Labour Migration And The Host Country: Russian case

Vladimir Mukomel

CARIM-East Research Report 2012/31
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CARIM-East – Creating an Observatory East of Europe

This project which is co-financed by the European Union is the first migration observatory focused on the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union and covers all countries of the Eastern Partnership initiative (Belarus, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and Russian Federation.

The project’s two main themes are:

(1) migration from the region to the European Union (EU) focusing in particular on countries of emigration and transit on the EU’s eastern border; and

(2) intraregional migration in the post-Soviet space.

The project started on 1 April 2011 as a joint initiative of the European University Institute (EUI), Florence, Italy (the lead institution), and the Centre of Migration Research (CMR) at the University of Warsaw, Poland (the partner institution).

CARIM researchers undertake comprehensive and policy-oriented analyses of very diverse aspects of human mobility and related labour market developments east of the EU and discuss their likely impacts on the fast evolving socio-economic fabric of the six Eastern Partners and Russia, as well as that of the European Union.

In particular, CARIM-East:

- builds a broad network of national experts from the region representing all principal disciplines focused on human migration, labour mobility and national development issues (e.g. demography, law, economics, sociology, political science).
- develops a comprehensive database to monitor migration stocks and flows in the region, relevant legislative developments and national policy initiatives;
- undertakes, jointly with researchers from the region, systematic and ad hoc studies of emerging migration issues at regional and national levels.
- provides opportunities for scholars from the region to participate in workshops organized by the EUI and CMR, including academic exchange opportunities for PhD candidates;
- provides forums for national and international experts to interact with policymakers and other stakeholders in the countries concerned.

Results of the above activities are made available for public consultation through the website of the project: [http://www.carim-east.eu/](http://www.carim-east.eu/)

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**Abstract**

Labour migration is discussed here in the context of the transformation of the Russian market and labour migrants’ communication with their host society.

Of central importance is the analysis of changes in the labour market and how these changes affect the structure of employment for migrant workers, their inclusion in local labour markets and labour mobility, the prevalence of illegal and informal employment. It is concluded that the functioning of the Russian labour market and its institutional design and the rules that restrict migrants’ access to decent work exacerbate social inequalities and contribute to the marginalization of migrant workers.

Particular attention is paid to: migrants’ interaction with social institutions and the population of the host country; factors that contribute to the breaking of ties with the sending society; the social exclusion of migrants in the host community; as well as problems of the social exclusion of certain vulnerable groups of migrants.

The interaction of labour migrants with internal migrants is discussed, prevailing relations (competition, complementarity) in the labour market are described.
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Introduction

The surge in labour migration in the 2000s presented new challenges caused by an influx of migrants of different ethnic origins and immigrants from societies with different traditions and cultures. The area of concern for migration policy has shifted to the socio-cultural sphere, and of particular importance have become the questions of the secondary socialization of migrants, their adaptation and integration potential. However, the question of the adaptation of migrants and, moreover, their integration is not possible without addressing the social barriers and social inequalities faced by migrant workers.

The greatest difficulties are associated with the functioning of the labour market. How do changes in the labour market affect the attractiveness of certain economic activities for migrant workers? Why are labour migrants concentrated in certain areas of employment? What is their labour mobility and how does it vary for different economic activities? What is the prevalence of informal and illegal employment? What are the main factors of social inequality in the labour market?

These are issues that lie on the surface. Second-layer issues originate due to the fact that the removal of social barriers in the labour market is a necessary but insufficient condition for the elimination of social inequality. Migrants face inequalities not only inside but also outside work, i.e. in everyday life, when communicating with institutions and the people of the host society.

In the case of Russia, issues of social justice and the social inequality of labour migrants are transformed into problems of social exclusion in the host community. At the same time, the accumulation of migratory experience increases the risk of the separation of migrants from the sending society and of weakened ties with it. This may be accompanied by a transformation, or even a rejection of the norms and values of the traditional society.

What factors contribute to the social exclusion of migrants in the host society and the breaking of ties with the sending community? What is the role of institutions and the population of the host society in the exclusion of migrant communities? What groups of migrants, in socially vulnerable groups, are particularly susceptible to social exclusion?

The third layer of questions arises in connection with the interaction of migrants with internal migrants. What is the nature of these relations? Are they competitive or complementary in nature?

Study of labour migration: an overview

In the 2000s, labour migration became dominant in research and publications on migration, almost every publication touches, in one way or another, upon this topic. There are thousands of Russian scientific publications on labour migration, including hundreds of books and collections of articles and dozens of theses.

Of particular significance are the works written by researchers from the Migration Research Centre at the Institute for Economic Forecasting, devoted to labour migration and related issues in the former Soviet Union (Zh.Zayonchkovskaya, E.Tyuryukanova, T.Ivanova, G.Vitkovskaya, Yu.Florinskaya, etc.

1 The Electronic Library of the Scientific Information Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (http://elibrary.ru), which takes into account not more than 5-10% of existing scientific publications, provides 600 references to publications during the 2000s on labor migration. Here and below we consider only those monographs and collections of articles published in Russia that deal exclusively with labor migration, excluding books analyzing labor migration alongside others issues, as well as journal articles. Among scientific journals, with a special interest in labor migration, one should mention, first of all, "Man and Work," "Sociological research", "Diaspora", etc.
E. Kirillova, I. Batyshtova, D. Poletaev, the Population Centre of Moscow State University, mostly on international migration (V. Iontsev, I. Ivahnyuk), internal migration (V. Moiseenko) and statistics (O. Chudinovskih). Then there are works completed in the various institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, e.g. the Institute of Sociology (V. Perevedentsev, A. Dmitriev), the Institute for Socio-Economic Problems of Population (E. Tyuryukanova, E. Krasinets), the Institute of Social and Political Studies (L. Rybakovsky, S. Ryazantsev), the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (V. Tishkov, E. Filippova, Guboglo), the Institute of Demography of the Higher School of Economics (A. Vishnevsky, N. Mkrtchyan, M. Denisenko, L. Karachurina) and the Russian State Humanitarian University (O. Vorobeva, T. Yudina, G. Osadchaya).

An analysis of labour migration in the international context is particularly popular among Russian scholars. There are also numerous publications by international organizations, including UN bodies. One should mention ILO publications that analyze Russia’s problems in the context of international experience, an active role of the IOM and publications based on papers prepared by the UN agencies.

One type of research is problem-based, focusing on social institutions, e.g. changes in the labour market, social protection, adaptation and integration, gender aspects of labour migration, and other issues still. A large number of publications analyze transit, and especially illegal migration and issues of labour emigration.

Other type of research looks at the distinct flows of labour migrants and certain territories. For example, studies dealing with immigrants from certain countries: Moldova, the Transcaucasian states, China, etc. Quite a lot of research describes labour migration by regions. There are also publications on internal labour migration.
A separate group of publications is based on sociological surveys among migrant workers, the first of which appeared at the beginning of the century\textsuperscript{22}.

Publications prepared by the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA of Russia) deal with the problem of migration from the point of view of their organization, though there are some publications of high level among them\textsuperscript{23}.

There are publications on the results of research implemented by young scientists\textsuperscript{24}.

Although there are a lot of papers, quantity does not always translate into quality. Another problem is that there are gaps in the research, which are caused by objective reasons, i.e. lack of relevant data and the loss of competences required in certain types of research. Studies of the economic consequences of labour migration are definitely lacking\textsuperscript{25}. Mathematical modelling has vanished, as the relevant Soviet scientific school has disappeared. There is an acute shortage of case studies in the field of social practices: strategies for the adaptation and the integration of migrants; their social mobility; the operation of their networks; the formation of ethnic niches in the economy; relations between various migrant ethnic groups in the labour market; discrimination against migrant workers; and ethno-social stratification in the labour market; and estimates of the scale of migrant workers presence, including illegal migrants, in Russian local labour markets\textsuperscript{26}.

**Research Methodology**

The present research uses statistical data from the following sources:

- the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat)\textsuperscript{27}
- the Federal Migration Service (FMS Russia)\textsuperscript{28}, database of the FMS of Russia (Central Data Bank on registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons, CDB RFC)\textsuperscript{29}.  

Results of the following mass surveys were used:

- A population survey on employment issues conducted by the State Statistics Service of Russia (PSEI)\textsuperscript{30}
- Monitoring of the Russian economy and the health of the population (MREH)\textsuperscript{31}.

Data from other social surveys were used, including:

\textsuperscript{22} Migration of the population .... 2001  
\textsuperscript{23} Ivanova, Sokol'tseva 2007; Labour migration ... 2005  
\textsuperscript{24} Labour migration through the eyes of ... 2001.  
\textsuperscript{25} For details, see: Mukomel 2005: 103-104  
\textsuperscript{26} Mukomel 2008: 271  
\textsuperscript{27} See the website of Rosstat www.gks.ru  
\textsuperscript{28} See the website of FMS of Russia www.fms.gov.ru  
\textsuperscript{29} CDB RFC registers individual foreign nationals, allowing the classification of registered migrants and those legally employed by the following parameters: gender, age, duration of stay, citizenship, employment, etc. Sometimes the way the data is collected and processed is criticized.  
\textsuperscript{30} A survey of the population by place of residence, covering all subjects of the Russian Federation, urban and rural areas. In 2010 monthly about 69,000 people aged 15-72 years (31,300 households) or 0.06% of the population of this age were surveyed; the total annual volume of the sample was 831,000 people (345,000 households). For details, see: Sample http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_30/Main.htm, Guidelines for conducting sample surveys on employment (labor force survey) http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/trud/Untitled452-10.pdf, Trends in the labor market. Statistical Bulletin for the year 2011 http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/population/wages/  
\textsuperscript{31} MREH is a longitudinal nationwide survey of households that has been conducted in the Russian Federation based on a specially designed sample (about 10,000 households) since 1994. For project description and details of sampling see: http://www.epc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/project
social surveys aimed at analyzing migration profiles, adaptation and integration problematic issues faced by migrants for the National Research University’s Higher School of Economics (NRU HSE CEPRS 2011)\(^{32}\)

Analysis of the specificity of adaptation and integration of representatives of the “one and a half generation” of migrants from the Central Asia and Transcaucasia in the Russian cities (supported by RFH, 2011)\(^{33}\);

In addition to quantitative methods, qualitative methods were used: for the purpose of this article a focus group with high-qualified migrants was conducted (FG)\(^{34}\).

The following definitions are used in the article:

Migrant: a foreign citizen or stateless person who does not have Russian citizenship, residing (staying) in Russia for purposes other than tourism, business and other short-term goals.

Labour migration: the movement of people from their country to Russia for employment purposes.

Migrant worker: a foreign citizen or stateless person who does not have Russian citizenship, working or looking for work in Russia.

**Labour migration policies**

A key component of Russia’s migration policy is the policy on labour migration. This is due to the following reasons: first, to the scale of labour migration, which dwarfs other migration flows; second, to the seriousness of the social, socio-cultural and political challenges arising from the massive influx of migrants of other ethnic origins; third, to the increased significance of the use of foreign labour as a result of depopulation and the reduction of working-age populations in Russia.

The national policy on labour migration in Russia covers three main areas: employment problems; problems of national security/illegal migration; and demographic challenges. Accordingly, the policy on labour migration was formally defined in the 2000s by the following legal acts: the Concepts of Actions in the Labour Market (Concept 2003 b), (Concept 2008); the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 (Strategy 2009); the Concept of Regulation of Migration Processes in the Russian Federation (2003 Concept a); and the Concept of Demographic Policy (Concept 2001) (Concept 2007).

In the Concepts of Action in the Labour Market, labour migration is considered in the context of employment issues and reduction of unemployment among Russian citizens. The basic principle of the regulation of flows of labour migrants is to provide Russian citizens with priority right in the job

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32 Sociological studies aimed at the analysis of migration profiles, the adaptation and integration of migrants at the request of the National Research University ’Higher School of Economics’ (HSE CEPRS 2011, unpublished) carried out by the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies (CEPRS), led by the author. The study included a sociological survey of migrants (8499 respondents), respondents were foreign nationals, regardless of their legal status, state of origin, and ethnicity, in 8 regions of Russia. The “snowball” sampling was used. Qualitative research was also conducted (18 focus groups and 35 in-depth expert interviews) in 8 regions of Russia at the end of 2011. Selected regions account for 53.9% of all legally employed in the Russian Federation.

33 A survey supported by a grant from the Russian Foundation for Humanities (RFH 2011) in Astrakhan and Samara, 2011. Survey of 299 respondents, six focus groups, 40 in-depth interviews, 16 expert interviews were conducted. Project Manager V. Mukomel.

34 High-qualified migrant with an annual income of 900,000 rubles and higher were selected. (Under current law, the criterion for inclusion into the category of Professionals is unclear: ‘professionals’ category include foreign nationals with an annual income exceeding 2 million rubles, researchers and teachers with an income exceeding 1 million rubles, certain categories of foreign citizens with an income exceeding 700,000 rubles; in some projects income criteria is not used, e.g. a project of high-tech zone “Skolkovo”). The focus group was conducted in December 2011 in Moscow and included nine participants.
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search. The main mechanism for regulating labour migration is the introduction of quotas by regions and occupations, taking into account scarce occupations and qualifications as well as forecasts for the labour market.

The Concept of the Regulation of Migration Processes adopted in the early 2000s focused on the fight against illegal migration and, in practice, aimed at limiting labour migration. A more gentle although similar approach was described later in the National Security Strategy, which focused on “the balance of interests of native population and migrant workers with regard to their ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious differences” (Strategy 2009).

In demographic development concepts the need to attract immigrants for the purpose of permanent residence is stated as one of the leading principles of demographic policy: “attraction of migrants in accordance with the needs of demographic and socio-economic development, with regard to the need of their social adaptation and integration” (Concept 2007).

To date, the contradiction between the concepts of “employment”, “security” and “demographics” has not been resolved: the first two demonstrate cautious attitudes to labour migration and a prevailing restrictive approach, while in the last one labour migration is considered in connection with immigration.

An attempt to resolve this contradiction was made in the draft of the Concept of State Migration Policy (Draft Concept 2012). This project has proposed differentiated approach to various migration flows, as well as a selective approach based on the personal characteristics of migrants. In addition, labour migrants are implicitly considered as probable future immigrants. It should be noted that in the Russian legal documents, labour migration is seen as temporary, primarily seasonal migration, temporary migration and immigration are distinguished. Relevant definitions in legal documents are not provided.

The term “labour migration” is widely used, but its definition is lacking. On the contrary, the rarely used term “migrant worker” is defined in the Agreement between the CIS countries, and applies only to its members: “migrant worker (or employee) is a person, permanently residing in the territory of the Country of origin, who is lawfully engaged in a remunerated activity in the Country Employment” (1994 Agreement).

The work of migrants in the Russian legislation is defined solely as legal work and is regulated by the law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons” (Federal Law 2002). The Law defines the work of a foreign citizen as “the work of a foreign citizen in the Russian Federation on the basis of a written contract with an employer”.

Illegal entry and illegal stay in Russia or illegal transit through the Russian Federation is considered to be illegal migration (the Criminal Code 1996) (Agreement 1998). The lack of work permits is interpreted as a violation of the rules of residence and foreign citizens working in Russia without a permit may be deported (CAO 2001). In Russian migration literature illegal migration is mostly understood as work without work permits.

Policy on internal labour migration is lacking, despite the fact that it is mentioned in several programs. There are several reasons for this: first, in the absence of a mature housing market and guaranteed citizens’ access to social and other types of services at the place of actual residence or temporary stay, the mobility of the Russian population is rather limited. Second, labour-surplus

35 In the draft Concept labor migration is defined as “temporary migration for employment purposes” (Draft Concept 2012)
36 Foreign nationals, except the ones residing in Russia and certain categories (e.g. “high-qualified specialists”), also need to obtain a work permit.
37 Given that the vast majority of migrants come to Russia based on a visa-free-travel regime, the most frequent violations are lack of migration registration and/or work permit. As migration registration is quite simple and accessible, the main violation is the lack of work permits.
regions include mainly the Northern Caucasus republics. The prevalence of xenophobic attitude towards immigrants from those regions can only exacerbate social tensions in the regions to which they might migrate.

During the economic crisis of 2008 measures were taken to promote intra-regional migration from the most depressed areas and single-industry towns, but such migration turned out to be expensive and inefficient.

Migrants on the labour market

The scale of migrant workers’ presence on the labour market is unknown. The main problem is concerned with the inconsistencies in the record types and the absence of any reliable estimates for the number and distribution of illegal migrants. Estimates for illegal migrants range from 3 to 18 million, the latest estimates of the FMS of Russia, most probably exaggerated, give 4 to 5.5 million.\(^{38}\)

Even in cases of legally employed migrants registration is inefficient; until recently the Russian FMS registered not persons but work permits. Data on working foreigners distributed by Rosstat are based on the departmental statistics of the Russian Federal Migration Service, the quality of which has been criticized by Rosstat. Nevertheless, in its publications Rosstat always refers to the Federal Migration Service of Russia as a source of information. (Labour and Employment 2011: 302). Changing procedures for issuing permits and the registration of migrant workers make data interpretation difficult and do not allow for the diachronic comparisons. According to the published data, the number of foreigners engaged in remunerated activities in Russia increased from 213,300 in 2000 to 1,640,800 people in 2010 (Labour and Employment 2011: 302).

The lack of reliable data on the number of migrant workers, however, does not call into question the phenomenon of explosive growth in their numbers in the 2000s. This was caused by the lack of work places and low earnings in the countries of origin as labour costs in Russia are several times higher than in the countries of origin: 2.5 times higher in the case of Ukraine and up to 11 times higher in Tajikistan. For many migrants quality of life is also important: there is a significant gap (based on the human development index (HDI)) between Russia and sending countries (Mukomel 2011a: 226-227).

On the other hand, the increase in the number of migrant workers has been caused by dramatic changes in the Russian labour market due to the reduction of the working-age population\(^{39}\) and changes in employment structure there.

Changes in employment structure: implications for labour migration

In the 2000s major changes in the labour market took place: a sharp decline in employment in agriculture, industry, was accompanied by growth in the number and proportion of people employed in construction, trade, services and public administration: Table 1.

\(^{38}\) Experts’ consensus estimate is somewhat lower. (Consensus estimate, 2010)

\(^{39}\) Reduction of working-age population in the first decade of the 2000s exceeded the reduction of population in general. This process has been exacerbating and will exacerbate in the coming years: according to the latest forecast of the Federal State Statistics Service for 2010-2030 total population will fall by some 2.8 million people, while working age populations will decrease, according to moderate estimates, by 12.1 million people. For details, see: (Mukomel 2011b: 34; Mukomel 2011:24)
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Table 1. Average annual structure of employment by economic activity, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Activity</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting and forestry</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing, fishery</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and distribution of electric power, gas, water</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction works</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, household goods and personal items</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communication</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial activity</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate, renting and business activities</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration and defence; social insurance</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare and social services</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other utilities, social and individual services</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. By actually performed type of economic activity.
2. By type of economic activity in line with organization’s main area of activity.

Particularly noteworthy are construction works, retail trade, utilities and social services, hotels and restaurants where local people work reluctantly and the demand for labour was mostly met by the influx of migrant workers:

“Everywhere, in every street market you visit you see a sign: “Hire a salesperson”…. A million arrives, a million leaves, and everyone has got a job”

(Focus Group)

There are several reasons for this: first, in the case of these activities there are, as a rule, long working hours or inconvenient work schedules. Second, in most of these areas of employment wages are lower than for other types of activities, e.g. those employed in hotels and restaurants get 64% of the national average; those employed in utilities and social services earn 78% and in retail trade 88% (Labour and Employment 2011: 416). Third, the work is usually characterized by difficult conditions, i.e. dirty, difficult, dangerous and often humiliating jobs (3Ds). Staff turnover in these activities is extremely high: among those employed in 2010 in hotels and restaurants 61.4% of the average number of employees dropped out; in trade 58.2%; in construction 49.0%; and in utilities, social and individual services 29.0% (Labour and Employment 2011: 281).

40The classification is given based on the National Classification of Economic Activities (NCEA), the Russian counterpart of the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community.
Unpopularity of these types of employment with the host population makes job search in these areas easier for migrants. According to the statistics of the Russian Federal Migration Service, which takes into account only legally employed migrants, most foreign nationals work in: construction (36.3% of employed in the sector); retail trade (16.6%); manufacturing (13.5%); real estate, renting and services (9.9%); agriculture and forestry 9.1% (Labour & Employment 2011: 304).

In addition, statistical data reflects changes in the employment structure of foreigners: a reduction in the share of construction employees is accompanied with an increased share of those employed in real estate, industry, agriculture, which is confirmed by official data on the legally employed. Changes in the structure of employment are explained mostly by varying access to work permits in different industries. Large enterprises in industry, construction and agriculture have the easiest access to work permits. The reduction in the share of people employed in construction is a reflection of the real situation in the sector caused by the economic crisis.

Table 2. The distribution of foreign nationals, involved in economic activity in Russia, by economic activity, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Activity</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting and forestry</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction works</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, household goods and personal items</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial activity</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate, renting and business activities</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare and social services</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other utilities, social and individual services</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other types of economic activities</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: FMS of Russia, Form 2-T (2008), (Labour and Employment 2011: 304)\(^{41}\)

The structural changes probably take place at a greater speed currently: highest mobility is characteristic for the latent part of the labour market, where illegal migrants are employed. A large-scale study, which covered both legal and illegal migrants, provides some evidence of underestimates of employment in the case of certain activities such as trade, utilities, social and individual services (NRU HSE CEPRS 2011).

According to the survey, the main types of migrants’ economic activities are: wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and household goods, 36.3% of employed; construction - 22.6%;

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\(^{41}\) Employees of the FMS of Russia do not possess skills required to identify the types of economic activity. Some of those employed in utilities and social services (Class O according to NCEA), as well as household services (Class P according to NCEA) were classified as those working in real estate, renting and service delivery (Class K according to NCEA).
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utilities, social and individual services 13.2%; and transport and communications 8.3% of employed. Other types of economic activities account for less than one fifth of all the employed (table 3).

Table 3. Types of economic activity and occupational groups of migrants, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of economic activity</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Agriculture</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Manufacturing</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Production and distribution of electric power, gas, water</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Construction works</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, household goods and personal items</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Transport and communications</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J Financial activity</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K Real estate, renting and business activities</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Public administration; obligatory social insurance</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M Education</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Healthcare and social services</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Other utilities, social and individual services</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P Household services</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational group</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Senior officials and managers</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Professionals</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Skilled service workers, housing &amp; utility workers and retail trade workers</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Craft and related trade workers</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Plant and machine operators</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Elementary occupations</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Employed, including employed in 2011, but temporarily not working and seeking employment (7445 respondents).
Source: NRU HSE CEPRS 2011

42 Employed, including those employed in Russia in 2011, but currently not working and looking for work. Hereinafter, unless otherwise stated, data of the above study is referred to.
72.1% of those employed or looking for work are men\textsuperscript{43}. Their activities are more diversified than those of women. In addition to the main areas of employment for men, i.e. construction (30.9% of employed) and trade (28.9%), men also work in utilities (13.5%), transport and communications (9.7%).

Most women work in trade (52.8%). 12.6% of women work in hotels and restaurants, 11.6% in utilities, social and individual services. Women tend to be less demanding when choosing a job, especially in older age groups, and the areas of their possible employment offer very little opportunity for professional growth. It is easier for a young unmarried woman to get a job compared to a married woman: first, such are the requirements of employers in the service sector, and second, a young, and therefore often unmarried girl is not controlled by her husband, and can agree to work at night or late in the evening.

**Labour mobility of migrants**

Most migrants with previous work experience at home and a current job in Russia – about 52% of all migrants – worked at home in the following spheres: in the wholesale and retail trade, 18.0%; construction 16.0%; transport and communication 11.7%; and agriculture 10.7%. Upon arrival in Russia the vast majority of migrants are forced to change the type of economic activity: fewer than 30% are involved in the same type of activity as at home.

Migrants turn en masse to trade, construction, utilities and social services: the number of foreigners employed in these areas increased respectively 1.9 times, 1.4 times and 2.8 times\textsuperscript{44} (Table 4). 71% of migrants with previous work experience in the sending country currently work in those areas.

Those who worked before in the most competitive and attractive for migrants employment sectors, i.e. construction, trade, transport and communications, are reluctant to change their line of work. Respectively, 61.5%, 58.6% and 42.9% of those who worked in these sectors in their home countries work in those sectors currently in Russia.

Together with the few migrants who used to work in mining, in the state administration, not in demand in Russia’s labour market, were also large numbers of migrants who used to work in healthcare and education.

Only 6.9% of migrants who had worked before coming to Russia in healthcare are employed in this sector in Russia. The share of those employed in education is even lower and stands at 3.4%. Almost half of those who used to work in healthcare and education now work in trade, and every seventh person – in utilities and social services.

\textsuperscript{43} According to the Federal Migration Service of Russia’s data on the formally employed, the share of women is constantly increasing: from 10.7% in 2000 to 14.4% in 2010 (Labor and Employment 2011: 303). These figures are underestimated as illegal employment is especially prevalent among women.

\textsuperscript{44} There is a growing number of household service providers and those involved in real estate transactions, but only 1.7% of employed people are involved in these activities.
### Table 4. Economic activities of migrants in the home country and in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Worked at home, %</th>
<th>Work in Russia, %</th>
<th>Work in Russia / Worked at home, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Agriculture</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Manufacturing</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Production and distribution of electric power, gas, water</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Construction works</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>143.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, household goods and personal items</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>192.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>113.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Transport and communications</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J Financial activity</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K Real estate, renting and business activities</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>180.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Public administration; obligatory social insurance</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M Education</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Healthcare and social services</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Other utilities, social and individual services</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>276.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P Household services</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>361.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>82.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Migrants with work experience at home (4405 respondents).

Source: NRU HSE CEPRS 2011

A large proportion of migrants perform work that does not require special skills. In the national economy unskilled workers make up 10.8% of all the employed\(^{45}\) and 29.4% among foreigners, while in the case of migrants from CIS countries 34.3%\(^{46}\).

Of course, some unskilled workers do not have relevant education, qualifications, experience and have little or no knowledge of Russian and cannot qualify for better jobs. These are mainly labour migrants from Central Asian states, 62-64% of whom have a level of education no higher than general secondary. 49.1% of migrants from Uzbekistan, 46.7% from Tajikistan, 45.6% from Kyrgyzstan\(^{47}\) work as unskilled workers (see Table 5).

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\(^{45}\) 2010 (Labor and Employment 2011: 81-82)

\(^{46}\) Third quarter of 2011, the FMS of Russia, legally employed

\(^{47}\) NRU HSE CEPRS, 2011
Table 5. Share of unskilled workers among labour migrants from various countries, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of information</th>
<th>FMS of Russia, those with work permits, 3 quarter of 2011</th>
<th>NRU HSE CEPRS *, all working migrants, 4 quarter 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including: Azerbaijan</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Survey of the Centre for Ethno-political Regional Research for the National Research University “Higher School of Economics”

Three quarters of unskilled workers are employed in three sectors: trade (30.9%); utilities and social services (25.0%); and construction (20.7%). In the utilities sector unskilled labour prevails: 74.6% of migrants involved in this activity are unskilled workers.

In a typical case, a migrant gets a job which is worse than the one s/he had at home. The share of professionals with positions in Russia relevant to those they had at home decreased 6.5 times, the share of specialists and office workers decreased nearly three times over (Table 6). In contrast, the proportion of unskilled workers increased 2.3 times.

Table 6. Migrants by occupations at home and in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational group</th>
<th>Worked at home, %</th>
<th>Work in Russia, %</th>
<th>Work in Russia / Worked at home, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Senior officials and managers</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 High-qualified professionals</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Specialists</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Office employees</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Skilled service workers, housing &amp; utility workers and market sales workers</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>132.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Skilled workers</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>102.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Plant and machine operators</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Unskilled workers</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>234.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Migrants with work experience at home (4405 respondents).
Source: NRU HSE CEPRS 2011
Only 40.2% of migrants belong to the same occupational group to which they belonged before their arrival in Russia. More than a third of migrants with work experience before coming to Russia perform work with no requirements in terms of education or skill.

Such work is performed by every fourth representative of occupational groups with specific requirements in terms of education level (university or specialized secondary level of education), i.e. senior officials and managers, high-qualified professionals, specialists.

The education, skills and professional knowledge of migrants are not in demand on the Russian labour market; migrants turn *en masse* to lower level occupational groups. 73% of migrants who worked before coming to Russia, had to change economic activity type, while 60% changed the occupational group to which they belonged at home.

Vertical labour mobility also takes place: 46.6% that started their career in Russia as unskilled workers have moved to better jobs, mostly as skilled workers, skilled service workers, skilled workers in utilities and trade. At the same time there is “secondary” downward mobility: 24.8% of those who started as skilled workers and 16.7% of those who worked as skilled service workers, skilled housing and utility workers and market sales workers currently work as unskilled workers.

The demand for unskilled labour is covered for the most part by skilled workers. “Status in exchange for a wage” is a conscious choice for migrants but this fact does not eliminate the problem of inefficient investment in human capital on the part of sending states, and its inefficient use by Russia.

**Illegal and informal employment**

One of the reasons why migrants take jobs that do not meet their training and qualifications is the absence of the Russian citizenship, which significantly limits their choice of job opportunities:

*“In the case of elite real estate, no one will take you to sell it with your Ukrainian or some other, e.g. Moldovan passport.”*  
(Focus Group)

Along with direct access restrictions in the case of state and municipal services, the Russian citizenship in many cases is required for work in the public sector. In addition, migrants are faced with the need to confirm their qualifications, and employers are extremely reluctant to take on foreign nationals from countries with visa-free travel regime for work requiring financial responsibility.

However, the main cause of downward mobility among labour migrants is the lack of legal grounds for work and therefore informal employment.

At least 60% of labour migrants in Russia work illegally. Lack of legal grounds for work in Russia depends on the type of economic activity or the occupational group. A very high concentration of illegal employees is typical for retail trade, where 41.9% of all illegal migrants earn their money: of which 23.1% are skilled workers, i.e. sales persons, goods manager etc., and 15.3% are unskilled workers. Illegal employment is also widespread in utilities and housekeeping services: e.g. 85% of migrants from Ukraine, involved in housekeeping activities, work illegally.

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48 Formally, a ban on municipal service for foreign nationals is missing, but in practice foreigners are not employed as municipal employees.

49 The relative nature of formal criteria for classifying migrants as having or not having legal grounds for work should be noted. Almost half of migrants with legal work permits are those who have permits allowing to work only for individuals (the so-called “patents”). However, most of them work at private and state companies, mainly in trade and construction.
Along with illegal employment, informal employment is wide-spread when work relations with an employer are not formalized\textsuperscript{50}. No more than two fifths of migrant workers have a written contract with their employer. In the case of most popular types of activities, the common practice is that of hiring on the basis of oral agreements: in construction 63.4\% of migrants work under such conditions; in hotels and restaurants 59.5\% of all migrants; and in household services 80\%. Informality is a general problem of the Russian economy and widespread among Russian citizens too. As researches demonstrate, even in the case of Russians, the probability of informal employment is high: first comes agriculture, second service workers, housing & utility workers, and retail trade workers, among whom about one-third are employed informally. (Gimpelson, Zudina 2011 : 225\textsuperscript{51}).

There is a direct connection between informal employment and illegal employment: three quarters of illegal employees work on the basis of oral agreements, Table 7. (On the other hand, 44\% of all those working with all official documents, work on the basis of oral agreements).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grounds for work</th>
<th>Legal employees</th>
<th>Illegal employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. On the basis of a written contract</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. On the basis of an oral agreement</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Self-employed, private entrepreneur</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Informal employment has its advantages, such as higher wages and more job opportunities, as employers are more willing to hire employees with whom they are not bound by formal commitments and for whom they do not pay taxes. The flip side of the compromise is that the employer may not respect the labour and safety regulations, as state bodies supervise only official employees. As a result, injuries among migrant workers are quite frequent, especially in construction: a scale of injuries is suggested by the fact that hundreds of migrants die each year in building and road construction sectors\textsuperscript{52}.

In addition, lack of Russian citizenship devalues the contract:

“Anyway, without citizenship you still do not feel totally protected”.

(Focus Group)

Informal employment and the employment of foreigners without legal grounds is not so much a consequence of their “profitability” for the employer and employee, but rather is a result of imperfect laws, and especially their imperfect enforcement. Strict rules on the three-month duration of a work permit without a job contract, makes legalization unprofitable due to a dilemma faced by an employee: either buying a permit or getting the permit officially but wasting a lot of time, during which s/he could have worked and have been paid.

The lack of legal grounds for work, along with informal employment, contributes to the over-exploitation of migrant labour. Forced labour also happens, but the majority of migrants deliberately work long hours in order to earn more money.

\textsuperscript{50} Here and below, informal employment is understood in the above sense and includes employment both in informal and formal sectors of economics.

\textsuperscript{51} The authors use somewhat different criteria of informality (Gimpelson, Zudina 2011: 12-13)

\textsuperscript{52} Based on indirect data on the employment of foreign nationals and injuries in construction, only in this sector of employment each year several hundred migrants die (Labor and Employment 2011: 304; information about the victims 2010)
Most migrants work from 9 to 11 hours 6 days a week. A migrant’s average workweek is 61 hours. Those with no legal grounds for work are especially hard working, as their workweek is 63 hours on average. The longest hours are worked in agriculture, trade, utilities, hotels and restaurants, especially in the case of unskilled workers.

Informal practices are widespread, not only in terms of labour, but also when entering the labour market. Most migrants, when looking for a job, rely on informal ties with relatives and acquaintances. But some migrants turn, instead, to brokers, recruiters, most often of the same nationality. 5.8% of workers paid for getting a job, and 1.5% keep paying on an ongoing basis. The broker receives 10-15% of a migrant’s monthly salary, but he solves conflicts with the employer and looks for new job opportunities etc.

Transformation of migration flows: new inequalities

First, changes in the structure of jobs, increasing demand for labour requiring different skills have contributed to changes in the structure of flows: for example, migrants from Central Asia started entering the Russian labour market en masse. In 2000-2010 their share, according to the Russian Federal Migration Service, rose from 6.3% to 54.8% of all migrant workers - Table 8.

| Table 8. The number of foreign nationals engaged in labour activities in Russia |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                                 | Percentage of the total |
|                                 | 2000   | 2005   | 2006   | 2007   | 2008   | 2009   | 2010   |
| Total                           | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    |
| including:                      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| From foreign countries other than CIS | 50.1   | 51.1   | 47.0   | 32.8   | 26.6   | 26.0   | 23.9   |
| From CIS countries              | 49.9   | 48.9   | 53.0   | 67.1   | 73.4   | 74.0   | 76.0   |
| including:                      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Azerbaijan                      | 1.5    | 2.5    | 2.8    | 3.4    | 3.1    | 2.7    | 2.5    |
| Armenia                         | 2.6    | 3.7    | 3.9    | 4.3    | 4.1    | 3.7    | 3.6    |
| Georgia1)                       | 2.4    | 0.6    | 0.5    | 0.3    | 0.2    | -      | -      |
| Kazakhstan                      | 1.4    | 0.6    | 0.5    | 0.4    | 0.4    | 0.5    | 0.5    |
| Kyrgyzstan                      | 0.4    | 2.3    | 3.3    | 6.4    | 7.6    | 7.0    | 7.2    |
| Moldova                         | 5.6    | 4.4    | 5.0    | 5.5    | 5.0    | 4.6    | 4.4    |
| Tajikistan                      | 2.9    | 7.5    | 9.7    | 14.6   | 16.1   | 16.2   | 16.4   |
| Turkmenistan                    | 0.1    | 0.2    | 0.1    | 0.1    | 0.1    | 0.1    | 0.1    |
| Uzbekistan                      | 2.9    | 7.0    | 10.4   | 20.1   | 26.5   | 30.0   | 31.2   |
| Ukraine                         | 30.1   | 20.2   | 16.9   | 12.2   | 10.1   | 9.2    | 10.2   |

1) Georgia stopped its CIS membership in August 2009.

Source: FMS of Russia, legal employees (Labour & Employment 2011: 302)
In 2011 their share reached 71%: 45.0% from Uzbekistan, 19.3% from Tajikistan, and 6.6% from Kyrgyzstan. The main reasons for the massive influx of migrants from Central Asia are the high unemployment rates in these countries, the availability of jobs in Russia, a huge gap in wages between the sending countries and Russia, the formation of transnational migrant networks.

These rapidly increasing immigrant groups from the Central Asian states, belonging to “visible minorities”, have become an irritating factor for part of the Russian society and stimulated the growth of xenophobic sentiments. The opinion is spread that only rural men from Central Asia with poor knowledge of Russian and with no education come to Russia. Putting mildly, this is an exaggeration, though, of course, there are also such types of migrants.

However, this perception of migrants from Central Asia influences, to a large extent, employers’ attitude towards them, work conditions and the salary expectations of migrants: the citizens of Central Asian states earn on average 20-25% less than migrants from other countries. Of course, differences in employment areas, education level and competencies, and other factors contribute to this as well. One of the manifestations of discrimination against members of migrant minorities is ethno-social stratification in the labour market (Mukomel 2011: 40-41).

Second, the schedule of labour migration has changed. In the previous period, a sharp upsurge in the inflows of migrant workers in the early spring and mass departures in autumn, at the end of the working season were registered. However, in recent years the influx of migrants has been registered both in spring and autumn. Moreover, the peak flow of migrants shifted to September and October, when young migrants enter the Russian market after graduation from schools and other educational institutions - Figure 1.

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53 The FMS of Russia, third quarter of 2011. Including work permits and patents allowing work for individuals.
Simultaneously, graduates of Russian schools enter the Russian labour market, and these too face difficulties in finding a job. In 2010 the average unemployment rate stood at 31.9% in the 15-19 age group, and at 15.1% in the 20-24 age group (ES 2011). Not ready to take the jobs of young migrant workers, the local youngsters perceive migrants’ activities as unfair competition. This imaginary rivalry increases social tensions.

Third, the calendar of migrations has changed: seasonal migrations have been replaced by circular and long-term migration. According to the NRU HSE CEPRS survey, 38.0% of migrants are circular migrants, 40.8% are long-term (permanent) migrants54, another 21.2% of migrants are those who came to Russia to work for the first time. Circular migration, traditional for such countries as Ukraine and Moldova has become customary also for the citizens of other countries, e.g. Tajikistan.

Long-term migration creates new challenges for both sending and receiving societies. Sending countries perceive long-term migrants as temporarily absent citizens, and Russia as temporary present migrants, who sooner or later will return to their country of origin. However, this perception does not always match the life plans of long-term migrants: a significant number of long-term migrants are oriented towards integration into the Russian society, and some of them do in fact integrate, living for years with their families in Russia.

Sending countries should take into account this new reality in their migration policies, considering long-term migration as a potential diaspora. For Russia, as the host country, the most serious problem is the lack of a formal legal status for migrants who have actually integrated into the community, who do not differ from Russians in any way, but who are deprived of civil and social rights.

Fourth, the “feminization” of migration is underway. In some migration flows women have started to dominate: according to the surveys, women’s share stands at 52.3% in the case of migrants from Moldova, and the share of women migrants from Ukraine is even higher and stands at 60.5%55. The same process takes place among migrants from Central Asia. Women already make up 38.7% of all migrants from Kyrgyzstan56. Some of them live in Russia with their families and work. Their intensive work contributes to the erosion of prevailing gender roles in the traditional society, but it also reinforces inequalities between local women and migrant women, contributing to the social exclusion of the latter.

The Russian labour market operation, its institutional design and game rules, in particular widespread illegal and informal employment practices, determine the following outcomes:

- social inequality of labour migrants and Russian citizens in the area of access to certain kinds of labour, safety of work, working conditions and wages;
- social inequality of migrants from different countries, as a result of ethnosocial stratification, manifested particularly in unequal access to certain jobs and levels of wages;
- downward labour mobility typical for migrants when entering the local Russian labour markets;
- gender inequality, caused by the specific nature of women’s employment and the concentration of migrant women in areas of employment, where illegal and informal employment is predominant;
- quasi-inequalities in access to employment in the case of young Russians and labour migrants.

54 Those who have stayed in Russia for over a year and have not left Russia during the last year.
55 Similar results were obtained in other surveys conducted in Russia (Tyuryukanova 2011: 12).
56 HSE CEPRS 2011. The FMS of Russia registers increases in the share of women receiving work permits from 10% in 2000 to 14% in 2010. However, official statistics underestimate the number of migrant women, as they often have no permanent income and work in the informal sector.
The routine life of social exclusion

The search for work is, of course, the main reason that migrants come to Russia. Yet it is not the only reason: most migrants have other hopes and plans – related to educational projects (acquiring a profession, upgrading qualifications and acquiring education) or personal projects (to provide children with education, settle down, avoid service in the national army). It is not a problem to find a job; problems are rather related to the fulfillment of other expectations: only half of the respondents planning to gain education and upgrade qualifications manage to do that, and even fewer migrants carry out their personal plans related to the education of their families etc. Unrealized expectations diminish the adaptation of migrants who restrict themselves to interactions with work-mates, which assures their social exclusion. This is true to a larger extent of those migrants who wanted only to find employment.

Mono-ethnic migrant working teams are not common. Ethnically-impermeable are sectors with a high concentration of unskilled workers: agriculture (54% of employees work among fellow compatriots) and construction (44%). The major proportion of migrants work in mixed teams (47%) or together with local workers (10%). Co-workers become the milieu in which they adapt to local conditions. Still, 27% of migrants work in a team of compatriots or migrants from other countries (10%), another 5% work independently, on their own.

Some migrants (10%) communicate at work only using their mother tongue. Work promotes social exclusion. This danger grows among young migrants who have just graduated from school and who do not have sufficient social experience and who are detached from the social control of the sending society, especially if this is traditional society.

Upon arrival in Russia, migrants risk social exclusion of two types: detachment from sending society and social exclusion in the receiving social community.

Detachment from sending society

Detachment from sending societies is determined, first of all, by the weakening of social relations and communication with this society and, second, by the departure from the norms and rules of behavior of sending society.

*Weakening social relations and communication with the sending society.* Some migrants consciously weaken social relations and communication with the sending society within the framework of personal and family plans. These migrants, first of all long-term migrants, aim at settling in Russia for ever, moving their families and dampening down contacts with the homeland to virtual communications and remittances to remaining relatives.

Still, for the majority of migrants, especially those with inconsiderable migration experience, weakening relations are a cause of pain. Of particular pain is the breakup of contacts with family which typically remains in the homeland.

Nearly half of migrants are unmarried, and the majority of family migrants in Russia live on their own. The phenomenon of divided families is one of the most serious challenges undermining the institute of family. Most often migrants reside in Russia with registered spouses (47%), children (40% including 24% of those with children under 18), brothers and sisters (33%)\(^\text{57}\). Other family members remain at home: parents of migrants and/or their brothers and sisters – Table 9.

\(^{57}\) Similar results were also received by Florynskaya (2011:187) based on the study of labour migrants from Central Asia.
### Table 9. Family members that remain back in the homeland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of the respondent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/husband</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child/children</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents (one of the parents)</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother (brothers), sister (sisters)</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No family member has remained</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other family members</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note – Multiple responses are possible

It is a widespread strategy when one of children, usually the youngest one, lives in Russia and others stay in the homeland.

Another problem is long-distance parenthood, which complicates the upbringing of children. Long-distance parenthood is extremely widespread among men: 81% of men and 69% of women with children left at least one child in the homeland.

At the same time, as the survey of Moldovan migrants in Russia has indicated, some parents (2%) do not maintain contacts with small children left at home at all or they keep in touch with them less than once a month (5%). The weakening of family ties leads to the erosion of marriage and family bonds: 14% of migrants and 15% of their family members have noticed deterioration in relations between spouses and within a family.

Contacts with relatives are maintained even more rarely: in the above survey 16% of respondents do not keep in touch with relatives at all or keep in touch with them several times a year. Contacts with friends and acquaintances deteriorate most significantly still: 13% of migrants keep in touch with them several times a year, 15% do not keep in touch with them at all.58

For obvious reasons, over time contacts with acquaintances and relatives back home deteriorate and are replaced by new relations in the receiving community. The diminishing social capital in the homeland is accompanied by its growth in Russia. At a given moment some migrants choose a transnational lifestyle or opt for a future tied to Russia:

“And I am going to stay here, I will die here... When I go home, I am already bored. Since I have realized my potential here, I have got a sense of myself here.”

(Focus-group)

**Transformation of the norms and rules of the sending society.** The transformation of norms and rules adopted in the sending society is reflected in the case of labour migrants, first and foremost in the field of conjugal relations.

Almost half of migrants living in Russia without families are married (and have registered their marriage) (41%). The movement of a family to Russia is not considered a real option. The absence of a family in Russia is considered a reason for the establishment of “secondary families”, women

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58 The study of the profile of Moldovan migrants in Russia included a survey of migrants in Russia (397 respondents), migrants in Moldova (119 respondents) and members of migrant households in Moldova (183 respondents) in Autumn 2011. Not published.
migrants often justify their decision to follow their husband on the grounds of these fears. The phenomenon of “secondary families” has turned out a relatively widespread practice: the survey results show that secondary families in Russia are established by from 5% to 9% of migrants.59

The practice of supporting two families at once – in Russia and in the homeland – is condemned socially (‘it is sinful’), yet far more for women than for men. It is acceptable to have a “second wife” to attend to a man-migrant and to carry out those household tasks that he ‘cannot’ carry out himself. Though a woman’s activities are not less than a man’s burden, the existence of a “second husband” is judged negatively regardless of the situation and is regarded as “shameful” if a woman turns out to be older than her new partner in Russia. Another factor behind “second families” established by men is the acceptance of the norm of polygamy among some Muslims, which however, is not accepted by all.

Clannish and ethnical conjugal preferences remain though in a diffused form. Under these conditions the toughest rule as regards the choice of a conjugal partner becomes religion: for many girls and young men Islamic belief is indispensable in a future husband/wife. The religious homogeneity of a couple may serve as a basis for the recognition of “normality” of mixed couples among the representatives of various nationalities. Still, among men there were individuals who did not demand Muslim partners: their female partners might come from other monotheistic religions. The most important thing is that a young woman should not be an atheist and that there should be a consensus over children and how they are to be brought up: conversion of a partner is less important than upbringing children as Muslims.

Migration to Russia leads to the transformation of matrimonial behaviour among women. There is, for example, the postponement of marriage, which leads to a gap in understanding of the best age to form families among young migrant women and their relatives who have stayed behind in the homeland. Thus, if their mothers and individuals of their age in the homeland get married at sixteen or older, these migrant women believe that 23-26 is appropriate in forming a family. Postponement of marriage may be related both to ambitious plans (for example, in education) and the desire for life experiences, which allows for a more reasonable choice of conjugal partners.

Among family values and gender attitudes which may undergo changes among female migrants in Russia we might mention attitudes to pre-marital sex.

Transformations of sexual and conjugal behaviour are not universal and are typical, first and foremost, among long-term migrants. Circular migrants and migrants who have arrived in Russia for the first time are more attached to “traditional” family gender roles, while the level of freedom in relations between men and women in Russian urban centers is not always accepted.

Since for labour migrants arrival in Russia means, most often, migration into a more urbanized environment, migrants typically have to adapt to large cities and urban culture. This adaptation is potentially painful, especially in Russia’s metropolises. And adaptation to the Russian urban environment is practically always equivalent to the departure from traditional norms and rules of behavior of the sending society:

“...I did not want to return home. Once I have tasted life, and that being far away from parents is even a little better”

(Focus group)

At the same time, for some migrants arrival in Russia is motivated not only by the search for work but also by the resentment to the norms of the sending society and a conscious wish to live in a megalopolis:

59 In an attempt to identify those that have a wife/husband both in the homeland and in Russia, it was 9% of the share of those who had left the wife/husband behind, and currently lived in Russia with a spouse in registered marriage, non-registered (cohabitating) or religious marriage. Yet, the religious marriage can be combined with registered or non-registered marriage too.
Labour Migration And The Host Country: Russian case

‘Moscow attracts me. For us it has always been the city of hopes, a huge immense megalopolis.

(Focus group).

Social exclusion in the receiving society

Social exclusion is created by several factors: restricted social rights (severance of migrants from mechanisms of social protection, the ineffectiveness of social institutions that are meant to provide the secondary socialization of migrants); practices of observance of declared human rights (first of all, access to justice and legal aid, cooperation with executive bodies, especially law-enforcement bodies); and rejection of migrants by the receiving society and limited relations of migrants with the local community. Socially vulnerable groups of migrants come across particular problems.

Social rights. Social protection is not guaranteed for labour migrants. By ratifying the European Social Charter, Russia has embarked upon the minimum obligations in accordance with this Charter: labour migrants are guaranteed a non-discriminatory fiscal regime and the possibility of remitting money to their homeland.60 (As a “justification”: Russia states that it has assumed no (!) obligations as regards the fulfillment of the rights of their own citizens in terms of social protection and healthcare, accommodation, protection against poverty and social rejection, rights of elderly people to social protection, employee rights to protect their dignity at work, rights to social welfare).61

It is extremely painful for migrants to be cut off from social insurance62.

The revocation of the right to pension contributions is perceived by migrants in different ways: some of them do it consciously realizing that their earnings will be the only source of subsistence when they are elderly. Others, particularly circular migrants, plan, at the end of their professional activity, to return to their homeland in order to receive a retirement pension. This strategy is widespread among long-term migrants as well:

“...I haven’t earned my retirement pension here. Although I used to work with the employment record book, there were no contributions anyway. I haven’t earned my retirement pension and I am not going to receive it. I don’t want to receive /Russian/ citizenship, I’m going to let my flat and will leave for Ukraine.”

(Focus group)

Social benefits, while limited, do not bother migrants too much. Access to social services, particularly healthcare, education and legal aid is more relevant for them.

Currently labour migrants are guaranteed only emergency medical care: foreigners are entitled to free healthcare only in the urgent cases with the direct threat to life.

Stand-alone medical insurance policy is regarded as unprofitable by the overwhelming majority of migrants and is extremely rare: it is easier to receive paid healthcare occasionally. Planned medical aid unlike emergency medical care can be provided on a paid basis either in commercial clinics or in public facilities that can offer paid medical services. Personal informal payments directly to the attending physician are also possible.

Since paid medical service is often perceived as inaccessible for financial reasons, migrants have their options at hand: self-care or a trip back home where medical services are cheaper, by joining

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61 Accordingly, articles 13, 31, 30, 23, 26, paragraphs 2-4 of Article 12 of the European Social Charter.

62 Currently, the employer is exempt from social security contributions for foreign workers.

63 She, a citizen of Ukraine, bought an apartment in Moscow.
their holiday and medical trip. In a focus group the statement “it’s better not to be sick” occurs as a veritable refrain. This is linked not only to possible difficulties at work where one can get fired but also by dangers as regards the healthcare system itself, its blurred functioning and the potential for huge expenses. Many migrants admit their disparaging attitude to health stemming from the need to work a great deal.

Traumatology, together with obstetrics and gynecology, dentistry – are the most widespread branches of healthcare offered to migrants. Physicians in these disciplines are typically contacted in emergency cases:

“…most recently there have been no cases of injuries at work, there were mostly inflammatory processes and acute toothache.”

(Physician in a private clinic)

Women face their own specific problems. Delivery is not a paid service, but medical observation during pregnancy refers to to-pay service for foreigners. Accordingly, registration for observation during pregnancy is problematic for those who do not have sufficient funds; at the same time, the lack of observation may lead to complications during delivery and dangers both for the mother and a child.

Things are better in education. Schooling is offered on a non-discriminatory basis to all children, regardless of the legal status of their parents. And problems are rarely encountered: only 6% of respondents could not enroll their children at school. And some parents consciously do not send their children to school and prefer them to help them at work.

The situation is more difficult in early childhood: as few as 26% of children of preschool age attend the relevant institutions. Russians face similar problems due to the lack of places in nursery schools and kindergartens:

“You cannot arrange a kindergarten for children. Well, [Russians] don’t even have places for their own children.”

(Focus group)

Still, even if there are places in a kindergarten, migrants cannot always enjoy this service in practice, since their long working hours do not correspond to kindergarten opening hours; besides, many migrants have irregular working hours.

There are no specific problems in special/vocational training and higher education. Foreigners are only restricted in their access to state-funded places and may receive education on a commercial basis in the same way as Russians (access to state-funded places is restricted on the basis of binding bilateral intergovernmental agreements).

Access to justice, relations with executive bodies. Migrants face serious difficulties in access to justice and legal aid; the lack of Russian citizenship marks the grounds for incapacitation. Russian citizens find similar problems yet Russian citizenship serves as a certain restraint on unlawful practices of interaction with the authorities64.

Migrants have tense relations with law-enforcement authorities. The unquestionable leader in terms of negative comments is the Russian Ministry of the Interior. Migrants, as a rule, recall humiliations and unjustified exactions related to these authorities. The Ministry of the Interior and its officials often evoke fears among foreigners even if they have all the necessary documentation, while the possession of documents does not always guarantee that a migrant will not have problems when dealing with the police. These experiences do not encourage migrants to turn to RF police when they need assistance.

Migrants are vigilant too as regards their attitude to the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of Russia, with which they often associate humiliations that they went through when visiting its offices. Moreover,

64 Although 61% of Russians believed that they could not defend their rights then they are violated (Levada- Centre 2010)
some employees of the FMS have abused their official positions and have participated in corrupt practices. foreigners have equally negative experience of cooperation with Russian border guards.

Serious concerns are raised by communications with state officials, especially the police and the FMS: 16% of migrants have experienced negative attitudes during paperwork and 27% have negative experiences of policemen. Women-migrants are stopped for document checks less often than men: hostile attitudes have been noticed by 33% of men and 20% of women.

Perhaps the only public structure in Russia that elicits positive attitudes among migrants is the army. The army is perceived as one of possible channels of naturalization, and young migrants often declare their willingness to serve in the army.

Relations with the local community. Russian society is contaminated by xenophobia. The slogan “Russia for the Russians!” is supported, to a greater or lesser extent, by most Russians. And the sentiment is growing: in 1998 this slogan was supported by 43% of respondents in 2000 it had grown to 49% and in subsequent years it did not fall below 53%65.

Migrant minorities are the special victims of xenophobia, and restrictive migration policies are supported by the overwhelming majority of Russians.

Table 10. The distribution of answers to the question: ‘What migrants are needed by Russia?’, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Our country needs only those migrants who want to stay here for ever</th>
<th>15.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The country needs only those migrants who come here in search of a job and do not want to reside here forever</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country needs both types of migrants</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country does not need either type of migrants</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know, no answer</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 11,5 thousands respondents have been questioned. Source: (Mukomel 2011: 38)

Russian society has only reached consensus as regards the inadmissibility of forming ethnic enclaves.

Migrants themselves see their relations with their host society in a more positive way compared to local inhabitants: 72% believe that Russians have a positive attitude to migrants; 76% that residents of a given settlement have a positive attitude to migrants; and 92% that they have good relations with locals. Yet one third of respondents would not recommend their compatriots to move to Russia for permanent residence. Here is a remarkable answer from one of the respondents: ‘if Russians do not change their attitude, I will leave’.

Contacts in receiving society. Migrant contacts mostly do not follow ethnic characteristic but rather interests, places of work, residence and leisure habits (for example, sports). Access to social networks, meanwhile, help create virtual acquaintances that can subsequently turn into real ones.

Still, contacts with compatriots prevail: 47% of migrants communicate with friends using their mother tongue; and 27% use their mother tongue and Russian. It is a widespread practice for migrants to share a flat or live in the same neighborhood: 17% of migrants communicate with neighbors using their mother tongue; and 23% using their mother tongue and Russian.

The “utility” of maintaining contacts with compatriots cannot be assessed in an unequivocal way. On the one hand, relations between expatriates can be helpful while searching for a job, or in extraordinary situations. Compatriots may also help when someone ends up in the police or in a hospital.

On the other hand, compatriots may play extremely negative roles, too, by making profit out of their compatriots. In some cases, compatriots pose a direct threat to migrants residing in Russia.

Since it is not a problem to meet a compatriot in Russia, the need for contacts within national and cultural organizations and Diasporas is weak. Communication with compatriots is informal there and awareness of the existence of such organizations is extremely low: only one third of migrants know about the existence of Diaspora organizations.

Some migrants, on the contrary, aim at friendly relations with Russians and intentionally limit their contacts with compatriots. In the opinion of this category of migrants, maintaining close relations with compatriots prevents successful integration in the receiving environment:

“We rarely meet the Diaspora. You have to integrate in society in order to move forward, if you are going to live on your own, as an enclave, right, with the Diaspora, you will never leave these borders and frameworks. Yet when you get integrated into a society, you have friends, then it is something else…”

(Focus group)

Exclusion of separate socially vulnerable groups

Children of migrants. Children of migrants born in Russia or of those who arrived in Russia as infants do not encounter special problems. Despite potential biases within the receiving society they have mastered Russian, the Russian social milieu is their native environment and they move freely around this environment. The problem is that their parents are not always able to provide them with decent living conditions.
The problem of accommodation is extremely acute. Not everyone can afford their own housing. Families with children come across serious difficulties while looking for a place to rent. Almost one third of families with children cannot afford decent housing for their children. – Table 11.

Table 11. Living conditions of migrants with children, in percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accommodation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have my own domicile (house, flat, room)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am renting a flat alone, with a family, (house, flat or room)</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am renting a flat with others (non-relatives)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I live at my relatives’/ friends’</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I live in a hostel</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I live where I work (marketplace, construction site etc.)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I live in the basement, barn etc.</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Living with strangers, in a hostel, at a parents’ place of work, in the basement is unacceptable when children are involved. It may, in fact, contribute to the fact that minors become ‘street children’.

Taking into account that migrants, as a rule, reside in poorer districts and that their children rarely attend good schools, the socialization of children already takes place at the margins. It is probable in this respect that migrants’ children will not be able to break out of this surrounding.

‘One-and-a-half generations’. Children brought to Russia at a relatively conscious age face specific problems. Unlike the second generation of migrants who undergo socialization in Russia, the “one-and-a-half generation” maintains the memory of the country of origin, social setup there, norms of behaviour and, of course, the traditions of the sending society. They typically have double (multiple) identities and perceive themselves as a group of culturally adapted individuals who have mastered the language of the country of residence but face barriers put up by society as ‘strangers’.

Most respondents – representatives of the “one-and-a-half generation” have – at least according to the survey⁶⁶– Russian citizenship, they are fluent in Russian, and they are more interested in social and political life in Russia compared to the country of origin. Representatives of “one-and-a-half generation” know their way around urban environments. Their perception of urban environments and the practices of its everyday familiarization does not differ from practices characteristic of indigenous urban populations: it dramatically differs though from the perception of urban environment on the part of labour migrants – all this notwithstanding the fact that initially they face a language barrier, overcome ‘culture shock’ and face the often hostile attitude of Russian students to the ‘freshman’, hostility that sometimes extends to the teachers as well.

The picture is not that rosy though: representatives of “one-and-a-half-generation” face serious problems in their everyday life: many of them mention a biased law enforcement and at best ambivalent local population and much more rarely problems in educational processes, contacts with public authority institutions and healthcare etc.

Major tensions are observed in everyday life and in contacts with law enforcement authorities: indicated by respectively 34.8% and 33.8% of respondents. There are, indeed, communication practices in everyday life, which bring about distance and the social exclusion of some of the representatives of the “one-and-a-half-generation”. A quarter of respondents believe that “there are peculiarities in the way of life of [local residents] which are very difficult to come to terms with for

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⁶⁶ Survey was conducted among 29 grown-up representatives of the ‘one-and-a-half generation’ migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan in Astrakhan and Samara regions; 56 in-depth interviews and interviews with experts were conducted in the framework of the grant of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation in 2011. Project director V. Mukomel.
people of my nationality”. 15.6 % believe that it is possible to live and work in a given city but that it is impossible to live there normally. Then 11.5% would not recommend co-nationals to move to their city for permanent residence.

Their integration proceeds with great difficulties. Most call the culture of their country of origin their “own” and the overwhelming majority considers their mother tongue their language. Their life plans are often not related to Russia: every third migrant intends to return to the homeland of their ancestors, and only 42% indicate their willingness to stay in Russia for ever. The proportion of those labour migrants willing to stay in Russia is similar. Only 38% of respondents would like their children and grandchildren to become indigenous Russians.

It is noteworthy that an intention to leave Russia is often supported by the parents of representatives of the “one-and-a-half-generation”.

Communication practices of representatives of the “one-and-a-half-generation” with their peers demonstrate estrangement from the ethnic majority: they have contacts with individuals coming from their family’s country of origin and with local Russians. More than half of respondents maintain their relations with friends left behind in their country of birth.

Subcultures of representatives of the “one-and-a-half-generation” differ dramatically from that of local peers. In their musical preferences they, for example, prefer performers from their country of origin and Iranian and Turkish performers.

The most important conclusion: the major proportion of representatives of “one-and-a-half-generation”, especially those who arrived in Russia aged 13-15 and formally integrated, do not belong to this category. Double identity, the attitude of the receiving society towards them, especially peers, may serve as vital factors of social exclusion, risks for marginalization and spreading of extremist attitudes among the representatives of this generation.

**Single women and women with children.** The majority of women do not reside in Russia on their own, three fifths of them live together with a member of their family. In general, co-habitation is typical of married women: four fifths of them live with their husband (including co-habitation and religious marriage).

Most often unmarried girls and young women live on their own, although 38% of them run their household together with members of their families, with parents and brothers (sisters), as a rule – Table 12.

**Table 12. Households of women-migrants, the percentage of those who reside with them**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Marital status of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Never married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residing not alone, %</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including those who reside together with them:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Never married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children of 18 and older</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner (co-habitation)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband (religious marriage)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Solitude is also typical of most divorced and widowed women, though some of them manage to settle down and find a partner.

The following groups deserve special attention: many of them have children and these children often live with them in Russia, two thirds of the divorced and four fifths of widowed women among those who do not live in Russia on their own, live with children. Most often these are grown-up children but many of them are minors: Table 13.

Women leaving Russia on a job search leave their children at home more often. Women who are not married find themselves in a more difficult situation and are forced to take their children with them. (Among women who have never been married and who have given birth to a child in Russia, there is a widespread practice that a young woman does not speak of the childbirth while living with her child in Russia).

A paradoxical situation occurs: married women live in Russia without children more often than unmarried women, table 13. The majority of mothers living with children in Russia are unmarried mothers: every fourth child lives with a divorced mother, 15% with widowed mothers and 17% with single mothers. Minors also live in Russia with single men but these are exceptional cases.

The situation of unmarried women is aggravated by the fact that together with children in Russia they may also have children in the homeland being raised by relatives.

Table 13. Share of children of women-migrants who reside with women-migrants in Russia and the country of origin, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status of women</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Never married</th>
<th>Registered marriage</th>
<th>Church marriage</th>
<th>Civil marriage</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
<th>Widowed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children reside in Russia</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children reside in another country</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Every sixth woman-migrant belongs to a socially vulnerable group – the divorced, widowed as well as the never married (yet with children): this goes to make up a numerous proportion of women of low social status in the country of origin and uncertain future in Russia. The majority of widowed women are Tajik females (39%) and Uzbek females (30%). Among the divorced the most numerous group are Tajik females (25%), Uzbek females (19%), Moldovan females (12%) and, what is noteworthy, every tenth divorced woman is Russian.

Labour migrants and intertal migrants: competitions, complementarity, shifted xenophobia

Labour migrants rarely compete with local inhabitants, as shown in various surveys: competition is true in the case of no more than 25-30% of migrants (Migration and demographic… 2010: 41).

More often competition with internal migrants occurs: first, Russians look for a job in regions where they can earn a living and win better living conditions for themselves; second, labour migrants compete with internal migrants in some areas of employment that use migrant labour on a massive scale.

The key regions of the Russian Federation that employ citizens from other regions are Moscow (900,000 or 15% of the number of employed population in a given region), Tyumen region (together with autonomous districts) (220,000 or 12.4%), Moscow region (190,000 people or 5.2%), Sankt-Petersburg (115,000 or 4.5%), Krasnodarskiy Kray (54,000 or 2.2%).
Of those who leave in search of a job outside their region: 435,000 (24%) are employed in construction; 274,000 (15.1%) in trade; 217,000 (12%) in transport and communication; 183,000 (10%) in real estate; 173,000 (9.5%) in manufacturing (Тенденции на рынке…/ Market tendencies 2011: 31).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Activity</th>
<th>Employment in Thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting and forestry</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and distribution of electricity, gas and...</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other communal, social and personal services</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare, social services</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration, defense, social insurance</td>
<td>101.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and mineral resources</td>
<td>136.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>172.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Business</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communication</td>
<td>217.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail</td>
<td>274.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>435.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Market tendencies 2011: 31

Certain areas of economic activity that attract internal migrants are practically closed off to labour migrants. This is either because they require either high qualifications (operations with real estate, communication, manufacturing industry, extraction of mineral deposits) or because access to them is legally restricted (public administration, military security).

In other areas relations between labour and internal migrants are complementary rather than competitive in nature. This includes construction, trade and communication, where internal migrants only partially compete with labour migrants: the latter, holding lower positions on the labour market compete only with unskilled Russian workers. Special attention deserve migrant formations of ethnically tinted labour applications, oriented towards the production of goods and services exclusively for migrants or based on their taste and habits that constitute the daily routine of also the local population. Ethnic niches that have recently developed dramatically include economic areas where migrants have competitive advantages compared to Russians.

Internal migrants leave those regions with the high unemployment and with the lowest level of wages. The highest level of unemployment is observed, in accordance with the ILO criteria, in Northern-Caucuses federal district, 17.1%, alongside the lowest level of employment (53.2%). - (Market tendencies 2011: 27). The lowest level of employment is observed in the Republic of Ingushetia (32.6%) and the Chechen Republic (37.7%) as well as the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, the Republic of Dagestan, the Republic of Adygeya, Zabaykalsky Krai (50-55%) (Market tendencies 2011: 28).

Migrants from these regions, as a rule, the unemployed youth, with no profession or qualifications and those actively looking for a job in other regions most frequently compete with labour migrants.
They constitute a minority of internal migrants but the major part of internal migrants is the population of the Central Russian regions located close to sites of mass employment.

The most hostile reception is reserved for internal migrants from the republics of the Northern Caucasus: the xenophobic attitudes of Russians towards inhabitants of these regions are especially strong. Yet Russians find it difficult to identify the ethnic affiliation of representatives of “visual minorities”. Xenophobia towards residents of the Northern Caucasus is shifted and projected onto all the representatives of “visual minorities”, first of all – newcomers from Central Asia, who are most numerous in the Russian cities.

**Conclusion**

Together with push factors, the massive inflow of labour migrants to Russia has been fostered by cardinal changes on the Russian labour market. These have been brought about by a decrease in the number of working-age populations and the lack of working hands as well as changes in the employment structure. Areas of economic activity with “special” working conditions (3 Ds) and unattractive for the local community: construction, services, housing and public utilities, - have developed extremely rapidly; the demand for work force in these areas has been met by the inflow of labour migrants to a large extent.

The inflow of labour migrants has been accompanied by new tendencies outlined in the 2000s. The most important one is the fact that seasonal migration has been replaced by circular and long-term migration. Circular migration, typical of countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, has become customary for citizens from other countries, too.

Long-term migration brings about new challenges both for sending and receiving societies. Sending countries need to take into account the new reality and include it in their migration policy while considering long-term migration as a potential Diaspora. For Russia as a receiving country the most serious problem has become the lack of regulation of the legal status of migrants who are practically integrated in the local community yet are deprived of the respective civil and social rights. Long-term migrants should be considered as future potential citizens and not as illegal temporary migrants.

Other important tendencies cover changes in the migration schedule, the massive inflow of migrants in autumn when graduates from Russian tertiary institutions enter the Russian labour market as well as the feminization of labour migration.

Russia, as a migrant receiving country, should, first of all, conceptually define the estimates as regards the demand for labour migrants in terms of perspective, respective goals and the tasks of migration policy. Second, one should realize that rapid changes in the labour market form a new reality and new challenges. The massive inflow of ethnically “other” migrants puts problems of adaptation and integration Forward.

Currently labour migrants in Russia face social injustice and social inequality. Social practices of inclusion of migrants in the Russian labour market, everyday interaction with the authorities, social institutions and population promote social exclusion rather than adaptation and integration.

The following factors stand out:

1. A typical trajectory of migrants on the labour market is their getting worse employment type in Russia than the one they had in their homeland. Horizontal and upward labour mobility is the exception that proves the general tendency. Education, qualifications and the professional knowledge of migrants are not demanded on the Russian labour market. The demand for unskilled labour is met, to a large extent, by qualified staff. The ineffective use of input into human capital has become a serious challenge both for Russia and sending countries.
2. The main reasons for downward labour mobility among migrants is the lack of legal grounds for employment and informal employment. At least 60% of labour migrants work in Russia illegally, not more than 40% of migrants have signed contracts with an employer, and there is a direct link between informal employment and illegal labour activities. As a result, the majority of migrants meet discriminatory practices in the labour market along with forced labour and the lack of decent employment.

3. In the 2000s workers from Central Asia entered the Russian labour market on a massive scale. The rapidly growing and notable presence of natives of Central Asian countries became a disturbing factor for part of Russian society and provoked the growth of xenophobic attitudes. These perceptions to a large extent affect employer’s attitudes, working conditions and remuneration for migrants. One of the manifestations of discrimination has been ethno-social stratification in the labour market.

4. The Russian labour market operation, its institutional shape and its rules form the social inequality for labour migrants and Russian citizens in: areas of access to certain types of labour; safety at work; working conditions; wages; the social inequality of migrants from different countries, which is a consequence of ethno-social stratification, something especially visible in unequal conditions of access to specific types of employment and wages; the downward labour mobility of migrants as a typical trajectory of their inclusion in Russian local labour markets; gender inequality governed by the specific nature of female employment and the concentration of women migrants in the areas of employment with widespread illegal and informal employment; quasi-inequality as regards access to work places of young Russians and labour migrants.

5. Work creates the necessary prerequisites for the adaptation of migrants, since the majority of migrants work together with local employees or in ethnically diverse teams, while their language of communication is Russian. Yet outside work, in everyday situations the danger of social exclusion grows both in relation to the sending society and for the receiving community.

6. The break-up with the sending society stems, first of all, from weakening social relations and communication with this society and, second, from the departure from the norms and rules of behaviour of the sending society.

Some migrants agree with weakening social relations and communications with the sending society consciously, within the framework of planning their personal biography or family strategy. These migrants, first of all long-term migrants, aim at settling in Russia permanently, moving their families there and limiting contacts with the homeland to virtual communications and remittances. Still, for most migrants, especially those with limited migration experience, weakening relations of this type are quite painful. The severance of contacts with family members, who usually remain “back home” is especially painful.

For obvious reasons, with time, with the extension of the stay in Russia, communications with acquaintances, and relatives in the homeland weaken, and they are replaced by communications with the receiving community. The reduction of social capital in the homeland is accompanied by its growth in Russia. At a certain point some migrants opt for a transnational lifestyle or vest their future in Russia.

7. The transformation of norms and rules accepted in the sending society are reflected in the case of labour migrants first of all in the area of family and conjugal relations. The clan and ethnic conjugal preferences get blurred; the toughest condition is the choice of marital partners is defined by religion: for many girls and young people from Central Asia the necessary prerequisite of a future husband/wife is Islam.

Migration to Russia changes conjugal behaviour among women, in particular including the postponement of the age of getting married. Among other family values and gender attitudes
which may be altered in the case of girl-migrants in Russia, there is a changing attitude to pre-
marital sex.
Transformations of sexual and conjugal behaviour are not universal and are typical of long-
term migrants. Circular migrants and those who have just arrived in Russia are more used to
“traditional” gender roles in the family, while the level of freedom in relations between men
and women in the metropolises of Russia is not always accepted.

8. Since for labour migrants arrival in Russia most often means migration from lower urbanized
environments to more urbanised environments, for many migrants adaptation to Russian
involves adaptation to large cities and urban culture. This adaptation is not always painless,
especially in Russian metropolises. Certainly, adaptation to the Russian urban environment
amounts to the departure from traditional norms and rules of behaviour of the sending society.

9. Social exclusion in the receiving society has been formed under the impact of several factors:
restricted social rights (severance of migrants from mechanisms of social protection, the
ineffectiveness of social institutions that are meant to provide the secondary socialization of
migrants); practices of observance of declared human rights (first of all, access to justice and
legal aid, cooperation with executive bodies, especially law enforcement bodies); and rejection
of migrants by the receiving society and limited relations of migrants with the local
community.

10. Socially vulnerable groups of migrants come across specific problems: children of migrants
(both residing in Russia and those left behind in countries of origin under care of relatives) and
women particularly.

Children brought to Russia at a later age, that is, representatives of “one-and-a-half-
generation”, face the most difficult problems. Unlike the second generation of migrants who
undergo socialization in Russia, the “one-and-a-half generation” maintain the memory of their
country of origin, the social setup back home, the norms of behaviour and traditions of the
sending society. Double (multiple) identity is typical of them. They have the self-perception of
a group of culturally adapted individuals who have mastered the language of the country of
residence and who face barriers as “strangers” in their Russian society.

Every sixth woman-migrant belongs to a socially vulnerable group – the divorced, widowed or
never married with children. This makes a group of women with low social status in the
country of origin and with an uncertain future in Russia. The position of unmarried women is
aggravated by the fact that, apart from children in Russia, they have children left behind in the
homeland who are raised by relatives.

11. Labour migrants rarely compete with local inhabitants. More often they compete with internal
migrants: Russians, who like the migrants, are looking for a job in the regions where they can
earn well and have better living conditions. Second, labour migrants compete with internal
migrants in some areas of employment that use migrant labour on a massive scale. At the same
time, in certain types of activities relations between labour and internal migrants are
complementary rather than competitive in nature.

12. Most often labour migrants compete with internal migrants from the Russian Republics,
especially the Northern Caucuses. Xenophobia against immigrants from the Northern
Caucuses – which is fierce – is then shifted and projected onto all the representatives of
“visual minorities”, primarily newcomers from Central Asia, the most numerous group in
Russian cities.
It is difficult to call the social environment favourable and “attuned” to the adaptation and integration of migrants. The policy of integration is doomed to fail without its transformation. The social environment of the receiving society is important for migrants alongside its economic counterpart, and it plays a special role in the case of those migrants who aim at integration. Competitiveness in the Russian social environment, is not always friendly towards “strangers” and it has become a huge challenge for the Russian society and Russian state.

Another challenge is operation of the institutions without which it is difficult to help the adaptation and integration of migrants as well as their socialisation. Serious institutional transformations are needed among law enforcement authorities, the judiciary, and among educational and healthcare institutions.
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