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Types of Mayors, Types of Subjectivity: Continuities and Discontinuities in the East-Central European Transitions I

ARPÁD SZAKOLCZAI

European University Institute, Florence

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50016 San Domenico (FI)
Italy

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1. Preface

It is considered almost as an evidence that the problematic of the East European transition process, and not just after 1989, is to be described and analysed in objective and macro-level terms. The central elements are economic - the deep crisis, the links to the world economy, the structural problems of the economies, central planning; political, either internal - the succession of authoritarian and totalitarian systems, nationalism, fascism, communism, the problem of the elite, the institutional and legal issues (party systems, constitution) or external - the geo-political and the broad international situation, the impact of the world wars; social - inequalities, poverty, the lack of middle classes. The research project of which this paper is a part, however, is motivated by a different perspective: the assumption that there are "subjective" aspects of this problematic, rooted in the concrete settings of daily life, that have their independence and relevance, and that must be rendered intelligible in order to solve the current problems.

This statement immediately calls for two clarifying remarks. First, the perspective is not rooted in a concrete, positive belief or value that motivate explicitly the research. It simply refers to a specific problematisation: a way of perceiving or formulating the problem. Second, the above perspective about the importance of subjectivity and daily life can be defined in two different ways. In the weak sense, it simply states the relative independence of these considerations from objective and macro-level concerns, the irreducibility of one to the other, the impossibility of assigning simple, one-way causal links. But in the strong sense, a certain priority is assigned, on the assumption that the fundamental points can be located at this, and not the other, more accepted level. Adherence to the weak sense would completely be sufficient to justify the present undertaking. Nevertheless, this paper would risk even the stronger proposition. Not to prove or even support, but only to illustrate this claim, let us refer to the well-known argument of Max Weber, presented at the beginning of the Protestant Ethic: states, markets, capitalism existed earlier; all the technical aspects of capitalism were present in late medieval Italy.

But something fundamental was still missing there. Weber called it the "spirit" of capitalism; but after Hennis, we know that this unfortunate word referred not to "spirit" in the way of Marx, only in an opposite sense, but to the conduct of life (*Lebensführung*). (1)

Such a way of posing the question of "transition" led to the start of several research projects whose exact connections were at first not always clear even to the investigator. First, obviously, empirical studies had to be made related to daily life and the formation of the subjectivity. In order to connect the two in a meaningful way, and to remain close to the actual centres of power and processes of transition, this part of the research decided to focus upon some of the crucial agents at the intermediate level of political and social life: the former local communist party apparatus, the new mayors, and the police. Second, it was necessary to look for a comparative reference point. Because this study took the term "formation" literally, instead of assuming the forms and contents of "subjectivity" and "daily life" as given or natural, the reference point had to be concerned with actual, concrete formations, therefore had to be historical. As it can be assumed that the current problems related to subjectivity and daily life did not originate in the East-European context in an autonomous, independent way, it followed that these processes had to be analysed historically, in the emergence of modern states and societies in West Europe.

Third, such a study had to rely upon a theoretical framework, and solve certain questions of method. There are many theoretical frameworks available that either reduced "subjectivity" and "daily life" to "objective" and "macro-level" factors, or that tried to assert positively their own inherent value. It is much more difficult to find ones that studied their independent problematisation, especially concerning their interconnection, and the joint historical emergence of their modern Western forms. Therefore, the empirical and historical research had to be supplemented with theoretical and methodological studies, that were all the more necessary as the work of those three authors that proved to be

the most useful for the particular purposes of this research (Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault) were cut short suddenly and remain fragmented, and that were, partly because of this, and especially concerning their interconnections, almost always misconstrued, and in a fundamental way.

But, beyond all the usual questions of theory and method, a final point needs to be discussed. All scientific research is based on the attempt to eliminate "subjective" considerations, in the sense of the bias given by the person of the investigator. In most cases, this is obviously a necessary precaution, a fundamental way to separate mere impressions from solid, scholarly studies. However, in the case of the particular problematisation of this project, the sides of the table had to be turned. It was both necessary that the "subjective" perspective of the researcher be brought into the analysis, as the illusion of exteriority in this case would not have been possible or ethical; and there was also a promise that such a manner of proceeding could even bring in additional, crucial information. Instead of trying to eliminate "subjectivity", the question was how the value of its inclusion could be maximised. Therefore, the question of method was not restricted to the search for useful tools of analysis, but had to go into this more complex problem of self-reflexivity - without making a slogan or virtue out of it, in a "post-modern" way. (2)

The paper therefore contains an empirical analysis on the formation and manifestations of subjectivity at the level of daily existence. Therefore, it had to combine three different methods, or literature: the presentation of aspects of East-Central European daily reality; the analyses of survey data, using mathematical-statistical methods; and a perspective on the problem of "subjectivity", using the framework developed on the basis of the writings of Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault. This creates the obvious difficulty that the short presentation of each area could be too schematic and superfluous to those who are acquainted with the relevant literature, and too short and incomprehensible to the "uninitiated". Therefore, attempt will be made to summarise

the specific analyses in plain terms, and to provide a conclusion trying to bring together the different bits and pieces.

This is the first paper presenting the empirical results of a research project undertaken together with Agnes Horváth. In the first step of our work, in the Spring and Summer of 1991, we made 37 interviews with members of the local elite (mostly newly elected mayors) in Hungary, Slovakia, and a few in Transylvania. In Hungary, the interviews were conducted in a county where we have already held a number of conversations in 1989, trying to document the dissolution of the former system, while in Slovakia, it centred on the largest compact Hungarian-speaking area, the Csallóköz, just east of Bratislava. On this basis, we constructed an hour-long questionnaire. Due to a number of considerations, we restricted our sample to mayors. The survey was conducted in July-August 1992 in Hungary, and in August-September 1992 in the Czech and Slovak republics, on about 250 elected mayors. The actual sample sizes were 246, 257, and 243, respectively. (3)

2. Introduction

The question of persistence and change, of continuity and discontinuity is among the most crucial and intriguing problems with respect to the current events in East Europe - and for any major social and political change in general. It is certainly present in the current discussions, ranging from high-level political rhetoric through everyday journalism up to the concerns of scholarly analysis. And, even without attempting the impossible task of analysing in detail each three areas, one can safely state that this question presents peculiar problems in all of them. Let me only give a few examples from the case of Hungary.

At the level of politics, it is among the most (maybe the most) hotly debated, sensitive and controversial issues. The closeness to or the association with the communist past was a central element of the political struggles since the first election, and was central, for e.g., in the sudden rise and success of the Free Democrats in

the turn of 1989-90. Since then, it does not cease to be the favourite tool of all those parties and politicians who perceive themselves in deficit of support. It is especially popular, of course, among the new breed of post-communist, nationalist populists.

At the level of the media, these debates are repeated, reflected, and often exaggerated out of proportion, not independently of the fact that the media itself is the subject, in more than one sense, of the hottest debates about the communist legacy, fuelled by its ambivalent past record. (4) During the communist period, positions in the television, the radio, and the major journals were considered to be among the most confidential positions, comparable only to diplomatic missions. (5) But also, especially in the last years before the change, the emerging independence of the media was among the most important catalysts of the changes. This can be again interpreted in two ways. Media people may have been in the forefront of struggle; but they may have only been swimming opportunistically with the tide, being close enough to sense the winds of change.

The whole media debate may have another important element, not visible from the outside, and perhaps, even from the inside. Such positions in the past gave almost unique possibilities to travel and to get information from around the world, from the best sources. As a result, media people had a much better understanding of the world than not simply the "population at large", but practically all intellectuals, first of all the "hidden opposition" containing the present core of MDF-nationalists, and even the former hard core of the system, as among the political, military, and police apparatus, there were important restrictions of travelling in effect, not to mention the more hierarchical, restrictive information distribution system. Thus, we can state that among the different strata of the intellectual elite, there were peculiar differences not simply related to ideological orientation, moral composure, or professional knowledge, but also concerning information about the "world". The restriction of such information and the distortion of the view of the world was among the most important aims of the former system. The original purpose may

have only been negative, but the most important lasting effect was different: a distortion of the sense of judgement, the loss of the ability to distinguish, to give proper weight to things, to develop a balanced picture, and not just an all or nothing view about the "West". This is what is coming back in the different versions of pro- or anti-Western populism, completely unintelligible from the outside.

Finally, the question of continuity and discontinuity in the current transition process presents problems at the level of scholarly analyses as well. (6) First, there are obvious problems due to the strong legacies of the past (the highly ideological character of the social and political sciences in the previous regime), and to the fact that often the same persons are involved in political, administrative, legal, and scholastic matters. This problem is rendered even more difficult as both the seriousness of the problems and the often clearly unacceptable methods of the current governments and popular views make the ideal of a detached scholarly analysis often inconceivable. But apart from such troubles, there is also another, substantive problem that is more difficult to solve - often, even to notice. There are no available methods to address the issue of continuity and discontinuity.

2.1. Studying continuity and discontinuity: a question of method

Even the analysis of social change and economic development presents a numbers of difficulties; so much so that both in sociology and economics, it is subsequently dropped from the agenda of mainstream theory and research that rather attempts to copy themethods of the natural sciences wherever it is possible, and is at any rate busy with the more or less static analysis of the advanced modern industrial (or post-industrial, even post-modern) societies, where most of the things that are currently debated in the East are simply taken for granted. But the problem of continuity and discontinuity is different even from a simple question of change. It wants to analyse, reflect upon, look beyond

the "apparent" changes; to see what has remained constant behind them; and also, from an opposite perspective, to assess what is changing behind the seemingly unbroken stability. The question of continuity and discontinuity addresses itself not to actions, agents, and behaviour, neither to its counterpart, political institutions, social structures, legal forms, ideas, ideologies, or beliefs. All these pose relatively easy matters with respect to change: they are either maintained or dropped, altered or left intact. The question concerns the level where things cannot be altered at (external) will and in short notice, questions that address the level of day-to-day life, routine practices, or, to use a term not much in vogue in sociology: the level of being. (7)

This "being", however, should not be interpreted as a mythical substance, an "essence" of the life of a nation or an individual; an essence that is given as an actuality or a potentiality, either given originally or developed historically, and has to be "rediscovered" or reasserted. There is no value connected to "being". It is only taken as a fact. "Being" is what is the closest, the most familiar, therefore the most difficult to see. The most drastic changes can happen in ideologies or beliefs (at the level of individuals), or of political and legal systems (at the level of societies) without altering this level of "being", of regular daily practices.

This does not imply that it is not possible or desirable to change this level of "being". The issue, on the contrary, is the question of how changes actually do occur at this level; what is the concrete, empirical interaction between external, macro-level political, economic, and legal changes, and this "tissue" of daily existence; which is the point where both the continuities and the discontinuities can be grasped, mapped, and analysed. As, perhaps, "being" can be defined, in its different levels, as a relative resistance to change, situating in between the most superficial changes of moods and opinions, and the complete dissolution of the whole entity. The question of continuity and discontinuity concerns the exact "hierarchy" between the two end-points of this process. In this way, instead of a dichotomy, we'll

have to deal with thousand fold gradations between fixity and fluidity; ultimately, between existence and disappearance. (8)

The above considerations do imply something that may be considered as a first hint toward a proper method. This way of posing the question of continuity and discontinuity means that all those matters of "substance" (to repeat, ideology, belief, politics, legal system) are not central to "being" in the sense of a resistability to change. Turning it into a working hypothesis, one could say that it is forms and not substances that are central to "being", the survival of an entity as an entity. (9) This implies a truly Nietzschean "revaluation of values": what matters in terms of longevity is not the political ideology, religious belief, or party membership of an individual being, but the manner, the way one is perceiving and expressing his ideas or belongingness, behaves accordingly, and forms his or her identity. In this sense, even the way one changes his or her affiliations is much more important than the actual, past or present ties. It is at that level that the true "depths" of one's "being" are hidden. (10)

Thus, we arrive at a major point of method with respect to the study of our problem of continuity and discontinuity, the study of the forms of being, not as a question of phenomena masking hidden, deep essences, but of styles, manners of existence and expressions, ways of living and thinking. Such an analysis could take as its object the manifold rituals of daily existence. Almost any activity or behaviour can be seen from this different and new light. But there is one issue that seems to be at the centre of all related inquiries: the question of the form of subjectivity, or the type or character of human beings themselves.

It is not at all obvious that a study about a topic usually described as the "transition to democracy", modernisation, economic development, or the setting up of a market economy should arrive at such a formulation. How could one have the idea to reduce the most pressing and "objective" issues to mere matters of subjectivity?! But, as both of us involved in the project arrived at

this point, with some degree of independence, a short account of the actual track should be given here.

The very way of posing the question of transition in the form of continuity and discontinuity seems something quite recent. Around 1989-1990, in the optimistic times, this was certainly not an accepted or widespread practice. One could even argue that the forgetting of the past was an imperative for the necessary concentration on concrete, actual and oncoming tasks. And yet, the posing of the question did have its very concrete precedent. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, in the research group at the Institute of Sociology led by Elemér Hankiss, this was the paradigm governing concrete work. In fact, the first major research report of the group was entitled exactly "Continuity and break". (11) That research report tried to pin down the question by a study of basic human values. Since then, many of those who were associated with this group, including us, did not cease to pose the crucial problem of our reality in such terms.

Concerning our research, this at first gave us the idea of focusing on the study of intermediate political organisations (the party apparatus at the district, county, and village level, the new systems of local government, and the police), connecting the citizens, in their daily activities, with the macro-level political and administrative organs. Our target was to avoid those kinds of political analyses that concentrated solely on the upper echelons, on the current moods and opinions of political and intellectual leaders, always in search of the hottest, most up-to-date information and gossip, and therefore living in a closed, short-circuited world, unable to gain a proper distance from the topic, and to reflect upon their world and themselves. Such an approach seemed to us all the more inappropriate as the system was disintegrating, therefore such kind of "internal" information was clearly losing its value. At that time, none did even dare to imagine that everything will be reproducing itself to such a large degree.

But it became increasingly clear to both of us that there was something even more crucial than the "intermediate" type analysis; something that explains and underlies almost everything found at that level; something toward which, however, access was only given by this intermediate analysis. This was the issue of "subjectivity", of types and forms of subjectivity.

2.2. On subjectivity

Let's start with a quick disclaimer. The central target of analysis is subjectivity as subjectivity, the links between the political, social, and economic aspects of modernity and a specific form of subjectivity, and not other, similar, often used terms. Therefore, it has nothing to do with studies or approaches that place the emphasis either on some universal components of human nature or individuality, assuming a standard model and only quantitative gradations with it; or that try to reduce and explain differences between human beings by certain external or natural factors (economic, political, cultural, national, or ethnic-racial factors). The study of subjectivity does not assume either a "natural" identity or difference between human beings. It starts at the point where the very term "natural" loses all relevance and meaning.

Still, and now positively, how can one define subjectivity? What is the "meaning" of subjectivity, and the related terms "subject" or "subjective"? This is a question that certainly would require at least a separate essay or a book. But, as it is so central for this empirical research, it is not possible to refer the reader to a broad list of readings, and this paper has to provide at least a short coverage of this topic.

The most obvious way to start is to define "subjectivity" together with "objectivity". These terms are at the heart of language and grammar, and specify the different positions persons and things can take up in a sentence structure, in relation to each other. The "object" is what is passive, lifeless, a mere tool for the other: the active, purposeful agent, the "subject". However, even in this

simplest formulation, there are two twists. First, even if almost by definition, the "subject" is assigned the active, superior position, the term has another sense. "Subject" is the name given to the subordinates of political authority (emperors, kings), a meaning central to the word since the old Latin usage. It is this ambivalence of the term that has been made ample use by Michel Foucault in his writings on power and subjectivity ever since the second part of the 1970s. (12) The point is that there is something profoundly disturbing about the fact that the term which is supposed to pin down the active, creative, personal component of existence has another meaning in which it is used to denote a subordinate position, and in a political sense.

Second, the most obvious contemporary use of the term still lies elsewhere. The key element of the object - subject opposition is not activity or subordination, but the difference between a simple, factual presentation of things, or the incorporation of a specific, personal viewpoint. In our age, the clearest and most crucial difference is between an objective description and a subjective opinion. This is the meaning that overtakes all others today, especially concerning scholarly analysis. The links between subjectivity and academic studies are well-defined. First, obviously, such an analysis has to present facts and reasoning, and not just opinions and viewpoints. Second, however, such subjective viewpoints can themselves become objects of study. Public opinion polls, sociological surveys, in-depth interviews, psychological experiments are only a few examples. However, in these cases, there is a clear assignment of priorities. Studies about the "objective" situation have clear precedence in importance and relevance. It is the economic crisis, the geo-political situation, international and national politics, or the characteristics of the brain that are the primary variables, and the study of subjectivity or opinions only matters to the extent that the way these "objective" factors are reflected in the "subjective" views have some theoretical, practical, or ideological relevance. Subjectivity in this sense is nothing more than a viewpoint - an interesting idiosyncrasy, one could say.

Such a position is accepted even by those who consider the study of subjectivity their specific topic of research, even if they take much trouble to wedge a line between a personal viewpoint and an idiosyncrasy. Thus, even proponents of the Q methodology, a new approach developed to study subjectivity "as such" defines its target in this way. (13)

So far, we have been only trying to bring out the obviousness, the evidence, the taken for granted definition of "subjectivity". Now, we have to move beyond, and elaborate this concept in three dimensions, related to the importance, the universality, and the specificity of subjectivity in modern societies.

First, within still the same conceptual model given by the opposition of "objectivity" and "subjectivity", different values can be assigned to their relative importance. Let's illustrate it with an anecdotal evidence, taken from the all-important media, and to contrast the way Sky International is presenting news with the way the Hungarian TV, or its model, the Russian TV or the news agency TASS provided information earlier. In the former bloc countries, news persons gave extremely severe, emotionless, stone-faced presentations of the official versions on the daily activities of the state and party leaders, and read the communiqués and news of the official agencies. All this was done not simply in an objective, informative, detached fashion, in order to avoid biases, but to present and represent the official hierarchy, the given and eternal state of affairs, in its full weight. The viewers did not simply have to hear that Leonid Iljich Brezhnev had some discussions with the leaders of such-and-such communist party, but that it is in the nature of things that it is so, and will always be; that there is no human agency, decision, or subjectivity involved in this process.

Let's contrast it with the way Sky presented its three "top stories" on a January evening in 1993, repeated *ad nauseam* at every half hour. The first was the story of an abandoned 18-month old child. As the girl was dressed up as a boy, it was first suggested that it was abandoned because of its sex, but later an update was given

that the child was actually kidnapped months earlier. After this, the item was complete with interviews with the mother. Second, the story of a British aid worker murdered in Somalia. From the start, ample evidence was provided from life and family background. Finally, the story of a businessman murdered in the Soho. Here, again, ample elements of horror, blood, the accounts of policemen and pictures of his girlfriend were given.

This example, in spite of its trivial character, has its specific relevance for our purposes, and on several accounts. First, it provides as strong a contrast between "objective" and "subjective" approaches as possible. Yet, clearly, neither of them is self-evident at all. In fact, it brings out, even if in an all too obvious manner, how both are in fact used for clearly manipulative purposes, where "manipulation" does not refer to something that is false or distorted (as none of the stories mentioned were simple lies), but indicates that the emphasis is not on the content of the news, but on the way it has a impact on the listeners; the way it creates and reinforces certain behaviour patterns. Thus, the most "objective" and "subjective" styles of news have the same aim: to stimulate and impose a certain way of perceiving things; ultimately, a certain type of conduct of life. The concrete styles promoted could not be more different; but the fact of trying to instigate, imprint, invest, motivate behaviour is the same. Seen from this perspective, the question of which relies upon the "true" model of subjectivity, or the claim that the Soviet model "lacked" subjectivity appears devoid of sense without further conceptual clarification, and requires a drastic re-formulation.

Second, this contrast is not a theoretical issue, but is at the heart of the dilemmas of the transition process. The population of most East European countries (foremost of all, the former Soviet Union) has been subjected to this style, and not just in the news, that from a Western point of view can clearly be defined as "de-subjectivising", for decades and decades. The question is how will these people be able to change themselves to a different style of subjectivity, presenting themselves, behaving in public places and

situations in a different way, getting finally rid of the legacy of the Brezhnevian style.

Third, the two styles and stories are not just abstract examples, but as concrete as they can possibly be. These two styles seem to be caricatures, overdrawn opposites. But for many, these are the almost only available examples. It is well known how important a role the intrusion of satellite TV channels had in the actual dissolution and transition process in East Europe. (14) But what it meant is that it was literally the Sky and Super channels that were "competing" with the official East European media for months and years; that these were practically the only types of TV news seen by millions and millions of people.

The second point is the question of universality. This concept of the subject as merely a personal viewpoint can be contrasted to a substantive stream of modern philosophy that, taking as their starting point Husserl's phenomenology, raises the subject to the level of universality, reversing the priorities between phenomenon and essence. Short of a more detailed presentation, let's just mention that it was this approach that served as the background for the investigations of Michel Foucault, who questioned the universality of this type of subjectivity, and tried to uncover its historical specificity.

This takes us to the third topic, the link between subjectivity and modernity. According to Foucault (and also Nietzsche, Weber, Elias, to mention only a few), "subjectivity" as we understand it is not something universal, but is specifically related to modernity. The modern age did not "discover" the subjective view-point, but shaped and instigated it, and in the form of an obligation. Everyone must have a personal opinion, a viewpoint on everything, from international politics up to the issue of abortion or the latest internal political scandals. In a "pre-modern" society, one could not express his or her opinion, perhaps did not even possess one, or was constrained to repeat certain obligatory formulas. In contemporary, modern societies, one is free to say whatever he or she pleases - but must take part in this discourse,

and has to express exactly what was forbidden before: a strictly personal view, a position with which one is identifying himself completely and wholeheartedly. The point is not about the "duty" to be free, and the "escape" from this obligation, but about the specific link made between the obligation of expressing opinion and the way identity is constructed through this. Free opinion or speech, as it is understood in modern societies, is not reducible to an ideology or a ruse in any sense, but is a highly structured, specific game, that is far from being obvious, natural, or universal.

Let's just point out one paradox. Everyone is supposed to speak all his or her opinions from the heart, feeling it and being convinced of it deeply, as his or her own "inherent property". But as the range of such possible opinions on any particular issue is extremely limited, it is obvious that such views are not at all personal. Thus, everyone is incited on a truly massive scale to state commonplaces and truisms in first person singular, to try to be genuinely individual and original in exactly the same dimension as everyone else. There is no escape from this overburdening demand of "subjectivity" and "originality".

This ritual of self-delusions is possible only with the help of another, related game: the game (and obligation) of self-confessions. At the height of this scenario of the presentation, representation, and shaping of subjectivity, the most exciting and personal element is the act of self-confession, of opening oneself up in public; the talk about one's inner world, feelings, secrets, dreams; to speak one's truth, to open one's soul. The question of modern subjectivity, therefore, is not the "discovery" of the self, but of the investment of the urge to discover, to talk about the self; the need to have a "personal" opinion in everything, the urge to believe that whatever one happens to utter is profoundly original and personal; and, to top it off, that the deepest secret and the most original topic is one's own self. This is a "developmental stage" in the history of Western subjectivity that has become problematised, is being overcome and escalated at the same time, only recently. The question of transition, from this perspective, is not simply the "thaw" of the Brezhnevian ice, the making of a face

for the faceless "homo sovieticus", but the manner the new, modern type of subjectivity will be formed.

Examples abound to prove that this is actually happening. The topic would require another separate paper. Let's only mention passingly the unbroken line starting from one of the most inexplicable characteristics of the Stalinist purges, the act of public confessions, broadcast to all public places from loudspeakers, through the seances of criticism and self-criticism, filling the compulsory seminaries at every workplace in the 1950s, to the escalation of private conversations and talk-shows, starting to dominate Hungarian radio and television from the late 1970s, and the public style of contemporary politicians or public figures, whose every second sentence begins with statements like "let's be frank with you", or "let me confess something". (15) What may seem as only a stereotypical matter of style, in fact, reveals specific practices and their legacies: an ever increasing distance from the realities of life, a closing off into the self, and a leap into an empty, short-circuited discursive universe where all connections between facts and statements, rights and duties, costs and benefits, existential prices and material rewards have been severed. With this leap, the self, instead of becoming independent, becomes subordinated, or "subjected", to the mechanisms that keep the system running; on whose efficiency everything depends. From now on, the question is no longer one of illusion or reality, truth and lie, but the efficiency of the former constructs to re-assert themselves.

With these comments, we are getting closer to the other, more crucial part of the story, the question of the conduct of life, concerning both ethical composure and practical action. At this level, even the border between the meaning of "objective" and "subjective" breaks down. Nothing is objective, including the concepts of "interest" and of "economic" matters, in the sense that there is no "natural" reality behind or under them. "Homo oeconomicus" is neither simply an assumption about human nature or rationality, nor a misunderstanding of its real "essence", but is in fact based on a whole set of relations to oneself. Modern

subjectivity has never been reducible to endless chatters, mostly about oneself. It has its specific, tight rituals, even if these may have become inaccessible at the level of consciousness today, and may even be being undermined. It is the product of long decades and centuries of ascesis and discipline. Apart from the short and significant period of fascism, it has never mistook the state as a primary reality. (16) It has its equilibrium and equivalence, its balance between rights and duties, even a sense of the difference between what can be told and what should not. It repudiates idle talk that remains unconnected to behaviour and conduct. In sum, this form of subjectivity is part of a system; is at the heart of the system; it builds up this system, is its foundation. The most fundamental and crucial basis of modern society is not military power, is not science and technology, is not capitalism and the market economy. All these are consequences of something much deeper and fundamental, and still specific and historically concrete: and this is the development of a specific type of subjectivity, a highly specific and original conduct of life; a peculiar mixture of strict discipline and sheer subjectivity; the imposition of an almost military order and the stimulation of free activity; a deep hostility toward human nature, claimed to be sinful, and a boundless belief in its creative potentials. It is this highly idiosyncratic combination, full with internal gaps, discrepancies, and even betrayals of its own values that, far from being universal, value-free, or, the realisation of the true potentials of mankind, form a particularly tight web that is able at once to stimulate and control human energies and passions to an extent unknown before, that give the irresistible power of modern society. This is what made all other cultures succumb to it, give up their own profile and style, and eventually become nothing but a copy of the model - even if "personal" touches remain (but this, it can be said, follows from the model itself ...); or engage in a parasitic relation to the original model; a relation which may spread to all social strata.

This term, in fact, is the best way to characterise the long links between East and West Europe, since the oncoming of the modern era. The populations of East Europe that, since the conversion to

Christianity, have been living on the border of Western civilisation, partly following its ways and styles, and partly preserving something of their own, have suffered a profound shock and transformation at that time. (17) Since then, they increasingly lost all specific cultural profile, and has become nothing but the negative stamp of the West. First the ruling classes, but increasingly all strata of the population, culminating with the years of communist rule, developed a type of co-existence with West Europe that can be described only with the single term of parasitism.

The historical significance of communism was that it took this line of development to its historical conclusion: it destroyed, and for good, everything of value that has remained from the former structures of society and culture, making all "national" roads of development impossible, all reference to distinctly "national" values impossible. This is why the current wave of nationalism is so absurd, so blatantly out of place and out of touch with reality; a much more thorough legacy of the past 40 or 70 years that any connection at the level of leadership permits us to see.

East European elites maintained their power and life-styles copying the Western elites, and obtaining the necessary means by claiming to guarantee the stability of the region. For this, they also "taxed" their population excessively, to squeeze out the same revenue from a much more backward economy. (18) The intellectual elites used monopolised connections and positions to "transmit" knowledge from the West to the East, always being extremely aware that all their power and privilege is not due to their work and ability, but solely the filling up of the scarce positions of transmission. The same holds true, as a general rule, with all due respect to exceptions, for entrepreneurs, economic and technological experts, who developed their own parasitic style for decades and centuries, copying, in a non-creative way, Western methods, and having at their centre of attention the monopolisation of their own position, and not the proper pursuit of the respective work-styles and attitudes. Their philosophy was always the opposite of the spirit of the Protestant ethic; not to do

one's best, but to make the most out of the least effort, and to keep oneself on the surface by preventing others to join in. Not surprisingly, this parasitism was always completely disrespectful of and hostile to all real concerns of the common good and popular interests, even if this was always used and abused as a slogan. It was this fundamental gap between the talk of the elite and its own conduct of life that always emptied the pronounced values, and undermined the hopes in real changes. (19)

In spite of being sketchy and inconclusive, the previous discussion, hopefully, has introduced the concept of subjectivity used in this paper, its connection to the notions of "being" and "day-to-day" life, the relevance this paper attributes to this question for the study of modern society, and, finally, even gave a diagnosis for East Europe. The latter comments only undermined what was obvious since the definition of this topic: that such a study of subjectivity, related to modernity and "modernisation", is extremely dangerous and difficult, on a number of different accounts. It goes against all established wisdom concerned relevance and objectivity, especially concerning the question of "transition" and "modernisation"; it touches upon all sorts of stereotypes and prejudices that it may only reinforce; it lacks a proper methodology, and this topic of subjectivity and "lived experience", being so close to the evidences and perceptions of the investigator, can easily fall into the very trap it wanted to diagnostise and avoid: the closing into oneself, and the loss of touch with reality.

In order to avoid these traps, to minimise the risks, and to continue with the investigation, the research project divided itself into two parts. On the one hand, a methodological investigations was carried out into the studies of subjectivity, favouring those approaches that were trying to study the specificity of the Western type of subjectivity historically, with an explicit incorporation of the dilemma of self-reference, as opposed to those approaches that shy away from this view and fancy themselves to study the self or the subject in an "objective" way. The approach of this paper is that this is simply a licence to posit

one's own picture about the "self" or the "subject" (usually modelled upon oneself) as natural and universal, where the "measure of truth" is that others find it also plausible, being close to their own views or prejudices. This part of the project discovered that in the works of Nietzsche, Foucault, Weber, and Elias, there is both a concrete body of historical research, and elements of a methodology that can serve as guidelines for a study of subjectivity along the lines indicated above.

On the other hand, strong emphasis was laid on concrete, empirical research. It turned out that the study of intermediate-level political and social changes provides a particularly fascinating area for the study of continuities and discontinuities at the level of subjectivity as well.

But first, a few words must be said about the particular lines of investigation chosen for the empirical part of the project.

2.3. Survey methods and social theory

The simple fact that this paper is using an empirical approach does not need much elaboration. It is not only in line with the general commitment to empirical research, but is shared by all the major authors this paper relies upon as a background, who can even be defined by their peculiar emphasis on a combination of philosophical, historical, and empirical analysis. But this paper will use the results of an empirical survey carried out among 250 mayors in Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics, respectively. This particular choice of empirical methods is not at all self-explanatory. Therefore, some methodological remarks must be given here about the way the empirical part of the study is connected to the broad theoretical framework.

Since the spread of the techniques of survey research around and after W.W.II, the relations between sociological theory and survey methods were always far from being close and complementary. Sociological theory remained close to the works of the classics, and

from their perspective, survey techniques did not seem to provide fundamental information. From the established perspectives of the major classics of sociology, such results could only be secondary in character. For the classical sociological position, mostly based upon Durkheim and allegedly also upon Weber, what matters as a social fact are the norms, the constraints, the morals, the collective representations. The whole Durkheimian method is based on the assumption that such norms, such representations exist independently of the individuals, shape and influence their conduct. A method that is based on the views of individual citizens gives us information only about the way individuals perceive and reflect upon such norms. The individual in this case is only a factor of distortion or of manifestation, never a source at par with norms themselves. The crucial methods of sociological analysis must lie elsewhere, in methods that provide us direct access to the study of such norms.

The verdict of Marxian sociology is similar. Its key variable is membership in a social class, and the task of social analysis is the reconstruction of the social structure; a system which exists outside individuals, assigns their place and shapes their destiny. Any survey could only give us a pale reflection of this fundamental structure, through the way individuals perceive their position. But as the position of these individuals, for Marxist sociologists, is already given by the place occupied in the social structure. At best, survey research can only give us an analysis of false consciousness. Just as Durkheimians gained knowledge through other means about norms and collective representations, and could compare this to the individual opinions and behaviour, in order to measure anomie, Marxians can use the same techniques to test false consciousness. But in both cases, given the fundamental assumptions of the theoretical frameworks, the results of a survey analysis could not have serious, first-rate theoretical relevance, except in the few special cases where the links between individual activity and social and political processes are at the centre of analysis. (20)

The methods of survey research, for a long time, developed in separation from, and also in marked hostility against, classical social theory. Its practitioners had their own justification of the mission: an empirical study of facts, as opposed to "great theories"; the attempt to be scientific, to use finally the methods of the natural sciences. In this sense, they claimed to be more faithful to the spirit, if not the word, of Durkheim and Weber than the theorists. And, by today, they found theoretical support in the new version of methodological individualism, the rational choice theory. The target of this approach is Marx and Durkheim at the same time. Norms and social classes are abstractions, only individuals have real existence. Based as much directly upon economic theory as the model of the natural sciences and the methodology of logical positivism, it has its own consistent approach. Its key words are "natural" and "rational". The basic units of analysis are "natural" facts or factors: impulses, needs, tastes, resources. And the agents managing these factors are assumed to operate "rationally"; in fact, this word defines the differentia specifica of human action, in a way that, it figures, none can really oppose (21). Because it is the individual who manages such drives, by way (and only by way) of its rationality, the methods of survey research are perfectly suited, without any gap or problem, to the needs of sociological analysis. The way needs and impulses are represented in a survey can in principle be the same as the way they are represented for the actor or agent who is actually acting on this basis. The reasons of actions can also be reproduced properly in a questionnaire. The major question of method is therefore error, the aim is the assure the correct representation in data collection, and not some mysterious reference to external factors as collective conscience or social class. And once we have these data, we can and should analyse it in a way that the natural sciences are doing, with the only difference of causal modelling replacing concrete experiments.

In sum, all this gives us a tightly knit logical web that lies miles away both from the problematics of subjectivity as discussed above, or the East European transition. From this perspective, it is therefore not surprising that the East European events made so

little impact in contemporary social theory. Apart from a few attempts at applying a fancy rational model, social theory did not offer much reflection. (22)

Nevertheless, this paper would argue that there is a way around, to connect social theory to survey methods (and to the events and problems of East Europe), through the classic that was all but "missing" from the previous account: Max Weber. Such a connection does have an obvious immediate appeal: as opposed to Durkheim and Marx, Weber was an "individualist" thinker. (23) Which immediately recalls a peculiar fact. In spite of being always considered as one of the classics or founding fathers of sociology, there is something peculiar about Weber's place, or the reception of his ideas, in sociology. It seems that all sorts of schools and orientations were trying to use him, or his name, for their own purpose, often in diametrically opposed ways; nevertheless none of them was able to capitalise on his "whole approach", or reading and following closely his exact methodology. In fact, one can argue that Weber is the only classic of sociology in whose case such basic questions about his work and method can still be defined and reformulated; who still represents a "mystery". It is known to boredom that modern (contemporary) sociology was founded by Parsons, who built it on the common points between Durkheim and Weber. All such attempts involve some kind of simplification and distortion, as differences had to be reduced, and commonalties amplified. The strategic reasons, the need to establish sociology as a "proper" discipline, make Parsons' procedures understandable and perhaps acceptable, even if some of the distortions, for e.g. in the translation of Weber, cannot be justified by mere scientific standards. (24) But today, the stakes are different, and it is increasingly clear not simply that the differences are also fundamental, but that the "marriage" was not made between equal partners: Parsonian sociology is based on the fitting of Weber into a Durkheimian perspective, and not vice versa.

Perhaps the best, indirect proof of such an assertion is that all the different approaches challenging mainstream, structuralist-

functionalist (i.e.: Durkheimian) sociology did eventually, without exception, make use of Weber in one way or another. First of all, there is the "eternal enemy", Marxism. In spite of the obvious, explicit, recurrent criticism of Marx by Weber, in the 1970s, there appeared a whole generation of writers who were neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist at the same time, with an explicit aim to challenge the mainstream, and succeeding to revitalise sociological thought. (25) Of course, the point is not to assert that there are no common points between Marx and Durkheim. Such commonalties trivially exist, as they both are considered widely as founding fathers of sociology. This is even rooted in their common ties to Saint-Simon. But this is nothing but the simple story of mainstream social theory. A "neo-Durkheimian neo-Marxism", in the analogue of a "neo-Weberian neo-Marxism", would be difficult even to imagine.

As a phenomenon close to, but different from, this line, one can "critical theory", or the Frankfurt School, that also read together Weber and Marx, but not at all Durkheim; even if one could argue that they consistently pick out some of the most questionable parts of their analyses, joining them in a thoroughly pessimistic vision of the irrational rationality.

The other major challenge to mainstream sociology, which today seems to fare far better, also draws a lot from Weber. This consists of the different type of methods of "understanding": phenomenology, ethno-methodology, and hermeneutics. These are making use of the fact that mainstream sociology, even if allegedly relying so much on Weber, never really could properly digest what Weber "really meant" by the subjectively meaningful social action. Needless to say, it is unthinkable to list Durkheim or Marx among the "classics" of phenomenology or ethno-methodology. (26)

And even this is not all. As Weber is referred to by two other groups, being diametrically opposed to each other and the previous groups. One is the methodological individualism characteristics of and providing the link between survey methods

and rational choice theory. Weber's methodological articles are considered as classics in both camps, because of the common emphasis on "objectivity" and "rationality". However, in spite of the identity of words, there are problems about the meaning of both terms. First, in the approaches of methodological individualism, there is an identification of "objective" with the "natural", thus paving way for the "scientistic" orientation. Such an interpretation, however, is a misreading of Weber, representing not simply an interpretation given out of context, but plain distortion. For Weber, "objectivity" concerns the subject of the investigation, referring to a particular, ethical attitude, a distance from current political and ideological debates, and not the supposedly "natural" objects of analysis. Second, the problem is that Weber always uses rationality in quotation marks, and in a very specific sense, as the rationalisation of the life - even more precisely, of the conduct of life -, and not as an anthropological constant.

The second group consists of those scholars who, as opposed to all the previous, strictly want to follow Weber, and to establish a "truly" Weberian sociology. (27) In doing so, they put the emphasis on the historico-philosophical aspects of Weber's work, on the progress of rationalisation, disenchantment, and bureaucratisation. This is mentioned here only as this approach was defined in more or less open hostility to the spread of the "American" methods or survey techniques and rational choice theories, proving the manifold possible uses that was made of Weber.

The previous discussion can be resumed in two points. First, it seems that Weber is not simply one of the founders of mainstream sociology, but is also used by any approach that tries to renew or question it. His work seems to contain a considerable, and still largely untapped potential. Second, it seems that he is the only one among the great classics whose approach is not incompatible with the new, empirical and statistical methods. Therefore, a Weberian approach, followed broadly in this paper

and the whole research project, could be used to re-stimulate and cross-fertilise theoretical thinking and empirical studies.

This is all the more plausible as there is a peculiar, complicated web of links between the purpose of analysis (types of subjectivity), Weberian methodology (the emphasis on typology, or "ideal types"), and certain aspects of the methods and development of survey analysis.

2.4. The empirical analysis of "types" of subjectivity

Let's restate the focus of our analysis. The aim of this paper is to formulate some points about continuity and discontinuity through the study of the "forms" of subjectivity in East Europe; in other words, about the "type" or "character" of human beings themselves, as they are formed in their daily life. Such a way of posing the question today seems completely out of place. And yet, there may be something peculiar in this surprise itself, as such characterological studies were for centuries and even millennia very widespread and common, parts of the broadest heritage of techniques of analysis, in between philosophy and spirituality, literature and history. They gave the most obvious and direct access to what today is provided by the human and social sciences: the knowledge of "man". (28)

In fact, the reasons why characterology has disappeared may be more interesting to investigate. Here, again, only a few short remarks can be offered. The basic point is that the space in which the discourse of characterology was located has vanished. This space was given the specific links posited between the individual and the common or the political, constitutive of the very form of individuality, since the emergence of Greek philosophy. This common field broke up with modernity. On the one hand, we have an every deeper gaze into the individuality of the individual, into his ever deeper and secret being and desire - the road of psychology and psychoanalysis, centring upon the individual as an entity in itself, and the corresponding philosophies of the subject,

relegating all characterisation and typologisation to the level of chimeras. On the other hand, we find the social sciences, with sociology and the connection to the external position of individual, and with economics and the assumption of the uniformity of all human beings with respect to what matters for analysis. (29) But all these discourses span a common space which has two ends: one is the ever more receding deepest, unattainable core of the individual as a concrete individual that cannot and should not be known, and which only reveals itself through preferences, decisions, and choices; the other end being the assumption of the identity of all human beings in all fundamental common characteristics. the assumption that only one human type as type exists, whether it is assumed as a "human nature" or "rational man", or as the product of social relations or culture. For all discourses in the social or human sciences, or for all major political ideologies (including both liberalism and socialism), any talk of human "types" is both epistemologically and politically unacceptable.

With one singular exception. This, of course, is Max Weber. As it has been recently rediscovered, he often talked about types of man or human qualities; so much so that it can be argued that the famous concept of the "ideal types" fundamentally referred to human types. (30) But sociology later simply could not make any sense of such ideas, and these were therefore downplayed and forgotten. This was helped by Weber's own ambivalence. On the one hand, he used the term "type" sometimes clearly referring to human beings, but elsewhere, to institutions or types of social action. On the other hand, it was not clear to what extent was this idea central and new, and to what extent only a left-over of the past.

A specification of Weber's main source could have contributed to a better understanding of this question, but this was impossible for a long time for many reasons: as this source was Nietzsche. Without going into the details of the links between Weber and Nietzsche, (31) let us only state that the ambivalence of this question would not have been solved even by the use of

Nietzsche's work, as the question between individuality, subjectivity, race, and humanity have not at all been clarified fully even by Nietzsche. A major move toward this step have only been made, after much initial hesitations and semi-satisfactory starts, by Foucault in the early eighties, in his lectures at the Collège de France that have remained mostly unpublished. Reinserting these ideas into the discourse of Weber and Nietzsche, we can say that their work could gained their full significance and potential if we resolve their ambivalence and hesitations, and state that their concepts life "type of man" or "human qualities" can be better defined as "types of subjectivity". (32).

Because this difference is so crucial for my purposes, let me offer at this point a working definition of subjectivity, in the non-legal sense. The central idea is that beyond the irreducible uniqueness of each human being, and beyond the attempts that try to overcome the difficulties it poses for analysis not simply by theorising the link between agency and structure or posing a dialectics of objectivity and subjectivity but still only reducing them to fundamental forces inside the individual (Freud) or society (Marx), or to basic structures of the individual mind (Levi-Strauss) or collective language (Wittgenstein), the emphasis is placed on the relation one is establishing with oneself, the fundamental freedom that characterises this relation, and the analysable concreteness and historicity of the techniques that establish such relations at the level of existence and make the problematisation of such a relation, therefore freedom, possible.

Even if this was not the way the development of sociology took, for a long time, sociologists influenced by Weber were in fact talking of human "types". This is true even of Lazarsfeld, the founder of survey analysis, who developed his techniques exactly for the typologisation of human beings - consumers, radio listeners, movie audiences, etc. In his methodological-theoretical essays, Lazarsfeld tried to "translate" Weber typological approach to his own language and methods. According to Gerth, "Lazarsfeld's typological procedure represented a crucial step away from Weber's humanistic-historical approach which brought

naturalistic thinking in fusion with the underlying assumption and methods of the humanities." (33) But this may have had another, more obvious reason. At that time, the only feasible procedure to derive empirical types was through the analysis of the connection among variables, and not individual cases. Procedures that made possible the multivariate analysis of the proximity or distance among individual cases were developed only with the onset of computers. By that time, however, empirical sociology has been so much immersed itself with the causal analysis of the links between variables that the methods that made the typology of cases possible were never extensively used.

3. Data and Methods

3.1. On Cluster analysis

Cluster analysis is a mathematical-statistical technique whose aim is to reduce the complexity of the data by bringing together into a single group observations that are "similar", or "close". (34) The method can be illustrated in a simple two-variable case. By plotting the observations on a map, one can easily notice whether there are compact, easily distinguishable sets, or clusters, of observations, that are at the same time close to each other and distant from other similar sets. In a multi-dimensional space, however, complex algorithms are required that, on the basis of different measures of similarity, can perform the task of assigning the observations into groups or clusters.

This is the point where the troubles begin. There are no clearly defined criteria available for deciding upon the proper classification. The most serious problem is that there seems to be no criterion by which it would be possible to test the actual classification of the data; there is no null-hypothesis that can be operationalised. Therefore, the results necessarily involve

judgements on the part of the investigator, contain a degree of arbitrariness that is considered a too high price according to the standards of modern empirical research.

There are a number of other reasons why cluster analysis is a relatively little used technique in the social sciences. First, although the method can be performed on variables, it is focusing on the analysis of cases. Most research, however, aims at developing and testing hypotheses about concepts, therefore performing a variable-centred, and not case-centred analysis. As in this case, there are many powerful techniques available, there is not much point in using cluster analysis. Second, in the last decades, there has developed, especially in political psychology, a methodology aiming at the study of cases, making use in a novel way of the more established mathematical-statistical procedures, especially factor analysis. (35) Third, the typology of cases, the aim of cluster analysis, has not been a topic much pursued recently, as most of the theoretical applications tested causal hypothesis. It was an old-fashioned method of taxonomy, of not much use in advanced, contemporary research. Finally, because of the lack of statistical criteria, the need to make judgement, it requires a degree of in-depth analysis, familiarity of the raw data that most analysts consider troublesome and little rewarding. In most studies, actual observations matter only as "cases", to satisfy the law of large numbers, and single items are not analysed separately, but only in indices, as indicators of general predisposition.

However, in the case of this study, all the objections raised above need to be reconsidered. First, the primary aim is to derive a typology of cases, and not to test causal hypotheses about variables. Just a look into some of the text-books on cluster analysis can illustrate the strong affinity between this technique and the theoretical purposes of this paper. Thus, Everitt starts his overview of the development of the techniques by referring to the old pastime of typologies of people, or character studies, mentioning in particular Galen, the famous physician; (36) while Aldenderfer and Blashfield chose as the motto of the Introduction

of their book a paragraph of Borges - incidentally, the very same one with which Michel Foucault started his most comprehensive philosophical work, *The Order of Things*. (37) Second, the whole epistemological approach underlying this paper questions the assumption that the need to make some "decisions" on the part of the investigator, in the sense of a *diacrisis* , and not judgement, is necessarily bad. All this assumes that the research is motivated by some kind of personal, political, or ideological interests that are external to truth. However, in the framework of a Nietzschean "will to knowledge", such reservations do not apply. (38)

The remaining points, related to the importance of the "cases" and the "items", will be very closely related to the concrete data. Therefore, before continuing this methodological discussion, it is necessary to say more about the data.

3.2. The cases

It has already been mentioned that the basic data set used consists of a survey of 750 mayors in three East-Central European countries. It is not at all obvious, however, that a study of types of subjectivity should centre upon such a sample. In the next section, the reasons will be given for this choice.

3.2.1. Why mayors?

Although survey methods offer themselves with ease to the study of subjectivity, they use a meaning different from the one implied in this paper. The emphasis there is on opinions or points of view, while in our approach the interest is rather in the relations established with oneself and with others, and the links between these two relations. Nevertheless, we argue that under certain conditions, methods of survey research could be helpful even to the study of the more complex issues of subjectivity. They can test the prevalence of certain attitudes and opinions that seem quite matter of fact for respondents, even considered as stereotypes,

but upon a closer look, may lose their obviousness. They can also map types of attitudes and conducts if a population can defined that seems to be particularly conducive to the kind of questions implied by our approach to the study of subjectivity, and if it can be assured that the questionnaire remains close to the daily life and activities of the respondents. We argue that our sample of mayors satisfies well these conditions.

Mayors occupy a very specific, almost unique position in the contemporary transition process. They satisfy a number of different criteria, each of which could justify a strong interest in their opinions - even their being. Firstly, they are an "elite" group, in a number of different, everyday and etymological senses of the word. By the criteria of political sociology, they by definition belong to the local elite. But, in most cases, they are part of the "elite" in the more normative sense as well. They are truly "elected", by direct popular vote, by people who, in most cases, knew them personally. (39) This vote in most cases was not linked to ideological lines or party affiliations. In an established democratic system, such a distinction does not make much sense, may even seem demagogic. Its importance in the East European countries, however, is not simply ceremonial, but is linked to the fact that at the level of national politics, the irreality, the ethereal, immaterial, verbal characteristics of the former system were carried over into contemporary political life. The names of the national lists were just names, at most faces, without much reality; and some kind of dissatisfaction with the national political life was expressed by the voters even in the 1990 elections where they failed to elect most of the better known political figures who dominated TV coverage. (40) Local mayors, however, had a concrete reality, and had to gain the confidence of people, and it was on the basis of their past record, deeds, and personality that the presence or absence of such a confidence was tested. (41) Thus - and this will be our second point -, mayors are not just elites, but also had to have a keen sense of reality.

Third, while at the level of national politics, in all countries of East-Central Europe, to some extent with the exception of Slovakia,

the change of personnel was almost complete, in local government, strong ties to the past have been preserved. It is well known that while there was an almost complete change of personnel at the high political level, in local government, the continuities were quite strong. (42) Our sample has reproduced this pattern. Almost exactly half of the sample of mayors were formerly members of the communist party in Hungary and Slovakia, and one quarter in the Czech Republic. Therefore, such a sample provides a particularly goo opportunity to test hypotheses about the possible differences between former party-members and non-members - perhaps the most obvious way to proceed with the question of continuity and discontinuity.

But, fourth, these people were not simply elected on their past record and personality. They had to maintain close ties with daily reality, the problems of the region. They could not become immersed into the meaningless, irrelevant discussions dominating high-level politics. And they did not simply "remain" in touch, but were in charge of making effective changes. They had to perform concrete activities, in their daily work. Their abilities, their determination, their energy and intelligence was tested daily. They provided an almost experimental laboratory to see whether those people who were used to a different regime are able to stand up to the challenges of the new one; whether the legacy of the former regime has a hold on activities in the new.

All these factors taken together certainly support the claim that mayors are a group of people that can certainly qualify as an interesting objects of study. But there can still be misgivings about the links between mayors as a group, and the central question of the "types of subjectivity". To formulate only the most obvious problem, such a study could certainly arrive at a typology of mayors. But to what extent could it be considered as representative for the types of subjectivity prevalent in the whole population?

To answer this objection, let's state first that a study of "subjectivity", especially as it is understood in this paper, has

several specific requirements, bracketing the usual considerations of "representative" sample. First, types of subjectivity cannot be studied directly. No direct questions can be asked about this topic; such items can only be inserted, almost "surreptitiously", in a questionnaire that has some other focus. A survey of local changes, at the intermediate level of politics, offers an excellent solution to combine two quite different types of research, without hindering any of them with the other. Second, in this case, representativity in the sense of the "average" is not only necessary, but would positively hinder the analysis. Such a study is only possible by the choice of a very specific sample, selected for the purpose. For the reasons detailed above, mayors can be considered as a particularly relevant group of people, not just reproducing average characteristics, but testing individuals by taking them to the limit of their abilities. They should not simply "reproduce" types of subjectivity, but magnify them into clear forms; produce "ideal" types, in the true Weberian sense. Third, a crucial aspect of the study of subjectivity concerns the relations to others. Because of their position, mayors are particularly able to provide information about the opinions, the mood, the local evaluations of the changes in general; opinions that at once should be informed, and - being related to people who gave them confidence, by electing them - should be strongly reliable. (43)

In sum, it seemed to us that an empirical study of the work, the opinions, the belief, attitudes and values of mayors could give us a particularly good occasion to combine our past and present work, the study of intermediate level political institutions and of types of subjectivity. There is a concept which in a single expression contains most of these considerations, some explicitly, others in a more hidden form: this is the concept of civil society. (44)

3.2.2. Mayors and civil society

It is possible to state without over-simplification that the discussion on "civil society" has two broad, general points that are shared by practically all the participants. The first is that this concept covers a type of reality that is specific and not just a

general truism, a synonym of the necessity of living in society; that is specifically modern; and that is basically an evidence in the modern world, so much so that, as it is sometimes asserted explicitly and always assumed implicitly, no person in his right mind could oppose. Second, this concept is always defined in opposition to something, be it the state, the socialist-communist party state or state-party, the military establishment, or the market.

Both of these characteristics call for further analysis that soon oversteps the limits within which the discussion on civil society is usually enveloped. Concerning the first, the major problem is not with the fact that certain elements of civil society are considered as evidence, but the manner in which this is done, the exclusive emphasis put on the second term, "society", and the relative neglect of the first, "civil", and the subsequent underplaying of the importance of individuals behaviour, conduct, the conduct of life (*lebensführung*). It therefore overlooks the extent to which the whole idea of "civil" society is based on a very specific kind of social order, an order that is based on the particularly ordered ("civilised") conduct of individuals. (45) By shifting from a Hegel-Habermasian to a Nietzsche-Weber-Foucault-Eliasian perspective, one can understand at what level the "evidence" of the civil society concept is located - where the conditions of possibility for a civil "society" are created in effect.

Second, it is somewhat disturbing that "civil society" is continually defined with respect to negative reference points. First of all, it creates some problems of principle in a Nietzschean framework, being too "reactive", and not active, creative in character. But there are some other, much more concrete elements. The first is the sheer, imposing list of those objects or structures against which this concept has been defined as a slogan since the early modern period. This diversity is overlooked by all those who want to redefine or reconstruct a true, unique, single underlying meaning and destiny to this term. In the first meaning, best known but not restricted to the Enlightenment, "civil" specified whatever was laic, not religious. Evidence for this use of the term

can be found throughout, in the way the religious, ecclesiastic nominations have been secularised in the emerging institutions of the modern state. Second, and parallel to this, "civil" meant something that was not military. There are still languages today when this is the basic everyday meaning of the term. Third, there is the whole opposition between civil, civilised, and barbarian, discussed in the work of Elias and Koselleck. (46) As this moves away from the framework of a single society to the field of inter-societal or international relations, this will not be pursued here. The fourth major opponent of "civil", now explicitly connected to "society", and given theoretical support and sophistication in the works of Hegel, Ferguson, and others, was the state. This is reflected even in the ordinary uses of the term: while someone's civil occupation in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period was interpreted as a non-religious work, in the next centuries it meant employment outside the military, while the contemporary use rather refers to a non-state job, although remnants of the early uses can also be found, for e.g. in the term "civil service". Finally, in contemporary discussions, we could see two new oppositions emerging. One is the East-European use of the term against the state, this time the meaning the communist party-state; while the other is the Western re-deployment of the concept against the bureaucratic state - and the market. (47)

Let us analyse these last two uses in some detail. Concerning the former, it is tempting to identify it with the earlier, 19th century liberal opposition between state and civil society. And such a parallel may have even more relevance than meets the eye, if we accept that the links between the early-modern police-state and the communist state-party version of the "police-state" are stronger than it was usually assumed. (48) However, we cannot stop here, as Marxist ideology and the communist parties introduced a different perspective into this discussion. For the 17-18th century theories of "police", the "state" was an unproblematic entity, an ideal. For 19-20th century Marxists and socialists, the situation was the opposite: the state was an enemy, both in practice and as a matter of principle. Their primary aim was not to create a state, but to form a society; a real civil society, without

the state and classes. East European communist parties defined themselves not as political parties (which they were not), but as social movements; as the true representants of society, embarked on a "civilising mission". A communist party that is the true representant of social interests, of society; that through its apparatus and membership all spheres of human activities, and that is engaged in a self-proclaimed "civilising mission": what is it if not a "true civil society", according to its own terms, its self-image?!

Around 1990, a lot of ink has been wasted on the "resistance" to political parties in East Europe, both by Western commentators and East-European intellectuals, allegedly due to the discrediting of the term "party". Perhaps not too surprisingly, this was done prominently by those who wanted to construct a new, true, real civil society. But they had to realise to their dismay and defeat that those who have a political interest are only to eager to create or at least imitate genuine political parties. It is not the word "party" that became discredited in East Europe, but much more the terms "society" and especially "movement". (49)

So, what we find in the East European context, in the countries of the formerly "existing socialism", is a continuous repetition of the same pattern of the state-civil society opposition, with important modifications: the rediscovery of this value of this couple by opponents of the existing state of affairs; the sacralisation of "society"; the projection of a group of elite intellectuals into the position of the "true representants" of this "society"; a desperate attempt to get rid of everything connected to the state, bureaucracy, and formal structures, back to some original, primary community; and the constant re-creation of a rigid, hierarchical, bureaucratic system, not at all similar to the ideals, but devoid also of all the advantages of a proper, efficient, rule-governed state bureaucracy. The state-civil society couple is not simply based on opposites, but - in East Europe, at least - is always leading the result opposite to the intentions.

But is such a "cunning trap of history" peculiar only to the East European countries? To answer this question, let's look first at the other - Western - contemporary use of this term. Here, the opposition between state and civil society is also present, but there is also something else: an opposition to the market. This is interesting not only because it is the radical opposite of the East European perception, which joins the market and civil society together, but also because the classical definition of civil society was based on the market. Civil society in Hegel and Ferguson is the sphere defined by private legal and economic relations; it is the market itself. Thus, surprisingly, exactly the same type of phenomenon is repeated in contemporary Western discussions as in East Europe: the civil society is being redefined against something the was - the former very definition of civil society!

And this is not even the first time that this has happened. This was always so, at least since the early modern period. The term "civil", as it was mentioned earlier, was defined against "religious" and "ecclesiastic". Yet, as, following especially the works of Gierke, Anthony Black, Prodi, and others demonstrate (and still others often rediscover as a "hidden truth"), the most important model for both the civil society and the modern state was provided by the ecclesiastic institutions themselves. (50) The same can be said about the opposition between the "civil" and the "military", with respect to both society and state. There is a whole line of thought in German historiography (Oestreich, Hintze, going back to Weber), that connects the modern state, bureaucracy, and social discipline to military methods; and it is this same thing that has been "rediscovered", even if given a different twist, in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* , his most questionable undertaking.

There is no space here to conclude this discussion. We can offer the rival hypotheses that civil society is either one of those ideals in history that are time and again betrayed, whenever attempt is made for their realisation; or those that when actually implemented, become so much taken for granted that their specificity and presence is forgotten, to the extent that it needs some reinforcement.

For the purposes of this paper, we'll retain only the importance of being extremely cautious about the application of this concept, and the need to connect it to concrete individuals and empirical realities. This is why an empirical study of mayors could have of theoretical significance to the civil society debate.

3.2.3. How to study subjectivity through mayors?

The previous considerations underlined why mayors could supply a particularly could sample for the study of types of subjectivity, and how this can be combined with an analysis of the more standard issues of the political and social transition process. But it is also evident that this sample also imposes limitations upon the types of methods that can be pursued. Thus, the already mentioned techniques of Q methodology, developed specifically for the study of subjectivity, could not be followed in our case. This method requires a detailed evaluation, on a scale going usually from +5 to -5, of a relatively large number of statements (50-60 items or more). In case of active, busy, mostly rural mayors, this would have been clearly unfeasible. Therefore, typological analysis had to rely upon a few set of questions, containing less, and much less detailed, items.

3.3. The items

If the previous discussion explained why in our study, the "cases" were more than numbers of observations, and had an appeal on their own, in this section, we'll give the reasons why the particular set of items also promised to pay off a detailed, in depth analysis.

This paper will only analyse the results of two sets of items. Both sets contain 11 statements. The text in the questionnaire looked as follows:

Table 1. The original text of the questions

Question 701. A few statements are listed below. Please, tell me whether you completely agree, rather agree, rather disagree, or completely disagree with them.

701/1. As a mayor, my main task is to establish the proper atmosphere for work
701/2. The elected body should set up general policies, but most members are only interested in single, personal matters
701/3. The local governments are abandoned
701/4. In the first days, the voters thought that everything that has been accumulated in 40 years will be solved by the next day
701/5. Practically everything happening here goes through my hand
701/6. As a mayor, I am nothing but a shock-absorber between the government and the population
701/7. Without my former contacts, we would have gone under long ago
701/8. I can't understand that if we pay unemployment benefits, why can't we constrain those in our area to do public works
701/9. It is not in the interest of this government that the local councils become stronger
701/10. Political discussions around the elections were loaded with cynicism
701/11. We must make people believe that the locality is theirs
702/1. I would prefer to raise taxes rather than cut back city services
702/2. It is important to have a city plan that shapes the nature of development in the city
702/3. Our resources should be distributed on the basis of need, even if this means that some parts of the city will get more than others
702/4. Governmental aid to cities should be increased
702/5. Because of a decrease in supervision, corruption has even increased in the last times
702/6. A Western type democracy would require proper individuals
702/7. The main entrepreneurs in this region are the same persons who filled important positions even in the former system
702/8. We have become careless, we still do not realise that the paternal power has disappeared from above us
702/9. Everybody is only looking for his own truth, does not care about performance
702/10. A lot of people think democracy means that from now on, they are free to do anything
702/11. People felt lost and disappointed after the changes, as the Promised Land did not come immediately

Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with these statements, and how strongly. The middle option was not allowed, but respondents could of course select the "no answer" or "don't now" options. (51) Therefore the set, even if being much less detailed and sensitive, was close to the type of questions required for Q methodology.

Four of 22 items were taken from a 1982 US Survey. (52) These statements were included in order to gain some comparative perspective on the results, along the lines of the usual dimensions of political ideology. All the other eighteen are from the interviews with mayors. One was from a published interview, the other seventeen from the interviews we made in 1991. (53) These were the statements we found most fascinating in the interviews. We wanted to assess the extent to which other mayors agree with them, whether these could be considered as representing a majority opinion, or whether there were specific groups of people that agreed or disagreed with them. In the language of the paper, we wanted to see whether on the basis of these statement, it is possible to distil a general, dominant type of attitudes, linked to a specific form of subjectivity; and whether within this general type (or in opposition to it), it would be further possible to define specific types.

Such a relatively large set of statements usually are not analysed separately, but only to the extent that they reflect certain general tendencies or predisposition, like responses reflecting authoritarian, liberal, socialist, conservative views, the presence or absence of anomie, etc. However, we would argue that there are reasons to believe that in our case, even the single items can be important, and deserve a detailed analysis.

All eighteen are related in one way or another to the question of continuity and discontinuity, though the emphasis, in different ways, was on continuity, as this was the question we thought more interesting: the changes being obvious. A large part of the statements were related to three broad areas, reflecting the

specific intermediate situation of mayors: the assessment of the new government and the changes; views about the population at large; and problems emerging in the concrete work of the mayors themselves. Let's use this first, rough classificatory scheme for a detailed description of the items, and some hypotheses about their expected variation.

The first group consists of statements about the work of mayors and local governments (701/1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8). Though all these refer to the current work of the mayor, all of them, in one way or another, represent left-overs of the past; sometimes in way that were mot always obvious.

In case of three items, such links to the past, and not just the last forty years, are obvious (701/2, 7, 8). One (701/7) is about the persistence of personal ties and friendships, whose everpresence was such a crucial aspect of daily life in the former systems. Another (701/2) is similarly about the influence of personal connections, but here it defines a more general attitude, a lack of ability distance oneself from one's immediate interests. This, by the way, was an element of "traditional political culture" that was at the centre of attention of the communist strategies themselves: to eliminate this "petty" reference points, order to focus attention to the broader, more general points of interest, to the "public good". Finally, the third item in this group (701/8) taps a traditional, authoritarian attitude. In the case of all three statements, the question is the way in which the different "pasts" survive in them; whether they represent direct links between the pre- and post-communist systems, or these are mediated by the former communist regime.

In case of the four other items (701/1, 3, 5, 6), such links to the past are more subtle. It is still quite obvious for 701/5: it alludes to the extreme centralisation of the former decision-making process, the "bio-political" character of the communist system of local government, where the party secretary and the head of the council "supervised" the life of citizens from ~~birth to~~ cradle to grave (54). Item 701/1 also indicates relatively broad, but more specific

continuities with the recent past. The overwhelming importance of "atmosphere" or "mood" was a peculiar characteristic of the former system, difficult to discuss in a short space for those who were unfamiliar with its daily reality, and even more difficult to notice for those who were living in it, as it was such an obvious element of daily life. It referred to something that perhaps does not even exist in advanced societies: a kind of "spirit" that accompanied places where people were closely bound together; a "spirit" that was not related to clear ideas or concrete relations, but nevertheless defined the mood of the particular surroundings. It was the perception of this "mood" that was at the centre of the whole information-collection mechanism of the former party apparatus. (55) And it was this "mood" that seemed to have been the central aspect of the evaluation of the workplaces as well. A study of the Hungarian value system conducted in 1978 has at least shown that a value called "a good atmosphere at the work-place" was ranked as the sixth most important of a set of 32 values, preceded only by values related to family and health, and surpassing values about material well-being or advancement. (56)

This is a fact that certainly cannot be compared to the situation of in a modern Western society. There, the crucial difference between workplaces is defined by competitivity, reflected in differences in salaries and connected symbols. The "mood" depend on success, which also defines the attitude of individuals to the given place, on which depends on their own career patterns. However, in a society where such a competition does not exist between firms and individuals, and the link between performance and reward is severed at most levels, the whole set of relations between employees becomes different. For those who dreamed of an ideal community, and wanted to see East European reality as a heroic attempt for its realisation, it may have been seen as a way for more collegial, loose, fraternal relations. However, for those who actually living in it, the situation was quite different. It was seen as dominated by short-circuited, unhealthy, internal relations, governed by moods and feelings that were difficult to define, and that were derived partly from the whimsies of the local leadership, and partly by the peculiar mix of individuals who

were brought together there, but which - in the absence of major reasons, often even possibilities, to move, and in the presence of strong, internal or external factors pushing for loyalty, were extremely persistent and defined in an overwhelming way daily life at the given community. One could say that the truly suffocating character of the routine daily life of the former system was contained in the importance of such "workplace moods", and not the well-known characteristics of a totalitarian secret police and the party ideology; and may well have been much more lasting in its effect.

Therefore, this seemingly innocent question is loaded with manifold meanings. Only a detailed analysis can tell us what was the way in which our respondents actually interpreted or used this statement.

Finally, two other statements were intriguingly close to opinions voiced by the members of the former communist party apparatus. One is the statement about "being left alone" (701/3), a statement defining almost ideal-typically the prevalent feeling of the last stages of the former system. This may again be difficult to reconcile with the usual picture presented about the "tightly controlled" party systems. However, in our interviews with members of the party apparatus, we again and again heard this same statement being repeated. This could only be made sense of as one of the many vicious circles of the former regime. People felt abandoned as soon as they got independent and responsible positions, because they were used to strong control and supervision; but also, they were being left alone suddenly and without any proper assistance so that they feel the need for guidance, and so that they reproduce by themselves, connecting their own identity to it from the inside, practices and techniques that they only studied from books, or have seen from the "other" side. This again shows how the former system worked: not through direct repression and control, but through the implementation of strictly regulated games or rituals, whose major aim were to reach down into the fabric of existence and the heart of subjectivity.

The other item, 701/6 specifies, perhaps again in an ideal typical form, a major mechanism of public life in the former systems, the use made of public functionaries. This is again opposed to the major, wide-spread explanatory scheme about the "transmission belts". The latter concept hypothesises the smooth, planned working of a structure of domination, with individuals playing the role of manipulators in a faceless system. In reality, we had a system that abused the individuals who were to serve its goals by loading on their shoulders the conflicts and the consequences of the failed policies, without providing them means to solve or at least help the problems they encountered. The result was a constant situation of conflict, the permanent need to deal with problems they were not able to solve. The question is the extent to which this situation has been reproduced - or felt being reproduced - in the new system.

This previous item was not just about the work of the mayors, but their role as a link between the government and the population. Another item was directly related to the government (701/9). This was partly just another formulation of the "being left alone" thesis, but had a much stronger and specific focus, and context At the time of the local elections, the major slogan of the leading party of the governing coalition, the Democratic Forum was that these elections will complete the change of the system. But the results proved to be a major disappointment for them. Their candidates suffered a humiliating defeat in the major cities from the liberal opposition, while at the countryside, the major winners were the independent candidates, most often the former "communist" heads of councils. This had a major impact on national politics, leading, among other things, to the en bloc conflation of liberals and former communists; and on local politics, where instead of being the "bastions of change", local government were redefined as the remaining communist strongholds.

Another, much bigger blocks of items were related to the electorate in general - to "people" (701/4, 11, 702/ 6, 8, 9, 10, 11). These were centred around one topic - a topic that came up,

without explicit questions, to most interviews: the extent to which mayors felt that the general attitude, behaviour, values of the citizens living in their area were overwhelmingly defined by unrealistic expectations. We are well aware that investigating such statements is an extremely precarious business, on many counts. First of all, it seems so similar to the previous practice of "information reports" - asking some "reliable individuals" about the way people think, instead of asking them directly. But we claim that we were trying to do something different, under changed circumstances. These mayors were legitimate, elected public officials; we were asking their opinions for scholarly reason, in a way completely unconnected to direct existential matters; and it was not about the questions "mood reports" were about - how people feel about the political line, the system, reforms and changes, etc. -, but about the way they thought people (their own electors) were thinking and behaving after and about the changes. We think that both the legitimate status and the range of view of these mayors justifies the expectation that their views in this matter can be trusted, will be both responsible and representative.

Exactly because of these consideration, we were surprised even in the original interview that such statements came up in the conversations, especially because in the face-to-face interviews, we became convinced of the sincerity, honesty of practically our interviewees, both as private and public men. We were intrigued by such claims. Just a cursory reading of the texts of the statements listed at the beginning of this section reveals that these were extremely strong and specific claims, not ones that anyone, at any time can voice about "others". Two voiced very high expectations in a very strong wording (701/4, 702/11). Just reading them, one could easily be convinced that these were exaggerated statements that would not be agreed even by those who have uttered them first. Other two were much more general (702/6, 10), but complemented the previous in placing the emphasis on the link between democracy and specific human characteristics, in almost explicitly Weberian terms, as a specific human type. And even if in this case, the references are more

general, not connected to the specific transition period, they were again put in the strongest terms. One could very much expect them to be rejected by the majority of the respondents, and not only in order to defend the "honour". In one case (702/6), one could easily object with the conviction, shared by all "modern" political ideologies, both liberal and socialist, that democracy does not much "need" individuals with proper attitudes, but produces such people itself, as a result of political and economic freedoms and rights. In the other (702/10), the qualifiers ("a lot of people" and "everything is free") again make the remark strong and equivocal, very easy to reject as excessive. (57)

The remaining three of this set are somewhat different by being inclusive, involving the self as well, and not just the others. In one (701/11), this "self" refers to the active work of the mayor - however, in a very specific set-up. His role is one of persuasion. He has to persuade his electorate about something that only seems obvious in a situation where there is a working popular government: that their village or town is theirs.

Three things make this statement particularly intriguing. First, because an evidence, when it becomes explicitly stated, ceases to be an evidence. Something is an "evidence", in the sense of being taken for granted as a hidden assumption, when it does not need to be spelled out. The re-statement of such an evidence is either tedious and boring, even indicating a certain impairing of the sense of judgement; or creates the suspicion of being merely an ideological conviction, therefore not being an evidence at all (an example could be an industrial town in the early period of the industrial revolution while it was still run by the old elite); or it is exactly the acknowledged absence of this evidence that makes it necessary to spell out the obvious, but as an absence. This looks like a paradox, a play with words; and it is in fact a paradox, but a very real one, being part of the East European set of dilemmas, spelling out a problem that is identical to the squaring of the circle. It is hardly possible to create something that should be obvious. The very fact that it is missing only reinforces its absence, by making its re-creation impossible, through a suspicion

of private interests and "bad faith" behind every concrete attempt. In itself, this question encompasses the fundamental dilemmas in which the East European countries exist today.

But there is even more here. Because, second, this statement rhymes all too closely to one made by the party instructors in our earlier study: that people should be "made believe" that their opinion matters; or, in general, the broader aim of the party is to "make people independent". (58) This task of squaring the circle is therefore not simply prohibitive by its own difficulty. This is multiplied by the fact that it reinforces patterns of the failed project. Most people perceive not simply that members of the new elite are indistinguishable from the old ones, but - rightly or wrongly - suspect them of trying to do the same thing again.

Finally, third, this item helps to shed new light on the whole issue of privatisation. On the one hand, the need for reliance upon private property in many spheres of the economic life is obvious, to the extent that it should never be confused with programmes under similar headings in England, France or Italy. On the other, it is also acknowledged that it is not that easy to return to a system of private property where it was practically absent and even prohibited for decades. For some, no such problem exists, as private property is internal to human nature. Others do not accept this crude idea, but assert that property will exercise the proper disciplinary effect: it will make people work and behave accordingly, to search for their own profit in a situation where it also contributes to the common good. Still others, with more sophisticated background in the history of thought, could recall that even in France, in the late 18th - early 19th century, the establishment of the modern attitudes to private property was not without its problems, the central issue being under what conditions does the existence of private property contribute to the common good, and in what way should or could such property rights be limited in the name of the public good. (59)

This point can also be taken further. All the previous discussion about private property was based on the assumption of the

existence of something like the common good, the presence of "public" sentiments, of an acknowledged public sphere. This statement calls into question this matter-of-fact assumption, making explicit that the truly fundamental characteristics of bolshevism was not the abolition of private property rights, not "ending alienation" by alienating everyone from his or her own property, but of alienating each and all from any public property, the common good, or simply "the" public. (60) And this is something perhaps truly unprecedented, that is much more difficult to undo. As, after all, it is easy to work out a schema of re-privatising property, the only real difficulty being created by the way to accommodate past and present interests and different claims for equity and justice. But without first solving this impossible dilemma about establishing the facticity of public good, there is hardly a space in which private interests could work to a convergent, or at least not too divergent solution. It may well be the case of West Germany after 1945 provides, under current conditions, the only feasible way out. But if this is the case, then both the model of the homo oeconomicus and the space in which it could function have to be created. (61)

The second item belonging to this subgroup (702/8) is inclusive in the sense that it asserts the persistence of the most standard, widely acknowledged legacy of the communist past, the reliance upon a paternalist power, the easiness of not doing anything, not deciding upon any matter, leaving everything to others, to those "above", in the first person plural. It should therefore be contrasted with those statements that assert continuity in the same attitude - but only in others. It would be especially intriguing to see difference here according to different strata of the population, or countries. Which are the ones that assert rather that such legacies are present in everyone, and which claim this to exist only in others?

Finally, the third items in this sub-set (702/9) is in a way between these two options, the blaming of the self and the others, with respect to a specific attitude: the search for the truths of the past, instead of worrying about the solutions to the problems of

the present. This problem is quite widespread, often discussed, and has many facets; the statement used here has again a very strong flavour.

A fourth set of items, finally, are concerned with the assessments of the changes as such. (701/10, 702/5, 7) Many of the previous statements were of course also related to this, but only indirectly, with respect to the work of the mayor, or general popular attitudes. But three items are directly related to the modalities of the changes themselves, in very opposed perspectives. One such question (702/7) is about a theme that was mentioned among the first by the most acute observers of the situation: the salvaging of the nomenclatura. (62) However, even though the presence and importance of this factor was obvious, and received much press coverage, our limited, but in-depth empirical studies did not seem to confirm the overwhelming importance of this factor. It seemed to have depended on a range of local conditions, personal connections, abilities, and willingness, and was not part of a conscious, general strategy. (63) Because of the large interest in the topic, one could argue that maybe more questions along similar lines should have been included in the set. However, we opted against this, as there were too many were former council heads among the mayors, and we did not want to antagonise them by unnecessarily aggressive questions.

The other two statements (701/10, 702/5) were critical of the transition period from an opposite perspective. They voiced perceptions that were quite surprising even for us, may even be shocking to those who had much more idealistic views. Were it proven to be widespread, it could pin down some of the darkest undercurrents of the transition period. However, it could also be that such statements mere reflect isolated events, or the over-sensitivity of a small segment of those mayors that were formerly engaged in the previous system.

Such a detailed analysis of a set of statements may well seem excessive. There were, however, a number of reasons why we considered such an exercise worthwhile. First, the possible

meanings of the statements had to be situated in the proper context. Second, these were all statements that were not made as answers to specific questions, but told by the interviewees themselves, had the value of a "confession". Third, behind each statement, there was for us one (or more) concrete mayors. This prevented to handle them as mere stereotypes, in a simplified manner. Due to these reasons, underlined by the type of the interview and the position of these statements in it, we had a perhaps excessive confidence in the value and discriminatory power of each of our statements.

This concludes our overview of the data and the methods. To return to the discussion left in suspense on p. 31, the reason for the unusual empirical-statistical approach was that our interest lay not in testing causal hypotheses about theoretical concepts, of which the concrete variables were only indicators, and the concrete respondents only numbers of observation, but we were interested in developing a typology of subjectivity, for which mayors seemed to constitute an especially promising group of people, and for such a characterisation, a detailed, in depth empirical study of the concrete items was necessary, in order to gain the necessary familiarity with their meaning, and the concrete response patterns.

Before the analysis of the concrete results, one further question has to be discussed, concerning all the items taken together. It can be argued that the previous analysis saw the trees, but not the wood. The single most important characteristics of the data set is a strong bias towards statements that formulated complaints. In fact, the ever presence of complaint was one of the most surprising element of our research from the start.

3.3.1 On constructing the set

In the construction of the set, a strong attempt was made to avoid possible response biases. Especial emphasis was made on eliminating the possibility of easy acquiescing responses. (64) It was done in two ways. First, the original, very strong wording of

the statements was left intact, except for minor syntactical corrections. Many of these statements were extremely strongly worded, expressing opinions that may have slipped through one's mouth in an interview, but carry much more weigh in a more reflexive survey situation. For e.g., statements like 701/2, 4, 7, 8, or 9, for different reasons, cannot be easily agreed upon; or, to put it in the opposite way, the stake of an agreement with a statement like that cannot be easily neglected. In fact, when constructing the questionnaire, we had serious doubts about the danger of the complete rejection of some of these statements by the respondents, and the methodological and substantive problems related to this possibility. Therefore, we purposefully included some statements that could more solicit general agreement, that were almost commonplaces - even if the very commonplace character of such statements were also a problem on its own, as it is by no means "natural" that such views should be so widely held.

The second precaution was the specific ordering of the statements. First, we tried to make the statements following each other as distinct as possible, following the well-known methodological caution of switching the positive and negative values of the items. Second, we divided the 18 statements into two groups, and put at the beginning of the second set the four comparative items. This subset was followed by a few extremely strongly worded statements. This second set was closed by a series of statements that repeated more or less the previous ones, in a somewhat different form. These were all complaints, voiced especially about "people" in general. This was the attitude and the type of statements that we were most intrigued about, and wanted to use a reconfirmation.

The previous discussion can be summed up in the following table. It is only a heuristical device, pointing out which are the different aspects or dimensions that are contained in each particular items, and also indicating the particular dimension that could be expected to dominate the perception of the given item. It will be used to help to interpret and assess the empirical results.

Table 2. The *a priori* classification of the statements

items	old legacy	comm. legacy	concr. others	gener. others	govt	comp-laints	chan-ges
701/1		+					
701/2	+		+			+	
701/3		+				+	
701/4				+		+	+
701/5		+					
701/6		+			+	+	
701/7	+		+			+	
701/8	+					+	
701/9					+	+	
701.10			+			+	+
701.11		+		+		+	
702/1							
702/2							
702/3							
702/4					+		
702/5		+				+	+
702/6				+		+	
702/7		+				+	+
702/8		+		+		+	
702/9				+		+	
702.10				+		+	
702.11				+		+	+

4. The results of frequency distributions

4.1. The Hungarian distributions

Let's start with the simplest, with the frequency distributions. The results of the Hungarian survey are contained in Table 3. (65).

Table 3. The Hungarian frequency distributions

items	strongly agree	rather agree	rather disagree	strongly disagree	missing
701/1	63.0%	25.2%	6.9%	4.9%	0. %
701/2	14.6	20.7	33.9	31.7	0.
701/3	40.4	32.3	18.4	8.9	0.4
701/4	68.3	15.0	8.9	7.7	0.
701/5	41.5	33.3	20.7	4.5	0.
701/6	20.7	26.0	22.4	30.9	0.
701/7	8.5	16.7	31.3	43.5	0.
701/8	46.3	18.2	16.5	19.0	1.2
701/9	29.0	26.6	26.6	17.8	2.0
701/10	31.9	27.0	21.3	19.7	0.8
701/11	85.4	11.0	2.4	1.2	0.
702/1	2.6	10.8	27.2	59.5	5.7
702/2	76.8	17.5	4.5	1.2	0.
702/3	56.8	26.1	11.2	5.8	2.0
702/4	77.0	18.1	3.7	1.2	1.1
702/5	29.8	23.4	24.7	23.0	3.7
702/6	73.1	18.0	6.1	2.9	0.
702/7	22.5	18.3	30.4	28.8	2.4
702/8	40.4	31.9	15.1	12.6	.4
702/9	28.5	43.9	18.7	8.5	0.
702/10	56.9	28.9	6.9	7.3	0.
702/11	52.8	29.7	13.4	4.1	0.

Out of the 22 statements, there were nine with which the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian mayors were in agreement, and at least more than half of them agreed completely;

these were items 701/ 1, 4, 11, and 702/ 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, and 11. These can be divided into two, relatively homogenous groups. Half of them (701/1, 11, 702/ 2, 3, 4) are just broad, general statements. These can be further divided into two subgroups. Three of the five were taken from the American survey for comparative purposes. These three are all statements that tap an activist, welfare state-oriented, "socialist" position about the need for planning, governmental support, and distribution according to needs, without any daily political rhetoric. Hungarian mayors agreed with them in a matter of fact way, showing that the strong sentiments against the former system did not coexist with a type of view seemingly much more prevalent, at least at the level of high politics, in Poland and the Czech Republic: a strong, ideological market- and capitalistic orientation, even concerning matters of local government. (66)

The other two were also considered as commonplaces or simply stereotypes. Especially the second (701/11), as there were hardly any respondents who did not agree with it, while 85% agreed completely. Nevertheless, as the overview given in the previous section has indicated, it is not that obvious at all that these statements should be agreed upon by mayors. In fact, the results of item 701/11 confirm the worst hypothesis about both the legacy of the past system(s) and the difficulty of overcoming them. Because under any "normal" circumstances, it is not the overwhelming agreement with this statement that one could expect, but the lack of sense it should make to the respondents. In the context of the approach of standard political sociology, only one explanation could be given to such a situation of alienation: extreme inequalities and poverty. But in Hungary, the situation was rather the opposite. Even if the former system was obviously not living up to its egalitarian promises, it becomes visible only today, when very significant inequalities are starting to re-emerge, to what a large extent - for better or worse - the former system was in fact egalitarian. The other possible and much used explanation, dictatorship, does not work here, because an externally imposed central government cannot alienate its citizens so successfully from their own surroundings. Quite the contrary,

under such conditions, people take refuge in their locality, and such belongingness is only reinforced once the tyrannical regime collapses. In sum, the seeming triviality of the response pattern given to item 701/11 is, quite the contrary, a weighty result.

The other items strongly agreed upon form a very compact and even more surprising group (701/4, 11, 702/ 6, 10, 11). All of them are statements about others, about "people" at large (the population, the voters), and are very strongly voiced complaints. In fact, these are the statements that we thought may have been rejected by the overwhelming majority of the respondents - but, quite the contrary, were agreed upon by them. In light of these results, perhaps it is not too bothersome to go through some of them with more detail.

Item 701/4 is not simply about exaggerated expectations concerning the changes. It does not state simple generalities about "people" being too rash, thinking that much can be changed and done about unreasonably quickly. It defines a very specific time horizon: the first days after local elections; and an outrageously quick scenario: to arrange in one day everything that has been accumulated in forty years. This expectation is not simply exaggerated, it simply does not make sense; no individual in his right mind could formulate such a thing. (67) And yet, 68% of all respondents very strongly agreed with this statement, testifying the very widespread presence of such a peculiar kind of expectation. This should be later analysed in much detail: how and why are such expectations created, what sense do they make, what light they shed on the transition process.

Item 702/11 covers more or less the same topic. It is again about exaggerated expectations, and in a very strong language. It focuses on a later time period, putting the emphasis not on the prior expectation, but on the subsequent disappointment. The words are again as strong as possible. The strength of expectations is given by the use of the word of the Promised Land, the Kanaan, (68) while that of the disappointment is underlined by the metaphor of orphanage. (69) And it was this statement that was

strongly agreed by 53% of the respondents, and rather agreed by a further 30%.

The other two statements of this subset are all related to the question of democracy - but in a particular sense. They refer not to the desirability of democracy, but to its preconditions, and especially their lack, in the contemporary local situation, with reference to people's conduct. Item 702/10 refers to a mistaken view of democracy as the freedom to do everything one pleases, and alleges that this definition is shared by "many" people. The overwhelming majority is in agreement with this diagnosis. Item 702/6 gives a formulation theoretically quite important for the purposes of this paper. First, this statement quite specifically refers to "types" of men. Even if the word "type" did not appear on the questionnaire, it was strongly implied in the concrete formulation, the statement hardly would make sense in any other way. In fact, this statement is so close to the theoretical perspective of this paper that would almost seem as if it had been smuggled into the set by the makers of the questionnaire, and not stated spontaneously by interviewees. Second, this claim is diametrically opposed not only to the principles of any socialistic system of ideas that are based on the exact opposite views, but in the same sense they are incompatible with liberal ideas; and for a different reason, by implication, to nationalistic or conservatives ideologies as well. It does not simply "blame" people for certain attitudes or expectations, but voices concerns about their very being; defines them unsuitable "as such" for a modern, Western type of political (and economic) development. The statement implies two things: the implicit acceptance of the model of West, as opposed to conservative or nationalistic tendencies, and the primacy given to the type of subjectivity for the establishment of democracy over matters of inequality and social structure, as opposed to both socialist and liberal ideas. Therefore, it simply cannot be asserted that this statement is nothing but an empty truism, that has no relevance for contemporary reality.

In spite of the incompatibility of this statement with all major contemporary political ideologies, respondents expressed a very

high degree of agreement with this statement, 73% agreeing completely, and a further 18& to some extent. In fact, the percentage distributions of this item were step by step almost the same as those of 702/2 and 702/4, implying therefore that mayors consider as much of a plain truth this statement about the "human preconditions" of Western democracy, as the claim about the need for a local long-range plans, or for an increase in central support for the localities that are burdened, as everyone knows, with a terribly run-down infrastructure for public services. To take this analogy a step further, it seems that mayors consider the "human capital stock" of their locality to be run down in exactly the same extent as their physical capital.

There were three more items out of the 22 with which the vast majority of respondents were also in agreement, but to a markedly less degree; these are items 701/3, 5, and 702/8. The results are different from the previous nine items in two main respects. First, the percentage of those who "strongly agree" is much smaller, well below 50%, around 40%, in each cases. Second, consequently, there is no large gap between the "strongly agree" and the "rather agree" percentages. Taken together, the level of agreement was still quite high, above 70%. These statements not only have similarities in their empirical distributions, they are also united in by having strong and specific connections to the former system of local administration. They directly refer to the remains of the strongly centralised, one-person oriented system of democratic centralism (701/5); to its counterpart, the feeling of being abandoned (701/3); and finally, to paternalism, which has been widely acknowledged as the main characteristic of the former system, especially in its late period (702/8). (70) It is also important that all these statements, even if obviously legacies of the past, were formulated with respect to the present, and - implicitly or explicitly - in first person. They therefore tap a strong, but not overwhelming acknowledgement of hidden, undercurrent legacies with respect to oneself, as opposed to the loud acknowledgement of such hidden legacy with respect to others.

Finally, there were three more statements with which the majority was in agreement, although this was far from being equivocal; these are items 701/9, 10, and 702/5. More than 50%, but less then 60% of the respondents agreed in Hungary that the government is hostile to local governments, and that the political changes were marred by phenomena of cynicism and corruption. (71) This indicates a surprisingly strong explicit negative assessment of the changes and the new system. Such statements could either indicate a hostility of the cadres of the former system, or description of the actual state of affairs. This can be clarified to some extent by further analysis (for e.g., the differences according to former occupations and party membership).

Taken altogether, in the case of 15 items out of the 22 statements, we found a high level of agreement (in 12 out of the 15, this was very high). But this does not mean that respondents were for some reason unable to reject any statement. In fact, five items of the set (701/2, 6, 7, 702/1, 7) were rejected by the majority.

These items can also be divided by three subgroups. For one item, 702/1, this rejection is extremely strong, coupled with a high percentage of missing values. This was the fourth element of the comparative American data set, referring to the raising of taxes. The strong rejection of this statement can be contrasted with the similarly widespread acceptance of the other three "welfarist" items. The explanation is easy on a first level. Since the introduction of a VAT and a personal income tax system in 1987, this issue is one of the most widely debated one in Hungary; (72) and it was often claimed in our interviews that there are simply no ways to increase local taxes, whether on individuals or on businesses. However, such an extreme contrast between the "demand" and "supply" sides of the "welfarist" arguments certainly uncovers a wide and disturbing gap, where the reality of the perceptions is perhaps only a secondary question to the fact of this gap.

The second subgroup consists of items 701/7 and 702/7. These are all tapping direct, explicit, visible connections to the past, but in opposite ways: the former gives the perspective of the insider beneficiaries, the "remains" of the previous regime, while the latter, even if quite matter of fact in its formulation, is reproduces the slogan of populists who think that the changes were not radical enough. Both of them, however, are rejected by a comfortable majority. The visible, direct, personal links therefore are not considered to be the major problem of the transition period by the majority.

Finally, the third subgroup of statements rejected by the majority consists of two items that voice direct complaints against the daily working contacts of the mayors, the local representatives (701/2) and the government (701/6), but in a way that represents a certain kind of self-deprecation. Concerning the former, the majority of those who disagree is quite comfortable; concerning the latter, the distribution is close to half and half, but there is a slight majority of those who disagree. These are both items that are open to quite different and divisive interpretations, therefore should be analysed in detail only after later.

In the case of the remaining two items, the shape of the response distribution was very peculiar, more important than the difference between agreement and disagreement. In one case (701/8), it was extremely polarised. One the one hand, there was an extremely wide gap between the "strongly agree" and the "rather agree" responses, which could not be due to the fact that the percentage choosing the first category was so large that there remained no possibility for the second category, as in the case of some other items (for e.g. 701/4 and 11). On the other, the percentage choosing the "completely disagree" response was also somewhat higher than the "rather disagree" choice. Therefore, in this case, it was the strength of the response that was crucial, and not the direction. The assessment of the strongly authoritarian statement was very controversial, eliciting particularly strong sentiments of agreement or disagreement.

Still, taken altogether, the majority of responses leaned more toward agreement than disagreement (64 vs. 36%). This is a highly surprising fact, on a number of different counts. First, this statement taps an attitude that in a West European context, belongs to the period of "poor laws", and even more to the 18th than the 19th century. Without available comparative data, one can only hypothesise about possible responses, but it is doubtful that more than a small minority of any respondents would agree with this statement in any EEC country. Second, however, the interpretation of this attitude requires some care, because of the different legacies packed into this claim. First, it alludes to a very old, traditional, pre-modern attitude, concerning idleness and work. This is an example of the kind of pre-modern, seemingly soft, non-aggressive authoritarianism which Adorno et al found (or hypothesised) as lying at the root of fascism. This statement has been made independently by not one of our mayors interviewed, whose general attitude did not fit any preconceived scheme of "authoritarianism". For them, it seemed to be a plain truism, and not an infringement of others' rights. The dominating feeling was incredulity about such laws, and not hostility toward the unemployed. Second, this statement has a particular link to the different aspects of socialist ideology. On the one hand, it clearly flies in the face of any Western socialist attitude under conditions of a market economy, this being a central target of this ideology. On the other hand, "existing socialism" reversed this evaluation as well in order to fit its own conditions, and defined unemployment as not just idleness, but even a felony. Therefore, it will but particularly interesting to see the way this statement correlates with the other statements of the set, and with the other attitudinal and background variables.

Finally, in one case (702/9) the shape of the distribution was the exact opposite, centring on the middle and not the polar responses, indicating that the sentiments about this statement were not very strong. This was perhaps the only case where the very strong words (<u>everybody</u> being concerned <u>only</u> with <u>own</u> truth) prevented very strong responses. However, the percentage

of those who agreed with this, taken altogether, were also very high, above 70%.

4.1.1. Summary

The results of the previous analysis of frequency distributions can be summarised in the following way. The set that was set up to test the presence of a general attitude towards complaining was working properly, and showing strong, even unexpected results. On the hand, the possibilities of response biases were successfully minimised, as there was both a strong general agreement and disagreement with different items, and were both very polarised and very unpolarised response distributions. Therefore, it was possible to diagnostise the presence of a general complaining attitude. Respondents did in general agree with the complaints raised, even with the most extremely worded ones, the more general they were, and the more distant from themselves, though not rejecting some degree of self-criticism. There were no marked differences between the complaints placed in the first part of the response set, and those placed at the end of the second. The break given by insertion of the broader, general, comparative questions, and the more time elapsed, did not lead to either a reduction or an increase of this general predisposition of "complaining".

Such a predisposition can be called a response pattern, or an attitude. Let's go further and, in line with the theoretical approach of the paper, let's call is a specific type of subjectivity. But, before further conclusions, let's review some other analyses.

4.2. The Czech and Slovak distributions

Let's turn first to the comparative, Czech and Slovak data. All the items analysed here were taken from interviews conducted in Hungarian, even if many of them were conducted in Slovakia. Therefore, it was extremely important to see whether these statement made any sense in a different context, whether similar

response patterns could be found there, or reflected only some peculiar, idiosyncratic characteristics of the Hungarian situation. The results contained in Tables 4 and 5 compared to Table 3 show that this is in fact not the case. Concerning most of the items, there are very high degrees of agreements across all three countries.

Table 4. The Czech frequency distributions

items	strongly agree	rather agree	rather disagree	strongly disagree	missing
701/1	60.2	32.7	6.7	0.4	1.2
701/2	11.6	27.7	39.8	20.9	3.1
701/3	27.6	38.0	24.4	9.7	2.7
701/4	58.6	32.8	6.6	2.0	0.4
701/5	30.3	46.9	18.9	3.9	1.2
701/6	27.1	30.6	32.5	9.8	0.8
701/7	0.8	9.6	28.7	61.0	2.3
701/8	24.3	20.4	18.1	37.2	12.1
701/9	8.7	26.1	40.9	24.3	10.5
701/10	7.0	19.0	47.1	26.9	5.8
701/11	86.3	13.7	0.	0.	0.8
702/1	18.5	34.1	30.6	16.8	9.7
702/2	78.5	16.0	4.7	0.8	0.4
702/3	69.8	24.6	4.4	1.2	1.9
702/4	69.4	22.7	6.7	1.2	0.8
702/5	24.9	32.8	33.6	8.7	10.9
702/6	65.2	28.0	4.8	2.0	2.7
702/7	16.5	24.0	41.3	18.2	5.8
702/8	60.2	30.7	7.5	1.6	1.2
702/9	18.3	52.4	25.8	3.6	1.9
702/10	56.6	37.5	3.9	2.0	0.4
702/11	24.5	44.7	23.3	7.5	1.6

Table 5. The Slovak frequency distributions

items	strongly agree	rather agree	rather disagree	strongly disagree	missing
701/1	75.8	20.4	2.9	0.4	1.2
701/2	15.3	36.0	35.2	13.6	2.9
701/3	51.3	35.0	11.3	2.5	1.2
701/4	52.1	27.5	14.6	5.8	1.2
701/5	45.6	39.3	12.6	2.5	1.6
701/6	39.1	33.2	20.6	7.1	2.1
701/7	6.9	17.2	34.3	41.6	4.2
701/8	38.6	20.2	13.3	27.9	4.1
701/9	15.2	28.1	41.0	15.7	10.7
701/10	22.1	31.6	32.6	14.0	4.9
701/11	86.4	12.4	0.8	0.4	0.4
702/1	9.0	26.7	43.0	21.3	9.0
702/2	69.8	21.9	7.4	0.8	0.4
702/3	58.8	32.9	7.5	0.8	1.2
702/4	73.0	21.1	4.6	1.3	2.4
702/5	36.1	35.2	21.1	7.5	6.5
702/6	66.4	29.5	3.3	0.8	0.8
702/7	15.6	22.7	40.4	21.3	7.4
702/8	50.4	32.1	14.6	2.9	1.2
702/9	29.5	46.8	21.5	2.1	2.5
702/10	68.7	26.7	4.5	0.	0.
702/11	35.7	38.2	23.3	7.5	0.8

This similarity is not restricted to the comparative items (702/2, 3, 4), but include those that were specifically used to test some of the implicit legacies of the past (701/1, 3, 5, 11, etc.), and even some of the most extremely worded statements about people in general (701/4, 702/6). Thus, for e.g., the overwhelming majority of respondents in both the Czech and Slovak samples did agree, and very strongly, with the statement that the voters thought that all the problems will be solved in a day's time, and agreed even more that for a Western style democracy, proper individuals would be needed. (73)

This is not to say that there were no differences across the countries. Thus, to give one example, the responses were very different concerning the item on taxation, where Hungarian respondents disagreed with this item much more than Slovakian and especially Czech mayors. The reason is obvious, and is related to the much higher level of taxation in Hungary, due to the earlier Introduction of economic reforms. Or, to mention another item of the questionnaire, the differences between the three countries in the standard left-right scale were as great as it is possible to get between samples, Czech mayors placing themselves extremely strongly toward the right, Hungarians toward the left, while Slovakians in between. Let's therefore turn to a detailed analysis of the similarities and the differences of the results. In the analysis, to avoid repetitiveness, emphasis will be on the differences from the pattern derived from the Hungarian results.

Concerning the two groups of statements that were very strongly agreed with by Hungarians, there were very little differences in the other two countries, and the pattern of the small differences was identical. Only one of the items (702/11) dropped out of the group of the "strongly agreed" statements. The idea about the failure of the immediate realisation of well-being was judged to be a bit too strong in these countries, even if the majority, after all, did agree with it. It was replaced, however, with another item about people in general, 702/8. The statement that not just "people" in general had strange expectations and carried in themselves strong legacies of the past was much more agreed in the Czech and Slovak samples than in Hungary. Apart from this difference, all that was said about Hungary concerning these items holds true for the other countries as well.

Concerning the items with which there was a definite, but less strong agreement in Hungary, the differences were more considerable, especially in the Czech Republic. Out of the three plus three items belong to these two groups, analysed on pp. 58-9, one has become more agreed upon in both countries, as we have already seen (702/8), and one much less (701/9). This only

confirms that the government is seen in a much more favourable light in both these countries than in Hungary, and for obvious reasons of the internal political life. In Slovakia, the other four items are also agreed upon by the majority in more or less the same way as in Hungary, except for one items (702/5) that indicates that in Slovakia, a perception about corruption being increased in the last years is much more markedly present than in the other two countries. In the Czech Republic, there is, however, less agreement with the continuing practice of centralised decision-making in the hands of the mayors (701/5), and on the complaint of the local governments being "abandoned" (701/3).

As for the rest of the items, it is difficult to work with the schemes developed on the basis of the Hungarian data, because there was a certain difference in the pattern of the general response distribution of these two countries. In Hungary, the responses were much more polarised, with a relatively high percentage falling in the strongly agreed or disagreed category. Consequently, there was only one item (702/9) where the responses were centred toward the middle. In the Czech and Slovak samples, however, this happened to be true for most of the rest of the items. That this was a definite response pattern, and not just some methodological error, is also proved by the pattern of missing answers. In Hungary, there was an extremely low percentage of such responses, while in the other two countries, this was definitely higher, in a few cases reaching ten percent. In general, a lower percentage of missing answers could be interpreted as a "forcing" of respondents into choosing from the available answers, creating a distortion toward the middle and not the polar options. However, it is exactly the Hungarian responses that show polarisation, indicating without doubt the very strong feelings most of the respondents had towards the statements.

In the Czech and Slovak cases, the strength of attitudes with respect to the rest of the statements is somewhat weaker, but the direction is much the same. There were few items where there was a marked difference concerning the level of agreement or disagreement. One of the statements disagreed in general in

Hungary (701/6) was rather agreed in the other two countries. In general, however, the statements that were critical of the changes were rejected more strongly in the Slovak and especially the Czech cases, than in Hungary, merely reflecting the general difference in the political atmosphere of the different countries. Finally, opinions about the authoritarian statement (701/8) were very strongly divisive in the other two countries as well, but, on the average, was much less agreed upon than in Hungary.

4.2.1. Summary

In sum, we can state that the responses to most of the items were remarkably similar in all three countries. In the other two countries, the responses were perhaps less polarised, but confirmed practically all the trends present in the Hungarian data. There was a high degree of agreement with general complaints in the other countries as well. It was somewhat lower in the Czech republic, but in Slovakia, at least as strong as in Hungary. And the major targets of these complaints were not the past of present political forces, neither concrete individuals, but everywhere people in general. As a representative statement, we can take item 701/4. This is a statement with a clear, unambiguous meaning, expressing an impossible expectation concerning the work of the mayors; therefore, it not only reflects general expectations, but indicates an uneasy situation, something of a threat, a danger to their work, an impossibility of success. As Tables 3 through 5 show, it was still strongly agreed by a vast majority of the respondents in all three countries.

4.3. Control runs

The previous analysis provides in-depth information about a number of aspects of the transition process; information that stands up on its own. Still, the question is the way we can both characterise globally the data, and also discern some regular, even causal patterns in it. To show the necessity of some more sophisticated analysis, and also a good reason why a simple, causal analysis along the established patterns of causal analysis would not give the best results, let's provide two short further results.

One question concerns the general commonalties and differences in the overall response patterns of the different countries. The previous analysis of frequency distributions was centred upon the strength of agreement or disagreement with the different statements, and the shape of the response distribution. Using data with only four categories, there was not much need of using averages and standard deviations. However, in order to compare the general level of agreement, and also the difference in the polarisation of the data in the different countries, two simple measures were computed: the average of the single item averages and standard deviations for the three countries. The first measure can be interpreted as the average response pattern, indicating how strongly "in general" respondents agreed with the statements, while the second is not the same thing as the standard error of this average, but still shows how "on the average" the responses for the items were spread around their own mean.

The value of the first index was 2.04 for Hungary, 2.06 for the Czech republic, and 1.93 for Slovakia. This confirms that there was in general more agreement than disagreement with the statements. This should not be so surprising as, after all, most of these statements were actually stated by active mayors. The differences between the countries are not very strong. The general level of responses is almost identical in the Czech and the Hungarian sample. Slovak respondents had a higher tendency to agree with all statements, close to the significance level, but the difference of 0.1 in this average index is not very large.

In the second index, however, there was a much more marked difference. The values were 0.92 for Hungary, 0.79 for the Czech republic, and 0.81 for Slovakia. Thus, responses were considerably more polarised in Hungary than in the other two cases. This would suggest for e.g. that in any analysis were all three data sets would be brought together, the Hungarian difference patterns would have a considerably stronger impact on the final results than the patterns of the other two responses. Further analysis should decide whether this is only a methodological characteristics or bias, or a meaningful result.

Second, as one of the reasons of interest in mayors is the possibility to test differences according to former party membership, an obvious choice is to see whether this variable would explain much of the differences in responses. Therefore, chi-square statistics were computed to test whether there is a significant difference among former party-members and non-members, and for which items.

Given the strong political charge of many of the questions, both directly and indirectly, and related to the present and the past systems, one could expect very strong differences according to former party membership, if not by all, but still, but most variables. However, in fact, the opposite proved to be the case: it turned out that hardly any differences exist between the two groups of people. Thus, in Hungary, there were three items where the differences were significant at the 0.01 level (701/7, 702/4, 702/7), and a further at the 0.05 level (702/1). Two of these are the items with the clearest, obvious links to the past, while the other two are from the comparative block.

In two cases, the connection is non-linear. In the case of item 701/7, the pattern of the non-linear relationship was intelligible. The difference here was non in the level of agreement or disagreement, but in its strength. Those mayors who were not members of the party entertained particularly strong feelings with respect to this statement. The reason may be that they either interpreted it as a hostile statement about the new political system, therefore rejected it very strongly; or they interpreted it as closely referring to their work, representing their outsider status under new circumstances, therefore were more like to sympathise with it. In case of item 702/1, however, a closer look showed that the results are practically meaningless. The differences between the categories were small, there was no system in it, and by all probability, the significance of the difference was due to the idiosyncratic result that all those few (six) who "strongly agreed" with this statement were non-members. Therefore, this item can be disregarded for further analysis.

Only for two items did we find clear and significant patterns. Item 702/7 was much more agreed with by the former non-party members, indicating that the proposition about the salvaging of the nomenclatura in Hungary is much more voiced by those who were not part of the former system, and the former party members support very strongly the idea that governmental support to the localities should be increased. The case for item 701/7 was the contrary. Former party members were much more inclined to rely upon their earlier contacts. All this, however, did not tell us anything particularly new or interesting.

The Czech results were even more meagre. There was not a single item where the difference according to party membership would have been significant even at the 0.10 level. This means that

according to our data, simple, former relations to the party were completely unconnected to the assessment of these 22 statements in the Czech republic. This may be given different interpretations. First, it can be taken at a face value, that even in a group of politically very active and ambitious people, former party membership simply had no correlation to opinion on a number of sensitive issues. This is difficult to believe. It may mean the opposite: the data on party membership are not valid. In fact, there is a good reason to doubt that former party members denied their association. Nevertheless, apart from the general point that in 1992, there would be little reason for most people to deny this in a sociological survey, the actual results for part membership lie very closely to the expected range. As we can safely assume that anyone who was not actually a member of the communist party did not claim so, the only possible bias is under-representation. But former party members are pretty well present in our sample, and the difference between the Czech and the other samples lie quite in the expected direction and range. Finally, one could also assume that the data set is not working properly. But as the frequency distributions gave very stable results, it would be difficult to explain the lack of sensitivity to party membership.

In Slovakia, there was a very clear and strong difference between the two groups concerning item 701/7, former party members agreeing much more that they had to rely upon earlier personal contacts than non-members. They also agree more with items 702/5 (at the 0.01 level) and 702/4 (at the 0.05 level), while disagree more with items 701/7 (at the 0.01 level) and 702/6 (at the 0.05 level). Thus, they see more corruption around them and less former colleagues after the changes; would prefer more central support, and relatively disagree somewhat with the idea about the human preconditions of democracy.

These results can be concluded in two points. First, whatever was said about the Czech case could be repeated for all samples: the differences were quite weak. Assuming the validity of a former rigid separation of the society along party membership, one would expect to find significant differences. Yet, nothing of the sort came out of the data. We need much subtler methods if we want to uncover and assess the hidden, lasting legacy of the past. Second, the meagre results we found did not contain anything particularly exciting. By looking back to our heuristical analysis of the items, we can see that in fact, the major recurrent difference across countries were related to those items that reflected the most obvious, direct legacy of the past: items 701/7, 702/7. Even in the Czech case, these were the items where the differences almost

reached the 0.10 significance level. Apart from this, it was possible to notice only a little survival of the former ideological system and some negative assessment of the changes in former party members. It is important to note that here again, the similarity between the two countries where we got some results was quite substantial (in case of all three items where there were significant differences in Hungary, the pattern was repeated in Slovakia).

In sum, the findings of the control runs gave some useful information about the differences between the three countries, confirmed the wide similarity of the results, and also the need for much more subtle and detailed analysis.

5. The results of factor analysis

The target of our analysis is the development of "types", therefore the analysis of the individual items will not be followed by the standard procedure, the testing of a causal model with hypothetical relations between manifest or latent variables. Still, before applying cluster analysis, it is necessary to gain more information about the "behaviour" of our items, to analyse, beyond questions of variance, their co-variance. Because of the heuristical nature of the analysis, it is important to see how the different statements are actually, empirically connected together, what is their "meaning". (74) For this purpose, exploratory factor analysis was applied to the data. As before, the Hungarian results will be analysed first, and the Czech and Slovak will be used for purposes of comparison. (75)

Before the concrete analysis, let's formulate some prior hypotheses, summing up the previous expectations and results. First, we expect the usual g-factor in this case be a "complaining factor". Those items that do not reflect this attitude (see Table 2) should be missing from the first factor. Second, the analysis should clarify whether the other factors are arranged on the opposite poles, along the lines of political attitudes (ideological differences, or assessment of the past system and the present government), or according to more subjective or attitudinal

concerns, without encountering a strong opposite polarity alongside political differences.

Finally, a methodological remark. The detailed description of the factor results no doubt would seem tedious to many. However, because of the particular theoretical framework adopted in this paper, and the connections that will be established between the theoretical and empirical parts, it was necessary to present the empirical results following their own logic. (76) However, in order to provide the reader some guidelines, the detailed discussion of the empirical results will be given in dense, endnote-type printing, while the more verbal summaries will return to regular line spacing.

5.1. The Hungarian results

Concerning the composition of the first factor, the expectations formulated above were met in a striking way. The results are contained in Table 6. (77) All those variables that on Table 2 were indicated as not containing an element of complaint are missing from this factor, which therefore does not measure simply "general acquiescence". This is all the more so as exactly some of these missing variables were among those that were most widely accepted (701/1, 11). Among those items contained in the first factor, there is also a difference between those that voiced rather general complaints, and those that were connected to specific ones, related to the past system, the present government, or the changes in general. Most items in the first group had extremely high factor loading (701/4, 702/9, 10, 11, the only one with a lower weight is 702/6). But, somewhat surprisingly, the highest factor loading belongs to item 701/6, that defined a very negative overall assessment of the mayor's position, almost amounting to the assertion of complete helplessness. This item was not agreed upon by the majority, but had a very high variance, and seem to be a particularly strong indicator of the "complaining attitude". (78) The other group of items that contain more specific and divisive types of complaints have understandably less weight in this factor, but are nevertheless present, and with a quite comfortable margin (see 701/2, 7, 9, 10, 702/ 7). Significantly, the complaint that is explicitly self-reflexive (702/8) has little weight, just as the item about authoritarianism, in spite of the fact that it had the largest variance. Finally, between the factor and principal

component runs, there were no major differences, indicating the strength of the pattern.

Table 6. The composition of the first unrotated factor (Hungarian)

Item	Factor loading
701/6	.66
702/9	.56
702/10	.54
702/5	.49
702/11	.49
701/4	.47
701/3	.42
701/9	.40
701/7	.40
702/7	.40
701/10	.34
701/8	.34
702/6	.31
701/2	.30
702/8	.30
701/1	.21
702/4	.14
702/3	.08
701/5	.05
701/11	.00
702/1	-.02
702/2	-.08

The second factor was very close to the second principal component, although there were considerable drops in the value of some of the items included in the second principal component. (79) According to this factor, the main dividing line within the sample, common to several variables, is between those who exercise some degree of self-criticism, who consider themselves as also culpable of not living up to the requirements of the day (702/8), and those who simply blame the government (701/9, 3, 6). In the second principal component, there are some variable present who more or less drop out of the factor. These can again be divided into two groups. All of them are having positive weights, therefore showing some affinity with "self-blame". One of them, completely dropping out, includes three out of the four items of the American sample (702/1, 2, 3). The second group, just on the borderline of presence, contains 701/1 and 702/6. The

second group is relatively easy to interpret. In the case of 702/6, it indicates that this statement had a self-reflexive component in its meaning. The other, 701/1 may have been drawn in simply because it was also related to the mayor's relation to others, in first person singular. Concerning the other group, there may be an affinity between agreement with welfarist measures, and self-criticism, in more human than political sense: such people were less inclined to reject such attitudes than those who vented their anger about the changes in the government, or in others in general. (80)

The third principal component all but disappeared as a third factor, having an eigenvalue much below 1. It was also difficult to interpret. It will not be analysed it individually, but was preserved in the factor rotation.

The rotation of the three principal components and factors gave very similar results. The first rotated factor remained a pure general complaint factor. Complaints related to the government (701/3, 6, 9), the elected body (701/2), the lack of proper authoritarian measures (701/8), and cynicism (701/10) were either dropped from the factor, or their weight was vastly reduced. What remained were not simply the complaints about others, however, but especially strongly all the complaints contained in the second set of items. This may mean two things. First, it may be due to a response bias. After the respondents selected carefully among the different types of complaints in the first set, were much more indiscriminate in the second, once, after the interlude of the general, comparative items, there was a return to complaints. Thus, while such a strategy had the beneficial effects of documenting the general disposition, we may have had to pay the price of less clean, distinguishing results. However, there exists also an other explanation, the two being not necessarily exclusive. The variables whose loading increased substantially are those in which complaining is related to some kind of self-criticism. In fact, we can see that this factor was composed was not simply by dropping out the specific complaints listed above, but also by increasing the weight of some items from the positive pole of the second unrotated factor - those that were related to the self, in a more-or-less critical way. It is this way that we can explain why item 701/1, that expresses no direct complaint, could be present, though only at the borderline, in the first unrotated factor.

We can conclude therefore that the general "complaining" factor can be broken down to two, correlated but somewhat distinct

tendencies. One the one hand, there is a tendency to complain about everybody else (the government, the representatives, the electors, everyone), and seeing oneself as a helpless victim; on the other, to leave the government and politics out of this, and rather to blame human attitudes - including oneself.

The second rotated factor contains mostly the complaints left out of the first rotated factor. It is centred around the blaming of the government (701/3, 6, 9), linked to a blame of the present co-workers and a praise of the former connections, a negative assessment of the changes (701/10, 702/5), and a special kind of authoritarian attitude (701/8 and 702/10·together has the flair). Here, a very clear dividing line appears between those with established ties to the past, and those hostile to and unconnected with the former system.

Finally, the rotation, using elements of the first two unrotated factors, made the third factor intelligible. The core of this factor pictures a very traditional, centralised, one-man "authoritarian" personal rule (701/1, 8, 11, and especially 5). This is a mayor who is keeping everything in his hand, wants to define the conditions of others' work, and exercise full discretionary authority. Surprisingly, in the principle component analysis, it is joined to three of the four comparative items (702/1, 2, 3). This may be a clear legacy of the communist past, as such kind of "authoritarian" mayors in a Western context, one could assume, certainly would not support welfarist positions. The comparison of the results of the factor and the principal component analysis clarifies even more the results. Two of the three miss out from the factor, but the one remaining (702/3) is the one that reflects most discretionary tendencies out of the three. (81) In this context, we can assume that it is the "mayor" who wants to distribute resources according to needs - according to the way he perceives such needs. (82)

Looking back to the third unrotated factor, one could say that traces of this factor are easily discernible, but there, this tendency was "contaminated" or "disturbed" by two variables that represent a clear legacy to the past: 701/7 and 702/7. In fact, in the light of this analysis, we can return and try to give a meaning to this third, unrotated factor. Just like in the case of the "complaining" tendency, the "authoritarian", centralised command-tendency has also two sub-currents. One of these is a general attitude, independent of positive or negative links to the present or past systems. The other, however, is strongly characteristic of those who have positive connections to the former system.

5.1.1. Summary

In sum, we can state that the issue that most divides the respondents was the attitude toward complaining, the acceptance or rejection of this attitude. Within this general tendency, however, there are a number of specific currents. The two poles are marked by the blaming of the current government, or the acknowledgement of personal defaults as well; while in the middle, related to both, is a general attitude complaining about "people" in general, and in very strong terms. Independently of the complaining disposition, there is another, less important, but still marked tendency that divides respondents, along the lines of preference or opposition to authoritarian, centralised, personal-discretionary attitudes. This also has a relatively "pure" version, independent of political affiliations, and a version that connects most components of this "authoritarian" set-up to clear, explicit links to the past. However, it is worthwhile to notice that an item that should fully belong here (701/1) has an almost marginal presence, pointing out that it has become one of the most specific hidden legacies of the past, being internalised in general, and no longer related to specific "authoritarian" or "personal-discretionary" tendencies.

5.2. The Czech and Slovak results

Compared to the Hungarian, the first unrotated Czech factor offers a lot of similarities on the first look.

Table 7. The composition of the first unrotated factor (Czech)

Item	Factor loading
701/6	.58
702/10	.56
702/11	.53
702/9	.50
702/8	.46
702/6	.44
701/4	.39
701/2	.37
702/5	.34
702/2	.30
702/4	.30
701/9	.29
701/11	.27
702/1	.27
702/3	.25
701/7	.25
701/8	.23
702/7	.21
701/3	.21
701/5	.20
701/1	.15
701/10	.11

This is also a broad general factor, where some items - and more or less the same ones, as in the Hungarian case - have very high loading (especially 701/6, but also 702/9, 10, 11). But on a more careful look, the slight differences add up to a clear, general picture. First, while in the Hungarian case, some of the items were completely missing from this factor, having close to zero, even slightly negative values, here, with the exceptions of 701/1 and 10, all items possess a positive value close to the 0.3 threshold factor loading level. Thus, it is much more a simple general factor than the Hungarian one. This is only reinforced by the fact that the low factor loading here do not correspond exactly to the non-complaining items. For e.g. item 701/10, that has the lowest value here, expresses a complaint, and is very much present in the

Hungarian first factor; and the same is true to almost the same extent to items 701/3 and 702/7. We can conclude that there was much less a general complaining tendency present in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, it was less influential and exclusive in defining the major variation within the data.

Let's suspend the general theoretical implications of this fact, and concentrate on the more methodological issue of specifying the exact difference between the Hungarian and Czech responses, and the separation of the general and the complaining components within the Czech data. A way to interpret better this general factor is to review in detail which items are strongly present in the first factor, and which are the ones that fall relatively out of line with the general line of agreement, that have low factor loading. The first hypothesis is the following: those items that are generally agreed by the majority will have a high loading in this factor. This would mean that Czech mayors not only agree to a large extent with this statements, but they have a particularly strong tendency to agree or disagree with all these items together. But this is clearly disproved by the data, as some of those statements that are the most highly agreed upon (701/1, 11, 702/2, 3, 4) are exactly the ones who are among the lowest factor loading.

This suggests a second hypothesis. Could it be that weak presence (even absence) in the general factor is simply a function of very anonymous agreement or disagreement with the statement; therefore implying, in case of discrete data with only four categories, a low possibility of variance? This hypothesis got more support from the data. In fact, the four items with both the highest and lowest averages (i.e. those that are strongly agreed or disagreed upon in general) are among the group of items not much present in the general factor. But this simple reference to a methodological component is still far from giving a complete and satisfactory answer, and for two reasons. First, because there are important deviations: quite strongly accepted or rejected items are forcibly present in the first factor (701/2, 702/6, 8, 10), while some that are missing from the factor do not at all possess a very high or low average (701/3, 5). Second, because the direct analysis of the standard deviations do not at all support the claim that those items are missing from the general factor that have little individual variance. In fact, the very opposite is true: the three items with the highest individual variance (701/8, 702/1, 7) are exactly missing from or hardly present in the first factor. Therefore, there is no clear-cut, methodological link between low variance and covariance in our sample set

This suggests that a third, less obvious hypothesis can be proposed here along similar lines. Could this difference between the Hungarian and Czech first factors be due to a difference in the general level of agreement with the particular items between the two countries? To test this, a simple measure was computed: the difference between Hungarian and Czech means, and this was related to the difference between the Hungarian and Czech factor loading. And this, even if not giving a perfectly one-to-one relationship between the two sets of differences, did give the answer needed.

There were six items, all expressing complaints, that were much less chosen by the Czechs than the Hungarians: 701/3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 702/11. Five out of the six are exactly those that are much present in the Hungarian complaint-factor, but are peripheral in the Czech general factor. They are all complaints that were specifically directed against the present government or the changes in general. There was four items with the opposite differences, with which Czech mayors were in general more in agreement (701/6, 702/1, 3, 8). Three of them are exactly those where the factor loading in the Czech case are considerably higher, the exception being 701/6. In this way, we could account for, in an organised pattern, supported by other changes, the difference of 8 out of the 13 items that had low weights in the Czech general factor (701/3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 702/ 1, 3, 8), and these are exactly those items which gave the complaint-character of the Hungarian first factor. The "behaviour" of the remaining five is easy to explain, as these are the ones that do not represent a complaint.

At this point, due to the specific importance of the first factor for our purposes, let's suspend temporarily the analysis of the Czech factors, and turn to the Slovak data.

Even by a cursory look at Table 5, we can see that there are considerable similarities between the Czech and the Slovak first factors, the latter being also much more a G-factor than the Hungarian one. All variables have positive factor loading, and there isn't a compact block of non-complaint items missing completely from the factor. A more detailed analysis of the similarities and differences in the three countries gave the following results. There are five items that move identically in all three countries (701/1, 6, 702/9, 10, and 11), and further three almost do so (701/2, 4, 702/5). With the exception of 701/1, all these are items that are very strongly present everywhere in the first factor. They define therefore the strong common element of

the three general factor. The interpretation is helped that in each case, item 701/6 has the strongest loading.

Table 8. The composition of the first unrotated factor (Slovak)

Item	Factor loading
701/6	.59
702/9	.55
702/10	.55
702/11	.46
701/2	.44
702/5	.43
701/10	.37
701/2	.34
701/4	.31
701/5	.28
701/11	.27
702/4	.27
701/9	.26
702/2	.26
702/6	.26
702/8	.25
701/8	.24
702/1	.21
701/1	.19
701/7	.17
702/3	.13
702/7	.09

The major attitude dividing all three samples in this set of items is therefore a strong presence of a general trust or distrust of others; of a feeling that one is living in a basically hostile, immoral environment, where others are corrupt and undemocratic, have impossible expectations and only hinder one's work; finally, at the core of this attitude, there lies a profound sentiment of helplessness, a perception that one is drifting in between the impossible demands of the population and the lack of means provided by the government. It is not a specific, politically or ideologically motivated hostility or preference to the current government that defines this dividing line as the self-perception of helplessness.

Apart from this general colouring, there were different shades present in the first unrotated factors of the three countries. In

principle, four possibilities existed: common partial patterns between Hungarians and Czechs, Hungarians and Slovaks, and Czechs and Slovaks, and items "behaving" differently in all three countries. However, the first and the last of the above four categories were empty. Most of the items, confirming the first look, pointed out strong similarities between the Czech and Slovak data (701/5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 702/1, 2, 4, 7). It is because a set of explicit political complaints, very strongly present in the Hungarian first factor, is weak or missing in the Czech and Slovak case (701/7, 9, 2/7; we can include here also the authoritarian 701/8; and, on the other hand, the more general, non-complaining comments are present more or less in this factor (see the comparative items 702/1, 2, 4, and 701/5, and 11).

Finally, there were five items where the Hungarian and Slovakian first factor structures were markedly similar, in distinction with the Czech one (701/3, 10, 702/3, 6, 8). Four of them can be divided into two clear groups that are both semantically related and move together in the three countries. Items 701/3 and 10 are clearly present in the Hungarian and Slovak factors, but absent from the Czech. These general statements above "being left alone" and encountering "lot of cynicism" around the changes kept a rather vague, general character in Hungary and Slovakia, but were understood as more of a complaint specifically voiced against the new system and the changes in the Czech Republic, and are therefore hardly present in the first factor. Two others, 702/6 and 8 exhibit opposite characteristics: they are very strongly present in the Czech factor, but marginal in the Hungarian and especially the Slovak case. These are complaints against people in general that - implicitly (702/6) or explicitly (702/8) - involve the self as well; that acknowledge that in this perceived state of helplessness, the subject who is speaking himself is involved. In a way, this does not say much more than reflect the well-known capacity of Czech people for more introspection and self-culpabilisation. But is certainly reassuring to see that this comes out so clearly of the data structure. No interpretation can be given now to the moves of item 702/3.

Back to the results of the factor analysis of the Czech sample, the second unrotated factor is very robust here, preserving an eigenvalue well above one even in the factor, and not principal component solution, and containing the very marked opposition of two characteristic group of items. On one pole of the factor, we'll find items 701/7, 10, and especially 9; on the other, 701/11, 702/3, 4, and especially 2. In this factor, a friendly or hostile attitude to the changes is opposed to the agreement or

disagreement with the comparative items, tapping welfare oriented orientations. Given the strong support of the changes in the Czech Republic, the lower level of continuity in personnel, and the extremely strong leaning of the sample toward the right as opposed to the left on the political scale, one would "naturally" expect opponents of the new system to come up in favour of the welfare-socialist items. However, the actual link is the opposite. At this point, no explanation can be given to this strange phenomenon.

The third factor is even weaker here than in the Hungarian case, and the differences between the factor and principal component solutions are also substantive. Nevertheless, this factor was maintained for the rotation here as well. The first rotated factor turned out to be almost identical to the Hungarian first factor, focusing on general complaints (701/4, 6, 702/6, 8, 9, 10, 11). It is also containing the same methodological characteristics of putting the emphasis on the items of the second set, only two of them (702/5 and 7), that are close to factual and hostile assessment of the changes, being missing here. The second rotated factors are also almost identical, containing especially items 701/6, 7, 8, 9, and also to some extent 701/2 and 702/5 in both case, the only difference being the definite presence of 701/3 and 702/10 in the Hungarian and the somewhat higher presence of 702/9 in the Czech case. Therefore, the same things hold true for the Czech case that were mentioned with respect to the Hungarian one concerning the difference between complaints about people in general, including oneself, and complaints about the government, the complaining about "others" being the link between the two types of attitudes.

Concerning the third factors, the results are more complex, and given the small eigenvalue, there is a risk of overinterpretation. Nevertheless, there are some intelligible patterns discernible. The authoritarian-discretionary attitude, so dominant in the Hungarian factors in both solutions is completely missing in the Czech case. The dominant items here are those that go together with the above attitude in the Hungarian PC solution, but drop out from the PAF solution: the comparative items, including very strongly 702/4 that is completely missing from the Hungarian third factors. The items which are somewhat connected to this compact group (present in PC, missing in PAF) are exactly not related to the personal attitude of the mayors, but to a certain perception of being threatened and abandoned by others (701/2, 3, 4).

This suggests a following, partial concluding comment. The link between the four comparative items and the other statements seems to be markedly different in the two cases. In Hungary, there is a wide gap between them, reflecting the low covariance between the two sets. In the Czech republic, to the contrary, these items fit very well into the other statements. (83) As we have seen in the previous discussion, even the pattern of the actual links is different. This may be due to the fact that the 18 other statements were much closer to the daily work of the mayors in Hungary, and the language of discussion they were used to. It may reflect that Czech respondents took these statements more as mere opinions, while Hungarians more as reflections of expressions of their self, more in line with the theoretical approach followed in the paper. But, apart from these methodological concerns, it may indicate a serious point of substance: these results seem to indicate a very high degree of isolation between the terms of political discourse in Hungary, and the terms in which this discourse is led in most of the other countries.

The first unrotated Slovak factors has already been analysed before, and the presentation of the rest of the results will be done by comparing them to the previous cases. Concerning the second factor, there are a set of common elements in all three countries, the comparative items. But there were considerable individual variations. First, the weight of these items is not equal in the different countries. In Hungary, they all but miss out from the PAF as compared to the PC solution. In the Czech republic, their influence as a block is also not that decisive, especially in the factor solution; while in Slovakia, they define the meaning of this factor almost single-handedly. Also, not all the four are present with equal weight. In Hungary, 702/4, while in the Czech and Slovak samples, 702/1 is completely missing from the factor. In the latter two cases, the relative weight of the three items present is also somewhat different: item 702/2 about the long-range plan has the highest factor loading, especially in the Czech republic. To these items is joined in both cases 701/11, and is opposed 701/7. Finally, a substantive group of items (701/9 and 10), giving the counterweight to the comparative variables, and even defining the major thrust of the Czech second factor is completely missing from the Slovak factor.

This difference is crucial, and helps us retrospectively to interpret the peculiarity of the Czech second factor as well. The basic opposition in the second factor in both countries is between the presence or absence of reliance upon close, personal contacts,

inherited from the former system, or more general, ideal or ideological orientation. In the Czech case, the continuity with the past system is strongly coupled with hostility toward the changes. In the Slovakian case, however, because of the stronger macro-level links, this connection does not appear.

These items (701/9 and 10) rather construct in Slovakia a separate, third factor; perhaps explaining why the third factor has a considerably higher eigenvalue here than in the other two countries. To them are joined 702/7, and opposed 702/8. Thus, the third Slovak factor does not simply contain parts of the second Czech factor, but also reproduces the basic opposition of the second Hungarian factor. The Slovakian sample contains both tendencies that are present either in the Czech Republic or in Hungary, but absent in the other.

This suggests that there is an intriguing, crucial difference in the behaviour of item 702/8 in the three different countries. In the Czech republic, this item has a strong presence in the first factor, showing that the general tendency of agreement with these statements, most of them expressing complaints, and being perceived as dominated by a sense of helplessness, is joined to an explicit acknowledgement of legacy also in the self. In Hungary and Slovakia, this is much less the case, the general attitude of complaining is less connected to the acceptance of self-criticism. In both countries, however, an agreement with this item implies a disagreement with the blaming of the government. The links between the assessment of the self and the other are definitely stronger in the Czech Republic than in the other two cases.

While in the previous two countries, we stopped with the analysis of the third factor, in the Slovakian case, the fourth factor was also consulted, and for two different reasons. The first is methodological: it had an eigenvalue much higher than the fourth Czech and Hungarian factors, higher even than the Czech third factor, and the drop in the eigenvalues also came only after the fourth. The second is substantive, and explains the previous discrepancy. As the Slovakian second and third unrotated factors reproduced the second Czech and the second Hungarian factors, respectively, it was not surprising that this sample contained a fourth common factor. The question was whether it was similar to the third Czech or Hungarian factors, or showed a different, more specific pattern.

This fourth factor turned out to be quite stable and easy to interpret. It had no relation to the Czech third factor, but was close to the third Hungarian factor, defining a personal, discretionary, authoritarian attitude. But with important differences. Here, a strong preference for the personal management of affairs (701/1, 5, 7) is not related either to authoritarian mentality (701/8) or to a clear attempt to impose one's ideas on the others (701/11, 702/3, in this context). But it is opposed, still at the level of personality, to a blaming of the self (702/6, 8), and also to two political items: 702/7 and 701/10.

Rotation led to the same clarification of profiles as in the other two countries. The first rotated factor was almost identical with the Czech, and even very close to the Hungarian, containing the general complaints about the others (items 702/9, 10, 11, 8, 5, 6, 701/2, 4, 6). The second rotated factor corresponds to the third Czech, containing the comparative items (702/2, 3, 4), and also item 701/11 that also has a broad, ideological character. The third factor has its equivalents in both Hungary and the Czech republic. This is a factor defining the attitudes to the present government. There is only one peculiarity: here, item 702/7 is also contained in this factor. As we have already seen in the unrotated factors, in the Slovak republic, hostility toward the government is expressed by those who see too many old faces around them in high positions. Finally, the fourth rotated factor just repeated the authoritarian pattern of the fourth unrotated factor.

5.3. Summary

Factor analysis provided us two crucial results for our main purpose, the study of the forms of subjectivity in the East European transition process. First, it helped us gain a detailed knowledge of the way the statements were interpreted by our respondents; which was the statements that were agreed or disagreed in general together, and agreement with which of the statements involved rather disagreement with the others, and vice versa. Such a "familiarity" with the items will be crucial for the interpretation of the results of cluster analysis.

Second, these results have also a direct relevance for our theoretical purpose. As, besides all possible types or sub-groups

within the sample to be analysed in the next section, the analysis of frequency distributions already showed us that there is an overwhelming presence of one response type in our sample: generalised complaining. This was confirmed by the results of factor analysis, that showed the very strong internal consistency of this kind of replies. It is the confirmation of the strong presence and internal coherence of this type of attitude (or this type of subjectivity?) that may be the most important result of the whole analysis.

6. The results of cluster analysis

With these results in hand, we can now turn to cluster analysis, the direct attempt to construct types. The previous analyses familiarised us with the data, helped to specify the shades of meaning assigned by the respondents to the items. Apart from this, cluster analysis will directly rely upon the previous three types of analysis, can be conceived of as uniting them in a specific way. The simple frequency description was an analysis of the mean and variance, while factor analysis centred upon covariance. Cluster analysis combines all three. As it collects together those cases that are close to each other in the space span by the variables (items), those with a high variance should have a larger role in defining the profiles of these clusters. However, it is not just single variance that matters in creating the clusters, but the joint selection, or the covariance, of the items, as clusters are formed according to closeness or distance on all variables. (84) Finally, the specification of the cluster profiles will be done by the group means.

Perhaps the basic problem in using cluster analysis for a relatively large data set is that it is quite time-consuming to use hierarchical clustering methods. Therefore, the number of clusters must be set in advance, and the programme will consequently generate as many clusters as the investigator defined earlier. This imposes an arbitrary limitation on the data, and makes most people very weary to apply this method.

However, in my view, this problem is not as prohibitive as it seems to be, and for a variety of reasons. First, similar type of trial and error methods are at the heart of many scientific investigation. The initial restriction can be relaxed by changing the cluster specification, and a comparative analysis of the

different factor solutions can bring us closer to a meaningful and realistic clustering scheme. Second, in the absence of clear-cut criteria to define how many "true" clusters are in the sample, heuristic methods have to be used that can be quite cumbersome. Nevertheless, some short-hands may facilitate the work. One such procedure is to run programmes only with odd number of clusters, and set an upper and lower limit of the number of clusters that can meaningfully be expected. In our case, these limits could be set up at 5 and 11 clusters. A programme permitting less than five clusters would only give a very rough partitioning of the data, while 13 or more clusters would give the break-up of about 200 cases into a large number of small groups. In this way, only relatively few outputs have to be analysed, and if necessary, the analysis could be repeated for a one or two even number solutions. (85) This is all the more acceptable as in this particular case, one cannot talk of clear, distinct clusters, rather only "dense" points in the space. Due to this approach, density seeking methods, even in spite of the arbitrariness of the initial definition of the number of clusters, could be even more helpful than hierarchical methods, aiming at the perceptions of a priori distinct clusters, often defined by mathematical functions or stochastic processes.

6.1. The Hungarian results

The analysis, as always, will be started with the Hungarian data. First, a methodological issue has to be clarified. As now cases, and not variables, will be compared, missing values present a problem. In factor analysis, one could rely upon the method of pair-wise exclusion, thereby minimising the loss of information. Here, however, as the basis of analysis is the distant between complete cases, the choice is either to exclude all cases that have any missing values, or put up with an artificial distortion introduced in the proximity measures. This is partly an empirical question, therefore several different runs were made using the techniques of both pair-wise and list-wise exclusion. (86) The results showed that in the pair-wise solution, there was in fact too much concentration around mean. Therefore, the analysis will focus on the list-wise results, and will use the others only to test the results of the list-wise analysis.

In the first round, four runs were made, setting the number of clusters at 5, 7, 9, and 11. Even the comparison of these, without established criteria of significance could present almost insoluble difficulties, and at least could require extensive time. However,

even a quick look at the results showed that the two marginal runs did not produce very interesting results. The 5-cluster solution gave one very larger cluster, with over a 100 cases, two very small ones, at the limit of acceptability, and only two regular, middle sized clusters. This confirmed the results of factor analysis that there is a very strong general tendency in the data, but is not helpful to provide further typology. The 11-cluster solution had the same deficiencies. On the other hand, it spread the cases into a large number of small outlier-clusters (6 of the 11 clusters contained fewer than 10 cases); on the other, surprisingly, it also contained a very large cluster, containing 75 mayors.

This could mean that there are no clear clusters, no distinct types present in the Hungarian data, only a strong middle tendency with a few outliers. However, the 7 and 9-cluster solutions give a different picture. The former gave 6 good clusters, the largest containing only 60 cases and the smallest 20, and only one outlier cluster of 5; while the 9-cluster solution also gave 6 interpretable clusters, with the largest containing 53 cases, and three outlier clusters. This suggested that in spite of the fact that there was a strong common tendency in the Hungarian data, there were nevertheless six quite distinct clusters or types that could be separated, if we did not impose extremely strict or lenient limitations on the data - not allowing clusters to develop in the 5-cluster solution, and allowing all cases outside the centre to spread around in the 11-cluster solution.

Detailed analysis was made of the 7- and 9-cluster solutions. (87) In order to interpret the individual clusters, we first have to define the profile of the clusters. For this, it is necessary to engage in another exercise of discrimination: to define which items characterise, positively or negatively, the different clusters. The rule of thumb used was the following. The output of cluster analysis gives the final cluster centres: the average values of all items for each cluster. Those items whose average value was at least one full value distant from each other, or 0.5 above or below the average, were defined as "strongly present" or "strongly absent" in a cluster; and present if this distance was about 0.6 and 0.3, respectively. Also, in cases where the variance of an item was very small, due to the very high or low population average, even smaller distances were marked.

Table 9. The Hungarian cluster solutions

Cluster	Strongly present	Present	Absent	Strongly absent
C7/1		702/7, 8	701/2	701/3, 4, 6,
(#=33)			702/3, 11	7, 8, 9, 10
C7/2		701/1, 5, 8	701/2, 10	701/3,6,7,9
(#=20)		702/1, 2, 3	702/8, 11	702/5, 7, 9, 10
C7/3	701/ 10	701/5, 8, 9	701/2	
(#=36)		702/3, 7, 8, 10, 11	702/5, 6	
C7/4	701/2, 3, 4,	701/1		
(#=60)	6, 7, 8, 9	702/3, 6, 9,		
	702/5	10, 11		
C7/5	701/6	701/1, 2, 4,		701/8, 9
(#=20)		7, 10		
	702/8, 11	702/5, 6, 9, 10	702/1,2	702/3
C7/7	701/6, 9	701/1, 3, 8	701/2, 7,11	701/1, 5
(#=25)		702/ 11	702/1, 3	702/8, 9
C9/5	701/10	701/2,3,4,8	701/6, 7, 9	
(#=39)	702/1	702/2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11		

Note: C7 stands for the list-wise 7-cluster solutions. The number of cases falling into each cluster is given in brackets. The 6th cluster was an outlier cluster of 5 cases, and was omitted from the analysis.

Table 9 contains the results of the analysis, indicating what are the items that are chosen by the given group of people in marked distinction from the averages, and how strong is this difference. Out of the six clusters of the 7- and 9-cluster solutions, five are very similar in both cases. Therefore, the two solutions will be interpreted jointly, but the emphasis will be laid on the 7-cluster solution, as there were less outliers here. (88) The analysis below will provide a typology of mayors; a definition of subtypes within the general type that emerged from the analysis of the simple distribution.

The first cluster of C7 corresponds very strongly to cluster 4 of C9; this will be called as the first Hungarian type. This cluster manifests a very strong relative rejection of the attitude of

complaining. It is this lack that defines the cluster, as there are hardly any items which they select above average. This type can be interpreted as defining one pole of the first unrotated Hungarian factor. But it also has a more specific pattern. First, it is closer to first rotated than the unrotated factor. Second, it has a slight change of colour. This type particularly strongly rejects authoritarian attitudes (701/8), and was very much outside the former system, have no personal connections whatsoever (701/7). The mayors belonging here also manifest a strong pragmatism, an attitude of getting things done. They strongly reject those items that try to evade responsibility in general terms (701/3, 6, 10), pointing out the impossibility to act, or blaming the government (701/9) - although this latter is not a central issue -, and less perceive the presence of general, unfounded popular expectations (701/4, 702/11). The only complaints with which they sympathise to some extent are the ones compatible with their external status (702/7) and pragmatism (702/8): they realise to some extent the limits of everyone, including themselves, instead of building up a picture of the enemy and an outlook of hopelessness.

One word of methodological caution should be given here. We have already seen in the analysis of the rotated factors that there is some tendency in the structure of the data to split along the three blocks of the items (701/1-11, 702/1-4, 702/5-11), especially in Hungary. This suggests that the interruption of "complaining" and the interview statements with the comparative items did disturb somehow the responses, they did not harmonise completely with the statements of the first part. Some reasons for this possible "bias" have already been given on p. 52., where we stated that the repetition of results we got for the averages may have to pay the price of less clear internal structure. This hypothesis gets strong support from this cluster, as the kind of pragmatic, non-complaining mayors may well have got bored with the similar questions, and their attention may have decreased. But, as crucial connections between items (for e.g.. between 701/4 and 702/11, or 701/7 or 702/7) were present even here, the possible bias should not be prohibitive.

In sum, we found a strong contingency of pragmatically minded mayors in the sample, who were able for a degree of self-criticism, and also felt themselves very much outsiders (over 15% of the valid cases fall into this cluster). This type will be referred to as the PRAGMATIC type.

The second cluster of C7 corresponds to the third cluster of C9. It was similar to the previous in the sense of rejecting rather than approving the statements in general, especially the complaints. But the profile of this type is quite different. Firstly, there are no differences here between the two parts of the set, questions 701 and 702. Second, the central problem of this group is not the non-pragmatic character of complaining, but its explicit or implicit hostility to the government. The statements that refer to the present government (701/3, 6, 9) or establish identity between the present and the past systems (702/5, 7) were vehemently rejected by members of this group. A look at the actual averages of these two items shows that these were extremely low, in midway between the disagree and strongly disagree categories, implying that practically all members of this group uniformly rejected these statements, and the difference between them was rather due to response style (stressing or not stressing disagreement).

But, apart from rejecting the criticism of the changes, especially the new government, this group also disagreed with the statements blaming the others. This, however, had again a specific pattern. There was no above average disagreement with statements that can be interpreted as general complaints against "the" people, especially concerning their expectations (701/4, 702/6, 11); while very strongly were rejected those statements that had a connotation the changes (702/9, 10). The tendency is clear: this type of mayor, with its strong commitment to the government and the new system, was hostile to all statements that were suspected to debase, undervalue the changes, but took issue less with those that could be interpreted as manifestations of the "ungratefulness" of people, who expected too much too soon, did not evaluate enough the hard work of the mayor and especially the government in general. With some exaggeration, supported by the average selection, therefore the strong agreement with item 702/6, one could say that this group considered themselves and this government to be too good for "this people".

The previous reading gets a strong support and an even more lively colour if we turn to those items that this group selected above average. These form two clear, separate conceptual groups that we also connected together, defining the third rotated factor. There is an above average agreement with three of the four comparative statements (701/1, 2, 3; 702/4 had practically no variance or covariance in the Hungarian sample, therefore was missing from practically all factors and clusters). Thus, again, the

pro-government group had a definite welfarist-socialistic orientation. But much more important are the other three statements selected above average, especially because in the case of two of these, this agreement was especially strong (701/1, and especially 5 and 8). There is a clear, strong authoritarian tendency providing a link between the disagreement with the blaming of the government, and an agreement with the welfarist items.

The profile of the type is therefore complete. The political characteristics - strong allegiance to the present government; the ideological orientation - welfarist-socialist; and the attitude toward the people - blaming their ungratefulness; is coupled with a clear personality profile: an inclination toward authoritarianism and one-man rule; to keep all things in hand (701/11 that was present in the respective factor is missing from here, because it has covariance, but no variance). This type has a lower presence in the sample, 15-20 of the 200 mayors that could be analysed here belonged to this group; thus, about 10% of the sample. As a short-hand, this type will be called the ANTICOMMUNISTS. (89)

The third cluster of C7 (comparable to cluster 8 of C9) takes up some of the characteristics of the second; those which it did not share with the first. This is again a type of mayor whose presence was already indicated by the third rotated factor: authoritarian, possessing a strong personality, and urge to take everything in his hands and arrange accordingly. But this type has an opposite assessment of the changes. It is hostile to the government, and has, by all probability, encountered personal hardships in these times (this is the way the original interview situation defines 701/10). Because of these dual fact, links to the past and bad experiences in the changes, it does have a general hostility toward people in general, but includes himself as being shaped by the past as well. The additional information contained in C9 is particular interesting: it contains a marked agreement with the self-referring complaint (702/8) and relative disagreement with the item (702/6). This may also be due to the fact that this type has no problems about his immediate work-connections (701/2), although it does not necessarily consists of former personal contacts (701/7 is not strongly selected).

In sum, this type is another type inclined to authoritarian methods, affiliated, however, not to the present, but to the past system. It does not have a particularly strong ideological

tendency, probably lost that, just like the system has lost its "claws" before the final collapse, and endured hardships, accumulated grievances. All this made it more self-reflexive, less arrogant and sure of himself. Perhaps because of this, it did not complain as much in general: it disliked strongly the government, but - perhaps because of the strong authoritarian inclinations of his personality, and the connections from the past - did not feel himself impotent. This was a considerable group, including 33-35 respondents, thus around 1/6 of all cases used in this analysis. It will be referred to as the COMMUNIST type.

The fourth group had the clearest, most easily interpretable profile. Besides the strong tendency to complain, and to complain together, characteristic of the whole sample, there was also a not inconsiderable group of people who complained even more than the average. Mayors belonging to the fourth cluster in C7 (the sixth in C9) agreed with almost all statements containing complaint much more than the average. They blamed the government and their fellow workers, complained about their lack of possibilities, and about the expectation of people in general. This extreme urge to complain especially manifested itself in the first question set. (90) Significantly, one complaint was chosen only at the average level: the one that was also referring to one-self, item 702/8 - although one could say that this was the one the explained this particular response- (or subjectivity-) type. This group was strongly authoritarian at the level of attitudes, did not see a continuity with the former system in terms of the salvaging of the nomenclatura (702/7), and agreed with one comparative item (702/3). On a methodological note, let's remark that this group did not select all items above the average, was therefore not comparable to the positive pole of a simple general factor, as all non-complaining items, with a small and partial exception, were selected only at an average level, which in some case (see for e.g. 702/1) implied a very strong rejection.

In sum, it was possible to define a compact type of subjectivity that manifested the general attitude of complaining, present in the population in general, in a particularly clear and strong form. This was a type of mayor with strong authoritarian inclinations who lacked a sense of self-control. Significantly, this was by far the largest type, including 60 mayors (almost one third of the sample studied). Let's call this the COMPLAINING type. (91)

The fifth cluster (cluster 2 in C9) was again defined by a kind of attitude to complaints. The kind of complaining strongly present in cluster five is against people in general, including especially oneself. This group clearly rejects authoritarian ideas, and has no explicit complaints against neither the government, nor the remains of the former system. But he perceives a very strong, overwhelming hidden, lasting legacy of the former regime in the way people behave with respect to each other, including, with particular strength, himself (almost all mayors in this group strongly agree with statement 702/8). Curiously, this is the only group where the comparative items present some distinctive traits: this group exhibits less the welfarist tendencies than the whole sample, especially concerning distribution according to need (702/3). (92)

In sum, this is a group that considers the situation almost hopeless, due to the strong hold of the former system in thinking and behaviour, and is therefore less convinced about the need for welfare rewards. The main idea is that the problem is with the "people", with human beings, and the blame cannot be externalised, but is present in each and all. However, this is fitted into a softer, perhaps Christian, and definitely not authoritarian context. This is a small cluster, containing about 20 people, or 10% of the sample. We'll give it the short label of HUMANIST.

Concerning these five clusters, instead of minor shades, there was a strong overall agreement between the C7 and C9 solutions. However, the sixth valuable cluster of each solutions was quite different. In C7, this manifested a strong hostility to the government, together with an authoritarian attitude and a blaming of popular expectations, while rejecting all considerations of self-blame, and items that indicate current strength or discretionary position.

This makes one suspect some kind of remains of the former system that is very hostile to the present system and where this opposition prevented them of being able to see themselves in any other way than unjust victims of the changes, that rendered them helpless. In C7, 25 people, or 1/8 of the sample belong to this loose group. They will be called the VICTIMS.

C9 gave a different solution, a cluster (its fifth) that manifests in a in a different combination some of the tendencies of clusters 2

and 3. These are people who were unconnected to the past system, who support the government, but who feel themselves abandoned or betrayed by "people" - their expectations, their cynicism, and the way they were not working properly, or even hindering the work, the carrying through of the changes.

Because of its closeness to type in putting the emphasis of the human factor, but its opposite evaluation of some items and the different shade of the whole ensemble, let's call this the ANTIHUMANIST type.

6.2. The Czech and Slovak results

The comparative study of cluster patterns presents even more methodological difficulties than that of the factors structures. There, it was possible to define the number of factors to be retained, and then proceed on a case by case comparison, using similarities of the factor structures given by obvious methodological considerations. Here, the specification of the clusters will be a much more cumbersome, heuristical task, the direct comparison of clusters across countries being all but impossible. Therefore the following strategy was used. The same table was created from the output as in the Hungarian case, indicating which items characterise, positively or negatively, the different clusters. Then, looking at the results, we selected items that seemed to be especially strongly defining the different clusters in all three; items with the consistently highest variance in their cluster means. (93) This analysis left us with eight items, four from each sets (701 and 702), four of which were particularly strong defining most of the clusters in all three countries. They were called the "main variables"; these are especially items 701/6, 8, 702/5, 11, and also 701/9, 10, 702/7, 9.

Now, in the next step, we could now compare the results of the different countries only among these eight variables, therefore reducing the complexity with the minimal possible loss of information, and could see whether the individual clusters of the different countries could be made correspond to each other. In this analysis, especial emphasis was laid on the 7-cluster solutions (C7), as the 9-cluster solutions (C9) did not seem to provide better results, the number of outlier clusters being higher in all three cases. The analysis will follow the following order. First, an attempt will be made to compare the different clusters, to see whether it is possible to define more or less uniform types; and

second, the Czech and Slovak results will be analysed in detail by comparing the deviations from these "uniform types", the Hungarian case, and each other.

Table 10. Comparing the Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak clusters

clus-ter	701/ 6	701/ 8	702/ 5	702/ 11	701/ 9	701/ 10	702/ 7	702/ 9
HU-1	-!	-!		-	-!	-!	+	
HU-2	-!	+	-!	-	-!	-	-!	-!
HU-3		+	-	+	+	+!	+	
HU-4	+!	+!	+!	+	+!			+
HU-5	+!	-!	+	+!	-!	+		+
HU-7	+!	+		+	+!			-!
CZ-1	+	+!		+!	+	+		+
CZ-2	+	-!	+!	+!	-			+
CZ-3	-!	+!		-			-	
CZ-5	+	+	+	-!		+	+	
CZ-6	-	-!	-!	-	-	-	-	
SL-1	-!	+!		-	-!	-!	-	
SL-2	-!	-!	-!		+!	+!	+	-
SL-3	+	+!	-!		-	+	-	-
SL-4	+!	+!	+!	+	+!	+!	+	+
SL-7		-!			+	-	+	

The results of the first step are contained in Table 10. They show two things. First, it was possible to make a relatively straightforward identification of cluster types across the three countries. There were two sets of clusters that were almost uniform in the three countries according to the "main variables" (in the Table, HU-2, CZ-3, SL-1; and HU-4, CZ-1, SL-4), and a further third with a strong common pattern (HU-1, CZ-6, and SL-7). There were one common Hungarian-Czech (HU-5 and CZ-2) and one Hungarian Slovak clusters (HU-3 and Sl-3). Somewhat surprising, exactly the common Czech and Slovak type was missing from the possible options. Finally, each country seemed to have possess one mayoral type that was completely missing from the other countries (HU-7, CZ-5, SL-2). Second, it is also clear that these "common types" are only very broad frameworks, attitudes, and are not yet the "life-and-blood" characters we gained in the Hungarian case by the full analysis of all 22 items. Therefore, in

the characterisation of the clusters, we'll not use as yet the labels given in the Hungarian case.

The common types can be roughly characterised in the following way:

- 1. There is a type that has a broad tendency to agree with all the complaints, without much exception or difference in any countries. Using the Hungarian cluster numbers, we'll call this type-4. It includes HU-4, CZ-1, and SL-4. This is by far the largest group in Hungary (almost 1/3 of the sample); smaller in the Czech republic (1/4), and quite minor in Slovakia (10%).

- 2. There is an opposite type, disagreeing with most complaints, but also showing a very strong authoritarian tendency (type-2, including HU-2, CZ-3, SL-1). This type is small in Hungary and the Czech Republic (around 10%), but is the largest in Slovakia (between 1/3 and 1/4 of the sample)

- 3. In the first two types, the agreement between the three countries is very considerable. In the third type, there are more divergence. This is a type that is disagreeing with most complaints, and rejects authoritarian solutions (type-1, containing HU-1, CZ-6, and SL-7). The difference is that in Hungary and in Slovakia, this "pragmatic" type feels outside, agreeing with 702/7, while in the Czech republic, there is no such perception. Second, while this type does not feel the government as hindering his work in the Hungarian and Czech cases, does feel so in Slovakia. This type includes around 1/6 of the sample in Hungary and the Czech Republic, and somewhat less, 1/8 in Slovakia.

- 4. Two of the Hungarian types had a corresponding group in one of the other countries, but not in the other. (94) Type-5 reflects a complete identity between the fifth Hungarian and the second Czech clusters of C7. This is the 'humanist' type considering that the major problem lies not the government or external circumstances, but in the people themselves, but is not favouring authoritarian solutions. In Hungary, this is a small type (10%), but in the Czech sample is much more present (1/4-1/5).

- 5. The third Hungarian cluster corresponds somewhat to the third Slovak cluster (type-3), although in the case of those two variables that already created some confusion (701/9 and 702/7) the divergence are very strong. This type general agrees with the complaints, but has an especially strong authoritarian tendency. In Hungary, this type was characterised as having close links to

the past system. The differences in some variables may be therefore due to the closer connection between the present government and people exposed in the past system in Slovakia than in Hungary.

The common types can thus be characterised by two broad cuts: according to broad, general agreement or disagreement with most of the main variables (because the non-complaining items had much smaller variance and covariace in Hungary, all the "main items" voiced some kind of complaint), and agreement or disagreement with the authoritarian attitude, 701/8 (this item had a quite low covariance, but due to its very high variance, it had a crucial role in the definition of most clusters).

After this short comparative assessment, let's return to the description of the results of the individual clusters, in order to see whether we can characterise the types as clearly, perhaps even in exactly the same manner, as in Hungary. As the main lines of the three countries have already been compared, the analysis will proceed cluster by cluster in the Czech and Slovak cases.

The results for the Czech and Slovak samples are contained in Tables 11 and 12. (95) As a general comment, the profiles of the types were less clear than in Hungary. There was less variance in the cluster means, as it indicated by the informative F-values, and therefore also less items are present in the Table, defining the clusters.

Let's proceed with the analysis by the order of the Hungarian clusters. Cluster 6 is the equivalent of the "pragmatic" type (type-1) in the Hungarian sample, but has a somewhat different orientation. In the rejection of the general attitude of complaining, the emphasis is less on pragmatism and activity, but on the assessment of the changes. This is particularly clear by the different evaluation of item 702/7. It must have considered as expressing hostility toward the changes in the Czech sample, therefore rejected by this group, while more the description of a perceived threat, an external position in the Hungarian. The assessment of item 701/3 is also different. Its above average acceptance contradicts the pragmatism of the Hungarian type. The reason of this difference may be that the sentence had a somewhat different shade in Czech, where it could have been interpreted in a positive sense, of being left alone, i.e. not being bothered. An important common colouring is given by the acceptance of self-criticism (702/8).

Table 11. The Czech cluster solutions

Cluster	Strongly present	Present	Absent	Strongly absent
C7/1	701/6, 8, 9	701/1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11	702/1	
(#=32)	702/11	702/6, 9,10		
C7/2		701/6, 11	701/9	701/8
(#=24)	702/5, 8,11	702/6, 9,10	702/1	
C7/3	701/8		701/1, 11	701/3, 6
(#=14)			702/2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11	702/3, 4
C7/5		701/2, 6, 8, 9, 10	701/1, 4	702/11
(#=37)		702/1, 5, 7		
C7/6		701/1, 2, 3	701/10	701/6, 8, 9
(#=18)	702/1	702/8	702/6,7, 11	702/5

Table 12. The Slovak cluster solutions

Cluster	Strongly present	Present	Absent	Strongly absent
C7/1		701/8	701/2,5,6,7	701/9, 10
(#=47)		702/1, 2,	702/7, 11	
C7/2	701/9, 10	701/2, 3	701/6	701/8
(#=21)		702/7	702/1,3,8,9	702/5
C7/3		701/1, 5, 6,	701/4, 9	
(#=43)		8,10	702/7	702/5
		702/3		
C7/4	701/2,4,5,6,	701/1,		
(#=15)	7, 8, 9, 10	702/6, 7, 8,	702/3	702/2
	702/5, 9,11	10,		
C7/7		701/9	701/1, 2, 5,	701/8
(#=21)		702/1, 7, 8	10	702/4
			702/3	

Thus, it seems that behind the general attitude of rejecting the complaints, a different phenomenon is present in these two countries. In Hungary, it is complaining that is opposed to pragmatism, more along the lines of the general framework of the paper, focusing on subjectivity as a predisposition at the level of being, and not just an attitude; while in the Czech sample, it is

more simply a question of rejecting negative assessments of the changes.

In Slovakia, the shades are again different. The dominant colour of this type (C7/7) is neither pragmatism, nor the assessment of the changes, but authoritarianism. In fact, this cluster can hardly be said to define an anti-complaint attitude. It is strongly disagreeing with all those statements that were defining the authoritarian factors, not only in terms of attitudes, but also personal conduct. Similarly to the Czech and the Hungarian cases, this group also acknowledges some legacy of the past in first person, and, like the Hungarian type, feels himself outside the present system. This is even stronger here, as in Slovakia, this type has very negative attitudes versus the government. This difference, however, is not due to the difference of the type, but of the different kind of political system in which this type seems to be working.

This only confirms that in fact, it is meaningful to talk about a common mayoral type in all three countries. There is a consistent group of mayors in all three countries that has a pragmatic, matter of fact attitude to the problems of his work; that strongly rejects authoritarian styles and attitudes; that is willing to do introspection about the lasting impact of the past; and that is very hostile to what it perceives - it seems, quite correctly, as the main threat to the solution of current problems. These, however, are different in the three countries: in Hungary, the complaining; in the Czech Republic, a scepticism toward the changes; in Slovakia, the government and the strong direct legacy of the past. Taken all together, we can talk about a uniform type, and the use of the term PRAGMATIC as a short-hand seems justified.

The profile of type-2, even if not as specific as in the Hungarian case, is still very close. The first difference is that in the Czech and Slovakian cases, the authoritarian profile does not give as much a distinct picture of personality and work style as a simple matter of attitude and opinion. Second, the link to welfare values is missing in Slovakia, and is working in the opposite direction in the Czech sample. Third, the specific combination between rejecting the blaming of the government and also strongly resenting the popular expectations and attitudes is missing from the other two cases; or rather, it is exactly concerned these items, but in a different way, that the specificity of this "authoritarian" type can be defined. The Slovak type is quite close to the Hungarian. It is here that the rejection of any complaint that may be thought of as criticising the government is especially strong; and also, perhaps surprisingly, claims no links to the past. The difference compared

to Hungary is that the relative resentment against the others is missing (this may be partly due to the fact that some of these items, like 702/9,10, may have gained a specific connotation in Hungary), and even this group manifested some kind of self-criticism. (702/8 slightly above average).

In the Czech sample, the major difference with respect to the other two countries is that there is no specific presence of an attitude with respect to the government. It is a clear-cut authoritarian type, disagreeing strongly with any statements that could be interpreted as implying a lack of a scope for action (701/3, 6), and also with socialist-welfarist statements. It also disagrees with general statements establishing the legacy of the past in people, whether in others or the self. It seems that this type in the Czech republic is a straight-forward right-wing authoritarian type, relatively neutral to the past or present political scene.

Type-3 is missing in the Czech sample, and its presence even in Slovakia was also not completely clear. The more detailed analysis has shown that there are two clear-cut set of attitudes defining this cluster in Slovakia. The first is a general authoritarian attitude and work-style, present in both countries, in a form that indicates some direct link to the past system, identical to the Hungarian case (701/1, 8, 702/3). The second is a major difference in the assessment of the present government: hostile in Hungary, friendly in Slovakia. In this, there is nothing particularly new. It is quite feasible that former council heads with a strong, authoritarian style, and clear nostalgia for the past system, were re-elected in Hungary, in hostility to the government, re-elected also in Slovakia, and having more friendly terms with the government; and loosing their position much more in the Czech Republic. The question is whether the difference between type-2 and type-3 in Slovakia makes sense, as in Hungary, these two authoritarian types were defined according to there attitude to the present government.

Of course, by the logic of cluster analysis, there must be strong differences between the profiles of the two clusters (C7/1 and 3). Therefore, these those clusters were compared again, by a very detailed reading. This showed that these cluster were indeed relatively close (the distance between these two cluster centres was the smallest of all), but there was a crucial difference in two key items (701/6 and 10). These three had a strong tendency to move together in all three countries, both in the factor and cluster analyses, defining a uniform view of the changes and the new

government. However, exactly these define the difference between these two clusters in Slovakia. Here, there are two authoritarian types, both supporting the government, who differ, however, mostly in the assessment of these two statements; and here diametrically. Together with the other smaller differences (701/2, 4, 5, 702/5, 8) the following interpretation can be given. The mayors belonging to cluster one have a "cloudless" picture of the changes and the government together, while those is cluster three seem to have encountered some troubles, especially concerning their concrete surrounding and the means at their disposal. They seem to me much more connected to the authoritarian one-man rule of the former system of local government, and compared to this, they feel that their hands are tied. The differences in the items related to cynicism and corruption is particularly revealing. The "happy authoritarian" mayors strongly disagree that cynicism characterised the changes, but are divided, like the sample in general, about corruption. Those who feel their hands are tied, however, claim much more than the average, and especially the mayors in cluster one, that they encountered cynicism, but strongly disagree about the growth of corruption. This may represents the larger sensivity to this issue; but perhaps it is more convincing to argue that this type perceives that the new system gives less lee-way to possibly uncontrolled personal rule. Therefore, the two types can clearly be separated even in Slovakia. In the first cluster, the emphasis is on the strong approval of the present system, while in the third cluster, it is rather on the close links to the past.

Type-4 should again be a type where all countries are in a large agreement. In Hungary, this was the clear "complaining type". In the Czech republic, the shades are a bit different: it is also quite hostile to the government, but the general level of complaining is somewhat lower. and is more distinctly authoritarian. One could hypothesise that while in Hungary, it was a general tendency of complaining and helplessness that defined this type, more or less independently of personal-authoritarian tendencies, in the Czech republic, the causality is reversed: it is a frustrated authoritarianism that leads to complaints. The Slovakian results are a combination of the previous two: a very high level of complaint (many items characterise this cluster, and quite strongly), and also strong authoritarianism. The major difference is that here, this is only a small minority type. The similarities are still strong enough to enable use to use the label COMPLAINING to this type.

Concerning type 5, the similarities between the Hungarian and Czech case were reinforced by the detailed analysis. The description given for the Hungarian case can almost be repeated word by word. This is a non-authoritarian type, refusing to blame the government, but seeing very strong legacies in the way people conduct themselves - not excluding themselves. We can use the label HUMANIST.

Finally, some words about the specifically Czech or Slovak types. First, it is important to note that the specifically individual types are not very stable even within the countries. Thus, the fifth Czech cluster disappear in the 9-cluster solution, similarly to the seventh Hungarian cluster, and only the second Slovak cluster has a persistence in the other solutions out of the clusters that have no equivalents in the other countries. It is certainly reinforcing to see the marked stability of the clusters across both different countries and different kinds of runs. It both helps to increase confidence that the results are not spurious, and also that the types are "real". In order to complete our picture, let's give a short description of the remaining individual clusters.

The Czech fifth cluster does not have very strong characteristics, but the differences from average form a clear pattern. Still, the closer inspection revealed that this type is not different from type-3, that was thought to be missing from the Czech sample, on the basis of the main variables. This group shows a distinct hostility toward the new system and the changes, but there is a quite strong rejection of one item, 702/11. It was this latter characteristics that prevented us from linking this cluster to the Hungarian and the Slovakian ones in the prior classification, but we can define it as an idiosyncrasy and assert the identity of the type. Therefore, we can we can establish the identity of the COMMUNIST type of mayors as well in the three countries.

Finally, the cluster that was only present in the Slovak sample is, but quite strongly, was quite peculiar. On a first look, in this group, items that usually went together were at the opposite pole (701/3 and 6, 701/8 and 9; 701/10 and 702/5). Nevertheless, it is possible to give a consistent interpretation of this cluster if, going back to our heuristical table, we chose the differentiation according to references to the self and the others. Mayors in the group had a very strong tendency to agree with all complaints that blame only the others, but directly and locally (701/2, 3, 9, 10), and reject all statements that have a negative implication for the self (701/6, 702/5, 8, 9). Therefore, this group happens to be quite close to the seventh Hungarian cluster terms as "victims".

The major difference, making the recognition of this common type difficult, was that the modalities of this self-victimisation were different in the two countries. In Hungary, it was more internalised, connected toward to the "deep self", a sense of helplessness and a lack of ability to have control over the surroundings, coupled with authoritarian attitudes. In Slovakia, it manifested itself in a hostility toward the immediate surroundings, a discharge of the anger; and yet, exactly here, there was a disagreement with the concrete application of authoritarian methods. Still, in spite of the difference, as in both cases we found a marked gap between attitudes versus the self and the others, we can talk about a common type, and label it as VICTIM.

6.3. Summary

All the previous analyses confirmed a basic similarity between the three samples and countries concerning some of the broadest and most surprising attitudes and views. We have seen that it was possible to confirm the presence of most the Hungarian types in the Czech and Slovak samples, with a refined analysis being able to account, in a consistent way, even for most of the differences. And yet, concerning some of the most important- perhaps: the crucial - aspect, some doubts still remained. As the Czech and Slovak profiles were somewhat less characteristic than the Hungarian ones, it remains in question whether we can talk about a difference of real types. In part, all this may have been due to the relatively high percentage of missing data in the other two cases. But this does not explain everything. Instead, it seems that we have to acknowledge that while in Hungary, the typology derived confirmed our hope of defining real types of subjectivity at the level of being, and not just of opinion, in the former Czecho-Slovakia, the typology is more of the order of opinion.

Several facts support this assessment. First, the clear dividing line in Hungary between complaining and non-complaining items is more blurred in the other two cases. There, the first unrotated factor indicates more the well-known general psychological predisposition usually referred to as the g-factor, and not a very specific "existential" predisposition of complaining. Second, the

four comparative items that were almost missing from the Hungarian clusters and factors were much present elsewhere, both as a separate factor, and as moving sometimes closely together with the other items. Third, the cluster types were much less characteristic than in Hungary, and for a number of reasons. First - and this may in fact be due to the effect of the missing cases - they had less stability, the difference between control runs being greater than in the Hungarian sample. Second, the number of items whose average in a given cluster was noticeably below or above the population average was smaller than in Hungary. Therefore, it was less easy to specify different kinds of complaints. Finally, as a result of all these, the profile of the types were less characteristics. Instead of the very plastic ones given for the six Hungarian types, it would be much more difficult to construct a personality for the Czech and Slovak clusters. They are much more partial, defining only types of opinion that can be divided, without a high degree of error, into four attitudinal variable: authoritarianism, relation to the past system, relation to the changes and the present system, and an attitude of complaining.

6.4. Control runs

Given these results, two control runs were decided to check upon the extent of the possible presence of the types of subjectivity discovered in Hungary in the other two samples. In the first, a corresponding index was computed for each original Hungarian type, in a very simple way. The numerical values of all items that was more agreed in the given cluster than the average was added together (in case of large difference, multiplied by two), while the values of items relatively disagreed with were subtracted, using the same weighting. (96) Because strong agreement was coded as "one" and disagreement as "four", the smaller the value of the index, the more present this type of attitude is in a particular subgroup, sub-sample, or cluster. (97)

The concrete analysis pursued was the following. The value of the six indices corresponding to the six Hungarian types of C7 were computed for the five Czech and Slovakian clusters. If a particular type were absent from these countries, or unrelated to the country-specific clusters, the cluster averages would not be

different. On the contrary, the presence of a type, a strong, significant difference across countries would not only indicate this presence, but also would give a statistically significant, even if only indirect, confirmation of the typology, as in this case, the usual caveats against the application of F-tests for cluster averages do not hold, due to the use of independent samples.

First, as a control analysis, the indices were computed for the Hungarian clusters. This analysis had no statistical significance, but the results confirmed that they have a very good power of distinguishing the types. For types 2, 4, 5 and 7, the dividing line between the respective cluster and all the others was very clear, in terms of the value of the index and the indicative F-statistics. For types 1 and especially 3, the line is less clear. The ANTICOMMUNIST type happened to be close to the PRAGMATIC type, because both rejected much of the complaints (but not vice versa!); and the COMPLAINING type was close to the COMMUNIST type, due to the opposite reasons (though the reverse is again less true).

The Czech and Slovak results basically followed the expected patterns, reinforcing the previous conclusions, but not adding anything fundamentally new. (98) First, let's review again the Czech results. The averages of all the indices differed significantly across the clusters, though the F-values were in general much lower than in Hungary. (99) In most cases, this was due to the fact that the range of the cluster averages was wider in Hungary. As a rule of thumb, we can state that both the highest and the lowest values in the Czech clusters corresponded to the second highest and lowest in Hungary.

A few cases merit some special notes. First, by far the largest difference among the cluster averages in Hungary was in the index of the COMPLAINING type, while in the Czech republic, this is exactly where the F-value is the lowest. This is another confirmation of the quite different attitude toward complaints in the two countries, not just in the sense of the levels, but in general, the discriminating value, the strength of the pro- and contra feelings. Second, in the sole case of type 3, the F-value was higher in the Czech republic than in Hungary. But the reason in simple. In Hungary, on the basis of the indices, it was difficult to separate the COMPLAINING type from the type that was hostile to the changes in general. In the Czech republic, however, no such two types could be separated, therefore the closeness of the two types did not "disturb" the F-value of index there as in Hungary. Third, just as it was expected on the basis of the direct comparison

of the clusters, the seventh Hungarian cluster could not be related to any of the Czech cluster types, the value of all of them being low in this index, some of them extremely. It shows that this particular attitude as completely absent in the Czech republic, while for all the other five indices, the population averages were quite close, only the range of the cluster averages was smaller.

Much of the previous discussion about the similarity, but less clear profile of the results apply for the Slovakian case as well. In general, concerning the discrepancies between the Hungarian and Czech cases, the Slovakian results indicated some kind of middle position. So, the presence of the COMPLAINING type was definitely more marked (the average of this index for the respective Slovakian type was even higher than in Hungary), and somewhat more distinct here (the F-value being higher than in the Czech sample). There was some kind of difference between types three and four, even if less pronounced, indicating a difference between complaining and direct hostility to the changes in Slovakia. The seventh Hungarian type was absent even here, according to this index. Moreover, because here, even the profound counter-sentiment was absent, the differences of the cluster averages on the index were so small that the F-value was not significant on the 0.01 level.

There was one marked difference between the Czech and Slovak samples. While the Czech results showed less variance around more or less the same Hungarian average, in the Slovakian case, the variance here is similar to the Czech, but the averages are lower for type 1 and 2, and higher for types 3, 4 and 5. This is due to the much stronger average presence of complaints in the Slovakian case.

In the second control run, an attempt was made to directly check upon the presence of the Hungarian types in the Czech and Slovak data. In a cluster run, the seven final Hungarian centres were given as the initial centres for the other countries. It is well known that the type of cluster analysis techniques used is are quite sensitive to the choice of initial centres. As earlier several different runs were compared, and as the emphasis was more on the partitioning of data than the recovery of "objectively" separate clusters, given by well-defined stochastic processes, such an experiment could not possibly invalidate the results discussed so far. But it was interesting to see in what way the data respond to this "artificial" imposition of cluster centres.

Peculiar attention should be paid for two points. First, it is important to note in advance that where there are marked difference in the population average of the Hungarian and the other samples, a marginal value in a Hungarian cluster may represent only an average (or, to the contrary, a quite extreme value) for the other sample, and vice versa. Second, the initial cluster centres are not exactly artificial. They represent a clear partitioning of the general space into seven sectors that lie broadly in the area where most of the individual cases should be, as the country differences are not that great. Therefore, it will be quite difficult to redefine in a substantive way the imposed cluster centres. The data therefore should be used for a very good comparative purpose: to compare the exact, percentage weight of a comparable respective types in the different countries (better terms!)

The first question is whether the types can be identified after the optimisation, or whether the original Hungarian profiles were lost. In the Czech case, the clusters have been somewhat "re-shaped" by the major division lines of the Czech sample. The welfarist attitudes could not "re-enter" the classification, but the differences were much more according to authoritarianism again than in Hungary. The PRAGMATIC and COMMUNIST types became defined by differences according to authoritarian views, and not styles of being. Also, differences in the evaluation of the government were much smaller, in most types. But, in sum, it was possible to recognise all the six Hungarian types in this kind of "guided" analysis of the Czech data.

The same is true, and even more so, in the Slovakian case. Here, if we take into account that some of the differences, compared to the own-sample average, may be due to the considerable differences between the country sample averages (see especially 701/6 and 702/8), the patterns are almost identical.

These results are quite important, as they indicate that the partitioning of the Czech and Slovak spaces by Hungarian criteria do make quite good sense, they define a partitioning that will not be changed much by the subsequent optimisation procedures. The initial guess that it would be difficult to alter significantly the original partitioning of the space was therefore confirmed. The next question is to compare cluster membership, to check upon directly the quantitative prevalence of these "types".

6.4.1. Summary

The results of Table 13 show crucial, conclusive, summary differences between the three countries. The PRAGMATIC "type" (I will use quotation marks because it is an imposition of the Hungarian results to the other cases) has a clear presence in both Hungary and Slovakia, but in the Czech Republic, it becomes dominant. The ANTI-COMMUNIST "type", with some hostility to the people, is small even in Hungary, and is all but absent in the other two countries. The COMMUNIST "type" has a clear presence in both Hungary and Slovakia, but is more marginal in the Czech case. The COMPLAINING "type" is by far the most widespread in Hungary, and to some extent even in Slovakia. It is clearly present in the Czech Republic as well, but is not a dominating influence. The HUMANIST "type" is much more present in both parts of the former Czecho-Slovakia, than in Hungary. (100) Finally, the VICTIM "type", hostile with respect to everyone, is almost completely absent in the Czech sample, and is very marginal even in Slovakia.

Table 13. The frequency of the types in the 3 countries

Country	C7/1 PRAGM	C7/2 ANTI-C	C7/3 C.ST	C7/4 COMPL	C7/5 HUMAN	C7/7 VICTIM
HU	17%	10%	18%	31%	10%	13%
CZ	43	7	10	21	17	3
SL	21	5	18	27	22	7

7. Conclusion

7.1. Preliminary remarks

After performing the empirical analysis, we should go back to our theoretical framework, and assess what the data have confirmed or rejected. At least, this is what the standard approach of the "scientific method", inspired by logical positivism, would assume. According to the formulation of Popper, for e.g., theory should be formulated in clear, distinct, refutable hypotheses. The purpose of the empirical analysis is to see whether these hypotheses should be refuted, or can be - always only temporarily - maintained. Therefore, the empirical results are assumed to "objectively" sit "judgement" over the theory. Further intervention of the "subject", the researcher, is considered a source of error and idiosyncrasy.

According the methodological approach followed in this paper, the exclusivity of this standard approach cannot be accepted. It is certainly true that all theories imply a necessary reduction of complexity. Without this price, it is not possible to think. (101) However, when elements of such theories or conceptions are formulated into statements or hypothesis that could be empirical tested and falsified without further intervention on the part of the investigator, a further, and often very considerable reduction of the complexity is achieved. (102) Therefore, the elimination of the "subject" entails a price. If the problem is such that this further reduction entails no significant loss of information or complexity, and/ or there is a good reason to be "suspicious" of the subject (personal interests, emotional motivation, lack of distance from the problem studied), the approach of logical positivism is perfectly suitable, even necessary. If, however, the problem is such that it incorporates some of the more difficult, circular, or even self-reflexive elements of reality, the application of the clear-cut, objective methods of the natural sciences, the turning off of the sense of judgement, or rather the diacritical power of the investigator, is too high a price to pay for the seeming objectivity of the results.

Therefore, this paper will not claim that the theoretical ideas or hypotheses were supported or refuted by the data. In this particular case, it probably would not even be possible at all. How could one confirm the existence of "types of subjectivity" at the level of being, using the methods of survey research? The aim is rather to revisit the theoretical approach after the intervention of the data, to assess the difference such data made in our picture of the analysis of the reality of the East European transition process. The consideration is the following. It has been shown in detail how the data analysis followed its own methodological logic, trying to bring out everything contained in the concrete data set with long, inquisitory procedures, and not trying to "prove" a preconceived interpretation. The aim now is to bring and interpret the two together, without assigning a hypothetical order of causality or primacy. It is assumed that concerning the specific problems of this paper, such an approach could advance knowledge and the solution of concrete problems more than the pursuit of a strict "scientific method". The point of the empirical analysis is not to decline responsibility, and leave every decision to the objectivity of significance tests (where, of course, everything is conditioned by the previous reductions of complexity and the exclusion of certain options accomplished by the researcher), but to consider empirical data as giving both limits and directions to the possibility of interpretation; thus, make a difference to thinking. (103)

Finally, this paper only provides a first analysis of some of the results, therefore does not claim to prejudicate the conclusions of the whole research project.

7.2. Homo sovieticus vs. civil society

One of the crucial issues of the communist systems, both from the perspective of social theory and daily reality, was the attempt to create of a new society and a new man. After all, this was what It was also the aspect found most alien and repulsive by all those

who were affected by the phenomenon, and that has been theorised in the early works on totalitarianism. However, as the ideological fervour and the police terror of the regimes subsumed, such considerations lost their importance in the Western theoretical literature since the mid-1960s. But they were revived by the dissident literature of the 1970s. When detente was at its height, people from the East began arguing that overt repression and terror is declining because the system has already succeeded to indoctrinate the population. (104)

Such pessimistic views, in turn, were discredited first by the rise of Solidarity, and then, in a seemingly decisive manner, the flood of changes in 1989-90. The despairing notion of "homo sovieticus" was exchanged with the optimistic slogan of the civil society. The very fact of the changes, it was argued, clearly proved which of the two opposing views was true. (105)

However, even at the very time of the changes, there were signs indicating that things were more complicated. One of the most surprising aspects of the East European transition, at least from an external point of view, was the relatively little popular enthusiasm these changes received. There was nowhere widespread and quick nostalgia toward the former systems, at least in East-Central Europe, and the elections gave a definite verdict, but enthusiasm and optimism was very subdued. The Hungary of 1956, the Prague of 1968, the Poland of 1979-81 was not repeated in 1989-90, or only for a very limited place and time. Hungarian attitudes were known to be particularly sceptic in this respect, but were not alone. According to an opinion poll published in 1990, well before the drawbacks of 1991-92, the overwhelming majority of the population had very dark views about the future in front of them. (106) Not just the revolutionary enthusiasm was low, but even more so the determination to go ahead, to solve the problems, to finally take charge of the affairs . Instead of a new start, gradually a vicious circle have appeared; the mechanisms of the former system that collapsed completely were starting to reassert themselves at all levels. The whole debate between the adherents of "civil society"

and "homo sovieticus" gained a new dimension. The question was no longer the desirability of socialism or communism, but the lasting effects of this system at the level of daily life, of existence, of the human beings living in it. Pessimism, hopeless, cynicism, the view that nothing will change anyway, the flood of complaints all indicated the frightening validity of this model.

During and after the interviews we conducted in Hungary and Slovakia, the most surprising, new, shocking thing we found was the extremely widespread and high level of complaining. We perceived it directly, as this was a feeling that dominated most of the interviews. For quite a time, we ourselves were drawn by the spell of the stories, and sympathised with them, but after a time, realised that something was wrong. The impact was also indirect, as it was only once we selected all the statements we found the most interesting in the interviews that we realised that most of these were in the form of complaints.

The data collected certainly reconfirmed this feeling, in the strongest possible terms. It was possible to diagnostise an extremely broad and deep attitude of complaining in all three countries studied. These complaints had many different targets. Not all of them were agreed upon by the majority, and there were important internal differences concerning most items. And yet, there were two aspects of these complaints that transcended all internal divisions: a profound sense of helplessness, and an almost uniform agreement with the blaming of "others".

First, we found a strong presence of a feeling of helplessness, a view that under the conditions, it is not possible to act, to do anything. This was not just defining a particular type within the sample, but was the most important tendency present in especially the Hungarian sample. (107) This is a far from trivial result, especially considering our specific sample. Our respondents were all elected office-holders in charge of the affairs of their locality, of their rebuilding after the devastating legacy of forty years. (108) This requires a lot of efforts and hard work, but also offers the possible rewards of success - at least, so it looks "from

the outside". It is all the more surprising why so many of those who are "inside", who should be the actual agents of this transformations, who are at the same time as close to reality as possible (thus, not simple central representatives, who can do the same paper-work as before), but who also have considerable power at their hands, in all sense of power (thus, not just simple "citizens", lacking all means) had such a pervasive sense of helplessness and hopelessness.

There are two ways to explain such complaints in an "objective" manner. First, it may be explained by the too close ties to he past. It is well known that the majority of elected mayors in both Hungary and Slovakia were the former "communist" council heads. But in a sense, this only begs the question, as it can easily be reformulated: why were these people elected now, under completely legitimate circumstances? The idea of the massive communist conspiracy to maintain power must be ruled out as a monster story (even if not a fairy tale) in these countries. Was it rather so because there was nobody else who wanted to take up this position? If so, was this because it was a hopeless job - as the situation was perceived as hopeless?! What is the link here between perception and reality?

This leads to the second possible short-circuiting towards "objectivity": the reference to the economic difficulties. The discussion of this theme, the relative importance of the "objective" or the "subjective" components of the complaints, would require at least a separate article. Such a problem can obviously not be "decided" upon by survey data. However, the other crucial common element of the results give a strong indication that the reference to the "objective" conditions as the sole explanatory factor does not work. While the previous point was about the relation to oneself, the conduct of self, this refers to the relation to others. The most widely accepted complaints were about others in general.

Concerning the assessment of the current government, the leftovers of the past regime, current associates and the

importance of former friends. opinions differed. But there was almost complete agreement with statements about "people" in general. These were about their unrealistic expectations, their lack of a proper attitude to democracy, the insufficient attention to performance; even accepting the summary statement about "people" being not suited to a Western type democracy.

Such statements can again be interpreted in at least to way: as simple complaints, or as factual assessments. But that would not make much difference for our purposes, that was to document the specific characteristic and the importance of the "subjective" aspects of them transition process.

7.3. The gap between self and other

The previous two points can be summed up as documenting a profound gap between the self and the other; a decline of responsibility towards oneself, due to the profound feeling of helplessness, and the entertainment of profoundly hostile sentiments towards the "generalised other". In fact, this indicates an almost Hobbesian situation of the war of all against all, and even supports the feeling that even if the state of "civil war" was no the "natural state" of mankind, it may well have been created by the dissolution of order - a situation not far from the England of the mid-17th century, and not without theoretical and paradigmatic relevance. This gap also recalls the gap between the two parts of the comparative items, as Hungary. Needless to say, both gaps indicate a detachment from reality.

These considerations also shed a very specific light on the particular dynamics of the events; a dynamics that is a special combination of the way events are lived on the basis of contemporary and past feelings and expectations, shaped fundamentally today by the mass media. The dynamics coming out of these statements is incompatible with any ideas according to which 'people" were active participants of these changes, in a manner comparable to what happened in Hungary in 1956 or in

Poland in 1979. The picture is rather the following. People lived for decades in a system that they never liked, did not identify with it in any positive way, but that they eventually took for granted, thought impossible to alter, and built it in a matter of fact way into their own world.

This happened in three steps, whose intensity and duration were different in the different countries. The first is the coexistence of high expectations and mobilisation on the part of some, and fear and terror for others. The second is given by the routinisation of the system, with the maintenance of hopes on both levels: for some, that the values can be realised; for others, that the system will eventually collapse. The third the period of hopelessness and despair. For the second group, it happens after the collapse of the major effort to shake off the system (1953, 1956, 1968, 1981); for the second, whenever it is realised that "communist Paradise" is not to arrive. This reached into the heart of the apparatus in the late 1980s.

This has succeeded in accomplishing what the earlier popular uprisings could not realise. In the most unexpected way, this system collapsed. A new system is emerging, explicitly or implicitly taking over many of the promises of the former system (the end of dictatorship, liberty for all, economic development, etc.). The change is coming out of the blue; the expectations return. What else could all this change mean if not the final realisation of the promises? As these changes, even if follow "logically" of the working of the system as such, were not felt as necessity or possible by those working and living in these countries. Hardly anyone felt the changes coming, and was even less working consciously on the destruction of the system. The result is this profoundly ambivalent, dual attitude at the breaking point: on the one hand, the often stated view that for most people, the change of system not just did not mean much, was not even perceived; on the other, the return of some kind of chiliastic hopes. The end result, however, is the same in both cases: profound disappointment and disillusionment, a gap between

desires and possibilities, dreams and reality; a dangerous, highly explosive situation.

In this whole analysis, centring upon, but not restricted to the latest East-European experience with "modernisation", there seems to be a recurrent theme: the reference to the loss of a sense of reality.

7.4. Disenchantement or loss of reality?

It is widely asserted that for Weber, modernity involved the disenchantement of the world, the loss of its mythical character, in favour of simple, down-to-earth, materialistic concerns. One could debate both the correctness of attributing this position to Weber, and of the idea itself, for modern societies. But it is beyond doubt that in the case of East Europe's experience with the different waves of "modernisation", it is not the "mythical", magic character of existence that seems to be lacking, but the very sense of reality. Throughout the paper, we encountered wide gaps between aspects or elements that should have belong together: unbridgeable gaps between rights and duties, the self and the others, supply and demand, domestic issues and international debates. Encountering such wide gaps and a lack of a sense of reality at the local level may help to understand, and perhaps even repair, some of this mysterious deficiencies that characterise political and social life in these countries at the national level as well. Because, if we look at both elite and popular attitudes and opinions, we find the same things again.

First of all, this separation between "elite" and "mass" itself indicates a gap that is too simplistic and invalid in a current Western context. For many, the validity of such a separation is in question. However, looking at almost any aspects of the current political life, starting from political and electoral participation to the organisation of interests and the formulation of programmes, it is clear that there is no point is shying away from the existence of such a gap.

Within the elite, there are two different, widely shared systems of view, powerful both at the level of current policy-making and the broader system of background ideas and principles, that dominate the scene: one is market-oriented neo-liberalism, taking over and trying to repeat some of the current strategies applied in some Western societies, the other is nationalism, relying upon past, indigenous values. At the level of ideas and principles, they are as distant from each other as possible on any meaningful issues, often questioning even the consensus that was shared by all parties shortly after the collapse of the communist system. What they share is that they are both completely unrealistic.

It is not surprising to see American economists preach the unrestricted values of the market economy, and to believe sincerely that the solution of all social problems depends on the right setting up of prices. It can be accepted, as the taken-for-granted assumptions of the model are not that far from reality in those cases, and the system, in spite of all failures, and in spite of the moral judgements one may have about its mechanisms, does work more or less in this way. But when "indigenous" economists repeat the same things, when responsible policy-makers try to convert these receipts in reality, when leading philosophers and social scientists praise Hayek and Friedman today as the greatest thinkers of our century, and if their books are the new Bibles of the students at the universities of economics and the social sciences - then something is seriously going wrong. The problem cannot be attributed to "capitalism" and the IMF - the latter has its own reasons -, but is due to this fundamental loss of common sense, the loss of touch with reality.

The same is true for nationalistic ideologies. The two world wars, with the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the difficulties of its inheritor states made it obvious that these countries reached a dead end, that the former paths taken led to nowhere. It was this disorientation, among other things, that made possible the Bolshevik take-overs. After the end of W.W.II, there was no responsible segment of the domestic elites in these countries that

believed that the previous road taken was in any sense "normal", or provided a viable alternative. The only change forty years of communism made in this respect was that it completely and irreversibly destroyed all the remaining elements of the former, indigenous cultures. There remained nothing from the past, its customs and values, that could provide a stable orientation for the conduct of life today. Therefore, anyone who would preach today a return to our East-Central European, or national past, our heritage, or own values, must have lost all sense of reality as a result of the last forty years. The only values that were preserved and that may have made life bearable under the former system were exactly those values that hinder activity, the solution of current problems today. It is easy to see that whatever was of value under certain circumstances - passive resistance, a retreat into oneself and the immediate surroundings, a refusal to go into the open air, a repression and withdrawal of all active and creative sentiments and instincts - is the greatest hindrance when possibilities open up, when activity and responsibility becomes possible.

The same lack of reality, of turning away from the genuine problems into chimeras is characteristic of popular attitudes as well. There are three issues that are the hottest, most dangerous elements of current political life: anti-communism, anti-Semitism, and anti-alien (especially anti-gypsy) sentiments. It is around these themes that popular mobilisation, so minimal shortly after the changes, seems to focus. Now, apart from their extreme sensitivity, all three issues seem to share a number of common characteristics. First, still, none of them is able to move truly large masses. Even today, such sentiments are voiced by some small, but increasingly vocal minorities, at the right wing of the established political parties, and even more in some extra-parliamentary groups. Second, apart from the very specific case of gypsies, whose presence created constant conflicts at the lower levels of society in the past, and which cannot be discussed here in any detail, all these were issues that were hardly at all present around the time of the political changes.

Concerning the first, around 1989-90, it seemed that hardly any communists were left in these countries; and the communist parties gave up their power in most cases without a single shot. In 1945, immediately the end of the war, popular sentiments against fascists and war criminals immediately were high. People wanted revenge; the enemies and the guilty were close, and often easily identifiable. Whatever is one's opinion about the correctness and legality of these procedures, the closeness to reality is obvious. In 1990, however, nobody really cared about the actual former communist functionaries. The fact that this issue is dragging on, and becoming always more pronounced today, is a proof of the inability of handling real problems, and the increasing loss of reality.

Much of the same is true for the issue of anti-Semitism. Today, a lot of things are said about the "repression" of this issue in the post-war period, the lack of publicity given to the Holocaust and the insufficient public discussion of hidden anti-Semitic sentiments. And immediately after the changes, even in the period of the first elections, this re-appearance of anti-Semitic feelings were soon claimed. However, as some of the best and most reliable observers immediately pointed out, (109) it is simply not true either that anti-Semitism was a major undercurrent in these societies after W.W.II, or that any kind of massive anti-Semitism would have appeared around 1989-90. Quite the contrary, generations grew up who had a good historical knowledge of the relevant facts of W.W.II - this was quite well detailed in school-books on history -, and who could not even understand what anti-Semitism was about. (110) Therefore, they claimed that this issue does not exist, its warming up was just a ruse of the former communist party, an attempt to divide the opposition.

And yet, today, it seems that this assessment is not correct. The rise of anti-Semitism cannot be assumed away. Still, I would claim that the argument about the disappearance of anti-Semitism and the lack of a profound, hidden continuity was correct. The problem, however, lies not in the others, but in the selves. The

problem that was not seen in 1990 is that the stereo-typical image used by anti-Semitism actually correctly characterises the mainstream attitudes of the whole population - independently, of course, of any ethnic background.

The central elements of the anti-Semitic stereotype are the following: living a withdrawn life, far from the public, building up only closed, limited circles, considering everyone else by definition an enemy, favouring only friends, considering personal loyalty much more important than actual performance, trying to gain from others in single, unclear financial transactions as much as possible. This is a life-style tailor-made for living under hostile conditions, in an "enemy" territory, considering oneself as captive and victim, who therefore have all legitimate right to do whatever one pleases against those whom are considered as the privileged, the oppressors. Just a short glance at this list can make it obvious why today, in East Europe, anti-Semitism does not require the actual, clearly distinguishable presence of people with a Jewish religion or identity: because, no matter the original value, this characterisation fits perfectly a very large segment of the actual "non-Jewish" population! There is, therefore, a deep, real root of the rise of anti-Semitism in these countries; and it is to be searched in the lack of ability to face one's own being. Anti-Semitism in the 1930s meant the search for a scapegoat for one's own dire conditions in a subgroup that was different, but very much present in daily life. In the 1990s, it is an escape from oneself.

The same thing holds true for the hostility against the gypsies. In this case, the stereo-type is that gypsies (and aliens in general) live off from society, at its margins; they do no productive work, only perform odd jobs, abuse and extort whoever they can, pick up the easiest parts of the work, and try to get the highest pay; steal whatever they can move, and if they get caught, they immediately complain about their hard life, their dire needs, and always decline all responsibility. In short, they lead a parasitic existence. Now, again, independently of whatever elements of truth this stereotype contains, and whatever reasons can be given

for it, the really huge problem is that all this provide a strikingly correct self-description of an established, quite wide-spread East European life strategy. And, as it was already outlined, it is this parasitism that even has a paradigmatic value on East-West relations in general, from economic links, both at the micro and macro level, up to scientific and cultural co-operation. No wonder that today, when such parasitic relations became again more visible and widespread, paradoxically due to the increased freedom, the sentiments against gypsies and aliens, the "living mirrors" of this attitude, are again rising.

Finally, the same things hold true even more obviously concerning contemporary anti-communism. Because, in a sense, this whole paper reflects the extent to which "we are all communists now", exactly when and due to the fact that nobody acknowledges it today; that the erasure of this communist legacy requires extreme efforts and a lot of work on oneself, and not the simple assertion that "I am not a communist" (which, today, has the equal value of the statement "I am not mad"); and that this is what not many people are willing to accomplish. Anti-communism, anti-Semitism, and hostility toward gypsies and aliens is rooted in East Europe not in a fear from the other, but in a fear of facing oneself, and of confronting head on the real problems. To assess which fear is deeper and more dangerous is an interesting and crucial theoretical and practical issue. (111)

Of course, so far, neither the nationalist vs. neo-liberal alternatives, nor the extreme popular opinions are shared by the respective majorities. The daily, pragmatic necessities take precedence, both at the elite and mass levels. This is a phenomenon that may again seem very well-known from the standard practice of contemporary Western political life, where there are often loud public debates, and menacing and extremist social movements, but after all, a reasonable compromise would always be worked out, and the extremists eventually loose their teeth. However, this perception again relies upon two things that are taken for granted as a matter of fact in the West, but are non-existent in the East. The first is stable political life and

professional, accomplished politicians; the second is "civil society", not as an ideal to be realised, but as the very material of civilised daily existence.

The current, centrist, pragmatic configuration is therefore highly unstable in most East European countries. Pragmatism is ruling so far solely because of inertia, and not because sensible equilibrating mechanisms would exist.

The previous discussion implies a number of "policy" conclusions: both for West and East. It is not the task of this paper to detail them. To mention only one, the closing of the gaps uncovered, and the securing of stable mechanisms; the need to work out methods to establish these "safety cushions" for democratic and civil life are at least as important as the study of the constitution-making process, the elaboration of the legal mechanisms for a market economy, the development of the party systems, or the "safety nets" of social policy. Without the former, something - perhaps: the most important thing - will always be missing. (112)

Notes

(1) See Hennis, Wilhelm (1988) Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction, London: Allen & Unwin.
(2) This is elaborated in detail in Chapter Three of the book on Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault in progress, to be published as a Working Paper of EUI entitled "What is Genealogy?".
(3) In a rare example of the link between study and reality, the analysis of the data was much hindered by the delays of the processing of the data by the Hungarian polling agency. Thus, after almost half a year after the survey was done, I still do not have any data related to occupation, and none of the open-ended questions have been yet coded. This obviously hinders the full analysis.
(4) It was these media struggles that first made it obvious for everyone, both inside and outside, that strange, unexpected things are happening in Hungary.
(5) In the past system, there were two major roads for the education of journalists: one was studying in Moscow, in a special university; the other was taking up at the University of Economics the same specialisation as future diplomats did.
(6) It is interesting to note that the three areas that are at the center of the continuity - discontinuity debate are the same three areas that Max Weber considered to be the only occupations that are still vocations: politics, science, and - perhaps - journalism. Without prejudging the oncoming analysis, let's just mention that the common point between the problem of Weber and the problem of this paper may be the inherent ethical questions involved, in contradistinction to moral issues or matters of fact
(7) This paper follows the meaning of Heidegger, not Marx.
(8) This is the way Foucault defined the modern perception of death, following Bichat. See *Naissance de la clinique* (Paris, P.U.F., 1963), Ch. 8. and Conclusion.
(9) For an excellent analysis on the importance of style and forms of human interaction in communist and post-communist societies, see Jadviga Staniszkis, *The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991), esp. Afterword, and Elemér Hankiss, *East European Alternatives* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1990), esp. Ch-s 2-3; the two best works available in English on the on-set of the transition (although much of the best related work of Hankiss is available only in Hungarian; see his books *Diagnózisok* I and II (Diagnoses), Budapest, Magvetö, 1982 and 1986; and also his articles written around 1980 and published in Valóság). Incidentally, as the titles of these works show, the importance of style is not identical to meaningless attention paid to mere words. Though writing mostly

about their respective countries, Poland and Hungary, neither of them is using "politically correct" words (Central Europe, East-Central Europe, etc.).
(10) The question, therefore, is not the eternal fixity of one's convictions - an impossible and pointless option; or the readiness to follow always the current mood - mere opportunism; but the way one is able to accomodate his or her views to the changing external world, and nevertheless preserve composure and autonomy. This is, of course, is the exact opposite of the "moral" requirement of today: loud, public break with the past, and wholehearted adherence the new parties.
(11) See Elemér Hankiss, Róbert Manchin, László Füstös, and Arpád Szakolczai, "Continuity and Break: the Analysis of the Value System of Hungarian Society, 1930-1978". Research report, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1983.
(12) See his "The Subject and Power", in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (University of Chicago Press, 1982).
(13) See the definition given by Bruce McKeown and Dan Thomas: "Subjectivity, in the lexicon of Q methodology, means nothing more than a person's communication of his or her point of view ." (in *Q Methodology* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1988), p.12.). See also Steven R. Brown, *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science* (New Haven, Yale U.P., 1980), p.4.
(14) About the role of media in the East European changes, see the works of Deirdre Boden, 'Reinventing the Global Village: Communication and the Revolutions of 1989', EUI, mimeo, 1992.
(15) This topic also offers itself for a comparative analysis of style.
(16) The difference between the stakes of the Southern and Eastern European transitions can be illustrated with the following remark. Fascist authoritarianism in the Latin countries was the period where the state was thought to embody as much reality as the world itself; while East European communism was a period in which the daily world was thought to be as irreal as the state and its institutions were always seen. The first was an error after which one could almost return to business as usual; in the second, there was no "business as usual" left afterword. This point cannot be emphasised enough. Human existence always and everywhere is based on the "taken for granted"; so much so that it is never noticed explicitly, comes out only in anthropological or hermeneutical descriptions. The problem of the current transition in East Europe is that it is this taken for granted world that - simply no longer exists. Compared to this, all talk about "property", "markets", or "social policy" is peanuts.

(17) It is this closeness that prevents most observers to notice the profound difference between East and West Europe. With the countries of the Third World, the differences are obvious at first sight. Concerning East Europe, one is so struck first by the similarities that the fundamental differences become invisible.
(18) See Andrew C. Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945* (Princeton University Press, 1982).
(19) This is the reason why the long debates about "the crisis of values" never led anywhere: because all segments of the elite were always talking about the "others", and never about oneself. No wonder that the style of Elemér Hankiss, who wrote in first person plural, evoked such strong responses, and even explicit searches for this "mysterious we".
(20) Thus, it is not surprising that the best works combining classical sociological theories and empirical survey methods focused on questions like social mobility and political participations; areas that called for the study of individual behaviour, but subordinated it to the study of social, political, economic, or legal structures.
(21) In the spirit of rational choice theory, anyone not accepting this theory would simply assume that others are not acting rationally, thus questioning their real humanity. This may be termed the democratic blackmail of rationality.
(22) See for e.g. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), Jon Elster, ' When Communism Vanishes', *London Review of Books*, 25 January 1990; and Timur Kuran, 'Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European revolutions of 1989', *World Politics* 44 (1991), No.1.
(23) Weber even applied the contemporary methods of survey analysis, for the study of the East Elbian rural labourers, done in 1892-93. See his 'Developmental tendencies in the Situation of East Elbian rural labourers', *Economy and Society* 8 (1979), pp.177-205.
(24) This was all the more justified as contemporary American sociology badly needed a proper intellectual foundations, and the earlier efforts by the most respectful men were not successful. Thus, Albion W. Small, who founded the first Sociology Department in the U.S. in Chicago, tried to connect sociology to the German tradition of social policy (yes, the *Polizeiwissenschaft* !), see his *The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Policy* (University of Chicago Press, 1909); while Veblen and others to Hegel and contemporary German historical school.
(25) See the works of Giddens, Parkin, Skocpol, Wallerstein, M. Mann.

(26) From Weber, one can refer to the *Critique of Stammler* (1906), published with an excellent introduction by Oakes. There are also peculiar, and perhaps spurious, connections between Weber and Heidegger. For e.g. Weber is using a language in the Protestant Ethic (like the terms *Dasein* or *Existenz*) close to the central terminology of Heidegger. This does not come through in English translation, though.
(27) For the best recent example, see the work of Wolfgang Schluchter.
(28) In this way, it is possible to reinterpret the loud debate in the period of structuralism about the "death of man": "man" was the unitary being who replaced and disvalidated the pluralism of human beings implied by characterology. See Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (N.Y., Vintage, 1973), and Jacques Derrida, 'The Ends of man', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 30 (1960), pp. 31-57. This pluralism, of course, will return with psychoanalytic methods, as variation of the same type, aiming to detect deviance.
(29) See George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker, 'De Gustibus non est disputandum', in *American Economic Review* , 67 (1977), No. 2. .
(30) See Hennis, 1988, and Wolfgang Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1974), though their interpretations are quite different; and also Hendricks, J. and C. B. Peters, 'The ideal type and sociological theory', in *Acta Sociologica* 16 (1973), pp.31-40.
(31) There has been quite a shift recently in revaluating such links. To see this, one only has to compare the indexes of books written about Weber in the 1960s and 1980s. In the former, Nietzsche most often is not even mentioned; in the latter, he receives as much atention as Marx or Durkheim. For a few studies, see Wilhelm Hennis, 'The Traces of Nietzsche in the Work of Max Weber', in Hennis,1988; Robert Eden *Political Leadership and Nihilism: A Study of Weber and Nietzsche* (Gainesville, Florida, 1984), and 'Weber and Nietzsche', in W. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Max Weber and his Contemporaries* (London, Allen, 1987); David Owen, 'Autonomy and 'inner distance': a trace of Nietzsche in Weber', in: *History of the Human Sciences*, 1991, 1:81-91; Peter Lassman and Irving Velody, 'Max Weber on science, disenchantment and the search for meaning', in Lassman and Velody (eds) *Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation'* (London, Unwin Hyman, 1989); and Colin Gordon, 'The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and Government', in: Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (eds.), *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity* (London, Allen, 1987), that also makes the link to Foucault. Such links, and their substantive and methodological

relevance, will be elaborated in detail in the book mentioned in note 2.

(32) At this point, even Nietzsche was not clear enough. One could say that for the topic of the analysis of the self-reflexive aspects of subjectivity, Nietzsche takes up exactly the same place as Adam Smith in economics, Machiavelli in politics, or Descartes in philosophy, that are at the origin of the modern discourses, but do not completely belong there. They made almost single-handedly the transition, their ideas are fresh even today, much fresher than most of their immediate followers, but still contain many false directions and left-overs of the past; so much so that perhaps exactly this makes them so enjoyable even today

(33) See Joseph Bensman, Arthur J. Vidich, and Nobuko Gerth (eds), *Politics, Character, and Culture: Perspectives from Hans Gerth* (Westport, CTC, Greenwood Press, 1982), p.213. See also Paul Lazarsfeld, *Quantitative Analysis: Historical and Critical Essays* (Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1972), Ch. 13, 'Philosophy of Science and Empirical Social Research'.

(34) For short but exhaustive reviews, see Everitt, Brian, *Cluster Analysis* (London, Heinemann, 1984), and Aldenderfer, Mark S. and Blashfield, Roger K., *Cluster Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1984)

(35) On Q methodology, see note 13.

(36) See Everitt, 1977, p. 2.

(37) See Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984, p. 7, and Foucault, 1973, p.xv.

(38) This was a recurrent topic of Foucault's lectures given at the Coll`´ge de France in 1980 and 1982.

(39) For the details, see Gábor Péteri (ed), *Events and Changes: The First Steps of Local Transition in East-Central Europe* (Budapest, LD & I Foundation, 1991).

(40) This tendency in Hungary was noticed shortly after the elections. For an excellent analysis, see László Lengyel, 'Fürtökben hullanak a csillagok' (The Stars are falling in clusters), in *Világ* , 1990.

(41) Our own experiences, though no doubt limited, did not reinforce the general scepticism about these elections voiced both by governmental figures and intellectuals. When we went back in 1991 to the places where we made interviews in 1989, we realised that the council heads we found competent, pragmatic and serving the interests of their locality were reelected, even if they had the "proper" party background, while the more questionable characters were rejected.

(42) Thus, in Hungary, it was estimated that 70% of the former local council heads have been reelected as mayors; see Két választás Magyarországon 1990-ben (Two elections in Hungary in

1990), (Budapest, KSH, 1991), p.43; in Slovakia, this number was only estimated at 20%; see Beba Bodnárová and Gejza Blaas, 'Local Elections in Slovakia', in G. Péteri (ed), 1991.
(43)
(44) The topic has already been discussed by us in different theoretical papers. See Arpád Szakolczai, 'On the Exercise of Power in Modern Societies, East and West', EUI Working Papers, 1992; and with Agnes Horváth, 'The Discourse of Civil Society and the Self-Elimination of the Party', in Paul G. Lewis (ed.) *Democracy and Civil Society in Eastern Europe* , Macmillan, 1992. This will not be repeated here, but, for the particular purposes of this paper, a further elaboration will be offered.
(45) For a contemporary example for such a use of the term, see the word "civiltà" used by Italian newspapers on the occasion on traffic controlls implemented during the smog of January 1993. It referred to showing restraint in one's on conduct (in the case, driving cars), by favouring the public good (clean air) over private interest (comfort). This use also had the trick that it was not just "civiltà" that was involved in this business, but there was an agency inforcing this civiltà: the other synonym, the other side of the coin, the police. Therefore, the paradox is clearly present even in this use: was such behaviour due to voluntary *civiltà* or only obedience to threat (the large fee of 100000 liras)? Or, from a slightly different perspective, is it not a preempting and devaluing of the term *civiltà* and the links to the self, identity, and the conduct of life, if it is closely associated with a simple rule of conduct that is enforced by the repressive organs of the state?
(46) See Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process, Vol. One: The History of Manners* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978), and Reinhart Koselleck, 'The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric Counter-Concepts', in *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1985)
(47) For the best exposition of both of these views, see John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London, Verso, 1988), and John Keane (ed.), *Civil Society and the State* (London, Verso, 1988).
(48) Agnes Horváth and Arpád Szakolczai, *The Dissolution of Communist Power: The Case of in Hungary* (London, Routledge, 1992), Ch. 9.
(49) Due to the importance of the term "social movements" in modern sociology, the strong links between the terms civil society, social movements, and alternative life-styles, it is perhaps not pointless to insert here some comments on the use of the term "movement" in the former regime in East Europe. As it was this term that provided the self-definition of the former system in its everyday life. The term "party" was not used very often, perhaps

due to the same reasons why the term "God" is little used by Christians (the third commandment); and the word "state" never had a truly positive meaning. It was different with "movement". Work done within the framework of the communist party or its youth organisation was called "work in the movement"; those who had done it before 1945 had a "past in the movement". "Movement" was a short-hand for the workers' movement, but gained independent meaning and significance. Therefore, it is this word that has become much more difficult to use, and not the word "party".

(50) See Antony Black, *Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the 12th Century to the Present* (London, Methuen, 1984), and Paolo Prodi, *Il Sovrano pontifice* (Bologna, Mulino, 1982), translated as The Papal state, published in1987.

(51) The discussion on the use of the "middle option" is often put into the language of "constraint"; of "forcing" people who do not have opinions to chose among alternatives. However, in certain type of questions, the issue is not so much the creation of artificial responses, as make respondents think. About this, see Jean M. Converse and Stanley Presser, *Survey Questions* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1986), pp.36-37.

(52) These are items 702/1, 2, 3, 4. The source is Susan Welch and Timothy Bledsoe, *Survey of Council Members in Large American Cities, 1982* , ICPSR 8655 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1987).

(53) In the following, the statements will be referred to by their code, as it was not possible to given them short labels, without losing important information. I have to repeat that such a close, descriptive analysis of the data is necessary for the kind of link between empirical data and theoretical considerations that will be established in this paper. For more, see the first section of the concluding remarks.

(54) This "bio-political" character of the activity of the former communist party at the village level was documented in our study with With Agnes Horváth entitled "Végvárak: A párt falun" (Fortresses: The party in the countryside). Research report, Department of Sociology, University of Economics, Budapest, 1989. The reference to "cradle and grave" may seem close to the concerns of the welfare state. There is even a book entitled "From Cradle to Grave", written from a neo-liberal - neo-conservative perspective. However, the difference between the two cases was obvious. In the East, it was not restricted to matters of assistance. The continuities between the two systems, of course, are numerous, and should indeed be studied. But the proper method for doing so is to follow the genealogical method, and not direct, politically charged involvement in contemporary political debates. One should only recall Weber on science as vocation

(55) About this, see Arpád Szakolczai and Agnes Horváth, 'Information Management in Bolshevik-type Party States: A Version of the Information Society', *Eastern European Politics and Societies*, 1991, No. 2, and also Horváth and Szakolczai, 1992.
(56) It was selected among the top ten values from a list of 32 by 46% of the respondents in a national representative sample of 1462 cases, while values like material well-being, useful work, success and the possibility of advancement were selected by 44%, 38%, 15%, and 27%, respectively. See Arpád Szakolczai, A magyar társadalom értérendszerének elemzése sokváltozós médszerekkel (The analysis of the value system of Hungarian society with mathematical-statistical methods), Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1983.
(57) One could argue that some of these statements are simple stereotypes. But this does not explain why certain statements become stereotypes; and why and to what extent do people identify with them, especially in a a specific context, related to their current work and status.
(58) See Horváth and Szakolczai, 1992, passim.
(59) In the French debate around the end of the 18th century, the central issue was how property rights could be assigned without the possibility to abuse - meaning idleness. The English case was upheld as an example by some as there, even the possibility of such idleness was allowed. One could, of course, argue that it was possible only because it has become socially marginal, therefore become irrelevant. This whole debate was discussed in several articles of the *History of Political Economy* in the early 1980s.
(60) All Western debates on liberal and libertarian principles are conducted in a space where certain things are considered simply as "natural", or true by definition. However, these assumptions simply do not hold in East Europe, or, for that matter, in any non-Western context. It is one question to debate, theoretically, whether all private interests automatically led to a public optimum, and how to deal with externalities and other marginal issues. It is another question what kind of a complex, minute, detailed configuration makes it possible that such a statement could be uttered by anyone with a genuine hope of being taken seriously. To pronounce it in the context of East Europe with respect to any period of the last four or five hundred years would not be a rational expectation, but sheer madness.
(61) The difficulty in making sense of East Europe is that one has to suspend three sets of deeply rooted prejudices, when in general even one is difficult: first, about the "naturality" and "rationality" of modern Western society, without saying anything value-ladden for or against; second, the prejudice to view the situation from the

prism of Western political divisions and ideologies, especially if it is coupled with a refusal to listen; and third, getting bogged down in the minute details and debates of the East European countries. And, to top it off, in spite of all these intellectual operations and bracketings, one has to preserve one's sense of reality.

(62) See Hankiss, 1990, Ch. 9, and Staniszkis, 1991, Ch. 2.

(63) See Agnes Horváth and Arpád Szakolczai, 'Political Instructors and the Decline of Communism in Hungary: Apparatus, Nomeclatura, and the issue of legacy', *The British Journal of Political Science* , 1991, No. 4. This was also reinforced by interviews we made in 1991 with former communist party functionaries.

(64) On acquiescence, see Bernard M. Bass, 'Authoritarianism or Acquiescence?', in *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology* 51 (1955), 3: 616-23; Dean Peabody, 'Attitude Content and Agreement in Scales of Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, Anti-semitism, and Economic Conservativism', in *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology* 63 (1961), 1:1-11; and Leslie L. Carr, 'The Srole Items and Acquiescence', *American Sociological Review* 36 (1971), 2:287-93.

(65) The analysis with always be started the Hungarian data, as this is where both our questionnaire and our competence is located. The percentages are recalculated on the basis of the valid percentages, as there was some difference in the pattern of missing responses across countries.

(66) About this, see G. Péteri, 'Similarities and Differences of Local Processes', in Péteri (ed), 1991, pp. 14-5.

(67) One could object that this sentence is only a slogan, and we are just playing with words out of context. However, our point is the opposite: all such statements, all truisms are specific; they are discursive events; they are created, and with a reason, and have a very real political sense.

(68) See Elemér Hankiss, 'Ez még nem a Kánaán' (This is not yet the Promised Land), *Világ* , 1990.

(69) The original Hungarian term for feeling abandoned was "orphaned". This is quite often used in ordinary language, but still does have a strong meaning.

(70) See László Bruszt, 'Without Us, But For Us?', in *Social Research* 55 (1988), no. 1-2.

(71) Note that there was no item in the 60-70% range; there was a wide gap between statements with which there was overwhelming agreement, and where the majority of agreeing over disagreeing was quite small.

(72) In fact, this has done more than anything else for the "repoliticisation" of society at that time

(73) In order to see whether differences in meaning could have distorted some of the results, the Czech and Slovak questionnaires were double-checked. However, only a few minor differences were detected. In item 701/3, the actual meaning was somewhat more neutral than in the original Hungarian questionnaire. In the case of item 701/6, the actual word used was not "shock-absorber", but "lightning-conductor", and for item 702/11, instead of the "Promised Land", only well-being was mentioned.
(74) Correlation and covariance analysis can be used for this purpose.
(75) We are well aware that there are some misgivings about the properness of performing factor analysis to discreet data with only four response categories. Nevertheless, there are four reasons why we consider such a practice possible. First, this method is robust enough to recover the structure even with such a high degree of data error. Second, we have a sufficiently large number of cases. Third, we possess comparable, independent data sets. Finally, in the case of exploratory data analysis, a lot depends on whether the results make sense, can be interpreted.
(76) About this, more will be said at the beginnings of the conclusion.
(77) In the principal component solution, the eigenvalues of the first five factors were 3.68, 1.74, 1.48, 1.26, and 1.20 respectively. Therefore, factor analysis was done for three common factors. The corrected eigenvalues of the three factors were 2.98, 1.00, and 0.64.
(78) In fact, such a high loading means that about half the total variance of the item is explained by the factor.
(79) In the following analyses, emphasis will be laid on the results of factor analysis (shortened as PAF, the name for "principal axis factoring" in the SPSS package). However, in order to prepare the interpretation of the results of cluster analysis, occasionally reference will be made to the principal component solutions (PC), as the main difference between the two methods is that PAF is a covariance analysis, while PC combines variance and covariance analysis, and in this, it is similar to cluster analysis.
(80)
(81) This poses an important theoretical question: does an emphasis on *discretio* have to go together with authoritarianism? The specific role of the "police" in modern societies would certainly support this idea: policemen are the individuals who combine most authority and discretionary judgement. The contrasting of the different tracks of the Greek *diacrisis* and the Latin *discretio* in Western societies, having roughly the same original meaning, would also be a fascinating topic.

(82) According to the logic of factor analysis, of course, the opposite can and should always be mentioned: the non-authoritarian mayor may not be in agreement in this statements in the same way
(83) The communialities of items 702/1 through 4 were extremely low, around or even well below 0.10, while for ten items, they were above 0.25.
(84) Item 701/8, the authoritarian statement, is particularly interesting in this sense. It has the highest variance of all items in all three countries, but its covariance is low. It was therefore not decisive in the factor results, but was very important in defining the clusters.
(85) This shorthand, used by László Füstös, was working well in the analyses we have done in Hungary.
(86) Even in Hungary, where there were very few missing responses on most individual items, this meant that cluster analysis could use only 200 of the 246 cases. In the other two countries, the situation was even worse: sample size dropped to 161 in Slovakia, and 132 in the Czech Republic.
(87) In the future, we'll use the short-hand C7 and C9 for the 7- and 9-cluster solutions. The similarity between the two solutions manifested itself not only in the "behaviour" of the items, but even in the number of cases. Apart from the list-wise runs, we have done pair-wise analysis for 7 and 9 clusters, because of the larger number of missing cases. However, because of the peculiarities of the results, the strong tendency to create a very large cluster and many small outliers, these two runs are used only as controls. The reason for this phenomenon, by the way, escaped us.
(88) This can be supported by two points. First, the analysis which excluded outliers did not result in clearer, but in more blurred results, indicating that the outliers were not extreme cases to be excluded, but only cases that manifested tendencies in this group with a particular clarity. Therefore, it seems, that the "most" marked behavior is not given by the average of the type, but by its extremity, most distant from the other cluster centers. This gives some indication for further analysis, and is also very much in agreement with the emphasis of Foucault and Canguilhem on the"limits", as opposed to representativity and average.
(89) These short labels run the danger of stereo-types, but the only alternative is to call them type 2-mayors, that could make the article incomprehensible. Nevertheless, in order to avoid the fixing of the labels, this will also be used sometimes.
(90) The items of second set, though, were still agreed at the average level, i.e. quite strongly.

(91) These are the mayors who complained even more than the average. This means that the majority agree very strongly with most of the complaints listed.
(92) Interestingly enough, the comparative items that played little role in defining the factors, were almost absent from the clusters as well, indicating that not only their linear covariance, but their variance, especially "joint" variance with the other variables is also very small. (As we'll see this will be very different in the Czech Republics and Slovakia). Therefore, the standard issues of "ideology" seems to be completely overshadowed by attitudes to complaining and its different modalities in Hungary.
(93) For that, we could have used the F-statistics as indicators, but because it was influenced, for e.g., by the biases of the outliers, we opted to use it only as a reconfirmation.
(94) This was checked by the C9 solutions.
(95) Here again, the C7 results were compared with the C9 results, and some of the runs with pair-wise exclusion of the missing cases. The results confirmed the specific existence of four of the clusters found in C7; the only one missing the only Czech cluster of C7 that had no comparative equivalent. Therefore, it may be that - not the least due to the large number of missing cases -, we can specify only four Czech types.
(96) A much more proper algorythm would be for all items to multiple their value with the difference between the cluster average and the population average, and divide it with the sample standard deviation. For this index, a significance test also could be developed. If this particular type is present in the other samples, it should have a bi-modal (perhaps even tri-modal) distribution, the high mode in indicating the presence of the type, while the low-mode the possible opposing type or attitude. If the characteristics of the given type are irrelevant for the sample, it should give a plain random normal distribution around the average. Unfortunately, these considerations cannot be pursued here.
(97) Of course, the major thrust of cluster analysis, the direct analysis of proximity between cases is lost here, and we are back almost to the analysis of factor scores or related indexes; but not completely, as these indexes are - assumedly - based on "real" types ("real" at least in the sense of the direct clustering of cases).
(98) There is an obvious problem with this analysis. We are sometimes forcing opposite meanings, for e.g. the case of item 701/9. But, as such differences of meaning were limited, this still provides a valuable tool of direct comparison.
(99) These values do represent a proper significance test here.

(100) This reaises the question of why this type was absent in Slovakia. The reason may have been the difficulty of a "spontaneous" link between 701/8 and 701/9, due to the differences in meaning. In general, the major reason for the large differences between the percentages shown here, and the own country C-7 solutions is the major reference point for the initial solutions was not the own-country average. This solution filtered the within-country differences through the prism of the Hungarian space partitioning.

(101) However, even at that stage, there is a fundamental question whether this reduction of reality into theoretical concepts is identical or not with the way - not simply "indigenous people" think, but the way reality is produced, discursively and subjectively. This is what is crucial for the approach of Weber, Nietzsche, Foucault, and others, and not simply a question of "perfect understanding" or "intersubjectivity".

(102) The same can be said with respect to analytical philosophy, where at stake is the truth of the statements, implying in a similar way absolute and clear-cut distinction between "truth" and "falsity" or "lie"; or "rationality" and "irrationality".

(103) I hope these comments will no be taken as arguments against the use of significance tests for assessing the validity of concrete theoretical proposals. Such a thing would not make any sense, and this paper has used significance tests amply anyway. The question rather is about the way the link from a significance test to an allegedly true theoretical statement about reality is made.

(104) See, among others, the works of Solzhenitsyn, Zinoviev, Medvedev, Glazov, and Haraszti.

(105) There is no point to list here all relevant articles. Let's only mention that in the1991 Congress of the Hungarian Sociological Association, there were so many papers presented in the session on Civil Society that it had to go on for the whole congress!

(106) See the yearly Gallup polls, done at the end of each year, that show the high degree of pessimism prevalent on all these countries since 1990, but especially in Hungary. See the relevant publications by Róbert Manchin and his colleagues.

(107) It should be emphasised that this point is made not on the basis of the level of agreement with certain items (especially 701/6), but the way this item "behaved" in the factor analysis. This defined best the "common" elements of the complaining responses, even if it was not at all the most accepted complaint (especially in Hungary).

(108) Perhaps the best way to characterise this legacy is by the words of one of our interviewees in Slovakia who said that while it is of course not true to say that the former system has only

destroyed, and did not create, build anything new. But the problem is that what it created is more often than not is worst had it not done anything!

(109) See György Spiró, in Népszabadság, September 1990, and Staniszkis, 1991.

(110) I doubt that many people would be able to tell today whether in their own school, there were people with Jewish origins, and who they were. One can argue that there were no opportunities present for the expression of Jewish identity, but the same was true for all sorts of religious or ethnic identities. It certainly discredits any ideas about the continuity of a "deep, hidden" antisemitism.

(111) A empirical comparison of anti-foreigner sentiments in the former East and West Germany would be most interesting in this respect. My hypothesis is that there would be a difference: foreigners are more directly perceived as others threatening objective privileges in the West, and as posing question about relationship to oneself in the East, therefore illiciting much more emotional and less comprehensible responses.

(112) Richard Sakwa reinforced this argument by showing that the situation in Russia in this respect is almost identical. See his *Russian Politics and Society* , to be published by Routledge in 1993.

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

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