THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF BECOMING A CITIZEN: SOLUTION OR SELECTION?
The Political Effects of Becoming a Citizen:
Solution or Selection?

ALEX STREET

EUI Working Paper MWP 2012/19
Abstract
The status of citizenship confers the right to participate as a full member of the political community. One might therefore expect foreign residents who acquire citizenship to become more engaged with politics. However, acquiring citizenship is a selective process. Foreign residents choose whether to apply, and states enact citizenship laws that make naturalization easier for some than for others. This suggests the alternative possibility that differences between naturalized citizens and the people who remain foreign residents reflect the factors that push some people to select into citizenship, rather than any effects of the new status. This paper evaluates these two alternatives, using longitudinal data to compare the same people over time. I present evidence suggesting that immigrants do not become more politically engaged after acquiring citizenship, but that the children of immigrants do become more engaged as citizens.

Keywords
Citizenship, immigration, political engagement, longitudinal data.

Alex Street
Max Weber Fellow, 2011-2012
Introduction
In the year 2009 alone, 1.7 million foreign residents became citizens of one of the 29 OECD member states for which data are available.¹ Millions more will be eligible to take the same step in the years to come. The foreign-born make up more than 10% of the population in half of these countries.² The incorporation of these immigrants promises to bring a range of social, economic and political changes to contemporary democracies. This working paper addresses the question of how acquiring citizenship affects levels of political engagement. The analysis is based upon over-time comparisons of the same people, before and after they acquired citizenship. This kind of within-person comparison has great advantages over cross-sectional comparisons between people who have, or have not, naturalized. In particular, within-person comparisons are much better suited to the task of disentangling the effects of naturalization from differences between individuals that lead some people to select into citizenship and others not to do so.

In this working paper, I explain the theoretical grounds for expecting that becoming a citizen should have a positive impact on political engagement. I also explain the major alternative possibility, namely that, because naturalization is a highly selective procedure, the differences between those who select into citizenship, and those who do not, account for any observed differences in political engagement. Most existing research is unable to distinguish between these alternatives, since it is based on cross-sectional comparisons between people who have naturalized and those who remain foreign residents. Using data from a high-quality longitudinal study in Germany, I show that cross-sectional comparisons yield very different results from within-person comparisons over time. Those who naturalize tend to be more politically engaged than those who do not, but this is true even before they become citizens. The longitudinal data suggest that naturalization has no positive impact among immigrants, though it appears to have a modest positive effect among the “second generation” descendants of immigrants who were born in Germany but inherited the non-German citizenship of their parents. I conclude the paper by discussing promising paths for future research and by explaining that the German case may provide a conservative estimate of the effects of naturalization. This is because the country has very restrictive citizenship laws, making selection especially important.

Citizenship as solution
In contemporary liberal democracies, non-citizen residents hold many civil, social and even political rights. In the member states of the European Union, most sectors of the labour market are open to non-citizens, who are also eligible for most social welfare programmes. Foreign residents enjoy civil rights such as habeas corpus and are protected against some forms of discrimination. These facts have led scholars to conclude that, in Western Europe at least, the domain of politics is where we see the clearest differences in the treatment of citizens and non-citizen residents (Hansen 2009; Joppke 2010; Soysal 1994). Foreign residents may have freedom of speech and of assembly, but they are generally not allowed to vote or to run for elected office. In some countries, non-citizens are barred from joining political parties or from contributing to political campaigns.

Existing research on citizenship and political participation provides a number of reasons for expecting that acquiring citizenship will lead to greater political engagement. It is well established that people with a greater sense of political efficacy, i.e., a belief that they can influence political outcomes, are more likely to participate and to develop an interest in politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Obtaining citizenship means acquiring the right to vote, which we might expect to confer a stronger sense efficacy. Scholars of US history argue that easy access to voting rights and citizenship hastened the political incorporation of immigrants in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries (Dahl 1961; Wolfinger 1972; but see also Jones-Correa

---

¹ OECD 2011: 420-421.
² OECD 2011: 385-386.
Dahl (2000: 151) describes the rapid assimilation of these immigrants as “the American solution” to the question of how to reconcile democracy and cultural diversity.3

Research on political participation shows that various kinds of engagement with politics can be habit-forming (Finkel 1985; Gerber, Green and Shachar 2000; Plutzer 2002; Prior 2010). Once people vote for the first time, they are likely to continue doing so in future elections. Since those who hold citizenship are given more opportunities to form political habits, we might expect that becoming a citizen will lead to higher levels of political engagement. On this account, political engagement might be expected to increase gradually in the years after becoming a citizen.

Another reason to expect that becoming a citizen would lead to higher levels of political engagement derives from research on the politics of recognition. For example, Fraser (2000) argues that formal recognition as a political agent is the basis for “parity of participation in social life” (for a related argument on multiculturalism, see Kymlicka 2001). We might expect people to become more politically engaged, once they are recognized as politically competent (Bourdieu 1984: 399), and the legal status of citizenship can be seen as the formal recognition of political agency. One can also make a more pragmatic argument along similar lines. Acquiring citizenship brings full legal security, and ensures that immigrants can no longer be deported for engaging in unwelcome political activism or illegal protests. Citizenship may therefore serve to make politics a less risky sphere of activity (Just and Anderson 2012).

Finally, the process of acquiring citizenship can, in itself, be expected to lead to higher levels of political engagement. A trend over recent years has seen many countries introduce classes for those wishing to naturalize, providing instruction on the values and institutions of the receiving society. Applicants for citizenship must often pass civics tests (Etzioni 2007; Goodman 2010; Joppke 2007). New citizens are expected to give oaths of allegiance and are invited to celebrate their new status in citizenship ceremonies. The requirements for citizenship provide new citizens with the information that they need in order to engage with politics in the new homeland, and are also intended to instil participatory values. The process of preparing to meet these standards can be expected to cause an increase in political engagement, especially in the years immediately before citizenship is actually acquired.

One way to try and adjudicate between the theories described above is to focus on timing. For example, if an increase in political engagement is observed shortly before naturalisation, this would be consistent with the argument that preparing for citizenship helps people engage with politics. If we see cumulative increases in the years after citizenship is acquired, that would support the argument that citizenship allows people to form participatory habits. Another way to try and distinguish between the implications of these theories is to test for distinctive patterns in sub-sets of the immigrant-origin population. For example, existing research suggests important differences in the political attitudes of immigrants and the so-called “second generation”, who did not, in fact, immigrate themselves, but have immigrant parents. Some scholars suggest that, whereas first generation immigrants tend to have low expectations from politics, the second generation are more assertive (e.g. Maxwell 2010). This prediction may shed light on the argument about the importance of recognition. Even if it is not possible to settle the question of how acquiring citizenship affects political engagement, one goal of this paper is to provide evidence that can inform further research in this area.

**Citizenship and selection**

Although there are good theoretical grounds for expecting citizenship to promote political engagement, there is also an important reason to be sceptical of the claim that becoming a citizen causes political integration. It is possible to take interest in, discuss and even try to shape the course of politics without being a citizen. In addition, acquiring citizenship is a selective process – indeed, a doubly selective process. Foreign residents must choose to apply. And citizenship laws are also selective, in that they make it easier for certain kinds of people to become citizens than it is for others. Naturalization has high costs, including not only the fees, which run into hundreds or thousands of Euros, but also significant amounts of time and effort that must be spent on meeting the complex

---

3 For many years, property-owning immigrants could vote even without US citizenship (Hayduk 2006).
requirements (Alvarez 1987; DeSipio 1987; Prümm 2004; Topçu 2007). These costs are more easily born by immigrants with more resources, in terms of financial, human or social capital.

The fact that immigrants select into citizenship implies that observed differences between those who have naturalized, vs. those who have not, may be related to the factors that explain who applies, rather than any effects of citizenship. For example, highly educated immigrants may feel more motivated and better equipped to naturalize, and these educational differences can also be expected to be associated with higher levels of political engagement. Some research suggests that immigrants naturalize in part because they are more interested in politics (Kahanec and Tosun 2007). Self-selection into citizenship is an example of one of the major problems of causal inference in the social sciences, namely, the bias induced by (often unobserved) variables associated with both the proposed cause and the purported effect. This problem is exacerbated by the selective nature of citizenship. Statistical models can control for differences related to selection only under strong and often implausible assumptions (Angrist and Pischke 2009).

Most existing research on the effects of citizenship on political outcomes is unable to address the selection problem. Most studies rely on cross-sectional comparisons between foreign residents and those who have naturalized, at a given point in time. For example, Leal (2002) controls for observed differences in factors such as age, education and income, and finds that naturalized US citizens participate at about twice the rate of foreign residents. He notes, however, that the difference is likely to be at least partly due to selection, since foreign residents who say they plan to apply for citizenship are more similar to naturalized citizens than to other foreigners (ibid., 369). Kesler and Demireva (2011) find that naturalized immigrants in a number of European countries report more interest in politics than foreign residents. However, they also find that the differences between naturalized citizens and foreign residents are larger in countries with low naturalization rates (e.g., Germany or Switzerland), compared to countries where naturalization is easier (e.g., Norway or Sweden). As the authors note, this would be consistent with differences in political engagement being driven by selection rather than any positive effects of naturalization (ibid., 218).

Another recent study, by Just and Anderson (2012), also takes care to address the selection issue. The authors find that naturalized citizens score higher than foreign residents on an index of “uninstitutionalized participation”, which includes signing petitions, boycotting or consuming products for political reasons, and joining protests. They concede that findings from their cross-sectional data could be due to selection into citizenship, and propose an instrumental variables approach to address this concern (ibid., 498). They suggest two instruments: geographic distance from the country of origin, and having parents who are citizens. The two requirements for a valid instrument are: a) correlation with both the outcome and the explanatory variable (the “inclusion” restriction), and b) no correlation with the error term (the “exclusion” restriction). The former requirement can be tested, and the authors report that the inclusion restriction is satisfied. But the exclusion restriction cannot be empirically tested.

There are grounds for scepticism over the validity of the exclusion restriction. This amounts to the claim that, conditional on observed differences between individuals that are controlled in the model, geographic distance and having citizen parents promote political engagement only by making immigrants more likely to naturalize. Just and Anderson argue that geographic distance encourages naturalization because it reduces the likelihood of return. But there is no theoretical reason to expect that the intent to stay in the country promotes political activity only indirectly, by increasing the likelihood of naturalization. Just and Anderson also observe that immigrants with native-born parents are more likely to have citizenship, but, again, this is a questionable instrument. In many cases, the children of such people inherited citizenship, and did not actually face the decision over naturalization. More importantly, there is again no theoretical reason to expect that pre-existing

---

4 In a multivariate analysis, the claim is actually that this is the only pathway, conditional on the other variables that are included as controls. This shifts the weight of the assumption to the strong claims that the model a) controls for all relevant variables, and b) does so using the correct functional form.

5 Just and Anderson use data from the European Social Survey, which includes information on country of birth and citizenship status. Sadly, the survey does not include information on the year in which citizenship was acquired, so that it is not possible to distinguish those who were born abroad but inherited citizenship from their parents, and later “returned”
family ties to the country of residence promote political engagement only via the pathway of increasing the likelihood of naturalization.

**An alternative approach: over-time comparisons**

The preceding discussion of existing research reveals the limits of cross-sectional comparisons. Other styles of analysis should also be brought to bear upon the question of the effects of acquiring citizenship. In this working paper, I present initial evidence from analysis of longitudinal data, which contain multiple observations of the same people over time. The great advantage of this kind of data is that we can control for factors that vary across individuals but are often unobserved, and which, therefore, cannot be controlled in statistical models using cross-sectional data. For example, some people are more ambitious than others, or more confident in asserting their rights, but surveys rarely contain good measures of such differences. By comparing the outcome variable of person \(i\) in time period 2 with that of person \(i\) in time period 1, we automatically control for temporally stable features of this individual. Fixed effects models extend this logic to compare people with their own mean score across the available time periods (see Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004; Wooldridge 2010).

This approach does not solve all inferential problems. Within-person comparisons only control for variables that are stable over time. We must therefore continue to assume that relevant covariates that change with time can be observed and controlled in the model. This assumption is weaker than that required for cross-sectional comparisons, but an assumption nonetheless. Longitudinal analysis is particularly helpful when we suspect that the underlying differences between people may be introducing variation due to selection that can be mistaken for causal effects. As we have seen, this is a serious concern in the study of citizenship.

**Data and methods**

The data source in this paper is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). This survey began in 1984 and now contains 27 rounds of data. The initial panel included over-samples of immigrants from the “guest worker” generation, who came to Germany in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. The survey has been refreshed with several new samples. All household members aged 16 or older are eligible for interview. Children who grow up in these households are also recruited into the survey once they reach adulthood, and the survey attempts to follow people who leave the household and move elsewhere. In order to estimate the effect of naturalization I focus on people who were not German citizens when they first entered the survey. In the case of those who have since naturalized, this allows before-and-after comparisons of the same person, with and without German citizenship. It is important to note that the analysis of the children of immigrants is restricted to people who were born in Germany to foreign parents and who had not already naturalized by the time they entered the survey. Over recent decades around half of those born in Germany as foreign residents naturalized as children, along with their parents. These people cannot be included in the analysis because the survey contains no measures of the relevant variables during childhood.

The main focus of the SOEP is on economic and labour-market outcomes, but the survey also includes several questions on political issues. In this paper I focus on the two questions that have been asked most frequently and which are therefore best suited for longitudinal analysis. Survey participants were asked in every round of data-collection to rate their level of interest in politics, and to say whether they tend to identify with a particular political party. I take party identification as an indicator of political engagement because partisans are known to participate at higher rates in a range of political activities (Finkel and Opp 1991; Hero, et al. 2000). I combine the two variables to create a five-point scale, which is treated as a continuous measure of political engagement. Very similar results are obtained when studying the two variables separately. Details on question wording and coding are

---

6 The data were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.
7 Similar results are also obtained when the scale includes the third most frequently asked question on politics, about the frequency with which survey respondents participate in local politics. This question is not included in the main analysis because it was only asked in around two thirds of the survey years.
The Political Effects of Becoming a Citizen

in Appendix Two.

The first step of the analysis is to test whether within-person comparisons produce different results than the standard approach of comparing across people. A simple way to do this is to calculate the mean scores on the political engagement variable for four sub-sets of the survey respondents. These are: a) foreign residents who did not naturalize at any point during the survey; b) people who naturalized, but only using scores from the years before they acquired German citizenship; c) people who naturalized, in the years after acquiring German citizenship; and d) the reference group of people who are German citizens and were born to German citizens. The standard between-person approach is to compare group a) with the combined groups b) and c). The within-person approach focuses on the difference between groups b) and c).

The next step is to study trends over time among those who acquire German citizenship. This will reveal whether differences emerge at the time of naturalization, before, or afterwards. Simply comparing mean scores over time allows me to avoid statistical models that make assumptions about the functional form of the relationship between citizenship status and political engagement, assumptions that may be more compatible with some mechanisms than others. This analysis also provides evidence on the causal mechanisms that could be compatible with any observed differences. If we see that a difference suddenly emerges several years after naturalization, this would suggest caution in interpreting the change as an effect of naturalization. A step-change at the time of naturalization would be more compatible with the efficacy or the recognition arguments, whereas a more gradual increase in the years after becoming a citizen would be easier to reconcile with the argument that citizenship provides new opportunities to develop participatory habits. If we see that a positive difference emerges shortly before naturalization, this would suggest that the process of preparing to apply is responsible for increased political engagement.

The final step of the analysis will be to use multivariate models to control for other variables that are changing over time and could therefore confound estimates of the effect of acquiring citizenship. For example, one important factor is length of residence, since in Germany as in most contemporary democracies it is only possible to apply for citizenship after living in the country for a number of years. As immigrants spend more time in a country they also tend to improve their language skills and to make more social contacts, along with other changes that could also spur political engagement. In this working paper, I will not present results of multivariate models; this will be the next step in preparing the paper for publication in a peer-reviewed journal. I do, however, make adjustments that are necessary even for bi-variate analysis of longitudinal survey data. I use longitudinal weights to account for the fact that people who remain in the survey for a long period are somewhat unusual, and not representative of the broader population. I also present standard errors that are clustered by individual and by household, to adjust for the fact that many of the observations in these data are not independent.

Results

Figure one (see Appendix One) shows the mean levels of political engagement among four sub-sets of the immigrants surveyed: those who have not naturalized, those who naturalized in the years before they did so, those who naturalized in the years after acquiring German citizenship, and the German-born descendants of German citizens. The people who remained foreign residents show the lowest levels of political engagement. This mean is significantly lower than the mean score for people who naturalized, both before and after the latter acquired German citizenship (in both cases, p < 0.01. Here and elsewhere in the paper I report p-values from two-tailed tests.). The simple cross-sectional comparison between foreign residents and people who naturalized would suggest that acquiring citizenship does make a difference. However, the within-person comparison yields substantially different results. Comparing the years before and after, for those who naturalized, we see a negligible and non-significant difference. Finally, the figure shows that native-born Germans report significantly

---

8 Longitudinal weighting begins with a sample weight that is intended to make the results representative for the resident population, and then applies an additional weighting factor for each year in the survey, which is designed to account for the fact that the kind of people who are able and willing to continue in the survey over time are somewhat atypical.
higher levels of political engagement than either foreign residents or people who naturalized ($p < 0.01$ in all cases).

Figure two (see Appendix One) shows results of the same analysis for the “second generation” children of immigrants. We see quite different results. Those who did not naturalize at any point again score the lowest. Those who naturalized score somewhat higher, in the years before they became German citizens, though the difference compared to foreign residents is not significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.17$). The mean score among those who naturalized, in the years after acquiring German citizenship, is significantly higher than among those who remained foreign residents, or the people who naturalized, in the years prior to naturalization (in both cases $p < 0.01$). Furthermore, the post-naturalization level of political engagement is not significantly lower than that observed among Germans born to German citizens ($p = 0.4$). For the children of immigrants, the within-person and between-person comparisons yield similar results. Political engagement is estimated to be around one third of a standard deviation higher among those with citizenship.

These results suggest that acquiring citizenship has no effect on political engagement for immigrants, but that it does lead to increased engagement among people who were born in Germany to foreign parents (and reached adulthood before becoming German citizens). We can further test these results by focusing on those who naturalize, plotting mean levels of political engagement in the years before and after they acquired German citizenship. Figure three (see Appendix One) displays the results for immigrants, in the seven years before and after naturalization. The points in the figure are connected by trend lines, blue for the years before naturalization, and red for the years thereafter (fit by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing). The figure reveals some fluctuation over time but no clear trend, and provides no evidence of a break at the point of naturalization. Figure four (see Appendix One) provides the equivalent results for the children of immigrants. The year-to-year means are more variable, because of a smaller sample size, but the figure does show a generally higher level of engagement after naturalization, a difference that first emerges in the year in which German citizenship was acquired.

Discussion
This paper uses longitudinal data to investigate the impact of acquiring citizenship on levels of political engagement, measured by interest in politics and the likelihood of identifying with a political party. Comparing the same people over time allows us to control for important differences between the kind of people who naturalize, and those who do not. The paper presents evidence that acquiring citizenship is not sufficient to make first generation immigrants to Germany more politically engaged.

However, in the case of those born to immigrant parents, who grew up as foreign residents in Germany, the findings suggest that citizenship does have a positive impact. The difference between the first and second generations does not seem to be merely due to age. I conducted separate analyses, restricting the sample of first generation immigrants to: a) those aged 40 or younger; and b) those who moved to German before the age of 16. These sub-samples do not yield substantially different results.

The change observed among the children of immigrants emerges at the point of naturalization and is sustained or even increased in the years thereafter. This suggests that the effect cannot be attributed to preparations to meet the requirements for naturalization. Since applications for citizenship typically take six months to a year to be processed, (Thränhardt 2008), it is unlikely that the positive effects of preparations could be concentrated into a sufficiently short time-period to emerge in the data during the year in which citizenship was acquired. Another possibility that receives little support in these data is that the difference between the first and second generations is due to the latter being more likely to form participatory habits. The SOEP only recently began asking questions on voting behaviour, so sample sizes are regrettably small. But the limited information available suggests that

---

9 Moving more than seven years on either side of the year of naturalization results in less stable estimates, at least partly due to falling sample size. The mean number of observations per person, for those who naturalize, is 12.

10 The requirements for naturalization have become more integration-focused in the years since 2000 (see Hailbronner 2010). Separate analyses of those who naturalized before and after this date do not reveal substantial differences, again suggesting that preparing to meet these standards is not the explanation for the observed differences.
“second generation” naturalized citizens are no more likely than those in the first generation to declare an intention to vote, or to report that they had voted in the previous election.\footnote{In 2009, 184 first generation immigrants with German citizenship were asked whether they intended to vote in the next federal elections, and 64\% said “definitely” or “probably”. This compares to 60\% of the 63 second generation immigrants asked the same question. In 2010, 70\% of first generation (n = 159) and 70\% of second generation immigrants with citizenship (n = 59) said that they had voted.}

The SOEP data do not provide leverage on the posited efficacy or recognition mechanisms, but the analysis reported in this working paper suggests that future research could fruitfully investigate these possibilities, and should pay particular attention to the children of immigrants. A \textit{caveat} is in order at this point, however. Substantial numbers of “second generation” children of immigrants are found only in countries where citizenship is attributed mainly by descent rather than by place of birth. Such countries include Germany (despite a major reform of citizenship law in the year 2000), Austria, Switzerland and Italy. Together these countries are home to millions of foreign residents. But the numbers of “second generation” immigrants growing up without citizenship are much smaller in countries where citizenship is attributed solely by place of birth, or which have provisions that make it easy for children to naturalize.

Another \textit{caveat} concerns the generality of this paper’s finding that selection explains the differences between immigrants with and without citizenship. The rate at which foreign residents acquire citizenship is lower in Germany, at around 1.5 per cent of the foreign population per year, than in other countries with comparable settled immigrant populations, such as France, the Netherlands, the UK or Sweden, all of which see around 4 per cent of resident foreigners naturalize per year (see OECD 2011: 421-2). Foreign residents in Germany view the naturalization process as very costly and onerous (Prümm 2004; Topçu 2007). The selective nature of German citizenship law ensures that the differences between those who are willing and able to naturalize, and those who are not, are relatively large. We might find clearer evidence of a positive impact of naturalization in countries where citizenship is not restricted to the most upwardly mobile and motivated of foreign residents. To the author’s knowledge, the only comparable country for which longitudinal data with information on political engagement are available is Switzerland, which also has highly restrictive citizenship laws (for example, the British Household Panel Survey only asks about citizenship once per person, precluding longitudinal analysis).

Studying the effects of naturalization provides a rare insight into the question of how people’s citizenship status relates to their levels of political engagement. Creating a political community is one of the key functions of citizenship, but becoming a citizen does not necessarily make people more motivated to engage with the political system. This working paper demonstrates the need to distinguish carefully between variation due to the effects of citizenship status and that due to selection into citizenship. The paper reveals distinctive patterns among immigrants and their descendants. Future research should aim to explain this difference, and should further investigate the mechanisms by which acquiring citizenship can influence political engagement.
Appendix One

Figure one

Mean political engagement among 1st generation foreign residents, naturalizers and native-born Germans

Figure two

Mean political engagement among 2nd generation foreign residents, naturalizers and native-born Germans
Figure three

First Generation: political engagement before and after naturalization

Figure four

Second Generation: political engagement before and after naturalization
Appendix Two

Question wording and coding

Political interest. “First of all, in general, how interested are you in politics? Very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested or not interested?”

Party preference. “Many people in Germany lean toward one party in the long term, even if they occasionally vote for another party. Do you lean toward a particular party?” Note that, although the question refers to voting, it was asked of both foreign residents and naturalized citizens. A significant number of foreign residents answer this question in the affirmative, even those who never naturalize.

The variables are combined into a political engagement scale as follows. Those who are “very” interested in politics and who have a preferred party are scored 1 (7% of respondents). Those who are “somewhat” interested in politics and have a preferred party, and those who are “very” interested but do not have a preferred party, are scored 0.75 (13% of the sample). Those who are “somewhat” interested but do not have a preferred party, and those who are “not very interested” but do have a preferred party, are scored 0.5 (23% of respondents). People who are “not very interested” and do not have a party preference, and those who are “not interested” but do have a party preference, are scored 0.25 (32% of the sample). And those who score zero on both measures are coded zero (the remaining 25%).
References


Alex Street

243-73.


