Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses and Practices in Greece

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Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses and Practices in Greece

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Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators’ Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country’s performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLULARISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 3

1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 6

2. Tolerance and Diversity Discourses in Greece ................................................................. 8
   2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 8
   2.2 Definitions ...................................................................................................................... 9
   2.3 Greece and Europe ......................................................................................................... 10
       2.3.1 National identity and state formation ................................................................. 10
       2.3.2 Citizenship in Greece ............................................................................................ 11
   2.4 The role of Europe and the “West” ............................................................................. 13
   2.5 Cultural Diversity challenges during the last 30 years .............................................. 13
   Source: Authors’ own compilation from various sources. .................................................. 14
   2.6 Omogeneis/Co-ethnics ............................................................................................... 18
       2.6.1 Pontic Greeks ......................................................................................................... 18
       2.6.2 Ethnic Greek Albanians ....................................................................................... 19
   2.7 Native minorities .......................................................................................................... 20
       2.7.1 Muslims of western Thrace .................................................................................. 21
       2.7.2 Members of the Slavic-speaking Macedonian minority ........................................ 23
       2.7.3 Roma of Greece ................................................................................................... 24
   2.8 Immigrants .................................................................................................................... 27
       2.8.1 Albanians ............................................................................................................... 28
       2.8.2 Georgians and Ukrainians .................................................................................... 30
       2.8.3 Southeast Asians (Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Afghani) ............................................. 31
   2.9 Definitions of tolerance in Greece .............................................................................. 32
   2.9 Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................... 36

3. (In) tolerance of Difference in Greek Schools: the case of migrant and Roma Children. 38
   3.1 The Greek educational system and intercultural education ....................................... 40
   3.2 Greece’s migrant and Roma school population ............................................................ 42
   3.3 Children of immigrant and co-ethnic returnee families ............................................. 42
   3.4 Roma minority children in Greece ............................................................................. 44
   3.5 Methodology and Research Design .......................................................................... 47
   3.6 Migrant and Roma Children Segregation .................................................................. 49
       3.7.1 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................ 54
   3.8 Accommodating Religious Diversity in Schools: Tolerance or Acceptance? .......... 55
       3.8.1 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................ 59

4. Migrants and (In) tolerant Discourses in Greek Politics .................................................... 62
   4.1 Tolerance and Xenophobia in Europe ....................................................................... 62
   4.2 Tolerance and Xenophobia in Greece ....................................................................... 63
   4.3 Case studies and Research Questions ....................................................................... 64
   4.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................... 66
   4.5 Tolerance and (in) tolerance in Greek public life: Framing the Two Case Studies ....... 69
       4.5.1 Presentation of the two cases .............................................................................. 69
       4.5.2 Frames ............................................................................................................... 71
   4.6 Political/Ideological Frame ......................................................................................... 71
   4.7 Public Muslim Prayer and the Framing of Tolerance ............................................... 72
   4.8 Racist Attacks and the framing of Intolerance ............................................................ 74
4.9 Identity/ Culture Frame ........................................................................................................... 76
4.10 Public Muslim Prayer and the Framing of Intolerance ........................................................ 76
4.11 Racist Attacks and the Framing of Tolerance ..................................................................... 79
4.12 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................... 81

5. Greek political culture in (times of) crisis. Concluding Remarks ...................................... 84
   5.1 Tolerance beyond the Ethnic/ Civic Dichotomy ................................................................. 86
   5.2 Intolerance not as an Exception to the Democratic Rule ..................................................... 88

References ............................................................................................................................... 92

Annexes ...................................................................................................................................... 109
   Annex I ................................................................................................................................... 109
   Annex II .................................................................................................................................. 112
   Annex III ................................................................................................................................. 121
   Annex IV .................................................................................................................................. 123
   Annex V ................................................................................................................................... 124
   Annex VI .................................................................................................................................. 127
Executive Summary

This report engages into a study of the concept of tolerance towards diversity as experienced throughout Greek history and as currently thematised around two major fields of social life, school life and politics.

Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Greece

In the first chapter we review the main concepts of nationhood in Greece along with challenges posed to dominant definitions of identity throughout the last three decades, by native minorities, co-ethnic migrants, and ‘other’ migrants.

Until 20 years ago, Greece was considered largely a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and mono-religious country, a true ‘nation-state’. The dominant definition of the nation was ethno-cultural and religious, while civic and territorial elements were of secondary importance in defining who is Greek. The Greek state formally recognises only the existence of a religious Muslim minority in western Thrace, while the relatively large Roma population suffers discrimination in all spheres of life and is largely marginalised. During the last two decades Greece has become the host of more than a million returning co-ethnics, co-ethnic immigrants and foreigners. Co-ethnic migrant populations, Pontic Greeks and Greek Albanians, are considered as integral part of the nation and are seen as easy to integrate into the mainstream national culture. In addition, during the 1990s and 2000s Greece has experienced significant inflows of economic migrants from eastern European, Asian and African countries. Albanians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians and Georgians, who form the oldest and largest immigrant groups in Greece, challenge Greek society with their cultural or linguistic otherness but not really religiously as they are largely Christian. Some of the more recently arrived groups, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Afghan citizens pose a great challenge to Greek society because of their different phenotype and Muslim religion even if numerically these communities are still relatively small.

At the face of a 10% immigrant population Greece is slowly and to a certain extent reluctantly adapting its education and citizenship policies. A first step in this direction has been the reform of the citizenship law last year that facilitates naturalisation for children born in Greece of foreign parents. Moreover, despite some reforms, there has been little effort to accommodate cultural and religious diversity in school life. Indeed the still dominant definition of national identity does not embrace minority and immigrant groups, who are largely considered to be (and at a certain extent remain indeed) outside the Greek society. In the public and political discourses on minorities and immigrants, the tolerance of their cultural diversity is understood as minimal liberal tolerance, meaning that one refrains from interfering with practices, individuals or groups that one does not approve of but there is no pro-active accommodation of the de facto cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity of Greek society. The main concept adopted in Greece to deal with diversity is that of integration, which is not used to refer to a mutual engagement of the different groups to form a cohesive society, but rather as mainly a one-way adaptation of immigrants to the host society, ideally leading to their ethnic and cultural assimilation.

(In) tolerance of Difference in Greek Schools: the case of migrant and Roma Children

The second chapter of this report investigates how the challenges of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity are addressed in school life.

As Greece has become host to a nearly 1 million migrant and co-ethnic returnee population, the Greek school population has become also ethnically diverse including approximately 10% of children from non national background (2008-9). There have been some reforms especially during this last decade aiming at, among other priorities, adapting the education establishment to the changing demographic
realities of the country. Studies however demonstrate that still Roma children are not well integrated and accepted in Greek schools and have difficulties to adapt to formal education and its rules. Migrant children, on the other hand, are well integrated in schools but they overall perform less well than their Greek peers and they abandon the school earlier. In order to shed some light on the situation, we attempted to explore first the question of ethnic selection practices of migrant and Roma children and then the accommodation of religious diversity in Greek schools.

Methodology
This chapter is based on desk research as well as fieldwork. We collected available statistical data, legal texts and policy documents as well as, relevant scholarly literature on the education of immigrant and Roma children. The fieldwork conducted (January-July 2011) involved qualitative interviews and discussion groups with the participation of 76 people, including experts, policy makers and local politicians, teachers, parents and pupils from three different schools of Athens. Going through the transcribed interviews, we looked for main argumentation strategies (the discursive topoi) that are adopted by different actors to present their viewpoint.

Findings
While segregation and discrimination against migrant or minority children are illegal and anti-Constitutional, there is a certain level of informal segregation or ethnic selection taking place in some schools. The issue is not presented as a question of rejecting, tolerating or accepting minority or migrant children, but rather on how to raise the performance of the school and its students. However, this is a politically correct discourse that disguises a strong ethnic prejudice according to which migrant children are worse than ‘our’ children. So, ethnic diversity is not accepted, but it is tolerated in Greece, as migrant children are thought to have a negative impact on the quality of education provided at a school. On the other hand, religious diversity is generally tolerated in Greek schools – to the extent that it is confined to the private sphere, it does not bother anyone. Although the majority religion is taken for granted and seen as a legitimate part of the school life, there is also a general questioning of what religion is, whether it should be included in the school curriculum and whether it is a problem if children are of different religions. Different attitudes towards religious diversity and different views on how it can be accommodated revealed that parents, teachers and pupils are at ease with religious diversity and that a more plural approach to religion in school life would respond better to the changing needs of Greek schools in the 21st century.

Migrants and (In) tolerant Discourses in Greek Politics
In the third chapter, we examine how the concept of tolerance is thematised when it comes to the representation of migrants in political life in the country. During the last three years Greece has been faced with a European and international migration crisis which coupled with the onset of the current financial crisis in early 2010 has deteriorated the situation. There has been an important increase in the crime rate and a generalized sense of insecurity in the centre of the capital of the country, while adding to this, extreme right wing groups have taken the situation ‘in their hands’. Departing from images and incidents taking place in the centre of Athens, an all the more xenophobic discourse started spreading and dominating the way public opinion interprets the ‘other’ living in the city. In parallel with the rise of racist violence and hate speech, far right parties’ popularity has dramatically risen—the neo Nazi Golden Dawn entered parliament in 2012 with 7% of the national vote.

Against this background, the first case analysed refers to the Muslim public prayer that took place in November 2010 as a peaceful protest for the non existence of an official mosque in Athens, provoking a debate on tolerance of religious diversity in the country. The second case study refers to the event of a Greek citizen’s murder (May 2011), which triggered a series of racist attacks against migrants in the centre of Athens and, thus, a debate on the tolerance of hate speech and racist actions in Greece. Interviews were conducted during a time when people were particularly concerned by the overall effects of the crisis on their livelihoods.
Methodology

This chapter is based on desk research as well as fieldwork. The material collected included scholarly literature on far right in Europe and in the country, as well as newspaper material and political parties’ discourse on the events under question. Nineteen (19) qualitative interviews were conducted between November 2011 and January 2012 with actors actively engaged in the events under question (local authorities, party representatives, migrant organisations, and civic activists). The methodology adopted was the critical frame analysis.

Our respondents were asked to comment upon the events and came up with two competing positions. There are those, who arguing along a political/ideological frame endorse tolerance towards the ‘other’, even if they consider the concept insufficient to accommodate diversity; moreover, they condemn racism and deem this is not directed only against migrants, but against people who are ‘different’. On the contrary, those framing the events as cultural/identity issues consider racism a mere symptom of the problem of migration and prioritize national cultural identity over the ‘other’s’ rights. Both frames use the law and order master frame, as well as the anti establishment critique frame, so as to develop their competing positions. However, even those respondents considering themselves to be defending democracy justify and legitimize intolerance towards the ‘migrant’ other, when what is at stake is the perceived interest or well being of the national in-group. Our frame analysis suggests that competing versions of reality and of the ‘good’ are reconciled by presenting ‘intolerance’ positions as apolitical and logical reactions towards an ‘objective’ reality, which is the ‘natural’ division of the world into ‘us’ fellow nationals and ‘them’ others. We may call this type of intolerance as the new nationalist intolerance.

Concluding Remarks

The scholarly literature so far has generally privileged the ethnic/civic dichotomy as capable of explaining why certain countries are more tolerant than others when it comes to ethnic, religious and cultural difference. Within this context, Greek national identity is believed to be defined in ethnocultural terms and, thus, reluctant in opening up dominant definitions of citizenship and endorsing tolerant attitudes towards diversity. However, interviews presented respondents as not adhering solely to the ethnic model of nationhood, but being able to incorporate both civic and ethnic elements in the way they understood their identity. Combining these findings with recent advances in literature and European developments leads us to the conclusion that tolerance cannot be viewed as a static value belonging to a civic tradition over citizenship that would be expected to better fortify nation states against ‘ethnic’ tendencies, but as a dynamic concept entrenched into national traditions of belonging and taking shape along with political and social developments in public life.

Moreover, in what concerns intolerance in political life, it seems as key aspects of far Right ideology are embedded in national political culture and do not appear as a radical shift in thinking and acting within the national context. And although there are reasons to explain this rise of racism in Greece by means of attributing it to ‘ethnocultural’ traditions of belonging, this would simplify the complicated picture of a general European shift towards intolerance to cultural and religious diversity. As a result, through our analysis racism towards the ‘other’ does not emerge as an aberration of national identity nor as an exception to the rule of European modern democracy. On the contrary, racist views and practices appear as a radicalization of already existing traditions and realities that have, however, taken an unprecedented violent and aggressive form.

Keywords

Intolerance, racism, violence, far right, national identity, cultural diversity, ethnic diversity, religion, tolerance, integration, Muslims, Greece, Europe, minority, migration, acceptance, respect, school life, Roma children, school segregation, ethnic selection
1. Introduction

During the first years of 21st century, both ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ host countries around Europe experience increasing tensions between immigrant communities or/and native minorities and majority populations. A migration crisis has been coupled since 2010 with the onset of a severe financial crisis that seems spreading around the continent creating more obstacles to an already troubled social cohesion. The concept of tolerance is considered to be a value that could bridge national identity with minority rights and establish harmonious forms of symbiosis. At the same time, however, it has been criticised, as part of a multiculturalist approach on diversity, for indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities. At the heart of this claim lies the belief that Muslim cultural and religious credos cannot be accommodated within a civic European democratic tradition.

Greece encompasses many aspects of this multifaceted crisis of collective identity that is spreading around Europe; on the one hand, the country has been traditionally experiencing a troubled relation with Europe and, on the other, it is currently going through new challenges for its national identity that reflect broader developments and anxieties.

From a geographical point of view, Greece is located closer to the ‘East’ rather to what is currently thought to be the ‘core’ of Europe, or the so called ‘West’. This of course is also reflected to a somehow peripheral character that the country has acquired as a political and economic actor within the European Union. Even if there have been many recent developments that seemed to change this narrative, however, the current economic crisis once again put into question the role of Greece within the European system. This geopolitical ambivalence between ‘East’ and ‘West’ seems is also said to define the dominant discourses on Greek national identity (Roudometof, 1999; Tsoukalas, 1993). However, long established definitions of nationalism and citizenship in the country have been severely challenged during the last two decades. Until 20 years ago, Greece was considered largely a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and mono-religious country, a true ‘nation-state’. Nowadays, returning co-ethnics, co-ethnic immigrants and foreigners account for more than 10% of the total resident population (Triandafyllidou and Kokkali, 2012). A notable increase since 2007 in irregular migrant and asylum seeker arrivals from Asia and Africa via Turkey was coupled with an acute economic and political crisis since 2010 to increase even more social tensions. Even if the spectacular rise of extreme right wing forces in 2012 elections seems to be partially explained by all the above reasons, it still however provokes many questions, tensions and anxieties on what went wrong and how things can change, both within Greece and in Europe in general, regarding our view of the “self” and the “other”.

In view of the above, this report is organised in four chapters as following.

The first one explores the main cultural diversity challenges for the national dominant culture as these have evolved throughout the country’s history and the relevant policies and practices adopted. It should be acknowledged that this chapter draws heavily on Accept Pluralism WP1 Report: Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Greece (Triandafyllidou and Kokkali, 2010). The first part of the chapter offers a brief overview on the main factors that have conditioned the development of the modern Greek state and the dominant conception of Greek national identity. Its second part concentrates on the internal Significant Others (Triandafyllidou 1998) of Greek society during the last three decades with a view to identifying, which have been the important minority groups that have challenged with their diversity the cohesion and homogeneity of Greek society. What we seek to highlight is what specific aspects of ‘difference’ have been particularly problematic and thus contested by the national majority. This way we are able to identify what the Greek national identity considers as tolerable, intolerable and what, on the contrary, can be accommodated within the national body.

We then move to examine how these national traditions of belonging have been recently confirmed, negotiated or rejected in practice by focusing on two case studies from two important fields of social life. Desk research is combined in both cases with fieldwork comprising qualitative interviews and discussion groups. Our aim is to explore through empirical study and interview texts’ analysis the
construction and evolution of discourse positions on diversity at the level of citizens interviewed beyond pre-conceived definitions of the self, the other and dominant national narratives.

The second chapter, then, looks at the challenges that cultural diversity brings in the development and implementation of public policy, with special reference to schools. The challenge for European societies and in particular for ‘new’ host countries such as Greece is to meet raised expectations for educational policies that are able to respond to the needs of the entire student population, that currently comprises significant numbers of students from non national background. The case study on schools is not based on some key events that have provoked conflict or contestation in Greek school life, since dominant representations of national identity have not been challenged by minority groups so far in Greek educational establishment. We decided however to question how religious and ethnic in diversity is negotiated daily in Greek schools, as these prepare the future citizens and denizens of the country projecting what is and what is not tolerated in national public space. It is in this context that we have engaged into our empirical research regarding two fundamental issues, on the one hand the question of ethnic selection of Roma and immigrant children and, on the other, the accommodation of religious diversity in Greek schools. Both cases in combination shed some light on the overall thematisation of intolerance / tolerance / acceptance of ethnic and religious diversity in Greek educational establishment.

The next chapter looks at issues of political life and tolerance/intolerance of migrants. Taking into account the multi level crisis that the country is going through and the parallel rise of racist incidents and xenophobic discourse, we decided to focus on key events that have provoked debate on the (in)tolerance of the ‘other’ in political life. Departing from a Muslim public prayer in the centre of Athens, our first case study engages in the issue of tolerating religious diversity in public space. On the contrary, the second case focuses on some series of racist violence that took place also down town so as to question the tolerance of hate speech and racist action on behalf of Greek citizens. In those two cases, the social practice of toleration was played out in the centre of the capital, which epitomizes the worsening of the quality of life brought by a rapid and acute crisis. The debates centred on the issue of migration, but reveal the limits of tolerance towards the ‘other’ in Greek society. Taking into account that the emergence of migration as a centre-stage political issue and the spectacular rise of the far right wing vote are not phenomena confined within Greece, but met in many European countries, this case study acquires a broad interest.

The last chapter brings together the findings generated by our empirical study and attempts to draw some tentative conclusions taking into account literature on Greek national identity and its role within Europe. Organised on the basis of key challenging events of contestation, those two case studies reveal different political, religious and historical contexts where tolerance as well as intolerance are thematised. Our aim in this concluding part is through these to re-examine the traditional categories according to which we have learnt to codify and explain our cultural and religious traditions and national identity. Relating with the ‘other’ and more specifically with the migrant ‘other’ has been a rather problematic process for the country during the last few decades. The growing presence of immigrants along with the spectacularly rapid changes that the country is undergoing forces us to challenge our pre conceptions over the nation and identify new ways of putting in practice the concept of tolerance. Against this context, the issue of exploring and understanding tolerance in Greece, but also in European societies, seems particularly urgent.
2. Tolerance and Diversity Discourses in Greece

2.1 Introduction

Geographically, Greece is located at the southeastern corner of the European continent, indeed closer to the Middle East, Turkey and the Balkans rather than to what is today defined as the ‘core’ of the Europe, notably countries like France or Germany. This geographic position of Greece at the fringes of the European continent is to a large extent matched by a geopolitically and economically peripheral character of the country within the European Union, despite the fact that the successive enlargements of the EU to the East in 2004 and 2007 have made Greece more central both culturally and politically. The position of Greece however may also be seen as a pivotal one, between East and West. Dominant discourses on Greek national identity reflect a geopolitical and cultural ambivalence between being ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ (Roudometof, 1999; Tsoukalas, 1993).

References to the ‘East’ in the Greek national narrative reflect a notion of ‘eastern danger’ (Heraklides, 2001; Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou, 2002; Triandafyllidou 2002) that is generally projected to modern Turkey, reflecting both past experiences of subjugation to the Ottoman Empire and current tense relations with this country. References to the West and Europe are also ambivalent. Modern Greece carries the ‘honourable burden’ of being the heir of ancient Greece, identified by modern European intellectual and political elites as the craddle of European modernity. This glorious past is both a source of national pride and inspiration and a heavy symbolic burden to the extent that modern Greeks cannot stand up to the level of cultural, political or scientific excellence of their ancestors.

Even though the national narrative managed to incorporate classical Greece with the Byzantine tradition creating a unified national history from the 6th century b.c. to this day, the tension between Greece’s western and eastern cultural and geopolitical influences remains an important feature of Greek identity today (Tsoukalas 2002). Indeed, Greeks have found themselves trapped between Hellenism (the western prototype of classical Greece) and Romiosyne (the historical experiences of Greece in the last five centuries under the Ottoman Empire) (see also Tziovas, 1994).

Although politically Greece has been firmly anchored in western Europe in the post World War II period, the cultural positioning of Greece remains ambivalent, modern Greek-ness being of but not in Europe (Triandafyllidou, 2002a). While the European-ness of modern Greece has been officially confirmed by its accession to the European Communities (later European Union) in 1981, the geopolitical, cultural and economic relations between Greece and its fellow member states are often fraught with misunderstandings. During the 1990s, the confrontation between Greece and its fellow partners in the EU on the Macedonian question as well as Greece’s unpleasant position as the only country who had striven but could not make it to the first phase of the European Monetary Union have been two obvious expressions of these tensions.

The 21st century has brought new developments and new challenges for Greece and its national self-understanding. The inclusion of Greece in the first phase of the Euro zone implementation, on 1 January 2002 has confirmed the Europeanness of the country at the monetary but also at the symbolic level (Psimmenos, 2004). Moreover, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe and

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2 i.e. the question of recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent Republic, the name that this last would take, as well as its nationalist claims to what the Greeks deemed as ‘their’ national heritage (Triandafyllidou et al. 1997; Roudometof 1996).
the shifting of the EU geopolitical, cultural and religious borders farther East has made Greece inevitably more central geographically and religiously (since other Christian Orthodox countries have joined the EU) even though geopolitically it remains quite peripheral (Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 2003). Greece, though, was the first country of the the Euro zone to be hardly hit by the fierce economic crisis that is now sweeping several European countries; the risk of a national bankruptcy and of quitting the Euro zone have on one hand emphasised the firm anchoring of political elites and citizens to the EU but also greatly shown the weakness of Greece as an actor in the European economic and political system.

The expansion of the EU to the east which continues, even if with a slower pace, with a view to incorporating Croatia, the western Balkans and Turkey poses new identity and geopolitical challenges. Enlargement is desired as a factor of stability, democracy and peace in the region, but also for economic reasons, since many Greek firms are highly oriented towards the Balkan markets. Greek public opinion has marked an interesting shift between 2006 and 2008 regarding EU enlargement to southeast Europe and especially to Turkey. In 2008, 47% of Greeks declared in favour of the entry of Turkey in the EU (Eurobaromter, 2008: 30), contrary to the respective 33% registered in 2006 (Eurobaromter, 2006). The possible future accession of Turkey to the EU certainly keeps stiring unsolved identity and geopolitical issues, not least the Cyprus question.

In light of these considerations, this chapter first offers a brief excursus on the main factors that have conditioned the development of the modern Greek state and the dominant conception of Greek national identity. The second part of the chapter concentrates on the internal Significant Others (Triandafyllidou 1998) of Greek society over the past 30 years with a view to identifying which have been the important minority groups that have challenged with their diversity the cohesion and homogeneity of Greek society during the last three decades. We cover three distinct time periods: the 1980s and the end of the Cold War, the 1990s and the rise of multiculturalism in Western Europe but also the debacle of Communist regimes and the rise of nationalism in central Eastern Europe, and the last decade with the expansion of the EU to the east, the rise of international terrorism and the financial and economic crisis of the last couple of years.

In the second part we shall seek to highlight the aspects of ‘difference’ of specific groups that have been particularly contested. Those aspects that the groups advocate as important for their identity and that the state or the majority group consider ‘intolerable’ or at least difficult to accommodate. Pointing to such challenging differences will help locate different instances in which ‘tolerance’ has been an important concept or practice with a view to allowing for diversity to exist. Naturally we shall also take note of the competing concepts in favour of a more active accommodation and respect for diversity or concepts and behaviours that call for the rejection of diversity and the imposition of not only unity but also homogeneity within Greek society.

2.2 Definitions

In order to clarify the focus of this chapter we propose here a set of working definitions of the terms nation, national heritage, national identity, nationalism and also integration and assimilation. Even though in the scholarly literature there is considerable polyphony regarding when a group qualifies to be a nation, we consider here a nation as a named and self-defining human community whose member cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or “homelands”, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws (Smith 2002: 15). A nation presupposes the notion of ‘national identity’ of a ‘feeling of belonging’ to the nation. The notion of national heritage is defined as a set of cultural forms that characterise a specific nation and which provide for the framework within which the members of the nation are socialised.
In sociology and political science the term integration is considered a fuzzy term and for this reason quite problematic. A minimal working definition adopted in this work for integration is the following: integration is a social, economic and political process that regards the insertion of immigrants into their country of destination. Integration requires both the effort of migrants to adapt to the new reality and the effort of the host population to adapt to the presence of migrants and the changing character of the host society. In common parlance, integration is often confused with assimilation. Assimilation is a social process by which the immigrants completely adapt to the traditions, culture and mores of the host country, and eventually become part of the host nation gradually abandoning their own ethnicity, culture, and traditions. Assimilation is indeed a one-way process that involves the effort of immigrants to ‘assimilate’ in the destination country and its dominant culture and is in this sense a distinct concept and term from integration.

This chapter focuses on cultural (customs, mores, life style, language), religious, and ethnic (cultural as before or phenotype, related to a specific ethnic descent of a group of people) diversity of minority groups that have lived in Greece since the creation of the modern Greek state in 1831 and of immigrant populations that have arrived in the country during the last twenty years. Terms like tolerance, acceptance, respect and recognition as well as multiculturalism and interculturalism are discussed as their definitions in the Greek context are one of the objectives of this study.

2.3 Greece and Europe

2.3.1 National identity and state formation

While the foundations of Greek nationalism in the late eighteenth century were based on European Enlightenment and its civic ideals (Veremis, 1983: 59-60; Kitromilides, 1990: 25-33), the Greek nation has eventually been defined in strongly ethno-cultural terms. Common ancestry, culture and language have been the main tenets of the development of the modern Greek national identity (Veremis, 1983; 1990; Kitromilides, 1983; 1990: 30), together with Christianity – a heritage of the Byzantine Empire (constructed essentially as Greek and related linearly to the Greek classical past.) The dominant national narrative concluded with Greece’s subjugation to the Ottoman Empire, the national resurrection in 1821 and the creation of a small independent Greek state in 1831. A unified national consciousness was successfully instilled in Greek society through state policies in military conscription, education and culture throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century.

The state and the political and intellectual elites propagated however for several decades an irredentist view of the Greek nation that extended further north to Macedonia and Thrace and further east to Minor Asia. This ‘Great Idea’ – to unite all the territories where people who were of Greek ethnicity or who spoke the Greek language and shared the Greek culture – dominated Greek politics and the successive enlargements of the Greek nation state until the early 20th century. It was only in 1923 and after the debacle of the Greek forces in Minor Asia by the Turks that irredentism was largely abandoned. Nonetheless the modern Greek state took its present territorial form after World War II when the Dodecanese islands were incorporated into Greece in 1948 (Divani 1997). It is this difficult and gradual path to the territorial integration of modern Greece that has marked Greek nationalism making the conception of Greek citizenship predominantly ethnic, religious and cultural (much less civic and territorial) (Christopoulos 2006; see also for a review Triandafyllidou 2001, Chapter 3).

Although territorial and civic features have gained importance through the expansion and consolidation of the national territory, the essence of Greekness is still often defined as a transcendent notion in Greek public discourses (Tsoukalas, 1993). The link between the modern institutions of the Greek state and the traditional Greek society remains even nowadays puzzling (Diamandouras 1983: 47-50). The late and limited industrial development of Greece in conjunction with the early introduction of parliamentarism resulted in the distorted functioning of the political system.
through the preservation of traditional power structures under the cover of Western-type institutions (Diamandouros 1983; Mouzelis 1986; 1995).

Modern Greek identity thus developed in a web of complicated relationships that evolved around two main contradictions or dilemmas. These contradictions have been articulated in the following characteristics of modern Greek identity: a national pride for a unique past; a frustration of grandeur ‘lost’ as the modern Greek state emerged into independence as a poor, agricultural economy and an incomplete and fragile democracy; an ongoing attempt to bridge the competing universalisms and fundamental antagonisms between the secular and rational interpretations of Hellenism advocated by Western Enlightenment on the one hand, and by the Byzantine Empire legacy and the conservative religious conformism of a strong and very present Eastern Orthodox Church on the other (see Tsoukalas 2002, Tziovas 1994); and last but not least a perpetual need to ‘catch up’ with the rest of Europe as there was much ground to cover in terms of Greece’s industrialization, modernization, and democratic consolidation.

The intertwining of such contradictory elements has resulted in an ideologically confusing notion of ‘Helleno-christianity’ and an underlying East–West tension in Greek identity and politics. Greece’s Ottoman past is presented as responsible for the country’s personalized, clientelistic political culture and a mentality of state patronage; while Great Power politics that were played out across the Balkan peninsula throughout the 19th and 20th centuries have engrained perceptions of threat of foreign intervention as regards national independence, territorial integrity and the cohesion of national identity.

2.3.2 Citizenship in Greece

These features of Greek national identity have marked the definition of Greek citizenship which has been based (until 6 months ago) almost exclusively on the jus sanguinis principle. The previews to the 3838/24.3.2010 laws (voted on March 2010) provided for a separate procedure for acquiring Greek nationality (the so called procedure of nationality definition) that has been reserved for people who could prove that they were of Greek descent and ‘behave as Greeks’. The terms used for this procedure imply that Greek descent and national consciousness exist prior to the acquisition of Greek nationality (Christopoulos 2006: 254). This rule refers to people of Greek ethnic origin, the *omogeneis* (meaning those of the same genos, i.e. of the same descent).

There are two broad categories of *omogeneis* in Greece currently: the Pontic Greeks (numbering a little over 150,000), notably people of Greek descent that resided in the former Soviet Republics. The Greek state has adopted a generous naturalisation policy allowing the large majority among them to naturalise through a simplified citizenship definition procedure called ‘specific naturalisation’ (Christopoulos 2006: 273). The second group of *omogeneis* (co-ethnics) are ethnic Greek Albanians or else known as *Voreioipirotes*. These held until recently Special Identity Cards for

---

3 Until March 2010 when law 3838/24.3.2010 was voted, second, or even third-generation immigrant children were not entitled to Greek citizenship at birth unless their parents had been naturalised. Law 2130/1993 foresaw that immigrants who wished to become Greek citizens had to be residents in Greece for more than ten years in the last twelve calendar years. This was one of the longest residence requirements for naturalisation in Europe. Law 2910/2001 (articles 58-64) had made the conditions and procedure even more cumbersome, introducing an application fee of 1,500 Euro. In addition to that, authorities were not required to reply within a specified period of time and need not justify a negative decision to the applicant. A special circular of the Home Affairs Ministry (Circular 32089/10641/26.5.1993) stated that such obligations of fair administration are not valid when the matters treated refer to the acquisition, recognition, loss or re-acquisition of the Greek nationality, rendering thus the whole issue truly exceptional and outside the normal work proceedings of state administration.

4 According to Dodos (1994: 119-121), the term “Vorios Epiros” (Northern Epirus) is a diplomatic and political designation that appears after 1913. It has come out of the opposition of the Greek inhabitants of Greece’s border regions to the international agreements that determined the borders of the country together with those people’s national fate decided
Omogeneis (EDTO)\(^5\) issued by the Greek police which gave them full socio economic but no political rights in Greece. As of November 2006, a joint decision by the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs facilitated the naturalization procedure for them, waiving the fee and the discretionary character of the judgment, encouraging thus ethnic Greek Albanians thus to naturalise. Indeed this change of policy has led to an exponential increase of naturalisations from two-digit numbers each year to several thousands. While in the period 1998-2006 only a handful of people had naturalised, in the period between 2007 and 2009 approximately 45,000 foreigners, in their vast majority of Albanian nationality, have acquired Greek citizenship.

The distinction between co ethnics and ‘other’ migrants that Greek law had introduced as early as 1997 had been subject to severe criticism by NGOs, the liberal press\(^6\) and international organisations (ECRI 2004) for being discriminatory and unfair\(^7\). ECRI in particular had raised concerns regarding the preferential path to citizenship available to individuals of Greek origin, noting that there are subjective elements in the assessment of such origin, making the applicants liable to discrimination.

In March 2010 that the Greek Parliament voted a new law (law n. 3838/2010) on citizenship and naturalisation which introduced provisions for the second generation of migrants, notably children born in Greece of foreign parents or children born abroad of foreign parents but who have completed at least 6 years of schooling in Greece and live in Greece. In either case, these children can naturalise by a simple declaration by their parents when they are born or when they complete their sixth year of attending a Greek school. The new law also lowers the requirement for naturalisation from 10 to 7 years of residence, provided the foreigner has already received the EU long term resident status which can be acquired after 5 years of legal residence. The new law also introduces local political rights (both passive and active) for foreign residents (living in Greece for 5 years or more). The new law seemed to make a breakthrough by Greek standards introducing a substantial element of jus soli in the concept of Greek citizenship. However, its implementation so far has not led to any massive naturalisations\(^8\) while the new government led by the Conservative Party New Democracy, that has taken power in June 2012 has announced plans to make naturalisation requirements more stringent again.\(^9\)

(Contd.)

against their will, since the areas where they were living in were granted to the new Albanian state. As a geographical term, it does not cover anything specific, because the limits of the northern borders of the "Northern Epirus" have never been clearly established. In addition, since 1919, even by the most favourable to the Greek positions tracing of borders, the importance of the Greek population is not so obvious (Kokkali, 2010).

5 There were 197,000 EDTO holders on 31 December 2009, according to data released by the Ministry of Interior in December 2010.


7 Greek authorities are generally required to respond within specified time limits to applicants addressed to them and to provide justification for their decisions.

8 In a report published on 24 July 2012, the Ministry of Interior has noted that approximately 6,000 applications for naturalisation have been submitted under the new law but decisions of naturalisation are about 1,100 so far. For more see: http://www.tovima.gr/files/1/2012/07/16/nomosallodapoi.pdf , last accessed on 27 July 2012.

9 On 12 July 2012, the Minister of Interior Evrypidis Stylianides has announced plans to reform the law raising the residence length requirements from 7 to 10 years. see http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=466485 last accessed on 27 July 2012.
2.4 The role of Europe and the “West”

In the pre-World War II period, Europe played an indirect role in national self-understandings of Greekness: it was part of the classical Greek heritage but also perceived as alien and threatening. Culturally speaking, Greece and Europe were constructed by Greek historiography as part of the same classical Greek/European civilization. From a political viewpoint however, other European countries were seen as – and indeed were actually – ‘foreign powers’ which imposed their interests on Greece and interfered with domestic affairs. While European foreign powers were perceived also as economically and culturally more advanced than Greece, they were also despised because they could not ‘compete’ with Greece’s glorious classical heritage.

Since the end of World War II Greece has been politically and ideologically part of Western Europe. This largely determined the outcome of the Greek civil war (1944-1948) as well as its post WWII political history. Western military, trade and energy interests held Greece firmly within the Western part of Europe and pulled the country out of its isolation and away from Communist and left-wing tendencies. Greece joined NATO in 1952 and in 1962 signed a pre-accession agreement with the European Communities (EC).

During the post war period the stance of Greek social and political actors towards Europe has alternated between ‘Europhilia’ and ‘Europhobia’ given the role that various western actors have played in Greece’s political history (particularly the UK and the USA), and the way this has translated in a deep polarization of domestic politics – between the pro-western right and centre-right and the communist and left political forces. The foreign influence over the outcome of the civil war; the 1960s political instability and the Colonels’ military coup (1967-1974); the importance of the Marshall Plan for the country’s economic recovery; the importance of participating in NATO’s southern flank in the context of the Cold War confrontation; Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish dispute, are all factors and events that determined Greece’s relationship with the rest of Europe and the West.

At the level of public attitudes, Kokosalakis and Psimmenos (2002: 24-26) show (on the basis of Eurobarometer survey data) that Greeks have been overall positive as regards their country’s participation in the EC and later EU, saw no conflict between their national and their European identity, and were overall supportive of European unification which they perceived as economically and politically advantageous for the country. However, qualitative studies have shown that Greeks tend to look at other Europeans as ‘others’ and as ‘different’ to the foundations of Greek tradition and collective identity (Anagnostou 2005; Kokosalakis 2004). Indeed, legacies of the past, territorial insecurities and antagonistic identities in Greece’s immediate neighbourhood the Balkans, have not been easily understood by Western and Northern EU member-states, and have at times been exaggerated in Greek politics, largely for domestic political reasons. Indeed, during the 1990s, the feeling of alienation that Greeks at times expressed towards the West (Tsoukalas, 1993; 1995) was further accentuated by the controversy between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the failure of resolving the Cyprus question, and the inability of other EU countries to appreciate Greece’s sensibility on these issues (Roudometof, 1996; Triandafyllidou et al., 1997, Triandafyllidou 2007).

In the early 21st century a more flexible understanding of Greek national identity seems to emerge, mainly due to the increasing salience of European policies and symbols, such as the European currency. Besides, the actual experiences of belonging to the European Union reinforce a civic and political value component in Greek national identity (Triandafyllidou et al. 1997; Kokosalakis 2004; Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou 2007).

2.5 Cultural Diversity challenges during the last 30 years

The new European context at the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first century has raised new challenges to Greek national self-understandings and the country’s geopolitical positioning within its
immediate neighbourhood and of course within the EU and Europe writ large. These challenges are related to the continuing (even if slower) expansion of the EU to the Balkans and Turkey.

Moreover, during the last two decades, Greece has had to make room – even if hesitantly and only to a limited extent – for cultural, ethnic and religious diversity within the nation. These developments have had to do with two different population groups: native, historic minorities and immigrants. Regarding minorities first, regional legal and institutional frameworks—such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—have furthered progress in promoting the recognition and protection of minorities (linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial) across Europe (Psychogiopoulou 2009). This progress has also increasingly influenced debates and policies on the position and rights of minorities in Greece, which for long has been a sensitive matter in Greek political life and society. Nikiforos Diamantouros (1983: 55) had described this ‘sensitivity’ as an indication that the process of national integration is incomplete.

### Table 1 Estimate of total immigrant Stock in Greece, on 1 December 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of data</th>
<th>Size of immigrant stock</th>
<th>% of total resident population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stay permits valid on 1 Dec 2011, Ministry of Interior database</td>
<td>447,658</td>
<td>3.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data from Ministry of Interior, for 31st Dec. 2009</td>
<td>197,814</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of Greeks abroad, Special Census, 2000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ own compilation from various sources.

Regarding migrants, even since the early 1980s, Greece can no longer be described as an emigration country. The country’s population has increased by 10-12%, with large numbers of migrants mainly from the Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria and Romania), ex-Soviet Republics (Georgia, Russia and Ukraine) and, increasingly, Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China). Immigration poses a challenge to dominant Greek nationalist discourses; there has been a gradual recognition on
behalf of state institutions and public opinion that Greek society has become de facto multi-cultural and multi-ethnic (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009). Tables 1, 2 and 3 below present an overview of the size and composition of the immigrant and native minority population in Greece.

### Table 2: National Composition of the Migration Stock in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>449,706</td>
<td>56.89%</td>
<td>388,666</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>388,666†</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>47,348</td>
<td>5.99%</td>
<td>71,949</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>71,949</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>28,041</td>
<td>3.54%</td>
<td>16,577</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16,577</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>40,620</td>
<td>5.13%</td>
<td>54,883</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>54,883</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>24,094</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
<td>16,974</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16,974</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>12,036</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
<td>13,454</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13,454</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>10,816</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>20,264</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>20,264</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>10,482</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>10,089</td>
<td>1.27%</td>
<td>7,394</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7,394</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>9,530</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>12,071</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
<td>7,270</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7,270</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7,481</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
<td>14,668</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14,668</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10,863</td>
<td>1.37%</td>
<td>13,629</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13,629</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5,323</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2,808</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>13,639</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13,639</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>7,642</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>10,330</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10,330</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6,216</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
<td>7,854</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7,854</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4,003</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>11,480</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>11,480</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>2,934</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2,934</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
<td>9,633</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9,633</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>132,903</td>
<td>16.81%</td>
<td>32,440</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20,598</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>53,038</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>790,431</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>557,097</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>190,486</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>747,583</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

† This number referring to valid stay permits does not include ethnic Greek Albanians holding EDTO cards.
Table 3. Native Minorities in Greece

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolute numbers</td>
<td>% of the total population of Greece</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics, Protestants, Jews and new religious movements</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>1-1,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah’s Witnesses</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims of Western Thrace*:</td>
<td>80,000-120,000</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-speaking</td>
<td>36,000-54,000***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomaks</td>
<td>28,800-43,200***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>14,400-21,600***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma (all over Greece)</td>
<td>300,000-350,000****</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arvanites/Arberor</td>
<td>200,000****</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians (Slav-speaking Greeks)</td>
<td>10,000-30,000****</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlachs/Aromanians</td>
<td>200,000****</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compilation and treatment of data from different sources/estimations (see notes below).

* The Muslims of Western Thrace according to the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Treaty of Lausanne), in 1923, counted for 106,000 individuals. According to the Greek census of 1928, 1940 and 1951, there were registered respectively 126,000 individuals, 140,090 individuals and 112,665 individuals (Human Rights Watch, ‘Greece: The Turks of Western Thrace’, Vol.11, No.1, 1999/January; available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/index.htm#TopOfPage [consulted on the 02/11/2010]. It is to note that the report on Muslims of Thrace does not distinguish between the sub-populations that are included in this category (that is to say Roma and Pomaks), referring thus to all as ‘Turks of Western Thrace’.

** Unlike the 1951 census, more recent censuses have not addressed issues of national/ethnic origin, language and religion (GHM, Report about Compliance with the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1999, available at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/Minorities_of_Greece.html [consulted on the 02/11/2010]). Therefore, no official data is available and we can only rely on estimations.

*** Estimation of Alexandris (1988) for the numbers in 1981, according to which from about 120,000 individuals 45% are Turkish-speaking, 36% are Pomaks and 18% Roma. According to an estimation of GHM (at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/pomaks.html [consulted on the 02/11/2010]), the Pomaks nowadays count for 30,000 (i.e. the minimum estimated by Alexandris above mentioned).


In this section we shall briefly outline the main native and immigrant minority groups of Greece. We shall discuss their history, size, main features and investigate the nature of their diversity. We shall thus identify the main diversity challenges that they pose to Greek society and seek for challenging events that have taken place in recent years. We shall discuss such events and the ways in which Greek institutions and society have dealt with them with a view to identifying the relevant
practices, norms, institutions and the use, if relevant, of concepts such as tolerance, acceptance, respect, pluralism, national identity and national heritage.

In table 2 below we present schematically the main native and immigrant minority groups and identify the diversity dimensions on which they challenge the dominant conception of Greek citizenship and national identity.

Table 4: Main Minority and Immigrant Groups in Greece and their Dimensions of Difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of difference</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Racial</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontic Greeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Greek Albanians</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks/Muslims of Western Thrace</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slav-speaking Macedonians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
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<td>Asian Muslim migrants*</td>
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<td>Sub Saharan Africans</td>
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Source: Author’s compilation.
* Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Afghani citizens mainly.

Minority groups in Greece can actually be classified into three broad categories in terms of their closeness to the majority group. The term ‘national majority’ is here to identify Greek citizens born of Greek parents, in Greece, who are Christian Orthodox (at least via a familial affiliation). In terms of the national identity and citizenship conception, omogeneis, that is co-ethnics, are the minority groups that differ less from the national majority. There are two populations within the larger category of co-ethnics: Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek Albanians.

The second category of minority groups are native minorities, that is people who are ethnically, culturally, religiously different from the national majority but which have formed part of the modern Greek state since its creation. These include the Muslims of western Thrace (which may be further sub-divided into Pomaks, Muslim Roma and ethnic Turks) who are Turkish-speaking, Muslims and largely self-identifying as ethnic Turks. There are also three more native minority groups, the Macedonians of Greece, Greek Jews and Greek Roma who are Christians.

The third category of minority groups in Greece are migrant populations. We identify here five different populations: Albanians, as the largest group; Georgians and Ukrainians as the second
and third largest nationalities among immigrants; Asian immigrants and asylum seekers (Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Filipinos and Afghans) who are Muslims from southeast Asia; and last but not least Sub-Saharan Africans who come from many different countries and are Christians in their large majority.

2.6 Omogeneis/Co-ethnics

The Greek national identity and citizenship definition asserts not only the distinction between citizens and foreigners but also between omogeneis (co-ethnics) and allogeneis. Omogeneis are the co-ethnics who are of Greek ethnic origin – belong to the Greek Christian Orthodox ‘genos’ – and allogeneis are those who are of another ‘genos’ (Christopoulos 2006: 253). Thus there are ‘allogeneis’ who are Greek citizens, e.g. members of the native minorities or naturalised foreigners. And there are ‘omogeneis’ who are not Greek citizens, e.g. members of the Greek diaspora abroad or emigrants. The first category of minority groups that we shall discuss is the ‘omogeneis’, the co-ethnics.

According to the decision of the State Council\(^{11}\) no. 2756/1983, the legitimate criterion for one to be characterized as a co-ethnic is ‘to belong to the Greek Ethnos’. That is ‘to have Greek national consciousness’, which is ‘deduced from characteristics of personality which refer to common descent, language, religion, national traditions and extensive knowledge of the historical events of the nation’. It may thus seem that having a Greek national consciousness suffices to be a co-ethnic although in practice this is not the case. The two criteria: that of ethnic ancestry and that of national consciousness are used cumulatively and in the absence of one, it is the ethnic descent criterion that prevails (see also Christopoulos 2006).

2.6.1 Pontic Greeks

Pontic Greeks are ethnic Greeks who either emigrated from areas of the Ottoman Empire (the southern coast of the Black Sea in particular) to the former Soviet Union in the beginning of this century or left Greece in the 1930s and 1940s for political reasons (Glytsos, 1995). The right of Pontic Greeks to return to their ‘homeland’ (Greece) has been conceded by presidential decree in 1983. Pontic Greeks are defined by the Greek state as members of the diaspora community\(^{12}\) who ‘return’ – even though most of them had never lived in Greece before – to their ‘homeland’ and are, therefore, given full citizen status and benefits aiming to facilitate their integration into Greek society. Pontic Greeks naturalised under the ‘definition of nationality’ procedure foreseen by the Greek legislation for people of ethnic Greek origin (Christopoulos 2006: 254).

The peak of their flow was in the early 1990s. Pontic Greeks were citizens of the former republics of the Soviet Union who declared an ethnic Greek origin, and on that base were given Greek citizenship. In 2000 there were 155,319 Pontic Greeks in the country. More than half of them (about 80,000) came from Georgia, 31,000 came from Kazakhstan, 23,000 from Russia, and about 9,000 from Armenia (General Secretariat of Repatriated Co-Ethnics, 2000).

Despite the fact that Pontic Greeks acquired Greek citizenship literally upon arrival and, also, that their education level is higher than that of native Greeks\(^{13}\), they faced serious problems in finding jobs, mainly because they did not speak Greek at a good level, but also because the state did not

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11 State Council is the Supreme Administrative Court of Justice in Greece.
13 This becomes apparent by comparing the educational level of the Greek population according to the data of the national census of 2001 for people over six years old with the data from the census of the General Secretariat of Repatriated Co-Ethnics, conducted in 2000 (p. 64). For example 10% of the repatriated co-ethnics have graduated from a Technological Educational Institute while the correspondent percentage for Greeks is 3%. Also 12% are University graduates while the correspondent percentage for Greeks is 8%.
recognise their educational diplomas. The highest percentage of returnees worked as unskilled workers. Other common occupations were those of constructors, cleaners and – especially for women – housekeeping (General Secretariat of Repatriated Co-Ethnics, 2000). In December 1990, the government set up the National Institute for the Reception and Rehabilitation of Emigrant and Repatriate Co-Ethnic Greeks (Ε.Ι.Υ.Α.Π.Ο.Ε.) (on the basis of art. 8, law 1893/1990) to manage the conditions of entrance, residence and work of Pontic Greek returnees. Accommodation, food, education for children and for adults, specialized courses of Greek language, and professional training, all these have been provided within the context of this Institute’s (Kassimati, 1993). EYAPOE has been dissolved in March 2003 and Pontic Greeks have largely ‘disappeared’ sociologically to the extent that there is no special monitoring of their socio-economic situation any more.

Diversity challenges: Pontic Greeks are considered to be similar to native Greeks as regards their national consciousness, culture, and religion. They only differ from natives in terms of their language (as at least the first generation of returnees spoke Russian and/or Ποντιακά (Pontian language) as a mother tongue) and at least the first generation in terms of the socio-economic system that they had been brought up in. Representatives of EYAPOE interviewed by the author in the mid 1990s considered that the main problem for Pontic Greeks’ socio-economic integration was their excessive reliance on the state to provide for anything and their inability to adapt to a free market economy. There are unfortunately not enough recent studies to assess this claim however it is clear that the cultural and linguistic difference of the Pontic Greeks is still present in Greek society even if on the whole it is not perceived as challenging the national unity. Indeed, Pontic Greeks (together with other ex-Soviet nationals, such as Georgians, Russians, and in a lesser extent Armenians) dispose a non-negligible ‘ethnic infrastructure’, this is to say their own shops, mini-markets, cafés, festivity halls, dentists, churches, at least in the city of Thessaloniki where they have mainly settled in the 1990s (Kokkali 2010).

2.6.2 Ethnic Greek Albanians

The second large group of co-ethnics that has recently ‘returned’ to Greece are ethnic Greek Albanians, widely known as “Vorioepirotes” (Βορειοηπειρώτες). The State Council (judgement no. 2207/1992) attempted to provide a description of their status: co-ethnics from Albania are the people that descend from Greek parents and their place of birth (theirs or their parents) is “Vorios Epirus” (Βόρειος Ηπείρος)\(^ {14} \).

As regards Greek Albanians, law 1975/1991, on the basis of article 108 of the Greek Constitution provided them with a preferable legal status as people without the Greek citizenship but with the Greek nationality (article 17). Because of their ethnic minority status in southern Albania, they were perceived as refugees who suffered persecution and discrimination because of their Greek nationality and Christian Orthodox religion. The legal provisions in issues of stay, social security, retirement coverage and medical care were of a discretionary positive character as opposed to those concerning other categories of foreign immigrants (article 24).

Even though the law provided for the preferential treatment of Greek Albanians, in practice they have not been as privileged as the Pontic Greeks. The Greek government did absolutely not want the evacuation of the minority in Albania, and, thus, was very reluctant to the settlement of ethnic Greeks from Albania to Greece (Tsoukala, 1997; Dodos, 1994: 142). And that is the reason why the Greek state has adopted a different approach towards co-ethnic repatriated Pontic Greeks and co-ethnics from the Greek minority in Albania. While the former are accepted as refugees, the latter are instrumentalized by the Greek foreign policy: their presence in southern Albania is considered as vital for the promotion of the Greek interests there (Pavlou, 2003; Kokkali, 2008: 78, 173 and 2010).

\(^ {14} \) See above, Dodos, op.cit.
The legal status of ethnic Greek Albanians has been clarified in detail with the Presidential Decree 395/1998. Following from this decree, Greek co-ethnics who are Albanian citizens (Voreioepirotes) hold Special Identity Cards for Omogeneis (EDTO) issued by the Greek police. On 31 December 2009 there were 197,814 Special Identity Cards for Co-Ethnics issued, of which over 150,000 were of 10-year duration. As of November 2006, holders of these Identity Cards were encouraged to apply for citizenship. They were exempted from the high citizenship fee and were generally granted citizenship if they satisfied the requirements (in other words, no negative discretion was exerted). Indeed during the past 3 years more than 40,000 Albanian citizens of ethnic Greek origin have acquired Greek citizenship.

Diversity Challenges: Ethnic Greek Albanians differ from native Greeks mainly in their citizenship and to a lesser extent in their language. Contrary to Pontic Greeks, the use of Greek language, especially among the older generation, was more widespread in southern Albania. Also the geographical and cultural proximity was higher – native Greeks of Epirus in northern Greece and ethnic Greeks born in southern Albania had many cultural similarities. Overall ethnic Greek Albanians’ public image has also been constructed as ‘positive’, contrasted to that of ‘other’ Albanians whose image was negative (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002), at least during the 1990s. The ethnic, religious and cultural proximity of ethnic Greek Albanians with native Greeks makes them a minority group that is gradually assimilating into Greek society and poses no strong cultural diversity challenge to the country. At the same time their presence forces to clarify how national and cultural unity and homogeneity is pretty much constructed rather than given depending often on beliefs of common genealogical descent more than actual cultural proximity. It is interesting how the cultural diversity of Voreioipirotes has been treated during the 2000s by contrasting to how the cultural diversity of ‘other’ Albanians has been perceived at the same time. Actually, however, such distinctions seem to have faded, since Albanian citizens (either omogeneis or allogeneis) are largely considered as very well integrated to the Greek society, while other – more recently arrived – foreigners (such as Afghanis, Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants or asylum seekers) monopolise the public discourse.

2.7 Native minorities

There are a number of native minorities in Greece whose population however is rather small (Clogg 2002). According to the data provided by international and Greek NGOs the following national, ethno-linguistic and religious minorities are present in Greece (percentages refer to the total resident population): Roma 3.3%; Arvanites 2%; members of the Macedonian minority 2%; Vlachs 2%; Turks 0.5%; Pomaks 0.3% (Lenkova, 1997; Minority Rights Group (MRG), 1994). Religious minorities, which include Catholics, Protestants and new religious movements, make up nearly 1% of the citizens of Greece. Among these minorities, the Greek State only recognises the existence of the Muslims of western Thrace, the Roma population and Greek Catholics and Protestants. Since official recognition of other minorities of any kind is withheld, these groups are subjected to discriminatory treatment, whether at the collective and individual level. The recent

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15 Even though the use of Greek language was mainly confined to private homes and only in southern Albania in the Greek inhabited villages. Often ethnic Greek Albanians were moved to Tirana and other areas for work where they could not speak the Greek language and hence many of them were no longer fluent in it.

16 Arvanites are a Christian Orthodox minority that originates from northern Albania and migrated to continental Greece in the late middle ages. Vlachs are a Christian Orthodox minority native of Greece. There are however important Vlach populations across the Balkans and even in Central Europe. Vlachs are sub-divided in several ethnic sub-groups and are predominately Christian Orthodox. Both populations (the Arvanites and the Vlachs) are considered today to be totally assimilated to the dominant Greek national identity and culture even if Vlachs in particular may have their group-specific cultural festivities. Pomaks are a local Muslim population that lives in the Rhodope mountains on both sides of the Greek Bulgarian border. In Bulgaria they are considered Bulgarian Muslims while in Greece they are seen as part of the larger Muslim population of Western Thrace (see also Clogg 2002 and Rozakis 1996; 2000).
mobilisation of the Macedonian minority (during the 1990s) has been dealt with by refuting its existence and persecuting its activists (Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM), 1998: Kostopoulos 2000). In this chapter we shall only discuss the two numerically important native minorities in the country: the Muslims of western Thrace and the Macedonians in north-western Greece.

2.7.1 Muslims of western Thrace

The border region of Western Thrace in the northeast part of Greece is home to a small but politically significant population of about 120,000 Muslims, inhabiting the region together with a Greek Christian majority.17 With its strategic location between three states and two continents, the Muslim community of Western Thrace marks a particular kind of geographical and cultural-historical boundary between East and West. In Europe’s southernmost corner, the region of Thrace borders with Turkey to the east and Bulgaria to the north. Across the northern border, Bulgaria’s south and southeast regions are also home to large and territorially concentrated Turkish communities, portions of the country’s sizeable Turkish minority.18

Thrace’s Muslim community was exempt correspondingly with the Greeks of Istanbul, from the mandatory population exchange between Greece and Turkey agreed with the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Signed in the aftermath of Greece’s military debacle in Anatolia, the international Treaty of Lausanne includes a section on the ‘Protection of Minorities’, a bilateral agreement between Greece and Turkey containing a series of provisions to guarantee the rights of the exempted minority populations (including Islamic law (shari’a) for family and inheritance matters).19

Comprising individuals of Turkish origin, Gypsies (Roma), and Slav-speaking Pomaks, the Muslims of Thrace prior to World War II coexisted largely as a religious community characteristic of the Ottoman millet system. Since the 1950s, however, they have transformed into a minority with ethnic consciousness, and in the past twenty years they have mobilized to assert a common Turkish identity. The latter has caused a major and ongoing rift with Greek authorities who officially recognize a ‘Muslim minority’ in reference to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 that has defined the status of the latter until the present.

Despite Greece’s transition to democracy in 1974, state relations with the minority in Thrace deteriorated due to the deepening crisis with Turkey after the invasion of Cyprus. A series of restrictive measures adopted by the Greek governments deprived the Muslim population of basic social and economic rights. In protest, in the second half of the 1980s the minority mobilized politically on the basis of Turkish nationalism, supporting independent minority candidates in parliamentary elections, who were not affiliated with Greek political parties. The accompanying tensions that erupted between Muslims and Christians in the region in early 1990 marked a turning point; they made clear the failure of the previous discriminatory policy, pointing to the need for change.

Alarmed by tumultuous conditions in Thrace at the turn of the decade, the Greek government decided in 1991 to abolish the discriminatory measures and announced a new approach towards the

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17 The overall (resident) population of Thrace is 358,426 (www.e-demography.gr, 2010). The precise size of the Turkish Muslim population is a matter of dispute due to their large-scale immigration over the years and the lack of an official census since the 1950s. Estimates range from 90,000 to over 120,000 while official accounts put it between 110,000-135,000 (see The Muslim Minority in Greece, Athens: ELIAMEP, 1995). Alexandris estimated the minority in 1981 to be about 120,000, with 45% Turkish-speaking, 36% Pomaks and 18% Roma (Alexandris 1988: 524).


19 The Greek Civil Code provides Muslim women the right to chose whether to take a case to religious as opposed to the civil court and thus individuals presumably submit their case voluntarily to them. For a critical discussion of the Islamic law system in Thrace see Ktistakis (2006) and Tsitselikis (2004).
minority to be guided by ‘legal equality – equal citizenship’ (isonomeia-isopoliteia). Such an approach was for the first time put to practice through a new regional development strategy for border regions, which was launched with the Findings of the Inter-party Committee for Border Regions submitted to the Greek Parliament in 1992.²⁰

Recent research (Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou 2007) shows that overall ethnic identification matters less today in Thrace than it used to 20 years ago. However, past divisions and discrimination, although much attenuated now, often persist. They may persist less in the form of institutional discrimination but they do in the form of attitudes and implicit favouring of majority members at the expense of minority ones. Turkish and Greek nationalism remains salient among minority and majority leaders and social-political actors, yet, it has become significantly moderated over the past 15 years. Exclusive conceptions of national-ethnic identity and solidarity are not as pervasive but are subject to alternative and diverse understandings, as well as more subject to intra-communal challenge among both minority and majority.

A number of individuals, particularly among the younger generation of the minority, are critical of Turkish nationalism in so far as its politics involve and depend upon the patronage of Turkey. At the same time, they support the right to self-determination as an ethnic Turkish minority. In a parallel fashion, despite opposition to the demand for minority recognition as ethnic Turkish, nationalism among Greek Christians also seems to have lost some of its exclusive quality and political rigour of the previous decade. Greek elites and Greek public opinion however remain largely worried that the minority’s claim to define itself collectively as Turkish is a national claim, re-opening the question of state borders between Greece and Turkey and allowing for Turkey to interfere in Greek internal affairs.

**Diversity challenges:** The Turks of Thrace pose an important ethnic and religious diversity challenge for Greece as they question its ethnic and religious homogeneity. They share with other Greek citizens neither their genealogical descent nor the religion – they differ in the two fundamental elements that define the dominant vision of Greek national identity and citizenship. Their claims for collective recognition of their ethnic identity have generally been met with intolerance and rejection. At the same time Greece has been pressurised by the policies of the Council of Europe and by the European Court of Human Rights to adapt and update its policy towards its largest native ethnic minority. It has thus abolished the infamous article 18 of the Greek Nationality Code which had been used discretionary to deprive members of the minority from their Greek citizenship unilaterally.

Overall Greek policies towards the minority have become more liberal, defending the equality of individuals before the law and the state no matter what their collective affiliation is in terms of religion. These policies however have been defended in the name of the common, compact and unitary national interest that is the Greek Christian Orthodox majority’s interest (Anagnostou 2005) not by reference to human rights norms. There is no re-consideration or re-definition of what it means to be Greek or a sort of collective level recognition of the existence of minorities that are part of the Greek nation state. There is as yet no room for these minorities to contribute to the definition of what it means to be Greek in the 21st century.

Interesting key events, where the tolerance and intolerance of the Greek state institutions, the norms applied as well as everyday practices adopted can be tested, is the quest of two different cultural associations to include the word Turkish in their title, the rejection of this request by the Greek Supreme Court (decision of January 2005) and the condemnation of Greece on this issue by the European Court of Human Rights in 2007 (Human Rights Papers, 2008). In the last 2012 election, three minority MPs were elected into the Greek Parliament (two with the SYRIZA left wing party and one with the Socialist party) from the districts of Ksanthi and Rodopi.

2.7.2 Members of the Slavic-speaking Macedonian minority

When the southern part of the geographic region of Macedonia was incorporated into Greece, as the Greek region of Macedonia, in 1912, a large part of its population was neither Greek-speaking nor identified as of Greek ethnicity (Slavic speakers at 1903 were estimated at 500,000, accounting for 60% of the local population, Kostopoulos 2002: 25). The Slavic speaking population in Greece has been declining in the inter-war period (as a result of the Balkan wars (1912-14), the First World War (1914-1918) and the compulsory exchange and/or ‘voluntary’ ethnic un-mixing of populations that ensued). After the Second World War and the civil war that ravaged Greece in 1946-48, this population was further reduced. In 1951, the national census of Greece found that there were 36,000 Slavic-speakers living in Macedonia but a classified document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Kostopoulos 2002: 223, footnote: 2) estimate the same population to be 120,000-150,000 strong.

The Slavic-speaking population of Greek Macedonia was and still is characterised by an ethnic and cultural consciousness related to the speaking of the Macedonian language, also referred by local people as ‘our language’, the ‘local language’, or the ‘old’ language. The Macedonian Slavic language is a Slavic tongue which resembles more to Bulgarian than to Serbian. It has been heavily influenced by the languages of the neighbouring states and includes a variety of slightly different local dialects (Kostopoulos 2002: 33, 43).

Following the civil war and as part of a policy of forging a common national consciousness and identity based on the Greek language, the dominant Greek culture, and the suppression of cultural, linguistic and religious minority identities, the Slavic-speaking minority of Greek Macedonia underwent a process of forced cultural assimilation. Its members were largely obliged to assimilate culturally as well as to adopt a Greek national consciousness. By contrast, the language and local customs survived to a certain extent within the homes and in everyday communication in many of the villages of the Florina and Pella prefectures.\(^{21}\)

Diversity challenges: Following the implosion of the Communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe and the Balkans in 1989 and the ensuing (re-)awakening of nations in the region, the federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia proclaimed its independence. The formation of an independent Macedonian Republic (and no longer a federal one) was met with outrage by Greece (by both Greek governments and Greek citizens, see Roudometof 1996, Triandafyllidou et al. 1997) and contributed to the emergence of a strong current of defensive Greek nationalism. At the same time, the creation of the new independent state and its claim for the existence of a Macedonian nation led a part of the Slavic-speaking populations in northern Greece to ask for their recognition as a cultural and ethnic minority living in Greece. It asked for the Macedonian language to be introduced in schools and for the local culture to be recognised and cultivated (see the Rainbow party platform at the European election of 1994). Interestingly the existence of a Slavic speaking Macedonian minority in Greece was mentioned in the State department report on human rights in the world in 1990, which stated that Greece was suppressing this and other ethnic and linguistic minorities living in its territory.

Nonetheless, Greek authorities refused to recognise that such a minority exists and sought to suppress the Macedonian ethnic movement by, for instance, refusing to recognise the foundation of a cultural Macedonian association (in 1994). Greece was later (in 1998) condemned by the European Court of Human Rights for this refusal. The Greek Macedonian minority organised into a political party, the Rainbow party, which obtained 7,263 votes in the national election of 1993 of which 2,250 in the prefecture of Florina (corresponding to 5% approximately of the total vote). At the European election the same party gathered 26,000 votes approximately.

During this last decade the question of the Slavic speaking minority in Greek Macedonia has lost much of its fervour. Macedonian identity is still celebrated at local fairs but political mobilisation

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\(^{21}\) See also Mackridge and Yannakakis (1997), Karakasidou (1997)
has diminished. The Greek state has continued to deny the existence of the minority (with the support of the majority of Greek intellectuals, see also Kostopoulos 2002: 329ff.).

While the case of Slavic speaking Macedonians of Greece poses clearly questions of (in)tolerance of cultural diversity in Greece as well as the question of how plural or indeed mono-cultural and mono-ethnic is Greek national identity and the definition of Greek citizenship, this group cannot be said to have raised important challenges in terms of public policy or everyday practice during the last years.

2.7.3 Roma of Greece

Roma populations are believed to be of Indian origin arriving in Europe in the 11th century (Fraser, 1995). In line with the general confusion regarding the identities of different Roma/Gypsy populations, there is uncertainty about this issue in Greece too. Greek historians’ attempts to account for the Roma presence in Greek history have often contributed to the negative stereotyping of their behaviour and ways of life, often stirring thus anti-Romani discourses in Greece (ERRI and GHM, 2003).

Racist stereotyping of the Roma can already be traced already under the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, under the Ottoman rule, the Roma were differentiated by their ethnicity from the rest of the population, not falling thus under none of the two categories of the Empire’s population, the ‘true believers’ and the ‘infidels’ (raya). Both the Ottomans and the raya are thought to have been looking down on the Roma (Marushiaikova and Popov, 2001: 46-47, cited in ERRI and GHM, op.cit.). However, unlike the rest of Europe, the Ottoman administration was the only one to spare the Roma from persecution (Fraser, 1995).

Following the typical urban organisation of the Ottoman cities in which people were segregated according to ethnicity and faith (Karadimou-Gerolympou, 1997: 22-30, 87), the Roma had their own neighbourhoods. The newborn Greek state (1830) put an end to this ethnic plurality – social and spatial. As any other ethnic minority in Greece, the Roma were subjected to homogenisation, to the imposition of the dominant Greek identity and history and to the misrecognition of their cultural difference. During World War II, the Roma of Greece suffered persecution from the Nazis and, in some cases, even deportation and concentration into camps in Germany, although accurate figures are not available (ERRI and GHM, 2003; EODM, 2002: 2-3).

According to the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (NAPSI) 2008-2010, Roma are considered Greeks with no separate ethnic identity (NCHR, 2009). They are not recognized as a national minority by the Greek State (Abdikeeva et al., 2005; Pavlou, 2009: 33), which accepts this term only for those groups explicitly mentioned in bilateral treaties – namely the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, according to which there is a 12,000-person Roma population, as part of the recognised Muslim minority of Western Thrace. Roma people outside Thrace are not considered by the Greek authorities as members of a minority, but as a ‘vulnerable social group’ (CommDH, 2009; cited in Pavlou, op.cit.).

22 For a discussion on the origins of the Roma populations see also Matras (2002). For the origins of the Roma populations in Greece see EODM (2002: 1-3) and also the DIKADI-ROM (Network for fighting discrimination against Rom) website at: http://www.rom.net.gr

23 The UN Human Rights Council, McDougall report (2009) highlights that the Greek government does not consider the Roma a minority within Greece, rather a vulnerable social group consisting of 250,000 to 300,000 persons. According to the government, this viewpoint is shared by Roma who consider themselves an integral part of Greek society (cited in Pavlou, 2009: 33). According to Pavlou (2009), the choice of the Greek state (based also on the self-identification of Greek Roma as ‘Zingani’) to use the denotation ‘gypsies’ for Greek Roma is related to its reluctance to accept that Roma constitute a ‘minority’ as a social group, protected by international legal instruments.
The 1951 census registered 7,429 individuals with Romani as their mother tongue in Greece (Tsitselikis, 1996), but this number appears to comprise only Roma who lived in Western Thrace (Zenginis, 1994: 20; cited in Alexandris, 2004). Given that since 1951 the Greek censuses do not collect data on ethnic affiliation, language or religion, there is no official registration of the Roma populations in Greece.

The size of the Roma population in Greece is actually unknown and it seems to vary according to source and purpose\(^{24}\). Yet, recent estimations\(^{25}\) concord into the number given by the Minority Rights Group-Greece, i.e. 300-350,000 people, half of whom are tent-dwelling Rom.

Despite their centuries-long presence in Greece, most Roma were stateless until 1955 and were regarded as ‘aliens of Gypsy descent’. On the contrary, the Muslim Roma of the western Thrace\(^{26}\) (covered by the provisions of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty), obtained citizenship in the 1920s, despite their later settling in Greece (compared to those that had already settled in the Helladic space long before 1923). Those later exempt, the rest were issued with a residence permit from the Aliens Department of the Greek Police that had to be renewed every two years. Law 3370/20-9-1955 has been the first effort made in Greece to provide citizenship to the many stateless Roma. Despite the enactment of the new law and an amendment adopted in 1968, the majority of Roma remained stateless, what then prompted the Greek authorities to issue Decrees 69468/212 and 16701/51 (respectively in 1978 and 1979) in order to facilitate the acquisition of Greek citizenship by those who had not benefited from the 1955 law (Alexandris, 2004; Roughieri, 2000; Abdikeeva et al., 2005: 6).

Even after citizenship acquisition, the Roma of Greece still face marked discrimination and social exclusion\(^{27}\), the main types of which include:

\textit{Spatial segregation, appalling housing conditions and eviction from their settlements:} All national and international reports on Greece agree that Roma live under heavy spatial and social segregation (Pavlou, 2009: 12-13). Allegedly, Pavlou (op.cit.) suggests that the only regulatory framework providing for Roma settlements promotes segregation and ghettoisation\(^{28}\). Moreover, Roma in Greece are frequently faced with forced eviction (and/or the threat of forced eviction), the subsequent demolition of their homes, destruction of property, etc. Many evictions are linked to major sport or cultural events, in which cases Roma must be made invisible or removed at any cost (Pavlou, op.cit.). A telling example of this is the 2004 Olympic Games of Athens that have been exploited by the region’s local authorities as a pretext for evicting Roma (ERRI and GHM, 2003). The brushing up

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\(^{24}\) Rinne (2002) suggests that when raising funds from the European Union for the improvement of the Roma situation, Greece officially presents a Roma population of 300,000 individuals, which otherwise decreases to some 100-120,000 or less.

According to a Statement by the Greek Delegation in the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, in Warsaw, 17–27 September 2001, Roma in Greece count for 120,000–150,000 individuals (cited in Abdikeeva et al., 2005 and available at: [http://www.osce.org/odihr/hdim2001/statements.php3?topic=4a&author=23]). In 2003, according to the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (Response of Greece to the MG-S-ROM questionnaire on the rights of Roma in Council of Europe member states, Doc. Ref. No. 30823, 31243, 8 August 2003, p. 1), there were 70,000–80,000 Roma people in Greece (Abdikeeva et al., 2005). Mavrommatis (2004) refers to 150,000-300,000 persons, pointing out that the Greek state accepts the number of 80,000 of whom 25,000 (or 4,000 families) are travellers/nomads. According to DIKADI-ROM (Network for fighting discrimination against Rom), Roma in Greece count for 160-200,000 individuals (see [http://www.rom.net.gr/node/3]).


\(^{26}\) For a critical overview of their situation, see Troumpeta (2001 and 2008).

\(^{27}\) For a selection of discriminatory incidents against Roma people, see the special edition of the quarterly Roma Rights (March 2001) Focus: Roma in Greece, referred to herein as Cahn (2001).

\(^{28}\) According to Pavlou (2009: 12), there are no official or unofficial quantitative data available on regulated or unregulated encampments, ownership, social housing, private renting or household types.
of the capital’s image in view of the 2004 Olympic Games is only one among the reasons for the forced evictions. According to Alexandris (2004) and Rinne (2002), the traditional hostility of the local authorities, who perceive the existence of Roma in vicinity to their localities as a threat to public order, as well as a source of crime (drug dealing, thievery, etc.), is another reason behind their frequent evictions.

The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has noted, already in its Second Report on Greece (1999), that Roma living in settlements often face extremely harsh living conditions. Similarly, the more recent report of HLHR-KEMO/i-RED on the ‘Housing conditions of Roma and Travellers in Greece’ (October 2009) suggests that ‘inhuman and degrading conditions, as well as the deprivation of a wide range of their fundamental rights is the common conclusion met in different national and international reports on housing of Roma minority in Greece […]’. Roma live in tragic conditions right next to dumps, in shacks, without water and electricity, without basic hygiene, among rodents, and at the mercy of extreme weather conditions and phenomena, affected by epidemic diseases, mainly caused by the trash they are paid to collect and remove.

Police violence towards Roma and persistent identity-controls in their settlements: Abusive police behavior towards Roma is a major issue when considering this particular population (Pavlou, 2009: 13; ERRI/GHM, 2003; ECRI, 2009: 32), and one of the main issues raised in the complaints that have been handled by the Greek Ombudsman in recent years. More precisely the complaints are related, first, to misbehavior on the part of the police in individual cases, as well as excessive use of force, ill-treatment and verbal abuse; second, to the excessive use of force and illegal massive controls in camps, where all residents are treated as suspicious or even guilty of specific crimes or offences; third, to the Police involvement in the evictions of Roma from their camps in co-operation with the local authorities. The illegal character of the procedure of investigation followed by the police was one of the main issues on which the Greek Ombudsman has been focused (Lykovardi, 2006). It should be stressed, however, that, according to Kalliopi Lykovardi, Senior Investigator in the Greek Ombudsman’s Office/Human Rights Department, since 2001, the Greek Ombudsman has received no reports indicating that massive investigations and controls in Roma camps continue (op.cit.).

Exclusion of Roma from the Educational System: A combination of racial discrimination and extreme poverty makes that very few Romani children complete even the basic primary education. The children are all too often subjected to segregation in ghetto schools and Roma-only classes that – most of times – provide inferior education. Municipal and school authorities have actively hindered access of Romani children to education by refusing to register Romani students in local schools and dispersing them to schools far away from their places of residence as well as by failing to provide school transport for Roma (ERRI and GHM, 2003; Marantidis and Mavromatis, 1999; ERRI, 2003; ECRI, 2009). The following chapter deals (also) with the case of Roma segregation in Greek schools and how this is perceived in terms of public opinion.

29 This report is referred to herein as Pavlou, 2009.
30 Dropping out rates are very high. A 1998 survey of school-aged Romani children in a number of Greece’s more exposed Romani settlements by DEPOS revealed that only 23% of Romani children of secondary school age in settlements have ever been to school and only 4.3% of this number attend regularly. Similarly, only 21% of Romani children of primary school age in settlements have ever been to school and just 13% of those who had started had continued to attend (ERRI, op.cit.). The same source offers an overview of the situation in different regions of Greece based on several empirical studies. All the findings consent on that the overwhelming majority of Roma children remain in practice illiterate. For more on the exclusion of Romani children in education, see also: http://www.rom.net.gr/node/105 , as well as Gotovos (2004) that presents research findings from the Research Project “Roma children education” carried out by the Department of Education of the University of Ioannina.
31 See the press release of the ERRC, on 10 August 2010, at: http://www.ercc.org and http://cm.greekhelsinki.gr. In the same, see also a list of the schools involved in such practices all over Greece.
Barriers to Access to Health Care and Other Social Support Services: It is not exceptional for Romani individuals to lack basic identity documents, what then makes it impossible for them to claim necessary health care and state social benefits. ERRI and GHM (2003) report that, in a number of Greek municipalities\textsuperscript{32}, local authorities have refused to register factually residing Roma as residents, effectively precluding them from access to public services (such as hospitals) necessary for the realisation of a number of fundamental social and economic rights (such as enrollment to school).

As a consequence Romani people and most particularly children are entrapped in a vicious circle, in which lack of official documents affects their health, education and living conditions (ERRI and GHM, \textit{op.cit}.; ECRI, 2009. See also Divani, 2008). Romani children are not sufficiently vaccinated because they fail to attend school regularly, but also because of the lack of readily-understandable information available to their mothers. But, the insufficient vaccination hinders their enrolment at school anyway.

Employment: Only few Roma are employed in the mainstream labor market, and this is mainly related to discrimination and prejudice, but also to their lack of qualifications (as a result of a low education). Most Roma living in settlements earn their income from scrap and garbage collection, while Roma in rural settlements occasionally earn a living by seasonal agricultural work. All above types of work are usually informal, thus not giving access to health or social insurance. It seems that many claim it is difficult and expensive to obtain the necessary permits, what then may lead to problems with the authorities (Abdikeeva et al., 2005).

According to the National Commission on Human Rights (NCHR, 2008), due to low levels of education and illiteracy, only an estimated 40 per cent of Roma have a job from which they can make a living. However, apart from education and housing, Roma suffer serious discrimination also in employment from members of the majority group, without exempting public officials and officials at the local level (ECRI, 2009: 31). This is a key issue to their unemployment or under-employment.

Diversity challenges: The Roma have always posed important ethnic and cultural challenges for Greece.\textsuperscript{33} Their phenotypic features (colour of skin, face traits) and their traditions and way of life (tent-dwelling, nomadic, traditional dress code for women, under age marriages, patriarchal extended families) make them appear alien to the Greek nation despite their centuries-long presence in the country. Even though a large part of the Roma populations in Greece are Christian, religion does not seem to matter here as a bridge between the majority population and the Roma minority. The Roma in western Thrace are also a more complex case as they are also discriminated against within their own Muslim community (Troumpeta, 2001).

2.8 Immigrants

The third category of minority groups that live in Greece are economic migrants that arrived in the country during the past two decades. We have identified here the three largest groups (see table 2 above), notably Albanians, Georgians and Ukrainians and also two smaller immigrant populations, notably southeast Asians and sub Saharan Africans, mainly because these last have been increasingly visible during the last couple of years (although they have been present in relatively small numbers in the country for at least 2 decades) and because of their religious (in the case of southeast Asians) and racial (in the case of sub Saharan Africans) difference from the national majority population.

\textsuperscript{32} For instance, ECRI reports that, in Spata and Aspropyrgos of the Athenian agglomeration, Roma living in settlements do not benefit from the requisite attention from the local social services. (ECRI, 2009: 32).

\textsuperscript{33} Unsurprisingly, Greek language and culture had an important impact on Romani language and culture. Words derived from Greek make up by far the largest component of the so-called “inherited lexicon” of Romani (ERRI and GHM, 2003).
2.8.1 Albanians

Albanian migration to Greece took massively place basically in two periods: in 1991 (following the collapse of the Albanian economy and polity) and in 1997 (after another crisis due to the implosion of the financial pyramid schemes). The availability of various access points from the difficult to guard mountainous north-western border of Greece and the proximity of this latter to Albania, together with the reactivation of existent post-WWII societal networks of kinship, friendship, partnership, etc. (that stayed ‘frozen’ for nearly 50 years due to the isolation Enver Hoxha imposed to Albania in the 1950s) (Kokkali 2010 and 2008: 214-218, Sintès 2002) were among the main factors that qualified Greece as by far the major migratory destination for Albanians during the 1990s. In addition the attraction of Greece’s large grey economy to undocumented immigrants (who saw in this a rapid economic integration) played a role (Kokkali op.cit.).

Gradually, during the last twenty years, a substantial part of Albanian migrants have settled in Greece. Still, different patterns of migration and various ideal-types of the immigrant can be distinguished among Albanians, basically those who have brought their families in Greece and those who did not. Generally speaking, the former enjoyed much more acceptance from the local communities than the latter, who – in many cases – remained isolated from the “autochthones” and enclosed themselves in exclusively male Albanian-speaking milieus with poor linguistic abilities in Greek (Kokkali 2010). By offering cheap, unqualified labor thus filling the gaps of the Greek economy, Albanians were firstly employed in any possible job. They have been working mainly in construction, agriculture, small industries and a number of other sectors (commerce, transport, hotels and restaurants). Gradually, some have started their own little business of cleansing or slight-repairing of apartments, in which they have been employing other Albanians, mostly relatives. Albanian women work as domestic workers, in the food and catering industry, in tourism and in agriculture. Lyberaki and Maroukis (2004) also showed that Albanian women are progressively moving out from unskilled work and cleaning services to become housewives, if they can afford it.

It is very difficult to talk of integration (if integration is defined as a binary process that involves both the immigrant and the society of settlement). Greek public opinion, Greek media and the state have viewed immigrants and Albanians in particular firstly with suspicion and resentment, harshly stigmatising them, then with a paternalistic and utilitarian spirit (since, according to the post-2000 campaign in politics and the media, immigrants are beneficial to the Greek economy, while Albanians in particular have largely contributed in the construction works needed for the organization of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens) (Pavlou 2009). The adaptation strategies that many Albanians have used in Greece, i.e. name-changing and, in some cases, christening (especially of the children belonging to families of Muslim affiliation), offer an exemplary indication of how the Albanians’ otherness is silenced or at least dissimulated so as to fit in Greek society.

Their cultural difference from Greeks is however rather small concerning mainly language and religion. Albanian immigrants are generally fluent in Greek, even the older generation which may not write or read Greek properly but generally speak it quite well. In terms of religion, there are many migrants who declare themselves atheists. Yet, it is important to stress that, before the total abolition

34 During the 1990s, Albanians have been generally faced with negative stereotyping in the media (presented as ‘criminals’, ‘backwards’, ‘uncivilised’ – often in stark opposition to the good, honest, hard working ethnic Greek Albanians) (Pavlou 2001, Triandafyllidou 2002)

35 Those strategies constitute, however, a more complicated issue, since they are also related to Albanians’ cultural characteristics and history (Kokkali 2009; 2010).

36These ones might either be truly atheists or just people who do not desire to reveal their religious beliefs and/or religious origin. Let us remind that Albanians have been subjected to twenty years of forced atheism, during the harsh regime of
of all religious practice in Albania, the population was divided into four major religions (Sunni and Bektashi Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism), 70% being Muslim. But for Albanians, the religious affiliation is more a form of social organization than religious belief. As such, religion is seen as inseparable from a certain ‘nature’, what then means that a person cannot flee the belonging represented by his/her religious affiliation, even if s/he was converted (De Rapper, 2002). In other words, since religion is intrinsic to origin and birth, display a different religion or declare oneself atheist is a merely superficial act that changes nothing, and, in any case, cannot alter the person’s ‘nature’ (Kokkali 2010).

During the 1990s and the early 2000s there have been incidents of xenophobia, racism, even more than intolerance towards Albanians. A well known example are the problems that had arisen at the beginning of this decade when Albanian pupils excelled in their classes and were entitled to carry the Greek flag in the national independence day during the school parade. While the law was clear: the best pupil in the class should carry the flag, in many schools parents, first and foremost, of native children and secondarily teachers and other local actors contested this right of the Albanian pupils arguing that the flag could not be carried by foreigners. While the Ministry of Education insisted that the law be respected and that the nationality of the children was not a criterion, several Albanian children conceded their place to the second best native Greek under the moral pressure of the school environment.

As Pavlou (2009) points out, this kind of incidents and tensions has been smothered with time and, today, a new generation with multiple cultural references and identities has arisen. Still, he recognises that this is not an irreversible conversion, to the extent that the actual discourse on immigrants is widely based on utilitarianism and the maintenance of socio-economic correlations of power between autochthones and immigrants. Besides, the on-going economic crisis in Greece will probably invalidate the arguments of the immigrants’ positive contribution to the national economy, what then might lead to the reappearance of wide-spread racist discourse and violence (2009: 54).

Research material drawn from a recent research project reveals interesting facts about Albanian immigrants’ housing patterns (Kotzamanis 2006). Overall, only few are those who seem to live under very poor conditions (e.g. in temporary structures or hotels), while the majority lives in a house or apartment. With time, important improving in their housing conditions is registered. Usually, migrants share their home with members of the nuclear family (spouses and children) or other relatives or Albanian friends. Rents are considered high compared to the living standards in Greece, but also compared to the quality of the residences, which are mostly old and dilapidated, located on ground floors or basements. Many landlords refused to rent a house to the interviewees in question because they were Albanians. This was so for almost one person out of two, while for almost one person out of five renting a house was a problem because of a foreign origin in general (not specifically Albanian). In other words, almost 6 out of 10 persons interviewed had difficulties in purchasing or renting a house because they were not Greeks (Kokkali 2011b; 2008: 239-40).

As regards intermarriage with Greeks, percentages are very low. In 2007, for instance, in a total of 61,377 marriages all over Greece, 53,943 marriages either religious or civic were held among Greek nationals that is 88%. Intermarriage between Albanians and Greeks in particular, in the same year, counted for 1,16% of all marriages what is then a low percentage compared to the volume of the Albanian population living actually in Greece which is estimated at 5% of the total resident population.

(Contd.)

Enver Hoxha. In 1967, there was an official abolition of all religious activities, which, since then, became subjected to severe persecution
2.8.2 Georgians and Ukrainians

According to the 2001 national census, there were approximately 30,000 Georgian and more than 13,500 Ukrainian citizens living in Greece. Georgians were mainly concentrated in the region of Macedonia (70%) and smaller parts of this population lived in the Athens metropolitan area (14%) and Crete (6%). The largest share of Ukrainians (about 60%) live in Athens and others are scattered across the country. However, data from stay permits show that in 2007 about 40% of Georgians lived in Athens and another 40% in Thessaloniki. Maroufof and Nikolova (2010) argue that this change in their geographical distribution is related to both new arrivals and to an internal movement of Georgians from smaller cities to Athens where it is easier to find work.

Maroufof and Nikolova (2010) estimate that in 2008 Georgian citizens living in Greece (both under legal and irregular status) numbered 80,000 while Ukrainians were about 30,000. More interestingly, Ukrainian immigration to Greece is a typical case of female post-Communist migration. Women account for 3/4s of all Ukrainians living in Greece. However during the last few years new arrivals of Ukrainian women have slowed down and it is rather members of their families that join them in Greece. By contrast among Georgians women account for slightly more than half of all migrants. Both groups are in their vast majority (81% of Georgians and 92% of Ukrainians) in an economically productive age (between 15 and 65 years of age) and more than half were between 20 and 45 years.

Both Ukrainians and Georgians migrated for economic reasons to Greece. However, Greece is a secondary destination for Ukrainians who can be actually found scattered all over Europe, both in southern countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal and in northern and western ones (Germany, Poland, the UK, Ireland). Greece thus was part of the global migration patterns of Ukrainians almost by accident. Once Ukrainian migration started, the networks continued feeding it albeit without massive increases. By contrast Greece is a primary destination for Georgians (after Russia and the USA) not least because of the large number of Pontic Greeks that lived in Georgia before 1989 (Maroufof and Nikolova 2010).

Georgians are for the most part Christian Orthodox while Ukrainians are Catholic, Orthodox or Uniates. Many among them have revived Greek Orthodox churches by attending Sunday mass. However, relations between Greece and Georgia or Ukraine were quite limited before 1989 and both Georgians and Ukrainians were faced with a foreign environment upon arrival in Greece. Their difference is linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and less markedly religious.

Ukrainians in particular are also white, with fair complexion and tall, a phenotype that is appreciated in Greece as a sign of beauty. Indeed, Ukrainian women are considered as among the most beautiful women in Greece. But this goes beyond a simple positive or neutral stereotype, since it has been closely associated, first, to prostitution and paid services of the sex-industry, and lately to marriages of young Ukrainian women to middle-aged Greek men. In 2002, the mayor of Zaxaro (village in Peloponnesus), in his electoral campaign, has promised to the unmarried middle-aged male residents of the village to find them brides from Russia, as a solution to the deficit of women in the whole region. The event has inspired the film director Kimon Tsakiris to do his very successful film “Sugartown”. Overall, the stereotyping on Ukrainians (and especially women, who are the main representatives of the Ukrainian migratory group) seems to have moved from the ‘Ukrainian/Russian prostitute’ to the ‘Ukrainian/Russian (potential) bride’, who comes to Greece to get married, as a means of survival.

37 This was also the case of Russians: the ‘Russian-woman-prostitute’ stereotype.
2.8.3 Southeast Asians (Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Afghani)

The influx of Pakistani immigrants in particular began during the 1970s but their population augmented significantly during the period between 1991 and 2003. According to the 2001 census the Pakistani community of Greece numbered more than 11,000, 92% of which came to Greece in search of employment. According to the same census, 96% of the Pakistanis in Greece were men who work mostly in manufacturing industries but also in the fields of construction and services. Based on data of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) there were at least 23,000 Pakistanis residing in Greece on 31 December 2009.

Bangladeshis are a more recent community since they began migrating to Greece after 1991. Based on the data of the last census of the National Statistical Service, 94% of about 5,000 migrants from Bangladesh who resided in Greece in 2001 came with the purpose of working and were mostly employed in small shops and restaurants while 97% of them were men. Data from the Labour Force Survey however suggest that there were 13,000 Bangladeshis living in Greece at the end of 2009. Lazarescu and Broersma (2010) estimate that there are between 30,000 and 60,000 Pakistanis and approximately 20,000 Bangladeshis living in Greece today.

Both groups are characterized by a stark gender imbalance: in their overwhelming majority Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants are men. Indeed qualitative research (Lazarescu and Broersma op.cit.) suggests that most of them are married but only 20% live in Greece with their families. They are generally unable to ask for family reunification because their income is too low and probably too unstable.

Afghans in Greece are very recent arrivals. They are not included in high ranks in the labour force survey or in the database of the Ministry of the Interior, we know however that they have been among the top three nationalities among those apprehended at the Greek Turkish borders in the period 2008-2010. Actually only in 2010 there were more than 20,000 arrests of people with Afghan citizenship at the Greek Turkish border. We therefore assume that there may be as many as 40,000 Afghans in Greece at this time. Further research is of course needed to confirm this number.

Diversity challenges raised by immigrant groups: All immigrant groups raise important identity challenges to the Greek majority to the extent that they are ethnically alien to the Greek nation. However, these challenges have been most acutely felt in relation to Albanian citizens for a number of reasons: because Albanians are by far the most numerous immigrant community in Greece, they are visible in the labour market, in schools, in leisure, among youth, in culture and the arts. Albanians also challenge Greek identity and culture because they are very close to it: the two groups share a common history (of conflict and coexistence), common culture and traditions (of the wider Balkans). Albanian immigration touches the most sensitive points of Greek national identity as it challenges the authenticity of the Greek nation and its symbolic boundaries with its neighbouring nations. Thus, it forces the Greek Christian Orthodox majority to re-consider both its internal and external boundaries: it obliges public opinion and a variety of social institutions such as the school, the welfare state, the labour market, state authorities defending equality in the labour market and in society to re-consider what it means to be Greek today (when 10% of the population is of immigrant origin, a vast majority of whom Albanian) and what are the rights of immigrants in Greek society and polity. It is interesting to note that the religious diversity of Albanians (when it was the case) has been largely invisible or indeed blurred not least because they have opted for an assimilatory path in this (but also in other) respect(s). By their silenced otherness they did not challenge the values and the practices of the dominant society. They are thus actually considered – and in this respect they are indeed – the most integrated migratory group in Greece (Kokkali, 2011b).

The debate that has arisen in December 2009 and January through March 2010 with regard to the citizenship law reform is an interesting point in question which highlights the predominantly ethnic diversity challenges that immigration raises for Greece.
Other groups of immigrants from Eastern Europe (Ukrainians, Georgians) have not posed important ethnic or religious challenges to Greek society because they largely share with the Greek majority the Christian Orthodox faith.

The immigrant groups that have most recently raised important diversity challenges in Greece by their visibility in the urban space are Asians. While Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Afghani immigration has been largely male only (and hence has not yet posed issues in school life for instance) and is overall numerically rather small, their largely illegal entry to Greece (crossing the Greek Turkish borders with the help of migrant smuggling networks), their concentration in downtown Athens, in cramped apartments where each room is inhabited by an entire family, and most importantly their instrumentalisation during the past few years (2007 onwards) by the Greek authorities has converted them (in the media and policy discourses) to the epitomy of the ‘migration evils’ that Greece suffers. During the last three years, the major political parties and the media have been constructing immigration as a security issue departing by the case of ‘illegal’ immigrants accumulated in the centre of the capital. Even more recently, major political parties have played the migration card in their campaigns in view of 2012 elections.

It comes as no surprise then that the question of irregular Asian migration through Turkey was related even to the discussion of the citizenship law reform in Parliament in March 2010 (see Gropas, Kouki and Triandafyllidou 2010). Indeed while the new naturalisation provisions did not concern of course irregularly staying and recently arrived aliens, several MPs used the argument of controlling and combating irregular migration to argue in favour or against the relaxation of naturalisation provisions. Indeed, in the parliamentary debate Greece was presented to be in danger because it is the ‘door to Europe’ for millions of destitute and war-ravaged Muslims. While there has so far been only one major public issue (the construction of an official mosque in Athens, see Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2009), Asian Muslims raise important religious and ethnic diversity challenges for Greek society.

2.9 Definitions of tolerance in Greece

The minority issues for long have been treated in Greece as taboos; they have thus stayed outside the public sphere and the public debate, what then permitted the emergence of non-transparent, arbitrary and oppressive regulations. Even if some NGOs and politicians (mainly of the left) support minority rights, the public discourse is dominated by fearful attitudes on “national dangers” that correlate any claim of a particular linguistic and/or religious identity to foreign interests and irredentist aspirations (Heraklides 1997; 2004).

According to Skoulariki (2009: 69-70) after 1990, the political discourse on the minorities in Greece has been characterised by:

- A formalistic invocation of the principle of fairness and egalitarianism.
- An obsession with national homogeneity and the fear for otherness.
- Suspicion towards minorities, which *a priori* are thought to be the “Trojan Horse” of foreign interests and a threat for the country’s territorial sovereignty.
- A legalistic approach: only minorities recognised by international treaties, such as the Muslim religious minority of Thrace, are officially recognised by the state.
- A selective reference to the ethnic dimension. For example, while the Slavic origins of the Pomak language are emphasised with a view to distinguishing the Pomaks (who are Muslims) from the ethnically Turkish majority of the Muslim minority in Thrace, the Slavic language and cultural identity of the Slavic-speaking Macedonians of Greece is not recognised by the Greek state.
Despite the above situation regarding minorities, the linguistic and religious difference comes unavoidably into light, imposed by the undeniable socio-demographic changes that migration has brought to Greece. Indeed, given that in some schools of the Athenian city-centre, such as Petralona and Gazi, the foreign pupils in a class reach 50%\textsuperscript{38}, there is not any doubt that issues of otherness are here to stay.

As a result, in recent years, there is an increasing debate going on – especially among teachers, education practitioners, associations dealing with educational issues (e.g. OLME/ Federation of Officers of Secondary Education) – on interculturalism, multiculturality and cultural difference. Interestingly this debate and the related education policies put in place by the Greek state do not associate in any way the education and other integration measures targeting immigrants with those targeting the Turkish Muslims of Thrace or the Roma population. Native and immigrant minorities are kept distinct in education policies and in all policy discourses.

Besides, despite the ongoing discourse on the necessity for an intercultural education aligned with the new realities of the de facto multicultural Greek society, the understanding of Greekness (and, thus, of the Greek national identity) as mono-cultural and mono-ethnic seem to impede the ‘opening’ of the Greek educational system to the cultures of its foreign pupils. Indeed, as Gropas and Triandafyllidou (2011) point out, a frequent understanding of what intercultural education is, especially among educational practitioners, implies the foreigners’ assimilation to the Greek culture without involving any redefinition of this latter. Therefore, the so-called intercultural education policies are plural in the letter of the law but rather assimilatory in their daily practice, thus reflecting more strongly the dominant understandings of what is Greek national identity than the more general principles of respect for and recognition of cultural diversity in spite of the fact that those later are currently referred to as integral parts of a liberal democracy such as Greece.

More generally, while multiculturality in Greece is gradually being accepted as a fact, multiculturalism is seen as a normative approach that predicates the parallel (but not integrated) co-existence of different ethnic and cultural communities. By contrast, Greek policy makers and scholars tend to favour intercultural dialogue: notably the integration of individuals (not communities) into Greek society. In the Greek debate, the intercultural approach is seen as favourable to societal cohesion and as a normative and policy approach that is in line with modernity and liberalism\textsuperscript{39}. In practice, however, there is little change in education, anti-discrimination or political participation policies towards this direction (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009).

The debate on the 2010 law on citizenship and the immigrants’ brand-new right to vote in the local elections is telling of this discordance, which is again related to the understanding of Greekness. While an attempt to differentiate national identity from citizenship sees gradually the light in the public discourse the reference to Greek ideals and turbulent history (1821 war of independence, Asia

\textsuperscript{38} “In the battle for grades without equal opportunities”, Ta Nea, 18 March 2010.

\textsuperscript{39} See for instance the speeches on the national celebration of 28th October of both the Prime Minister Kostas Simitis [27-10-2003], (http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpegrb/2003/03-10-27.mpegrb.html#02) and the president of the main opposition party at the time, K. Karamanlis, (http://www.nd.gr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26372&Itemid=242). The former declares: “and, on the occasion of the national celebration of 28th October, I urge all Greeks to fight together for […] Greece's progress and prosperity. […] For a Greece that respects human rights and diversity – a Greece that leads the chorus of modern democratic countries”; while the latter stress that “there aren’t any citizens of 2nd class in Greece of the 21st century” (referring to Roma populations). “Our goal must be to integrate the immigrant element – a progressive and creative integration into Greek society. With mutual respect and understanding. With acceptance of the religious beliefs, the cultural heritage, the culture in general… And, of course, on the condition that they must respect the place that hosts them, the place where they live, will study and will make family and children....”.

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Minor refugees, etc.) is dominant. Indeed, as Kouki, Gropas and Triandafyllidou (2010) show in their analysis of a recent parliamentary debate on the new law, while there is a clear right-left wing rift as regards the dominant views on Modern Greek identity, both views are based on the same elements of reference: national history and tradition and the national heroes. In this respect, the role of education is again put into debate. For those in favour of a civic citizenship, education is the means for becoming Greek, whereas, for those in favour of an ethnically based Greek nation, education should reinforce the existing ethno-religious conception of the nation but cannot convert to Greeks those who were born ‘foreigners’, that is to say of foreign parents.

In the above discourses, but more generally in Greece overall, the cultural difference is understood as ethnic, linguistic and religious, all three echoing the ethnic conception of the nation. The ethno-linguistic difference refers to the genealogical aspect of the nation related to the common language and ancestry, whereas the religious part refers to Orthodoxy, which is also considered as intrinsic to Greekness.

The media and parliamentary debates regarding the construction of a mosque in Athens, on the occasion of the 2004 Olympic Games, are indicative of the dominant understandings of difference in Greece and of how religious difference, in particular, should be accommodated. In their analysis of the debates in the press, Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2009) point out that, while it is generally considered that constructing a Mosque is not only a reasonable religious freedom but also a necessary venue for the needs of the Muslims who desire to practice their faith, a significant underlying unease still exists. This latter partly concerns geopolitics and identity, thus linking the religious aspects of Islam (the construction of a mosque) with the question of national security and the relationship between Turkey and Greece. As such, the question of the mosque becomes intertwined with Greece’s most significant Other (Turkey) and the West’s most significant threat (violent Islamic fundamentalism) rather than being treated as part of internal arrangements within Greek society. In other words, cultural and religious differences are defined as coming from outside and/or necessarily related to a sense of threat – both military and symbolic – to the nation and its well-being (op. cit., 966-968). The analogies with the discourses held on the internal minorities of Greece as “Trojan horses” of foreign factors are more than evident.

In the above debate, another central issue was the disassociation of religious and national identity. Here again, exactly as in the discourses on the intercultural education, “modernity” was at stake, meaning that the establishment of a temple of worship for another faith was considered necessary in a ‘European’ and democratic country like 21st century Greece. The terms ‘tolerance’ and ‘democracy’ were thus repeatedly mentioned. However, as Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2009: 969) maintain, diversity (and the tolerance of it) were recognised only as an individual private matter and not as an issue associated with the recognition of collective rights.

Similarly, in her analysis of the press discourses and the political juxtaposition that followed the announcement of the candidature of Gulbeyaz Karahasan (a young Muslim woman from the

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40 Similar to the parliamentary debate, is the discourse in the press. We read, in the conservative quality broadsheet Kathimerini: “The issue of the ‘corruption’ of the national identity came several times into debate […]. It has been even attempted to negatively correlate this to the granting of citizenship to some social groups that live permanently in Greece. The granting of political rights (citizenship) does not necessarily require a certification of ‘Greekness’. Modern Greek society has shown through its long-term coexistence with other groups (Roma, Muslims of Thrace) that the dominant components of the Greek national identity such as language, religion and traditions, do not constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for political and inclusion of others”, “Citizenship and national identity”, H Kathimerini, 31 January 2010. It is interesting how the ‘modern Greek society’ referred to in this quotation is perceived as separate of (though coexisting with) ‘other groups’ such as the Greek Roma and the Muslims of the recognised minority in Thrace, as if those latter do not constitute integral parts of the former. In the same issue of Kathimerini (devoted to migration), 57% of Greeks believe that migration alters the national identity of Greeks, while 45% are for and 45% against the right to participate to the elections and acquire the Greek citizenship (“Divisions on a vote of immigrants”, H Kathimerini, 31 January 2010).
Minority in Thrace) in the 2007 regional elections by the leader of the socialist party (PASOK), George Papandreou, Skoulariki (2009: 69-93) stresses the tenacity with which the Greek state considers the auto-definition as a strictly personal issue, refusing thus – even with judicial decisions of first degree – the auto-definition of citizens organised in associations, syndicates, etc.

In the public discourse, the limits of tolerance (that is to say what and who is tolerated or considered as intolerable), apart from the above mentioned issue on the ‘individual vs collective’ recognition of diversity, are also set from what is said to be the democratic values of a modern state, 21st century Greece that is. In this respect, the main argument has been that, in the name of tolerance, we cannot abort basic civil rights as for instance equality in front of the law. The case of the Muslim minority of Thrace, where the Islamic law of the shari’a is valid instead, was abundantly cited41. Another issue raised, even if hesitantly, probably inspired from the western-European and north-American discourses on terrorism, is the Islamic veil of women. A number of articles have recently dealt with whether the veil is a symbol of fundamentalism or of culture, as well as if it is compatible with the multiculturalism experienced in Greek schools42. Despite its democratic, liberal and modern coverage, this discourse is undoubtedly intertwined with the same unease that has characterized the debates on the construction of a Mosque in Athens. The apparent affirmation of the religious diversity – and in particular the Muslim otherness – appears indeed to bother the public opinion.

In the above debates, the term tolerance is either not used at all or very scarcely. In the Greek context, tolerance (ανοχή /anohi/) corresponds to liberal tolerance, notably the will to tolerate practices, beliefs or behaviours with which one does not agree although one has the power to suppress them. The use of the Greek term for tolerance is so far not connected to any sense of egalitarian tolerance, notably to acceptance, let alone respect of cultural diversity.

Terms such as pluralism (πλούραλισμός) or liberalism (φιλελευθερισμός) are not used in the Greek political debate on migrants and minorities. There are no arguments made in the name of pluralism (let alone religious pluralism), nor in the name of liberalism. Liberalism is understood in the sense of right-wing neoliberal ideology not as regards diversity. The terms national heritage, national identity and the nation are often used and hotly debated as we have noted above and indeed in relation to issues pertaining to migrant diversity accommodation, integration or assimilation.

Indeed, it is the term integration (ένταξη) that is mostly used in Greek political and policy debates on ethnic minority and immigrant diversity. Conveniently, its meaning is often not clarified and hence can range from

- integration in a multicultural perspective (of both individual and group diversity, reconsideration of the meaning of national identity, pluralisation of national identity – but these views are held by a very small minority of left wing parties and intellectuals), to

- integration in an intercultural perspective (integrating individuals as bearers of specific cultures, view of culture as a box, promotion of dialogue between cultures, acceptance and respect of ‘other’ cultures, but no reconsideration of the Greek national culture and identity,

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42 “How much backtracking is the State willing to do in the sake of respecting diversity?” […] “the burqa is consistent with the democratic achievement of gender equality” (“The crisis has exacerbated tensions in Europe”, H Kathimerini, 31 January 2010). “Do we prefer protecting the culture of […] the mullahs or engaging with the hundreds of Muslim women who are struggling to overcome the reactionary traditions of Islam and gain their freedom? Do we support the mixing of races or their separation and ghettoization?” (“The culture of Sabine”, Ta Nea, 8 August 2005. See also “Who is afraid of Islam?”, To Vima, 28 May 2006; “Hijab: a symbol or a terror?”, Ta Nea, 14 May 2009; “Conference on the Muslim woman in Europe”, 8 November 2008 in http://www.ert3.gr/news/et3newsbody.asp?ID=428206
nor of the fact that for instance migrant or minority children are of ‘hybrid’ cultural upbringing), and/or to

- assimilation understood as the peaceful and welcoming but still total cultural, ethnic and linguistic assimilation of immigrants and minorities into the dominant Greek national culture and language.

2.9 Concluding Remarks

Massive immigration flows towards Greece and the consequent shift of the country from an emigration to an immigration pole bring into light and stir old, unsolved issues of the Greek national identity. Moreover, given that the majority of those new immigrants are either nationals of neighbouring states or countries related to Greece’s not-so-distant past, it becomes clear that the newcomers, with their presence and their potential claims for respecting their cultural diversity, disturb old equilibriums and established orders. They challenge the idea of national security and territorial sovereignty, as well as the up-to-now crystallized idea of Greekness. Therefore, important parts of the Greek society tend to interpret any minority/immigrant claim of rights as a territorial claim of a neighbouring state that seeks to interfere in the domestic affairs.

Greece’s main immigrant groups are not complete “strangers” to Greece: Albanians and “Vorioepiroti” are added to the albanophone Arvanites, by now completely assimilated by the Greek element, but who have - for long - been a distinct community (18th-19th centuries\(^4\)); their descendants can still be found in Greece and are – in many cases – conscious of their (or at least of their fathers’ and grandfathers’) ethno-linguistic difference. Bulgarians are linguistically very close to a part of the recognised Muslim minority of Greece, the Pomaks, but also to the unrecognized minority of the Slavic-speaking population of the Greek region of Macedonia. Besides, the geographic proximity of this minority to the state of (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia (in which the dominant spoken language is quasi identical to the one spoken by the Slavic-speaking Greeks) stirs up identity and territorial fears of various kinds.

Those fears substantiate the existing (traditional) suspicion towards minorities, but also nourish the unease of the Greek society regarding cultural diversity, and in particular religious – and most specifically Muslim – diversity. Despite the recent apparent changes in the general social climate (the media and parliamentary debates on diversity, the recognition of the need to implement changes in the educational system, the 2010 law on citizenship and the migrants’ participation to the local elections) and the undeniable fact that in the early 21st century a more flexible understanding of Greek national identity emerges (especially among elites), there seems to be little room for the accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity in practice.

The current acute economic crisis certainly does not make things any easier. Immigrants become easy scapegoats as impoverished Greeks start competing with them for jobs in the low skill sector and any claims for special measures (for Roma or immigrant children in schooling for instance) is seen through the lens of the budgetary constraints even more than before. The obvious arguments include: we have hardly enough money to provide for decent schooling for our own children. Can we really afford the extra effort for migrant children? We can hardly save our jobs and make ends meet, how can we bother about the special problems that migrants and their families face? And if Afghani

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\(^4\) Circa 1850, there was still a sizable albanophone population in Greece, located mainly in Attica, north of Euboea, etc. According to the 1928 census, the ethnic Albanian population reached 19,000 people, but it seems that this figure is underestimated and that we should instead consider a figure around 65,000 people (Poulton, 1991)
suffer persecution in their own country, does this mean that they have to come here to be fed? We cannot stand any more foreigners. The country has reached its limits.

In this negative climate the notion of tolerance can provide for a fruitful normative and policy basis because it allows for different groups and claims to be treated differently. Liberal tolerance can be defended for a variety of diversity claims that do not necessarily require a whole-hearted embracement by the majority population but just their tacit approval for letting be. Such issues include the codes of dress, the customs and life choices including issues of gender equality of minority and immigrant people, to the extent that these habits do not infringe Greek civil law. In addition there can be a claim for egalitarian tolerance that is for acceptance and recognition of specific claims to cultural and religious diversity that require public recognition and state support to be satisfied. Such claims include the construction of one or more official Muslim temples in Athens; the introduction of alternative religion classes in schools; and the recognition of the native and immigrant populations’ contribution to the Greek history and to society and economy today. Last but not least, the principle of non-tolerance can also provide for a good basis for forbidding practices that are against the Greek Constitution and Greek civil law (for instance some provisions of sharia family law that treat daughters and wives as unequal to their male counterparts, marriages at the age of puberty, and female circumcision). Ultimately, the issues that will be subject to non-tolerance, liberal tolerance and egalitarian tolerance will have to be decided on a case by case basis and in relation to their specific context. It is worth noting that deciding what is tolerable and intolerable is also a way of drawing boundaries between ‘us’, the ingroup, and ‘them’, the outgroup(s). In the next chapters, we will explore those issues through specific case studies drawn from two important fields of social life; the next chapter deals with school life and the third one with political life.
3. (In) tolerance of Difference in Greek Schools: the case of migrant and Roma Children

Having discussed the dominant conceptions of the nation in Greece and the main migrant and minorità groups raising cultural, ethnic and religious challenger in contemporary Greek society, this part of the report looks closer into how these challenger manifest themselves and are dealt with in school life.

Access to information and knowledge influences access to employment, socio-economic integration and overall development prospects. At the same time, education is also the primary institution through which children become socialized into a core set of values and norms and through which they acquire a feeling of belonging to a specific country and/or a specific (minority or majority) group. The dominant national group in a society usually provides for the general framework of the educational system and the cultural and values that this propagates through schooling. Education thus determines not only learning and future employment prospects but also identity and perceptions of own identity and understandings of the ‘other.’ Indeed national education systems have been of crucial importance in the construction of modern nations and nation-states (Hobsbawm 1983; Anderson 1981).

When societies are characterized by a relatively high degree of cultural and ethnic homogeneity, the education system usually reflects the majority culture and views and there is little contestation about this. During the post-War period and increasingly so since 1989, European societies have become more heterogeneous because of the arrival of new immigrant populations. In addition, the international framework for the respect of human and collective minority rights has provided for fruitful ground for native minorities to raise claims for the recognition of their cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious diversity. In this context, national education systems can become fields of contestation as majorities may cling on to them as if they were their ‘cultural property’ while minorities may require for their ethnic, religious or linguistic identity to be incorporated into the national education system.

Faced with the challenges of ethnic and cultural diversity, schools may become places of inclusion, and contribute towards the incorporation of immigrant and native minority children, or they may propagate – directly or indirectly – prejudice, stereotypes, and perceptions of cultural confrontation, superiority, or discrimination. The challenge for European societies and in particular for ‘new’ host countries such as Greece is to meet raised expectations for educational policies that are able to respond to the needs of the entire student population. Schools must thus prepare children for their successful integration into the labour market, but must also socialize them into a set of core national and European values of democracy, peace and respect for diversity. They should in fact ideally enhance educational, socialization and personal development opportunities for all students regardless of their majority or minority/immigrant background.

The Greek education policy and the national educational system are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, Lifelong Training and Religious Affairs. The current educational system and

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44 This part of the report has been drafted by Anna Triandafyllidou. The interviews and discussion groups were conducted by Ifigeneia Kokkali (interviews 1-28), Eda Gemi (discussion groups 5-8 and interviews 29-31), Hara Kouki (discussion groups 1-3) and Anna Triandafyllidou (discussion group 4).

45 Native minorities are defined as populations historically established in a given territory and which took part in the formation of the (national or multi-national) state in which they live. In many cases their participation in state-building is recognised in the Constitution and they are guaranteed special rights regarding the preservation of their cultural, religious, or linguistic heritage. In some countries, there are special provisions regarding the political representation of a native minority in cases where that minority is so numerically small that it risks being left out of the political system (Triandafyllidou, 2010: 23).

policy was set up by the 1976 educational policy introduced with the new Constitution after the end of the 1967-1974 military dictatorship in Greece. Primary, secondary and higher education as well as research and lifelong learning policies have gone through a series of reforms during the 1980s, 1990s and most importantly in this last decade aimed at, among other priorities, modernizing the curricula and the textbooks and adapting them to contemporary pedagogical approaches and to the changing demographic realities of the country. As Greece has become host to a nearly 1 million migrant and co-ethnic returnee population, the Greek school population has become ethnically diverse. The Greek school population in the academic year 2008-2009 included approximately 9% of children from migrant families and 1% of children from co-ethnic returnee families.

Despite the subsequent reforms of the last three decades, the Greek education system has remained highly centralized with the Ministry of Education and the Pedagogical Institute responsible for the curriculum, the school timetable and distribution of classes, the material and textbooks and the employment and training of teachers. Schools are governed by their Headmasters and the teachers working in them. However, they have to abide by specific and relative rigid requirements about what is taught, when, how, on the basis of what books. As regards its territorial organization, the Ministry has regional directorates which are then divided into prefectural or local offices, to which specific schools correspond (on the basis of their geographical location). The socialist government which came to power in November 2009 embarked into a thorough reform of the education system at all levels. The proposed changes, which will be outlined in the section that follows, are to a certain extent postponed or modified due to the economic crisis that the country is undergoing and which also affected the field of public education in the form of significant spending cuts.

This chapter focuses on the challenges that ethnic, cultural and religious diversity brings to Greek schools both as regards migrant and native minority children. As the focus of this study is on highlighting how intolerance / tolerance / respect of ethnic diversity has been thematised in Greek school life when ethnic, cultural or religious diversity conflicts arise, we have chosen to concentrate on two case studies that pose important challenges to the Greek school system. The first issue is the question of ethnic selection practices that may of migrant and Roma children. In particular we explore practices of ethnic selection of pupils in schools, according to which Roma and immigrant children are segregated respectively in Roma-only and in immigrant-only (or at least overwhelmingly Roma or immigrant) schools and classes. Some local authorities and school administrations are thought to discourage or even hinder the enrollment of immigrant children in order to preserve a “good reputation” for their schools for which all those “different” children seem to be considered a burden. Although it is difficult to prove whether such ‘ethnic selection’ practices are applied by some school headmasters (none would admit to it as such segregation is illegal), we shall use these practices as an entry point to discuss with school teachers, parents and other stakeholders whether migrant and Roma children are rejected, tolerated or accepted in Greek schools.

The second issue that is discussed in this report concerns the accommodation of religious diversity in Greek schools. In this second case study we have presented to our informants (who include teachers, parents and pupils) the current policy and practice regarding religious minorities in schools and we have asked them to comment upon it. We have thus analysed the emerging discourses of intolerance, tolerance or acceptance of religious diversity in schools.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the structure and scope of the Greek education system and some of the reforms that in theory were in progress at the time of writing this chapter (winter 2011), discussing also briefly the education policy measures implemented so far to meet the needs of children of migrant or minority origin. Section 3 presents the migrant and Roma school population and surveys the relevant research findings so far concerning their school performance and the problems that they face. Section 4 presents the methodology and research design of the case studies. Sections 5 and 6 present the two case studies and offer a critical discourse analysis on how intolerance / tolerance / respect has been thematised with reference to the two topics of
interest, notably ethnic selection or ethnic ‘mixing’ in schools, and religious diversity and its accommodation in Greek school life. The last section presents our concluding remarks.

3.1 The Greek educational system and intercultural education

Primary education and lower secondary education is compulsory for all children aged 6 – 15 years old. Post-compulsory secondary education (lyceum), according to the 1997 educational reform, consists of the Unified Upper Secondary General Education Schools (“Eniaia Lykeia”) and of the Technical Vocational Educational Schools (“TEE”); students may transfer from one type of school to the other. As for the former type, studies last 3 years and after graduation a competitive national examination takes place giving access to University or to Technological Educational Institutes. For the latter type, the duration of studies is either of two (A’ level) or three years (B’ level), (Dimitrakopoulos and Mavrommatis, op.cit.).

The Greek educational system has suffered from chronic under-funding. In year 2000, Greece spent only 7.3 % of its total public expenditure for education (all levels of education included), compared to 13% that was the OECD average. Greece’s spending again on education as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 4.2% in 2005. Dimitrakopoulos (2004:11) argues that the Greek national education system has a history of ‘educational conservatism’ due to the country’s nation-building effort and the primary role of education in political socialization and the formulation of a solid, common identity. Fragoudaki and Dragona (1997) in their seminal book entitled: ‘what is our homeland?’ also highlight the strongly ethnocentric views that permeate the Greek national education system, its curricula and textbooks.

Since the mid 1990s however, there has been a public and political debate (within the Ministry, among parties, among trade unions and in the press) concerning the need to change the ‘educational philosophy’ in order for Greek students (a) to be able to compete in an increasingly globalised and competitive environment; and (b) to be able to successfully integrate within the European Union. These arguments have been expressed by representatives and politicians from across the political spectrum suggesting a consensus on the need to reform and to benefit from access to EU community funds to financially support the costs associated with reform.

Intercultural education in Greece has developed as a response to a number of factors: the poor school performance of native minority children (the Roma in particular as well as the Muslims of western Thrace); the need to adapt to EU standards as regards intercultural education and the education of minority children in particular; the arrival of nearly half a million of immigrants (largely undocumented) during the first half of the 1990s and the need to enroll and integrate their children in Greek schools.

Greece’s intercultural education policy was formally inaugurated with law 2413/1996 which created Institute for the Greek Diaspora Education and Intercultural Studies (IPODE, Ινστιτούτο Παιδείας Ομογενών και Διαπολιτισμικής Εκπαίδευσης). The main aims and work of this institute was geared towards co-ethnics living abroad (the former Greek emigrants and their descendants), however, a small part of its work concerned also immigrants and returning co-ethnics in Greece. Actually the data available on the composition of the Greek schools’ population were collected by IPODE. IPODE

47 Beside those two main types of schools, there is a small number of nurseries and schools of primary and secondary education dedicated to students with special needs, as well as a number of Musical, Ecclesiastical and Physical Education secondary education schools (Mavrommatis, 2004; referred data sourced from the Greek Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs47, http://www.ypepth.gr/en_ec_page1531.htm).
48 see OECD Education at a Glance, 2007, in more recent editions data on Greece are missing (available at: http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3746,en_2649_39263238_41266761_1_1_1_1,00.html, last accessed on 20 May 2011)
was abolished in 2010, as part of the overall restructuring of Greek public administration and of the effort to reduce public spending.

The same law (articles 34-37) also created the Greek intercultural education, notably the *intercultural schools*, 26 in total. These were the schools formerly designated as school for returning emigrant children (σχολεία ομογενών). These schools were created (according to law 2413/96, article 34, paragraph 1) to cater for the needs of ‘children with special educational, social, and cultural needs’. These schools follow the mainstream national curriculum but they have a wider margin of flexibility to adapt this curriculum to the special needs of these children. They function to this day providing a friendly environment for immigrant and co-ethnic children that study in them. They cannot of course cover in any sense the needs of the wider immigrant and co-ethnic school population (details on the composition of the school population today are given in the section below).

The second component of intercultural education in Greece has been the reception and support classes. Reception classes were first set up in gymnasiums and lyceums in the 1980s, particularly in the Thessaloniki area for the children of co-ethnic returnees (Markou 1993; Damanakis 2005). Law 1894/1990 revised the 1404/1983 legislation on reception classes, incorporated these classes in the mainstream public school system and focused on Greek language, culture and history courses for pupils who did not have Greek as their mother-tongue. The initial priority of integrating co-ethnics and returnees was impregnated by an underlying logic of assimilation, since they were considered Greeks returning to their homeland. Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2011) actually argue that this assimilation approach of the early phases continues to define Greek educational policy today even though the overwhelming majority of the immigrant population in Greece does not fall within the co-ethnic, returnee category.

In 1999, reception and tutorial/support classes were reformed by a Ministerial Act (Ministry of Education). Reception classes are organized in schools when there are at least 9 pupils with no or a limited knowledge of the Greek language. They are organized during the normal school hours and are divided into two levels. Level 1 is for children with no knowledge of Greek and can last up to 1 year. Children follow some courses with their ‘normal’ class level such as arts, physical education, and foreign language. Level 2 is for children with some knowledge of Greek and may last for up to 2 years. In this case children follow also science courses with their normal class but not Greek. Normally after 2 or 3 years the child is integrated fully in the class that corresponds to their age.

Tutorial/support classes function in the afternoon after the end of the normal school hours and comprise between 4 and 9 children. They aim at supporting children who have difficulties to follow the mainstream curriculum because of their poor knowledge of Greek. Both reception and support classes form part of public schools. While the organization of these classes is well spelled out in the Act, their implementation in practice has been at best discontinuous, at worse ineffective. The reason has mainly been that teachers for the reception classes were not organic part of the schools but rather were appointed after needs were verified and hence would arrive in schools in November each year, if

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49 A drop in the sea of Greece’s 9-year compulsory primary and lower secondary education system which comprises 7,621 schools.

50 If there are less than 9 pupils support is given to children in need within the ‘normal’ class. If there are more than 17 pupils, additional support classes are created.

51 The same Act leaves the initiative to organise mother-tongue classes to the prefectures. The Act does not define the budget line that prefectures would utilize to pay for such classes and to the best of our knowledge no such initiative has been taken by prefectures. By contrast, our fieldwork has revealed that there have been sporadic initiatives by teachers and parents to organise classes of Albanian, Ukrainian and Arabic language in downtown Athens high schools. However, such classes have usually lasted for a couple of years (some did not even go beyond a few meetings) because of the practical problems (they operated unofficially in the evening in public high schools) as well as because the immigrant parents’ working hours were such that they could not bring their children to the classes, outside the normal school hours (see Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007).
at all. During the academic year 2010-2011 and because of the severe cuts in all branches of the Greek public sector including education, these classes have not functioned at all in many schools.

The third and most important component of intercultural education in Greece are the special programs co-funded by the Greek State and the European Union, which cater for the needs of Muslims children in Western Thrace, Roma children and children from immigrant and co-ethnic returnee families. These Programs have been running since 1997 and have provided for specialized textbooks concerning the teaching of Greek as a foreign language, training of teachers in intercultural education, special initiatives of intercultural education activities. We shall discuss the activities of these programs in more detail in the section below with special reference to immigrant and Roma children.

In concluding this section, it is important to note that the national education system is currently undergoing yet another major reform. The reform program announced by the Minister of Education Anna Diamantopoulou in early 2010 is symbolically entitled ‘the new school’\(^52\) and concerns all levels of education. Its special new features include: the expansion of pre-school education to age 4 (instead of age 5 as it is today), the conversion of all schools to ‘full-day’ schools (i.e. 8.10 to 16.15 instead of the current compulsory 8.00-13.30), and the strengthening of communication technologies and foreign language learning. The program announced by the Ministry introduces several new elements including the notion of zones of educational priority (ZEP) in areas with ‘vulnerable communities’ which will introduce innovative pedagogical approaches to fight social exclusion and school abandonment. However many of these measures including the general implementation of the ‘full-day’ timetable and the ZEP have not taken off because of the severe budget cuts of the last couple of years.

3.2 Greece’s migrant and Roma school population

The Greek legislative framework guarantees schooling for all children, citizen or foreign, from the age of 6 to the age of 15 (6-year elementary school and 3-year lower high school). Education is compulsory and is applicable to all children regardless of the residence status (legal or irregular) of their parents. Article 40 of law 2910/2001 stipulates that all children born to third-country nationals living in Greece have the right to public education. In effect, school authorities enroll foreign students even if they do not have the necessary documents, such as school certificates or birth certificates that are required for enrollment. The same is true for Roma children who may not have certificates of residence in a given municipality or may be enrolled at different ages than those foreseen by the law (e.g. age 6 for elementary schooling, and as of 2008 age 5 for compulsory pre-school).

3.3 Children of immigrant and co-ethnic returnee families

At present, approximately 10 % of the total school population in Greece may be categorized as foreign or co-ethnic repatriated. Co-ethnic repatriated are children of co-ethnic returnees either from the former Soviet Republics who have naturalized upon arrival and whose mother tongue is Russian. Immigrant children are children who are of non-Greek citizenship and whose mother tongue is other than Greek.\(^53\)

According to data from the Institute for the Greek Diaspora Education and Intercultural Studies, in 2005-06, 42.7% of foreign pupils had been living in Greece during the past six years, while

\(^52\) The reform and re-organisation programme proposed by this government has been called (symbolically) ‘The New School’. For more information see the relevant web site of the Ministry: http://www.minedu.gov.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=402&Itemid=785&lang=el

\(^53\) For more information on the distinction between ‘co-ethnic’ and ‘other’ immigrants in Greece see the ACCEPT PLURALISM WP1 report (Triandafyllidou and Kokkali 2010), available at www.accept-pluralism.eu last accessed on 12 May 2011.
57.3% had been living in Greece for under five years (Hellenic Regional Development Centre 2007: 55). Regarding the distribution of foreign students in Greek schools in 2005-06, 35.6% of schools in Greece have no foreign pupils enrolled. By contrast, the highest concentration of immigrant students is found in the Athens metropolitan area where immigrant and co-ethnic students are about 12% of the total school population (op.cit.: 56).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schooling level</th>
<th>Foreign pupils</th>
<th>Co-ethnic pupils</th>
<th>Total foreign and co-ethnic pupils (percentage)</th>
<th>Total of all students (Greek, foreigner and co-ethnic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>15,447</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>12.91</td>
<td>128,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>58,332</td>
<td>5,212</td>
<td>11.17</td>
<td>568,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnasium</td>
<td>28,713</td>
<td>4,327</td>
<td>10.46</td>
<td>315,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyceum</td>
<td>9,229</td>
<td>2,262</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>210,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Schools</td>
<td>8,094</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>84,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>119,815</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,747</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.29</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,308,179</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The special needs of immigrant and co-ethnic children have been addressed by the reception and tutorial/support classes mentioned in the previous section but also by specific educational programmes (Πρόγραμμα Εκπαίδευσης Παλιννοντούντων και Αλλοδαπών Μαθητών – Programme for the Education of Co-ethnic and Foreign Children) implemented by the Capodistrian University of Athens in the period between 1997 and 2008. After a 2 year break the new programme started in 2010 is directed by the Aristotle University of Thessalonike.

These programs have provided for books and audiovisual support materials aimed initially at intercultural schools only but later diffused to a large number of mainstream schools who responded to the call for participating in the program. However, these books were discontinued in their production as there was an interruption in the implementation of the above mentioned programme between 2007 and 2010. It is worth noting that these books were not integrated into the standard list of textbooks printed and distributed to public schools by the Ministry either. Many intercultural schools have continued using them in photocopies (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007 and Interview N.G.).

These programs have also implemented a large number of initiatives for the training of teachers in intercultural education as well as paying for specialized teachers that would teach support and tutorial classes in schools that participated in the program. Several studies (Palaiologou 2004; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007) testify to the importance in supporting the education of immigrant and co-ethnic children.

Nonetheless, the scholarly literature shows that a large number of immigrant students experience school failure and other school-related problems (Nicolaou 2000). A disproportionate number of immigrant students fail to complete the lower high school grade (gymnasium) and even
more numerous fail to complete the upper high school grade (lyceum) (Voulalas 2007). School principals interviewed in the late 1990s (Bombas 1996; 2001) reported the students’ lack of language fluency and their general cultural adaptation problems as the main issues. Difficulties were highest among students of higher elementary school classes with more advance curricula that required more advanced written and oral communication skills. The immigrant students starting to attend Greek school from the first two classes were quicker to adapt to the new environment and to learn the language.

Studies conducted a decade ago signalled to the fact that the reception and tutorial classes risk being ineffective as few attempts, if any, have been made to raise the multicultural awareness of teachers and students (see also Bombas op.cit.). Dimakos and Tasiopoulou (2003) showed that native students have negative opinions about immigrants. The comments made by students (the study applied both quantitative and qualitative techniques) were derogatory or at best neutral. Positive arguments and views were very limited. Interestingly, these opinions were not influenced by the gender or the socio-economic profile of the responding pupils.

A recent study by Palaiologou and Evangelou (2007) shows that overall foreign or co-ethnic children perform worse than Greek children. However, there is variation: Foreign or co-ethnic children’s performance suffers more in language than in maths. Russian speaking children do better than other foreign children and in particular in maths they perform almost as well as Greek students. Overall, children who have Greek friends perform better and progress more quickly than foreign children who have no Greek friends. Naturally, socio-economic and not only ethnic inequality is part of the explanation of why foreign children do worse than native ones. Worryingly although children who have been in a Greek school for 6-7 years improve their performance and diminish their difference from Greek children, the level of improvement compared to children who have been in Greek schools for 3-4 years is quite small.

3.4 Roma minority children in Greece

Until 1984, the Greek state had not shown any particular interest as to the school performance of Roma minority children. Actually a Ministry working group document dated 27 March 1986 on Roma children blamed Roma families for their children non-attending school or attending with very poor results. In 1987 there was a first attempt to study the issues of Roma children education and to identify the relevant problems in cooperation between the Ministry of Education (General Secretariat of Popular Education), the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Interior. The relevant study issued by the General Secretariat of Popular Education proposes for the first time a different approach to the analysis of Roma children educational issues with a view to recognizing their cultural specificity and addressing the root causes of their school failure. Actually this was the first study that tried to produce a mapping of the Roma populations and to estimate their total numbers (currently standing at 150-200,000, see above).

However, it was only in 1993 when the Ministry of Education issued a circular (Circular G1/1126, 17 September 1993) which invited all Directorates and Regional Offices as well as teachers and school principals to cooperate in a special effort to integrate Roma children in public schools. According to Pitsiou and Lagios (2007) this slow realization that a special approach was needed for the integration of Roma children into the school system was largely due to a White Paper issued by the Ministers of Education of EEC member states on 22 May 1989 regarding Roma education and intercultural education at large.

It is worth noting that Roma populations in Greece include four different types of residence/societal organization:

- Those who are permanently settled in towns and cities in ‘normal’ housing
- Those who are permanently settled in Roma camps at the outskirts of towns and cities
Those that are semi-settled and live for longer periods in camps but also move to different regions in search of temporary or seasonal work.

Those that live a truly nomadic life moving around in trucks and vans.

During the last two decades, the latter two categories of Roma communities include also Roma from other Balkan and central Eastern European countries (interview with T.K. local politician in Aspropyrgos, a neighbourhood of Athens with a high Roma population, and Discussion Group with 4 Roma parents). A study issued by the University of Ioannina (not dated) argues that the Greek Roma populations tend to become more and more settled and there is a significant reduction of those living a nomadic life. They rather tend to be settled in a specific locality and to move temporarily for employment reasons. It is however also worth noting that Roma people are overall highly mobile within the Greek territory (Omas Synergon Evaluation Report, 2008). These special features of the Roma way of life pose special challenges for the education of Roma children as these may start the school year in one place and finish it somewhere else, may not have a certificate of residence to enroll to a specific school.

In addition the Roma population has high levels of illiteracy which poses an additional challenge in the schooling of young children. Roma parents are not familiar with the formal educational system and the school environment and often see no usefulness of formal education other than basic reading, writing and arithmetic skills for their children. They are not able to check the performance of their children in school, and may induce their children to work from an early age because of economic need (Discussion group with Roma parents, T.K. Local politician in municipality with large Roma population, M.L. chairperson of an NGO that provides for day care and school support to Roma children).

In the period 1994-1996 Roma children were gradually integrated in the reception and support classes for children who do not know the Greek language (see also previous section) while in June 1996 the first Program for the Education of Roma children begun. This Program continues to this day with an interval between 2004 and 2006. It was initially implemented by the University of Ioannina (1997-2001 and 2002-2004), the University of Thessaly (2005-2008) and more recently it started again (2010-onwards) under the direction of the Capodistrian University of Athens and the Aristotle University of Thessalonike.

This program was met with significant success in reducing school abandonment of Roma children from 75% to 26% in 30 prefectures addressed by the program in its early phase. It trained about 5,000 teachers throughout Greece and developed special school programs and special approaches for the integration of Roma children in mainstream education. In the period 2002-2004 the program was implemented in 41 prefectures and introduced some innovative measures: after the normal school hours Roma children were integrated through special creative laboratories and music classes as well as ‘normal’ support/tutorial classes. The aim was to bring children close to school, reveal their special talents and cultural capital and help them perform better in the mainstream courses.

The evaluation report of this Program (Omas Synergon 2008) has identified a number of positive developments as well as several persisting problems concerning the integration of Roma children into Greek schools. Positive developments include:

- The Program had a significant positive impact in reducing school abandonment albeit only in the prefectures where it was implemented.

- The introduction of the Cultural Mediator was met with great success and should be generalized. It boosted the participation of Roma children in schooling and reduced absenteeism.

- Specialized training for teachers in primary education was evaluated positively by those who followed these courses.
- Children from sedentary Roma families were generally enrolled in schools at the beginning of each school year.

- Teachers and headmasters in schools participating in the Program were particularly committed and obtained important positive results in enrolling Roma children, keeping them in school and helping them learn and not be discouraged by their initially low performance in school (see also M.L. chairperson of NGO providing day care and school support to Roma children).

Persisting problems were:

- The program had no effect on reducing school abandonment in areas outside those in which it was implemented and the general school abandonment rate remained at 77%. In other words, the program and any other policies adopted so far had no lasting institutional impact on this issue.

- There was no evaluation on how the training provided to teachers actually was adopted in their everyday work and had eventually a positive impact on the educational attainment of Roma children.

- There was no sustained and systematic effort to integrate Roma parents in the school community by providing, for instance, adult education courses. This was considered to be a key factor for the overall integration of Roma children as one of the main problems identified is that Roma parents are at best unable at worse not interested in supporting their children in their school career.

- Many school teachers and headmasters continued to be prejudiced against Roma families and created ‘those conditions so that with the tolerance of the administrative authorities, children abandon the school and they [the teachers and headmasters] were not “disturbed” in their work’ (Omas Synergon 2008: 248).

In October 2008, the Ministry of Education issued a circular where it emphasized the inclusion of Roma children in the reception and tutorial/support classes and presented the framework for the set up and functioning of such classes. Two years later, on 20 August 2010 the Ministry of Education issued another special circular that pointed to the obligation of school headmasters to assist and encourage the enrollment and participation of Roma children in schools. The circular reminded headmasters that Roma children have a special Student Card that follows them from school to school. Because of the frequent moving of families this Card allows schools to trace back the school history of the child and ensures a continuation in the school career of the child. The ministry thus invited school headmasters to enroll children even without the appropriate documentation (proving their residence), even if they were older than the class they should attend. It emphasized that the equality of the citizens is a Constitutional principle and should not be violated, and that any reluctance to enroll or effort to segregate Roma from non Roma children is a violation of this principle, introduces discrimination among Greek citizens and is against the obligations of Greece emanating from the international conventions (such as the UN Convention for Children Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights). Last but not least the Circular encouraged the cooperation among all relevant services (health services for instance for the vaccination of children and general family support services) for the successful inclusion of Roma children in the national education system.

It is in this context that we have engaged into our empirical research regarding the ethnic selection of Roma and immigrant children in Greek schools, the accommodation of religious diversity in schools and the overall thematisation of intolerance / tolerance / acceptance of ethnic and religious diversity.
3.5 Methodology and Research Design

This chapter on school life is based on desk research as well as fieldwork. In terms of desk research we have collected the available statistical data, legal texts and policy documents (e.g. circulars or Ministerial decisions) as well as, of course, the relevant scholarly literature on the education of immigrant and Roma children. Fieldwork has been conducted into three phases, the first phase comprising the period between mid December and mid January, the second period between mid February and late March and the third period between early June and the end of July 2011. The fieldwork was for the most part conducted in the metropolitan area of Athens while one interview was conducted also in Thessalonike.

We have selected our two case studies on the basis of our knowledge of the relevant literature, of the Greek education context, past incidents of segregation especially of Roma children as well as past incidents of rejection of migrant children (Pitsiou and Lagios 2007; Vemi and Alexopoulos 2003; Ministerial Circular, Ministry of Education, 20 August 2010, Φ.3 / 960 / 102679 / Γ1; Markou 2010) and also on the basis of the interviews with key informants, with people who have held high political or administrative positions and who were directly involved with Roma minority and migrant education (interview 1, 2, 5 and 6) as well as with education experts (interview 3 and 4).

More specifically, we have conducted in total 32 semi-structured qualitative interviews. Of those, 9 interviews were with experts, policy makers and local politicians (for details see the Annex I and II), 4 with middle rank Ministry officials. In addition to the expert interviews, we selected three schools in which to conduct interviews with teachers or headmasters, parents of Greek, migrant and Greek Roma children. Our selection of the schools has been based on the knowledge of the Athens metropolitan area and its different neighbourhoods with larger or smaller migrant and Roma populations. With a view to capturing different experiences of diversity and different approaches to it, we have on purpose selected three types of schools: a school with a high percentage of immigrant children and from different backgrounds. That was a gymnasium in the so-called Yellow Neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in central Athens that is well known for the high percentage of immigrant inhabitants that it has. The second school was a school with a relatively high percentage of Roma minority and migrant children with a strong representation of Pontic Greek children in particular (i.e. children of co-ethnic returnees from the former Soviet Union. This has been called the White Neighbourhood school and is located in the western outskirts of Athens. This is an area well known for the high percentage of co-ethnic returnee inhabitants, namely Pontic Greeks, and for its relatively high percentage of Roma minority families. These two schools can be called ‘difficult’ schools in that the challenges of diversity are acutely felt in the classroom because of the different ethnic, linguistic, religious and socio-economic composition of the student population.

In addition to these two ‘special’ schools, we have selected an ‘average’ school, notably a school in a lower middle class area of Athens, in the so-called Red Neighbourhood, again in the western suburbs of Athens, where there is a small even if visible percentage of migrant children of different nationalities but where native Greeks remain the majority.

In each of these schools we conducted 2 or 3 interviews with teachers or the school principal and 3 or 4 interviews with majority and immigrant or Roma minority parents. We conducted 19

54 These are fictitious names for the neighbourhoods in respect of protecting the anonymity of respondents.
55 It has proven to be a formidable challenge to find a lower high school (a gymnasium) with a significant percentage of Roma minority children. Although gymnasium is part of the 9-year compulsory education, many Roma children abandon school after the completion of the elementary school. Many actually complete the elementary school at age 15 – i.e. at the age that they normally should be graduating from gymnasium.
56 Western Attica is the only area of the wider Athens metropolitan area that registers a relatively high percentage of Roma pupils in elementary schools (13%). In all other areas of Athens such percentages range between 0.2% and 2% (based on data for 2009-2010 from the Directorate of Primary Education, Ministry of Education.
interviews (of which 2 were with both parents) in total of which 7 with teachers or school principals, 5 with Greek parents, 7 with migrant parents and 1 with a Roma minority mother. Among the 19 informants, 14 were women and 5 were men. This over-representation of women has to do both with the fact that it was the mother that we would usually get for an interview with a parent and also that teachers and school principals are often women. In selecting our interviewees we have followed a mixed strategy. We used snowballing from initial contacts in the wider migrant civil society network as well as through our initial interviews with experts.

During the third phase of the fieldwork we conducted eight discussion groups. Of those four discussion groups were held with immigrant parents, notably with Albanian parents, with Albanian Roma parents, with Eastern European parents and with a mixed group of immigrant parents comprising the smaller nationality groups (Pakistani, Egyptian, and Moldavian). One discussion group with high school teachers was held at a middle class neighbourhood school in Athens. In the same school we conducted a discussion group with high school pupils of Greek origin. We also conducted a discussion group with lower high school children at a private high school in a working class neighbourhood. Both these schools had a 10-20% presence of migrant children from different national backgrounds. We also held a discussion group with three young people of sub Saharan African origin, 2 second generation and 1 first generation. All had attended Greek schools.

Interviews were conducted in the schools, at the teachers’ office, in public places (cafés for instance), in the workplace of a parent or at their home. Discussion groups were conducted at schools, at the premises of an NGO or research centre, and at a children’s hospital - wherever it was suitable for the interviewees. They were all conducted in a friendly atmosphere and the researchers sought to create a feeling of equality, especially with parents of immigrant or minority background. All interviews were conducted in Greek and were taped and then transcribed. While recruiting experts for an interview was not particularly difficult due also to our network of contacts among colleagues working in the field of migration and minority studies, the recruitment of interviewees within the schools was much more complicated. In each school there was one contact that eventually functioned as a gatekeeper and which provided contacts with other parents and teachers. In one case where the school headmaster was completely against the conduction of the research this was particularly problematic and interviews were conducted outside the school hours upon condition of keeping the interviewees completely anonymous. The recruitment of migrant parents was much easier through our researcher of Albanian origin while contacts with additional schools were facilitated by the parent of one of the researchers who is a high school teacher.

All interviews were conducted in Greek with the exception of one discussion group with Roma parents, which was conducted in Albanian. The audio records were transcribed into Greek and were anonymised. The interview guides used for the interviews as well as the list of interviews can be found in Annex I and II. In the case of experts and politicians we have chosen to give their initials and their role. In the case of parents and teachers and for references to the discussion groups we cite them with their interview numbers. Some basic socio-demographic data (their ethnicity/nationality, gender, marital situation, gender of their child, and school they are attending) are given in the list of interviews at the annex of this report.

Our analysis of the interview data has been based on the tradition of qualitative discourse analysis, from a critical perspective. In particular we draw from the concept of discursive topoi as developed in the work of Wodak et al (1999), where topoi are conceptualised as highly conventional and core elements of argumentation. Going through the transcribed interviews, we looked for main argumentation strategies (the discursive topoi) which enable us to understand how individuals’ discourse over the school, the foreigners, the immigrants, the minority and the majority, are constructed (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).
3.6 Migrant and Roma Children Segregation

The first issue of concern in this study has been the question of migrant and Roma minority segregation in schools and the efforts to de-segregate them. Segregation as a policy means the spatial separation of children in separate classrooms and/or in separate schools. Such a policy is in Greece of course against the Constitution and is not implemented anywhere, at least not officially. However, there have been two types of segregation practices and two related discourses registered in Greece. Below we shall present the actual problem and the relevant discourses of state actors, teachers, and majority, minority or immigrant parents.

Segregation may take the form of informal spatial separation of the Roma minority children in separate school annexes created near a Roma camp with the excuse that they thus can better cater to the needs of the Roma children but with the implicit scope of keeping these children physically away from the local ‘normal’ school. As A.S., former secretary of state in Intercultural Education, and T.K. local councilor note in the area of Aspropyrgos, in the western outskirts of Athens there had been acute problems of rejection of the local Roma population by the local Pontic Greek and overall Greek population which have led among other things to the set up of a separate Roma school. Pontic Greeks have arrived in the area in the last 15 years, are Greek citizens like the Roma of course, and are locally a majority. Roma in this area are generally nomadic or in any case moving frequently between this place and other parts of Greece depending on where job opportunities arise and many among them come from other Balkan and central eastern European countries (see also Discussion Group 7, with Albanian Roma parents, interview with T.K.). These features create additional challenges for their local integration.

This type of direct segregation is against the Greek Constitution but is supported by local actors with the justification that Roma children are not vaccinated and suffer from various skin or other contagious diseases, thus representing a health hazard for other children (X.X. mayor of neighbourhood with high Roma nomadic population). A.S. (former secretary of State that had taken a special interest in Roma children integration in schools) confirms that such risks truly exist and that he as a secretary of state had to face such incidents where primary school teachers had been infected. The Ministry as a response had issued a circular reminding school headmasters of the protocol for registering Roma children including their accompanying them to the local health centre for vaccinations, the need to overlook the lack of residence certificates and the importance not to turn away Roma children from the schools. The importance of health related assistance to Roma children in also confirmed by an NGO chairperson working with Roma children (L.M.).

Apart from this form of acute segregation and complete rejection of Roma minority children, there are more subtle ways of indirect segregation, notably ethnic selection that appears to be practiced informally in some schools which refuse migrant or Roma children with the excuse that there are no more free places in the school. Such practices have been indirectly documented in a recent research (Markou 2010) and have also been referred to by teachers and parents in the Yellow neighbourhood school (interview 22, 23, 26) and in the White neighbourhood school (interview 18) as well as in the Discussion group 4 with young people of sub Saharan African origin. The relevant testimonies however are indirect: our informants accuse their neighbouring schools who are seen as ‘elitist’, all

57 In one specific locality of the wider Aspropyrgos area called Psari, with tent dwelling Roma, the local authorities had constructed a segregated primary school. It was made up of two containers with basic facilities, in the middle of nowhere as A.S. notes and a bus was taking the Roma children from the nearby camp to the school every day. When he intervened asking the local authorities that the Roma children from this camp be integrated in the nearby local elementary school, the other parents and the local authorities (the Mayor and the Prefect) opposed this view. They refused that their children and the Roma children be housed in the same school even if children would neither share the same classrooms nor the same recreation time. The Ministry had exerted pressure in this direction with a view to incorporating somehow the Roma with the other children but to no avail.
native children schools, to practice such informal ethnic selection with the excuse that the school is full. By contrast the three discussion groups with immigrant parents (discussion groups 5, 6 and 8) and the discussion group with teachers (discussion group 2) have had no experience of such ethnic selection practices and have refused that they exist.

We have not been able to test the truthfulness of these allegations as no school principal or regional director would admit to such practices. Quite the contrary they would ensure that such practices are forbidden and that schools enroll all the students that come to them (interview 17). Interestingly two teachers from the Yellow neighbourhood schools which is an inner city centre school in Athens noted that immigrant children keep the school (and the relative teacher jobs) alive because otherwise the school population in the Athens city centre is notably shrinking (Interviews 22, 24).

This is the kind of segregation or ethnic selection problems identified through our desk and field research. However when it comes to the testimonies of the teachers, the parents (and their children) involved the issues and relevant discourses are different. In order to avoid simply re-telling their views in our own words we have applied here the method of critical discourse analysis looking for structures of argumentation (discursive topoi) in the interview transcripts. We have thus identified three main discursive topoi concerning the ethnic composition of schools (in terms of Greek majority, immigrant and Roma minority children) and the idea of segregation or ethnic selection.

The first discursive topos is that of school quality. Here the ethnic segregation or ethnic selection of the children is directly related to the ‘quality’ of the children and the teachers. ‘Quality’ is a vague concept that ultimately has to do with students that do their homework and middle class (Greek) parents that exert some parental supervision over them, and about teachers that do their job diligently. Discussing the relationship between the two neighbouring schools (both in the Yellow Neighbourhood) in which school A (the teacher’s school) has more than 60% migrant children from more than 20 different nationalities while school B (the neighbouring school) has a majority of Greek children, and the concept of school quality, a teacher offers a very good example of this kind of discursive topos:

‘in the neighbouring school they have different class rooms, one for geography, one for history, one for mathematics. This is how it is, [in the school] across the street. But here we do not have this luxury, the school is old, we cannot do it. The students from the school across the street say: we want the teachers of A school because this gymnasium has a core of good teachers but [they say] we do not want the kids of A school. Because now there will be a merger of the two schools, it is only a matter of time\textsuperscript{58}, if it is not this year, it will be next year. (..) [at the school across the street] there are children of judges, of lawyers, of chemists’, children that could have gone to a different school. We have some of these children too. But only a tiny minority. By comparison to the school across the street. We only have about 15 such children.’ (Interview 22).

This argumentation structure is proposed in different words by the Greek parents of a boy that attends this same school A. The dialogue between the two parents who both propose that migrant children should study in different, separate schools is eloquent:

‘Mother: [Albanian] children can attend Greek schools without having to attend a different school. They can do it because they have the basis [of language learning] from their own country, and even if they do not, they can learn Greek. But it would have been better to have different schools.

Father: ‘it would be better for us, that is’

\textsuperscript{58} This is part of the overall mergers of schools currently (2010-2011) implemented by the Ministry with a view to optimising the use of material and human resources.
Mother: ‘no no, no. it would be better. For them’

Father: Why would it be better? In what sense? Because it would be convenient for us?

Mother: because separately they would learn differently, they would progress differently

(..)

Mother: you forget that now an Albanian [boy], a Moldavian [girl], another, comes G. [their child] and tells you [at home] an Albanian word, a Georgian word, another [word]’ (interview 26).

This school quality discursive topos can thus be used to argue in favour of school segregation or simply to note that the problem exists and is real and has more to do with socio-economic and educational factors (‘good’ schools have middle class children with educated parents). However there is no consideration of what the school does to promote student integration and whether the educational approach and the existing means (e.g. textbooks) are such that they can bring the best out of the more socio-economically disadvantaged children.

This topos is however used also by a teacher (interview 17) to evaluate the school and while she draws the conclusion that the school is good, taking into account the diversity of its school population and the language learning issues that it faces (having children from different linguistic backgrounds with different levels of Greek language knowledge, including here the Roma children not only the migrant children).

While the evaluation of the school quality in relation to its ethnic and socio-economic composition is a common theme in discussions about the challenges of migrant children education (see also Bombas 1996; 2001 and Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007), the new feature here is its linkage to the question of school segregation or de-segregation. Interestingly it is an adolescent student that participated in part of the interview with his parents that noted that actually going to a school such as his (the Yellow Neighbourhood school with over 60% of immigrant children) is a good thing ‘because you get to meet people from different countries’ (Interview 26, also discussion group 2 with 17-18 years olds of Greek origin).

Interestingly our informants make also contradictory statements about this topos: they on one hand acknowledge that immigrant children who are born in Greece or have arrived in the country at an early age have no problems with the language (you would not be able to tell they are ‘immigrants’), when asked if they would send their kids to a school with a high percentage of immigrant children they say:

Respondent 1: I would avoid it, why not? Why hide it? There would be more problems

Respondent 2: even with friends when we talk, they search for a school with the fewer Albanian kids possible, why? Because the lesson goes more smoothly? How can you teach properly when there are kids who do not speak the language?

Interviewer: but you just said that there is no more a problem, that children of second generation speak ‘normally’

Respondent 3: yes, of course, but this does not mean that their standards are not lower, these kids are not as good [in school] as our kids, except for exceptions…

[..]

Respondent 1: We also had very good students from Albania, this is not the issue…

Respondent 3: they do not have families that support them…
Eventually the school quality discursive topos is an ethnic prejudice discourse under disguise. The discussion groups with immigrant parents (discussion group 5, 6 and 8) show that migrant parents, especially those settled for a long time in Greece, have a strong interest in their kids’ schooling, speak with teachers and generally actually say they are in good terms with teachers and headmasters in most cases. One informant, an Albanian mother who is a cleaner, applied and got her child into an Experimental School because she felt that her local school was not good enough (Discussion Group 6). An Egyptian mother chose an Arabic school for her daughter (Discussion group 5) and several migrant parents chose private schools for a period or for the whole schooling of their children if they could afford it because they wanted them to get a good education (Discussion group 8 and 4). Our informants of Sub Saharan African origin (discussion group 4) actually noted that African parents send their kids to foreign language schools (English speaking or French speaking, depending on whether their country of origin’s post-colonial language is English or French) if they can afford it because they want their kids to have better prospects in life, especially if they have to live Greece.

The second discursive topos regarding ethnic selection and separation of children can be called the troublemaker topos. According to this topos ethnic diversity in schools is a problem when it comes to foreigners, because they are troublemakers. In this sense the Roma children, even if they are socio-economically disadvantaged and perform poorly in schools, are not a problem, because they are not particularly demanding. Pontic Greeks, those settled for a longer period in Greece and with Greek citizenship and their children are not a problem either. The problem is the newly arrived ‘Rossopontioi’ (the Russian Pontians). This discursive topos is found in the White neighbourhood school which has a 10-15% Roma minority children, a high number of Pontic Greek children, of Greek children and a number of migrant children of Albanian and other nationalities too. A Greek mother, who is also the head of the parents’ association in the White Neighbourhood school notes:

‘Most problems are not created by the Roma. With the Roma we do not have a problem. The Roma, the poor things, they tried to squat the school, and we went and opened the school. Well we told them tell us what are your requests, what do you want. And they had no claims, no requests. After that the Russian Pontians came and the president of the student association and they squatted the school for 3-4 days and it finished. But Roma no, [they are not a problem]. The Roma, to the contrary, if you start yelling at them, and you tell them ‘you will be punished, you will this and that’ they get timid, they stop. The problem are the Russian Pontians. The Russian Pontians and the Albanians.’

The troublemaker topos is however associated to several nationalities depending probably on the context. Participants in our discussion group with Eastern European mothers (Discussion group 5) say that Albanian children are seen as violent and other children are actually afraid to tease them. In the discussion group with Greek 17 year olds (discussion group 3) a girl argued that Pakistanis are particularly violent and criminals. The other children rejected her arguments. Overall it seems that the troublemaker topos in schools is a corollary to the argument that immigrants have higher rates of criminality than natives.

Migrant parents note that some teachers attach the label of ‘troublemaker’ to some migrant children because they are prejudiced. They do not say it clearly though, but rather accuse the children for being trouble makers

‘I do not like one or two of the teachers. They are not nice with the child [her child]. (…) they gossip about the children, they ask them strange things about their nationality, to 1-2 children from Kazakhstan they behave in a racist mode, they do not let them play at the computers, they punish them more easily than other kids, they yell at foreigners more than at Greeks. It is always the fault of the child: you are to blame because you run, you tease the other children, you throw litter on the floor’ (an Albanian mother of 2 children, who lives in a downtown
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses and Practices in Greece

Athens area with a majority of immigrant population in the neighbourhood and in the school, Discussion Group 6)

An interesting testimony comes also from a Russian woman, mother of 2 adolescent children and married with a Palestinian man (Discussion group 8):

I remember an incident when my son was at elementary school. The parents association had targeted a little Albanian boy, they said that he was teasing the other children and they wanted to expel him from the school. The poor child would react when they called him ‘Albanian’. He was very smart and strong. My son, Yannis, stood by his side, it was the two of them against all others.

Thus the troublemaker topos can be used both to explain ethnic selection or segregation in schools as well as discriminatory behaviour and prejudice within the school.

A third topos is that of discrimination. The segregation of Roma children in particular and their rejection even when they are integrated in the school environment with other Greek majority and immigrant children as happens in our White Neighbourhood school is understood as discrimination. This view is supported by the Greek mother who is also the president of the parents’ association in that school (Interview 18) and by the Roma mother and daughter (interview 21).

In the interview we conducted with a Roma mother and her daughter this same topos of discrimination is taken up. The Roma adolescent daughter says:

‘I believe they do not want me in class because I am Roma (..) they tease me (..) they tell me bad words (..) both girls and boys [make a fool of me].’ (Interview 21)

This girl suffered from double discrimination. She was discriminated by Roma boys who made advances on her simply because she is a Roma girl and felt they had the right to. She was called names by migrant and Greek majority boys and girls because she is Roma. She was called ‘Gyftissa’ (which is a colloquial term used in Greece to refer to Roma people but also has a derogatory meaning, as someone who is dirty and uncivilized). Neither she nor her mother nor the Greek mother cited above could give any explanation of why the majority parents did not want the Roma in the school.

‘They [the majority of the parents] do not want them [the Roma children] (..) they have no justification. They just do not want them. (..) just because they are Roma. They consider them Roma, ok, they do not want them [in the school]’ (interview 18)

While Roma segregation and discrimination is widely documented in the Special Programme for Assisting Roma Children integration in the education system (see also Omas Synergon 2008), it is interesting that lay people, majority and minority parents, have no explanation to provide. They somehow take it for granted, as the ‘usual’ situation.

This topos is repeated in our discussion group with Albanian Roma parents (Discussion group 7): they expected to be rejected because they were Roma. However they argued that their segregation and exclusion was due to the fact that they were non Greek. An Albanian Roma mother actually argued strongly that she had been unable to enrol her daughter in elementary school because she tried to enrol it with some delay (a couple of years alter than normal because the child had to have an operation in the eye) but they rejected the child. At the same time, Roma segregation acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy – since they expect to be asked for papers they cannot produce, they do not even try to enrol their children in schools (Discussion group 7). It has to be noted however that children of nomadic and non Greek Roma families are much worse off than the children of settled down Greek Roma families who attend and usually finish primary school (P.S., teacher at a primary school with nearly half Roma children).
Anna Triandafyllidou and Hara Kouki

The topos of discrimination is relevant also for children from Sub Saharan Africa. When speaking about religious diversity in schools, J. a young second generation migrant from Sub Saharan Africa noted:

‘migrants from these countries [eastern Europe] have this [assimilation] mentality because they can hide, the African cannot hide, so you do not even start thinking about it. It is different, your child is different no matter what happens, what she does [she means because of the skin colour] (...) this is not just about Greece. Africans in Europe cannot hide…’
(Discussion group 4)

In fact the few informants in Discussion Group 4 and Discussion Group 5 who are from Sub Saharan Africa noted that skin colour is something that conditions their existence in Greece and in schools. A Kenyan mother of a 17 year old boy, married to a Nigerian and living in Greece for many years noted that ‘black’ people are always made to feel different:

‘I cannot say that they tell [my son] bad things, but generally they distinguish her from other children. This is how we have had to address this – in what way? With positive comments because he is African. For instance someone would watch a documentary about Africa and would come and say to the child I saw who you are and what you do, what clothes you wear, and this kind of thing. The school headmaster expected him to be fast in running because he is black. I cannot say that it is negative, but to a certain extent it is a form of racism’

This view is confirmed also by discussion in Group 4 which include all sub Saharan African youth of first and second generation. They all noted that they were made to feel different. At best because ‘blacks’ are good at sports, at worse because ‘blacks’ steal our girls. Race is thus an important dimension in the discrimination topos.

The discrimination topos and its ramifications actually show the subtle ways in which children at schools can be made to feel different, that they do not belong, by name calling or refusal to enrol them as happens for the Roma but also by stereotypes and labelling as ‘black’ or ‘African’ as happens with people of sub Saharan African origin.

3.7.1 Concluding Remarks

While segregation and discrimination against migrant or minority children are illegal and anti-Constitutional in Greece there is a certain level of informal segregation or ethnic selection taking place in some schools. While our background research documented in the earlier sections of this report and our expert informants confirm the existence of this problem, our own fieldwork in schools with larger or smaller migrant and Roma minority populations does not contain issues of clear segregation or ethnic selection. The relevant challenges in these schools is to avoid the risk of becoming a ‘ghetto’ or ‘all migrant’ schools because this is coupled with being a low quality school, where students are troublemakers and know no discipline and discrimination is common practice. The issue is thus not presented as a question of rejecting, tolerating or accepting minority or migrant children but rather on how to raise the performance of the school and its students. A closer look into the data however shows that the discursive topos of school quality is in reality a politically correct discourse that disguises a strong ethnic prejudice according to which migrant children are worse than ‘our’ children and immigrant children lower the standards at a school regardless of whether they speak Greek fluently.

While the school quality topos openly argues in favour of separating majority children from migrant ones, the trouble maker topos only indirectly supports the idea that ethnic selection would be a good thing because it would help avoid all the problematic children that create mayhem in the classroom. The troublemaker topos is quite common and uses another politically correct strategy to argue that migrant children are bad for the school. They are not bad because they are inferior but because they create trouble and interrupt the teaching. Similarly the discrimination topos indirectly justifies segregation as the argument goes that children are separated anyway even if they study within the
same school. The discrimination topos takes ethnic prejudice for granted and does not question it. Interestingly we find within the discrimination topos that more than religion, race (skin colour) is a relevant dimension for being seen as ‘different’ in Greek schools.

The analysis of the discourses developing around the issue of school selection shows that ethnic and racial diversity is mainly tolerated in Greece but not accepted. The presence of migrant and Roma minority children is considered a bad thing for a school (school quality going down, troublemakers) but is tolerated because segregation is against the law.

3.8 Accommodating Religious Diversity in Schools: Tolerance or Acceptance?

Religious diversity is not mentioned spontaneously by our informants as a challenge for Greek schools. In the three selected schools, where our fieldwork concentrated in spring 2011, teachers, headmasters and Greek parents noted that religion was not an issue mostly because the majority of immigrant children are either christened when they came to Greece or are not practicing Muslims. A Greek mother in the Yellow Neighbourhood School noted:

‘most of the children who go to the High school, in the high schools of the neighbourhood, well most are christened, they declared they were christened, of course they were bringing some papers, because they had been christened here [in Greece], and those who were not, you could see who they were, they were writing religion: - dash, we knew they were Muslims most of them. (...) some children have asked not to follow the religion class, one or two Muslim girlfriends of my daughter, I think they have been exempted from religion class. (...) the motivation is not to go to the religion class. Not fanaticism. We do not have fanatic people in the area, on this level, no.’ (Interview 24)

The same was true concerning the Roma children: their difference is understood as ethnic and cultural, not religious. However, the hypothetical question of conceding the right to collective prayer or other religious duties to children from a different religion and notably Islam proved to be a good research strategy for prompting interviewees to speak about what tolerance and acceptance of diversity in school life means to them.

We have identified five discursive topoi concerning people’s attitude towards ethnic and cultural diversity. The first is religion is a private matter which is somehow in opposition with the assimilation discursive topos. The second is tolerance as the first step to acceptance. The third discursive topos is that of acceptance, and the fourth topos is that of respect.

The religion is a private matter discursive topos, from a Greek majority perspective, is epitomized in the following statement of a teacher in the White Neighbourhood high school (Interview 18):

‘Yes we have [Muslim students] and yes, ok, we accept, yes, [that they do not want to participate in the prayer every morning] (...) at home they can do whatever they want. It does not concern us. We follow the rules of the school. We pray every morning, we do religion classes, all the normal stuff that we receive from the Ministry of Education, (..), we do not care of the religion of each person. One can believe whatever he wants, at home. (...) what does it mean to be different? In the classroom they are all together, to learn and go ahead. I do not think that the educator should see it in this way. (...) in the classroom we all progress together. With the particularities that may exist, we address them, we help the pupil, we include him in the group, we cannot leave her/him out because s/he is Roma, s/he is Russian Pontic or Albanian. I do not even ask what each person is.’

This excerpt exemplifies the dominant benevolent view of liberal tolerance towards ethnic or religious diversity. People are different but this difference is not relevant for the school or is only
barely relevant to the extent that the teacher must help all students to feel included in the class and to perform well in school. Religion is a private matter, and minority religions should be exercised at home. In school there is only space for the dominant religion.

There is an interesting variant of this topos expressed by several immigrant parents and some Greek children in our discussion groups which says that religion should be left out of the school. Thus religion is a private matter and hence should not be in schools, any kind of religion. Parents who originate from post communist countries note that they would prefer some morning physical exercise instead of the gathering together of all the pupils, standing in line and ‘praying’ (this is the common morning ritual in all Greek schools) and learning some crafts instead of religion (discussion group 8; discussion group 6). They see religion classes as a ‘wasted time’ and note that religion is a private matter and is about God and belief in God not the church and the teaching of organized religion. The religion is a private matter topos is contradicted by the assimilation topos adopted by several migrant parents:

‘Are you sure that this decision [of being exempted from the religion class] is in force? Because I have this problem. For me religion is something very complicated. Believing is one thing and ideology is another thing. Here in Greece religion is ideology. It is not about what you believe. You are obliged. You have to follow. When I told my child not to participate he said I cannot because I will be separate from the rest of the class and none will play with me. And my child is not christened and they called her: non christened (avaptisti), atheist. And it was a problem. And she participates [in religion class] to be with the other children. And now in gymnasium the problem is even greater (...) I do not like it that children have to take marks about what they believe. And religion is what you believe. And my daughter wants to leave [the class] but she does not know what to do. That is why I want religion to go, to be out of the school. Completely. Maybe it is how I grew up. But I have never told my child because I do not believe you should not believe [in God] (...) there used to be a lot of xenophobia [related to religion] and there still is, even if much less. We had to hide behind a cross then [when they arrived, 10-15 years ago] (Albanian mother of two children, cleaner, who sends her child to an Experimental School, Discussion group 6).

Not all migrant parents have had problems with their religion and with their children being asked to assimilate. Some note that religion was not an issue and others that it was (discussion group 6 and 8). Experiences and opinions are divided. However, the last sentence of the Albanian mother above is eloquent: we had to hide behind a cross.

The practice of religious assimilation by encouraging migrant children to be christened has been documented in a previous study (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2011) and while not reported directly by the informants of this study seems to loom at the back of many migrants’ experiences in Greece. An interesting version of the assimilation topos is expressed by the Albanian mother of an adolescent boy who gave birth to her child in Greece:

It came as a surprise that when I gave birth they registered the child as ‘non christened’. Well we had not decided about a name, we did not know it was a boy and in any case we had not a name ready to give. And when I gave a name they did not register it. I do not like being seen with a different eye [means: I do not like being discriminated, treated differently]. So I christened the child and I did very well. I have no objection to this. I did it with love.

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59 When children are born in Greece they are registered as without a name, literally using the term ‘avaptiion’ that means non christened because it is expected that the parents will christen the child within the first two years of her/his life and will then communicate the given name to the municipal registry. If a parent does not want to christen their child they may do a civil act of ‘name giving’ at their municipality of residence but many Greek, let alone immigrant parents are not aware of this option.
Generally the religion is a private matter topos is not accepted by the migrant parents – regardless of their own views which vary a lot (some are in favour of religion classes as they are, others would like religion out of the school, still others would like to see religion classes diversified teaching all religions). We have not even found a concrete pattern of opinions depending on the country of origin or on the religion of the parents that participated in the discussion groups. The few practicing Muslim parents that participated in discussion group 5 noted an increased sensitivity on the issue: it is important for them that their children learn about Islam and do not lose their faith by assimilating into Greek society. However, even among them, some (e.g. an Egyptian mother of an adolescent daughter) feel more confident that their teaching of the religion at home is sufficient, while others (e.g. a Pakistani father with two adolescent sons in Greece and 3 younger children in Pakistan) are quite worried that children will eventually adopt what they are taught in school even if they are only required to be in class without participating or having to study religion (Discussion group 5).

The religion is a private matter topos includes a certain level of liberalism: individuals are embraced in their diversity but they should keep their diversity for their private life – there is no room for collective diversity or collective minority rights. At the same time, contrary to a Republican view, the public space is impregnated with the dominant religion (as the assimilation topos emphasizes). The legitimacy of the dominant religion is not based in history or identity but on what the Ministry of Education, the ‘authorities’ dictate for the school life. Thus, we have here an interesting mix of liberal, minimal tolerance of diversity and a level of communitarian intolerance: the majority community has its religion respected by all. Those who are not part of it may not participate to relevant rituals, they can be exempted, as private citizens/residents but they cannot ask for alternative arrangements.

The third discursive topos is the one that sees tolerance as the first step to acceptance. In this topos, the argumentative structure supports the idea that tolerance, acceptance and respect are different steps on the same ladder. They are separated by a time element: the first contact is fraught with suspicion, then comes tolerance, then acceptance of diversity, under some conditions. The school principal of the White Neighbourhood school (interview 17) provides an eloquent example of this topos:

‘We have different populations here, all these populations have to co-exist in the first instance, not necessarily to accept one another, we cannot impose on one another diversity. This comes as a habit, through the years. Right? The contact, the first contact that they have initially here, will have to become, so that it does not create problems in the next stage, it will have to become acceptance. The first phase is not acceptance (..) The first phase is to examine diversity, right? To process it. To look at it with a bit of an investigative eye, with some suspicion and then we move on to acceptance. Provided differences are not created, are not increased’ (Interview 17).

Here there is no separation of the public and the private confining religion or ethnic identity to the private sphere. Rather the school offers an appropriate space where to meet ‘Others’ and get used to their diversity, so that a relationship of simple acceptance develops later.

For this however to take place the migrant parents note that there is a need for more information sharing:

‘my daughter told the religion teacher: if you do not teach us about other religions how can we say if they are worse than ours?’(Russian mother married to a Palestinian, 2 adolescent children, Discussion Group 8)

Greek children in our discussion group with 17 year olds also note that it is good to learn about other religions. At the same time they see religion as not important any more. In both discussion groups conducted with Greek adolescents (Discussion group 1 with children aged 12-15 and Discussion group 3 with 16-17 year olds) the children did not see religion as an issue of difference with migrant children and generally argued that religion was not important anymore and that the main
reason for being exempted from a religion class was to take advantage of the free time or because one did not like the teacher. These views are confirmed by the discussion group with Greek teachers (discussion group 2). These contradictory findings suggest that native and migrant children (and parents or teachers) perceive religion and the current arrangements (one can be exempted by there are no other courses offered while religion is heavily present in school life) in different ways. Those who belong to the native majority do not see an issue of tolerance, intolerance or acceptance of people from different religious backgrounds. They see it as a non issue. And they are happy with the current arrangements. Migrants by contrast have different experiences and while for some religion has been a secondary issue, others have had difficult experiences where their children were made to feel very uncomfortable and where they opted for assimilation in order to avoid being ‘different’. 

The fourth discursive topos is that of acceptance. This topos is closer to what Elisabetta Galeotti has termed tolerance as recognition. This topos argues in favour of changing the institutional framework with a view to accommodating not only the individual difference but also collective needs of minority and migrant children. For instance, when prompted by the interviewer, a mother of an adolescent boy in the White Neighbourhood high school notes that she would not have liked it if her son was in a foreign country and he had to participate to a morning Muslim prayer. She goes a step further and argues that mere tolerance of their religion by way of not obliging them to participate in the morning Christian Orthodox prayer is not enough. Room should be made both physically and in the school weekly programme so that children of other religions, notably Muslims, can fulfill their religious duties:

‘They have a right to this, I believe. They have a right. If they do not want to do the Morning Prayer, I do not know what their religion dictates, I cannot know that. But what I know is that they have some time to pray, yes, I believe they have a right to this and that they should ask for it’ (Interview 18).

The same argument is put forward by the Head of the Regional Education office in the White Neighbourhood. She argues that such collective needs should be accommodated but also notes that the most important and inalienable right is the right not to participate in the Morning Prayer. This topos does not include however any reference to the need to incorporate minorities or migrants to the self-perception of society. They are allowed to exist and co-exist with the majority children in the school life having both their individual and collective level of difference accepted but they are not seen as changing the majority group or the school overall. Somehow the process of acceptance foresees a neutral provision of institutional space but not real embracing of diversity nor re-consideration of the meaning of the ‘we’- Greeks.

Most interestingly we also find among the teachers and the experts interviewed a discursive topos that argues for respect and recognition of diversity. A teacher of classics at the Red Neighbourhood School argues that she would change her way of teaching history and religion if she were to find herself teaching in a school where Roma minority or immigrant children are a local majority:

‘Look I would do it differently. [If I were in a school] with a majority of Muslim children, I would say the same things, as regards historical facts, these are the facts but I would not analyse the strength of the faith (…) I would opt for some more neutral [topics] so that I would not touch upon their religious sentiment, because this would be unfair to these children’ (interview 11).

While this classics teacher uses the topos of respect to argue in favour of a modification of teaching methods, an expert informant uses the respect topos to argue for a truly intercultural education (his own words):

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60 A similar concern and a similar solution to this concern (changing the content and the approach to the course)
‘For me tolerance is the first step, because it is not sufficient. (...) in some cases you need to show tolerance, when a child speaks a different language in class. But what I say is that this is not enough for true intercultural education, we need more, we need to bring up the culture of the children, not just to tolerate it, that they have their own culture, but to encourage it, to reveal it, to bring to the surface. To learn ourselves this culture. Ok? It is only like this, this is for me what we should do, not tolerance.

The respect topos include both a change in the way the teacher understands her role in the classroom and an adaptation of the teaching approach and methods, and a valorisation of the cultural capital of the immigrant and minority children. The respect topos is adopted by some immigrant parents too but they see such a situation, a policy that would provide space for all religions by, for instance, teaching different religions in the school including minority religions as an ideal situation that cannot materialise anywhere (Moldavian mother of 2 grown up children, discussion group 5).

In conclusion, ethnic and cultural diversity in school life is seen as an important challenge that Greek schools face. While there have been no major incidents documented in the media concerning the rejection / tolerance / acceptance of diversity upon which to base our case study our interviews with teachers (mainly) and secondarily with parents have provided useful material to discuss what is the understanding of tolerance in Greek school life. We have thus identified five topoi of those four may be seen as incremental, while one discursive topos is a topos of resistance, the topos that points out that what is practiced in Greece is assimilation. The first topos corresponds to a basic minimal definition of tolerance: diversity seen as a private matter that people are free to express in their private life but which they should keep outside the public space. The second topos argues that this is not about religion being a private matter but rather about being forced to assimilate in the dominant religion. The third topos supported the idea that tolerance is a minimal solution, suitable for the first period during which schools get acquainted with cultural and ethnic diversity within their school populations, but which should slowly lead to acceptance. Indeed the fourth topos is the one that argues in favour of minimal, neutral acceptance: The majority and its institutions need not change anything apart from providing the space in which minorities may express individually or collectively their different religion. Last but not least the discursive topos of tolerance developed by educators only recognises the need to change one’s own way of teaching and of thinking with a view to taking into account the special sensitivities and the special cultural capital that migrant and minority children have.

3.8.1 Concluding Remarks

This chapter starts with a brief presentation and evaluation of the policies adopted by the Greek state to favour the integration of immigrant and native Roma children in the national educational system. Studies show that Roma children perform poorly in Greek schools both because their parents cannot afford to send to school or are not familiar with the formal education system or are indeed discouraged/rejected by school headmasters. At the same time studies have shown that there are a number of schools and teachers in primary education that make heroic efforts to keep Roma children in schools. As regards immigrant children, some of them excel but on average they perform less well than native children.

It is against a short critical survey of the size of the migrant and Roma school population that we analyse qualitatively, adopting a critical discourse analysis methodology, the discourses of relevant stakeholders (policy makers, experts, middle rank officials of the Ministry), teachers, parents and children of Greek, immigrant and Roma origin. Interestingly our two case studies have yielded slightly divergent results.

The first case study on ethnic selection or school segregation of Roma and migrant children suggests that ethnic diversity is only tolerated in Greek school life: Greek majority parents, children and teachers argue that migrant children have a negative impact on the quality of education provided at a school. Migrant parents are aware of the stereotype and also sometimes deplore the poor quality of the
school that their child attends, blaming it on the fact that the school has too many migrant children and that teachers are indifferent about their children’s education. Overall they also express a feeling of being tolerated not accepted in Greek society.

The second case study which concentrates on religious diversity in particular yields more positive results. Religious diversity is generally tolerated in Greek schools – to the extent that it is confined to the private sphere it does not bother anyone. However, different attitudes towards religious diversity and different views on how it can be accommodated have been found among both Greek and non-Greek informants. Thus, overall parents and teachers were divided on the topic of religion and whether it should be part of the school curriculum at all; if it is part of the school curriculum whether it should include courses on all religions and/or a history of religions or not; and whether the current situation of minimal liberal tolerance (a child can be exempted from religious duties if her parents ask the school) is satisfactory.

Competing discursive topoi reveal contradictory tendencies and tensions in Greek school life as regards religions. The main two discursive topoi: religion as a private matter, and assimilation actually reveal the fundamental tension of the current arrangements: people are free to choose whether to be exempted from the majority religion classes or not but at the same time the whole school environment is impregnated with the majority religion to the extent that migrant children feel forced to assimilate (and hence not to ask to be exempted from the course).

The findings of this study on ethnic and religious diversity in Greek school life show that the predominant attitude towards diversity is one of tolerance that goes hand in hand with the unquestioned acceptance of the majority religion, the majority language, the majority ethnicity in Greek school life. This is well in line with the dominant discourses on national identity in Greece and the dominant tradition of only accommodating diversity (if at all) at the individual but not at the collective level.

There is a tacit assumption that the state belongs to the native majority, and that immigrants are not legitimate political subjects that could ask for a different policy as regards for instance religious education. Interestingly however while none questions the primacy of the Greek language in schools and the distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks, religion appears to be less important an identity marker. Although the majority religion is taken for granted and seen as a legitimate part of the school life, there is also a general questioning of what religion is, whether it should be included in the school curriculum and whether it is a problem if children are of different religions. Indeed, religious diversity is not yet seen as a problem in Greek schools.

With regard to our conceptual framework this chapter reveals that minimal liberal tolerance is rarely neutral but rather goes hand in hand with a tacit assumption that there is a majority culture and religion that provides for the blueprint as regards cultural and religious matters in school life. Thus the absence of any acceptance or respect policies and measures eventually leads not to liberal freedom of choice but rather to pressures for cultural and religious assimilation.

While the assimilationist tendencies of the Greek national education system shown in this chapter come as no surprise, there are two key messages arising from this study for policy makers. The first message is that minority and immigrant children’s continuing negative stereotyping and marginalisation in Greek schools needs to be addressed. Relevant measures should not only target issues of learning (improving the school attendance and educational achievement levels of migrant and minority children) but also and more urgently civic education. There is a need for a renewed emphasis on citizenship and civics education that introduces the concepts of identity, diversity, citizenship, tolerance, and acceptance, respect of ethnic and religious diversity, ethnic prejudice and racism. Children should be better equipped to deal with an increasingly diverse classroom and society at large. Within this course or within courses of contemporary history and the history of European integration there is a need for acknowledging the role that emigration and immigration has played in the recent history of Greece as well as of Europe. A better understanding of Greece’s role as a migrant receiving
A second key message for policy makers that is closely related to the one above is that Greek citizens and residents are ready to consider small changes in the education curricula that would acknowledge the increasing ethnic and religious diversity of Greek society. Relevant measures could include the introduction of alternative options for the religion course so that children of other Christian denominations or of Muslim or other religious background can have the option of being taught their own religious tradition. Also parents should be able to justify their children’s absence on the days of major religious or ethnic festivities in which they children are absent from school.

While there continues to be a negative stereotyping of migrant children as a ‘problem’ for schools and while there are complaints from both native and immigrant or Roma parents about the ways in which minority and immigrant children are marginalised in Greek schools, there is also a growing awareness that the position and role of the majority religion in schools can be and perhaps should be questioned. In the next chapter, we will attempt to dwell on the same issues, this time however when it comes to contestations related with political life.
4. Migrants and (In) tolerant Discourses in Greek Politics

This chapter engages into a study of the limits of tolerance towards cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in Greek politics in the period 2010-2011. Not pertaining to the traditional migrant host countries, Greece has experienced since 1990s a wave of migration flux that has severely intensified in the last three years, along with incidents of racist violence. Moreover, the country has been since 2010 the centre of a severe financial crisis that has hit Europe having an overwhelming impact on the living conditions of the totality of its inhabitants. It seems, thus, as an ideal case to study so as to look at how meaningful the concept of tolerance is during a period when certainties about liberal public life are being rapidly shattered and how its use is embedded in the negotiation of the national self and the ‘other’. In the following section we discuss the wider European context as well as the national background for the case studies analysed later on.61

4.1 Tolerance and Xenophobia in Europe

Today the concept of tolerance is commonly defined as the realm of differences which are not approved but should be tolerated mainly for principles, such as freedom of opinion or freedom of religion, which are constitutive for the political culture of benevolent nationalism. The so called space of tolerance is made up when there are things that we have reasons to reject and to see as wrong or able to cause harm, but not to forbid or censure, or, when reasons not to forbid or censure are stronger than reasons to do so (Brown, 2006). Against this background, tolerance became in the postwar era an inherent feature of decent politics taking the character of a social contract with minorities, which were given a secure status within the nation state (Schiffauer, 2012, forthcoming). In parallel with that, societal and political actors in liberal democratic societies, including even sections of the extreme right, reject racism and discrimination as normatively objectionable.

However, it seems that currently the pendulum sways in a different direction. The limits of toleration are re-emphasized and drawn narrower. Since the 1980s, new Right and neo-conservative ideas have become more prominent in Europe, with their emphasis upon ideas such as the right to difference, anti-egalitarianism and anti-universalism. The migration issue has marked a recomposition of extreme right, which has experienced during the last decade a significant rise all over the continent (Ignazi, 2003). In this new formation, often self defined as ‘New Radical Right’, culture has replaced race and what is propagated is not the superiority of the nation against others, but the right to cultural difference, or even the equality of each culture, which can be maintained only if cultures remain separated (Taguieff, 1994).

This also leads to a radical rejection of globalization and multiculturalism that challenges the cultural integrity of nations and local communities. In many cases, radical right agents adopt the narrative of the clash of civilisations (Huntington 1993) creating, thus, a new enemy, Islam.

These new forces do not reject democracy per se, but criticize parliamentary parties for betraying the ‘people’ and support the idea of a ‘direct democracy’ beyond ideologies representing the so-called ‘anti party parties’(Crepon, 2010). According to this new postwar master frame that combines ethnonationalism, cultural racism and anti political establishment populism, extreme right parties mobilize on xenophobic and racist public opinions without being stigmatized as racists and adopt anti establishment strategy without being stigmatized as anti democrats (Hainsworth 2000). Appealing, thus, to both the Right and the Left in the last few years, these have entered the parliament in various countries across the continent (Rydgren, 2005).

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61 This part of the report has been authored by Hara Kouki and Anna Triandafyllidou.
At the same time, recent European policies and mainstream political discourse in the field of migrant integration – concerning related integration and citizenship acquisition policies – may be conceptualised as a new type of principled, liberal intolerance. It is liberal by being associated with the values of autonomy and equality, democracy, and the health and stability of liberal societies. It becomes intolerant by reversing the pragmatic of old school tolerance, insisting that too much leniency may be bad for social peace and a sign of undue cultural self-doubt. As or when these challenges are not only seen as challenges but threats, the liberal order becomes increasingly intolerant towards ‘too much diversity’ in its self-defence (Mouritsen and Olsen, 2012). For the nation to exist there must be some ‘out-group’ against which the unity and homogeneity of the in-group is tested. A possible coexistence requires the constant re-definition of the ‘We’ that must be distinguished from a ‘They’ that is geographically close (Triandafyllidou, 2011, 2012). The new case of principled intolerance towards ‘Others’, thus, is translated more into the anxieties and the crisis that the national self is going through, rather than the difference of the other.

4.2 Tolerance and Xenophobia in Greece

As for Greece, during the last 20 years the country has been rapidly transformed from a migrant sending to a migrant receiving country and currently about 0.8 million of its 11 million population is of foreign origin. Moreover, during the last three years Greece has been faced with a European and international migration crisis: while increasing numbers of people are fleeing war and poverty from Asia and Africa, the Greek Turkish border has become the main gate to Europe. The onset of the current financial crisis in early 2010 has deteriorated the situation. Unemployment grew dramatically among long term settled immigrants and working class natives (Triandafyllidou 2011). There has been an important increase in the crime rate and a generalized sense of insecurity in the centre of the capital of the country, while adding to this, extreme right wing groups have taken the situation ‘in their hands’. Departing from images and incidents taking place in the centre of Athens, an all the more xenophobic discourse started spreading and dominating the way public opinion interprets the ‘other’ living in the city. Large parts of society appear as prone to morally accept incidents of racist violence and hate speech (Christopoulos 2010).

Central to this change has been the unprecedented rise of far right parties, actions and discourse in the public sphere. LAOS (Laikos Orthodoxos Sinagermos - The People’s Orthodox Rally), is considered to be an extreme right wing formation that won 5.63% of the vote in 2009 national elections and 7.14% for the elections for the European Parliament. LAOS has participated in the provisional grand coalition government formed to deal with the crisis (from November 2011 till February 2012) thus further legitimising the position of extreme right agency in the Greek political system. As a result, while LAOS did not succeed in entering the parliament in 2012 elections, the even more radical Golden Dawn did. The latter is a nationalist far right organization, whose members have been repeatedly accused of carrying out acts of violence and hate crimes against immigrants, political opponents and ethnic minorities. Golden Dawn, with a clear racist and Nazi political position, operates in certain ‘troubled’ urban areas in terms of ‘field work’ and establishes a state within a state offering security to local residents (Vernadakis, 2011). This radical organization won a sit in municipal elections in the city of Athens (5.3%) and entered the parliament in 2012 national elections getting an 6.97% of the national vote. There are more organizations, underground groups and people expressing different versions of extreme right ideology and practice in the country (See Annex V).

For the purposes of the present study, though, and while acknowledging the complexity of the terminological debate, we use the term ‘extreme right’ to refer to those two groups that exhibit the

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62 http://www.neolaiaalaos.gr/
63 http://xryshaygh.wordpress.com/
characteristics of nationalism, xenophobia (ethno-nationalist xenophobia), anti-establishment critiques and socio-cultural authoritarianism (law and order, family values) (Mudde, 2007).

As for the nature of this new ‘radical right’ force in Greece, it follows the above mentioned European tendencies. In their declarations, LAOS and Golden Dawn MPs officially dissociate themselves from fascist ideas64, but also from all parliamentary parties, which in their attempt to become ‘European’ have obliterated basic tenets of national identity.

What has brought the far right at the fore in Greece, however, is its xenophobic, often racist, stance concerning migration. The main political tenets of the party of LAOS focus on the migration issue, the issue of security (law and order for a more powerful state) and defending the nation that has been tempered lately by ‘too much’ democracy and leniency exhibited by ‘liberal’ governments, including those of right ideology (Papadatos 2011). LAOS considers migration and coexistence with migrants a problem, attributes criminality and unemployment to migration, cannot handle issues of integration and those migrants who are not ‘legal’ and ‘useful’ must leave the country (Psarras, 2011).

According to Giannis Kolovos, the political scientist who is considered to be the theorist of the party, LAOS departs from the principle that we must respect every person whose identity differs from our own. In some cases, yet, the cultural difference is so unbridgeable that cannot but lead to the exclusionary principle of non integration- for instance, when it comes to the illegal immigrants having ‘inundated’ the city centre of Athens (Kolovos, 2010). As a result, absolute respect to difference leads to racism as it precludes rapprochement and merging. New radical right thinking appropriates liberal concepts in politically correct terms so as to distort them (Georgiadou, 2010). Golden Dawn’s history and role have not been so thoroughly studied, as from a fringe party it has been converted into a legitimate mainstream political actor in an unexpectedly short time (it got 0.29% in 2009 national elections and 6.92% in 2012 national elections). It seems as its members organize anti immigrant rallies and are accused of violent racist attacks; the party’s leader, however, blames the state and Europe for the situation in the city centre, while proclaiming his party to be not an extreme right, but a nationalist and anti capitalist force (Christopoulos, 2011).

This recomposition of the extreme right in the country runs in parallel with a conservative unfolding of Greek identity and a generalized political crisis unfolding in the 1990s, since when sensitive issues of national identity have re emerged and national particularities surfaced as the opposite pole to reform and globalization (Psarras 2010, Ellinas, 2011). Such a tendency seems severely intensified during the current crisis. Even if at the time of writing this chapter (summer 2012), Golden Dawn rose in popularity seemingly at the expense of LAOS that has somehow faded from public view, both formations should be examined together as standing for the evolution and nature of the extreme right in the country. What remains still to be examined is the relationship and dynamics between the extreme right discourse and mainstream public opinion, party and official state discourse in Greece.

### 4.3 Case studies and Research Questions

The present chapter departs from the assertion that a key point in examining this issue is the concept of tolerance65, which is used to draw boundaries and spaces of difference shedding light on the way ‘our’ identity is defined as compared and contrasted with the ‘other’. However, tolerance is not a self-consistent concept and has never enjoyed a unified meaning across time, nations and cultures. Instead, it is a concept dynamically shaped by context and social realities (Brown, 2008). It seems that we

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64 Despite media and scholars’ allegations, Golden Dawn’s members deny the Neo nazi label that is attributed to their party, even if in the past they have explicitly praised Nazi Germany and made use of Nazi symbols.

65 We use the term tolerance to speak of the concept while the term toleration to speak of the practice, the applied attitude that people or institutions may adopt.
cannot conclude with certainty whether there is more or less tolerance in one country, as societies constitute rather discursive fields in which different positions fight with each other about what should be tolerated/accepted and what not (Brown, 2008; Schiffauer, 2012, forthcoming). This also implies that statements about limits of tolerance are often used to position a speaker within the discursive field.

For instance, the boundary-drawing or positioning function of tolerance is particularly relevant in political life as it cuts across the left-right wing dimension. Tolerance is a liberal value and as such it is attractive to progressive people at the left wing of the political spectrum who are more open to ethnic and religious diversity and to what is defined as ‘egalitarian tolerance’. Egalitarian tolerance involves making room in the public space for minority and immigrant groups that have in the past suffered by stigmatization and marginalization (Galeotti, 2002). However, tolerance is also a neoliberal value that is appealing to people more in the right wing of the spectrum as it puts the native group in the role of majority that tolerates (in the minimal, liberal sense of allowing to be without suppressing) minority and immigrant groups (King, 1998).

This part of the study explores the recent discourses on diversity and tolerance in Greek political life. It investigates what has been defined by different political actors as intolerable, tolerable or acceptable cultural difference—hence it questions what intolerance/tolerance/acceptance means for each actor and how they re-define and use it to draw boundaries in Greek society. These boundaries cut across and overlap with different dimensions: natives/nationals and Others/aliens, tolerant and intolerant people/parties, racist and non-racist, democratic and authoritarian, right wing vs. left wing forces.

The boundary drawing process between what is tolerable and what is not is characterized by contradictions and unclear answers, as it seems related less to the problem of difference of the other per se and more to the fears and concerns relating to difference. In this chapter, we examine the political and discursive deployment of toleration in two different case studies and see how tolerance relies on the construction of images of ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’. Our main scope is to gain a better understanding of why and when some aspects of difference are rejected. We seek to answer the question what kind of difference is tolerable/acceptable in Greek society and why? We also examine whether Greek society is becoming more or less tolerant towards specific groups and why.

The first case analysed refers to the public prayer of Muslim inhabitants of Athens on 18 November 2010 on the occasion of the ‘Id festivity (end of Ramadan) before the sprawling courtyard of the country's main university as a peaceful protest for the non existence of an official mosque (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2009; Antoniou 2005); this protest event provoked a public debate, the first on the issue to acquire visibility at the national level and took place without problems. The second case study concentrates on a tragic event that took place a few months later. In May 2011, in the very centre of Athens a 44-year old man, Manolis Kantaris, was cold blood assassinated by unknown people, believed to be irregular migrants. This murder triggered a series of violent and racist attacks against migrants in the city centre, and especially the 6th city council district that were led by far right wing organizations, such as the Golden Dawn, and tolerated by both the police and part of the residents of the area. These incidents, our second case study, produced a polarised political discourse focusing around the crisis in the city centre as linked with the issue of irregular immigration.

In those two cases, the social practice of toleration was played out in the historical centre of the capital, where deterioration of living conditions has been followed by considerable irregular migration flows (see Map). The above events have generated discussions and conflicts in national politics regarding more generally migrants and the immigrant ‘Other’ in Greek society and the limit of his/her presence in public. While the political and symbolic exclusion of the immigrant Other is nothing new in Greek society (see also Psimmenos 1995; Triandafyllidou 2001; Maroukis 2009), what is new is how concepts of tolerance/intolerance and actions of toleration or lack of toleration are newly negotiated amidst a generalized economic and political crisis. The emergence of migration as a centre-
stage political issue in the last two years and the spectacular rise of the far right wing vote (role of far right parties brings these questions and by the emergence of far right parties strong enough to win seats in the Parliament and in Athens municipal council. These political developments have brought racist and intolerant discourse (and actions) centre-stage in the debate on migration.

Map 1: Map of the City of Athens (National Institute of Social Sciences, 2011)

Note: In white the 6th District Council where racist violence has been proliferating in the last 1.5 year, and the Panepistimio Square where the Muslim public prayer took place.

This chapter investigates how the concept of tolerance is mobilized when actors are confronted with ethnic and religious diversity. The first event in particular concentrates on the issue of religious diversity and to what extent Greek society proved tolerant of its public manifestation and of difference in general. The second event is characteristic of the current insecurity-diversity-intolerance triplet that has been proposed by far right wing actors and has increasingly gained legitimacy in Greek mainstream political discourse.

We particularly examine whether conceptions of what is or should be intolerable, tolerable and accepted/respected differ in each case and why. This chapter, then, analyses how tolerance and intolerance are (re)presented in the discourse of the various parties involved; how intolerance and anti migrant discourse voiced by far right wing actors is integrated into mainstream official discourse and legitimated in terms of public opinion

4.4 Methodology

For this chapter, our study included both desk research and empirical fieldwork. We have analysed the scholarly literature on the issue of the far right in the country, while also collecting material on far
right wing parties and groups active at the moment in the city centre. We also examined newspaper materials: We searched for articles in five mainstream newspapers with the highest circulation at the national level (notably Kathimerini, Vima, Eleftherotypia, Ethnos, ta Nea) and in a selection of far right groups’ websites. The search topics were: public prayer, Muslim prayer, Muslim prayer in front of the University, Kantaris, Kantaris’ murder, migrants’ pogroms, pogroms in the centre, attacks against migrants, for the period between November and June 2010. Moreover, we examined how the major political parties present in the Greek Parliament in 2011 (Conservative party New Democracy, Socialist party PASOK, left wing party SYRIZA, the Greek Communist Party KKE, the far right wing party LAOS and the Golden Dawn party that was not represented in the national parliament but whose actions and discourse were important for our selected case studies.

Desk material, thus, has been used so as to set the picture of the events and positions taken, while our object of analysis were qualitative interviews conducted with actors actively engaged in the events under question. We have conducted 19 qualitative interviews with representatives of right and left wing groups and migrant associations more active in the events aforementioned, as well as with residents of the city centre that have not taken active part in those conflicts but see themselves affected by immigrants’ presence. More specifically, as regards authorities, four Athens Municipal Councilmen have been interviewed: one from the governing coalition (‘Right to the City’, socialist party PASOK-and leftist party DHMAR), one from the opposing coalition (previously in power, 2000-2004, ‘Athens, the Town of our Life’, right wing party New Democracy- far right party LAOS), one from the coalition supported by the non communist left party (‘Open City’), and one from the ‘Greek Dawn’ far right party. Moreover, a radical right (LAOS) MP was interviewed.

We have also interviewed the Hellenic Police Press Spokesman and three individuals engaged with media (two journalists, one newspaper and one TV presenter and one writer contributing in newspapers and free press). Concerning civil society representatives, our respondents include others: the president of Medicins du Monde Greece, a clergyman, president of Christian Solidarity and Charitable Fund of Athens Archdiocese, the President of Muslim Association of Greece, the president of Afghan association in Greece, a citizen of immigrant background, who had participated in a hunger strike for migrants’ legalization in 2011, a head teacher of a primary school populated by a majority of children with migrant background, a founding member of a local committee for the protection of the city centre, the president of Athens’ Chamber of Hotels, a member of an antifascist coalition and a member of an architectural group doing voluntary work in the centre of Athens. Given that the official and public role of the majority of those actors has been quintessential in our analysis, anonymity is not always feasible.

We followed a structured interview guide and all interviews ranged between half an hour and 45 minutes. The topics list was standardised for all respondents: after asked about the events per se (if they were informed on these, how they perceived them and what is their stance towards them), all respondents were asked two blocks of questions, one regarding tolerance as emerging from the public Muslim prayer event and, the other, on racism and xenophobia as emerging from the events following the murder of a citizen in the city centre. This guiding scheme, however, was used in a flexible way, as the order and phrasing of the questions did not always follow the same sequence (for the list of interviewees and the questionnaire followed see Annex I).

We have adopted the critical frame analysis approach as the methodology for our studying diversity in political life. According to Goffman, frames are schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective (Goffman, 1974). Frame analysis has been used first by

scholars studying New Social Movements, but it soon proved to be a useful analytical tool kit for a variety of disciplines. It concerns the (re)construction and negotiation of reality by social/political actors through the use of symbolic tools (Triandafyllidou and Fotiou, 1998) and it is often depicted as a dynamic and emergent process occurring in interaction with the larger political culture, public discourse and dynamics of collective action. When it comes to the investigation of collective action, frames function ‘as accenting devices that either underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of asocial condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable (Benford and Snow, 1992).

Framing processes allow for the definition of the self and the opponents, in short for the definition of the ‘Us’ and the ‘them’ category (Tilly, 2003); however, we opted for this approach also for the following reasons.

Firstly, this chapter aims at studying the complexities and explicit or latent contradictions in actors’ argumentations over tolerance; interpretative frames allow examining the ways in which social actors use competing or convergent frames to (re)construct a specific cultural orientation which favours and justifies their own policy positions, even when departing from the same reality or similar ideological cores (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998).

Moreover, when it comes to the analysis and interpretation of the recent rise of xenophobia and racism in Greece, frame analysis seems to deal with inconsistencies of other approaches. Cases studies often attribute the rise of extreme right wing forces to their privileged media promotion and their contradictory discourse, the decrease in political trust and the high level of unemployment, deep economic troubles and rise in migration (Georgiadou, Psarras 2011). Through such readings, however, on the one hand, one is tempted to reduce the rise in intolerance in public life to the critical action of a few agencies, such as extreme right wing forces, while, on the other, explanans with explanandum merge and determinism emerges as the key interpretation (Rugdgen, 2005).

On the contrary, what is at issue is the manner in which grievances are interpreted, diffused and framed through action. Without denying the presence of discontent, frame analysis as applied in social movement studies, tends to give more leverage to the capacity of social actors to interact with contextual opportunities and constraints. This way, analysis focuses on the ‘political-cultural or symbolic opportunities that determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be ‘legitimate’ by the audience’ (Kriesi, 2004, p. 72). By accounting exactly for this process and not for the final outcome of attributing meaning to external realities, frame methodology can shed more light in the rise of xenophobia and racism in contemporary liberal democracies.

Furthermore, as our discussion revolved around debates on migration and diversity policies, we also explore how the debate on diversity and (in) tolerance has evolved as a ‘policy problem’ through reconstructing the framing of these issues within the political arena. For this reconstruction, thus, we also adopt insights from the policy frame method, which attempts to study how an organising principle transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful policy problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly enclosed (Verloo, 2005, Triandafyllidou and Fotiou, 1998). In the policy process, what is important is to see what is represented as the problem and the different assumptions that underpin such representations (Roggeband, 2007, p 4).

Given the widespread stigmatization of racism and the establishment of liberal democracies in post-war Europe, concepts as diversity and tolerance are widely endorsed by the majority of actors. Differences arise when it comes to the identification of what constitutes in each case ‘the problem’, who is to blame and what is the preferred course of action for addressing the ‘problem’. It is for this reason that we apply the methodology of frame analysis, which focuses on the process of the attribution of meaning that lies behind the emergence of any conflictual event. There are different stages of this process when it comes to collective action analysis, such as the recognition of certain incidents as social problem, then of possible strategies which would resolve these, and, lastly, the
identification of motivations for acting. Snow and Benford (1988) defined those steps as the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational dimensions of framing.

Taking into account these different dimensions, the present chapter is organised as follows. The following section explores the case studies under question and the issues these raise in relation with the concepts of tolerance and intolerance. Section 3 presents the positions adopted by the political and social actors interviewed and how these were justified in each case. The chapter is structured along the two major competing frames emerging from our analysis. In the concluding section, we bring the findings together with a view to highlight new conceptions of intolerance in the national public sphere.

4.5 **Tolerance and (in) tolerance in Greek public life: Framing the Two Case Studies**

This chapter examines the competing frames adopted by different societal actors concerning issues of tolerance of (religious) diversity and (in) tolerance of racist actions and speech as these were played out in the public space of the capital of the country between 2010 and 2011 in two different case studies.

4.5.1 Presentation of the two cases

On 18 November 2011, Muslims of all nationalities, mostly immigrants from the Middle East, Africa and Asia, gathered in Panepistimio square in central Athens to pray and celebrate Eid al Adha (an honour to the sacrifice of Abraham). The public prayer was organized by the Muslim Association of Greece. Women and children were allowed to pray in a specially designated area of the square. Taking place without problems, the event was positively endorsed by authorities, political parties and media that tolerated religious diversity as manifested on that day in the city centre. Even Church representatives demanded from the state to manage the issue of the right to religious freedom for those people living in the country. LAOS opposed this public expression of religious difference, while members of Golden Dawn and other far right groups led violent incidents in Attiki Square in their attempt to cancel the event. ‘Greece has been transformed into a country of tolerance due to passivity, fear against reactions, lack of self respect and self esteem’, observes a far right blog post.

Six months later, in May 2011, after the assassination of a 44 year old man and without having evidence concerning the nationality of perpetrators, a series of violent and racist attacks against migrants evolves in the very centre of Athens, led by ultra right wing groups and tolerated by both police forces and part of the residents of the area. The days following the murder, far right wing supporters would go after and beat passing irregular migrants and asylum seekers down town, while in some cases, Golden Dawn’s members, as well as other individuals, filmed those attacks, which spread in the internet and TV. Those violent incidents took place on the open urban city spaces around the areas of Aghios Panteleimonas, Aharon, Patision, Plateia Vathis and Attikis (6th municipal district of Athens). The next day, a 21 year old man from Bangladesh lost his life after being stabbed

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68 Muslims occupied for hours the city centre, 20 February 2011, http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17708&Itemid=86, see also Islamic prayer next to the monument of Grigorios E. Christi Avgi, 16 November 2010 http://xryshaygh.wordpress.com/2010/11/16/%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BB%CE%B1%CE%BC%CE%B9%CE%BA%C E%AE-%CF%80%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%83%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%87%CE%AE-%CE%B4%CE%AF%CF%80%CE%BB%CE%B1-%CE%B1%CF%80%CF%8C-%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%BD-%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B4%CF%81%CE%B9/
69 http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xevip5_yy-yyyyyy_news
70 http://omniatv.com/open-publishing/news/308
at Kato Patisia under unclear circumstances. Security representatives attributed this racist attack to the 44-year old man assassination. All parliamentary parties condemned both the event of the murder, as well as the racist violence that erupted in the city centre. This was also the line followed in the media coverage. However, the focus was put on the uncontrolled situation and rise of criminality in the city centre that was directed linked with the influx of migrants;\footnote{Mihalis Katsigeras, Beyond regime, \textit{Kathimerini}, 11 May 2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_ell_1_11/05/2011_441739. Kostas Pretenteris, They took Athens from us, \textit{Ta Nea}, 11 May 2011, http://www.tanea.gr/empisteytika/?aid=4630465}{71}

In relation to the public prayer issue, it is worth noting that Athens is the only European capital that does not yet have a formal mosque operating in the city or in its immediate surroundings. This has been the case since the foundation of the Greek state even (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2009). The growing number of practicing Muslim immigrants in Athens from South Asia, Africa and the Middle-East pray in informal prayer rooms. Dozens of these makeshift mosques have been set up in the capital in apartments, shops and garages mainly accumulated in the city centre. At the same time, at several occasions there have been reported in mainstream media attacks by ultra right wing groups against those places of worship (graffiti displacing hate speech or the symbol of swastika, fire bombings, attacks etc- reference). Religious diversity resulting from immigration has emerged as a challenge only during the past few years, as Asian Muslim groups have increased in size and have started raising claims regarding their religious needs (Triandafyllidou 2010). Reflecting the lack of wider integration policy towards economic migrants, the \textit{November 2010 event of massive public prayer raised the question of how much toleration can be publicly manifested and endorsed nowadays in Greece}. Actually the public prayer was a silent but quite loud claims-making on the part of Muslims of Greece that they need to have their religion accepted in the public space, through the official construction of a mosque in Athens.

The racist attacks down town following a case of murder in May 2011 examine to what extent acts or words of racist violence can be tolerated in the country’s public life, especially at a time when irregular migration is coupled with high unemployment rates and deteriorating living conditions for the majority population. The city centre and especially the 6th municipal district constitute an area that, since 2008, has been receiving political and public attention, domestic and international, as racist violence incidents have been taking place there on a regular basis. In terms of anti-racist legislation, the only piece of specific legislation in place regarding racist crime is the anti-racism Law 927/1979 ‘on punishing acts or activities aiming at racial discrimination’ (Annex VI). This also contains an article (2) referring to criminalization of hate speech.\footnote{There are also soft law articles (Kodikas Deontologias) who proscribe the transmission of racist and xenophobic messages by radio and television (RAXEN 2010)}\footnote{See European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Annual Report on Greece (2009) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/greece/GRC-CbC-IV-2009-031-GRC.pdf last accessed on 23 February 2012; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Greece (2009) http://www.nchr.gr/media/keimena_diethwnn_organismwnn_kai_forewn/diethneis_ektheses_gia_ta_dta_stin_ella/CERD _2009_en.pdf last accessed on 24 February 2012. Plus Plevris} International organizations have repeatedly reproached national authorities for inefficient anti racist legislation in theory and in its highly problematic application in practice.\footnote{Since 2009, there has been a rise of hate speech by –not only ultra right wing- social and political agents that goes unaccountable. At the same time, no official case of racist violence and crime has been recorded on the basis of the relevant anti-racist penal legislation (law 927/1979). There has never been a conviction for crimes related to racist motives, even if national and international NGOs and institutions have presented documented cases of racist attacks, especially in the city centre, while in many cases the perpetrators reported are police officers (UN Refugee Agency Greece, 2012). This case raises issues of intolerance towards migrants in Greece and conversely of tolerance and toleration of racist discourse and violence.} Since 2009, there has been a rise of hate speech by –not only ultra right wing- social and political agents that goes unaccountable. At the same time, no official case of racist violence and crime has been recorded on the basis of the relevant anti-racist penal legislation (law 927/1979). There has never been a conviction for crimes related to racist motives, even if national and international NGOs and institutions have presented documented cases of racist attacks, especially in the city centre, while in many cases the perpetrators reported are police officers (UN Refugee Agency Greece, 2012). This case raises issues of intolerance towards migrants in Greece and conversely of tolerance and toleration of racist discourse and violence.
4.5.2 Frames

A first reading of the interview texts revealed that all respondents share some common assumptions. All depart by acknowledging that tolerance is an inherent principle of a democratic life and by condemning words and practices of racist nature as illegal and inhuman practices. Moreover, when it comes to the phenomenon of intolerance in public life, all actors criticize politics and the political establishment. On the other hand, political and social actors develop different positions regarding how much toleration or non-tolerating can be allowed and manifested in public space. Concerning the Muslim public prayer, there are two positions emerging, that religious diversity in public space must be tolerated and the other that religious diversity should not be tolerated, which in some cases becomes Islamophobia. When it comes to our second case study, one way to argue is to Justify/Tolerate Racism and the other Not to Tolerate Racism. In an attempt to classify the above actors and frames (Table I, Annex II), we came to the conclusion that those defending the latter also fall into the tolerating (religious) diversity frame, while those understanding the May events as an issue of justifying/tolerating racism also opt for the intolerating (religious) diversity frame –except for two more ambiguous cases. We may say, then, that there are two competing positions emerging from this first diagnosis analysis: Tolerance of Diversity-Intolerance of Racism and Intolerance of Diversity/Islamophobia- Tolerance/Justification of Racism.

In order to understand, then, how actors drawing from the same assumptions end up unravelling different positions, the section that follows concentrates on the way actors organise their arguments and represent their positions. This analysis brings to light five frames prevailing in the interview texts:

a) the political/ideological framing, that explains tolerance and intolerance towards diversity as political choices towards the question of coexistence with the other

b) the identity/cultural framing, namely the underlying assumption that national cultural identity is an objective reality that defines public life

c) Law and order frame according to which public life is interpreted as a matter of legal rights

b) Anti establishment frame, namely the appeal to a critique over power that attributes social problems to all stakeholders irrespectively of political identity or ideological position

e) Crisis frame that apparently subjects all aspects of national life under the perspective of the current not only financial severe crisis that the country undergoes

The first two frames emerge through the interviews as competing and define how actors place themselves with regard to the events under examination. The other three more frames are operationalized as strategies depending on respondents’ positions and develop in different directions in each case. As a result, the analysis will be divided in two sections studying the two major competing frames and how these define the way our two case studies are read and represented. In each section we will examine first how the concept of tolerance towards religious diversity is framed departing from the event of the public prayer; then, with regards to the violent attacks of May 2011, we will attempt to explore what is represented as the problem and the different assumptions concerning victims/perpetrators, causes and solutions to the problem that underpin such representations.

4.6 Political/Ideological Frame

This frame explains words and actions taking place in public space as choices made by citizens on how to live their lives in relation with other people and power structures. In this sense, it is a political/ideological frame, as politics here is taken to refer to power structured relationships maintained by institutions, mentalities, historical contexts and people and as such is not confined to institutions or political parties, but pervades every aspect of life (Foucault 1991, Kauffman 1990). Those interpreting events under this frame come up with the following positions: regarding the public prayer they defend
a ‘tolerance of (religious) diversity’ stance, while regarding the racist attacks downtown in May 2011, they object racist attitudes and words and call for intolerance of racism.

Drawing from the values of democracy, social equality and multiculturalism so as to justify their position, those respondents could be situated in the ‘left’ tag of a left/ right cleavage. Social cleavages are social and cultural dividing lines that oppose the interests and identities of different groups in society, while the left/right one has been used mainly by political scientists to explain electoral behavior. However, this traditional cleavage was challenged by the emergence of a larger number of mainly sociocultural issues in post industrial societies (Kriesi et al. 2006, Kitschelt 1994). A new dimension is often labeled as new politics involving conflict over environmental and minority rights, participation, social and gender equality. As such, it represents the cleavage between proponents of these issues, the New Left, and citizens who feel threatened by these issues, the New Right (Dalton, 1996). For the purpose of this paper, we maintain the Left and Right labeling that still shapes ties between people and groups that broadly define with the same cause (Diani 1995). At the same time, we consider Left and Right as terms responding to contemporary circumstances and, thus, amplified to include varying aspects of the New Left and the New Right.

Apart from the representative of the leftist coalition, respondents falling into this category also include interviewees who are not self defined as of a leftist political ideology, such as a journalist, those representing migrant communities, the president of the Medicins sans Frontieres and other civil society representatives.

4.7 Public Muslim Prayer and the Framing of Tolerance

Tolerance as a political/ ideological value

To begin with, there was no problem whatsoever in Muslims conducting their religious duties in open public space, as this is a right they are entitled to. Tolerance of religious diversity is a duty of any democratic regime that the Greek state has not observed.

Accepting religions different than the majority one is a basic principle and duty of every liberal democracy, which has not been put into question by the national political system. So, a part of our co-citizens, who believe in various versions of Islam, decided to protest in public space for their constitutional right (for the construction of a Mosque) and they were right in doing so.

Having said that, the municipal councilor that represents the leftist coalition justifies her position not based on constitutional provisions, but on her political ideology.

It has to do with the standpoint from which we choose to see the events in ideological terms. I speak from the leftist point of view: for us, migrants are the wretched of the earth; they are part of labor class, at the lower level of social strata in terms of rights labor, welfare state provisions and the rest. As a result, the Left must deal with the victims of the crisis with a common strategy...putting a priority on those suffering the most from injustice, going through exploitation, those uprooted, poorer than the poor. We do not classify people according to their country of origin. That is why the Left has always been before all an antifascist agent.

(Interview 3)

This is the first strategy used to justify the position of tolerance, namely the appeal to a political and ideological culture that considers diversity to be not a problem to be resolved but an added value for a democratic society to be actively defended.

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74 For instance, it is thought to be less meaningful after the emergence of New Social Movements in the 1970s and 1980s touching upon a new set of issues (Koopmans, 1996) or the emergence of the ‘new right’ characterized by exclusivist attitudes and anti establishment appeal combined with a market/ liberal position (Giugni and Passy, 2004).
Multiculturalism is not an issue under question, it is reality. The question is to understand that as a gift, not a problem, it depends on how you decide to see it, then the school may appear as a disadvantage, if you take advantage of the languages, of the different cultures and civilizations, if there is infrastructure and planning, then all, all that becomes a wealth (Interview 16).

But it is not just the leftist political ideology justifying the ‘tolerance of diversity’ position; there are interviewees defending tolerance as part of democratic values, citizenship ethics and duties towards the ‘other’.

Why is there a rise in xenophobia, when all those years migration offered so much to Europe and Greece in terms of economic prosperity? Well, now, we enter into the political field, into the domain of ideology, how we want our world to be, how we want to construct it, it would be naive to wish to live in a society all together, like Christmas slogans, without looking deeper what must change. And in order for things to change, things must change, in education, in schools...It is the huge responsibility of the democratic citizen, not just of the progressive one, there is an urgent need to participate and to be alert, to fight for the coexistence in urban space... (Interview 16).

This is not a principle stemming from legal duties or political parties’ positions, but part of political / ideological choices about how to relate with the other in public sphere and how one wishes the world around him/her to be. In this sense, it is also the Church representative who seems to end up in the same perspective over diversity, even if departing from a different principle, the ‘Love Thy Neighborhood Christian’ standpoint:

The Church in Greece aims at two things: first, how people who have been caught under surprise by the abrupt change internalize that they have to accept the other, that the thing that he is a stranger does not mean he will distort our identity, than he will negatively influence us, no...We must not tell people depending their background...and then, we must help alleviate those next to us, no matter where they come from, they are people in need...(Interview 10)

Tolerance not enough, beyond tolerance

The church representative, however, hesitated to frame the issue under question using the terms ‘toleration’ and ‘tolerance’, as these may lead to a problematization of migration and diversity instead of treating these as enriching elements of a whole culture and people, as they entail:

…a negative connotation, they usually mean that somebody has harmed me and I just tolerate him, but this was not the issue, this person just stands next to me and happens to be different, this is not an issue of tolerating.

Tolerance is on the one hand endorsed in the name of values, such as equality and respect of diversity; at the same time, it is the political/ideological framing of tolerance questions the limits of the concept.

Respondents seek to broaden the concept so as to endorse a positive interpretation of multiculturalism rather than the classical ‘negative’ attitude of toleration towards difference. This is done through the strategy of frame amplification (Benford and Snow, 2000), which is a term derived from social movement analysis to describe the process of drawing from a concept to further amplify it.

Toleration means that I tolerate something...I think I disagree with this term, because it is not related with notions as integration, solidarity, which means that I want the other to treat me as I treat him, this is a question of values, it means I love the other person next to me, I care...
about him, and I want to help him throughout this period of his life, as I would like him to do if I were at his homeland.

Tolerance is not defended as a legal and immutable principle, but as value conditioning social relations and promoting values, such as, for instance, gender equality. In this sense, it should be problematized taking into account the role of women as victims and Muslim men are perpetrators of a legal abuse. Unequal gender relations must not go unabated in the name of ‘multiculturalism’.

If tolerance and/or acceptance of difference refer to violence against women, because that is a specific cultural or national tradition, well, this is a problem we cannot ignore. The delinquent act of abusing a woman must be reported to the police and the position that women are inferior to men must be ideologically contested. Tolerance among cultures must not be equated with the lack of dialogue or with the avoidance of conflictual situations. There must be both tolerance and rights for all (Interview 3).

In this quote, through the law and order ‘master frame’ the concept of tolerance is criticized and then amplified so as to better address everyone’s rights and satisfactorily address contemporary forms of cultural diversity within a multicultural society.

4.8 **Racist Attacks and the framing of Intolerance**

Framing tolerance as a political/ideological issue leads respondents to adopt two discursive strategies in relation to the May 2011 violent events; the first is to deny that racism is a national identity problem and rather link it to a class dimension. The second is to investigate the phenomenon trying to identify what is the problem and what is to be done.

**Racism as a class issue**

Condemning the event of the murder, respondents point out that this could have been committed both by native and migrants due to the deterioration of living conditions in the city centre.

Racism is not racial, but (a behavior) of the most powerful towards the impotent, it is pauperization that is repulsive for the people, not their color, migrants, homeless people; we will shortly hear about incidents of violence against Greek people, we already do! I care about residents of the city centre who sleep in a paper box in the streets, no matter where they come from...how they will gain access to their right to housing, health, labor, culture, cleaning services (Interview 15)

Those suffering from racist violence are not only, or principally, labeled or seen as ‘migrants’, but as ‘this increasing group of marginalized people, those people living in poverty’, as a member of an antifascist coalition comments. Respondents falling into this frame category emphasize that a crucial aspect of racist violence is intolerance towards anything different, including native people.

When you are poor, homeless, dirty, one cannot tell where you come from, and you will soon be a victim of racist discrimination, you will not be allowed to enter into fast food restaurants to go to the bathroom, and then violence will be the next. Today it is Muslims, because they are different, it used to be the Albanians, now not anymore, tomorrow it will be the unemployed. (Interview 10)

Those responsible for racist violence or discourse are not only extreme right people, groups or parties, the police and the state, but also those tolerating xenophobia. This brings us to another key
discursive strategy in the construction of frames: identifying the **victims and the perpetrators** (Roggeband, 2007).

Greek society is phobic towards not only the ‘foreigner’, but in general the ‘other’, the different, even when he or she is of the same nationality. The recent rise in racist violence in Greek public life did not come as a surprise, then since the views that

‘prioritize us against them’ are actually the only players in town, not even the left opposes them (…) People from various neighborhoods reacted against the construction of a Mosque in the same way as they have reacted against a migrants’ centre or against drug addiction centers, so even if we say that we are hospitable, we are not at all tolerant (Interview 7).

**Problematization of Racism**

As racism is not an issue of different nationality (culture/identity), then the problem arising from the May 2011 events is the criminalization and stigmatization of migrant communities and the fact that racist violence was tolerated, if not justified by local residents during those May 2011 days. For people holding dear values as tolerance towards diversity, intolerance of diversity/racism is not a natural reaction of a threatened national majority against non nationals, but a choice over how to relate with the ‘other’ and society.

The fact that we are an intolerant society is something that came about. I do not believe in racial theories, some people believe that it is in our DNA to be tolerant, and that we are a hospitable people. But when we were faced with the problem, it became apparent that we are a fearful people and we proved ready to close the door to the migrant...as we close the door to the drug addicted and so on (Interview 7)

In the same sense, not all people going through harsh living conditions resort to intolerant attitudes towards the ‘other’.

There are people who are racists, who before that (events) did not let that be expressed in public; now they do. But there is a very big part of Greek society that even today has nothing to do with racism and xenophobia, people who love the other, who care, who believe that it is not the others to blame for the crisis, and do not accuse the migrants and the refugee for what is happening to them (Interview 16)

Attributing to racism an ideological character leads respondents into looking for the various political/social causes that contributed to the rise of the phenomenon. There is an anti establishment critique which highlights inefficient EU and state migration policies, municipal authorities’ neglect and police xenophobic performance, along with the crucial role played by the mainstream media.

In line with the above problematization, respondents proceed to articulate what they consider as solutions to the problem and their own personal call for action concerning the issues at stake- what is called in frame analysis **prognosis and motivational** step. On the one hand, there are specific suggestions with regard with the city centre crisis, such as the construction of night shelters and health provisions for homeless people, drug treatment policies, development of an efficient system for monitoring racist violence and others. The state is called upon to adopt a more preventive than restrictive role, as ‘more policing or legislative measures will do no difference’ (Interview 10). On the other hand, extreme right ideology becomes widespread as it is ‘attractive putting the blame always on the other’. What is considered by respondents to be important is citizens’ personal mobilization showing that the ideological/political framing of the issues also decides where the responsibility lies for the way the ‘other’ and ‘us’ coexist.
4.9 **Identity/Culture Frame**

This frame attributes social practices and discourse uttered in public life to the culture and identity of individuals and groups involved. This emphasis on the identity, which points out to an attempt to define the self and the opponents based on nationality (Tilly 2003), is rather common when it comes to public discourse on immigration. This is done by putting emphasis on the cultural (and not civic) identity defined by the category of nation and which is appearing as beyond and above politics and irrelevant to ideology. The positions taken by respondents framing their arguments as such are the following; concerning the public prayer ‘intolerance of (religious) Diversity’ and with regard to the May 2011 violent incidents down town ‘justification or tolerance of Racist words and Actions’. The identity/cultural framing is exemplified in the reaction of LAOS’s president towards the violent events of May 2011 in the centre of Athens: ‘At some point, we have to get rid of all ‘those’ in order to save the Greek citizen.’

Touching upon the issue of co existence with the nationally and culturally ‘other’, the assumption underlying these positions is that there is a distinction between the autochthonous ‘us’ and allochthonous ‘them’. The different language, religion or customs of minority populations are seen by the national majority as threatening to the latter’s presumed cultural and/or ethnic purity (Triandafyllidou, 2012). Such a framing presents ‘us’ as a unified group united by a common national background and which by default should be protected against ‘them’, who even if they have arrived here from various destinations and for different reasons and live under different circumstances, however, they become a homogeneous group since they threaten national cohesion.

Apart from the far right representatives, this framing is also adopted by municipal councillors from other political parties the police spokesman, journalists and civil society representatives, who are not self defined as far right or right wing people, but consider this negative and threatening representation of minorities an intrinsic feature of the majority-minority relationship.

4.10 **Public Muslim Prayer and the Framing of Intolerance**

All interviewees acknowledge that tolerance is an inherent value of any democratic regime and it goes without saying that they accept it. Then, respondents framing their arguments in terms of identity and culture use two strategies to unfold the way they perceive tolerance and to justify their intolerance of (religious) diversity.

**We tolerate ‘them’ as long as this does not clash with ‘our’ rights**

The first strategy is to acknowledge the need to tolerate ‘other’s’ rights only to the extent native people’s rights are not threatened and public order is maintained. An affirmative stance, thus, that soon retreats into a restrictive view of the notion of tolerance.

Tolerance cannot be put into question, it is part of every civilization; it goes without saying and towards all differences. But I disagree with the public prayer, religion is a sacred thing, so we have to respect them, but they should themselves respect their own institution! What was that, praying in the middle of the street and provoke the people…In this country, there must be at last some kind of order established! You cannot do as you wish, if that is the case, then go back to your country!'

The protest event performed by the Muslim community is criticized on the basis of being a provoking action that could have potentially incited disorder and encouraged fanaticism.

Public order, then, is maintained by rejecting whatever may differ from the dominant religious expressions and in this way the concept of religious tolerance is severely limited.

In this context, the crisis frame is also operationalized so as to prove that values, such as tolerance, are highly irrelevant when the majority population is faced with economic and social insecurity.

When the Greeks have to contribute 30-40% of their wages in order for the state to survive, they are called to contribute also for those people who for their own reasons decided to enter in here. Greece is facing its own problems, very serious ones, so serious that there is no time to think whether we can be tolerant towards other things or not. If the problem of massive and uncontrolled move of people from other countries and civilizations continues, then intolerance will increase (Interview 6).

Tolerance defines the terms of co existence with the non nationals as long as national identity and well being are safeguarded and not conceived as vulnerable. This framing subsumes tolerance (and intolerance) to the Us and Them dichotomy.

This kind of intolerance is not however peculiar to this period of economic crisis in Greece. For instance, another respondent argues that all religious events, Muslim or Orthodox, must be forbidden in public in the name of secularism. However, this limitation of religious tolerance is itself subject to a further limitation: Migrants first have to adapt to the legal and cultural context of the country that hosts them and, thus, abstain from claims over religious and cultural diversity. It is only after that, that their right to protest will be recognized and their quest of tolerance (not acceptance though) can be listened to.

‘It is self evident that Greece has an identity, a Christian identity, which preexisted and the migrant must adapt, ‘when in Rome, do as the Romans’ (Interview 9).

In the name of the native majority’s wellbeing tolerance should be legally and institutionally limited. In line with this, respondents propose the following course of action: tolerance is not inexhaustible, but feasible and desirable only when referring to a limited number of different people.

Greece has to deal with an unprecedented problem; no other country has accepted such a big number in such a short time, so this became a problem. There should have been a limited number of people, which could be tolerated, because every town can put up with a certain number of them, this can be calculated, but it did not happen this way (Interview 2).

This position introduces the position of intolerance and emphasizes the limits and preconditions of toleration and the restrictive role of the national state. The same is argued in the name of migrants’ rights through the use of the law and order master frame: the wellbeing of the majority population is safeguarded by making sure migrants have legal, social and religious rights and this can be secured only for a limited number of newcomers.

Migration is not a right, we must not give the right to everyone who wishes to come to enter Greece and get a job and stay forever. We must check how many we could have, where to canalize them, what kind of jobs they could do, but, at the same, time, make sure that all of those, whom we already have, are given labour and social rights, a decent presence in the country. Otherwise, too much tolerance can lead to imposition (Interview 8).

Prioritizing the ‘us’ as against ‘them’ framing of religious or cultural diversity, enables respondents talk about tolerance while arguing for intolerance of (religious) diversity.
It is ‘them’ who cannot be tolerated

On the other hand, intolerance frame is sustained also based on another assumption, that ‘the capacity of integration that people with such a different cultural and educational background, norms of hygiene and mentalities, have is limited’ (Interview 2). In this case, it is not a matter of accepting, amplifying or restricting principles of our democracy, it is about the ‘other’ who cannot or does not want to be integrated and, thus, tolerated by us. To begin with, a distinction is made between the first (from the Balkan region, former ex communist regimes) and the second wave of migrants (sub Saharan Africa and Middle East), where

‘the first, the Balkans, had a lot in common with Greeks, our cultures were similar, there was no real multicultural attempt, we cannot compare those cases with people from Africa and Southeast Asia’ (Interview 6)

This argument is further explained in the following quote:

It has become apparent that people from the Third World cannot integrate into the Western World; it becomes difficult due to their background, not difficult, impossible. Due to the lack of institutions, the man from Bangladesh is able only to sell flowers in the streets, which is a parasitic labor according to Western criteria, and he is not willing to channel his skills in another way (Interview 8).

This way, the blame for racist violence is put on the migrants themselves, and not on the Greek society. According to another respondent, the latter has been proved tolerant in the case of second generation Albanians, for instance, who ‘not only speak Greek, but they cannot even speak Albanian, they are totally assimilated!’ If migrants wish to be tolerated, they, thus, must not differ from the native community; otherwise it is them, who put limits to tolerance.

Accepting tolerance in theory, while arguing that it is minorities who cannot be tolerated is a discursive strategy also achieved through the operationalization of law and order master frame, this time when touching upon gender inequalities. Reject tolerance in the name of Muslim women’s rights enables the political representative of the populist right party to reverse his argument and argue for intolerance exactly in the name of tolerance.

Toleration simply means that you cannot deprive my rights, simply because I tolerate you! And tolerate what? Female excision? (It means) To let me live freely without imposing me your own mentalities, toleration means there are institutions in my country, there are laws and you did not come here so to change those and impose your own, you must follow my rules. Perform your religious duties, if you wish, but (allow you to) carry out genital excision to women? I will never tolerate that! (Interview 4)

In this case gender rights are operationalized not only so as to prove ethically wrong the concept of tolerance, but also so as to reject a culture that is seen only as subordinating women and legitimating violence. In the following case of a journalist interviewed, this argument introduces the position of ‘Islamophobia’:

The other day in Paris I saw a woman wearing chador, full face, I mean. I looked at her with evil feelings, I would have called the police, this is forbidden by the law in France. Even if this takes place with her consent, it is a human’s blockage and it is forbidden. In this sense, zero tolerance! (Interview 8)

Both the radical right and the extreme right party political representatives believe that it was unacceptable to legally allow the event of the public prayer on the basis of it being Muslim. We are heading to a violent Islamization of Europe, jihad, whoever reads history is aware of that (Interview
4). Politicizing the cultural gap between minorities and autochthonous populations makes the migrant population responsible for bridging the gap and for any intolerance incidents that may occur.

There are various kinds of difference. Female genital mutilation is a painful one. Letting your children drop from school is an unacceptable one, and in Greece it is an illegal act. So, Roma people residing in the national region must understand this -even if they do understand, we are the ones who ignore it- they break the law in every single step of theirs! And when their children attend the school, they behave in such a way they become marginalized, some people says that this is racism, but if they behave in this way, what would they expect? They provoke a reaction! (Interview 8)

Tolerance as a liberal democratic principle is abolished as soon as human rights issues come into play and with this priority in mind intolerance and, what’s more, Islamophobia and phobia against the ‘other’ is introduced in politically correct terms and rational argumentation. What lies behind such a rationale, however, is the unquestionable priority of the national cultural self over migrant identities. This is how those respondents framing the event of the public prayer as a cultural/identity issue end up arguing for intolerance of (religious) diversity.

4.11 Racist Attacks and the Framing of Tolerance

Respondents framing racist attacks as a cultural/identity issue on the one hand treat diversity as a problem to be resolved and, thus, interpret those events as showcasing the difficulties arising from such a problem, while they also use the strategy of objectifying incidents of racism.

Problematization of Migration and Diversity

The massive influx of immigrants in the country, along with the recent economic crisis and the feelings of generalized insecurity for the population of Greece are factors taken into consideration by all respondents. Under the ‘cultural/identity’ frame, however, these are linked casually so as to accentuate the ‘us and them’ dichotomy.

Greece went through a problem no other country went through, no other has accepted such a big number in such a few time, and of course this naturally created a problem, because there is a huge number of people who came with different mentalities, different mindsets, different daily lives and culture, daily customs and hygiene (Interview 2).

While talking about violent clashes in the centre of Athens, one respondent repeated four times in his interview that we cannot expect from local people to tolerate all those migrants, whom, in any case, ‘nobody invited to come here, all those who came massively and without the consent of local society’. While condemning racism as an illegal and inhuman act, he departs from the assumption that diversity is per se a problem that naturally provokes negative reactions.

There is an over accumulation of migrants, there, the environment is purely multicultural. Local residents, thus, reacted. And one could of course justify their reaction, since this was a purely closed local society some years ago and it has been called upon to coexist with so many different nationalities! People were agitated seeing all those people in the streets of the neighborhood they used to know so well. That is not easy......even if we accept that a multicultural society is a positive feature (Interview 6).

This appears a legitimate conclusion to draw if one takes a look at the circumstances dominating the city centre during the last two years. A journalist describes the situation as an explosive one using the words alienation, collapse, fear, criminality, violence, isolation, and pauperization, threat, while linking the problems of delinquency, drugs, and violence with migration.
The whole human geography of the area has changed, the area itself is so different and Greek residents live as ‘freely besieged’ people, they lock up in their apartments. A woman that has learned for 70 years in the row to live in an urban environment so abruptly changed will feel threatened, that is natural (Interview 9).

This way, the murder of the citizen and the subsequent racist attacks against migrants in the centre of Athens are used to construct diversity as a problem. The uncontrolled immigration and the illegal influx of massive numbers of people in the city centre emerge as the causes of rising criminality and delinquency down town and this is a situation that people cannot bear, as admitted by the political and social actors adopting this frame.

**Non politicization/Objectification of racism**

Following this argumentation, then, racism becomes a symptom of the generalized crisis caused (also) by massive illegal immigration. According to a journalist interviewed, racism is due to the uncontrolled influx of migrants, the defragmentation of the urban landscape, the abrupt change of the familiar environment and the subsequent criminality. Explained as a natural consequence of social reasons, then, racist attacks are not labeled as an alarming phenomenon to worry about, but as a ‘reaction to some certain actions’. This normalization of racism through the cultural/identity frame is well reflected in the following words:

> It is logical for people to look for exit for their feelings of wrath, they will look for scapegoats...Our society is impressively tolerant, but now people logically react and direct their reaction against them (Interview 13).

The above becomes highly legitimated by the ‘law and order’ frame that justifies xenophobic attitudes as reactions against insecurity and for the safeguarding of public order. In this way, the majority population instead of being the perpetrator is now turned into a homogeneous victim. Even the municipal councillor representing the centre/left coalition while fiercely condemning racist attitudes considers these as a mere symptom of the generalized insecurity.

> I empathize with locals...when (fascist) groups of people appear in their door and provide them with security, what can they do, them, Mrs Giorgos who owns the grocery shop, Mrs Maria who sells fruits, they fear of the ‘foreigner’, of the ‘other’, so... (Interview 1)

In other cases, the law and order frame transforms the very acts of racist violence into a self defense action that means to protect native peoples’ rights: ‘how can people resist extreme right wing ideas and practices, when 300 people are illegally entering the country on a daily basis and violate their rights?’ (Interview 13)

As conflicts between migrants and natives are objectified and racism is naturalized, it is implicitly stated that there is no problem with the dominant culture and society. This also explains why people framing the issue as a cultural/identity problem through the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy react negatively when asked if Greek citizens are racists or if there is such an issue in the country. These violent incidents do not reflect a conscious political or ideological choice, but a natural reaction and logical channeling of peoples’ anger and fear, and cannot, thus, be considered as racist, they argue. The extreme right wing (Golden Dawn) party representative reassures that Greece has always been a hospitable country when it came to some foreigners, but this was a ‘true invasion’. When asked his opinion on the violent incidents down town, another respondent summarizes the strategy under examination:

> No, there is no racism here, these are exaggerated assumptions, these were simply the adjunct consequences of a phenomenon that is so difficult to deal with... and if there is, this is not a political or ideological problem, racism is ideological, here it is not like in other countries, there its nature is ideological, rigid, military based, there are criminals there...you cannot call
this little lady from the (Ag. Panteleimonas) neighbourhood, who went out in the square screaming a slogan a racist, of course not, what is happening in Greece is unprecedented (Interview 2)

Stressing the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy leads to the operationalization of the murder of a Greek citizen so as to justify or even tolerate intolerant and racist attitudes against migrant populations. When asked their opinion about these racist attacks down town, some respondents reversed the question, as the spokesmen of far right wing party did when answering:

There is racism against the Greeks. Crimes against Greek people are silenced by mainstream media, even if these are much more. I consider it a mistake on your behalf not to have included a relevant question in your agenda (Interview 5).

4.12 Concluding Remarks

To summarize, the two competing positions emerging from the interview texts, Tolerance of Diversity- Intolerance of Racism and Intolerance of Diversity/ Islamophobia- Tolerance/ Justification of Racism, correspond to two competing framings, the political/ ideological and the cultural/ identity one.

More precisely, those arguing along a political/ ideological frame sustain a tolerant position towards diversity and an intolerant one when it comes to racist words and acts. Even if only one interviewee explicitly attributed her choice to a ‘leftist’ ideology, however, all respondents defended what we could call ‘new left’ values such as minorities’ rights, equality and diversity according to a ‘left/ right cleavage’. Tolerance is endorsed in the name of this framing, but at the same time is proved limited to reflect accommodation of diversity in contemporary multicultural settings. Racism is perceived as a problem not to be tolerated and respondents attempt to erase the differences raised between ‘us’ and ‘them’ situating the framing on the ‘them’ tag of the ‘us/ them’ cleavage.

Those framing the events as cultural/ identity issues, on the contrary, put forward the ‘intolerance of diversity’ position, while justifying if not tolerating racist attitudes. The latter category insist on the non political/ ideological nature of their standpoint and present it as apolitical, as a non option, but, instead as a natural reaction to the problem of migration. Within this framing, racism is a mere symptom of the problem of migration and tolerance accepted in theory but severely limited in practice due to the ‘us/ them’ dichotomy. Prioritizing national identity and culture, thus, those frames could be situated on the ‘us’ tag along an ‘us/ them’ cleavage and on the ‘right’ tag of the ‘left/right’ cleavage as they prioritize national cultural identity over the ‘other’s’ rights, without questioning their liberal values and beliefs in a modern society (see Table I and Table II, Annex III).

As seen above, both frames use the law and order master frame, as well as the anti establishment critique frame, so as to develop their competing positions. For instance, state migration policies have been either lackling or inefficient and EU regulations contributed to the explosion of the problem. Concerning particularly the city centre, many of our respondents, including party representatives and the extreme right representative, claim that the first to blame is not the migrants themselves, but the state, along with all parliamentary parties, politicians and authorities, that did nothing to prevent or deal with the issue. Moving even further, the populist right representative puts the blame for uncontrolled migration to the exploitation of the Third World countries by the multinational companies and the dominant economy.

These strategies adopted when dealing with the issue are rather unexpected and resemble more to those arguing along a political/ ideological frame. There is, then, something like a basic understanding for immigrants at a first sight between those supporting the two competing frames (Caiani and Wagemann, 2006). However, the difference becomes visible through a frame analysis looking for the construction of the problems under question.
On the one hand, those arguing for intolerance through the law and order master frame examine the ‘lamentable’ phenomenon of massive immigration in terms of the effects on local people, public image and economy, without taking into account the rights of the immigrants themselves, or without rating ‘their’ rights equally with ‘ours’. The victims of criminality and lawlessness are first and foremost local residents of the central areas of Athens. Even if respondents acknowledge that immigrants’ rights are abused, however their public presence in the area puts native people’s security further at risk as this is already the case due to economic harsh situation—using in the same way the crisis frame. So, even if the law and order frame is presented as a non political way to classify and understand social reality, it is however constructed in ethnocultural terms that define the political identities of ‘us’ vs ‘them’ in the national public sphere.

In the same way, the critique of political power that both frames share, presupposes different understandings of what is the ‘problem’ and who is considered to be the perpetrator, the agent of change and the possible solutions. The cultural/identity frame attributes the role of the agent of change to the state; at the same time, however, it constructs ‘them’ as a homogeneous category that is so different than the national self that coexistence becomes a cultural problem. So, the dominant culture is not to blame, while it remains unclear how the state could have resolved what seems to be natural conflicts and unbridgeable cultural differences. Even if respondents pay lip service to tolerance during the interview, the solutions suggested through this frame are quite intolerant. In other words, there is an inconsistency between the goals formulated on the one hand and the analysis of the problems that require a solution on the other. For instance, the representative of the radical right party attributes the problem of the public prayer to state’s neglect over building a Mosque; soon afterwards, however, he denies any possibility of tolerating Muslim culture, a culture that rejects women’s rights. While both positions include the same criticism against power, voiced even by those representing power structures, however, the cultural/identity frame attacks power holders in the name of quite different criteria as it is framed in ethnocultural terms (Simmons, 2003).

Across Europe and along with the rise and gradual legitimation of ultra right wing rhetoric, hate speech is often disguised in the name of liberal values so as to exclude individuals from citizens’ liberal rights. A new principled intolerance is seen, paradoxically, as necessary to protect the rights of individuals, and the rights, values and the identity of the majority. Greece is experiencing (already in the past years but particularly so in spring 2012) an unprecedented rise of far right parties, along with a notable spreading of incidents of racist violence and xenophobic discourse in the public sphere. The actual presence of the ‘other’ in need next to the nationals, who are also through a time of crisis, renders the issue of tolerance into a central political challenge to be thoroughly examined.

The contradictory diagnoses of the ‘problem’ notably the political and principled framing of the problems by reference to tolerance (if not necessarily acceptance) of diversity and rejection of racism; and the identity framing where all issues are subsumed to a fundamental dichotomy between Us and Others (we cannot tolerate others if their presence is perceived to harm our material or cultural well being. There are no principles that hold here – the interest of the ‘ingroup’ is the utmost priority) are however solved by the strategy of objectification.

Our frame analysis suggests that competing versions of reality and of the ‘good’ are reconciled by presenting ‘intolerance’ positions as apolitical and logical reactions towards an ‘objective’ reality. Thus, with the exception of a few clearly left-wing and pro-diversity interviewees, most others, including those who would classify themselves as faithful to equality and democracy, use the law and order frame to justify and legitimize intolerance and racism. This strategy of objectification is also adopted to strengthen the culture and identity frame: it is ‘natural’ that the world is divided into ‘us’ fellow nationals and ‘them’ others. Exclusion, inequality, intolerance, even racist violence can be justified when what is at stake is the perceived interest or well being of the national ingroup.
We may call this type of intolerance as the new nationalist intolerance – a further variant of what Olsen and Mouritsen have labeled the new liberal intolerance. There is an analogy between the two sets of arguments. Principled liberal intolerance

‘is liberal by being associated with the values of autonomy and equality, democracy, and the health and stability of liberal societies. It reverses the pragmatic of old school tolerance, insisting that too much leniency may be bad for social peace and a sign of undue cultural self-doubt, and that values and virtues may in fact be implanted in recalcitrant minds. It implies that liberalism as a social and institutional order and form of civic subjectivity is vulnerable, should be defended, and needs active promotion, so that not leaving people alone is good. It censures, or at least increases the human and social costs of sub-scripting to cultural and religious practices and ‘values’, which are deemed threatening to liberal societies. And it defines as undesirable such groups that are seen as predominantly illiberal, who have their access and/or residence possibilities restricted as a consequence. (Olsen and Mouritsen 2012: p.15)

Principled national intolerance may be defined as follows. It subscribes to the values of the nationalism doctrine, notably that the world is naturally divided into nations and that nations need to preserve their political autonomy, ethnic purity and cultural authenticity. Anyone who casts doubt on this view of the world and of the nation puts the nation into danger. In addition anyone, like migrants do by definition, who violates the fundamental principle that cultural and ethnic boundaries should coincide with political ones puts the nation to danger. Indeed national intolerance can already be found in the work of A. Sayad on the paradox of alterity (Sayad 1991). Migration is deemed threatening to society. The best way to protect the nation is to restrict the rights of migrants or better to expel them altogether.

What is particularly worrying in Greece is that such discourses of principled national intolerance (and racism) are increasingly seen as justified and legitimized by reference to an ‘objective’ reality. They thus push the far right wing discourses centre-stage.
5. Greek political culture in (times of) crisis. Concluding Remarks

Before presenting some concluding remarks, let us briefly summarize the main points raised in the previous chapters of this report. Some twenty years ago, the perception of the Greek nation as ‘homogeneous’ was dominant in terms of an uncontested majority religion, culture and language. The nation was defined as ethno-cultural and religious, while civic and territorial elements were of secondary importance in defining who is Greek. The Greek state, as well as at public opinion at large, has been hesitant, if not hostile, to any assertions of collective ethnic rights on the part of native minorities - meaning actually the Muslims of Western Thrace, as the Roma and the Slavic minority have never been recognised officially as such. On the contrary, co-ethnic migrant populations, Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek Albanians, are considered to be of the same ‘genos’ (descent) and, thus, have not significantly disputed the view of the nation as a community of descent and culture. However, this was challenged by the immigrant populations that have been arriving in the country since the early 1990s. At first it was mainly Albanians, but also Romanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians and Georgians, who arrived in great numbers to shatter culturally and linguistically what seemed to be an imaginary homogeneity. Some of the more recently arrived groups, notably Pakistani and Bangladeshi citizens, even if numerically smaller, they seem to pose a great challenge to Greek society, partly because of their different phenotype and Muslim religion.

Native minority groups along with immigrant population account now for more than 10% of the total resident population. Reflecting this change, the citizenship law has been modified in 2010 so as to facilitate the naturalization of children of foreign parents born in Greece or who arrived early in the country, as well as of non-nationals living in the country for more than 7 years. Moreover, there have been intercultural seminars for teachers and reception classes for non Greek speaking pupils so as to facilitate school populations to adapt to new circumstances. Overall, however, official policies both in terms of education and political life have been quite hesitant, if not reluctant, in opening up the conception of the nation so as to accommodate diversity and accept people of non Greek descent. In various fields of life such as the labour market, political participation and education, policies have taken small and hesitant steps in a positive direction seeking to open up to the demographic, cultural and religious diversity of the resident population as this has formed in the last twenty years. The main concept used in public and policy discourse to describe this process of change and adaptation has been that of integration (rather than of tolerance, intolerance or indeed respect). Integration is generally understood by both citizens and policy makers as a one-way process by which newcomers adapt to the host society. When successful integration leads to complete cultural, religious and linguistic assimilation, keeping thus the homogeneity of the nation more or less intact.

Taking this background knowledge into account, this report has focused on school life and political life as two important realms where cultural, ethnic and religious diversity is played out and negotiated, both at the level of discourses and that of policies. Our focus here has been on contested events and/or upcoming challenges, investigating how citizens, state actors and civil society representatives involved make sense of these challenges. We particularly questioned whether they understand such challenges as issues of tolerance/acceptance or intolerance/rejection of cultural diversity in Greek society. We have investigated whether they tend to accept, tolerate or indeed reject minority and migrant claims for the accommodation of their ethnic, cultural and religious diversity and how they justify their positions. Our aim has been to understand what kind of discourses permeate society and how they relate to actual policies. Indeed in some cases, as we shall explain below, public and political discourses go beyond current policies (e.g. as regards the accommodation of religious diversity in school life) while in other cases (such as in the opening up of naturalisation requirements) they are more reactionary.

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76 This part has been authored by Hara Kouki and Anna Triandafyllidou.
The second chapter of this report first reviews the current situation in the Greek educational establishment when it comes to issues of diversity. It then examines how intolerance / tolerance / respect of diversity has been thematised by actively engaged actors (teachers, parents and pupils, as well as stakeholder), when ethnic, cultural or religious diversity relevant issues arise in Greek school life. As Greece has become host to a nearly 1 million migrant and co-ethnic returnee population, the Greek school population has become ethnically diverse including approximately 9% of children from migrant families and 1% of children from co-ethnic returnee families (2008-9). Primary, secondary and higher education have gone through a series of reforms during the 1980s, 1990s and most importantly in this last decade aimed at, among other priorities, adapting them to the changing demographic realities of the country. Studies demonstrate, however, that still Roma children are not well integrated and accepted in Greek schools and have difficulties to adapt to formal education and its rules. Migrant children, on the other hand, are well integrated in schools but they overall perform less well than their Greek peers and they abandon the school earlier.

In order to shed some light on the situation, we conducted qualitative interviews and discussion groups concerning first the question of ethnic selection practices of migrant and Roma children and then the accommodation of religious diversity in Greek schools. While segregation and discrimination against migrant or minority children are illegal and anti-Constitutional, there is a certain level of informal segregation or ethnic selection taking place in some schools. The issue is not presented as a question of rejecting, tolerating or accepting minority or migrant children, but rather on how to raise the performance of the school and its students. However, this is a politically correct discourse that disguises a strong ethnic prejudice according to which migrant children are worse than ‘our’ children. So, ethnic and racial diversity is not accepted, but it is tolerated in Greece, as migrant children are thought to have a negative impact on the quality of education provided at a school. On the other hand, religious diversity is generally tolerated in Greek schools – to the extent that it is confined to the private sphere it does not bother anyone. Although the majority religion is taken for granted and seen as a legitimate part of the school life, there is also a general questioning of what religion is, whether it should be included in the school curriculum and whether it is a problem if children are of different religions. Different attitudes towards religious diversity and different views on how it can be accommodated revealed the existence of an active and diversified public opinion.

The third chapter of this report investigates discourses on diversity and tolerance as these develop in Greek political life by focusing on two conflictual events that took place in 2010-11. During the last three years Greece has been faced with a European and international migration crisis, while the onset of the current financial crisis in early 2010 has provoked further social tensions. There has been an important increase in unemployment, in the crime rate and a generalized sense of insecurity in the centre of the capital of the country; at the same time, incidents of hate speech and racist violence more than often go unaccountable, even when perpetrators are alleged to be public officers. In parallel with the rise of racist violence, far right parties’ popularity has dramatically risen; the neo Nazi party Golden Dawn entered parliament in 2012 after having gained 7% of the total vote in the May and June 2012 national elections.

Against this background, the first case analysed in this chapter refers to the Muslim public prayer that took place in November 2010 as a peaceful protest for the non existence of an official mosque; this made the Muslim minority visible and provoked a debate on the tolerance of religious diversity in the country. The second case study refers to the event of a Greek citizen’s murder in the centre of Athens in May 2011, which triggered a series of violent and racist attacks against migrants down town and, thus, a debate on the tolerance of hate speech and racist actions in Greece. Interviews were conducted during a time when people were particularly concerned by the overall effects of the crisis on their livelihoods. Our respondents (local authorities, party representatives, migrant organisations, and civic activists) were asked to comment upon the events and came up with two competing positions. There are those, who arguing along a political/ ideological frame endorse tolerance towards the ‘other’, even if they consider the concept insufficient to accommodate diversity;
moreover, they condemn racism and deem this is not directed only against migrants, but against people who are ‘different’. On the contrary, those framing the events as cultural/identity issues consider racism a mere symptom of the problem of migration and prioritize national cultural identity over the ‘other’s’ rights. Even those respondents considering themselves to be defending democracy justify and legitimize intolerance towards the ‘migrant’ other, when what is at stake is the perceived interest or well being of the national ingroup. Our frame analysis suggests that competing versions of reality and of the ‘good’ are reconciled by presenting ‘intolerance’ positions as apolitical and logical reactions towards an ‘objective’ reality, which is the ‘natural’ division of the world into ‘us’ fellow nationals and ‘them’ others. We may call this type of intolerance as the new nationalist intolerance.

All in all, until 20 years ago, Greece was considered largely a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and mono-religious country. This definition of nationhood is still dominant and running through education, media and official discourse, daily practices and urban structures of the country. During the last two decades, however, it has been rapidly transformed into a migrant receiving country and native minority groups along with immigrant population account now for more than 10% of the total resident population. Official policies have been slow or inefficient in responding to such population changes and, thus, in accommodating diversity, as evident for instance in school reforms that have not dealt efficiently with the significant change in school population. Even if there have been some reforms and policy developments towards a tolerant direction, however, some have been already contested while the overall perspective adopted has been that of minimal liberal tolerance. This is rarely neutral in practice as it rather goes hand in hand with a tacit assumption that there is a majority culture and religion that serves as a blueprint for diversity matters.

When it comes to public perceptions, however, our interviews revealed a more complicated reality. Teachers, parents and pupils interviewed, for instance, seem to hold far more diversified opinions concerning the accommodation of diversity in school life than those reflected in official policies. Especially in what concerns religious diversity in schools, but also in public space, it seems that our respondents are ready to question things taken for granted, as the dominant conceptions of nationhood. There were interviewees who were not just tolerant, but open to endorse practices that lead to acceptance and respect of diversity. On the contrary, interview data leads us to opposite results when it comes to the current rise in racism and xenophobia. Even when denying the mere existence of such phenomena in the country, respondents felt the need to somehow justify intolerant practices as ‘normal’ according to a rigid conception of national belonging. The European and international migration crisis coupled with the onset of financial crisis seemed to legitimise feelings of fear and anger towards the ‘other’ and explain the unprecedented rise of extreme right parties in the country in such a short time.

What conclusion can we draw when bringing together these contradictory findings that emerge from our desk research and fieldwork? How are dominant national perceptions on the self and the other related with public attitudes in school and political life? How the concept of tolerance comes into play amidst this overall crisis the country is experiencing? **Is Greece a tolerant country, which is facing a multi faceted crisis, or a traditionally intolerant society towards diversity?**

### 5.1 Tolerance beyond the Ethnic/Civic Dichotomy

Our first contention concerns the concept of tolerance. Our fieldwork in school and political life present this more as a dynamic process rather than as a static civic value, as so far represented in literature.

Already since 19th century, there has been a thin equilibrium between national identity and universal human identity that has to me maintained in liberal democracies so as to ensure social cohesion among populations. Liberal ideas have been called to ‘take action’ whenever the dominant national and religious identity threatens minorities’ identities or when the majority culture does not tolerate to be challenged. During the last decades, the increasing presence of minorities in European
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses and Practices in Greece

states has transformed this conflict between nationalism and liberalism into a quasi existent question: how can plurality become incorporated within the national body? How can minorities safeguard their cultural, religious and ethnic identity within a dominant national culture? The concept of tolerance is believed to be one of the driving forces behind this merging and, as a result, has attracted scholar and policy attention to ways of introducing this in school life, for instance, or politics.

One could note that the above theoretical undertaking in the different levels of tolerance towards diversity is reflected in flexible and rigid immigration policies, assimilationist and multiculturalist integration policies, inclusionary or exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants, and laws on citizenship defined by just sanguinis and others by jus solis (Medrano and Koenig, 2005). It is widely acknowledged that models of citizenship reflect the relationship between immigrants’ and citizens’ rights in each country and, thus, the ways in which national identity, cultural difference and tolerance interact in each case. It was Brubaker (1992) in his seminal posited that ethnic conceptions of the nation are connected with jus sanguinis models of citizenship whereas civic conceptions of the nation are connected with jus soli models of citizenship perceptions and attitudes concerning the nation, citizenship and immigration (Medrano and Koenig, 2005). Literature so far has generally privileged this ethnic/civic dichotomy as capable of explaining why certain countries are more tolerant than others when it comes to ethnic, religious and cultural difference (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). Ethnic models are thought to be exclusionary when it comes to various kinds of diversity, whereas civic ones are the ones better equipped to promote tolerant attitudes and, thus, safeguard the harmonious coexistence of individuals and communities.

Greek national identity is believed to be predominantly defined in ethno-cultural terms (Demertzis, 1995). The two elements, the ethnic and the religious, are used in a pivotal but also deeply entrenched manner. Thus people have to be of Greek ancestry even if they do not speak the language. Having Greek ancestry is conceived to bring with it necessarily a Christian Orthodox religious identity. In other words, Christian Orthodoxy is a necessary but not sufficient condition while being of Greek descent is a necessary and sufficient condition. Even if there is tension specifically regarding the role of religion, however, the latter’s role within the official national identity has not been so far challenged. Socio-demographic developments during the last 20 years have willy-nilly incorporated into Greek society more than one million of immigrants of different ethnic origins and religious backgrounds. Tensions regarding the role of religion, as well as recent policy developments in Greece (relaxing of naturalisation requirements, citizenship by birth for children born in the country subject so some requirements, local voting rights for third country nationals) seemed to point to a reconsideration of what it means to be Greek today. But even if these seemed to mark a turn towards a civic citizenship approach, most recent developments in Greek political life appear as a retreat away to a rigid ethno cultural definition of belonging.

However, interview data concerning school life presented us with a more nuanced picture. Respondents’ views concerning diversity in school life were reflected in five discursive topoi varying from a basic minimal definition of tolerance to a neutral definition of acceptance. Moreover, respondents appeared as open to questioning dominant practices concerning the majority religion also when it comes to public space and political life. Citizens appear throughout the interviews as not adhering clearly or solely to the ethnic model of nationhood as projected through national education and official political discourse, while some also hold multiculturalist attitudes towards immigrants, or even put forward a civic model as more democratic. For instance, when asked about ways of accommodating diversity, respondents most often depart from the tradition of assimilation that dominates the way Greek people understand their relation with the migrant ‘other’; some of them, however, move on to negotiate or challenge this pattern and discuss further options. Studies have shown, for instance, that more or less tolerant attitudes towards the ‘other’ throughout Greek history have been integrated in a large pattern of assimilation that does not challenge the dominant national narrative (Kandylis 2006, Mazower 2004, Divani, 1999). Moreover, when it comes to interviews concerning political life, interviewees could accept religious diversity in schools and
public space, while at the same time agreeing with the dominant definition of nationhood. Even if this could appear contradictory, however the same interviewee can defend both civic and ethnic elements in the way national identity is understood. It seems that this dichotomy is somehow dismantled when it comes to daily life. The national body does not emerge through the interviews as homogeneous, but as a unit that can organically incorporate tensions and contradictions when it comes to understandings of belonging and the ‘other’.

This seems more suitable to comply with research conducted in the first decade of the twenty first century and which reveals a more flexible understanding of Greek national identity not only in terms of public policy and elites’ representations, but also among citizens (Kokosalakis 2004, Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou, 2007). In any case, the narrative that attributes to Greece an ethnocultural tradition on nationhood that strictly conditions current developments also provides us with a static view of national identity. Greek nationalism, however, did not remain invariable throughout the 20th century. Its form and content, ‘who’ was to be tolerated, accepted or rejected in the citizens’ body changed several times (Tsoukalas, 1987, Christopoulos, 2012).

Moreover, recent advances in literature move towards the same direction; studies show that although different national traditions over nationhood significantly influence the citizenship models countries produce, these are constantly in interaction with broader geopolitical and economic developments, migration flows, politics, diaspora and colonial settlements, or power relations within each nation state (Christopoulos, 2012). It is often the case that the same citizen can defend a model of belonging to a nation that entails civic and ethnic elements, at the same time as national traditions most often entail both ‘trends’ (Medrano and Koenig, 2005). That may come as no surprise, as ‘there is no sustainable concept of political culture without history; all civic and democratic cultures are unavoidably integrated in specific national histories’ (Baer, 1997). This detachment from a rigid ethnic/ civic dichotomy is also reflected in the fact that the East-West Divide in the conception of citizenship in Europe is equally put into question (Baubock and Leibich, 2010).

Furthermore, there is a general shift towards intolerant opinions and practices across Europe that in many cases stems from those same liberal values that meant to protect minorities’ rights. Within the same vein, the concept of tolerance as adopted in the ‘traditional’ host European countries has been in various cases attributed the failure of the multiculturalism model to account for social cohesion. So, it seems that tolerance has taken various forms in different countries, mainly those holding dear civic traditions of nationhood, but has not proved better to safeguard nation states against ‘ethnic’ tendencies.

What emerges through the above, thus, is that tolerance towards diversity in Greece is not an imported civic value imposed upon an ‘ethnocultural’ conception of citizenship; on the contrary, as evident from fieldwork in school and political life, it can take in practice different forms that depend (also) on the realities that the country experiences and co exist with or build upon traditions that appear as ‘exclusionary’. So, departing from this national case study as situated within a European context, we could argue that tolerance is not as a static value belonging to a civic tradition over citizenship that would be expected to better fortify nation states against xenophobia towards the ‘other’. On the contrary, it is a dynamic concept entrenched into national traditions of belonging and taking shape along with political and social developments in public life.

5.2 Intolerance not as an Exception to the Democratic Rule

Our second argument concerns the concept of racism, as a form of absolute intolerance towards diversity, which is rising at a worrying pace nowadays in Greece. Far right wing parties LAOS and Golden Dawn have attracted (the two together) between 5% and 8% of the national vote in the national elections of 2009, and 2012 (May and June) turning themselves into legitimate actors in mainstream politics, while anti-migrant racism and xenophobia have been transformed into a routine discourse in Greek society. Relating with the ‘other’ has become highly problematic in contemporary
Greece. Is this reactionary nationalism ingrained in Greek culture, a symptom of the crisis or a European trend? In our effort to shed some light to this question, we attempt to move beyond culturally deterministic approaches that consider Greek political culture to be traditionally intolerant as based on an ‘ethnocultural’ conception of citizenship, but also beyond path dependency accounts that attribute the rise of fascism to financial crisis and thus preclude the possibility of a nation state to accommodate diversity while in need.

As evident in our analysis of (in) tolerance in political life, exclusion, inequality, even racist violence can be justified when what is at stake is the interest of the national majority. Intolerant positions are introduced as politically correct discourse when framed as apolitical and legal opinions or through the ‘objectification’ strategy that manages to reconcile competing versions of reality and of the ‘good’. Although there is a left-right wing dimension organising the discourse where left wing party activists and NGOs defend a civic and plural understanding of national identity that should make room for ethnic and religious diversity, a large number of our interviews, supporters of right-wing parties and not only, expressed highly intolerant positions towards migrants in general and Islam / Muslims in particular. While the first group of respondents consider their tolerant position as a choice over how they want to live their lives and justify why, the second group of respondents need not explain why this is the case, as they present their intolerant stance as based on the self evident ‘hierarchy’ between ‘us’ and the ‘others’ which naturally organizes life in the country.

In this sense, intolerant arguments are articulated around a coherent nationalist narrative of the situation that is somehow taken for granted, as they appear rooted into conceptions of nationhood; arguments in favour of non-tolerating migrants are presented as apolitical and logical reactions towards an ‘objective’ reality. A closer look in our material reveals that intolerant positions are in a first place based on the idea of the national determination itself, which holds that each nation should have its own state-a cornerstone of both European and global politics. Moreover, respondents use the ‘objectification’ strategy exactly because, as we have already mentioned, the national body is imagined as homogenous ethnically, culturally and religiously and as such is taught and represented in public life in the country (Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou 2007). In accordance with this, official policies and narratives have treated since the 1990s immigration as a temporary phenomenon and immigrants at the individual and not collective level restricting them to presence and not participation (Kandylis, 2006). What’s more, during the last couple of years mainstream political parties and media discourse have been politically constructing immigration as a security issue, while the pre electoral campaign of the now ruling right wing party revolved around anti immigrant rhetoric. The negative rendering of immigration is how national identity has been defined during the last few years, in antagonism with minority groups. It seems, then, that key aspects of far Right ideology are embedded in national political culture and do not appear as a radical shift in thinking and acting within the national context; what seems to be at stake at this very moment is that these are shared in an intense form by the mainstream, both at the elite and mass level, and have dominated political life in the country.

On the other hand, that may appear as the natural outcome of the dominant Greek ‘exclusionary’ conception of the national self. This type of intolerance and rejection of the migrant ‘other’ emerging in the country is based on arguments about the well being of the nation as the utmost and uncontested priority that conditions all matters of social and public life. If we draw from the ethnic/civic dichotomy, then this type of intolerance is straightforwardly attributed to the ‘ethnocultural’ conception of nationhood dominant in national traditions of belonging and to the ‘Eastern’ heritage of the country and, thus, easily explained.

However, putting this national case within a broader context complicates the picture. Anxieties and fears over the immigrant ‘other’ are not only to be found in ‘mono cultural/ethnic/religious’ Greece. Both national and European Union’s policies over immigration flows, as well as the rapid rise of xenophobia in official political discourse around the continent, testify to this. Conflicts around diversity, which in Greece emerge in more pronounced form due to an
ethnocultural tradition of nationhood, seem to be part of a recent general shift towards xenophobic and racist opinions and practices across Europe. Recent studies have attempted to explain the remarkable rise of European extreme right wing parties, which tailoring their discourse to the civic and liberal elements of national identity present themselves as defenders of citizens’ rights (Hainsworth, 2008). In the light of too large religious, ethnic and cultural differences, there is a concern expressed that without some shared liberal principles shared, society will disintegrate. The allegedly liberal absolute respect to difference leads to racism as it precludes rapprochement and merging. Moving a step forward, Mouritsen and Olsen have recently argued that what we are witnessing mainly in North West European countries is the emergence of a ‘principled liberal intolerance’ across the political and social spectrum.

Taking into account the above, we argue that intolerance takes various forms in nation states and incite diverse explanations depending on different conceptions on nationhood and national histories. We consider the current popular xenophobic attitudes in Greece as a variant of the ‘liberal principled intolerance’. In Greece, this subscribes to the values of the nationalism doctrine, notably that the world is naturally divided into nations and that nations need to preserve their political autonomy, ethnic purity and cultural authenticity. All over Europe, national traditions of citizenship are operationalized so as to justify a common trend, that of a rising intolerance towards the ‘other’, which in the case of current immigration flows privileges the nationals over the non nationals. European nation states put forward intolerance not as an exception to their political tenets but as emanating from those. Intolerance is called to ‘safeguard’ the liberalism of Europe in different forms in each country.

Examining the case of the country as part of overall broader developments allows us to draw parallels between Europe and Greece, as well as to further develop our argument concerning the concept of tolerance and intolerance. Although, thus, there are reasons to explain the rise of racism in Greece by means of attributing it to strong national traditions of belonging, this would rather simplify the more complicated picture of a general European shift towards intolerance that takes various forms emanating from different traditions.

As a result, through our analysis racism towards the ‘other’ does not emerge as an aberration of national identity nor as an exception to the rule of European modern democracy (Mudde, 2010); it is not a remnant from the past or something to be explained only outside the ‘normal’ or due to some kind of crisis. On the contrary, in many cases throughout our interviews’ material such intolerant positions do not even need to be justified as an option, but are introduced as restoring ‘normality’ in a state of things that has been temporarily distorted. Racist views and practices appear as a radicalization of already existing traditions and realities that have, however, taken an unprecedented violent and aggressive form. As such, this intolerant view of the ‘other’ appeals to popular beliefs and social practices to a great extent at a time when an overall identity reconfiguration is taking place.

The above findings have a profound influence on how we study the issue of tolerance, intolerance and indeed racism especially under current economic crisis circumstances that will most probably become even harsher. What is at stake is not to understand whether Greek political culture is racist or not, nor to trace in past traditions and current developments an inevitable path of the country towards racism. What is important is to thoroughly study why and under which national and European conditions exclusionary views that have always existed within the national body became radicalized and popular and managed to dominate the public space and dialogue creating a legitimate political platform that keeps expanding. Within this general context, it is vital to understand why racist views and attitudes have gained ground over other discourses and practices; why conservative trends and reactionary forces are expressed and (re)produced through the image of the illegal immigrant in the streets- most often from a Muslim background; why and how this current shift towards intolerance has taken this aggressive and violent form that tends to become hegemonic obscuring other democratic traditions; how is this situated within the overall political culture
nowadays in relation with other political forces; and why an anti racist discourse and plan has not managed to appeal to popular beliefs and appears detached from public sentiments.

There is little doubt that the ethnic/ civic dichotomy is helpful in clarifying the issues at stake, also in the case of Greece dominated by an ethnocultural model of citizenship; however, this dichotomy seems to presuppose a particular conception of tolerance and to simplify a rather more complicated current reality that especially nowadays tends to be radically intolerant towards the ‘other’.

Our desk research combined with qualitative interviews revealed that in the case of Greece both intolerance and tolerance can be articulated by the same interviewee. The national culture cannot be strictly labelled as either tolerant or intolerant, as it entails national traditions and current realities of both acceptance of diversity and others of xenophobia. Recent advances in literature and more importantly in what European countries currently undergo seem to testify to that both intolerance and tolerance can co exist within the same political culture, as they reflect different notions of national identity. For instance, what seems to be the case at the moment is that both ethnic and civic traditions are operationalized by different nation states so as to justify a common trend throughout Europe, that of a rising intolerance towards the ‘other’, which in the case of current immigration flows privileges the nationals over the non nationals. Tolerance, then, emerges not as a value strictly belonging to a civic tradition, while, on the contrary, intolerance seems entrenched in and not alien to democratic political cultures.

What we should aim at is to examine how collective national identity is shaped in the context of an institutional structure, traditions of belonging, current developments, social practices and European and global contexts. In this particular moment, our attention should be directed towards examining why racist views and attitudes are gaining spectacular ground in the country, but also around Europe, over tolerant discourses and practices. However, exactly in view of minorities’ presence within a troubled nation state, universal human rights can merge with national identity through a dynamic perception of the concept of tolerance that will reflect current needs and produce new forms of collective membership that. Stuart Hall (1991) has defined identity as ‘something that happens over time, that is never absolutely stable, that is subject to the play of history and the play of difference’. In the same way, also racism and intolerance refer to a relationship with the ‘other’ and the ‘self’ that is subject to change, if we ask the right questions.
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Repository of publications and conference papers on intercultural education and other education issues, http://repository.edulll.gr/edulll/
Annexes

Annex I
List of interviews for Part 3 (School Life)
(all interviews were tape recorded and transcribed, unless otherwise stated below)

Interviews with experts and policy makers
No. 1, A.S., male, former Secretary of State for the Education of Greeks Abroad and Intercultural Education, Ministry of Education, 12 and 13 January 2011
No. 3, N.P., female, University lecturer, export on intercultural education, 14 January 2011.
No. 4, N.N., male, Teacher at intercultural gymnasium in the wider Athens metropolitan area, researcher on the teaching of Greek as a foreign language, interview 15 January 2011.
No. 5, D.H., male, former Secretary of State on Intercultural Education, interview, 17 January 2011.
No. 6, Z.Z., female, University professor, former Director of programme on the education of migrant and co-ethnic children, interview 20 January 2011.
No. 30, T.K., male, Elected local councillor in White Neighbourhood, 13 July 2011
No. 31, M.L., female, NGO chair person and activist, NGO providing day care and school support for Roma children, Athens, 10 June 2011.
No. 32, X.X., male, Mayor of a municipality in the outskirts of Athens with a relatively high nomadic Roma population, Athens, 11 July 2011 (the interview was not taped. The mayor initially refused to concede an interview but eventually gave some general observations about the Roma situation in his municipality).

Interviews with middle rank Ministry officials
No. 7, M. F., female, School Councillor, and former Headmaster at an intercultural gymnasium in the wider Athens metropolitan area, will now become local councillor at the 1st area of the Municipality of Athens, 8 March 2011.
No. 8, D. H., male, Director for Educational Matters, 3rd Office of Secondary Education in Athens, interview 11 March 2011.
No. 9, A. A., male, Director of Secondary Education, Prefectural Office, First Directorate of Athens, short discussion with note taking (no tape).
No. 29, P.S., male, Support Teacher in Primary Education (special role in supporting migrant and Roma children with learning difficulties) teaches for 10 years at a school in a western neighbourhood of Athens with 45% of Roma children, 14 July 2011.
Interviews in 3 selected Schools with teachers and parents

Red Neighbourhood High School (‘average’ school with some immigrant children but not many)
No. 10, Teacher of Sociology, male, 10 March 2011
No. 11, Teacher of History, male, 10 March 2011
No. 12, Headmaster of Gymnasium, female, 10 March 2011
No. 13, Greek mother with daughter in Gymnasium, 11 March 2011
No. 14, Ukrainian mother with child in Gymnasium, 11 March 2011
No. 15, Bulgarian parents (joint interview) with child in Gymnasium, 11 March 2011

White Neighbourhood High School (‘difficult’ school with high percentage of Pontic Greek children, a smaller (about 10=15%) of Roma children and with other immigrant and Greek children)
No. 16, Teacher of Chemistry, female, 15 March 2011
No. 17, Headmaster of gymnasium, female, 15 March 2011
No. 18, Greek mother with son in Gymnasium, 18 March 2011
No. 19, Albanian mother with son in Gymnasium, 18 March 2011
No. 20, Russian Pontian mother with Greek origins (the father is Georgian) with son in Gymnasium, 18 March 2011
No. 21, Greek mother married to a Greek Roma man, with daughter in Gymnasium, 18 March 2011

Yellow Neighbourhood High School (‘difficult’ school with very high percentage of immigrant children from 20 different nationalities, Greeks are a numerical minority in this school, inner city centre of Athens)
No. 22, Teacher of English, female, 16 March 2011
No. 23, Teacher of Classics, female, as of this year a pensioner but has been working for 10 years in this school, 23 March 2011
No. 24, Greek mother with son in Gymnasium (the father and the son participated in part of the interview), 21 March 2011
No. 25, Albanian father with son in Gymnasium, 26 March 2011
No. 26, Greek parents with child in Gymnasium, 21 March 2011
No. 27, Teacher, female, 9 March 2011
No. 28, Teacher of classics, female, 9 March 2011

Discussion Groups
Discussion Group 1: Seven children of Greek origin (5 boys and 2 girls) at the level of Gymnasium (aged 12-15). The discussion lasted 33 minutes and was held at the school premises. A classics teacher was present but did not interfere with the discussion. The children are students at the 2nd High School of a rich residential suburb in northern Athens, 27 June 2011.
Discussion Group 2: Seven teachers, all Greek, 6 women and 2 men, all serving at the same High School as above, , discussion lasted for 36 minutes and was held at the premises of the school at an available classroom, 27 June 2011

Discussion Group 3: Seven children of Greek origin (5 boys and 2 girls) at upper high school level (Lyceum), aged 16-17. The discussion lasted 36 minutes and was held at the school premises. No teacher was present. The children are all students at a private school in a working class neighbourhood of western Athens, 7 July 2011.

Discussion Group 4: Five participants: N.M. is in his late 20s and is a first generation African immigrant and well known NGO activist who arrived in Greece at age 8, J. is in her early 20s and is a second generation African immigrant who did all her schooling at a private English speaking school of Athens, A. is in his late 20s, a first generation Somali immigrant in Athens and NGO activist. In addition a Greek researcher and a trainee Greek researcher (both male in their late 20s and early 30s were present at the discussion – the male researcher is a close friend of N.M. and made the contact for the discussion). The discussion group was held at the premises of a research centre (ELIAMEP) in Athens on 12 July 2011. The discussion lasted 1.5 hour.

Discussion Group 5: Five participants: all parents of children in adolescence. The daughter of the Egyptian mother is attending an Arabic school, the other children attend Greek schools. Nationalities: an Egyptian mother, a Ukrainian mother married to an Egyptian man, a Moldavian mother, a Pakistani father, a Kenyan mother married to a Nigerian man. The discussion group was held at the premises of the Children’s Hospital of Athens A. Kyriakou, 28 June 2011.

Discussion Group 6: Five participants: Five Albanian mothers of adolescent children attending Greek schools. All established in Greece for 10 years or more. The discussion group was held at the premises of the Albanian Cultural Centre (NGO), 26 June 2011.

Discussion Group 7: Four participants: Two mothers and two fathers, Albanian Roma living in Greece for 15-20 years, 3-7 kids each. Working in agriculture, at the garbage site (recycling iron) and with other manual jobs, they are all residents of the White Neighbourhood. They live in temporary makeshift dwellings as they are among the semi-nomadic Roma. None of their children attends school. Only one mother with 5 children stated that she tried hard to enroll her youngest daughter (now 12) to elementary school albeith with some years dealy due to a heath problem of the child but she did not manage and she is very sad about it. The others had occasionally considered enrolling their kids to school but never did. Their elder kids work with them, some have their own kids already, the younger kids stay at home with relatives if the mother or father are out for work. The discussion was held at the premises of the Albanian cultural association, July 2011.

Discussion group 8: Four mothers of adolescent children all studying in Greek schools, nationalities: Russian, Uzbek, Ukrainian, Georgian. The discussion group was held at the premises of the Albanian cultural association, July 2011.

Interviews 1-28 were conducted by Ifigeneia Kokkali
Interviews 29-31 were conducted by Eda Gemi.
Discussion Groups 1-3 were conducted by Hara Kouki
Discussion Group 4 was conducted by Anna Triandafyllidou.
Discussion Groups 5-8 were conducted by Eda Gemi (Discussion Group 5 jointly with Meri Kumbe).

44 people in total participated in the discussion groups.
Annex II

Interview-guides for Part 3 (School Life)

Interview-guide for key-informants

1. What is your main responsibility now / in the period just before now (in the Ministry /etc.)
2. How long have you been in this position and how has your work evolved in that time? What were / are the main challenges in your work (today)?
3. What are the main challenges of diversity (cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic) in school life in Greece today?
4. In your opinion, which are the most important policy measures that have been taken so far to address these challenges? What were the difficulties faced to? What is your evaluation of the situation so far? What did work well and why? What did not work and why?
5. What does tolerance mean for you? Can the concept of tolerance provide a basis for the creation of "social cohesion" both in and outside the school?
6. If you disagree with the concept of tolerance as a basis for developing social cohesion, what notion/norm/principle would you suggest instead? And how do you define it?
7. In which way do you understand the acceptance and the respect of cultural and religious diversity in school? How do you define them? [IF NOT ANSWERED ABOVE]

Part A: spatial segregation

1. At a more practical level, it seems that some school principals object – in putting forward various obstacles – the enrolment of foreign students in their schools, usually after pressure coming from Greek parents (but not always). According to some NGOs (eg Greek Helsinki Monitor, European Roma Rights Centre) this has been done for years now in the case of Roma. What do you think about this?
2. Alternatively, what other options are there in such situations?
3. In your opinion, what are the determinants of whether a school adopts or not such practices? Why do some schools do so while others do not?

Part B: school bullying

1. Is there school bullying in Greek schools?
   [E.g. children taking things from other children or pocket money/money, threats, verbal and physical violence, etc.]
2. Do you know where the spoof /violence is focused on (in which kind of characteristics)?
   [E.g. associated with religious diversity?]
3. Do you have in mind any such incidents? In which schools?
[What has happened exactly? What was the reaction of the teachers’/parents’ association and of the school principal? How was the matter settled?]

4. Are there any measures (preventive or other) anticipated for such situations on the part of the Ministry / state? What has been done so far?

5. What kind of children (= which ethnic/national group of children) are more targeted, in your opinion? (= who are those who are teased/ bullied more often) Why?

6. Are there any fights taking place at school between 'different' groups of children? (E.g. Albanians, Russians, Greeks Afghans, etc.)?

7. Do you remember the story of Odysseus Tsenai and the flag in Mihaniona, Thessaloniki? What would you say in relation to this incident, how would you comment on it?

[Prompts: Has anything changed in the last 10 years?

Finally, who is Greek – how to determine who is Greek? ➔ What is your opinion on this and what do you think is the prevailing view (on who is Greek) among the bodies of the Greek educational system (Pedagogical Institute, Ministry, etc.)]

8. Do you think that kids like Odysseus - good or excellent students with foreign parents - may be targeted at school? (= Can have a harder time at school than an excellent Greek student?)

9. Would you like to add anything you consider important to our discussion?

10. In your opinion, which are the institutions (social and others) involved in the above issues and with whom it will be necessary for us to discuss with?

**Interview-guide for teachers of Secondary Education (high school)**

1. You are a teacher of ... [philologist, physicist, etc.].

2. For how long have you been teaching in the Secondary Education? For how long have you been teaching at ........ [Number] High School?

3. Did you know anything about this high school before coming to teach here? Have you selected it (and if so why)?

4. In recent years the presence of foreigners and repatriated pupils in Greek schools has been particularly noticeable at least in some areas of the country. What is approximately the percentage of foreign students in your school?

5. What are the main challenges you face at work today in this respect, meaning the ‘different’ – so to speak – students?

[For middle-class neighborhood school]

OR [for the two "difficult" schools]

The students of your school come largely of immigrant /Roma families [depending on the school].

From your everyday experience: What are the main challenges you face in class

- due to the presence of children whose mother tongue is not Greek and who come from countries with different traditions, customs and religion from Greece/ OR

- because of the presence of Roma children that have different customs from the majority Greek population?

**Challenges = key issues / problems**
6. Can you talk to me about an event or a problem that occurred in class or in the school in general with respect to the relations between the children in the classroom?

[Prompts: Problem to be associated with different ethnic origin of children. What happened? How did the school deal with it? What should have been done? Were you satisfied with the solution found?]

7. [IF RELEVANT] If, in the future, a similar issue occurs, in which way do you think you should deal with it? What would you suggest? What would you do in order this problem NOT to occur again? What does the school about similar issues?

**Part A: spatial segregation**

8. How would you describe your school? Do you consider it as a good school? Why?

[E.g. in relation to student performance; define what they consider a ‘good school’]

9. Is there some kind of choice in the enrolment of students in your school? And if so, in which way does this happen?

10. [If applicable / if not already answered] Does this concern specific groups of foreign students? To what extent?

[= which groups are preferred and which are they discouraged? How do you explain / justify this choice? [if justified]

**Part B: school bullying**

11. [if not already answered] How are students’ relations? Is there any segregation in groups made in the basis of nationality / ethnicity/origin? Are there any particular tensions?

12. Is there any school bullying taking place at your school?

13. Do you have in mind any such incidents?

[What exactly did it happen? What was the reaction of the teachers’/ parents’ association and of the school principal? Has the issue been resolved?]

14. Is intimidation/bullying related to religious or other difference, e.g. with the fact that some children do not speak Greek very well or have darker skin?

15. Do you remember the story of Odysseus Tsenai and the flag in Mihaniona, Thessaloniki? How did you evaluate the decision taken at the time in this school?

16. Were there any such incidents in your school?

[If there have been excellent foreign students, was there a problem/negative atmosphere/tension at school regarding the issue of the flag?]

17. In your opinion, kids like Odysseus – good or excellent students from foreign parents – do they targets of bullying at school (and if so, more than Greek children that have an excellent performance at school?)

**** [If there is time / appropriate atmosphere]

18. [WHERE APPROPRIATE/ IF RELEVANT] I would like to have your opinion on some hypothetical scenarios and how should school face them:

If the school had a relatively large proportion of Muslim pupils (e.g. 10%) and the parents of those children wanted them not to attend the customary morning prayer but instead pray at noon at a specific time according to their own traditions, would you accept it? What do you think the school should do in such a case?
19. If foreign/Roma children spoke during classes (or during the break in the courtyard) their own language, how would you deal with this? You, as an individual teacher, but also, what do you think should be done in the school for this?

20. I would also like to have your opinion on the following:

If a school was attended by several children from Roma/immigrant families, would it be appropriate to devote some lessons of history to the particular experiences and traditions of those people (e.g. the Greek Roma or European Roma) in recognition of their separate (minority/migrant) identity in Greece?

******

21. Finally, I would like to have your opinion on something more theoretical:

What does tolerance of cultural diversity at school mean for you? Is it a solid basis/principle for the making of social cohesion and peace at school?

22. Would you like to add something else that you consider important to our discussion?

**Interview-guide for Greek parents**

**Part A: spatial segregation**

1. Is the school of your child in your neighborhood?

2. Do the children attending this school live in the neighborhood or elsewhere too?

3. Did you encounter any problems (e.g. bureaucracy) when you went to enroll your child for the first time in this school? If so, what kind of problems?
   [e.g. documents were missing (and if so, of what kind), etc.]

4. Are you happy with your child’s school? Is it a good school? (If yes / no) Why?

5. Does the school have immigrant/Roma pupils? In what percentage approximately?

6. Have you ever thought of enrolling your child to another school?

7. If yes, in which school you would like to enroll your child?
   [Why do you prefer this school? (E.g. there are more Greek students, it is closer to home, the bus passes near, etc.)
   Why haven’t you finally enrolled your child to that particular school? What happened?
   (IF RELEVANT) Have you chosen the actual school of your child?]

8. With what kind of kids is your child hanging out? What does s/he have in common with her/his friends from school?
   (e.g. all of them are Greeks, etc..)

**Part B: school bullying**

9. Have you ever heard of cases of bullying in your child's school? Meaning, have you ever heard that some kids tease others systematically, make full of them, take their things, etc.?

10. Has your child ever complained about something similar?
11. Do you know where teasing focuses on?
[E.g. because of being Greek.]

[If for someone else’s child]
What is that makes those children targets of bullying?
[e.g. other religion/language or skin color or very good students or who have a disability...]

[For both cases]
12. [IF RELEVANT] What social/cultural or other characteristics have in general those children who "intimidate"/bully other children at school? (if you happen to know...)

13. Is there any segregation in the pupils’ groups according to nationality? Are there any particular tensions? (e.g. fights at school among children who speak different languages, say Greeks and Albanians or Russians, etc.)

14. Has your child ever asked to change school? If yes, why/ what was the reason put forward for this request?

15. [If yes] In what kind of school did your child ask to go to? [What was the difference with the current one (i.e. more Greek children/ no Roma children at school/ better reputation/ supposed to be an easier school, etc.)

16. Do you remember the story of Odysseus Tsenai and the flag in Mihaniona, Thessaloniki? In your child’s school was there any such issue?

Which was the child that has been the flag carrier this year on October, 28th?
[If an immigrant child, was there dissatisfaction/reactions, as in the case of Odysseus? What has been said? / What has happened?

How do you feel about this issue? Is it right/fair? What should be done?]

17. Sometimes, students with excellent performance at school become victims of bullying too. Are you aware of such cases in the school of your child?

18. [If yes] Is there a difference between immigrant children and local children? (=immigrant children who excel do they receive the same pressure and/or the same admiration at school as the local children? Is there a difference?)

[If yes, what is the difference?]

**** [If there is time / appropriate atmosphere]

19. [WHERE APPROPRIATE/ IF RELEVANT] I would like to have your opinion on some hypothetical scenarios and how should school face them:
If the school had a relatively large proportion of Muslim pupils (e.g. 10%) and the parents of those children wanted them not to attend the customary morning prayer but instead pray at noon at a specific time according to their own traditions, what would you think of this?

20. I would also like to have your opinion on the following:

If a school was attended by several children from Roma/immigrant families, would it be appropriate to devote some lessons of history to the particular experiences and traditions of those people (e.g. the Greek Roma or European Roma or immigrants) in recognition of their separate (minority/migrant) identity in Greece?

**Interview-guide for parents (non-Greek + Roma)**

**Part A: spatial segregation**

1. Is the school of your child in your neighborhood?

2. Do the children attending this school live in the neighborhood or elsewhere too?

3. Did you encounter any problems (e.g. bureaucracy) when you went to enroll your child for the first time in this school? If so, what kind of problems?
   [e.g. documents were missing (and if so, of what kind), etc.]

4. Are you happy with your child’s school? Is it a good school? (If yes / no) Why?

5. Does the school have other immigrant/Roma children apart your own child? What is approximately their percentage?

6. Have you ever thought of enrolling your child to another school?

7. If yes, in which school you would like to enroll your child?
   [Why do you prefer this school? (E.g. there are more Greek students, it is closer to home, the bus passes near, etc.)]

Why haven’t you finally enrolled your child to that particular school? What happened?

IF RELEVANT: Have you chosen the actual school of your child?

8. With what kind of kids is your child hanging out? What does s/he have in common with her/his friends from school?
   (e.g. all of them are Roma/Albanians, etc..)

**Part B: school bullying**

9. Have you ever heard of cases of bullying in your child's school? Meaning, have you ever heard that some kids tease others systematically, make full of them, take their things, etc.?

10. Has your child ever complained about something similar?

***************

[For the interviewee’s child]

11. Do you know where teasing focuses on?
   [Is it that they are Albanian, Bulgarian, Gypsy, etc.]
If for someone else’s child
What is that makes those children targets of bullying?
[e.g. other religion/language or skin color or very good students or who have a disability...]

***************

[For both cases]

12. [IF RELEVANT] What social/cultural or other characteristics have in general those children who “intimidate”/bully other children at school? (if you happen to know...)

***************

13. Is there any segregation in the pupils’ groups according to nationality? Are there any particular tensions? (e.g. fights at school among children who speak different languages, say Greeks and Albanians or Russians, etc.)

14. Has your child ever asked to change school? If yes, why/what was the reason put forward for this?

15. [If yes] In what kind of school did your child ask to go to? [What was the difference with the current one (i.e. more Greek children/no Roma children at school/better reputation/supposed to be an easier school, etc.)

Interview Guide for immigrant parents

16. Do you remember the story of Odysseus Tsenai and the flag in Mihaniona, Thessaloniki? In your child’s school was there any such issue?

Which was the child that has been the flag carrier this year on October, 28th?

[If an immigrant child, was there dissatisfaction/reactions, as in the case of Odysseus? What has been said? / What has happened?
How do you feel about this issue? Is it right/fair? What should be done?]

Interview-guide for Roma parents

16. Do you remember the story of Odysseus Tsenai and the flag in Mihaniona, Thessaloniki? In your child’s school was there such an issue?

17. Has there ever been a Roma flag carrier in this school?

[If not, why do you think this is so?]

18. How does your child do at school? What are his/her grades?

[ever happened to have the lowest grades in the classroom?]
Discussion Group Guide

June 2011

Topic 1: Selection of school (lower high school/gymnasium)

We would like you to tell us what have been the main criteria for selecting the school in which your child goes?

   The school is close to home
   This is the school that the child prefers (because it is close in the neighbourhood, or because her/his friends from elementary school go there)

Are you happy with the school?

How are your relations with the school headmaster and with the teachers?

What does your child feel at school? Does s/he like it? Does s/he have friends? Did s/he ever had problems with fellow pupils from other countries (including from Greece)? did they tease him? If yes why?

Does the school have a high percentage of foreign/co ethnic migrant or Roma children?

Is this something good or bad for you?

If you could, would you change your child’s school? If yes why?

What is most important for you in selecting a high school for your child?

Have you heard of cases when a school headmaster avoided to enrol children from other countries, of Roma origin or from co-ethnic families?

Topic 2: Religious diversity in schools

In Greece schools children are required to participate in the morning prayer. Children of other religious or who are atheist do not have the option of doing something else but stand in line together with other children even if they do not pray.

Something similar happens with the religion class. Parents who wish may ask the school that their child is exempted from religion class. In this case children have to stay in the class but don not participate in the lesson, nor give exams on the subject.

Do you think that the above solutions are satisfactory? i.e. the possibility to stand in line but not pray? Or to be in class but not participate in the course? Is this a good solution for children from different religious backgrounds? Would you propose a different policy or practice? What would you propose? (if they have a hard time proposing something, you may suggest possible solutions such as

The organisation of alternative religion classes like history of religions

The organisation of different courses for children from different backgrounds (e.g. mulims, catholics etc.) and of philosophy classes for children whose families are non believers.

The school could provide a place for people who are of a different (from the majority) religion to pray in the morning or in the time that their religion requires.

To celebrate all the important festivities of the big religions, e.g. not only Xmas but also the end of the Ramadan, or the Chinese new year or the Jewish Passover.
Generally do you feel that in Greece there is acceptance or at least tolerance of religious difference in school life?

How do teachers treat children of different religions? In the same way as Christian Orthodox children? Is there some sort of distinction?

Has your child suffered ever from such a distinction? If you recall a relevant incident please tell us the story.
Annex III

List of Interviews for Part 4 (Political Life)

Authorities

Athens Municipal Councilmen
1) K. M, lawyer, (‘Right to the City’, PASOK-DHMAR), Migrant Integration Council chairwoman
2) S. E., journalist, (‘Athens, the Town of our Life, New Democracy-LAOS), Vice Mayor and chairman of the Centre for Solidarity with the Homelessness of the City of Athens during 2007-2010
3) E. P., University Professor of Architecture, (‘Open City’, SYN), founding member of Network for the Political and Social Rights
4) N. M., teacher of mathematics, (‘Greek Dawn’, Golden Dawn), leader of Golden Dawn LAOS representative
5) K. V., journalist, LAOS MP, Thes/ki Police Unit
6) A. K., Police Lieutenant, Hellenic Police Press Spokesman

Media

8) S. T., writer, translator, contributing often in Ta Nea and Athens Voice (free press)
9) G. P., TV presenter MEGA, journalist, To Vima, Ta Nea

Civil Society

10) N. K., doctor, president of Medicins du Monde Greece
11) V. H., clergyman (Church S. Efthimios Kipselis), president of Christian Solidarity and Charitable Fund of Athens Archdiocese
12) D. N., coordinator of ΚΙΠΟΚΑ (Mobilization of Citizens for the Centre of Athens)
13) G. T., President of Attica Hotel Owners and of the Athens’ Chamber of Hotels
14) G. A., Network for Political and Social Rights, founding member of NEVER AGAIN (anti fascist coalition for the centre of Athens)
15) G. V., architect, Architects’ Group of the Mobilization of Residents of the 6th municipal district of Athens
16) N. E. and A. S., President of Muslim Association of Greece/ Public Relations Manager
17) Y. M., President of The Afghan Association in Greece
18) H. K., ex hunger striker
19) S. P., head teacher of 132nd primary school of Athens

**Questionnaire**

**Case Studies**
- What happened then (1,2,3) and what was your stance on that?
- What do you think about the immigration issue in Greece? How is this reflected in the city centre of Athens? (How is the current crisis related to it?) Which would be the way to deal with it? Is there a European dimension to it?

**On Tolerance**
- Do you think the Greek society is tolerant towards cultural/religious diversity?
- What do you think tolerance towards diversity mean? And how is this translated in daily life?
- Does the current crisis affect the issue of migration?
- Is Greece more or less tolerant than other societies?
- Do you think a cautious/intolerant discourse related with immigrants is more relevant nowadays than it was some years before? Why?

**On Racism/Xenophobia**
- How would you describe a xenophobic/racist discourse/action?
- How do you explain the rise of extreme right wing parties/groups in Europe?
- How do you explain the rise of extreme right wing parties/groups in Athens/Greece?
- Will the current crisis affect issues of racism/xenophobia?
### Annex IV

**Tables for Part 4 (Political Life)**

**Table I. Frames (4)/ Actors (19)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Tolerate (Justify) Racism</th>
<th>Intolerance of Racism</th>
<th>Tolerance of (religious) diversity in public</th>
<th>Islamophobia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal A (centre-left)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal B (right)</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal C (left)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal D (extreme left)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP (populist right)</td>
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<td>Church representative</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journalist A</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journalist B</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journalist C</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO (medicins sans frontiers)</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO (citizens’ security)</td>
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<td>NGO (antifascist coalition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society (hotel owner represent.)</td>
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<td>Civil society (teacher)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society (architect)</td>
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<td>Immigrant community repress. A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrant community repress. B</td>
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<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex V

List of Ultra Right Wing Sources for Part 4 (Political Life)

It is difficult to map and represent the ultra right wing ‘movement’ in Greece as a linear process and well articulated list of groups and people. What we can do is find the links between groups - political initiatives and ad hoc associations, blogs, press, editorial houses, well known individuals, and TV shows, as well as the points of convergence between fascist discourse and parliamentary extreme right wing agents.

Ultra Right Wing Groups


Golden Dawn http://xryshaygh.wordpress.com/

Autonomous Nationalists (Aftonomoi Ethnikistes) http://ediktyo.gr/

National Front (National Front) http://ethnikometopo.gr/

National Alliance (royalist Ethniki Simmahia)

Greek Front (Elliniko Metopo), MP LAOS Makis Vorides,(editorial house) www.e-grammes.gr, www.metopo.gr

Patriotic Front (Patriotiko Metopo) http://www.pamet.gr/

Black Swan (Mavros Kiknos) http://mavroskrinos.blogspot.com/

Ardin (Ardin) http://www.ardin.gr/

Ultra Right Wing Blogs

http://redskywarning.blogspot.com/
http://egklmatikotita-allodapwn.blogspot.com/
http://www.eglimatikotita.gr/
http://www.patriwtes.gr/
http://hellenicrevenge.blogspot.com/
http://www.thermopilai.org/
http://olympia.gr/
http://www.afipnisis.gr/
http://ellinikiafipnisis.blogspot.com/
http://www.resaltomag.gr/
http://enantion-olwn.blogspot.com/
http://www.greekalert.com/
http://patriotismos.wordpress.com/
http://ellinikoistologio.blogspot.com/
Ultra Right Wing Press

Alpha Ena (Alpha Ena- weekly press release of parliamentary party LAOS) alphal.gr
Free World (Eleftheros Kosmos) elkosmos.gr
Free Time (Eleftheri Ora- daily release by pro junta Mihalopoulos) elora.gr
Golden Dawn (Chrisi Avgi- weekly) http://xryshaygh.wordpress.com/
Counterattack (LAOS youthsection) http://resistance-hellas.blogspot.com/
Patria, http://www.patriamag.gr/
National Front (Ethniko Metopo) http://ethnikometopo.gr/
Target (Stohos) http://www.stoxos.gr/
Greek Lines (Ellinikes Grammes) www.e-grammes.gr/

Local groups are not present in the net, some leaflets are available in hand and information through other sites (e.g. local committee of America Square, Angelopoulou, Viktoria Square, of the Museum district, and of the cultural association ‘The Friends of Kipseli’)

List of Anti Racist and Human Rights groups and NGOs

Aitima, http://aitima.gr/
Antifascist Coalition NEVER AGAIN
Doctors of the World (MdM Greece), www.mdmgreece.gr
Network of Social Support for Refugees and Immigrants, http://migrant.diktio.org/
Greek Council for Refugees, www.gcr.gr
Greek Helsinki Monitor, www.greekhelsinki.gr
Greek Forum of Refugees www.migrant.gr
Klimaka, www.klimaka.org.gr
Metadrasi, www.metadrasi.org
The Greek Ombudsman, www.synigoros.gr/allodapoi
Ecumenical Refugee Programme
Praksis, www.praksis.gr
Movement ‘Expel Racism’, www.ksm.gr/kar
Anti Racism and Fascism Initiative, www.antiracismfascism.org
Institute for Rights, Equality and Diversity (i-red), www.i-red.eu/
Youth against Racism in Europe (YRE), http://www.yregreece.blogspot.com/
Annex VI

Law 927/1979


Art.1

1. anyone who publicly, orally or in writing or through pictures or any other means intentionally incites people to perform acts or carry out activities which may result in discrimination, hatred or violence against other persons or groups of persons on the sole ground of the latter’s racial or ethnic origin or religion (by virtue of article 24 of Law 1419/1984) is punished by imprisonment for a maximum of two years and/or pecuniary penalty or both;

2. The above-mentioned penalties are dealt with by the same provision in cases where someone establishes or participates in organisations that aim at organising propaganda or activities of any form whatsoever, leading to racial discrimination.

Art.2

To express publicly, either orally or by the press or by written texts or through pictures or any other means offensive ideas against any individual or group of individuals on the grounds of the latter’s racial or ethnic origin or religion. The penalty provided for in this case is imprisonment of a maximum of one year and/or pecuniary penalty.

Art.3 (abolished and substituted by art.16 of law 3304/2005)

The initial art.3 of the latter included provisions about fines and sanctions against those discriminating during provision of goods and services on the grounds of ethnic or racial origin. The law 3304/2005 by art.16 has extended protection to victims of sexual orientation by providing that ‘whoever violates the prohibition of discriminatory treatment on grounds of ethnic or racial origin or religious or other beliefs, disability, age or sexual orientation, during transactions regarding provision of goods or services to the public is punished by imprisonment of six months and up to three years and with a fine from 1000 up to 6000 Euros.’ The motives of the crime are taken into account when determining the sentence so racist motives can be considered as aggravating circumstances. According to the article 23 of Law 3719/2008, amending article 79 of the Criminal Code (Presidential Decree n.283/1985), committing an offence on the basis of, inter alia, ethnic, racial or religious hatred is considered an aggravating circumstance.

Art.71.4 of the law n. 3386/2005) provides ex officio prosecution of acts of racism and xenophobia as described in the law n.927/1979.