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The European
Defense and Security Policy
and EU Enlargement
to Eastern Europe

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
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ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES

**The European Defense and Security Policy
and EU Enlargement to Eastern Europe**

**Report of the Working Group
on the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union**

Chairman: Horst Günter KRENZLER

Rapporteur: Milada Anna VACHUDOVÁ

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The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has taken shape very rapidly over the past two years. Can the impressive momentum of 1999 and 2000 be sustained? Can the Europeans come to more precise agreements on the scope, the capabilities, and the budgetary implications of an effective ESDP? How will the ESDP coexist with NATO, and can the Europeans work out a satisfactory arrangement for how the EU's ESDP will cooperate with non-EU NATO members, especially the United States and Turkey?

With these questions in mind, in September 2000 the European University Institute's Working Group on the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union met to discuss the ways in which the EU's two ambitious and long-ranging projects, ESDP and enlargement, would interact with one another. These projects pose a particular challenge to the EU because they require a high level of consensus and cooperation among existing member states, and because they also require cooperation and close coordination with states outside of the Union. The EU's sudden industry and broad consensus in the area of security and defense policy are impressive and perhaps surprising given that the EU's agenda at the turn of the millennium is so full with the project of enlargement and also of economic and monetary union.

1. The Purpose of the European Security and Defense Policy

The overarching security goal of the ESDP has been defined as developing the ability to carry out the so-called "Petersberg Tasks" within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Back in 1992, the West European Union (WEU) had set for itself the Petersberg Tasks consisting of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations, crisis management, and peace enforcement. The Maastricht Treaty enabled the European Council to request that the WEU carry out this type of military work on behalf of the EU. The Amsterdam Treaty opened the way for an integration of the WEU into the EU, following the decision of the European Council. This decision – to merge the WEU into the EU instead of outsourcing the EU's security needs – was taken at the European Council summit in Cologne, Germany in April 1999. EU leaders also decided in Cologne to set up a rapid reaction force to carry out the military work known since 1992 as the Petersberg Tasks.

The purpose of the ESDP's rapid reaction force is two-fold: to provide the EU with a military capacity for crisis management, and to lend credibility to other aspects of the EU's foreign policy. The goal is not to build a European army or to provide for Europe's collective defense: This is to remain the work of the Atlantic Alliance. The Working Group agreed that the potential military capability of the rapid reaction force would be more important for bolstering the

EU's non-military foreign policy than for the actual operations it might undertake in the future.

The EU's resolve to create a security and defense policy came at the close of a decade when the EU's foreign policy competence had been gravely put in question by the wars in the former Yugoslavia. The first step was taken in December 1988, when the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the French President Jacques Chirac crafted the St. Malo declaration. "The Union," they admonished, "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."¹ The St. Malo declaration, in particular its co-authorship by the British, was a response to the frustration and humiliation of the EU's inability to prevent, contain or stop the wars in Bosnia.

In the spring of 1999, the EU's inability to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, or to intervene militarily to punish it, only reinforced the EU's resolve to pursue a European security and defense policy. As Anne Deighton writes, "there was a realization amongst the Europeans of the weakness of the measures available to the EU to intervene against a country [Yugoslavia] that was not merely just beyond its borders but that could potentially become a member of the Union itself. (...) In 1995, the U.S. had taken control of policy toward Bosnia as events there deteriorated. In 1999, once again, the EU proved itself unequal to the task of dealing with the disintegration Yugoslavia."²

While a broad consensus may exist as to the purpose of the ESDP, the Working Group agreed that many differences remain among the EU member states about the nature of their common security project. To build a credible and effective ESDP, EU leaders will have to agree about what security problems the EU should tackle, and also what military capabilities it will need to develop to do so competently and how the costs of all of this are to be born by the member states. The issues that will determine the success or the failure of this project were introduced by Geoffrey Edward's background paper for the Workshop, entitled "Europe's Security and Defense Policy: A triumph of hope over experience?" As Edwards points out, "the strategic purpose of the headline force and the budgetary implications necessary to give substance to the ESDP have been more or less shrouded in a European version of "constructive ambiguity." To resolve this ambiguity, whose usefulness has past, the EU member

¹Joint Declaration on European Defense Issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998 at: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?1795>.

² Anne Deighton, "The European Union and NATO's war over Kosovo: Toward the Glass Ceiling?" in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley, eds., *Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, p. 96.

governments will have to come to more precise agreements as to the scope of the Petersberg tasks and their geographical limits.

The most substantial disagreements reflect different definitions of what it would mean for the EU to be capable of autonomous action. The Working Group agreed that two different definitions of "autonomy" are at play. For the French, autonomy means autonomy of defense – including a military self-sufficiency from the United States that allows the EU to launch military operations without NATO hardware. For the other EU member states, autonomy generally means autonomy of decision-making – the ability to decide to launch military operations but necessarily drawing on American benevolence and NATO military hardware to carry them out. This debate was however partially resolved in December 1999 in Helsinki, Finland when the European Council expressed its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army."³

Talks between NATO and EU leaders were complicated in 2000 by France's continued preference that the EU's defense capability be more independent of NATO. France finally backed down in December 2000 and agreed to permanent arrangements binding NATO and the ESDP together, including two ministerial and six ambassadorial meetings per year. France's aspirations for a geo-strategic world role independent of the United States are nothing new. The Working Group agreed that although these aspirations will cause tension, France's European partners and the United States will continue to cope with them and keep them in check as they have done in the past.

If France's ambitions towards the ESDP are feared to be too great, the United Kingdom's are feared to be too modest. The decision-making structure for the rapid reaction force, however, has been designed to reassure even the most hesitant Member State. It stipulates that deployment will require a unanimous decision of the 15 member states, but no member will be obliged to take part in the subsequent military operation. Thus British defense secretary Geoff Hoon explained to his fearful public: "UK participation in any particular operation, and the nature of our contribution, would be matters for decision by the UK government in the light of circumstances at the time."⁴

³Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, Finland, 10-11 December 1999 at: http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#security.

⁴Alexander Nicoll, "EU unveils plans for defence arm," *Financial Times*, 21 November 2000, p. 1. All *Financial Times* and *BBC Monitoring Service* articles are from: <http://globalarchive.ft.com>.

The Working Group agreed that the conception and ultimately the use of an EU rapid reaction force would be complicated by the divergent views among EU member states about the appropriate timing and form of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, the EU would have to develop a vision of what to do after military intervention, and the political will to follow through over the long-term. For starters, it would need to come to terms with the existence of a long-term Western protectorate in Kosovo.

With respect to maintaining cohesion during a particular mission, there were no obvious reasons why an EU force would have more trouble with this than NATO, which had preserved an impressive solidarity during the Kosovo conflict. During the air strikes against Serbia, the EU also managed to preserve its cohesion despite substantial domestic opposition to the bombing in some EU member states. Although in military terms the Kosovo conflict was an embarrassment for the EU, it was a triumph of solidarity among the member states. The Working Group debated whether the presence of the European neutrals – Austria, Sweden, Ireland and Finland – would change things significantly in an actual EU-led military operation, but most participants agreed that it would not.

Nevertheless, the divergence of views on issues at the heart of any future European security and defense initiative are a cause of concern for those who have the most ambitious goals for the EU's future military role. Consequently, some EU leaders, most notably France, have pushed very hard to apply the principles of "enhanced" or "flexible" cooperation to the ESDP. This would allow a smaller coalition of willing EU member states to forge ahead with closer military cooperation, leaving the other EU member states behind. France pushed hard at the European Council summit in Nice, France in December 2000 to apply the principle of enhanced cooperation to defense issues. Britain blocked the move on the grounds that enhanced cooperation procedures were unsuited to defense issues, except perhaps arms procurement.⁵

Military Capabilities

As the scope of the military operations that the EU would like to tackle becomes clearer, a parallel challenge exists in determining what military software and hardware are necessary to carry them out. At the European Council summit in Helsinki, Finland in December 1999, the member governments began hammering out the details of the future rapid reaction force that they had agreed to in Cologne, Germany the previous spring. They committed themselves to

⁵ Peter Norman and Andrew Parker, "Britain to oppose defence deal," *Financial Times*, 4 December 2000, p. 1.

establishing by 2003 a European military force of 50-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year of operations. In November 2000, EU defense ministers met at a Capability Commitment Conference in Brussels, Belgium and pledged troops, aircraft and ships to the future EU force. They offered contributions to a catalogue totaling about 100,000 ground troops plus 400 aircraft and 100 ships along with their crews. In addition, 15 non-EU countries committed forces for a total of 30 countries. Although modest, this EU force would be larger than any individual EU Member State could muster on its own.

The Presidency Conclusions of the European Council summit in Feira, Portugal in June 2000 emphasized that improving European military capabilities “remains central to the credibility and effectiveness” of the ESDP. European members of NATO spend on average 2.3% of their gross domestic product on defense, compared with 3.1% for the United States. Although the fifteen EU member states thus spend two thirds as much as the United States on defense, because of duplication and other inefficiencies they benefit from far less than two thirds of America’s military capability.

By the time of the European Council summit in Nice, France, in December 2000, EU leaders predicted that the rapid reaction force would have an “initial operating capability” by mid-2001. Gaps notwithstanding, the chief of the defense staff of France, General Jean-Pierre Kelche, declared: “European capability does exist. Nothing prevents us tomorrow from saying we could take responsibility for Bosnia.” NATO’s stabilization force in Bosnia totals only about 20,000 troops, but some in Europe were uncomfortable with such bravado even though it was clarified as a technical comment on military capacity and not a political proposal.⁶

As Ian Davidson points out, the irony is that while the Balkans are the most likely place for the EU to intervene, “a force of 50,000-60,000 would almost certainly be too small to be useful to deal with a real crisis...unless it were backed up by the U.S.”⁷ Edwards agrees, noting in the background paper that even if the primary focus is to be local instability in or around Europe, “it remains difficult to gauge whether all the Member States are envisioning a force that would have been able to intervene in Kosovo without the US – even with access to NATO assets.”

⁶ Alexander Nicoll, “EU force ready for Bosnia role,” *Financial Times*, 30 November 2000, p. 1.

⁷ Davidson also argues that the force is useless in the next most critical area for EU foreign policy, Russia and the CIS, because it is “inconceivable” that the EU would contemplate intervention there. Ian Davidson, “The European Union and its near abroad,” *Challenge Europe*, 22 November 2000, p. 4 at: http://www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/.

Whatever the use, reaching the “full capacity” of the 60,000 force will prove laborious. It will depend on the EU remedying some of the military deficiencies that were so observable during the air strikes against Serbia – generally in areas of high-technology warfare. While more than 400 aircraft and 100 ships have been pledged to the EU force, there are crucial gaps in its armory including heavy lift aircraft, strategic sea transport, satellite intelligence systems and precision guided munitions.⁸ The capability gap most on display during the 1999 NATO air strikes against Serbia was the serious difficulty of European militaries in dealing with anti-aircraft missiles. So far only 30 of the 60 needed “SEAD” (suppression of enemy air defence) aircraft have been offered to the EU force. In the background paper, Edwards cites a long, expensive list of the EU’s military deficiencies as catalogued by Timothy Garden: a list that one Working Group participant termed “horrifying.” As Garden observes, “no amount of re-dividing and re-tasking the current forces will provide these expensive force enablers.”⁹

Many Working Group members echoed Garden’s pessimism about the willingness of Europeans to increase their defence expenditures sufficiently to give the ESDP a meaningful military capability. For his part, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson had stern words for ESDP, urging EU leaders to “exercise rhetorical discipline,” and to focus on military capabilities in order to convince their U.S. allies that ESDP was not simply serving European self-assertion.¹⁰ The Working Group agreed that creating the right military capabilities would be the litmus test for the ESDP, and that the project would prove meaningless without them.

2. How Will ESDP Interact with Non-EU Member States?

The question of how non-EU European countries will participate in the EU’s security and defense policy took center stage in 2000. Two issues dominated the discussion. First, how will non-EU European members of NATO participate in decision-making given the likelihood that no major EU operation can succeed without NATO assets? Second, what role should EU candidate countries have in shaping the EU’s security policy in its formative years?

⁸ Peter Norman, “EU rapid reaction force set at 60,000,” *Financial Times*, 18 November 2000, p. 1.

⁹ Sir Tim Garden, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 28 June 2000, cited in Geoffrey Edwards, “Europe’s Security and Defence Policy – A triumph of hope over experience?” Background paper, Krenzler Group Meeting, 14-15 September 2000, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰ Douglas Hamilton, “European Rapid Reaction Force Unlikely by 2003,” *Reuters*, 29 March 2000, p. 1.

The Transfer of the WEU Acquis to the ESDP

The development of the ESDP created a feeling of exclusion among the six non-EU European members of NATO who had been associate members of the West European Union (WEU): Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The genesis of the EU's ESDP was rapidly followed by the decision to dissolve the WEU. To preserve the institutional autonomy of the EU, only some of the WEU *acquis* could subsequently be transferred to the ESDP.

The merger of the WEU into the EU has threatened the political interests of the WEU's associate members by diminishing their role in European security. In contrast, the neutral members of the EU, who had observer status in the WEU, have been able to preserve their neutral role quite easily because the EU has not taken on the Article V functions of the WEU. While the WEU's associate members were not signatories of the WEU's constituting Modified Brussels Treaty and were consequently not endowed with full membership right, they did enjoy rights that were very substantial. Associate members could participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council, of its working groups and of its subsidiary bodies, subject to the following provisions:

- Participation could be restricted to full members at the request of a majority of the members states, or of half of the member states including the Presidency.
- Associate members had the right to speak but could not block a decision that was the subject of consensus among the full members.
- Associate members could associate themselves with the decisions taken by full members and participate in their implementation unless a majority of full members, or half of the member states including the Presidency, decided otherwise.
- Associate members took part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they committed forces.

As the ESDP replaced the WEU, the non-EU European members of NATO (the WEU's former associate members) did not band together to fight the downgrading of their influence over European security affairs. The six countries in question – Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – have divergent military traditions, geo-strategic positions and relationships to the EU. Consequently, although the six were all opposed to the loss of the WEU's extensive *acquis* and consulted one another about it, they did not craft a joint strategy for its preservation.

The key to the discontent of the WEU's former associate members is the fact that in the ESDP non-EU European NATO members are not invited to take part in the decision whether or not to launch an operation, even if NATO assets are to be used. The European Council Summit in Helsinki, Finland in December 1999 concluded that "Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets. Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the Council has decided to launch such an operation."

The European Council Summit in Feira, Portugal in June 2000¹¹ set the following parameters for the non-EU European NATO members' participation in the emerging decision-making structures of the ESDP:

- The decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework will be respected.
- A single, inclusive structure will provide for dialogue, consultation and cooperation between the EU and 15 other countries – the non-EU European NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU.
- Within this structure, the EU will collaborate with the non-EU European NATO members as required, for example, when planning the scope and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.

The Feira summit thus proposed very complicated arrangements for cooperation between the EU and NATO. Working Group members pointed out that these were EU decisions, and that they could still face opposition from NATO – especially from the United States and from Turkey. At present, an interim phase is in progress while the modalities for the participation of third states are worked in the routine, non-crisis phase and in the operational phase. During this phase, there are a minimum of two meetings in the EU+15 format during each Presidency. There are also a minimum of two meetings in the EU+6 format in each Presidency. These meetings cover the elaboration of the headline and capability goals, and inform non-EU members of progress toward the necessary force and hardware targets.

¹¹ Feira European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Feira, Portugal, 19-20 June 2000 at: http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june2000/june2000_en.pdf.

Reacting to the Feira conclusions, the non-EU European members of NATO, especially Turkey, took exception to the arrangement of a 15+15 structure where the 6 non-EU European members of NATO are not afforded a special status. This is reminiscent of NATO's creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in the early 1990s, where Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were treated the same as Tajikistan and Kyrgistan. For Turkey, a laggard in the EU accession process, Feira is the least acceptable. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic can expect to join the EU in the next three or four years, and Iceland and Norway can expect to join at will; all have therefore in the meantime accepted the arrangements proposed by the EU.

Jiri Sedivy framed the debate in his background paper for the Workshop entitled "Non-EU European Allies: Winners or Losers from European Security and Defence Policy?" Sedivy noted that "given the quite safe assumption that there is a long way to go before Europe is able to conduct autonomous operations, the main issue to be solved is how to preserve the associate members' place at the EU's table in the field of security prior to their entry into the Union." Of course, some associate members will have to hold their place at the table much longer than others, depending on their prospects for rapid EU membership. Herein lies the problem with Turkey.

The Position of Turkey

Since 1999, Turkey has strongly opposed the non-transfer of the WEU acquis to the ESDP. It has charged that the status of full partnership established in the WEU is being downgraded to the status of a "third country." Turkish leaders have emphasized that given Turkey's location in the center of a very sensitive geo-strategic region, Turkey should play an integral role in the decision-making mechanism of Europe's crisis management body. More broadly, Turkey has argued that the ESDP processes are violating the principle that European security is indivisible.

After the European Council summit in Feira, Portugal in June 2000, Turkey's foreign ministry issued a very critical statement charging that the EU had failed to respect the conclusions of NATO's Washington summit in June 1999.¹² NATO's Washington Declaration had emphasized the importance of the participation of all of the European allies in the creation of ESDP and the transfer of the West European Union (WEU) acquis to the ESDP. Ankara declared that given the content of the Feira conclusions, Turkey cannot agree to the EU's request for automatic access to NATO facilities and capabilities.

¹² Anatolia news agency, Ankara: BBC Monitoring Service, 20 June 2000, p. 1.

Of the six non-EU European members of NATO, Turkey has the strongest position with respect to Europe's security but also the greatest potential grievances against the EU. In his paper, Sedivy sketched what Turkey has demanded of the EU:

- Full and equal participation in the decision-making process leading to and accompanying the deployment of forces on all EU-led operations drawing on the collective assets and capabilities of NATO.
- Participation in the decision-making process and subsequent preparation, planning and conduct of EU operations not drawing on NATO assets.
- Regular participation in day-to-day planning and consultation on matters related to European security, as was the case within the WEU, preferably including the adoption of WEU procedures.
- A structural relationship between the EU and NATO based on a framework agreement that would inform Turkey of developments in the CFSP and provide a forum for Turkey to express its views in a timely manner. This would include regular 15 + 6 meetings with an agenda agreed upon jointly by the two groups, and a permanent representative of each of the 6 at CFSP headquarters.

According to the rules adopted at Feira, once EU members make a unanimous decision to deploy the force, non-EU members who contribute troops and assets to the operation will be invited to take part in the day-to-day decision-making. However, the decision whether or not to deploy a force for peacekeeping or humanitarian tasks would be made by EU member governments alone.

In September of 2000, the Working Group members agreed that the 6 non-EU European members of NATO had become reconciled with the fact that the WEU *acquis* would not survive the creation of the ESDP. They decided that attempts to block the EU's rapid reaction force would be counterproductive, and the aim instead should be to increase the efficiency and the capabilities of the ESDP by contributing their forces. As regards Turkey, members of the Working Group debated whether Turkey's fear of marginalization might compel it to block the transfer of NATO assets to the ESDP.

The Working Group agreed that it would be useful to find some way to compensate Turkey for its loss of influence stemming from the creation of the ESDP. When Turkey's application for membership was turned down in the

1980s, Turkey was offered an economically and politically consequential stake in European integration in the form of membership in the EU's customs union. For now, Turkey's participation in the EU's pre-accession strategy keeps the relationship busy. But what next? Several members of the Working Group were of the opinion that Turkey does not belong in the EU but, since Turkey's recognition as an official candidate at the December 1999 Helsinki summit, "the train has left the station."

At the Capability Commitment Conference in November 2000, all of the non-EU European members of NATO – Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – pledged to contribute to the EU's future rapid reaction force. They generally opted for dual assignment of units already assigned to NATO. Other European states such as Slovakia and Estonia who are aspiring to join both the EU and NATO also made force commitments. Turkey seemed to signal that its opposition to the EU's autonomous defense capability had receded by making a substantial military contribution to the rapid reaction force at the November 2000 conference. Turkey's pledge of troops, ships and aircraft, totaling some 4,000 to 5,000 troops, was the largest from a non-EU country.

But in December 2000, Turkey dug in its heels. After the Working Group met, the question of Turkey's cooperation with the EU's plans became more acute and the search for a way to compensate or appease Turkey's fears of marginalization became a prerequisite to operationalizing the rapid reaction force. Turkey continued to insist that it should have a voice in the decision whether or not to deploy the EU force. EU members maintained that although they are willing to consult Turkey closely about the use of the force, especially when Turkey's own security could be affected, only EU members can make the decision whether or not to deploy.

To drive home its opposition, Turkey blocked an agreement between the EU and NATO allowing automatic EU access to NATO assets. A broad consensus had formed among EU and NATO members that the EU must have access to NATO planning staff. Otherwise, the EU would have to set up its own planning staff which, it is feared particularly in Washington and London, would undermine NATO. The U.S. emphasized that the EU must not duplicate assets already held by NATO, especially in the area of defense planning. The U.S. called for general defense planning to be carried out jointly, with planning for EU operations to be done by NATO planners at the alliance's military headquarters in Mons, Belgium.

Turkey is in effect demanding EU membership in defense matters and the EU Member States are refusing to grant it. If Turkey does not back down, however, it is hard to see how it will emerge the victor. On the one hand, if

Turkey refuses to budge the EU's rapid reaction force could founder because the UK and other EU members would not like to allow the EU to set up a planning staff independent of NATO.¹³ On the other hand, if the EU is forced to set up its own planning staff, this will weaken NATO and diminish Turkey's own influence on European security.¹⁴ From January to April, Turkey blocked the ongoing consultations between EU and NATO military expert teams about future cooperation between the ESDP and NATO. In April 2001, Turkey allowed the consultations to resume – although it remained ambiguous about whether it would eventually drop its opposition to guaranteed use by the EU of NATO assets.

The Position of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic

For the East Central European non-EU NATO members – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – the structures for associating the non-EU European NATO members to the EU's security policy are less of a concern. Unlike Turkey, they expect to become EU members in the next few years. As Sedivy observes, their main concern was the denial of substantial input into the EU/CFSP framework during the initial, "formative" period. The Feira arrangements solve, at least partially, the problem of "how to ensure access to information so that they can build an institutional memory from the early stages of ESDP and not only after they join the EU."

Sedivy also expressed his personal view that too much political energy had been devoted in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to a problem of limited substance. The huge efforts devoted to the problem of saving the WEU *acquis* and of winning a role in ESDP decision-making were unwarranted. After all, no EU-only operation could be possible before Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic enter the EU, barring some cataclysmic slow-down of enlargement or some momentous speed-up of the ESDP.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are all firm proponents of preserving the U.S. military presence in Europe and safeguarding the preeminent position of NATO as guarantor of European security. On the question of the U.S. role in European security they are therefore much closer to the position of the United Kingdom than to that of France. They believe that the EU's security role should be strictly limited to the crisis management tasks set out in the Petersburg Declaration. Moreover, an EU-led military operation should be a fall back option should a NATO-led operation prove impossible.

¹³ Alexander Nicoll, "Setback for plan on EU link with NATO," *Financial Times*, 18 December 2000, p. 1.

¹⁴ "Turkey and NATO," *Financial Times*, 19 December 2000, p. 1.

As aspiring members of the EU, however, the East Central European governments have to reconcile their championship of strong transatlantic relations and with their priority of acceding to the EU.¹⁵ They have had to temper their pro-U.S. enthusiasm in order to not annoy any EU governments, particularly the French who are already less than lukewarm advocates of their timely entry into the EU. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are viewed by France (and perhaps other Member States) as a Trojan horse for American control over European security. In early 1999, the French government signaled to the East Central European governments that their security views could slow their accession. They pledged forces to the rapid reaction force in order to make themselves attractive to the EU in terms of military capabilities, and also to demonstrate their military commitment to the ESDP.

Poland opposed the ESDP most strongly on the grounds of its strong pro-American stance in international politics. The Czech Republic also opposed ESDP, though more mildly, in part because of fears that it would undermine the U.S. presence in Europe and in part because of a domestic isolationism that manifested itself during NATO's military operations in response to the Kosovo crisis.¹⁶ Even in the Czech Republic, however, public opinion polls show increasing support for the general idea of sending troops abroad. Moreover, the prestige of the military has improved thanks to its involvement in the Bosnia's SFOR and Kosovo's KFOR forces. Of the three, Hungary, a neighbor to the unsettled Balkans and a key player in plans for the security and economic revitalization of the region, has been the greatest support of the EU's effort to craft a security policy.

The Position of the United States and the Relationship with NATO

The United States had been opposed to the development of a European security identity, but changed its mind during the Clinton administration. However, American support has been conditional on the answers to two questions: will it work, and will it strengthen the Atlantic Alliance? The Clinton Administration was particularly supportive of the EU taking on the stabilization and economic rejuvenation of the Balkans in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, but it was (justifiably) skeptical that the Europeans would commit adequate resources to the project.

¹⁵ On the analogous behavior of aspiring NATO members during the Kosovo crisis, see Milada Anna Vachudova, "The Atlantic Alliance and Kosovo: Enlargement and the Behavior of New Allies," in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley, eds., *Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001, pp. 303-332.

¹⁶ Vachudova, "The Atlantic Alliance and Kosovo," pp. 307-311.

The Clinton administration warned against an ESDP that grows out of NATO, that duplicates NATO and that eventually competes with NATO. It also stressed the need for complete transparency between the EU's military structures and NATO, and the EU's use of NATO military planning facilities. Though there was no public disagreement with France, in 2000 French officials seemed to be suggesting that unless NATO assets were being used, the EU should use national or EU planning facilities. For the French, as Dominique Moisi tells us, the ESDP is a project of political assertion that the Americans should welcome: "the political benefits of ESDI in terms of Europe's sense of purpose far outweigh potential strategic costs to the transatlantic agenda."¹⁷

The mantra of any U.S. administration regarding the ESDP is likely to be, at a minimum, no duplication and no rivalry with NATO. In early 2001 while the EU struggled to come to an agreement with Turkey, it also had to convince a new U.S. administration about the virtues of the ESDP. The new secretary of state Colin Powell endorsed the plan, on the condition that it remained "firmly embedded in NATO and not duplicating NATO planning capabilities."¹⁸ The new secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, however, expressed concern that the force could destabilize the Atlantic Alliance.

Some observers have remarked that a natural division of labor may develop between the Americans and the Europeans. While the United States will remain reluctant to provide ground troops, it will provide advanced military capabilities "that it likes to spend money on" such as high-technology communications and surveillance. Meanwhile, the Europeans will remain reluctant to spend money on sophisticated military technology, but will be willing to provide the troops for peacekeeping and peacemaking.¹⁹ On the emerging balance between NATO and the EU, Anne Deighton writes: "Whether we will emerge with the European providing the manpower – the ghurkas of Europe – for gendarmerie-type operations in the Euro-Atlantic area, autonomously from but under the benevolent eye of NATO, while the heavy defense, backed up by very high-tech equipment and the decision-making high ground that this implies is left to the U.S., or whether this is the beginning of a more comprehensive re-balancing is as yet unclear."²⁰

¹⁷ Dominique Moisi, "A sea-change in the transatlantic relationship," *Financial Times*, 12 February 2001, p. 1.

¹⁸ Andrew Parker, "US move gives boost to plans for rapid reaction force," *Financial Times*, 7 February 2001, p. 1.

¹⁹ Charles Grant, "European defence from 2010 – a British view," *Challenge Europe*, 21 October 2000, pp. 1-2.

²⁰ Deighton, "Toward the Glass Ceiling?," p. 99.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Atlantic Alliance has been redefining its security mission and seeking to reinvigorate itself institutionally. For some analysts, enlargement was the first nail in NATO's coffin – but for others, including the US administration, this was a way to reinvigorate the institution and make it relevant in the post-cold war world. Could ESDP be a similar case? If the EU initiative is to succeed, then the Europeans must create new military capabilities and spend more money overall on defense. Working Group members agreed that this alone would in fact strengthen NATO.

3. What are the links between ESDP and EU enlargement?

Experience shows that credible candidates for EU membership tend to anticipate their future status by supporting the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy in general, and the EDSP in particular. The Kosovo crisis demonstrated that countries that are aspiring to join the EU and NATO will give political and logistical support to military operations even in the face of strong domestic opposition and the absence of any immediate rewards for their cooperation.²¹ The link between the ESDP's capabilities and EU enlargement is a question of geography. The ESDP's capabilities will be determined in part by the location of the EU's borders. Where will the EU end and the EU's backyard begin? For a defense policy to be well-designed, there must be a general consensus about what security questions it may be called upon to solve. This will, in part, be a function of which countries are members of the EU, which countries are the EU's immediate neighbors, and which countries consider themselves credible future members of the EU. Moreover, as Davidson observes, "the European Union's foreign policy agenda... is more or less self-defining, since the fundamental, and unavoidable, strategic issue facing the EU is the re-shaping of the European continent in the aftermath of the Cold War. In other words, all of the EU's most pressing strategic problems lie on its immediate periphery."²²

So far, ESDP is much more popular than enlargement, and some suggest that EU publics oppose adding new countries to the EU when it is crafting such a sensitive common policy. According to preliminary results of a Eurobarometer poll of the EU commission conducted last November and December, as many as 73% of EU citizens support a common security and defense policy. However, the groundwork has not been laid as regards public opinion in the EU-15 for the first enlargement of the EU, much less for the second or the third. If the EU halts

²¹ Vachudova, "The Atlantic Alliance and Kosovo," pp. 304-307. For the similar experience with immigration and border policy, see Milada Anna Vachudova, "Eastern Europe as Gatekeeper: The Immigration and Asylum Policies of an Enlarging European Union," in Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder, eds., *The Wall Around the West*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp. 153-171.

²² Davidson, "The European Union and its near abroad," p. 3.

enlargement because it is unpopular at home, after promising it to candidates in the second and third waves, it will create a backlash among its neighbors that will make EU foreign policy much less effective.

The European Union as an Important Actor on the World Stage

If the EU is going to become an important geo-strategic actor on the world stage, it will need to deliver on both enlargement and ESDP. The Stability Pact started out as a rather unfortunate bravado on the part of the EU about how it would take care of the Balkans. The EU needs to avoid similar bravado about how it will become a security heavyweight by way of enlargement and of the ESDP, until it is sure it can follow through. The Working Group agreed that the EU's credibility as a geopolitical actor will depend crucially on its follow through on ESDP.

Externally, the EU will seem like a more and more coherent actor on the world stage. As the EU deepens its internal cooperation, it will necessarily continue to harden its external border. This is already very visible in the gradual transfer of border/immigration policies (Justice and Home Affairs) from national to EU level, and the transfer of security and defense policy (ESDP) from the more inclusive WEU to the EU-only ESDP. As the external border hardens and that border shifts to the south and the east with enlargement, it will create new challenges: new opportunities but also new problems for Europe's emerging foreign policy.

Conclusion

At the European Council meeting in Nice, France, European leaders definitively settled the institutional structure of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy. This institutional structure, which includes a Military Committee and a Political Security Committee within the Council, will serve as a bulwark against any actors or any disagreements that would risk unsettling the ESDP. The Nice Presidency Conclusions called for the following new permanent political and military bodies to be established within the Council:²³

- A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels will be composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level. The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP, in accordance with the provisions of the EU Treaty and without prejudice to

²³ Common European Policy on Security and Defence: Excerpts From the Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, at: <http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/Summit9912/DEFENCE.html>

Community competence. In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation. For that purpose, appropriate procedures will be adopted in order to allow effective and urgent decision taking. The PSC will also forward guidelines to the Military Committee.

- The Military Committee (MC) will be composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military delegates. The MC will meet at the level of the Chiefs of Defence as and when necessary. This committee will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff. The Chairman of the MC will attend meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.
- The Military Staff (MS) within the Council structures will provide military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff will perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces.

Given that these institutional arrangements exist to buttress the political commitments made by EU member states to the ESDP, it is unthinkable that the construction of the ESDP could now be reversed.

The critical question is not, therefore, whether an ESDP will exist. Rather, it is whether the ESDP will be militarily effective – as well as being institutionally extant and politically expedient. Military effectiveness will only come if the ESDP's considerable capability problems are successfully tackled. This will require members to deliver on their military commitments – of existing forces and, more important, of those that must be developed. Defense spending poses a particular problem in this regard: without increased spending the very serious gaps in capabilities simply cannot be filled. In early 2001 the German government failed to grant the defense minister an increase in spending. Other EU governments suffer from the same disjuncture: on the one hand, they have promised to develop military capabilities for the ESDP, but on the other hand they have balked at increasing their country's defense budget.

ESDP has developed with lightening speed: Its clear institutionalization represents one of the few shining successes of a very disappointing Nice summit. But it cannot stand alone and is part of the ongoing debate of EU's future. As the debates of the Working Group have shown, so far everything that

accession candidates are ready to go as far as EU Member States in developing the ESDP. Therefore enlargement as such poses no problems to the ESDP – though the central question of the ESDP's military capabilities will also touch the candidate countries, whose budgets and resources are even more limited than those of the Member States.

The ESDP, however, cannot stand alone, whatever its successes over time in assembling a potent military capability. As was highlighted during the discussions of the Working Group, the ESDP is only a tool of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. And for now, as EU leaders themselves will admit, the CFSP lacks a clear vision of what are to be the purposes and the responsibilities of the EU as a rising geopolitical actor on the world stage.



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