Challenges to Tolerance in Political Life
A comparative overview of 15 European countries

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2012/29
4. National Case Studies - Political Life
Synthesis and Highlights
Challenges to Tolerance in Political Life

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WP4: Political challenges

D4.2 Synthesis and Highlights of Country Reports on Concepts and Practices of Tolerance Addressing Cultural Diversity in Political Life
The ACCEPT PLURALISM Consortium

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country’s performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

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Duration: March 2010-May 2013 (39 months)
Funding Scheme: Small and medium-scale collaborative project
EU contribution: 2,600,230 Euro
Consortium: 18 partners (16 countries)
EC officer: Ms Louisa Anastopoulou, project officer

For more information on the Socio Economic Sciences and Humanities Programme in FP7 see:
http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/index_en.htm
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Executive Summary

The concept of tolerance implies an asymmetrical relationship of power between those entitled to tolerate and those who are object of tolerance. Power-asymmetries are shaping the contours of toleration / non-toleration / respect attitudes and not everyone has (the same) power to exert it. As such, the space of tolerance is entirely embedded in the political space and in politics. The existence of power-asymmetries, political domination, majority-minority relationships but also dynamics of competition, claims over power and minorities agency, which are at the core of politics relate strongly to the way in which tolerance may be exerted and to the transformation of the boundaries of tolerance in society. There is a fundamental tension between disagreement and acceptance at the heart of toleration but only those who have the power to do so can choose to accept or not what they disagree with. Tolerance thus appears as a tool which enables understanding tensions and challenges in the political life when it comes to dealing with difference and diversity, especially ethno-religious diversity.

In the European context, the development of liberal-democracies has been strongly associated with the development of a culture of tolerance. The development of tolerance was meant to be part of the public culture as well as of the individual culture of the citizen. With the diversification of societies, notably by migration and the mobilization of native minorities, many institutional arrangements have been made in order to guarantee the acceptance of minorities in the political life. This has been the case for ethno-religious minorities but also for other dominated groups such as women or homosexuals. These practices of acceptance, however, have not always gone far beyond tolerance and many claims of minorities have been ignored by the State and the majorities.

The objective of the research carried out in the frame of ACCEPT PLURALISM as regards to tolerance in the political life is to investigate key questions such as:

- What kind of cultural diversity is considered compatible with the ‘secular’ politics of European countries?
- What claims or requests are tolerated?
- What political practices are considered tolerant or intolerant?
- What values and norms are considered to promote or undermine tolerance in political life?

The studies carried out in the frame of ACCEPT PLURALISM empirically challenge the concept of tolerance and the three-class concept of toleration, non-toleration and respect. The aim was to examine in a particular social space such as politics how these concepts can contribute to the analysis of diversity, difference and majority/minority relationship in European societies.

The researches on tolerance and political life have stressed the diversity of the modalities of toleration. Toleration in the political life refers to a continuous tolerance boundary drawing activity which appears to be central in complex society’s assemblages. The different studies presented in this report bring empirical evidences about how boundary-drawing is realized in the public life. They provide a variety of answers to three core questions:

- Who is entitled to tolerate or not-tolerate?
- What is tolerable and what is not in a society?
- How acceptance or objection is expressed and implemented?
The different research projects carried out within this work-package are based on country-specific case studies investigated with qualitative research methods. All the research projects are empirically grounded and they aim at challenging the concepts of tolerance. For the purpose of comparability, all research cases analyse how the dimensions presented above (which we can summarize as: who / what / how) are embedded in the case study as well as in national (and European) public debates.

The national case studies selected by the different partners have been organized into three main clusters.

Cluster 1 is organised around the challenge of political discourses in relation with intolerance boundaries drawing activities.

Cluster 2 is organised around the challenge posed by public policies of exclusion. It focuses on the institutional obstacles opposed to the rights and admission as normal of minorities.

Cluster 3 is organised around quests for recognition and the political mobilisation of minorities. This cluster has been divided into two different chapters: one on the mobilization for recognition of native ethno-national minorities and one on a dialogue between the French and British experiences of Muslims organizations’ mobilisations.

The different country cases are thus displayed in this report along four thematic chapters. They aim at drawing comparisons and highlighting similarities and differences between country cases, in order to explore the way the national contexts challenge the concept of tolerance.

**Political discourses and the definition of tolerance boundaries.**

In the first chapter, Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero present the challenges of intolerance embedded in political discourses in five countries: Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Spain. It focuses on political discourses in which tolerance/intolerance contributes to draw boundaries when it comes to defining the place of migrants and minorities in the society. The discourses analysed may present overtly anti-immigrant positions, while others seek to discuss the norms that enable the social and political acceptance of cultural or religious difference. Others finally seek to oppose racism and anti-immigrant discourses and seek to limit the public expression of such discourses. The cases present how the boundary drawing activity is realized through political and public discourses and how political actors negotiate the limits of acceptance and/or tolerance of cultural diversity.

Despite their differences in terms of experience related to migration and ways of dealing with cultural diversity, all countries under study have experienced important debates about migration and native minorities who are increasingly presented as a problem in terms of tolerance.

All countries under analysis have seen the radical right gaining position in the political life. But the weight of these groups in the political landscape as well as in national and local controversies is very different from one country to another. While far right organizations are represented at the Parliament in Greece, Denmark and Hungary, extra-parliamentary radical groups and parties manage to influence mainstream politics in Spain and Germany. To understand the dissemination of intolerant discourses in the countries under analysis, the relationship between extreme-right's overtly anti-immigrant discourse and mainstream politics and parties is determinant. The radical right alone cannot reconfigure the boundaries of toleration. Discourses and debates which intend to define or redefine what can or cannot be tolerated as regards to cultural and religious diversity are effective when they become central in the public arena. In all the controversies and events under examination in the country cases, the discourses effectively succeeded in making tolerance to migration and native minority a mainstream concern and subject of contentious expressions. This means that the participation of mainstream political actors as well as mainstream media is crucial to transform isolated expressions of intolerance into a central society debate able to change effectively the limits of tolerance in the society. The studies explore the process by which discourse on tolerance/intolerance to cultural diversity has been mainstreamed.
The chapter focuses on the analysis of the discursive frames that contribute to toleration boundary drawing in the different countries. It pays attention to the content of the discourses, both the ones advocating for tolerance and the ones advocating for intolerance, depending on the cases analyzed in the different countries. The objects of toleration or intolerance vary in function of the cases. Discourses may define how much toleration must be allowed in public space, either through discourses (Denmark, Germany, and Spain) or practices (Greece, Spain, and Hungary). Others may refer to how much toleration must be granted to the practices and expressions which are perceived as conflicting with majority’s values and practices. It identifies three main frames:

1. A frame in which legality is a condition for tolerance.
2. A ‘law and order’ frame or security frame.
3. A frame in terms of culture and identity.

Other frames, which are specific to one or few country cases, are also presented, such as the “essentialist/biological” frame, the “crisis/welfare protectionism” frame and the “non-toleration towards intolerance” frame.

Even if much of the content of the discourses on tolerance is common to several cases, the definition of limits of tolerance during the public debates refers also to dimensions which are particular to the national context, the culture, the history of migration and the definition of citizenship in each country. The authors thus present these particular features and highlight the predominance of national patterns in the way political discourses are dealing with minorities.

The report ends by highlighting that one common feature of all cases is the tendency in political debates to depoliticize tolerance, which means to consider that tolerance and intolerance are not a political matter and therefore should not be politicized.

Local and national policies of exclusion

In the second chapter, Ambrosini and Caneva present the challenge posed by tolerance by what they define as policies of exclusion in Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. They present how increasingly restrictive policies have been implemented at the European and national levels, especially as they conceive migrants as a threat to security.

They then present the interactions between local and national policies within this framework of restrictive policies. Even if local policies are usually seen as more inclusive, aimed at promoting measures and interventions for the benefit of immigrant populations, local governments often encounter difficulties and obstacles in implementing policies of inclusion, because of the lack of resources and regulatory frames. In the last few years new political discourses have risen at the local level too, emphasizing urban security, social cohesion, assimilationist instances and generally a more hostile attitude towards migrants, particularly irregular ones. Consequently, besides local policies which try to move away from, oppose or compensate for national policies, in the last few years the authors observe the growth of local policies that reinforce the restrictive or assimilationist approach of the national level policies. The authors show how local and national policies interact, in different ways, with inclusive (as in the case of local citizen mobilisation in the Netherlands) or rather restrictive (as for instance in the case of restricting local socio-economic rights in Italy) outcomes. The Bulgarian and Irish case study, on the other hand, discuss opposed examples of national policies that accommodate (the turban case in Ireland) or indeed ostracise (restricting the voting rights of Bulgarian Muslims and Roma) minority populations.

The reduction of the space for tolerance raises the opposition of civil society actors who claim respect for migrants (in the case of the Netherlands for instance). These groups and movements are able to intervene in the public arena and can sometimes affect the local policies. In some cases city governments rely on these groups and movements, or collaborate with them, in order to implement actions for the integration of minorities. In any case these civil society actors fill the gap between laws.
and regulations that produce exclusion, and social needs to which society has to respond either for humanitarian reasons or because of general interests.

The chapter ends by presenting the challenges that these policies pose conceptually in terms of tolerance. It underlines how intolerance is embedded and legitimized and promoted by institutional bodies which in principle are liberal and democratic. In the Netherlands and Bulgaria for instance, intolerance is justified by national policies based on the legal status of people. In Italy and Ireland instead, people are tolerated or not tolerated because of their “difference” and their cultural or religious claims, whereas their legal status is less important.

The analysis thus confirms that there is a trend towards restrictive and neo-assimilationist tendencies in European policies on immigrants.

Key messages for policy-makers

- Reinforcing anti-discrimination norms and institutions. European institutions in particular could take on an even more incisive role in the defence of liberal values in the European framework.
- Supporting and activating civil societies. This requires educational investment, seats for debate and the opportunity for dialogue with the relevant political institutions.
- Giving immigrants, their representatives and their association networks the capacity to participate in matters regarding local policies and all discussions that concern them.

Quests for recognition by Sámis, Silesians, Hungarians and Circassians

In the third chapter, Kaya presents findings about quests for recognition of native minorities in Poland, Romania, Sweden and Turkey. He discusses theoretically different modalities of response to minority claims in Europe. Former Eastern and Central European states respond rather distinctly to such minority demands in comparison with Western countries, which difference can be summarized as justice and fairness discourse on the one side, and loyalty and security discourse on the other. In East and Southeast Europe the objection to the idea of collective rights is that they can be invoked as a basis of secession, or a threat to national security. On the contrary, in the West, the concern with collective rights is that they can be invoked to supersed individual rights, although cases of denial of collective rights of minorities have occurred over the last years.

The chapter then proceeds to a comparison of four different cases, along different types of interrogations, in order to find out the convergences and divergences between the ways in which Sámi minority claims are responded by the Swedish state, Silesian minority claims by the Polish state, Hungarian minority claims by the Romanian state, and Circassian diaspora claims by the Turkish state. What kinds of means, institutions and techniques do they use to raise their political claims? Who are they? How are they defined by their respective states?

It examines firstly the diverse modalities of dealing with minorities and, secondly, the type of minorities involved and the interactions they engage with authorities. The cases display different characteristics with regard to the definition of the term minority. While Sámi minority in Sweden and Hungarian minority in Romania are legally defined minorities, with rights in reason of their political representation at both local and national levels, Silesians in Poland and Circassians in Turkey are not accepted as legal minorities by their respective states. As regards to the channels for claims, Sámis and Hungarians, being officially recognized minorities, have local and national parliamentary facilities to present their claims. However, the Silesians and Circassians generate civic, cultural and folkloric associations to present their claims to the state. European integration process, transnational networks and internet also become strategically important for both communities to raise their claims in public space. Unlike the Circassians, the Silesians are inclined to generate political movements aiming at cultural, educational and linguistic autonomy.
Finally the chapter adopts a new lens and sees how the claims are perceived from the state and public institutions and examines the dynamics of recognition and mobilization. The Sámis and the Hungarians are officially recognized, but still exposed to discrimination and intolerance and then are mobilizing themselves to halt socioeconomic discrimination, or the deterioration of their situation. The Silesians are socially and culturally accepted minorities who are mobilizing themselves for the search of political recognition through the right to self-determination, or incorporation into the institutions. The Circassians instead are still discriminated, hence they mobilize themselves for the search of recognition and respect by the state.

After summing up the main findings, Kaya observes that there are still two competing forms of managing diversity in the European countries: multicultural form and republican form. The former corresponds to the ‘unity-in-diversity’ approach, which recognizes ethno-cultural, linguistic, national and religious differences of minorities. The latter translates into the ‘unity-over-diversity’ approach, which is difference blind and assimilationist.

Minority Mobilisations in France and the United Kingdom: the Case of Muslim Organisations

Finally, the fourth chapter is dedicated more particularly to a comparison of the mobilisation of Muslim organisations in France and the United Kingdom. It considers and contrasts Muslim mobilisations around the British General Election of 2010 and the mobilisation during debates about laïcité in France as examples of minority claims-making in two “old immigration countries”.

The report focuses on minority organisations and their attempts to articulate claims in the national context. In ‘multiculturalist’ Britain, minority representatives can be portrayed as divisive while in ‘integrationist' France, organisations struggle to make their claims seem acceptable in Republican terms.

The main findings of these studies lead not to consider the level of acceptance as given and rather suggest that it should be explored as a result of interactions, symbolic claims and the extension of boundaries in which minority organisations are often centrally involved.

Escafré-Dublet and Dobbernack start by providing background elements on the participation, the representation and the content of claims in both countries. While the participation of minorities remains low in both countries, there have been significant civil society mobilizations with ethnic minority involvement in the UK in recent years. The same can be observed in the case of minority representation which also remain low in both countries, but again some effort to increase the number of ethnic minority representatives can be acknowledged in British politics.

As regards to claims-making on the basis of ethnic minority identities, French and British political structures display contrasting features. There is no general rule in Britain that would prevent minority groups from articulating specific concerns, although it may well be the case that mobilizations on the basis of ethno-religious minorities will be negatively perceived and thus remain unsuccessful. On the contrary, France is certainly more averse to ethnic demands, but there has been a tradition of mobilisation in immigrant-based organisations for a long time.

The authors then proceed by presenting the case studies in the two countries, highlighting the common features of the mobilisations but also particular elements which stress the singularity of each national context.

The analysis of the Muslim vote in the UK draws on the concept of misrecognition, which has recently been appropriated for identity claims by post-immigration communities. It identifies five types of misrecognition of Muslim claims, considered as distinctive topoi in the rhetoric of various advocacy organisations.

1) Misrecognising Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to other identity politics (Muslim claims are exceptional)
2) Misrecognising the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim identities and concerns (Muslim claims are homogenous)
3) Misrecognising Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based of pariah politics (Muslim claims are reactions to stigma)
4) Misrecognising Muslims concerns not compatible with an orientation towards the common good (Muslim claims are sectarian)
5) Misrecognising Muslim political actors as toxic and refusing political association (Muslim claims are exclusive).

The French case examines claims of organisations that mobilised in relation to the issue of *laïcité* in general, including old and new organisations. It shows that the participation of minority organisations and Muslim organisations to the mobilisation in defence of *laïcité* is a way to articulate claims for acceptance of Islam as a component of French religious diversity, on an equal footing with Protestantism and Judaism. In doing so, minority organisations are able to propose claims for acceptance that are more difficult to ignore by the majority population.

The chapter then proceeds by opening perspectives on the contrasting configuration of identity politics between the two countries.

It shows that minority constituencies face comparable challenges in the articulation of their political claims. In each context there is a tendency to be less tolerant towards Muslim claims on the ground that they are seen to be sectarian and particularist. In France this is justified by the general suspicion towards religious expressions in the public sphere. As a consequence, a striking result of the research is the fact that Muslim advocacy organisations seek to emphasize the compatibility of their claims with existing political frameworks.

However, Muslim organisations in both countries face dissimilar obstacles that they seek to overcome in different ways. In the UK, the link between post-immigration groups and the Labour Party, and in some cases the exploitation of this link through forms of patronage politics, means that negative conceptions of the ‘Muslim Vote’ need to be overcome. As for Muslim minorities in France, when negotiating the terms of their visibility in political life, they use a language of universalist politics and draw on core Republican values, such as *laïcité*, in their claims-making.

The chapter presents two main conclusions and policy recommendations. Firstly, the obstacles faced by Muslim activists result from the alleged exceptionality of their identities and claims and can be considered as forms of stigmatisation, intolerance and discrimination. In both cases, there is a need to raise awareness regarding this intolerance and to highlight the issue of religious discrimination in political activities. Secondly, the findings stress the fact that the wish for a certain normalization of Muslim claims and identities is evident in both case studies.

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The executive summary of all the national studies carried out for the work-package on Tolerance in Political life are displayed at the end of the report.

**Keywords**

Tolerance; Toleration; Acceptance; Respect; Non-tolerance; Politics; Political participation; Political representation; Political mobilization; Political discourses; Ethnic minorities; Immigrants; Majority/Minority relations.
Introduction

Flora Burchianti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero

1. Diversity, tolerance and politics

Tolerance and practices of toleration are embedded in particular social spaces which have their own rules, institutions and forms of interaction. The purpose of this report and of the different lines of research made within the scope of ACCEPT PLURALISM is to investigate the forms and practices of tolerance in the political life.

The concept of tolerance has been defined as an attitude or a principle which correspond to disagreeing or disliking something and yet voluntarily enduring it (King, 1976: 20). This definition of tolerance applies to human relations but finds an application for the analysis of how European societies deal with the increasing diversity and pluralism they are experiencing. More particularly, in the realm of the political, the project aims at analysing:

- The meaning and practices of tolerance when it comes to issues of political representation or participation of migrants and native minorities.
- What kind of cultural diversity is considered compatible with the ‘secular’ politics of western democracies. What special claims or requests are tolerated? What political practices are considered tolerant or intolerant and what values/norms are considered to promote or undermine tolerance in political life?
- How the embodiment of tolerance in political life norms and practices relates to concepts such as multiculturalism, liberalism, respect, understanding, national heritage and national tradition.

Three types of attitudes are related with the broader concept of tolerance, and structure the analysis of particular national contexts. They can be seen as degrees of acceptance as regards to individuals or groups, beliefs or practices which differ from the majority or dominant group, its practices and beliefs (see Dobbernack, Modood, 2012):

- Before toleration, non-toleration relates to attitudes, discourses or institutional arrangements which refuse toleration to other individuals or groups’ attitudes, practices, beliefs or discourses because one disagrees with them or dislikes them.

- Toleration itself is the fact of allowing, putting up with or not opposing attitudes, practices, beliefs or speeches although one disagrees with them or dislikes them.

- Beyond toleration, recognition, respect as equal or admission as normal relate to practices and attitudes which admit that toleration is not enough for some groups, individuals or practices. It leads to the reconsideration of the relationship between majority/dominant group and

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1 The coordinators of this volume wish to express their gratitude to all the researchers of ACCEPT PLURALISM and especially to Anna Triandafyllidou, the principal investigator of the project, who has been present at all stages of the coordination and has read and commented all documents produced for this part of the research. We thank also in particular the authors of the different chapters which are presented in this volume for their help and dedication. As a comparative report based on different national cases studies, the presentation of the studies in the different chapters may sometimes paraphrase the original studies. In that case, the reader should understand the authors of the original studies (cited) as the real authors.
minorities/dominated groups, and implies that difference is perceived as normal feature of social life.

This classification of attitudes within the broad concept of tolerance intends to make it operational for research about the relationship between cultural majorities/dominant groups and cultural minorities/dominated groups whose attitudes, practices, beliefs and discourses can differ from the ones which are considered 'normal' in society.

The concept of tolerance, as stated here, implies an asymmetrical relationship between the one who is entitled the power to tolerate and the one who is object of tolerance (Bader, 2012). Power-asymmetries are shaping the contours of toleration/non-tolerations/respect attitudes and not everybody have (the same) power to exert it. As such, the space of tolerance is entirely embedded in the political space and in politics. The existence of power-asymmetries, political domination, majority-minority relationships but also dynamics of competition, claims over power and minority’s agency, which are at the core of politics, relate strongly to the way in which tolerance may be exerted and to the transformation of the boundaries of tolerance in society. The fundamental tension between disagreement and acceptance at the heart of toleration, and the fact that only those who have the power to do so can chose to accept or not what they disagree with, make of tolerance a tool that enables understanding tensions and challenges in the political life when it comes to dealing with difference and diversity, especially ethno-religious diversity.

In the European context, the development of liberal-democracies has been strongly associated with the development of a culture of tolerance (Dobbernack, Modood, 2011). The development of tolerance was meant to be part of the public culture as well as of the individual culture of the citizen. With the diversification of societies, notably by migration and the mobilization of native-minorities, many institutional arrangements have been made in order to guarantee the acceptance of minorities in the political life. This has been the case for ethno-religious minorities but also for other dominated groups such as women or homosexuals. These practices of acceptance however, have not always gone far beyond tolerance and many claims of minorities have been ignored by the State and the majorities.

The different political systems of European countries have led to different ways diversity has been managed. The classic liberal democracy’s conception of tolerance as applied in several political systems did not lead to challenge the dominant culture, which remains privileged, and only led to allow minorities to express their culture or religion in specific spaces. The republican conception of tolerance which prevails in other political systems led to a public/private separation of the space of tolerance. While every practices and beliefs are admitted as components of the private life of citizens, they are only admitted publicly as far as they do not go against the State-defined common interest. This is notably the case in France and Italy. The liberal pluralist conception of tolerance is certainly the one that seeks to extend spaces of tolerance for ethno-cultural minorities practices and beliefs, and seeks to maintain pluralism. But the recognition as legitimately different does not mean recognition as equals. These systems are certainly not exhaustive or exist as pure systems in Europe. But one of the objectives of the different research projects presented in this report was to examine these national traditions and compare the systems to understand better the different modalities by which diversity and pluralism are managed in different political systems.

Moreover, in recent years, manifestations of intolerance have increased in many European liberal-democracies. One of the most important sign of it is the rise of a ‘new’ radical-right and of anti-immigrant parties which clearly stand against cultural pluralism and advocate for reducing the space of tolerance. Another form of intolerance, and important component of the public debate in many countries, refers to a new liberal intolerance and its modalities. Liberal intolerance posits that intolerance is necessary when the principles of liberalism and human rights are infringed. This compatibility between liberal principles and intolerance are redefining the limits between the tolerable and the non-tolerable in Europe.
Introduction
The objective of the research within ACCEPT PLURALISM as regards to tolerance in the political life was to investigate key questions. The main questions were:

- What kind of cultural diversity is considered compatible with the 'secular' politics of European countries?
- What claims or requests are tolerated?
- What political practices are considered tolerant or intolerant?
- What values and norms are considered to promote or undermine tolerance in political life?

Each of these questions refers to asymmetrical relations and minority-majority relations. But all these dimensions must be placed in a dynamic perspective. Migrant or native minority claims and practices are perceived as the introduction of difference as regards to the norms and practices of the cultural/political majority. But this does not mean that cultural/political majorities’ norms and practices were and are homogeneous. The homogeneity of culture, practices and beliefs is constructed and used explicitly or implicitly to maintain the domination of the majority or its autonomy from the outside. In every national enterprise, the unity of culture is a strong component of making society. As such, the introduction of practices and beliefs which have not been understood so far as forming part of the majority culture is a challenge posed to majorities. Conversely, the homogeneity of minority culture and ethno-religious practices and beliefs is also constructed, positively or negatively, by the members of the minority or by the cultural majority itself. As such, two dynamics are important when it comes to cultural diversity challenges in the political life: on the one hand, the modalities of recognition and the modalities of representation; on the other hand, the dynamics of mobilisation and participation. In the first case, the cultural majority is engaged in the definition process of what is acceptable and the very definition of the perimeter of minorities and the definition of their culture/identity. In the second case, minorities engage in dynamics of unification and codification of their culture and linkage, as well as in attitudes directed at the majority, issuing claims of acceptance/respect and recognition.

The studies carried out in the frame of ACCEPT PLURALISM empirically challenge the concept of tolerance and the three class concept of toleration, non-toleration and respect. The aim is to see in a particular social space such as politics - as it has been previously done with education (Maussens, Bader, 2012) - how these concepts can contribute to the analysis of diversity, difference and majority/minority relationship in European societies.

2. Modalities of tolerance in the political field
The lines of research on tolerance and political life have highlighted the diversity of the modalities of toleration. Tolerant in political life refers to a continuous boundary drawing activity which appears to be central in complex society’s assemblages. Following Schiffauer, toleration as played in contemporary societies refers to three different boundary drawing activities (Schiffauer, 2012). The first one refers to the “limit between the accepted and the objected” and its modalities, which respond to the question how toleration/non-toleration is put in practice and justified. A second definition of boundaries refers to what is tolerated or not, and thus to the limit between the tolerable and the non-tolerable. The third boundary drawing refers to the who. We have already said that toleration implies an asymmetrical relationship, and thus creates limits between the dominant and the dominated.

The different studies presented in this report bring empirical evidence about how boundary-drawing is realized in the public life.
2.1. Who is entitled to tolerate or not-tolerate?

In principle, actors with political power define the boundaries of toleration or acceptance. The most powerful actor is classically the State, which has the main power and legitimacy in defining the limits of tolerance over its territory. In the different studies gathered here, the state apparatus is still the major actor entitled to tolerate, in particular national governments, the legislative power and the judicial power. Other actors with an important political power, and who are increasingly defining toleration boundaries, are local governments and European institutions. Other actors situated on the side of the cultural majorities and powerful agents such as political parties and party leaders, Administrations (police, local Administration) or courts are also important actors for the definition of the tolerable. On the other side, the ones who are susceptible to be tolerated or not, are the minorities, minority beliefs and minority practices. It should be said however, that the scope of who is tolerated or not is changing in function of the cases under examination. They may represent all migrants, “post-migration”, native minorities, “culturally different” migrants, minority religions or “coloured people”. They may be a group within one of these categories. The focus of non-toleration in the European countries is placed predominantly on Islam and Roma people. It might depend also of other criteria than ethno-religious identities such as the class (low-income, homeless, unemployed immigrants or native minorities) and the status as regards to the law (unauthorized migrants). These are the dominated. But, without invalidating the definition of tolerance as an asymmetrical relationship, studies on collective action have shown that even the dominated are not powerless, and may come to be dominant in specific spaces and contexts. The studies show examples in which the relationship between the one who tolerates and the object of toleration may be more complex and even reversed in certain situations. Studies on the mobilisations of minorities for example, highlight cases of minorities gaining toleration and even recognition, including within highly vertical configurations of power. The less powered may even have the power to not tolerate sometimes.

2.2. What is tolerable and what is not? Justifications

As regards to what is not tolerated in political life, Mouritsen and Olsen have defined different modalities of liberal intolerance which refer to different justifications for not tolerating what one disagrees with (Mouritsen and Olsen, 2012). These modalities can be found in the different country cases examined here. Firstly, intolerance is justified by a concern over the necessity of “cultural cohesion as a precondition of liberal-democratic societies and institutions” (idem, p.19). This concern has been especially highlighted in studies of political discourses and policies justifying the exclusion of those who are reputed to bring “too much difference” to the society and thus harm social and cultural cohesion. This justifies policies of exclusion, practices of securitization and anti-immigrant/anti-minorities discourses. The second dimension of liberal intolerance is linked to the necessity of “neutrality or universalism of the public realm, and the proper form of the private-public distinction”. This has been examined especially through the reception of claims of minorities for representation or participation to the political life. Neutrality and universalism are major arguments to reject the political accommodation of minorities as they are asked to integrate the “normal” political system and respect its norms and practices which are applying to all citizens. In these reports, the authors argue that the rules of representation and participation to the political system introduce a bias in favour of the cultural majority. Finally, a justification of liberal intolerance lays in the requirement to manifest dispositions as a good and liberal citizen and to practice effectively liberalism. This has been especially identified in the doubts expressed toward Muslims' fidelity to the liberal-democratic system.

Other intolerant practices and discourses have been identified, which do not rely on liberal intolerance and go far beyond intolerance. This refers to racism and prejudices expressed and practised towards migrants and native minorities. The justifications identified for these forms of intolerance, which are no longer in the realm of liberalism, are rooted either in biological racism and prejudices or in a principled nationalism (Triandafyllidou, 2012). As Triandafyllidou shows, national identity and
nationalism have been constructed as opposite to the “other”. Even if the other can be tolerated by the national group, and even if a self-reflexion on the intrinsically diverse nature of nations could be a way to accept the “new” diversity, the examples highlighted by the reports show that nationalism is still conceived as a source and justification for intolerance.

In the side of the justifications to go beyond toleration, the claims expressed by minorities (and those who support their recognition and respect) are made also according to different justifications. In particular, several case studies show how migrant claims are rooted in liberal principles and/or how representatives of these minorities strategically use concepts and values of liberalism to justify their desire to go beyond toleration and enter in the space of the normal or respect as equals. “Laicité” (Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet, 2012), human rights, religious freedom or the right to personal autonomy and freedom are major components of the claims of minorities and of their political mobilisation.

2.3. How acceptance or objection is expressed and implemented?

Here again, the case studies present diverse modalities for the implementation of acceptance or non-toleration in the public space. In the sector of political life, our attention has been put especially on institutional arrangements which allow the recognition of minorities’ beliefs and practices and effective admission as equals. The attention to institutional arrangements, as demonstrated by Bader (2012), allow shifting from an excessive attention to the State and above all show that studies of tolerance benefit from not only analysing discourses and principles. In fact, as shown by the different studies covered by this report, the modalities and directions of institutional arrangements and modalities of governance are much more complex, dynamic and diverse than what discourses and public debates seem to manifest. Recognition might not be granted formally but practical arrangements and governance through administrations, local governments or other might contribute to the effective “normalisation” of minorities’ beliefs and practices. On the contrary, formal respect and formal equality granted to minorities might be contradicted in practice by institutional discrimination and policies which reduce the space of tolerance.

The different modalities of acceptance or rejection/non-toleration have been organising the research of the different partners of ACCEPT PLURALISM on tolerance in political life. Political and media discourses, public policies and political mobilisation, and their translation into institutional arrangements are organising the findings presented in this report.

3. Dynamics of toleration and acceptance: the clusters

For the purpose of the research on tolerance and diversity in the political life, one aim of the ACCEPT PLURALISM project is to explore how comparable challenges are dealt with in different European countries. The comparative dimension of the case studies is one of the main interests of the project in order to provide results which challenge empirically the concept of tolerance and its usefulness in the study of the management of diversity, as well as for policy-oriented outputs of the project.

For the purpose of comparison in the field of politics, the research carried out by the different partners of ACCEPT PLURALISM has been coordinated with the objective that all case studies be relevant and comparable challenges. This means that the case studies were conceived to be at the same time 1) relevant for the national context, which means that they must have been object of public debate and led to policies, forms of regulation, institutional arrangements or at least the implication of mainstream political actors; 2) relevant for the general European context, which means that the national challenge that was selected should be related in some way to political or social issues that are discussed at the European level, and 3) provide good examples of how different countries deal with common challenges. In addition, all challenges had to have been discussed in some way as a challenge for
toleration/non-toleration or recognition/respect as equals by one or more of the participants to the public debate.

The different research projects within this work-package are based on one (or more) country-specific case study investigated with qualitative research methods. All the researches are empirically grounded and they aim at challenging empirically the concepts of tolerance. For the purpose of comparability, all research analysed how the dimensions presented above (which we can summarize as: who/what/how) were embedded in the case study as well as in the national public debates in general.

The national case studies selected by the different partners have been clustered along three main dimensions:

Cluster 1 is organised around the challenge of political discourses in relation with intolerance boundaries drawing activities. The key question of this cluster is: how are the limits of tolerance defined in the political discourses of European countries? The cluster seeks to explore reactions of political actors or institutions facing cultural and religious diversity in the society, by the entry of political and public discourses. Intolerance is expressed whether by political parties – and especially extreme-right parties – elected representatives, charismatic figures or organised political groups. Two types of discourses are studied within this cluster: xenophobic and anti-immigrants discourses on the one hand and liberal-intolerance discourses expressed in relation with beliefs and practices of minorities which are perceived as harming the principles of liberalism, on the other hand. These case studies investigate the mechanics of production of intolerant discourses (What is expressed? How is it expressed? Which means are used to make it public?) and the boundary drawing activity as displayed in contradictory debates in favour or against toleration/ respect.

Cluster 2 is organised around the challenge posed by public policies of exclusion. It focuses explicitly on the institutional obstacles opposed to the rights and admission as normal of minorities. The key question of this cluster is: what are the institutional limitations for the respect of minorities’ rights? The case studies explore public policies which limit the rights of immigrants and minorities. They focus on political institutions (state, parliaments, local governments or public administrations) actively obstructing the possibility for immigrants to benefit from equal rights with the majority: political rights (right to vote or eligibility); civil rights (right to assemble, freedom of expression, religious freedom, right to no discrimination) and social rights (right to education, healthcare and social support). The challenges studied focus on the political and social debates that frame these limitations as an expression of injustice, non-toleration and disrespect.

Cluster 3 is organised around the quests for recognition and the political mobilisation of minorities. The key question of this cluster is: what are the institutional limits of tolerance to minority claims? This cluster gathers case studies which seek to explore the claims expressed by organisations representing minorities that emerge from below and their recognition – or not – by political institutions. They analyse the scope of claims expressed by the minorities (such as ethno-territorial claims, claims regarding political rights and political representation at national level, or claims of laïcité), the modalities of the political mobilization of minorities and the response of political institutions to these claims (whether by setting up institutional arrangements for the political representation of the minority, by furthering its territorial autonomy or, conversely, by dismissing the claims or increasing repression). This cluster has been divided into two different chapters: one on the mobilization for recognition of native ethno-national minorities and one on a dialogue between the French and British experiences of Muslims organizations’ mobilisations.

The report is divided into four chapters.
Introduction

In the first chapter Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero present the challenges of intolerance in political discourses of five countries: Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Spain. Despite their difference in terms of experience related to migration and way of dealing with cultural diversity, these countries all experience important debates about migration and native minorities and political discourses are presenting increasingly migration and native minorities as a problem in terms of tolerance. They show that a common phenomenon of mainstreaming of intolerant discourses is at stake in the countries. The chapter presents then the framing processes in terms of tolerance toward diversity and the different discursive repertoires. It ends by highlighting the predominance of national patterns in the dealings with minorities in the public space.

In the second chapter, Ambrosini and Caneva present the challenge posed for tolerance by public policies of exclusion in Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. They present how increasingly restrictive policies have been implemented at the European and national levels, especially as they conceive migrants as a threat to security. They then present the interactions between local and national policies in this framework of restrictive policies. The cases of the Netherlands and Italy show how local policies extend (in Italy) or oppose (in the Netherlands) the restrictive national policy framework. In the case of Bulgaria and Ireland they compare cases in which national policy frameworks have developed in more restrictive (Bulgaria) or more accommodating (Ireland) ways to the need of integrating native minorities (Bulgaria) or migrants (Ireland) in public life.

In the third chapter, Kaya presents the findings on quests for recognition of native minorities in Poland, Romania, Sweden and Turkey. After discussing theoretically different modalities of response to minority claims in Europe, he proceeds to a comparison of the different cases along different types of interrogations: Firstly on the diverse modalities of dealing with minorities, secondly on the type of minorities involved and the interactions they engage with authorities. He ends by reversing the perspective and see how these claims are perceived from the state and public institutions.

Finally, the fourth chapter is devoted to a comparison of the mobilisation of Muslim organisations in France and the United Kingdom. Escafré-Dublet and Dobbernack start by providing background elements on the participation, the representation and the content of claims in both countries. They then proceed by presenting the case studies in the two countries, highlighting the common features of these mobilisations but also particular elements which stress the singularity of each national context. They end by opening perspective on the contrasting configuration of identity politics between the two countries.

References


Chapter 1. Political discourses and the definition of tolerance boundaries.
Flora Burchianti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero

Introduction

The rise of intolerant discourses toward migrants and the strengthening in many European countries of extreme-right and anti-immigrant parties is one of the main shared concerns among governments, civil society organisation and scholars. Radical-right parties are gaining ground since the 1980s in some countries like France, and are part of the political landscape of many since the 1990s. This has led to an extensive academic literature aimed at understanding the causes of such a renewal, portraying their electorate, and determining the nature of political parties which seemed to present characteristics different from the traditional far-right parties.

A common feature of all these parties is the centrality of migration in their platform, and their exclusionary views on this phenomenon. That along with the fact that the political parties gained power in countries of immigration has linked in all ways migration and cultural diversity to growing forms of intolerance in European societies. Radical-right movements have also developed in Eastern Europe, in countries which are not experiencing large scale immigration but have important cultural minorities such as Roma people.

However, the discourse of the radical right is not the only one to challenge definitions of tolerance in the different countries. In certain countries, it is certainly one of the main actors in debates on the possibility to receive immigrants and on what should be tolerated or accepted on part of resident foreigners and ethnic minorities. But public debates of tolerance in the political life have also involved many other actors: mainstream politicians and political parties, governments, media, social organisations and minority representatives. Over the last few years, several countries have experienced a series of events, incidents, public manifestations or declarations which have led to intense public debates in which the rules of toleration were discussed and redefined.

This chapter presents five country cases of such debates. It focuses on political discourses in which tolerance/intolerance contributes actively to draw boundaries when it comes to define the place of migrants and minorities in the society. The discourses analyzed may present overtly anti-immigrant positions, while others seek to discuss the norms that enable the acceptance of cultural or religious difference. Others finally seek to oppose racism and anti-immigrant discourses and seek to limit the expression of such discourses publicly. The cases present how the boundary drawing activity is realized through political and public discourses and how political actors negotiate the limits of acceptance and/or tolerance of cultural diversity.

The chapter will start with an overview of the different country cases. It will then discuss the nature of the actors whose discourses are aiming at changing the limits of tolerance and highlight their main arguments. It will end by comparing the ways to stretch or redefine the boundaries of tolerance in politics in the different countries.

1. The case studies

The countries analysed have very different experiences of immigration. Two of the countries are old immigration countries (Germany and Denmark), two of them have experienced large-scale immigration flows only in the last 15 years but with certain intensity (Greece and Spain) and Bulgaria has an important ethnic-minority, the Roma. However, they have all experienced controversies regarding the acceptance of migrants and native-minority practices and views or debates challenging
tolerance of these minorities in the political life. All the controversies presented have received important media coverage and have been at the centre of the public and political debate.

1.1 Thilo Sarrazin’s pamphlet on immigration (Mühe, 2012)

In August 2010 Thilo Sarrazin, a prominent member of the SPD (Social Democratic Party) and then board member of the German Federal Bank, presented his book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” (Germany does away with itself) which content created a major public debate. He defended in the book that migrants and Muslims threatened Germany by lowering general intelligence rates and having a higher birth rate. He had already presented these views in an interview for the magazine “Lettres International” in September 2009 and chose to apologize before the importance of the debate which followed. But in 2010, many saw the book of Sarrazin as breaking a taboo in place for too long in German society. The debate influenced greatly the discourse about integration, immigrants and Islam in the political life of the country since then, especially the open questioning of multiculturalism as a model.

1.2. Public meetings of radical Islamic actors in Denmark (Lindekilde, 2012)

The two case studies selected for investigation in Denmark are two recent episodes of public meetings involving ‘radical’ Islamic actors who expressed intolerant views that conflict with majority norms and values. They both questioned the limits of toleration in regard to Muslim minority articulation of controversial views in the public sphere in Denmark.

In January 2011, an intense debate evolved around a public meeting arranged by the Danish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir under the title ‘Afghanistan: Scandinavian Governments in the service of the US’. Hizb ut-Tahrir had previously held similar public meetings in Denmark, always generating an extensive public debate. This time the debate reached new heights because of the invitation which was perceived as a support to the killing of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan and because of the public and symbolic nature of the Danish National Library, chosen as the venue of the meeting. Despite the attempt to stop it, the meeting took place.

In April 2011, the ‘radical’ Islamic preacher Bilal Philips was invited by a Muslim organization to give a public talk on ‘Islamophobia – is Islam a threat to the West?’ in Copenhagen. The controversial and intolerant views that Philips had continuously expressed publicly, notably on homosexuals, Shia Muslims, women’s condition or violent Jihad, led to an important debate prior to his visit. An important debate was centred on the role of the Islamic Faith Community in inviting Philips to Copenhagen and on whether the opinions of the preacher were shared by the organisation. Unlike other countries, Denmark did not deny Philips’ entry into the country. His arrival and debate were extensively covered by the media and the debate took place before 1000 persons.

Both episodes highlight the kind of norms, attitudes and values Muslim actors, implicitly and explicitly, are asked to subscribe to and denounce in order to be accepted as legitimate actors in public debates.

1.3. Tolerance and intolerance in Greek political life (Kouki and Triandafyllidou, 2012)

The study on Greece examines the discourses adopted by political and social actors in reaction to two cases studies related to religious diversity and racist actions in the public space in Athens between 2010 and 2011.

The first case refers to a public prayer, organised in the public space in protest to the absence of any official Mosque in Athens. On 18 November 2010, Muslims gathered on the courtyard of the country’s main university to pray publicly on the occasion of the Eid al Adha (the major Muslim festivity in
Political discourses and the definition of tolerance boundaries

honour to the sacrifice of Abraham). The pacific protest was organized by the Muslim Association of Greece. The event was positively endorsed by authorities, political parties, media and even the Church that tolerated religious diversity as manifested on that day in the city centre. But anti-immigrant parties, LAOS and Golden Dawn, opposed the event. Members of Golden Dawn and other far right groups led violent incidents in Attiki Square in their attempt to cancel the event.

Six months later, in May 2011, after the assassination of a 44 year-old man and without having evidence concerning the nationality of perpetrators, a series of violent and racist attacks against migrants took place in the very centre of Athens. They were led by ultra right wing groups who beat deprived immigrants while, in some cases, member of Golden Dawn filmed the aggressions and broadcasted it via Internet. These attacks were tolerated by both police forces and part of the residents of the area. Two days after the 44 year-old man assassination, a 21 year-old man from Bangladesh died after being stabbed. All parliamentary parties condemned both the event of the murder and the racist violence that erupted in the city centre. The media coverage followed also this line but the focus was put on the loss of control on crime and insecurity, linked to the influx of migrants.

1.4. Local controversies about migration in Catalonia (Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero, 2012)

Despite a fairly progressive and comprehensive policy toward migrants, Catalonia experienced several important local controversies about migration in the years 2010-2011. Three of them are analysed.

In January 2010, the city council of Vic voted the ban of unauthorized migrants from the city census (padrón), which is the only way for them to access public welfare. This ban was later declared illegal but it raised an important debate about the role of municipalities in integration policies and about the rights of undocumented immigrants.

Candidates of the Popular Party to May 2011 municipal elections have put the anti-immigrant rhetoric at the centre of their campaign. This was particularly the case in the city of Badalona in which the candidate and actual mayor of the town has based his campaign on targeting the Romanian Roma who have settled in the town for bringing insecurity, crime and incivility.

Several towns in Catalonia decided to vote proposals banning the wearing of religious veils covering the face, such as burqa and niqab, in public buildings. The first and most publicized case has been the one of the provincial capital of Lleida, ruled by the socialist party, which raised contention across the country. In this case, the debate was whether the ban proposals were stigmatizing migrants or, conversely, decisions were based on human right values and on ensuring security.

1.5. The Roma integration issue in Hungary (Vidra and Fox, 2012)

Two case studies have been researched in Hungary. Both of them refer to murder cases between Hungarian and Roma, one perpetrated by Roma and one in which Roma are the victims. Both cases fed an important debate in Hungary about the Roma integration in the society. In 2006, a teacher who was driving in Olaszliszka, a small village in the North, with his two daughters, accidentally hit a girl crossing the road. The father of the daughter and other people of the village, all Roma, attacked the man who went to check on the girl. This one died as a result of his injuries. Within two days, the police arrested the perpetrators. The second case refers to a series of murderous attacks against the Roma that began in 2008 in the city of Tatárszentgyörgy. They were later revealed to be racially motivated. The initial debates and police investigation thought the murders were related to Roma criminal activity or family revenge. It is only after the murder of a man and his 5-year old son that the police considered possible racial motivations for the attacks. One year later in August 2009, four men were arrested by the police on suspicion of murder. The police found neo-Nazi symbols in the suspects’ houses, which established the racial motivations of the crimes. Their trial is ongoing. Both murder cases spurred on the ongoing debate about Roma integration, involving the media, politicians
and intellectuals. In the aftermath of the murders, a number of these actors stressed the need to abandon the politically correct discourse, as they viewed it as an impediment to engage in a ‘genuine’ dialogue on these important issues. This in turn legitimated the further racialisation of the Roma question by virtually all parties to the debate.

2. The actors involved in the redefinition of the limits of tolerance

2.1. The opportunity for radical right-wing parties and groups to extend intolerance.

All countries under analysis have seen the radical right gaining position in the political landscape. But the weight of these groups in the political life as well as in the controversies is very different from one country to another.

In Denmark, Greece and Hungary, radical-right parties are represented in the Parliament. The Danish People's party is the third political force in the country since 2001 with currently 22 MPs. In Greece, the radical right is represented at the parliament through the LAOS (The People's Orthodox Rally) party since 2007. LAOS participated in the provisional coalition which was meant to deal with the crisis between November 2011 and February 2012, which legitimized the party. Despite that, the party did not secure any seat at the Parliament at May and June 2012 elections. Nevertheless, another radical right party, Golden Dawn, entered the parliament in 2012 getting nearly 7% of the national vote. It has also one seat in Athens' city council. Its members have been repeatedly accused of carrying out acts of violence and hate crimes against immigrants, political opponents and ethnic minorities. The organization has a clear racist position and endorses Nazi symbols and political positions. In Hungary, Jobbik (The movement for a better Hungary) has gained electoral support and received 16% of the votes in the 2010 Parliament elections, representing 47 seats (out of 386). Jobbik was created in 2003 and its success is largely due to its successful exploitation of the Roma situation. The party contributed to put Roma issues on the political agenda and mainstream parties and representatives have engaged a dialogue with the ideas expressed by Jobbik on this issue, often in an uncritical way. It has close connexion to extra-parliamentary and paramilitary groups with which it participates to public protests and actions aiming at ‘restoring order’ in Roma settlements. This was the case with the Hungarian Guards, a paramilitary group which was dismantled by the Court in 2009. Jobbik was also a central actor in the 2010 demonstrations and riots demanding the resignation of the government, along with mainstream right parties.

In other countries, the presence of the extreme right is weaker, but extreme-right groups and parties, even in marginality, manage to influence mainstream politics.

In Spain, no important far-right party has existed since the democratisation and no seat at the Parliament has been won by such parties since 1979. The sum of the votes for the radical right does not even reach 1% at Spanish level. This situation is currently challenged to some extent in Catalonia. A new far-right political party named the Platform for Catalonia (PxC), averse to migration and, above all, to resident Muslims, was born in 2002. Its electoral support is mainly at local level, in specific cities, but its electoral scores at Catalan level are still very weak in comparison with other European countries (2.4% in 2010). But its score is growing fast, and the participation of PxC in street activism has sparked several incidents, received a large audience and is changing the political landscape in Catalonia. Germany is experiencing a re-composition of the extreme-right and of its discourse in the recent years. The traditional extreme-right party, NPD (National Democratic Party), as well as new parties such as “Die Freiheit” (Freedom) and “Bürgerbewegung Pro Deutschland” (People’s Movement Pro Germany), have focused their discourses towards the stigmatization of Muslims. NPD has no presence at Federal level but has seats in two regional parliaments. It employs overtly anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim slogans, some of them referring implicitly to National Socialism, such as
the “GAS geben” slogan, which means ‘accelerating’ but literally taken means “giving gas”. The new parties created in 2011 deny being anti-immigrant parties but are overtly targeting the “Islamisation” of Germany and appropriated Thilo Sarrazin’s ideas.

Table 1. Electoral scores of anti-immigrant parties (Most recent national elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries and main far-right parties</th>
<th>Last national election (year)</th>
<th>Seats in national parliament (nb)</th>
<th>Share of vote (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark Danish People's Party</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany National Democratic Party</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece LAOS Golden Dawn</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary Jobbik</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia Plataforma per Catalunya</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,4 (in Catalonia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.24 (total)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration with public data

In all countries under analysis, one of the main and under-researched features is the relationships between extreme-right's overtly anti-immigrant discourse and mainstream politics and parties. The limit of tolerance drawing activity relies mainly on the use of migration issues by mainstream politicians during controversies.

2.2. Mainstream actors and toleration boundary drawing

The radical right alone cannot reconfigure the boundaries of toleration in the countries examined. Discourses and debates which intend to define or redefine what can or cannot be tolerated as regards to cultural and religious diversity are effective when they become central in the public arena. In all the controversies and events under examination in the country cases, the discourses effectively succeeded in making tolerance to migration and native minority a mainstream concern and subject of contentious expressions. This means that the participation of mainstream political actors as well as mainstream media and newspapers is crucial to transform isolated expressions of intolerance into a central society debate able to change effectively the limits of tolerance in the society. These studies explore how the discourse on tolerance/intolerance to cultural diversity has been mainstreamed.

The Greek, German, Spanish cases stress the role of mainstream parties and politicians in debating tolerance. In the Greek context, the radical-right and its discourse has gained legitimacy in the ultimate years, especially thanks to its representation at the Parliament and its handling of the issue of security in the city centre of Athens. The country experiences a conservative unfolding of Greek identity since the 1990s which has been intensified by the deep economic crisis the country experiences. Intolerance and the blaming of migrants for the problems suffered by the country are thus not only a far-right discourse. It is also partially shared by mainstream actors and the public opinion. The study shows that mainstream politicians and other actors share the same discursive frames, notably the cultural/identity
floring and the threatening component of the majority/minority relationship. Being integrated in mainstream discourse on immigration, the report shows that the discourse of the radical right has gained legitimacy.

A similar process has been analysed in the German case. However an important difference is the fact that the initial anti-immigrant statements which raised contention have been expressed by a SPD representative and representative at the Federal Bank, Thilo Sarrazin. While the Federal Bank decided to dismiss him after the release of his book, this led to a major debate on the freedom of speech in Germany. Even if major representatives expressed their disagreement with the content of Sarrazin’s book, many of them nevertheless developed the idea that there was a strong relationship between integration, Islam and Muslims and German “leading culture” (Leitkultur). CDU representatives, followed by SPD representatives, developed the concept of the German “leading culture”, which refers to values of the Constitution, the rule of law and the inviolable dignity of human beings, which migrants and Muslims had to adopt to be part of the German society. Many political statements of mainstream representatives supported implicitly or explicitly the idea that “Muslims culture” had different values and norms from the German leading culture, and that the conflicting ones had to be abandoned. Even if she has taken distance firmly with Sarrazin statements, Chancellor Merkel made only a few weeks after the release of the book the famous discourse on the failure of multicultural society in Germany, stating that “This approach has failed, absolutely failed.” Another important leader of the CDU, the CSU chairman and Minister-President of Bavaria Horst Seehofer, presented a plan about integration policy demanding to add the criteria of the “willingness and ability to integrate” as a prerequisite for immigration, and sanctions for those who refused. These are examples of the way that even if mainstream political actors took their distances with Sarrazin's discourse, they reproduce and legitimize the idea that immigrants and Muslims present problems for the society. They coincide with more restrictive boundaries toward Muslim and migrants reflected notably in integration policies.

The Catalan cases also highlight the participation of mainstream parties and politicians in the legitimisation of the debate on the duties of immigrants and the tolerance to values and practices which are deemed culturally different from the local one. Mainstream right-wing and left-wing politicians have sparked the different controversies, with or without the support of their own party. The Catalan Popular party representative in Badalona has led the campaign relating crime and insecurity with the Romanian Roma settled in the town. He received the support of the Catalan executive board of his party who also made of a tough policy on migration a key component of its platform. The representatives of the conservative Democratic Union of Catalonia also supported the ban on unauthorized migrants’ access to public welfare and contributed to the framing of migration from Muslim countries as an identity/cultural threat for Catalonia and its welfare system. Finally, many socialist representatives in city councils supported the ban on *burqa* and *niqab* in public buildings, but without the support of the national board of the party. Mainstream parties and politicians are the main actors who have engage in toleration boundary drawing about immigration and cultural diversity. Other political actors and notably the top of political parties tend to avoid the debate and refuse to position themselves in clear terms when it involves members of their own party but also when it involves other parties. The study shows that the autonomy within the party and the belief that a tough discourse on migration allow to gain votes are the main reasons that explain the dominant laissez-faire policy among political actors.

The Danish case presents discursive strategies of mainstream actors when they are asked to cope with the controversial meetings and legitimize their positions. It identifies three main dynamics of relative positioning in the boundary drawing process. The first strategy is to displace the responsibility of drawing boundaries from the realm of the political to the realm of law. It has been adopted by the two main conservative ministers concerned by the organisation of the meeting on the Afghanistan war. This strategy enabled the minister to avoid politically controversial issues, while other political actors who were not in charge positioned themselves clearly in favour or against tolerance to gain legitimacy and score political points. The second strategy was to securitize the boundary drawing process, thus leading also to a de-politicization of the issue. Each meeting was suitable to such interpretation in
terms of security. The topic of the debate on Danish participation to Afghanistan and the alleged call for murdering Danish soldiers could be securitized. But the debate also tended to securitize the debate with Bilal Philips and the organiser, the Islamic Faith Community which was suspected to be disloyal to Danish democratic principles. The third strategy was used by Muslim actors to cope with the controversy. These ones, contrary to the cases examined in the other countries, have had an important voice during the Danish controversies. They have tried to counter-securitize the issue and also adopt a strategy to shift responsibility for boundary drawing. This passed by reframing opponents' discursive frames. It also tried to adapt to the boundary drawing of others, in order to ease the pressure, by recognising its errors and presenting itself as harmless. Finally these actors simply avoided to enter directly the debate about boundary drawing by declaring it irrelevant.

Mainstream media also plays a major role in shaping public debates about migration and migrants attitudes. It reflects and constructs the process by which anti-immigrant statements or debates about the toleration of migrants' practices and values have been mainstreamed. As in the political arena, positions and opinions expressed in the media are controversial. But they offer a public space for contentious discourses which contributes in any case to present tolerance toward cultural diversity as a leading issue. The Hungarian study shows that newspapers have had a very important role in framing the different cases and organising the debate on Roma issues. It shows that radical-right media are not the only one to present Roma as a problem and put forward intolerant views relying on the “biologisation” of Roma difference, and that a great part of this discourse is also endorsed by conservative newspapers. The left-liberal newspapers, on the contrary, emphasizes tolerance through norms of human rights and non-discrimination. Yet, in the same left-liberal newspaper, the cultural distinctiveness of Roma is highlighted and tolerated, but this does not point towards the integration of migrants. This is the “right to difference” and the construction of special policies for Roma which are supported by the left wing.

In Denmark, the debates about the public meetings have been extensively covered and organized through newspapers. The study shows that the media has presented “instances of toleration boundary drawing”, defined as “articulated positions by an individual either for toleration or intoleration of the meeting, accompanied by a discursive rationale or argument for the boundary drawing” (Lindekilde, 2012, p.8). The media gave voice to actors expressing different views on the meetings and tend to balance tolerant and intolerant stances. But while tolerant expressions have been reproduced more in the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, expressions of intolerance have been presented in a greater number in the second case.

In all countries the debate on the toleration of cultural diversity and “difference” has not been monopolised by the radical-right. The debates and the process of toleration limits drawing have gotten central in the public space and involved mainstream political actors as well as mainstream media, and sometimes representatives of minorities themselves.

The discourses used by these actors during the controversies have been extensively analysed. The framing of what is at stake in the controversies and the elaboration of framed of tolerance/intolerance share many common features in the different countries. But national features also give more or less importance to certain dimensions.

3. Framing the boundaries of tolerance

This section focuses on the analysis of the discursive frames that contribute to toleration boundary drawing in the different countries. This pays attention to the content of the discourses, both the ones advocating for tolerance and the ones advocating for intolerance, depending on the cases analysed in the different countries. The objects of toleration or intolerance vary in function of the cases. Discourses may define how much non toleration must be allowed in public space, either through
discourses (Denmark, Germany, Spain) or practices (Greece, Spain, Hungary). Others may refer to how much toleration must be granted to the practices and expressions which are perceived as conflicting with the majority values and practices (Denmark, Hungary, Greece, Spain).

The content of the public discourses can also be divided between explicit and implicit intolerance. The first rely on anti-immigrant or anti-minority discourses, use stereotyped representation of these ones and go far beyond intolerance to reach racism and active exclusion of minorities. These discourses are mainly put forward by radical-right groups in the different countries but can at times be retaken by mainstream actors (Thilo Sarrazin or the Popular party representative in Catalonia for example). The second type of discourse is more connected to intolerance embedded in political correctness. The targeted groups are not migrants or native minorities as a whole. This type of discourse targets determined practices or values that are associated with a (cultural, social, religious) difference between the in group/majority and the out group/minority. Another strategy is to target not practices and values associated to culture but to draw tolerance boundary in the minority group, separating the “extremist” or “radicals” who cannot be tolerated and the others. This kind of discourse has been put forward by all kind of mainstream actors during the controversies.

Different ways of framing what is tolerable and what is not have been analysed in the different cases. We will outline the main common frames among the country cases and present briefly national particularities in the boundary drawing discourses.

The main common discourse drawing boundaries between tolerable and non-tolerable refer to legality, securitisation and culture and identity.

Discursive frames on legality have had a major place in the controversies in Denmark, Spain and Greece. This frame proposes a clear contribution to boundary drawing and justifies toleration or non toleration depending on the cases and controversies. In Denmark, legality has been employed mainly as a discursive strategy to justify the tolerance of public meetings. It has been used to depoliticize the debate on public meetings but it is also founded on liberal grounds that claim that same toleration boundaries must apply to all groups. The only equal boundary applying to all groups is the one stated by the law and intolerance must be correlated to the legal framework. But this “tolerance-as-a-legal-must” does not mean that other members of society cannot protest publicly against the views expressed in the meetings. In Spain, the argumentation about legality has been used also to justify tolerance, for example to oppose the illegal ban of undocumented immigrants or the ban of the burqa. Conversely, legality has also been integrated to the opposition to racism and hate speech in the case of the stigmatisation of the Roma. The Courts are perceived at the same time as the ones which are entitled to make respect the boundaries of tolerance. The discontent about their effective action to condemn racism does not lead to their delegitimization but rather to the need for the political power to strengthen the capacities of the Courts. The frame on legality has also served as a justification for intolerance. In the Greek case, the unauthorised situation of many immigrants is a justification for intolerance. The fact that immigrants comply with the law is perceived as a precondition for their tolerance by the Greek society. This was also the argumentation of the actors in favour of the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from social rights in the city of Vic. The main characteristic of this frame is to consider that tolerance/intolerance is not a matter of moral judgement but of equality before the law. That said legality frames are also used to extend intolerance in many situations. The use of the “law and order” frame is often part of a discourse on the duties of minorities and the need for them to respect the same rules as the nationals. But this is part of an argumentation that essentialise the cultural traits of certain groups (such as polygamy, genital ablation or violence against women) to justify intolerance toward the minority group.

Secondly, law and order frame or security frame have been dominant in the majority of the controversies. In Denmark, the securitization of the debate and the perception of the public meetings as a potential threat for the Danish society and state, especially for the debate on the war in Afghanistan, have been the main justification for intolerant stances. In Hungary, Roma culture is also constructed as a threat for the security of Hungarian people. The popularisation of the term “Gypsy
crime” has been a (successful) attempt to frame Roma as bringing insecurity to the Hungarian society. For the extreme right, this essential threat must not only not be tolerated but also actively fought, by substituting state forces if necessary. The same justification exists in Greece, especially among radical-right representatives. Xenophobic attitudes are justified as reaction against insecurity and for the safeguarding of public order. In Greece as well as in Hungary, this discursive frame allows reversing the roles of the victim and the perpetrator. Even in crimes against the minority, this discourse turns the local into the victims of a previous general crime (the insecurity felt because of migrants/national minorities) which justify reactions of self-defence.

The third main discursive frame common to the country cases is the frame about culture and identity. This frame is in general a justification for intolerance toward minority practices. This frame stresses explicitly or implicitly the existence of a “leading culture” with its own rules and values that members of the minorities have to adopt in order to be part of the national (and local) society. The stances on the leading culture have been central to the recomposition of discourses and policies about migrants and Muslim integration in the ultimate years in Germany. This was connected to the stretching of the limits of intolerance, notably because of the discursive strategies to reinforce the perceived difference between the in group/majority and the out group/minority. The same process of differentiation between the majority and the minorities has been at the play in Hungary. It has been endorsed notably by left-wing media, experts and politicians who stressed the right to difference of Roma. But the study shows that despite this tolerant approach, the “right to difference” has led in the country to a disinterest for the integration of Roma in the Hungarian society. The question of the compatibility between cultures and their implicit or explicit hierarchy is also a major component of the discourse of the conservative parties in Catalonia, notably in relation to Roma and migrants from Muslim countries. Intolerance expressed through cultural/identity frames present cultures as incompatible and reinforce the differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, as demonstrated in the Greek case. Either cultures of the majority and the minority are perceived as homogeneous and exclusive. In that view, the boundary between what is tolerable or not tolerable is clear-cut and not subjected to negotiations and change. The only way to be tolerated is then for individuals to comply with the rules of tolerance.

Other discursive frames have had a prominent role in one (or more) of the national case but was less present or even absent of others. This shows the particular configuration of discourses and the differences between intolerance boundaries drawing in the different countries. They will be briefly presented.

A major intolerant frame is characterized in Hungary by the “biologisation” and essentialisation of difference. This frame is connected to securitization but present the threat of Roma population as being biological and essential. Roma are thus neither deserving respect nor tolerance because of their innate inclination to crime. Radical-right media and parties establish a clear hierarchy between the Hungarian and the Roma cultures and genetic. This is the most explicit form of racism among the country cases under analysis. The major issue comes from the progressive penetration of such discourse into mainstream politics, notably conservative media. The idea of an irreducible difference between Roma and Hungarians, whether due to genetic or culture, is one of the main components of the debate on the definition of the limits of tolerance. In Germany, Sarrazin’s stances about immigrant from Muslim countries also relied on biological stigmatisation and racism. He notably stressed the alleged difference of IQ between these migrants and Germans, which, in his view, is one of the main dangers for the economic and social development of Germany.

An important frame in Spain and Greece is related to welfare and the economic crisis. In both countries, many actors explain the need to expand the limits of intolerance in order to preserve the local population in times of crisis. This form of welfare protectionism or welfare chauvinism is not only related to the current economic situation of the countries. Rather, the crisis has led to a clear reduction of tolerance toward migrants, especially so among poor migrants living in the city centre of Athens and undocumented immigrants. The “crisis frame” contributed to expand the limits of intolerance in both countries.
Finally, another transversal frame refers to the damage that intolerance can cause to other minorities. This frame, in-between the security and liberal intolerance frames, can be summed up as “intolerance for intolerance”, especially when intolerance can harm psychologically another group. We already presented the rhetoric of the extreme right who in certain countries such as Hungary or Greece strategically reverse the positions of the victim (presented as the majority group) and of the offender (presented as the minority group) to justify non-toleration. But in other cases, the justification of intolerance is to preserve minority groups. This was the case in Denmark when the opposition to the public meeting on Afghanistan was justified by the risk that such a public debate would harm Danish veterans. But it is also an important component of the rhetoric of anti-racist organisations and opponents to anti-immigrant discourses and racist statements that advocate for intolerance towards such discourses.

These frames are not exhaustive and others have had important roles in shaping the debates on the limits to tolerance toward cultural and religious diversity. Nevertheless, many of the discursive frames or positions on the controversies have been identified as central in the majority of the countries, despite the difference of nature of the cases. This shows that the way in which issues related to cultural diversity are understood in the different countries has many similarities, notably in the content of the stances. However the dynamics of toleration-boundary drawing reveal differences between the countries.

**Conclusion: the national dynamics of toleration-boundary drawing.**

Finally, some differences among the toleration-boundary drawing in the country cases will be presented. Even if much of the content of the discourses on tolerance has been common to several cases, the definition of the limits of tolerance during the public debates refer to dimensions which are particular to the national context, the culture, the history of migration and the definition of citizenship in each country.

Breaking the taboo and political correctness

In two countries, Germany and Hungary, the main dynamics in relation to the limits of tolerance has to do with the perception that intolerant (and racist) statements about minorities have broken a taboo on important issues faced by the country. Even actors who oppose anti-Muslims or anti-Roma discourses and publicly condemned them, acknowledge the “positive side” of such discourse in unbinding political expressions. The criticisms to the discourse of Thilo Sarrazin address the way in which he presented his ideas rather than the validity of the content. Criticisms to the naturalisation of Gypsy crimes are accompanied with a major discourse on the need to get rid of political correctness and talk about “real problems”. In both countries, there is a common tendency to blame liberal-leftists, researchers and human rights or anti-racist associations for stopping any discourse on the limits of tolerance toward migrants. Stances on the relativity of cultural differences and the need of equal treatment of majority and minority are perceived as an imposition of political correctness. This remembers also the important frame on anti-establishment in Greek cases. This process is accompanied with a re-centring on the majority group / in group and its interest, while the needs, rights and interests of the minority are disregarded. In relation to boundary drawing, this dynamics clearly points toward an extension of the limits of intolerance.

Liberal intolerance and minority participation in Denmark

The dynamics of the Danish intolerance boundary drawing clearly rely on a deliberative process. This deliberative process in the public space has to be linked with the deep liberal culture of the country. Either tolerant or intolerant positioning was mainly driven by liberalism. The principal arguments for
tolerance were related to the centrality of free speech considerations, its guarantee by law and the preference to discuss the ideas which one disapproves in the public place rather than forbidding them. One of the two main intolerant positions defended during the public debates was also in relation with the modalities of “liberal intolerance”. But the authors show that the modalities of “liberal intolerance” are reinforcing mechanisms of “othering”. The opposition is expressed not only towards the illiberal views of minority representatives, but also to their “illiberal identities” which are put in opposition to the Danish liberal and democratic principles.

This explains the effect of the boundary drawing process on Muslims and migrants’ political participation. Liberal intolerance tends to inhibit the participation of actors from minorities, even the more moderate ones. The suspicion of illiberalism and the need to publicly demonstrate their adhesion to central liberal values, while this prerequisite is not asked to Danish natives, discourages the participation of immigrants. Boundary drawing is made differently in function of the groups. This consideration applies to all country cases and not only to Denmark. The suspicion towards “radical” Muslims has been extended to all Muslims, which inhibit their political participation. This negative effect on political participation has also been highlighted in the analysis after the debates on Thilo Sarrazin’s book and its perception by young immigrants.

Boundary drawing from below and redefinition of citizenship in Catalonia.

In Spain, the culture/identity frame has been a major component of intolerance-boundary drawing. However, its particularity is to not provide a clear definition of the “leading culture” migrants have to respect. In the Spanish context, there is no consensus on a national culture or in its components. In the Catalan context, however, the building of a common national culture has effectively been at the centre of political mobilisations and of Catalan policies. But intolerant frames about identity and migration are poorly connected to the “Catalan common culture” which has been historically defined as a land of migration and in which residence citizenship prevails. In that sense, identity frames are aiming at not only changing the boundaries of intolerance but also at changing the meanings and principles of the Catalan citizenship, from a civic definition to a cultural/ethnic definition of citizenship. But this process is fundamentally made from below and, despite the laissez-faire attitude of the government and of mainstream parties’ leadership, this has not yet led to extend radically the limits of intolerance.

New nationalist intolerance in Greece

Despite the presence of conflicting frames in the public debate on the limits of tolerance in Greece, the authors show that these competing positions are reconciled by the depoliticization of intolerance, presented as a logical reaction and realism. This leads to a naturalisation of the differences between the in-group and the out-group, as well as the justification of the preservation of the in-group members and their self-defence. This led the authors to categorise this form of intolerance as a “principled national intolerance”, which subscribe to the idea that the world is naturally divided into nations, which need to preserve their autonomy as well as their cultural and ethnic cohesion. This form of intolerance relies also on a securitization of migration, as it considers that the violation of principles of cohesion and “purity” is a threat for the society.

A depoliticisation of tolerance?

Despite these different national dynamics in drawing boundaries of tolerance, one common dynamics is important to stress as a conclusion: the tendency to consider that tolerance and intolerance are not a political matter and therefore should not be politicized. Diverse strategies of de-politicisation have been underlined, such as securitisation, “new realism”, legalism or techniques to avoid entering the boundary drawing process or to shifting the responsibility on others. The depoliticisation is mainly a
strategy of government leaders and persons in charge to resist the attempt of other actors in the opposition to challenge their power. But in all countries this depoliticisation has given the opportunity to certain actors to test – and extend – the limits of intolerance.

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**Chapter 2. Local and national policies of exclusion**
Maurizio Ambrosini and Elena Caneva

**Introduction**

For a certain period of time, in the 1970s and 1980s, it might have been assumed that the recognition of cultural diversity and the rights of minority groups was destined to be gradually imposed in the liberal democracies in Europe. For a few years, however, the issues of tolerance and of respecting diversity have to be considered alongside the restrictive tendencies of admission and asylum policies (Zetter 2007), of the efforts to combat unauthorised immigration (Triandafyllidou 2010) and of the tendency to make the civic integration of new immigrants compulsory, including through the prescribed use of procedures to be followed and tests to be passed, especially in the fields of language and knowledge about the national cultural heritage (Goodman 2010): this was defined by Joppke (2007) as “repressive liberalism”, while Grillo (2005) spoke of it as a “backlash against diversity”.

The economic crisis and anxiety related to globalisation are worsening the situation: in various countries, these factors reinforce estrangement from governments and from traditional political forces, they create scepticism towards the European model and cosmopolitan perspectives and they nurture votes in favour of new political organisations which are generally defined as “populist” and whose success is largely based on opposing immigration (Albertazzi and McDonnel 2008). The issues of legitimate belonging, citizenship and physical and symbolic borders have once again become present day concerns. To sum up, as the economy becomes increasingly globalised, the policies tend to renationalise.

One of the emerging core issues is that of tension between the resurgence of nationalism and the re-assertion of identity of both old and new minority groups.

The second question concerns the relationship between the national and local contexts: if and to what extent local policies reflect and even reinforce the emerging restrictive orientations at national level, or whether they stay away from them, thereby favouring the goal of including the various resident populations.

Finally, the third problem concerns the relationship between political institutions, minority groups and civil society: to what extent civil societies sympathise with policies of exclusion and approve of the limitation of minority groups’ rights, or whether they side with minority groups and with immigrants and asylum seekers in particular, forming advocacy coalitions which can influence the formation and implementation of policy decisions.

This report will analyse these topics by comparing four National cases: Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. For some purposes other countries will be mentioned such as Greece and Spain.

The report is structured as follows: first of all, there will be a review of the general context of the progress of restrictive policies applied to new and neo-assimilationist immigration from a cultural perspective (Section 1). There will then be an analysis of the relationship between national and local policies, with particular reference to the policies of the exclusion of immigrants, asylum seekers and the Roma minority (Section 2). Thirdly, there will be a discussion on the role of civil society actors and the importance of the part they play in the defence of immigrants’ and minority groups’ rights (Section 3).
1. The European context and the increase in restrictive policies

The issue of governing migration has grown in importance over the last few years, and it has become a priority on the political agenda of all European countries. The backlash against multiculturalism has spread throughout all European countries and many national leaders, such as Blair, Cameron, Merkel and Sarkozy, have openly criticized this concept and talked about the “end of multiculturalism”.

The belief that multiculturalism has failed has contributed to the diffusion of a kind of neo-assimilationist approach. The most meaningful example of this is the introduction of special “integration agreements” (Joppke 2007) which immigrants have to formally sign in some countries in order to prove their commitment to learning the national language, their political loyalty to the host country and their adaptation to some types of national values.

Besides that, in the last few years, European countries have managed the issue of migration based on two principles: the closure of national boundaries and the hardening of national rules that concern both resident and irregular immigrants.

In relation to the first issue, the importance of boundaries and national belonging has been emphasized by governments (Balibar 2012), as has been the importance of entry and resident permits (Duvell 2006), and of the agenda of civic integration (Goodman 2010). While the flows of capital, goods, information and cultural products grow, the governments respond to increased human mobility by reaffirming their national sovereignty (Wihtol de Wenden 2009), and their role as defenders of the borders against the entry of outsiders from poorer countries.

Strict policies of the control of migrants have been realized reinforcing not only external but also internal controls (Faist 2002; Mitchell 2002). Regulations that limit minorities’ rights or obstruct their claims have been recently introduced in order to protect the national identity. A tendency towards "re-ethnicization of citizenship" (Bauböck et al 2006) has been observed in several countries which draw the boundaries between insiders and outsiders by reaffirming a supposed unit of culture, territory, language and religion in contrast to the diversity of immigrants.

The countries considered here, i.e. Bulgaria, Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy show this neo-assimilationistic tendency in various ways. Some of them apparently adopt a liberal approach, such as Ireland, where EU and non-EU citizens who are resident in the country can vote at local elections, non-citizens can work in the public service sector and they are eligible for naturalization after 5 years of residence. However, this open-minded attitude contrasts with some recent developments. Instances of intolerance and racist discourses have emerged over the years, particularly towards the African community. An emblematic case of the assimilationist attitude occurred in 2007, when a Sikh man applied to join the Garda (Police) Reserve. Before being commissioned, the man was informed that he would not be allowed to wear a turban with his uniform. The man refused to accept this, and did not take up his post. The issue sparked a significant media and political debate, involving journalists, politicians, NGOs and Sikh communities. The case of the Sikh man is a clear example of the difficulty of recognizing and respecting minorities’ claims, beyond the declared inclusive approach. The efforts to engage with the ethnic and religious minorities have often been superficial (Honohan and Rougier 2012).

Unlike the other three countries discussed here, the minorities in Bulgaria are not of immigrant origin, but represent historical communities living in the Bulgarian lands for centuries. As such, the people belonging to minorities enjoy the same rights as the majority population (Bulgarian speaking Orthodox Christians). And yet, despite the nominal equality before the law, in practice the minorities (above all, the Roma community) suffer from discrimination in many areas. In the recent years, the Bulgarian politics made a clear turn in the direction of nationalism and populism, and under the current government (in power since 2009), the intention to limit some rights of the Bulgarian minorities was openly stated. One of the areas that came under attack were the political rights of the Turkish minority. In 2011, the government has passed the new Election Code, which limited the voting rights of those Bulgarian Turks, who have emigrated to Turkey and have dual (Bulgarian and
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Turkish) citizenship. Different authors give different figures about the number of people with dual Bulgarian-Turkish citizenship, but the highest estimate is around 380,000 people (Özgür-Baklacioglu, 2006, p. 322; Smilov and Jileva, 2010, p. 19). The 2011 Election Code introduced a six-month residence requirement in order to vote in local elections. The residency requirement and some other restrictive provisions in the Code have drawn criticism from international institutions, Bulgarian human rights watchdogs and other civic organisations, and some political actors. Although the regulation seemingly affects in the same way all Bulgarian dual citizens regardless of their ethnic background, it in fact has much more serious consequences for the political representation of Bulgarian Turks. The reason is that the Bulgarian emigrants of Turkish origin are considerably more active and organised voters than the ethnic Bulgarians in emigration. For example, results from the last few elections show that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the main political party representing the Bulgarian Turks, received between 50 and 60% of all votes cast abroad. The attempts to disenfranchise Bulgarian-Turkish dual citizens therefore have a very practical goal – to decrease the electoral success of the MRF.

The approaches of Italy and the Netherlands towards immigration are less explicit but generally we can say that assimilationistic concerns are now prevailing. Italy has only recently become an immigration country and has never planned its own model of integration. The citizenship code remains strict (ten years of residence), even towards the second generation. The shared approach among civil society actors (and also educational staff) is that of interculturalism, which is aimed at recognizing and appreciating diversities (not only tolerating). Nevertheless, there is great discrepancy between the local and the national approaches and between the social actors and the institutions. At national level a policy of recognition of cultural and religious differences does not exist, but a sort of assimilationist approach prevails. The involvement of immigrants in civil, social and political life is very weak or absent. The only accepted integration is the economic one, in the low ranks of the labour market: a kind of “subordinate integration” (Ambrosini 2011). In addition to this, in the last few years a restrictive approach has spread in some contexts at local level. The meaningful examples of this approach are the “local policies of exclusion”, i.e. local measures introduced to clarify in various ways the difference between "us" (the native citizens endowed with full rights) and "them" (the immigrants), who are assumed to be a threat to security, welfare and cultural identity.

The aim of these local policies was apparently to protect general interests (e.g. urban standards, which were compromised by the presence of annoying beggars), and to suppress behaviours that were considered inappropriate. Nevertheless, most of these measures have actually resulted in limiting immigrants’ rights, directly or indirectly, and favouring their exclusion.

The Netherlands has changed its approach to immigration in the last few years. In contrast with the previous image of the country as one of the most tolerant in Europe, the demand to restrict immigration has recently increased and Dutch migration policy now has a reputation as one of the strictest in Europe. Among the most meaningful examples of this change are the recent rules about asylum seekers. These regulations have hardened to distinguish between those who (a minority) actually are “true” refugees and are granted residential permits on humanitarian grounds, and those (the majority) who have no right to live in the country because they are irregular or rejected asylum seekers. The Dutch asylum policy has provoked opposition and protest, especially for the expulsion of asylum seekers, a matter which became the centre of public and political debates.

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2 According to the 2011 census, there are 588,318 Turks in Bulgaria. Considering the large number of people who did not declare their ethnicity, the experts estimate that the more accurate number is around 700,000. The number of Turks who have emigrated from Bulgaria between the establishment of the Bulgarian state in 1878 and today exceeds 1 million. If we look only at the 1989-2011 period, over 400,000 Bulgarian Turks left Bulgaria and now reside in Turkey. A large part of people from this most recent emigration wave hold dual Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship (Zhelyazkova, 1998; Maeva, 2006).
In this European context characterized by increasing difficulties in recognizing and managing the diversity of populations, the political parties that emphasize a closure to migration in their programmes have gained ground (Swank and Betz 2003; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). The closure of national boundaries, stricter controls within the national territory in order to guarantee public security and combat irregular flows and the hardening of immigration laws are seen as important objectives for the public and politicians. Nevertheless, they also contribute to the growth of populist and xenophobic attitudes and behaviours, particularly towards those who are in an irregular or dubious situation, or who are perceived as completely different, such as Roma minorities. Research done by Jaworsky in the United States (2011) identifies three public frames associated with the irregular flow of migrants. In the first irregular migrants are described in the public discourse as invaders, who do not respect the boundaries and the property of the natives; in the second they are seen as criminals who do not respect native women and children; the third frame represents them as people who do not respect democracy, native culture and lifestyle. Even though in this research these kinds of frames concern irregular migrants, the representation of them as invaders/outsiders also occurs in the case of foreign (regular) residents and it is used by populist parties to obtain political consensus. Indeed, these frames have sometimes infiltrated the language and programs of more moderate and institutionalized political forces (Cento Bull 2010).

Populist parties have grown in importance and won voters in the last few years in many European countries. In Italy, the Northern League party obtained 8.3% of votes in the last political elections and entered the right-wing government in 2006-2011. Its leading representative, Mr. Maroni, was assigned to the Ministry of Home Affairs and, under the right wing government, different measures gathered together under the label of “Security Package” (various rules aimed at controlling immigration and particularly irregular migrants) were approved in 2008-2009.

In Bulgaria, in the second half of the 2000s two populist parties shattered the typical left-right bipolar model. The GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) was established in 2006, and the extreme nationalist party Attack in 2005. The victory of GERB in the 2009 election made it possible to introduce the Election Code to limit the voting rights of the Turkish minority.

The spread of populist parties has also occurred in other countries, such as Greece, where the party Golden Dawn has obtained a large consensus among the public, despite its openly racist and xenophobic stances. In Spain the problem is more limited, but the Platform for Catalonia emerged in 2003 with its anti-immigrant discourses. But the presence of populist parties has increased in many European countries in the last few years, such as Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark or Belgium.

In Ireland the situation is quite different, because there is not a real populist party. Nevertheless, some anti-immigrant social movements or discourses have spread, such as the Immigration Control Platform (ICP), an anti-immigrant voice which is not registered as a political party but which ran candidates in the 2002 and 2007 Irish general elections. Besides that, some instances of intolerant and racist discourses emerged over the years in Ireland, involving the African community in particular.

This anti-immigrant climate, with its shared perception of the failure of multiculturalism, is common in all European countries and influences national and local policies regarding immigration.

2. The local policies and their responses to the national policies

In the governance of migration, local policies now have a significant degree of autonomy with regard to national policies. Indeed, they have often tried to compensate for the limitations and shortcomings of national policies, moving away from the national models (Alexander 2003) or even contradicting them.

Many services and resources for citizens are delivered locally, so the possibility of using them for immigrants depends on decisions, organizational processes and ordinary practices that are developed
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locally, in the education system, in housing policies, in assistance to families in difficulty and in employment services (Ambrosini 2012).

Some scholars have noted a discrepancy between the official positions taken at national level and local practices. In France, for example, at national level the myth of cultural homogeneity prevails, but locally the mayors implement multiculturalist policies (Martiniello 1997).

Local policies are usually seen as more inclusive, aimed at promoting measures and interventions for the benefit of immigrant populations (Pennix et al. 2004). Nevertheless, local governments often encounter difficulties and obstacles in implementing policies of inclusion, because of the lack of resources and regulatory frames. In addition, in the last few years new political discourses have risen at the local level too, emphasizing urban security, social cohesion, assimilationist instances and generally a more hostile attitude towards migrants, particularly irregular ones. Consequently, besides local policies which try to move away from, oppose or compensate for national policies, in the last few years we can observe the growth of local policies that reinforce the restrictive or assimilationist approach of the national level policies.

As local policies that are openly hostile to minorities can hardly be promoted in democratic regimes, city governments react in two ways: either they do not implement immigrant integration measures without taking a clear stance, or they introduce local policies which do not overtly appear discriminatory but which actually are. To do this they adopt measures which are apparently universalistic and aim to protect general interests (e.g. security, urban decency, hygienic conditions of cities), but actually damage or exclude specific components of the foreign population, such as residents with an irregular status, vagrants, Islamic minorities, or the Roma minorities (Ambrosini 2012).

So, besides the traditional concept of the local policies as more open approaches than the national ones, constraining policies have recently increased in many European contexts, promoted by populist parties and often supported by other right wing parties, and sometimes also by left wing parties.

Among the case studies considered here, the Netherlands is the only country where the local level reacted positively to the exclusive national policies. It follows the pattern we were used to, i.e. local policies which are more willing to promote the inclusion of minorities than the national ones. The restrictions introduced to the Dutch asylum policy by the national governments from 1998 onwards were cushioned by several local governments. In contrast with the indications of the Linking Law (1998), which excluded irregular migrants from social services and work, some municipalities offered shelter and support to immigrants. They also wrote a letter to the Secretary of State that they would no longer exclude rejected asylum seekers from facilities and accommodation. In the following years, because of the continuing restrictions (e.g. the so-called Return project in 2003) imposed at national level, and following incidents related to the asylum issue (see Versteegt and Maussen 2012), the local level reacted once again: 40 local aldermen and mayors of the Green party showed their willingness to continue offering support for irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers, writing a manifesto and organizing a demonstration.

These mobilizations “from the bottom”, even though they involved a small number of municipalities, demonstrate that the local governments do not always follow and implement the national guidelines, but bypass them in order to manage their multiethnic cities and favour the integration of minorities.

The Italian context is different, because at local level intolerant positions have emerged, supported and promoted by the Northern League party but also by other right wing parties. City governments, particularly those ruled by Northern League mayors, introduced stricter measures than the national rules, which were already constraining. We called them “local policies of exclusion”, to refer to those measures introduced to guarantee urban safety and suppress any behaviour that is considered annoying, indecent or ill-mannered (e.g. begging, public gatherings e.g. to play cricket in public parks, eating in parks, praying in rooms which are not specifically designed this purpose, etc.). Even though the declared aim is to protect general interests (e.g. urban standards, hygienic conditions of cities,
restoration of city centres), they actually limit immigrants’ rights indirectly or directly and favour their exclusion. In Italy several local policies, therefore, “go beyond” national policies, thus hindering the process of integration for immigrants.

Nevertheless, the reasons why these measures have to be introduced are often well-structured and they can impress Italian citizens favourably. They play upon the interests and rights of natives, intervening in issues that affect the daily life of people and their lives in the local community. Firstly, the local policies of exclusion respond to the demand for security and social order on the part of the citizens. Thanks to them, places of worship are controlled, the construction of mosques is banned, the concentration of immigrants in specific areas of the cities is monitored. Secondly, they regulate access to social benefits and welfare provisions. Because of the scarcity of the economic resources needed to meet social demands, these measures give priority to the rights of Italians before those of immigrants: Italians have rights because they are citizens, whereas immigrants are guests, they are not part of the nation, so their rights are secondary to those of Italians, or in extreme cases immigrants have no rights. Finally, the local policies of exclusion are useful tools for defending the Italian identity, history and culture. The ban on “non-traditional activities” in the city centre (e.g. the opening of kebab shops), or on opening mosques and Islamic cultural centres, speaking languages which are different from Italian in public places, are all measures aimed at preserving Italian history and culture from the invasion of immigrants. Foreign people are in fact seen as a threat to the Italian culture, traditions and values, and their customs pollute Italian cities. Exclusion here takes on a more symbolic meaning linked to identity.

The issue of preserving the identity of a nation is becoming fashionable again and it is often used in anti-immigrant discourses. People are used to thinking of their country as a unit of language, culture and religion. This unit and homogeneity is the rationale behind the construction of the modern states and the basis of nationalism. Faced with globalization and the transformation of societies in a multiethnic sense, this principle has been reinforced and has become the basis of nationalist movements and anti-immigrant political discourse. These movements and parties reinforce their anti-immigrant positions on the grounds that immigrants’ cultural and religious practices are incompatible with the national culture and values, and with the homogeneity of the nation. Like the Northern League party in Italy, the Spanish far right party Platform for Catalonia has used the issue of identity to justify its hostility towards immigrants. It is interesting to highlight that the intolerant discourses used in the Spanish context by the far right party are the same as the discourses used by the Northern League Party in Italy. Besides the issue of the defence of national identity, both parties build their political programmes and actions on the need to guarantee urban security and to safeguard access to social benefits for natives. The topic of security, welfare and identity, are the main frames used by the populist parties both in Italy and in Spain.

The similarities between the two countries are striking and show that the issue of local policies of exclusion regards not only the Italian context but also other European contexts. Like in Italy, in Spain some measures were taken at local level in order to exclude migrants. The decision of the city of Vic to exclude undocumented migrants from the municipal registers and consequently from the right to access basic social rights is a case in point. But other cities have taken similar measures, such as the ban of the full veil in public buildings in other cities in Catalonia. Besides that, the intolerant discourses are used not only by the populist parties Northern League and Platform for Catalonia, but they have also become part of the programmes of other parties, which think they can obtain public consensus through these discourses.

In Ireland the topic of identity is the most popular of the three, and it is the reason why the Garda Uniform is kept alive and preserved, as Honohan and Rougier explain (2012). The police uniform is a strong symbol of identity, and the standards of dress and behaviour are part of the Police’s tradition. It also projects an image of impartiality and represents not only the police but also the state, and its secularism. For this reason the case of the Sikh man who was not allowed to wear his turban with the uniform (see paragraph 1) sparked debates in Ireland.
It is interesting to note that the Irish national policies on immigration are considered inclusive, compared to other European countries. The citizenship law in one of the least restrictive in Europe and in the political arena anti-immigrant parties do not exist. The country was also one of the leading states to put a National Action Plan Against Racism in place (2005-2008), followed by the Migration Nation document (2008) in order to provide instructions for a inclusive society. Besides that, a national institution was set up in 2007 to develop and co-ordinate integration policy across Government departments, agencies and services, i.e. the Office of the Minister for Integration (OMI). The task of this office, which became the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI) in 2011, was the promotion of the integration of immigrants.

Even though Ireland seems inclusive in principle, there is a gap between good intentions and practices, and some claims for recognition have not been accommodated, such as in the case of the Sikh man. But this case reveals that the issue at stake is not only the accommodation of cultural and religious differences, but also the definition of Irishness (Honohan and Rougier 2012). The emphasis on the importance of the Garda uniform reflects the fear of losing identity. Ireland shows an inclusive approach but also the need to maintain control and sovereignty.

The issue of identity is very important in Bulgaria and it is related to the political participation of Bulgarian minorities. In contrast with Ireland, where Irishness can be reconciled with diversity, even in principle, in Bulgaria there are strong positions against Bulgarian minorities, which are perceived as a threat to national identity. This is particularly evident in the case of Bulgarians with dual Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship who have voting rights both in Bulgaria and in Turkey. The demand to limit their voting rights has increased since 2005, because of the populist parties GERB and Attack. It is worth noting here that this intolerant position towards Bulgarian Turks gained popularity (and not only among the populist parties) because it was linked to “election tourism”, a phenomenon which is largely condemned. “Election tourism” is the practice of organizing trips of large groups of voters residing in Turkey to their native towns in Bulgaria, in order to cast their votes. This strategy of obtaining votes is used by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a party which represents the rights and interests of Muslims in Bulgaria. The resentment over the MRF, which many ethnic Bulgarians perceive as yielding too much political and economic power, has produced a negative attitude towards Turks in general. Beyond these political aspects, intolerance towards Turks is rooted in the perception of their diversity. Indeed Turks resident in Bulgaria are a close and well-organized community, they usually live separately in specific areas, but at the same time they participate in the social and political life of the country. They distinguish themselves from the majority through different cultural traditions, ethnic origin and religion. For these reasons they are perceived as aliens, people who are not part of Bulgaria (even though they also have Bulgarian citizenship) and who should not have rights there. Moreover, their activism in the social and political sphere is seen by some as an attempt to sustain the interests of Turkey.

The Bulgarian Turks are, therefore, a minority who come up against tolerance issues because of their diversity. Their identity is a challenge to national identity, and the majority reacts by limiting their rights – especially trying to diminish their participation in the political life. In this case the policies of exclusion are national, formulated “from above” and aimed at excluding those minorities which represent a threat to national identity.

The issue of identity, therefore, emerges in all four countries, showing that the common aspect in the approaches to minorities is the new trend towards assimilationism: those who demonstrate that they have been assimilated (in the sense of “becoming similar”, see Brubaker 2001) and do not want to question the fact that national identity can be accepted and integrated. If the intruders (in the Netherlands), the guests (in Italy), those who claim the imposition of identity markers in the public arena (in Ireland), those who want to be loyal to two countries and maintain dual citizenship (in Bulgaria) do not assimilate, and put aside their cultural backgrounds without making claims for recognition, they will have to face various forms of political exclusion. They will be expelled (Netherlands), their integration will be impeded by local policies of exclusion (Italy), their voting rights will be limited (Bulgaria) or their claims will not be accommodated (Ireland).
In conclusion, the Irish national policies are more inclusive than the other three. The Netherlands, on the other hand, has restricted its national policies on immigration (particularly on asylum seekers) in the last few years but the city governments have reacted by opposing or bypassing them. Italy and Bulgaria are the countries where the interplay between the local and national level has led to most restrictive outcomes in recent years. Besides the fact that Italy has restrictive national policies on citizenship, in the last few years several local policies have adopted a particularly exclusionary overtone, aimed at separating Italian citizens from “the guests”. Finally, in Bulgaria the local responses to the restrictive national policies are highly diverse. In municipalities dominated by the governing GERB party, they are accepted and shared, but in municipalities where other political parties (especially the Movement for Rights and Freedoms) are in power, these policies are opposed and resisted. Of course, in every country civil society actors have reacted to the national and/or local policies of exclusion in different ways, depending on their power and visibility as well as the constraining structural factors.

3. The responses of civil society actors

In the relationship between national and local policies, a third actor often intervenes, i.e. organizations and movements within the civil society which usually fight for the rights and claims of minorities. They include a broad range of forces: religious institutions, charities, NGOs, anti-racist social movements, ethnic associations and trade unions.

These groups and movements are able to intervene in the public arena and sometimes can affect the local policies. In some cases city governments rely on these groups and movements, or collaborate with them in order to implement actions for the integration of minorities. Furthermore, civil society actors are particularly active in supporting irregular migrants and asylum seekers, so local governments often delegate the issue to them. In other cases these civil society actors oppose local governments because of their restrictive policies or their discriminatory measures. In any case these civil society actors fill the gap between laws and regulations that produce exclusion, and social needs to which society has to respond, for humanitarian reasons or because of general interests (e.g. health care).

In the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Bulgaria these civil society actors have different roles and can influence the local policies using various degrees of power. It is worth noting that in every country considered here, these movements and organizations consist mostly of natives, whereas immigrant communities and minority associations have little influence in the public and political arena. This depends on many factors, which differ from country to country and are affected by the characteristics of the immigrant populations living there. Nevertheless, the national policies on immigration have considerable influence on their presence and their potential to be active socially and politically.

It is no coincidence that in Ireland immigrant communities can intervene in the public arena. As mentioned above, in Ireland the legislation on immigration is more inclusive than in other countries and allows non-citizens to participate in political life. For example, in the case of the Sikh turban in the Garda Reserve, the Sikh community intervened and publicly expressed its opinion, openly opposing the decision of the Garda. The Irish Sikh Council was founded in 2004 in order to provide various services to the community: information services, education and training, cultural events, etc. The Council is usually engaged in public Irish events, e.g. St Patrick’s Festival Parades, and collaborates with several Irish institutions. After 9/11, with the increasing racist events involving Sikhs, the Council also began to offer support for the victims and acted as an advocacy group in disputes.
Some obstacles to the participation of minorities in public and political life occur in Ireland, too. Political parties do not encourage their political participation, while minorities lack information about the rules and have difficulty in creating political networks. Ethnic communities and organizations act in this regard by organizing campaigns to encourage migrants to vote.

The Dutch and Italian cases are completely different, because minorities do not intervene in the public and political arena. Their claims and rights are defended by native associations and organizations, such as NGOs, operating on behalf of migrants, Churches and religious or humanitarian NGOs involved with charity. In the Netherlands, NGOs involved in specific issues (i.e. rejected asylum seekers, refugees and/or undocumented migrants) and international organizations (i.e. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) have also intervened following the introduction of restrictive policies on asylum seekers. In Italy, trade unions supported migrants in their fight against the local policies of exclusion, joining other organizations in the advocacy. In addition to these organizations, both in the Netherlands and in Italy there are some civil society actors who have expertise in legal issues and who actively defend migrants’ rights in court. In Italy an association of volunteer lawyers, called Avvocati per Niente (transl.: Association of Pro-Bono Lawyers) was founded to guarantee justice for the weak, and is usually called upon by trade unions and charities when providing legal aid to defend migrants.

The lack of ethnic organisations which represent migrants’ interests and rights is counterbalanced by these active actors in civil society both in the Netherlands and in Italy. The main discourses they use to justify their support for minorities are: the necessity to guarantee human rights to everyone and to fight against discrimination (in Italy), the need to recognise the refugee status for those who are real refugees, to offer solidarity because of global injustice, to support particularly vulnerable people and finally to favour the inclusion of those who feel they belong to the country (in the Netherlands).

Advocacy groups and human rights watchdog organisation in Bulgaria were among the most vocal critics of the 2011 Election Code. Their pressure, in combination with the opposition of some political actors (most notably the president Georgi Parvanov), actually forced the government to amend the Election Code in June 2011 and shorten the residency requirement for participation in local elections from twelve (in the first version of the Code passed in January 2011) to six months. Such views, however, remained a minority. Many civil society actors, even though they generally show tolerant views, saying that minorities should be politically represented, also express positive opinions about the Election Code, thereby supporting national policies of exclusion and intolerance. Most civil society actors are highly critical of the political parties and believe that they are not interested in working for the minority integration and political participation, but only want to manipulate minority groups in order to obtain votes. This general distrust in state institutions and the political class most likely also influences the attitude and behaviors towards minorities and their political participation.

Regardless of their opportunity to influence national and local policies on immigration, the active role of civil society actors shows that the assimilationist approach is not generally shared and cannot be successful. It also shows that good practices of accommodating diversity at local level should be taken into account in order to improve local/national policies on minority groups’ issues.

4. The policies of exclusion and the issue of intolerance

The national and local policies of exclusion in the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Bulgaria are forms of intolerance which are introduced and shared by national and/or local institutions. This is the most worrying aspect: intolerance is legitimised and promoted by institutional bodies which in principle are liberal and democratic.

The forms of intolerance that emerge in the four countries are grounded on two different justifications. In the Netherlands and Bulgaria intolerance is justified by national policies based on the legal status of people.
In the Netherlands, illegal migrants are not tolerated or even accepted, so they have to be removed from the country. Those who try to enter the country as asylum seekers, but are not recognized as such by the receiving State, cannot be accepted as often happened in the past. In these cases strategies such as detention, fines and expulsion have to be used. Intolerance against those who have no legal rights to live in the country becomes tolerance when migrants await the outcomes of an appeal or because they are under age. In these cases tolerance is manifested through assistance in order to prevent homelessness and destitution for asylum seekers, especially for vulnerable groups like children, the sick and the elderly. Even though they are seen as “intruders”, the national and local governments have a duty of care towards them. Acceptance occurs only when migrants are recognised as “victims” (Anderson 2008, Fassin 2005).

In Bulgaria the legal status which affects the level of tolerance/intolerance is related to citizenship, not to legal residence in the country (as is the case in the Netherlands). Although the intolerant attitudes against the Bulgarian Turks are manifested in many areas, the intolerance is most openly displayed in case of those members of the community who reside in Turkey, but have a Bulgarian citizenship, which gives them the right to vote on the elections in Bulgaria. Besides the fact that they are perceived as culturally and ethnically different, their dual citizenship is considered incompatible with loyalty to the Bulgarian nation.

The kind of discourses used in Italy and Ireland to justify intolerance is based on the ethnic and/or religious differences of migrants and minorities. People are tolerated or not tolerated because of their ‘difference’ and their cultural or religious claims, whereas their legal status is less important.

In Ireland intolerance is also grounded on a vision of national identity which is threatened by migrants’ claims. In this case intolerance emerges when cultural and religious claims are made within the state institutions. This produces a sort of “selectivity” in tolerance and the accommodation of diversity, depending on who or what is tolerated, where it is tolerated and why. Accepting the wearing of the hijab in Irish schools is a case in point. The issue concluded with broad acceptance within most Irish schools, with the incorporation of the hijab into the schools’ uniforms. By contrast, intolerance towards the claim of the Sikh man to wear his turban with the Garda Reserve uniform is explained by the need for individual religious and cultural backgrounds to be invisible and irrelevant in a state institution. The difference in accepting the hijab at school and not accepting the turban in the police is due to the fact that the majority of Irish schools are not state institutions, whereas the police is a state institution. Besides that, most schools are religious (mainly Catholic) and it is a great challenge for them to accommodate different religious groups. By contrast, the police is not a religious organization, so it is not obliged to deal with accommodating religious diversities. The police has to be neutral because it is a state institution. Ireland is therefore selective in the nature and the amount of diversity accommodated.

Bearing in mind the whole attitude spectrum which goes from intolerance to tolerance, acceptance, respect and recognition, it seems that in the four countries under study the political arena is characterized by signs of growing intolerance. This approach on the part of the state institutions shifts to tolerance when the diversity of migrants and minorities is not a threat for national identity and social cohesion. In order not to be perceived as a threat, minorities have to avoid making specific cultural claims (e.g. not asking for places of worship or not wearing turbans), they should become
similar to the majority of the population, showing that they have adopted national customs, traditions and the language, and they should be loyal to the state. In the Netherlands, for example, a discourse on “rootedness” has emerged in the last few years, alongside the introduction of stricter asylum policies: it is wrong to evict a person who is well integrated into Dutch society and feels they belong to the country. Migrants are therefore tolerated if they are culturally assimilated and if they show willingness to “embrace Western values”. In Bulgaria, loyalty to the state is required in order to become integrated into the society. To have only one citizenship, i.e. Bulgarian, is the first step to being tolerated, whereas integration occurs when people are no longer perceived as aliens but prove they want to be part of the state.

Despite the fact that Ireland has declared that it has adopted the model of interculturalism (based on which cultural diversity should be acknowledged and catered for), when minorities demand to follow their traditions or ask for their differences to be respected in public services, these demands are not easily accommodated. Minorities are tolerated when their diversity is not apparent in public places and when they do not claim recognition. Similarly, in Italy, migrants who do not come to Italian urban areas with their different symbols and practices, who do not ask for the same rights as Italians and who do not claim recognition might be tolerated.

To sum up, it seems that in the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Ireland and Italy the accommodation of diversities is evolving towards a policy of limited tolerance and within a broader discourse based on assimilation.

**Conclusion**

From our analysis we can first of all confirm that there is a trend towards restrictive and neo-assimilationist tendencies in European policies on immigrants. The spirit of accepting the recognition of cultural diversity seems to be taking a step backwards (Irish case). Long-standing distrust of resident minority groups and their loyalties have resurfaced and have been institutionalised under new forms (Bulgarian case). The long-standing practice of accepting asylum seekers has become more selective and less tolerant (Dutch case). Local policies’ traditional pragmatism and liberalism are now questioned and at times overturned, thereby following and nurturing xenophobic attitudes (Italian case).

There appear to be three reasons for this exclusion. The first concerns security issues: the fight against international terrorism is closely linked to requests to defend the national territory from invasion by unauthorised foreigners. The second reason consists of the claim to be given priority on the part of national citizens in terms of the distribution of welfare benefits, whereby immigrants and refugees are seen as potential exploiters of the generosity of the receiving countries. The third reason concerns defending national and local cultural identity against claims for settlement, legitimisation, and public visibility of minority groups which are considered outsiders in terms of the country and its history.

These policies of exclusion all share a common underlying feature: they reaffirm the boundaries of belonging and the legitimate community, they distinguish between “us” (national citizens who feel they are the legitimate owners of the territory) and “them” (the threatening outsiders), they thus rediscover a kind of community cohesion which reasserts the precedence of the majority over the claims of the minority. These minority groups are increasingly required to conform to the norms of the majority if they want to be accepted or they are required to be less visible or troublesome.

For these reasons, many political battles and initiatives have an eminently symbolic value. Norms might even be contradicted by court judgements, may prove to be inapplicable or may have very limited impact on the living conditions of immigrants and minority groups. What counts is the message they send out: that a majority community feels threatened and intends to defend itself against intrusion and claims. Social order is restored with the aim of recreating a kind of internal homogeneity and rejecting the forms of “superdiversity” (Vertovec 2007) which threaten it. Policies of exclusion
are more threatening because of their cultural significance than because of their actual content: they tend to indirectly justify other more serious forms of xenophobia and discrimination (Ambrosini 2012).

The cases analysed have shown that the democratic vote, which rewards the wishes of the majority, can become an instrument of exclusion. It is important, therefore, to consider the antidotes to the possible shifts in the absolute power of the principle of the majority.

The first consists of reinforcing anti-discrimination norms and institutions. European institutions in particular could take on an even more incisive role in the defence of liberal values in the European framework.

The second antidote consists of supporting and activating civil societies. This requires educational investment, seats for debate and the opportunity for dialogue with the relevant political institutions.

The third important response to the growth of policies of exclusion regards the need to give immigrants, their representatives and their association networks more say in matters. Those most affected by the issues often run the risk of being left out of the discussions that concern them. Like the emancipation of the working classes in the past, the battle for the respect for human rights, let alone for cultural pluralism, will depend on the degree to which minority groups under pressure manage to take control of their own destiny.

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Chapter 3. Quests for recognition by Sámis, Silesians, Hungarians and Circassians
Ayhan Kaya

Introduction

Western European states have so far generated various ways of dealing with their minorities be it ethnic, national, linguistic, or religious minorities. One needs to reveal the main features of the management of national minorities by the western states in order to decipher the perception of the claims of minorities. Management of cultural diversity in Western Europe has followed up the ways in which national minority claims have been perceived by the respective states. As regards the ways in which the modern states interpret minority claims, Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski (2002) make a two-fold separation: perceiving minority claims as a challenge for national security, or as a quest for justice and fairness. They argue that the claims of national minorities are assessed primarily in terms of justice in the West, and on the other hand they are assessed in terms of security in former Eastern and Central Europe.

According to Kymlicka and Opalski (2002), while in the West the goal is to find an accommodation that is more or less fair to both majority and minority, in the East the goal is to ensure that minorities are unable to threaten the existence, or territorial integrity of the state. Accordingly, many democratic states accepted that justice requires some form of self-government for minorities, and most of non-democratic states believed that self-government for minorities poses a threat against the state. In other words, Western states tend to consider the demands raised by ethno-national minorities as a matter of justice, which minorities have the legitimate right to enjoy as well. On the contrary, former Eastern and Central European states interpreted the demands vocalized by ethno-national minorities as a threat to the security of the state. The primary reason of treating minority claims in non-democratic countries as such is that minorities were believed to be collaborating with the neighboring countries (e.g. Serbians in Bosnia are believed to be collaborating with Serbia; or Kosovar Albanians with Albania).

Apparently there is a great discrepancy between the two positions summarized above. Justice and fairness discourse on the one side, and loyalty and security discourse on the other. After making such a comparison, Kymlicka and Opalski (2002) state that the discourse of justice is of course more favourable than the security discourse. Then, what is to be done to refrain from the security discourse in the former Eastern and Central European countries? The answer to this question is easy: to desecuritize the discourse of minority rights by turning that into the discourse of justice and tolerance. However, the implementation of this answer seems rather to be a difficult task. Kymlicka and Opalski (2002) also try to explain if it is possible to export the western model of management of minority rights to relatively non-democratic countries. Making such a proposal, their assumptions were that Western European values have lately become dominant all around the world; Western discourse of justice is apparently more efficient; Western model would work well if adopted in the then candidate countries to the European Union; and Western model is quite logical and reasonable. They further claimed that it is possible to export the western model to other countries as well.

The peculiarities of the Western model based on the discourse of justice and fairness are that the model has generally been competent enough in managing major minority claims, which are threefold: territorial autonomy, language claims, and institutional completeness (i.e. sustaining their own universities). At the beginning of the twentieth century, only Switzerland and Canada had adopted the combination for territorial autonomy and official language status for substate national groups. Since then, however, virtually all Western democracies with sizable substate nationalist movements have
moved in this direction. The list includes the adoption of autonomy for the Swedish-speaking Åland Islands in Finland after the World War I; autonomy for South Tyrol in Italy, and for Puerto Rico in the USA, after the World War II; federal autonomy for Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain in the 1970s; for Flanders in Belgium in the 1980s; and most recently for Scotland, Wales and Corsica in the 1990s. These changes correspond to the fact that Western democracies have turned out to be multinational federalisms in one way or another. The success of Western democracies does not only lie in granting minority groups the right to territorial autonomy, but also in granting them the right to enjoy their culture through bilingualism and universities. Consequently, what makes Western democracies more reasonable and successful is the right granted to minorities for effective political participation by eliminating the threshold system and letting almost all national minority groups mobilize along political lines.

Former Eastern and Central European states respond rather distinctly to such minority demands. In Macedonia, the minority’s demand for a private university is considered as a threat to the existence of the state. For example, in East and Southeast Europe the objection to the idea of collective rights is that they can be invoked as a basis of secession, or a threat to national security. Any claim for territorial autonomy, minority language higher education, collective rights or official language status triggers the security discourse in the East. On the contrary, in the West, the concern with collective rights is that they can be invoked to supersede individual rights. In the West, quest for collective rights, or minority nationalisms, only become securitized when they involve terrorism, as in Northern Ireland or the Basque Country. As long as it remains peaceful and democratic, then minority nationalism is not securitized, even if it explicitly aimed at secession. Nonetheless, the Western ways of managing ethno-cultural and religious diversity should not be idealized and essentialized as there are also various examples, which can be translated into the denial of collective rights of various groups in the European countries. For instance one should remember the ways in which the Roma communities have been treated by the Sarkozy government in France in 2010, and the ways in which Muslim origin migrants and their descendants have been treated in several European countries.

1. Multiple Forms of Managing Diversity

In proposing the Western democracy as a model for the former East and Central European states, Kymlicka and Opalski (2002) actually keep in mind that minority nationalism discourse in search for secession has lately changed its colour. European Union has evidently displayed a stronger political unity since the Tindemans Report submitted to the Commission in 1975, which prompted the member states to form a unified political entity with her own flag, anthem, myths, memories, regions, and rights and duties granted to the EU citizens. Thus, an implicit assumption that Kymlicka and Opalski (2002) have in proposing to replace the Eastern discourse of security with the Western discourse of justice is that a strong European Union vision may encourage the national minorities in East and Southeast European countries not to challenge the state with secessionist or irredentist claims. Then, in return, the states can be expected to give up the discourse of security. The whole debate here corresponds to the discourse of ‘unity in diversity’.

It is beneficial to substantiate the discourse of ‘unity-in-diversity’ by referring to the works of Will Kymlicka - a discourse which has dominated the ways in which most of the European countries have construed the claims of minorities including migrants and their descendants in the 1990s. There are several political philosophers who have recently tried to provide some conceptual and philosophical tools in order to lay out a framework around the discussions on diversity. As stated earlier, Will Kymlicka (1995), a liberal-communitarian, attempts to combine ideas of liberal democratic principles as a basis for a cohesive societal structure (unity) with recognition of communitarian rights for cultural minorities (diversity) within the multinational state (Unity-in-diversity). Kymlicka claims that collective rights for minority groups do not contradict the liberal notion of politics, as they are pivotal for enabling individual freedoms for the members of the minority group in question (Kymlicka, 1995: 46).
On the other hand Brian Barry, a liberal, warns the reader about the cleavages springing from a multiculturalist approach, since respect for diversity threatens the unity necessary for promoting equal distribution among citizens. This is not wholly an economic issue, but also one of distributing equal rights. Barry points to the negative consequences of Kymlicka's emphasis on 'group rights' when it comes to sectarian religious groups. He argues that such groups could never be granted group specific rights, if the (liberal) state is to remain true to its ideal of impartiality and neutrality (Barry, 2001: 165). This approach is characterized by a commitment, first, to basic liberal civil and political rights. Second, Barry endorses the idea of state neutrality or impartiality. Third, Barry’s position is egalitarian in the sense that his norm of equal treatment requires equalizing the resources that individuals possess in order to pursue their chosen goals. Fourth, his position underlines that claims made on behalf of culture cannot be justified in the name of liberal justice, and that the norm of equal treatment requires rights that are insensitive to those differences that multiculturalism prompts us to observe. His priorities lie at the rule of the majority with respect for individual rights over the principles of group-centred multiculturalism, a kind of “Unity-over-diversity”.

However, Iris Marion Young (2000: 215), a communitarian, questions this ‘unity’ as a necessary ground for a modern pluralistic society. Instead she promotes a ‘politics of difference’, which aims at recognizing cultural and social differentiation among people settled in a particular region. The people, then, do not necessarily need to share the same basic ideals; rather they ought to focus on reaching agreements and coalitions for political problem solving (Young, 2000: 216–217). In contrast to notions of segregation and even ideals of assimilative integration, Young (2000: 206) postulates a principle of ‘together-in-difference’. Young’s perspective is in tune with the Levinasian view proposing a deontological ethics to replace the ontological warfare between self and the other. The main rationale of this stance is to respect the uniqueness of the other without trying to assimilate him/her into mainstream culture.

Kymlicka’s perspective of ‘unity-in-diversity’ stands somewhere between the two perspectives, namely ‘unity-over-diversity’ and ‘together-in-difference’. What Kymlicka implicitly proposes by ‘unity-in-diversity’ is somewhat similar to what Charles Taylor offers by the model of ‘politics of difference’. Charles Taylor argues in favour of a dialogical model of justification based on the recognition of the uniqueness of collective identities. He calls this model the “politics of recognition” to distinguish it from the standard liberal model which he terms the "politics of equal dignity". He characterizes their difference as follows:

"With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of recognition, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else. The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity" (Taylor, 1994: 38).

Thus, while the politics of equal dignity "fought for forms of non-discrimination that were quite ‘blind’ to the ways in which citizens differ, the politics of difference often redefines non-discrimination as requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential treatment" (Taylor, 1994: 39). In other words, what Taylor calls ‘politics of equal dignity’ is identical with Brian Barry’s assimilationist perspective of ‘unity-over-diversity’.

The example Taylor cites in defense of the politics of difference is that of the French speaking community of Quebec. They should be granted special rights and immunities so as to be able to preserve their unique collective identity and to maintain their cultural distinctness from the majority of English speaking Canada. Taylor’s model of the politics of recognition is neither neutral nor perfectionist: it rests on the Herderian presumption of equal worth, namely, that "all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings" (Taylor, 1994: 66). It is dialogic, insofar as it promotes cross-cultural exchange among different groups and collectivities. The aim of such an exchange is to enlarge our understanding of other cultures, so that we and they may learn something from the dialogic encounter.
The aim, in other words, is to achieve a "fusion of horizons" (Horizontverschmelzung), to use Hans Georg Gadamer (1999)’s well-known formulation, or in other words, to experience a “process of heterogenesis”, to use Guattari (1989)’s formulation.

In what follows four different case studies will be discussed in a comparative way in order to find out the convergences and divergences between the ways in which Sámi minority claims are responded by the Swedish state, Silesian minority claims by the Polish state, Hungarian minority claims by the Romanian state, and Circassian diasporic claims by the Turkish state. What kinds of means, institutions and techniques do they use to raise their political claims? Who are they? How are they defined by their respective states? These are the questions to be answered in the first place. The comparison will be made in accordance with the data provided by four different teams who conducted their own individual studies using different research techniques ranging from discourse analysis of the official documents, speeches of politicians, media coverage of the relevant issues to interviewing the members of minority groups, politicians, scholars, journalists, and bureaucrats.

2. Types of minorities?

The term minority is a rather contested term. It has legal, political, sociological and anthropological connotations. Hence, the cases studies compared in this work display different characteristics with regard to the definition of the term minority. While Sámi minority in Sweden and Hungarian minority in Romania are legally defined minorities with the rights granted them with regard to their political representation at both local and national levels, Silesians in Poland and Circassians in Turkey are not accepted as legal minorities by their respective states.

2.1. Sámi Minority in Sweden:

The Swedish Sámi people were given a special status and constitutionally recognized as a minority for the first time by the Swedish Parliament in 2010 (SFS, 2010:1408). In the introductory chapter it was stated that the “opportunities of the Sámi people and ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own shall be promoted” (SFS, 1974: 152, Ch. 1, Art. 2). Already in 1993, however, the popularly elected Swedish Sámi Parliament (Sametinget) was established in order to grant cultural autonomy to the Sámi people, and today the parliament is considered to be the main body to ensure Sámi self-determination. In many ways, the situation and status of the Sámi people is highly acknowledged and recognized in Sweden through the Sámi Parliament. The Sámi people have also been granted special language and educational rights through Sweden’s ratification of the European framework conventions concerning the rights of national minorities. Members of the Sámi people are granted the right to communicate in their own language with courts and other important state authorities in the northern parts of Sweden where the bulk of the Sámi population are living. Sámis have been struggling for the following claims: to strengthen the Sámi culture, to raise the knowledge of their own language, to represent the interests of the hunting, fishing and reindeer industry and to increase the unity among the Sámi.

However, the recognition of the Sámi people seems to be challenged, or undermined, by different forms of discrimination and intolerance in Sweden. For the first time in history, the Swedish state formulated an apology for the discrimination and injustice that the Sámi people had experienced throughout history by the Minister of Agriculture, Annika Åhnberg, in 1998. Questions of discrimination and injustice are still salient in the public debate. For instance, there have been several conflicts during the last few years on the right to use land and water for the maintenance of Sámi reindeer on private property, where the Swedish Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Sámi for the first time in the case of Nordmaling in 2011 (HD, 2011). In its decision, the Supreme Court also acknowledged that the Sámi people is indigenous, which means that the members of the group are the first inhabitants in the territories at stake. In addition to these conflicts, there have been severe
conflicts on the construction of wind power parks in traditional reindeer grazing areas. In its observations concerning how Sweden fulfils the conventions concerning the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, the United Nations (UN) is regularly voicing concerns over these kinds of issues with regard to the fact that the issue of ownership of land and water has not yet been investigated (UN, 2004, Art. 12-14; UN, 2008, Art. 19-22).

2.2. Hungarian Minority in Romania:

Romanian population is composed of mostly ethnic Romanians (88.6 percent), Hungarians (6.5 percent), Roma (1.7 percent) and some others groups. Hungarians constitute the largest national minority in Romania. After the Second World War, the Hungarians tried to integrate their minority status and obtain the individual and collective rights they were promised at the 1918 Union. The upsurge of the Communist regime in Romania brought about hope for the Hungarian minority. In 1952, the Popular Republic was creating, under the pressure of Moscow’s autonomous policies, the Hungarian Autonomous Region, which was later cancelled in 1968 as a result of an administrative/territorial reorganization. After Bucharest abandoned Moscow’s policy favorable to minorities, Hungarians became "cohabitant nationalities" or "Hungarian-speaking Romanians", in other words, second class citizens. Although the Hungarian leaders continued to feature in the Communist party leadership until the fall of Communism (Pippidi, 2000), it did not spare the community of persecutions. The clustering and cancellation of Hungarian schools, the mandatory assignments after graduation from university, the change in the ethnic composition of Transylvania through the industrialization process, they are all the coordinates of Ceausescu’s assimilationist project (Andreescu, 2004; Gallagher, 1999).

The Romanian revolution of December 1989 against the Communist regime, with its start in Timisoara by the persecutions of the secret police against a Hungarian pastor, meant a new starting point for the Hungarians to renegotiate their arrangements with the state: the negotiation of its status and the definition of the institutional framework meant to protect identity and administer it (Robotin, 2005). The first and last violent Romanian – Hungarian inter-ethnic conflict burst in March 1990 in Targu Mures in the post-revolutionary confusion. The international background, Romania’s aspiration to accede to EU and NATO, as well as the domestic political events turned this process into a more refined one, if not actually entirely abandoned. Thus, the Hungarians gained significant political, cultural and linguistic rights.

2.3. Silesians in Poland:

Silesians have often been considered as a centrifugal force by the Polish state threatening the unity and security of Poland, and right-wing populist parties such as the Law and Justice Party have named them as “camouflaged German”. Silesia is a borderland region, and the Silesians attempted at creating an independent polity immediately after the WWI, and declaring their autonomy during the interwar period. Ethnographically speaking, Silesia was a trilingual, and prevailingly Catholic region. German was used in secular public spaces such as schools, offices, and business, while Polish was the language of religion. In everyday life and in their private spaces, Silesians usually used their own dialect, which constitutes a Slavic language permeated with many German words and often structured according to the German grammar. Being located at the border, Silesians experienced often harsh policies of both Polonisation and Germanisation since the World War I (Linek, 1999).

Silesians are not recognized as an official minority by the Polish state. They have often been perceived as traitors and collaborators by the Polish nationalists. Silesians have become more outspoken during the European integration process of Poland in a way that has eased the declaration of ethno-cultural differences of minorities in public space. Popular reconstruction of the Silesian identity is also correlated with the growing impact of the internet, which makes the dissemination of identities
possible across the national borders. Historically speaking, the Silesian minority in Poland has often been perceived by the Polish state as a threat against the national security, or as “camouflaged Germans” collaborating with Germany. The Law and Justice Party, which has a strong populist tendency, has openly portrayed them as traitors challenging the Polish national unity due to their ethno-cultural and linguistic claims.

The communist past in Poland was repressive towards the politicization of ethno-cultural and religious claims of minority groups. However, several ethnic and religious organisations – most often called ‘cultural associations’, had a centralised structure, and they were both financed and controlled by central authorities. Ethno-cultural and religious minorities were hardly perceptible in everyday life. In the process of democratic change they were allowed to form independent associations and express their identities. The Treaty with Germany signed in 1991 gave political rights to the German minority who have self-organised themselves into various associations whose members had ‘miraculously’ risen to hundreds of thousands despite several waves of migrations in the past. Due to a special election law for ethnic minorities stating that ethnic organisations’ candidates do not have to meet the requirement of crossing a 5 percent threshold of votes nationwide in order to be elected to the parliament, as well as its concentration in the Opole region, this minority has managed to have its representatives in the lower chamber of parliament – Sejm. However, so far only German minority are able to mobilise themselves enough to have at least one representative in the national parliament.

2.4. Circassian Diaspora in Turkey

The term ‘minority’ has a delicate history in Turkey, as it often has negative connotations in the popular imagery. There are three legally recognized minorities in Turkey according to the Lausanne Treaty signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers in July 1923. Non-Muslims such as the Greeks (Roumi), Jews and Armenians were officially recognized as minorities. In Turkish popular memory, minorities are often believed to be the causes of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as they were believed to have collaborated with the European powers to dismantle the Empire. The best way to explain the sources of such a kind of scepticism and fear among the state elite vis-a-vis minorities is to refer to the “Sèvres Syndrome”, which is based on a fear deriving from the post-World War I era characterized with a popular belief regarding the risk of the break-up of the Turkish state (Öniş, 2004: 12).

Despite being a ‘constitutive element’ of the Turkish nation, the Circassians became subject to various discriminative policies in the nation-building process especially after the 1930s when the spectre of Fascism and National Socialism was roaming around in Europe. In the current Turkish political context, the Circassians, who have been mobilized along with ethno-cultural claims, protest against the suppressive and discriminative policies and practices implemented by the state throughout the history of the republic. By mobilizing through ethno-cultural associations, protests, conferences and campaigns, along with the other cultural minorities, the Circassians aspire to be one of the driving forces of the democratization process whereby they vocalize their claims for the elimination of discrimination against ethnic minorities, and for the respect for individual rights as well as for the cultural rights. Therefore, although the political mobilization of Circassians contributes to the democratic consolidation of Turkey, the Circassians cannot yet raise their voices through legitimate political channels as much as they wish to. Rather, the Circassian challenge vis-à-vis the nation-state is prevalently handled by the government policies making a specific reference to all-encompassing principles and concepts such as constitutional citizenship, equal citizenship rights, and respect and recognition for cultural differences.

Since the deepening of the European integration process in the early 2000s, the Circassians have become more vocal in raising their claims on the recognition of their right to education in mother tongue, recognition of their ethno-cultural identity, right to dual citizenship, recognition of their contribution to the foundation of the Republic made by the politicians, military officers and
bureaucrats of Caucasus origin, and removal of descriptions of Çerkes Ethem as a “traitor” from school textbooks (Bilmez, 2011; Yılmaz, 2011). Circassian claims for constitutional citizenship, recognition and respect, and the government’s initiative for a constitutional reform and legal arrangements to secure political and cultural rights can be categorized as a good example of accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity challenge referring to tolerance in political life.

3. Types of institutions to present minority claims?

Case studies also differ in accordance with the types of institutions presenting their claims in public space. As the Sámis and Hungarians are officially recognized minorities they have the local and national parliamentary facilities to present their claims. However, the Silesians and Circassians generate some civic, cultural and folkloric associations to present their claims to the state. European integration process, transnational networks and internet also become strategically important for both communities to raise their claims in public space. Unlike the Circassians, the Silesians are inclined to generate political movements aiming at cultural, educational and linguistic autonomy.

3.1. Sámis in Sweden

Contemporary Sámi policy has its origins in the politics formulated during the end of the 19th century around an image of the Sámi as reindeer herders, and a belief that they were physically adapted to this industry and unable to support themselves through any other profession. In the changing political climate in the aftermath of World War II, the Sámi were to be assimilated into and integrated in the full-blown Swedish welfare state. Moreover, by the formation in 1950 of the first national Sámi organization, Svenska Samernas Riksförbund (SSR), the Sámi movement was strengthened. SSR challenged the Swedish policy in their claims that the Sámi had older usage of the land than the Swedish state, and that Sámi reindeer herding was based on the Sámi rights to land and water. During the 1960’s SSR started to justify Sámi rights in their capacity of being an indigenous people.

Sámi Parliament was established in 1993. The newly formed parliament was given both an administrative and a representative status. The idea behind this construction was to guarantee the cultural autonomy of the Sámi people, while making obvious to them that the parliament was not completely autonomous. However, with the status as an administrative authority, the parliament is not granted any actual political power, such as a right of participation in decision-making, veto-rights concerning administrative decisions, or independent sources of income. The parliament’s opportunity to act on its own initiative is thus limited by the grants from the Swedish state, and as an administrative authority it ought to observe objectivity.

3.2. Hungarians in Romania:

Hungarian minority is mainly represented by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). The organization was established in December 1989 for the purpose of “defending and representing Hungarian community’s interests”. As a parliamentary and as a ruling party, DAHR initiated and contributed to the law-making process that resulted in the improvement of the Hungarians and of other minorities’ status. The Hungarians, as well as the other minorities, obtained the right to association, to participation and representation on a national and local level, the right to signage in mother tongue in the localities and counties where the minority reaches, or exceeds, 20 percent of the population, to use mother tongue in the local public administration, in justice and in relation to the state institutions from the localities where minority reaches or exceeds 20 percent of the population, and the right to education in the mother tongue on all education levels, including universities.
3.3. Silesians in Poland:

Silesians are very much engaged in the activities of the Ruch Autonomii Śląska (RAS, the Silesian Autonomy Movement), which is a regional organization with an educational, cultural and political profile fighting for the restoration of the regional autonomy of Upper Silesia based on historical grounds. RAS’s activities are primarily based on the Internet, which is an extremely popular tool reshaping the Silesian identity at both national and transnational level disseminating the Silesian claims to those Silesians residing across the national borders such as Germany. There are virtually no printed versions of the charter of the organisation, no flyers or manifestos – a very broad access to the Internet in Silesia has prospered the RAS, which would be otherwise difficult due to the lack of external funding.

RAS, an officially registered organisation, has a clearly defined political aim of creating an autonomous region in Poland. In 2011, RAS became successful in local elections and entered the ruling coalition in the local parliament of Górny Śląsk/Upper Silesia voivodship. This success and a coalition with the local branch of the currently nationwide ruling party, the Civic Platform / Platforma Obywatelska, stirred discussions about the administrative and political constitution of Poland, the ethnic composition of the ‘nation’, and the limits of democracy and tolerance. RAS members have so far raised their arguments, opinions and discourses with a persistent reference to the turbulent past, but with a tangible focus on the constitutional democracy meeting all formal standards of the European Union. What is also remarkable for the Silesian minority is the ways in which they try to mobilize the transnational Silesian communities who live across their national borders, particularly Silesian migrant communities residing in Germany.

3.4. Circassians in Turkey:

Circassians have so far been mobile in public space by means of their ethno-cultural associations. The rise of the number of ethnic associations (derneks) in the urban space indicates that they often use such means to raise their cultural and political claims. Ethnic associations provide diasporic subjects with a safe haven from capitalist urban life. All associations in every city are alike. Each has similar aims such as organizing language courses, cultural evenings, folk dances and trips to the homeland. Ethnic associations play an instrumental role in the processes of construction and articulation of Circassian diasporic identity. Historically speaking, Dost Eli Yardimlasma Derneği (1946), Kuzey Kafkasya Kültür Derneği (Northern Caucasus Culture Association, 1964), Kafkas Derneği (Kaf-Der. Caucasian Association, 1993), Kafkas Vakfı (the Caucasian Foundation, 1995) and Birleşik Kafkasya Derneği (the United Caucasian Association, 1995), and Kaf-Fed (Kafkas Dernekleri Federasyonu, Federation of Caucasian Associations, 2004). Nowadays, there are approximately 80 different associations throughout the country.

Circassians have recently become more politicized due to their rising expectations from the European integration process of Turkey, which has become more intensive since 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU. Circassian associations try to refrain themselves from using a minority discourse due to the negative connotations of the term in the Turkish context. Instead, they underline the efforts of their forefathers in the establishment of the Turkish Republic as the “constitutive elements” of the nation similar to the Turks, Kurds and Alevi. Circassian associations such as Kaf-Der and Democratic Circassian Platform abandoned minority politics in the early 2000s to contribute to the democratization process of Turkey on the way to the European Union. As known, the post-Helsinki period was very decisive in the expansion of societal movements ranging from employers’ associations to labour unions, or from ethnic groups to religious groups. Kurds, Alevi, Circassians, Armenians, Romans and Assyrians are some of these groups that vocalized their concerns in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit. Such attempts were consequential in weakening the oppressive hegemony of the Turkish state vis-à-vis non-Sunni, non-Turkish, and/or non-Muslim groups.
One of the important elements which differentiate the Circassian diasporic communities from the former indigenous communities is the ways in which they have recently discovered the power of transnationalizing their cause in order to make a pressure on the Turkish state for extending political and cultural rights to the Circassians. European Parliament and the Council of Europe have become important venues for the Circassian diaspora to express their concerns in international platform. Transnational connections and global communication channels have shaped the ways in which Circassian diaspora have recently started to raise their claims in a way that transcends the hegemonic power of their countries of settlement such as Turkey. Circassians are no longer content with the ways in which they are perceived by the Turkish state. They want to be recognized by the Turkish state as a collective group, but not only as individuals. The research also reveals that transnationalization of the Circassian social movements and the use of the social media impact the ways in which their claims are recently being raised in a way that challenges the traditional patriarchal structure of the Circassian communities.

4. Their perceptions by the states?

Finally, a third way of making comparison among these cases is to see the dynamics of recognition and mobilization of their claims. One should try to understand if these minority groups (a) are not tolerated and discriminated, hence they mobilize themselves for the search of tolerance and acceptance; or (b) if they are socially and culturally accepted minorities who are mobilizing themselves for the search of political recognition through the right to self-determination, or incorporation into the institutions; or (c) if they are already institutionally recognized and respected minorities, who are mobilizing themselves to halt social-economic discrimination, or the deterioration of their situation. It seems that the Sámis and the Hungarians fit into the third category as they are officially recognized, but still exposed to discrimination and intolerance. However, their political integration does not necessarily mean that they are note discriminated by the state and society. The Silesians fit into the second category as they are in search of political recognition. On the other hand, the Circassians seem to be fitting into the first category as they are in search of recognition and respect by the state.

4.1. Sámis in Sweden:

In spite of the demonstration of acceptance on a national and constitutional level, an intolerant and stereotypical understanding of the Sámi people seem to prevail. The research conducted on the representation of the Sámi shows that the Sámi are still being discriminated by the state and society in general. The analysis shows that the media discourse has both direct and indirect consequences for the political representation of the Sámi, delimiting their recognised right to self-determination. Directly, it affects the construction of a Sámi public sphere, indispensable for the parliament to function in its role as a representative body. The news reporting is limited in scope as it privileges reporting on internal conflicts and individual behaviour and tend to neglect or ignore fundamental political problems of the Sámi people, thus it contributes to a de-politicisation of Sámi politics. Furthermore, it contributes to a conception of the parliament as problematic and dysfunctional, thereby undermining the potential level of trust of its constituency. The news reporting is limited in scope as it privileges reporting on internal conflicts and individual behaviour and tend to neglect or ignore fundamental political problems of the Sámi people, thus it contributes to a de-politicisation of Sámi politics. Furthermore, it contributes to a conception of the parliament as problematic and dysfunctional, thereby undermining the potential level of trust of its constituency. Indirectly, the emphasis on the democratic and administrative immaturity of the Sámi parliament reproduces stereotypical images of the Sámi as unable to handle their own affairs, thus framing the problem in a specific way and limiting the range of possible political options for the Sámi.
4.2. Hungarians in Romania:

Despite the fact that Hungarian minority in Romania is politically integrated, they are still accused by the Romanian nationalists of generating a dual loyalty towards Romania and Hungary. That is why, in public imagery they are not seen as trustworthy citizens, being more attached to their own ethnicity than to the Romanian state. Furthermore, Romanian majority have generated some fears about the Hungarian minority with regard to their irredentist inclinations towards the neighboring country, Hungary. Despite the entry of Romania into the EU in 2007, conflicts between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority have not yet calmed down. One should not also underestimate the impact of the Hungarian state on the Hungarian minority in Romania. The passage of a citizenship law by Orban government in Budapest now enables the Romanian Hungarians to acquire Hungarian citizenship; the escalation of claims by relatively small but highly vocal groups of local Hungarian politicians of a special status in the counties of Harghita, Covasna, and Mures in Szeklers Land also reinforces Hungarian minority nationalism; and eventually the representative office of the Szekler land in Brussels in 2011 contributes to the dissemination of Hungarian claims across the national borders.

4.3. Silesians in Poland:

Primarily because of the trauma of the past, the Polish state is still far away from identifying the Silesians as an officially recognized minority. The Polish Parliament accepted the Act on Minorities in 2005, making a distinction between ethnic minorities and national minorities. A national minority is a group: a) less numerous than the rest of the state’s inhabitants; b) differentiated by language, culture or tradition and aiming to maintain the differentiation; c) possessing consciousness of a historical national community; d) inhabiting Polish territory for at least 100 years; e) and identifying with the nation organized in a state. Several groups were defined as national minority including Germans, Belarussians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians but not Silesians. Similar to all these national minorities, Silesians also use their right to organise themselves. However, the paradox is that Silesians are not recognised by the authorities as a minority.

4.4. Circassians in Turkey:

Circassians embody one of the largest ethno-cultural minorities living in Turkey. Though they are not legally defined as a minority like the non-Muslim minorities (Jews, Greek-Rums, and Armenians), sociologically and anthropologically they constitute a minority. So far, they have not been considered by the majority society to be facing any major obstacle since their arrival in Anatolia in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. However, recent studies carried out in Turkey demonstrate that it is not only the non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevi who have been subject to a kind of structural exclusion with regard to having equal access to political and cultural rights, but also the Circassians have been through the discriminatory acts of the state and the majority society since the early days of the Republic in 1920s (Kutay, 2004).

Circassians have been exposed to some acts of discrimination by the Turkish state, and that while having a strong orientation towards their homeland most of the Circassian population in Turkey still feel themselves to be guests (Ülker, 2007; Kaya, 2004 and 2005). The fact that the voices of the Circassians have not been heard so far in the public space reflects to some extent the power of both formal and popular majority nationalisms to which they have been subject. The current Turkish state policies generated to respond to the Circassian claims cannot be considered as a discourse and practice of respect and recognition. On the contrary, the policies of the contemporary government (Justice and Development Party, AKP) spring from a discourse of toleration towards the Circassians, who are actually in search of a constitutional citizenship, equality, and respect with regard to their ethno-cultural differences. The state actors are not yet tolerant towards the politicization of minority claims.
as in the case of the Circassians. However, cultural and folkloric forms of representations demonstrated by ethno-cultural minorities are tolerated by the Turkish state.

**Conclusions**

Four case studies display various characteristics, which are sometimes converging, sometimes diverging, with each other. Swedish case study reveals that Sámis have so far gained a full-fledged right to political representation in both national and local levels. However, Sámis are still far from experiencing an egalitarian treatment by the state, society and media as they are still being stereotypically coupled with backwardness, bad-temperedness, and being traditional. It seems that Sámis still need the parental authority and benevolent tolerance of the Swedish state and society to be able to raise their claims through legitimate political grounds, which are believed to be far from being internalized by the Sámis. On the other hand, the Silesians in Poland, the Hungarians in Romania, and the Circassians in Turkey face similar problems when they raise their claims in regard to the ways in which they are perceived by the respective states. Their cultural and political claims encounter a relatively strong resistance of the state due to the common stereotypes produced about the minorities, who are believed to be challenging the security and indivisibility of the nation, which is based on a myth of homogeneity.

Rather than perceiving the claims raised by ethno-cultural minorities as a quest for justice and equality, Poland, Romania and Turkey are more inclined to perceive them as a challenge against national unity, which was believed to be secured by the majority against all the odds deriving from former neighbouring colonial powers. Circassians set out a different example in the sense that they are a diasporic kind of community, whose cultural and political claims have also become more vocalised during the European integration process of Turkey in a similar way to the rise of the claims of Silesians and Hungarians as an outcome of the transformative power of the European Union. The research indicates that Silesian and Circassian claims have become more outspoken in line with the European integration of Poland and Turkey. EU is certainly perceived as an anchor by these communities, which help them raise their cultural and political claims through democratic forms of participation in politics.

Hungarian claims in Romania and Silesian claims in Poland are partly perceived by the state as acts of secessionism and irredentism. Historical conflicts between Germany and Poland on the one hand, and Hungary and Romania on the other hand, are still being reproduced by some of the state actors in a way that securitizes those minority claims. However, technological innovations such as the internet make it easier now for the dissemination of those claims in and across the national boundaries. Silesians and Circassians efficiently use these tools in order to make their voices heard in transnational space, thus to make an impact on the decision making processes of the respective states. Transnational element seems to be one of the driving forces of those minorities that are not yet recognized by their states as officially recognized minorities.

To recapitulate, one could make a comparison among these four cases in several different ways. First of all, these cases can be compared with regard to the nature of their claims for autonomy, equality, justice and fairness. It is displayed that the Silesians and Hungarians raise their claims along with a quest for autonomy, the Sámis and Circassians raise their claims along with political, cultural and economic lines in order to acquire equality and justice vis-à-vis the majority nation. Secondly, it becomes apparent that these cases are also comparable with regard to the patterns of mobilization which they generate through either international resources, or new technologies such as Internet, or elite or grass-root politics. The Silesians, Hungarians and Circassians have certainly become politically more active along with the European integration process of their states. Silesians and Circassians have also used internet to a great degree to vocalize their claims across the boundaries of the nation-states, and to make their claims heard by the international community. Sámi claims are rather expressed by the newly emerging Sámi elite. The ways in which the aforementioned minorities
are perceived by their respective states and majority nations differ to a great extent. It seems that the Sámis and Circassians are perceived by their respective states as the constitutive elements of the Swedish and Turkish national identities, whereas Hungarians and Silesians are not due to their ambiguous loyalty to the state.

Eventually, one could observe that there are two competing forms of managing diversity in the European countries: multiculturalist form, and republicanist form. The former corresponds to the ‘unity-in-diversity’ approach, which recognizes ethno-cultural, linguistic, national and religious differences of minorities. The latter translates into the ‘unity-over-diversity’ approach, which is difference blind and assimilationist. It seems that the EU is going to continue to be witnessing the competition between these two models, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages for the minority communities. It is not easy to estimate the winner of this race. However, what is certain is that the democratic consolidation in the European space depends on the states’ capacity and ability to interpret the minority claims as a quest for justice and fairness, but not as a challenge against the national security.

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Chapter 4. Minority Mobilisations in France and the United Kingdom: the Case of Muslim Organisations
Angéline Escafré-Dublet and Jan Dobbernack

Introduction

France and the United Kingdom allegedly display contrasting opportunity structures with regards to the political mobilisation and representation of post-immigration minority interests. In line with its pluralist ‘national model’, British politics is said to embrace group representation and to endorse ethno-religious identities as legitimate basis for mobilisation. By contrast, French politics is seen to confine identities to the private sphere and to only allow for the representation of general concerns. While such characterisations have some basis in reality, stark contrasts between the two country cases appear overdrawn. Individual cases of minority-mobilisation reveal pressures that exist in both countries as well as opportunities for migration-related minorities to insert themselves into political life. This report considers and contrasts Muslim mobilisations around the British General Election of 2010 and the mobilisation during debates about laïcité in France as examples of minority claims-making in two “old immigration countries”.

The report focuses on minority organisations and their attempts to articulate claims in the national context. In ‘multiculturalist’ Britain, minority representatives can be portrayed as divisive and in ‘integrationist’ France, organisations struggle to make their claims seem acceptable in Republican terms. Their ability to express specific concerns as members of minorities may be considered as an indicator of the level of acceptance within each country’s political life. Yet organisations also seek to test and extend the boundaries of acceptance. We will argue that in each national case study, minority organisations face the challenge of particularism by highlighting the compatibility of their claims with the respective national framework. Rather than considering the level of acceptance as a given, this report suggests that it should be explored as a result of interactions, symbolic claims and the extension of boundaries in which minority organisations are often centrally involved.

First, the report identifies the differences between French and British political opportunity structures. Second, it briefly presents each case. Third, it discusses the implication of each analysis for an assessment of tolerance in each country.

1. Background Elements

1.1. Political participation and citizenship

Full political rights in Britain as in France are secured by obtaining citizenship. In both countries this currently requires a minimum of five years legal residence. By international standards, these formal requirements are seen to be fairly liberal. The comparatively easy access to British citizenship has increasingly been regarded as a problem and measures to make naturalisation conditional upon command of the English language and knowledge of British history and culture were introduced. In France, naturalisation is conditional upon a criterion of assimilation. Until recently, this was assessed by an administrative officer during a meeting with the applicant. Since July 2012, all applicants must pass a French language and culture test (decree 2011-1265 of 11 October 2011).
In France, 40% of the foreign-born population hold French citizenship and are thus eligible to vote. In the UK, immigrants coming from former British colonies (India, Pakistan and the Caribbean) are a special case; they were eligible to vote in national parliamentary elections upon their arrival (even though immigration flows coming from this area were restricted starting 1962). In comparison with France and other post-colonial migration countries (such as Belgium or the Netherlands), the United Kingdom has one of the highest ethnic minority populations with a right to vote in Europe (Cracknell 2012).

Despite significant mobilizations of British South Asians for labour rights, political participation among British minority groups remained low in the immediate aftermath of their arrival. Yet in recent years there have been significant civil society mobilizations with ethnic minority involvement. Even within formal politics, there has been some movement. For the first time, ethnic minority turnout at the British General Election 2010 exceeded the majority average. By contrast, despite significant mobilisation for immigrant rights in the 1970s and 1980s in France, the participation of immigrants and descendants of immigrants in France remains low. Surveys demonstrate the low rates of voter registration among French people with immigrant parents as opposed to those with no immigrant background (Richard 1998).

1.2 Political representation

Recently, there has been some effort made to increase the number of ethnic minority representatives in British politics. The first six non-white MPs in post-war Britain were elected in 1986. The Westminster parliament now includes 27 ethnic minority MPs, the House of Lords 48 peers, Scottish Parliament 28 MSPs and the Welsh Assembly 2 AMs. Minority representation in local government has remained relatively stable, between 3% and 4% (Parsons 2009; Cracknell 2012). In France, the National Assembly includes 10 minority MPs in 2012, that is 1.8% of the total MPS for an estimated 12% of the population with an immigrant background. Even though this is a notable increase as compared with 2002, when only one representative of the National Assembly was non-white, France is evidently still lagging behind the UK or the Netherlands where minority members represent 8% of the lower chamber.

Minority representatives in France and the UK are mainly left-wing. All minority deputies in the French National Assembly belong to the Socialist Party. As for British minority MPs, most of them are Labour MPs although the number of Conservative MPs is increasing. Historically, there was a clear alignment of interests between Labour and immigrant groups, and the Labour Party became the near-exclusive entry point for ethnic minority citizens into politics well into the 1980s.

Some disenchantment in particular about Labour’s foreign policy record has made this link appear more tenuous. Labour’s Roy Hattersley remarked that up to 1997 when “heard of a Khan, Saleem or Iqbal who did not support Labour I was both outraged and astonished.” Such assumptions about political loyalties have been put into question in particular by considerable disenchantment among Muslims about Labour’s foreign policy record. Other parties increasingly appeal to ethnic minority constituents and at the 2012 election the Conservatives increased their non-white MPs from 2 to 11.

As for France, President Sarkozy decided to appoint a number of minority politicians to his 2007 government (Rachida Dati, Justice Minister; Rama Yade, Human Rights State Secretary and Fadela Amara, Urban Development State Secretary); yet these appointments were short-lived. In the last presidential campaign, Sarkozy’s UMP avoided any discussion about the political representation of minorities. As for President François Hollande, he appointed seven minority government members out of 38 that is 20% (notably: Christiane Taubira, Justice Minister; Najat Valaud Belkacem, Women’s Rights Minister and Victorin Hurel, Overseas Minister). He made a point in respecting a gender balance in the formation of the government (19 women and 19 men) so as to respect parity and to increase the representation of diversity in the government in comparison with the Sarkozy government of 2007.
1.3 Political claims-making

French and British political structures display contrasting features with regard to political claims-making on the basis of ethnic minority identities. There is no general rule in Britain that would prevent minority groups from articulating specific concerns, although it may well be the case that such mobilizations on the basis of ethno-religious minorities will be negatively perceived and thus remain unsuccessful.

France is certainly more averse to ethnic demands. Article 1 of the 1958 French constitution states that the Republic: “shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law regardless of their origin” and this has been generally understood as invalidating any mobilisation on the basis of ethnic or religious belonging. In Britain, the Labour Party has been a vehicle for post-immigration groups to articulate their interests. Although Labour provided channels into formal politics, it has not unconditionally welcomed ethnic minority assertiveness and minority politicians within Labour often faced accusations of sectarianism and generally needed to undertake additional efforts in order to demonstrate their concern for the ‘common good’. In both countries, ethnic minority mobilizations face comparable obstacles that pertain to the fundamental challenges of identity politics: the difficulty to conciliate the defence of particular interests with the universal ideal of liberal democracy.

In France, despite the difficulty to articulate ethnic claims, there has been a tradition of mobilisation in immigrant-based organisations. They have learned to articulate their claim in terms that are acceptable in the French Republican context, by avoiding to being specific and by appealing to French common values. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, specific interests can be articulated. In practice political elite still consider ethnic minority assertiveness as threatening and minority politicians can be suspected as particularistic or sectarian. Minority representatives need to undertake extra efforts to convince the majority that they are not only serving the interest of their co-ethnics. Thus, despite different conditions in each country, minorities face the similar challenge that their ‘identity politics’ is suspected of threatening the common good. This creates pressures and particular conditions for their political agency, which are explored in the following.

2. Muslim Mobilisations in France and the UK: Two Case Studies

2.1 Justification for the case studies

Both case studies deal with minority mobilisations. In France, the mobilisation around the issue of laïcité was selected as an exemplary case for situations where organisations cannot openly express their religious belonging (namely their identity as Muslim) and, thus, mobilise around the French value of laïcité to articulate their concern over Muslim discrimination in France. In the UK, the focus on initiatives that mobilized British Muslim constituents in the run-up to the General Election 2010 allows analysing a situation where Muslim advocacy groups struggle to repudiate misperceptions of Muslim claims as sectarian and impossible to accommodate. Although the two mobilisations take place within contrasting political frameworks, both cases explore how minority actors challenge narrow boundaries of acceptance that threaten to exclude what they consider to be legitimate demands. Both cases in question thus involve claims for acceptance as well as the attempt to redefine standards of acceptability so that it will become possible to legitimately make political demands.

2.2 The Muslim Vote in the British Election of 2010: Misrecognition and Political Agency

The case study explores how different mobilizing organisations that specifically addressed Muslim voters conceive of a number of issues, such as the act of political representation, the ‘Muslim vote’, and significant concerns about political neutrality and partisanship. It draws on in-depth interviews
with significant actors of the mobilisation of Muslim voters in 2010, focusing on the construction of political messages and strategic considerations. Organisations and initiatives investigated are the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) for its ‘Muslim Vote 2010’ campaign, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC), Operation Black Vote (OBV), Engage and the Youelect initiative.

The case study provides an account of the environment for Muslim agency in British politics. Although political rights for British post-immigration groups have long been established, their participation in mainstream politics is not unproblematic. Minority citizens that run for elections or highlight issues of concern for their communities often do so cautiously. Muslim political actors are faced with special circumstances as their claims are seen to be exceptional, potentially sectarian and impossible to accommodate.

The analysis draws on the concept of misrecognition, which has recently been appropriated for identity claims by post-immigration communities (Meer 2012). Misrecognition is understood as a distortion that may be based on a partially correct perception but which ignores features that are important to the group in question. It reflects a significant dissonance between how an individual or collective identity is experienced and how it is socially understood and acted upon. When it systematically shapes the experience of particular social groups with shared ‘interpretive frames’ and claims for (a particular type of) recognition, misrecognition can motivate collective action.

Three contested issues invited particular reflexivity by Muslim advocacy groups and illustrate how they respond to the experience of misrecognition. Firstly, among the actors of the 2010 mobilization there was a measure of concern regarding dilemmas of the representation. This concern was about the way Muslim political actors felt boxed in: they felt that they were either forced to abjure their Muslimness in favour of more encompassing political identities, or that they were only visible as Muslim actors and thus unable to articulate claims on the basis of other identities, next to their religious identity, that were as important to them.

The notion of the ‘Muslim Vote’, and how organizations consider or problematize its weight and coherence, highlights a second challenge. Their aspiration is to ‘normalize’ the participation of British Muslims – to emphasize that a ‘block vote’ no longer exists or to argue that block-like voting instincts need to be overcome in favour of informed political decision-making. At the same time, respondents are apprehensive about what they consider to be the disempowering effects of an individualizing perspective on shared concerns and identities. They suggest that Muslim identity politics is usually perceived as markedly different from other types of political mobilizations that highlight shared concerns or identities.

Thirdly, how to forge relationships with mainstream parties and candidates is a concern among Muslim political actors. Some organisations see themselves as ‘service facilitators’ and refrain from offering recommendations on who to vote for as this would contradict their idea of self-reliance and sophistication among Muslim voters. Others offer specific advice and recommendations on the basis of evaluations of candidates’ policy record. With such considerations the organisations respond to a problematic environment for political positioning where mainstream actors consider Muslim claims to be toxic and refuse to associate with them.

The case study thus identifies five types of misrecognition of Muslim claims that can be identified as distinctive topoi in the rhetoric of various advocacy organisations.

1. Misrecognising Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to other identity politics (Muslim claims are exceptional)

2. Misrecognition the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim identities and concerns (Muslim claims are homogenous)

3. Misrecognising Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based of pariah politics (Muslim claims are reactions to stigma)
4. Misrecognising Muslims concerns not compatible with an orientation towards the common good (Muslim claims are sectarian)

5. Misrecognising Muslim political actors as toxic and refusing political association (Muslim claims are exclusive)

Perhaps most significantly, Muslim political actors see the diversity of opinion within their diverse community scarcely acknowledged and find themselves suspected of sectarianism and other problems that are associated, often wrongly, with the political agency of post-immigration groups. While some groups assert themselves against such misperceptions, it is more common for actors to counteract misrecognition by emphasizing the compatibility of their ideas with elements of the mainstream political framework. The emphasis on the civic maturity and sophistication of Muslim voters is one such example. The Muslim Council of Britain consistently highlights its ‘main goal’ of 'working towards the common good'.

2.3. Minority Claims of Laïcité in the French Republican Context

The case study explores how minority organisations adopted the notion of laïcité to defend their interests. Laïcité is the French understanding of secularism that ensures the strict separation of church and state, and confines religious expressions to private matters. It is considered as a Republican value. However, the discussion of laïcité has been repeatedly used to respond to the perceived growth of religious diversity in France, and more specifically to the challenge of Islam. This was the case in 2004 when a law in the name of the principle of laïcité banned the wearing of the Islamic veil in French public school. This was also the case in 2011 when Interior Minister Eric Besson decided to launch what he called an “Official Debate on Islam”: the debate was quickly relabelled an “Official Debate on Laïcité”.

In response to such uses of the term, minority organisations such as immigrant-based associations or Muslim organisations, struck back with a mobilisation in “defence of laïcité”. They argued that the governmental use of the principle was a distortion of its original meaning and was not protective of religious freedom. For instance, a collective of associations – including Muslim associations – gathered on 2 April 2011 to demonstrate against the “Official Debate on Laïcité”. It is interesting to note that minority activists chose not to oppose laïcité but rather to reclaim laïcité and therefore articulate their demand in Republican terms.

The case study investigates claims of organisations that mobilised in relation to the issue of laïcité in general. They include old organisations that addressed this issue (The Human Rights League and the Education League) and new organisations that encompass activists with an immigrant background: organisations that are specifically mobilised against the passing of restrictive laws pertaining to laïcité (All Equal Moms); organisations whose mobilisation on the issue of laïcité is part of a larger objective to defend Islam and French people associated with the Muslim faith (Collective Against Islamophobia in France, Coordination against Racism and Islamophobia, Muslim Participation and Spirituality). However, such mobilisations generally involve few people and some activists participate in several of these organisations.

The case study consisted in interviewing activists about their understanding of laïcité as a value and if they saw laïcité as a necessary frame to articulate minority-related claim in the French context. The point was not to define laïcité through these interviews, but rather to analyse the discursive and strategic use of the notion as a means for mobilisation. By applying discourse-analytical methods with the aim to identify interpretative frames for claims-making, the case study led to the following findings:
Minority organisations that are mobilised on the issue of Muslim discrimination and anti-Islam discourse articulate their claim for equal treatment in terms of laïcité to make themselves heard in the French context. Although Muslim people in general may be reluctant to adopt the notion (perceived as anti-religious and also systematically used by the media to condemn their practices), Muslim activists identify laïcité as a French tradition and use it to render their mobilisation compatible with French political life. Beyond the strategic use of the term laïcité to articulate claims in Republican terms, minority organisations are reclaiming laïcité and participating in a larger discussion on the definition of the notion and its link with the fundamental value of religious freedom.

In this discussion, they are joined by majority organisations such as human rights associations and feminist groups. How did this happen? In fact, the initial framing of the first headscarf affair of 1989 was essential in linking the issue of Islam with laïcité and feminism. The wearing of the veil was interpreted as a sign of religious extremism and the oppression of women, which prompted organisations to mobilize for the defence of laïcité and women’s rights, respectively. However, with the growing stigmatisation of Islam and the systematic use of laïcité to pass laws restricting the practice of Islam, some defenders of laïcité and feminist activists shifted their position to rally behind Muslim organisations and denounce an intolerant interpretation of laïcité.

French feminist positioning on the issue of laïcité is complex. Most French feminists support a restrictive interpretation of laïcité because they interpret the wearing of an Islamic veil as a sign of discrimination against women. Only a limited number of feminist activists contest the manipulation of a discourse on laïcité to discriminate Muslim women and situate the issue at the intersection of gender and racial discrimination.

What is more, by rendering their mobilisation adapted to the French context, Muslim organisations have contributed to the articulation of a Muslim consciousness. They are highlighting the specificity of a Muslim identity in France and the post-colonial construction of Islam in France.

In conclusion, the participation of minority organisations and Muslim organisations to the mobilisation in defence of laïcité is a way to articulate claims for acceptance of Islam as a component of French religious diversity, on an equal footing with Protestantism and Judaism. In doing so, minority organisations are able to propose claims for acceptance that are more difficult to ignore by the majority population.

3. Comparative Perspectives on Muslim Claims-making

3.1. Similar Challenges

Muslim organisations, as representatives of minority constituencies in France and the United Kingdom, face comparable challenges in the articulation of their political claims. In each context there is a tendency to be less tolerant towards Muslim claims on the ground that they are seen to be sectarian and particularist. In France this is justified by the general suspicion towards religious expressions in the public sphere. The articulation of claims by groups of people that share one religious belonging (real or perceived) is seen as infringing upon the principled separation of state and religion. Moreover, the focus on the veil that is interpreted as a sign of religious extremism tends to overshadow other Muslim claims. Even though the United Kingdom is seen to be more acceptant of minority claims-making, there still is considerable suspicion of the alleged sectarian character of Muslim claims in British political life. In both cases, Muslim claims are seen as exceptional in comparison to other types of claims – a suspicion that a number of scholars have recently tried to confirm (e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005, Joppke 2010).

Yet from the perspective of our research, which is not concerned with aggregates or the media coverage but with two particular cases, it is striking that Muslim advocacy organisations seek to emphasize the compatibility of their claims with existing political frameworks. An important
discursive element in their claims-making is the emphasis on normality and the request to be treated as any other minority, interest or identity group would. For instance, in France, an important element is the comparison of Islam with other religious minorities that are recognised as such (Lochak 1989). Muslim activists ask that Islam be recognised as a normal component of French religious diversity, on an equal footing with Protestantism and Judaism. In the United Kingdom, Muslim political actors request a type of socio-political recognition that would acknowledge the comparability of their self-conceptions with other identities on the basis of which political requests can legitimately be made.

3.2. Contrasting Strategies

However, Muslim organisations in both countries face dissimilar obstacles that they seek to overcome in different ways. In the UK, the link between post-immigration groups and the Labour Party, and in some cases the exploitation of this link through forms of patronage politics, means that negative conceptions of the ‘Muslim Vote’ need to be overcome. Interviews show that the emphasis of maturity and sophistication among Muslim voters is perhaps the most widely shared point of reference in the rhetoric of the various initiatives. On the one hand, this can be seen as a claim for acceptance of Muslim voters as normal. Robert Dahl argues that ethnic political integration process is achieved when ethnic groups vote for all parties, on the left and on the right, just as the mainstream population (Dahl 1961). The emphasis of maturity among Muslim voters may be seen as a way to reclaim this integration in the political process. On the other hand, it could also be suggested that the class interest of British Muslims align closely with the Labour Party. A preference for Labour among Muslims – rather than an affinity with the Tories because of the proximity between conservative and religious values – indicates normality then, not an exceptional status.

As for Muslim minorities in France, they are in the process of negotiating the terms of their visibility in political life. The framing of their claims is an instance of such negotiations. They are struggling to render their claims acceptable by French political standards, yet the difference with Britain is that they insert themselves into a language of universalist politics and draw on core Republican values, such as laïcité, in their claims-making. Their understanding of political integration is that they are being seen as equal citizens of the French Republic, without having to abandon their sense of religious belonging.

Conclusion

Conceptual Remarks: Identity politics and acceptance

It is important to take notice of problems that have been associated with the involvement of post-immigration groups in the political process (such as communal hierarchies or the position of old and unelected spokesmen). Yet problems evidently do not apply in all cases, or may pertain in equal measure to majority groups, and there is the risk that problems are invoked to disqualify mobilizations even when these are bottom-up or civil society-based.

Such biases stifle the civic normalization that most post-immigration groups desire. In the United Kingdom, the insistence that political claims have to be proposed in universalistic terms and without highlighting minority identities creates a burden that particularly affects newcomers to the polity. They are expected to live up to particularly high and possibly unrealistic standards of commitment to the ‘common good’.

Regarding France, there are claims that it may not be possible to articulate within existing political frameworks. The case illustrates particularly well how minority groups respond to the ‘challenge of particularism’ by “transform[ing] their claims from mere expressions of self-regarding interests to appeals to justice” (Young 2000, 115). In reclaiming laïcité for the protection of their religious freedom, French Muslims do not claim acceptance within the narrow understanding of the term. Their
request for acceptance involves the re-making of such understandings in order to extend the boundaries of acceptance and respect.

Facing similar challenges of not being tolerated by mainstream politics or political elites, minority groups do not articulate claims for toleration but rather take the discourse on citizenship and equality at face value and ask to be accepted as equal, arguably a more demanding request than the claim for mere tolerance. One could therefore argue that when facing intolerance, minorities do not reply with a claim for tolerance but move on directly to a claim for acceptance and civic recognition.

Recommendations

Obstacles faced by Muslim activists result from the alleged exceptionality of their identities and claims and can be considered as forms of stigmatisation, intolerance and discrimination. In both cases, there is a need to raise awareness regarding this intolerance and to highlight the issue of religious discrimination in political activities.

• In France, it is necessary to raise awareness among French citizens and politicians about the issue of religious discrimination. As public expressions of religious identity are considered illegitimate, there is a tendency to justify or downplay the importance of this discrimination, which significantly impairs the contribution that it is possible for minority citizens to make.

• In the UK, the popular perception of Muslim political actors as ‘toxic’ is a form of stigmatisation that would be unacceptable if applied to other minorities. For mainstream politicians to go with such characterisations is damaging. All political parties should develop better relationship with Muslim organizations, and reach out and encourage participation in a manner that would facilitate a conduit for the mainstream presence of Muslim actors.

The wish for a certain normalization of Muslim claims and identities is evident in both case studies:

• The centrality of the notion of laïcité in the French value system makes it fitting for Muslim activists to articulate their claims along this line and secure support among French social movements. Muslim organisations adopt the discourse of laïcité to make themselves heard as Muslims in France. The mobilisation of Muslim people for the defence of their interests (namely the fight against discrimination) is operating within the framework of French politics and demonstrates their ability to adopt the standards of French political life.

• In the UK, the wish for certain normalization can be conceived as a desire for hyphenated British-Muslim identities to be recognised as ‘normal’, just as it is normal among the majority to combine English, Welsh and Scottish identities with Britishness. Hyphenated identities are in this understanding a legitimate basis for political mobilisation and lobbying, not divisive or disloyal.

References


APPENDIX. Political challenges to tolerance: Country cases

Texts of country profiles to be attributed to the authors mentioned at the beginning of the summary.

References


Mühe N. (Working under Prof. Werner Schiffauer) (2012), Extending the Limits of Intolerance: The Sarrazin-Debate and its effect on members of the targeted minority, ACCEPT-PLURALISM 4. National Case Studies - Political Life; Final Country Reports.

Executive Summary

The debate about the political participation of Bulgarian minorities and especially about their allegedly disproportionately strong influence on the election results is among the most disputed and polarising issues in Bulgaria. Populist and nationalist political actors have periodically raised demands to limit the voting rights of Bulgarian minorities. Their intentions were partially realised in 2001 with the passing of the new Election Code.

While introducing numerous positive changes and bringing some much needed clarity and order into the previously fragmented and confusing electoral legislation, the Code is highly controversial and has drawn criticism from international institutions, Bulgarian human rights watchdogs and other civic organisations, and some political actors. The most problematic issue is the six-months residency requirement for participation in local elections, which is an infringement on voting rights of numerous Bulgarian citizens. This restriction is aimed above all at the large community of people holding a dual Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship (estimated at up to 380,000).

The new Election Code also tries to prevent or discourage some of the most notorious illegal and illegitimate practices that regularly accompany the elections in Bulgaria. One such practice is the so-called vote buying – a process when people vote for a certain party or independent candidate in exchange for money or other type of bribe. Roma are most often accused that they sell their votes and in this way distort the election results. A 2009 survey has shown that 40% of Roma are prepared to vote for those who pay them. The measures are therefore disproportionally targeting the Roma community. The media reporting on alleged Roma vote selling also strongly contributes to the prevailing negative public attitude towards Roma.

The key question the following report therefore tries to answer is how the populist and nationalistic political agenda on voting rights of Bulgarian minorities influences the relations between different ethnic communities in Bulgaria. The debate on voting rights is an excellent catalyst for evaluating the attitudes towards minorities – ranging from extremely intolerant demands for full revoking of existing political and voting rights to calls for genuine acceptance and respect of diversity.

The fieldwork was conducted between October 2011 and February 2012. It included both desk research and empirical fieldwork. The most important event that marked the period in which the fieldwork was conducted were the presidential and local elections, which took place in October 2011.

During the fieldwork, 14 semi-standardised interviews were taken. The interview guide was divided into two main groups of questions. The first one focused on the new Election Code and its restriction of the voting rights of people with double citizenship. This topic very directly concerns the political representation of the Bulgarian Turks. The second topic centred on the so-called vote buying – a notorious practice which seems to spread with each successive elections. The issue is connected with the voting of the Roma community, as Roma are most often believed to participate in such schemes.

The main part of the desk research consisted of collecting and analysing the media coverage of the main political challenge analysed in this report: the 2011 Election code and its consequences for the voting rights of Bulgarian Turkish and Roma minorities. In addition, statistical data, legal texts, policy documents, and proceedings of the National Assembly and relevant parliamentary committees were also examined.

One of the main findings of our research is that the changes introduced by the new Election Code have tainted the pre-election process and the election campaign. They also intensified the inter-ethnic distrust and confrontation.
The research has shown that the declarative support for the democratic and tolerant arrangements where all Bulgarian citizens have equal political rights is quickly cast aside when it comes to the concrete cases concerning ethnic and religious otherness. The fact that Bulgarian Turks have been directly affected by the new Election Code has caused a barely concealed relief among the majority population, rather than an open indignation over the undemocratic arrangement. Such an attitude is an indication of a low level of tolerance towards the minorities and of immature civil consciousness of the society.

Three main discourses on the state of inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria can be identified:

1) inter-ethnic relations are not on a downward curve, but follow a cyclical pattern – deterioration in the election period after which they return to normality;

2) inter-ethnic relations are steadily deteriorating, not just because of the political games and manipulation, but because of the economic crisis and worsening standard of living

3) not only inter-ethnic relations are worsening, but relations among all people in Bulgaria in general

The notorious practice of vote buying and selling is not confined to Roma, as the popular stereotypes would have us believe. The October 2011 elections have shown that this malicious practice is spreading. As a result, the majority of the Bulgarian voters are becoming increasingly disillusioned and disappointed over the state of the Bulgarian political system and prefer not to vote at all, which is playing straight into the hands of the corrupt and dishonest economic-political actors. Despite that, the media and the public perceptions continue to attribute this malpractice to Roma, who are therefore accused that they influence the election results in an illegal and illegitimate way.

The current research has again highlighted the significant discrepancy between the official political and public discourse on perception and application of democratic norms and values, and the reality. While the public speech is focused on notions of tolerance and acceptance, the concrete examples and everyday practices testify about entrenched intolerance that can be easily mobilised in the critical moments like political, social and economic crisis.

Despite the fact that the central government periodically comes up with different programmes and strategies for integration of minorities, the practical implementation is either lacking or is flawed and inadequate. The research has shown that the regional solutions tailored to the ethnic, cultural and religious structure of the population on the local level can be far more successful than the solutions proposed on the national level. The largest problem is to find a way to transfer the functioning everyday tolerance from the local level into the national context, which continues to be dominated by intolerant stereotypes and prejudices. A larger regional and municipal autonomy to address the needs and problems of the local population according to its specific features would be a positive step in turning the unsuccessful top-down approach into a more appropriate two-way process.

The research has also established that many people are either ignorant of or tend to disregard the numerous problems that could provoke or intensify tensions between different ethnic, cultural and religious groups. Forming and changing the collective matrix is a long and contradictory process. Our recommendation is to intensify the research of inter-ethnic relations – not just in Bulgarian context, but also in the European one. The disclosure of good practices and popularisation of results from similar studies increase the sensitivity of the society for such topics. They also stimulate the willingness of state institutions to look for and implement more adequate and comprehensive policies.

Keywords

Political participation of minorities; Bulgarians; Turks; Roma; Bulgarian-Turkish dual citizens; vote buying; Election Code; populism and nationalism; voting rights; Movement for Rights and Freedoms; intolerance, tolerance, recognition and respect.
Executive Summary

This report analyzes negotiations of toleration-boundary drawing as they play out in two recent public debates in Denmark, both concerning political meetings arranged by or involving controversial Muslim actors. The two meetings – one arranged by the organization Hizb ut-tahrir, and one involving the Canadian Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips – generated intense public debate about the limits of tolerance and the room for illiberal and anti-democratic views and practices in the public sphere.

First, the report maps and compares the different toleration positions and arguments in the two debates, building on analysis of the media coverage. This analysis finds that while the debate surrounding Hizb ut-tahrir’s meeting was skewed towards toleration, the debate about Bilal Philips’ visit to Denmark was skewed towards intolerance. The reason for this difference in toleration-boundary drawing is explained with reference to important differences in the sender-message-audience triad in the two selected cases. Despite these differences the analysis also shows that the same toleration positions and arguments of boundary drawing are found in the two debates. These recurrent positions include: ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’, ‘toleration-but-protest’, ‘toleration-because-intervention-is-counterproductive’, ‘intolerance-due-to-threat-and-harm’, ‘intolerance-because-of-liberal-perfectionism’. The analysis shows how the support of these different positions of toleration boundary drawing cut across the traditional political spectrum in Denmark.

Second, the report investigates the discursive strategies put forward by different actors in pushing exactly their version of boundary drawing and the coping strategies of dealing with pressures of taking a stand on the limits of tolerance in the two cases. This analysis, building on media data as well as interviews with engaged actors, identifies three significant and recurrent strategies; 1) the strategy of pushing boundary drawing from the political to the legal arena, 2) the strategy of securitization, which pushes boundary drawing into the realm of the extra-political and extra-ordinary, and 3) the strategy of reframing, adaptation or avoidance of boundary drawing. The central argument in this section is that the interactive nature of public debates generates relative positioning of actors, which co-determines the toleration boundary drawing of actors and the discursive strategies used to legitimize it and cope with pressures.

As a last step, the report focuses on how toleration boundary drawing in public debates may affect Muslim actors’ possibilities for engaging in political debates in the Danish context. The report argues that although the controversies regarding the two meetings did not generate any concrete policy implication, which directly altered Muslim actors’ possibilities of using public meetings as a platform for political claims making, there seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, it is argued, with the fundamental interdependence of tolerance-boundary drawing and processes of othering. Toleratation boundary drawing implies othering, as it functions to differentiate the realm of the recognizable normal and tolerable from the foreign and intolerable. When drawing toleration boundaries we are at the same time constructing in-groups and out-groups. In the analyzed debates Muslims in general are often designated as the ‘other’, covering up important differences within the Muslim community, which may potentially serve to delimit the possibilities of being tolerated as legitimate participants in public debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims.
Keywords
Tolerance, respect, accommodation, integration, intolerance, political participation, secular politics, political representation, public debate, public deliberation, Islam
**Executive Summary**

Background Elements on the Political Mobilisation of Minorities in France

French political life is relatively immune to ethnic demands and claims for group rights, should they come from immigrant or native minorities (such as regional minorities or the Roma community from France). Article 1 of the 1958 constitution reads that the French Republic “shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law regardless of their origin, race or religion” and this has been generally understood as invalidating any mobilisation on the basis of ethnic or religious belonging. This is regarded as opposed to the civic understanding of French citizenship that guarantees a vertical relationship between the state and the citizen. Any political claim articulated in ethnic or religious terms is considered favouring the pursuit of particular interests over general interest.

Moreover, non-nationals do not hold political rights (to the notable exception of European citizens who can vote in local and European elections since 1992) and cannot participate formally to political life. As for immigrants who acquired French nationality and French people of immigrant descent, they hold political rights but surveys have demonstrated their low participation and lack of presence in French political life.

However, there has been a tradition of immigrants’ mobilization in organisations since the post war period that can be seen as instances where to study the articulation of ethnic interests. France counts numerous immigrant associations that have learned to articulate their claim and negotiate their identity in Republican terms. In this process, the state has played a significant role in channeling the articulation of their claim. By drawing a line in between what could be considered as a reasonable claim from a minority group and what was regarded as leaning towards a separatist claim that would contradict Republican universalism, public institutions and policy makers greatly impacted the expression of minority interests. Activists have learned to navigate French political life and articulate their claim in Republican terms.

The Focus of the Study on Minority Claims of Laïcité

The mobilisation of associations defending the interest of Muslim community in terms of laïcité is an instance of the adaptation of minority group to Republican universalism.

Laïcité is the French understanding of secularism that ensures the strict separation of church and states, and confines religious expressions to private matters. It is considered as a Republican value. However, the discussion of laïcité has been repetitively used to respond to the perceived increase of religious diversity in France, and more specifically to the challenge of Islam. This was the case in 2004 when a law recalling the principle of laïcité banned the wearing of the Islamic veil in French public school. This was also the case in 2011 when Interior Minister Eric Besson decided to launch what he called an “Official Debate on Islam “and that the debate was quickly relabelled an “Official Debate on Laïcité”.

In response to this, minority organisations such as immigrant based associations or Muslim organisations, stroke back with a mobilisation in “defence of laïcité”. They argued that the governmental use of the principle was a distortion of its original meaning and was not protective of religious freedom. For instance, a collective of associations –including Muslim associations – gathered on 2 April 2011 to demonstrate against the governmental “Official Debate on Laïcité”. It is
Minority activists chose not to oppose laïcité but rather to reclaim laïcité and therefore articulate their demand in Republican terms.

Minority claims of laïcité pertain to claims for equal treatment and tolerance. However, from a research point of view, investigating minority claims of laïcité, as such, appears as a valuable angle to discuss the state of tolerance in French political life. First, the direct link of this principle with notions of equality and tolerance allows for a direct entry into a value discourse that is not as easily discussed otherwise. Second, the frequent use of the term in link with Islam is a convenient topic to announce when contacting interviewees while the issue of religious diversity or tolerance to Muslim identity could be seen as infringing Republican correctness (namely the neutrality of the public space where religious expressions are not to be discussed).

Methodology

The case study on minority claims of laïcité consisted in a literature review, a press review, a collection of secondary sources on the issue and material collected during fieldwork.

The fieldwork consisted in the attendance to meetings organised in reaction to the governmental decisions regarding laïcité (demonstrations and public meetings) and a selection of interviews (n=7). Interviews were conducted with activists of different organisations in an effort to keep an equal repartition in terms of gender, origin and religious belonging.

The organisations were selected so as to keep a balance in between old organisations mobilised on the issue of laïcité and new organisations (organisations that are specifically mobilised against the passing of restrictive laws pertaining to laïcité; organisations whose mobilisation on the issue of laïcité is part of a larger objective to defend Islam and French people associated with the Muslim faith). However, the mobilisation involves few people and some activists participate in several of these organisations, which explain the limited number of interviews.

Interviewees were asked about their understanding of laïcité as a value and if they saw laïcité as a necessary frame to articulate any minority-related claim in the French context, and if this was the case, what other options they would see. We paid attention not to impose the frame of laïcité on the interviewee and interviews also dealt with resources of mobilisation and individuals’ understanding of issues pertaining to diversity. The point was not to define laïcité but to analyse its use to articulate claims with respect to the acceptance of religious diversity in French political life.

Main findings

1. Minority organisations that are mobilised on the issue of Muslim discrimination and anti-Islam discourse articulate their claim for equal treatment in terms of laïcité to make themselves heard in the French context. Although Muslim people in general may be reluctant to adopt the notion of laïcité (perceived as anti-religious and also systematically used by the media to condemn their practices), Muslim activists identify laïcité as a French tradition and use it to render their mobilisation compatible with French political life.

Beyond the strategic use of the term laïcité to articulate a claim in Republican terms, minority organisations are reclaing laïcité and participating in a larger discussion on the definition of the notion and its link with the fundamental value of religious freedom.

2. In this discussion, they are joined by majority organisations such as human rights associations and feminist groups.

How did this happen? In fact, the initial framing of the first headscarf affair of 1989 was essential in linking the issue of Islam with laïcité and feminism. The wearing of the veil was interpreted as a sign of religious extremism and women oppression, which prompted the mobilisation of organisations
mobilised on the defence of laïcité and feminists, respectively. However, with the growing stigmatisation of Islam and the systematic use of laïcité to pass laws restricting the practice of Islam, some defenders of laïcité and feminist activists shifted their position to rally with Muslim organisations and denounce an intolerant interpretation of laïcité.

3. French feminist positioning on the issue of laïcité is complex. Most French feminists support a restrictive interpretation of laïcité because they interpret the wearing of an Islamic veil as a sign of discrimination against women. Only a limited number of feminist activists contest the manipulation of a discourse on laïcité to discriminate Muslim women and situate the issue at the intersection of gender and racial discrimination.

4. By rendering their mobilisation adapted to the French context, Muslim organisations have contributed to the articulation of a Muslim consciousness. They are highlighting the specificity of a Muslim identity in France and the post-colonial construction of Islam in France.

As such, minority claims of laïcité also qualify for claims of acceptance and recognition of Islam in France.

Concluding remarks

By focusing on the mobilisation in the defence of Muslim rights in France, the case study encompasses a limited number of activists. It allows analysing the implications of a mobilisation in terms of laïcité for individuals who distinguished themselves from the rest of the population by their religious belonging (real or perceived). However, this should not overshadow the restrictive turn in the interpretation of laïcité in the current French discourse and the fact that both right-wing and left-wing parties tend to follow this path. The change in positioning that we observed among a number of activists of the Human rights league and eminent specialists on laïcité such as Jean Baubérot, could inaugurate a broader change in discourse. However, the politicisation of the issue of laïcité in reaction to the Muslim presence is pervasive and appears as the most favoured strategy by politicians right now.

Policy recommendations

- Policy makers should give more audience to NGOs and organisations that are organised on the defence of Muslim rights in France.
- It is necessary to sensitize the population on the issue of religious discrimination and the construction of racism on the basis of people’s religious belonging (real or perceived). A tendency to see the articulation of religious identities as illegitimate in France has contributed to undermine the understanding of discrimination on the basis of religion, or even, to justify discrimination on the ground that religious expressions are incompatible with French society.

Keywords

Political Mobilisation, Minority, Discrimination, Muslim organisations, Laïcité, Feminism
Executive Summary

This report analyses the national debate about the book “Germany does away with itself” by the former politician Thilo Sarrazin, that draws a future scenario of the German nation being overwhelmed by Muslims, who lower the national levels of intelligence and economic performance. The arguments of the author draw on already existing images of Muslims as the significant other in society and take them even further to a point, where tolerance towards this other and its religious practices does not seem appropriate any more. Although the book does not open a new debate, but connects to similar discourses in other European countries, it takes this debate further and supports the social boundaries towards Muslims being drawn narrower. This survey is interested in how this debate developed and how it can be seen as supporting the construction of a significant other against whom fears and anxieties are awakened that are hardly open any more for rational deliberation but support intolerant and even racist attitudes towards Muslims with a large part of the German population. Apart from the analysis of the Sarrazin debate, the report also looks at possible effects this national discussion has on members of the targeted minority.

The main questions of the present study are thus: Has the overall effect of the debate been to make intolerance towards a specific minority more socially acceptable? For this purpose we look into the development of the debate its effects on social and political life. Has the political debate about Muslims and/or minorities and maybe also political measurements changed during and after the debate? And how do these developments, especially the changed acceptability of intolerance or intolerant speech affect the people involved? How does it change both their everyday life, their self-perception as entire part of the German society and their also their engagement in political life?

The analytical frame for analysing these questions is the interest in discursive mechanisms of boundary drawing and the construction of a significant other. The study seeks to collect insight into these mechanisms as well as their effects on changing (in-)tolerance towards Muslims in Germany and Europe.

The methodological tools of the analysis are a short discourse analysis of two major national newspapers and expert interviews with members of the Muslim community and professionals, who work within the community. For the media analysis the left-liberal Die Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and the rather conservative Die Welt were followed between the 30th of September and the 20th of November 2009 after Sarrazin had already given a widely noticed interview in the magazine Lettre International, and between 23rd of August and the 9th of November 2010 right after the publication of the mentioned book, that quickly became a bestseller. Additionally individual articles were taken into consideration that appeared about a year after the debate.

The second part of the analysis deals with the perception of the Sarrazin debate by members of the targeted minority groups and reactions of individual Muslims towards it. It consists of 6 expert interviews and one group discussion with a political group of 5 young Muslims and one of their group leaders, who had invited Thilo Sarrazin in order to meet the person behind the book and personally discuss his views with him.

The specific anti-Muslim discourse in Germany of which Sarrazin is a spokesperson, has an important function for the construction of a national identity especially in times of fundamental changes of the country turning into an immigration country and witnessing steadily growing (religious) diversity. The immigrants and/or Muslims and their apparent cultural or religious difference is created as the absolute ‘other’ to German society by attributing with them every negative aspect that Germans want to
distance themselves from - from Homophobia to anti-Semitism and misogyny. Following this ascription of negative attributes and values the group is then quite justifiably positioned outside the borders of ‘what can still be tolerated’ by German society. At the same time this exclusion of the other helps to construct a common national identity that is otherwise hardly to be found regarding the strong inner diversity of Germany and other European nations. Drawing the border towards the significant other and to what one is not however gives some kind of common identity and unifies interests from very different political persuasions. This process of exclusion becomes stronger with the degree of public fears that the discourse raises. The worse a future scenario is constructed, in which the significant other becomes the dangerous other and takes over important parts of society, the more irrational the public fears become.

One of the factors of Sarrazin’s success were the already existent anti-Muslim debates in other European countries and especially the growing populist parties, warning the European citizens against an apparent Islamisation of their societies and through this scenario creating a common European fear of the Muslim other, that is like the Sarrazin discourse quite untouched by rational deliberation. This significant other takes over a similar role on the European level as it does on the respective national levels, as it helps to define Europe through its perceived borders and ‘limits of tolerance’ and thus supports the unification process of the diverse European countries.

The Sarrazin debate reflects many of those arguments that turn around the ‘limits of tolerance’ towards the marked minority. In the case of Muslims it is mainly the visibility of religion through mosque buildings, headscarves or prayers in public that is negotiated as a limit of tolerance where the still tolerable other, Muslims who do not obviously identify as such and/or exclusively practice their religion in private, transgresses the boundary into public visibility and therewith the boundary to what can still be tolerated. Those issues typically become public debates in which those boundaries towards the tolerable other are negotiated.

Regarding the effects of the Sarrazin debate and the general construction of Muslims as significant others on members of the Muslim minority, this survey found, that it caused detrimental social divisions by enforcing the perception of many Muslims not to be welcome in German society. Some young Muslims obviously reacted with drawing back into their smaller communities and looking for other possible identity concepts than the German one, even if they were German citizens. Especially young people, who had already been active in civil society organisations and projects however managed to empower themselves and strengthen their self-confidence by learning more about both their own religion and German politics and how to handle both and engage into critical debates and even social activism.

Besides the empowerment of members of the minority that is targeted by the intolerant discourse, political conclusions could be the countering of the construction of a significant other through stronger counter discourses and national debates about this construction of others and its effects in racist attitudes that have already reached large parts of the population also within the middle of society.

Keywords
Tolerance, intolerance, significant other, national identity, fears, Muslims, Islamophobia, racism, Sarrazin, diversity, religious difference
Executive Summary

During the last 20 years the country has been rapidly transformed from a migrant sending to a migrant receiving country and currently about 0.8 million of its 11 million population is of foreign origin. Moreover, during the last three years Greece has been faced with a European and international migration crisis: while increasing numbers of people are fleeing war and poverty from Asia and Africa, the Greek Turkish border has become the main gate to Europe. The onset of the current financial crisis in early 2010 has deteriorated the situation. Unemployment grew dramatically among long term settled immigrants and working class natives. There has been an important increase in the crime rate and a generalized sense of insecurity in the centre of the capital of the country, while adding to this, extreme right wing groups have taken the situation ‘in their hands’. Departing from images and incidents taking place in the centre of Athens, an all the more xenophobic discourse started spreading and dominating the way public opinion interprets the ‘other’ living in the city. Large parts of society appear as prone to morally accept incidents of racist violence and hate speech.

Central to this change has been the unprecedented rise of far right parties, actions and discourse in the public sphere. LAOS (The People's Orthodox Rally), is considered to be an extreme right wing formation that won 5.63% of the vote in 2009 national elections and 7.14% for the elections for the European Parliament. LAOS has participated in the provisional grand coalition government formed to deal with the crisis (from November 2011 till February 2012) thus further legitimising its position in the Greek political system. Golden Dawn, on the other hand, is a nationalist far right organization, whose members have been repeatedly accused of carrying out acts of violence and hate crimes against immigrants, political opponents and ethnic minorities. Golden Dawn, with a clear racist and Nazi political position, operates in certain ‘troubled’ urban areas in terms of ‘field work’ and establishes a state within a state offering security to local residents. This radical organization won a sit in municipal elections in the city of Athens (5.3%) and entered the parliament in 2012 national elections getting an 6.97% of the national vote.

This re-composition of the extreme right in the country runs in parallel with a conservative unfolding of Greek identity and a generalized political crisis unfolding in the 1990s, since when sensitive issues of national identity have re emerged and national particularities surfaced as the opposite pole to reform and globalization. Such a tendency appears severely intensified during the current crisis. However, the relationship and dynamics between the extreme right discourse and mainstream public opinion, party and official state discourse in Greece has not been thoroughly studied.

This study explores the recent discourses on diversity and tolerance in Greek political life. It investigates what has been defined by different political actors as intolerable, tolerable or acceptable cultural difference – hence it questions what intolerance/tolerance/acceptance means for each actor and how they re-define and use it to draw boundaries in Greek society. These boundaries cut across and overlap with different dimensions: natives/nationals and Others/aliens, tolerant and intolerant people/parties, racist and non-racist, democratic and authoritarian, right wing vs. left wing forces.

We examine here the political and discursive deployment of toleration in two different case studies and see how tolerance relies on the construction of images of ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’. Our main scope is to gain a better understanding of why and when some aspects of difference are rejected. We seek to answer the question what kind of difference is tolerable/acceptable in Greek society and why? We also examine whether Greek society is becoming more or less tolerant towards specific groups and why. Case studies

The first case analysed in this study refers to the public prayer of Muslim inhabitants of Athens on 18 November 2010 on the occasion of the ‘Id festivity (end of Ramadan) before the sprawling courtyard
of the country's main university as a peaceful protest for the non existence of an official mosque (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2009; Antoniou 2005); this protest event provoked a public debate, the first on the issue to acquire visibility at the national level and took place without problems.

The second case study concentrates on a tragic event that took place a few months later. In May 2011, in the very centre of Athens a 44-year old man, Manolis Kantaris, was cold blood assassinated by unknown people, believed to be irregular migrants. This murder triggered a series of violent and racist attacks against migrants in the city centre, and especially the 6th city council district that were led by far right wing organizations, such as the Golden Dawn, and tolerated by both the police and part of the residents of the area. These incidents, our second case study, produced a polarised political discourse focusing around the crisis in the city centre as linked with the issue of irregular immigration.

In those two cases, the social practice of toleration was played out in the historical centre of the capital, where deterioration of living conditions has been followed by considerable irregular migration flows. The above events have generated discussions and conflicts in national politics regarding more generally migrants and the immigrant ‘Other’ in Greek society and the limit of his/her presence in public. While the political and symbolic exclusion of the immigrant Other is nothing new in Greek society, what is new is how concepts of tolerance/intolerance and actions of toleration or lack of toleration are newly negotiated amidst a generalized economic and political crisis. The emergence of migration as a centre-stage political issue in the last two years and the spectacular rise of the far right wing vote ( role of far right parties brings these questions and by the emergence of far right parties strong enough to win seats in the Parliament and in Athens municipal council. These political developments have brought racist and intolerant discourse (and actions) centre-stage in the debate on migration.

Methodology

Our case study included both desk research and empirical fieldwork. We have analysed the scholarly literature on the issue of the far right in the country, while also collecting material on far right wing parties and groups active at the moment in the city centre. We also examined newspaper materials: We searched for articles in five mainstream newspapers with the highest circulation at the national level (notably Kathimerini, Vima, Eleftherotypia, Ethnos, ta Nea) and in a selection of far right groups’ websites. Moreover, we examined how the major political parties present in the Greek Parliament in 2011 (Conservative party New Democracy, Socialist party PASOK, left wing party SYRIZA, the Greek Communist Party KKE, the far right wing party LAOS and the Golden Dawn party that was not represented in the national parliament but whose actions and discourse were important for our selected case studies.

Desk material, thus, has been used so as to set the picture of the events and positions taken, while our object of analysis were qualitative interviews conducted with actors actively engaged in the events under question. We have conducted 19 qualitative interviews with representatives of right and left wing parties and groups, with migrant associations active in the events aforementioned, journalists, writers and with residents of the city centre that have not taken active part in those conflicts but see themselves affected by immigrants’ presence.

Key Findings

There are two competing positions emerging from the interviews: Tolerance of Diversity- Intolerance of Racism and Intolerance of Diversity/ Islamophobia- Tolerance/ Justification of Racism, correspond to two competing framings, the political/ ideological and the cultural/ identity one.

More precisely, those arguing along a political/ ideological frame sustain a tolerant position towards diversity and an intolerant one when it comes to racist words and acts. Even if only one interviewee explicitly attributed her choice to a ‘leftist’ ideology, however, all respondents defended what we could call ‘new left’ values such as minorities’ rights, equality and diversity according to a ‘left/ right cleavage’. Tolerance is endorsed in the name of this framing, but at the same time is proved limited to reflect accommodation of diversity in contemporary multicultural settings. Racism is perceived as a
problem not to be tolerated and respondents attempt to eraze the differences raised between ‘us’ and ‘them’ situating the framing on the ‘them’ tag of the ‘us/ them’ cleavage.

Those framing the events as cultural/identity issues, on the contrary, put forward the ‘intolerance of diversity’ position, while justifying if not tolerating racist attitudes. The latter category insist on the non political/ideological nature of their standpoint and present it as apolitical, as a non option, but, instead as a natural reaction to the problem of migration. Within this framing, racism is a mere symptom of the problem of migration and tolerance accepted in theory but severely limited in practice due to the ‘us/ them’ dichotomy. Prioritizing national identity and culture, thus, those frames could be situated on the ‘us’ tag along an ‘us/ them’ cleavage and on the ‘right’ tag of the ‘left/right’ cleavage as they prioritize national cultural identity over the ‘other’s’ rights, without questioning their liberal values and beliefs in a modern society.

Both frames use the law and order master frame, as well as the anti establishment critique frame, so as to develop their competing positions. For instance, state migration policies have been either lacking or inefficient and EU regulations contributed to the explosion of the problem. Concerning particularly the city centre, many of our respondents, including party representatives and the extreme right representative, claim that the first to blame is not the migrants themselves, but the state, along with all parliamentary parties, politicians and authorities, that did nothing to prevent or deal with the issue. Moving even further, the populist right representative puts the blame for uncontrolled migration to the exploitation of the Third World countries by the multinational companies and the dominant economy. Those arguing for intolerance through the law and order master frame examine the ‘lamentable’ phenomenon of massive immigration in terms of the effects on local people, public image and economy, without taking into account the rights of the immigrants themselves, or without rating ‘their’ rights equally with ‘ours’. The victims of criminality and lawlessness are first and foremost local residents of the central areas of Athens. Even if respondents acknowledge that immigrants’ rights are abused, however their public presence in the area puts native people’s security further at risk as this is already the case due to economic harsh situation- using in the same way the crisis frame. So, even if the law and order frame is presented as a non political way to classify and understand social reality, it is however constructed in ethnocultural terms that define the political identities of ‘us’ vs ‘them’ in the national public sphere.

In the same way, the critique of political power that both frames share, presupposes different understandings of what is the ‘problem’ and who is considered to be the perpetrator, the agent of change and the possible solutions. The cultural/identity frame attributes the role of the agent of change to the state; at the same time, however, it constructs ‘them’ as a homogeneous category that is so different than the national self that co existence becomes a cultural problem. So, the dominant culture is not to blame, while it remains unclear how the state could have resolved what seems to be natural conflicts and unbridgeable cultural differences.

Even if respondents pay lip service to tolerance during the interview, the solutions suggested through this frame are quite intolerant. In other words, there is an inconsistency between the goals formulated on the one hand and the analysis of the problems that require a solution on the other. For instance, the representative of the radical right party attributes the problem of the public prayer to state’s neglect over building a Mosque; soon afterwards, however, he denies any possibility of tolerating Muslim culture, a culture that rejects women’s rights. While both positions include the same criticism against power, voiced even by those representing power structures, however, the cultural/identity frame attacks power holders in the name of quite different criteria as it is framed in ethnocultural terms.

Across Europe and along with the rise and gradual legitimisation of ultra right wing rhetoric, hate speech is often disguised in the name of liberal values so as to exclude individuals from citizens’ liberal rights. A new principled intolerance is seen, paradoxically, as necessary to protect the rights of individuals, and the rights, values and the identity of the majority. Greece is experiencing (already in the past years but particularly so in spring 2012) an unprecedented rise of far right parties, along with
a notable spreading of incidents of racist violence and xenophobic discourse in the public sphere. The actual presence of the ‘other’ in need next to the nationals, who are also through a time of crisis, renders the issue of tolerance into a central political challenge to be thoroughly examined.

The contradictory diagnoses of the ‘problem’ notably the political and principled framing of the problems by reference to tolerance (if not necessarily acceptance) of diversity and rejection of racism; and the identity framing where all issues are subsumed to a fundamental dichotomy between Us and Others (we cannot tolerate others if their presence is perceived to harm our material or cultural well being. There are no principles that hold here – the interest of the ‘ingroup’ is the utmost priority) are however solved by the strategy of objectification.

Our frame analysis suggests that competing versions of reality and of the ‘good’ are reconciled by presenting ‘intolerance’ positions as apolitical and logical reactions towards an ‘objective’ reality. Thus, with the exception of a few clearly left-wing and pro-diversity interviewees, most others, including those who would classify themselves as faithful to equality and democracy, use the law and order frame to justify and legitimize intolerance and racism. This strategy of objectification is also adopted to strengthen the culture and identity frame: it is ‘natural’ that the world is divided into ‘us’ fellow nationals and ‘them’ others. Exclusion, inequality, intolerance, even racist violence can be justified when what is at stake is the perceived interest or well being of the national ingroup. We may call this type of intolerance as the new nationalist intolerance. What is particularly worrying in Greece is that such discourses of principled national intolerance (and racism) are increasingly seen as justified and legitimized by reference to an ‘objective’ reality. They thus push the far right wing discourses centre-stage.

**Keywords**

New radical right, intolerance, racism, violence, far right, migrants
The Rise of the Extreme Right in Hungary and the Roma Question: The radicalization of media discourse

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Executive Summary

In Hungary in the last couple of years we have witnessed the rise of radical racist discourse. The radical rightwing party succeeded in setting the terms of political debate and bringing the Roma question back to centre stage. This resulted in calls to ‘break taboos’ to allow for a sincere biologically and a culturally informed discussion of difference. Both forms of discourse lead to exclusion.

The aim of this case study is to better understand the strengthening of the radical right in Hungary, its openly anti-Roma discourses, and the reactions of mainstream political actors to this radicalism. We examine the media coverage of two murders, one in which the Roma were the perpetrators and in the other in which they were the victims. We also review public debate on the question of Roma integration and the end of political correctness as it appeared in the mainstream media. The two murders are significant for understanding how the Roma question became increasingly racialised. The first incident we have ‘Olaszliszka’ after the locale where the murder took place. In 2006, a non-Roma teacher was lynched by a group of Roma. Our second case is ‘Tatárszentgyörgy’, also named after the locale where the murder occurred. In 2009, a Roma father and his son were murdered by a number of Hungarian men who were known for their neo-Nazi political allegiances. Both murders were followed by serious local conflicts between the Roma and non-Roma actors, and both drew unprecedented media attention that set off national political debates. Our third case addresses the aftermath of the media representation and the public debates generated by the two incidents. The conclusion drawn by a number of intellectuals was that politically correct discourse should be abandoned, as they viewed it as an impediment to ‘genuine’ dialogue on these important issues. This in turn legitimated the further racialisation of the Roma question by virtually all parties to the debate.

Our interest throughout is in examining the ways in which both radical and mainstream discourse have contributed to the reproduction and legitimisation of anti-Roma attitudes and actions in Hungary. Our analysis considers the radical right’s discourses on these issues and how they ultimately fed into more moderate or mainstream political and public debate.

In our case study we analyse media representations of the two murder cases (with the Roma as the perpetrators in the first one (case 1.) and the victims in the second one (case 2.)); we then conclude with a debate on ‘Roma integration and the end of political correctness’ (case 3.) as it appeared in left orientated papers. Our main purpose is to show the range of reactions to the radical right and how the Roma issue was thematised through engagement with these two murder cases. This sheds light on the ways in which radical right discourses spread to mainstream discourses. For the first two cases we included the following media: kuruc.info.hu, one of the most important radical right-wing internet web-sites in Hungary, the left-wing but mainstream Népszabadság, and the right-wing (also mainstream) Magyar Nemzet. For our third case we compiled a database by choosing one particular debate published in a weekly political and economic magazine, Heti Világ Gazdaság. For case 1. and 2. we conducted keyword searches – looking for the name of Olaszliszka and Tatárszentgyörgy – in both papers and the website to compile a dataset containing all relevant articles published since the incidents occurred. From the dataset we selected opinion articles and looked for discursive strategies employed in the articles. For case 3, we used all articles of one particular debate launched by the editors of hvg.hu entitled: Why don’t Hungarian Roma integrate?

Our analysis revealed intolerant discourses not only from the radical right media but from the conservative as well. In these media the Roma are characterised as biologically different: their innate inclination for crime means that they cannot be tolerated. The leftist newspaper we sampled emphasizes tolerance through norms of human rights and non-discrimination. In the integration debate we found that the emphasis switching to the Roma’s purported cultural distinctiveness. This more
culturalist interpretation was nevertheless still exclusionary in its effects, even if it was coming from the left. The main distinction between the left on the one hand and the right and radical right on the other was in the degree of their exclusion.

We also consider how these discourses relate to our non-tolerance–tolerance–acceptance model. We have argued that both kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet displayed intolerant discursive strategies that invoked the putative biological differences of the Roma. The Roma are not deserving of toleration given their genetically innate inclination to crime. Népszabadság in contrast used discursive strategies that emphasised tolerance through a respect of basic human rights and non-discrimination. In the integration debate we found that the ‘end of political correctness’ and ‘peculiar Roma culture’ topoi were used to stress the cultural distinctiveness of the Roma (not in genetic but cultural terms). The recognition of this distinctiveness, however, does not point to the integration of the Roma but on the contrary, to their continued exclusion, as was the case with kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet as well. The main element of the Roma’s distinctiveness is their deliberate exclusion.

These findings point to a growing tendency of non-tolerant public discourse in Hungary that spread to almost all corners of the political spectrum. There are several political and social processes that contribute to this trend of non-toleration. First, the rise of radical racist discourses which has accompanied the political successes of the radical right wing party, Jobbik, has set the political and media agenda by thematising the ‘Roma question’.

Second, non-radical political and public figures from both the left and right have responded to this thematisation of the ‘Roma question’ in a way that has not excluded non-tolerant racist discourses. Indeed, they have often been complicit in legitimating non-tolerant discourses. By acting as partners in ‘breaking taboos’, they have simultaneously been breaking with the tolerant language that supposedly accompanied those taboos.

Third, in the current non-tolerant climate, accepting the (cultural) difference of other ethnic groups has become impossible. ‘Roma cultural difference’ instead was ‘accepted’, though in a somewhat ambiguous way: its existence was acknowledged, but as grounds for deliberate exclusion. This is similar to what we witnessed in France in the 1970s when the new right misappropriated the slogan of the left, ‘le droit à la différence’ for their own purposes, claiming that immigrants have the right to difference because their culture is so different from French culture that integration is not a possibility. Similarly, in the UK, cultural racists have claimed that other (immigrant) cultures cannot be integrated.

Finally, in Hungary as in some other post-socialist countries, non-tolerance has troublingly become a rally cry of a good number of political and public actors, often irrespective of political affiliation. State institutions, political parties and the media have joined forces to fuel suspicion of Roma difference, be it biological or cultural. As a result, tolerance as a value and discourse has suffered, embraced by only a handful of actors increasingly marginal to the political mainstream.

Hungary is thus a paradox. It recognises the Roma as culturally distinct; indeed, it reifies and essentialises their cultural distinctiveness. But this recognition is not based on respect, as we see in the ACCEPT framework. Rather, it is based on racism: the Roma are not just culturally distinct, they are culturally inferior, and that cultural inferiority prevents their full incorporation into Hungarian society. This is intolerance, feebly masked as cultural recognition. This intolerance may have the radical right as its strongest advocates, but what is perhaps most disturbing from our analysis is the extent to which the racism voiced by the radical right is used by the mainstream media and political actors as well. There is widespread consensus that Roma problem is just that: a problem, and the problem is with the Roma, and their deficient culture. This in a sense relieves majority Hungarians of responsibility for accommodating the Roma. Indeed, it becomes an argument for the non-tolerance of the Roma: their cultural deficiencies must not be tolerated any longer.

This profound intolerance raises important questions about the relationship between racism and intolerance. To be sure, racism can be found in countries of immigration as well. But whilst this
Minority Mobilisations in France and the United Kingdom: the Case of Muslim Organisations

racism typically only becomes explicit on the fringes in these other countries (claimed by the radical right or voiced on extremist websites), the Hungarian case shows how racism has gone mainstream in Hungary. The recent incidents we have examined in Hungary have been unscrupulously used to legitimate racism in ways that greatly expands the scope of intolerance.

**Keywords**

Radical right, media discourse, racism, political correctness, Roma
Executive Summary

This report examines the extent to which cultural and religious minorities participate as equals in Irish public, institutional and political life, and examines the avenues and obstacles to their participation, in order to explore the meaning of tolerance and tolerance-related concepts in Ireland and their embodiment in practice.

This issue arises in an Ireland whose population, despite the economic downturn, has continued to increase in numbers and diversity in the first decade of the twenty first century.

Political institutions in Ireland facilitate the inclusion of cultural and religious minorities in certain respects. Non-citizens are not excluded from employment in the public service or in specific occupations. While political rights in national elections are confined to Irish (and British citizens), Ireland has granted political rights to vote and stand in local elections to those resident for a minimum of six months, and has thus one of the more inclusive voting systems in the EU.

The opportunity to stand for local elections has been taken up by a number of candidates from minority groups; some of these have been successful and in some cases have achieved considerable media notice. Political parties, however, were slow to recognise immigrants until the 2007 local elections, when most put up immigrant candidates. Immigrants have been relatively slow to mobilise and to register to vote. Aside from conventional electoral politics, migrant communities have also engaged in active participation and representation through the development of a variety of community structures and networks.

Access to citizenship, a significant benchmark of inclusion in society and political life, may be seen (again in comparative European terms) as relatively inclusive in principle. Resident non-nationals can acquire citizenship after five years of residence, but with a number of other conditions. In addition, there is complete Ministerial discretion to award or reject applications. For many years, the numbers of those naturalising were very low, due to small number of applications, slow processing and a rather restrictive approach. In recent years this has changed considerably. Increasing numbers are naturalising, and the process has been speeded up, though the numbers refused are still high, and there is no process of appeal.

Issues of recognition for cultural and religious groups have arisen most notably in connection with the claim by the Traveller community to be recognised as an ethnic group. This has been supported by the Equality Authority and the United Nations Periodic Review on Human Rights group, but has been resisted by successive governments. With respect to other areas of recognition, Ireland has not signed the European Convention of Nationality nor the Convention on Minority Languages.

Migrant inclusion is favoured by the Equality Act, which forbids discrimination on nine grounds, including race and religion, by a series of government anti-racism campaigns, and by the institution of a Minister for Integration, from 2007 to 2011. The office of the minister was intended to co-ordinate policy with respect to migrants across government departments. This has now been replaced by a co-ordinating office without a dedicated Minister of State. A consultative Ministerial Council with appointed migrant minority representatives, which was set up in 2010, has been discontinued. These shifts may, along with shifts identified in official language, constitute a wider trend to interpreting integration in a more assimilationist way.

Ireland has not seen the emergence of any real right-wing, anti-immigrant party, or any significant campaign against immigrants. Nor has there been a strong emphasis on security concerns in connection with immigrants. At the same time there is evidence of a significant underlying level of
racial discrimination, and of intolerant and racist discourses, including by political and media figures. It is not clear whether instances of racially motivated violence have increased in frequency or seriousness or whether they are being better documented, and it is clear that only a percentage of these is reported.

In order to explore in more depth and details the meaning of the three levels of acceptance: intolerance – toleration – respect/recognition, in political and public life, and how they manifest themselves, this report focuses on a case study of a recent challenge relating to religious and cultural diversity in Irish public institutions - the controversy that emerged in 2007 when a member of the Sikh community applied for membership of the Garda (Police) Reserve.

While still small in numbers, the Sikh community is quite visible. After 9/11, Sikh men in Ireland became more liable to encounter prejudice and racism because of their turban and beard, which led some to equate Sikhs with followers of militant Islam. It is a significant part of the Sikh tradition to serve in the military and police forces. As the part-time Garda Reserve was being set up, a Sikh applicant, who had taken part in the training process, was informed just before being commissioned that he would not be allowed to wear his turban with the uniform. The man refused to accept this, and did not take up his post. The issue sparked a significant media and political debate, in which journalists, politicians, NGOS and others took a wide variety of positions. The case was referred to the Equality Authority, which is still considering it.

Our analysis of this case is based on desk research and empirical fieldwork, consisting of semi-structured qualitative interviews with representatives of the Sikh community in Ireland, former and current politicians, representatives from NGOs working with migrants, migrant candidates, as well as a discussion group. Combining data gathered through the desk research and the empirical study, we employ a critical discourse analysis to highlight and discuss the main argumentation strategies evidenced in the controversy. We interpret this as a case of official non-toleration of a practice, and non-accommodation of a primarily religious (though also cultural), new immigrant minority in the public service.

Three main discursive topoi were identified in the turban debate.

The first, ‘this is a uniform’ topos, encompasses arguments addressing the most basic, obvious and ostensibly rational arguments advanced: the very definition, justification and meaning of ‘a uniform’. The Gardai emphasised that the uniform represented the impartiality of the force, claimed to treat all religions equally, and drew attention to their concurrent intercultural policies. The opponents of the ban questioned the possibility or desirability of homogeneity, and the implied secularity of the Irish state - and of the police force in particular, pointing to the acceptance of Catholic practices, and argued for the equal recognition of all religions within the police force. The argument that the uniform requirement was specifically important for a police force was countered by pointing to its acceptance in police forces in other countries, including Canada, England, and notably, Northern Ireland.

The second topos – ‘discrimination and rights’ encompassed arguments that the uniform argument covered up more contentious issues, and that the decision in fact amounted to religious, if not racial, discrimination. This was denied by the Gardai, who pointed that they accepted the Sikh reserve on condition that he wear the uniform hat. It was also claimed that the ban was contrary to the equivalence of rights under the Good Friday Agreement and to the country’s own National Plan against Racism and Migration Nation policies, which called for the reasonable accommodation of diversity.

The third topos identified was the ‘This is Ireland – how far do we have to go to accommodate?’ This encompasses arguments dealing with the recognition of and support for diversity in Irish society, as the issue of the turban developed into a broader reflection on the perception and accommodation of religious and cultural minorities in Ireland and on the nature of Irish interculturalism. Arguments were advanced that newcomers have to recognize the Irish way of doing things, perhaps reflecting a certain
sense of threat to the cultural character of a small country from the novelty and difference brought by immigrants. Others emphasized the difficulties, including segregation, experienced by countries seen as having pursued strong multicultural policies. In response arguments were advanced that integration is a two-way process, and criticisms of the slow pace and limits of accommodation and engagement with new minorities, even in view of the adoption of an ostensibly interculturalist approach.

This case provides an interesting contrast to the controversy over the wearing of the hijab in Irish schools, which concluded with broad acceptance, where the hijab could be incorporated into the uniform. The contrast may indicate the limits or selectivity of toleration and accommodation in Ireland.

In interpreting the Sikh turban case in terms of the spectrum of non-toleration, toleration, respect/recognition, the ban may initially be understood as exemplifying the limits of recognition or accommodation of diversity in Ireland, in not adjusting a policy which creates an obstacle to full participation of a minority in public institutions. It may be argued, however, that it also involves the border between toleration and non-toleration. To the extent that the turban is a non-negotiable aspect of the Sikh faith, and banning it thus effectively prevents any Sikh from joining the police force, the ban constitutes a policy of exclusion, limiting the rights and career options not only of ‘new migrants’ but also of their Irish-born children. It thus represents a case of non-toleration of the practice, and non-accommodation of religious/cultural diversity in the public service in Ireland.

**Keywords**

Toleration, Sikhs, turban, police, political participation, interculturalism, accommodation, integration
Local policies of exclusion: the Italian case

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Executive Summary

This paper deals with those local policies which have been introduced in the last few years to guarantee urban safety, regulate economic activities, adjust the measures of the welfare state, etc. The aim of these local policies was apparently to protect general interests (e.g. urban standards, compromised by the presence of annoying beggars), and to suppress any behaviour that was considered annoying, indecent or ill-mannered. Nevertheless, many of these have limited immigrants’ rights indirectly or directly and favoured their exclusion. We will call them “local policies of exclusion”.

Before going deeply into the issue, the paper discusses the Italian context as regards the political participation and representation of migrants. Migrants currently have few political rights in Italy. The citizenship law is the most restrictive in EU15: it is based on ius sanguinis and states that citizenship can be obtained after 10 years residence for non EU nationals and after 4 years for EU nationals. Besides that, the various immigration laws introduced from the ’90s until today have not dealt with the political participation and representation of migrants and they have not provided legislative changes in order to introduce political rights for migrants (even at local level). These restrictions and the unwillingness to change the law depend partly on the political climate: the issues of security and control were central in the political programmes of the right-wing coalition (especially of the Northern League party) and influenced its victory in the 2008 elections (by contrast, in the 2011 administrative elections there was a turnaround). To guarantee these issues, the right-wing coalition sustained (and still sustains) the necessity to combat the illegal flow of migrants, fight against crime and repress public disorder, defend local cultural identities, give priority to Italian citizens in accessing welfare services.

Although at national level most policies are constraining, at local level some initiatives have been promoted by a few administrations to favour the political participation of migrants. Firstly, some Regions and Municipalities modified their Statutes autonomously to give migrants the right to vote. Nevertheless, these modifications were rejected by the State Council which declared that national institutions rather than local bodies should cover the issue of voting rights. Consequently, these local administrations gave migrants the possibility to participate politically by setting up two special bodies, the Municipal Consultative Body and the Additional Foreign Council. In addition, they introduced the right to vote for non EU nationals at least in District Councils, Circuit Councils and Local Consultative Referenda. But these two solutions (the bodies and the voting rights in sub-local councils) did not resolve the issue of political participation and representation of minorities. Indeed the bodies are consultative and they have no power to legislate. Besides that, the lists of those who are eligible to vote for the bodies are incomplete. In the same way, the voting in sub-local councils was rejected by the Constitutional Court and by the State Council, which declared that the issue of voting rights to immigrants falls under the jurisdiction of the national State.

Nor do immigrant associations have political power. They have actually been built to satisfy cultural, social and religious needs. They are places where migrants meet, stay together, share cultural or religious practices, exchange information. They are usually formed by migrants of the same ethnic and/or national origins, they are locally organized and they operate only in their municipalities. Besides that, they have few relations with Italian institutions and they lack a framework of institutionalization and public support. For all these reasons they are not suitable for representing migrants politically. Consequently, migrants’ participation in the public arena generally occurs through the intermediation of Italian associations and organizations, i.e. no-profit and voluntary organizations, and trade unions. These organizations firstly offered assistance and legal protection to migrants, facilitated their regularization as residents and workers and their access to social services.
Now migrants are also enrolled in trade unions and some hold positions within them. Furthermore, in the last few years trade unions, NGOs and charity organizations have defended migrants as regards the local policies of exclusion.

The focus of this study

This study focuses on how the issues of intolerance, tolerance, respect and recognition of ethnic diversity have been thematised in Italian politics. The topic of “local policies of exclusion” is a case in point and it is a current and debated question, as these measures became fundamental in local politics in 2008 and they are still recurrent in several local administrations. An important aspect related to this issue is the introduction of the Security Package, i.e. a set of norms introduced by the Berlusconi government in 2008 and 2009, in which the cities’ mayors obtained more power: they could autonomously introduce measures in order to guarantee urban safety, without any approval at national level. So, many municipalities, mostly governed by the North League or by right-wing coalitions, began to introduce local regulations to maintain public order, guarantee urban standards, defend citizens from crime, danger, annoying or indecent behaviour. Most of these actually targeted migrants directly or indirectly, such as the ban on playing cricket in public parks or the bonus for new-born babies reserved only for Italians, the requirement of a minimum income to register in the Registry Office, etc. For this reason they provoked reactions from above and below. From above, the UNAR (National Office against racial discrimination) exercised the right to carry out checks. It intervened in the most flagrant cases of local measures which were discriminatory and it expressed its opinion and asked for the removal or the revision of such measures. From below, the advocacy coalition of pro-immigrants gave rise to protest initiatives and legal battles, often producing positive results. Of course, the introduction of these measures, the protests and the legal battles were accompanied by public and political debates, media outcry and they attracted the attention of public opinion. The aim of this study was therefore to analyze frames and discourses used by mayors, politicians, and civil society actors to talk about the issue of “local policies of exclusion”.

Data and methods

This report is based on desk research and fieldwork. In terms of desk research we collected statistical data, policy documents, judgments of courts and newspaper articles. The aim was to collect frames and discourses of the political and social actors involved in the processes regarding the local policies of exclusion. This phase started at the beginning of the research and ran in parallel to the fieldwork.

The fieldwork was conducted between October 2011 and January 2012 in the metropolitan areas of Milan and Brescia (another province in the Lombardy region, where many ordinances were introduced by small or medium size municipalities) and was based on qualitative interviews. More specifically, we conducted 15 semi-structured qualitative interviews with people from different backgrounds: 4 lawyers, 4 members of trade unions, 4 members of no-profit associations, a member of the opposition within a municipality, a Regional councillor of the Northern League Party in Lombardy and finally a city councillor of the previous administration in Milan (centre-right). Most of them were interviewed because they were directly involved in the processes regarding the local policies of exclusion, like the members of trade unions or the two lawyers who fought against them in courts. Others were contacted because they work in associations and organizations which deal with defending and representing immigrants.

The analysis of the interview data was based on the tradition of qualitative discourse analysis, and a critical perspective was used to analyze the main argumentation strategies adopted by the various actors interviewed.

Main findings
The analysis of secondary sources and of qualitative interviews highlights that the “local policies of exclusion” are “institutionalized forms of intolerance”: they are drawn up and enforced by legitimate bodies (i.e. the Municipalities), which are elected democratically and which influence social life within the local communities. They are institutional obstacles to the rights of several minorities (civil, social) and to their freedom of expressing their cultural and religious identity. Nevertheless, there are justified by mayors using three types of frames.

The first is about urban safety and decency: some local policies are justified because they guarantee citizens’ security and preserve urban decorum and social order, e.g. the controls on places of worship or checks on the conditions of houses in the city centres. The second frame is the scarcity of economic and social resources: the local policies are necessary because the social benefits have been reduced, so they have to be set aside only for Italians or for those who have been residents in the town for a long period (e.g. bonus for babies reserved only for babies born to Italian parents). Only Italian citizens have the rights to access some social and economic benefits, whereas immigrants have to be excluded because they are “guests”. Finally, the third frame is about the defence of Italian identity, culture and traditions. The prohibition on opening mosques, new kebab shops or to ban non traditional activities in the city centres is a case in point. Here the local policies are justified because they defend the Italian (and local) culture from immigrants, who are perceived as invaders. They are seen as necessary to avoid contamination and changes in Italian cities, culture and habits.

By contrast, the main frame used by civil society actors to fight against these policies is that of discrimination. These measures are in fact discriminatory. They damage fundamental human rights, such as the freedom of religion, personal freedom, equality among people, etc. Human rights must be guaranteed, and are not open to debate or subject to political discretion. This is also the frame used in courts, and it has often been cited in judgments condemning the local policies.

With regard to our conceptual framework, this study shows that the local policies of exclusion are institutionalized forms of intolerance that legitimize xenophobic attitudes and behaviours. They are in fact formulated and approved within democratic institutions, and justified because they defend citizens under three aspects: personal safety and public order, the distribution of economic and social benefits, the cultural and religious identity of the country. Besides that, they have symbolic and cultural effects: they mark the boundaries between “us” and "them", between the legitimate “owners of the land” and newcomers who expect to settle.

By contrast, civil society actors fight against the intolerance of local policies of exclusion referring not to the concepts of tolerance or respect or recognition, but to those of human rights. In their discourses the issue at stake is not that of drawing boundaries among what should/must/can/could be tolerated, respected and recognised, but of protecting people from having their basic human rights compromised.

Keywords

Immigration; political representation; local policies; exclusion; intolerance; discrimination; advocacy.
Executive Summary

The report ‘Do Silesians Exist and Silesia be Autonomous? Limits of Ethno-Political Tolerance in Poland’, presents the case of the Silesian Autonomy Movement (Ruch Autonomii Śląska, hereafter RAS), its participation in political life at a regional level, and the efforts in promoting regionalism as well as the idea of a Silesian nation. RAS is an organisation of an educational, cultural and political profile fighting for the restoration of Upper Silesia’s political autonomy on the grounds of its specific borderland status and a history of autonomy granted to Silesia in the interwar period, and supporting Silesian identity-building.

This case study was inspired by controversies around Silesians and RAS caused by The Report on the State of the Republic published by the major right-wing party Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – hereafter PIS). The document is a list of charges against the ruling party, Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform, hereafter PO). The right-wing rhetoric of the oppressed nation and the threat of Polish unity used in the report was a tool used for discrediting PO. The Report… accuses the ruling party of a lack of patriotism and of indifference to a progressing degeneration of national identity. The statement that triggered a heated country-wide debate and immediate reactions in the circles of Silesian activists (mainly RAS activists and politicians), the German minority and other minority communities is a short passage expounding a view that ‘Silesianness’ (Silesian identity) is a ‘camouflaged German option’, i.e. connecting Silesian organisations promoting autonomy and the strengthening of Silesian cultural identity with some kind of an anti-Polish ideology, without even attempting to explain this notion and casual link.

After this strictly political debate stopped, the controversies around Silesia and Silesians have brought one remarkable and unexpected outcome, i.e. a revival of interest in ‘Silesianness’, Silesians’ national existence, rights and identity. Many people in the region have apparently re-invented themselves as members of the ‘Silesian nation’.

In contrast to most other European countries, national and ethnic minorities in Poland are numerically insignificant; the result of the 2002 Census showed that, already then, Silesians were by far the largest declared minority (173 000), followed by Germans (153 000). Migrant communities are small and practically absent in political life. However, this largest declared minority group is not recognised by the state neither as a national, nor as an ethnic minority. Silesians are politically active, have their organisations and leaders, and are present in public discourses. All this makes Silesians particularly interesting in terms of the issue of the tolerance of diversity in political life.

The latest Census (carried out in 2011) confirmed the fact that Poland is, at least in comparison to many other European states, ethnically homogenous, and over 91% of the population declare Polish national identity (36 007 000). The most numerous minority identities are: Silesian (809 000), Kashubian (212 000) and German (109 000). These results confirmed previous ones, but the significant changes in the numbers surprised even Silesian activists. More than two decades after democratic change, it seems that the growing involvement of minority activists in the efforts to promote a minority identity and the increasing visibility of ‘non-traditional’ minorities’ in public life have brought astounding effects.

The case of RAS, Silesians and their political and cultural status has been constantly discussed in Polish public debates since the 1990s, often in relation to contemporary political challenges. It serves as an example of post-transformational tensions between the policy and practice of national unity and the grassroots efforts of people in some regions to change the dominant cultural schemata. In the centralised Polish state, any challenge to undermine this kind of monolithic socio-political setup, which at the same time is permeated by the image of a homogenous Polish nation, any claim to
recognise not only minority rights, but also the possibility to exercise them, is often interpreted as dangerous and as undermining nation-state integrity. Attempts at implementing constitutionally granted entitlements to cultural visibility and the execution of civic rights are perceived either as unsubstantiated and unnecessary demands of an insignificant number of people, or as a result of the overambitious goals of some activists that manipulate history and people. They are presented as presenting a threat to homogeneous society.

This case study shows, on the one hand, how the opportunities offered as a result Poland’s participation in the structures of the European Union (especially European support for regional movements and minority organisations) are actually used by local activists and minority organisations, and, on the other hand, how they are interpreted within the mainstream political debate. The attacks on RAS illustrate strong universalising tendencies and unifying themes present in the rhetoric of the nationally minded segments of the society and rightist politicians, who have used the case to weaken the ruling coalition and frequently use it as an argument against political opponents. In short, it illustrates how the issue of basic civil rights can be a hostage of political stalemate as well as how it may unveil the structural mechanisms of political life.

This report, focusing on RAS’s reception and rejection, raises issue of the limits of tolerance in political life in Poland in the sphere of the political representation of minorities, and it shows the boundary-drawing process in the political life of the country.

The report is based on secondary sources (scientific literature on Silesia and Silesians, documents, reports and expert documents on minorities and their political participation in Poland, on articles in newspapers commenting on the ‘camouflaged German option’ controversy), as well as primary data (interviews) concerning the political activity of RAS. The secondary sources are to a large extent Internet sources – web sites, forums and comments. The interviews were conducted in January and February 2012. Four semi-structured, very long (2 hours each) qualitative interviews with RAS leaders and members in the two main cities of Silesia – Katowice and Opole – were conducted. In the interpretation of the materials the method of thematic analysis was applied.

The analysis attempts to answer the questions about the limits of ethno-political tolerance in Poland: (1) What kind of groups and claims can be tolerated in political life? (2) On what terms can these groups express their difference and fight for their civic rights? (3) And, what cannot be tolerated in public/political life in Poland? In the course of the so-called thematic analysis we identify three major themes and apply discursive means by which we try to answer these three questions.

The analysis revealed that there is a limited access of minorities to public debates and their political participation is restricted; it demonstrates a general lack of support extended to minorities in their efforts to participate in public life as equal partners (e.g., the accusation that RAS abuses preferential democratic rules designed to promote actual ethnic minorities, such as Germans). This situation can be classified as a lack of acceptance and recognition of the minorities in the political sphere. This applies both to the marginalisation of recognised minorities (there is a formal possibility of participation in political life), and the paradox of Silesians – the largest, unrecognised minority accused of the treason of Polishness.

There is a lack of tolerance at the state level and a partial tolerance at the local level towards the identity-based activity of Silesians and its political manifestations. However, the support for RAS in the region is relatively narrow, which support our thesis from our previous studies (Buchowski and Chlewnińska 2010; 2011) that Polish society conceives itself as a homogeneous ethnic entity, a unified and integral nation. Public discourse favours patriotic and national perspectives and there is no room for the equal participation of minorities in public life, or, at least, any leeway is constricted for them and it is defined by the dominant majority.

However, all this does not mean that there is no hope for change in this area. Due to their growing effectiveness, modern activity strategies applied by RAS are emulated by other political forces in the region and elsewhere. Silesians are increasingly regarded as a social force that cannot be longer
ignored; for instance, RAS activists participate in the ruling coalition at the regional level and Silesians’ representatives got invited to the parliamentary committee on minorities, which indicates a change in the politicians’ approach to the phenomenon of ‘Silesianness’). It may happen that the Silesians will pluralise Polish political life without necessarily achieving their own goals.

**Keywords**

Silesia, Silesian Autonomy Movement, tolerance in political life, unrecognised minority
Acceptance or Lack of Tolerance towards Minorities in Romanian Public Administration

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Executive Summary

On the occasion of the Hungarian Revolution Day on March 15 2010, Mr. Barna performed a public show in the streets, which portrayed Avram Iancu on trial and later sentenced to death for crimes against the Hungarians during the 1848 Revolution. Csibi Barna’s protest, an ethnic Hungarian, Romanian civil servant and keen promoter of a Hungarian ethnic autonomous region Szekler Land who hanged a doll representing a Romanian national hero, was a test of tolerance for the society and a challenge for the Romanian political elite and the relevant public institutions. This event, with its many implications and developments, is a tolerance boundary conflict case between the majority and the minority. While the Hungarian minority, unaccustomed to its minority status, intends to move the tolerance border by requesting a new public status through the recognition of collective rights, for the majority of ethnic Romanians, the limit is much lower. The majority is intolerant when it comes to the institutionalization of any ethnic differences, which would require the public presence of ethnic diversity (Robotin, 2002). Through the Romanian media, political representatives and state institutions, the majority asks the minority to display a civic loyalty beyond the formal-legal obligations, and expresses its intolerance towards what it considers to be the lack of loyalty toward the Romanian state, through its national symbols.

The case of Csibi Barna proves the paradoxical situation of Romania, where a strong legislative and institutional framework against discrimination does exist, but without any substantial effect because of the intolerance towards the other community’s views and interpretation of historical events, which in turn are used to justify the current political designs. As Mungiu-Pippidi argued (1999) the two groups have separate and opposite views of entitlement, grounded in different interpretations of history. Despite the strong centralization of the Romanian school curricula, the two groups are socialized into two antagonistic versions of history. Amplified by the political entrepreneurs, this leads to an environment of intolerance and distrust manifested on every occasion.

Keywords

Csibi Barna, Romanian-Hungarian relationship, dual loyalty, mythological blockage, authonomy for Szekler Land, regionalization, tolerance, recognition
**Executive Summary**

Spain has become the first country of immigration in Europe and has received more than 4 million immigrants since 2000. But unlike other European countries, no important extreme-right party in terms of electoral results has existed in the country since the re-establishment of a democratic regime at the end of the 1970s. In addition Spanish policy toward immigrants settled in the country is said to be fairly progressive, in particular because of the usefulness of migrants for Spanish economy and welfare system. But the financial crisis experienced by the country since 2008 is setting up a new deal for how Spanish politics is managing migration issues and cultural diversity. This new situation deserves to be examined from the angle of political discourses. During the two last years, coinciding with the economic crisis in Spain and several electoral campaigns, anti-immigrant and intolerant political discourse in relation with migration have been at the forefront of public discourses. Intolerant statements have attracted differently media and public attention. While some have been almost ignored by media and other political actors, others have attracted a huge public and media attention and created important controversies. How to deal with the rise of non-toleration is undoubtedly one of the main challenges that face Spanish politics for the years coming.

**Case study**

The study focuses on Catalonia due to its particular position within Spain. Catalonia is the first autonomous community to have experienced important immigration flows, especially since the late nineties. It is still one of the autonomous communities with the main proportion of resident foreigners (15.7%) and the second community regarding the proportion of non-communitarian foreigners (11.7%). The Catalan policy toward migrants has always been considered as the most integrative policy in Spain and a model of acceptance at European level. The Catalan administration and its policies have always emphasised the acceptance of migrants, especially by recognizing equal rights between nationals and immigrants and pressing the Spanish State for a more inclusive policy and the empowerment of autonomous communities. It also succeeded in articulating the definition of the Catalan citizenship to the reception of non-Catalan people (foreigners or Spanish) in a civic-inclusive way and not in an ethnic-exclusive way. In December 2008, the parliamentary groups, except Popular party, signed the National Agreement on immigration, which reaffirms their commitment for building inclusion along three lines: “Management of migratory flows and access to the job market”, “Adapting public services to a diverse society” and “Integration in a common public culture”. But, despite its fairly progressive and comprehensive policy toward migrants, Catalonia has also experienced several important local controversies about migration in the last years. The report focuses on three of these controversies which serve as an entry to understand the discursive repertoires of intolerance toward migrants and also to understand the context in which these discourses are put forward. The three controversies are:

- The local exclusion from city census and basic welfare of undocumented immigrants in the city of Vic: In January 2010, the city council of Vic (Barcelona province, pop. 40,000) voted the ban of unauthorized migrants from the city census (padrón), which is the only way for them to access public welfare provisions and services (health, education, social services...). In Spain, this registration is a right and a duty no matter the administrative situation. The ban has raised an important debate in Spain about the right of municipalities to do so and about the possibility for undocumented immigrants to access basic rights.

- The “anti-Roma campaign” in the city of Badalona: Candidates of the Popular Party to May 2011 municipal elections have put the anti-immigrant rhetoric at the centre of their campaign. This was particularly the case in the city of Badalona (pop. 215,000), a close suburb of Barcelona, in which the
candidate and actual mayor of the town has based his campaign on targeting the Romanian Roma who have settled in the town for bringing insecurity, crime and incivility.

- The “burqa” ban proposals in the city of Lleida and across Catalonia: In 2010, several towns of Catalonia decided to vote proposals banning the wearing of religious veils covering the face, such as burqa and niqab, in public buildings. The first and most publicized case has been the one of the provincial capital of Lleida (pop. 131,000), ruled by the socialist party, and which ban has raised contention across the country. In this case, the contention was whether the ban proposals were stigmatizing migrants or, conversely, decisions enlightened by human rights values and ensuring security.

In addition, the absence of an electorate for far-right political parties in Spain is currently challenged in Catalonia, where a new far-right political party named the Platform for Catalonia (PxC), averse to migration and, above all, to resident Muslims, has been created in 2002. Although its electoral scores are still very weak in comparison with other European countries (2.4% voters at Catalan level), its audience is growing fast from an election to the next.

Catalonia thus undoubtedly appears as a “laboratory” for Spanish politics concerning issues related to cultural diversity.

Method

This report draws on a qualitative research methodology to study political discourses and policies which express intolerance toward migration and cultural diversity. The methodology chosen to research on this challenge combines a content analysis of secondary sources and semi-structured qualitative interviews.

Evidences from other scholars who demonstrated the non explicit and ambiguous presence of racism and prejudices in elite's public discourses have oriented the research towards the study of discourses accompanying policies and interviews rather than party manifestos or public texts which are much more controlled by the “political correctness” when it comes to migration and diversity issues. We also chose to examine altogether political discourses, policies and practices. What is the discourse accompanying the policy? Are all the policy-makers and representatives producing the same discourse on the topic? Is this discourse changing along the controversy which occurred? What are the counter-discourses and who is producing them? Focusing on controversies and policies and not only on explicit anti-immigrant discourse of far-right parties enables to emphasize the plurality of actors and topics involved.

The desk research has been conducted between September and November 2011 and consisted mainly in collecting secondary sources. Newspapers materials have been collected on the three cases studied for the period between January 2010 and June 2011 (end of municipal elections) in seven Spanish (3) and Catalan (4) newspapers. The second part of the desk research consisted in the collection and analysis of administrative, policy and civil society documents. We examined in particular: the minutes of the city councils of the case studies and Catalan parliament during the controversies, public positions of civil society organisations and public reports.

15 semi-structured interviews were carried out between November and December 2011 with relevant actors who had taken part in one or more of the three controversies (10) and leaders of the main Catalan political parties (ICV, ERC, PSC, CiU and PP). The list of interviews and interview guide are provided in appendix.

Main Findings

The report focuses on two dimensions of intolerance embedded in political discourses on migration. Firstly, it focuses on the framing of the political discourses, especially during the three controversies studied. Secondly, it focuses on the role of political parties in the regulation of the discourse in Catalonia.
Framing processes offer a great resource to analyse the political discourses on migrants and cultural diversity in Catalonia. We have identified different modalities of what we call “intolerance” frames, defined as emphasizing the impossibility to maintain a tolerant attitude toward migrants (or particular groups of migrants) and the need to preserve the local society and its cohesion above the acceptance of migrants’ values, practices or accommodation. Intolerance is only one of the way in which migration and cultural diversity can be framed but we assume that this frame has been more and more present in public discourses since the economic crisis.

Each of the three local controversies appeals to different framing processes on the challenge which was supposedly faced by political representatives, each one being perceived as important for Catalan politics. Three principal “intolerance” frames are identified in the report.

1) Intolerance based on the perception of migration as bringing insecurity, delinquency and problems of coexistence.

2) Intolerance based on the definitions of migration as a threat for the cultural homogeneity of Catalonia and its fundamental values.

3) Intolerance based on a perception of migrants as competitors with locals for limited resources.

Through all these “intolerance” frames, migration is perceived as undermining the social cohesion and norms of civility that are attached to the local society. In the terms of non-toleration, the ones who are perceived as “others” then have to merge in the local society (if possible) or be excluded from it so as to preserve cohesion.

In the political landscape of Catalonia, two different discourses claim to halt the toleration that has been implemented so far toward migrants. They both start from considering that migration and cultural diversity come along with problems posed to the social cohesion, and cannot be only perceived as positive for the society. But while some express non-toleration to practices and values of migrants they deem problematic, the discourse of others go beyond non-toleration to express exclusion, rejection or hate toward (groups of) migrants or religious minorities (Muslims) per se.

The case studies show that non-toleration toward migrants is increasingly expressed by representatives of mainstream parties. Anti-immigrant statements would be a manner to test the limits of what can be said or not about migration in Catalan politics. Emerging political discourses stretch the limits of intolerance toward migrants. The second part of the analysis then focuses on party politics to provide elements which help understanding the rise of intolerance. Unlike other countries the influence of the radical-right remains limited and the demand for tough discourse and policy on immigration is ambiguous. However, the succession of electoral campaigns during the years 2010-2011 in Catalonia, in combination with the financial crisis, has undoubtedly created opportunities for a change of discourse toward migrants. The relative novelty of international migration and the rather tolerant discourse about the “usefulness” of migrants which prevailed during the years 2004-2008, are challenged now by the raise of intolerance frames. The most interesting feature of this situation is the laissez-faire policy and the trivialisation of the issue done by the political and administrative leaders.

We thus shift our attention toward the organisational dynamics of political parties that could influence the way in which the issue is framed. Firstly, the presence of racism in Catalan politics is discarded by political leaders who understand intolerance as an electioneering strategy. The trivialization of intolerance and racism then explains in part the laissez-faire policy. Secondly, the organisation of parties as stratcharchies, with an important autonomy within the party of local and Catalan levels, explains also the lack of mobilisation and sanctions against the representatives who express intolerance even if it goes against party’s ideology.

This demonstrates the importance of the context and of partisan dynamics when it comes to understanding the use of intolerance frames in the political life. In Catalonia, we understand that intolerance toward migrants expressed by mainstream political leaders and representatives is allowed
by the party as far as it does not undermine its core values or challenge its position within party competition. Frames must be coherent to the belief system and experience of the people who is mobilized but also to some extent, to the ideological system of the political party or leader. Denial of racism and the reference to the autonomy of representatives enables in our view the preservation of the position of the party, while testing at the same time the impact of a new discourse on migration. The attitude of laissez-faire also serves other purposes for all stakeholders: it appears as a strategy to marginalize these discourses by not letting them receive media coverage and it serves also to preserve the representation of Catalonia as a welcoming and tolerant territory. And indeed, expressions of intolerance tend to change the meaning of Catalan citizenship and notably make it pass from a civic-inclusive definition to a cultural-exclusive one. The backlash against multiculturalism is located around the question of civic behaviours and values that sustain citizenship in Catalonia. This takes the opposite view of the central political concept of “convivencia” (life together), which has been used in integration policies to stress the positive effect of the social plurality and of the coexistence of diverse cultures or religions.

The report ends by addressing two challenges on the path of the fight of intolerance and racism in the political life. Firstly, the tension between freedom of speech and the fight against hate speech and racism, which points toward judicial solutions. Secondly, the tension between laissez-faire attitudes and the institutionalization of anti-racism, which points toward the regulation of political discourses.

Keywords

Intolerance; migrants; diversity; political discourses; party politics; radical right; Catalonia.
The Swedish Sámi Parliament: A Challenged Recognition?
Ulf Mörkenstam, Andreas Gottardis and Hans Ingvar Roth, Stockholm University

Executive Summary

When the new Instrument of Government was adopted by the Swedish Parliament in 2010, the special status of the Swedish Sámi people was recognised constitutionally for the first time. Already in 1993, however, the popularly elected Swedish Sámi Parliament (Sametinget) was established in order to grant the Sámi people cultural autonomy, and today the parliament is considered to be the main body to ensure Sámi self-determination. In many ways, the situation and status of the Sámi people can be said to be highly acknowledged and recognized in Sweden, where the political representation of the Sámi is institutionalised in and through the Sámi Parliament. This recognition of the Sámi people appears, however, to be challenged or undermined by different forms of discrimination and intolerance. There have, for instance, been several conflicts during the last few years on the right to use land and water for the maintenance of Sámi reindeer on private property, and there have been severe conflicts on the construction of wind power parks in traditional reindeer grazing areas. In its observations concerning how Sweden fulfils the conventions concerning the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, the UN is regularly voicing concerns over these kind of issues, for instance, regarding the fact that the issue of ownership of land and water still has not been investigated, and over the Swedish Government’s passivity in regards to clarifying the borders for the reindeer grazing area. Moreover, according to a report from the Swedish Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination, the Sámi testifies to harassment in their day-to-day lives connected to their ethnic background. In spite of the demonstration of acceptance on a national and constitutional level, an intolerant and stereotypical understanding of the Sámi people thus seem to prevail.

In this case study we investigate this potential coexistence of recognition and intolerance in the Swedish society. Our focus is the Swedish Sámi Parliament, as it represents the most radical institutionalized form of recognition of the Sámi people (and of any national minority in Sweden). The status of the parliament is as an administrative authority under the Swedish Government. However, it is a popularly elected administrative authority and the parliament is assigned two different functions: as an administrative authority whose tasks are strictly regulated by law and as a popularly elected parliament representing the Sámi people. With the status as an administrative authority, the parliament is not granted any actual political power, such as a right of participation in decision-making, veto-rights concerning administrative decisions or independent sources of income (like taxation rights). In 2010 the Sámi Parliament was allocated a total amount of 185 146 000 SEK (around 19 405 000 EUR), where all grants were directed towards its role as an administrative authority.

By looking at the media coverage of the Swedish Sámi Parliament since its inauguration in 1993, we analyse how the parliament is conceptualised within the media discourse. We analysed the media coverage of the Sámi Parliament in eight national and local daily newspapers during the years 2005, 2009-2011, there are no local or regional newspapers in Sámi in Sweden. We also analysed articles from the election years 1993, 1997, and 2001 (two elections) ten days before and ten days after the elections, and we started out by an analysis of the headlines of all the articles published in three non-election years (1994, 2000, and 2011). Is the Sámi right to cultural autonomy or self-determination widely accepted in the Swedish society as portrayed by the media? Or is this institutional accommodation of the Sámi people challenged by a widespread intolerance? If so, what might the consequences of this intolerance be for the political representation of the Sámi?

Our headline analysis clearly showed that the media discourse on the Sámi Parliament is characterized by a very limited set of topics out of which the political instability and the administrative performance of the parliament were most prominent. This is not too surprising as these topics obviously spring out of the dual role of the parliament as both representative body of the Sámi people and as an administrative authority under the Swedish government. More interesting, however, is that these topics
tend to be conceptualised as major problems and represented in a negatively biased way, as is often the case in news reporting on ethnic minorities. Headlines that refer to what can be considered as the normal activity of the parliament, like “the Sámi Parliament adopted the budget proposal”, are rather uncommon; instead, most of the examined headlines tend to focus on negative attributes such as, “‘pure Balkan war in the Sámi Parliament’—a negotiator sort out the chaos”.

When we turned our attention to the more comprehensive analysis of the Swedish press and its coverage of the Sámi Parliament, our focus was on how the problem of the parliament’s political instability and weak administrative performance was explained in and by the media. What kind of problem was the parliament represented to be? What news representations were produced and reproduced within the media discourse? What was taken for granted and thus not critically examined?

The political instability of the parliament was basically explained in two different ways within discourse. In the first, the problem is considered to be external to the Sámi Parliament, as it is the institutional design of the parliament that hampers its representative capacity and constrains the political parties and the MPs. In the second way to explain the limited representative capacity, the problem is considered to be internal to the parliament. In this view the problem is typically represented to be a result of a persistent and unsolvable conflict between the political parties, a firm unwillingness to compromise or a personal antagonism between the MPs. The first way to explain the limited representative capacity of the Sámi Parliament is, however, marginal within the media discourse. It is the internal explanation that dominates, and it is important to point out that the order of discourse remains more or less unchanged during the period of our study. Our ambition is not to discuss or evaluate the accuracy of the different ways of explaining the problem. However, the implications of the different explanations are extremely severe. If the problem is external, the blame for the defects of the parliament is basically to be put on the Swedish state; it is primarily the design of the parliament that ought to be in focus of the discussion and, in a wider perspective, Swedish Sámi policy at large. But if the problem is considered to be internal—a conception of the parliament that dominates the media discourse—the blame is to be put on the Sámi themselves. In this perspective, the discussions tend to focus on the political parties and the individual MPs as elected representatives rather than the institutional prerequisites for their actual work.

As in the case of the depiction of the representative capacity of the Sámi Parliament, the explanation of the weak administrative performance of the Sámi Parliament, we discerned two general explanations regarding the causes of this problem. Within the terms of the dominant discourse, the weak performance was assumed to result from individual incompetence of the MPs or the functionaries, immature behaviour or a not fully developed organisation and a further explanation could be strong and deeply engrained internal divisions between the subgroups of the Sámi population. The weak performance is thus explained by internal flaws. The alternative explanation to this problem is once again explained in terms of the institutional design of the parliament, i.e. external factors. The conclusion is thus similar to the analysis of the other problematic topic within the media discourse: if the problem is formulated as an internal problem, the Sámi officials are the ones to blame for the defects of the parliament.

If we return to our research questions it appears as if the recognition of the Sámi as an indigenous people is widely accepted in the news representations of the Sámi Parliament, and the parliament in itself and the Sámi right to self-determination are not explicitly challenged. In the media discourse, however, a consensus can be found on the limited capacity of the Sámi Parliament to function as a representative body of the Sámi people and on its weak administrative performance, which—if true—must be considered to be a serious problem. On the one hand, the massive critique formulated in the media discourse could be seen as legitimate and a fulfilment of one of the major tasks of the media: to critically scrutinise political power. From this point of view a malfunctioning Sámi Parliament ought rightfully to be criticised, just like any other publicly elected body in Sweden (or elsewhere), and the elected MPs have to take their responsibility. Furthermore, the media discourse might be interpreted as mainly, or at least partly, reflecting an internal Sámi debate, not the attitudes of the dominant Swedish
society, as the articles often refer to or quote Sámi MPs and civil servants. However, the internal Sámi debate is much more complex than what is usually represented in the media. Earlier research also confirms that the Sámi MPs are worried about the how the parliament works in both its roles, but a fundamental problem according to them is the unsolved question of how the Sámi right to self-determination ought to be interpreted and what it would mean in the day-to-day life of the Sámi Parliament.

On the other hand, this one-sided news representation is problematic, and has consequences for the political representation of the Sámi, especially in a context where the right to self-determination—what it means and ought to mean—is negotiated and re-negotiated in political practice. Media discourse has both direct and indirect consequences for the political representation of the Sámi, delimiting their recognised right to self-determination. Directly, it affects the construction of a Sámi public sphere, indispensable for the parliament to function in its role a representative body. The news reporting is limited in scope as it, as we have seen, privileges reporting on internal conflicts and individual behaviour and tend to neglect or ignore fundamental political problems of the Sámi people, thus it contributes to a de-politicisation of Sámi politics. Furthermore, it contributes to a conception of the parliament as problematic and dysfunctional, thereby undermining the potential level of trust of its constituency. Indirectly, the emphasis on the democratic and administrative immaturity of the Sámi parliament reproduces stereotypical images of the Sámi as unable to handle their own affairs, thus framing the problem in a specific way. And if we believe that the way a problem is framed affect the way that this issue is dealt with politically, then the range of possible political options is seriously limited by the way the Sámi Parliament is conceptualised in media discourse. If it is the Sámi Parliament (and the Sámi politicians) in itself that is the problem, and not the Swedish Sámi policy or the relation between the dominant majority society and the Sámi minority, political proposals trying to increase Sámi self-determination in accordance with the UN Declaration will, for instance, easily be rejected within discourse.

Our analysis clearly shows that the recognition of the Sámi people on an institutional level—the right to self-determination as institutionalised in and through the Sámi Parliament—is hampered by the way the media represents the Sámi Parliament. The practice of toleration in the media discourse seems to reach a limit when the Sámi claims equal public and political status in capacity of being an indigenous people. By neglecting the relation between the Sámi people and the dominant Swedish society in news representations, i.e. the right to self-determination, it is obvious that the Swedish State still is considered to be the sole legitimate authority with exclusive “discretion over the values that justify and limit toleration”. The practice of toleration as it is expressed in the media is thus based on domination and disrespect, not on recognition and respect. In that way, the media discourse could be characterised in terms of a limited or very limited tolerance.

**Keywords**

Indigenous rights, political representation, Swedish Sámi Parliament, discourse analysis, news representation, media
Contested policies of exclusion in The Netherlands: The lamentable asylum cases of Sahar and Mauro

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Executive Summary

A large percentage of Dutch voters believe that immigration should be curbed to a minimum and Dutch immigration and asylum policy now have a reputation as among the strictest in Europe. But there is also protest: against the unfair treatment of asylum seekers during their asylum application, against (rejected) asylum seekers being excluded from basic social rights, against the bad circumstances of alien detention, and many people worry about the situation of children without legal status. There is also highly mediatized public protest on behalf of individuals who are at risk to be expelled and who are said to be “well integrated”.

This is a case study on contestation and protest against Dutch asylum policy. We are interested in the reasons and arguments used by the protesters, the way they draw on concepts such as tolerance, toleration and basic respect, and the consequences of these protests for Dutch asylum and expulsion policy. We decided the cases of Sahar and Mauro should be two focus points of the study. These were two young end-of-line asylum seekers who were to be expelled and who became the centre of public and political debates in 2010 and 2011.

The research aims to answer the following main question: How do different actors resist (aspects of) the execution of asylum policy, what argumentations do they articulate in relation to concepts such as tolerance and respect?

Results

Six main groups of protesters could be identified: 1. Political organisations, politicians, policy makers and bureaucrats. 2. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) for migrants. 3. NGOs involved with human rights or asylum law. 4. Religious and humanistic NGOs involved with charity. 5. Academics specialized in human rights, migration and/or asylum. 6. Media and journalists.

Five main aspects of policies for (rejected) asylum seekers are contested:

1. False rejection and unfair asylum admission procedures
2. Homelessness and refusal of housing/ social security
3. Detention, circumstances of detention and criminalization
4. Expulsion (protests related to dangerous circumstances in country of origin and inhumane treatment during expulsion)
5. The uprooting of children, and (too) limited use of discretionary abilities for individual cases

The report shows how the debate about rejected asylum seekers constantly circles around two central questions: First: should the asylum seeker be qualified as a “victim” or an “intruder”? Second, is the government responsible for providing assistance? The different combinations of answers that are given to these questions are used to legitimize the steps that need to be taken for individuals and groups, for example, whether a residence status should be given, or emergency shelter provided (see table A).

Protest movements tend to argue in various ways that asylum seekers should be regarded as “victims”, not as an “intruders”, and that there is an obligation for the Dutch state to provide assistance. The varying ways in which these arguments are being developed in relation to broader narratives, representations and normative positions can be mapped out by distinguishing four discourses. These are:
1 Asylum authenticity discourse. In this discourse the leading question is how to know whether or not the asylum demand has been authentic (but falsely rejected).

2. Global injustice discourse. In this discourse, economic refugees are recognized as victims of poverty. Those who make use of this discourse demand more solidarity and more open borders.

3. The duty of care discourse. In this discourse the (local) government is said to have a duty to prevent homelessness and destitution among rejected asylum seekers, especially for vulnerable groups like children, ill people and the elderly.

4. Accomplished cultural inclusion discourse. This discourse draws on ideas about “cultural citizenship” to present the rejected asylum seeker who has become connected to the (people in the) Netherlands as a victim of the length of Dutch procedures.

Seen in this light different discursive strategies are available. The protest movement is drawing on these four different discourses to establish categorization of an asylum seeker as “victim”. If one discourse fails to categorize an asylum seeker as victim, another discourse can be used in which this is possible. Such re-framing is visible in our two case studies on Mauro and Sahar. The 13-year old Afghan girl Sahar, who feared expulsion with her family, was successfully re-categorized as a victim, because she was considered too Westernised to be expelled to Afghanistan. Because the frame “sending her into the burqa” was initialised by the Socialist Party, the objections of Wilders’ anti-Islam PVV party were refuted and she was considered an authentic refugee in hindsight. Contrarily, Mauro, an 18-year old Angolan boy who wished to be with his Dutch foster family, was insufficiently re-framed as a victim, because he was also framed as an imposter who still had connections in Angola and because fears of a honeypot effect could not be countered (see table B)

Recommendations for policy makers and researchers:

• Awareness that the asylum debate draws on different discourses and several ways to determine whether a person is a “victim” or not, and that these categorizations exceed one-dimensional asylum and refugee definitions.

• Becoming frame-sensitive will improve communication between policy makers, politicians and protest movement. This requires an understanding of different perspectives in the debate

• More realism and pragmatism is necessary in policies for undocumented migrants who are reluctant or unable to return.

Method

In order to answer these questions, a qualitative research method was used. Three main sources were analyzed. The first source consisted of interviews with thirteen experts, policy executioners and representatives of the protest movement. A second source included policy documents and political debates, motions and reports. A third source consisted of various newspapers which described aspects of the asylum policy. The mediatized, lamentable cases which we examined in particular were that of Sahar Hbrahim Gul and Mauro Manuel in 2010 and 2011. Legal procedures (trials and court cases) and violent protests and extremist activism were excluded from the research.
Minority Mobilisations in France and the United Kingdom: the Case of Muslim Organisations

The ‘Muslim Vote’ in 2010. Misrecognition and Political Agency
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Executive Summary

Immigrants to the United Kingdom, coming predominantly from Commonwealth countries, benefited from significant political rights upon arrival. As was to be expected, political participation was generally not among the highest priorities for newcomers. Institutional obstacles and widespread racism meant that official channels into mainstream politics were barred. Beginning in the 1950s, initial mobilizations on an ethnic minority-basis occurred largely in response to local experiences of racial discrimination. The current competition among the three mainstream parties, Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, for ethnic minority votes is a comparatively new phenomenon, as the Labour Party was historically the main access route for post-immigration groups into British politics.

Despite new attention to ethnic minority voters as a result of electoral competition, there are a number of obstacles that remain in the way of equitable representation and access into politics. Political agency that highlights ethno-religious identities, for example, tends to be conceived as particularist, divisive or sectarian. The implication often was, and to a lesser extent still is, that in order to be representative, such as to embody a Labour philosophy, minority politicians need to undertake additional efforts. It would be their responsibility to prove the ability to represent. While such paternalistic motifs have become weaker over the last few decades, they remain in place and, together with concerns about extremism, radicalization and ‘identity politics’, account for features of British Muslim political agency.

In order to explore such features, the report considers the case of the General Election 2010 and how national-level organisations that mobilized Muslim constituents conceived of their objectives and responded to perceived pressures. It explores a number of salient issues, including the act of political representation, the ‘Muslim Vote’, and significant concerns to do with political neutrality and partisanship. Organisations and initiatives investigated in this report are the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) for its ‘Muslim Vote 2010’ website, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC), Operation Black Vote (OBV), ENGAGE and YouElect.

The report firstly shows that among the actors of the 2010 mobilization there was a measure of concern about dilemmas of representation. This concern was about the way Muslim political actors were forced to abjure their Muslimness in order to claim a more encompassing political identity. At the same time, the notion that increased representation would provide a remedy to inequality that could be achieved without a serious and issue-based commitments was widely denounced. How to balance the ‘politics of ideas’ with the politics of ethnic minority ‘presence’ was a live political issue for respondents and reflects a strong concern to counter simplistic or particularist mis-representations of their political agency.

Secondly, the notion of the ‘Muslim Vote’, and how actors of the mobilization consider or problematize its weight and coherence, points into a different direction for our concern with political agency. As with political representation, there are ambiguities to consider that are the reflection of a difficult environment. The aspiration to ‘normalize’ the participation of British Muslims – to emphasize that a ‘bloc vote’ no longer exists or to argue that bloc-like voting instincts need to be overcome in favour of informed political decision-making – runs through the rhetoric of all of our respondents. At the same time, respondents acknowledge the strategic usefulness of the appeal to shared concerns and are apprehensive about what they consider to be the disempowering effects of an individualizing perspective on shared concerns.

Thirdly, the appropriate distance or proximity to political parties and candidates is contested among the actors investigated in this report. Some organisations see themselves as ‘service facilitators’ and
refrain from offering recommendations on who to vote for, as this would contradict their conception of self-reliance and sophistication among Muslim voters. Others offer specific advice and recommendations on the basis of strong of candidates’ policy record and their positive or negative attitudes towards issues of concern to Muslims. In such calculations about endorsements, the organisations respond to what they perceive as a problematic environment for political positioning.

The report investigates such features of Muslim political agency by drawing on the concept of misrecognition. ‘Misrecognition’ allows for a consideration of how actors respond to perceived pressures, make claims and project identities in opposition to alleged misperceptions or the refusal to acknowledge desired self-descriptions. We highlight five specific types of misrecognition:

1) misrecognising Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to other identity politics;
2) misrecognising the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim identities and concerns,
3) misrecognising Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based or ‘pariah politics’,
4) misrecognising Muslim concerns as ‘sectarian’, not compatible with an orientation towards the common good;
5) misrecognising Muslim political actors as ‘toxic’ and refusing political association.

While misrecognition has been our focus, we do not suggest that it provides a complete or determinative account of Muslim political agency. Indeed experiences of misrecognition are not understood particularly well if they are viewed as merely oppressive and constraining, limiting spaces for agency and inviting nothing more than coping strategies and postures of defensiveness. The political positioning that is evident among the organisations examined in this report shows that constraints are often creatively dealt with and that perceived pressures invite a significant degree of reflexivity and strategic awareness. Although the past decade has been a challenging time for confident expressions of Muslim identities in British politics, there are some indications that political actors succeed in projecting political subjectivities that are not simply determined by the experience of misrecognition. The diversity of attempts to delineate such identities, as is evident among the mobilizations examined in this report, might indeed make it more difficult for Muslim political claims to be misrecognized.

Keywords
British Muslims; participation; representation; citizenship; religious identities; misrecognition.


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**Executive Summary**

This study investigates the way the regime of tolerance has been implemented in Turkey as far as the political participation of the Circassians is concerned since the late nineteenth century. The paper first scrutinizes the political and cultural claims raised by the Circassians, and then explores which claims have so far been tolerated by the state, what political practices are considered to be tolerant, or intolerant, and what values/norms are considered to promote, or undermine, tolerance in Turkish political life.

Circassians embody one of the largest ethno-cultural minorities living in Turkey. Though they are not legally defined as a minority like the non-Muslim minorities (Jews, Greek-Rums, and Armenians), sociologically and anthropologically they constitute a minority. So far, they have not been considered by the majority society to be facing any major obstacle since their arrival in Anatolia in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. However, recent studies carried out in Turkey demonstrate that it is not only the non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis who have been subject to a kind of structural exclusion with regard to having equal access to political and cultural rights, but also that the Circassians have experienced discriminatory acts of the state and the majority society.

The common belief in Turkey concerning the Circassians is that they are more privileged than the other ethnic groups. This belief may be correct to a certain extent, however research shows that the Circassians have also been subject to various exclusionary acts in the nation-building process. Hence, the basic premise of this study is that Circassians have been exposed to some acts of discrimination by the Turkish state, and that while having a strong orientation towards their homeland, most of the Circassian population in Turkey still feel themselves to be guests. The fact that the voices of the Circassians have not been heard so far in public space reflects to some extent the power of both the formal and the popular majority nationalism to which they have been subjected.

Despite being a ‘constitutive element’ of the Turkish nation, the Circassians became subject to various discriminatory policies in the nation-building process, especially after the 1930s when the spectre of Fascism and National Socialism was rampant in Europe. In the current Turkish political context, the Circassians, who have been mobilized along with other ethno-cultural claimants, protest against the suppressive and discriminatory policies and practices implemented by the state throughout the history of the Republic. By mobilizing through ethno-cultural associations, protests, conferences and campaigns, along with the other cultural minorities the Circassians aspire to be one of the driving forces of the democratization process whereby they vocalize their claims for the elimination of discrimination against ethnic minorities, and for respect for individual rights as well as cultural rights. Therefore, although the political mobilization of Circassians contributes to the democratic consolidation of Turkey, the Circassians cannot yet raise their voices through legitimate political channels as much as they wish to. Rather, the Circassian challenge vis-à-vis the nation-state is predominantly handled by government policies making a specific reference to all-encompassing principles and concepts, such as constitutional citizenship, equal citizenship rights, and respect and recognition for cultural differences.

Since the deepening of the European integration process in the early 2000s, the Circassians have become more vocal in raising their claims to the recognition of their right to education in their mother tongue, recognition of their ethno-cultural identity, their right to dual citizenship, recognition of the contribution to the foundation of the Republic made by the politicians, military officers and bureaucrats of Caucasus origin, and the removal of the descriptions of Çerkes Ethem as a “traitor” from school textbooks. Circassian claims for constitutional citizenship, recognition and respect, along with the government’s initiative for constitutional reform and legal arrangements to secure political
and cultural rights, can be categorized as a good example of accommodation of the ethno-cultural diversity challenge regarding tolerance in political life.

This study undertakes a textual discourse analysis of various policy documents, public statements, newspaper articles, NGO reports, academic works, blogs and websites regarding Circassian political participation. In addition, some in-depth interviews were held with the community leaders of the Circassian diaspora and executive members of their associations who are involved in the public debates and initiatives with regard to the recent constitutional changes and other legal arrangements regarding the recognition of political and cultural rights of ethno-cultural minorities. I also made active participant observations in the meetings of various Circassian associations engaged in preparing their suggestions for the new constitution.

This study finds that the current state policies generated to respond to the Circassian claims cannot be considered as a discourse and practice of respect and recognition. On the contrary, the policies of the contemporary government (Justice and Development Party, AKP) spring from a discourse of toleration towards the Circassians, who are actually in search of constitutional citizenship, equality and respect with regard to their ethno-cultural differences. The study also reveals that cultural and folkloric forms of representations demonstrated by ethno-cultural minorities are tolerated by the Turkish state. However, the state actors are not yet tolerant of the politicization of minority claims, as in the case of the Circassians.

One of the important findings of this study is that the Circassians have recently discovered the power of transnationalizing their cause in order to put pressure on the Turkish state to extend political and cultural rights to the Circassians. The European Parliament and the Council of Europe have become important venues for the Circassian diaspora to express their concerns on the international platform. Transnational connections and global communication channels have shaped the ways in which the Circassian diaspora have recently started to raise their claims in a way that transcends the hegemonic power of their countries of settlement, such as Turkey. Circassians are no longer content with the ways in which they are perceived by the Turkish state. They want to be recognized by the Turkish state as a collective group, not only as individuals. The research also reveals that the transnationalization of the Circassian social movements and the use of the social media impact the ways in which their claims are currently being raised in a way that challenges the traditional patriarchal structure of the Circassian communities.

**Keywords**

Circassians, diaspora, Turkey, political participation, democratization, European integration, citizenship, transnational space, tolerance