Tolerance and Cultural Diversity
Concepts and Practices in Hungary

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Executive Summary

Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Hungary

The ‘Nation’ has figured prominently in Hungarian political and social life over the last century and a half to describe and explain all sorts of social and economic phenomena. In order to better understand the impact of this most recent resurgence in Hungarian nationalism on discourses and practices of tolerance, we explain in our study how the question of Hungary’s internal minorities (and the Roma in particular) has taken a backseat to the question of the transborder Hungarians. The result is that in certain respect the search for solutions to the Roma problem in Hungary is still in its infancy. For years, Hungary’s policies toward its minorities were driven, at least in part, by concern for (and a preoccupation with) the transborder Hungarians: Hungary used its domestic policies in an attempt to set an example for the neighboring countries to adopt in their treatment of the transborder Hungarians. The policies thus devised for Hungary’s minorities and the Roma in particular did not always correspond to the needs or demands of these minorities. Legislative changes in education, the welfare system, and economic structures have often had the effect of further marginalizing the Roma. This continued socio-economic marginalization of the Roma has been further exacerbated by racialized understandings of difference (particularly evident vis-à-vis the Roma) that preclude possibilities for socio-cultural integration and/or accommodation.

The major tolerance issues in Hungary today are overwhelmingly related to the situation of the Roma. Social scientific research shows that the Roma are the primary target of the most intense prejudice and racism in Hungary. The extreme right has recently turned their attention to the Roma not with the aim of ameliorating tensions but rather aggravating them by scapegoating the Roma. This has had the effect of legitimating the continued radicalization of more mainstream discourses on the Roma.

Immigrants in Hungary, although very small in number, are also typically viewed with a combination of fear and distrust. The largest group of immigrants to Hungary are Hungarians from the neighboring countries. Despite the fact that in political discourse these Hungarians constitute an important part of the national ‘self’, in and through the practices of immigration they have been constituted as, somewhat ironically, a national ‘other’. Other immigrant groups in contrast have been less visible simply due to their small numbers. But when these groups do appear in the media, they too are often presented as either threatening (e.g. the Chinese mafia) or at the very least exotic. The study elaborates on these two main types of groups: indigenous groups and immigrants.

The 1993 Minorities Law signalled a ‘multicultural turn’ in Hungary’s relations with its minorities. The Law officially recognized (and institutionally accommodated) cultural and ethnic difference. As for the Roma, the law contributed little to resolving the harsh social, cultural and economic problems they experienced. Roma political mobilisation and activism has been unable to reverse these trends. Roma minority self-governments and political parties were formed after the 1993 law, but without significant power.
Although rarely successful, Hungarian elites have made some significant efforts over the past three decades to adopt minority and human rights frameworks laid out by the European Union and other international organisations. These changes have also importantly been accompanied by the new availability of financial resources, part of which have reached the targeted minorities and contributed to the improvement of certain aspects of their lives (e.g., a slight decline in school segregation in some districts, and the improved treatment of immigrants and refugees). But while the EU has undoubtedly produced successes in these and other regards, the accession process has also somewhat paradoxically provided new opportunity structures for nationalists and right-wing radical groups to pursue discourses and policies of intolerance towards ethnic and religious groups. This is what is occurring now with the Roma in Hungary. The Roma will therefore be the main focus of our further research into issues of tolerance and acceptance in Hungary.

The embodiment of (in)tolerance in discourses and practices addressing cultural diversity in schools in Hungary – The case of Roma

The case study addresses two issues that are of major importance from the point of view of ‘tolerance’ and ‘diversity’ in present day Hungary. The first deals with the complex and multifaceted issue of the segregation of Roma children in the education system, and the second focuses on the curriculum: how diversity questions related to the Roma minority are manifested in the content of the curriculum. Hungarian pupils’ scores in the PISA test reflect the two most important characteristics of the school system: its ineffectiveness, and its selectivity (favouring children of higher social status, contributing to social inequalities, and failing to compensate for students coming from disadvantaged family backgrounds).

The most important educational issue for the Roma in the last decade has been the desegregation of the school system and the (failed) integration of Roma pupils into mainstream education. In 2002 the government launched a set of policy initiatives designed to tackle these issue. Many of these initiatives have been formally integrated into the current system, but the overall social and political reception of the policy has been negative, thus contributing to strong opposition at all levels of policy implementation. This opposition makes it important for it reveals many aspects of the concept of ‘non-acceptance-tolerance-respect’ in the Hungarian context. The second case, the teaching of minority (Roma) content both in the framework of ‘minority education’ and the National Core Curriculum intended for the entire student population, raises important questions about how Roma cultural difference is understood and taught and how it contributes (or not) to the issue of the three-fold conceptualisation of ‘tolerance’.

In our analysis of the desegregation/integration policy debates we identified three main discourses: the ‘firm advocacy for desegregation’, the ‘unintentional segregation’ and the ‘justified segregation’. The ‘firm advocacy’ discourse is a clear-cut case of tolerance insofar as it emphasised acceptance of the ‘other’ as the ultimate goal. This acceptance could only be achieved by teaching Roma and non-Roma (disadvantaged and middle-class children) in the same classrooms and schools. Early socialisation is thus an essential ingredient for learning toleration of the other. The next discourse type, ‘unintentional segregation’, similarly stressed that learning to accept others required early socialisation. In contrast to the ‘firm advocacy’ view, however, the ‘unintentional segregation’ discourse interpreted segregation as a ‘natural’ and irreversible process. From this perspective, segregation could thus be justified and even
be beneficial to the children. As such, the meaning of tolerance is blurred since it is not clear how the distant other would be or should be viewed or treated. The third ‘justified segregation’ discourse is an example of what we have termed ‘reverse respect’. In the name of respect for cultural diversity, proponents of this view endorsed separate education for Roma so that the Roma may better preserve their customs, language and identity. It is questionable whether those articulating such views had the best interests of the Roma in mind. To the contrary, they may have been more interested in protecting the cultural integrity of the majority nation against encroachments from the Roma; hence the term, ‘reverse respect’. Indeed, proponents of this view tended to associate Roma culture with low social status, deviance, and undesirable behaviour – hardly cultural traits in need of preservation.

The discourse analysis of the issue of the cultural accommodation of Roma in the school system revealed three types of formulations of the problem. The first, the essentialist-culturalist type sees Roma cultural difference basically in essential terms. Although well intended, this approach results in promoting a type of curriculum that treats Roma not as an integral part of the society but as a group apart characterized by specific cultural traits. This approach can be contrasted with the second type, the multiculturalist, that also emphasises the cultural distinctiveness of Roma but it starts from a constructivist understanding of culture. It underlines that Roma culture should be seen as a social historical construction. The social integrationist perceives Roma cultural difference also from a constructivist point of view but it ascribes difference to the ‘culture of poverty’ arguing that Roma otherness is a result of their historically low social status. The different understandings of Roma culture have implications as to the ‘tolerance framework’. Similarly to the discourses on the desegregation/integration theme, we have found a case of ‘reversed respect’: the essentialist-culturalists argue for a type of ‘respect’ that has the intention to keep the other at a distance. Cultural difference is glorified as long as it remains intact and does not assimilate to the mainstream culture. The argument lacks references to human rights or excluded the possibility of cooperation between the majority and the minority culture. The multiculturalists, on the other hand, could be argued to support ‘real respect’ since they stress recognition of cultural difference along with the respect of human rights and mutual understanding of majority and minority. Finally, the social integrationists could be seen as promoters of ‘tolerance’ by drawing on such values as human rights and cooperation between groups without giving importance to culture and cultural difference.

The radicalisation of media discourse. The rise of the extreme right in Hungary and the Roma question.

In Hungary in the last couple of years we have witnessed the rise of radical racist discourse. The radical rightwing party succeeded in setting the terms of political debate and bringing the Roma question back to centre stage. This resulted in calls to ‘break taboos’ to allow for a sincere biologically and a culturally informed discussion of difference. Both forms of discourse lead to exclusion.

The aim of this case study is to better understand the strengthening of the radical right in Hungary, its openly anti-Roma discourses, and the reactions of mainstream political actors to this radicalism. We examine the media coverage of two murders, one in which the Roma were the perpetrators and in the other in which they were the victims. We also review public debate on the question of Roma integration and the end of political correctness as it appeared in the
mainstream media. The two murders are significant for understanding how the Roma question became increasingly racialised. The first incident we have ‘Olaszliszka’ after the locale where the murder took place. In 2006, a, non-Roma teacher was lynched by a group of Roma. Our second case is ‘Tatárszentgyörgy’, also named after the locale where the murder occurred. In 2009, a Roma father and his son were murdered by a number of Hungarian men who were known for their neo-Nazi political allegiances. Both murders were followed by serious local conflicts between the Roma and non-Roma actors, and both drew unprecedented media attention that set off national political debates. Our third case addresses the aftermath of the media representation and the public debates generated by the two incidents. The conclusion drawn by a number of intellectuals was that politically correct discourse should be abandoned, as they viewed it as an impediment to ‘genuine’ dialogue on these important issues. This in turn legitimated the further racialisation of the Roma question by virtually all parties to the debate.

Our interest throughout is in examining the ways in which both radical and mainstream discourse have contributed to the reproduction and legitimation of anti-Roma attitudes and actions in Hungary. Our analysis considers the radical right’s discourses on these issues and how they ultimately fed into more moderate or mainstream political and public debate.

Our analysis revealed intolerant discourses not only from the radical right media but from the conservative as well. In these media the Roma are characterised as biologically different: their innate inclination for crime means that they cannot be tolerated. The leftist newspaper we sampled emphasizes tolerance through norms of human rights and non-discrimination. In the integration debate we found that the emphasis switching to the Roma’s purported cultural distinctiveness. This more culturalist interpretation was nevertheless still exclusionary in its effects, even if it was coming from the left. The main distinction between the left on the one hand and the right and radical right on the other was in the degree of their exclusion.

We also consider how these discourses relate to our non-tolerance–tolerance–acceptance model. We have argued that both kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet displayed intolerant discursive strategies that invoked the putative biological differences of the Roma. The Roma are not deserving of toleration given their genetically innate inclination to crime. Népszabadság in contrast used discursive strategies that emphasised tolerance through a respect of basic human rights and non-discrimination. In the integration debate we found that the ‘end of political correctness’ and ‘peculiar Roma culture’ topoi were used to stress the cultural distinctiveness of the Roma (not in genetic but cultural terms). The recognition of this distinctiveness, however, does not point to the integration of the Roma but on the contrary, to their continued exclusion, as was the case with kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet as well. The main element of the Roma’s distinctiveness is their deliberate exclusion.

These findings point to a growing tendency of non-tolerant public discourse in Hungary that spread to almost all corners of the political spectrum. There are several political and social processes that contribute to this trend of non-tolerant. First, the rise of radical racist discourses which has accompanied the political successes of the radical right wing party, Jobbik, has set the political and media agenda by thematising the ‘Roma question’.

Second, non-radical political and public figures from both the left and right have responded to this thematisation of the ‘Roma question’ in a way that has not excluded non-tolerant racist discourses. Indeed, they have often been complicit in legitimating non-tolerant discourses. By
acting as partners in ‘breaking taboos’, they have simultaneously been breaking with the tolerant language that supposedly accompanied those taboos.

Third, in the current non-tolerant climate, accepting the (cultural) difference of other ethnic groups has become impossible. ‘Roma cultural difference’ instead was ‘accepted’, though in a somewhat ambiguous way: its existence was acknowledged, but as grounds for deliberate exclusion. This is similar to what we witnessed in France in the 1970s when the new right misappropriated the slogan of the left, ‘le droit à la différence’ for their own purposes, claiming that immigrants have the right to difference because their culture is so different from French culture that integration is not a possibility. Similarly, in the UK, cultural racists have claimed that other (immigrant) cultures cannot be integrated.

Finally, in Hungary as in some other post-socialist countries, non-tolerance has troublingly become a rally cry of a good number of political and public actors, often irrespective of political affiliation. State institutions, political parties and the media have joined forces to fuel suspicion of Roma difference, be it biological or cultural. As a result, tolerance as a value and discourse has suffered, embraced by only a handful of actors increasingly marginal to the political mainstream.

Synthesis of the diversity discourses in the field of education and media

Synthesising the finding of all chapters, we came to some conclusions with regards to all the fields studied in the project. Various social actors connected to the education who faced proposed changes intended to end segregation responded by claiming that segregation of the Roma is legitimate and justified under certain circumstances. Typically these actors invoked culturalist arguments about ethnic difference, claiming that the Roma are a culturally distinct group with desire to remain separate from the majority society. Therefore, it is in their best interest to segregate them, that is, to let them live as they wish. Although different stakeholders expressed different views, this undercurrent of cultural distinctiveness (and its justification of segregation) was dominant and widespread. At the same time, cultural distinctiveness in the curriculum was treated either as unnecessary (there was no need to mention Roma in textbooks) or if acknowledged the Roma constituted a category of ‘outsider’. As a result, topics related to the Roma were taught only in classrooms with exclusively Roma pupils; majority pupils therefore are not exposed to anything having to do with Roma culture, or history. This educational phase of socialisation goes by without any opportunity to learn about or appreciate the ‘difference’ that exists in society. Pupils do not learn how to relate to other ethnic groups.

The media, in contrast, presented both tolerant and intolerant discourses. The main question that concerns us is which discourses were more dominant or influential, those that were tolerant, or those promoting intolerance. As we observed, over time, the radical racist discourses became increasingly common and accepted. This was due in part to a number of incidents that lead to the abandonment of political correctness. Ultimately the mainstream media started using discourses that could be joined with the more racist versions favoured by the radical right. As we argued in the mainstream media, cultural differences are presented and understood as unchangeable and therefore deterministic: Roma desire to remain outside of majority society by refusing to embrace its norms and values. The radical right website uses both biological and cultural explanations of difference whereas the mainstream media
distinguishes itself by claiming that its cultural interpretations protect it from the sorts of accusations of racism that the extreme right has faced. Nevertheless, the logic and aim of biological and cultural racism is the same: to maintain social distance and hierarchies by excluding certain groups.

The Hungarian public sphere has become more intolerant in the last couple of years. We have identified various political and social factors that are connected to and indeed manifest these changes. The most important factor is the rise of the radical right, both in terms of their electoral successes but also with respect to increased activity (and popularity) related to their civil organizations and movements. These far right views have worryingly spread through much of Hungarian society, due at least in part to the work of discourses like ‘reverse respect’ becoming acceptable and legitimate. Radicalism in Hungary in many ways has become normal; it is the new mainstream. Radicalism is not as menacing as it once was, it has been tamed by its subtle acceptance and even endorsement in Hungary’s political establishment.

One measure of the far right’s successes was its ability to set the terms of debate, thus taking over certain areas of the public discourse. By thematising issues (such as the Roma question) that have in the past been handled in a more cautious manner the radical right has managed to set an agenda that all other political and public actors have followed. To be sure, this was not an unambiguous process. Rather than openly and directly condemning the racist rhetoric coming from the far right, established mainstream parties (together with the media) remained silent or even reacted in a more receptive way. Indeed, the call ‘breaking taboos’ was welcomed for its promises to ‘tell the truth’, thus replacing dishonest, insincere, and flawed discourses of non-discrimination, human rights and tolerance.

In this way non-tolerance has emerged as the dominant paradigm, and tolerance is increasingly on the defensive. Public figures representing or advocating tolerant values have been marginalised. In other respects, the public sphere has become deeply polarised between remaining stalwarts committed to tolerance and the growing majority of voices advocating non-tolerance. The animosity between these positions is tangible in many areas of public life.

The common denominator in all of these questions is ‘Roma cultural difference’. This is not only found informing these various discourses, it also explains the ways in which different positions of non-tolerance, tolerance, and acceptance/respect are formulated with respect to the Roma in Hungary. The most important feature of the Roma’s distinctiveness is presented as their deliberate outsider-ness. This is only one of their supposed traits, but it has become the dominant one. This understanding of Roma difference appears in all areas of public life in Hungary. It is repeatedly invoked to legitimise exclusionary practices and policies with respect to education and as found in the media. We labelled this discourse ‘reverse respect’, and we identified it as contributing to the spread and growth of intolerance in Hungary. Under the pretext of ‘respect’ and ‘tolerance’, the proponents of ‘reverse respect’ are actually promoting exclusion. Moreover, the genuine respect we identified in multiculturalist discourse is negligent in its influence on the wider public. Recognising difference and respecting other cultures is not possible with respect to the Roma since their culture is deficient.

‘Reverse respect’ should thus be understood as a type of racism that invokes cultural as opposed to biological interpretations of difference. At the same time, it avoids openly arguing that Roma culture is inferior, but it ascribes traits to the group that can hardly be recognised as
positive. The main difference between traditional (biological) racism and this new cultural racism – both conspicuously present in public discourse in Hungary today – is that the latter absorbs the former, making inherently racist ideas more palatable to a wider public.

**Keywords**

nationalism, racism, segregation, desegregation, integration, discrimination, immigration, Hungary, Roma, transborder Hungarians, intolerance, tolerance, acceptance, respect, education system, curricula, cultural difference, radical right, media discourse, political correctness.
Introduction

Our study explores social practices in the field of education and political life with the aim to reveal the everyday as well as the political manifestations of (non-) tolerance and acceptance/recognition.

The first chapter of this study discusses the cultural diversity challenges in Hungary over the last 30 years in a way that highlights the most pressing questions in Hungary related to the Roma. The Roma, socio-economically marginalised in Hungary, present Hungary with its most significant diversity challenge. A long history of assimilative politics coupled with the stigmatisation of Roma belonging have compelled a good number of Roma to seek anonymity in Hungarian majority society. The regime change in 1989/1990 brought with it the official legal recognition of cultural diversity of minorities, including the Roma. This did not, however, result in a reversal of the stigma of being Roma. In fact, anti-Roma attitudes remain very strong and even have enjoyed a resurgence parallel to the recent rise of the radical right.

Poverty, social exclusion, and segregation, all accompanied by racism, discrimination, and contempt, are the fate that awaits many Roma. While there are several other national minority groups living in the country, their low numbers and their average socio-economic status make them significantly less relevant with respect to questions of diversity. The number of migrants and asylum seekers from Asian and African is very small. There is one migrant group, however, that is important for our research, not so much for its size (relatively small, but still the largest overall cohort of migrants to the country), but because it has constantly generated public debates that have often resulted in controversial policies. This is ethnic Hungarian migrants from the neighbouring countries who have been arriving mostly in the last twenty years.

Most questions related to minorities are all versions of the same fundamental question: who belongs to the Hungarian nation. This question has long been debated in both ethnic and civic terms. We are interested in the consequences these debates have for definitions of toleration and acceptance for these Hungarians, for the Roma, but also for other minority groups in Hungary.

The second chapter addresses two themes that are important from the point of view of ‘(non-) tolerance’ and ‘acceptance’ in present day Hungary with regards to the education system. The first focuses on the issue of segregation of Roma children in the education system, and the second explores the issue of the curriculum, more precisely how questions related to the Roma minority are dealt with in the content of the curriculum.

The aim of the case study related to political life (chapter 3.) is to investigate the strengthening of the radical right in Hungary and its anti-Roma discourses and to see how these discourses were received by mainstream media. The analysis focuses on the media coverage of two high profile incidents, one in which Roma were the perpetrators, and the other in which they were its victims. The two murders set off huge public debates where racist language became more and more widespread and accepted.
Chapter 1.

Anikó Horváth – Zsuzsanna Vidra – Jon Fox:
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Hungary

1. Introduction

The 2010 Hungarian Parliamentary elections made it onto the front page of many international newspapers. Although most papers reported on the electoral success of the radical right-wing political party, Jobbik, at the same time another, arguably more important, development had occurred in Hungarian electoral politics that led to the restructuring of the entire Hungarian political landscape. The previously governing Hungarian Socialist Party was unseated (capturing only a couple more percentage points of the vote than Jobbik), while the Fidesz-KDNP coalition (the centre-right Hungarian Civic Union-Christian Democratic People’s Party, hereinafter simply ‘Fidesz’) received enough votes to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament, making it possible for them to pass legislation (or even change the constitution) without support from the opposition. The new government made it clear that they saw their victory as a “two-thirds revolution” reflecting the will of the “Hungarian nation”. Thus, as the new Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared, Fidesz formed a “Government of National Causes” which would not shy away from using its constitutional majority “to demolish taboos”. They intended to push their own legislation through parliament and to rewrite the Hungarian Constitution to reflect “the moral system of the new Framework for National Cooperation”.

The ‘nation’ played a central role in Fidesz’s vision of legislative and constitutional reform for Hungary. Through its national discourse and policies, Fidesz implicitly and explicitly identified who belonged, and who, by extension did not, to the nation. Ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary in the neighbouring countries were included (and not only symbolically) in Fidesz’s conception of the ‘Hungarian Nation’. This was reflected in the institution of dual citizenship for transborder Hungarians, one of the first laws passed by the new parliament. The new law removed residency requirements for those speaking Hungarian and claiming Hungarian ancestry. In effect, this meant that the 2.5 million ethnic Hungarians in the neighbouring countries were now eligible for Hungarian citizenship. In his ‘one-hundred day’ speech Orbán made it clear that these transborder Hungarians were now ‘reunited’ with the ‘Nation’.

At the same time, boundaries of exclusion from the ‘Nation’ were also being redrawn at the level of discourse and in some cases policies as well. The Roma minority, which had featured

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1 The KDNP is a small party that would not have obtained enough votes in 2010 to enter parliament without the support of Fidesz. The last time the KDNP won seats on its own was in 1994. After the party fell apart in 1997, many of the party’s MPs joined the Fidesz fraction in the parliament. Former KDNP members joined Fidesz lists in 1998 in elections that saw Fidesz ultimately form a government. KDNP subsequently reformed and the two parties formed an official alliance in 2005, a year before the 2006 parliamentary elections (in which they lost out to the Socialists).
2 Prime Minister Orbán, evaluating the first 100 days of his government’s work, in a speech at the ‘Professzorok Batthyány Köre’ on September 4, 2010.
3 Ibid.
4 Prime Minister Orbán on September 4, 2010.
prominently in the 2010 elections as the primary ‘Other’ against which the ‘Nation’ was constructed, clearly did not fit in Fidesz’s conception of the ‘Nation’. A series of laws were passed that directly or indirectly targeted the Roma ‘problem’: tougher measures on petty crime were introduced; school behaviour of children deemed violent was to be more strictly punished; it again became possible to fail students, thus forcing them to repeat the school year even if they were only in the first grade; and actions seen as ‘welfare delinquencies’ were criminalized. Although none of these changes named the Roma explicitly (to the contrary, Fidesz repeatedly invoked an anti-discrimination discourse citing ‘dignity for all’\(^5\)) it is clear that the Roma were disproportionately affected by these measures.

Orbán thus clearly demarcated the boundaries of the Nation. Transborder Hungarians were referred to as ‘co-nationals’ (nemzettársak) or ‘Hungarian people’ (magyar emberek), and Roma were ‘our fellow citizens’ (állampolgárok) or ‘our compatriots’ (polgártársak). Other ‘markers’ also conveyed and constructed difference: ‘Gypsy ethnic origin’ (cigányszármazás), ‘skin colour’ (bőrszín), ‘citizens belonging to the Roma minority’ (Roma kisebbséghez tartozó állampolgárok) were often used in relation to criminality, social welfare delinquencies, or school violence.\(^6\) Government officials emphasized the fact that they had to take action against such crimes in order to protect Hungarians, whose interests had been neglected by the previous government. The irony of this situation is that while the boundaries of national inclusion were extended beyond the political borders of the country, the boundaries of national difference were constructed within those same political boundaries. This was an ethnic (or ethnicised) vision of the nation: it included transborder Hungarians but excluded Roma.

These inclusionary and exclusionary discourses were diluted versions of similar discourses preferred and proffered by the right-wing party Jobbik. Indeed, the governing party, Fidesz, operated in a symbiotic if ultimately silent relationship with Jobbik. When it suited them, Fidesz, could draw clear boundaries to distinguish them and Jobbik, identifying in the process what was unacceptable and what was not. On other occasions, Jobbik became the unofficial spokesperson for Fidesz, saying explicitly what Fidesz dare not say even implicitly, thus blurring the lines between politically correct and stigmatizing discourses.

The dramatic electoral changes taking place in the spring of 2010 reflect only the latest chapter in Hungary’s political history of national inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, the discourses circulating now enjoy political legitimacy in large part due to their lineage through previous generations of Hungarians politics. The status of Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries has been a perennial topic of public debate on the nation on and off for the last century. All post-communist governments of varying political stripes have made the transborder Hungarian question central to their political agenda. The question of Hungary’s internal minorities has taken a backseat to the question of the transborder Hungarians. In many ways, Hungary’s policies on internal minorities can even be said to have been driven by the political elite’s preoccupation with the transborder Hungarians: Hungary has used its domestic policies to set the example for minority politics which the neighbouring countries have been meant to follow in their treatment of Hungarians. But the policies they

\(^5\) See for example the ‘one-hundred day’ speech of Orbán on September 2, 2010 (http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=152748), or his parliamentary address on ‘Roma criminality’, September 13, 2010 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0x3bJ7wUck).

\(^6\) Ibid.; see also some of Orbán’s declarations during the electoral campaign: (http://www.nol.hu/belfold/Orban_viktor__ciganybunozes_nincs__ciganybunozok_vannak).
have devised for Hungary’s minorities in general and the Roma in particular have provided administrative structures that do not always meet their needs. Legislative changes that were introduced in education, the welfare system, and economic structures have had the effect of further marginalizing the Roma. The key difference now with the rise of Fidesz has been the party’s ability to implement policies unencumbered by political opposition.

Our study on tolerance will focus its attention on these two groups: the transborder Hungarians and the Roma. We will sketch out the position of other groups in Hungary in both historical and demographic context, but our main focus will be on these two groups that have also received historically the main focus in Hungarian political, cultural, and social life.
2. National identity and state formation in Hungary

The ‘Nation’ has figured prominently in Hungarian political and social life over the last century and a half as an all-encompassing framework to explain all sorts of social and economic phenomena. The ‘nation’ has even overshadowed to a certain extent traditional left-right political cleavages in various east European contexts (Fox and Vermeersch, 2010; Palonen, 2009). In order to better appreciate this resurgence of the ‘Nation’ in Hungarian political and public thought, as well as its effects on the public’s perceptions of what ‘being Hungarian’ means, we will look at, first, how Hungarian national identity has been historically constituted, and, second, changing popular understanding of Hungarian national identity. In both cases our interest is in how both political and public space has been ‘nationalized’ and the implications of these developments for both inclusion and exclusion.

Understandings of the ‘Nation’ in Hungary

Political debates on questions related to definitions of the ‘Hungarian nation’ began in Hungary in the 19th century and have continued with varying degrees of intensity and with periodically shifting ‘Other-figures’ to the present day. The debates wavered between ethnocultural and civic-political conceptions of Hungarian nationhood. These competing conceptions were applied differently to Hungary’s changing landscape of minority politics. Until 1918 the minority question concerned those non-Hungarian living within the borders of the Hungarian portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After World War I and the loss of territory it entailed, the situation of the Hungarian minorities living in the newly constituted or transformed neighbouring countries became the main national minority issue. Then as now, the relationship between internal (non-Hungarian) and external (Hungarian) minorities was viewed as two sides of the same coin: how can Hungary adequately address the issue of its internal minorities without harming the interests of ethnic Hungarians living outside the national borders.

Different solutions to this problem have been proposed at different historical junctures. Following Hungary’s political reconfiguration at the conclusion of WWI, the ruling classes “perceived the main danger as the threat to the existence of what remained of the state of Hungary”, overshadowing their concerns for the Hungarian minority abroad (Kis, 2002a, p. 234). During the years of the Cold War stability “Hungarian statehood – even if not independence – seemed fairly secure. Thus, the anxiety for the Hungarians outside of Hungary, for their capacity to resist oppression and forced assimilation, became the main preoccupation of the new populists” (Kis, 2002a, p. 234). This distinction led to different policy strategies and outcomes: while the ruling classes sought out alliances in the interwar period to help bolster Hungarian statehood and regain the lost territories, by the 1960s and 1970s, when the Hungarian minorities of the neighbouring countries were ‘rediscovered’ and their existence raised political questions for Hungary, the new populists had to depart from the old nationalism and form alliances with western powers embracing the discourse of human rights and minority rights.

Things changed again following the collapse of communism when Europe emerged as a key political actor, “offer[ing] a set of international standards, including provisions on minority rights, in terms of which conflict resolution could be sought” (Kis, 2002a, p. 236). This new
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Concepts and Practices in Hungary

generation of Hungarian nationalists thus had to ‘learn’ this new rights-discourse if they wanted to be accepted in European politics. The ensuing debate has

“reveal[ed] a deeper disagreement between the nationalist and non-nationalist understandings of the policy of minority rights. For non-nationalists, the commitment for such a policy is a matter of principle, a consequence of their more general commitment to freedom, equality, and individual dignity. Nationalists, on the other hand, adopt the rights-discourse as a matter of tactical accommodation to a status quo, not as a framework for principled settlement” (Kis, 2002a, p. 238).

Nationalists thus, argues Kis, fail both the universalization test (anti-Semitism and indifference for the plight of the Roma are common in these groups) and the human-rights test (they treat individual human rights with neglect and contempt).

**Hungarian national identity and some of its external “Others”**

Hungary has defined itself not only vis-à-vis internal minorities (the Roma) and external neighbours, but also vis-à-vis Europe. After World War II, when leading public figures were expected to legitimize the “sovietization” of Hungary and the neighbouring countries (Bariska and Pallai, 2005), there was little room for open debate on questions of national identity. In this new context, the ‘reactionary forces of the ancient regime constituted the ‘internal Other’; at the same time the “people of the East” became part of the ‘self’ in a new homogeneous and homogenising version of Eastern Europe. This was an attempt to ideologically and historically justify the geo-political division of Europe, a political reality that emerged after Yalta. Similarities among the nations of Eastern-Europe were frequently stressed, and common roots in their history, literature, and culture were highlighted by literary critics, musicologists, ethnographers, and historians.

These state-driven, top-down identity construction programs ultimately contributed to the appearance of a counter-debate, led by historians, about the characteristics of Hungarian national identity and Hungary’s position in Europe. Starting in the 1960s a new generation of Hungarian historians began to reframe the “Europe debate”, many of them with the aim of differentiating Hungary and its neighboring countries – “Central Europe” – from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thus repositioning the region on the mental and geographical map of the continent (Pach, 1963, 1968; Berend – Ranki, 1968, 1969; Szűcs, 1981; Berend 1982, 1985; Hanák, 1988). Beginning in the early 1970s, more and more academics argued that a sharp line cut through Eastern Europe where the western parts of this region – especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary – were more developed and thus more similar to Western Europe. However, it was not until the early 1980s that a Hungarian historian, Jeno Szucs, openly claimed that Europe was divided into three parts – the West, the East, and the in-between region of Central-Eastern-Europe. He argued that each of these three regions had a different path of development (Szűcs, 1981).

By the 1980s this debate evolved into a more general dispute about the existence and essence of a “Central” Europe, with well known intellectuals from all around Europe chiming in (Milan Kundera, Czeslaw Milosz, Eugene Ionesco, Danilo Kis, Gyorgy Konrad, Timothy Garton Ash and others). This debate centred on the degree to which a shared Central-European culture and mentality could be said to exist. These debates carried into the 1990s,
trickling down ever more into public consciousness and public opinion, leading ultimately to
the rediscovery of the Hungarians that lived as minorities in the neighbouring countries. Csepeli (1989) argues that at the start of late 1970s Hungarian national identity began a
process of reinventing itself. Part of this can be explained by an emergence in a “world-wide
demand for a reformulation of national identity”, but the more particular reasons were the
worsening condition of Hungarians living outside Hungary: “consequently, beginning in the
second half of the 1970s, an outwardly directed aspect of the national question emerged in
Hungary” – argues Csepeli (1989). In surveys conducted in the 1980s a significant number of
Hungary’s population (57%) said that “there were countries in Hungary’s vicinity which
discriminate against Hungarians who live there” and they thought that the Hungarian state
should support and help these groups of Hungarians living outside of Hungary. However, it
was only a minority of the respondents which said that, if it became necessary, Hungary
should not avoid clashes with its neighbours (23%), while an even smaller proportion (7%)
thought that there was nothing objectionable “to the Hungarian government’s extortion of its
neighbours through the limitation of domestic minority group’s rights.” (1989)

This shift in focus by the early 1990s led to the re-emergence of some of the neighbouring
states and nationalities as Hungary’s dominant ‘external Others’, thus undoing completely any
notion of ‘relatedness’ among ‘the people of the East’ that had been constructed and
legitimated during Communism.

**Attitude surveys on Hungarian national identity**

Surveys from recent decades reveal ambiguity over popular understandings of Hungarianness. Research from the 1980s showed that political vacillation between ethno-cultural and civic-
political understandings of nationhood was reflected in popular confusion over Hungarian
national identity (Csepeli, 1989). On the one hand, the communist state promoted a civic-
political understanding of identity where all individuals, irrespective of their background,
were equal citizens. On the other hand, in its everyday practices the same state placed
pressure on minority groups to assimilate into a ‘homogenous nation’. This was further
complicated by the fact that the majority population resisted the assimilation of certain
minority groups, especially that of the Roma. Attempts at ‘integration’ were thus viewed as
imposed cultural and lifestyle practices that were deemed desirable for the Roma by members
of the majority society (e.g., the forced washing and haircutting campaigns to ‘civilize’ the
Roma in the 1960s, as described by Stewart, 1989; Bernath and Polyak, 2001).

National identity is understood in Hungary as elsewhere as an ascribed identity, one that it is
given at birth (and therefore one that is not achieved). The assimilation of the Roma was thus
inconceivable simply because the Roma were ascribed “a separate minority identity which
took into account primarily origin and outward appearance. That made it impossible, even in
theory, for a change in ‘national’ character to occur” (Csepeli, 1989; Hann, 1990).

In the 1990s there was a greater ambivalence in relation to these civic-political and ethno-
cultural understandings of national identity. On the one hand, human rights, tolerance, and
rational discourse were seen as dominant components of the national character; on the other
hand, ethnocentrism and intolerance towards foreigners were part of the same national
identity. These latter components were remnants of the long history of the ‘culture-nation’
rhetoric of Hungary and could be best understood by using Habermas’ concept of ‘welfare
chauvinism’: people living in developed welfare states were aware of the set of privileges they benefited from, and, fearing the loss of those privileges, they developed feelings of ethnocentrism and intolerance towards foreigners (Csepeli, 1997; Csepeli et al., 1999).

More recently culture-nation conceptions of Hungarianness have been resurgent. This is manifest in the lately declining negative attitudes towards foreigners (xenophobia) and the increasing prejudice, rejection, and negative attitudes towards internal minorities (mainly the Roma). This is accompanied by claims of cultural supremacy and the rejection of ‘difference’. These trends have been attributed to alarmist discourses about the ‘shrinking of the nation’ (nemzetfogyás) which anticipate a rapid aging of Hungary’s population. Against this backdrop, foreigners are increasingly expected to undergo complete assimilation. This was made easier (at least in theory; see below) by the fact that the largest group of immigrants in Hungary are ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries. These groups speak Hungarian as mother tongue and share more or less the same cultural codes; as such they are not perceived as threatening the ‘Nation’. In contrast, assimilation of internal minorities and especially the Roma is viewed as much more problematic: a separate ethnicised and sometimes racialized identity is ascribed to the group, based mainly on origin and outward appearance, which makes assimilation unimaginable.

Nationalism and ethnocentrism has been consistently high among Hungary’s population since the 1990s (Csepeli et al., 2004; Örkény, 2006). During this same time significant changes have occurred not so much in the degree of nationalism but in its content and in the socio-economic background of those who support it. In the mid 1990s, the demographic profile of nationalists was older and low social status; ten years later this demographic profile dissipated and only value preferences correlate with nationalist attitudes (Csepeli et al., 2004). At the same time, ethno-cultural understandings of the nation have enjoyed a political revival. This has contributed to a slight decrease in xenophobia and rejection of foreigners but also a significant increase in prejudice and intolerance against internal minority groups, namely the Roma.
3. Cultural diversity challenges during the last 30 years

In this section we identify minority groups in Hungary and account for their ‘difference’. We summarize the most important demographic features of these groups and briefly outline their histories with a focus on questions of toleration and/or exclusion. We also explore how well ‘toleration’ captures the circumstances of these groups in the larger political and social contexts in which they are embedded. Whilst we provide a general overview of all major minority groups in Hungary, our focus will be on the Roma (as our ‘indigenous’ minority) and transborder Hungarians (as our ‘immigrant’ group).

The most significant tolerance issues in Hungary today are related to the situation of the Roma. Their ‘otherness’ has been constructed differently from other groups for a variety of complex historical and social reasons. At present, Roma are the target of the most intense xenophobia, prejudice, and racism in Hungary. Historically, it was Jews who were seen as the primary internal other against which the national ‘self’ was understood; now it’s the Roma who fill this role. This is due in part to the rise of the extreme right who have turned new (and negative) attention on the Roma, further legitimating the radicalization of more mainstream discourses in the process. But the extreme right is both cause and consequence of this: anti-Roma prejudices can and also should be viewed more generally as a ‘cultural code’ shared reflected to varying degrees and with different interpretation in all political discourse and indeed at a societal level more generally as well. In different ways, a wide range of political processes contribute to the ethnicization of Hungary’s social, political, and economic problems by making a scapegoat of the Roma.

Immigrants in Hungary, although comparatively small in number, are also typically viewed as a fearful ‘other’. This is even the case, somewhat paradoxically, when the ‘other’ in certain other contexts (namely nationalist political discourse) simultaneously constitutes part of the national ‘self’. Thus ethnic Hungarians arriving in large numbers primarily as labour migrants from the neighbouring countries since the early 1990s have suffered the humiliations and degradations (often ethnicised) of labour migrants elsewhere in the world, in spite of their nominally shared ethnicity. Other immigrant groups in contrast have basically remained more invisible due to their small numbers. But when these other immigrant groups do appear in the media, they too are often presented as either threatening (e.g. the Chinese mafia) or at the very least exotic. Our primary focus in the present project will be on the co-ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries.

Main minority groups in Hungary

We will discuss both indigenous groups and immigrant groups in Hungary. The **indigenous groups** include:

1. National minorities: Germans, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Greek, Armenians, Poles, Bulgarians, Romanians
2. Religious minority: Jews
3. Ethnic minority: Roma

The **immigrants** include:

4. Ethnic Hungarian immigrants from the neighbouring countries
Indigenous groups –demographic picture

Changes in the number of the biggest national and ethnic minority groups, 1949-2001:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Slovak</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Croat</th>
<th>Slovène</th>
<th>Romanian</th>
<th>Roma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>22 455</td>
<td>25 988</td>
<td>5 185</td>
<td>20 123</td>
<td>4 473</td>
<td>14 713</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>50 765</td>
<td>30 690</td>
<td>4 583</td>
<td>33 014</td>
<td>10 502</td>
<td>8 640</td>
<td>325 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35 594</td>
<td>21 176</td>
<td>12 235</td>
<td>14 609</td>
<td>4 205</td>
<td>8 640</td>
<td>325 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>31 231</td>
<td>16 054</td>
<td>20 030</td>
<td>5 185</td>
<td>14 713</td>
<td>10 740</td>
<td>142 683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>30 824</td>
<td>10 459</td>
<td>2 905</td>
<td>13 570</td>
<td>1 930</td>
<td>7 139</td>
<td>380 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>62 233</td>
<td>17 692</td>
<td>3 816</td>
<td>15 620</td>
<td>3 040</td>
<td>7 995</td>
<td>190 046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sociological estimations⁸:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Slovak</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Croat</th>
<th>Slovène</th>
<th>Romanian</th>
<th>Roma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>80 000-90 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>400 000-800 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the 2001 census, about 4% of Hungary’s population belong to a national minority group. The Roma minority population has at least doubled over the last forty years from an estimated 200 000 (1967) to 400 000-800 000 (2008). Censuses in Hungary notoriously undercount Roma who are reluctant to self-identify as Roma for fear of persecution.

National minorities

Hungary is home to a number of officially recognized national minorities that together make up about 8-12% of the population including both the Roma and the national minority groups. Most officially recognized minorities in Hungary are the result of the post World War I efforts to fashion (ethnically homogenous) nation states out of previously multi-national empires in the region. Whilst minorities constituted nearly half of the population of the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, the post war I truncated version of Hungary (with two-thirds less territory and half the population) largely achieved its aims of national homogeneity, thus accounting for the modest figures for national minorities that we see echoed generations later in contemporary Hungary. After World War II, the expatriation of a large part of the German minority and the population exchange of ethnic Slovaks in Hungary for ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, as well as the assimilationist politics of the communist regime resulted in even further population decrease of national minorities in Hungary.

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⁷ The data are from the national census.

⁸ Estimations – as opposed to census data – began in the late 1980s and are done regularly by organizations and researchers.

Source: Tilkovszký 1998. As to the data on the Roma population, the most important sources are: Kemény-Janky-Lengyel 2004; Kemény-Janky 2003; Ladányi-Szelényi 2002.
A. Germans/Swabs

Germans have lived in Hungary since the 17th century when came as settlers. More waves arrived throughout the centuries to follow. At the end of World War I, 500,000 Germans lived in Hungary. After WWII, in the name of collective guilt, thousands of Germans were either deported to the Soviet Union for forced labour (35,000-60,000) or expatriated back to Germany. During this period, in total about 185,000 Germans were deprived of their citizenship and of property and had to leave the country for Germany. About 230,000 Germans remained in Hungary.

During the communist regime, the cultural activities of the German minority were very limited. In this politically (and ethnically) constrained environment, however, the Alliance of Germans was established and officially recognised (1955), thus providing the German intelligencia with an opportunity to develop certain literary and fine art activities as well as to engage in research projects on the history, linguistic and ethnographic characteristics of the German minority in Hungary. From the early 1980s, the Alliance established its first bilingual primary schools. These schools were popular with German families, including those who had otherwise been on the path to assimilation. This contributed to a revival of German culture in Hungary, which included the fostering of cultural and economic links with various organizations in Western Germany. Today, the German minority (benefitting from the 1993 Minorities Law) is very active and enjoys a vibrant cultural life in villages and towns where there are significant numbers of ethnic Germans.

B. Slovaks

As in case of the Germans, Slovaks also settled in the historic territory of Hungary in the middle ages to fill various gaps in the labour market. And like the Germans, Hungary’s Slovak population was also subjected to population transfers following the conclusion of World War II. At this time nearly half a million Slovaks lived in Hungary and a million Hungarians lived in Slovakia. The population exchange affected a much smaller proportion (but nevertheless very significant) of the two groups: 76,000 Hungarians move to Hungary from Slovakia, and 60,000 Slovaks moved from Hungary to Slovakia. Today, there are still villages and towns in Hungary where half of the population declares themselves Slovak. In these places there are minority self-governments which organize local cultural life. Like the Germans, the Slovaks have also been beneficiaries of the 1993 Law on Minorities. Slovaks thus have been bouncing back from the post World War II population transfers with Czechoslovakia which had attempted (unsuccessfully) to tidy up a messy national minority picture.

C. Other national minorities: Greeks/Bulgarians/Croats/Serbs/Slovenes/Ruthenians/Ukrainians/Poles/Armenians/Romanians

The number of ‘other national minorities’ in Hungary (including Greeks, Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Poles, Armenians, and Romanians) totals altogether around 40,000 (with nearly three-quarters of those being either Croatian, Romanian, or Ukrainian).

Hungary’s Law on Minorities granted all of these groups a degree of cultural autonomy that has contributed to their revival (though this especially true for the biggest of these groups, the Germans and Slovaks). This cultural autonomy, however, is in large part symbolic. Given the
relatively small number of these groups together with the degree of their assimilation, none are viewed as a challenge to the hegemony of the Hungarian nation or as groups that present problems related to toleration today.

D. Jews

The Jewish population is estimated to be around 80 000 – 200 000 in today’s Hungary. At the beginning of the 19th century this population was rather small, consisting of mainly wealthy families living in urban areas. From the 1830s onwards, new migrants (mostly from poor rural backgrounds and Yiddish speaking) started to arrive from Galicia and Russia. By the turn of the century Jews made up 4% of Hungary’s population. The liberal and open political atmosphere of the time, however, contributed to a significant degree of assimilation among these Jews. The political emancipation of Jews took place in 1867 and in 1895 the Jewish religion was given the same legal status as other religions, thus effectively legalizing mixed marriages between Jews and Christians. Hungarian Jews turned increasingly to Hungarian culture and Hungarian even became the language of religious practices. The Jewish population, especially in towns, mixed with the rest of the population. Intermarriage and conversion provided further paths of assimilation. These trends continued relatively unabated until 1882 and the ‘Tiszaeszlár trial’ in which members of a Jewish community were accused of killing a Christian girl for her blood to drink at Pesach. Whilst the accusations were ultimately dropped, the trial signalled a new era in the rise of anti-Semitism in Hungary.

A new era in anti-Semitism began following the end of World War I. The political shock owing to the loss of territories and population led to the dominance of an irredentist political ideology that went hand-in-hand with (and indeed fuelled) the rise of anti-Semitism. In 1920 the Hungarian government passed the first ‘numerus clauses’ law, placing caps on the number of Jews who could be admitted to university. Further laws followed culminating in the late 1930s with severe restrictions placed on the Jews’ basic rights of citizenship. With the outbreak of World War II, Jews were moved to ghettos before they were eventually deported with the German occupation in 1944. In the span of a couple of months about 600 000 people (70% of Hungary’s Jewish population at the time, most of them from the countryside) were deported to the death camps and killed. The majority of the Budapest Jews (in the ghettos), however, survived.

After the end of the war a segment of the surviving Jewish population left the country for the US and Israel. Many of those who stayed behind in Hungary joined the Communist Party. Jews also participated in the 1956 revolution, but because Rákosi, the previous dictator, was well-known for his Jewish origins, whose Jewish origin was well-known, anti-Semitism rose as a result during the revolutionary period. The revolution was oppressed and thirty years of soft communism followed (the Kádár-regime, 1956-1989). But this soft communism was not soft for national or religious minorities, who by the 1960s were being subjected to policies of assimilation and religious persecution. The National Church Office controlled all churches and let them function only under surveillance. Practicing one’s religion was risky and demanded lots of personal devotion. The majority of Budapest Jews were already strongly assimilated before the war and this tendency continued in the Kádár era.

9 Jews are neither a national, ethnic nor a religious minority from an official point of view; rather Jewish is (officially) a religious denomination on the one hand, and a cultural community (unofficially, sociologically) on the other hand.
The regime change in 1989/1990 brought about a Jewish revival. Zionist organizations, cultural and civil organizations, and Jewish educational institutions were all established and many Jews, especially the younger generations, discovered a new interest in their previously lost and forgotten cultural and religious traditions. Second and third generation Jews, often from mixed marriages, began to organize themselves. Today, there is a vivid Jewish cultural life in Budapest. Despite some debate on the matter, most Jewish leaders did not make demands for official recognition in the 1993 Minorities Law. During this same time, however, anti-Semitism has also been on the rise. Surveys reveal that about 10% of the population hold radical anti-Semitic views (radical being defined for those respondents scoring high on all dimensions: negative opinion on Jews, negative emotions attached to these opinions, and negative behaviours towards Jews) (Kovács, 2005). (Notably, however, these rates of radical anti-Semitism are still below those views expressed in relation to the Roma.) Political anti-Semitism has recently surged ahead where it has been finding renewed expression amongst the next generation of radical right extremist groups.

Over the years anti-Semitism has been an essential and formative element of Hungarian national self-understandings, with the Jew filling the role of ‘internal other’ for centuries. Two hundred years of Jewish assimilation in Hungary, sometimes interpreted as a success story, sometimes as a failure, has now seem to arrive at a new phase. The Jews as a group will not be studied in detail, though references to the group as well as the phenomenon of anti-Semitism will be made when relevant, given the fact that the Jewish question has always been a crucial question in Hungary and continues to be clearly connected to broader issues of tolerance.

The Roma

History of toleration and exclusion

Today, the ‘Roma question’ is the most serious diversity challenge facing Hungary. One of the reasons the Roma question is distinctive is because the state always treated them as a distinct group, developing specific policies exclusively targeting the Roma. These policies were also consistently assimilatory, with the aim of eliminating ‘differences/otherness’ of the Roma (Liégeois, 1983). The 1993 Minorities Law signalled a new ‘multicultural turn’ in Hungary’s relations with its minorities. The Law officially recognized cultural and ethnic difference, but it did little to resolve the ‘Roma problem’. The recognition and emancipation of the Roma as a minority group did not and could not lead to sustained ethnic political mobilization or the fight for reversing the assimilatory trends of the past. Cultural difference continues to operate as a disadvantage rather than a source of pride. Prejudiced discourses have indeed become even more dominant and discrimination and segregation of the Roma is arguably greater now than during the communist regime.

The Gypsy/Roma population first arrived in Hungary during the 15th century. Another important wave of Gypsy/Roma migration, this time from Romania, occurred following the Turkish occupation of Hungary in the 16th century. In the 18th century, the Empress Maria Theresa, followed later by her son Joseph II, introduced a series of policies intended to sedentarize this otherwise nomadic Gypsy/Roma population. This was partly successful, although at a cost to the majority communities who relied on the Gypsy/Roma itinerant tradesmen for local goods and services. Part of the Gypsy/Roma population, was, however,
settled (mainly by force) in villages where they could fill the niche of some missing trades (Gypsies/Roma thus became blacksmiths, brick makers, etc.). These new Gypsy/Roma communities were located on the edges of villages where they were unable to enjoy the basic enemies of village life. Linguistic assimilation gradually began around this time and by the 19th century the sedentarized communities had all lost their original languages.

From the beginning of the 19th century new waves of Gypsy/Roma migration began from Romania. These Roma became known as the Vlach Gypsies and spoke the Romany language. They were tradesmen, who, similar to their predecessors in Hungary, still travelled around the country selling goods and providing services. Another important group arriving from the east were the ‘Beas’ Gypsies who were not nomadic but instead settled in villages in the south of Hungary. They mainly worked with wood and spoke an archaic Romanian dialect.

According to the 1910 census, 0.6% of the population of 18 million was Gypsy/Roma. From the beginning of the 20th century, the living conditions for many Gypsy/Roma communities began to deteriorate as the demand for traditional trades waned. During WWII, the Roma were persecuted and ultimately deported, with tens of thousands murdered (on debates over figures, see Bárány and Daróczzi, 2005; Karsai, 1992; Purcsli, 2004).

The Roma population in Hungary was politically emancipated at the end of WWII with the onset of communism. This emancipation, however, consistent with the communist ideology at the time, promoted the assimilation of all sub-national groups; it did not, therefore, translate into the recognition of the Roma as a cultural/ethnic/linguistic group. New policies were instituted in 1961 that amounted to forced assimilation. The Roma were viewed as a socially disadvantaged group with distinct cultural traits. Their social integration was to be achieved by suppressing all signs of cultural difference, which, in communist parlance, included somewhat vaguely the ‘Roma way of life’. The Roma were categorized into three groups: integrated Roma, Roma on the path to integration, and non-integrated Roma (a system of classification that still operates today). Integration was interpreted as acceptance of and adoption to the ‘Hungarian way of life’ and norms (Mezey, 1986; Kemény, 2005).

The communists thus regarded and dealt with the ‘Roma question’ as a social problem. At the same time the Roma were viewed as a reserve of manpower to fulfil the regime’s industrial ambitions. Due to this (and alongside more generic communist goals of full employment), the majority of the Roma were indeed employed as unskilled workers in these communist years. The state also had plans to resettle the majority of Roma who continued to live at the edges of towns and villages. This resettlement program, which began in the 1960s, however, resulted in numerous local conflicts. By the 1980s, though, most of these old colonies had disappeared, with their populations dispersed. This ultimately led to the next problem: the increasing concentration of Roma in poor urban areas and the emergence of new urban ghettos. The relatively high employment rates of Roma during the communist years ensured that rates of absolute poverty remained relatively low. The social distance separating the Roma from the majority population, however, did not decrease during this period. Nonetheless, linguistic assimilation continued to take place: in 1971, 71% of the Roma claimed Hungarian as their mother-tongue; this figure has more recently increased to 90% (Kemény, Janky and Lengyel, 2004; Kemény, 2005).

It was claimed during Communism that the Roma were fully tolerated and accepted into society. In reality, however, the Roma experienced very real and specific problems in housing, healthcare, education, and employment that were systematically ignored by a ‘colour
blind’ state committed to a policy of assimilation. These policies did not eradicate difference, but cemented the marginal position of the Roma. The possibility for discussing these issues in public, and the need for a shift in approach, emerged only with the political and socio-economic restructuring of Hungary in the late 1980s. By then, because of the long standing inequalities they had endured, the Roma were the most vulnerable and also therefore the most affected population by the changes brought about during the transition to a market economy.

With the regime change in 1989/1990 one million jobs were lost as a consequence of the economic transition and the restructuring of major industries. Unskilled manpower was made largely redundant resulting in the long-term unemployment of large numbers of Roma. The transition thus led to mass unemployment among the Roma: while in 1989, 67% of the Roma were still employed, by 2003 this number had dropped to 21% (Janky 2004) and 23% in 2005 (Kertesi, 2005). Since the changes, a second and now a third generation have grown up without ever entering the labour market. The poverty rate is five-ten times higher for Roma than it is for the majority population, and it has doubled in the last ten years. (It is important to note, however, that 60% of households living in deep poverty are not Roma [Ladányi–Szelényi, 2002; Spéder, 2002]).

Neighbourhood and school segregation further exacerbates this marginalization of Roma. Discriminatory practices against them in employment, healthcare, and law enforcement have worsened, and segregation in schools and places of residence have also increased. The extent of Roma isolation in some of the poorest areas of Hungary has been so great that so-called "Roma Villages" have come into being without access to public transport or public services. Nearly three quarters of the Roma live in segregated areas (Kemény, 2005), with most of them trapped in the most deprived and unemployment stricken areas of the country. Steady rates of school segregation also contribute to the low educational level of the Roma population (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2009). Despite policy measures aimed at curbing segregation, the situation is not improving. Life expectancy for Roma is seven years below the national average (Kemény and Janky, 2003, 2004).

Political representation and mobilization of Roma

The most important political institution guaranteeing political representation for minorities is the self-government system, created by the 1993 Minorities Law. In 1994 there were 477 local Roma self-governments; by 2006, the number had increased to 1100. There are several Roma political parties representing different interests and political views in local self-government, but none have won representation at the national level. Roma politicians lack a significant power base in Hungary, not because they are not politically united (as some critics claim), but because the political system, like Hungarian society at large, continues to discriminate against Roma. In 2006 and 2010, only four candidates of Roma origin were elected as MPs of different mainstream parties. Critics say, however, that the political representation of the Roma minority is still inadequate because the self-government system was tailored to meet the needs first of the national minorities and only then the Roma. The minority self-government system was designed to provide minorities with a degree of cultural autonomy, which is what national minorities were demanding. For the Roma, however, the

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10 Research has been done on the issue of the legitimacy and effectiveness of minority self-governments (Csefkó 1999, Kállai 2003)
The greatest challenge they face is not whether they can nurture their cultural heritage or develop their particular ethnic identity, but rather whether and how they can integrate into the majority society, becoming equal, tolerated, non-discriminated members with the same opportunities as others in society. The minority self-government system is therefore more of symbolic importance than any real politically practical consequence.

**Toleration/exclusion today**

No other group suffers from lower rates of acceptance and tolerance than the Roma. In spite of a few blips in the early 2000s, “it is noticeable that attitudes towards the Roma remain essentially negative and, in comparison with other ethnic groups, the rejection of the Roma is at a very high level” (Enyedi, Fábián and Sik, 2005). Since then, increasingly open and hostile political discourse directed at the Roma has translated in part to declining rates of acceptance (Láttelet, 2008).

**Attitudes towards ethnic/national/migrant groups in Hungary (scale of 100: 1 – the least accepted; 100: the most accepted)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans/Swabs</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Non-acceptance’ is constructed by well-known stereotypes such as: ‘They do not want to integrate’, ‘They do not deserve to be helped’, ‘They are thieves because it is in their blood’, etc.

**Anti-Roma attitude scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Agreed among those who responded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma are mature enough to make decisions concerning their life</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma should be given more assistance than the non-Roma</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country should provide the opportunity to Roma to study in their mother tongue</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All problems of Roma would resolve if they finally started to work</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Roma should completely be separated from the rest of the society since they are incapable to cohabitate.</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma should not hide their origin</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Roma should be taught to live in the same way as the Hungarians</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is good that there are still bars/discos where Roma are prohibited to enter</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 Research conducted by András Kovács. Data collection by Median: http://www.median.hu/object.ad137cad-29f5-4fd8-8a3a-b28531f9d8d7.ivy
The increase of the number of the Roma population | 943 | 73
Everyone has the right to take their children to schools where there are no Roma children | 956 | 60
Roma have criminality in their blood | 947 | 67

Source: Fábián-Sik 1996, 2006

The intensity of these stereotypes has also grown over time: more negative stereotypes are shared by a higher proportion of the population now than twenty years ago.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of those who agree with the following statements on Roma (%) (Source: Median)</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are respectable Roma but most of them are not</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma do not make any efforts to integrate into the society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma should be forced to live as the rest of the society</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma do not deserve assistance</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma have criminality in their blood</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma should be separated from the rest of the society</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma cannot integrate because of discrimination</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hungarian government should do more for Roma</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The negative tendencies characterizing this picture of intolerance can partly be explained by the rise of the radical right in the last several years. However, as the data indicate, the non-acceptance of Roma is more widespread than this: along different dimensions 50-80% of the population display negative attitudes towards the Roma. Moreover, surveys also reveal that prejudiced attitudes are held from people on both sides of the political spectrum.

The recent rise of Jobbik as part of a more general shift to an increasingly radical and racist political discourse emerged following the ‘legitimacy crisis’ political scandal of 2006 (precipitated by the leaking of the prime minister admitting to lying in the build up to the elections earlier that year). This culminated with a series of on again, off again riots orchestrated and attended by an assortment of radical right groupings. Jobbik, although not the main organizer, benefited from this backlash and witnessed an increase in its support. Their first big electoral victory came in 2009 when they sent three MPs to the European Parliament. Their next big success came in the Hungarian 2010 elections when they came in third, only slightly behind the previously governing socialists. The Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard), which established itself in 2007 as a ‘cultural NGO’, also has links to Jobbik. Its main activities involve organizing uniformed marches through villages and towns with large Roma populations. The association was outlawed in 2008 but still continues to operate.

This is all evidence of a general shift to a more radical political discourse (frequently echoed in the media). Jobbik has put the Roma back on the political and public agenda with their talk about ‘Gypsy criminality’, ‘parasites of the society’, and so forth. These and similar themes have found their way into the mainstream media, reproducing and in a sense legitimating them in the process.
Immigration trends

The proportion of immigrants in Hungary is one of the lowest in Europe (less than 2%, with the majority being ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries). These numbers are nevertheless on the rise (with non-EU nationals now making up 35-40% of all immigrants) (Kováts, 2010).

The first important wave of migration to Hungary started in the late 1980s still during the communist years across the tightly controlled borders of Romania. Most of these immigrants were ethnic Hungarians fleeing economic hardships and political persecution in Ceauşescu’s Romania. The early 1990s witnessed a second upsurge in ethnic Hungarian migration from Romania in response to continued economic stagnation but also following the outbreak of ethnic tensions in Romania (Sik, 1990, 1996). The third wave of migration took place during the Yugoslav war, with ethnic Hungarians accompanied by many other nationalities from the former republics of the dissolving Yugoslavia. (Most of them, however, continued on to other EU countries).

The number of naturalized citizens between 1990 and 2005 can be seen in the graph below. The 1992 spike presumably reflects the upsurge in migration from Romania following the ethnic violence there (see Kováts, 2005).

Given that the question of migration in general and transborder Hungarian migration in particular had been politically taboo in the communist years, it is not surprising there was a corresponding void in the area of migration policy. The 1993 Law on Minorities did not address immigrants, only national minority groups. Another 1993 law, however, “The Act on Hungarian Citizenship”, was the first law to address immigration matters. The law decreed fairly restrictive paths to naturalization (with some benefits for ethnic Hungarians).
Because of the ambiguities surrounding the problems of immigration, civic participation of immigrants was not a relevant issue in contemporary Hungary, and so its direct legal regulation has been practically non-existent. Currently, NGOs are tasked with matters of immigrant and refugee inclusion (Sik and Tóth, 2000; Tóth, 2004). This hands off approach to immigrant incorporation is evidence by Hungary’s failure to sign the European Council’s Convention on the role of foreign nationalities in local politics (ETS. 144). Since their participation was not forbidden, however, migrants have in some cases participated in local elections (Sik and Zakariás, 2005; p. 16). One of the main reasons the state has not concentrated its efforts on immigrant integration is because it has been assumed that most migrants are ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries, for whom questions of integration are viewed as unproblematic. Research on the topic has nevertheless shown a sharp discrepancy between the political elite’s discourses on national unity and the discriminatory practices experienced by migrants on the ground (Fox, 2007; Pulay, 2006; Feischmidt, 2005).

A marked shift in policy towards immigration occurred in 2002 when the then Fidesz government introduced its ‘Status Law’, a package of entitlements for transborder Hungarians which included the legal right to work in Hungary for three months per calendar year. Although the law did little to facilitate immigration and settlement for ethnic Hungarians, it did open the door to legalized labour migration (which had previously been mostly undocumented). A far more significant breakthrough in immigration issues, however, came in 2007, when Romania joined the EU and Hungary decided to open up its employment market to workforce coming from Romania. Against all expectations and forecasts, studies show that these administrative changes did not lead to mass migration to Hungary (Hárs, 2003; Örkény, 2003a, 2003b; Feischmidt and Zakariás, 2006; Sik and Simonovits, 2003). Within the above context, the new Dual Citizenship Law passed by the Fidesz government in May 2010 can be perceived as more of a symbolic gesture than a law with immediate practical implications for the Hungarian economy (at least not in the case of ethnic Hungarians that live in countries that already joined the European Union.)

Attitudes towards immigrants

Attitude surveys (Dencső and Sik, n.d.) show that general levels of xenophobia are very high in Hungary (only Greece, Portugal and Estonia exhibit higher levels), despite low levels of immigration.

The rate of those refusing to receive the different ethnic groups arriving to Hungary (%) June 2006 and February 2007 (Source: TARKI 2006, 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirez (a non-existent group)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to another survey (TARKI 2009) 71% of the Hungarian population supports issuing residence permits to ethnic Hungarians, whereas only 15-19% support residency for other immigrants (Arabs, Israeli, Africans, Ukrainians, Serbs, Chinese, Roma from neighbouring countries).

It is worth pointing out that the acceptance of ethnic Hungarians today at the expense of other immigrant groups was very different in the early 1990s. Survey data have shown that more than half of the ethnic Hungarian coming to Hungary felt that the receiving society was unfriendly towards them (Sik, 1990). The most common complaints were verbal insults and occasional discrimination (Fox, 2007; Pulay, 2006; Feischmidt, 2005). These findings are in sharp contrast with survey data on attitudes toward co-ethnic Hungarians. More ethnographic research has shown that ethnic Hungarian migrants have been frequently blamed for the worsening labour market situation: ‘they take our jobs’. In the early and mid-1990s only 25% of the Hungarians agreed that ‘they should unconditionally be admitted into the country’. Research on attitudes toward foreigners shows that Hungarians in Hungary consistently regard Transylvanian Hungarians favourably and Romanians unfavourably (Fábián, 1998; pp. 158-60; Tóth and Turai, 2003 pp. 112, 115-16). Such findings, however, do not account for the way in which category membership shifts in sending and receiving contexts. It is not enough to say that Hungarians in Hungarian like Transylvanian Hungarians and dislike Romanians. Hungarians in Hungary like Transylvanian Hungarians as long as they stay in Transylvania. The moment Transylvanian Hungarians cross the border as migrant workers they become ‘Romanian’ in the eyes of their hosts (Tóth and Turai, 2003, pp. 108-10, 125).

The root of tolerance towards ethnic Hungarians comes from the traditional understanding of national identity and nationhood which claims ethnic/cultural kinship among all Hungarians who are scattered in different states of the Carpathian basin. Despite this political discourse, the ethnic Hungarians were perceived as ‘others’ when they started to come and live side by side with their co-nationals in Hungary.
4. Definitions of tolerance and acceptance/accommodation in Hungary

The concept of ‘tolerance’ as such is not explicitly defined or used in Hungary’s legislative frameworks. However, from an analytical point of view, it can be said that different aspects of the notion in Hungary can be captured by the notion of ‘liberal tolerance’. Thus the constitution codifies and guarantees freedom of speech, media, and religion, the right to respect and dignity; equal treatment before the law; the right to equal education; and the protection of children and ethnic minorities. Many of the laws and policies that have been implemented in Hungary over the past two decades have contributed to the development of a framework of ‘egalitarian tolerance’. While in principle these frameworks of ‘tolerance’ were developed in order to address the problems of all groups and individuals living in Hungary, in practice questions of ‘toleration’ most often came into focus in relation to the Roma and their integration into mainstream society. Thus, throughout this chapter we will focus on the Roma. We will discuss how values of accommodation are understood and articulated in Hungary and how these values are codified into laws and policies. We will also consider how tolerance is reflected in institutional and everyday practices.

Values of the Hungarian regime of accommodation: legislative and policy frameworks

By the late 1990s, two main and divergent approaches had taken shape to accommodate Roma in mainstream society: the first approach focused on legislative solutions whilst the second concentrated on educational and welfare policies. The two approaches saw the root of the ‘Roma problem’ very differently and offered remedies that were therefore based on different assumptions of the cause of the problem. But as many experts have pointed out, the legislative and socio-economic solutions need not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary (Szalai, 2000).

Legislative frameworks

It was suggested by lawyers, NGOs, and human rights activists who pursued legislative solutions for the Roma that the problems they experienced existed because intolerance and informal discriminatory practices against them were deeply embedded in Hungarian society. As a result, the Roma, both as individuals but also as members of a minority group, had little or no protection under the law. Two parallel legislative frameworks were thereby developed, both of which attempted to codify norms of respect and recognition into Hungarian law:

a) **Minority rights approach**: This approach resulted in the Minorities Law of 1993, which was conceived, drafted, and implemented to protect the cultural rights of all ethnic and national minorities living in Hungary. The law explicitly named thirteen indigenous minority groups to benefit from the law by being given the right to form local and national minority self-governments. Minority self-governments in turn could administer their own cultural institutions as well as offer their opinions on bills concerning minorities, including sending them back to parliament in cases where there were objections of a substantive nature. The law was modified in 2005 to create electoral lists, meaning that only those who registered as a member of a minority group before an election were able to vote for their respective minority self-
government. This was welcomed by minorities given earlier perceived abuses of the system where non minorities were able to vote for minority representatives, resulting in certain cases in minority self-governments without any minority members. Despite these modifications and improvements, the law has remained very controversial in Hungary. Many of its critics claim that the law is burdened by an inherent contradiction: while it protects cultures of numerically small and assimilated national minority groups, the less assimilated, numerically larger minority Roma are the least protected. Legislative efforts in this regard have thus been aimed primarily at addressing the needs of Hungarians national minorities, not the Roma. This is due in part to the Hungarian state’s desire to use the law to showcase its progressive minority treatment to the neighbouring countries and the EU and its institutions more generally. The hope was that the Hungarians in the neighbouring countries would eventually benefit through the implementation of copycat laws in their own countries.

b) **Human rights approach:** This approach resulted in the *Equal Treatment and Equal Opportunities Law* of 2003, more commonly referred to as the ‘anti-discrimination law’. It was designed to sanction established discriminatory practices in everyday life (e.g. workplace, housing) and institutions (e.g. education, police, healthcare). This approach, by its very nature, focused on individuals, and claimed that all people, irrespective of their ethnic, racial, religious, sexual, differences should be given equal opportunities and be treated with equal respect before the law. Since the law was passed, several human rights NGOs have successfully brought cases against schools, hospitals, and companies that discriminated against the Roma (data on such cases can be found in the archives of the Roma Press Agency and the Equal Treatment Authority). During this same time period, the media became more cautious and nuanced in its reporting on Roma matters and avoided routinely linking the Roma with criminality. However, as pointed out in the introductory chapters, some of these gains have recently been lost: "Roma criminality" has once again become a catchphrase both in the media and political discourse. These successful cases were thus both few in number and often only of symbolic importance: the law failed to bring about significant improvement in the lives of the Roma. Discrimination against the Roma in state institutions, the labour market, and everyday interactions is still widespread; some analysts even claim that in the past few years the tendency has been toward a worsening of the situation (see for example studies by Havas-Liskó, 2006 and Kertesi-Kézdi, 2009 on increase in school segregation). And even at the time the legislation was passed critics argued its basic framework, although important, did and could not adequately remedy the situation of the Roma in Hungary since their problems were not caused by discriminatory legislation but by informal and non-codified discriminatory practices which laws in themselves cannot eradicate (Stewart 2002). Lately, though, others have begun to argue that more recent legislation does at least implicitly discriminate against the Roma, or at the very least has discriminatory consequences for the Roma.

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Policy frameworks

Many researchers have argued that an ethnicized (Roma) underclass (e.g. Szelényi and Ladányi, 2001, 2002) has been taking shape in recent years and have thus urged the state to speed up its efforts for the ‘inclusion’ of this group. Proponents of this perspective acknowledge the importance of anti-discrimination and minority rights legislation, but at the same time argue that the problems facing the Roma minority have to be addressed not only through the ‘politics of recognition’ but also through the implementation of various measures and policies of social inclusion. Some social policy experts (e.g. Ferge, 2000, 2002) support the idea of universal social rights, claiming that without a universal system of such rights, the chance for increasing social inequalities is much higher. On the other hand, there have been sociologists (Szalai, 1992, 2005; Ladányi, 2009) who have been fiercely critical of the existing system for supporting not only the needy but the more privileged classes as well. Moreover, research on social policies shows that consecutive Hungarian governments have often promoted policies that benefit the middle and upper-middle classes while simultaneously contributing to the emergence of an ‘aid industry’ which socially excludes the poor (Ferge, 2000, 2003; Ferge, Tausz and Darvas 2002; Szalai, 2005). Data show that the lack of well-targeted social policies correlate with inequalities, poverty, and increasing social exclusion.

Besides debates over how comprehensive a system of social inclusion should be (whom to include, how, and for how long), there is also considerable confusion among policy makers, the general public, and politicians concerning whether colour-blind or colour-conscious approaches are preferable. In theory, social integration policies are (or ought to be) colour-blind; they target the poor regardless of their skin colour or cultural background. Many people belonging to the Roma minority are poor, and since the poor are targeted, they would automatically benefit from these policies. At the same time, successive governments in Hungary have liked to remind everyone of the efforts they have made to facilitate the integration of the Roma. This has meant that certain policy measures and the budgets attached to them were specifically labelled ‘Roma integration policies’ without the benefit of clear goals or budgetary allocations (as the State Audit Office wrote in its report in 2008). Therefore, it has never been entirely clear how much money has actually been spent on the Roma, or how many of them have actually benefited from these funds.

At the time pre-accession EU funds became available to promote integration in the labour market and educational institutions, policy making took a different tack. A clear requirement of these funds was they had to explicitly target the Roma (thereby endorsing a colour-conscious approach). This approach was also carried over to the post-accession period when the National Development Plans required recipients of public monies to specify how their programs would specifically affect the Roma. The state funded ‘Szechenyi Plan for small and medium sized enterprises, for example, was a colour conscious economic policy that targeted the Roma to address EU directives regarding equality in labour markets. The plan offered financial incentives for businesses that employed Roma in disadvantaged regions of Hungary and gave financial support to small and medium size businesses that were started and run by Roma. An analysis of the program once in place, however, suggested that a significant portion of the plan’s budget was spent on non-Roma businesses that employed Roma only for the shortest period required, and only in low paying, marginal positions.
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Concepts and Practices in Hungary

It is important to highlight, though, that a colour conscious approach has not been adopted wholesale in Hungarian policy making. To the contrary: certain integration measures continue to be formulated as colour-blind. One of the most crucial issues in this regard is school segregation. The most important steps that have been taken to reverse the processes that have led to segregation have all used social and not ethnic terminology to define the target group (their preferred terminology is the ‘socially disadvantaged’). The system today is thus a mixed one, containing both colour-conscious and colour-blind elements.

Twenty years of ‘state efforts’ to integrate the Roma have therefore not achieved the expected results as increasing poverty, inequality, and segregation tendencies reveal. Until pre-accession funds became available, successive governments developed more holistic integration strategies that attempted to simultaneously address all policy areas (labour market, education, housing, health care, social assistance) in a collective effort to foster integration. Later, when EU funds became available, new programs were developed specifically targeting the Roma. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Roma have benefitted less from these projects than the majority society\textsuperscript{14}. At the same time, there is continued social and political opposition to a number of integration and desegregation strategies and policies (e.g. school desegregation is typically hindered by resistance from local populations). This also contributes to the socio-economic degradation of the Roma in Hungary.

\textbf{(In)Tolerance as institutional and everyday practice: the Roma}

The complex processes that have contributed to the ongoing exclusion of the Roma are so deeply embedded both in institutional and everyday practices that it is almost impossible to disentangle them to discuss them individually. Most studies that describe labour market discrimination (Kertesi, 2005; Ladányi and Szelényi, 2001, 2002), school discrimination (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2009), law enforcement discrimination (Helsinki 2008), and discrimination in the social security system (Ferge, 2000, 2003; Ferge, Tausz and Darvas 2002; Szalai 1992, 2005) also emphasize that the reasons for the failure of these policies are to be found at both macro and micro levels, and that institutional and individual discriminatory practices are strongly intertwined. Although there are many studies of these issues, two by Julia Szalai (1992, 2005) particularly exemplify the (in)tolerance of the system, demonstrating why the social security system is ill-suited to help Roma families in breaking the poverty cycle.

Szalai (1992) argues that the long-term impoverishment of the unemployed, pensioners, families with young children, and the Roma after 1989 was not the inevitable consequence of the transition from a planned to a market economy, but rather resulted from the ways in which the social security system was structured and organized during communism and immediately thereafter. In 1990 this system suddenly lost 27-28\% of its operating budget since two deficit running departments (the health care system and the pharmaceutical industry) were included in its budget. As a consequence, a conflict of interest arose between the long-term and the temporarily poor, while the two big ‘players’ (the healthcare system and the drug industry) succeeded in representing their interests against the interests of the ‘small and powerless consumers’ of the social security system. A second major change occurred also during the early 1990s: The social security system was decentralized and many of its functions were

\textsuperscript{14} Kadét-Varró (2010)
given over to local self-governments, where minority self-governments were thus put in charge of many issues related to ‘Roma poverty’. New funds to tackle these issues, however, were not allocated to these minority self-governments; the allocation of social aid remained the responsibility of municipalities. These contradictions provided few opportunities to redress problems of social exclusion. Szalai (2005) also shows through interviews with key social security stakeholders how many policies were subject to different local interpretations. Thus even well intentioned policies not infrequently resulted in practices that were discriminatory and even racist, with the Roma, the long-term unemployed, and families with many children benefiting little if at all. These bureaucrats were always able to find some law or policy to support their exclusionary decisions. Szalai (2005) concluded her study by placing the burden of responsibility for these abuses not only on the state bureaucrats directly involved, but more widely on society as a whole for the overly broad scope of this power.
5. Concluding remarks

An overview of the history of Hungarian nation building and of the policy and legislative frameworks that resulted from different approaches of the state to this issue has highlighted several important points. First, it is clear that ethnic/cultural and civic/political interpretations of nationhood in Hungary have existed concomitantly throughout the past 150 years of state building, and political elites have alternated between both to define the nation and formulate policies to protect or assimilate minorities. Second, Hungarian political elites in the past three decades have made significant efforts to adopt minority and human rights frameworks laid out by the European Union and other international organisations. These obstacles to nationalism were strong enough so that even the radical and extremist political forces attempted to conform to them. Third, accession to the European Union has brought about many significant changes in Hungarian legislation and has been accompanied by the availability of new financial resources, part of which have reached the targeted minorities. This has led, on the one hand, to the rise of a policy discourse of toleration/acceptance and, on the other hand, to the improvement of certain aspects of the life of these minorities (e.g., a slight lessening of school segregation and improved treatment of immigrants and refugees). But while EU has undoubtedly produced successes in these and other regards, the accession process has also somewhat paradoxically provided new opportunity structures for other nationalists and right-wing radical groups to pursue discourses and policies of intolerance towards ethnic and religious groups.
Chapter 3.

Zsuzsanna Vidra – Jon Fox:
The embodiment of (in)tolerance in discourses and practices addressing cultural diversity in schools in Hungary – The case of Roma

1. Introduction

The present case study addresses two issues that are of major importance from the point of view of ‘tolerance’ and ‘diversity’ in present day Hungary. The first deals with the complex and multifaceted issue of the segregation of Roma children in the education system, and the second focuses on the curriculum: how diversity questions related to the Roma minority are manifested in the content of the curriculum.

To understand the context and the relevance of these issues it is necessary to briefly outline the main characteristics of the Hungarian education system. Hungarian pupils’ scores in the PISA tests reflect the two most important characteristics of the school system: its ineffectiveness, and its selectivity (favouring children of higher social status, contributing to social inequalities, and failing to compensate for students coming from disadvantaged family backgrounds) (Molnár and Dupcsik 2008; Berényi and Neumann 2009). As a matter of fact, until the first PISA tests, the Hungarian politicians, policy-makers and the public looked the education system as a success story. Pupils, when compared to ones form other nations, did indeed score higher. It was, however, due to the fact, that earlier tests measures more factual knowledge and less the ability of children to understand and apply the knowledge they have (Molnár and Dupcsik 2008).

The various elements of the school system – structure, pedagogical traditions, the curriculum, etc. – should thus be analysed with regards to these basic features. The current education system, responding to the problems associated with an over centralised state-socialist education system, was (re-)built on the principle of autonomy for the schools, their administrators, the teachers and the parents. In real terms this meant the decentralisation of the system, handing over school maintenance primarily to local governments. In addition, some schools are run by churches, private organisations and foundations. Granting any legal body the right to found and maintain a school was viewed as an important achievement in the area of civil rights. The National Core Curriculum was designed to provide a loose framework for curriculum development, thus ensuring the autonomy of educators\textsuperscript{15}. Equally, it was welcomed as an important democratic achievement that parents were provided with the right of free choice of school for their children.

The education level of national minorities and the majority population does not vary significantly. The case is much different for the Roma whose school achievement is far below the national average. This is the case today and it was the case during the state-socialist regime.

\textsuperscript{15} The National Core Curriculum defines only the general educational targets that schools are supposed to reach. Each school maintains the freedom to develop its own curriculum and freely choose its textbooks (Molnár and Dupcsik 2008).
Before the 1980s the Communist party assiduously suppressed national minorities and there were no schools where minority languages were taught. In the 1980s, minority schools were revived as a result of the changed attitude to the ‘minority question’. After the regime change the number of nationality schools increased further to about 10% of the total education system (Vámos and Szvoboda 2004).

In the 1950s most Roma either did not attend school at all or attend for only a few years. This situation started to change in the following decade when the state put special emphasis on the schooling of the Roma, so that by the late 1970s, most of the Roma attended some school but still with only 25% finishing primary education resulting in 39% of Roma over age 14 remaining illiterate. The increase of Roma in schools prompted a backlash from non-Roma parents, teachers and children. The state responded by gradually establishing separate classes (class C) for Roma children. This practice became widespread and was legitimated by claiming that this way of teaching was more efficient and for the well being of all (Csovcsics 2002).

Today, the major issue for the Roma is not diversity but their segregation. There are three types of mechanisms that contribute to this segregation: a system of special schools (for children with mental disabilities), segregated institutions, and segregated classes (Molnár and Dupcsik 2008).

2. The treatment of diversity in the education system

Structure of the education system

Despite being well-intentioned, the educational policies that emerged out of the democratisation process of the 1990s to erase the tight controls of the earlier decades have produced a number of unintended (and grievous) consequences. The selectivity of the education system channels pupils of higher social status into better achieving schools whilst pupils of lower social status remain in lower achieving schools. Inequalities stemming from family background are thus further exacerbated by a selective educational system. The decentralised school system is not able to correct for these inequalities for several reasons. Historically, despite the egalitarian ideology of the state-socialist system, a hierarchy of schools reflecting and maintaining the social stratification of the given community has persisted throughout (Csanádi, Gerő, and Ladányi 1978; Ladányi and Csanádi 1983). Through post-transition decentralisation policies, local governments became school administrators but with little interest in disturbing the local power relations and the hierarchical order of social groups. The fact that parents were granted the right to choose their children’s school simply reinforced the inequalities between schools: parents continued to choose the school where their children would receive the ‘best education’. This phenomenon of white-flight contributed greatly to these segregation tendencies. (Havas and Liskó 2005; Gerő, Csanádi and Ladányi 2006)

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16 The so-called reform communists in the 1980s became interested in the issue of transborder ethnic Hungarians that also changed their take on minorities living within the borders of the country (Föglein 2004).

17 C means ‘cigány’ or ‘Gypsy’ in English.
A second problem following from the decentralisation of the school system concerned their financial regulations. Local communities, as school administrators, all receive the same per-capita educational grants for administrating their schools. These grants, however, do not cover the full costs needed for running the institutions, so local governments have to supplement their school budgets with other sources of income. Wealthier local communities thus obviously give more to their schools whereas poorer ones, in most cases, are unable to contribute any extra funds. These are problems that come from structural issues and are first of all the results of decentralisation (Varga 2008).

A third structural problem relates to schools maintained by private organisations or foundations (and to some extent by churches). These schools have become the reserve of children of higher social status. Indeed, many of these schools were established to provide education to middle class children, using various strategies (like tuition fees) to keep lower class children away. To be sure, some of these schools were founded with the opposite aim of educating disadvantaged children. The overall outcome still produces social segregation since these schools teach higher and lower class children separately (Kertesi and Kézdi 2008).

A fourth legacy of the state socialist system has been that Roma children whose learning difficulties derived from their social and economic marginalisation have nevertheless come to be viewed as students with as mental disorders. Huge numbers of these children were channelled into special institutions that often became the places of racial segregation. When placed in ‘normal schools’, Roma children were also often segregated into ‘C’ (‘Gypsy’) classes. In other cases, Roma children simply went to schools where there were mainly or only Roma children.

**Curriculum and pedagogy**

Questions of the cultural difference of minorities in education are governed by the Public Education Act, the Act on Minority Rights, and the National Core Curriculum. The Public Education Act provides minorities with the right to establish ‘nationality schools’ (nemzetiségi iskola) where the language of instruction is the minority language. These schools provide instruction either in minority and majority languages (a mixture) or exclusively in the minority language. The Act also stipulates that schools with minority children must have classes where the culture of the given minority is taught (Beck 2008). This policy measure became a tool for segregation when policy makers linked ‘cultural difference’ with ‘social disadvantage’. Schools with Roma children were eligible for supplementary subsidies on the condition that they provide ‘Gypsy minority education’ for Roma children. In practice this meant the separation of Roma and non-Roma children within schools. This is an ‘old technique’ dating back to the state-socialist regime when separate classes existed for Roma children (class C), now with ‘good’ students separated from ‘bad’ ones. The classification and sorting of pupils based on achievement simultaneously reflected both their socio-economic status and ethnic background. Despite the policy’s aim to empower Roma children and eliminate discrepancies between them and the rest of the student population, in practice these inequalities persisted and were reinforced without achieving improvement in Roma children’s education level. In the end, the government realised its negative effects and cancelled the policies in 2002 (Varró 2008).

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18 Both Acts were first passed in 1993 and have been amended several times since then.
The National Core Curriculum in turn stipulates that schools must incorporate minorities’ history and culture into their local curricula. In practice, however, this policy is ignored: little is taught about minorities and representation of minorities or ‘otherness’ are largely missing from textbooks.

Pedagogical practices and educational culture can therefore be characterised as a policy of non-toleration. Most teachers are trained to work only with culturally and socially homogeneous (‘white middle class’) children and there are hardly any pedagogical practices that have been developed to deal with any sort of differences. This leads to frustration among teachers and intolerance towards ‘otherness’, be it cultural or social or both (Liskó and Fehérvári 2008).

3. Methodology and Research Design

The most important educational issue for the Roma in the last decade has been the desegregation of the school system and the (failed) integration of Roma pupils into mainstream education. In 2002 the government launched a set of policy initiatives designed to tackle these issue. Many of these initiatives have been formally integrated into the current system, but the overall social and political reception of the policy has been negative, thus contributing to strong opposition at all levels of policy implementation. This opposition makes it important since it reveals many aspects of the concept of ‘non-acceptance-tolerance-respect’ in the Hungarian context. The second case, the teaching of minority (Roma) content both in the framework of ‘minority education’ and the National Core Curriculum intended for the entire student population, raises important questions about how Roma cultural difference is understood and taught and how it contributes (or not) to the issue of the three-fold conceptualisation of ‘tolerance’.

The two case studies were developed using identical data collection techniques and methodologies. The primary source of data was interviews conducted with policy makers, civil servants, politicians, teachers, church representatives, and civil activists. Interviewees were selected based on significant roles they had in either or both of our two cases. For the first case, we chose people who were responsible either for making or implementing desegregation policy measures. In the second case, we identified people who were active in the field of ‘cultural accommodation of Roma in the education system’.

For the desegregation policy discourses, we interviewed the parliamentary commissioner on education, two ex-civil servants who were the main architects for the desegregation measures, one current civil servant working on educational matters, a Roma MP and member of the green party, two civil activists (one with right wing leanings and the other running a foundation that advocates school desegregation by prosecuting local governments), and a teacher who was an ‘equal opportunity expert’ employed in the desegregation program.

For the second case study, we interviewed two civil activists working in the field of Roma culture and intercultural and multicultural education, three teachers, two authors of textbooks on Roma culture designed for nationality/ethnic education, and three church representatives.

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19 Interviews were conducted by Anna Szász, Márton Rövid and Zsuzsanna Vidra.
all of whom had been active in Roma missions in their respective churches. In all (between both cases), 18 interviews were conducted (see Annex for further particulars).

We conducted structured interviews on each topic. Although interviewees were selected on their centrality to one or the other case study, all interviewees were asked the same questions. This is because that all interviewees were active participants in the broader field of the educational and Roma issues and since there was overlap between the two topics, we decided to ask the interviewees their opinion and experiences on both topics. This proved to be a fruitful strategy since all interviewees had important points to make not only on the topic more closely linked to their expertise but also on the other one as well.

We also consulted relevant policy documents and some newspaper extracts for our case studies. We employed discourse analytical techniques for our interview data, whereas documentary evidence was mainly used for purposes of illustration. Discourse analysis began with the thematic coding of the interview transcripts. Once major themes were identified, we looked for typical argumentation techniques to reconstruct different discourse types.

4. Segregation of Roma children in the education system

Historical background

The selectivity of the Hungarian school system means that children of disadvantaged families and/or Roma origin are more likely to go to lower status schools where the level of teaching and the physical conditions are significantly worse than in other schools (Havas and Liskó 2005). This leads to poorer school achievements and contributes to the reproduction of low educational attainment for the Roma.

The publication of PISA tests in 2002 shocked a Hungarian public that had been long been proud of its education system. It revealed the ineffectiveness and inequalities of the school system compared to other schools around the globe. It also coincided with the year when a new socialist liberal coalition took over the government. The ministry of education, headed by a member of the liberal party, was set with the task of education reform to respond to the deficiencies highlighted by the PISA results.

The major policy objectives developed at the time focussed on desegregating the school system to make it more inclusive and capable of fostering equal opportunities (Borovszky 2008). The approach outlined in the policy emphasised that desegregation and integration must be promoted simultaneously. Desegregation concentrated on putting an end to practices that separated children, whereby integration was intended to assist schools and teachers by providing pedagogical methodology trainings to mix children from different backgrounds in the same classrooms and schools. These desegregation/integration policies were underpinned by three pillars: first, the development and improvement of pedagogical methods; second, the modification of legal regulations; and third, the introduction of financial means. The EU would be the primary source for this extra financing. Prior to 2004, this came in the form of

pre-accession funds and after Hungary joined the EU it took the form of the European Social Fund, making billions of Forints available for programmes promoting integration.

This set of policies was based on methods that had proven successful in other countries. The integration part of the policy was fully voluntary, which gave local governments discretion in implementing them. The desegregation element was partly voluntary and party obligatory. It was voluntary insofar as local governments (school administrators) were given discretion as to whether or not they would participate in the integration programme. Incentives were provided in the form of access to extra financial support as well as methodological innovations. It was obligatory in that it stipulated the re-organisation of school districts to be regulated by the enforcement of a new law.

The policy initiatives also established the Office of the Ministerial Commission for the integration of disadvantaged and Roma children. A National Educational Integration Network tasked with providing assistance to schools to introduce and implement new pedagogical programmes for integration was also established at the same time.

Policymakers were crucially concerned with referring to ‘disadvantaged’ and ‘multiple disadvantaged’ pupils instead of relying on ethnic forms of categorisation. In order to apply for support to introduce the integration programme, schools had to account for the number of disadvantaged and multiple disadvantaged pupils - not the number of Roma pupils. Policymakers preferred socio-economic forms of categorisation to avoid ethnic stigmatisation, especially given that among the multiple disadvantaged pupils about half were estimated to be Roma.

The government also implemented financial incentives (extra per capita grants) for school administrators (local governments) to apply for the integration programmes. These initiatives were supplemented by a government decree that regulated the proportion of (multiple) disadvantaged pupils in a school in case they applied for targeted normative per-capita grant. In 2007, the government also modified school district regulations to curb white-flight.

These desegregation/integration policies had some major drawbacks. They were designed to promote voluntary participation, but the majority of the population perceived them as ‘forced integration’, something they had to do comply with against their will. This was mainly due to the government’s inadequate communication of the details of the programme and its voluntary nature. It was also exacerbated by the growing intolerance of majority Hungarians that were in turn reinforced by negative discourses coming from both government and opposition politicians. The policies, as many experts stressed, was initially only supported by a small handful of liberal politicians (not even the entire party) but later lost all of its support after the socialists took control of the ministry of education following the 2006 elections. The programme was officially still in operation but the political will to implement it was gone completely.

As the political backing for desegregation/integration policy shrank, political discourse became increasingly hostile to questions of integration, thus further contributing to the weakening of public support. The major structural causes of segregation were left untouched by the political elite and many of the education policy measures proved in fact to be counterproductive to fostering equal opportunities and desegregation/integration. For example, more state support was provided for local governments to form school alliances
while there was no guarantee that such initiatives would hinder segregation (the opposite result was often achieved as two or more schools typically allied to separate the children into one or the other school based on their social/ethnic background). The system of 6-8 grade high schools and private foundation and church schools continued to be in operation, which basically remained the institutions where children of higher social status could escape to.

With the new, national-conservative government came into power in 2010, education policy became the reserve of the ultra-conservative Christian Democrats coalition partner. The new education conceptions they promoted envisioned a conservative turn in education which translated into more support to elite education and ‘talent nurturing’ rather then focusing on providing equal opportunities for the entire population. 21

The implementation of the desegregation/integration policy measures generated huge public debate, including open protest and conflicts. The main actors involved were policy-makers, politicians, local governments, schools, teachers, Roma and non-Roma parents, experts and civil organisations promoting desegregation.

Public and political debates

Our analysis considers the perspective of the main actors involved in the formulation and implementation of the desegregation/integration policies in an attempt to uncover the most important discourses they expressed.

Civil servants, policy makers:
The main policymakers were civil servants working in the Equal Opportunities Department, which had been established to design and implement desegregation/integration policies. The Department was created in a somewhat unusual way, with people recruited from the civil sphere to work in the ministry of education on the desegregation policies. It was a romantic story. ‘About twenty people, who had been involved in journalism, civil rights protection, education, got into state administration (…) and managed to establish a new culture within the ministry. We were not burnt out and we did not know any hindrances.’ (2.)

But the main message of the policy to make the school system more inclusive and effective in the interest of the whole society did not reach the public. This message found expression neither in political discourse nor in the public media. (3.)

Politicians:
The role of politicians is crucial to understand how school desegregation/integration was perceived in the public and how local conflicts developed. As one of the Department policy makers (3.) pointed out, a successful implementation required much more serious political commitment than they enjoyed. The liberal minister who initiated the programme lacked the full support of his Liberal Party as an important fraction of the party opposed centralised policies in the name of defending liberty and autonomy. From this view, the

desegregation/integration policy was therefore conceptually flawed insofar it was designed to be centrally administered.

Following the 2006 elections, the Liberal minister of education was replaced with a new minister from the Socialist Party. Political support for the desegregation/integration policy under the new minister was significantly weakened for several reasons. First, the government’s desegregation/integration policies had sparked strong opposition from various actors (mayors, non-Roma parents, and teachers in particular) that led to the total withdrawal of political support. The Prime Minister and the socialist party began to blame problems with integration policies on their supposedly forceful nature in a ploy to appease their increasingly unsatisfied political base (3.; Varró 2008).

The next government’s rhetoric, which took office in 2010, should be understood in two different ways. On the one hand, education policy reforms are on the whole much less integrative and contain a number of elements suggestive of anti-poor and anti-Gypsy inclinations. On the other hand, the newly established State Secretariat for Social Inclusion communicated that the aim of the new policy is to elaborate a comprehensive and inclusive public policy for the integration of the Roma: ‘The essence of the new conception is its composite nature, which means that qualitative improvements in disadvantaged areas can only be seen if educational, social, healthcare and employment conditions are improved simultaneously.’ Thus there is a contradiction in the policy initiatives of different government bodies. At the same time, the state secretary for social inclusion frequently expressed controversial views on social integration. He has frequently used the expression, ‘conditional social integration’, meaning support for integration is made available if an effort is made to prove integration is indeed desired.

Local communities: schools, teachers, parents:
The actual conflicts arising from school desegregation/integration policy implementation appeared in local communities. Non-Roma parents pressured school administrators not to accept Roma children by exercising their right to choose (different) schools (thereby threatening schools with reduced enrolments with closure). Many teachers also opposed integration policies and thus sided with the non-Roma parents. Teachers objected to teaching ‘problematic’ Roma children. In addition, teachers feared of losing should integration policies lead to the closure of segregated schools.

Civil organisations:
Another important actor was the civil organisation that pursued legal action against desegregation. As the head of the organisation said: ‘What we do is we step up against segregated education by trying to achieve the enforcement of laws. It is an experiment, but we are the only ones doing this.’ In fact, successive governments have not enforced existing laws that prohibit segregation. This has motivated this civil organisation to try to achieve the enforcement of existing laws, thus obliging local governments and schools to desegregate.

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22 This can be seen for instance in policies aimed at lowering the age for school attendance and abolishing policies that prohibited failing pupils in the first four grades.
Framing strategies and evaluating policies

Both public and political discourse, as illustrated above, increasingly converged around anti-integration stances. The general scepticism of the public has been increasing since anti-government riots in 2006. During this period, we have witnessed the rise of the extreme right wing, evidenced most spectacularly in the Jobbik party’s successes in elections for the European Parliament and then the Hungarian parliament. At the same time, mainstream public discourse on both the left and right has adopted a much less tolerant language towards issues related to the Roma. Mainstream discourses have thus become less tolerant, whilst radical, racist views have enjoyed increasing legitimacy in ways that influence wider public opinion.

The views expressed by our interviewees (civil servants, policy-makers, experts, civil activists, and teachers) represent this mainstream public discourse. We did not include any extreme right wing people expressing openly racist opinions in our sample. Our aim was to collect a wide range of views within the mainstream to allow for detailed analysis. More extremist views also contain anti-integration arguments that are only partially framed by radical discourses. The more ‘moderate’ general public employs more subtle discursive strategies in arguing for segregation. Our analysis will thus contain examples of this sort of variation in opposition to integration that will be contrasted with other pro-integration positions.

Below we elaborate three typical framings for these issues that were expressed by the interviewees. The first is firm advocacy for desegregation, the second is unintentional segregation, and the third is justified segregation. In the following paragraphs we will summarise how each of these discursive strategies are constructed by the speakers. We explore the main and most typical elements of their arguments, the justifications they use to support their position, and the main differences between the various strategies and how they are related to the three-fold conceptualisation of ‘tolerance’ (non-acceptance, tolerance, respect).

(1) Firm advocacy for desegregation

The most central argument for the ‘firm advocate of desegregation’ is the necessity of teaching Roma and non-Roma children together. Advocates emphasise that an integrative approach to education is beneficial to both majority and minority children. Through integration, these children get to know each other and get used to each other from early childhood.

“I absolutely agree that for Roma children it is better if they study together with non-Roma children, this is very positive, they can learn a lot. And vice-versa, for non-Roma children it’s good if they have Roma classmates, they learn a lot. So the objective is good.” (16.)

“It’s better for everyone to be together, even for the non-Roma [children] because they see them, not only when they are adults. That’s how life is, this is the reality that we have to live together.” (7.)
The underlying assumption in these arguments is that the Hungarian education system is unjust insofar as it does not provide equal opportunities for everybody. It segregates social groups on the basis of social status and ethnicity. As one of the policy-makers responsible for the desegregation policy expressed:

“The ideological background for the integration programme was the American civil rights movement. (…) Where there is segregated education in Hungary, the access to quality education is limited, the infrastructure is worse and the human recourses are weaker. (…) In Hungary, children of families in deep poverty suffer huge disadvantage and if they are Roma then they basically don’t have any chance to break out from their situation.” (2.)

The same rationale was formulated by an MP of the ecological party:

“The Hungarian education system is very unjust,[it] reinforces social inequalities. (…) Today what we see is that the new education concept is emphasising centralisation. This would not be a problem if it was based on social justice. But I don’t believe that this is the case. (…) The whole general public supports the idea of helping the middle class and this can be found in education measures too.” (5.)

Another justification favoured by the civil rights organisation that initiated lawsuits against local governments and schools is that segregation is simply illegal. Despite this, there are no official bodies with responsibility for preventing or stopping segregation:

“Neither the present nor the previous government, I don’t want to make a difference. Nobody dares to touch this problem but it must be dealt with. Studies show that segregation is growing. Nobody monitors what local governments do with their Gypsy schools.” (7.)

Additional arguments stress the negative sides of segregation. A ‘pedagogical reasoning’ line of argumentation emphasises that it is a ‘pedagogical nonsense’ to think that separate classes are good for the children:

“And the other thing is that Roma children will not learn anything in a segregated school, only bad things from each other.” (7.)

In a similar vein, others argue that no serious education policy in the world supports segregation:

“There are different views, some people think that the better pupils with higher achievements should be taught separately from worse pupils since a better result can be achieved in both types. However, there are those who say that integration is necessary. Disadvantaged children can be best helped if they are together with better children. No serious education expert in Hungary or in the world would support separate classes. This is a joke what they are doing now [the current government]. They don’t have any experts. Their political bases are the conservative, rural teachers and what they say they just put it into the new education bill.” (9.)
Economic reasoning is also favoured to defend desegregation as most sensible approach.

“It would be worth thinking about segregation from an economic point of view. Many Gypsy schools are run to avoid integrating these children in other schools. And this costs a lot of money because these schools are half empty, teachers are paid whether or not they work. For example, in one school that was recently closed, pupils were absent a lot so (…) the teacher went to class, nobody was there and so she went home.” (7.)

Examining this line of argument in view of the non-acceptance, tolerance, and respect conceptual scale, it is clear that the main goal they seek to achieve through desegregation and integrated teaching is tolerance: tolerating the Roma, their presence in the classrooms and in the society at large. Proponents emphasise that the education system is of crucial importance because toleration must be learnt through early socialisation. If it does not happen at this early stage then the basic capacity to tolerate others will always be lacking.

(2) Unintentional segregation

The next discursive strategy views segregation in more fatalistic terms as the inevitable outcome of certain social processes that are impossible to change:

“This is not segregation, this is life itself. (…) It seems as if Roma children were separated in such schools, but this is simply due to the composition of the population [where the whole population is Roma] I don’t like the word ‘segregation’ or ‘segregated’. I think it’s very good for majority children if they are together with their minority peers. Integration would be good for their interest. Accepting the other culture is easier at an early age. If children grow up together, they will be tolerant and can live nicely together.” (4.)

“Families that are good at representing their interests establish their own schools. This would not be a problem if it started at the age of 15. But the problem is that parents take their 6 year-old children to schools where they can be sure that there are no Roma. (…) Segregation is bad for everybody, for the country and for individuals, however, it has just happened and neither you, nor I nor anybody cannot do anything about it. It has been a very long process.” (12.)

School segregation is thus presented as the result of more general social processes, such as regional segregation. In economically deprived areas the more mobile parts of the population exercise their ability to move to other areas (and schools), and so people lacking this ability stay. Typically (though not always), lower status correlates with ethnicity. This means that there are certain villages or even smaller regions with the majority deprived and Roma. In cases like these, segregation is not the consequence of intentional discriminatory practices. The ‘white-flight’ of the non-Roma population that contributes to the segregation of these schools is not in the first instance ‘ill-intended’. These are processes instead that are the result of complex social and political factors, making it difficult to pinpoint any single factor responsible for segregation.

According to proponents of this view, segregation is thus unavoidable; it cannot be counteracted. It is only a short leap from here to finding some sort of legitimisation for ‘certain types of segregations’:
“Fighting against all sorts of segregation is very stupid because in certain cases it can be reasonable. (…) When children are separated in order to compensate for their disadvantages, it is done in their interest. When children are not allowed to attend a school because they are Roma, it is serious and unforgivable segregation. And when non-Roma parents take their children out of the school, they have the right to do that, it happens unintentionally. We may call it ‘unintentional segregation’. But either way it’s not good because it means majority children will not have experiences with minority children.” (6.)

Although the interviewee supports integrated teaching in general and recognises its benefits, he also argues that in some cases separate classes are preferential. This argument is consistent with an important strain of public debate concerning whether children with learning difficulties deriving from their social background should be dealt with in integrated or segregated classes. In Hungary, many policymakers argue that it is better and more effective to keep children separate (Váradi 2010).

This view, unintentional segregation, is not only shared by many but, as can be seen from the following citation, can serve to legitimate inaction in terms of challenging the legal basis of these practices. Court decisions often differentiate between intentional and unintentional segregation despite the fact that no such distinction can be found in law:

“In a court decision, for example, it was declared that there was segregation but not discrimination, so neither the school nor the local government was responsible, it just happened. But the law does not make a difference between intentional and unintentional (by default) segregation. So if the local government just let it happen, it equally breached the law.” (7.)

The unintentional segregation argument views segregation as an inevitable fate. As a consequence, no justification for desegregation policies is put forward. This sort of argument posits that children irrespective of their background should be taught together. The arguments to underline the importance of integrated teaching are similar to those found in the first discursive strategy: tolerance (‘accepting the other culture’) is the main goal. It differs from the first strategy insofar as it treats segregation as an inevitable and somehow natural process, thus calling into question the meaning of tolerance.

(3) Segregation justified

We saw that viewing segregation as an unintended consequence of other social processes and practices can ultimately contribute to its justification under at least certain circumstances. This argument, however, still presents mixed classes as important and indeed beneficial for both Roma and non-Roma children. In this respect, it is different form what we have labelled ‘justified segregation’, which draws a strong boundary between Roma and non-Roma culture:

“I am convinced that segregated education should be maintained until the conditions are good enough for integration. (…) They should get to know their own Gypsy culture first, and then the other’s culture. When the child is not strikingly different any more, then he or she could be integrated.” (18.)
“Many of them [the Roma] think that the way of life they have is part of their collective identity and if this changes then they will lose their identity.” (16.)

“We force children with different problems in one class (…) which creates tensions in parents, children and teachers who are supposed to deal with this irresolvable situation.” (16.)

The message contained in these discourses is that the Roma are simply too different, meaning that it would require too much time and effort to get them to adopt the majority culture. From this perspective, placing Roma children alongside majority children in the same school would cause numerous problems given the cultural distance that separates them. The most revealing part of the argument is that this imagined cultural distance is used to justify segregation: in the name of respect, they should be given the time and space (in separate classes and schools) to get to know their own culture and nurture their collective identity. We might call this a ‘reversed respect’ approach to cultural difference if we are to place it in our three-fold conceptual framework of ‘tolerance’.

While evaluating the policy measures, the following positions were formulated:

(1) Forced integration

The interviewees all shared similar backgrounds as experts and practitioners in the field of education. More specifically, they were all involved in desegregation/integration policymaking and implementation. It is perhaps surprising, then, that they all demonstrated a surprisingly low level of knowledge of concrete policy measures. Except for those directly involved in the policymaking process, the majority of interviewees were aware neither of the concrete components nor of the general ideology that informed integration policy. The mainstream discourse that took the view that the policy was ‘forced upon the society’ reflected the general opinion of the population rather than the views found in ‘expert discourse’.

“It was an ‘enlightened’ top-down policymaking process and instead of integration being a means, it was an end. (…) The integration policy did not have any social support because policymakers didn’t explain anything to anyone, why they were doing this and how they were planning to get from A to B. (…) Everybody who was not an expert was excluded from participating in the debates on integration. (…) Although the minister was a liberal, this issue of non-communication with the population resembled of the darkest of dictatorships.” (1.)

“I can’t see this question clearly. It is not a simple problem and it is not so simple what should be done. In 2002 The EU had a recommendation where they said integration should be assisted but not forced by legal actions. And since 2000 when we pushed for integration, the opposite has been happening: segregation has been growing at an unanticipated speed. My impression is that the best legal measures have not been invented. The non-Roma parents take away their children and as far as I can see the local governments or schools do not have any means to stop this. So without the mayors or schools breaching any laws, the school becomes a Gypsy school and according to the law they have to be closed. (…) The places where it was stopped, the
local government restricted parents’ rights. I have no idea how this process could be stopped.” (16.)

“I didn’t find integration policy the best solution because it was a forced integration. It wasn’t the right way of doing things and it brought the opposite results from what the government wanted to achieve. Schools, teachers, parents and children became even more anti-Gypsy. If five Gypsy children are forced upon a Hungarian community,(…) this is not very fortunate situation. It cannot be done like this. (…) This biggest mistake was to force integration. It wasn’t voluntary, and there was no proper communication with the majority society. They should have asked the Hungarians, the Gypsies, is this was what they wanted? Children and families have to be listened to because there are families that want their children to learn Roma language and there are others who don’t. (…) Obviously it is not good if we segregate them, but it is not good either if we try to integrate them by force. So we would need something in between.” (14.)

A number of discursive tropes are applied in articulating criticism of the integration policy as being forced. A first strategy is to refer to the force used by the government: the policies were ‘forced by legal actions’, they constituted ‘forced integration’, they were ‘forced upon a Hungarian community’, and the government ‘pushed for integration’, the ‘government restricted parents’ rights’, resulting in a ‘lack of voluntarism’. The second strategy emphasised the government’s failure to involve the wider society in the design and implementation of the policy: the government ‘didn’t explain’ things, there was a ‘non-communication’ problem, meaning that ‘society [was] excluded, leading one interviewee to describe the government’s actions as those of a ‘dictatorship’. All these explanations, according this discursive strategy, led to the ‘failure’ of integration policies insofar as they instigated conflicts and tensions and contributed to anti-Gypsy attitudes.

A more professional criticism from another policy expert makes similar claims but uses a different, more scientific register, basically arguing that the biggest mistake was that ineffective policy procedures were used:

“So the policymaking of the liberals wanted to force upon the stakeholders the changes they thought to be the right ones. Generally speaking their policymaking tools were incredibly poor because they used only two: regulation and financial incentives. The problem is that the success of policy measures depends on local contexts. In local communities where the social pressure to segregate is huge, such policies won’t work. There is a difference between addressing the symptoms or the real causes of the problems. The concept of segregation should be extended because it is one of the subtypes of selectivity. And selectivity is a symptom. It is a symptom of the segregation pressure in the system itself. We could use the image of a steam engine where the steam is the segregation pressure. And still the pressure is huge, the steam is leaking from time to time. The integration policy is like putting our fingers where the steam comes out, in other words, where the Roma children fall out from the system. But as soon as one hole is covered a new one appears somewhere else. This is because these policies did not aim at lowering the pressure in the tank, in other words they did not address the problem of selectivity. Thus, the whole integration policy targeted only the symptoms. Tools have to be applied that can override local contexts and local networks of interests.” (8.)
This more professional variant of the discourse starts from the same position as its non-professional counterpart: policymakers wanted to force their policy ideas on the society without their consent. This version of the discourse, however, does not conclude that this is why the policy failed. It points out instead that the tools chosen were ineffective because they only addressed symptoms instead of the structural problems.

This difference is crucial in understanding the real nature of the negative attitudes towards integration policy. In the professional variant, the selectivity of the system is emphasised as the main problem that needs addressing. Correcting for the system’s selectivity would redress the structural problems discussed in the introduction of this chapter. This of course would require that both the political elite and ‘white middle class’ accept that the integration of the lower classes (and thus the Roma). This is a classic problem of social competition between the lower and the middle classes. Ultimately the general public disaffection expressed in these critical discourses originating from both the public and the politicians was a reflection of the majority society’s unwillingness to integrate the social and ethnic ‘other’.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the ‘forced integration’ premise is that there is no special need for integration/desegregation since the target group itself often prefers segregation (e.g., to keep their segregated schools):

“There are places where it works and there are places where it doesn’t. So the school had to be closed because it was a segregated school. I don’t know if it was good or bad. Maybe the school was not bad, the teachers were nice. But in the end, as I heard, it worked (children were scattered in other schools). These things seem so simple but they are in fact very complex.” (12.)

“Certain Roma organisations are extremely self-conscious and wanted to close some schools and sued these schools claiming that they were segregating. Roma parents protested to save their school and said their children received a good education in them, they like it there and they are successful. I don’t know of any study that looked into the achievement level of these schools.” (6.)

(2) Lack of political support

At the opposite end we find the discourse of the most involved and invested actors—a member of the policymaking team and an activist of a civil organisation fighting for desegregation. These interviewees did not blame the integration policy itself or the way it was implemented but instead claimed that its ‘failure’ (popular rejection) was due to a lack of political support:

“The programmes were very well-designed. Of course, there are some minor problems in the law. But the basic programmes were well-elaborated and there was professional support as well as money allocated to the programmes. (…) However, the socialist minister did not do anything so the programmes started to fail.” (7.)

“Over the years, probably as a result of the attitudes of politicians, very strong misconceptions developed in the public. Many people think that integration means the forceful mixing of mainly Roma and poor children with the other pupils. But the
programme is not ethnically targeted. In fact, only about 50% of the disadvantaged children, the target group of the programme, are Roma. The other thing is that integration is never forceful, it is not obligatory. It was not an obligatory programme, it was a voluntary programme where the schools could receive extra financial support if they participated in the programme.” (2.)

It is telling that the integration policy was positively evaluated (in terms of its favourable impacts), only by those policymakers directly involved in its design.

“I can see that where they decided to adopt new pedagogical methods, schools became more open and cooperative. Something has started.” (13.)

“One of the very positive outcomes of the integration programme was that it introduced long-awaited pedagogical innovations into the system. (…) These methods were known in Hungary but only in elite schools. (…) The programme started with 45 schools and over the years, 1,800 schools joined in. (…) This means that about 300,000 pupils and 10-13 teachers are reached by the programme. This is about one third of the total pupils’ population. (…) As studies show, teachers are very prejudiced towards both the Roma and the poor and they have a strong attitude of pedagogical fatalism. Our programmes aiming to change teachers’ attitudes were not very successful in their primary goal, but all teachers who participated agreed that these programmes were very useful for them to improve their pedagogical methods and culture.” (2.)

To sum up it can be pointed out that the issue of school segregation is hotly debated. The problem begins with the inefficiencies, selectivity, and segregation tendencies of the education system. This is thus a serious structural problem that has not been adequately addressed by any Hungarian governments.

The implementation of desegregation/integration policies generated social conflict on both national and local levels. The dominant argument proffered in public debate claimed that the policy had failed. Our case study identified the types of arguments and discourses employed with respect to questions of desegregation. We also applied the conceptual framework of non-acceptance-tolerance-respect to our analysis.

5. Cultural accommodation of national and ethnic minorities in the Hungarian education system: the case of the Roma

Major policy measures and historical background

This case focuses on curriculum issues with regards to Hungary’s largest minority, the Roma. In Hungary, the ‘debate on the curricula with regards to the Roma’ has been a debate that is simultaneously hidden and omnipresent. To date, there has been only been notable public debate around one issue: the 2003 publication of a textbook on Roma culture that was strongly criticised by certain Roma activists who claimed it contained racist language. The book was ultimately withdrawn by the government. Ultimately, however, this was only a marginal debate that mobilised only a few actors active in the field. At the same time, more fundamental questions like ‘What is Roma culture?’, ‘How are Roma different?’, ‘What are
the consequences of their difference in the education system?’, and ‘How are Roma perceived by the majority?’ are at the centre of discussions on issues on Roma and education. That is to say, when debates on ‘education and the Roma’ occur, Roma culture and the ways in which it can be accommodated in the school system become the concern of a larger field of actors. We have thus chosen to address these larger issues in this case study despite the fact that the specific public debates around this particular issue are not easily discernible.

The most frequent themes discussed are (1) representation of the Roma in textbooks (including Roma history and culture); (2) minority schools and minority education more generally (including schools and/or classes organised for minority children with the express purpose of nurturing their cultural/ethnic identity); and, (3) ‘tolerance’ and the issue of the Roma (pedagogical methods for teaching toleration, especially with respect to the Roma). All of these questions are informed by a more fundamental question of what Roma culture is. In all of these discussions we find Roma culture and otherness interpreted and framed in different ways. Our analysis will consider how different actors express different interpretations of Roma culture, and how these interpretations inform and relate to the three major questions outlined above.

Three majors periods can be distinguished for major policy measures on minority education over the past twenty years: first, the essentialists-culturalist period, second, the multiculturalist-emancipatory period, and finally the social integration period (Neumann, Berényi and Bajomi 2010).

The essentialists-culturalist period (1990-1995) was notable for its attempts to overcome the assimilationist politics of the previous state-socialist regime. The 1993 Act on Minorities gave cultural autonomy to minorities so that they could cultivate their identity, traditions and language. The law also gave minorities the right to establish minority schools and to participate in ‘minority education’ (time and materials dedicated to minority cultures for schools where at least eight minority parents requested it). Minority education provided a minority only educational environment for children to learn about their own history and culture.

The multicultural-emancipatory period (app. 1995-2002) approached ‘minority education’ from a cultural rights and cultural recognition perspective. This approach had a double aim: one, to enable minority children to become more familiar with their own cultural heritage, and two, to give the opportunity to majority children to become familiar with other cultures.

The third period (2002-2010) was the social integration approach, in which cultural questions were completely ignored. The objective of this approach was to achieve desegregation and integration in the school system. The target group of the policy measures was defined in social rather than cultural terms. The beneficiaries of the programs were therefore ‘disadvantaged’ and ‘multiple disadvantaged’ children. The integration policy measures introduced as a part of these initiatives were consciously colour-blind (see our first case study).
Public and political debates

The main questioned that informed public discourses on these issues was ‘what Roma culture is’. Here, we develop a brief overview and typology of the major discourses types formulated by different public actors (politicians, policymakers, journalists, Roma intellectual elite and activists, NGOs, etc.).

The first discourse type can be labelled ‘biological racist’ because it emphasises the genetic roots of ‘difference’ and attributes cultural difference to these putative essential difference. ‘It’s in the Gypsy’s blood’ is an oft-heard expression that is informed by this sort of biological racism. The second discursive type we discuss is ‘cultural racism’, which is functionally similar to biological racism but emphasises cultural instead of biological difference. Culture from this perspective is nevertheless just as deterministic as biology. ‘The Gypsies’ marginal position is in the first instance not the result of the majority’s exclusionist practices’, wrote one representative of this perspective in a liberal weekly magazine.25 ‘The presence of Gypsies in all developed countries raises the same questions and the reasons for should be sought in their particular culture that can be described as a ‘culture of self-exclusion’. (…) This is not about poverty but survival patterns that follow historically evolved cultural codes.’

A third discourse type might be called ‘romantic essentialist’. This discourse type is also essentialist, but it differs from the previous ones in that it portrays Roma culture in a positive light, drawing on positive stereotypes.

The remaining more positive discursive strategies can be divided into two subgroups. A ‘culture of poverty’ discourse denies the existence of a separate Roma culture, arguing instead that majority Roma culture in Hungary is characterised by the loss of the Roma language and their traditions, suggesting that it would be misleading to portray the Roma as a separate group with its own culture. This view also holds that Roma customs and behaviours are derived from their socio-economic circumstances and therefore are closer to a ‘culture of poverty’ rather than the specificities of their ethnic culture. The final discursive type emphasises the ‘social historical roots’ of Roma culture: cultural difference is be understood from analysing the past social position of Roma in various periods of the history of the country.

These ideal discursive types are in practice never so clear-cut or self-contained. They often overlap, with elements of one mixing with elements of others. They are nevertheless useful as ideal types to help us analyse discourses on education.

Framing of Roma culture/difference

The main topics touched upon by the respondents included the representation of Roma in textbooks, minority education and the issue of tolerance with respect to the Roma. All interviewees were actively involved in policymaking during one or more of the periods. Their discourses revealed opinions on ‘minority education’ that reflected tendencies from the three periods. In what follows we explore these discourses in our interview data. Although we find

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particular policy discourses corresponding with particular periods, we also find additional evidence of other discourse types present at the same time.

As a first step, we begin with the ways in which our interviewees described ‘Roma culture’. 26

Most common was the constructivist social historical approach:

“We should be clear that the history of Gypsies should not be viewed as a history of suffering in Hungary or elsewhere in Europe. (…) We should also explain why 60-70% of one Roma group has degrees in higher education degree whereas they only represent 10% of the whole Roma population. It’s simple, since they have always had their place in Hungarian society. They were better integrated. They lived in a culture similar to a poor peasant culture.” (17.)

“My positive experience is that for about 300 years, from the beginning of the 1400s, there were no significant conflicts between the Roma and the non-Roma populations. I think this is a very important conclusion.” (16.)

“I cannot talk about Gypsies in general, I can only talk about what I know. There are no Gypsies in general just as there are no Hungarians in general.” (9.)

There was also evidence of the culture of poverty approach, which emphasised the Roma’s lack of culture:

“Many people emphasise that Roma children have a different culture. I don’t think this is the case, there is no difference in culture. It’s negative, regrettable side is that the culture of the Roma had been taken away from them. (…) In fact, their culture is closer to what we could call the culture of poverty than some ethnic culture.” (2.)

The romantic essentialist view was also articulated by some of the interviewees through the invocation of positive stereotypes:

“This beautiful Gypsy religion, this world view that we organise our lives around God. This is what the Catholic and the Reformed churches should embrace. (…) They destroyed our Roma culture, they did not let our culture develop. (…) If India had been our homeland, we would have brought something from there. A people can change its language but it can’t change its customs or relationship to God. Our Gypsy customs are still different from the Hungarian ones even though we are Hungarian speaking Gypsies.” (11.)

“Gypsies, their culture, their fabulous gracefulness, vitality, their love for their children and their strong solidarity are a social value. (…) As they often say, nobody who visits a Gypsy family will stay hungry. In that sense I have a very positive opinion of Gypsy communities.” (4.)

26 Two discourse types are missing from our interview data: the biological and the cultural racist. Whilst both types of discourses are widespread in everyday practice, including in schools, these discourses are not found in policy documents, which suggests they are consciously avoided in education policy. The ‘romantic essentialist’ discourse is, however, is present. It will be interesting to observe what impacts this essentialist approach has on questions of ‘tolerance’. Furthermore, it needs to be emphasized that.
Most interviewees were, however, stressed different understandings of Roma culture and some even framed this as a dilemma that contributes to problems for policymaking:

“The basic problem has always been whether the Roma are a social group characterised by their poverty or a group with specific cultural features. (…) In the past they were expected to assimilate, and now they are expected to be self-conscious Roma. (…) It becomes a social scientific dilemma, however, when it gets mixed up with education policy.” (13.)

Framing the case

(1) Representations of Roma in textbooks

The question of the representation of the Roma in textbooks concerns their portrayal both in the general curriculum and in textbooks written specifically for Roma children. There are textbooks ‘with Roma cultural content’ intended for majority children and there are other textbooks intended for Roma children.

Textbooks that form part of the general curriculum are the province of the National Core Curriculum:

“The NCC states that minorities’ history and culture should be incorporated into the curricula. It was a requirement.” (6.)

Textbooks for Roma children are governed by the Act on Minorities:

“Culture and language must be taught if eight parents demand it in a school.” (13.)

There are two opposing strategies for representing Roma in textbooks. The first argues that Roma themes should be incorporated into the general curriculum:

“I wouldn’t make it a separate class. It should be integrated into the wider curriculum. (…)” (4.)

“So I would not do separate teaching for majority and minority children. …[T]his content could be incorporated into all subjects.” (9.)

The second strategy supports separate textbooks on Roma for the Roma:

“More teachers are needed who know the language and culture so that they have some insight and can give something extra to their teaching of Roma children. … Governments should provide financial support to activities that are aimed at reviving local cultures and introducing them to classrooms. If schools don’t emphasise the importance of dealing with Roma culture, the communication between the different Roma groups as well as the minority and majority will be very difficult.” (14.)
“I developed a Roma culture and history curriculum for the Roma so we can get to know ourselves.” (11.)

The first strategy is supported by the multiculturalists and to a certain extent by the representatives of the social integration approach. The multiculturalists do not necessarily oppose separate textbooks as long as the general curriculum addresses the Roma issue as well. One of the major concerns with the general curriculum, however, was that it contains practically no information on the Roma in any of its textbooks:

“Today’s education materials don’t convey any image of the Roma or other minorities, or just in a very few cases. (…) It’s up to the teacher to decide what to teach about the Roma.” (5.)

“How many pages can you find about Roma in history books? Zero. This is absurd.” (12.)

This lack of mention of the Roma (or their culture, history) contributes to a wider silence on the issue:

“The situation is tragic. (…) Teachers are mostly afraid of talking about the Roma.” (13.)

This silence is attributed not only to the textbook problem but, also to the inadequate knowledge and negative attitudes of teachers toward the Roma:

“Teachers are confused, they don’t like the Roma and they say ‘in our school there aren’t any Roma children’.” (12.)

“There are lots of stereotypes about the Roma derived from inaccurate ideas about their history. For example this ‘why are Gypsies poor and why can’t they integrate’ and related biological racist idiocies are widespread. But the idea that this has social, social historical roots and this should be talked about is rare. (…) One time I heard a lesson in a teacher training college by the person responsible for courses on Roma culture. What she said was complete nonsense and stupid.” (9.)

At the same time, many interviewees expressed as scepticism regarding the possible impact of incorporating Roma themes into the general curriculum given these knowledge and attitude problems but also because of the prevalence of negative and even biological racist public discourses.

“Whether prejudices can be reduced by incorporating different narratives into history teaching?, yes, probably it’s possible. But I can’t recall very many good examples. And especially where the problems are on a more primitive level. In the last couple of years, the consensus that racist views and discourses are not acceptable… has broken down. In a country without this minimum consensus, it’s rather futile to use such subtle methods as widening the history curriculum.” (8.)
The most vocal critics of separate textbooks for the Roma are made by the **multiculturalists** and **social integrationists**. These people pointed out that, like with the lack of textbooks in the general curriculum, there are no proper textbooks for minority education.

“But I wonder how many institutions are actually prepared to provide minority education. (…) Those who want to teach Roma culture have no materials they can use. (…) Teachers don’t know what to teach, it isn’t part of the curriculum of teachers’ training.” (13.)

Others criticised on the treatment of Roma culture in textbooks as generally ‘naïve science’:

“In the 90s, the education ministry supported a book series written partly by Roma on Gypsy history and culture. You can find it in schools everywhere. It’s completely fraudulent science. (…) In the last eight years the government failed to give any thought to how Gypsy culture should be taught by future teachers. Now, a new book was published by a Catholic bishop. They’ll teach from this in Catholics school. This isn’t as crap as I though it would be. And this is already something. (…) LGY wrote a textbook about ten years ago. This isn’t bad [either].” (9.)

“What some people think or teach regarding Roma history (…) is not real science. (…) [It’s] myth creation. There is no serious Roma historian. (…) It would be in the interest of the Roma intellectual elite to have a realistic view of Roma history. (…) All the curricula I have seen are usually based on naïve science.” (17.)

“There aren’t any textbooks that achieve scientific standards. On that basis we could say that any money given or accepted for textbooks is fraudulent. The contents aren’t scientifically proven and what is even worse is that they spread misinformation.” (2.)

(2) Ethnic schools and minority education

Underlying all these discourses on textbooks is a more fundamental question regarding whether minority education (schools or classes for minority children to nurture their cultural/ethnic identity) is in the interest of the Roma at all:

“Since the regime change the view that Roma need separate nationality schools similar to other nationalities to nurture their culture and language has been accepted. (…) On the other hand, there’s the view that most Roma are disadvantaged and therefore need extra help to get them out of their misery. According to this view there is no need for separate Roma schools.” (12.)

Opinions are sharply divided on this issue. The question can be framed as a debate between colour-conscious versus colour-blind approaches: should policies towards the Roma be colour conscious or colour blind, and which approach do the Roma support. There are strong and convincing arguments on both sides.

The main argument for a colour-conscious approach to minority education is consistent with the intentions of the law intends for all minorities, including the Roma: to cultivate minority
culture, traditions and language. It finds support among both **multiculturalists** and the **culturalist-essentialists**:

“There is a need for minority education for several reasons. For the minority itself, because if they can’t experience their own culture at school, if the school doesn’t confront their difference, then the children will feel excluded.” (14.)

“You can develop in a healthy way if you accept your identity, if you don’t cut your roots, if you don’t refuse your roots. We have to help the Roma reinforce and nurture a healthy identity that is not opposed to their Hungarian identity. For this, they need institutions, for example Roma secondary schools where they can nurture their culture and language. (...) Integration is not assimilation. Roma people have the right to nurture their culture. I don’t think a healthy Roma identity is antithetical to integration. And if you want to conceal your origin, family background, you [should] have the right to do so. We can’t say you’re from there, you have to go back and for example teach in the Gypsy colony.” (16.)

The arguments against minority education were expressed by those who prioritised **integration**. This view held that treating Roma children as culturally different does not serve their real interests; rather integration in the education system is needed. Colour-consciousness, according to this view, does not help, but rather hinders integration:

“The basic problem is that the Roma don’t have access to quality services and as long as this is the case it’s completely futile to teach Roma culture, it won’t help them to learn how to read and write and calculate. I would warn everyone against imposing more Roma cultural education to try to improve the educational situation of the Roma. It’s a dead-end, for sure. Roma cultural education doesn’t increase the educational level of the Roma, it’s not the key to equal opportunities.” (2.)

“Teachers don’t need to be experts on Roma (trained in Romology) in order to teach Roma children.” (17.)

“Gypsy children are actually the same as all the others, they will learn or not learn the same things as the others if they are given the same opportunities. The problem is that those with the loudest voice who can influence public opinion don’t have any contact with the Roma, they have an abstract image of them. Roma children are stuck in ghetto schools and that is why this savage image has developed.” (2.)

The problems with a colour-conscious approach are further stressed by pointing out that minority schools and classes may lead to segregation. In other words, minority schools become a pretext for segregation:

“So parents have the right to demand ethnic-minority teaching for their children. If there are eight of them, the school has to provide minority education (extra classes on minority culture). In legal cases we often saw that schools use minority classes as a pretext for segregation. It’s a good opportunity for them to make sure that non-Roma children don’t hear anything about the Roma. So they don’t incorporate the material into the general curriculum, even though the goal is for all children to know something about the Roma.” (7.)
“Nationality schools receive support, but my party takes the view that they should only be supported at the level of secondary school, otherwise they lead to segregation.” (5.)

(3) ‘Tolerance’ and the issue of the Roma

Finally, we considered these discourses in view of their appropriateness for achieving and maintaining tolerance. The most frequently expressed view was that tolerance depends on getting to know one another and learning to cooperate:

“There is no doubt that children need more information about minorities. (…) And besides getting to know each other, children need to cooperate more. Prejudices can be overcome if children cooperate, do things together, resolve problems together.” (1.)

“Tolerance can be taught. (…) We organise training for tolerance, cooperation and our students love it.” (12.)

“We can’t just say, let’s be tolerant! It needs to be based on an everyday working relationship.” (14.)

A somewhat different view was formulated when the importance of getting to know one another culture was emphasised:

“If I know how a community functions, I will obviously be less prejudiced towards its members. Prejudices mainly come from a lack of knowledge. (…) Everyday experience tells us they are loud on trams, that’s where prejudices come from. And we, teachers, should work to undo these attitudes.” (14.)

“For the majority, for middle class children, that is non-Gypsy children, it’s important for them to understand and get to know and like difference and diversity.” (9.)

These opinions were expressed by multiculturalists and social integrationists. Proponents of these views also stressed the importance of teaching civil and human rights:

“It’s important that children learn about human rights, the civil rights movement mean, and, from the opposite perspective, right wing ideology. They also need to know what hate groups are and that we have them in Hungary today.” (5.)

Multiculturalists and social integrationists differ, however, in at least one important respect: how they understand Roma culture. The social integration discourse explicitly rejects the multicultural approach on the grounds that claiming a culturalist view is ‘essentialist’:

“The consequence of our integration programme is that Roma and non-Roma children met one another. But the programme didn’t directly address cultural difference; it only emphasised sensitivity and tolerance to change attitudes. (…) Multicultural education is based on an understanding of different cultures. I’ve emphasised that the Roma in Hungary have the same culture even though many people say it’s different. (…) I
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don’t think that this reflects the Hungarian situation, it would be contrived and ridiculous, like ‘the Gypsies like colourful skirts’.” (2.)

The **multicultural** discourse, on the other hand, accepts colour-consciousness and thinks that ‘dialogue’ – getting to know each other and each other’s cultures – is the path to tolerance.

“The question is whether policies are colour-blind or colour-conscious. If you emphasise social problems, you’re using a colour-blind approach. If you’re trying to apply multicultural methods, then it’s colour-conscious (…). When I worked as a vice state secretary under the first liberal education minister, we launched a programme called ‘Dialogue’ that aimed to provide incentives to schools to develop multicultural programmes. (…) Sociologists attacked me for turning a social problem into an ethnic question. (…) The second liberal minister did not put forward even one programme that contained any colour-conscious elements, except for some affirmative action type measures. (…) So today you can’t find any multicultural initiatives.” (8.)

The **culturalist-essentialist** discourse similarly stresses the importance of getting to know one another’s culture. But in contrast to the multicultural approach, culturalist-essentialists rely on a ‘romantic essentialist’ understanding of Roma culture. As such it constructs its discourse by drawing on stereotypes about the ‘other culture’. The ability of these stereotypical views of Roma culture for promoting tolerant attitudes and behaviour is questionable.

“I think Hungary’s in a special position because our diversity is an important value. (…) If we know the other and their values and the richness of their culture then we already feel closer to one another. This very colourful Carpathian basin is a source of pride. (…) At the same time, they can also learn a lot from us, especially about child rearing, so that by the age of six they won’t be disadvantaged. Of course they are somewhat ‘natural people’).27 For example, a[Rom]a priest in Kaposfő is always saying his people were born in tents, lived in the woods, and he’d always remark how beautiful the morning dew was. Us white people, or I don’t know how to say it, how should I say it? (…) if we know each other we can learn from each other. There can be a synergy between the two cultures, they flow into one another.” (4.)

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27 This can be understood as a euphemism for uncivilised.
To summarize the main findings we have created two summary tables: the first shows the different discourse types on ‘Roma culture’, the ‘textbook question’ and ‘minority schools’, and how these discourse types relate to questions of tolerance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse type</th>
<th>‘Roma culture’</th>
<th>Separate textbooks on Roma</th>
<th>Integrated curriculum</th>
<th>Minority schools</th>
<th>Educational approach to tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essentialist-culturalist</td>
<td>Romantic essentialist</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Culture as value in itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
<td>Constructivist: social history</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Multicultural education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integrationist</td>
<td>Constructivist: culture of poverty</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Civic education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second table summarises each ‘educational approach to tolerance’. We conclude that the ‘multicultural education approach’ promotes respect insofar as it emphasises the acceptance of cultural. The ‘civic education approach’, on the other hand, corresponds with tolerance: accepting other without reference to cultural difference. The ‘culture as value in itself’ approach also promotes ‘respect’, but the inverted commas suggest that this strategy is not based on a genuine understanding of cultural difference since it is constructed through stereotypes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Getting to know the other culture</th>
<th>Getting to know the other (regardless of culture) (cooperation)</th>
<th>Getting to know civil, human rights with regards to minorities</th>
<th>Type of attitude/behaviour/social relation aimed for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture as value in itself</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>‘Respect’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural education</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Tolerance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Concluding remarks

The Hungarian school system is highly selective that leads to severe inequalities in the education system. Due to various structural and attitudinal reasons children of higher social status end up in incomparably better schools than their peers from lower social status. The selectivity of the system is further exacerbated by the fact that the proportion of Roma among the low status children is significantly high. Thus, the Hungarian education system can be characterized as having separate classrooms and/or schools for children of low social status of whom a huge percent is Roma. This situation is referred to as school segregation regardless of the fact whether it is the result of conscious techniques of separating children or the outcome
of unintentional practices or structural processes. Desegregation, on the other hand, refers to state policies that intend to stop and reverse these tendencies and achieve to have socially and ethnically mixed or integrated classes and schools.

In our analysis of the desegregation/integration policy debates we identified three main discourses: the ‘firm advocacy for desegregation’, the ‘unintentional segregation’ and the ‘justified segregation’. The ‘firm advocacy’ discourse is a clear-cut case of tolerance insofar as it emphasised acceptance of the ‘other’ as the ultimate goal. This acceptance could only be achieved by teaching Roma and non-Roma (disadvantaged and middle-class children) in the same classrooms and schools. Early socialisation is thus an essential ingredient for learning toleration of the other. The next discourse type, ‘unintentional segregation’, similarly stressed that learning to accept others required early socialisation. In contrast to the ‘firm advocacy’ view, however, the ‘unintentional segregation’ discourse interpreted segregation as a ‘natural’ and irreversible process. From this perspective, segregation could thus be justified and even be beneficial to the children. As such, the meaning of tolerance is blurred since it is not clear how the distant other would be or should be viewed or treated. The third ‘justified segregation’ discourse is an example of what we have termed ‘reverse respect’. In the name of respect for cultural diversity, proponents of this view endorsed separate education for Roma so that the Roma may better preserve their customs, language and identity. It is questionable whether those articulating such views had the best interests of the Roma in mind. To the contrary, they may have been more interested in protecting the cultural integrity of the majority nation against encroachments from the Roma; hence the term, ‘reverse respect’. Indeed, proponents of this view tended to associate Roma culture with low social status, deviance, and undesirable behaviour – hardly cultural traits in need of preservation.

The cultural accommodation of Roma in the Hungarian school system pertains to the question of how the Roma culture and history is represented in textbooks, whether there is a need for separate minority education and how ‘tolerance issues’ with regards to the Roma is manifested in schools, especially in pedagogical methods.

The discourse analysis of the issue of the cultural accommodation of Roma in the school system revealed three types of formulations of the problem. The first, the essentialist-culturalist type sees Roma cultural difference basically in essential terms. Although well-intended, this approach results in promoting a type of curriculum that treats Roma not as an integral part of the society but as a group apart characterized by specific cultural traits. This approach can be contrasted with the second type, the multiculturalist, that also emphasises the cultural distinctiveness of Roma but it starts from a constructivist understanding of culture. It underlines that Roma culture should be seen as a social historical construction. The social integrationist perceives Roma cultural difference also from a constructivist point of view but it ascribes difference to the ‘culture of poverty’ arguing that Roma otherness is a result of their historically low social status.

The different understandings of Roma culture have implications as to the ‘tolerance conceptual framework’. Similarly to the discourses on the desegregation/integration theme, we have found a case of ‘reversed respect’: the essentialist-culturalists argue for a type of ‘respect’ that has the intention to keep the other at a distance. Cultural difference is glorified as long as it remains intact and does not assimilate to the mainstream culture. The argument lacks references to human rights or excluded the possibility of cooperation between the majority and the minority culture. The multiculturalists, on the other hand, could be argued to
support ‘real respect’ since they stress recognition of cultural difference along with the respect of human rights and mutual understanding of majority and minority. Finally, the social integrationists could be seen as promoters of ‘tolerance’ by drawing on such values as human rights and cooperation between groups without giving importance to culture and cultural difference.
Chapter 4.

Zsuzsanna Vidra – Jon Fox:
The radicalisation of media discourse
The rise of the extreme right in Hungary and the Roma question

1. Introduction

The aim of this study is to examine the strengthening of the radical right in Hungary, its anti-Roma dimensions, and how these discourses were received by mainstream political actors. We will proceed by considering the media coverage of two murder cases, one in which Roma were the perpetrators, and the other in which they were its victims. In the third part of our analysis we will turn to public debate on the question of Roma integration more generally, with a particular focus on calls to bring an end to political correctness as an impediment to genuine debate on these issues. The two murders and their treatment in the media are significant for understanding how the Roma question became increasingly racialised. The first of these murders is labelled ‘Olaszliszka’ after the village where the murder took place. In 2006, a teacher was lynched by a group of Roma. The second case is called ‘Tatárszentgyörgy’, again after the locale where the murder occurred. Here in 2009 a Roma father and his son were murdered by a number of Hungarian men who were later discovered to have neo-Nazi leanings. Both murders occasioned serious conflict between the Roma and non-Roma, and both attracted unprecedented media attention, setting off in turn national political debates. Our third case considers the media’s handling of both of the incidents and the discussion on the Roma question that the murders spurred. It is here where we see it proposed that politically correct language and discourse should be abandoned insofar as it is portrayed as an obstacle to genuine debate on these important issues. Our analysis of these examples will reveal how both mainstream and radical right media have complicit in the reproduction and legitimation of anti-Roma attitudes and actions in Hungary. Our analysis begins with the radical right and then considers how they are received by mainstream political actors. We conclude by examining how these discourses map onto the non-tolerance – tolerance – acceptance framework.

Roma exclusion

One of the main factors contributing to the rise of the extreme right in Hungary in recent years is the inadequate and unsuccessful handling of the social integration of the Roma minority by all successive governments since the regime change. This has not only contributed to the Roma’s increased socio-economic marginalisation, it has also made as a consequence the Roma question one of the most important topics in the Hungarian political life. But this is a problem without a solution: the institutional framework for Roma political activism is unable to provide for their effective participation in mainstream politics. Roma interests are thus either overlooked completely or manipulated and represented by a small handful of civil organisations claiming to represent equal treatment and rights. Roma integration and inclusion has been on the political agenda since the regime change that occurred in 1989-90. But just as quickly as the Roma question became a topic of debate, the situation of the Roma deteriorated precipitously. The economic transition of the 1990s created a new and stable underclass (Ladányi-Szelényi 2002). This population, the losers of the
transition, is characterised by intractable unemployment, low educational attainment and rural poverty. About half of this emergent underclass population are of Roma origin. Their social situation has continued to deteriorate over the course of the past 25 years.

This underclass is concentrated in small villages where tensions with the lower middle class have been intensifying. Although the roots of this conflict is primarily socio-economic, they are often represented in ‘ethnicised’ or ‘racialised’ ways. Thus conflict between segments of the population occupying different socio-economic positions come to be understood and interpreted as conflict between the Roma and the non-Roma. The last twenty years have thus witnessed the racialisation of conflicts in these marginalised rural areas.

State policies aimed at remedying this situation have not achieved their desired effects; indeed, some of these policies have even contributed to the further ethnic segregation of the Roma. The racialisation of social integration problems has multiple causes. For one, the Hungarian welfare system has been unable to reduce social inequalities or to prevent the formation and the reproduction of the underclass. Second, the social integration of the Roma population, although supposedly prioritised by successive governments, has in fact been viewed as a political liability by these governments, lacking the will to tackle the problem in a serious way. Third, the decentralisation of the Hungarian system of local administration has provided local governments with excessive authorities which are able to override other principles of non-discrimination and human rights when dealing with the Roma.

The rise of the radical right and the Roma question

Though different in its origins, the rise of the radical right in Hungary is unrelated to what is happening in many Western Europe states where the multiculturalist model has come under increased scrutiny and criticism. In Hungary, however, the success of the far right is to a large extent due to their effective exploitation of Roma issues. Both whilst campaigning for parliamentary election and since capturing 16% of the vote, Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary) has successfully thematised the Roma question, putting it on the mainstream political agenda. Jobbik’s first electoral success came in the European elections in 2009; a year later they captured 16% of the vote in Hungary’s parliamentary elections, nearly edging out the former governing Socialists (who received just 17% of the vote). At the same time a growing number of extra-parliamentary and sometimes paramilitary groups have also became active, some with close links to Jobbik. Indeed, mainstream political actors and the media have responded to Jobbik discourses on Roma, but often in uncritical ways. Jobbik’s anti-Roma rhetoric was crucial to its electoral success (Karácsony-Róna 2010). Its forceful and clear message of non-tolerance of the Roma assumes various discursive forms (such as talk about ‘Gypsy crime’) but can also be found in an expanding of array of public actions (particularly in marches organised by a number of paramilitary groups28 with the purpose of restoring order in settlements with high Roma concentrations).

28 The most important of these groups is the Magyar Gárda, the Hungarian Guard. The Hungarian Guard was founded in 2007 as a cultural association but with links to Jobbik (Jobbik’s president founded the cultural association that established Hungarian Guard). The main activities of the Guard include marches against ‘Gypsy crime’ in villages and towns with high concentrations of Roma. After a series of such marches the Guard was banned in 2009. Within a month, however, the Guard had reformed, composed largely of the same leaders and supporters. Since then, the group has been organising similar anti-Roma demonstrations, threatening and provoking the Roma population. The state’s failure to stop their activities has helped legitimate these activities.
Support for the radical right doubled between 2002 and 2009 (Juhász and Krekó 2011). There are numerous factors behind the rapid rise and success of the far right in Hungary: popular attitudes toward democratic institutions, the state, and the government and politics in general. Xenophobic attitudes can also be viewed as a determinant (but also as an effect) of the rise of the extreme right. More generally, economic decline, poor governance, interethnic tensions and the media’s handling of the issue has also contributed to the strengthening of the radical right (Gimes et al. 2009). The consolidation of democratic institutions in Hungary since 1989 has only been partial: popular support for democracy and participation in civil activities remains weak. Indeed, low levels of trust in democratic institutions persist. Hungarians are equally critical of the both the ruling elite and the government. Survey research that reveals high levels of popular dissatisfaction with public safety issues is attributable in part to an expectation that the state assume a greater role in such matters (itself a legacy of the communist past) (Gimes et al. 2009). This is consistent with other research that demonstrates that a quarter of the population accepts and supports authoritarian views and political rhetoric (Gimes et al. 2009; Juhász and Krekó 2011). These features of public opinion help explain how the extreme right is able to fill these gaps by establishing independent organisations that promise to restore and maintain public order (Gimes et al. 2009)

Another important factor is the high levels of xenophobia and racism in Hungarian society, amongst the highest in Europe and on the increase (Gimes et al. 2009). Anti-Roma attitudes, already strong throughout the entire population, have been shown to be significantly stronger amongst supporters of extreme right parties Karácsony and Róna 2010, p. 42). Indeed, anti-Roma attitudes amongst the population are more powerful predictors of party affiliation than either anti-establishment or anti-Semitic attitudes (Karácsony and Róna 2010). Jobbik clearly capitalises on this support base by using anti-Roma rhetoric to differentiate itself from the more moderate governing party, Fidesz, whose voters tend to share similar attitudes as the Jobbik voters (except with respect to anti-Roma attitudes) (Karácsony and Róna 2010).

Whilst general economic decline has contributed to the rise of the radical right, the more recent economic crisis has been shown not to be deciding factor in this same regard. Rather, it was the political crisis of 2006 and the instability that followed that can be seen to be a more decisive factor in the rise of the far right (Gimes et al. 2009). After winning a second term in 2006 (despite poor economic governance), the re-elected socialist prime minister privately admitted that his party had lied about the country’s economic performance so that it would win the elections. When the speech was leaked to the media, a series of demonstrations and riots ensued, demanding the resignation of the government. These demonstrations were organised and dominated by the radical right, but included at times the participation and backing of mainstream right and centre-right opposition parties. As the socialist government refused to step down, the demonstrations continued for weeks, contributing to the air of political instability.

Mainstream political as actors and opinion leaders have reacted ambiguously to the rise of the radical right. Their general reticence can be viewed as a silent (and at times not so silent) endorsement of the radical right’s intolerance. Indeed, open and explicit challenges to extremism were formulated by only a minority of mainstream politicians. Behind the

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29 Nearly half of the population support the view that democracy is not adequate for maintaining public order.
ambiguity and reticence of the majority of mainstream political actors lies a profound lack of consensus about what counts as radical and therefore unacceptable (Barta 2008).

The mainstream parties’ reasons for their reluctance to denounce the radical right are varied. The previously governing Socialist Party, which in the past articulated and defended an anti-fascist platform, has become too driven by internal divisions and thus too feeble to have a real impact on influencing the political discourse. The next and smaller opposition party, the Greens, has been accused of not being straightforward enough in its condemnation of the radical right. The Greens claim to want to distance themselves from all established political forces in Hungary (Magyar 2010). But as others have argued, ‘if a political party in Hungary wants to adopt a fierce anti-fascist position, this party will be, in the public eye, clearly associated with the unpopular [Socialist-Liberal] partnership’ (Magyar 2010, p. 7). The governing conservative rightwing party, Fidesz, has never really articulated strong anti-fascist discourses, again mainly for political reasons. Both Fidesz and the Socialists however, the two main parliamentary factions, whilst careful to criticise the far right, have been relentless in blaming each other for the rise of the extreme right. Fidesz suggested that it was in the political interest of the MSZP to allow the radical right’s activities so that they would be better able to demonise the centre right; the Socialists liked to portray the conservatives as in cahoots with the radical right (Gimes et al. 2009).

Problematic interethnic relations have been posited as another factor contributing to the rise of Jobbik. These ethnic tensions are in turn attributable to the Roma’s deteriorating economic and social situation. In economically deprived settings, perceived differences between groups become more accentuated and ethnicized (Gimes et al. 2009).

Supporters of the radical right cannot however be consistently linked to particular media, although they are overrepresented as internet users. This itself is significant because the radical right has created an alternative public space on the internet to spread its views. The mainstream media thus mobilises a good portion of otherwise politically indifferent voters by emphasising anti-Roma themes (Karácsony and Róna 2010).

Jobbik in contrast focuses its attention on issues of popular interest. Through their internet presence, they are able to keep these issues on the agenda. The internet networks of the radical right have thus been more effective than those of other parties. Jobbik has a central website with links to numerous smaller local sites. This means that local issues easily become public issues, further facilitating continued communication between the centre and the local spaces. This is also an interactive internet world proffering related discursive topoi rather than a clearly defined ideology. Their contents also appear on multiple sites (with videos on youtube, for example), thus providing greater access to a wider audience. The creation of this second or alternative public sphere is itself conducive to its message that a small minority of liberals, ex-communists, and Jews has the power to impose its view on the society. In the name of the nation, the radical right argues, this power must be opposed. Alternative knowledge against canonized knowledge is thus fabricated (Barkóczi 2010).

2. Research focus

Political processes can be understood from both their demand and the supply sides. This is particularly true when considering the rise of the far right (Mudde 2007). Jobbik’s successes cannot simply be explained by their supporters’ anti-Roma views, that is to say, the demand
side. The reactions of other political forces and the mediatisation of the radical party also need to be considered in order to understand how anti-Roma attitudes have been used to achieve political goals; in other words, the supply side must also be investigated. The radical right made anti-Roma themes the centrepiece of its political rhetoric; for its part, the mainstream media made sure those themes remained on the agenda. Jobbik was thus able to manipulate and control the Roma question and through it the media in a way that contributed to its rapid rise. The party took advantage not only of the ‘opportunity’ offered by the demand side – anti-Roma attitudes – but also from the supply side.

There are at least two explanations why the mainstream media are receptive to the issues presented by the radical right. First, it has been claimed for a long time by researchers, experts and activists that the media representation of the Roma and Roma issues are strongly biased and prejudiced. Editors, journalists, and reporters are either not aware that certain media content they produce are stereotyped or even racist or they simply hold prejudiced views themselves (Bernáth-Messing 1998; Ligeti 2007; Tóth 2011). Second, the mainstream media are unable to handle or contain the radical right. They are inexperienced and lacking appropriate skills in this regard. The mainstream media present the radical right in three ways. First, they tend to overdramatise both the importance and impact of the radical right (this is particularly the case with the more leftist orientated media), second, they tend to downplay their significance (this is the case with the rightwing media), and third, while the media support extremist views (as can be seen in the extremist media) (Barta 2008).

In our study we are interested in the rise and spread of ‘racist language’ in public debates and the media. We take Wodak and Reisigl’s (2001) premise that racism is a political ‘fighting word’ as our starting point. Racism in this view is both a practice and an ideology that manifests itself discursively. Ian Law argues that two fundamental discourses, racist and anti-racist ones, are in a struggle with one another in the media (Law 2010: 193) The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the emergence and rise of ‘coded racism’ (Downing and Husband 2005). Hall (2000) and Van Dijk (1989) observed that this coded racism was more dangerous since it was less noticeable and therefore more insidious. In many countries the 1990s brought with it a fashion for ‘breaking taboos’ that had been earlier created by anti-racist discourses and forced upon the society. This ‘new realism’ presented itself as revealing the ‘truth’ about ethnic and racial groups (Prins 2006). This ‘new realism’ as its proponents would like to call it might also be known as the resurfacing of an open racism in public and media discourses.

This spread of racist language and discourse of course requires further analysis. ‘A “discourse” about a specific topic can find its starting point within one field of action and proceed through another one. Discourses and discourse topics “spread” to different fields and discourses. They cross between fields, overlap, refer to each other, or are in some other way sociofuncionally linked with each other’ (Wodak and Reisigl 2001: 383). A discourse analytical approach cannot however reveal causality (Downing and Husband 2005). Nevertheless, we can make use of quantitative methods through which conclusions about agenda setting can be formulated (Protess and McComb 1991).

In our case study we will analyse media representations of two murder cases (with the Roma as the perpetrators in the first one (case 1.) and the victims in the second one (case 2.)); we will then conclude with a debate on ‘Roma integration and the end of political correctness’ (case 3.) as it appeared in left orientated papers. Our main purpose is to show the range of reactions to the radical right and how the Roma issue was thematised through engagement
with these two murder cases. This will shed light on the ways in which radical right discourses spread to mainstream discourses.

**Research design**

In our research we applied the method of discourse analysis. Wodak (Wodak and Meyer 2001; Wodak and Reisigl 2001) identifies five different discursive strategies found in discriminatory utterances: (1) **referential or nomination strategy** that serves the purpose of constructing and representing social actors as in-groups and out-groups. (2) **Predication strategies** are characterized by the use of “stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits” in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates: “labelling social actors in a negative or a positive way, deprecatorily or appreciatively” (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 73) (3) **Argumentation strategies** and fund of topoi are used to justify positive or negative attributions, and political inclusion or exclusion, discriminatory or preferential treatment. (4) **Perspectivation, framing or discourse representation** is a strategy through which speakers express “their involvement in discourse and position their point of view” (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 73). (5) **Intensifying strategies** and **mitigating strategies** help to “qualify or modify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of racist, anti-Semitic, nationalist, or ethnicist utterances” (Wodak and Reisigl 2001: 386).

In our study we analysed four Hungarian media sources three of which served as a basis for case 1. and case 2., and the fourth for case 3. For the first two cases we included the following media: kuruc.info.hu, one of the most important radical right-wing internet web-sites in Hungary, the left-wing but mainstream Népszabadság, and the right-wing (also mainstream) Magyar Nemzet. For our third case we compiled a database by choosing one particular debate published in a weekly political and economic magazine, Heti Világ Gazdaság.

For case 1. and 2. we conducted keyword searches – looking for the name of Olaszliszka and Tatárszentgyörgy – in both papers and the website to compile a dataset containing all relevant articles published since the incidents occurred. From the dataset we selected opinion articles and looked for discursive strategies employed in the articles. For case 3, we used all articles

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30 “This is done via membership categorization devices including references by tropes like biological, naturalizing, and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies as well as by synecdoches” (Wodak and Reisigl 2001: 386).
31 “Topoi are the content related-warrants or ‘onclusion rules’ which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion” (Wodak and Meyer 2001, p. 74.).
32 Kuruc.info.hu is the leading internet web-site of the radical right. Its editors use pseudonyms and it is operated from an American server. It is openly racist against all minorities. The site is constantly in the focus of debates on hate speech and efforts have been made to ban it.
33 Népszabadság is the largest national daily with left wing orientation. It used to be the Communist Party’s official paper. Since 1989 it has enjoyed the the continued support of the Sociality Party.
34 Magyar Nemzet was founded in 1938 and has always been a conservative paper. After 1989, the newspaper emerged as an independent and moderate/conservative paper. In 2000 the paper was merged with a more extremist right wing paper. Although it is still considered mainstream, since the merger it has adapted a rather radical voice.
35 www.hvg.hu: According to the self definition of the magazine, HVG is a liberal minded, economic-political weekly not linked to any political parities. It publiches articles regardless of political party interests.
of one particular debate launched by the editors of hvg.hu entitled: Why don’t Hungarian Roma integrate?\textsuperscript{36}

3. Analysis of the media representation and the public discourse on two symbolic events: Olaszliszka and Tatárszentgyörgy and the ‘Roma integration debate’

Case 1. Olaszliszka

In October 2006 a middle aged teacher was driving through a small village in the north of the country with his two daughters when he accidentally hit a girl crossing the road. As the man got out of his car to help the girl a group of local people including the father of the girl gathered around, concerned for the girl’s wellbeing. The driver was brutally attacked, and died on the spot as a result of his injuries. His two daughters witnessed their father being killed from where they sat in the car. The attackers were Roma. The girl, who had been hit by the car, had not been injured. Within two days, the police had arrested the perpetrators.

The government also reacted swiftly by issuing a statement in which it both denounced the murder but simultaneously warned that generalising from the incident by blaming the whole Roma community should be avoided:

“The police… will make every effort to find and punish the persecutors. There is no excuse for such a murder. It is a crime, a brutal act. However, any kind of generalisation or anti-Gypsy instigation should be denounced. This would be harmful… to the case and to the country. The government believes we should not let anyone lead us into this cul-de-sac. …The state should interfere to prevent aggression and prejudice of this kind” (Government spokesperson, HVG 18.10.2006).

Despite the government’s warnings the brutal murder captured the attention of the media for weeks. The initial shock caused by the incident was further aggravated by the media’s insistence on the ethnic origins of the perpetrators, deliberately invoking stereotypes while discussing the details of the case. Thus expressions such as ‘wild and barbarian group’, ‘blind family attachment’, ‘inclination to vigilantism’, ‘uncontrolled aggression’, ‘different norms of behaviour from that of the majority’, to name but a few were found throughout the media (Pócsik 2007).

In what follows we argue that this public discourse eventually followed two different trajectories. On the one hand, one discourse continued to rely on stereotyped representation of the event and the Roma, while a second discourse attempted to use a more politically correct approach to framing the event.

This second, politically correct variant proved weak in the face of the more radical and stereotypical representations found elsewhere. It was thus the stereotypical discourses that soon began dominating the media on all sides of the political spectrum. This emboldened the radical right, allowing them to take advantage of the situation by labelling the case a typical manifestation of ‘Gypsy crime’. The term in Jobbik’s formulation:

\textsuperscript{36} http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091014_roma_cigany_integracio. The debate was published between October and November 2009.
“does not mean that all Gypsies are criminals. This is not the collective stigmatization of Gypsies, neither is it racism, since the term refers not to a genetic determination but socio-cultural background. This is a term used in criminology to describe certain types of crimes specific to this minority (usury, stabbing, mob fighting, iron theft) which require special treatment. (…) Jobbik made a historic breakthrough by openly saying what everybody knows but tries to hide in the name of political correctness: Gypsy crime exists, moreover, it proliferates in Hungary” (Election program of Jobbik, 2010).

In the following paragraphs we will examine how Olaszliszka was discursively dealt with on the most important radical right web-site, kuruc.info.hu. Next, we will consider how the two major daily newspapers, the right wing Magyar Nemzet and the left wing Népszabadság reported these events, revealing the differences between these various media representations to see to how they contributed to the radicalisation of the discourse.

**Kuruc.info.hu**

The main discursive strategy of kuruc.info.hu was the use of the topos, ‘Gypsy crime’:

“The Gypsy mob lynched a teacher to death. Another victim of Gypsy terrorism: It is a shame that the … Gypsies, after having fucked the possibility for peaceful coexistence, are still free and are attacking us. Us, peaceful Hungarians. They forget to mention that Olaszliszka was not a unique case. In the last sixteen years Gypsy mobs have been attacking peaceful Hungarian citizens in more and more aggressive ways. Gypsy leaders don’t want to stop this” (http://kuruc.info/r/2/6487/).

For kuruc.info.hu, Gypsy crime is a fact: deficient Roma attributes explain their criminal behaviour, and this in turn justifies their continued exclusion. The genetic explanation for ‘Gypsy crime’ is taken for granted as can be seen in the headings used on the website: ‘Gene cemetery’ marks the phenomenon of biological racism and the idea of inferior race as used in the far-right discourse. Anti-Semitism is also present on kuruc.info.hu. Besides ‘Gypsy crime’, the site presents other articles under the heading ‘Jewish crime’. The Roma and Jews are thus both genetic groups, having certain specific and deterministic biological characteristics that inspire them to engage in certain types of criminal activities.

Other discursive strategies included nomination and predication. The out-group, the Roma were attributed negative traits by using the expression ‘Gypsy mob’. Other out-groups, including those that represent and stand up for Roma, included human rights activists and Roma leaders. The in-group, in contrast, the Hungarians, are the opposite: they are peaceful. Presenting Hungarians (the majority) as victims is actually one of the main strategies of kuruc.info.hu when expressing their views on the Roma. There is a heading ‘Anti-Hungarianism’, that sums up the essence of the extremist understanding of intergroup relations: on the one side can be found ‘them’, the genetic waste, the criminals, and on the other side are ‘us’, the ‘Hungarians’, who are threatened and, as the case of Olaszliszka proves, attacked and killed by ‘them’.
Magyar Nemzet

In *Magyar Nemzet*, we find evidence of the same main discursive strategy favoured on kuruc.info.hu: the characterization of the murder as an example of ‘Gypsy crime’. Here we examine how this topos is constructed by *Magyar Nemzet* and the ways it differs from kuruc.info.hu’s uses of it. What we discovered is a direct link between the radical right website, the radical party and *Magyar Nemzet*. Indeed, *Magyar Nemzet’s* initial reporting on the Olaszliszka case was as a mouthpiece for Jobbik:

“Jobbik was appalled to learn that a father who hit a Roma child with his car was beaten to death in Olaszliszka in front of the eyes of his two children. The incident is not unprecedented since in the previous years the number of brutal crimes committed by Gypsies has radically increased. The media and the authorities in the name of positive discrimination did not mention the ethnic background of the perpetrators” (http://mno.hu/migr/jobbik-olaszliszka-utan-uj-romapolitika-kell-473660, 16.10.2006).

The paper then quoted the Jobbik’s official statement in response to the event:

“Jobbik demands the immediate change of laws infringing legal equality by providing an unduly favourable situation for the Gypsy ethnic group. A radically new and systematically altered Roma politics has to be implemented. (...) One of the essential elements of this programme would be the implementation of crisis management based on the recognition of the existence of Gypsy crime. The majority society must be informed about Roma issues without hiding facts and the Gypsy society must be made to realise that in Hungary they also have to obey the laws” (http://mno.hu/migr/jobbik-olaszliszka-utan-uj-romapolitika-kell-473660, 16.10.2006).

*Magyar Nemzet* thus declared its ideological stance in that matter by aligning itself with Jobbik. The next day a long opinion article entitled ‘Gypsyliszka’ appeared in the newspaper:

“The perpetrators were Gypsies. Several dozens. Several dozens of lynching people.’ ‘Now what is to come is that the unbearably abject “human rights defenders” will appear in the media with tears in their eyes. The script is the following: after a couple of days an article will be published that the slaughtered teacher was racist. Then it will be succeeded by a report from the village that reveals that poor Gypsy kids are always run over by cars, and so therefore the life of poor Gypsies in Olaszliszka is a never ending dread. The third report on Olaszliszka will disclose that racism rages in the village and poor defenceless Gypsies are exposed to constant bullying. It is no wonder that they went wild. (...) Anyone hitting a Gypsy child in this country with his car should accelerate (...) and only stop at the next police station. (Since if we run over a child we stop, we should do something, so it is better to get hold of a gun before hitting the road). (...) We know very well that the state will not guarantee our safety. Similarly we cannot hope that the state will compensate us for our injuries. (...) We should shout: the majority society does not have to tolerate this. We are self-destructive fools if we tolerate this. (...) Zero tolerance. This should be the new catchword. Nobody will defend our rights. We can depend only on ourselves.” (http://mno.hu/velemeny/ciganyliszka-473730, MN 17.10.2006)
The main goal of the article and others like it is to break the taboo of referring to the ethnic background of the perpetrators. In this way the ‘Gypsy crime’ topos features differently than the way it was used on kuruc.info.hu. There, ‘Gypsy crime’ is an expression that is taken for granted; there is thus no need to break any taboos.

The out-groups (nomination) are similar to those used by kuruc.info.hu: the Roma and the civil rights activists; the in-group is again the majority society (Hungarians). When labelling the groups (predication), Magyar Nemzet employs very similar strategies: on the one hand, the majority society is again represented as victim of the minority:

“We are self-destructive fools if we tolerate this’, while on the other hand, we have the ‘unbearably abject human rights activists’ and the innately brutal and aggressive Roma: ‘They suckle criminality from their mothers’ milk and as soon as they become a majority somewhere, they destroy everything. They abuse and hate Hungarians although they have never received as much money from the state then nowadays’ (http://mno.hu/migr/hvghu-kontra-magyar-nemzet-382895).

This latter quote also reveals Magyar Nemzet’s biological understanding of the Roma: ‘they suckle criminality from their mothers’ milk.’

Népszabadság

Népszabadság used different discursive strategies when reporting on Olaszliszka. The topos ‘Gypsy crime’ is used in a negation, claiming that no such phenomenon exists by citing Roma leaders: ‘This is not a Gypsy issue, but a criminal case.’ (http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-421067)

One of the newspaper’s other strategies is the use of various framings. Articles dealing with the desperate situation of the region where the murderous incident took place were published in the weeks and months after the murder. Journalists wrote reports and did interviews with people living there, including the Roma. One Roma woman from the village complained:

“This incident is disastrous for us. It is horrible what happened but most people generalise, they don’t treat us as individuals. (…) The grandfathers and fathers of the new generation had jobs and worked. Now they only can hope for social assistance and public service work. (…) Children growing up in destitution will become desperate themselves” (http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-421353).

This strategy introduces a new perspective, the perspective of the Roma as victims of social disadvantages.

The same strategy is discernable when Népszabadság writes about the ‘Roma being afraid of revenge’. Jobbik organised demonstrations in the village and concerts in other locations to commemorate the murdered teacher. The memorial site erected on the spot of the deadly act and just the village itself more generally gradually became a site for pilgrimage for the radical

37 In Hungary the “Gypsy origin” of offenders were recorded between the period of 1971 and 1989. Today, the 1992 data protection law prohibits such data collection. http://www.okri.hu/content/blogcategory/26/52/
right. In connection to these events, *Népszabadság* published articles denouncing the radical right. They also reported on how the Roma population felt about the presence of these groups in the village:

“Last autumn the rumours spread among the Gypsy families of Olaszliszka that two thousand skinheads were heading to the village from Miskolc. On these occasions, hundreds of people fled their homes and found shelter on the other side of the river with their relatives. In the meantime in the Roma settlement, windows of several houses were broken and one deserted house burnt down. Another scandal broke out after anonymous death threats were delivered to many Roma. A political group organised a demonstration in Olaszliszka demanding the reinstitution of capital punishment” (http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-450496, MN 17.06.2007).
Case 2. Tatárszentgyörgy

‘Four men, nine cases, six dead’
(http://nol.hu/kritika/20091004-ciganyvadaszat_magyarorszagon)

A series of murderous attacks against the Roma that began in 2008 were later revealed to be racially motivated. The victims all lived in houses situated on the edges of small villages, and the villages were all close to major roads that helped facilitate the gunmen’s escape. The gunmen prepared meticulously for their attacks, choosing the village, street and houses carefully. Each attack took place in the middle of the night or at dawn; Molotov cocktails provided the necessary light to make the targets easier to see. The actual victims, however, were chosen randomly. This sent the message that Roma people do not deserve recognition as individuals, but rather share collective guilt for their ‘Gypsy crime’. In August 2009 four men were arrested by the police on suspicion of murder. The police found neo-Nazi symbols in the suspects’ houses, establishing the racial motivations of the crimes. Their trial is ongoing.

The murders in Tatárszentgyörgy of a father and his five year old son marked a turning point not only in public discourse but also in how the police and authorities dealt with the cases. It was then that the police began to consider possible racial motivations for the attacks. Before, their investigation had focused on the Roma as the perpetrators of the crimes on the assumption that the victims had been involved in some sort of Roma criminal activity or family revenge.

In our analysis we will look at the discursive representations of the Tatárszentgyörgy murders as they appeared on the radical right wing web-site and in Magyar Nemzet and Népszabadság.

Kuruc.info.hu

Similar to the Olaszliszka case, one of the most common strategies employed by kuruc.info.hu is the Tatárszentgyörgy case was nomination whereby the in-group, the majority Hungarians, through a process of conversion became the victims. They were the targets of an anti-Hungarian conspiracy: “Anti-Hungarianism: The funeral in Tatárszentgyörgy can be turned into an anti-Hungarian demonstration” (http://kuruc.info/r/2/36281/).

In other cases we find the ironic use of double conversion, whereby the ‘victims’ (the Hungarians) are mockingly recast as murderers:

“Hungarian humiliation in the Sunday Times. The sinful nation committed a murder against poor, honest, hard working Gypsies. (…) A well informed journalist from

38 In August 2008 in the village of Piricse, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the house of a 64 year old woman who was subsequently shot in the leg. In November of the same year in Nagycsécse, a middle aged couple were killed in a similar attack. The following February a Molotov cocktail was thrown again at another house, this time in Tatárszentgyörgy, and the fleeing father and his five year old son were shot to death. Two months later in Tiszalők a man leaving his house was shot and killed. Finally, in August 2009 in Kisléta a 45 year old woman was killed and her 13 year old daughter injured in another gun attack. The perpetrators entered their house and shot them from close range.
Vienna wrote that since the Cosma murder\(^\text{39}\) the number of attacks against Gypsies has increased. We know that we Hungarians shot, stabbed, raped, threatened our dark skinned friends on a daily basis. Not the other way around, that’s for certain” (http://kuruc.info/r/20/36261/).

Predication strategy is also used in connection to the murders in the same way as in the Olaszliszka case. Roma and human rights activists are given pejorative, condescending labels:

“The left-lib Kisalföld\(^\text{40}\) wants people to feel sorry for the Moccas.\(^\text{41}\) It published a timely and juicy Gypsy-pitying article so that our readers can feel even more sorry for the persecuted Roma who live in fear.” (http://kuruc.info/r/35/38377/).

The predication strategy does not only evaluate the out-group (Roma) negatively, but the mainstream media and press agencies as well. The media are depicted as presenting lies and they are portrayed as controlled by Jews:

“The Hungarian Press Agency lied in connection with the Tatárszentgyörgy case. How many times has the Hungarian Talmud Agency\(^\text{42}\) lied to us using our tax proceeds?” (http://kuruc.info/r/35/37430/). Or: ‘The race defender, HVG, lies again about racist attacks. – We are used to HVG, which has an editor-in-chief who is a famous news-faker and which used to have a Zionist ex-editor-in-chief, who spread the most brutal Gypsy-coddling, race defender propaganda.” (http://kuruc.info/r/35/38081/).

There is a direct link between kuruc.info.hu, Jobbik and Magyar Nemzet. We found Magyar Nemzet reports often serving as a positive point of reference points for kuruc.info.hu. For example, Kuruc.info.hu referred to Magyar Nemzet articles in which the paper presented local Roma in Tatárszentgyörgy (including the victim’s family) as being involved in various criminal activities: “On Saturday Magyar Nemzet published a well written piece on the Tatárszentgyörgy murder” (http://kuruc.info/r/35/38797/).

**Magyar Nemzet**

In the two mainstream papers, the murder was framed as one of two possible but competing interpretations, either ‘a racial hate crime or a non-racial hate crime’. The major strategy found in Magyar Nemzet, was the use of the topos ‘not a hate crime’; its aim was to prove that the killing was not motivated by racial hatreds:

“Is it out of the question that racists committed the murder in Tatárszentgyörgy? No, this cannot be excluded, but it is the least likely scenario. Racist attacks everywhere in the world are committed by terrorists who are proud of their deeds and they want their

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\(^{39}\) This is a reference to the murder of a famous handball player, Cosma, by Roma perpetrators in 2009.

\(^{40}\) Kisalföld is a regional newspaper.

\(^{41}\) Mocca is a racialised term for Roma.

victims to be afraid of them. They make their voice heard somehow, they want publicity” (MN 25.04.2009).

This perspective was frequently repeated not only by journalists writing for the paper but also by different experts reported in the paper, thus giving the interpretation even greater importance and legitimacy.

The topos, ‘not a hate crime’, is constructed with the other topos, ‘Gypsy crime’, that we saw earlier in the case of Olászlíszka. Both topoi were frequently employed by Magyar Nemzet. The ‘not a hate crime’ strategy depicted other interpretations ‘conjecture’, motivated by ‘revenge’ or ‘usury’. Conventional wisdom in Hungary holds that these types of crimes are committed mainly by Roma. The implication is that the murderer must have also been Roma:

“In Tatárszentgyörgy the perpetrator was most likely Gypsy. I spent a couple of weeks in the village and I know that the relatives of the victim had tense relationships with Gypsy criminals who have guns” (MN 18.06.2009).

The aim of Magyar Nemzet was to present various types of evidence suggesting that all the Roma in Tatárszentgyörgy, including the murdered man, were criminals. In this way, Magyar Nemzet’s coverage of the Tatárszentgyörgy murders harkened back to the ‘Gypsy crime’ topos deployed in the Olászlíszka case:

“Without any reason, the Roma attacked a young man in Tatárszetgyörgy. The instigators of the fight were all relatives of Csorba Róbert, the murdered man. (…) The motivation according to the attacked man was that they had drunk too much” (MN 23.05.2009).

Magyar Nemzet also posited that the Roma could also be guilty of committing racial hate crimes. This could nevertheless be interpreted as part of the ‘not a hate crime topos’. By turning the hate crime interpretation back on the Roma, the ‘Gypsy crime’ interpretation gains further credibility.

“I feel there is a contradiction here. While in case of the Olászlíszka murder where all relevant details are known, we are not supposed to talk about racist emotions or motivations in the name of political correctness. In the case of the Tatárszentgyörgy murder, as soon as we learnt about the ethnic origins of the victims, Roma rights activists immediately label the killing as racial hate crime” (MN 28.03.2009).

The nomination strategy employed in the Tatárszentgyörgy case was used mainly to distinguish between the human rights activists and left-liberals on the one hand and majority Hungarians on the other. The most important ‘other’ is thus the liberal left, advocating human rights and defending the rights of the Roma minority. One of the accusations made against left-liberals is that they demand that the murders in Tatárszentgyörgy and elsewhere be investigated as racial hate crime, but without, as Magyar Nemzet argues, having any proof. Moreover, the same left liberals are also instigating hatred against the Hungarian majority by labelling them racist:
“Iványi Gábor instigates hatred – (Talking at the funeral of the victims): He accused the non-Roma population of being accomplices to the murderers even though we don’t know anything about the motivation or skin colour of these cold-blooded perpetrators. (...) In his prayer, he expressed the idea of collective sin: “Forgive us for the hate speech that we cannot stop. Forgive us for the schools where Gypsies cannot enter. We threaten you and we do not stop the vicious guards that march all over the country” (MN 05.03.2009).

This can be understood as a predication strategy whereby the pejoratively labelled minister is accused of committing the same negative racist deeds that he claims to be criticising. Magyar Nemzet used the same strategy while claiming that the ‘racist card’ is a political instrument of the left-liberals. The left-liberals accused the right of being racist to deter people from supporting to the ‘racist right’:

“According to the leftist liberal elite the right wing is instigating hatred against the minorities which has resulted in the serial murders of Gypsies. Tatárszentgyörgy is a metaphor, a political symbol: it means that it is not possible to support the right because it is racist” (MN 25.04.2009).

Predication strategies manifest themselves in Magyar Nemzet as conspiracy theories:

“A radical right, racist, ideologically motivated group of serial-murderers is a tempting idea, but it’s very unlikely. What is most likely is that we are facing a politically motivated murder…. What is important is not the murder itself but the social, political and economic impact the killings have on society. This was the aim of those who committed the murder, and they found the right tools and the right plotline” (MN 08.08.2009).

The political ‘other’ here is marked as a negative figure, someone capable of heartlessly committing murder to achieve political goals.

In August of 2009, four men were arrested and charged with the Tatárszentgyörgy murders. After they were taken into custody it was announced that the suspects had all possessed neo-Nazi paraphernalia and had also expressed openly radical and racist views. From that point forward, Magyar Nemzet stopped reporting on the murders. The topic only resurfaced in the pages of Magyar Nemzet once the trial began a couple of months later. The tone and language of the articles at that stage became mostly matter of fact.

Népszabadság

The discursive strategies found in Népszabadság were the opposite to those used by Magyar Nemzet. Népszabadság deployed the ‘hate crime’ topos as its main discursive strategy. Expert opinions were published in the newspaper that did not rule out the possibility of a racially motivated hate crime:

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43 Iványi Gábor is a well-know methodist minister and an outspoken defender of the Roma minority.
“It is possible that the family in Tatárszentgyörgy was attacked as a result of a previous conflict, but it is also possible that racism was behind the killing. According to Németh [the chief police investigator], the murderers believed that they were omnipotent and that they knew the truth about everything. It is likely that they have families and jobs and that they are not from underground criminal groups” (NSZ 23.02.2009).

At the same time the police were criticised for not taking this interpretation seriously in their investigation:

“Until the murders in Tatárszentgyörgy, the police had not taken attacks on the Roma very seriously. Since then they have changed their tactics. In 2008 when the first Molotov-cocktail and other attempted murders occurred the police immediately ruled out the possibility of the crimes being ethnically motivated and investigated instead the lives of the victims as if they had somehow deserved their fate. They do not dare commit the same mistakes in Tatárszentgyörgy” (NSZ 07.08.2009).

Népszabadság also raised an issue that had not been addressed in other media. In their reporting, Népszabadság raised the possibility that the Hungarian Guard might somehow be implicated in the murders. Indeed, a direct link was posited between the Hungarian Guard’s intimidating and provocative marches and the murders that followed:

“The rotten fruit of the Hungarian Guard planted in December 2007 an accompanied by the applause of the cheering villagers has now ripened”, said Sanyika, a sixty year old Gypsy man in a pub in Tatárszentgyörgy. “They were shouting that Hungarians should come with us! And we were watching them, horrified while they marched through the main street. Tell me, aren’t we Hungarians?” (NSZ 23.02.2009).

“According to a local woman, after the Hungarian Guard marched through the village in December 2007, the atmosphere changed in Tatárszentgyörgy. “They looked at us in the supermarket as if we were criminals”, she said” (NSZ 02.03.2009).

As part of a predication strategy, the paper depicted the rightwing in a negative light and insinuated that the rightwing media and assorted institutions were not doing their job responsibly (insofar as they weren’t taking the possibility of a hate crime seriously). Népszabadság was critical of politicians of all persuasions, including a circle of the leftwing intellectuals, for using racist discourses:

“In Kisléta the rightwing journalist was very provocative and aggressive toward the family shocked by the murder. Then he managed to write about the uncivilized and barbaric Gypsies in a witty way. Part of the media lacks self-control and instigates hatred that becomes even more plausible in periods like we’re experiencing now. This is part of our media reality. While the rightwing deliberately borrows the rhetoric of the far-right, a segment of the leftist liberal side does the same thing more indirectly but while posing as the brave opponent of political correctness, thus endorsing the prejudicial beliefs of the wider public” (NSZ 07.08.2009).

The same strategy was used to portray the victim and his family as poor but peaceful and good:
“The mayor of Tatárszentgyörgy reported that both the murdered man and his father worked regularly. They supported their families by relying on odd jobs. From the spring till the end of the autumn they worked in construction in the capital. (…) They received housing aid as do all poor families in the village. But they did not always beg for aid” (NSZ 26.02.2009).

Roma, the victims, are characterised in a positive light by the paper. Like in the Olaszliszka case, the framing strategy used by Népszabadság for the Tatárszentgyörgy murders tended to call for compassion for the victims whilst stressing its concern for the Roma community given the possibility of future attacks. The state in the view of Népszabadság was neglecting the Roma:

“Whatever the intentions of the Gypsy hating perpetrators, today several thousand people live their lives in fear. (…) The state does not feel any obligation to help the victims to get on with their lives or to overcome the trauma [of the murders], unlike in the United States where special aid workers are sent to help after murders in schools” (NSZ 07.08.2009).

Case 3. The Roma integration debate

Olaszliszka as a symbol

Now we turn to the ‘Roma integration debate’ that occurred in the mainstream, leftist oriented newspapers and weekly magazines between mainly conservative but also some leftist-liberal intellectuals. This case reveals how taboos associated with political correctness were deliberately challenged and ultimately discarded. The debate was spurred by the incidents discussed in the previous pages (mainly Olaszliszka). A content analysis of these debates revealed the incident occupied an important place in the two major mainstream newspapers for an initial six-months (the sensational period) and remained important for a long period thereafter (Vörös 2009). It was also discovered that Olaszliszka had increasingly been transformed into a reference point for the wider debate, particularly for the rightwing conservative paper. Olaszliszka was referred to in relation to other issues, but the incident itself and the events directly linked to it received little attention, implying that Olaszliszka had achieved the status of a symbol (Vörös 2009). Olaszliszka did indeed leave its imprint on the Hungarian collective consciousness through the various representations found in the media. However, as we have seen, the leftwing paper had attempted to establish a competing frame of interpretation, using different discourses, while the rightwing paper did not shy away from embracing overtly racist discourses that were basically indistinguishable to those used by the radical right on its web-site. Thus, as Olaszliszka became a symbol, a referential issue, on the one hand, its representations did continue to vary to a large extent on the other hand, at least in the two mainstream newspapers.

What then accounts for the radicalisation of these public discourses? How could Olaszliszka and the meanings attached to it (‘Gypsy crime’, ‘born criminals’, ‘Gypsies terrorising the
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majority’, etc) become so widely accepted? Here we have to refer back to Jobbik’s definition of ‘Gypsy crime’ in their 2010 election programme. They described their return to a rhetoric of ‘Gypsy crime’ as a historic breakthrough because in their view the phenomenon existed but had been stifled by politically correctness. Jobbik’s claims were prophetic: ultimately a shift occurred in mainstream discourse as well. It began with prejudiced talk about ‘being Gypsies’ (‘cigányozás’), becoming more widespread, penetrating public and everyday talk as well: ‘It [cigányzás] promises to solve existing problems. It provides momentous pleasure in breaking taboos and offers the illusion of a treacherous remedy. If the Gypsy is the cause of almost all of our problems, it is our duty to say openly this heretofore repressed truth about Gypsy crime in order that we may approach the solution. Covering up the problem makes the situation worse; such is the logic’ (Zádori 2010).

One of the most important channels for unleashing racist language similar to or identical with that used by the radical right was the rightwing paper, Magyar Nemzet. The newspaper’s influence would have still likely been limited however had it acted alone in this regard. But it didn’t. It was joined by commercial TV channels, and to some extent even the public service media as well when discussing ‘Gypsy issues’ (Pócsik 2007). In addition, many leftist papers and weekly magazines (Népszabadság, Figyelő, HVG) launched debates on questions of ‘Gypsy integration’ where an important trend began to develop. Intellectuals with both left and conservative world views participated in the debates and although their voices were (mainly) moderate, they nevertheless created a new discourse that was not openly but still inherently racist. In the following paragraphs we will present some of the most typical discursive strategies that emerged in and through these debates.

**Down with political correctness!**

The ‘Roma integration debate’ involving various intellectuals of moderate political background (both conservative and leftwing) displayed two main discursive topoi: the ‘end of political correctness’ and the ‘peculiar Roma civilisation/culture’.

The ‘end of political correctness’ topos was constructed by claiming that political correctness was a mistaken approach and it is time to move beyond it in order to be able to talk about real problems:

> “From the very beginning, intellectuals acting in the name of “political correctness” tried to suppress debate about real problems. With the anti-liberal revolution there’s no longer any obstacle getting in the way the Gypsy question for the social and political centre”

(Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly).

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44 About four fifths of the population believes that Roma commit crimes more often than the non-Roma, and about two thirds agrees that Gypsies have crime in their blood (Gimes-Juhász-Kiss-Krekó 2009. p. 68).

45 Some of the authors who were regular contributors to Magyar Nemzet can still be identified as moderate conservatives. But although they were published in leftwing papers, in most of the cases no real counterarguments were published that challenged them. Thus, the debates presented the dominant arguments of these moderate contributors without any other perspectives.
“PC is gone with the wind. This is not a big loss. Finally we can say what we want and it is not hate speech”

“The editor of HVG has launched a more democratic debate than ever before on Roma questions. Most of the authors address the question very honestly, they voice opinions, while holding the extreme right at bay, that could not have been said in the mainstream media earlier. Not because they were so horrible but because they did not use the expected phraseology”

“In the last twenty years, we middle class Hungarians thought that it was better to look away and hide our incapacity behind political correctness”
(Babarczy: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091018_roma_cigany_felzarkozas_babarczy).

Declaring the end of political correctness is not unique to Hungarian politics. This has been termed the emergent ‘new realism’ (Prins 2006), a phenomenon occurring in a number of Western democratic (and multicultural) societies especially since the 1990s. Prins describes this ‘new realism’ as a powerful discourse that claims to face facts and speak frankly about the truth that had been theretofore covered up by leftist censorship. In this sense it represents the vox populi, expressing their anxieties as well.46 In Hungary, left-liberals are portrayed as the main proponents of political correctness and it’s their dominance in this regard that has to be challenged. From the new realism perspective, these left liberals have been suppressing the truth for too long, forcing an artificial language upon the people.

This new realism topos is used together with a predication strategy that constructs the left liberals as the out-group in conjunction with social scientists and the middle class. Both the validity and usefulness of the so-called pseudo-scientific language of political correctness is questioned, and the ways in which the question of Roma integration is handled by social scientists is challenged. These challenges assume various forms: ‘the Roma question has been over-researched’, ‘the Roma question is researched in the wrong way’, and ‘there are very few genuine results coming out of research on the Roma.

László Sólyom, then president of Hungary (2005-2010), was unsparing in his criticism of academics who, whilst perhaps well intentioned, were hamstrung by their supposed insistence on political correctness.

“This topic is over-researched. I have been to a Roma settlement which has been invaded by sociologists every year for ten years.(…) Their meticulous diagnoses are inconsistent with their proposed remedies: more education, more jobs, less residential segregation, more Roma intellectuals. To be sure, these general statements are politically correct. But digging deeper and asking uncomfortable questions puts them at risk of ideologically motivated attacks, be it about crimes, school segregation, social benefits, corruption, or what we might expect from people living in destitution and

46 In the Netherlands,’new realism’ and its more radical version, ‘hyper-realism’, has both national (being Dutch means being frank) and gendered dimensions (Muslim women are oppressed) dimensions.
trying only to survive. (…) It turns out that avoiding talking about these problems has serious consequences, such as the rise of the radicals” (Sólyom: http://www.solyomlaszlo.hu/beszdek20091013_konferencia.html).

Many others shared similar views. Some claimed that the problem was not that the Roma question had been over-researched, but that it had been researched in the wrong ways, producing few usable results:

“Both the research questions and the results are often based on ideological preconceptions. In fact, we know very little about Gypsies” (Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly).

“It seems to me we know very little about European Gypsies even though lots of money has been spent on researching them. We have very few tangible results” (Pelle: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091102_cigany_roma_vita).

And President Sólyom again:

“I would like to see more facts… and real knowledge about the Gypsies themselves” (Sólyom: http://nol.hu/archivum/lap-20090228-20090228-34).

The other topos favoured in the debate was that the Roma had a ‘peculiar civilization’. Here again President Sólyom’s early interventions helped shaped the debate and became an important point of reference as the debate continued. In his comments, Sólyom referred positively to a book on the topic that had been written by a Roma author:

“I would like to draw attention to a book called “Gypsy Street” written by Romano Rácz Sándor. (…) The author wrote a biography interspersed with long passages in italics on the Gypsy lifestyle, their way of thinking, their customs, and the organisation of their society” (http://nol.hu/archivum/lap-20090228-20090228-34).

The author of the book, Romano Rácz, defined ‘Roma culture’ thusly:

“The Roma constitute ‘not only a distinct ethnic group, but also a peculiar and particular civilisation that evolved during the long centuries of nomadism; this is a culture of “deliberate outsiders”. This culture included a very thrifty life style that provided very low and modest living conditions that would have been unimaginable for the majority society. At the same time, it also offered security for the community, united as they were in poverty by solidarity” (Romano Rácz: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091014_roma_cigany_integracio).

Romano Rácz constructs a Roma identity that is based on essentialist understandings of his own culture. This concept proves useful to others in the debate since it fits well the notion that certain features of Roma culture are the main obstacle to their integration. Thus various interpretations of this new concept of their ‘peculiar civilization’ were readily related to the question of Roma integration. The arguments that relied on Romano’s representation of these cultural (civilisational) differences concluded that because of their long history as an outsider, the integration of the Roma was not possible for at least two reasons. First, the Roma do not
want to integrate (which itself derives from their civilisational/cultural differences): there is an implication that

“perhaps the Gypsies of Hungary do not even want to integrate. This suggestion is an unforgivable offence in the eyes of the Rózsadomb crowd, even though the author of the book, Romano Rácz, can hardly be accused of Gypsy racism”
(Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly).

Second, whether or not the Roma want to integrate, they cannot be integrated:

“The author [Romano Rácz] suggests that Gypsies migrating into Europe need a longer period of time to integrate, but that ultimately this process can be successful. In fact, however, nowhere in Europe have Gypsies managed to integrate even if individual members of the community have achieved success in certain areas”

Roma culture is presented as having two features that explain the Roma’s lack of integration. The first is that it is pre-modern and the second is its desire for self-exclusion. This pre-modern Roma culture hinders integration:

“Gypsies are pre-modern. Their outsidersness is not only one of the manifestations of their pre-modernity, but also an effective barrier that is artificially constructed to prevent their modernisation”
(Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly).

The same can be said for the Roma’s supposed tendency toward self-exclusion:

“If their culture is the culture of outsiders, then their exclusion is their own choice”
(Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly).

“We know form Romano’s book (...) that Gypsies live in much more isolation than we might have thought. Conventional wisdom holds that the Roma are isolated in their world because of prejudices against them, but the truth is that they isolate themselves, integrating only if a need emerges. They never wanted to be successful in the majority society, they always wanted to lead a nomadic life outside of this society. (...) By now they have become sedentary but some of them still live according to nomadic moral code. If someone from their group suffers real or imagined harm, they defend them by the excessive use of collective vigilantism, as was the case in Olaszliszka” (Stadler: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091109_cigany_roma_integracio).

47 Rózsadomb is one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods in the Budapest. In the debate, “Rózsadomb people’ refers to researchers (sociologists, anthropologists, etc.) and civil rights activists who speak and write about the Roma using a politically correct language from the comfort of their homes, thus concealing the ‘real’ problems. Critics hold that they are isolated from reality and do not appreciate the real problems. The term is heavily laden with negative judgment, suggesting a strong negative stereotype.
The validity and strength of these arguments are of course justified by the fact that the author of the book is Roma. This, coupled with the book and author’s endorsement from the President of Hungary, can be seen throughout the entire debate. For example,

“Romano Rácz has helped us immensely to understand this civilisation and culture that is far beyond ethnicity. His work marks a new era”
(Stadler: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091109_cigany_roma_integracio).

This debate in the mainstream, moderate, and even leftist oriented media featured a new discourse on the Roma that gave increasing legitimacy to the idea that Roma culture is directly derived from nomadism. The Roma’s intentional self-exclusion is consequently regarded as a determining feature of the Roma, reinforcing widespread stereotypes that the Roma still want to be outsiders because it is their culture’s essence not to want to integrate.
4. Conclusions

Our analysis of the two murders and the more general ‘Roma integration’ debate that followed reveals differences and similarities in discursive strategies used in the media. We distinguished four topoi in our three cases: ‘Gypsy crime’, ‘hate crime’, ‘the end of political correctness’ and ‘the peculiar Roma civilisation’. We examined how each of these topoi were used in the different media. Our first important finding regards the topos of ‘Gypsy crime’. Kuruc.info.hu used it differently from Magyar Nemzet. While Magyar Nemzet considered it important to write openly about ‘Gypsy crime’ in order to break the taboo of not talking about it, kuruc.info.hu treated ‘Gypsy crime’ as self-evident and therefore not requiring further elaboration or justification. In the integration debate we found a similar strategy: the ‘end of political correctness’ topos is used to break the taboo of not talking about the truth, the real nature of ‘Gypsy difference’. There is, however, an important feature that differentiates that understanding of difference. Kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet invoked biological and genetic differences, whereas in the integration debate they referred to Roma differences as cultural differences.

Our analysis of the predication strategies revealed that the left-liberals, the liberal media, and civil rights activists were the most common ‘others’ for both kuruc.info.hu Magyar Nemzet. At the same time, the Roma were also othered by kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet. The ‘Roma’ indeed are the ‘other’ who are not assimilable because of the stereotypical characteristics ascribed to them, not all of which were negative. An important and new ‘other’ in the integration debate were the social scientists who were responsible for conspiring with the liberals to hide the truth, thus creating an atmosphere of suppression. In fact, they become the most important ‘other’ in the debate. In Népszabadság it’s the Hungarian Guard, the rightwing media and the institutions responsible for not putting an end to discrimination that are evaluated negatively.

Besides these argumentation (topoi) and predication strategies, Népszabadság also employed a framing strategy by giving voice to the Roma. This is almost the only example of Roma participating in the debate. Another example is in the integration debate, but here the Roma voice is used to justify the positions of the non-Roma.

Victims feature in all the debates (except the integration debate), but the victims change with each case. For kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet the Hungarians are the victims whereas for Népszabadság it’s the Roma.

Finally, we consider how these discourses relate to our non-tolerance–tolerance–acceptance model. We have argued that both kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet displayed intolerant discursive strategies that invoked the putative biological differences of the Roma. The Roma are not deserving of toleration given their genetically innate inclination to crime. Népszabadság in contrast used discursive strategies that emphasised tolerance through a respect of basic human rights and non-discrimination. In the integration debate we found that the ‘end of political correctness’ and ‘peculiar Roma culture’ topoi were used to stress the cultural distinctiveness of the Roma (not in genetic but cultural terms). The recognition of this distinctiveness, however, does not point to the integration of the Roma but on the contrary, to their continued exclusion, as was the case with kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet as well. The main element of the Roma’s distinctiveness is their deliberate exclusion.
These findings point to a growing tendency of non-tolerant public discourse in Hungary that spread to almost all corners of the political spectrum. There are several political and social processes that contribute to this trend of non-tolerance. First, the rise of radical racist discourses which has accompanied the political successes of the radical right wing party, Jobbik, has set the political and media agenda by thematising the ‘Roma question’.

Second, non-radical political and public figures from both the left and right have responded to this thematisation of the ‘Roma question’ in a way that has not excluded non-tolerant racist discourses. Indeed, they have often been complicit in legitimating non-tolerant discourses. By acting as partners in ‘breaking taboos’, they have simultaneously been breaking with the tolerant language that supposedly accompanied those taboos.

Third, in the current non-tolerant climate, accepting the (cultural) difference of other ethnic groups has become impossible. ‘Roma cultural difference’ instead was ‘accepted’, though in a somewhat ambiguous way: its existence was acknowledged, but as grounds for deliberate exclusion. This is similar to what we witnessed in France in the 1970s when the new right misappropriated the slogan of the left, ‘le droit à la différence’ for their own purposes, claiming that immigrants have the right to difference because their culture is so different from French culture that integration is not a possibility. Similarly, in the UK, cultural racists have claimed that other (immigrant) cultures cannot be integrated.

Finally, in Hungary as in some other post-socialist countries, non-tolerance has troublingly become a rally cry of a good number of political and public actors, often irrespective of political affiliation. State institutions, political parties and the media have joined forces to fuel suspicion of Roma difference, be it biological or cultural. As a result, tolerance as a value and discourse has suffered, embraced by only a handful of actors increasingly marginal to the political mainstream.

Hungary is thus a paradox. It recognises the Roma as culturally distinct; indeed, it reifies and essentialises their cultural distinctiveness. But this recognition is not based on respect, as we see in the “tolerance” conceptual framework. Rather, it is based on racism: the Roma are not just culturally distinct, they are culturally inferior, and that cultural inferiority prevents their full incorporation into Hungarian society. This is intolerance, feebly masked as cultural recognition. This intolerance may have the radical right as its strongest advocates, but what is perhaps most disturbing from our analysis is the extent to which the racism voiced by the radical right is used by the mainstream media and political actors as well. There is widespread consensus that Roma problem is just that: a problem, and the problem is with the Roma, and their deficient culture. This in a sense relieves majority Hungarians of responsibility for accommodating the Roma. Indeed, it becomes an argument for the non-tolerance of the Roma: their cultural deficiencies must not be tolerated any longer.

This profound intolerance raises important questions about the relationship between racism and intolerance. To be sure, racism can be found in countries of immigration as well. But whilst this racism typically only becomes explicit on the fringes in these other countries (claimed by the radical right or voiced on extremist websites), the Hungarian case shows how racism has gone mainstream in Hungary. The recent incidents we have examined in Hungary have been unscrupulously used to legitimate racism in ways that greatly expands the scope of intolerance.
Chapter 5.

Zsuzsanna Vidra – Jon Fox: Synthesis of the diversity discourses in the field of education and media

Our assumption that we will explore in details is that racism complicates the question of tolerance. In this final chapter we wish to make our focus on racism and its problematic relation to tolerance more explicit. Our starting point is that in the last couple of years racist discourses have been increasing, infiltrating political and everyday life. As we saw in the previous chapter, this rise and spread of racism is linked to the simultaneous rise of the far right party, Jobbik, and in particular its use of anti-Roma discourses and strategies to gain electoral support. Indeed, Jobbik put the ‘Gypsy question’ on the political agenda; by doing so, the party has become one of the three most popular political forces in the country. On the one hand, it could be argued (Gimes et al. 2008, 2009) that the party’s anti-Roma discourses were a response to growing popular disaffection that demanded political expression, even in racist form. This type of racism expresses the frustrations of majority Hungarians by providing them with a convenient target to take the blame for their hardships: the Roma. On the other hand, it could also be argued (Gimes et al. 2008, 2009) that Jobbik’s racism is not a response to popular discord but a driver of that discord. This can be evidenced by the increased use of racism by more mainstream political parties, presumably in recognition of its potential for capturing more votes. This trend is more prominent amongst conservative right wing parties, but the left is not entirely exempt from it either.

In our analyses of education and the media, we have focused on racism both in political discourse (and policy) but also its spread to the wider society. In the area of education we investigated two important phenomena: segregation in the school system and the accommodation of cultural difference in school curricula. And we witnessed how racism was implicated in both of these domains. School segregation, as everywhere, is a complex social phenomenon that is the consequence of various factors such as geographical and social inequality, territorial segregation, lack of equal opportunities, and discrimination. Racism is often more fundamental to these various proximate causes of segregation: it can both trigger segregationist practices, but it can also be the ongoing result of continued segregation. On the other hand, the treatment of cultural difference in the curriculum (what is taught about minorities and how majority-minority relations are depicted) reveals how new generations will be socialised into the interethnic relationships of their country. Through this socialisation, stereotypes of minorities can be either challenged or, on the contrary, strengthened.

The media is of course also very influential in shaping people’s attitudes to minorities. The media is itself influenced by various political affiliation, genre (television, radio, print, but also traditional versus more sensational genre). The media also play a key role in shaping the ways in which certain norms are set or breached in a society, in determining what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, for example, in deciding whether racism should be ‘tolerated’ or not. The media occupy an important position in these processes by either promoting tolerant or non-tolerant discourses.

In our study we have looked at the ways stakeholders formulate their views on desegregation policies and school curricula, both with respect to minority (Roma) representations. Concerning the media, our aim was to examine the media’s coverage of high profile events involving the Roma. Here again we were interested in the media’s promotion of negative
minority representations and sometimes racist views, and the negative consequences this coverage had for promoting more intolerant media discourses.

In what follows we will consider more fully the role of racism in these domains of education and the media. First we turn to education and questions of segregation and curriculum development; then we shift our attention to the media’s coverage of the Roma. We conclude with an analysis of the centrality of racism to these domains, and its implications with respect to questions of tolerance.

1. Exclusionary discourses in education: desegregation and the accommodation of cultural difference in the curriculum

Desegregation has emerged as a political issue in Hungary as a response to a school system that has been increasingly recognised as unable to adequately provide equal opportunities for all pupils. Studies show (Molnár and Dupcsik 2008; Berényi and Neumann 2009) that children of higher social status go to schools with better resources and better conditions, thus giving them a distinct advantage when furthering their education. Many of these same studies show that Roma children are disproportionately represented among lower status children. Many classrooms and even entire schools end up having these low status children only, and very often most if not all of them are Roma. This is segregation, a situation where children of different ethnic backgrounds go to separate classes and schools. This can result from both intentional discriminatory practices, or more often, unintentional social processes (residential segregation, white flight, parent choice, and teacher practices).

In 2002 the Hungarian government developed and launched a programme aimed at desegregating the Hungarian school system. This package of policy measures has been considered a failure by the majority of stakeholders and political and public figures to date. Indeed, a certain defeatism has taken hold, with many arguing that desegregation policies should not even be pursued as they serve neither the interests of the majority nor the minority. Proponents of this view argue that the minority Roma prefer to go to schools of their own where they can learn amongst themselves.

There are many reasons why these policies have failed. For one, these policies found very little political backing outside the narrow clique of policymakers tasked with drafting the legislation and making and implementing policy measures. Others have claimed that the problem was that these policies were forced upon the schools (and Hungarian society more generally) against their will. This was a peculiar interpretation insofar as the policy in fact promoted voluntary participation, allowing dedicated schools to apply for funding to implement desegregation programmes.

A more fundamental factor related to growing discontent with desegregation policies relates to racism and growing levels of intolerance. This can be seen in the concomitant rise in popularity for the far right party, Jobbik (in the EP elections in 2009 and then the parliamentary elections in 2010). Central to Jobbik’s political agenda was ‘solving of the Gypsy question’ by which was meant radical, exclusionary practices and policies (including labour camps for Roma and foster homes for Roma children). This intolerance in the public sphere was not challenged by mainstream political parties; to the contrary, many politicians joined in and promoted somewhat less radical but still exclusionary ideas (for example,
legitimating claim for separate schools for Roma). Thus the legitimacy of the far right and especially its anti-Roma discourse was reinforced by a combination of silence and outright support from mainstream political players. Mainstream parties’ complicity in this process meant in turn that the far right party and particularly its supporters could take from this that racism of this type is acceptable. In other words, voting the radical party doesn’t necessarily make that voter a radical.

In this political atmosphere, support for desegregation policies quickly faltered. In its initial phase, its support was limited to a small group of liberals within the liberal-run Ministry of Education (in an otherwise Socialist government). The governing Socialist Party (2002-2010) did not in fact support these policies, and ultimately came out against them. The national-conservative opposition at the time was also opposed to the policies. Without social or political support, these policies had no chance. Despite this, and perhaps simply because the programmes enjoy the support of EU funds, some elements of the desegregation policy remain in operation.48

Our study of stakeholder discourses on desegregation revealed three topoi: ‘firm advocacy for desegregation’, ‘unintentional segregation’, ‘justified segregation’. Those promoting the ‘firm advocacy’ discourse supported desegregational efforts in the name of justice and equality. Proponents argued that all children have the right to equal opportunities regardless of their social or ethnic background. Those who talked about ‘unintentional segregation’ tended to view segregation as a ‘natural’ and irreversible process. They also claimed that segregation could even be beneficial to children. It was with respect to this latter point that ‘unintended segregation’ advocates converged with those talking about ‘justified segregation’. The proponents of ‘justified segregation’ sometimes invoked the need to respect the cultural diversity of the Roma and therefore believed separate education for Roma children was justified. These stakeholders based their argument on the assumption that greater separation would make it easier for the Roma to preserve their culture and identity. Having their own separate schools would help them safeguard their culture.

We also addressed the issue of the cultural accommodation of Roma in the Hungarian school system. Here we were interested in the ways in which Roma and Roma culture were represented in textbooks and school curricula, and the extent to which these representations fostered tolerance. This analysis revealed that questions of cultural accommodation typically began with the question of ‘What is Roma culture?’. This question in turn is not infrequently reformulated as ‘How are Roma different?’, or ‘What are the consequences of their difference for the education system?’, or ‘How are the Roma perceived by the majority?’ In all of these cases, Roma cultural difference receives multiple interpretations and framings from various actors expressing rather different understandings of their ‘otherness’.

Our analysis uncovered three main interpretations of Roma culture: the ‘essentialist-culturalist’, the ‘multiculturalist’, and the ‘social integrationist’. The essentialist-culturalist discourse, as the name suggests, treats culture in an essentialist way. Culture in this view is not a construction but rather a historical given and thus more or less unchangeable. Different cultures are thus seen as mutually exclusive, internally homogenous and externally bounded blocs. This in turn can easily justify various exclusionary practices: Roma culture is not like

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48 As of July 2012, the conservative government plans to cut the state support for the program that would mean that it would come to an end.
ours, it cannot be like ours, so the Roma are forever culturally different from us. The multiculturalist in turn adopts a more constructivist understanding of culture: from their view, any culture or cultural phenomena should be understood as the outcome of various social interactions. Roma culture is thus a historically contingent construction, and one that can be subjected to further manipulation (and accommodation). The social integrationist discourse shares this constructivist understanding of cultures but it argues that Roma otherness should be understood as the consequence of their historically low social status. This argument invokes the concept of the ‘culture of poverty’, implying that the experience and condition of poverty can engender certain attitudes and behaviours that can be understood as specific cultural traits. The cultural problem (and solution) for the Roma thus, from this perspective, is understood in socio-economic terms.

In sum, in the various discourses on desegregation and the cultural accommodation of Roma in the education system we found at least thee types of interpretations of ‘what Roma culture is’. Stakeholders have different views on that particular issue and it has a direct link as to what position they take in the analysed policy fields. One conclusion we could make at this point is that an essentialist understanding of Roma cultural difference is, on the one hand, a rather dominant view, and on the other hand, it is a view that legitimises or justifies exclusion rather than inclusion. In the last chapter we will analyse in more detail what consequences this has as to how non-tolerance, tolerance and acceptance/recognition is manifested in practices related to school life in Hungary.

2. The radicalisation of mainstream media and public discourse: the influence of far right racist discourses on the mainstream

Here we examined how the rise of the far right has influenced mainstream political actors and the media. We focused on two high profile incidents and the subsequent public debate that occurred in the media. The first incident (named ‘Olaszliszka’, after the village where it took place) was the lynching a teacher in a village by local Roma, and the second incident (‘Tatrászentgyörgy’, also named for the settlement where it occurred) the racially motivated murder of a Roma father and his son. Both of the cases triggered media debates in which racist language was unleashed, including at times in the mainstream media. This culminated in our third case: a debate on Roma integration or name it differently, the anti-PC debate. This case reveals that racist debate does not require overtly racist language: here the use of ‘culturalist’ arguments displays an underlying logic of racism.

We analysed the media coverage of these two murders to see how they were represented in three media outlets: a mainstream leftwing paper, a mainstream rightwing paper, and a far right website. The anti-PC debate was also analysed using the same discourse analytical methods. Here we drew mostly from a well-known liberal economic and political weekly magazine with contributions from public figures and intellectuals from both the right and left.

The discursive strategies and representations in the rightwing and leftwing paper mirrored one another. The central preoccupation for both papers was whether or not there is something that can be called ‘Gypsy crime’ (in the first case) and whether or not the second murder (of the Roma father and son) can be characterised as a ‘hate crime’. The right wing paper insisted that the murder of a Hungarian teacher by a Roma mob is a clear illustration of ‘Gypsy crime’. This means that the Roma are innately predisposed to crime (‘it is in their blood’ or ‘in their culture’). The leftwing paper began in contrast by denying the existence of ‘Gypsy
crime’; crime, from this perspective, is unrelated to ethnic background, there aren’t crimes that are specific to any particular ethnic group. For the second murder, the conservative paper either denied that the crime was a hate crime or argued that if it had racial motivations then logically there must also be ‘Gypsy crime’. In this view the two should be seen as parallel phenomena: the Roma commit crimes against non-Roma, which is not unlike non-Roma committing crimes against Roma (so-called ‘hate crimes’). The leftwing paper, in contrast, consistently presented the second murder as a hate crime and refused the idea of hate crime and ‘Gypsy crime’ being parallel phenomena.

It is interesting to compare these views presented in the mainstream media to the ways in which these crimes were depicted on the far right website. The website openly argued that ‘Gypsy crime’ is a fact; criminality is both a biological and a cultural feature of the Roma. In this respect, the far right website and rightwing paper basically shared the same argumentation. The differences between the two occurred with respect to how ‘Gypsy crime’ was handled in the first place. The rightwing daily emphasised that the taboo of not admitting ‘Gypsy difference’ (consisting primarily of their criminal nature) needs to be broken as a preliminary step. This taboo, it was claimed, was imposed on Hungarian society by ‘liberal public figures and intellectuals’. The far right website for its part employed racist arguments as self-evident as opposed to the conservative paper’s need to frame its views in opposition to a liberal discourse.

In the ‘integration debate’, intellectuals of varied political colours agreed that political correctness should be abandoned in the name of sincerity and objectivity. This position could be labelled as the ‘end of PC’ or ‘breaking of taboos’ argument. This coalition of political actors presented political correctness as a liberal imposition, intent upon blaming the racism and discriminatory practices of majority society for the Roma’s beleaguered status. Proponents of this view argued that it was not majority Hungarians but rather minority Roma who are responsible for their own predicament. The root cause of this predicament is the peculiar cultural characteristics of the Roma that prohibit them from living like the rest of society. According to this view, the Roma want to live separate from mainstream society, free of its norms and values. Advocates of this anti-PC argument claimed that without first admitting that the Roma have a distinct cultural tradition, there cannot be honest or effective dialogue on any issues concerning Roma integration.

The most significant contributions of these intellectuals to the integration debate and public perceptions of the ‘Roma question’ more generally was in their consensus on the need to break the taboo of political correctness. Public intellectuals thus allied themselves with the conservative daily, and in so doing contributed to the legitimation of an increasingly radicalised, xenophobic, and racialised public discourse. Supporting these views we find the far right expressing more or less the same sorts of arguments. The main difference between the views expressed by public intellectuals and those disseminated through the far right website and the conservative media was that the latter did not refrain from invoking biological and/or genetic rationales for explaining ‘Gypsy difference’, whereas the intellectuals exclusively emphasised the Roma’s cultural distinctiveness. This was done to deflect accusations that they too were racist: intellectuals explicitly stated they do not support the view that there exist biologically determined differences; accordingly they are not racist. They argued instead that difference has to be understood in cultural terms: the Roma’s peculiar culture leads them to behave in certain ways, namely to preserve and uphold their outsider’s status and associated traditions. This cultural particularity explains why the Roma do not want
to integrate. The responsibility of the majority society is to respect this specific culture and to let the Roma live the way they wish. This argument of course is also based on an essentialist (and thinly veiled racialised) understanding of cultures whereby those cultural traits are not only unchangeable but also determine and characterise all members of the group.

A further significant difference between this culturalist approach to difference and the discourses elaborated by the conservative newspaper and the far right concerns the valorisation of these differences. For the culturalist intellectuals, Roma are positively represented: their cultural difference is seen as worthy of respect. Nevertheless, that cultural difference still serves as a basis for exclusion: though it should be respected, that respect implies that the majority society should allow the Roma to exist outside mainstream society. In contrast, the biological determinism of the far right website and conservative daily views the Roma unambiguously as the ‘negative other’. Exclusion follows from this unproblematically.

3. Racism and tolerance

Various social actors connected to the education who faced proposed changes intended to end segregation responded by claiming that segregation of the Roma is legitimate and justified under certain circumstances. Typically these actors invoked culturalist arguments about ethnic difference, claiming that the Roma are a culturally distinct group with desire to remain separate from the majority society. Therefore, it is in their best interest to segregate them, that is, to let them live as they wish. Although different stakeholders expressed different views, this undercurrent of cultural distinctiveness (and its justification of segregation) was dominant and widespread. At the same time, cultural distinctiveness in the curriculum was treated either as unnecessary (there was no need to mention Roma in textbooks) or if acknowledged the Roma constituted a category of ‘outsider’. As a result, topics related to the Roma were taught only in classrooms with exclusively Roma pupils; majority pupils therefore are not exposed to anything having to do with Roma culture, or history. This educational phase of socialisation goes by without any opportunity to learn about or appreciate the ‘difference’ that exists in society. Pupils do not learn how to relate to other ethnic groups.

The media, in contrast, presented both tolerant and intolerant discourses. The main question that concerns us is which discourses were more dominant or influential, those that were tolerant, or those promoting intolerance. As we observed, over time, the radical racist discourses became increasingly common and accepted. This was due in part to a number of incidents that lead to the abandonment of political correctness. Ultimately the mainstream media started using discourses that could be joined with the more racist versions favoured by the radical right. As we argued in the mainstream media, cultural differences are presented and understood as unchangeable and therefore deterministic: Roma desire to remain outside of majority society by refusing to embrace its norms and values. The radical right website uses both biological and cultural explanations of difference whereas the mainstream media distinguishes itself by claiming that its cultural interpretations protect it from the sorts of accusations of racism that the extreme right have faced. Nevertheless, the logic and aim of biological and cultural racism is the same: to maintain social distance and hierarchies by excluding certain groups.
Here we turn to an analysis of the ways each of our cases relate to our conceptual framework of non-tolerance – tolerance – acceptance/ recognition.

If we begin by considering the discourses found in desegregation debates we find that the ‘justified segregation’ discourse is perhaps dominant. This can be viewed as a sort of ‘reverse respect’, a subversive approach to cultural difference. In name, ‘justified segregation’ is supportive of difference: it promotes the idea that minorities should retain their distinctiveness so that they can nurture their language, traditions, and identity. But the valorisation of difference upon which this cultural distinctiveness rests is unambiguously negative, with frequent mention of ideas like deviance, poverty, laziness, and the Roma’s parasitic nature. This raises the question as to whether these negatively evaluated differences can be the basis of a genuine respect for and accommodation of difference. The answer is no. ‘Reverse respect’ is a discourse not borne out of respect for the minority but rather to protect and preserve the interests and dominant position of the majority. ‘Respecting’ difference from this perspective is a means of exclusion. This is an important modification to the non-tolerance – tolerance – respect framework. ‘Reverse respect’ is not respect, but neither should it be understood unproblematically as non-tolerance. It is instead that ‘reverse respect’ masquerades as tolerance but its underlying racism means it is actually a form of exclusion. We must therefore be wary of taking these discourses at face value, because what might appear to be a form of accommodation is in reality a type of exclusion. The ambiguity rests on the mix of positive and negative cultural traits ascribed to the Roma. Depending on how Roma culture is characterised, this topos of ‘reverse respect’ allows for a mixture of tolerable and non-tolerable responses.

The next discourse we uncovered, ‘unintentional segregation’, also accepts the idea of separate schooling for Roma children. Here though segregation is not premised on the supposed deficiencies of Roma culture; rather, it is more of a resigned (and more value neutral) acknowledgment of the current state of affairs. This neutrality, however, complicates and indeed blurs the meaning of tolerance insofar as there is no clear indication of how the ‘other’ should be viewed or treated. It is not that ‘unintentional segregation’ is tolerant or intolerant; it is that it manages to sidestep these questions of tolerance.

Finally, it can be reasonably argued that the ‘firm advocacy for desegregation’ topos is a clear expression of tolerance. The proponents of this view invoke human rights and equality discourses in support of their views. In their reasoning no mention of cultural difference of any kind is to be found: on the contrary, advocates of desegregation strongly support colourblindness as the only way to achieve equality for all citizens. From this perspective, desegregation is a social good that can only be achieved if the majority accepts whatever nature, characters or features describe the ‘other’. This is therefore the tolerance, but only the tolerance of difference. It does not respect that difference or seek to accommodate it; rather its emphasis on desegregation is more concerned with eliminating difference (understood firstly in socio-economic terms).

As we saw in the cultural accommodation of Roma discourse with proponents of ‘reversed respect’, essentialist/culturalists also respect cultural difference provided it does not encroach upon the majority culture. Those putting forth this argument think of all cultures in an essentialist manner. For them, the preservation of cultures is important in itself. This can only be achieved if cultures are kept distinct (and socially distant from one another); mixing is antithetical to this.
We also uncovered other discourse types such as the multiculturalist and the integrationist. The **multiculturalists** in our understanding promoted ‘genuine respect’. For them, the recognition of cultural difference was informed by a deeper respect for human rights and the mutual understanding between majority and minority. The **social integrationists** in contrast stood for ‘tolerance’. As in the case of the ‘firm advocates for desegregation’, respecting human rights was seen as more important than taking account of cultural difference.

Our media analysis revealed that the extreme right website and the conservative newspaper both displayed **intolerant** discourses that emphasised the Roma’s biological and/or cultural differences. The Roma were portrayed as inclined to criminal behaviour, and it was further argued that this cannot and should not be tolerated. This reasoning is **racist**: it ascribes genetic and cultural features to the Roma that are in turn held to account for the inferiority of all the members of the group. In contrast, the leftwing paper displayed a **tolerant** position to the Roma by promoting respect of human rights and non-discrimination. This perspective was also critical of the view that cultural traits can be generalised.

In the ‘integration debate’ a different sort of reasoning emerged. Here we found evidence of two main discursive strategies, the first calling for an ‘end to political correctness’ (and the ‘need to break taboos’), and the second emphasising the ‘peculiarity of the Roma culture’. This latter view recognises and indeed even respects (in a certain way) the cultural distinctiveness of the Roma: since Roma difference is characterised as a culture of outsiders (who do not wish to be like majority Hungarians), the only way to respect this culture is to allow them live separate from majority society. This is not unlike the ‘**reverse respect**’ we observed at times in the ‘cultural accommodation of the Roma in the curricula’. It is also similar insofar as cultural difference is characterised in both negative and positive. Either way, this becomes a legitimising discourse for the (continued) social exclusion of the Roma.

The Hungarian public sphere has become more intolerant in the last couple of years. We have identified various political and social factors that are connected to and indeed manifest these changes. The most important factor is the rise of the radical right, both in terms of their electoral successes but also with respect to increased activity (and popularity) related to their civil organizations and movements. These far right views have worryingly spread through much of Hungarian society, due at least in part to the work of discourses like ‘reverse respect’ becoming acceptable and legitimate. Radicalism in Hungary in many ways has become normal; it is the new mainstream. Radicalism is not as menacing as it once was, it has been tamed by its subtle acceptance and even endorsement in Hungary’s political establishment.

One measure of the far right’s successes was its ability to set the terms of debate, thus taking over certain areas of the public discourse. By thematising issues (such as the Roma question) that have in the past been handled in a more cautious manner the radical right has managed to set an agenda that all other political and public actors have followed. To be sure, this was not an unambiguous process. Rather than openly and directly condemning the racist rhetoric coming from the far right, established mainstream parties (together with the media) remained silent or even reacted in a more receptive way. Indeed, the call ‘breaking taboos’ was welcomed for its promises to ‘tell the truth’, thus replacing dishonest, insincere, and flawed discourses of non-discrimination, human rights and tolerance.
In this way non-tolerance has emerged as the dominant paradigm, and tolerance is increasingly on the defensive. Public figures representing or advocating tolerant values have been marginalised. In other respects, the public sphere has become deeply polarised between remaining stalwarts committed to tolerance and the growing majority of voices advocating non-tolerance. The animosity between these positions is tangible in many areas of public life.

The common denominator in all of these questions is ‘Roma cultural difference’. This is not only found informing these various discourses, it also explains the ways in which different positions of non-tolerance, tolerance, and acceptance/respect are formulated with respect to the Roma in Hungary. The most important feature of the Roma’s distinctiveness is presented as their deliberate outsider-ness. This is only one of their supposed traits, but it has become the dominant one. This understanding of Roma difference appears in all areas of public life in Hungary. It is repeatedly invoked to legitimise exclusionary practices and policies with respect to education and as found in the media. We labelled this discourse ‘reverse respect’, and we identified it as contributing to the spread and growth of intolerance in Hungary. Under the pretext of ‘respect’ and ‘tolerance’, the proponents of ‘reverse respect’ are actually promoting exclusion. Moreover, the genuine respect we identified in multiculturalist discourse is negligent in its influence on the wider public. Recognising difference and respecting other cultures is not possible with respect to the Roma since their culture is deficient.

‘Reverse respect’ should thus be understood as a type of racism that invokes cultural as opposed to biological interpretations of difference. At the same time, it avoids openly arguing that Roma culture is inferior, but it ascribes traits to the group that can hardly be recognised as positive. The main difference between traditional (biological) racism and this new cultural racism – both conspicuously present in public discourse in Hungary today – is that the latter absorbs the former, making inherently racist ideas more palatable to a wider public.
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ANNEX: List of interviews, Chapter 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1.)</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>parliamentary commissioner on education</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3.)</td>
<td>Civil servant, policymaker</td>
<td>government bureaucrat, working on school integration for Roma children in the Socialist government (2006-2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.)</td>
<td>Civil servant, policymaker</td>
<td>government bureaucrat working on current education bill in the Young Democrats government (2010-present).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.)</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>current Roma MP, LMP (Greens) party (2010-present)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(6.)</td>
<td>Civil activist</td>
<td>activist in Roma Polgári Tömörülés, civil organisation promoting the integration of Roma, right wing orientation, close to Young Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7.)</td>
<td>Civil activist</td>
<td>activist in Esélyt a Hátrányos Helyzetű Gyerekeknek Alapítvány – Chance for Children Foundation promoting school desegregation</td>
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<tr>
<td>(8.)</td>
<td>Policymaker</td>
<td>education expert working for an independent organisation promoting educational reform</td>
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<td>(9.)</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>equal opportunity expert at Collegium Martineum, Arany János programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>(10.)</td>
<td>Civil activist</td>
<td>author of a textbook on Roma history and culture, director of Kurt Lewin Foundation (promoting equal opportunities and diversity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(11.)</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>author of a textbook on Roma history and culture (banned for being racist); head of Utolsó Padban, an association teaching disadvantaged Roma children</td>
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<tr>
<td>(12.)</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>head of Romology department, University of Pécs, expert on Roma culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>(13.)</td>
<td>Civil activist</td>
<td>activist promoting Roma culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14.)</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>author of a textbook on Roma history and culture, Romani language teacher</td>
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<tr>
<td>(15.)</td>
<td>Church official</td>
<td>Roman Catholic priest, leader of a ‘successful’ Gypsy mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>(16.)</td>
<td>Church official</td>
<td>Roman Catholic bishop, author of Roma culture textbook and head of the Gypsy mission of the Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>(17.)</td>
<td>Church official</td>
<td>head of Protestant Gypsy mission</td>
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<td>(18.)</td>
<td>Church official</td>
<td>Protestant church</td>
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