years and are influenced by the attitude in Greenland defining Greenlandic in contrast to Danish.
revision claims from the German minority, especially after the Nazi takeover in Germany, as well as some Danish claims after World War II (Klatt 2006: 11).

The two minority groups have been recognized in both Denmark and Germany, which have agreed on practical solutions to problems concerning family separations and broken trading and cultural relations, though the Danish government refused to make a bilateral agreement with Germany concerning the two minorities despite pressure from Germany and the German minority (Kühle 2003: 129-130). Hence, national policies for minority protection were passed to facilitate a significant degree of cultural autonomy for the minorities.

In 1920 a number of Danish policies were implemented enabling the German minority to establish private German schools or German speaking sections in Danish schools, with both receiving Danish state subsidies. German vicar positions were established in Haderslev, Sønderborg, Tønder and Aabenraa and in 1923 Nordschleswigsche Gemeinde was founded as an independent church in the rural districts closely connected to the Nordelbische Kirche in Schleswig-Holstein. It was also made possible to communicate in German with public institutions, and a relaxation of legislation made it possible for the minority to establish a political party, Schleswig Party, running for election in 1920.

In the years leading to World War II tensions between the German minority and Denmark grew, with more than half of the former supporting the Nazis, many volunteering for the German army and leaders expressing desire for changed borderlines (Ibid: 130-131). After the war, the Danish state and legal system clamped down on the German minority by closing all of the 89 German schools and imprisoning many Germans, affecting almost all German-minority families.

This made the German minority, supported by the regional Länder governments of Schleswig and Holstein, eager to obtain publicly guaranteed minority rights. The Bund Deutscher Nordschleswiger (BDN) association, the new organizational centre of the German minority, declared unconditional loyalty to the Danish King and state and pledged to accept the present border, but in return sought recognition as a national minority entitled to safeguard its political and cultural interests (Ibid: 131-133).

When Danes in Germany were given minority rights in 1949, the German minority initiated negotiations with the Danish government aiming to obtain a corresponding official declaration. The Danish government made it clear that the German minority already possessed the civic rights announced in Germany through existing practice, and that the minority could freely negotiate on equal terms with authorities. Hence, no governmental declaration or establishment of a liaison committee was achieved, but a promise of equality of rights was expressed in the minutes from the meeting (Copenhagen Note).

Following the West German NATO membership application the Danish-German minority issue emerged on the international agenda, resulting in dual government declarations: the 1955 Copenhagen-Bonn Declaration. It contained recognition of school examinations, the long desired written declaration of German-minority rights in agreement with Danish-minority rights, acknowledgement of the need for spiritual and material support of the minorities, and finally a free-choice basis of affiliation with German nationality and German culture that the government would not be allowed to verify, hereby maintaining the principle of ‘disposition’ [sindelagsprincippet]: those who wish to be part of the minority are part of it (“Minderheit ist, wer will” / “til et mindretal høre, hvem der regner sig til dertil”) (Ibid: 99-100, 135-136; Klatt 2006: 74-76).

The German delegation did not achieve a bilateral liaison committee, and the consequences of the prosecutions after World War II for the German minority had not been part of the negotiations. However, the reciprocal declaration had great political and sociological impact and is often described as the turning point from national tensions to increasing mutual recognition and co-operation (Kühle 2003: 136).
Since 1953 a German minority-Danish government dialogue has been facilitated through a regular elected representative in the parliament in the periods 1920-43; 1953-1964; 1973-79 and, following failure to have candidates elected, through the Contact Committee established in 1965 (Ibid.: 137). Inclusion of the German minority is also facilitated through significant local and regional political participation. In this regard, the merging of Danish counties in 2007 creating bigger administrative entities was opposed by the German minority, who feared losing their significant local political leverage in some city councils (Ibid: 149). The close attention to the regional minority by the Danish queen and royalty has also contributed, at a more symbolic level, to reconciliation.

German-minority issues do not take up much attention in the Danish media or public anymore. To a large extent the German minority is recognised as a well integrated group, and the co-operation between it and Danish authorities is almost without friction. The Danish-German way of handling the border and minority issues has in an international context been emphasized as role model for other areas. Today in Denmark there are 17 German-language schools, including one continuation school [efterskole], usually one year following basic schooling] and one gymnasium financially supported by the Danish state; several German-language day care centres and after-school centres; and German libraries financed by the German and Danish states (Kühle 2003: 133)

However, dislike of Germans still occasionally surfaces (Ibid: 143). Two events have recently gained attention. First, the creation of a Euro-region between the county of Southern Jutland and the German part of Schleswig in 1997 ignited an emotional debate with anti-German hostility, threats of violence and incidents of vandalism (Ibid: 143-144). This transnational regional co-operation remains strongly supported by the German minority represented, presently, with a seat in the Southern Jutland Regional Council.

Second, the Danish ratification of the European Treaty of Regional or Minority Languages in 2000 initiated intense debate concerning the use of German language in Danish public institutions (Ibid: 145-148). The debate was quickly played down by the Danish government, supported by the Danish minority in Germany. German language is now recognized as a minority language in Southern Jutland, meaning among other things that a greater effort is made to ensure German-speaking staff in residential homes for elderly people who cannot speak Danish well – an issue advocated for by the German minority.

1.3.2.4. Roma

For nearly 200 years, from 1554 to 1736, the Roma were outlawed in Denmark; if caught by the authorities they were either deported or put into forced labor. By the mid-1700s reports on the Roma had gradually disappeared, and for the next 100 years very little was heard of them (Østergaard 2007: 200). Not until the latter half of the 19th century did the Roma (immigrating from Hungary and Romania) re-appear in noticeable numbers. A new law, stating that it was illegal to take up residence in Denmark if one sought work by travelling, was put into force to form a legal basis for deporting the traveling Roma; this law remained in force until 1952.

Today the Roma residents in Denmark have settled more permanently. In 2006 there were between 5,000 to 10,000 Roma in Denmark (Ibid: 204). Most are ‘guest workers’ from Yugoslavia who arrived in the late 1960s, and their descendants. A smaller number came as refugees from the wars in Yugoslavia and Kosovo.

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5 Committee members include the Ministers for Education and for Interior Affairs, party representatives and four members from the German minority.
A large part of the Roma is concentrated in the city Elsinore. The municipality has gained a certain media attention with their special initiatives aimed at relieving the group’s social problems, especially concerning low rates of school attendance among Roma children. From 1982 to 2004 the municipality maintained special all-Roma school classes for children deemed problematic. After the policy had been criticized internationally as racial segregation, however, the Ministry of Teaching declared that the school classes violated the primary school law. Another practice eventually found illegal started in 2000 and consisted in an economic incentive structure set up to make parents bring their children to school. If the children did not turn up in school, it was seen as a failure by the unemployed parents to participate in a mandatory ‘activation program’ and money was deducted from their social transfer payments.

A recent expulsion from Denmark of 23 Roma with citizenship in other EU countries, justified on the grounds of their threat to public order, created some debate on the discrimination and prejudices experienced by the Roma in Denmark. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) in Budapest is currently preparing a court case against the Danish state, claiming that the expulsion violates EU law (EU citizens’ right to free movement) and is discriminatory.

The stereotype of the Roma as stealing, cheating, lying, poor, uneducated, lazy and unwilling to integrate is well alive in Denmark and felt by the Roma, inducing many to hide their background (Schmidt 2003). This stigmatization may have influenced the lack of organizational representation to carry forth group demands to public institutions.

1.3.2.3. Jews

Following a spread of anti-Semitic sentiment in Poland in 1969 more than 3000 Poles migrated to Denmark, contributing significantly to the number of Jews in Denmark. The Jewish minority today consists of somewhere between 5000 and 7000 members, less than one per thousand of the total population. The Danish Jews are especially of interest due to the status which the rescue of the Danish Jews during World War II still carries in Danish, Israeli and American national mythologies about the events during the Second World War.

Copenhagen is the religious center for Danish Jews. There are several synagogues in Copenhagen, and Jews also have their own nursery, school, after-school center, elder care home and cemetery. These institutions have never been the subject of critical public discussion in a way that resembles anti-Semitism.

The general impression is that anti-Semitism is practically unknown in Denmark except for conflicts between some Muslim immigrants and Danish Jews. Most noticeably the media reported on 20 documented incidents where Jews were harassed by Muslims during the three weeks of the Gaza War in 2008/09. However, the former head rabbi of the Jewish Community in Denmark, Bent Melchior, was quick to emphasize that he did not see the incidents as reflecting general anti-Semitism and that their significance was blown out of proportion (as opposed to the DPP, who called for a national action plan to fight anti-Semitism). He did not want the fight against anti-Semitism instrumentalized in what he perceived to be a much more systematic and organized Islamophobia and fear of Muslims (Melchior 2009).

Unconcern about the level of anti-Semitism is in part contradicted by a recent study that demonstrates a significantly higher level of apprehension towards Jews among Turks, Pakistanis, Somalis, Palestinians and Ex-Yugoslavians than among ethnic Danes. Between 60 and 70 percent of the former five groups confirmed that ‘you can’t be too careful around Jews’ compared to 18 percent

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6 Det Mosaiske Troessamfund, the main organization representing Jews in Denmark.
of ethnic Danes (Nannestad 2009). This points to a tacit, rather than explicit, anti-Semitism. Cultural sociologist and former president of the Jewish Community Jacques Blum does indeed find a combination of straightforward harassment of Jews by Muslims (mostly unreported), as well as an undercurrent of anti-Semitism reflected in the negative connotation of the word ‘Jew’ in the Danish language (Jørgensen 2007). The latter has prompted Danish Jews to label themselves as Jewish or as having a Jewish background.

1.3.2.4. Muslims

Since the 1990s a tendency has been identified across Europe to label immigrants in religious terms rather than in light of their ethno-cultural background or social roles in society (Allievi 2006: 37). This tendency, whereby Muslims in particular are seldom categorized as Turks, Iranians or Somalis (or as students or workers) also exists in Denmark, where debates over integration and tolerance of differences invariably centre on Muslims and where religion is often associated with potential conflict (Mouritsen 2006: 75-76).

Whereas controversy over integration is discussed as related to issues of culture, culture is almost always linked to religious beliefs and associated value conflicts. Since the end of the 1990s immigration and integration policies have been important issues among the electorate and a main theme in election campaigns (Mikkelsen 2008: 185), although there are now indications that it may be losing saliency after continual tightening of immigration, citizenship and integration policies and requirements that has been implemented over the last decade.

Public discussions tend to take place in an ‘us-them’ framework which, on the one hand, is concerned about the social and residential segregation of an out-group of Muslims in vulnerable suburb districts (these officially termed ‘ghettos’ have recently been the target of competing action plan proposals from the Government and the Opposition (Social Democrats & Socialistic Peoples Party, 2010; Government, 2010). On the other hand, the ‘us-them’ polarity is reinforced as Islam is increasingly constructed in opposition to Danish values of democracy and equality (Mouritsen 2009: 19; Lindekilde 2009: 4).

In Denmark, as noted, the constitution gives a privileged position to the Lutheran Folkekirke as the state church, while also guaranteeing freedom of religion to other religious communities; these can be officially recognized by the state, but without getting all the same privileges. Today 23 Islamic communities are legally recognised (Ministry of Justice 2010a). Approved religious communities may be granted authorization to officiate marriages, subject to individual evaluation of congregations (Ministry of Justice 2010b). In contrast to the state church, other religious communities finance their activities, buildings and cemeteries themselves.

A mosque built in accordance with traditional Islamic rules does not yet exist. Financial difficulties and obstacles to obtaining planning permits have long delayed the process despite strong desires among Muslims, who have set up advocacy groups in favour of a mosque. Groups opposing the building of mosques in Denmark have also been established, and the political salience of the issue remains high. Particularly controversial is the question of whether to allow calls to prayer from mosque minarets, which is currently prohibited. In 2009 the Ahlul Bait association was granted permission to build the Imam Ali Mosque in Copenhagen. The building will have a traditional look with a dome and minarets, the latter only having symbolic function. The cost of the project is estimated to be 40-50 million DKK, of which less than half was collected by June 2010, through private donations from Denmark and abroad7. Building a Mosque in Aarhus has also been discussed. At the time of writing, these plans have collapsed due to internal disagreements among Muslim

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7 See www.IslamDenmark.dk.
Conceptions of Tolerance and Intolerance in Denmark

groups, lack of finances and disagreements about location. For now, Muslims in Denmark use previously existing buildings not built for the purpose as places of worship.

The first Muslim cemetery not attached to a Christian cemetery was established in 2006 near the city of Brøndby outside Copenhagen\(^8\). Until then Muslims were either buried in their country of origin or in special areas of cemeteries reserved for Muslims. The negotiations and preparation preceding the opening of the Muslim cemetery date from the early 1990s, when different Muslim associations joined together to advance their claim. The process made slow progress due, among other things, to disagreement over the prohibitive price (21.5 million DKK/approx. 3 million EUR) initially asked by the local council that owned the desired land. After the Danish Muslim Association had managed to raise 3 million DKK, the Social Democratic government in early 2001 pledged to compensate the remaining difference within a price set by an impartial appraisal commission. The new government that took office later in 2001, supported by the Danish People’s Party, withdrew the promise (Hjort 2002: 11). The price was later set at 3.2 million and the Danish Islamic Funeral Fund (a fusion of 23 associations) bought the site, which they now administer with private funds. Negotiations to establish Muslim cemeteries in Herning (Jutland) and Roskilde (Zealand) are now taking place, meeting Muslims’ wishes to be able to bury family members nearer to their homes (Ritzau 2008; Jørgensen 2008).

An official education for imams (corresponding to the official Lutheran priest educations) does not exist, but the possibility has been discussed for a number of years (Kristeligt Dagblad 2005; Pedersen 2007; Borking 2010). It has been argued that a Danish education would stem the influx of radical imams without any background in Denmark. Currently, imams from abroad who are affiliated with an approved religious society in Denmark can obtain a residence permit (Law of Foreigners §9f subsection 1).

The Danish version of the head scarf debate began as a controversy about whether cashiers in supermarket had a right to wear headscarves on the job, or whether it was a legitimate interest of the employer to ensure that no customer was ‘inconvenienced’ by the headscarves, and that they were therefore ultimately allowed to fire employees who insisted on wearing headscarves. The controversy was settled with the right of the employer to dictate a job uniform. In most cases practical solutions have been found, with a large majority of employers accepting the headscarf (Bømer 2008).

Debates over headscarves in schools have not been as protracted or politicised as in France or Germany, in part because of a relatively decentralised system of school administration, which has facilitated local solutions. Debates over headscarves have, however, spread to other areas, from politicians wearing headscarves at the speaking podium in Parliament to whether or not judges may wear headscarves (the latter a purely hypothetical debate that prompted an amendment of the Law of Justice Administration (Retsplejeloven) in 2008 (Klarskov 2008)).

In the latter case the Danish court agency (Domstolsstyrelsen) had announced that Muslim female judges could in fact wear headscarves in court, but the government disregarded the statement and banned the wearing of any kind of religious or political symbols in court (Law of Justice Administration: §56 subsection 1; Boddum 2008). The headscarf is in general involved in the larger debate about integration and Islam’s compatibility with the fundamental values of Danish society, especially gender equality (Mouritsen 2009: 20).

Owing to existing Danish legislation on private schools, Muslims are allowed to run Muslim schools on the condition that the curricula meet basic Danish standards. No official statistics on the number of Muslim schools exist. However in 2004-5, 21 independent schools were categorised by the Ministry as having predominantly bi-lingual students (Haarder 2006). This number may be compared

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\(^8\) See the homepage of the Danish Islamic Funeral fund: http://www.dibf.dk/.
to the total number of independent schools, which is about 500, and the number of regular public schools, which is about 1600.

Various controversies concerning education have emerged in public debate, including native-language instruction (abolished in 2001); questions of separate changing rooms and shower facilities for Muslims in connection with sports activities; the uneven distribution of immigrant children in schools; bussing of pupils (practiced in Aarhus and discussed in Copenhagen); and, most recently, parents’ meeting only for mothers.

A more general change of the Danish official school ideology may also be identified, in line with a growing focus on national identity, diversity and integration in society. The preamble of the Danish Law for primary and secondary school (Folkeskoleloven) was changed in 1993 (and adjusted in 2006) to emphasise that pupils must become ‘familiar’ with Danish culture (and history from 2006) while giving them an ‘understanding’ of other countries and cultures (Jensen 2010).

Certain subjects referred to as ‘identity carrying subjects’, such as history and Christian studies (kristendomskundskab), were strengthened. In particular, a discussion has taken place between politicians and teachers as to whether ‘religious studies’, as a broader information subject, could be taught instead of ‘Christian studies’ as a cultural and identity-oriented subject (even if the latter does not include the preaching of Christianity). The government made it clear that Christian Studies is a compulsory subject. How these changes may affect the pupils, however, depends largely on their implementation by teachers (Mouritsen & Olsen, forthcoming).

In the intense public debates on integration problems, Danish media have tended to confront non-Western ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims, to get their reactions regarding the issue at hand. Hence, immigrants are often presented in the role of a self-defending reactor to a political agenda that has been defined by others (Lindekilde 2009: 26-27). This media focus may partly explain why ethnic minorities in Denmark raise more claims regarding issues of integration, as compared to claims regarding issues of immigration, asylum, citizenship and homeland affairs. However, better opportunities for immigrants, when compared with those in most other countries, to participate in the framing of local integration policy, e.g. through integration councils, could be an explanation for this tendency too (Ibid: 22-23): the Danish local electoral system has been found to be relatively favourable to (concentrated) immigrant groups in the larger cities. Before the Muhammad caricatures in 2005, Danish Muslims had not mobilized and engaged in continued claims-making or been prominent actors in national debates, but this is now changing (Ibid: 26).

Often in debates of Muslims vis-à-vis the Danish society all Muslims have been portrayed as a monolithic group. However, in some cases internal splits among Muslims have become evident, even in public media. This has been the case, for instance, with the issue of whether sunni Muslims could identify with the Mosque project in Copenhagen, which was led by a shia community. Particularly in public debates surrounding the Muhammad caricature controversy, different Muslim groups became visible expressing quite different views, emphasising different problems, and making different claims to the state. The question of which groups, representing which Muslim communities, the state should consult or negotiate with remains controversial.

One way of distinguishing between Muslim groups is to describe Muslim claimants as exponents of different ways of practicing Islam in a Danish context (Lindekilde 2008: 78-79). A major task, here, is to combine their identity as Europeans/Danes and their Islamic beliefs, which may be done in different ways by stressing various normative interpretations of Islam and different guidelines for adjusting to Danish society. Three basic types of this diverse ‘diasporic’ Islamic religiosity have been distinguished by Werner Schiffauer – see the table below (Schiffauer 2007). The different dispositions should be viewed as positions on a continuum.
Cultural Muslims are the most assimilated group and believe that Islam can be practised in the same secularised way that Danes typically practice Christianity. Thus religious symbols are not to be displayed in the public sphere. The organisation Democratic Muslims are the clearest exponent of this group. It was established during the Muhammad caricatures controversy, attempting to mobilise the ‘silent majority’ of Danish Muslims (Lindekilde 2008: 79).

The Neo-orthodox Muslims maintain their Islamic traditions but in a way that is adjusted to the Danish context. Sometimes demands for certain privileges are made by groups belonging to this category. An organisational exponent of this group is The Community of Islamic Faith (Islamisk Trossamfund), who was very active in the public debate in the beginning of the caricature controversy. They demanded an official apology for the publication and initiated the sending of the ‘imam delegation’ to Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, thereby aiming to achieve external support for their claims (ibid: 86; for a detailed analysis of Muslim organisations and claimants during the Muhammad caricatures controversies in Denmark see Lindekilde 2008).

The Ultra-orthodox Muslims consider the other two groups as not being real Muslims or as ‘selling out’ on Islamic values. These segments often come together in loose networks instead of organisations and often choose to live isolated from society. They reject democracy by being passive and often they support violent groups in their lands of origin which are condemned by the West, e.g. Hamas and al-Shabaab. Danish authorities are worried about the development of these groups because radicalised Muslims, including individuals actually convicted of terrorism, have come from here.

Muslim organisations cutting across national origin but with Islamic religiosity at their cores have gained ground in recent years, especially among the second and third generations of Muslim immigrants (Mikkelsen 2008: 144-145). Emphasising a pan-Muslim identity is favoured by many

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**TABLE 1.3 Types of Islamic Religiosity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Cultural Muslims”</th>
<th>“Neo-orthodox Muslims”</th>
<th>“Ultra-orthodox Muslims”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>emphasis on non-discrimination</td>
<td>emphasis on the right to difference</td>
<td>rejection of the struggle for recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>normative pluralism</td>
<td>normative conservatism</td>
<td>“authenticity”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam should be practiced in private</td>
<td>strong affiliation to Islamic community</td>
<td>sectarian affiliation to the Islamic community: elitism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scepticism towards strong/influential Islamic organisations</td>
<td>communitarian solidarity is hold in high esteem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sharia is not an issue</td>
<td>search for life in conformity with sharia</td>
<td>implementation of sharia by political action (revolutionary Islam) or by withdrawal (quietist Islam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mobilisation is difficult</td>
<td>empowerment by mobilisation</td>
<td>empowerment by political action (only revolutionary Islam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secularism: rejection of ostentatious religious symbols in public</td>
<td>fight for Islamic symbols in public</td>
<td>Islamic symbols are expressions of political loyalty (revolutionary Islam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion integrated in everyday life</td>
<td>Methodist and systematic religiosity</td>
<td>ascetic and religious virtuousity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assimilation</td>
<td>integration</td>
<td>isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acceptance of cultural modernity</td>
<td>search for alternative modernity</td>
<td>Islamization of modernity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: reproduced from Lindekilde 2008, applied from Schiffauer 2007: 80-90

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Conceptions of Tolerance and Intolerance in Denmark
youth who seek integration in the host society without entirely losing their background (Lindekilde 2009: 36). For this group religiosity is becoming an increasingly important part of their identity, and they spend more and more time and energy, compared with their parents, familiarizing themselves with Islam. At the same time they clearly seek recognition from Danish society, signalling that simultaneously being a second-generation immigrant, a Dane and a Muslim is perfectly possible.

1.4. DEFINITIONS OF TOLERATION AND RESPECT IN DENMARK

Historically, tolerance has in a widely received interpretation been dismissed as a form of indifference and relativism with regard to the beliefs and actions of others. As such it connotes the idea that all beliefs, values, and practices are of equal value and therefore also of no value. Tolerance, in this sense, means the inability to make judgements, or to differentiate properly between right and wrong, good and bad, true and false (Bredsdorff & Kjældgaard 2008: ch. 15). While this idea is based on a biased (or misunderstood) reading of Enlightenment philosophy, many have wished to employ an alternative term, a favourite being frisind, meaning ‘liberality’ or ‘free mindedness’.

This term, originating from the influential populist leader, author and priest N.F.S. Grundtvig, originally refers to the idea that the state should stay out of matters of religion and let the exponents of different views of religion use all verbal powers at their disposal to promote their own views and criticise those of others. By contrast, ‘tolerance’ would here be indifference towards, and refraining from judgment on that which one considers wrong, and thereby losing an essential moral faculty as a human being.

Yet with the state as the guarantor of equal civic freedoms – securing, as Danes have put it since Grundtvig, freedom to Loke as well as to Thor⁹ – liberality means that one is able to speak truth against a lie without holding back in dull indifference or adopting social conformism in order to ensure social and political peace (ibid.). One is able to fight for all that one holds dearly (‘kæmp for alt hvad du har kært’),¹⁰ while insisting on the same rights for others. The notorious Danish cartoon crisis referred to this understanding of liberality: by those who argued for the right to criticise and ridicule the beliefs of others, as well as by those who were concerned that all the relevant parties did not in fact have equal civic standing in Danish society (Ibid.; Meer & Mouritsen 2009).

The preference for liberality over tolerance is particularly conspicuous among right-of-centre politicians in Denmark today. A competing conception of tolerance developed in connection with a split up of the Liberal party in 1905 (in Danish the party is called Venstre, literally ‘Left’). Ongoing debates in Parliament led to an institutionalisation of the split-up and the creation of two separate liberal parties, one mainly consisting of farmers and members of the liberal professions (Venstre), and another made up by small peasants and intellectuals (Radikale Venstre, literally ‘Radical Left’).¹¹ The political views of both groups were by and large inspired by the thoughts of Grundtvig, but the latter also found inspiration in the thoughts of brothers Georg and Edvard Brandes and the editor Viggo Hørup, representing a new, radical, form of liberalism. Due to this ideological difference not only two distinct liberal parties but two distinct liberal ideologies developed, and these two different

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⁹ In Nordic mythology Thor of course denotes uprightness and truth, whereas Loke stands for falsehood and deviousness.

¹⁰ The passage is from a hymn, ‘Altid frejdig, når du går’, by Christian Richardt, written in 1867, which has become associated with resistance and struggle, in particular resistance to the German occupation during World War II.

¹¹ The bone of contention leading to the division of the liberals was the question of the defences of Copenhagen. By circumventing the Commons Prime Minister Estrup of the governing Right Party (Højre) had financed the extension of the outdated defences of the capital city, which had, due to the massive urbanisation of the 19th century, far outgrown the boundaries of the old city. He was able to do so with the political support from the right-wing liberals. The left-wing liberals on the contrary considered spending money on military expenses as a waste, especially in light of the defeat of 1864, which had demonstrated the Danish military’s inefficiency in front of a determined enemy.
interpretations of liberalism caused the reception of tolerance to follow two separate courses throughout the 20th century. In very general terms: in contrast to the right-wing liberals who, by and large, stuck to Grundtvig’s distinction between tolerance and liberality, left-wing liberals accentuated the importance of a universal concept of tolerance.

Recent times have seen a change in the subjects and objects of toleration in Danish discourse. While it never acquired an unequivocally positive meaning, the main concern with tolerance has shifted: from the intolerance of the majority against immigrants in the 1970s and the 1980s, to a concern, in the 1990s and the 2000s, that too many immigrants (potentially tolerant themselves) being reluctant to integrate would have a corrosive effect on the otherwise well-established, traditional tolerance of the majority. There has never been any celebration of multiculturalism in Denmark, beyond seeing cultural diversity as giving interesting spice of life (foods, folklore, etc).

From the 1990s onwards, multiculturalism has represented ‘parallel societies’, disintegration, and a moral, social and political failure to demand and promote the full inclusion of all groups into society: into its labour market, education, civil society organisations and, eventually, politics. This inclusion is seen to be endangered by too much tolerance or overindulgence towards groups who abuse the rights and privileges they enjoy in Denmark and who may not eventually reciprocate the tolerance of the majority (or who may themselves in the future become an intolerant majority).

The form of inclusion available for immigrants is based on a comprehensive concept of equal citizenship that pertains to all fields of life, including family and private life. The only form of recognition given to immigrants is that of becoming a full and equal citizen; a form of recognition nonetheless withheld for a considerable number of years, until immigrants have proved their determination and ability to become full members of society through economic self-sufficiency, Danish language literacy and knowledge of Danish history, culture and fundamental political values. Some symbolic (and legal) recognition is also given to working immigrants who bring special professional skills to the country and contribute to its economic growth. However, their positive contribution is seen as almost purely economic, not cultural (skills, not identity) (Mouritsen & Olsen 2011).

1.4.1. Acceptance and integration in Denmark

1.4.1.1. The values of the Danish integration regime

The inclusion of post-immigration minorities in Denmark is based on the values of equal and active citizenship. The fundamental idea is that this status is accessible to all who want it, and that it is not prima facie a particularly Danish, ‘national’ form of citizenship. As a normative and identity- or practice-oriented ideal (‘good’ citizenship) it is relatively comprehensive (Mouritsen & Olsen 2011; Mouritsen 2011) and is conceived to have a progressive and emancipatory potential for the suppressed and dominated in different ways, i.e., in relation to traditional authority and patriarchal norms, gender equality and child education, and even sexual practices. Capacity to practice critical self-reflection in private lives as well as politics and democracy is crucial.

Right of the political centre, these values are often seen as anchored in a broader Danish cultural-Christian tradition influenced in particular by the Grundtvigian movement which emphasises popular consent, anti-authoritarianism and liberality. Groups on the left, while generally subscribing to the same comprehensive understanding of these values, are more reluctant to agree to this particular cultural heritage argument (Mouritsen 2006). Liberality is thus broadly considered a central virtue when dealing with others in a democratic system such as the Danish, i.e. where democratic decision making is often understood (and celebrated) as a ‘form of life’ characterised by informality, deliberation, equal voice and consensuality.
Democracy and democratic debate do not here connote politeness and civility, let alone ‘recognition’, so much as blunt and open exchanges are combined with having ‘thick skin’. In this view, one has to be able to handle rudeness and even ridicule as a part of democracy. There is no real place for offence or for being offended, neither hence for catering to cultural and/or religious sensibilities, which again diminishes the space for criticism of stereotyping, pejorative expressions, etc. This all entails that Danish tolerance in a paradoxical way is not seeing society and exchanges between groups in society as being based on ‘co-existence’ or a modus vivendi. Tolerance is wrong, or even a vice to the extent that it implies permissiveness or ‘letting people be’. Rather, tolerance is, as it were, a republican virtue that structures the critical exchanges of citizens in what is essentially a cooperating democracy.

1.4.1.2. Policies and institutional arrangements

Danish efforts to reduce discrimination and create equal treatment for all to a large extent have been driven by the need to transform international obligations into national law (Justesten 2003, Nielsen 2010). However, the early 1990s saw the creation of a Board for Ethnic Equality (BEE) with the purpose of ‘fighting difference of treatment in all its aspects as well as supporting that all ethnic groups in society, irrespective of differences in their conditions, are given the opportunity to exercise their activities on an equal footing.’ (Law on the BEE 1993). The BEE was to work through campaigns and counselling of public and private organisations, individuals and policy makers. Consonant with the dominant perception in the 1980s of subjects and objects of toleration, the BEE was supported across the political spectrum. Behind the BEE, which was based on a Social Democratic proposal, was a general concern with racism and pressure from immigrant organisations who had fought for recognition as ethnic minorities rather than as immigrants and who pointed to discrimination as a main cause of minority exclusion (Navnet for Etnisk Ligestilling 2002: 7-12).

The BEE defined ethnic equality as ‘more than just formal rights. Ethnic equality entails equality before the law, equal access to the institutions of society and equal right to realize one’s distinctive character (særpræg) within the limits of the law’ (Ibid: 15). One idea behind ‘ethnic equality’ rather than just ‘ethnic equal treatment’ (a discussed alternative) was that ethnic equality meant more than formal equal treatment and might imply certain types of positive action, as well as a recognition that the different needs of different groups might have to be met in different ways. It is not clear that ethnic equality as a concept entailed either an appreciation of cultural differences as a positive contribution to society per se, or the recognition of minority identities as valuable.

The BEE could not process individual complaints about discrimination. Danish legislation against discrimination and racism was based on criminal law until 1996 where a new law on discrimination in the labour market opened up possibilities for civil law suits. This law was supplemented in 2003/4 by the implementation of two EU directives on anti-discrimination which extended civil law prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity beyond the labour market. This extension also introduced administrative complaint procedures, which were strengthened in 2009 with the creation of a new Equality Board which will process complaints on all relevant grounds.

Nonetheless, public campaigns against discrimination and racism suffered a blow with the change of government in 2001, which closed the BEE and ‘restructured’ the Danish Centre of Human Rights into a new Danish Institute for Human Rights. The present governing coalition of Liberals, Conservatives and Danish People’s Party had found the two former institutions too vocal in the general immigration and integration debate. The new government prioritised restrictions in immigration policies and access to citizenship and pursued a tough integration policy already initiated in the late 1990s by its Social Democratic predecessor.
Integration policies, over the last decade, have aimed to render the immigrant able to participate ‘on an equal footing’ in Danish society, to a large degree placing the responsibility for this to happen on the individual immigrant/minority member, rather than the receiving society. The aim was to contribute to the newly arrived foreigner’s possibility for participating on an equal footing with other citizens in the political, economic, work-related, social, religious, and cultural life of society; ...to her quickly becoming self-supporting; ...to contribute to giving the individual foreigner an understanding of the fundamental values and norms of the Danish society (The 1999 Integration Law, par.1).

This integration policy has been deepened and extended in consecutive stages, moving from an initial emphasis on labour market functionality and language into a wider realm – particularly after 9/11 – of civic competences and liberal values, cultural and historical orientation, and loyalty. It has pushed sensitivity towards cultural identities and notions of a society based on pluralism, mutual respect and tolerance of diversity into the background (Hvenegaard-Lassen 2002: 251; Mouritsen & Olsen 2011).

However, government policy has not been without focus on tolerance and equal respect. In 2003, the government developed an action plan, ‘For the Promotion of Equal Treatment and Diversity and The Fight Against Racism’ (based on the 2001 Durban Declaration). This plan again refers to the old Nordic ‘freedom for Loke as well as for Thor’ as a principle of equal treatment that implies that ‘we are not identical and we should not be made uniform’ and stipulates that ‘difference is the precondition for all democratic dialogue’ (p. 1). But consonant with the new perception of subjects and objects of toleration, the plan eagerly underlines that ‘tolerance should go in all directions’, and points to problems of intolerance between groups of ethnic minorities as well as ‘intolerant attitudes among ethnic minorities towards the majority population’ (p. 14). The remedy is again the creation (through integration policy) of a set of shared values:

The freedom to be different can only thrive if there is a widespread commitment in society to the shared fundamental democratic values of freedom, equal worth (ligeværdighed), responsibility, duties and active participation. (p. 15)

The plan was mainly premised on state support for initiatives formed by other actors, primarily from civil society. In 2010 it was replaced by a new action plan on ‘Ethnic Equal Treatment and Respect for the Individual’. The new plan is based on the same ideas of spreading the fundamental principles of democracy. It does, however, reflect an increased concern with intolerance both against minorities and within minorities (anti-Semitism in particular) and underlines the need to map and counteract discrimination in different areas of life such as work, spare time activities and education. As something relatively new, it refers to diversity management in workplaces and conceives of diversity as an asset for companies and for the economy more generally. Also in a few places it even mentions that ‘nobody should be discriminated, degraded or threatened because of, for example, their ethnic origin, sex, belief, sexual orientation or because they have voiced their opinions’ (5), presumably pointing in two directions simultaneously: against the degrading of minorities on the one hand and the threats against cartoonists, opinion makers and politicians on the other.

The shift in emphasis that this plan entails can reasonably be explained by a desire to attract highly skilled workers to the booming (until 2008) Danish economy on the one hand, and on the other a concern with domestic cases of planned (but not executed) terror actions (and the Cartoon Affair). As to the latter, the plan is indeed directly tied to a strong government concern with radicalisation of minority youth and is part of the realization of the 2009 government action plan on ‘Prevention of Extremism and Radicalisation among Young People’. In this plan the fight against intolerance and
discrimination is regarded as an important part of avoiding extremism and generally connects this goal with increased efforts to instil democratic values in all new members of society, in particular through education and civil society participation. Hence tolerance and equal respect are back on the agenda, this time not only in order to ensure the rights and security of minorities, but especially with a view to enhance the security of the majority.

1.4.1.3. Acceptance and accommodation as a social practice

Danes exhibit a relatively high level of comfort with the idea of having neighbours who have a different ethnic background or another religion than themselves, compared to the European average. Danes are also more likely than the EU average to have friends and acquaintances that have another ethnic background (62 percent) and religion (66 percent) than themselves. Younger people mix more with people of different backgrounds than do older people, and the more education you have, the more you mix with people of other ethnic backgrounds (Eurobarometer 317/2009, factsheet on Denmark, p. 1).

Paradoxically, Danes at the same time perceive their country to be quite discriminatory in relation to people with different ethnic or religious backgrounds. 77 percent and 55 percent find discrimination on the basis of these respective grounds widespread (Ibid.). Between 63 and 68 percent also suspect that skin colour, ethnic background and the expression of a religious belief make a negative difference for job candidates when employers choose between people of equal skills and qualifications (Ibid: 2).

This indicates that while people themselves in general are appreciative, indifferent, or perhaps tolerant towards ethnic and religious differences in their daily lives, they perceive others to be rather intolerant of such differences. Eurobarometer surveys generally show a high level of comfort, among Danes, with the idea of having people with different ethnic background elected for the highest political office in the country while the comfort level with regard to people with a different religious background is at the European average (Eurobarometer 317: 69, table QE6.5).

Studies of political tolerance carried out in Denmark (but thought to apply generally) demonstrate, however, that tolerance is conditional on the perception of whether the groups in question respect democratic norms and hence live up to a norm of reciprocity (Petersen et al. 2010). Low tolerance, on the other hand, is found with regard to groups who have been previously associated with an ‘extremist stance in terms of violent and non-democratic behaviour’ (Ibid: 10, 13). The partial exception here is the group of ‘ordinary Muslims’ (as opposed to ‘Islamic fundamentalists’) who are not tolerated among those who dislike them the most, despite the fact that they have not been directly connected with extremist stances. This is likely to be explained by the ‘perception that the social practices of even ordinary Muslims are in conflict with liberal ideals’ (Ibid: 14).

The findings of the above studies suggest that Danes personally have a somewhat high tolerance level in their daily practices when it comes to people with different ethnic or religious backgrounds than their own, and that there is a relatively high level of contact between people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, especially among the young and the well-educated. Indeed, Danes may be indifferent towards or appreciative of such cultural and religious differences. However, their perception is paradoxically that the tolerance of other fellow citizens is low. Moreover, political tolerance is largely conditional on the perception of others’ respecting fundamental democratic values and subscribing to a norm of reciprocity: no toleration for the intolerant.

12 Ethnic background: 8.6 vs. EU27 average 8.1 (score between 1 and 10); Religion 8.9 vs. EU27 average 8.5 (Eurobarometer 296/2008:Tables QA6.4 and QA6.5.)
1.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Over the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic and religious identities. The discourse of integration is explicitly set against the notion of multiculturalism. The latter is synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and political failure to demand and further the integration of all residents into society. In general, cultural and religious differences are seen as illegitimate to the extent that they stand in the way of integration, understood as the ability to live up to one’s duty as an economically self-sufficient and taxpaying individual and as a participating citizen at all levels of civil society and political institutions.

The idea that we need to be mutually reassured at the symbolic level that we all belong to the same community (in that we affirm the same fundamental democratic values) is now a central part of a self-conscious discourse on the necessity of ensuring the ‘cohesion’ of Danish society in order to sustain the support for the Danish welfare community and its social and moral achievements. While these achievements include equality and self-reflective moral and political autonomy for the individual citizen, the idea of social integration through values is closer to the idea of a *Gemeinschaft* built on mechanic solidarity (Durkheim), than to that of a *Gesellschaft* premised on abstract norms of interaction, individualism and division of labour (organic solidarity).

This ‘civic integrationism,’ with its comprehensive notion of citizenship, draws on central elements in national identity history that place a value on the society’s smallness, popular participation, consensus and the ability and duty to communicate in the same language across social and political cleavages. For the right-of-centre, it is rooted in a broader national and Christian culture. The centre-left also subscribe to the citizen ideal, but tends to reject the right wing’s somewhat nationalist interpretation of its basis. It is generally believed that status as an equal citizen with identical rights and duties provides sufficient support for the realisation of cultural and religious identities and that it is accessible to all with the right motivation. Danish citizenship as a social and legal status is not biased towards a specific nationality, culture or religion. Nonetheless immigrants are thoroughly vetted through integration and language tests to qualify for citizenship: the formal legal status is a prize and the end of a long trial period that is supposed to ensure and demonstrate the commitment by the new-comer to the fundamental democratic values of Danish society.

The overshadowing concern with cultural and religious differences in Denmark today pertains to post-immigration minorities who arrived from non-western countries in the last 40 to 50 years, most of whom are (identified as) Muslims. National and older religious minorities of Greenlanders, Germans, Poles and Jews are today uncontroversial and rarely raise claims themselves about special or equal rights, symbolic respect and recognition. Immigrants from non-western countries, on the other hand, are very controversial because of (what is perceived to be) their low ability to integrate into the ‘modern’ and ‘liberal’ Danish society and democracy.

The turn towards integration has pushed the question of toleration aside. In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities. This criticism of tolerance as indifference or *naïveté*, relies on a historical preference in some parts of society for ‘liberality’ over ‘tolerance’. Tolerance is seen as form of moral failure: it implies giving up the forming of judgements over what is right and wrong. Liberality, on the other hand, entails fighting for the values one holds dear while insisting on the same right for all others. The basis of this Danish interpretation of tolerance is, first, a strong commitment to equal citizen rights by all and their protection by the state. Liberality, secondly, implies criticising and even ridiculing all that you find wrong. While this leaves some space for legal tolerance, understood as the right to think and act in ways that are considered wrong, it leaves little space for social tolerance, understood as abstention from criticism of, among other things, cultural and religious sensibilities. Liberality is a ‘republican’ virtue that enables you to participate in
blunt public exchanges with a ‘thick skin’ so that you can reach negotiated, consensual democratic agreements with your opponents at all levels of society.

In the last 4-5 years, concern with radicalisation and extremism may have led policy makers to re-consider whether the swing towards civic integrationism, also fuelled by post 9/11 fears of radical Islamism, has been too one-sided. Slightly more emphasis is given to concepts like tolerance and equal respect in order to prevent minorities from being alienated and turning against society: these concepts are thus back on the agenda, not only to ensure the rights and security of minorities, but also improve the safety of the majority.

In conclusion, the main diversity challenges that politicians consider important relate almost exclusively to non-Western immigrants. As described above, the concerns driving them can be summed up in three themes:

1. **Unemployment**: It is often emphasized that the percentage of non-Western immigrants on social security is out of proportion with the rest of the population. This is seen as a problem for the sustainability of the Danish welfare model.

2. **Parallel societies (ghettoisation)**: It is often noted that we need to avoid a situation where Muslims are living in their own secluded communities impervious to the rules and institutions of the rest of society and that we are heading towards such a situation if something is not done now. The fear is one of parallel societies hostile and indifferent to one another, of Sharia law being de facto implemented outside Danish law, and generally of the erosion of society’s social cohesion.

3. **Radicalisation/extremism**: There has been a growing concern with radicalisation within Muslim communities. In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices of minorities that in a worst-case scenario could lead to acts of terrorism. Concern for the democratic mind-set of Muslims is often expressed. However, both in order to counterbalance the symbolic exclusion of immigrant youth and thereby avoid radicalisation and in order to counteract anti-Semitism in larger urban areas the concept of toleration is being brought back onto the political agenda.
CHAPTER 2. (IN)TOLERANCE AND ACCOMMODATION OF DIFFERENCE IN DANISH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS

By Tore Vincents Olsen and Sofie Marie Ahlgren

INTRODUCTION

Denmark has 10 years of mandatory education from age 6 to 15. Denmark offers free education in public schools and parents can choose to send their children to state subsidized private schools, so-called free primary schools. The state subsidy makes them affordable to most parents. Home schooling is also allowed, but very rare.

Private Schools: Free Primary Schools

Private schooling is based on a constitutional clause from 1849 which reflected discontent with state schools (Balle 2006). First, starting from 1787 the bourgeois class had established private schools to educate their children to enter into the (modern) trades of the estate, including international commerce, and to bestow them with bourgeois virtues (Balle 2006: 4). Secondly, the school movement led by N.F.S. Grundtvig and K. Kold saw the state school as repressive and reactionary (‘the school of death’, Grundtvig). It pleaded for ‘the school of life’ which should raise the children of especially independent peasants/farmers to a life in freedom, (national) enlightenment and self-determination (individually and collectively) by teaching history, languages, poetry, singing and storytelling. The schools were established in the first half of the 19th century and defied the formal strictures of tests and exams (Balle 2006: 5).

The constitutional protection of home and private schooling can be construed as democratic minority protection. In terms of educational policy it places a strong emphasis on the rights of parents (and not the state) to have their children educated according to their preferred ideological outlook (Balle 2006: 6). The freedom of free primary schools peaked in 1979 when the state subsidy was at about 85 percent and the schools’ only formal obligation was to fulfil the general aims of education as stipulated in the law on the public primary school. This allowed minorities to make use of their minority rights, determining the content and form of education for their children. The schools hence incarnated Danish liberality or tolerance.

However, in the last 13 years more conditions for the reception of state funds have been placed on free primary schools and they are increasingly seen as a part of a common educational system. This reflects the increased number of students attending these schools (now 13 percent of all students) as well as concerns about their academic quality and about religious and cultural diversity. The schools are monitored more closely by the state. They have to teach in Danish and their staff and board all have to be proficient in Danish.

Moreover, in 2002 and 2005 civic education became obligatory for the schools:

According to their purpose and in all of their work [the schools] shall prepare the students to live in a society like the Danish one with freedom and democracy and develop and strengthen the students’ knowledge of and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, including equality between the sexes (Law on Free Schools, article 1.2).
Students in private schools must receive liberal civic education and not taught political, religious and cultural doctrines that are socially and politically divisive. The state (the political majority) will no longer fund schools that do not teach democratic virtues. Moreover, both government and opposition are currently considering how to induce predominantly ‘white’ private schools to take greater responsibility for the ‘integration task’ by recruiting more students with ‘weak family backgrounds’.

Public Schools: The People’s School

The public primary school, literally ‘The People’s School,’ must familiarise the students with ‘Danish culture and history’ and give them an understanding of ‘other countries and cultures’. It should create national awareness if not identity but not necessarily appreciation of other cultures. Moreover, the school should induce the students to ‘learn more’ and ‘educate themselves’, promote the ‘well-rounded development of the individual student’ and provide the framework for the students to develop ‘cognition and imagination (…) confidence in their own potential and a basis for taking a stand and acting’ (Law on the People’s School, art. 1.1. and 1.2). The Danish public school hence rests on a rather strong (liberal) perfectionism when it comes to the development of individuality and personal autonomy. Also civic education is emphasised:

The People’s school shall prepare the students to participation, mutual responsibility, rights and duties in a society with freedom and democracy. The work of the school shall therefore be characterized by intellectual freedom, equality and democracy (Law on the People’s School, art. 1.3)

The general aim of the public school was revised in 2006. Arguably, the revision represented in part a change towards the development of a more opportunistic personality type who should be able to compete in a (global) labour market and increase the wealth of the nation (Pedersen 2011). In the new ‘competition state’ (as opposed to the welfare state) the school is once again instrumentalized for national (economic) purposes and is no more the sanctuary for the general education, Bildung, of the individual’s character that it had been from 1958 to 2006 (Pedersen 2011). As for democracy and civic education, the emphasis has arguably shifted from a perception of the school as a site for the practice and constitution of (school) democracy to a place where students are taught how to act in a democracy which is pre-constituted or ‘already given’ (Pedersen 2011).

The municipalities are responsible for running the public schools in Denmark. Since 2005 parents are allowed to send their children to schools outside their school districts. Bilingual children with deficient Danish language skills can for ‘pedagogical reasons’ be sent to schools outside their school district. In Aarhus (Denmark’s second largest city) bilingual students are forcefully redistributed via bussing. In Copenhagen city, a number of places are especially reserved in predominantly ‘white’ public schools for bilingual students who wish to attend a school outside their own district. In both cases, the intention is to ensure an more equal distribution of bilingual children and diminish the segregation of schools into ‘black’ and ‘white’ schools.13

There are national descriptions of the subjects taught in the public school, but no nationally set curricula. However, central control with what is being taught in schools arguably has increased over

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13 The Copenhagen Model is currently under revision, because it, perhaps unsurprisingly, is bilingual students with the least need for school relocation who use its opportunities. Copenhagen now wants to conduct ‘firm supervision’ of parents of students who really need relocation to a more Danish dominated school environment to acquire sufficient Danish language proficiency.
the last decade with the development of ‘canons’ of literature, history and democracy and with the introduction, in light of disappointing PISA results, of ‘common national goals’ and national tests as well as mandatory individual student evaluations and development plans for all students in all ages in all taught subjects (Nielsen et al. 2011). The responsibility for the curricula and teaching methods lies with the school director, supervised by the locally elected school board, but in practice often with the individual teacher.

Parents are (also legally) required to be ‘actively involved’ in the schooling of their own children (including doing homework with them) and in the daily functioning of the classes and the school. This is seen as peculiar to the Danish educational system and the Ministry of Education has issued brochures in several languages listing parents’ rights and responsibilities. The school board (one per school) is elected among the school’s students (2 reps), parents (5 to 7 reps) and staff (2 reps).

Schools, directors, teachers, parents and school boards thus have considerable autonomy in deciding how the school should be run in order to fulfil its tasks. As a ‘school community’ they are able to make flexible interpretations of the content and form of education. This includes decisions about how to accommodate cultural and religious diversity, which are (may be) based on local experiences and experiments.

Number and Composition of Schools

In 2009 there were 2,306 primary schools in Denmark: 1,529 public primary schools, 513 free primary schools and 264 so-called continuation schools (private, publicly subsidised schools for school primary school graduates 9th to 10th grade) (Ministry of Education 2010a: 50). The number of public schools has decreased slightly, while the number of free primary schools has increased in recent years. This also reflects a ‘migration’ of students from public schools to private. The number of students in public schools has dropped 3 percent from 2005 to 2008 while the number of students in free primary schools has risen 6 percent (Ministry of Education 2010a: 50). There are in total 719,000 students in the Danish school system (2008 numbers); 581,000 (81 percent) in public schools, and 95,000 in free primary schools (i.e. 13 percent, the rest are in continuation schools and different special schools). Public schools have about 376 students on average while free primary schools have about 189 students on average (Ministry of Education 2010a: 53).

About 10 percent of the students are of non-Danish ethnic origin, and about 90 percent of these are of non-western origin.

14 The Integration Ministry has issued a Handbook for School-Home Cooperation to strengthen the inclusion of New-Dane parents (i.e. parents with immigration background) into the daily life and work of the primary school, URL: http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/5DA0130F-8591-4CBA-A2E6-CC7A329C13CC/0/1020101_Detgodeskolehjemsamarbejde_samlet.pdf

Table 2.1: Students by country of origin, 10 largest immigrant groups (2009/10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Public schools</th>
<th>Free primary schools</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9,691</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>10,898</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5,810</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>6,672</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5,538</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>6,547</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>4,617</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2,817</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3,217</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>3,010</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2,898</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2,984</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2,186</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2,292</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>2,342</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>20,450</td>
<td>5,443</td>
<td>25,893</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-Danish</td>
<td>60,405</td>
<td>10,792</td>
<td>71,197</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>516,485</td>
<td>85,062</td>
<td>601,547</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>576,890</td>
<td>95,854</td>
<td>672,744</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The number does not include students at ‘continuation schools’, cf. above.

In some municipalities the concentration of immigrant children is much higher than the 10 percent average (see table 2). Except for Aarhus and Odense, the municipalities with a high percentage of immigrant children are in the Greater Copenhagen area.
Table 2.2: Municipalities with high percentage of immigrant children (2009/10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Danish</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ishøj</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brøndby</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>31,181</td>
<td>14,008</td>
<td>45,342</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertslund</td>
<td>2,582</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>3,676</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Høje-Taastrup</td>
<td>4,705</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>6,403</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aarhus</td>
<td>27,803</td>
<td>6,739</td>
<td>34,557</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herlev</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>3,008</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odense</td>
<td>18,099</td>
<td>4,066</td>
<td>22,168</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallensbæk</td>
<td>1,707</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rødovre</td>
<td>3,425</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>4,096</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hvidovre</td>
<td>5,061</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>6,005</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederiksberg</td>
<td>7,091</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>8,373</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glostrup</td>
<td>1,886</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As table 3 reveals, 8 percent of the public schools have no immigrant children. For the free primary schools the percentage is 16 percent. 75 percent of the public schools have less than 10 percent immigrant students, while this applies to 82 percent of the free primary schools. 42 (3 percent) public schools and 30 (6 percent) free primary schools have more than 50 percent students with immigrant background.
### Table 2.3: Distribution of immigrant children in different school types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of children with immigrant background</th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1-9.9</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-24.9</td>
<td>239</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34.9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49.9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-74.9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-99.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of schools</th>
<th>Public schools</th>
<th>Free primary schools</th>
<th>Continuation schools</th>
<th>Special schools</th>
<th>Day treatment programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1-9.9</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-24.9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-74.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-99.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


About 83 percent of all students continue education after the first 10 years of mandatory education. However, more girls than boys pursue further education. Moreover Danish children pursue further education to a greater extent than immigrant children. 17 percent of the ethnic Danish boys compared to 22 percent of the immigrant boys do not continue education. 17 percent of the ethnic Danish girls compared to 23 percent of the immigrant girls do not pursue further education.16

**The Educational Quality, Segregation, and School Choice Anxiety**

Disappointing rankings in the OECD PISA surveys have been an important driver of Danish school policy in the last decade both generally and in relation to bilingual children. The last decade has seen some improvement, but despite a strong focus on raising the competences of immigrant students, 43 percent of first generation and 32 percent of second generation immigrant students have not acquired the skills deemed necessary for further education (compared to 13 percent of ethnic Danes) (Egelund et al. 2011). On average immigrant students are almost 2 years behind Danish students. Statistically, the one third of the educational deficit of immigrant students compared to ethnic Danes can be explained by their socio-economic and cultural status (i.e. OECD’s ESCS17 measure, not ‘ethnicity’) (Egelund et al. 2011: 10-11). Other explanatory factors are language spoken at home (Danish or not), whether parents read to their children and whether the immigrant children attend schools where

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16 http://www.uvm.dk/~media/Files/Stat/Folkeskolen/PDF09/090914%20herkomst.ashx

17 Definition of ESCS: ‘The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) index of economic, social and cultural status was created on the basis of the following variables: the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI); the highest level of education of the student’s parents converted into years of schooling; the PISA index of family wealth; the PISA index of home educational resources; and the PISA index of possessions related to ‘classical’ culture in the family home.’ Education at a Glance, OECD, Paris, 2002, Glossary. URL: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5401
immigrant children make up the majority. The latter may be explained by special dynamics at schools with a high percentage of immigrants which makes the teaching challenge different and more difficult (Egelund et al. 2011: 10). Also, the teachers’ (and the parents’) low expectations to students at schools with high immigrant concentration may contribute to low achievements as may lack of respect among students for teachers since it obstructs teaching generally (Egelund et al. 10-11).  

Better educated Danish parents and immigrant parents who speak Danish at home tend to avoid public schools with more than 30 percent immigrant children (Rangvid 2010). While Danish parents choose a public or private school with fewer immigrant children, immigrant parents pursue a two-pronged strategy. Either they send their children to schools with fewer immigrant children or they send them to pure immigrant private schools. The rejected school generally has lower academic achievements than the one chosen. All in all this means that school choice increases both ethnic segregation and segregation between students with poorly and well educated parents and between more and less language proficient immigrants (Rangvid 2010: 327). In general figures indicate a large degree of socio-economic segregation of students (both Danish and immigrant) between different schools (cf. Egelund et al. 2011: 10).

The teaching quality of public schools has been under fire in recent years (in light of the PISA results). A general discourse on the difficulty and necessity of finding the right school for your children has emerged and is likely to push towards further segregation. Continued segregation is problematic since a low concentration of students with ‘weak family background’ (at least below 30 percent) in schools significantly elevates the academic achievements of ‘weak students’ and increases their tendency to pursue further education (Olsen 2009: ch. 3). This creates a collective action problem: It is individually rational to pursue a strategy with segregation effects, while it is collectively irrational because it lowers the academic achievements of some (in particular those with ‘weak family backgrounds’) without necessarily raising those of others.

To sum up, initiatives to handle cultural and religious diversity in the Danish school system should be seen in light not only of cultural and religious differences, their accommodation and potential integration, but also in connection with concerns about the segregation of the student population into high and low academic achievers. While there is – as in many countries – a strong concern about academic achievement generally, there is a particularly strong concern with the academic achievements of students with immigrant background, not only for their own sake, but also because of the cost they might incur on the welfare state.

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18 In a qualitative study of the differences between the successful Finnish school system and the less successful Danish system, Andersen (2011) points to norms of respect for the teachers and of ‘always doing your best’ as central to the Finnish success.
19 Rangvid’s study is based on data from Copenhagen only.
20 In Rangvid’s model the explanation would be that this strategy is chosen because the option to choose a public or private school with fewer immigrant students is not available. The private immigrant schools are hence seen as a better option – a second or third best – than staying in the local public school. This is supported by a survey revealing that immigrant parents’ applications to schools with lower immigrant concentration have been turned away at a higher rate than the applications of ethnic Danish parents (Rangvid 2010: 330).
21 A ‘weak family background’ obtains when a student displays at least two of the following three characteristics: 1) neither parent has any education beyond upper secondary education or vocational training; 2) at least one of the parents’ main income is based on social welfare payments; 3) the student does not live with both parents.
Policy Initiatives

In a short overview, there are a number of initiatives in education that relate to cultural and religious diversity either entirely or partly. One consists of strong focus on Danish language acquisition for immigrant children, since language is seen as a presupposition for learning. This has entailed language screening at the age of three and mandatory language stimulation for children who do not attend preschool care. The kindergarten class (grade 0) has been made mandatory for all (as of 2009) and there is also a mandatory language screening here. Efforts have been made to raise the expertise among teachers and extra resources have been invested in teaching Danish as a second language. As mentioned, the municipalities of Aarhus and Copenhagen try to redistribute immigrant students with low language skills on a mandatory or a voluntary basis. These are in a certain sense desegregation measures. In late 2010, the government introduced the idea of redrawing school districts in order to avoid segregation into white and black schools and it wants to increase state monitoring of immigrant free primary schools to make sure they meet academic standards including Danish classes (Danish Government 2010a: 23). It would also allow schools with many immigrant students to extend the school day to further their academic development (ibid.). Finally, as mentioned, it is being discussed how white free primary schools may contribute to ‘integrating’ students with immigrant background (Danish Government 2010b).

A second initiative has been to more closely monitor the free primary schools, in particular those with a high percentage of immigrant students. One concern is their academic standards; another whether immigrant Islamic schools teach fundamentalist and divisive anti-democratic doctrines as evidenced in the introduction of mandatory civic education in these schools. State monitoring of Islamic schools is now also connected with government anti-radicalization programs. Similarly, staff at public schools is required to report on students with radical outlooks.

A third set of initiatives directly addresses the question of cultural and religious diversity in school life. The Ministries of Education and Integration have developed handbooks and tools for dealing with such differences and resolving conflicts among pupils and between teachers and pupils (e.g. Ministry of Education 2008; 2003). As mentioned a separate effort has been directed towards establishing the right connection between school and immigrant parents and turning the latter into active participants in school life according to the Danish ideal of parent involvement.

A fourth concern has been the increased focus on civic education for all children in the school and on establishing a stronger national and cultural awareness/knowledge if not identity among students in Danish schools. From different sources, teaching material has been developed that can be used in civic education. Civic education is not a separate subject but is thought to be part of other subjects, mainly social sciences, but also history, Danish, and Christianity studies. As mentioned there has been a move away from the idea that democracy is taught through practice at the schools towards seeing it as cultural knowledge that students should acquire in school to be able to participate in a pre-constituted democracy (Pedersen 2011; Jensen 2010). This is crafted especially with immigrant youth in mind (Jensen 2010). Furthermore the transmission of Danish national identity has been given a stronger emphasis by the centre-right government (Jensen 2010).

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22 In Denmark Kindergarten is for the 3 (sometimes 2½) to 6 years old. Kindergartens are separate institutions. Kindergarten class is for 6 years old and is placed as the entry level at public and private schools alike and is also sometimes called grade 0. You are allowed to enroll your children already as 5 years old in the kindergarten class if they are deemed to be sufficiently mature. But normally children are enrolled when they are 6 or turn 6 within the first semester of the kindergarten class.
Finally, addressing problems of bullying it has been made mandatory for each school (board) to formulate an anti-bullying strategy based on a value set for good behaviour. It should create student welfare and a good learning environment of ‘respectful relations between the school students and between students and school staff’ (Ministry of Education 2010b: article 1.2). Transgressions of norms of good behaviour in and outside the school can be sanctioned.

2.2. Toleration, Recognition And Integration

Many issues regarding non-toleration, toleration and recognition have emerged in the context of the above developments. The strong focus on integration has worked against the acceptance of differences either negatively (toleration) or positively (recognition). There is a general concern that the school system transmits civic values and in the public schools also a common (national) identity and development of individuality and autonomy. It is feared that some free primary schools teach divisive ideological (religious) doctrines. Generally there is a concern with segregation along not only ethnic but also social and academic lines, due to the legislation on free primary schools and free choice between public schools.

In this study of toleration issues in the Danish school sector, we focus on two particular cases which cover most, but not all of these issues. With regard to the transmission of key values through the school system, we have focused on the permissibility of individual schools to accommodate culturally and religiously founded demands of students and parents with minority background. The case concerns self-representation and interaction in the public school system and the relation between principled boundaries of tolerance and pragmatic accommodation so that the school provides education for all students on a daily basis (in collaboration with their parents).

The other case regards the institutional structure of the educational system and in general the creation of free primary schools by religious minorities, in particular Muslims. The Danish rules on free primary schools can be construed as a right for minority parents to choose the kind of (ideological and religious) education they want for their children. As such it epitomizes Danish (institutional) toleration. However, increased state control and monitoring of free primary schools can be seen as restriction of the space of tolerance.
2.3. Case 1: The Accommodation of Ethno-Religious Diversity within the Public School

A controversial issue in the Danish public debate has been the extent to which the public schools should accommodate demands for special treatment and exemptions for immigrant students and parents based on their cultural and religious sensibilities.

As accounted for in the introduction, public schools have relative autonomy to decide the content and form of education and the individual school boards can make decisions on how to run the schools. This autonomy can be used to accommodate cultural and religious differences. However, the need for schools to transmit key liberal democratic values and a common (national) identity has been strongly emphasised and accommodations have been controversial when they are perceived to conflict with core values.

Accommodations in the form of exemptions have been discussed in relation to Christianity studies in the public schools, gym classes including swimming as well as music and arts classes. Special treatment has been discussed in connection with the selection of teaching material, creation of prayer rooms, shower curtains facilitating privacy, dietary requirements, special days off in connection with Ramadan and the resort to religious authorities, imams, in keeping discipline in schools. This type of cases predominantly concerns identities and practices in schools and to what extent they should be prohibited, discouraged, tolerated, or recognized as valuable and accommodated.

The present case study concerns a recent event in February 2010 that represents discussions of this kind. A debate erupted about whether it was legitimate for the public Holberg School in Copenhagen to hold parent meetings only for women on the grounds that some immigrant women did not turn up to meetings open to both sexes and the school had difficulty creating contact with those parents. To some this was a pragmatic measure to create the kind of parent involvement that is needed in order to get the daily life of the school to function. To others, it was a fundamental breach with the key norm of gender equality and a submission to Muslim intolerance and ‘medieval patriarchal norms’, etc. The fact that certain groups of parents cannot work within the framework of mixed-gender parents’ meetings should not be taken into account because it would undermine clear norms of gender equality, interpreted to mean no separation between men and women at common meetings with the school as well as identical responsibility of both sexes for the education of their children.

The initial complaint that started the event came from a father who felt unjustly excluded from the women-only meetings on bullying among students. The complaint was reported by a national newspaper. High-ranking national politicians intervened. Some demanded that the politically elected head of the Copenhagen School administration should correct the headmaster of the Holberg School and have him change the decision regarding the meetings. The Danish People’s Party developed a national plan for schools to counteract initiatives of this kind. One suggestion was that children should only be allowed to speak Danish in Danish schools (no Arabic and Turkish!). The Liberal Minister of Education said that he found the initiative to hold women-only meetings ‘horrible’, but still defended the autonomy of the school’s board and headmaster to make such decisions. Some politicians, also from the Liberal Party, demanded a national investigation on how widespread these (illegitimate) accommodations of cultural and religious differences were. They were turned down by the Liberal Minister of Integration, who preferred to spend her money on integration instead – as she put it. The leader of the left-wing Socialist People’s Party got in trouble with sections of his own party, especially those in Copenhagen, for his initial hard line opposition to the women-only meetings, and had to retract his ‘condemnation’ of the meetings. Some of the high-ranking politicians were invited to and visited the Holberg School. Curiously it turned out that the meetings were part of a state-subsidized,
local ‘integration project’ with funding sanctioned by the same national parties who were criticizing it. The women-only meetings were held and continued as planned. There was no immediate action at any political level (national or local) to change this type of accommodation.

There are two interesting aspects in this case with regard to toleration in education: the (lacking) effect of principled national discourses on every day practices at individual schools and the underlying approach to making accommodations in the daily life of schools. There is a prevailing (pragmatic) interest in getting the school life to work, especially ensuring that the students receive the relevant education and that schools create good communicative relations with immigrant parents. Sometimes the ‘big questions’ about fundamental values and identities are bracketed in order to reach an understanding about the very concrete concerns of different parties involved in the individual student’s schooling. This may also involve not only toleration but the employment of norms of interaction that imply respect for immigrant parents as competent and equal participants in communication with the school and in the ‘school community’ in general.

Nonetheless, there are limits to the kinds of accommodation that can be made. Some have pointed to the (unintended) negative consequences of accommodating, for instance, religious demands. Accommodating religious practice within school hours can, for example, lead to peer pressure on students ‘nominally’ belonging to a specific religious group to conform to religious norms that they reject or are disinterested in.

The case study is mainly based on three sources: (1) media coverage of the Holberg School debate; (2) interviews with people connected to the event at the national, municipal and local levels, representing different points of view and interests. Interviewees who are differently placed with regard to the case (see list in annex 1) are prioritized; (3) examples of policy guidelines and tools developed at different levels (national and local) for dealing with cultural and religious diversity in school life, including communication with immigrant parents.

2.3.1. The Media Debate

The concern about integration is almost all-pervasive in Denmark and this was also reflected in the debate about the Holberg School. Both supporters and opponents of the women-only meetings used ‘integration’ as an underlying premise in their argumentation. Opponents saw them as undermining central Danish values in school practices and as a form of ‘performativ’ contradiction by a central Danish (value, cultural) institution. They would undermine the ability to transmit key values to children and, not least, to their parents. The parents ought to adapt to the modern Danish values and leave old-fashioned patriarchal cultural and religious norms behind. Among the strong opponents of the women-only meetings, there was no talk of recognition or toleration.

Supporters claimed that such pragmatic measures would establish contact to parents – and in general to groups – that could not be established through other means. By including groups through pragmatic measures communication would be established and communication would lead to ‘integration’. It is evident in the interviews, that this perspective is dominant in the professional world. It also clear from the guidelines or ‘inspiration catalogues’ / handbooks published by the Ministry of Education. While the introductions/forewords by the minister may emphasise the centrality of ‘Danish values’ the body

23 The funding came from a special pool of money, Satspuljemidlerne, distributed to social projects with regular intervals and decided upon by most Danish political parties in common.
of the publication is based on the notion of intercultural dialogue and places great emphasis on recognizing all students and parents as equal and important irrespective of their cultural and religious background. It is also underlined that the cultural backgrounds of such students should be seen as a ‘resource’ in teaching and school life. However, there is no talk of recognizing people’s particular identities as valuable as such – and great efforts are made not to reduce the explanation of behaviour and conflicts to culture (religion). Similarly, while there is focus on the fact that people legitimately may hold different values and the publications advise on conflict resolution, there is no admission of fundamental and permanent value conflicts. There is in this sense little focus on ‘tolerance’ as a possible means of dealing with cultural and religious conflict. More about this below.

The opponents of the women-only meetings claimed that such meetings were unacceptable. There were various lines of criticism and reactions. A key concern was the undermining of modern Danish gender equality norms:

It is a completely ridiculous decision. We shall not sacrifice gender equality and the rights of fathers to participate in the school life of their children out of consideration for some entrenched religious convictions. (Villy Søvndal, Leader of the Socialist People’s Party, quoted in Berlingske Tidende 04.02.2010)

According to Villy Søvndal, the school should not promote and legitimize reactionary gender roles based on the notion that the education and well-being of children were only the responsibility of women. This line was generally supported by the members of the Social Democratic Party (at the national level), members of the governing Liberal and Conservative Parties and of course the Danish People’s Party:

It is deeply grotesque that a Danish people’s school holds such a medieval conviction that men and women cannot be in the same room in the year 2010 (Pia Adelsten, DPP Spokesperson on gender equality, quoted in Berlingske Tidende 04.02.2010)

Pia Adelsten (DPP) summarized the main expectation behind this view

In Denmark men and women are equal and we will not change our society to the demands and norms of immigrants. The immigrants should adapt to Denmark and not the other way round. It is completely unreasonable that a single father or a father who wants to, cannot participate in a parents’ meeting at the school of his child. It is sex discrimination and gender equality has to apply both ways (Pia Adelsten, in Berlingske Tidende 05.02.2010).

It is obvious that for most of the opponents, this is the limit of toleration:

If more school directors – in misunderstood tolerance – contribute in this manner to undermining the necessary integration process, which the Prime Minister several times has defined as the government’s focus area, the Minister [of Education] must join the debate clearly demarcate the boundary of toleration (Editorial, Berlingske Tidende 05.02.2010).

One concern is that accommodation of particular demands of immigrants is a slippery slope that may end in an irreversible state of affairs:

Every time people insist on special accommodations of Muslim fellow citizens, and every time these special accommodations are extended also obligate others besides Muslims, another slice of the salami is cut off – another slice of the Danish basis of democratic culture (Editorial Jyllands-Posten, 05.02.2010).
There is a risk that it becomes much more comprehensive and once something like this is established it is difficult to change (Karen Jespersen, Liberal Party, quoted in Jyllands-Posten 05.02.2010).

This is paired with the claim that it is really only the most extreme segments of Muslim minorities that make such demands and that accommodations really are accommodations of the extremist and not of the ordinary Muslims (N. Khader, Conservative Party, quoted in Jyllands-Posten 05.02.2010).

The reaction was in favour of having the school director stop the meetings. Another action was to have the extent of such accommodations mapped with a view to regulation. The DPP went furthest. It was not content with a general debate about values leaving school autonomy intact, and therefore suggested prohibiting sex-separated classes and parents’ meetings in Danish schools (Berlingske Tidende, 05.02.2010) as well as a ban on languages other than Danish in schools (Information, 06.02.2010).

The middle ground was covered by Liberal ministers, predominantly the Minister of Education. He argued for toleration based on local school autonomy and reluctance to have the Danish state regulate in detail how individual schools should be run. The minister is reported as saying that he had never heard anything as ‘horrible’ in his fifteen years as Minister of Education and he encouraged the school director at the Holberg School to get a hold of the immigrant fathers, give them a scolding and tell them that ‘this is Denmark and here you can go to a meeting even if there are people of the opposite sex present.’ However, he added:

It is definitely not something that we have to decide for all of Denmark. We have to strengthen the management responsibility [of the individual schools], not weaken it. I am neither minister for headscarves, shower curtains, liver pate sandwiches [traditional Danish lunch dish containing pork], invitations to parents’ meetings nor questions about what you are allowed to say in the school yard (Politiken, 05.02.2010).

The Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party sided with the government. They also did not want to ban or regulate this type of accommodations in individual schools.

Supporters of the women-only meetings generally took a pragmatic stance and argued that if these meetings would facilitate communication that otherwise would not take place, then they were in order. A second premise is that the overall principle is to make sure that the school communicates with and includes all groups. In fact, it transpired that the meetings were not really parents’ meetings in the strict sense, but rather special theme meetings organized in the context of a general integration project financed by the government and authorized by the same parties which were condemning it in public. 24

The supporters’ argument was that this was a pragmatic measure and was justified on the basis of the aim of the meetings

If that is what it takes to ensure that the students have a safe and good day in school without bullying, then I respect the decision. (Anders Bondo Christensen, Chairman, Teachers’ Union, quoted in Berlingske Tidende 04.02.2010)

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24 In fact, members of the SPP, SD and the Liberal Party retracted some of their initial criticism when it became public that the meetings were part of an integration project for women and that they were not parents meetings in the strict sense. They claimed they had been misinformed.
This kind of medieval view on women has to be fought, but that is not the purpose of this coffee meeting. Nor is it the responsibility of the school. The school must focus on the children; on their well being and education. (Mette-Line Thorup, commentary, Information, 05.02.2010)

A good suggestion: Relax, let the individual school directors decide. If they can help the children by holding meetings only for mothers, only for siblings or only for fathers, then let them do it as long as the regular school-parent cooperation is observed and respected. The meeting at the Holberg School was not actually part of the value struggle. (Editorial in Politiken, 05.02.2010)

As the last two quotes reveal there is a conscious distinction between the principled political value debate or ‘culture/value struggle’ – a household term in Danish politics in the last 10 years – and pragmatic measures. Not all things could possibly be the responsibility of schools and their efforts to create contact with groups of parents.

Also the chairman of the board of the Holberg School lamented that the politicians had lost contact with reality:

> You simply have to relate to how the real world is. The politicians completely miss the point and escalate the whole thing into a very populist debate (Britt Vorgod Pedersen, quoted in Information, 05.02.2010)

While the critics of the meetings were afraid that the Holberg School was going to set a bad example for other schools, the supporters, many of whom belonged to the professional community, argued for allowing schools to experiment with different solutions adjusted to their individual conditions and experiences.

> The experiences of the Muslim Schools underline yet again that there are differences between schools and that it is up to the teachers and directors at the schools to establish a meeting culture which takes into account the interest and well-being of the children in the best possible manner. (Bondo Christensen, Teachers Union, Kristeligt Dagblad, 05.02.2010)

Testing different ideas is positive. The most important thing is that one does what is best for the children (…) The schools in Denmark are very different and it is therefore important that the schools are able to manage problems individually. (Benedikte Ask Skotte, national parents’ association, School and Society, quoted in Berlingske Tidende 06.02.2010).

> I propose that one experiments with what works and what does not. (A. Balle, School Directors Association, quoted in Berlingske Tidende 06.02.2010).

One university expert pointed out that schools had to work with the parents as they actually were and not how they ought to be:

> One can hope that that is what the Holberg School does: that it takes its starting point in how the parents actually are and listens to their perception of the problems. It can benefit the school because it gets new information. It can also benefit the parents because they are taken seriously. And it can benefit the students because the school and the parents in this manner together can solve some problems instead of being mutually disappointed in each other (H. Knudsen, Dept. of Education, Aarhus University, quoted in Kristeligt Dagblad 05.02.2010).

The pragmatic defence of the meetings reveals an implicit concept of tolerance. As with the liberal minister of education, there is no positive acceptance of the alleged difference – different interpretation of gender equality (or patriarchal norms). However, contrary to the minister it is here
argued that this difference has to be tolerated in order to achieve an overriding goal: the well-being and education of the children. The medieval norms should be changed, but parents’ meetings about bullying are not the time or the place. To the minister, tolerance is towards school practice out of respect for school autonomy and in a rejection of the notion of a detailed central state regulation of school life. In defence of pragmatic solutions there also a second conception of toleration which is less pragmatic and more principled. This is evidenced in the last quote: the parents have to be taken seriously as persons and parents even if they endorse wrong perceptions of gender roles. The parents are not only conceived as objects of toleration, but also as subjects of toleration: they are seen as moral and ‘political’ equals.

The endorsement of local experiments can be seen in the same vein; as a way for power wielders – school, board and staff – to best develop working relationships with immigrant parents as objects of manipulation; or, in a more democratic interpretation, local solutions consider the interests of all involved to ensure the well-being and education of the children.

In the debate, few directly addressed the need for recognition. A participant in one of the meetings (on bullying) pointed to the negative view of immigrant groups produced in the debate and how this misrecognition may have negative consequences beyond their immediate target group (immigrant fathers allegedly subscribing to medieval patriarchal norms):

One thing is that some of the elected politicians haven’t bothered to study the purpose and idea behind the meeting, another is how they talk about Muslims, while they with their words of condemnation dig the chasm between ‘them’ and ‘us’ deeper, deeper and deeper. It is thought provoking and perhaps not so strange that the children in the schools have difficulty treating each other with dignity and respect. There are in any case clear threads back to the exclusion mechanisms which are drawn all the way down from the highest level (Ditte Dalum Christoffersen, in Politiken 06.02.2010).

Another critique of the politicians’ reactions pointed to the potentially negative consequences of the initial harsh criticism of the school’s initiative to seek new solutions in cultural and religious diversity questions: Who would bother or even dare to take new initiatives if one risked being attacked in this manner (letter to the editor, Jyllands-Posten 09.02.2010).

Behind the defence of the pragmatic approach to accommodating cultural and religious diversity is another partly competing, partly supplementary perception of what leads to integration, the overriding concern in Danish politics. This approach may be termed ‘integration through inclusion’ as opposed to ‘integration through values’ (i.e. through the transmission and acquisition of central (Danish) values). Integration through inclusion is based on the idea that it is better to make accommodation which pulls various groups, predominantly women, out of their isolation and establish contact, than to insist on a very definite and uniform understanding of what central Danish values entail (e.g., that all meetings should be gender mixed):

The inherent beauty of the mothers’ meeting at the Holberg School was that in addition to resolving the problem of bullying at the school, it would get the mothers out of isolation and give them an opportunity to get in contact with and integrate with society (Anita Bay Bundegaard, editor, in Politiken 06.02.2010).

One of the very popular words of the day is parallel society. We are really getting a parallel society if the Muslim girls are kept at home because they cannot participate in activities together with boys. Now the girls are together with Danish girls and girls with another ethnic background
The code words here are pragmatic integration solutions. It does not make the medieval darkness descend over Denmark that 25 women meet and drink tea. (A. Vang, Mayor for Education in Copenhagen, quoted in Information 09.02.2010).

As mentioned, integration through inclusion seems to be the favoured approach by most members of the professional community (i.e. municipal school administrations, teachers’ and school directors’ associations as well as parent representatives). Obviously, the details of this approach did not emerge in the media debate, but material from the professional community, including the highest levels of the Ministries of Integration and Education, give more evidence for this approach as do many of the interviews.

However, the approach lives side by side with the integration through values approach and in particular with the requirement contained in the legal framework that the public school imbue the students with certain values and virtues. The next section will look at publications issued by the Ministries of Integration and Education in which the approach is spelled out and in which tensions with other concerns can be seen.

2.3.2. Integration Through Inclusion: Dialogue and Respect

As mentioned, curricula in the Danish schools are determined locally. However the state governs the school sector by setting goals and targets for all school subjects. Moreover the ministry (ministries) issues optional guidelines and handbooks on topics such as cultural differences in schools. While the final editing is in the hands of the ministries, production of the material is usually outsourced to professionals and based on research projects and experiments in schools in Denmark.

These publications evidence a tension between integration through values and integration through inclusion. A good example is a 2003 publication from the Ministry of Education Inspiring Better Integration in the People’s School (see also Ministry of Education 2008). The Minister of Education writes in the foreword that ‘the school should ensure that the values upon which the school is based is known and respected by staff as well as students and parents’ and mentions the three values ‘intellectual freedom, equality and democracy’ (Ministry of Education 2003: 8 cf. above) and have other statements to the same effect. The rest of the publication is nonetheless mainly dedicated to the idea of integration through inclusion and the discourse on ‘values’ recedes to the background. The publication hence underlines the need to create understanding of the purposes of the schools and the expectations on both sides of the cooperation between schools and parents. For example, it is important that ‘the school is interested in the [the parents’] ideas and expectations and views the parents as important co-players, who have to be included in the cooperation as early as possible’ (Ministry of Education 2003: 15). It is underlined that there may be different ideas about schools and schooling among immigrant parents and that it should be taken into account in the communication that there are different expectations in Danish schools about certain norms, for example the perception of authority, the need for discussion and argumentation in class as well the informal dress of students and teachers (ibid.: 21). It is emphasised that all misunderstandings and conflicts are not necessarily based on culture and identity, but may have personal or social reasons (ibid.: 15). The publication discusses how certain accommodations on the basis of inclusion of immigrant students and parents can be made in connection with for example cooking classes (selection of meat, possibility of taking the produced food home and eating it after sunset), gym classes (showering dressed), sex education (separate classes
for boys and girls), school excursions (separate sleeping arrangements, food selection, no alcohol) and in connection with religious holidays, exempting students from school and planning key school events.

Integration through inclusion is also prevalent in a recent publication from the Ministry of Integration on School-Parent cooperation with ‘New-Danish Parents’ (Ministry of Integration 2010). It is initially underlined that it is important to convey the purpose of the school-parent cooperation and the school’s demands to the parents. However, the actual dialogue between teachers and parents (i.e. the actual participants in the cooperation) emphasises mutual respect. Teachers and parents have common interest in the academic success of the child:

The purpose of school-parent cooperation is to unite the school’s and the parents’ view on the child and achieve a common understanding of the child as a student. (ibid.: 11)

The dialogue thus has one overriding purpose: the education and well-being of the child. The publication then underlines the importance of mutual respect and how ‘the appreciative dialogue’ can ensure such respect:

Parents and teachers have different roles and see the child from their respective perspectives. Mutual respect is a critical condition for good cooperation. The parents want to be respected for the values they give to their child and for their effort to raise the child in such a way that he/she will be able to take care of him/herself as an adult. The parents are emotionally tied to their child and view the child from experiences and contexts which include much more than just the child’s school-life. The teachers want to be respected for their competence as teachers. The teacher is the professional, who sees the child as a student and as part of a bigger group of students. (ibid.: 11)

The appreciative dialogue is based on the notion of focusing on future directed actions and possibilities rather than on identities and problems. It is seen as a dialogue in which mutual recognition of others as equals is established and where differences in views are recognized (ibid.: 11). The dialogue is intended to establish relations and transforming them and the field available for action. In terms of practical advice it is underlined that it should be made clear that parents are able to contradict the teacher and express disagreements. The focus should be on dialogue and concrete issues and not (just) on the transmission of information from teacher to parent. Similarly, and strikingly, it is underlined that ‘speaking inclusively’ excludes expressions such as ‘This is how we do it in Denmark’ (ibid.: 18).

Another publication lays out the principles and steps of the appreciative dialogue (Navigent 2008) based on the idea that the truth must emerge as a result of negotiations between different perspectives, none of which can be said to be correct or true beforehand (ibid: 9-10). The parents must be accepted and recognised with a view to developing mutual respect:

When you understand and accept the parents, it is also possible to recognise and appreciate them. Even if they have a different world view than you and have other convictions, you can talk about it with them and create the possibility of changing some things – simply because they feel recognised. (ibid.: 13)

Recognition leads to ‘mutual respect’ (see figure 1) and this entails recognising and respecting the differences among parents and teachers. For the teacher this is important to remember because the risk

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25 A adaptation of the concept of ’appreciative inquiry’.
is that ‘integration takes place as cultural adaptation where some people are incorporated [assimilated] into your culture and the dialogue takes place on your premises’ (ibid.: 13).

**Figure 2.1: Illustration of the steps of appreciative dialogue**

![Diagram of the steps of appreciative dialogue](image)

**Note:** It is emphasised that the last step, ‘love,’ is only relevant in the relation between child and parent, not in the professional relation between teacher and child/parent (Navigent 2008: 12).

Now, the underlying theory, and principles and practical measures of the appreciative dialogue are some distance from the idea of integration through values. There is no scolding of fathers with antiquated patriarchal norms and telling them that ‘in Denmark we do so and so.’ Similarly, there is no idea that there are some key values that are necessarily privileged at the outset (however, see below). On the other hand, it is not clear that it is based on positive recognition of the values and identities of other people. Rather it is the respect and recognition of others as people who hold other values and convictions. And again there is a warning against reducing people to their cultural and religious background because it can ‘impede the dialogue’ (ibid.: 23).

In this sense ‘integration through inclusion’ contains an implicit notion of tolerance, which entails more than objection, namely a form of curiosity and openness, but still less than a necessary embracement and ‘positive recognition’. Openness and curiosity even apply when the limit of toleration is reached:

Acceptance is impossible in those rare cases when utterances of the parents are in conflict with the law or our society’s fundamental values of democracy, gender equality, freedom of religion etc. Here it is necessary for you as a teacher to hold your ground. But do it in an appreciative manner. Ask what it is the parents wish for, what they hope for and dream about, and go on from there instead of problematizing their statements. (ibid.: 12)

So there are limits to toleration and tension between equalizing all perspectives and key values does arise. Dialogue-based integration through inclusion has its limits. On the one hand, it is geared towards reaching common solutions and discussing disagreements, e.g. about the school’s role in influencing the children in the area of ‘values and life attitudes’ (Ministry of Integration 2010: 41). It seeks solutions that ‘fit the school and parent group in question’ (ibid.: 41). On the other hand, the solutions must be ‘in agreement with the school’s view on learning and its value basis’ (ibid.: 41), including for example the notion that students are required to ‘take responsibility for their own learning’, ‘that the school is based on student democracy and co-determination’ and that the ‘students are expected to express their views’ (ibid.: 10), i.e. ideas closely related to the Danish People’s School’s emphasis on personal autonomy and development and reflexive democratic virtues.
In the publications the dialogue-based integration through inclusion and related practical measures are generally presented as things that have been proven to work because it creates communication and because it motivates immigrant students and parents for participation where they are taken seriously as equal and competent communication partners with legitimate interests, views and values. The same impression comes from interviews with members of the professional community. It is underlined that the political discourse on key values and drawing on the idea of ‘integration through values’ at best is irrelevant and at worst harmful, either because it produces risk adversity in the school sector with regard to new experiments and accommodations or because it pollutes the efforts to establish contact and communication between school, parents and students. The latter because the identities created in the national discourse on values, including the prevalent ‘them’ and ‘us’ distinction, become interpretative schemes through which parties interpret each other and each others’ statements, making communication even more difficult. Interviewees from the professional community reveal that the big questions about ‘values’ are often bracketed in view of the need to find concrete solutions to concrete challenges of making the school life of individual students work. The effort is in other words to distance themselves somewhat from the principled political discourse on values and prioritise the goal at hand: the well-being and education of the student.

2.3.3. Conclusion

An underlying premise of the accommodation of cultural and religious differences in Danish public schools is integration. Danish national politics and public discourse is dominated by a conception of integration through values, according to which the public schools should transmit key national and liberal democratic values to students and their parents in a uniform and uncompromising manner. This leaves little space for the recognition or even toleration of difference. The counter discourse of ‘integration through inclusion’ is also in part based on the goal of integration. Pragmatic arguments for toleration and accommodation are however also closely related to securing the well-being and education of the individual student. They are followed by more principled arguments pertaining to the concept of appreciative dialogue about respecting minority parents as equal and competent speaking partners who are entitled to make their own choices about values and child rearing. The driving idea about integration through inclusion is that integration follows from the kind of accommodation that creates contact and interaction between different groups in society. The underlying concept of acceptance is a respect based conception of toleration emphasising the need to respect others as moral and political equals with the right to make their own choices. However, it does not go beyond this notion of respect. It is paired with a principled openness and curiosity towards that to which one objects/rejects, but does not rest on any requirement of positive recognition.

At the same time, the concept of toleration and respect contained in ‘appreciative dialogue’ – the more principled part of ‘integration through inclusion’ – is some distance from the traditional Danish notion of liberality which includes a blunt and confrontational discursive ethos according to which one ‘fights for everything one holds dear’ while recognizing the same right for all.

It seems clear from the material issued from e.g. the ministries and from the interviews with people working with or in the public school professional community that the partly pragmatic and partly principled approach underlying the overall discourse of ‘integration through inclusion’ is deemed successful, whilst the stubborn insistence on a uniform transmission of values, including the inherent ‘them and us’ distinctions, is at best irrelevant and at worst harmful to school level efforts to create facilitating conditions for immigrant minority students in public schools.
2.4. Case 2: Free Schools – The Epitome of Danish Educational Tolerance?

The Danish tradition of free primary schools is often seen as an expression of (institutional) tolerance in the Danish educational system. The free schools are seen as privileging the rights of parents to choose education for their children in accordance with their own ideology and pedagogical convictions over the right of the state and the democratic majority. As such it can be construed as a democratic minority right which furthermore is made effective through a large state subsidy (a voucher system) which makes it affordable for most parents to send their children to these private schools.

In the 1990s a number of schools were established for Turkish, Arabic and Urdu-speaking children. In 1998 the free school legislation was tightened so that only free schools teaching in Danish would be eligible for state subsidies. German minority schools and some international schools were exempted. A post-9/11 debate on Muslim free schools and concerns that their teaching may not teach in support of democracy and human rights led to a change in the legislation in 2002 so that the free primary schools are required to teach democracy and human rights. In 2005 the regulation was tightened yet again emphasising that the schools should ‘develop and strengthen the students’ knowledge of and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, including equality between the sexes’ (cf. above). The basis for monitoring the schools’ ability to live up to these requirements and to academic standards equal to those of the public schools was improved. Recently, monitoring of free primary schools was included in the Government’s 2009 anti-radicalization plan (Danish Government 2009: 18).

Another criticism against the use and establishment of free primary schools is that they facilitate ‘white flight’ from the public schools based on ‘intolerance’ against weak and bilingual (i.e. immigrant) students and that this leads to segregation and increased intolerance between groups because social and cultural groups do not mix. As mentioned, it is currently discussed how free schools may be economically induced to take more responsibility for the ‘integration task’.

Together the two criticisms and the ensuing policy development can be seen as a restriction on the minority right and the space of tolerance partly to ensure tolerance in the future. In this sense, what some see as the epitome of Danish (institutional) tolerance (or liberal) others see as its opposite. It should be added however, that tolerance and integration are not the only concerns. The academic effects of segregation also play a role for some of the critics.

The case study concerns the ‘structure of the education system’ and it is about the boundaries between what is unacceptable and what is tolerable. To some degree it also concern issues of interaction – or rather lack thereof – between different groups in the overall Danish school system with regard to development of tolerance and respect/recognition.

The case study is based on newspaper coverage in the last 10 years and policy documents pertaining to the 2002 and 2005 revisions of the law of free primary schools. The main actors in the debate are national politicians, school sector professionals, commentators and members of the general public. The study is also based on interviews with people from the free primary school sector, politicians and employees in the Ministries of Education and Integration.
Conceptions of Tolerance and Intolerance in Denmark

2.4.1. The Free School Debate in The Danish Press

The attitudes to the free schools and their role in Danish society can be divided into different types of tolerance and intolerance. A nationalist intolerance argues that the establishment of Islamic free schools undermines fundamental Danish values and traditions. In addition, new forms of principled liberal intolerance come in three modalities relating respectively to the liberal divide between public and private; the perfectionist requirement to become ‘liberal people’; and the protection of cultural cohesion and homogeneity i.e. a societal intolerance of ‘too much diversity’ including concerns about segregation.

The arguments in defence of the Islamic free schools and their right to teach in Denmark are based on the Danish free school tradition, on notions of tolerance and the democratic rights of minorities as well as on pragmatic arguments about maintaining peace through a *modus vivendi*. In general the debate is about tolerance and the limits of tolerance. However in a single case (and perhaps somewhat rhetorically), it is argued that the fact that the Muslim minority has acquired the Danish ‘free school tradition’ should be celebrated and recognised as valuable.

National Intolerance: Islamic Schools Destroy the Danish Free School Tradition

To people in the DPP and others, the establishment of Islamic free schools is an abuse of a Danish tradition that requires the rules to be changed. It undermines Danish values. Members of the DPP have argued that while they are for the free school tradition, it should be against the law on free schools to teach the Quran: ‘it is completely out of place that children growing up in Denmark are given state subsidies to be taught in any other religion than Christianity’ (Chr. H. Hansen, DPP, *Jyllands-Posten*, 12.11.2001). Another commentator argued along similar lines:

> There is no warrant in the Danish constitution for giving other cultures equal status to the Danish culture and turning us into a country of immigration. In addition, it costs us money to give these people human rights which we ourselves do not need, and which will destroy our culture. (A. M. Engel, commentator, *JP*, 05.06.2001)

The view that Islamic free schools lie outside the Danish tradition is perhaps most evident in a relatively recent comment from DPP party leader Pia Kjærsgaard:

> The utilization/abuse of the Danish free school tradition by the Muslim private schools makes it necessary to tighten the rules concerning free schools and the rules concerning the duty to monitor [the free schools], and it destroys a good Danish tradition for being able to establish free schools and teach in accordance with the value set of the parents. (*Berlingske Tidende*, 12.10.09)

The statement implies that it must be ensured that the parents’ values are within the realm of the acceptable before they can establish their own schools. Or at least that is should be ensured via the legislation that the schools teach within the limits of what is acceptable. The view is that Islamic free schools must be viewed with a general suspicion and monitored. They are furthermore to be regretted because they are undermining a good Danish tradition which would function well in their absence.

Liberal Intolerance

The nationalist intolerance of Islamic free schools as a threat to Danish values and tradition of tolerance or liberality (see Danish WP1) shades into a more liberal concern with the fact that the teachings of Islamic schools may go against fundamental liberal and democratic norms. Paired with a form of Christian intolerance against Islam in Europe, one commentator, a retired priest, hence saw far-reaching consequences of the establishment of Islamic free schools. They
are emerging all over Europe and lay the basis for an Islamism which will become a serious political factor in the future, a political factor that does not know of religious freedom (John W. Hørbo, Jyllands-Posten, 15.10.2002)

At a less apocalyptic level, the concern is that the Islamic free schools do not teach the values of democracy and human rights or in accordance with them:

The whole point of the free school is that there is space for thinking and believing in a way that is different ... but conversely this should not mean that this becomes a sanctuary for a belief and a way of thinking that is characterised by intolerance and opposition to the surrounding society. (K. Sejr, Social Liberals, JP 15.11 2001)

Commentator Lone Nørgaard perhaps took this point the furthest:

As far as my (failing) tolerance is concerned, I am no longer prepared to be tolerant towards values that I deeply and utterly oppose: the repression of women, discrimination, and the reading of the Quran that elevates the Quran to the highest authority … if tolerance means that I have to observe from the side line while Danish society step by step is transformed in a direction that I do not want, well, then I do not mind giving up that version of tolerance. (BT, 12.07.2003)

This is a version of not being tolerant of groups with illiberal values: a case for the intolerance against the intolerant. Nørgaard also used a second modality of liberal intolerance. The point is that allowing parents to send their children to Islamic free schools is really to let down the children and their interest in achieving a good life: ‘The freedom and rights of parents should not take priority if the price is that the children are left in the lurch.’ (L. Nørgaard, JP, 12.05.2003)

The unambiguous opinion is that Islamic free schools produce ‘losers’ unable to function in society. It is reminiscent of liberal perfectionism and its ‘intolerance’ of non-autonomous living. Free schools are to give their students the education they need to live autonomous lives. By not giving children this type of education they harm their interests (rights).

This argument is connected to the third modality of liberal intolerance, according to which the Islamic free schools produce too much diversity to the detriment of the sociological preconditions for maintaining a liberal society. Islamic free schools undermine liberal integration. They represent an unhealthy segregation of society.

Free Schools Lead to Segregation Generally

As mentioned, this point is taken further by some commentators who apply it to the free primary schools generally (not only Islamic or religious schools). The targets for criticism are not only immigrant Muslim parents, but all parents who choose to send their children to free primary schools for no other reason than to avoid the allegedly low quality of public schools with many ‘weak’ students, in particular those with immigrant background:

It was never the intention with the free school law that resourceful families would send their children to private schools at the taxpayers’ expense to avoid the weakest pupils. (Ritt Bjerregaard, Social Democrats, JP, 16.04.2005)

The use of the free primary schools can be seen as a form of escape option that is based on intolerance of the weaker students. This is really a break with the free school tradition which is about ideological and pedagogical experimentation and about democratic protection of minorities.
The original idea behind the free school tradition was to develop a diversity of teaching which reflected the right of minorities which was part of the idea of democracy ... we risk that the alternative school sector is replaced by a protest school sector ... that it becomes an attractive alternative that enables people to avoid those children nobody really wants play with. (C. Antorini, Social Democrats, Berlingske Tidende 19.05.2005)

The problem is that these private schools are subsidized by the public but do not accept a social responsibility: ‘it is a reverse Robin Hood, the state’s money is redistributed from the poorest in the country to the richest’ (JJ. Steen & K. Barsøe, CEVEA, JP, 03.06.2010). As mentioned, some of the concerns here regard the ability to ensure quality teaching in the public schools to increase the academic results of the weakest learners who are affected by the ‘flight’ of strong learners from the public schools. A second point is that segregation is not only based on intolerance, but that it fosters intolerance because different groups do not mix:

I think it is easier to have a community with people you know. And for me, the People’s School is the core. It is a central building block in our welfare society. Because this is where we meet each other and get the [sense of] community. If we don’t meet each other because the top and the bottom are taken out, then we have a problem. (interview, A. Vang, Mayor for Education. Copenhagen).

In sum, some find that the free school tradition is being abused to create free schools which teach intolerant doctrines which go against central Danish values and/or the values of liberal democracy and create intolerant (and uneducated) children. That is seen as a threat to integration and the ability to maintain a liberal society. Moreover, the resulting segregation has been under attack for undermining the academic results of the weaker learners and for fostering intolerance among social groups. The demands have ranged from banning Islamic free schools over increasing the demands for civic value education and state monitoring to creating new economic incentives to make free primary schools take more social responsibility and contribute to integration. Regulation and increased monitoring have been the main policy reactions, which has arguably reduced the space of toleration. However, other people have defended the freedom of the free primary schools in the name of tolerance and the Danish tradition of liberality.

In Defence of the Free School Tradition

A relatively unusual defence of the Danish free schools and the ability to establish religious schools within this legal framework is based on the pragmatic idea that it allows different religious and value sets to exist side by side. This is unusual in a country where the integration concern has been so predominant. One commentator hence defended Islamic free schools on the following grounds:

The path school director Abdul Wahid Pedersen has chosen with his [Islamic] free school is the only way to prevent that two great cultures collide in insoluble conflicts. The Muslim culture will not adjust to the Christian. And the Christian will not adjust to the Muslim. (V. Madsen, deputy school director, JP, 1008.2001)

This argument is reminiscent of a classic pragmatic argument for tolerance. It creates peace through *modus vivendi*. Remaining arguments in defence of the free school tradition is first that it is a venerable Danish tradition of toleration or ‘free mindedness’ (liberality, see Danish WP1). This is construed as a democratic minority right, which again is connected to the idea that the choices of others should be respected as the choices of moral and political equals. It is part of the conception of liberty that state regulation of and intervention in the free schools should be opposed. B. Haarder,
Minister of Education at the time, expressed this first argument, which he shares with his colleague and later Liberal Integration Minister B. Rønn Hornbech:

Precisely the free schools are a special Danish value since nothing like them can be found anywhere. The fact that we not only give equality to the minority, but give them extra support is unique for Denmark. The free school legislation means that one has the right to send one’s children to a school that fits one’s ideas of what a good school is. (Information, 06.07.2009)

The point is that this is something special pertaining to Denmark. This is not necessarily based on universal values, but rather a part of Danish national history and culture. Others take the same route and underline the paramount values of democratic minority protection:

Liberality [free-mindedness] has always been a capital point in questions of schools and churches ... A democracy must be evaluated based on how it treats its minorities ... we have ended up in judgmentalism – the foulest enemy of liberality. (Asger Baunsbak Jensen, priest and writer, JP, 20.07.2009)

T. Balle, former headmaster of the Free Teachers College (educating teachers for free primary schools), also points out that there is something more at stake than just forbidding Muslim schools, namely the rights of parents and the democratic protection of minorities: The free schools ‘are a key cornerstone in what you could call the special Danish values’ (T. Balle, Information, 14.12.2007).

Muslim commentators who defend Islamic free schools also used a combination of liberal arguments and arguments based on the Danish tradition.

Denmark boasts about its unshakable values, including freedom and tolerance. It is tragic that it does not take more than a couple of Muslim immigrants to shake them and turn them into empty rhetoric. (O. Shah, JP, 18.05.2003)

To Shah it is evident that the Islamic free schools cannot be disconnected from the surrounding society and have to teach their students about it and how to function in it, however,

to demand that they have to preach all those values (or the lack thereof) which characterize society in all its aspects, is a dictatorship of opinion and contrary to the values that Denmark claim for herself. (O. Shah. JP, 18.05.2003)

Shah offers a different explanation of the creation of Islamic free schools and their popularity. They are not the product of Muslim disdain for Danish society or intolerance of the Danish majority, but rather of the lack of tolerance and consideration for Muslims by the Danish public and public school:

Like other parents, Muslim parents simply wish to have their children seen and treated as students who have to be taught, rather than as some sorry creatures who (in the best case) have to be saved from repression or who (in the worst case) are seen as cultural enemies to be fought ... if the Copenhagen public school reflected realities, and tolerance and consideration were not seen as submission to fundamentalism, then many of the children who today end up in the free schools would most likely stay [in the public school]. (O. Shah Information, 10.01.2006)

Another Muslim commentator, Safia Aude, also claimed Muslim parents had all good reasons for sending their children to Islamic free schools including the fact that the grades are higher there than in the public schools (JP, 15.05.2003). In a relatively recent comment Z. B. Hussain asks why nobody can see the positive in the fact that Danish Muslims have learned from the Danish tradition of
organizing in voluntary associations and created their own nurseries and free schools (Information 31.07.2010).

These views link back to the discussion about cultural and religious accommodation in public schools and the different concepts and effects of integration through values and integration through inclusion respectively. It is also evident that the conception of who is tolerant/intolerant and who is breaking with Danish traditions is reversed. The Islamic free schools do not represent intolerance. Rather the criticism of them represents intolerance and shallow commitment to key liberal principles. And finally, it is pointed out that critics are not even able to recognise the value of something they usually value, just because the people involved are Muslims.

People directly connected with Islamic free schools tried to remove criticism by pointing out that they were indeed committed to integration (J. Hansen, Ahi International School, Berlingske Tidende, 02.10.2001). One school director described how the school had moved in a more secular direction by introducing sex education, natural science and religions other than Islam. He also described a school excursion to a Christian (Grundtvigian!) Church:26

It was a very positive experience to see and hear the engagement of the children. The priest said that it was exciting to have us visit and that we were welcome another time, if we wanted to. (D. Anik, Sealand’s Private School (Islamic), Information 21.11.2001)

The strategy here is to show that the Islamic schools are oriented towards and engaged with the surrounding society in a positive and open-minded manner to deflate the picture of them as sanctuaries for fundamentalism or for cultural and religious isolation and intolerance.

2.4.2. Policy Changes

There is widespread political support for the Danish free school tradition and it is unlikely that it will be changed fundamentally. However, in recent years defenders of free school autonomy have lost to the extent that free autonomy has become increasingly conditioned and circumscribed. There has been an increased emphasis on the need for free schools to ensure academic quality equal to the public school (and through this regulate the subjects taught in the schools) including the demand that schools operate and teach in Danish. Similarly the free schools are now explicitly required to transmit the values of freedom and democracy to students.

In 1998 it was stipulated that free primary schools should teach in Danish in order to receive public subsidies, and the monitoring of the quality of education was increased. In 2002 and 2005 two major changes followed. In 2002 it was introduced in the law that ‘the schools shall prepare the students to live in a society with freedom and democracy’. The legislative bill was motivated by reference to integration of bilingual children. It furthermore stated that

It has hitherto been an underlying presupposition for the freedom to establish and run free primary schools with state subsidy that the schools respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Of late, doubt has emerged as to whether the freedom is utilized to run free primary schools on value bases which are so fundamentalist that they disable the students to function in a society like the Danish one with freedom and democracy. (2001/2 LSF 163)

26 N.F.S. Grundtvig was an influential priest and educationalist and one of the (two) ‘founding fathers’ of the Danish free school tradition, cf. the general introduction to the report.
Originally, the new clause contained a reference to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but this was taken out in the legislative process due to concerns about readability. The clause (and its motivation) set the outer boundaries of toleration (for schools receiving state subsidies). The bill continues:

It is not the intention … to mandate that the free primary schools express specific views on ethical, religious or political questions, etc. On the contrary, the schools shall prepare the students to function as citizens in Denmark, including acknowledging and respecting that there can be different views on such questions, which is a presupposition of democracy. (2001/2 LSF 163)

It furthermore states that the schools are to give the students understanding of the underlying principles of the ECHR and that the clause entails a prohibition of teaching based on the notion that the ECHR is not respected, for example through religious and racist discrimination or the violation of freedom of speech and association. It unclear whether the clause demands that the schools transmit a democratic ethos to their students or only that they are provided with knowledge about the basic principles of human rights and democracy in order to function in Danish society.

Only two parties did not accept the 2002 revision. The DPP thought it was too slack and the Red-Green Alliance (far left-wing party) rejected it on other grounds. In the 2005 revision the democracy and freedom clause is expanded:

According to their purpose and in all their work [the schools] shall prepare the students to live in a society like the Danish one with freedom and democracy, and develop and strengthen the students’ knowledge of and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, including equality between the sexes. (Law on Free Schools, article 1.2)

The 2005 revision is seen as a specification and expansion of the 2002 clause to include not only teaching per se but all activities connected with the school. The expansion is made to ensure that fundamentalist or extremist actions, which are justified on religious grounds, etc., but which contradict human rights and fundamental freedoms, including gender equality, cannot take place at or from a free primary school. (legislative bill 2004/2 LF 105, emphasis added)

The government underlines that this clause is consonant with the ECHR because the ECHR only protects ‘associations, statements/utterances and gatherings, etc., which respect democracy and the equality between the sexes’ (legislative bill 2004/2 LF 105). This arguably restricts the freedom of schools and students to express opinions which diverge from endorsement of democracy and gender equality and come close to demanding a democratic and sex-egalitarian ethos in free schools. It hence seems to construe the space of toleration even more narrowly than the 2002 revision.

The 2005 revision also requires that teachers and board members are proficient in Danish and that the schools set goals for their own subjects or adopt those formulated for the public school, publish them and evaluate them continuously. The latter would increase the focus on academic standards and facilitate external monitoring of the schools.

The 2005 revision was opposed by the Social Liberals, The Socialist People’s Party and the Red-Green Alliance on the grounds that it took the freedom out of the free school tradition. They saw it as
undermining the rights of educational choice and as revealing distrust in the ability of parents and schools to use their freedom responsibly. As such it represented centralism and paternalism.\footnote{Betænkning afgivet af Uddannelsesudvalget den 21. april 2005.}

The most recent initiatives for free schools are a) monitoring of their activity as part of a 2009 government action plan on anti-radicalisation; and b) increased discussion about how to induce ‘white’ free schools to take on more responsibility for ‘the integration task’.

2.4.3. Policy Effects

State monitoring of free schools has led to the closing of a few schools. Before the 2002 legislative change three Muslim free schools were closed (i.e. their state subsidy was taken away). Two because of failing academic standards and one because it was suspected that it was not an independent unit (as required by the free school legislation), but a school run by the Lebanese organisation A.I.C.P. After the 2002 legislative change one Muslim school has been closed (in 2011) due to concerns that it did not live up to the requirements in the freedom and democracy clause.\footnote{In fact the school closed itself before the formal process came to an end.} The same applied to one Christian school belonging to the Pentecostal movement. Two other Muslims schools and one Scientology school have been closed due to failing academic standards. In terms of school closings, the monitoring effects have not been very strong.

If the Ministry of Education (in cooperation with the Ministry of Integration) finds shortcomings at a school, it can put it under ‘special monitoring’ – a sort of probation period. Schools are selected for monitoring because a) they lack clearly stated goals and policies for civic education; b) a general concern that students are part of isolated groups and social environments which exclude others because of religion, skin colour or political views (e.g. ‘ghetto schools’); and c) information (e.g. through the press) that creates concern in the ministry that a school’s civic education is failing. This implies that it rather easy to fall into the categories of schools put under monitoring. Recently, 25 free primary schools were selected for monitoring in connection with the Government’s 2009 anti-radicalisation plan to establish whether new changes in the law on free primary schools are required (Danish Government 2009: 18).

The ministry has a flexible approach to evaluation. It can use a 140-indicator model as guide relating to whether the school has clearly formulated goals, the goals and intentions of its teaching, the concrete teaching (content and learning processes), the results, and the overall culture of the school (Ministry of Education 2009b). One of the intentions behind model is that there ‘are many ways in which one can prepare the students to live in a society’ with freedom and democracy and ‘that there can be a lot of [different] signs that [the schools] live up to the requirement’ (Interview A. Andersen, Ministry of Education).\footnote{Interview with A. Andersen, former consultant in the Ministry of Education, responsible for the monitoring of free schools.} The evaluation is hence based on a ‘general assessment’, not on a strict list of criteria that must be fulfilled (ibid). Furthermore, the ministry’s general experience is that problems in relation to the freedom and democracy clause are predominantly due to the fact that schools have not provided the students with sufficient knowledge about society and its fundamental principles, not that the schools transmit controversial convictions and attitudes (ibid). Although the ministry does not see itself as conducting ‘loyalty tests’, it does not exclude that controversial convictions and attitudes could make schools fall short of the freedom and democracy requirement (ibid).
Interviews with people from the free school sector (The Free School Teachers’ Union and the Free School Association) reveal the perception that the monitoring of free schools represents a lack of trust in Islamic free schools. The latter have felt discriminated against, also in connection with ‘random’ selection of 25 schools for monitoring in continuation of the 2009 anti-radicalisation plan (cf. above). The two interviewees generally think that the increased monitoring is unnecessary and is an example of symbolic politics. Lastly, it is suggested that although the legislation continues to allow for large degrees of freedom, some schools are inclined to copy the subjects and the teaching methods from the public school in order not to have to defend themselves in connection with state monitoring. Documenting that they live up to standards in alternative ways is too costly and too risky for individual schools.

Two school directors of monitored schools generally express great uncertainty about how to demonstrate that the school and its teaching is really democratic and non-extremist. They describe how their school and staff make great efforts to come across as democratic (Kjærgaard & Larsen 2010: 68-75). They also express great concern about the method and feel that it is random whether or not a school is found to be failing in regard to civic education (ibid.). They furthermore see it as (part of) a general suspicion of (or construction of suspicion) Islam, Islamic free schools and Muslims (Generalverdact). They point to the ensuing feeling of discrimination and exclusion, especially among the students:

It makes them feel ‘but we are not a part of this society anyway, they don’t regard us as equals after all’ (School Director 1, interviewed anonymously in Kjærgaard & Larsen 2010: 73).

I think this has gotten a real negative ring to it because by now radicalization and extremism are simply connected with Islam. I think they have used the words – really grabbed them and used them so that one cannot use radical or extreme without people thinking: Islam, terrorist or whatever. ... And I think it is sad that we have to sit here and defend ourselves like this. (ibid.)

It is an attempt to articulate an agenda, saying that there are some really dangerous, there are some young people, who are latent terrorists. (School Director 2, interviewed anonymously in Kjærgaard & Larsen 2010: 75)

The closing of schools and the effect of the perception of being under general suspicion suggest that the policies have a knock-on effect in the free school world. Most likely schools are and will become more alert to the possibility of being closed if they do not come across as sufficiently democratic. Another effect is that they reduce their diversity in order not to have to defend their own alternative standards (i.e. definition of subjects and teaching methods) and hence become more similar to the public school. In addition, monitoring may have exactly the opposite effect of what this version of ‘integration through values’ approach aims to achieve, namely alienation of Muslim students from society. The interviewees do not convey a feeling of freedom and an experience of secure rights and tolerance from the Danish state. It is hence questionable that the policies can be regarded as unequivocal successes.

2.4.5. Conclusion

The case concerns the structure of the educational system and whether or not it is necessary to define the parameters of private school autonomy more precisely in order to defend key national liberal

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30 A. Pedersen, chairman of The Free School Teachers’ Union and E. Lilliendal, chairman of the Free School Association.
democratic values, further integration and ensure the rights of children to education that makes them competent individuals and citizens. The proponents of a more precise definition of free school autonomy – which arguably leads to its reduction – have used both arguments from the national tradition and arguments which can be described as liberal intolerance. They have wanted to reduce the space of toleration by defining its limits more precisely. The recent legislative changes seem to mandate that students are equipped with democratic ethos and not just knowledge sufficient to live in a society with freedom and democracy, although state monitoring usually is more concerned with the knowledge that schools provide than with their ethos. The discourse of integration through values may also be said to be underpinning these efforts.

Opponents of the reduction of the space of toleration through the more precise delimitation of free school autonomy have argued that this goes against the Danish tradition of liberality and have furthermore based their criticism on liberal arguments about the rights of minorities to make their own choices as well as the need to trust that they as moral and political equals will make responsible choices for themselves and their children. Again, the emphasis is more on toleration and respect than on clear positive recognition of particular minority identities and values.

In terms of implementation it is likely that the increased state monitoring and the risk of being closed down have increased schools’ attention to academic standards and to civic education. However, people at the receiving end of these policies generally feel that they are not trusted and their rights are not entirely secure. The system may pressure free schools to become more similar to the public school in order to reduce the risks and costs of pursuing a diverse vision of their school and its religious and ideological basis. Moreover, the experienced lack of trust may ultimately have counter-productive effects on the feeling of belonging to Danish society and democracy.

2.5. General Conclusions from the Two Case Studies

This section draws some general conclusions from the two case studies. It discusses differences and similarities between the two cases and asks whether the cases represent continuity or change within Danish school traditions before it addresses the various Danish forms of acceptance and non-acceptance that the cases represent. Finally, the section points to some of the lessons that can be learned from the two cases.

Similarities and Differences between the Two Cases

In both cases the focus on integration is very central. There has been a lot of emphasis on transforming parents and students into democratic citizens with the right values. This is integration through values. There is in both cases strong emphasis on democratic citizenship as an ideal that has to be taught and practiced in schools among parents, students and school representatives. While the free primary schools are not under the same formal obligation to develop students into autonomous persons in the private and professional realm, they are under some obligation to create democratic virtues which in fact come very close to this (in particular if one takes a close look at how it is operationalized in the state’s 140 indicator model). This is reminiscent of liberal perfectionism, or even better a strong republicanism, i.e. the civic integrationism which is very dominant in Denmark and which extends to the private life and the family. Becoming an ‘active citizen’ is regarded as a category which is and should be accessible to all. It represents the framework of the good life, including a reflexive relationship to one’s own life style and life choices encompassing family relations. There is here no conscious distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism (even though the latter two are difficult to distinguish in practical terms, cf. Gutman 1995).
The two cases are to some connected the other way around. The lack of tolerance and respect (but not necessarily positive recognition) resulting in an alleged lack of accommodation in the public school system partially explains why immigrant students feel forced to leave it and attend Islamic free schools. This relates to the general discussion whether it is better to make exemptions to religious fundamentalists to keep them within realm of the public school (e.g. Brighouse 2008: 259-62). The alternative of having them leave and create their own private schools may on balance be worse because of the disintegrative effects etc. However, this is a balancing act that Danish politicians have not entered into. They have decided to make sure that also private schools are required to teach civic education.

Another similarity is that both public school autonomy and private school autonomy is defended, while increasingly circumscribed by central state regulation (goals, civic education). Two other competing steering rationales blend into the discussion about school autonomy and the rights of parents to choose school for their children. One relates to the concern about the academic effects (on weak learners) of segregation, and segregation’s effect on the feeling of community and the acquisition of tolerance of others. The other relates to New Public Management ideas in the governance of the school sector: the schools compete for students and parents as customers (the money follows the student). The schools’ ability to deliver educational service is measured on centrally set goals. This is a question of creating a market rather than a question of ideologies, culture and religion. It is not clear that the market necessarily protects or leads to diversity: the same reduced number of models may be pursued with more or less success and resources.

In both the public school case and the Islamic free school case we see instances of nationalist and liberal intolerance although the distinction is easier to track in the Islamic free schools case (see below).

The counter discourses are different in the two cases. In the public schools case there is a pragmatic discourse which ultimately rests on a conception of toleration and respect which views others as moral and political equals (even when they endorse the ‘wrong’ values). This is far from the Danish liberal tradition and close to a concept of civility (Lægaard 2011). In fact it even seems to go ‘beyond civility’ as it entails a form of curiosity towards that to which one objects. At the same time, it is less than positive recognition of differences, identities and values as valuable per se.

The other counter discourse invokes the Danish tradition of liberality. Sometimes it shades into a defence of free school autonomy and parents’ choice based on universal liberal principles and on the notion that people (parents and schools) should be trusted to use their freedom responsibly. In the universalistic version, it relies on the concept of regarding others as moral and political equals who can make these choices for themselves.

Staying or Breaking With the Tradition?

Public school autonomy has been reduced in the recent years despite a strong preference across the political spectrum for continued school autonomy. The permissibility of local accommodation according to experiences and conditions lie well within the tradition. As mentioned, part of the defence comes from a New Public Management perspective championing marketization. In fact, the possibility of being able to choose a public school outside of one’s assigned school district seems to undercut the idea that the school is tied to a specific local democratically constituted ‘school community’.
The pragmatic approach in the public school system to differences is also in line with the Danish tradition where ‘cooperation’ between different groups at the local level across differences has been seen as a virtue. On the other hand, the theoretical underpinning of ‘appreciative dialogue’ seems to be rather far away from the critical and confrontational ethos contained in the Danish idea about liberality.

In the free school case both proponents and opponents of more regulation see themselves as protectors of the Danish free school tradition. For the opponents, the political ambition to control and monitor what free schools teach students is a radical break with the tradition. Indeed, in the tradition of the Danish liberality, the rights of the parents/schools should be protected from the majority, while the majority – or anybody – would have the right freely and bluntly to criticise views and practices they find wrong.

In another interpretation, the free school tradition (the legacy of Grundtvig and Kold) is founded on a democratic movement against a repressive and anti-democratic state, meaning that the whole ‘purpose’ of the tradition was to create democratically engaged citizens. The right of the minority (parents) to form their own school is seen as a democratic minority right. Accordingly, those who use this right do so out of respect for fundamental democratic principles. This can be seen in the Danish Government’s justification of its introduction and expansion of the ‘democracy and freedom clause’ in the law on free primary schools in 2002 and 2005. Educationalist and school historian Ove Korsgaard describes this break with the tradition as a way of defending it in these terms:

Recent years’ tightening of the control represents a break with a tradition that goes way back in time. But the reason is that we now have a number of schools which do not place themselves in the classic free school tradition. Earlier some schools built on a different cultural or pedagogical foundation, but there were not a lot of schools whose support for the democracy we live in could be questioned (Ove Korsgaard, Kristeligt Dagblad, 20.09.2005).

Of course, opponents of the restricted school autonomy would say that this represents a lack of trust in the ability of parents and schools to use their freedom responsibly and hence a lack of respect for minorities as moral and political equals who are entitled to make their own decisions, even ‘wrong’ ones.

Danish Conceptions of Acceptance

There are two types of intolerance in Denmark: nationalist and liberal intolerance. Nationalist intolerance is based on the view that certain cultural and religious practices non-acceptable because they may undermine core national values and eventually the identity of Danish society. Liberal intolerance appears in the public school case and in the free school case. The first modality of liberal intolerance is seen in the concern that central liberal norms are undermined (in casu gender equality, democracy and fundamental rights). The second modality is perhaps most easily traced in the free school case and regards the divisive and segregative effects of too many religious (Islamic) free schools. Too much diversity endangers the sociological basis for maintaining a liberal democratic society. The third modality regards the creation of ‘liberal people’ and/or ‘active citizens.’ Again this modality is most obvious in the free school case where Islamic free schools are criticised for not preparing students to become competent individuals and citizens in a modern society ‘with freedom and democracy’. Of course, it can be debated how ‘liberal perfectionist’ this criticism really is. Some non-perfectionist strands of liberalism would also be concerned about the potential harm done to the fundamental interests/rights of children by not providing them with the preconditions for a life
independent of others and/or of the pursuit of collective political goals of different groups, minorities as well as majorities (Gutman 1995; Brighouse 1998).

In the Danish case it can be difficult to disentangle nationalist and liberal intolerance since nationalists often endorse very liberal values which they claim are special Danish values (or a special Danish interpretation of these values) rooted in a (Christian) national cultural tradition.

Conceptions of tolerance are in the Danish case based on both pragmatic and principled reasons. The pragmatic defence of tolerance is in the public school case found, first, in the defence of school autonomy by the ministers. It is seen as suboptimal and epistemologically challenging to make rules on the (non) accommodation of cultural and religious differences which should apply uniformly to all schools in Denmark. Secondly, tolerance is defended pragmatically at the school level with reference to the goal at hand: accommodations have to be made to ensure the well-being and education of the children. In the free school case, the pragmatic argument for tolerance is less prevalent and atypical in a country obsessed with integration: free schools allow the peaceful co-existence of two religions/cultures which are fundamentally incompatible.

In the public school case the argument for toleration on pragmatic grounds in the ‘integration through inclusion’ strategy shades into arguments which mirror more principled liberal arguments for toleration, namely that immigrant parents need to be regarded as moral and political equals who are entitled to make their own (even wrong) choices and that their views (as parents) have to be taken seriously as those of equals. In the free school case we find the same kind of argument with regard to the schools’ and the parents’ use of their freedom of choice. At times, this argument is based on the Danish free school tradition rather than on general liberal principles. This is the part of the ‘free mindedness’ or liberality tradition that underscores the guaranteed equal civil rights (legal tolerance). (The other part of liberalit promotes a frank and confrontational ethos combined with the development ‘think skin’ and enables you to ‘endure’ ‘scorn, mocking and ridicule’ (Mohamed Cartoon crisis), is not very salient here). Underlying these arguments are ‘respect conceptions’ of tolerance.

In the two cases, there are only very few instances of something which goes ‘beyond tolerance’ in the shape of claims about positive recognition. In the public school case, the theoretical framework underlying the idea of the ‘appreciative dialogue’ require respect for the status of immigrant parents as moral and ‘political’ equals, but stops short of demanding positive recognition of the identities and values of immigrant parents. The recognition of/respect for the parents concerns them as people who hold values, not their values. The central idea in the appreciative dialogue comes close to the notion of civility and perhaps even goes beyond, since it demands a principled curiosity towards that to which one objects and even towards that which one rejects. This arguably implies expanding the range of what is ‘normal’ and part of the ‘public space’ of the local school community. In the free school case one commentator noted that it was strange that nobody could recognise the positive value of immigrants acquiring Danish traditions for collective self-organisation in associations and free schools. Otherwise claims regarding any need to go ‘beyond toleration’ were sparse.

Lessons Learned

From the public school case it seems evident that the dialogue-based integration through inclusion and the related practical measures seem to be effective in ensuring the welfare and education of the students. Conversely, the more principled and symbolically laden ‘integration through values’ discourse can be counterproductive for the involved parties’ motivation and mutual communication.
In the free school case, it is unclear whether or not policies are necessary and/or should be regarded as a success. Undoubtedly they prevent schools from teaching openly divisive and fundamentalist doctrines and they are likely to have reduced the number of schools with low academic quality and deficient civic education strategies. However, the unintended consequence of state monitoring may be alienation rather than integration. The price to be paid may be that students, parents and teachers feel that they are under a general suspicion of not being full and trustworthy citizens; a suspicion they will never be able to remove. Moreover, the method for establishing whether or not a school lives up to the freedom and democracy clause is intransparent to the target group and gives them the feeling of not having secure rights.

It is difficult to gauge the long term effects on toleration, feeling of community and reciprocal understanding of the general segregation that results from the existence of free primary schools and the free choice of public school. However, there is no doubt that segregation can have serious effects on the academic achievements of weak learners in particular. On the other hand, for some minority students Islamic free schools may give a more secure learning environment where their identity is positively reinforced or just not ‘an issue.’ This may improve their academic achievements. In fact, measured on their teaching effect the top 20 schools in Denmark include four Arabic/Islamic free schools (undervisningseffekt.dk; see the general introduction to the chapter).

**Key Messages for Policy Makers**

**Public Schools**

In relation to the public schools it is advisable to continue to spread the ideas of the appreciative dialogue between the schools, the parents and the students. This ought to be the task of the Ministry of Education as well as the municipal school administrations. One risk pertaining to the local school autonomy in Denmark is that it can be random whether schools adopt best practices. Or even make the effort to seek out information and learn about new methods. At the same time it should be remembered that the appreciative dialogue itself presupposes local autonomy since solutions found through appreciative dialogue require local decision makers to act in a flexible manner. It is procedural and not a one-size-fits-all approach.

**Private Schools**

For national level policy makers wanting to maintain a diverse free school sector it is important that the costs of establishing and maintaining a free primary schools with an alternative philosophy and pedagogy is not too high in terms of having to document and monitor academic standards and the requirement to teach freedom and democracy. The apparent uncertainty that schools some schools feel about what it takes to live up to requirements and their reluctance to run the risk of not being found to live up to them may well lead them to not use the degree of freedom that the current law actually allow them. While there is a dilemma contained in forcing a limited definition on how schools ought to teach in line with the freedom and democracy clause because it invariably will reduce the flexibility in how the requirement can be met, a more simple and transparent evaluation model could increase the feeling of certainty. Moreover, it would be fairer to schools if the model was mainly oriented towards the kind of knowledge that should be transmitted through lessons since a requirement to create a specific democratic ethos among students arguably is much more difficult to measure. When does for example criticism of certain aspects of democracy as a form of government represent lack commitment to democratic values? After all criticism of democracy abound, even among people who carry no totalitarian convictions. The emphasis on knowledge rather than on ethos also seem to be in line with
the experience of the Ministry of Education has had with monitoring, namely that is usually lack of knowledge transmitted through lessons that is the problem, not attitudes towards democracy and freedom. Moreover, increased certainty among schools may also lessen potential alienating effects of monitoring, resulting from the experience of being under general suspicion.
CHAPTER 3. NEGOTIATING LIMITS OF TOLERANCE IN PUBLIC DEBATES IN MUSLIM ACTORS

By Lasse Lindekilde

3.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses attention on toleration of ethno-national, cultural and religious differences in political life in Denmark. It investigates what kinds of limits to tolerance are expressed in public debates regarding issues of minority political participation. Thus, it focuses on the active citizenship of immigrants and their descendants in Denmark, and the challenges to toleration this produces.

Generally speaking political integration of minorities in Denmark is high and acceptance of this is widespread. A recent survey of active citizenship among immigrants and their descendants in Denmark, concluded that the political integration and participation among ethnic minorities is in fact in many regards comparable to that of ethnic Danes (INM 2011). Thus, citizens with immigrant background share with ethnic Danes to an equal degree basic citizenship virtues, such as finding it important to vote in elections or to be informed about current affairs. Also when it comes to perceived opportunities to achieve political influence through presenting opinions to politicians, citizens with immigrant background on average believe their opportunities to be as high as do citizens with Danish background (INM 2011: 22). General trust in fundamental institutions – parliament, public administration, police and the court system – is likewise high among citizens with immigrant background in Denmark. On average citizens with immigrant background have only marginally less trust in such fundamental institutions than citizens with Danish background (INM 2011: 25).

A study of the level of participation by ethnic minorities in the last local election in 2009 shows that the level of participation in the election was considerably lower among immigrants (47% voter turnout) and descendants (36% voter turnout) than among ethnic Danes (68% voter turnout) (Bhatti & Møller Hansen 2009). For eligible voters who were not Danish citizens the level of participation was only 33%. However, other research shows that this level of participation among immigrants and descendants in a cross national comparison is relatively high. Lise Togeby (2003, 2006) has convincingly argued that this pattern of participation should be understood as an effect of the specific election rules in Denmark, which gives the opportunity to personalize votes so that votes are cast for a specific candidate and not a party. Participation in national elections for parliament in Denmark requires Danish citizenship. As it has become increasingly difficult to obtain Danish citizenship over the last decade, it has become more difficult for foreign nationals to become fully integrated in Danish politics. The patterns of participation in national elections for parliament among citizens with immigrant background seem to be parallel to the patterns at local elections (Mikkelsen 2008: 156-157).

A range of non-institutionalized ways of political participation is, in principle, also open to ethnic minorities in Denmark. Through freedom of organization, ethnic minorities have set up a large number of civil society organizations/associations (social, cultural, religious). If we look at the level of membership of and participation in associational life among immigrants and descendants in Denmark we find that they are very active, although to a lesser degree than ethnic Danes (INM 2011: 36). On average an ethnic Dane is member of twice the number of associations as a Dane with immigrant background. The extensive right of freedom of expression and assembly in Denmark also gives ethnic minorities an opportunity to influence the public debate and indirectly political decisions. Ethnic minority members as individuals and as a collective often make use of these opportunities. Out of seven forms of non-institutionalized political participation, which have been investigated, citizens with immigrant background scored higher or as high as ethnic Danes on five parameters (wrote letters to
the editor; posted on a debate forum; signed an online petition; participated in public demonstrations and strikes). Only when it comes to participation in political meetings and signing regular petitions do ethnic Danes scores higher.

3.1.1. Main Challenges to the Toleration of Participation in Political Life among Danes with Immigrant Background

The results presented above, indicating a relatively high degree of active citizenship among Danes with immigrant background to some extent contradict generalized media descriptions of immigrants and descendants, in particular Muslims, as passive and marginalized citizens living in parallel communities isolated from majority society, its institutions and political life (see Hussain 2003). Thus, participation is not always recognized. Furthermore, it is fair to say that political participation among immigrants and descendants in Denmark is not always appreciated, or believed to take an appropriate form. On many occasions the nature of issues raised, opinions put forward and the norms and values that underlie these opinions among citizens with immigrant background have been challenged in the media and by majority society in general as being ‘too different’. This has been the case in particular regarding demands and views put forward by individuals or collective actors who are identified (or identify themselves) as Muslims (Hervik 2011). Recurrently public debates have evolved around questions such as: Is orthodox Islam a threat to secular democracy? Do religious argumentation and values have a place in public debates in a secular society? How to deal with the few, but at times rather outspoken, Muslim actors who do not accept majority society standards of gender equality or who preach non-integration? Should we tolerate the intolerance of some Muslim actors regarding homosexuals? What to do about Muslims who openly speak against liberal democracy and endorse forms of terrorism? All these questions pertain to the way fundamental political rights are exercised by Muslim actors, rather than the fundamental rights to participation. Thus, at the core of debates are the norms and values displayed in political life by some Muslim actors, and questions of how much difference can and should be tolerated in political life without undermining cohesion and allowing intolerance to flourish. Put another way, what is characteristic about these debates is that they all turn the political mobilization and participation of ethnic minorities into a political problem. In most cases the ‘cultural baggage’ of Muslim actors is framed as an obstacle to legitimate exercise of these actors’ political rights. Debates of this kind, I argue, are the most common way tolerance of political participation of immigrants and descendants in Denmark is problematized and has been challenged in recent years.

3.1.2. The Two Case Studies: Overview, Relevance and Key Questions

The two case studies selected for investigation in this chapter regard two recent episodes of public meetings/conferences involving ‘radical’ Islamic actors that have questioned the limits of toleration in regard to Muslim minority articulation of controversial views in the public sphere in Denmark; views that are not prohibited by law, but in conflict with majority norms and values. Common for these two public controversies has been discussions of what kind of norms, attitudes and values displayed by Muslim minority actors can be tolerated in the public sphere, and which ones are considered a threat to public order, social cohesion and secular democracy. As such both debates offer a prism for studying the unwritten limits to non-institutional political participation of Muslim actors in the form of public meetings, conferences, etc. Both episodes highlight what kind of norms, attitudes and values Muslim actors, implicitly and explicitly, are asked to subscribe to and denounce in order to be accepted as legitimate actors in public debates.
Case 1 – Hizb ut-Tahrir’s public meeting at the Danish National Library (January 2011)

In January 2011 an intense debate evolved around a public meeting arranged by the Danish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir under the title ‘Afghanistan: Scandinavian Governments in the service of the US’. Hizb ut-Tahrir has previously held similar public meetings in Denmark, always generating extensive public debate. However, this time the debate reached new heights for two main reasons: the nature of the invitation to the meeting, and the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir had chosen the Danish National Library as the venue for their meeting. In the invitation for the meeting Hizb ut-Tahrir wrote:

In this meeting we will focus on the obligation of armed resistance that falls upon Muslims in Afghanistan and surrounding areas. We believe this resistance to be fully legitimate. We will also discuss the attempt by authorities to criminalize and intimidate any kind of opposition to the war in Afghanistan (Ritzau 28-12-2010).

Next to this text the invitation showed a map of Afghanistan, on which was placed coffins draped in Danish, Swedish and Norwegian flags. To many the invitation suggested that Hizb ut-Tahrir condoned the killing of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan and that they were inciting violence against Danish troops. Regarding the National Library as venue for the meeting, many voices found that Hizb ut-Tahrir are free to have their meetings, spread their intolerant views, but that the National Library as a publicly funded institution and historical symbol of enlightenment should not have hosted the meeting and thereby indirectly legitimize Hizb ut-Tahrir. Indirectly tax money (although Hizb ut-Tahrir paid to book the venue) to give voice to people who were (potentially) inciting the killing of Danish soldiers.

Among the political elite protest against the meeting was very visible, both at an arranged counter-demonstration, and in the public debate prior to the meeting, which included representatives of all major political parties, including several ministers. In addition, a number of representatives of NGOs, Muslim organizations and think tanks participated in the debate, including representatives of military veterans associations.

On January 21 2011 the meeting took place as planned, despite different political attempts to stop it.

Case 2 – The visit of the ‘radical’ Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips (April 2011)

In April 2011 the Canadian Muslim convert and preacher, Bilal Philips, was invited to give a public talk on ‘Islamophobia – is Islam a threat to the West?’ in Copenhagen. The conference was organized by the youth branch, MUNIDA (Muslim Youth in Denmark) of the Danish Islamic Faith Community, which was the Muslim organization primarily responsible for the protests against the Muhammad cartoons published in 2005. Bilal Philips’ visit became an issue of great public controversy due to his controversial and intolerant views on homosexuals and Shia Muslims, his endorsement of Sharia (e.g. the beating of women) and of violent jihad expressed in a number of books, public lectures and performances posted on Youtube. In addition, Philips’ name has appeared in a number of terrorism trials, including the trial regarding the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. Paradoxically, Philips was invited to talk about islamophobia, intolerance and discrimination vis-à-vis Muslim minorities in the West, while he himself is an exponent of quite intolerant views.

In the public debate prior to his visit different discursive positions and arguments both for and against toleration of his public lecturing were articulated. To a large extent the public debate on Philips’ visit was also centered on the role of the Islamic Faith Community in inviting Philips to Copenhagen. The question was to what extent they shared Philips’ views. On April 16 2011 Bilal Philips arrived at Copenhagen airport under great media coverage. The day after Philips spoke to an assembly of about 1000 Danish Muslims. Outside the meeting venue a demonstration was arranged which counted
between 200-300 people. Philips has previously been denied entry into Britain and Australia, and few days after his visit in Denmark he was denied entry to give a similar speech in Germany.

3.1.3. Situating the case studies: relevance and questions

The two instances described above highlight how tolerance as a boundary drawing activity is taking place vis-à-vis concrete instances of Muslim non-institutionalized political participation in the public sphere. I find that these episodes offer interesting perspectives into the negotiations of the limits of tolerance of divergent views and practices as the play out in public debates regarding controversial statements by Muslim actors. As such the case studies deal with less conventional and institutionalized forms of immigrant political participation and representation. As already indicated, it is this form of political participation among citizens with immigrant background that has caused most challenges to tolerance of difference in political life in recent years in Denmark. Furthermore, I believe that these debates offer good insights into the different discursive positions on toleration in the political sphere in the Danish context, the dynamics and strategies of positioning in such debates as well as the effects of boundary drawing on Muslim actors’ possibilities for participation in public debates.

As mentioned, the two cases regard the boundary drawing between intolerable and tolerable norms, attitudes and values. Nobody in the debates argued for the recognition, respect as equal or admission to the realm of normal for the views raised at the meetings. Arguments were either for intolerance of the views, however for quite different reasons, or for some kind of ‘teeth-grinding’ tolerance. The episodes also highlight issues of ‘principled’ or ‘liberal’ intolerance, i.e., the way interventions and limitations to tolerance are based on arguments for the need to create a ‘liberal state for liberal people only’ (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012). Furthermore, the episodes show how such intolerance of illiberal values in the public sphere contribute to actively endorse ‘good’ liberal citizenship and integrationist views a prerequisite for the participation of Muslim minority actors in political debates in the public sphere.

Building on this, the chapter uses the two selected cases to address the following key questions:

1) What were the main discursive positions of toleration articulated in the public debate in regard to the two cases?

2) What are the unwritten limits to non-institutional political participation of Muslim actors, as articulated in the two cases? And are they the same in the two cases?

3) How does tolerance as a boundary drawing activity play out in practice in the two public debates analyzed, i.e. how are limits to tolerance negotiated in the public sphere, and what kind of discursive strategies do different actors make use of in promoting exactly their boundary drawing?

4) How, and through which mechanisms does the toleration boundary drawing in the two public debates affect Muslim actors’ exercise of political rights?

3.2. Methodology

The public debate regarding the two episodes evolved from December 1 2010 to about May 1 2011, which will be the time-frame of investigation. The basic research design of the study in this chapter is a comparative case study, including within case comparison (comparing across types of actors and discursive strategies in the debates).

As indicated, the two cases do not concern instances of direct Muslim claims making on Danish authorities, for example raised claims of building mosques, establishing Muslim burial grounds or introducing halal food in kinder gardens. I expect this circumstance to weigh on the side of intolerance as authorities are less committed to finding practical solutions and more free in these cases to engage in principled boundary drawing. In addition, the two cases concern issues of Danish foreign policy (Danish engagement in Afghanistan) and the visit by a foreign controversial preacher. Especially in
the case of Bilal Philips, I expect this ‘foreign’ element to make toleration boundary drawing skewed towards intolerance. This has to do with the limits of tolerance historically being more narrowly defined regarding non-citizens.

The case studies build upon analysis of the press coverage of the two episodes as well as interviews with central stakeholders in the debates. The newspaper articles have been selected using the Danish media archive, Infomedia. The searches included all nationally distributed newspapers in Denmark as sources, including broadsheets, tabloid and free-of-charge newspapers as well as the largest news wire Ritzau. The sources of the articles collected are the following newspapers: Jyllands-Posten, Politiken, Berlingske Tidende, Information, Weekendavisen, Kristeligt Dagblad, B.T., Ekstra Bladet, MetroXpress and Urban. The collection of articles resembles that of a ‘population study’, as all articles regarding the two cases from the mentioned sources have been included in the constructed database. However, articles of less than 200 words have been omitted as have article ‘duplicates’, for example Ritzau telegrams published in more than one newspaper. Furthermore, letters to the editor regarding the two episodes have also been omitted in order to keep the number of articles at a manageable level. This sampling strategy resulted in a data corpus of 112 articles, 59 articles regarding the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting (case 1), and 53 articles regarding the Bilal Phillips meeting (case 2).

The collected newspaper articles have been coded using Nvivo 9. First all articles were coded classifying the articles regarding source, data, length, and case number. Then the units of analysis, the particular individuals who in the articles express a tolerance view, claim or stand regarding the two cases, were identified. All statements made by a particular actor during the course of the episodes were collected in one ‘node’, rendering it possible to look at all the interventions of one actor, and compare it to others.

The coding of the actual content of statements followed a strategy of combined closed (deductive) and open (inductive) coding. From the general conceptual framework of toleration as identified by Modood and Dobbernack (2011) a number of closed categories of toleration positions were deduced and applied. Thus, statements and standpoints on the respective cases were in an initial step coded and categorized as expressions of either a) recognition/inclusion to the realm of the normal, b) tolerance or c) intolerance. This crude categorization was then refined using further theoretically deduced sub-codes and supplementing with inductively driven sub-codes stemming from the material itself. The coding scheme for this analysis of instances of toleration boundary drawing can be found in Annex I.

In addition to the newspaper material the analysis is based on interviews with central stakeholders in the two episodes identified on the basis of the newspaper material. These stakeholders include: Political elites; Muslim organizers of the meetings/conferences; organizers of the counter-demonstrations; NGOs and venue owners/representatives. The interviews were carried out using semi-structured interview guides, and evolved around tapping the interviewees’ toleration boundary drawing and arguments in regard to the particular episode as well as their reflections on the dynamics and effects of the debates. In total seven interviews were conducted – two with actors involved in case 1, two involved in case 2, and three involved in both (see Annex II). In combination with the newspaper material this amount of interviews proved sufficient to flesh out the main discursive positions of toleration in the debates, and I found that further interviews would have added little to the investigation. The interviews were transcribed, and transcriptions imported to Nvivo where they were coded using the same coding scheme applied to the newspaper material. This procedure made it possible to collect all material regarding one actor (newspaper statements and interview transcriptions) in one node.

The descriptive and comparative analysis of toleration positions in the two cases building on Nvivo-coding was supplemented with elements of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis was applied in order to delve further into how specific arguments and meanings in the debates are constructed, discursive coping mechanisms enacted and analyze the effects different toleration positions have on the opportunities for Muslim political participation in public debates.
3.3. The main discursive positions of toleration boundary drawing in the debates

In sections 2.1 and 2.2 the main discursive positions of toleration boundary drawing in the two cases will be mapped and analyzed. The purpose is to investigate what political practices are considered tolerant or intolerant, and what values/norms are considered to promote or undermine tolerance in the particular cases. Section 2.3 compares the main positions in the two cases, and explains important differences in toleration boundary drawing. Section 3 focuses on the dynamics of toleration boundary drawing as it plays out in the two cases with a view to explaining the different strategies of positioning in the debate employed by actors promoting exactly their version of boundary drawing. Finally, section 4 explores how the public toleration boundary drawing of the two cases affect Muslim actors’ exercise of political rights.

3.3.1. Case 1 – Hizb ut-Tahrir’s public meeting at the Danish National Library

In the 59 newspaper articles collected focusing on the Danish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting at the Danish National Library in January 2011 the coding procedure applied returned 101 identifiable instances of toleration boundary drawing. By instances of toleration boundary drawing I mean articulated positions by an individual either for toleration or intolerance of the meeting, accompanied by a discursive rationale or argument for the boundary drawing. Table 1 below shows the basic distribution of instances of toleration boundary drawing according to types of argumentation.

Table 3.1. Main arguments of toleration/in-tolerance in case 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toleration/intolerance code</th>
<th>Number of appearances in material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toleration as a must due to the rule of law</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, but active protest</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because we need to challenge and reconfirm our values</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because intervention would be counterproductive</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, but no obligation to promote intolerant views</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration as long as no physical harm is likely (Mills harm principle)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because of autonomy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of perceived threats and harm</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of liberal perfection</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of concerns vis-á-vis cultural cohesion</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance of illiberal intolerance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows that more instances of toleration boundary drawing in the case were arguing in favor of toleration than of intolerance (62 vs. 39). Obviously, we cannot conclude anything substantial about the general toleration boundary drawing among Danes on the issue based on this result. Only that among the actors given voice in newspapers, boundary drawing was skewed towards toleration. However, the distribution also indicates that arguments of intolerance were not marginal, but substantial in the debate. This distribution is partly a product of the media’s balancing norm – the
tendency of journalists to collect quotes for an article from both actors who are ‘for’ and ‘against’ a particular issue — but also indicates a substantial line of conflict and disagreement, which was the driver of the intense public debate.

In the following sections I will substantiate the different toleration boundary drawing positions presented in Table 1.

### 3.3.1.1. Positions of toleration

The most frequent argument in the public debate for tolerating Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting, despite its provocative nature and illiberal views, simply stated that as long Hizb ut-Tahrir had not done anything illegal or could be reasonably expected to express views that would be illegal, the practices of gender separation and the indirect legitimation of killing Danish soldiers must be tolerated. In a democracy, liberal freedoms of organization, assembly and free speech must apply to all, and cannot be limited due to feelings of unrest and outrage, but only by stipulated legal regulation. One central exponent of this position was the director of the National Library, Erland Kolding Nielsen, who argued to uphold Hizb ut-Tahrir’s booking of the venue on the grounds of liberal freedoms, even though the Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller, asked him to reconsider the decision twice. In support of Kolding Nielsen the legal advisor of the liberal think tank CEPOS, Jacob Mchangama, said:

*In Denmark we hold freedom of speech to be a core value, and this is why politicians should not dictate cultural institutions’ decisions on meetings and debates, according to whom they like and don’t like. Because politicians exist who would in one case argue for unlimited freedom of speech and who would be ready to reduce freedom of speech in others. We should not sort and categorize opinions and views in this manner* (Interview 5)

Such arguments involve an element of ‘liberal absolutism’ stipulating that the same kind of toleration boundary drawing must apply to all groups.

Other actors argued for toleration on these classic liberal grounds, including most newspapers in the sample, which in editorials stressed liberal democracy’s unavoidable dilemma of having to tolerate organizations, views and practices of which the large majority strongly disapproves:

*It is characteristic of a democracy like the Danish one that it makes room also for voices and views, which most find distasteful. It is not illegal to be against the war in Afghanistan, although the resistance of Hizb ut-Tahrir is not driven by pacifism. And it is likewise fully legal to arrange public meetings about the issue as long as there are no concrete incitements to violence against Danish soldiers. In Denmark we have freedom of organization, assembly and speech. We hold these rights dearly. Thus, no matter how provocative Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting may seem, we cannot compromise these fundamental rights and principles* (B.T. 20-01-2011)

These classic liberal arguments were in the debate found across the political spectrum, constituting a common argumentative platform and position in the debate bringing together otherwise political opponents. Thus, politicians and commentators adhering to both the then liberal-conservative government and the centrist-left opposition used arguments of a pre-toleration legal ‘must’ to legitimate non-intervention.

In many ways the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position argues that toleration in this case is not a matter of moral judgments and boundary drawing, but narrowly a question of legal boundary drawing. If intervention against Hizb ut-Tahrir is found to be necessary then politicians need to change the legal framework. In fact, several actors in the debate, most significantly members of the Danish People’s Party, called for exactly this.

Many of the actors adhering to the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position would occasionally develop
the argument to include a call for explicit airing of protest and disagreement with the views of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Just as Hizb ut-Tahrir has the right to speak their views in public so do we, the argument goes. We must tolerate, but we must also publicly challenge what we find to be outrageous and wrong. This was the general attitude of the people who participated in the counter-demonstration on the day of the meeting. In the words of the main organizer of the demonstration, Lars Aslan Rasmussen (city counselor for the Social Democrats):

*Hizb ut-Tahrir should not be allowed to spread hatred and incitements to violence against Danish soldiers without anybody resisting. We will do this in a peaceful and calm way. Political fanatics’ and extremists’ hijacking of religion should not be fought with bans and threats. They should be met with protest and visible counter-reactions* (JP 21-01-2011)

At the counter-demonstration politicians from across the spectrum stood side by side marking a rare united front in Danish politics on issues of value pluralism and management of difference. After the demonstration chief editor of Berlingske Tidende, Lisbeth Knudsen, wrote:

*The demonstration yesterday outside the National Library showed that the statements and attitudes of Hizb ut-Tahrir and likeminded are not just met by an ‘ohh well’ in Denmark. It is something which we in a democratic manner will sharply protest. The demonstration showed that whether you are for or against the war in Afghanistan, leading Danish politicians, public intellectuals and ordinary citizens were able come together in protesting Hizb ut-Tahrir’s incitement to kill Danish soldiers* (Berlingske Tidende 23-01-2011)

However, as we shall see below, not all participants in the counter-demonstration identified with the ‘toleration-but-protest’ position.

A more sophisticated, but in many ways related argument stated that the meeting should be tolerated, views discussed and counter-arguments displayed. Not so much because marking disagreement is important in itself, but because we by airing disagreement and debating views we disapprove of are forced to reconfirm, reconsider and refresh our commitment to our own basic values and beliefs. This Millian argument of the need to tolerate and engage with views we find wrong rests on a logic of potential ‘dead dogma’ – that is the belief that the values and norms we live by and hold dear will become empty and meaningless if they are not at times questioned, debated and defended (Mill 2009). In this perspective the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting can be said to serve an important and positive function of normative integration and re-confirmation. From an editorial in the centrist-left newspaper *Politiken*:

*There is one good thing to say about the meeting the darkened Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir is hosting today at the Danish beacon of enlightenment, The Royal National Library: As a society we are forced to actively engage with an ultra conservative, freedom denying and fanatic movement, which challenges our modern values. Values that are not challenged disintegrate and disappear. By having the madness brought into daylight, we are at least forced to think about what kind of anti-democratic and anti-Semitic phenomenon Hizb ut-Tahrir is, and what we in common can do to fight the party’s reactionary attack on enlightenment freedoms* (Politiken 21-01-2011)

In addition to these toleration arguments stressing legality, toleration but open protest and the need to actively reconfirm and rearticulate values, I shall mention two further arguments of toleration that appeared fairly frequently in the debate (coded five times each). The first argument connects to the public/private divide and concerns the degree to which public institutions are obliged to be equally open to all groups of citizens. This argument, which was aired by the Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller, as well a number of legal scholars, stated that although Hizb ut-Tahrir has the right to hold their meeting at the National Library and we, thus, should tolerate it, this does not mean that a public institution like the National Library is obliged to accept all bookings. There is scope for moral judgment within the legal framework of self owned public institutions, and the National Library could legally have said no to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the argument goes. This argument, on the border of intolerance,
tries to connect the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position to an element of individual moral judgment. The reasoning is that although Hizb ut-Tahrir has the right to preach hatred and provoke feelings we should not actively support them in promoting their views. Legal rights do not translate into an obligation for public promotion.

Finally, we find in the public debate an argument for toleration and non-intervention, which in a pragmatic manner argues that political intervention (outlawing Hizb ut-Tahrir or forcing the National Library to cancel the meeting) would be counter-productive in terms of fighting unwanted views and practices. In this perspective, what matters is neither legal nor moral boundary drawing, but pragmatic boundary drawing in terms of what will and what will not work to combat illiberal and potentially dangerous views. For example, Karen Hækkerup (Social Democrats) argues that by suppressing such views ‘support and mobilization for Hizb ut-Tahrir would only intensify due to a massive media coverage’, and turn Hizb ut-Tahrir into ‘martyrs’. Intolerance would make the views of Hizb ut-Tahrir an interesting ‘forbidden fruit’, which would be counter-productive (JP 19-03-2011).

3.3.1.2. Positions of intolerance

The argument of toleration because of counter-productive effects of intervention was in the public debate used in contrast to the most common argument of intolerance and intervention, reasoning that Hizb ut-Tahrir and the meeting should be stopped due to the potential security threat posed to Danish society and Danish soldiers in Afghanistan. The potential physical threat that the diffusion of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s views would pose to Danish society and soldiers is enough to justify preemptive/preventive intervention. A concrete example of this line of reasoning:

*It testifies to a sick and anti-democratic mind when Hizb ut-Tahrir is inciting armed resistance. To me there is a hidden threat in this message, and it terrifies me to think of how Hizb ut-Tahrir might influence young people* (Karen Lorentzen, Socialist People’s Party: Ritzau 29-12-2010)

Common to this position is a discourse of radicalization and terrorism. In short, this position is characterized by using security as boundary marker for toleration. Hizb ut-Tahrir and the concrete meeting is ‘securitized’ and seen as a threat to society (see also section 3 below). Not necessarily an imminent or concrete security threat, but a potential threat that we cannot afford to just tolerate. Thus, it is not current demonstrable harm that defines the limit of tolerance, but increasingly potential future harm (see Schiffauer 2012: 17). Discursively a scenario is built that suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir through their rhetoric, glorification of terrorism and meetings is radicalizing youngsters so that eventually somebody will respond to their call for armed resistance, maybe even interpret it as legitimizing terrorist attacks in Denmark. Preventive intervention is therefore needed. This position of intolerance due to potential threat and harm had in the debate exponents from most political parties.

A variant of the ‘intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm’ argument emphasizes not the potential physical, but rather the more imminent psychological harm of the meeting. In particular, a number of actors in the debate point to the psychological distress caused to Danish veterans and families of fallen soldiers by the content of the meeting. This was the position taken by e.g. the Association of Permanent Military Personnel:

*It is not right that families where spouses, kids or loved ones are away in battle, and those who have lost family or friends in battle in Afghanistan, should have to listen to this* (Interview 6)

Here non-toleration is argued on the grounds of the distress toleration would mean to a rather small, but vulnerable minority. Often this line of reasoning is further strengthened by invoking elements of a nationalistic discourse of ‘treason’, ‘fourth column activity’, and ‘national pride’. In the light of what veterans have done for their country, the argument goes, we as a society, should show our appreciation by shielding them from the distress caused by the meeting.
The second most common position of intolerance found in the material (covering twelve instances of toleration boundary drawing) argues that intervention is needed and legitimized, not only because of the content of the concrete meeting, but also because Hizb ut-Tahrir and its members in general are exponents of illiberal and fundamentalist attitudes, practices and identities, which are unsuited for a modern liberal democracy. What matters to toleration boundary drawing is not just the legality and content of concrete statements, but also the larger identity of those making the statements. In this perspective, the illiberal attitudes, views, practices and goals of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir – their way of life – is believed to justify intervention. Often the gender division at Hizb ut-Tahrir meetings is the concrete hook for this kind of reasoning. This practice is seen as ‘medieval’, ‘gender apartheid’, ‘insane’, and ‘in opposition to everything Danish’:

*Hizb ut-Tahrir with their medieval gender practices and antidemocratic views represent the antithesis to enlightenment values. Should we tolerate that they spread their hatred and way of life through public institutions? No! We should prevent them from doing so, and insist on Danish values and Danish culture* (Pia Kjærsgaard, Danish People’s Party: Berlingske Tidende 9-03-2011).

This position of intolerance forms part of a larger ‘liberal perfectionism’ discourse where the end-goal of integration and the yard stick of good citizenship is not just labor market integration, educational integration or active political participation, but also forming a liberal identity and a liberal way of life. In line with this discourse of ‘liberal perfectionism’ then Minister of Integration, Søren Pind (Liberals), used the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting to publicly formulate a demand for assimilation among immigrants: ‘There exist in Denmark norms and culture, which you should basically respect and adopt if you come here as a foreigner. You should not mock or disrespect these basic values and norms’ (JP 16 January 2011). Denmark is a liberal society with room for liberal people only, the argument indirectly seems to say. This kind of intolerance has been referred to as a form of ‘liberal intolerance’, as boundary drawing here is tied up with evaluation of the liberalness of norms, practices and identities, and intolerance accompanied by liberal reasoning stressing the lack of autonomy, free choice etc. (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012).

A closely related variant of ‘liberal intolerance’ found in the material (coded four times) elaborates on why Danish society should insist on liberalness as a threshold/boundary for integration and participation in political life. The core of this argument is a concern with societal cohesion and parallel communities in the light of too large cultural, religious and normative differences, as exemplified by Hizb ut-Tahrir. Without a common ‘leitkultur’ and shared basic liberal democratic principles, society will disintegrate and social conflict escalate. Here two examples of this argumentation:

*Hizb ut-Tahrir is in no way concerned about world peace or the well-being of Danish society, and they constitute a threat to social cohesion in our otherwise harmonic society* (Fathi El-Abed, Muslim intellectual: JP 21-01-2011)

*The power of Islam has become a part of our reality. It is the tribal culture, which continually plays a role in Muslim countries, and which to a large degree influences Muslim immigrant communities in European countries. The tribal culture means that you will always take side with your family or tribe against other families or tribes … […]… We know from research that young Muslims in Europe often feel more Muslim than Danish, German or French. They will side with other Muslims against non-Muslims* (Karen Jespersen, Liberals: Berlingske Tidende 21-01-2011).

In the last quote Hizb ut-Tahrir is made an exponent of a wider problem of lacking societal cohesion and shared identity, which is perceived to be rooted in the proliferation of Islam following immigration in general. Here mobilization and political participation based on a Muslim rather than a Danish identity is seen as problematic and as a barrier to rational deliberation and peaceful coexistence. In this perspective, intervention blocking Hizb ut-Tahrir from spreading their illiberal views in the public sphere and intensifying ethno-cultural conflict in society become minimum
requirements in terms of boundary drawing. However, the position is connected to much wider calls for boundary drawing, and has been used to legitimize a range of integration policies and requirements, which aim at securing social cohesion, common values and liberal outlooks among immigrants in Denmark (see Jensen et al. 2010). In the case material arguments of ‘liberal intolerance’ of either kind are predominantly found among representatives of the Danish People’s Party and the Liberals. But also individual Muslim actors and other protesters of the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting interviewed express such views.

The final type of boundary drawing, which I shall highlight here, marks an outer limit of legitimate forms of intolerance expressed in the public sphere. This kind of boundary drawing was expressed in particular in connection with the counter-demonstration outside the National Library. As mentioned, although the demonstrators stood united outside the venue they did not protest for the same reasons or used the same kind of argumentation. Some had come to mark their disagreement and disgust with the meeting, but recognized Hizb ut-Tahrir’s basic right to hold the meeting, while others had come to mark intolerance of Hizb ut-Tahrir and believed that the meeting should have been stopped for some of the reasons discussed above. During the demonstration such differences in positioning came to the fore, as a group of skinhead activists started to shout racist statements at Muslims who were entering the National Library. This led to internal quarrels among the demonstrators, and the skinheads were ‘loudly told to shut up and go home’ by fellow demonstrators (BT 21-01-2011). In his speech at the demonstration one of the organizers, Lars Aslan Rasmussen said that ‘any racist or intolerant people at the demonstration should cross the street and join their friends inside the National Library’ (Interview 3). Thus, a boundary was drawn between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for non-toleration, excluding the racist positioning of the skinheads to the realm of the intolerable. Put in a different way, we can say that a boundary was drawn between liberal and illiberal forms of intolerance.

3.3.2. Case 2 – The visit of the ‘radical’ Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips

In the 53 articles collected on the Canadian preacher Bilal Philips’ visit to Copenhagen in April 2011, the coding procedure returned 91 instances of toleration boundary drawing. In contrast to case 1, the arguments in the public debate on Philips’ visit were skewed towards intolerance (52 vs. 39). The possible reasons for this difference are discussed in the comparative section 2.3. below. However, also the relative distribution of toleration and intolerance positions is somewhat different from case 1, as indicated by table 2. Nevertheless, it is basically the same kind of arguments of toleration boundary drawing that were put forward in the two public debates, which is not surprising given the two cases’ proximity in time and nature. For this reason, the following discussion of argumentative positioning in case 2 focuses on main differences and nuances as compared to case 1.
Table 3.2. Main arguments of toleration/in-toleration in case 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toleration/intolerance code</th>
<th>Number of appearances in material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Toleration</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, but active protest</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because intervention would be counterproductive</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration as a must due to the rule of law</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because we need to challenge and reconfirm our values</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration as long as now physical harm is likely (Mills harm principle)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, but no obligation to promote intolerant views</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toleration, because of autonomy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intolerance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of perceived threats and harm</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of liberal perfectionism</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance because of danger of slippery slope</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of concerns vis-à-vis cultural cohesion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance of illiberal intolerance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance, because of need to maintain secular divide</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.2.1. Positions of tolerance

As indicated by table 2, the public debate surrounding Philips’ visit to Denmark showed much less importance of the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ position, which was the dominant position of toleration in the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting. From a legal point of view, this is probably because the existing legal possibilities for intervention in the case of foreigners are larger than with regard to national citizens. As pointed out in the debate by legal scholar Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen: ‘It is always the sovereign right of states to deny entry on grounds of for example disturbance of public order’ (Berlingske 11-04-2011). Thus, there was no hindrance in the existing legal framework of having Philips stopped at the airport upon arrival and returned to his destination of departure, as it had happened to him in both Australia and Britain on prior occasions. As indicated, this did not happen in Denmark, although a number of actors, including MPs, local politicians, public intellectuals and newspapers, argued for exactly this move, among them Mayor of Children’s Affairs and Culture in Copenhagen, Pia Allerslev (Liberals): ‘When I realized that other countries, with which we normally compare, had denied him access I appealed to the government for the same reaction in Denmark. Because why does Denmark always have to be the ‘nice guy’ on these matters?’ (Interview 2).

One of the primary reasons that the legal possibilities of stopping Philips from speaking was not utilized was probably the strong advocacy of the position in the debate that such a move would be counter-productive. Here the memory of Geert Wilders denial of entry to Britain in February 2009 played an important role. Karen Hækkerup (Social Democrats) argued along these lines:

*Imagine that he is denied access, but turns up and pulls a ‘Geert Wilders’, making a media stunt which would only further diffuse his views. It will be much more effective to meet his views with protest and argumentation* (Information 12-04-2011).
As indicated by the last part of the quote and table 2, the ‘toleration-but-protest’ position also played a significant role in the debate on Philips’ visit. The main organizer of the counter demonstration outside the meeting venue was again Lars Aslan Rasmussen (Social Democrats), who like with the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting argued a need to visualize to Muslim adolescents ‘that an alternative to radical views exists’ (Interview 3). However, in this case Lars Aslan Rasmussen had done anything ‘politically possible’ to stop the meeting with Philips from taking place, thus, demonstrating as a last resort (Interview 3).

3.3.2.2. Positions of intolerance

In terms of intolerance positions it was in case 2 the same two dominant positions – ‘intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm’ and the modalities of ‘liberal intolerance’ – as in case 1. Thus, one basic conclusion to be drawn is that these modalities of intolerance are fundamental to the boundary drawing vis-à-vis Muslim non-institutionalized political participation in Denmark today.

In terms of ‘liberal intolerance’, arguments that Philips represents ‘backwards’ and ‘illiberal’ views, practices and identities unfitted for modern liberal democracy – arguments very similar to those raised against Hizb ut-Tahrir – were relatively common in the public debate (coded ten times) and in interviews (Interview 2, 3, 5, 7). Philips’ views on women, homosexuals and Jihadism cannot be tolerated, it was argued, as they undermine fundamental liberal principles of equality, autonomy and secularism.

Although the basic argumentative figure of the ‘intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm’ likewise was the same in the two cases, a difference can be identified in the threat scenarios constructed. Where the risk of direct physical harm against Danish soldiers was highlighted in the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting, the threat from Philips was more seen to stem from future radicalization among Muslim adolescents who would be inspired by his views. Furthermore, several actors stressed that it was an aggravating circumstance that the Islamic Faith Community was the sponsor of the event, as it is often perceived as a relatively mainstream and integrationist Muslim organization. Later Minister of Equality, Manu Sareen (Social Liberals) argued:

*When the Islamic Faith Community is the organizer, it can seem like an approval of Philips’ views. Marginalized, young Muslim adolescents can all of a sudden get the impression that it is okay to hate Jews and homosexuals* (Ekstra Bladet 11-04-2011).

As I shall argue below this perceived aggravating circumstance was one of the main reasons boundary drawing was skewed more towards intolerance in case 2 than in case 1.

A last argument of intolerance, which I will highlight here (absent in case 1), is the position that by tolerating Philips spreading his views in public we will enter a slippery slope which will slowly erode the liberal democratic society we praise (coded eight times). In many ways this argument is the intolerant counterpart of the classic liberal argument for toleration that if society intervenes to stop practices that are disliked, pressure will build to repress more and more practices, in the end undermining freedoms and liberties. With regard to Philips it was argued that non-intervention in the name of ‘misunderstood tolerance’ would allow repression of women, homosexuals and more moderate Muslims to flourish, eventually leading to ‘Sharia zones’ and ‘ungovernable spaces’ (Interview 3; Interview 7; Berlingske 15-04-2011). One reason this particular position is found to be influential in case 2, and not in case 1, could be the perception that Philips as an internationally renounced authority of Islam would be more likely to influence wider circles of Muslims than Hizb ut-Tahrir (see also next section).

3.4. Comparing Main Positions in the two Cases

Reading across the two cases, and the main discursive positions on toleration boundary drawing articulated, what springs to mind immediately are the many similarities. I will reflect on four such similarities here, before turning to the most important differences. First, it is striking how closely
public debates on the limits of tolerance are linked to issues of free speech in the Danish context. This has to do with the kind of cases investigated here – public meetings where controversial views are articulated – but also with Danish political culture, which has traditionally been characterized by strong endorsements of free speech. The 2005-2006 Danish cartoon controversy to a large degree reaffirmed this tradition (Lindekilde 2009). This coupling of toleration and free speech regulation helps explain the prominent position of the toleration-as-a-must argument in the two cases. In this perspective toleration becomes a matter of legality rather than moral considerations, political opinions, etc.

Second, both cases exemplify the importance of radicalization scenarios to debates of toleration vis-à-vis Muslim actors’ political participation today. In both cases the views articulated at the meetings are construed as radical, posing a threat to integration, social cohesion and potentially to security (providing the breeding ground for violent extremism). In the radicalization scenarios constructed a direct line seems to run from attitudes and opinions to actions. Thus, the young Muslims attending the meetings are accordingly constructed as both ‘at risk’ in terms of integration and potentially ‘risky’ in terms of security (see Heath-Kelly 2011). This is the underlying logic of the intolerance-due-to-potential-threat-and-harm position playing a prominent role in both debates. In this way radicalization scenarios work to narrow the room of toleration by excluding to the realm of intolerance, practices and views, which are not forbidden by law, due to their potential destabilization of security.

Third, the absence of a particular position in both cases is striking. A prominent position, when debating in Denmark similar public meetings and marches arranged by the far right, at least until the terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya in June 2011, has been the view that such racist and neo-nazi views should be met with silence. The best way to combat such ideas is not intolerance or tolerance-but-protest, but simply to ignore the events and meetings. However, when it comes to controversial meetings arranged by Muslim actors it seems as if the marking of toleration boundaries has become increasingly important. This, I believe, has to do with the interdependence between toleration boundary drawing and mechanisms of ‘othering’ (see also section 4 below). Islam, and in particular radical Islam, serves in Denmark, as in many other Western countries today, as the main ‘other’, which constitutes the negative opposite of the ‘us’ and its positive traits (Schiffauer 2012: 2). In this perspective marking the boundaries of toleration becomes also an issue of necessary identity maintenance, and ignoring the meetings become unfeasible.

Fourthly, the interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing in the two cases and othering of Muslims in Denmark, also helps to explain the prominent role played by ‘modalities of liberal intolerance’ in both cases (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012). These arguments of intolerance are exactly characterized by reference to not just the illiberal views and practices articulated at the meetings, but to the illiberal identities and ways of life they exemplify, which are deemed in opposition to ‘our’ liberal and democratic norms and principles. In this way toleration boundary drawing becomes entangled with the prescription of particular liberal virtues and identities which must be shared. By highlighting the liberal way of life and enforcing it on others these arguments squeeze the room of toleration.

Despite these significant similarities across the two cases, important differences also exist, not least regarding the overall distribution of toleration boundary drawing in the debates with case 2 being more skewed towards intolerance than case 1. What can explain this observed pattern? A number of interviewees pointed to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad regarding the two meetings.

At the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, the senders of the invitation and the message entailed are, despite the problematization hereof, Danish citizens. Bilal Philips is a foreign citizen, who came to Denmark to speak only to leave again right after. This seems to make a difference to toleration boundary drawing. The mayor of Children’s Affairs and Culture in Copenhagen, Pia Allerslev (Liberals) puts it this way:
Conceptions of Tolerance and Intolerance in Denmark

You should not just be allowed to come and stir up emotions and then leave again. I have more respect for Hizb ut-Tahrir, because they have stakes in this. They will be held accountable for what they say tomorrow and in a year (Interview 2).

The quote shows, maybe not very surprising, how the limits of toleration are dependent on the subject of toleration’s citizenship position and embeddedness in Danish society. However, the comparison of the two cases also shows that the limits of toleration are linked to the tolerator’s expectations to the subject of toleration. Thus, the fact that the organizers of Bilal Philips’ visit, Islamic Faith Community and its youth section, are involved in a number of collaborations with local authorities and like to present themselves as integrationists bridging cultures, led to disappointed expectations hampering toleration of their engagement with Philips. In fact, it was by many deemed to be an aggravating circumstance that the Islamic Faith Community by being conceived of and treated as a relative ‘mainstream’ Muslim actor was legitimizing the views of Philips.

Regarding the intended and perceived message of the two meetings, several interviewees point to the difference between raising issues of homophobia, gender inequality and endorsement of terrorism (case 2) and challenging Danish engagement in Afghanistan (case 1). The difference highlighted is that if you disregard the provocative invitation to the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, the articulated criticism of Danish foreign policy resonates with significant parts of the majority population in Denmark, while Bilal Philips’ views resonate with very few in majority society (and within the Muslim minority). As indicated by one interviewee; ‘I think it is legitimate to question Danish engagement in Afghanistan and believe that there should be room to air criticism’ (Interview 3). In short: Toleration boundary drawing seems also to be dependent on distribution of support for the issue/object of toleration.

Finally, a difference in the targeted audience of the two meetings is pointed out:

With Hizb ut-Tahrir we know more less who they appeal to. But with Philips the Islamic Faith Community legitimized that a much broader crowd of young Muslims could come and listen out of interest. When you show up at HT meetings you declare much clearer that you share their views (Interview 2)

In other words, the fact that the Bilal Philips meeting targeted a much bigger audience of ‘ordinary’ young Muslims than the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting was by many believed to make boundary drawing more acute in case 2.

3.5. The dynamics and strategies of toleration boundary drawing in the two cases

When trying to understand why particular actors draw toleration boundaries and legitimate boundary drawing as they do, important explanatory elements have been found to be the value system/ideology and the life world/experiences of the actor. Research has shown correlates between individuals’ general political orientation and beliefs, and their propensity to tolerate particular practices (Bang Pedersen, Slothus, Stubager & Togeby 2007). Likewise, research has shown, although less clearly, a connection between individuals’ lived experiences with particular practices and their propensity to tolerate them (Frølund Thomsen 2012). Other research has shown how the context and specificities of practices (e.g. public vs. private; Christian vs. Muslim symbols etc.) matter to toleration boundary drawing in practice (Aarøe 2012). However, much less researched and understood is how the dynamics of engaging in public debates help to shape toleration boundary drawing and positioning. And, in addition, how discursive strategies are employed to legitimize positions, cope with pressures of boundary drawing and refute counter-arguments. Thus, my argument in the following section is that the interactive nature of public debates generates relative positioning of actors, which co-determine the toleration boundary drawing of actors and the discursive strategies used to legitimate it and cope with pressures. In the following I will highlight across the two cases three such dynamics or discursive strategies of dealing with toleration boundary drawing.
3.5.1. From Political to Legal Boundary drawing

The first prominent discursive strategy of dealing with toleration boundary drawing can be seen by looking at the argumentative strategies of the two primary ministers involved in the debates – Minister of Justice, Lars Barfoed (Conservatives), and Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller (Conservatives). When the news of the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting first broke, journalists approached the ministers for a comment and asked about their view on toleration boundary drawing in this specific case. Lars Barfoed initially responded by stating his disapproval of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting, but argued that any substantial boundary drawing had to be done by legal experts and the courts. Thus, he asked the State Attorney’s office to look into the matter. This move had at least two strategic advantages for the minister. First, by asking the State Attorney to investigate (like it had been done on two earlier occasions) if Hizb ut-Tahrir could be banned, he signaled action and a degree of intolerance of the meeting, while at the same time upholding basic liberal freedoms and the rule of law. Second, the move shifted the responsibility for boundary drawing from the political to the legal arena. In doing so the minister avoided having to choose between either ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ or ‘intolerance-because-of-threat-and-harm’, which were the two main positions he was trying to balance. Interpreted as a strategic move, the transformation of a political issue into a legal one, helped the Minister of Justice bypass a decision, which would most certainly be criticized no matter what position he ended up taking.

In a very similar manner, the Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller, responded by shifting the responsibility of boundary drawing from the public and political arena to the semi-private arena. This was done by calling upon the venue owner, the National Library, to reconsider the decision to rent the venue to Hizb ut-Tahrir. Again, this move seems strategically favorable from the perspective of the minister as it signals action, shifts responsibility and avoids difficult political decision-making here and now. The director of the National Library, Erland Kolding Nielsen, responded by trying to shift responsibility back to the politicians by calling for clearer policy guidelines for such situations. Kolding Nielsen argues: ‘Drawing the limits of tolerance and freedom of speech is most certainly a political responsibility. You cannot expect a public employee to do this on behalf of the Minister, the government or the majority’ (interview 1). In the interview Kolding Nielsen links this strategy of pushing responsibility downwards in the bureaucratic system to a more general tendency, which he refers to as ‘the syndrome of increasing responsibility avoidance’ (interview 1).

In both debates this kind of strategic shifting of responsibility for boundary drawing and blame avoidance, was criticized by several actors, not least the Danish People’s Party. Representatives of the party on several occasions called upon the two ministers to ‘step up’, ‘take responsibility’, ‘be more proactive’ and, thus, intervene to stop the meeting (Ritzau 10-04-2011; Berlingske Tidende 9-03-2011). If necessary the relevant ministers should change the legal framework to make it possible to intervene, it was argued. Through their outspoken criticism of the political handling of the meeting, The Danish People’s Party tried to position itself as the only ones with the political courage to clearly draw boundaries and intervene to stop Hizb ut-Tahrir. However, others, like Lars Aslan Rasmussen (Social Democrats), shared the view that toleration boundary drawing was in fact a clearly political responsibility, which should not be delegated to legal or private arenas: ‘Of course politicians should have an opinion as to whether or not this is okay. That is our job’ (Interview 3).

This dynamic positioning in the debate, I will argue, exemplifies how the two ministers used their political power and position to sidestep a politically controversial issue, while The Danish People’s Party, as well as members of the central-left opposition, embraced the issue to score political points by drawing boundaries, either for or against toleration of the meetings. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s strategy in the debate was clearly to provoke a public outcry and thereby force the political elite to react and negotiate limits of tolerance. The invitation to the meeting and the choice of venue was, as indicated, deliberately designed to stir up emotions. From Hizb ut-Tahrir’s perspective this strategy of deliberate provocation created a ‘win-win situation’ for the organization. Either the political elite would intervene and stop the meeting, which would make possible an argument of victimage and freedom of
speech violation (cf. the ‘intolerance-as-counter-productive’ position). Or the political elite would tolerate the meeting, giving Hizb ut-Tahrir a public and heavily medialized platform to spread their views.

3.5.2. Securitization: Pushing boundary drawing into the realm of the extra-political

Securitization is another central discursive strategy of removing issues at hand from the realm of politics that is employed in both cases. In line with the Copenhagen School of security studies, securitization can be seen as ‘speech acts that frame the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). Thus, by making an issue a matter of security, securitizing actors close down politics and push the issue into the realm of ‘exception, emergency and decision’ (Wæver 2011: 651). Through the creation of particular radicalization scenarios of the two meetings, a number of actors across the political spectrum argue that the matter at hand is really not about toleration of dissident views, but about security and risk management. Although the Danish Intelligence Service in both cases found no imminent risk connected to the meetings, these actors stress the potential threat to security posed by allowing the meetings to take place, and thereby attempt to push the issue of toleration boundary drawing out of normal politics. Here securitization functions as a discursive strategy which constructs decision making and boundary drawing as necessary and extra-political. The meetings pose potential security threats and therefore they must be avoided. When successful, securitization functions as a conversation stopper – the debate of the limits of toleration become irrelevant as the issue at hand is framed as calling for extra-political measures. As shown, strategies of securitization were linked to the position of ‘intolerance-due-to-threat-and-harm’, which was the main position of intolerance in both cases. However, the securitization of the two meetings was not complete, and in several ways challenged, as testified to by the diverse arguments put forward in the debates.

In the case of the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting the strategy of securitization was easily applied with reference to the direct and existential threat posed by the supposed appeal to violence against Danish soldiers in Afghanistan. But the strategy of securitization is, as exemplified clearly by the constructed radicalization scenarios in the two cases, not limited to imminent existential threats. Thus, more indirect and lagged threats to integration and social cohesion can also be securitized. In fact, the Bilal Philips case shows how securitization can work to problematize, not just the direct exponent of radical and supposable security-threatening views (Bilal Philips), but also anybody engaged with such actors (The Islamic Faith Community). Despite all arguments by the Islamic Faith Community that they had invited Philips due to his expertise on islamophobia, and repeated public statements distancing the community from homophobia and violence against women, the invitation of Philips was securitized, said to show ‘the true face of the Islamic Faith Community’ (interview 2). In this way the Islamic Faith Community was found ‘guilty by association’, and accordingly constructed as a latent security threat due to its ‘two-faced Islamists’ who pose as tolerant, but who in fact have a ‘hidden agenda’ of using the principles of democracy to undermine them (Interview 3). By introducing doubt vis-à-vis the sincerity of statements and motives of Muslim actors the strategy of securitization poses serious challenges to Muslim actors’ possibilities to participate at face value in public debates and engaging in rational discussion (see also section 4 below).

3.5.3. Strategies of Coping among Muslim Actors: Reframing, Adaptation and Avoidance

In terms of the discursive strategies used by the main Muslim actors in the two cases – Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Faith Community – three strategies can be identified that seek to counter securitization, shift responsibility, perform safety and avoid boundary drawing.

The first coping strategy I will call ‘reframing’. For example, as a response to the argument that the organization was inciting violence and putting Danish soldiers at risk one spokesman of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Sharif Redji, said: If there is anybody to blame for the fact that Danish soldiers are dying in a
pointless battle in Afghanistan, it is Danish politicians who have cynically chosen to send them on a mission, which only serves American strategic interests in the regions (Ritzau 28-12-2010). Here the spokesman is trying to shift responsibility and blame to the political elite, and recast the object of debate and toleration from Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting to politicians’ decision to send troops to Afghanistan. In a similar manner, another spokesman, Chadi Freigeh, argued that: When the people of Afghanistan defend themselves against aggressions from the occupying forces you cannot blame them. It is their right to defend their lives (Ritzau 21-01-2011). By reframing the armed resistance of the Afghan people away from terrorism and towards legitimate self-defense, Hizb ut-Tahrir is tying in with and challenging dominant arguments and positions in the debate. In a way the securitization strategy is turned upside down by recasting the threat to security as caused by decisions made by the political elite.

The second coping strategy employed by Muslim actors – which I will call ‘adaptation’ – is most visible in regard to the Bilal Philips meeting. Faced with intense criticism, securitization attempts and a public debate skewed towards intolerance, the Islamic Faith Community, personalized in their spokesperson, Imran Shah, was under severe pressure to distance itself from Bilal Philips. In the hours before Philips’ speech this was done by publicly declaring that the community regretted having invited Philips. Imran Shah said:

If we could do it all over we would not have invited him. It is not fruitful for the dialogue here in Denmark that we have demonstrations outside Korsgadehallen [the venue of the meeting].
On the other hand we will not be dictated (B.T. 18-04-2011; Interview 4).

This move can be understood as an attempt to cope with intense pressure by acknowledging mistakes and adapting to articulated boundaries. In this perspective regretting the invitation is seen as a sign of learning and readjustment to mainstream formulations of the limits of tolerance. However, critics argue that it is a purely strategic move designed to maintain privileges, because ‘if they [the Islamic Faith Community] are cut off from close dialogue with politicians at the town hall they lose all their power and influence in the community’ (Interview 2).

Besides airing remorse for having invited Philips, the Islamic Faith Community also tried to adapt to pressures by ‘performing safety’ (Mythen 2011). Performing safety is a discursive (or behavioral) strategy meant to signal safety in the face of securitization. One example is the move of the Islamic Faith Community to arrange for coffee and cake for the demonstrators outside the meeting venue (Interview 4). Nobody who meets their opponents with coffee and cake can be truly dangerous. Rather they signal peaceful coexistence and respect. The ability to perform safety seems important as a way of countering securitization and trying to influence negotiations of the toleration boundary drawing among Muslim actors in public debates today.

The last identified coping strategy has to do with Muslim actors who avoid drawing boundaries essential to toleration/non-toleraton. In the debate regarding Bilal Philips, spokesperson of the Islamic Faith Community, Imran Shah, was heavily criticized for not answering directly if the community supports the beating of women or the view that homosexuals should be punished by death, as suggested by elements of Sharia law. In a number of interviews he argued that these questions were irrelevant as ‘we are in Denmark, and here the Danish constitution applies and not Sharia’ (Interview 4). By insisting on a fundamental distinction between evaluating certain practices and views in a Muslim versus a non-Muslim context, Shah is avoiding having to either dismiss aspects of Sharia law or openly endorse Bilal Philips’ views. However, the lack of clear boundary drawing was by many commentators read as constituting support of Philips’ views. In the words of former Minister of Integration, Birthe Rønn hornbech (Liberals):

As long as the Islamic Faith Community does not speak out against the views of Philips, but instead refuses to answer simple questions, believing that these vital questions are irrelevant, we can only conclude that that the Islamic Faith Community accepts these views (Berlingske 14-04-2011).
3.6. Effects of public boundary drawing on Muslim actors’ exercise of political rights

In this section we shift focus from the content and strategies of toleration boundary drawing in the debates, and focus instead on the effects this boundary drawing can be said to have on Muslim actors’ possibilities for participation in future public debates. My basic argument is that although the controversies regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting and Bilal Philips’ visit did not generate any concrete policy implication, which directly altered Hizb ut-Tahrir’s or the Islamic Faith Community’s (or other Muslim actors) possibilities of using public meetings as a platform for political claims making, there seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, I argue, with the fundamental interdependence of tolerance boundary drawing and processes of othering (Schiffauer 2012: 2-3). Tolerance boundary drawing implies othering, as it functions to differentiate the realm of the recognizable normal and tolerable from the foreign and intolerable. When drawing toleration boundaries we are at the same time constructing an in-group and an out-group. As the differences that generate public debate and activate toleration boundary drawing today primarily are differences of Muslim views and practices, the main out-group constructed is that of the ‘Muslim other’. Often it is Muslims in general who are designated as the ‘other’, covering up important differences within the Muslim community.

One way this interdependence between toleration boundary drawing and processes of othering affects the Danish Muslim community was suggested by Per Ørum Jørgensen from the Christian Democrats among others:

I believe that the statements of Hizb ut-Tahrir and all the attention their meeting has received is most harmful to the many liberal, peaceful Muslims in Denmark, who too often are equated with extremist Islamists like Hizb ut-Tahrir. And after all, peaceful Muslims constitute the majority (Kristeligt Dagblad 19-01-2011)

The thrust of this argument is that the intense focus on toleration boundary drawing in regard to specific views/practices can lead to a lack of boundary drawing vis-à-vis internal differences in the Muslim community. The public drive to cast Hizb ut-Tahrir and its views and practices as intolerable, may implicitly lead to misrecognition of variation in views and practices within the Muslim community. Likewise, it was argued that the Islamic Faith Community by inviting Philips and not clearly denouncing his views e.g. on homosexuals ‘was taking moderate Muslims hostage’ and ‘undermining general trust’ (Interview 2). This indirect othering of all Muslims as potentially problematic may serve to delimit the possibilities of being tolerated as legitimate participants in public debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims. In the case material, the tendency to equate particular views and practices to all Muslims is in particular connected to the position of ‘liberal intolerance’, as boundary drawing here is less concerned with specific statements/practices, and more with liberal identities and general challenges posed to societal cohesion by cultural difference.

In a similar way, Zubair Butt Hussain, spokesman of the Danish moderate Islamic umbrella organization, The Muslim Common Council, used the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting to raise a principled issue of excommunication of Muslim actors through the labeling of actors as ‘radical’. Butt Hussain was arguing how he dared not go to the Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, or other controversial arrangements or mosques in the Muslim milieu, as he said to ‘hear with his own ears what kind of nonsense they were preaching’, as this would most certainly lead the media and certain politicians to label him as ‘radical’ (Politiken 28-02-2011). Thus, the argument was that important limitations on Muslim actors’ maneuvering in public debates are infl ected through mechanisms of ‘guilt by association’. In other words, the fear of the label ‘radical’, which can have great consequences for Muslim actors with ambitions to participate in political life, leads to self-censorship in terms of argumentation and participation in particular events. At a more general level, the debate highlighted how the discourse of radicalization and connected strategies of securitization may shrink the room of tolerance for Muslim actors participating in public debate (see also Lindekilde & Kühle 2012).
A further effect of the great outrage regarding the two meetings on Muslim actors’ possibilities for participation in political life was suggested by Butt Hussain. Asked about the possibilities of participating in public debates as a Muslim he answered:

*I would say that a different set of premises or unwritten rules apply to Muslims in public debates as compared to others. When I speak about radicalization, terror or integration, I do so from a predefined vision of what Islam is about and how it should be practiced. This is why I am constantly asked to distance myself from a range of scary interpretations of Islam and Muslim practices before I am allowed to talk about the particular topic in question. This is really constraining* (Politiken 28-02-2011)

As a Muslim actor you are, Butt Hussain argues, expected proactively to endorse central liberal values (freedom of speech; gender equality; non-violence; secularism; rule of law etc.), and dismiss certain illiberal ideas and values (Sharia; support of violent jihad; gender segregation; homophobia etc.) as a prerequisite for participation in public debates and political life. If you fail to do this or dismiss it as irrelevant to the question at hand, Muslims risk being excommunicated and having their ‘moderateness’ or ‘liberalness’ drawn into question. Thus, an indirect effect of the intense public debate about the illiberal views and practices of Hizb ut-Tahrir or Bilal Philips is that more liberal Muslims are forced to spend time and resources distancing themselves from certain views and practices, and endorsing others, before they are certified as tolerable and legitimate public debaters. Put another way, Muslims are forced to discursively ‘perform safety’ and certify boundaries in order to be accepted as part of the in-group. In this way the boundary drawing regarding ‘radical’ Muslim actors in public debates generates special conditions for participation vis-à-vis also ‘moderate’ Muslims actors.

That special conditions for participation and argumentation exist for the out-group of Muslim actors is further underlined by the fact that toleration boundary drawing in practice often varies from group to group. As pointed out in several interviews, the same kind of views and practices seem to be unimportant and tolerable differences when practiced by in-group actors, but significant and intolerable differences when performed by the out-group (see also Schiffauer 2012: 11). Concretely it is pointed out how the gender division at the two meetings, and in Muslim communities in general, is pointed out as intolerable, while the same practice in Jewish communities is rarely problematized (Interview 4). Likewise, while the tendency to isolate and create parallel societies among some Muslims is securitized, the same practice among Chinese immigrants is left uncommented (Interview 1). In practice this means to Muslim actors that certain practices and views cannot be defended without the actors losing legitimacy, although such practices and views are tolerated in other contexts.

Finally, as stressed in an interview with Lars Aslan Rasmussen, there can be negative effects on moderate Muslim voices of not drawing the boundaries of toleration clearly enough vis-à-vis ‘radical Islam’. Because if the majority society does not communicate boundaries clearly, e.g. by stopping Philips from entering the country or by outlawing Hizb ut-Tahrir, it ‘signals that anything goes, and then it becomes the most extreme voices within the Muslim community who dictate the direction’ (Interview 3). In other words, the absence of external boundary drawing affects possibilities of internal boundary drawing.

### 3.7. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that in Denmark the limits to tolerance of ethnic and religious difference in political life have been most significantly challenged in recent years by the non-institutionalized political participation of ‘radical Muslim’ actors, who through public meetings have pushed controversial views and practices into the public sphere. The chapter has investigated the negotiations of toleration boundary drawing as it plays out in public debates by comparing the arguments and
Discursive strategies put forward in regard to the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting at the Danish National Library and the visit of the Islamic preacher Bilal Philips to Copenhagen both in 2011. Based on this comparison a number of conclusions can be reached. First, it is found that despite the proximity in time and resemblances of the illiberal and undemocratic views aired at the two meetings, the public debate regarding the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting was skewed towards tolerance while the debate regarding Bilal Philips’ visit was skewed toward intolerance. In explaining this difference the chapter points to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad of the two meetings. The significance of intolerance arguments in connection with Philips’ visit is connected to the fact that 1) Philips is a foreign citizen, 2) his views on homosexuality and gender equality resonated purely with audiences in Denmark (as compared to the criticism of Danish engagement in Afghanistan aired by Hizb ut-tahrir), and 3) that the audience at Philips’ lecture was perceived to be much wider than the audience at the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting, due to Philips’ international status as an Islamic authority, and because of the perceived ‘mainstream’ status of the Islamic Faith Community, who invited him to Denmark. Thus, it can be concluded that toleration boundary drawing is shaped significantly by the citizenship status and the perceived impact of the object of toleration.

Secondly, the comparison shows a number of recurrent positions of tolerance/intolerance across the two cases and involved actors. In both cases the two most prominent positions of tolerance are what I have called ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ and ‘toleration-but-protest’. The prominence of these positions, it has been argued, are linked to the importance of free speech considerations in Danish political culture, which connects toleration boundary drawing narrowly with legal limitations on free speech, and a widespread view that views and practices which are disapproved of are best challenged by debating them in public and marking opposition. However, it is also found that the public marking of opposition depends on who is the object of toleration, as views and practices deemed controversial among Muslim actors are left uncommented when practiced among other groups. This has to do, the chapter argues, with the important interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing and mechanisms of othering, with Islam and Muslims, especially ‘radical’ Islam, posing as the significant other in a Danish context today. Regarding the most dominant positions of intolerance these are in both cases found to be ‘intolerance-due-to-perceived-threat-and-harm’ and modalities of ‘liberal intolerance’. In both cases radicalization scenarios of the meetings are constructed and linked to a discursive strategy of securitization, which attempts to push toleration boundary drawing out of the political arena and into the realm of the extra-political. The meetings hereby become, it is argued, not a matter of political or moral boundary drawing, but of security concerns, and toleration is therefore not an option. The prominence of the modalities of ‘liberal intolerance, I argue, has to do again with the interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing and mechanisms of othering. These arguments of intolerance are exactly characterized by reference to not just the illiberal views and practices articulated at the meetings, but to the illiberal identities and ways of life they exemplify, which are deemed in opposition to ‘our’ liberal and democratic norms and principles. In this way toleration boundary drawing becomes entangled with the prescription of particular liberal virtues and identities which must be shared.

Thirdly, the comparison of the two cases points to a number of recurrent discursive strategies of positioning and coping with public pressures of boundary drawing. Here the chapter highlights three such strategies: 1) the attempts by leading politicians to make boundary drawing a matter of legality rather than politics, 2) the attempts to securitize the meetings by especially actors on the political centre-right, and thereby remove boundary drawing from normal politics, and 3) the attempts by some Muslim actors to reframe the issue at hand, perform security in the face of securitization and avoid clear boundary drawing by recasting the terms of debate.

Finally, the chapter points to a number of potential effects that public toleration boundary drawing may have on the room of maneuvering of Muslim actors in political life in Denmark. Most importantly it is showed how the marking of opposition to certain illiberal views and practices, and connected mechanisms of othering, may squeeze the room of tolerance for also more ‘moderate’ Muslim actors in the public sphere. Often opposition and boundary drawing in public debates are made in regard to
Islam in general, not paying attention to the important internal differentiations of the Muslim community in Denmark, which forces also ‘progressive’ Muslim voices to confirm certain liberal views/practices and disconfirm specific illiberal ones in order to be accepted as legitimate participants in public debates. Even if this is done, the chapter shows, the prospect of having ones arguments taken at face value as a Muslim actor is challenged by a widespread view that Muslim actors speak with ‘two tongues’.
CHAPTER 4. CONCEPTIONS OF TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE IN DENMARK: FROM LIBERALITY TO LIBERAL INTOLERANCE?

By Tore Vincents Olsen & Lasse Lindekilde

4.1. Introduction
In this chapter we draw together the studies of conceptions, debates and arguments of tolerance and intolerance in Denmark presented above. The chapter is structured in five main parts. The first part brings together the major insights from the presented studies in order to provide an answer to the question to what extent current conceptions of toleration and intolerance are challenging or reproducing the Danish tradition of ‘freemindedness’ or liberality. The second part concludes on the degree to which we witness examples of going beyond toleration in Denmark towards ‘positive recognition’ or inclusion to the realm of ‘the normal’ of particular cultural and religious differences. The third part likewise draws comparative conclusions on the conceptualization and limits of tolerance across issue fields (education and political life), in particular addressing the question of whether or not it makes a difference to perceptions of toleration if the issue at hand is one that demands practical solutions (concrete decision-making) or one that operates more at a symbolic level (more principled debates). The fourth part of the chapter discusses across the studies if Danish debates on limits of toleration and policies of difference are excluding groups or making it difficult for them to participate in school or political life. Thus, it is discussed how toleration boundary-drawing impacts on not least Muslim minorities in these two spheres. Finally, the chapter concludes by giving some reflections as to what could be done vis-à-vis toleration of cultural and religious difference in the studies area in the future.

4.2. The Connection between the Danish Tradition of Free-mindedness/Liberality and Current Conceptions of Toleration and Intolerance

4.2.1. The Danish Tradition of Toleration
Historically, in Denmark tolerance has in a widely received interpretation been dismissed as a form of indifference and relativism with regard to the beliefs and actions of others. As such it connotes the idea that all beliefs, values, and practices are of equal value and therefore also of no value. Tolerance, in this sense, means the inability to make judgements, or to differentiate properly between right and wrong, good and bad, true and false (Bredsdorff & Kjældgaard 2008: ch. 15). While this idea is based on a biased (or misunderstood) reading of Enlightenment philosophy, many in Denmark have wished to employ an alternative term, a favourite being frisind, meaning ‘liberality’ or ‘free mindedness’.

This term, originating from the influential populist leader, author and priest N.F.S. Grundtvig, originally refers to the idea that the state should stay out of matters of religion and let the exponents of different views of religion use all verbal powers at their disposal to promote their own views and criticise those of others. By contrast, ‘tolerance’ would here be indifference towards, and refraining from judgment on that which one considers wrong, and thereby losing an essential moral faculty as a human being.

Yet with the state as the guarantor of equal civic freedoms – securing, as Danes have put it since Grundtvig, freedom for Loke as well as for Thor – liberality means that one is able to speak truth against a lie without holding back in dull indifference or adopting social conformism in order to ensure
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Liberality means fighting for the values one holds dear while insisting on the same right for all others. The basis of this Danish interpretation of tolerance is, first, a strong commitment to equal citizen rights by all and their protection by the state. Liberality, secondly, implies criticising and even ridiculing all that you find wrong. While this leaves some space for legal tolerance, understood as the right to think and act in ways that are considered wrong, it leaves little space for social tolerance, understood as abstention from criticism of, among other things, cultural and religious sensibilities. Liberality is a ‘republican’ virtue that enables you to participate in blunt public exchanges with a ‘thick skin’ so that you can reach negotiated, consensual democratic agreements with your opponents at all levels of society. Indeed, the notorious Danish cartoon crisis referred to this understanding of liberality: by those who argued for the right to criticise and ridicule the beliefs of others, as well as by those who were concerned that all the relevant parties did not in fact have equal civic standing in Danish society (Ibid.; Meer & Mouritsen 2009).

The preference for liberality over tolerance is particularly conspicuous among right-of-centre politicians in Denmark today. A competing conception of tolerance developed in connection with a split up of the Liberal party in 1905 (in Danish the party is called Venstre, literally ‘Left’). Ongoing debates in Parliament led to an institutionalisation of the split-up and the creation of two separate liberal parties, one mainly consisting of farmers and members of the liberal professions (Venstre), and another made up by small peasants and intellectuals (Radikale Venstre, literally ‘Radical Left’). The political views of both groups were by and large inspired by the thoughts of Grundtvig, but the latter also found inspiration in the thoughts of brothers Georg and Edvard Brandes and the editor Viggo Hørup, representing a new, radical, form of liberalism. Due to this ideological difference not only two distinct liberal parties but two distinct liberal ideologies developed, and these two different interpretations of liberalism caused the reception of tolerance to follow two separate courses throughout the 20th century. In very general terms: in contrast to the right-wing liberals who, by and large, stuck to Grundtvig’s distinction between tolerance and liberality, left-wing liberals accentuated the importance of a universal concept of tolerance.

Recent times have seen a change in the subjects and objects of toleration in Danish discourse. While it never acquired an unequivocally positive meaning, the main concern with tolerance has shifted: from the intolerance of the majority against immigrants in the 1970s and the 1980s, to a concern, in the 1990s and the 2000s, that too many immigrants (potentially intolerant themselves) being reluctant to integrate would have a corrosive effect on the otherwise well-established, traditional tolerance of the majority. There has never been any celebration of multiculturalism in Denmark, beyond seeing cultural diversity as an interesting spice of life (foods, folklore, etc).

4.2.2 The Civic Turn in Denmark

Over the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic and religious identities. The discourse of integration is explicitly set against the notion of multiculturalism. The latter is synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and political failure to demand and further the integration of all residents into society. In general, cultural and religious differences are seen as illegitimate to the extent that they stand in the way of integration, understood as the ability to live up to one’s duty as an economically self-sufficient and taxpaying individual and as a participating citizen at all levels of civil society and political institutions.

The idea that we need to be mutually reassured at the symbolic level that we all belong to the same community (in that we affirm the same fundamental democratic values) is now a central part of a self-conscious discourse on the necessity of ensuring the ‘cohesion’ of Danish society in order to sustain the support for the Danish welfare community and its social and moral achievements. While these achievements include equality and self-reflective moral and political autonomy for the individual
citizen, the idea of social integration through values is closer to the idea of a Gemeinschaft built on mechanic solidarity (Durkheim), than to that of a Gesellschaft premised on abstract norms of interaction, individualism and division of labour (organic solidarity).

This ‘civic integrationism,’ with its comprehensive notion of citizenship, draws on central elements in national identity history that place a value on the society’s smallness, popular participation, consensus and the ability and duty to communicate in the same language across social and political cleavages. For the right-of-centre, it is rooted in a broader national and Christian culture. The centre-left also subscribes to the citizen ideal, but tends to reject the right wing’s somewhat nationalist interpretation of its basis. It is generally believed that status as an equal citizen with identical rights and duties provides sufficient support for the realisation of cultural and religious identities and that it is accessible to all with the right motivation. Danish citizenship as a social and legal status is not biased towards a specific nationality, culture or religion. The form of inclusion available for immigrants is hence based on a comprehensive concept of equal citizenship that pertains to all fields of life, including family and private life. The only form of recognition given to immigrants is that of becoming a full and equal citizen; a form of recognition nonetheless withheld for a considerable number of years, until immigrants have proved their determination and ability to become full members of society through economic self-sufficiency. Danish language literacy and knowledge of Danish history, culture and fundamental political values. The formal legal status is the prize at the end of a long trial period that is supposed to ensure and demonstrate the commitment by the new-comer to the fundamental democratic values of Danish society. Some symbolic (and legal) recognition is also given to working immigrants who bring special professional skills to the country and contribute to its economic growth. However, their positive contribution is seen as almost purely economic, not cultural (skills, not identity) (Mouritsen & Olsen 2011).

The overshadowing concern with cultural and religious differences in Denmark today pertains to post-immigration minorities who arrived from non-western countries in the last 40 to 50 years, most of whom are (identified as) Muslims. National and older religious minorities of Greenlanders, Germans, Poles and Jews are today uncontroversial and rarely raise claims themselves about special or equal rights, symbolic respect and recognition. Immigrants from non-western countries, on the other hand, are very controversial because of (what is perceived to be) their low ability to integrate into the ‘modern’ and ‘liberal’ Danish society and democracy.

The turn towards integration has pushed the question of toleration aside. In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities. This criticism of tolerance as indifference or naiveté, relies on the above mentioned historical preference in some parts of society for assertive ‘free-mindedness’ over the morally deficient ‘tolerance’.

In terms of toleration, the civic integrationism can hence be interpreted as emergence of a somewhat paradoxical ‘liberal intolerance’ in Denmark. Liberal intolerance is, first, an increasing non-acceptance of too many non-liberal differences in society which make it impossible for people to (mutually) reassure themselves that all are willing to support the same liberal democratic values and hence the social and institutional basis for the maintenance of a liberal democratic society. This, secondly, especially manifests itself against cultural and religious beliefs and practices which are perceived to conflict with the constitutive divide in liberal society between the public and the private. A third form liberal intolerance is directed against ways of living which contradict the ideal of the ‘active citizen’ and autonomous individual who engages responsibly and self-reflectively with him or herself in relation to education, work and life in general. Not only are un-modern and un-liberal lives not good for persons living them, they also entail a risk of overburdening the institutions of modern welfare society through low productivity, welfare reliance and general dys-functionality, not to speak of their perceived inappropriateness as role models for coming generations (Mouritsen & Olsen 2012).

But of course things are not completely one-directional. In the last 4 to 6 years concerns with radicalisation and extremism appear to have led policy makers to re-consider whether the swing...
towards civic integrationism, also fuelled by post 9/11 fears of radical Islamism, has been too one-sided. Slightly more emphasis is given to concepts like tolerance and equal respect in order to prevent minorities from being alienated and turning against society: these concepts are thus back on the agenda, not only to ensure the rights and security of minorities, but also improve the safety of the majority. Similarly, the centre-left government that replaced the centre-right government in September 2011 has introduced a new emphasis in the immigration and immigration policy with more talk about the respect of differences and the rights of individuals.

The Government wants to create a new balance in Denmark’s integration and immigrant policy. A new balance between rights and duties. A new balance where integration is prioritized over exclusion; in which ‘what works’ stands over symbolic politics and in which the rights of citizens are guarded (Danish Government 2011: 51).

So far the most tangible result of this new policy emphasis is a loosening of the rules on family reunification and the conditions for obtaining permanent residency.

The next section recapitulates the analysis of the conceptions of acceptance, toleration and intolerance found in our case studies on education and politics in chapters 2 and 3 and relates them to the Danish tradition of free-mindedness or liberality on the one hand and the civic turn and liberal intolerance on the other.

4.2.3. Conceptions of tolerance and intolerance in Danish education and politics

In chapter 2 we studied the debates on the toleration and its limits in both public and private schools. In chapter 3 we studied the views on toleration and its limits in Danish politics pertaining to two public events involving controversial Muslim actors.

4.2.3.1. Toleration in Education

Studying the debates on schools we were able to trace both similarities and differences. First, as regards the similarities it is notable that in both cases the focus on integration is very central. There is a lot of emphasis on transforming parents and students into democratic citizens with the right values. This is what we in chapter 2 called integration through values. In both cases there is strong emphasis on democratic citizenship as an ideal that has to be taught and practiced in schools among parents, students and school representatives. While the free primary schools are not under the same formal obligation to develop students into autonomous persons in the private and professional realm, they are under some obligation to create democratic virtues which in fact come very close to this. This is reminiscent of liberal perfectionism, or even better a strong republicanism, i.e. the civic integrationism which is very dominant in Denmark and which extends to the private life and the family. As mentioned, becoming an ‘active citizen’ is regarded as a category which is and should be accessible to all. It represents the framework of the good life, including a reflexive relationship to one’s own life style and life choices encompassing family relations. There is here no conscious distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism.

To some participants in the debate, the two cases are connected the other way around. The lack of tolerance and respect (but not necessarily positive recognition) resulting in an alleged lack of accommodation in the public school system partially explains why immigrant students feel forced to leave it and attend Islamic free schools. This relates to the general discussion whether it is better to
make exemptions to religious fundamentalists to keep them within realm of the public school (e.g. Brighouse 2008: 259-62). The alternative of having them leave and create their own private schools may on balance be worse because of the disintegrative effects etc. However, the Danish Government has not entered into this balancing act. It decided to ensure that also private schools are required to teach civic education.

Another similarity is that both public school autonomy and private school autonomy is defended, while increasingly circumscribed by central state regulation (goals, civic education). Two other competing steering rationales blend into the discussion about school autonomy and the rights of parents to choose school for their children. One relates to the concern about the academic effects (on weak learners) of segregation, and segregation’s effect on the feeling of community and the acquisition of tolerance towards others. The other relates to New Public Management ideas in the governance of the school sector: the schools compete for students and parents as customers (the money follows the student). The schools’ ability to deliver educational service is measured on centrally set goals. This is a question of creating a market rather than a question of ideologies, culture and religion. It is not clear that the market necessarily protects or leads to diversity: the same reduced number of models may be pursued with more or less success and resources.

In both the public school case and the Islamic free school case we see instances of nationalist and liberal intolerance although the distinction is easier to track in the Islamic free schools case (see below).

However, the counter discourses are different in the two cases. In the public schools case there is a pragmatic discourse which ultimately rests on a conception of toleration and respect which views others as moral and political equals (even when they endorse the ‘wrong’ values). This is far from the Danish liberal tradition and close to a concept of civility (Lægaard 2011). In fact it even seems to go ‘beyond civility’ as it entails a form of curiosity towards that to which one objects. At the same time, it is less than positive recognition of differences, identities and values as valuable per se.

The other counter discourse invokes the Danish tradition of liberality. Sometimes it shades into a defence of free school autonomy and parents’ choice based on universal liberal principles and on the notion that people (parents and schools) should be trusted to use their freedom responsibly. In the universalistic version, it relies on the concept of regarding others as moral and political equals who can make these choices for themselves.

The question is then whether the debates on schools and the ensuing policies are in line with the Danish tradition for toleration or whether they represent a break with it. No doubt, public school autonomy has been reduced in the recent years. However, there is a continued strong preference across the political spectrum for continued school autonomy and the permissibility of local accommodation according to experiences and conditions lie well within the tradition. Moreover, part of the defence of local autonomy comes from a New Public Management perspective championing marketization. In fact, the possibility of being able to choose a public school outside of one’s assigned school district seems to undercut the idea that the school is tied to a specific local democratically constituted ‘school community’.

The pragmatic approach in the public school system to differences is also in line with the Danish tradition where ‘cooperation’ between different groups at the local level across differences has been seen as a virtue. On the other hand, the theoretical underpinning of ‘appreciative dialogue’ seems to be rather far away from the critical and confrontational ethos contained in the Danish idea about liberal tolerance.

In the free school case both proponents and opponents of more regulation see themselves as protectors of the Danish free school tradition. For the opponents, the political ambition to control and monitor what free schools teach students is a radical break with the tradition. Indeed, in the tradition of the Danish liberal tolerance, the rights of the parents/schools should be protected from the majority, while the
majority – or anybody – would have the right freely and bluntly to criticise views and practices they find wrong.

In another interpretation, the free school tradition (the legacy of Grundtvig and Kold) is founded on a democratic movement against a repressive and anti-democratic state, meaning that the whole ‘purpose’ of the tradition was to create democratically engaged citizens. The right of the minority (parents) to form their own school is seen as a democratic minority right. Accordingly, those who use this right do so out of respect for fundamental democratic principles. This can be seen in the Danish Government’s justification of its introduction and expansion of the ‘democracy and freedom clause’ in the law on free primary schools in 2002 and 2005. Educationalist and school historian Ove Korsgaard describes this break with the tradition as a way of defending it in these terms:

*Recent years’ tightening of the control represents a break with a tradition that goes way back in time. But the reason is that we now have a number of schools which do not place themselves in the classic free school tradition. Earlier some schools built on a different cultural or pedagogical foundation, but there were not a lot of schools whose support for the democracy we live in could be questioned* (Ove Korsgaard, Kristeligt Dagblad, 20.09.2005).

Of course, opponents of the restricted school autonomy would say that this represents a lack of trust in the ability of parents and schools to use their freedom responsibly and hence a lack of respect for minorities as moral and political equals who are entitled to make their own decisions, even ‘wrong’ ones.

Chapter 2 demonstrated that there are two types of intolerance in the Danish School debate: nationalist and liberal intolerance. Nationalist intolerance is based on the view that certain cultural and religious practices non-acceptable because they may undermine core national values and eventually the identity of Danish society. Liberal intolerance predicated on the civic turn in Denmark appears both in the public school case and in the free school case. The first modality is most easily traced in the free school case and regards the divisive and segregative effects of too many religious (Islamic) free schools. Too much diversity endangers the social basis for maintaining a liberal democratic society. The second modality of liberal intolerance is seen in the concern that central liberal norms are undermined (in casu gender equality, democracy and fundamental rights). The third modality regards the creation of ‘liberal people’ and/or ‘active citizens.’ Again this modality is most obvious in the free school case where Islamic free schools are criticised for not preparing students to become competent individuals and citizens in a modern society ‘with freedom and democracy’. Of course, it can be debated how ‘liberal perfectionist’ this criticism really is. Some non-perfectionist strands of liberalism would also be concerned about the potential harm done to the fundamental interests/rights of children by not providing them with the preconditions for a life independent of others and/or of the pursuit of collective political goals of different groups, minorities as well as majorities (Gutman 1995; Brighouse 1998).

In the Danish school debate it is difficult to disentangle nationalist and liberal intolerance since nationalists often endorse very liberal values which they claim are special Danish values (or a special Danish interpretation of these values) rooted in a (Christian) national cultural tradition.

Conceptions of tolerance are in the Danish debate on schools are based on both pragmatic and principled reasons. The pragmatic defence of tolerance is in the public school case found, first, in the defence of school autonomy by the ministers. It is seen as suboptimal and epistemologically challenging to make rules on the (non) accommodation of cultural and religious differences which should apply uniformly to all schools in Denmark. Secondly, tolerance is defended pragmatically at the school level with reference to the goal at hand: accommodations have to be made to ensure the well-being and education of the children. In the free school case, the pragmatic argument for tolerance is less prevalent and atypical in a country with a strong concern about integration: free schools allow the peaceful co-existence of two religions/cultures which are fundamentally incompatible.
In the public school case the argument for toleration on pragmatic grounds in the ‘integration through inclusion’ strategy shades into arguments which mirror more principled liberal arguments for toleration, namely that immigrant parents need to be regarded as moral and political equals who are entitled to make their own (even wrong) choices and that their views (as parents) have to be taken seriously as those of equals. In the free school case we find the same kind of argument with regard to the schools’ and the parents’ use of their freedom of choice. At times, this argument is based on the Danish free school tradition rather than on general liberal principles. This is the part of the ‘free mindedness’ or liberality tradition that underscores the guaranteed equal civil rights (legal tolerance). The other part of liberality promotes a frank and confrontational ethos combined with the development of ‘think skin’ is not very salient here. Underlying these arguments are ‘respect conceptions’ of tolerance.

4.2.3.2. Toleration in Politics

The study of toleration boundary-drawing in public debates in Denmark, presented in chapter 3, found, firstly, that despite the proximity in time and resemblances of the illiberal and undemocratic views aired at the two meetings, the public debate regarding the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting was skewed towards tolerance while the debate regarding Bilal Philips’ visit was skewed toward intolerance. In explaining this difference the chapter pointed to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad of the two meetings. The significance of intolerance arguments in connection with Philips’ visit is connected to the fact that 1) Philips is a foreign citizen, 2) his views on homosexuality and gender equality resonated purely with audiences in Denmark (as compared to the criticism of Danish engagement in Afghanistan aired by Hizb ut-tahrir), and 3) that the audience at Philips’ lecture was perceived to be much wider than the audience at the Hizb ut-tahrir meeting, due to Philips’ international status as an Islamic authority, and because of the perceived ‘mainstream’ status of the Islamic Faith Community, who invited him to Denmark. Thus, it can be concluded that toleration boundary drawing is shaped significantly by the citizenship status and the perceived impact of the object of toleration.

Secondly, the comparison between the two debates showed a number of recurrent positions of tolerance/intolerance across the two cases and involved actors. In both cases the two most prominent positions of tolerance are what has been called ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ and ‘tolerance-but-protest’. The prominence of the ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’ positions, it has been argued, is linked to the importance of free speech considerations in Danish political culture, which connects toleration boundary drawing narrowly with legal limitations on free speech. However, in the debates this position is often criticised as a way of avoiding making moral judgement and of taking a stand. The criticism connects to the tradition of liberality in Denmark, which sees this kind of tolerance and behaviour as naive and a sort of value relativism. Put another way, tolerance is seen as a form of moral failure: It implies giving up the forming of judgements over what is right and wrong. Likewise, the discursive strategy of leading politicians in the two debates to make boundary drawing a matter of legality rather than politics - something for courts and lawyers to decide on – was criticised, not least the Danish People’s Party. Representatives of the party on several occasions called upon the involved ministers to ‘step up’, ‘take responsibility’, ‘be more proactive’ and if necessary change the legal framework to make it possible to intervene. In line with the Danish tradition of free-mindedness or liberality this criticism of tolerance calls for more active engagement with and confrontation of what is found to be wrong. Such a stand was inherent to the position of ‘toleration-but-protest’. Echoing the Danish tradition of liberality many actors of this positioned argued that we must tolerate, but we must also publicly challenge what we find to be outrageous and wrong. One version of this argument stated that the meetings of Hizb ut-tahrir and Bilal Philips should be tolerated, views discussed and counter-arguments displayed. Not so much because marking disagreement is important in itself, but because we by airing disagreement and debating views we disapprove of are forced to reconfirm, reconsider and refresh our commitment to our own basic values and beliefs.
Regarding the most dominant positions of intolerance these are in both cases found to be ‘intolerance-due-to-perceived-threat-and-harm’ and modalities of ‘liberal intolerance’. In both cases radicalization scenarios of the meetings are constructed and linked to a discursive strategy of securitization, which attempts to push toleration boundary drawing out of the political arena and into the realm of the extra-political. The meetings hereby become, it is argued, not a matter of political or moral boundary drawing, but of security concerns, and toleration is therefore not an option. The prominence of the modalities of ‘liberal intolerance’ has to do, as argued in chapter 3, with the interconnectedness between toleration boundary drawing and mechanisms of othering. These arguments of intolerance are exactly characterized by reference to not just the illiberal views and practices articulated at the meetings, but to the illiberal identities and ways of life they exemplify, which are deemed in opposition to ‘our’ liberal and democratic norms and principles. In this way toleration boundary drawing becomes entangled with the prescription of particular liberal virtues and identities which must be shared. The prominence of these liberal conceptions of intolerance testifies to the fact that alongside a continued tradition of Danish liberality Denmark has also seen a ‘civic turn’ in the last ten years, underlining the need to ensure commitment among the populace to key liberal democratic principles and values.

4.3. Moving beyond Toleration in Denmark – ‘Positive Recognition’ and Inclusion to the Realm of ‘the Normal’?

In the debate on toleration, some have argued that toleration, or at least toleration in its most classic guises, is deficient as principle of inclusion. The reason for this is that toleration involves a negative attitude towards that to which one objects and that the liberal doctrine on toleration does not take into consideration that not all differences are the same and all therefore cannot be relegated to the private realm as presupposed by liberalism’s divide between the public and the private (Modood & Dobbernack 2011). Therefore arguments have been made to move beyond toleration, either by recognising them instrumentally so as to include them in the realm of ‘the normal’ or by positively recognising their intrinsic value. For Galeotti, who argues for conceiving of ‘toleration as recognition’, the notion of toleration should hence be expanded to include a form of recognition, understood modestly as ‘the acceptance and hence the inclusion of a different trait, practice or identity in the range of the legitimate, viable, “normal” options of an open society’ (Galeotti 2006: 574). Others have demanded that we move even further and apply ‘positive recognition’ as a civic principle in all our relations (Modood 2007: 57). This implies working actively to turn the negative and stigmatic status of some (typically non-European) identities ‘into a positive feature of the societies of which they are now a part of’ (Modood 2007: 43). Such positive recognition, especially of the latter kind, is demanding and something rather different than the negative ‘objection’ entailed in the concept of toleration (Jones 2006; Lægaard 2011; Forst 2008).

The question is now whether there are tendencies to move beyond toleration in Denmark? As demonstrated in chapter 2, it is not clear that the debates on education and concepts elaborated school practices of dialogue contain explicit moves to go beyond toleration in this manner. In the public school case, the theoretical framework underlying the idea of the ‘appreciative dialogue’ requires respect for the status of immigrant parents as moral and ‘political’ equals, but stops short of demanding positive recognition of the identities and values of immigrant parents. The recognition of/respect for the parents concerns them as people who hold values, not their values. The central idea in the appreciative dialogue comes close to the notion of civility and perhaps even goes beyond, since it demands a principled curiosity towards that to which one objects and even towards that which one rejects. This arguably implies expanding the range of what is ‘normal’ and part of the ‘public space’ of the local school community (cf. Galeotti 2006). In the free school case there were hardly any traces of attempts to move beyond toleration, although one commentator noted that it was strange that nobody could recognise the positive value of immigrants acquiring Danish traditions for collective self-organisation in associations and free schools.
Chapter 3 likewise hardly showed any instances of arguments going beyond toleration of the two investigated public meetings. Thus, the debates, regarded the boundary drawing between intolerable and tolerable norms, attitudes and values. Nobody in the debates argued for the recognition, respect as equal or admission to the realm of normal for the views raised at the meetings. Arguments were either for intolerance of the views, however for quite different reasons, or for some kind of ‘teeth-grinding’ tolerance. This is not very surprising considering the nature and content of the meetings - having focused on meetings arranged by or including controversial Muslim actors with views, which are by many perceived as ‘radical’. To argue for positive recognition of e.g. Bilal Philips views on homosexuals or Hizb ut-tahrir’s views on gender equality would be political suicide in the Danish context. Nevertheless, at least one example in that direction can be found in the material. Among individual Muslims interviewed in connection with the Bilal Philips meeting it is interesting to see how a few argue that Philips views on homosexuality is ‘normal’ and widely shared within Muslim communities. However, rather than leading to positive recognition of Philips’ views such statements led to counter-statements arguing that this only shows how different the boundaries for what is normal and what is not is within Muslim minorities and the majority population, and that Bilal Philips in this way is a symptom rather than the cause of the problem.

In general the absence of moves beyond toleration in the cases that we studied in Denmark is partly predicated on the rather restrictive ‘civic turn’ that Denmark has witnessed in the last 10 to 15 years and which was very heavily pushed by the centre-right government (2001 – 2011) who was kept in power by the right wing Danish People’s Party– and of course partly based on the fact the public meetings studied in chapter 3 were indeed rather controversial in terms of their content. As mentioned the centre-left government in power since September 2011 has introduced a new emphasis in the immigration and immigration policy with more respect for differences and rights. However, this does not entail any immediate move ‘beyond toleration’:

*The Government’s policy is based on respect and reasonable demands. Those who want to be a part of Denmark should not constantly be met with new unreasonable demands, which exclude rather that integrate. The Government want a Denmark, where all regardless of their background feel welcome and participate actively in our community. A Denmark, where all can speak the Danish language. A Denmark, where all get an education that they can use. A Denmark, where both women and men participate in the labour market. And a Denmark, where people with different social and ethnic backgrounds live side by side. That is what Denmark needs (Danish Government 2011: 51).*

So even though the centre-left government also underline that diversity is a strength for Denmark in a globalised world etc, it should be clear from the above that the form of recognition that it is possible to obtain is the recognition as an active citizen who participates in education, in the labour market and in society in general and who do not separate themselves out or distance themselves from the rest. It is therefore unlikely that we will many attempts to move ‘beyond toleration’ in Denmark in the near future if by this we understand something akin to the positive recognition advocated by some multiculturalists (Mouritsen 2012).

4.4. Conceptions of Tolerance and Intolerance across different Spheres/Situations: Educational vs. Political life – Praxis vs. Principle?

Looking across the analyses of debates on toleration in education and in politics we tend to find that people who are involved with the task of reaching practical solutions to problems in everyday situations are more tolerant and pragmatic than people who are not. Hence in the study of public schools we find that the more pragmatic stance on accommodation of cultural and religious diversity
comes from the professional community who are concerned about ensuring the participation of students in educational activities, whilst politicians generally pursued a much more ideologically laden agenda with a focus on fundamental principles and questions of identity.

This pattern tends to repeat itself when we look at toleration within the field of politics itself. Here we saw how the non-political actors engaged with the everyday practices of, e.g. deciding who should be allowed to book and rent a particular venue are generally more tolerant and pragmatic in their argumentation. Following this logic we would expect both debates analysed vis-à-vis Hizb ut-tahrir’s meeting and Bilal Philips to be skewed towards intolerance as neither debate centred on finding practical solutions to everyday problem. The nature of these debates was much more symbolic, leaving politicians and commentators the room to argue in principled ways about the general question of tolerance/intolerance of the meetings. Nevertheless, as shown in chapter 3, the debate surrounding Hizb ut-tahrir’s meeting was in fact skewed towards tolerance, not intolerance. One reason for this, however, supports the argument that circumstances of practical decision-making have a moderating effect on intolerance. Thus, as argued in chapter 3, the fact that Hizb ut-tahrir’s members are Danish citizens in contrast to Philips, and that they and their views therefore are not just going to disappear, has made some actors more inclined to tolerate and seek more pragmatic positions.

Taken together the studies carried out in chapters 2 and 3 suggest that engagement with concrete activities and working under the pressure to produce solutions that will get things working increases the inclination to tolerate. While there is no guarantee that contact with others will make one more tolerant in one’s attitude towards (or beliefs about) others, it does seem to indicate that a goal oriented activity is more likely to lead to toleration in practice than ideological debates about basic principles and identities.

4.5. The Impact of Toleration Boundary-drawing on Affected minorities: Intended and Unintended Consequences

The civic turn in Denmark has the ostensive goal of integrating people into Danish society, generally and in its various institutional spheres. In the literature there is no clear cut conclusion on which kind of policies lead to inclusion and exclusion or segregation respectively (cp. Koopmans et al 2005; Koopmans 2010; Joppke 2009). From our studies only suggestive results can be gathered as to whether the debates and the policies concerning integration requirements and the boundaries of toleration affect minorities in a positive or in a negative manner. Results which would require further more thoroughgoing research. In the following we will take a brief look at them.

Chapter 2 gave us that in the case of public schools the dialogue-based integration through inclusion and the related practical measures seem to be effective in ensuring the welfare and education of the students. Conversely, the more principled and symbolically laden ‘integration through values’ discourse can be counterproductive for the involved parties’ motivation and mutual communication. In the free school case, it is unclear whether or not policies are necessary and/or should be regarded as a success. Undoubtedly they prevent schools from teaching openly divisive and fundamentalist doctrines and they are likely to have reduced the number of schools with low academic quality and deficient civic education strategies. However, the unintended consequence of state monitoring may be alienation rather than integration. The price to be paid may be that students, parents and teachers feel that they are under a general suspicion of not being full and trustworthy citizens; a suspicion they will never be able to remove. Moreover, the method for establishing whether or not a school lives up to the freedom and democracy clause is intransparent to the target group and gives them the feeling of not having secure rights.

It is difficult to gauge the long term effects on toleration, feeling of community and reciprocal understanding of the general segregation that results from the existence of free primary schools and the free choice of public school. However, there is no doubt that segregation can have serious effects on the academic achievements of weak learners in particular. On the other hand, for some minority
students Islamic free schools may give a more secure learning environment where their identity is positively reinforced or just not ‘an issue.’ This may improve their academic achievements. In fact, measured on their teaching effect the top 20 schools in Denmark include four Arabic/Islamic free schools (undervisningseffekt.dk; see the general introduction to the report). It should also be added that there is no general evidence to support that students of private (religiously based) schools are less tolerant and less civic minded than students from public schools (Glenn & De Groof 2005).

Chapter 3 gave us that although the controversies regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir’s meeting and Bilal Philips’ visit did not generate any concrete policy implications, which directly altered Hizb ut-Tahrir’s or the Islamic Faith Community’s (or other Muslim actors) possibilities of using public meetings as a platform for political claims making, there seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, as argued in chapter 3, with the fundamental interdependence of tolerance boundary drawing and processes of othering (Schiffauer 2012: 2-3). Tolerance boundary drawing implies othering, as it functions to differentiate the realm of the recognizable normal and tolerable from the foreign and intolerable. When drawing tolerance boundaries we are at the same time constructing an in-group and an out-group. As the differences that generate public debate and activate tolerance boundary drawing today primarily are differences of Muslim views and practices, the main out-group constructed is that of the ‘Muslim other’. Often it is Muslims in general who are designated as the ‘other’, covering up important differences within the Muslim community. This interdependence between toleration boundary drawing and processes of othering affects the Danish Muslim community in at least two different ways.

One way is that the intense focus on toleration boundary drawing in regard to specific views/practices can lead to a lack of boundary drawing vis-à-vis internal differences in the Muslim community. The public drive to cast Hizb ut-Tahrir and its views and practices as intolerable, may implicitly lead to misrecognition of variation in views and practices within the Muslim community. This indirect othering of all Muslims as potentially problematic may serve to delimit the possibilities of being tolerated as legitimate participants in public debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims.

A second effect of the great outrage regarding the two meetings on Muslim actors’ possibilities for participation is that as a Muslim actor you are today expected proactively to endorse central liberal values (freedom of speech; gender equality; non-violence, secularism; rule of law etc.), and dismiss certain illiberal ideas and values (Sharia; support of violent jihad; gender segregation; homophobia etc.) as a prerequisite for participation in public debates and political life. If you fail to do this or dismiss it as irrelevant to the question at hand, Muslims risk being excommunicated and having their ‘moderateness’ or ‘liberalness’ drawn into question. Thus, an un-intended effect of the intense public debate about the illiberal views and practices of Hizb ut-Tahrir or Bilal Philips is that more liberal Muslims are forced to spend time and resources distancing themselves from certain views and practices, and endorsing others, before they are certified as tolerable and legitimate public debaters. Put another way, Muslims are forced to discursively ‘perform safety’ and certify boundaries in order to be accepted as part of the in-group. In this way the boundary drawing regarding ‘radical’ Muslim actors in public debates generates special conditions for participation vis-à-vis also ‘moderate’ Muslims actors.

In sum, our studies suggest that one should be cautious about making policies which inadvertently produce exclusion and alienation rather than inclusion and integration and which make almost impossible for minorities to be perceived and act in a differentiated manner. Policies which aim at security of rights, specifying more precisely what requirements should be met and how they should be met may be a way to avoid this. As concerns the effects of public political debate itself, these are harder to regulate and control since this would imply a regulation on the freedom of speech and openness of debate. Still, for participants in such debates it is worth considering the further effects of public interventions and the framing of problems and identities. We now briefly turn to this issue.
4.6. What Could be Done?

In relation to the public schools it is advisable to continue to spread the ideas of the appreciative dialogue between the schools, the parents and the students. This ought to be the task of the Ministry of Education as well as the municipal school administrations. One risk pertaining to the local school autonomy in Denmark is that it can be random whether schools adopt best practices. Or even make the effort to seek out information and learn about new methods. At the same time it should be remembered that the appreciative dialogue itself presupposes local autonomy since solutions found through appreciative dialogue require local decision makers to act in a flexible manner. It is procedural and not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In the relation to the private schools, it is worth considering the extent to which a diverse free school sector is dependent on the fact that the costs of establishing and maintaining a free primary schools with an alternative philosophy and pedagogy is not too high in terms of having to document and monitor academic standards and the requirement to teach freedom and democracy. The apparent uncertainty that some schools feel about what it takes to live up to requirements and their reluctance to run the risk of not being found to live up to them may well lead them to not use the degree of freedom that the current law actually allow them. While there is a dilemma contained in forcing a limited definition on how schools ought to teach in line with the freedom and democracy clause because it invariably will reduce the flexibility in how the requirement can be met, a more simple and transparent evaluation model could increase the feeling of certainty. Moreover, it would be fairer to schools if the model was mainly oriented towards the kind of knowledge that should be transmitted through lessons since a requirement to create a specific democratic ethos among students arguably is much more difficult to measure. When does for example criticism of certain aspects of democracy as a form of government represent lack commitment to democratic values? After all criticism of democracy abound, even among people who carry no totalitarian convictions. The emphasis on knowledge rather than on ethos also seem to be in line with the experience of the Ministry of Education has had with monitoring, namely that is usually lack of knowledge transmitted through lessons that is the problem, not attitudes towards democracy and freedom. Moreover, increased certainty among schools may also lessen potential alienating effects of monitoring, resulting from the experience of being under general suspicion.

At a different level of policy, chapter 3 shows that principled public debates about the limits of toleration are often intense and heated. However, as the material also shows such debates tend to fade rather quickly with media attention. This indicates that it would be unwise to change legislation in the area of free speech or public assembly on the grounds of individual, controversial cases. In many ways the two cases investigated in chapter 3 indicates that Denmark has the necessary regulation in place to deal with ‘radical’ statements in the public sphere. The room of tolerance is wide in Denmark due to lenient free speech regulation and the Danish tradition of free-mindedness or liberality. At the same time the room of tolerance could be substantially narrowed within existing legislation if a political majority wanted it, as shown in the case of Bilal Philips where nothing hindered that Philips had been denied entry to Denmark.

In both the cases of education and politics, toleration comes in combination with security of rights. In the case of appreciate dialogue in public schools, the confrontational ethos strongly present in the Danish tradition of free-mindedness is replaced with a more gentle approach which seem to entail ‘gag rules’ as to ‘what’ and in particular ‘how’ certain issues are addressed (cf. Holmes 1988). This of course differs from the ‘rules of engagement’ known from and ultimately legitimate at the level of public political debate. However, here it should be remembered that the two approaches to debate and dialogue relate to different levels of politics and policy. At the level of schools there are not only informal differentiations in status and power, but also formal ones. In the political public debate equality necessarily must be assumed in relation to the freedom of speech.
4.7. Conclusion

In this final chapter we have brought together the results of our studies of acceptance, toleration and intolerance in Danish society, education and politics. It is difficult to make very general conclusions as to whether the Danish tradition of free-mindedness has been broken. However, we find that the tradition could be said to be broken in three ways. First, the tradition’s firm insistence on equal and legally secured rights to say, think and do whatever you want as long as it does not harm others directly seem to have been narrowed down in some instances where ‘the liberal intolerance’ of ‘the civic turn’ has led to an increased emphasis on the need to incur ‘common liberal values’ in current and future citizens in order to preserve the social and institutional basis for the liberal democratic order and in order to promote the creation of liberal people with liberal ‘ways of life’. Secondly, calls to forbid certain interventions by controversial religious groups and individuals through the restriction of rights also borders on this tradition which emphasises the combination of secure rights with harsh criticism (when needed): ‘freedom for Loke as well as for Thor.’ Finally and conversely, the pragmatic response to the dominating discourse on ‘integration through values’ in the form of appreciative dialogue promoted by professional school community discontinue another part of the free-mindedness tradition in that it shies away from the confrontational ethos found in debate culture of this tradition.

Our studies have found that despite these new developments, or perhaps because of them, moves to go beyond toleration are not very dominating and are not likely to develop in Denmark even with the 2011 change in government from centre-right to centre-left. Our studies also indicate that having an action oriented or solution seeking element in the interaction between parties rather than a purely discursive exchange on principles and identities lead to more toleration in practice (if not necessarily in belief and attitude). This suggests that highly charged debates on the relative worth of different principles and identities is just as likely to lead to further intolerance as it is to move participants beyond toleration towards a notion of positive recognition.
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