Political Parties and Party Systems in World Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Party-Based Foreign Policy Contestation and Change

Angelos-Stylianos Chryssogelos

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

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ABSTRACT

The argument of this dissertation is that instances of foreign policy change can be best understood as interactions between ongoing dynamics of important aspects of domestic party systems and changes in a state’s normative and material international environment. I identify three types of dynamics of party systems: different patterns of coalition and opposition, different patterns of expression of social cleavages through parties, and redefinitions of the meaning attached to the main axis of competition. These dynamics provide partisan actors with the ideational resources to make sense of changes in the international system, contribute to the creation of new (domestic and foreign) policy preferences and bring about political incentives for the promotion of new foreign policies. The pace, content and fields of change are determined by the specific aspects of a party system undergoing change.

Using insights from party systems theory and political sociology, the dissertation promotes the idea that the contestation of foreign policy, the engagement of domestic political actors with developments in the international system, and ultimately foreign policy change, all take place within a thick social and institutional structure that prescribes interests and delineates the terms of debate. In this way, this dissertation introduces in the field of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) a view of domestic politics that is made up of constrained but enabled political agents, and social structures that impose continuity while containing opportunities for effecting political change. This is a significant departure from existing works on political parties and foreign policy that usually focus on the partisan effect in government or see parties only as carriers of ideologies or societal preferences.

This dissertation applies its theoretical framework to three deep historical case-studies (Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the decision of Canada to enter a Free Trade Agreement with the USA, and Greece’s decision to allow Turkey to acquire the status of an EU candidate-member) and four shorter cases in the shape of a plausibility probe. Using the method of structured-focused comparison, the research shows how, in varying historical, social, institutional and international contexts, foreign policy change was brought about by partisan actors who were constituted by domestic social and institutional structures, but who still found opportunities to engage with these structures and promote their own version of change in accordance with the systemically defined interests of their political parties.

The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and meta-theoretical implications of the comparative research, focusing especially on the importance of sociological approaches like the agency/structure debate in FPA and the need to ‘give teeth’ to the constructivist project in IR by applying its premises to real-world problems and cases, and by opening up the discipline to insights from other literatures. By taking comparative party politics literature seriously, this dissertation reveals the link between this conceptualization of domestic politics and debates in IR and FPA on the interplay of agents and structures, as well as the possibility of change within pertinent social and institutional arrangements.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For a process that was described to me when I first started off as solitary and lonely, I am surprised to think back at the time working on this dissertation and realize that the energy, support and time of so many people contributed to its successful completion. Revisiting the previous four years (and beyond), and recollecting events and faces in order to write this note of acknowledgments is probably the first time when writing this dissertation actually feels like fun. Better late than never…

Very early in my time at the EUI I was told that ‘working with Fritz is like a state of mind’. Looking back at it, this is the best definition of what working under the supervision of Friedrich Kratochwil felt. An assortment of almost disparate literatures, a sometimes unmanageable amount of historical data, and an endless succession of vague ideas were brought together by Professor Kratochwil’s pressure on me to go beyond neat explanations and to think of the social world for what it is: a sum of processes and unexpected outcomes, of contingency and ambivalence. Professor Kratochwil always offered unconditional support and a unique kind of encouragement, a blend of fair criticism and an unequivocal trust in my own ideas. I thank him, not so much for helping me write a dissertation as for helping me find myself in the process.

I was privileged to have my work evaluated by a host of other prominent academics. It was a terrible shock when, three years into my time at the EUI, I learned of the passing of Peter Mair. Starting already as a member of my interview panel in April 2008, and then as head of the SPS department and an unofficial co-supervisor, Peter Mair was always a reassuring and warm figure in my life at the EUI, and a constant source of encouragement. For what it’s worth, I take the opportunity here to thank him posthumously. Warm thanks are due to the three members of the evaluation jury, Luciano Bardi (who stepped in Peter Mair’s role at a later stage), Sven Steinmo, and Bertjan Verbeek. My work also benefited immensely from the thorough critique of Peter Katzenstein during my time in Cornell University. I thank him for taking the time and effort to impress on me the obvious but not always clear distinction between a narrative and an actual argument.

In more than one ways, the roots of this project lie in the time I spent next to inspiring teachers before I came to the EUI. In Leiden University Jan Erk and Koen Vossen exposed me to foundational questions of comparative politics at a time when I thought I would be studying international institutions, humanitarian intervention or diplomacy. Before Leiden, I negotiated six years in the surreal world of Greek universities. Three Greek academics transmitted to me not just their knowledge but also a sense of responsibility and dignity that has guided my work and conduct in academia ever since. They are Konstantina Botsiou, Emmanouella Doussis and, of course, George Mavrogordatos. I thank them for honoring me with their trust.

Writing a PhD is solitary enough – doing it in an insular place like the EUI can only make matters worse. I thank Julien and Jason, Ben and Helena, Urska, Marco, David, Eugenio and Sanne for being
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In these four years I was away from the EUI on two different occasions: In 2010 I interrupted my research to work as a visiting fellow in the Centre for European Studies in Brussels. It was a welcome respite and an opportunity to see the world of policymaking from the inside. I thank Roland Freudenstein, my boss at CES. I also thank the Brussels gang (Antonis and Panos) and I promise them that our work is still not done. In 2011 I went to Cornell as a visiting graduate student. This visit became possible thanks to a tuition fee waiver granted to me by the Department of Government in Cornell, for which I am deeply grateful to Peter Katzenstein and Christopher Way. I thank Linda Gilbert at the EUI and Tina Slater at Cornell for helping me negotiate the arduous bureaucracy before my visit.

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This dissertation would never have been possible without the priceless presence of two people who, for lack of a better expression, give meaning to everything. My brother Konstantinos is a trustworthy companion in our joint journey of exploration of everything from the most refined to the most outlandish. I still learn from him the myriad ways the two interact. My girlfriend Gosia on the other hand has been showing me how every day has to be a new discovery. I’m still not able to keep up with her pace, but I promise I’ll try harder from now on. I can only pray that both of them will be there for me forever and I hope that sometime, somehow I will be able to give back to them just a fraction of what they have given me.

I dedicate this thesis to my parents and my uncle, and to the memory of my grandparents. For thirty years they have tried stubbornly, and against the onslaught of decay and vulgarization around them in Greece, to instill in me the values of education, hard work and merit. This dissertation reflects my and my family’s deep belief in these values, not just as ideas of social upbringing but also as the core principles of political and social life.
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PART I

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION
LITERATURE REVIEW
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CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL PARTIES AND FOREIGN POLICY: TOWARDS A SYSTEM-BASED UNDERSTANDING OF PARTY-BASED FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION AND ARGUMENT

The general theoretical question this dissertation is concerned with is the effect of party politics on state foreign policies—and more precisely the role of political parties in foreign policy change. The dissertation embarks from the assumption that existing literature concerning the effects of political parties on foreign policy offer many valuable and generalizable insights on the way parties as carriers of ideologies and interests influence state foreign policies; but also concludes that these works fail to expand further into the field of comparative party politics and make use of this literature in order to gain an improved understanding of world politics. The result is that whatever literature on political parties and foreign policy there does exist, only builds upon a simplified conceptualization of party politics. This conceptualization serves the creation of parsimonious arguments, but to the detriment of more daring theoretical questions within the field of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and of empirical accuracy. This dissertation seeks to expand on existing works surrounding political parties and foreign policy while trying to remedy certain emphasis on political parties as dependent carriers of exogenous preferences (and not as actors in and by themselves), as well as the inability to see preferences on domestic and international issues as forming coherent wholes.

Even though I will emphasize the shortcomings of the existing literature on parties and foreign policy, I am far from ignoring their important contributions within a field that seems to ignore the topic altogether. Works in IR stemming from the tradition of the transnational relations literature ignore parties and party systems as meaningful societal agents of world politics; FPA literature surprisingly overlooks parties while focusing on its traditional interests of bureaucracies and personalities; and comparative party politics very rarely looks into the way domestic and international politics interact. Existing literature on parties and foreign policy boldly insists on a topic whose relevance seems to be on the rise in the press and among the lay public. Thus this dissertation positions itself within this existing literature and recognizes its important contributions, while trying to identify shortcomings and improve our understanding of the links between democratic politics and foreign policies.

My argument differs from prevailing tendencies in two important respects. First, I try to scale down the research question from ‘foreign policy’ into ‘foreign policy change’. Surprisingly enough, FPA tries to explain foreign policy outcomes as outcomes in se. There is much less interest in the dynamics of foreign policies as a series of outcomes
within time. I believe that it makes sense to try and understand the effect of party politics (or any other factor we are interested in for that matter) on foreign policy through the general question of how they impact on a significant change of policy. In this way we can understand the impact of processes and dynamics on foreign policy, with change serving as a laboratory environment where the factors we are studying play themselves out.

The second way my argument differs from the current literature is my conceptualization of political parties as independent and interdependent actors of domestic politics. I see parties as ‘independent’ because I think that most current literature on political parties and foreign policy simplifies the idea of political parties. To the extent that it sees political parties as shortcuts for ideological and societal preferences, it is not really a literature about party politics as much as literature about other things (ideologies, preferences, norms, personalities etc.) using political parties as useful but secondary intermediate layer between roots and outcomes of policy. I also see parties as ‘interdependent’ because I think that existing literature on parties and foreign policy misses the key insight which comparative party politics offers, namely the fact that parties form part of a systemic environment prescribing positions within a policy space, codifying patterns of interaction, reproducing histories and identities and creating a language of competition. This systemic environment – domestic ‘party systems’ – is what political parties function in, what constrains and enables them.

In other words, current literature on parties and foreign policy only sees parties as monistic and isolated actors. Instead, I propose a richer image of domestic politics, one where the formation of foreign policy preferences and the decision on foreign policy change are the results of interactions between parties and of parties with their systemic environment.

The argument of this dissertation is that instances of foreign policy change can best be understood as interactions between ongoing dynamics of important aspects of domestic party systems and changes in a state’s normative and material international environment. In other words, dynamics with party systemic potential are necessary conditions for the emergence, articulation and implementation of new foreign policy preferences. Flows of change in the international arena are a necessary impetus, but it is only when these meet new dynamics in party systems that states readjust their foreign policies. These dynamics of reform of party systems provide political agents with the ideational resources to make sense of changes in the international system, contribute to the creation of new preferences and bring about political incentives for the promotion of new foreign policies. In this way, the pace, the content and the field of change are determined by the specific aspects of a party system undergoing change.

This view sees foreign policies reflecting a specific equilibrium between the dominant ideas about a state’s position in the world and its domestic governance, and dominant material and discursive conditions in the international system. Foreign policy change reflects an effort to rebalance this equilibrium by creating policies that reflect a
state’s adaptation to new international conditions according to ideas and preferences emerging within domestic competition. Assuming that flows from the international system are the impetus for change in the various fields of foreign policy, changes in important dimensions and terms of domestic party competition arise as the critical factors that determine the kind and timing of foreign policy change.

Far from discarding the importance of other roots of foreign policy such as ideas, institutional features and policymaking procedures, this argument considers that these things do not take place in a vacuum. Indeed, ‘ideas do not float freely’ (Risse-Kappen 1994) and neither do policymakers or institutional arrangements. In democratic societies, mature liberal democracies where government is ‘party government’, all these things play themselves out within a context of partisan competition. Party systems do not simply prescribe electoral interests to selfish partisan actors, nor do they just automatically cue party preferences according to ideology or dominant societal interests. Instead, and beyond that, they codify a language of competition and patterns of interaction among partisan actors. They give meaning to policy contestation and help those actors interpret changes in the international sphere and express preferences within a discursively meaningful pattern of interactions.

This view of foreign policy change as a result of a combination of changes in the international system and in domestic party systems has important repercussions in the way various literatures treat the topic of domestic politics and foreign policy. The creation of a theoretical framework based on comparative party politics thus should not conceal the main ambition of this dissertation: to make a contribution to the wider field of International Relations and use the empirical results to answer important theoretical and metatheoretical questions of this literature. Most works on parties and foreign policy position themselves within this wide literature after all, however they shy away from asserting a position on critical theoretical questions both of IR and FPA. I believe that IR has the capability to absorb thorough discussions from other fields of the social sciences – here, comparative party politics can contribute to the methodological rigor of studies of world politics, as well as contribute to foundational discussions about actors and processes of world politics.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Political parties are generally an understudied topic in the realm of comparative Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations works on sub-state actors and the domestic politics of international affairs. FPA has traditionally focused on issues of personality, leadership, bureaucracy and organizational decision-making processes. More recent turns in FPA seek to go beyond the field’s behavioralist roots, but the substantial and empirical foci remain largely the same (Houghton 2007; Kaarbo 2003). Work on sub-state and transnational actors in IR has highlighted the importance of norms and ideas in
the study of domestic politics and its links to international affairs, but political parties are conspicuously absent – perhaps because the analytical turn to domestic affairs coincided with the empirical novelty of the rise of sub-state and transnational actors like NGOs, epistemic communities etc. (Risse-Kappen 1995). Somehow, that mainstay of modern democratic (and less so) politics, political parties, has failed to enter the picture.

Situation of the field is not more encouraging at the other end of the divide, comparative politics. In comparative public policy and party politics, foreign policy is seldom considered as a significant output of partisan interaction. Some have argued that the nature of the policy itself makes it different than other public policies, so party effect on foreign policy is not to be expected1. The net result is that the link between political parties and foreign policy is rarely raised in literature – which is a pity given the abundance of lay and anecdotal perceptions that ‘there is something’ linking democratic politics and foreign policies.

Nevertheless, in recent years this situation has slowly been changing, as more and more works within the FPA tradition or empirical fields of study (such as European security) look at the effect of political parties on foreign policies. These works raise important issues such as the importance of party ideologies and the causal links between parties in government and implemented foreign policies. Yet they organize the discussion in a disparate way, diluting the real nature of party politics and, more importantly, the nature of the links between domestic and international politics. Where these works try to establish a link between substantive political party positions and foreign policy output, they miss the institutional effect of domestic party systems on partisan activity. Mostly they are confined to an inside-out argumentation, failing to see the feedback loop of foreign policy into domestic politics. And they miss the opportunity to heed the call of the literature on transnational relations about the need to include more focus on the role of international and domestic norms and ideas (Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993; Risse-Kappen 1995). Nevertheless, there are important theoretical insights to be gained from existing works on partisan effects on foreign policy, most importantly their methodological rigor and their effort to decisively link party policies with foreign policy output.

An obvious route to take when studying partisan effects of foreign policy is a straightforward inside-out view of politics, mostly on cue with the liberal strand of IR2 and classical FPA. Here political parties are seen as expressions of domestic preferences and the interests of societal actors. As such any space for their independent effect on the domestic interest formation is lost. However, some of these works, most notably Trubowitz (1999), manage to highlight the importance of domestic institutional setups such as Congress. Others, like Alons (2007), take into account the International Political

1 For example see the emphasis on the ‘urgency’ of foreign policy decisions in Blondel and Nousiainen (2000).
2 See Moravesik (1997).
Economy argument about state-society relations as a qualification of domestic politics and link domestic and international politics through a structural/materialist ontology of international pressures and domestic interests. Precious as these finding may be, they do not constitute real partisan arguments as much as efforts to use political parties as heuristics for domestic/societal preferences on the international scene.

Some works have a clear empirical focus, and their discussion of parties serves more to highlight broader institutional issues that affect foreign policies. For example Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) look at the role of coalition governments and how junior parties affect the decisions of coalitions. DeLaet and Scott (2006) focus on Congressional voting of arms control treaties and check for ideological and partisan effect. Both articles employ quantitative techniques. Whereas DeLaet and Scott’s conclusions are intriguing, since they find an independent partisan alongside an ideological effect, it is difficult to generalize cross-nationally because of the uniqueness of the American institutional setting. Kaarbo and Beasley on the other hand pose interesting questions, but quantitative methods as the one they employ fails to capture the relational nature of, for example, extreme parties.

The American invasion in Iraq in 2003 and the disparate European responses to it provided an opportunity to comparativists to verify the effect of party politics on European policies towards a common foreign policy issue (Mouritzen 2006; Mouritzen and Wivel 2005; Schuster and Maier 2006; Stahl 2005; Stahl et al 2004). For some, the partisan effect on foreign policy was conditioned by a state’s position within the international distribution of material power, thus resembling the realist argument that domestic politics affect responses within a very narrow field of alternatives (Schuster and Maier 2006). Other works took a more post-positivist view of things, seeing parties responding to domestic dominant identity imperatives (Stahl 2005).

Indeed, few works in the literature of political parties and foreign policy take this ideational turn. An exception is Cordell and Wolff (2007), who discuss how German foreign policy towards the East relates to international and domestic norms. However, they take a ‘matter-of-fact’ view of such norms, and political parties are seen as simple reproducers, as opposed to creators or contenders, of those norms. Earlier, Barnett (1999) had offered a vivid account of the domestic contestation of the Oslo accords in Israel, seeing party-based actors as normative entrepreneurs and active agents of change, employing international norms and interacting with domestic ideas and electoral institutions. Barnett does a fine job in setting a partisan argument within a wider IR discussion concerning ideas, agents and structures. Concurrent to Cordell and Wolff however, his model can be quite demanding when trying to apply it on a cross-national comparative design. Elsewhere, Ozkececi-Taner (2005) matches political parties and

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5 Also see Narizny (2007).
4 On the importance of coalitional and parliamentarian politics in foreign policy outputs also see the part by Everts in Hagan et al (2001).
5 Here see Capoccia (2002).
specific sets of ideas, and then assesses whether other institutional and contextual factors (e.g. ministerial positions or issue saliency) affect how these ideas find expression in a coalition’s foreign policy decisions within the Turkish context. The party system emerges here as the main structuring factor of the interplay among contesting ideas about foreign policies.

A very influential recent work is Rathbun (2004). His aim is to explain the reactions of national governments in Germany, France and Great Britain towards the security emergencies in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. His claim is that foreign policy decisions and changes can be traced back to the ideological heritage of governing parties according to whether they are left-or right-wing. Leftist parties will generally seek policies that promote ‘inclusive’ goals, justice and human rights; rightist parties will stress more limited objectives like the safeguarding of a narrowly defined national interest. A similar task is undertaken by Hofmann (2009), who checks how party ideologies affected the creation of security institutions in Europe. Her argument is that, in instances when the government parties of Germany, France and Great Britain expressed similar positive values towards European security institutions simultaneously, these institutions expanded. The key insight from both of these works is their comparative rigor, which builds on a common foreign policy challenge across national cases unfolding contemporaneously, as well as a parsimonious operationalization of political ideologies. This creates an empirical basis upon which alternative explanations, such as international/structural conditions, can be refuted.

Rathbun does offer a vivid empirical account of his partisan argument, but one cannot ignore simplifications that lie at the heart of it. The most important one is the complete mooting of the possible effect of the international system on foreign policy, both in material and normative terms. By the same token, the simple extrapolation of ‘left’ and ‘right’ ideological components to the international arena misses the influence of international normative developments in the domestic ideological constellation of individual countries. ‘Left’ and ‘right’, even understood in the way Rathbun presents them, differ from national setting to national setting, and evolve constantly depending on how they absorb and structure new issues. Hofmann on the other hand does a better job in presenting ideological components of parties not along a unique axis of competition, but rather along multiple value-axes that structure partisan preferences on European security. A weakness in her account however, lies precisely where Rathbun’s strength is – in the empirically rich account of the politics of justification and normative contestation that lies at the core of party politics. For Hofmann partisan attitudes in government translate unproblematically into foreign policy action.

It is interesting to see the dialectic of both books, especially in their effort to conceptualize party politics. Rathbun starts with the plausible assertion that there is an inherent consistency between the domestic and international policies of parties, something Hofmann does not deny either (Hofmann 2009: 30). Rathbun decides to
conceptualize these positions along a Left-Right axis, which incorporates awkwardly the two main axes of modern party politics, the socio-economic and the cultural one (see Kriesi et al 2006: 923-924). In as much, for him foreign policy issues are absorbed by the existing constellation of party competition in domestic political arenas. Hofmann on the other hand takes the view that foreign policy issues cut across existing dimensions of political space, i.e. the policies of parties on them cannot be deduced from a single existing axis of competition. Empirically this would seem to be the case, but it adds a degree of complexity to the argument. Hofmann decides to keep things simple by assuming that foreign policy values of parties are crosscutting on existing axes of competition, but that they are essentially independent from other cleavages and ideas that have created the current ideological profile of parties. She says this is so because most foreign policy issues do not have domestic consequences – in her case, European security issues have low redistributional repercussions, hence the socioeconomic Left-Right (and by extension office-seeking posturing towards the electorate, Hofmann 2009: 32-33) is irrelevant for how parties reach their opinions on such foreign policy issues (ibid: 19-22, 29).

This argument raises an obvious objection. Domestic cleavages have an identity element (us-versus-them) that usually extends to the international sphere as well. Indeed, constructivists have tried to trace foreign policy positions to domestic constellations of social identities (Hopf 2002)\(^6\). Foreign policy issues like treaty making, regional orders, restructuring of foreign relations etc. are foundational issues that affect the way a state sees itself and its place in the world (Ashizawa 2008: 592-593). By extension, domestic actors look inside of their own identities to make sense of these changes. Such foreign policy decisions may not always redistribute material resources, but hold the potential of redistributing ideational power among identity constructions concerning key political and social issues. To claim that parties have opinions on foreign policy issues independent of their social roots, and to base this on the alleged insignificance of such issues for politics at large (Hofmann 2009: 26), is a self-defeating assertion for a partisan argument\(^7\). I do not think this move hurts Hofmann’s argument too much, yet it should not be expected to yield wholly accurate empirical results when parties face more controversial foreign policy issues – even ones that do not have immediate redistributional repercussions\(^8\).

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\(^6\) The view of societal cleavages as identities is the base of the discussion in the following section.
\(^7\) See here Marks et al (2002: 586).
\(^8\) ‘Once the public gets involved in security affairs and the issue salience raises, the political processes do not look much different from those in any other issue-area’ (Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993: 38). For an argument linking domestic policy repercussions with positioning on the ‘European’ issue see Hooghe et al (2002). Their argument that a party’s positioning on the Left-Right axis conditions the party’s position towards Europe is basically the straightforward redistributional argument Hofmann feels does not apply on more general foreign policy issues. Yet their discussion of the equally compelling effect of the libertarian/authoritarian axis is a vindication that ideational and identity concerns (so not concerned with redistributional issues) also affect a party’s position towards an external issue. Hooghe et al then allows us to assume that party attitudes towards a foreign policy issue can be deduced by its rooting in societal
Even for high-politics issues such as security alliances, we know that party-based actors have recourse to domestic identities and argue based on them. Most significantly, their preferences are informed by these domestic identities. To talk of the CDU’s or Labour’s preferences on Europe without reference to the cleavages upon which these came about gives an incomplete picture at best. Hofmann’s response would be that parsimony could take a severe blow when we try to include too many layers of historical and ideological explanation – and that historical explanation is not her interest anyway. Although it is a valid point, the objections I raise here show that the will for parsimony sacrifices empirical accuracy of party politics because if a foreign policy issue cuts across dominant axes of party competition, then the social cleavages that are already submerged in these axes are called upon to give meaning, structure arguments and provide justifications – in other words, they become reenergized.

Hofmann is correct in saying that foreign policy positions start abroad: it is the inability of political parties to agree on the normative framing of new material constellations of the international system that leads to partisan differences of foreign policy (Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993: 31; Risse-Kappen 1995: 28-29). However, the example of the interaction between European party systems and the issue of ‘Europe’ has shown us that political parties understand new foreign issues with reference to their domestic identities – sometimes more than one of those exists within a party, sometimes one of those cuts across numerous parties etc. (Marks and Wilson 2000). We also know that there is significant leeway for partisan agency as to how and when a new issue will be presented, absorbed within the existing language of politics etc. Despite the dominance of the socioeconomic axis (and the very high relevance of a cultural/new politics axis), social cleavages do not wither away, they just become structured under these axes (Marks et al 2002: 592).

Usually, as Hofmann implies, foreign policy issues are not very salient, and adding historical explanatory layers confuses things. But more often than not, foreign policy issues are so important that they necessarily energize domestic identities stemming from persistent cleavages (Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993: 40-41). If she is correct that the one dominant axis of partisan competition is insufficient to explain partisan foreign policy ideas (and I believe she is), she also has to live with the fact that the different domestic cleavages submerged under this axis are the social roots of how foreign policy issues become defined and discussions around them organized.

Both Rathbun and Hofmann construct a simple image of political parties as carriers of ideologies in order to gain in parsimony. Yet this is a monistic view of political parties cleavages that express worldviews beyond redistributional issues. Marks et al (2002) argue along these lines as well.

9 Marks and Wilson also show how the European issue is organized through cleavages that extend beyond redistributional issues. In their discussion, only the Social-Democratic parties see Europe through a clear functional lens reflecting their concerns about domestic economic order. Liberals, Christian Democrats and Conservatives have such concerns as well of course, but questions of domestic governance, identity and ideology also come into play.
as lonely societal actors. The reality is that political parties interact with each other and the wider discursive environment of domestic and international arenas. Rathbun does show that political parties can be resourceful in pursuing their policies, but does not relate domestic justification of foreign policies with other norms, as for example Barnett does. Hofmann on the other hand is better at showing that partisan positions on international issues have their roots in value-attitudes that extend beyond the Left-Right axis and so allows for a richer mapping of political space. But again, political parties are seen more as heuristic labels for the values of foreign policy actors than as independent actors engaging with international issues. Both aim to make arguments within the framework of IR/FPA; consequently, their simplified conceptualization of party politics is meant to serve this goal.

As a good example of how to see partisan foreign policies as outputs of a wider institutional environment, Thérien and Noël (2000) undertake a very interesting effort to show how the historical patterns of domestic party systems condition the foreign policy output of these systems. It is worth quoting their argument at length. They start from the position that ‘parties matter’ for foreign policy, but they do not assume a direct relationship between parties and policies. Instead, ‘in foreign as in domestic policy, patterns tend to be established at critical junctures and change only incrementally thereafter. The dominance of a party over a long period probably matters more than the distribution of power at any moment’ (Thérien and Noël 2000: 153). In other words, what they term ‘partisan cumulative power’ is the most decisive signal of whether and how parties matter in foreign policies. Their empirical question has to do with the effect of left party incumbency on the amount of foreign aid given out by states. For this they conduct a statistical analysis with a closer look at their various cases, which includes a historical comparative research. In all, the results confirm their hypothesis that ‘political parties do matter, not directly and in the short run, but indirectly and over the years’ (ibid: 160).

Thérien and Noël present an image of domestic politics taking place not in a preference-promoting free-for-all, but in a political space defined by prior patterns of political dominance, and set the stage for a more dynamic integration of the domestic arena in the study of international relations, whereby politics and institutional (or normative) constraints shape the environment within which foreign policies take place. Parties may have ideological attributes, but the way these play out is contingent on a very peculiar constellation of domestic histories, patterns of social representation, political agency and international conditions. New foreign policies are not just policy outputs but intellectual constructions whose longevity is dependent on their successful

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10 For the same argument being made about transnational actors in the Soviet Union, see Evangelista (1999).
11 Here also see Keohane and Milner (1996), especially chapters 3 and 10.
institutionalization in a normatively rich political space. What constitutes this institutional space in democratic polities is the topic of the following chapter.

AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF PARTIES: CLEAVAGES, AXES OF COMPETITION AND PARTY SYSTEMS

Based on the above, we can see that most work on partisan effects on foreign policy of liberal democracies takes a rather monistic view of political parties and their interactions. Political parties are seen as markers of the dominance within the executive of specific foreign policy ideas, of certain societal interests, or of specific preferences on foreign (and domestic) issues. The ‘politics’ of party politics gets lost. In as much, the process by which specific ideas or preferences come to dominate a government becomes largely overlooked. This is partly in line with a public policy view of foreign policy: the presence of a specific party in government means that analogous ideas about domestic issues will become expressed in governmental policies. But foreign policy has an added amount of complexity: it is directed towards, and is being influenced by, developments and actors beyond the executive’s control. This is to a certain extent true for all public policy of course, which is why there remain lingering doubts about whether parties really do make a difference. But if one wishes to make the argument that parties do make a difference in foreign policy, one is compelled to untangle the whole web of domestic and international conditions that confront a party-based actor when promoting a new foreign policy issue.

This work on parties and foreign policy reproduces, within International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis, the general tendency within comparative politics to look at parties as individual actors and to overlook the systemic essence of domestic party politics. Bardi and Mair (2008) claim that parties are usually seen by party politics scholars as unique actors with the systemic dimension only rarely taken into account (Bardi and Mair 2008: 147-154); almost inevitably this bias becomes translated into the work of those who want to study the effect of political parties on foreign policy. In this way they ignore the very important set of constraints within which political parties operate, namely the sum of patterned interactions as prescribed by parties’ relative strength, policy distance and other parameters.

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12 For an extensive literature review defending the partisan argument in public policy, see Schmidt (1996). For a ‘governmental’ partisan argument vis-à-vis EU policies, see Manow et al (2008).
13 A very eloquent defense of the anti-party thesis is provided by Rose (1984).
14 One note here: I will be using the terms ‘party’, ‘party group’, ‘party-based actor’ or ‘partisan actor’ interchangeably. There are two reasons behind this. The first reason is to remind the reader that I am not attempting a reification of the analytical unit ‘party’. Second, as will become evident down the way, groups within parties are as capable of doing ‘party politics’ as whole parties united behind one policy – and, when looked at in this way, a party leadership in the end is just one group within a party leading the party in a specific moment.
Here I follow the plea by Bardi and Mair in that I see the systemic focus as a viable way to overcome the limitations of current discussions about political parties and foreign policy. These limitations concern mainly the inability to theorize about an independent partisan (as opposed to an ideological or a preference-based) effect on foreign policy, the discarding of the effect of the international arena in the domestic politics of foreign policy, and an empirical bias against the actual politics of foreign policy contestation. The systemic focus of party politics can remedy these shortcomings of current literature by providing a view of political parties as actors constrained but also enabled by the format and the patterns of the systems they operate in; and a better understanding of where partisan foreign policy preferences come from as well as the timing and pace of their expression.

There are two distinct, but closely interrelated, avenues in the study of party systems. The one takes a historical and sociological look at party systems, aiming to trace their historical descent and analyzing their current dynamics with reference to their social roots. This literature revolves around the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and conceptualizes party politics through the prism of social cleavages, i.e. dimensions of opposition between social groups that gave rise to the formation of political parties in the past and structure partisan competition today. The other avenue is concerned with the mechanics of partisan competition, taking a more positivist view of party politics as interactions between units within a web of systemic restrictions. This view of party politics as systemic structures revolves around the work of Sartori (1976), and seeks to make the point that party systems are more than just a sum of their constituent parts (Bardi and Mair 2008: 152; Mair 1997: 51).

These two approaches are distinct, but profoundly complementary. The social cleavages approach sees party systems as creations of social interactions and deep historical processes. This bottom-up view is complemented by the top-down view of the systemic theorists who prefer to emphasize the independent effect of systemic exigencies on the structuring of new social conflicts. The distinction, of course, is not clear-cut and it was never meant to be: a party system at any given point in time is the culmination of long historical processes that absorbed the expression of various cleavages into some basic axes of competition. These axes then regulate the way new issues are absorbed into public discourse and how they interact with, or affect, existing cleavages.

Already two years after Lipset and Rokkan, Rose and Urwin argued that West European party systems are to a very large extent structured by the historical cleavages of the past, but that a significant part of individual parties’ outlook and the dynamics of party systems can also be attributed to the strategies of parties themselves in their effort to broaden their appeal (Rose and Urwin 1969: 26-30). In their seminal work, Bartolini and Mair argued that the structuring of political competition by historical cleavages went a long way towards explaining the small (at the time of their writing) electoral volatility in West Europe, but that systemic demands on party strategies and institutional factors
were an important counterforce pointing towards electoral volatility (Bartolini and Mair 1990: ch. 10). Hooghe et al (2002) and Marks et al (2002) see European parties responding to the issue of the EU according to their rooting in social cleavages; positions in the party system are important in explaining party policies, but as a ‘subset of the political cleavage hypothesis’ (Marks et al 2002: 592). In sum, a systemic view of party politics sees partisan actors as historically constrained by their rooting in social cleavages, but it also accounts for partisan agency and its ability to structure new issues and alter various characteristics of party systems. Indeed, this dialectic between systemic exigencies and individual (partisan) agency is a recurring feature of system-focused work on comparative party politics.

Bartolini and Mair (1990) offered a celebrated conceptualization of social cleavages within which partisan competition is embedded. They differentiated between three dimensions of a social cleavage: first, a social cleavage has an objective social basis, i.e. a social group which clusters around a dimension of opposition against a certain development, policy etc. Yet this social basis is not enough for a social cleavage to enter the political realm. The other two dimensions complete this transition. The second characteristic is the embedding of a social cleavage within an ideational dimension, namely the creation of political identities around oppositions and grievances. The third characteristic is the organizational dimension and it involves the mobilization of these social identities and their expression in organized mass politics through political parties. In other words, a view of party politics through the concept of cleavages highlights the ideational dimension of domestic politics – the mobilization of identities – and the ability of partisan actors to influence the way social developments and new issues are expressed as partisan issues (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 213-220).

More recent scholarship sees modern party systems in Western Europe as being structured along two basic axes of competition that absorb and restructure old cleavages. Apart from the socioeconomic Left-Right, these works advocate that it is empirically more accurate to also see a vertical cultural axis crosscutting the Left-Right. These dominant axes of competition do not have a fixed content. Partisan actors reinterpret the content of the axes of competition according to the cleavages they represent and the way these are affected by social developments. Additionally, they may even have the capability of using issues in an effort to reform the meaning of an axis in order to make it more compatible with their ideological profile or their electoral needs (Bornschier 2010; Kriesi et al 2006; Manow et al 2008).

A focus on cleavages has important repercussions if one wishes to make a partisan argument about foreign policy. It provides a richer template of the intellectual resources for foreign policy argumentation than the one offered e.g. by Rathbun (2004), who

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15 For an example, see Batory and Sitter (2004).
16 For a classical treatment of the translation of social cleavages into political issues and the particular nature of political competition vis-à-vis simple social divisions, see Schmitt (2007 [1932]).
collapsed all dimensions of competition into one Left-Right axis including cultural and economic issues. It also allows for a better conceptualization of foreign policy ideas as part of integrated coherent policy sets offered by parties. Hofmann (2009) for example wholly separates foreign policy ideas from domestic policies. Ozkececi-Taner (2005) is bolder in conceptualizing ideas of foreign policy as part of general sets of ideas institutionalized within parties (she even calls those parts of ‘cleavages’), but she does not relate them to party systemic effects and conditions, such as electoral competition or ideational agency.

If we accept the Bartolini/Mair conceptualization of cleavages as political identities, we are very close to work done on ideas and foreign policy that sees domestic ideas as creating domestic identities with international referents. I assume that independent partisan agency absorbs and structures the demands of social cleavages into coherent policy setups that are consistent across domestic and foreign policy sectors - the reason for this is that, by creating political identities, social cleavages help identify not only domestic but also international ‘others’. Ultimately, foreign policy ideas institutionalized within political parties are as much the result of this aggregating process as they are rooted within important historical traditions.

We saw that Hofmann (2009) argued that the nature of foreign policy is such that, because it does not entail redistributional conflicts, political parties have recourse to foreign policy ideas and preferences that are independent of ideas on domestic governance. The effort of political parties to offer a consistent policy profile to their voters across policy sectors is well documented (Manow et al 2008: 24-25). Hofmann’s assertion also presupposes that the socioeconomic Left-Right axis is devoid of ideological/cultural meaning, that it is unable to organize opposition on foreign issues as much as it is able to on domestic issues. Now, some foreign policy issues may lend themselves to interpretation according to the class cleavage. But also other, less obvious, policy areas can be interpreted by the apparently irrelevant class cleavage. The reason for this is precisely the fact that a cleavage includes an ideological element, which politicizes it and turns it from a social into a political fact. The underpinning of the class cleavage for example is not just a general redistributional issue, but also the opposition between socialist ideology and pro-capitalist reaction. How could one account, for example, for positions of West European social democratic parties on peace and superpower relations during the Cold War without this ideological component, which fixes foreign policy preferences in conjunction with domestic policies?

Nevertheless, even without the socioeconomic Left-Right, most foreign policy issues can be absorbed by, or upset, the vertical cultural axis of partisan competition which structures cleavages concerning intangible values of domestic governance. Yet one would

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17 See Hopf (2002); also Barnett (1999).
18 On consistency of party positions across policy areas as part of the representative and integrative function of parties, see Rose and Urwin (1969: 23).
19 On the example I used, see Risse-Kappen (1994).
be mistaken to think that this dimension of competition is also devoid of direct practical implications for voters. Instead, partisan preferences translated into foreign policy preferences may represent salient societal preferences about the nature of domestic governance, questions of citizenship and nationality, personal values etc. The point here is that foreign policy issues are being interpreted through relevant domestic cleavages whose ideational dimensions organize political identities both with domestic and international ‘others’, and that foreign policy issues can be potentially presented as having tangible or intangible repercussions if the partisan agency wishes to present it in this way. As Manow et al (2008: 25) describe parties pursuing European policies, the sum of redistributional and ideational goals a party can pursue through its foreign policies constitute ‘visions of domestic society’.

If the above line of reasoning is correct, one is legitimated to think of foreign policy positions of political parties as a combination of the two sublime counterforces Bartolini and Mair identified: parties’ rooting in social and historical traditions which have shaped modern party systems; and their incentives to engage with the domestic language of competition in an effort to improve their political fortunes. The systemic view allows us to see how cleavages create what has been called ‘rationally bounded’ partisan actors when confronted with a foreign policy issue (Marks and Wilson 2000). But, to fully account for party positions on foreign policy issues we also need to evaluate the prior position parties within systemic space and the constraints of patterned interactions parties respond to.

The main systemic elements that structure the interaction between parties are a party system’s properties and format (Mair 2000: 28). Format refers to the number of relevant parties in the system, while the properties refer to the established interactions between parties in terms of antagonism and coalition-making. According to Sartori (1976), there is a clear connection between the number of relevant parties in a system and that system’s ideological and policy stretch, or polarization. The emphasis here is on the mechanics of the party system, which to a very large extent regulate the movements of parties within political space, as well as the dominant language of politics. It is an integral aspect of partisan competition, the framework within which the interpretation of foreign policy issues and ideational entrepreneurship as discussed above takes place. The systemic constraints imposed on political parties are the result of the integration of historical

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20 See Moravcsik’s (1997) systemization of the struggle between various ideational and non-tangible preferences in his concepts of ‘ideational liberalism’ (struggle between ideas and identities) and ‘republican liberalism’ (struggle between norms of domestic governance).

21 Bartolini and Mair (1990: 194-195) study voter volatility and the opening of electoral markets, which effectively are the mirror image of the systemic availability for independent party strategies. In their view, in the real world a party system is a mix of two ideal types of a perfectly mobilized electorate along social cleavages, and of a perfectly de-aligned electorate fluctuating freely among parties. By extension, party strategies fluctuate between reflecting parties’ social roots and independent vote-seeking. But Bartolini and Mair still ascribe analytical and empirical precedence to social cleavages as structuring forces of party systems.
cleavages in some essential dimensions of competition. These dimensions constrain parties not only in terms of what they can do, but also what they can say (and how): ‘[A] given party system, and a given structure of competition, act to ‘freeze’ into place a specific language of politics. Party competition, and politics more generally, then becomes dominated by a particular overriding choice, to which other considerations are subordinated’ (Mair 1997: 13).

So what does this systemic aspect add to a partisan argument about foreign policy? First of all it remedies the tendency to view parties solely as carriers of preferences or ideas that are being unproblematically carried over from the electoral arena to government and from there to policymaking. Instead, partisan actors are embedded within a thick institutional structure including both structural constraints and ideational resources, and which both constrains and enables them in their effort to improve their political fortunes. Within such a structure, parties’ interpretation of foreign policy issues cannot be divorced neither from their response to social traditions informing their domestic preferences, nor from their effort to make the best of their position within the systemic arrangement of patterned interactions between parties and a dominant language which regulates what party competition is ‘about’ (ibid: 14).

Second, the systemic view allows us to incorporate the international dimension of foreign policy making in a partisan argument. If we see political parties as unique, lonely actors carrying foreign policy ideas or societal preferences, the inside-out view of foreign policy is inescapable. Political parties are just an intermediate layer between domestic preferences and foreign policies. With a systemic view of domestic politics, we are forced to see political parties as true social actors, interacting with other parties, ideas and systemic conditions. In this dynamic view, the international arena can become more easily incorporated as another source of ideational resources in the parties’ efforts to preserve or redefine the dimensions of domestic competition, to overcome systemic constraints, win elections and promote their preferred policies.

Based on the above, a foreign policy issue is being interpreted according to the domestic cleavages institutionalized and mobilized within political parties in the shape of political identities. But there is no social determinism here. Sometimes foreign policy issues are so remote that partisan actors are free to interpret them as a ‘clean slate’. Even pressing foreign policy issues do not lend themselves easily to a fully societal interpretation due to their complexity. But there must always exist a minimum basis of understanding international issues, and they are inseparable from party positions on domestic issues. The social and ideological roots of parties then create a framework within which they function to interpret foreign policy issues. But they are not static.

Mair’s analysis builds on Sartori’s view that party system mechanics are to a large extent regulated by the ideological stretch within the system. In other words, there is a discursive underpinning of parties’ position within policy space. However, there is no perfect match between political parties and ideas stemming from given mobilized cleavages. As Mair put it: [T]here is no simple one-to-one correspondence between an individual party
Instead, they are resources for partisan actors to pursue their systemically defined goals. Parties also want to expand their social basis or ameliorate their position along the various axes of competition within a party system. A systemic view of party politics would allow for cross-case comparisons of how the interrelationship between partisan agency and systemic structures of competition affected the interpretation of foreign policy issues into policies.²⁴

**WHY FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE?**

The prevailing tendency within FPA is to study foreign policies as outcomes and not relate them within a series of outcomes. However, there are good theoretical reasons to shift the focus from studying foreign policy to studying foreign policy change. A persuasive argument for this is presented by Welch (2005). The ontological nature of the problem at hand – the small number of observed cases (state foreign policies) and the complexity of policymaking – makes it difficult to generalize about foreign policies the way typical positivist epistemology, which dominates FPA, would expect. What is more, analyzing foreign policy necessitates a real-life threshold along which policy outcomes can be judged and evaluated. Yet the peculiar nature of international politics (whereby ‘interests’ are difficult to identify beyond tautologies)²⁵ makes this threshold elusive. Welch puts forth the idea that this predicament can be remedied if we shift from analysis of foreign policy to analysis of foreign policy change. If we decide to study cases of foreign policy change, we not only have a very good guide as to what it is we are looking for in the policy making process, but we can also let the cases guide us to a better understanding of what states want, and how they come to want it, in a specific policy setting. Focusing on change means that we start from an observable real-life occurrence, while being able to draw theoretical conclusions about the sources and processes of interest and goal-formation. This applies particularly to the question of the effect of party organization and the presence of a cleavage, for while the political relevance of the latter requires expression in some form of political organization, such a political organization may nevertheless include two or more parties competing for more or less the same constituency’ (Mair 1997: 65). Other times, more than one cleavage is represented within a party (see Rose and Urwin’s (1969) discussion of heterogeneous parties).

²⁴ This argument essentially sees parties functioning with a view of ameliorating their position within party systems. This is a more dynamic view of what parties can do under systemic constraints. For example Mair is concerned with parties’ strategies to maintain the predominant language of a party system against contenders – parties that want to change it altogether, or opponents of party-government in general (Mair 1997: ch. 1, especially p. 14, and ch. 4, especially p. 87-90). Here I consider that parties will still want to change features of a party system without necessarily looking to undermine its very existence or its predominant language. Parties that wish to introduce new dimensions of competition also cannot be considered necessarily as looking to undermine the very existence of a party system. Whereas Mair sees efforts to change the dominant language of a party system as anti-systemic, my argument here concerns party strategies that seek to infuse the existing language of competition with new elements, i.e. alter-systemic efforts.

²⁵ See here Kratochwil (1982).
politics on foreign policy. An analysis of the relationship between parties and foreign policy would most probably have us believe that parties negotiate the details and rough edges of commonly accepted goals that arise from pre-given interests – the reason being that a ‘policy’ leads us to assume (perhaps unconsciously) the existence of prior determined interests. An analysis of the role of political parties in foreign policy change though changes matters significantly, because it necessitates to look at how parties contest not only policy but also goals and even supposedly pre-given ‘national interests’.

The first important issue that needs to be clarified is the exact meaning of ‘change’. In his classical volume, KJ Holsti (1982) talks of ‘restructuring’ of foreign policy, under which he means a wholesale realignment of all of a state’s policies and relationships vis-à-vis a larger ‘patron’. In their article, Volgy and Schwarz (1991) also talk of far-reaching restructuring spanning policy areas, but for them the essence of the matter is the sudden and sensational nature of change. In this way, they differentiate between ‘change’ and slow and incremental bureaucratic ‘shifts’. Goldmann (1988: 10) defines change as ‘either a new act in a given situation or a given act in a situation previously associated with a different act’. Hermann (1990: 5) distinguishes four gradations of change: adjustment, change of means and methods, change of goals, and wholesale restructuring.

Here I follow as a first step Goldmann: I identify foreign policy change with a policy that was presented, perceived or generally evaluated to be a departure from previous continuous practices. But for the purposes of my argument and in order to see how party politics affect generally foreign policy, such a departure will have to go beyond Hermann’s ‘adjustment’. Instead, a focus on cases where methods to achieve goals or some of the goals themselves were contested will allow us to see how partisan actors redefined and engaged with the foundations of their states’ foreign policies. So here, while I am very much aware of the distinction between the two, I will include both the second and the third versions of Hermann’s change under my understanding of foreign policy change. As will become evident from the cases, this middle level of foreign policy change between adjustment and restructuring usually provokes contestation of both methods and goals – indeed, partisan actors would move the discussion across the two levels according to their strategic needs. However, contestation of methods and contestation of goals take place on the same level of intended change, one that seeks to reform and innovate while engaging with an existing normative structure of accepted interests that serves as the backdrop (but also as a resource in seeking change).

Foreign policy restructuring is of course the time when the interests themselves come under severe redefinition. Cases like that are very rare. However, the borders

26 Indeed, even two of the most thorough works on parties and foreign policy, Rathbun’s and Hofmann’s, can be seen as implicitly tackling the question of change. Their respective arguments are especially stark in their dealing of, for example, the decision of Germany to contribute to the use of force abroad (Rathbun) or the decision of Great Britain to support CSDP under Blair (Hofmann).
between what I call foreign policy change and restructuring are very malleable in any case. Foreign policy change in one sector may imply far-reaching reorientation in multiple other aspects of a state’s international standing (as the example of Canada’s commercial policy will show). In other words, the contestation of methods and goals may even concern altering the understanding of some of the state’s interests in all but name.

Holsti and Volgy and Schwarz include in their understanding of foreign policy all of a state’s external relationships and policies. Holsti makes a point that cultural and identity issues are as important as military and economic ones. Here, the broad definition offered by Hermann comes to mind: ‘Foreign policy is a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program…directed towards entities outside the policymakers’ political jurisdiction…[I]t is a program (plan) designed to address some problem or pursue some goal that entails action toward foreign entities’ (Hermann 1990: 5). This definition raises two points: First, foreign policy is any policy directed towards other states, independent of issue-area. Second, the ‘problem’ to be solved can be potentially domestically defined, and the designed policy can have important ramifications for domestic politics.

Another issue is what kind of states are more likely to implement foreign policy changes. Volgy and Schwarz think that small states are less likely to escape the pressures of the international system and implement far-reaching changes in their foreign policies. This is a view made within the field of political economy by Katzenstein (1985) as well. Holsti on the other hand focuses precisely on small states rearranging their international orientation vis-à-vis powerful international others. Moon (1985) also understands foreign policy change as restructuring of a state’s grand orientations (with an emphasis on developing countries). Holsti’s and Moon’s work in this regard is manifestly influenced by the Cold War reality, where small state’s external policies were usually coherent across policy areas in their dealings with the two blocs. As for Volgy and Schwarz, their model makes sense within a Western European context (where France, Germany and the UK are indeed bigger than Ireland and Belgium), but one wonders if its logical conclusion is that even bigger democratic states (e.g. US or India) are even freer to implement far-reaching changes.

Works on foreign policy change have the important advantage of being bolder in incorporating international and domestic explanations than most FPA literature. Holsti and Moon explicitly see the source of foreign policy change as a combination of international and domestic parameters. For them, especially for small(er) states, domestic political issues have inescapable international dimensions, so decisions to realign foreign policy reflect both domestic and international reasons. Volgy and Schwarz develop a model of domestic reasons for foreign policy change, yet recognize that a better understanding of the forces that trigger change would also include international factors. According to Hermann ‘foreign policy begins with a problem – a threat or opportunity – that motivates concern’ (Hermann 1990: 13). This means that identification and analysis of cases must start with the establishment of foreign policy challenges a state faces.
Finally, Gustavsson (1999), in his exciting literature review of important works on foreign policy change, differentiates between international, domestic political and domestic bureaucratic sources of foreign policy change. Yet he ascribes particular importance to a sense of crisis as an impetus for change (a theme also encountered in Holsti) and, implicitly, ascribes empirical priority to international factors.

Of importance here is Kupchan (1994), which is not a book about foreign policy change per se, but also sees foreign policy decision starting from conditions of ‘international uncertainty’. His argument is concerned with historical cases of empires that needed to balance changing international conditions in the imperial center and the periphery. In a general sense, his argument is that foreign policy outputs are triggered by events outside of the realm of the state, but that uncertainty of policymakers is an important condition for the direction adaptation will take. If we see cases of foreign policy change as cases of adaptation towards conditions of initial uncertainty, Kupchan’s view is important because it locates these conditions of uncertainty in both the beliefs of policymakers and their institutional and political interests.

In summation: first, foreign policy refers to a wide array of policy areas, spanning political, military, economic and cultural/identity issues. Usually important foreign policy issues in one of these areas bears consequences for the other areas well. So we are looking for significant departures from previous patterns of a state’s policy in at least one important policy area. Second, foreign policy issues have domestic repercussions. These could refer simply to how they reflect on domestic day-to-day electoral politics, but they may also refer to their linkage with important ideas of domestic governance (or ‘visions of domestic society’ as Manow et al (2008) put it). For Kupchan foreign policy decisions are inseparable not only from the individual beliefs of policymakers, but also from the general ideational and institutional environment within which they function. Third, as to the importance of size of states, one would expect that these conclusions apply mostly to smaller states, which are more dependent and susceptible to international pressures. Yet, having said that, the empirical fact is that all kinds of states engage in foreign policy change.

An argument about foreign policy needs to maintain the importance of the international sphere for states’ foreign policies. It is what makes foreign policy unique among public policies (see Blondel and Nousiainen 2000), and it is sadly all too often (and all too easily) forgotten by a vast part of scholarship in FPA. Here, I not only claim that foreign policy change is triggered by international events – but also that these events and the way they are framed by domestic actors play an important role in the way foreign policy is contested and the directions it takes.

What kind of developments in the international system can trigger a state to consider changing its orientations? Here, I take a broad view of these terms, and I will include both material and ideational changes in the international system as triggers of foreign policy change. Material changes are any changes in the international distribution of
power that affect an aspect or the whole of a state’s foreign policy. A regional enemy becoming much stronger due to economic development or military innovations, or a change in the global distribution of power (or the logic underlying it), are examples that fall under this category. Ideational changes refer to the emergence of relevant norms, ideas or ideologies that affect the conduct of a state’s foreign policy in a regional or global setting, as well as the discursive resources of domestic actors in contesting foreign as well as domestic policies (Veliz 2010). Usually these two changes go hand in hand. New arrangements of power, new structures or institutions produce underlying norms that regulate practices – and the emergence of ideas can bring about new material arrangements. With this definition I take on a broader view of international developments than Kupchan. Even though his work is a bold effort to incorporate individual psychological and institutional ideational factors in the study of foreign policy adaptation, his view of international development impacting on foreign policy is decisively realist; his focus is exclusively on material conditions. However, I believe that an argument that takes domestic politics into account needs to include normative changes in the international sphere as well.

Because of the bias within the field of foreign policy research and practice towards continuity, focusing on cases of foreign policy change creates a kind of a laboratory environment where we can hope that the conditions we are interested in play themselves out on the influence of foreign policy. In as much, this dissertation is about the impact of party politics on foreign policy change. The argument is that under changing international conditions, pressures from a state’s international environment need to be filtered through significant dynamics of change in the underlying conditions of domestic party politics for foreign policy change to occur. These dynamics of domestic party systems create different combinations of preferences, discursive resources and political incentives that make foreign policy change conceivable, feasible and helpful towards the goals of partisan actors. It is toward the elaboration of this argument that I will now turn.

THE ARGUMENT: SYSTEMIC DYNAMICS OF PARTY POLITICS AS NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

A state in its continuous foreign policy conduct constantly receives signals of change in its environment. Neighbors, allies and enemies become stronger or weaker, patterns of economic interaction change, new ideas gain in prominence or subside. Yet incidents of significant change in an aspect of a foreign policy, let alone a wholesale redirection of a

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27 Also to note here: The use of the word ‘adaptation’ throughout the text signifies, apart from linguistic variety in the place of the constant use of ‘change’, my understanding of foreign policy as a response to international systemic pressures. Thus the meaning of adaptation is different than the meaning of foreign policy ‘adjustment’ in Hermann’s terminology discussed above (i.e. an adaptation of some aspects of ongoing policy whose content and direction remains the same).
country’s orientation, are relatively rare. This means that the constant flow of information about change in the international system becomes filtered and interpreted by states in a way that privileges continuity.

There are many possible reasons for this bias towards continuity, and FPA has dealt with them (albeit not through an analytical lens of continuity/change) in various works on bureaucracies, leadership etc. All these aspects can be credible candidates for why a state keeps its foreign policy constant – or why at some points change occurs. However the possibility that a state’s party system provides this bias towards continuity, as well as the resources for the institutionalization of change, has rarely been considered. Since flows of events and information coming from abroad are frequent, but foreign policy changes are rare, foreign policy change will by definition be a result of a combination between these flows and a kind of change in the party system.28

Here, it is important to think of Kupchan’s book again, and especially his focus on ‘strategic culture’ and ‘national identity’ as important contributing factors to a state’s adaptation to international change. For him the domestic ideational and institutional setup intervenes between the individual beliefs of policymakers and international change to inhibit timely adaptation and or completely prevent reasonable policies. Kupchan himself admits that culture and identity are fuzzy notions, yet they are indispensable for an explanation of the pace and content of foreign policy adaptation (Kupchan 1994: 26-27, 67 ff). Here I see party systems as a needed institutional corrective to Kupchan’s significant introduction of ideational variables: the party system is the institutional setup within which a policy equilibrium is codified, agreed upon and reproduced. Concurrently my argument also reaches out to important works on ideas and foreign policy, seeing these ideas not as ‘floating freely’ but as being embedded within a specific arrangement of domestic ideas and interests codified in the party system.

Mair puts forward a definition of party system change that is restrictive and demanding for our purposes. According to him party system change occurs only when one party system passes from one class or type to another – e.g. from a two-party pattern of competition to a form of multiparty, crosscutting competition (Mair 1997: 51-52). Developments in the party system such as changing voting patterns, changing patterns of coalition or realignment of representation of social strata through parties are important only to the extent that they bring about changes of the basic features of a party system: the pattern of interactions and the logic or ‘language’ of politics which regulates what party competition is ‘about’. For Mair, one of these two things has to change for party system change to occur (ibid: 75).

28 This sentence should not be read inversely – changes in the party system do not necessarily lead to foreign policy change if there are no suitable or relevant developments in the international sphere; but cases of significant foreign policy change have to be analyzed with reference to changes in the party system.

29 For the role of identity in world politics see Jepperson et al (1996). However their analytical framework sees identity more as a source of entrenched policies (i.e. continuity) rather than of change.

30 See e.g. Barnett (1999).
The problem with this definition for my argument is that such changes of party system are few and far between. With so few party system changes and few foreign policy changes as defined here, hoping to find a case where both occur at the same time is really a demanding proposition. And since foreign policy change is a combination of suitable international developments and changes in the party system, if we see party system change the way Mair sees it, cases where party system change is accompanied by foreign policy change would be very few indeed. Clearly one needs a wider definition of what changes in the party system are of interest for a foreign policy argument.

Following Mair, I believe it is important to focus on systemically relevant developments in domestic party politics. His definition of party system change may be demanding, but it alerts us to the fact that simple volatility in election results or changes in voting behavior of various groups are not systemically consequential changes (ibid: 200). It thus helps us limit the range of phenomena we should be looking at to only the ones that hold a potential to influence the systemic workings of the environment within which parties function. In this vain, I identify three types of dynamics in the party system that fall short of party system change, however are of significance for the argument here, especially because they concern the way social cleavages filter and interpret a foreign policy issue.

The first kind of dynamics in the party system that is of interest is changing patterns of coalition and opposition between parties. Mair himself accepts that such shifts are consequential if they lead to a change of the logic of the party system, i.e. a change of the language and the main dimensions of competition that structure voters’ choices. In other words, a change in the way parties align or oppose each other may lead to, or reflect prior dynamics that signal, a changing logic of competition and so a new pattern of systemic effects. However, changes in the way parties interact with each other may be important without necessarily changing the overriding logic of the party system – instead, changes of patterns of competition and opposition may imply a redefinition or updating of the main axis of competition, without changing the prevailing structures. Indeed, renewed and inventive patterns of coalition may actually strengthen the primary dimension of competition, while new elements enter it. To the extent that different patterns of coalition within the same logic of competition can produce different policy outputs, I believe they are worth identifying as significant evolution of the party system.

31 Using an example from the first case study of this thesis, the decision of the FDP to break out of the bourgeois camp and enter a coalition with the SPD in 1969 in West Germany did not change the primary logic of the party system, which was a binary competition between two big Volksparteien. In order to understand how this change of coalition patterns was systemically relevant, we can contrast it with the various coalition patterns within the bourgeois camp between 1949 and 1966, when change of coalition partners for CDU did not affect the overriding logic of the system at all.

32 In an indirect way I am also addressing Mair’s argument that predictability of governing alternatives and patterns of coalition making is an important tool in the hands of parties to maintain the basic structures of a party system – with unpredictability signaling potential party system change (Mair 1997: 211-214). Here I claim that there is an intermediate option between predictability and unpredictability – namely the renewal
A second type of systemically relevant evolution in a party system concerns the change in the patterns of expression of societal cleavages through different parties – again, this may or may not lead to party system change (ibid: 55). But it can be yet another evidence of a change in the meaning of competition, if not of its overall direction. This aspect is particularly important for my argument because I see partisan preferences on foreign policy rooted in social cleavages. Which cleavages become energized, which ones gain or lose in importance, which ones align or oppose each other according to which parties represent them, are critical issues of how a party system will ultimately determine a foreign policy change. In terms of the content of policy outputs from a party system, the patterns of expression of cleavages through parties are important. The format of a party system, and the main direction of competition, may remain more or less the same. But some new features will definitely be added if various identities change political hosts. In this way, the direction of competition may remain largely stable, however the actual language, or stakes, of competition may evolve.

The third type of dynamics one can observe in the party system is a redefinition of the meaning of one of the dominant axes of competition. This shift is to a large extent a derivative of the other two dynamics I discussed above – and like them, it can be very consequential for the structure of a party system but fall short of provoking complete change. According to Kriesi et al (2006) for example, mature party systems usually align around a two-dimensional space, whereby one axis of competition concerns socioeconomic issues (Left-Right) and the other concerns values. Their argument is that party agency serves to redefine the meanings attached to this second axis. In such cases, the main dimensions of political competition and interactions of parties may remain largely the same. However, such evolution may be very consequential in terms of policy outputs. If a new foreign policy issue arises and calls for interpretation, parties that function along renewed and evolving axes of competition may read different things in a new situation than what they did at the time when they originally formulated a foreign policy. As I claimed, this aspect of a change in a party system is usually the result of the two other changes I discussed above – the role of party agency in the emergence of these new meanings of competition being crucial (Sitter 2001). But, as Mair would say, these

of government alternatives within the same direction of competition. Without qualifying as party system change, it rather constitutes important ways a party system reproduces itself.

33 See here Marks and Wilson (2000). Interestingly they speak of ‘bounded rationality’ of partisan actors as they interpret the EU issue according to the cleavages they are rooted in. ‘Bounded rationality’ is also a term used by Kupchan (1994: 45-46, 491) to denote the ideational and institutional constraints imposed on foreign policymakers.

34 Here we can use an example from the second case of this thesis, Canada. The Conservative decision to enter a Free Trade Agreement with the US in the late 1980s was the result of a novel alliance between the two most pro-free trade regions of the country (Quebec and the West), under the same party. The party system that produced this decision was not newer than what it had been for most of the century in terms of format and patterns of competition – however the parties forming it were different enough to make new combinations of the demands of cleavages (in this case, the regional cleavage) and thus produce new policies.
changes are not always consequential in terms of renewed dimensions of competition; instead, direct political agency may make it so that an existing structural dimension of opposition becomes reinterpreted in a way that serves the promotion of specific policies, with phenomena like realignment of cleavages or new coalition patterns following it.

The fact that I differentiate between three different types of dynamics of change of a party system should not give the impression that each type is inconsequential towards the others. On the contrary, new patterns of coalition may reflect or create new understandings of the language of competition, and new patterns of expression of societal interests through partisan hosts may create new patterns of coalition and new stakes of competition. Indeed, the interaction between them qualifies them as significant changes, rather than mere volatilities of cleavage and vote Mair dismisses as systemically inconsequential. All three different types of dynamics may originate from below, due to deep and longstanding changes in a society’s outlook, and above, due to parties’ and partisan entrepreneurs’ efforts to ameliorate their position within policy space. Each type may or may not lead to wholesale party system change, however they are deemed enough for the purposes of my argument concerning foreign policy change if only they are systemically relevant, i.e. if they have the potential to contribute to the renewal or redefinition of the dominant language of politics, the normative anchor of the party system.

The mechanism of party-based foreign policy change proceeds as follows:

a) The evolution dynamics of important parameters of a party system create realignments of interests and governance ideas within partisan hosts and give rise to new preferences promoted by parties – a new anchor around which party competition revolves. If such changes occur while the state is faced with significant changes in its international normative and material environment, this realignment of interests and ideas about domestic governance will also result in new preferences on foreign policy. The issue area within which new ideas and preferences will arise will be contingent on the combination between domestic and international changes.

b) Together, new domestic and foreign policy preferences from the various partisan actors form coherent sets of ‘visions of domestic society’. In this way, under conditions of renewal or systemic evolution in party systems, partisan competition extends to foreign policy as partisan actors try to promote contending visions of domestic society. This is a different thing than saying that politicians promote foreign policy goals as a diversion from domestic matters (Smith 1996), or even that foreign policy goals are just symbols or signals for changes in the domestic field. Instead, domestic political actors

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35 How this redefinition of the policy space can lead to new policies can be seen in the third case of this thesis, Greece. There the overriding structural characteristic, a binary competition between the socialist PASOK and the conservative New Democracy parties, was maintained but the meaning of Left-Right competition changed radically in the second half of the 1990s: From a polarized competition between two class-based mass parties, it turned into a convergent competition between two parties seeking to increase their catchall appeal under conditions of essential convergence around the goal of Greece entering the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
pursue foreign policy changes honestly, precisely because they form part of a wider whole under which domestic policies also fall.

c) In honestly pursuing foreign policy preferences, partisan actors use party systemic and institutional features as opportunity structures for the contestation, promotion and institutionalization of new policies. In this way, a dynamic interplay between developments in foreign policy and party systems arises: the realignment of domestic preferences and ideas that initially gave rise to new foreign policy preferences will only be cemented in reformed party systemic features once the new foreign policy preferences are also translated into new policies. If the challenge to existing foreign policies fails, this means that the existing dominant patterns of systemic interaction between parties are strong enough to absorb underlying dynamics in the party system, which then remain systemically inconsequential.

In this way, we can see domestic alignments of ideas and societal interests forming an equilibrium with ideas institutionalized within foreign policies. Once domestic arrangements shift, foreign policies also have to change in order to reflect the state’s self-view and its position in the world more accurately\(^\text{36}\). However changes in the international system are also needed for full-blown foreign policy to take place. This implies that even under conditions of international change, changes in foreign policy are only possible when domestic rearrangements produce new preferences and new ideational frames that make new policies conceivable and create incentives to pursue them. It is changes in the institutional setup within which ideas and preferences are codified that make new policies possible – without such changes, even external impetus remains inconsequential, since partisan actors have neither the ideational tools to make sense of them, nor the institutional incentives to pursue them.

d) The end result of foreign policy contestation may be thought of as a new equilibrium. Successful institutionalization of foreign policy through creative engagement of party systemic parameters also results in the cementing of new features of party systems themselves, reflecting the initial dynamics that sparked the formulation of new foreign policy preferences in the first place. In this way, cases of foreign policy contestation and change may be seen as more general cases of systemic interaction between domestic party systems and the international system. This new equilibrium

\(^{36}\) The idea of an equilibrium between domestic politics and ideas expressed in foreign policy is partially taken from Wæver (2001). He is concerned with the way discourses about ‘Europe’ express domestic conceptions about ‘state and national identity’ (Wæver 2001: 25). He systematizes this in three layers of discourse analysis: the basic conceptual understanding of state and nation (domestic level), the relational position of the state/nation vis-à-vis Europe (interplay between domestic and international) and the concrete policy for Europe (international level). Changes in the basic normative constellations are harder the more one moves from the external to the domestic layers. The more changes one sees at the top, the more possible it is that efforts will be made to instrumentalize these changes through discursive reframing in order to alter the dominant identity constellation domestically. This framework then accounts for the role of domestic agency in realigning domestic conceptions of governance with ideas expressed within foreign policy. Even though I do not share this emphasis on discourses, Wæver highlights the importance of close correspondence between dominant domestic ideas and foreign policy.
comes about as actors with new preferences and political incentives use the occurrence of change in a state’s international environment to promote their policies. To the extent that initial dynamics in party systems only become finalized as party system features after new foreign policy preferences result in new foreign policies, the new domestic arrangements may be seen as indirect outcomes of the impact of the international system on domestic politics. The mechanism of this is partisan agency that uses international changes as discursive resources to promote foreign (and accompanying domestic) preferences that end up making changes in party systems more permanent. The following graph outlines the mechanism of the argument:

*Graph I: The Mechanism of Party-Based Foreign Policy Change*
This view of party system dynamics combines the two dimensions of a party system which affect the positions of parties on new issues: their rooting in social cleavages that cue their preferences on foreign policy issues; and their embedding within an institutional environment that prescribes positions within the policy space and, thus, electoral and political incentives. Political parties interpret changes in the international system and create new foreign policy preferences as they respond both to their societal commitments and the systemic demands of the party system. Changes in the way these two poles of the party system – the bottom-up effect of cleavages and the top-down structuring of competition through systemic patterns – interact create the preconditions (systemic dynamics) for the emergence of new foreign policy preferences, as well as their successful promotion.

The significance of this expectation can be better established if we contrast it with two rival expectations, which seem plausible, intuitive and slightly more parsimonious. However, I want to argue that either of these views by themselves is insufficient to portray adequately the conditions under which foreign policy change takes place. The one rival expectation sees political parties as expressing the societal cleavages they are rooted in without reference to any other interests. Political parties are pure policy seekers and foreign policy change must be traced in the development of cleavages, their rise and their fall. The other rival expectation sees parties responding only to electoral needs. Political parties formulate foreign policies as part of their office and vote seeking activities, and foreign policy change would need to be deduced from parties’ interests as these are determined by their position within policy space and their interactions. Both of these rival expectations are plausible, however they offer less than satisfying insights into the conditions under which foreign policy change becomes possible.

The first alternative essentially focuses on the bottom-up view of party politics and sees parties as carriers of the ideas and views prescribed by their rooting within political cleavages. Most existing work on political parties and foreign policy are variations of this perspective, even though some do not go as far as to pursue the argument that foreign and domestic policies of parties form coherent wholes. As much as the perspective of cleavages is a progress over the simplistic view of parties as representatives of societal interests, it still leaves open the question of how it relates to foreign policy change. At a specific point in time, a policy equilibrium can be plausibly explained with reference to the balance of strength between parties representing various policy preferences. However, an explanation of foreign policy change under this view would have to account not only for the rise of new cleavages and ideas within society, but also for the ways in which these come to influence policymakers, i.e. how they come to be institutionalized within parties. For this, the argument would have to go beyond a simple cleavage-based argument. In sum, a bottom-up view of party systems is very good in accounting for a foreign policy equilibrium at a specific point in time. It can also, in a more dynamic view,
incorporate the international dimension. However, it needs to be expanded in order to account for foreign policy change.

The top-down view is more straightforward. It sees foreign policies as part of the general effort by parties to respond to the systemic demands they face for gaining votes and office. Parties compete along specific axes of competition and this competition determines the policies they express. This view sees parties engaging a more or less dealigned electorate – they are not constrained by particular societal commitments as much as by their effort to lure the ever-crucial median voter (Downs 1957). This view of parties as office-seekers is not very popular in the literature on foreign policy, since it leaves very little room for ideas and preferences. Concurrently, such a view also leaves very little room for the incorporation of the international perspective in the study of foreign policy. However, this top-down view is recognized as an essential complement of cleavage-based arguments (see Batory and Sitter 2004). Political parties are not completely free to move around policy space and electorates are not socially dealigned (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 193-196); yet the timing and pacing of the expression of these cleavages is to a very large extent determined by systemic factors. In addition, this view of parties as being capable of substantial agency serves to accommodate the element of foreign policy change, something which a cleavage-based perspective lacks.

What this argument omits is direct reference to other potential sources of foreign policy change such as bureaucracies, individuals or pressure groups. First, this is a conscious decision to focus the argument on political parties alone, something that is very rarely done in FPA, where analyses of these other determinants of foreign policy abound. While I recognize that reality is much more complicated than that political parties alone matter in complex states and societies, I prefer not to blur the emphasis of the argument of this thesis – especially when party politics is already being conceptualized as a multifaceted analytical unit including systemic mechanics and social identities. Second, the focus of this thesis already implies where I personally stand on the question as to which domestic factors matter the most (though not exclusively) in the domestic politics of foreign policy. In liberal democracies important foreign policy decisions, and especially ones that signal significant reorientations, cannot be made without some sort of consultation and adjudication in the public arena (and perhaps they cannot even be conceived by policymakers with this dimension in mind).

I think that the approach I propose here goes some way towards reconciling the question of multiple actors of foreign policy: The focus is not really on political parties in government (as competitors for analytical primacy to, say, a specialized bureaucracy or an epistemic community or trade unions) but on party systems, an institutional space codifying patterns of expression and interaction between parties that themselves have prior societal commitments. It is within this institutional space of democratic deliberation that the ideas and preferences of other actors, institutions or even bureaucracies try to find hosts and promote their ideas. I am very much interested in how the mechanisms of
deliberation themselves allow the emergence of policy change, but this does not mean that I discard the potential that ideas and preferences of foreign policy are rooted outside of the party system. I will return to the question of why analytical priority to party politics is justified in the concluding chapter, with references to the empirics of the case studies.

TESTING THE ARGUMENT

The above discussion gives rise to various alternative propositions and explanations. This dissertation will test them in a comparative research design. The core of the argument is that foreign policy change occurs only in the presence of two necessary conditions: international change and ongoing systemic dynamics of party politics. In other words, it will test the validity of the following antithetical pairs of propositions:

Proposition Ia: Foreign policy change is the contingent result of the combination of two necessary conditions, international systemic change and ongoing dynamics in domestic party systems.

Proposition Ib: Absence of foreign policy change is the result of the absence of ongoing dynamics in domestic party systems.

Proposition IIa: Foreign policy change responds solely to international systemic change; evolutions of party systems are non-necessary for foreign policy change.

Proposition IIb: Foreign policy change responds solely to dynamics of domestic party systems; change in the international system is non-necessary for foreign policy change.

This thesis will test these propositions in cases of foreign policy change. The aim of this exercise is to show that there are significant links between foreign policy change and crucial developments in the party system. Comparing the role of party systemic factors as intermediate factors between international developments and foreign policy outputs in cases of foreign policy change creates a sound empirical environment within which specific mechanisms and causal paths can be discovered. In this vein, short counterfactuals in each of the cases of foreign policy change would demonstrate how this specific change would have been impossible in the absence of either systemically relevant developments in party systems or changes in the international environment. However, the exact role of party system dynamics as necessary factors of foreign policy change would remain unexplored if the research also did not control for the actual occurrence of foreign policy change as well. By using at least one case study where international material and normative conditions did change, but foreign policy remained
stable, we should be able to see how party system conditions underpinned the bias towards stability.\footnote{Since this dissertation seeks to establish the necessity of party system dynamics for foreign policy change, cases of foreign policy stability in the absence of international change will not be considered here. Even if party systems were changing in such cases, the explanation according to the argument here would be that foreign policy did not change due to international systemic stability.}

This dissertation does not, however, only make an argument about the necessity of domestic change for foreign policy change to occur in general, but also pursues the point that systemically relevant dynamics of party competition is crucial for foreign policy change, thus justifying the view that political parties are both enabled agents of change \textit{and} constituted by the structures of party competition. It is important to show in every case study that foreign policy change became possible due to the kind of systemically relevant dynamics we identified in the previous section: new patterns of coalition-making, realignment of political identities across parties, and redefinition of the meaning of one major axis of competition leading to the emergence of a qualitatively altered language of competition. In this way, we make use of the insights of literature on party system change (especially Mair) in order to go beyond standard accounts in IR and FPA that see parties as dependent carriers of societal preferences and political identities, as well as simplistic arguments that see foreign policy as derivative of crude movements of parties along an asocial axis of competition.

For this reason, at the end of each case study it will also be portrayed that bottom-up or top-down explanations, alone, would be insufficient to make us understand the kinds of processes that filter international pressure into foreign policy change. The three types of party system dynamics we identified contain precisely both dimensions of party systems: they are systemically relevant because they imply both a realignment of political identities across parties, and changes in the patterns of interaction between parties. It is at the intersection of these two dimensions that a normative redefinition of the stake and language of party competition takes place. So, in the cases of foreign policy change we study, a short counterfactual argument would need to show that either of the two dimensions (bottom-up and top-down) of change in a party system by themselves would be insufficient for foreign policy change to have taken place. Instead, it will be shown that it was the sequence from one dimension to the other that made developments in the party system relevant and foreign policy change possible.

Finally, for each of these cases, alternative explanations for the foreign policy change at hand need to be considered and the strength of the partisan argument against them demonstrated. This will be done with reference to strong accounts that focus on the empirics of each case, but also seek to make wider theoretical contributions. In this way, each case study will serve as a test of strength of the argument of the thesis vis-à-vis multiple literatures of IR and comparative politics.

Comparison has been recognized as essential for the creation of at least meaningful generalizations both in the constructivist and the newly emergent ideational FPA.
literature (Carlsnaes 1992; Kaarbo 2003). The method of comparison recommended is that of a structured/focused one, which is generally wedded to a language of variables and knowledge accumulation (George 1979; George and Bennett 2005). The structured/focused comparison is a method to do comparative case-study research with the aim of unravelling close causal relations through process tracing (George and Bennett 2005: 67-72)\(^{38}\). Here I eschew the methodological and epistemological goals (identify variables, accumulate knowledge)\(^{39}\); but I retain the commitment to:

a) Abide by an analytical model that will guide my research through specific questions.

b) Streamline the findings so that they allow contingent generalizations.

The comparison will be focused because not all of the information arising through the historical cases will be of interest, and it will be structured because it will revolve around specific analytical categories as these arise from the theoretical discussion (George 1979: 61-62).

The analytical categories around which comparison will be structured are:

a) A foreign policy challenge: I assume that foreign policy restructurings start from an upheaval of the state’s structural environment (Gustavsson 1999: 84-85)\(^{40}\). A foreign policy challenge (not necessarily a crisis, as in ibid: 86-87) is also assumed to carry contested meanings: Different domestic interests and identities see different things in every new foreign policy challenge, and this contestation expresses itself in different understandings of what the state’s interests are (ibid: 83-84). Here, the first step in every case is to briefly show what different understandings each foreign policy challenge carried.

b) Dynamics of the party system: In the case of foreign policy stability, this part of the comparison will show that if the relevant party system underwent any changes, they did not qualify as ‘systemically relevant dynamics of the party system’ as defined above – i.e. they did not lead to the reformulation of the normative anchor that would have allowed the absorption of international pressures into new conceptions of a state’s political identity, place in the world and, ultimately, interests.

c) The mechanism of change: The emergence of new partisan foreign policy preferences and ideas, their institutionalization first within individual parties and then within the party system as new foreign policies, and their parallel embedding in lasting party systemic features will be reconstructed. The emphasis will be on the main two functions of partisan agency as mechanism of change: the synergy and synchronicity in the development of foreign and domestic preferences (‘visions of domestic society’) of

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\(^{38}\) On process-tracing see Vennesson (2008).

\(^{39}\) See the discussion on metatheory in the last section of this chapter.

\(^{40}\) Gustavsson writes that foreign policy change has both domestic and international sources. But his focus on ‘crises’ clearly shows that he perceives systemic (i.e. international) factors as the primary instigators for change. Domestic sources are included as sources to the extent that they inform actors with policy ‘solutions’ (i.e. identity/interest bundles) waiting to be attached to a ‘problem’ (86). The same logic is at play in Volgy and Schwarz’s (1991) discussion of sources of foreign police restructuring.
political parties; and the use of partisan actors’ preferred interpretation of the foreign policy challenge as normative argumentation in the process of contestation of foreign policy.

The first two steps of the comparison will reconstruct the domestic and international background of each case. Works of diplomatic and political history will highlight the situation in the international and domestic political field. Expert accounts of party politics will reconstruct the point of equilibrium of the party system at the point when foreign policy contestation started, as well as the different foreign policy preferences and interpretations of foreign policy challenges by parties. The tracing of the process of foreign policy contestation will be made through the use of both secondary sources (expert accounts of intra-party politics and personalities) as well as primary material such as party documents (programs, electoral material), speeches and interviews.

Continuing to the background conditions of the comparison, a parameter we need to control for in both cases of foreign policy change and non-change is politicization of the given foreign policy issue. In our cases the foreign policy issue at hand needs to be an object of high-profile (if not intense) competition between parties. In this way it becomes easier to see how parties use argumentation consistent with their ideological traditions and how they frame foreign policy issues as important determinants of partisan competition. Lack of politicization in cases of non-change could be explained by a partisan argument, but that would be laboring the point, as many other explanations (systemic, rationalist etc.) would be equally adequate. A combination of politicization of foreign policy and non-change on the other hand is very important, because in these empirical occurrences obviously some actors actively seek to implement new foreign policy preferences and the pathways through which party systemic factors keep them from achieving this become more highlighted. In cases of foreign policy change, politicization is a control condition, which allows us to see foreign policy actors acting as partisan actors beyond other institutional allegiances.

Another parameter the comparison will control for is the relative size of states. Literature on foreign policy change is generally inconclusive as to whether bigger or smaller states are more likely to engage in foreign policy change. Volgy and Schwarz (1991) think that only big states have the capacity to implement change and the ability to.

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41 The list of sources draws largely on Kaarbo’s (1996: 516-517) research design.
42 This reasoning would seem to imply that the argument of this thesis only applies to politicized or deeply salient foreign policy issues with important domestic repercussions. However, I would say that I expect party systemic factors such as the redefinition of the normative terms of party competition or the self-repositioning of political parties to affect policy makers’ views on most foreign policy issues. In a sense I ascribe to an ontological and normative view of public policy issues as political issues, i.e. issues of redistribution and essential values. In other words politicization is the norm (despite different degrees); allegedly neutral issues are in reality ‘neutralized’ issues reflecting the interests of dominant political actors (see Buzan et al 1997, also Schmitt 2007 [1932]). For this reason I would say that the scope of my argument extends to all foreign policy issues; picking cases of high profile foreign policy contestation only facilitates the empirical research and presents cases where the mechanisms identified here play the predominant role.
escape the constraints of the international system. Katzenstein (1985) had also made a similar argument in the field of political economy. Conversely, work on realignment of foreign policy within the context of the Cold War focused on how smaller states changed aspects or the whole of their foreign policy orientations (Holsti 1982, Moon 1985). My primary argument would be that size is not necessarily relevant, and that it is in any case a relational concept. However size of a polity is not only relevant regarding the state’s international standing; it also bears consequences about the abilities of domestic actors to implement far-reaching changes. The bigger the polity and the more complicated the state, the more demanding will be the preconditions for the implementation of change. For the argument of the thesis to be strong, I will include examples of states of varying size in order to account for differences in this respect.

The final factor I intend to control for is type of state, including state-society relations and accompanying political arrangements and party politics. Following a basic classification of democracies (Lijphart 1999; Risse-Kappen 1991), I differentiate between consensual, democratic corporatist states, where party systems link strong societal interests with strong state institutions and where coalition governments and multiple checks between the executive and the legislative branch exist; Westminster democracies with pluralitarian government, dominance of the executive and competitive societal interests that compete for representation through the party system; and South European states with polarized and dispersed societal interests, dominant states vis-à-vis societies, strong executives and party systems that reflect political cleavages overlying constantly shifting societal ones. This classification will inform case selection to the extent that it will show that parties within party systems with different degrees of societal commitments, historical trajectories and embedding institutions respond in the same general manner to foreign policy challenges, and that the mechanisms of foreign policy preference formation and expression identified here can be applied to a representative sample of different types of liberal democracy.

THE LOGIC OF CASE SELECTION

Based on the various qualifications I have identified, a complex matrix of potential cases of interest arises. I am interested in covering cases of both big and small states, of three different types of state, and of both successful and non-successful foreign policy change. Such a design yields the following table:

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For the importance of institutional settings such as parliaments, executives etc. as arenas within which party systemic interactions unfold (often with substantial differences from one setting to the other), see Bardi and Mair (2008).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of State</th>
<th>Size of State</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Change</th>
<th>No Foreign Policy Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus/Corporatist</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South European</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously conducting 12 deep case studies that cover all the possible types of foreign policy contestation while satisfying the criterion of visible politicization (controlling for politicization would multiply the possible types by 2 and complicate case selection even more) is not feasible. There would need to be some hierarchy of the different criteria in order to justify the selection of a manageable number of cases in a meaningful way. In my view the type of democracy is the primary criterion, and for this reason there would need to be at least three cases, each covering a type we have identified here. Ideally there would need to be at least one case of change and non-change per type, thus raising the number of required case studies to six – which is still a high number. I consider size a secondary qualification and the variety of the concept can be captured by choosing states of various sizes, without insisting on how size relates to the other criteria.

Based on the above premises, I have identified three cases of successfully politicized foreign policy change covering all three types of state:

- West German Ostpolitik 1969-1972: The decision by West Germany to change substantially its relationship with the Eastern bloc in 1969-1970, and by extension its own self-conception as sole legitimate German state, came on the heels of a significant political change: for the first time since 1949 the Christian Democrats were in the opposition, due to the creation of a coalition between the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats. Novel foreign policy preferences served as a signal for the creation of this coalition. The creation of this new government reflected the definite establishment of a competitive binary system of alternation of government, which in turn made the new foreign policy possible. The elections of 1972, largely fought on the question of Ostpolitik, cemented this new equilibrium. In many ways, the specific content and timing of Ostpolitik was the result of prior changes in the West German party system, and its contestation was as much contestation about the direction of the dynamics of the party system.

- Canada and free trade with the US 1988-1993: In 1988 the Conservative government in Ottawa decided to enter a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. The decision was fiercely contested by the opposition Liberals and New Democrats. The decision was seen as carrying far-reaching consequences for Canada’s political,
economic and social identity. In the elections of 1988 the Conservatives took advantage of the splitting of the anti-free trade vote between the Liberals and the New Democrats and won in what amounted to official ratification of the FTA. According to the analytical framework suggested here, the successful foreign policy change can be adequately explained by the creation of an electoral pro-free trade coalition between the Canadian West and Quebec, reflecting specific understandings about the relationship between the different communities of Canada. It was this concentration of significant ends of the dominant cleavages of Canadian politics (region and language) within the same partisan host that made the difference from earlier efforts to accept foreign trade with the US.

- Greece and the EU candidate status of Turkey 1999-2000: In late 1999 Greece changed a significant aspect of its foreign policy towards Turkey by allowing the EU to grant Turkey official membership candidate status. This change was more than a tactical maneuver. Instead it represented a profound change in the way Greece viewed Turkey and its relationship with it. The decision became the object of intense political debate between, and within, Greece’s two main parties, the then ruling socialists of PASOK and opposition conservatives of ND. The decision was the result of PASOK’s shift away from its populist past and towards a modernizing message about Greece’s image (which also included a vision of Europeanized Greek-Turkish relations) after a new leadership took over in 1996. Behind the decision in Helsinki lay the strategic decision of PASOK first and ND later to reformulate the stakes of the Right-Left axis that structured their competition, from one of polarized class politics to one of convergent ‘modernization’ of the economy in order to absorb pressures by an increasinglydealigned electorate.

- In addition to these three main case studies, I will conduct a plausibility probe of the main argument in four shorter case studies. These will also cover cases of non-change in order to satisfy the logic of comparison as specified above, while they will portray the ability of the argument here to ‘travel’ across time and space. The cases included in the plausibility probe will be Austria (a case of non-change, regarding the maintenance of neutrality after the Cold War), the Netherlands (a case of change, in the sense that a hitherto emphatically Atlanticist security policy for the first time received a Europeanist dimension in the 1990s), and Australia and New Zealand (taken as a pair, exploring why Australia did not go through with foreign policy change and its famous ‘Asianization’ of the 1980s and 1990s whereas New Zealand actually moved away from the orbit of the United States to develop a more independent security policy at around the same time).

CONTRIBUTIONS AND METATHEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Efforts to widen our understanding about the role of domestic politics in international affairs until today have been less than satisfying precisely because comparative politics have been incorporated in discussions within IR and FPA only imperfectly. The main challenge for this dissertation is to show that the preceding
discussion about parties, party systems and party system change broadens our understanding of the way domestic and international politics interact and contribute to the theoretical advancement of the study of international phenomena.

Since the 1980s already, works in International Political Economy, influenced greatly by Gourevitch’s (1978) seminal article, created arguments about the interplay of domestic and international politics. Indeed, recent scholarship on the work of parties seems to forget where ‘it all started’, namely initial interest in the effect of domestic politics on international affairs which mostly came from work in International Political Economy. Yet one of the main insights of IPE, whose spillover into IR was reflected in ‘Second Image Reversed’ arguments, was that inside-out policies only make sense if placed within a more holistic view of politics, one which spans borders and levels of analysis (Keohane and Milner 1996; Risse-Kappen 1995: 15-16). In this view, partisan foreign policies can be better understood if we see them as reactions to, and incorporations of, input from the international arena.

Turning to IR, interest in the role of domestic politics took an upturn from the mid-1990s on, mostly through heightened interest in transnational relations (Risse-Kappen 1994, 1995) and the development of liberalism by Moravcsik (1997) as a distinct theoretical strand of International Relations theory. However key insights and pleas of the transnational relations literature for further research remained unheeded. Original work on the effect of sub-state and transnational actors in state foreign policies laid particular importance on, and further pleaded for more attention to, the role of ideas and norms in politics (Evangelista 1999: 377; Risse-Kappen 1995: 31-32). Party politics is about deliberation and justification, and party-based actors constantly look for normative tools in their effort to promote new policies and defend old ones. The always-insufficient engagement of the discipline with the cause of ideas and norms undoubtedly hampers the way it approaches party politics.

Moving to Moravcsik’s (1997) liberalism, it theorizes state interests and foreign policies as expressions of sets of preferences of societal actors who compete in an open market of political competition. Moravcsik considers his societal actors pursuing both material and ideational interests, and patterns of international conflict and cooperation being determined by the transnational interactions of societal preferences. But Moravcsik remains agnostic as to the process of preference formation, opting to see preferences as a given outcome of political deliberations, which he is not interested in. Moravcsik’s liberalism is a useful framework for the incorporation of domestic politics in the study of international relations. Surprisingly it has rarely been put to use, perhaps because of its ambitious nature. Unlike Moravcsik, I do not seek to explain systemic results with reference to the cross-border interaction of societal interests. Instead, I simply see how these interests come to be expressed internationally through new foreign policies after fighting it out in the domestic arena. On the other hand, I problematize Moravcsik’s simplistic view that societal actors form preferences ‘prior to politics’. Here I show that
domestic preference formation is all about politics, and that it is informed by structural and ideational factors.

Turning to another major theoretical strand of IR, constructivism as a broad metatheoretical school takes interest, among other things, in domestic politics as a process of state interest formation. For constructivism (especially the domestic constructivism of Hopf 2002), domestic social identities inform state interests and are extrapolated into the international arena through framing and interpreting changes in the international system. But constructivism is not primarily a theory of domestic politics. On the contrary, its dominant strand – systemic constructivism – is concerned with norms on the systemic level, and how interaction among states constitutes an international normative order, which then informs interests and identities (Wendt 1999).

If it involves domestic politics then, constructivism decisively does so by seeing international and domestic arenas as a discursive whole, a social space where actors engage both with domestic and foreign identities, ideas and norms (Houghton 2007: 27-30). Unlike liberalism, constructivism adds ideas into the mix and conceives of domestic interests as bundles of material interests and identities, and of societal actors as bounded rational actors, pursuing identity informed interests by rationally engaging in a political process (Barnett 1999: 6-7, 26) – not unlike the elaborate view of social cleavages as organizational and ideational dimensions, and the literature seeing party positions on European integration conditioned by a combination of ideological commitments and partisan incentives.

Despite its opposition to structural realism, systemic constructivism remains equally agnostic (not to say indifferent) to the issue of individual foreign policies. Yet any systemic theory should be able to show that systemic developments have effects on the behaviour of the units. Similarly, strands of constructivism that emphasize ideas in the domestic arena sometimes lose focus of the fact that ideational politics constitutes a whole, spanning the domestic and the international realm. In both cases, constructivism needs a better understanding of unit-change within a system, because these unit-changes ultimately determine systemic developments as well. Using party systems theory is also an effort to fill the constructivist ‘shell’ with the insights of a literature seldom used in IR, but which can complement the broad metatheoretical constructivist understandings with concrete empirical contributions.

The argument of this dissertation also engages with other works falling within, emanating from, or moving even further than, the constructivist project. More mainstream applications of constructivism’s focus on ideas and linkages between international and domestic politics have been made in the study of national identity as a source of, and institutional embedding of, foreign policy ideas and preferences (Jepperson et al 1996). More post-modern studies (falling within the field of post-structuralism) look at how domestic discourses serve as institutional structures that reproduce foreign policy ideas (Campbell 1992; Hansen 2006).
This dissertation aims to offer an ‘institutional corrective’ to studies of national identity by showing that party systems are crucial institutional settings within which ideas about a state’s self-image and place in the world are formed and reproduced. In this view, party-based foreign policy change reflects a reappraisal of the way domestic political forces view the state’s position in the international system and, by extension, visions of domestic society. To the extent that studies of national identity reproduce within states the conventional constructivist view of powerful ideational structures, the argument here also complements attention of domestic institutional settings with an emphasis on agency and the possibility of creative engagement with such structures. In addition, my argument remains far more critical of discourse-based, post-structural accounts of foreign policy formation. The implications for mainstream constructivism (identities etc.) and post-structuralism will be discussed more extensively in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

When it comes to Foreign Policy Analysis, the recent turn to cognitive and ideational approaches serves the study of the traditional ‘darlings’ of FPA such as individuals, bureaucracies etc. (Houghton 2007: 31-33; Kaarbo 2003: 160-161). This research applies the two basic tenets identified as a major advancement of FPA, namely the turn to constructivist ontology and the employment of modest positivist methodology like structured/focused comparison. It shows how foreign policies become possible under conditions of political contestation in a wide range of cases.

When it comes to comparative party politics, this dissertation builds on some very interesting early (Valen 1976), as well as more recent (Golden 2004), works where the impact of international issues on domestic party politics was the focus. The argument of this dissertation is about how changes in the domestic party systems filter international developments to produce foreign policy change. However, to the extent that the role of agency is crucial in this process and that the end result of this process is a new equilibrium between new foreign policies and altered party systems, foreign policy change must also be seen as a process through which international norms and material conditions impact on domestic arrangements. At the same time, in showing that party systems can have policy outputs in foreign policy, this dissertation brings attention to the inescapable importance of the international dimension in the workings of domestic politics.

If we had to use the parlance of IR metatheory, the ontology of this dissertation would be idealist and holist; it sees political parties as actors within a thick discursive environment spanning the domestic and the international. And if we had to embed the ontological argument of the thesis and its epistemological repercussions within a discussion of social and scientific theory, the best tool would be the agency/structure debate.

The agency/structure debate of social theory has been applied both in the field of IR (Dessler 1989) and Foreign Policy Analysis (Carlsnaes 1992). It focuses on political agency and how political actors interact with their surrounding structures, which both
constrain and enable them. In this picture, political parties can be thought of as constrained and enabled by a combination of the international normative environment, the domestic constellation of identities and the exigencies of party competition and electoral survival (Volgy and Schwarz 1991: 622-626). In times of contestation of foreign policies one can think of party-based actors as creatively engaging with international and domestic norms in order to institutionalize their preferred interpretations of foreign policy and domestic order (Barnett 1999: 24); but also, one can think of them as constrained by the established limits of discursive contestation of domestic orders and by the burden of the social identities they are meant to represent (Carlsnaes 1992: 265-268).

My research operationalizes the domestic normative structure within which political parties function, by looking at party systems theory. Party systems are understood here as institutions, prescribing interests and terms of debate for their members, political parties. The domestic structure party agents engage with is the structure of codified patterns of interaction and the accepted language of politics that gives meaning to domestic political competition. It also constrains them, most notably by prescribing terms of debate and strategies for electoral success (Barnett 1999: 8-9).

This dissertation then falls within the broad category of works of IR that embark from a view of politics as flows of interactions, rather than linear relations, and are lead by this ontological assumption towards an epistemological view that prioritizes the untangling of processes and aims at contingent generalizations. This correlates with Hopf (2002), who claims to make only ‘modest truth claims’. What is really interesting is that such modest research goals can have important theoretical implications: ‘[In case of empirical validation of theoretical expectations] the theory should be considered to be applicable to other domains, even though the empirical evidence itself is necessarily uniquely bound to its historical context’ (Hopf 2002: 31). This means that the empirical findings in each case yield theoretically important results, rather than empirically universal claims. Blyth (2008) on the other hand emphasizes that the contingent and unstable state of social reality and the importance of ideas as tools that make sense of this world make continuity and stability in social research a futile exercise. Rather, the world itself is a world of uncertainty and unregulated interactions and social science needs to reflect such a reality. Of particular importance in this analysis is the author’s call for paying closer attention to agency. Agency is affected by environmental pressures that create a thick social environment conditioned by feedback loops and constant interaction. In such a world, causality itself is rarely linear and conclusions that hold in one social setting are only hardly transferable elsewhere.

Barnett is indeed a useful example here. Whereas his piece on the ideational politics of Israeli foreign policy change is excellent in showing how key constructivist tenets shed light in one particular case, and it clearly addresses the issue of party politics in this process, its scope remains quite limited. An ideal situation would be to have a Barnett × n, or a comparative study of the interplay between domestic institutions, political agency and ideas cum interests. The inevitable scaling down of descriptive accuracy due to time and other constraints can be compensated for by a more rigorous comparative method, seeking to frame key empirical insight in analytical/theoretical terms.
Even though I ascribe to a post-positivist epistemology, it must be clear that my methodology tries to address some basic concerns of scientific research and parsimony. I do not see foreign policy and party systems as variables in a causal relationship, but rather as co-constituting discursive entities. Comparison does not try to answer which of the two affects which, as much as it tries to show how processes of mutual influence unfold (Barnett 1999: 18). My analysis of the interplay between party politics and changes in the international arena as determinants of foreign policy change resembles the mutual constitution of state interests and domestic orders in agency/structure-informed works within FPA, and also aims at contingent generalizations and a close untangling of processes and constitutive links between actors and structures (Carlsnaes 1992: 267; George and Bennett 2005: 32).

Finally, taking a broader look of the discipline of IR, I see my work being positioned within the problematique developed by Buzan and Little (2001). What is of interest here is the authors’ call for a ‘thicker, more holistic form of theorising’ (Buzan and Little 2001: 34) that is capable of making sense of large-scale social phenomena; the focus on deep historical analysis; and the reference to the potential of IR to ‘become a kind of meta-discipline, systematically linking together the macro sides of the social sciences and history.’ (ibid: 22). I see my work here as responding to these epistemological concerns. I also think that IR has the potential to incorporate the teachings of other fields of social science – here being comparative party politics. My belief is that an emphasis on the role of political parties in international relations as social entities with global outreach can enrich the understanding of world politics as politics as such, i.e. as a process of deliberation and social representation within a context of interest expression and deliberation.

Summing up, the empirical question of the thesis, the development of an analytical framework based on comparative party politics and the employment of the comparative method also constitute advancements within IR. As a study of the interplay between domestic and international politics, this dissertation seeks to develop the liberal and constructivist agenda by showing the importance of domestic preferences, the impact of the international system on domestic politics as mediated through political agency, and the link between the domestic and international arena as ideational settings. It highlights the importance of domestic institutions and identities, and is also an exercise in metathoretical questions by seeing political actors in a dynamic interplay with the structures that enable and constrain them. In this way, this dissertation seeks to go beyond offering an improved empirical view of the issue at hand, but it also seeks to touch upon its repercussion for International Relations in general. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I will address how the findings of the comparison impact these different literatures, as well as make an effort to put the question of party-based foreign policy change in even more abstract sociological terms, by seeing how it can be stated in terms of open-systems theory.
PART II

FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE AND PARTY POLITICS IN THREE CASES:
WEST GERMANY, CANADA, GREECE
CHAPTER 2

“The worst tragedy is that election in ’69. If this National Party, that extreme right wing party, had got three-tenths of one percent more, the Christian Democrats would be in office now”. Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, June 16 197145

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER AND ARGUMENT

Ostpolitik refers to the new policy of rapprochement towards the Eastern bloc practiced by SPD Chancellor of West Germany Willy Brandt and FDP foreign minister Walter Scheel between 1969 and 1974. In literal terms, Germany has always practiced a ‘policy towards the East’. In the past, West German foreign policy had insisted on insulating, isolating and antagonizing the Eastern bloc, hoping that the inter-bloc struggle would result in the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the absorption of East Germany (and hopefully the lost territories to the East of the Oder) by the Federal Republic. This policy, conceived by Adenauer and imposed by him during the heyday of the CDU’s dominance over West German politics, was as much dictated by international developments as by Adenauer’s and CDU’s identity conceptions. To him, the foreign policy of Westbindung and Alleinvertretungsanspruch (claim to sole representation of the German nation by West Germany) was an essential ingredient of a policy that would stabilize democracy, liberal economy and international respectability for Germany. The intense competition between the US and USSR facilitated the imposition of this understanding. West German foreign policy in the 1950s was thus a distinct CDU creation.

Throughout the 1960s West Germany was confronted with the imperative of détente, i.e. of superpower rapprochement that brought the US commitment to European security and German unification into doubt. Détente revealed the dead-end Adenauer’s ‘policy of strength’ had run into with regards to German reunification: It was very clear that the US would not risk direct confrontation with the USSR for the sake of reunification. The time was ripe for a reevaluation of West German foreign policy, which became even more forthcoming after Adenauer left the Chancellery in 1963. The process of this reevaluation culminated in the Ostpolitik. But this reevaluation could not have been translated into concrete action without permissive party system circumstances. The background of Ostpolitik is as much a matter of international as of domestic politics.

Even though all major West German political parties carried political identities with demands for foreign policy reform, the new Ostpolitik only became possible, in the shape it took on, once dynamics of the party system culminated in a systemically relevant change of the logic of party competition: The SPD-FDP coalition formed after the 1969 elections. It was the first of its kind and allowed the two parties to put forth a different conception of the stakes of party competition, beyond the anti-Communism that had allowed the CDU/CSU to dominate political life until then. Once these parties found themselves within this new systemic constellation, the reformist foreign policy agendas they were carrying became energized and led to the formulation of a far-reaching foreign policy change. The contestation of Ostpolitik in 1972 from the CDU was intense, despite the presence of many reformists in the party’s ranks, precisely because the reformulation of the meaning of party competition was at stake. The new Ostpolitik captured accurately the preferences of a coalition intent on reforming the political identity of the Federal Republic. The impressive victory of the Brandt-Scheel coalition in 1972 signified the institutionalization of a new normative anchor of party politics and a new corresponding foreign policy identity.

POLITICAL CLEAVAGES, DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION, POLITICAL IDENTITIES OF GERMAN POLITICS

The two main cleavages that initially dominated political life of Germany since the creation of parliamentary life in the 1860s and unification under Prussian domination in 1871 have been religion and national integration. These two crosscutting cleavages crucially determined the shape of the German party system, which was further complicated by the advent of social class as yet another cleavage of importance after the lifting of restrictions against the Social Democrats (SPD) in the 1890s. The interplay of social developments, history and geography carried on these cleavages to the post-World War II era in West Germany and decidedly shaped the West German party system.

By 1871 the first political families had been formed – despite important heterogeneity of their various regional incarnations. The main agents of national integration were the liberal parties, heavily Protestant, committed to a strong modernizing state and a modern capitalist economy. However they severely split after 1866 over the question of the relationship between executive and legislative power: The more conservative and heavily Prussian National Liberals sided with Bismarck’s powers over the Parliament; the less numerous and more heterogeneous (due to strong presence in the

46 Information on this chapter has been largely drawn from Tormin (1966), Pulzer (1971), Vogel et al (1971), Rohe (1990) and Lösche (1994). More detailed references will be made where appropriate. In this and the other case-studies, references of multiple works in the parentheses will be given in chronological and not alphabetical order so that the contrast between sources of different chronological proximity to the cases will become more evident. In the chapters of theoretical discussion referencing will switch back to alphabetical order as was the case in the first theoretical chapter.
Catholic South) Social Liberals resisted this. The split of German liberalism between the proponents of the nation-state and the supporters of democratic values can be traced back to different philosophical ideas about politics – a split between Hegel and Kant to be very schematic (Winking 1991: 44-45). On the other side of the national cleavage lay initially various Conservative groupings, uniting social forces that felt threatened by the advent of the bourgeois class and the creation of a modernizing state. They had a dirigiste view of the economy, supporting industrialization under strong government supervision, and diligently safeguarded the old agricultural order as well as the three-class voting system in Prussia.

The first crisis of national integration in Germany brought to the fore the crucial role of religion in the new Reich. Catholics were suspected of low commitment to the new state. Constituting a strong, albeit minority, they became the target of Bismarck’s oppressive policies in what became known as the Kulturkampf. This combination of confessional persecution and a sublime cultural heritage codified in Catholic social thought crucially shaped the political identity of the Zentrum. It became a consciously cross-class alliance of Catholics, developing an ideology of social mediation, middle-of-the-road political tactics and a commitment to democracy and social order. Despite the increasing presence of Catholic trade unionists from the 1890s onwards, the Zentrum’s dominant wing remained a centrist bourgeois one.

Last to rise were the Social Democrats (SPD). With a much more uniform following than all other parties, and with much less differences in its identity geographically, the party of the working class overcame years of persecution and from 1890 onward, started a steady climb towards becoming the biggest-party in 1913. Its historical leaders, Ferdinand Lassalle in the 1860s and Eduard Bernstein in the 1890s, bequeathed it a doctrine of German patriotism, which the party sometimes felt compelled to overcompensate for due to the lasting suspicions of internationalism. The flip side of SPD’s patriotism was an aversion to the institutional structures of the Reich. Its following was almost exclusively working-class, even though for years the party failed to make inroads into the Catholic labor vote.

These cleavages created the first discernible patterns of competition, cross-cutting or reinforcing each other according to the issue area: Catholics, Social Democrats and Social Liberals against National Liberal and Conservative Protestants on democracy, Liberals against Catholics and Conservatives on social protection and the economy, Social Democrats with Catholic labor allies (and even less significant Protestant social thinkers) against everyone else on reform of the capitalist system, National Liberals and Conservatives against all others on governance of the state and the prerogatives of Prussia, Catholics and Social Democrats against all others (the ‘national camp’) on foreign policy and national integration etc. By the beginning of World War I the German party system was characterized by fragmentation, polarization and problematic aggregation of cleavages through coalition politics.
The party system of the Weimar Republic faithfully and spectacularly reproduced these patterns, despite years of war and monumental changes in the state’s institutional order and geographical shape. Class, confession and the poisonous national question, inflated by the loss in the war as well as the humiliating terms imposed by the Entente, cut across and reinforced each other in roughly similar ways as before. The Zentrum maintained its strategic position in the center of the party system, its status augmented by its commitment to democracy. Now a regime party, the Zentrum highlighted its cross-class appeal that allowed it to pursue alliances on both the left and right. However, the Zentrum grew increasingly conservative as the Catholic middle-class dominated its workings. The SPD was the second pillar of the Weimar regime, rising from the ashes of World War I as the agent of working-class interests and parliamentary democracy. However, it was deeply mistrusted by the bourgeoisie, and especially the pro-capitalist Liberals, for its protectionism, and by the right for its conciliatory foreign policy positions. Bridging the middle-class Zentrum and the working-class SPD was the DDP, the evolution of social liberalism and third founding party of Weimar. Also committed to democracy, representing entrepreneurial and merchant interests, it found itself torn between the need to cooperate with the SPD to defend democracy and its clientele’s fear of socialism. To the right of the Weimar alliance was the DVP, the new party of national liberalism, deeply nationalistic but ostensibly, if lukewarm, democratic – Protestant and bourgeois in outlook. Further to the right, the DNVP managed to form an umbrella party for all conservative, militaristic, traditionalist and nationalist forces. The DNVP was very strong in Prussia, however it made inroads into Bavaria as well, where it found a partner in Bavarian regionalists, allied on a national level with the Zentrum.

The destruction brought about by World War II fundamentally changed the playing field, within which, however, the old cleavages remained pertinent. Two external and one internal factor determined the shape of the German party system. The first external factor was the country’s occupation and the important role of the Ally licensing policy of new parties. The second external factor was geography. As it became evident that democratic politics in some form would only develop in the occupied zones of the Western Allies, German political parties were going to function within a peculiar West Germany, a German state for the first time oriented towards the South and the West (rather than the North and the East), for the first time devoid of the Prussian presence, and (most crucially) for the first time since the Treaty of Westphalia containing a numerical balance between Catholics and Protestants\(^\text{47}\). The third crucial factor was endogenous to the new system, and concerned the strategies of party actors themselves. The development of the party system will be traced through this lens.

The West German state contained the existing deep cleavages that had characterized German politics before. Fragmentation on the general level was small compared to the

\(^{47}\) The importance of confessional balance first being achieved in West Germany after Westphalia is mentioned in Paterson (1975: 36) and Schmitt (1990: 183-184).
distinct patterns of opposition in the various regions of the new state\textsuperscript{48}. The aggregation of all these crosscutting and overlying cleavages was overcome through the conscious strategies of the licensed parties. The lesson of Weimar was that fragmentation of social classes and confessions inhibited the emergence of a stable party system, characterized by centripetal politics.

This concern informed the tactics of the Catholic parties, and especially the Rhineland leader of the local Christian Democratic branch Adenauer. His main concern was with the creation of a strong bourgeois party, committed to democracy and opposed to both right-wing and left-wing totalitarianism. This concern was at the root of the new strategy of political Catholicism: interconfessional politics. Adenauer successfully outmaneuvered the exponents of social Catholicism in the Ruhr and Berlin to impose a Christian (rather than a Catholic) profile to his party\textsuperscript{49}. By maintaining the Catholic social doctrine’s inter-class appeal and combining it with an interconfessional strategy, the hope was that the new CDU party would overcome the fragmentation of the middle-class, as well as the fragmentation between the middle-class and the working-class\textsuperscript{50}. However, the inclusion of conservative Protestants from the North, Adenauer’s personal preferences, and the advent of the Cold War, bequeathed the party with a decidedly anti-Communist and conservative profile. The CDU remained in its beginnings a primarily Catholic party. Its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, also followed an interconfessional strategy, but due to its following’s rural and conservative Catholic outlook, was also much more to the right than the CDU.

If the CDU/CSU was an effort to overcome the religious, class and national cleavages (the latter reflected in Adenauer’s foreign policy positions, as can be seen below), German liberalism found itself from the beginning struggling with the divisions of its various ideological traditions. At the onset, the new FDP was plagued by the divide between conservative, nationalist and rural Protestants from the North and social liberals from the South. This divide also inhibited the party’s electoral strategies: There was always the question whether the FDP was going to develop into a catch-all party of the right, uniting all forces to the right of Catholicism, or whether it would develop into a liberal party of the middle. By the first West German federal elections of 1949, the FDP was seen as a party of the right, with its national liberal wing dominant (also reflected in its name, which did not contain the word ‘Liberal’), staunchly anti-socialist and always suspicious of Catholic clericalism. Its following was almost exclusively Protestant, however it also represented an effort to overcome the division of the middle-class which

\textsuperscript{48} The volume edited by Rohe (1990) gives a very concise overview of the different geographical traditions of the West German party system patterns. For the Ruhr see the chapter by Rohe (1990b), for Bavaria the one by Mintzel, for South Germany the contribution by Niehuss, and for a general overview the introductory chapters by Rohe (1990a) and Ritter.

\textsuperscript{49} On the first days of the CDU and Adenauer’s role in its programmatic development see especially Pridham (1975: 21-62) and Buchhaas (1981: 151-178).

\textsuperscript{50} See here Pridham (1977) and Glaessner (2005) as well.
had plagued Weimar. Its roots in the middle-class and the national camp lead it to an inescapable but ambivalent alliance with the CDU.\footnote{For the FDP in particular see Juling (1977).}

The SPD on the other hand was less concerned with local diversities. The party’s main concern was the challenge mounted against the democratic order in the West by the KPD and the Soviet occupation of the East. Fearful of finding itself contained due to its alleged anti-patriotism once again, the SPD and its leader Kurt Schumacher developed a strategy of confrontation with the KPD and of conciliation with the bourgeois camp, mostly with the CDU and its social, labor Catholics. The party’s power lay with the working-class, especially in the North. It also attracted a significant, but by no means majoritarian, part of the Catholic working-class. Its following in Catholic areas closely followed the confessional line (such as its support primarily by the few working-class Protestants of Bavaria). Its main electoral breakthrough was in the 1950s in the industrial Ruhr, where the SPD managed to inherit the ‘national camp’s’ following against the Catholic milieu of the region and to incorporate Protestant ideologues beyond the working-class (Rohe 1990b: 140-144). This was a peculiar case however, and already by the late 1940s the party lacked the potential to escape its working-class fortress.

The CDU/CSU quickly became the epicenter of the party system. By mopping up small conservative and particularist parties, it cemented its dominance of the bourgeois camp. Most importantly, it created the notion of the bourgeois camp. By employing a polarizing anti-Communist discourse, and aided by the Cold War climate of the time, Adenauer created an alliance of the middle-class spanning the old religious borders. The remaining working-class Catholics who voted for the CDU emphasized the fact that its roots and establishment were still impinged with Catholicism. However the party effectively created an interconfessional ideology of social mediation, reflected in its concept of the Social Market Economy, itself a compromise between the Catholic social doctrine and Protestant ordoliberal concepts of free market economy (Manow s.d.). However, the CDU was an effort to overcome not only religious and class fragmentation, but also the old national divide. The incorporation of much of the ‘national camp’ was successful not only due to Adenauer’s anti-Communism, but also due to his position on the issue of German unity and its foreign policies, which will be discussed below.

In the 1950s CDU’s political agency cemented the patterns of West German politics in a simplified aggregating axis of competition. By uniting all forces to the right of Social Democracy, the CDU and the FDP formed a bourgeois camp representing an alliance of middle-class and agricultural voters of both confessions; a fraction of Catholic working-class votes both reflected and reinforced the CDU’s commitment to a soft form of welfare protection. Pitted against the bourgeois camp was the SPD, confined to roughly a third of the votes, with entrenched dominance within the working class and few Länder, but essentially doomed to perennial opposition (Jesse 1990: 89). This first form of West
Germany’s party system found its apex in 1957, when the CDU secured an absolute majority of the electorate.

Table 1
Bourgeois and Socialist camps, vote percentages in Bundestag elections 1949-65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Bourgeois Camp %</th>
<th>Socialist Camp %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>56,0</td>
<td>34,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>67,5</td>
<td>31,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>67,7</td>
<td>31,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>61,7</td>
<td>38,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>59,1</td>
<td>40,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Adapted from tables in Vogel et al (1971)

From 1959 onwards, incremental changes in the party system started unsettling this arrangement of power. The Godesberg program of the SPD was the most important development, in that the party accepted the existing social order of the social market economy and started presenting itself not as a radical reformer of the capitalist system, but as a moderate reformer of the democratic and economic order of the Federal Republic. In 1960 the FDP decidedly resolved its self-positioning dilemma by electing as its leader Erich Mende, a national liberal who however wanted to break from the party’s rightist past. Culminating in the elections of 1961, the FDP created the image of the ‘liberal corrective’ of the CDU, remaining within the bourgeois camp but occupying the middle position between the CDU and the SPD. Finally, within the CDU/CSU itself fatigue with Adenauer and various scandals started undermining the party’s position as a catchall aggregator.

Consequently, in the 1960s important electoral developments started altering established patterns, thus undermining the Adenauer consensus in domestic and foreign policy. The new SPD strategy allowed the party to break out of the 30% fortress, primarily by making inroads into the Catholic labor and the middle-class urban vote, and by challenging the conservatism of the political order and the foreign policy of West Germany. Led by Willy Brandt, SPD recorded vote gains both in 1961 and 1965. The CDU on the other hand, despite a short-term boost due to the replacement of Adenauer by Erhard in 1963, saw its support being eroded steadily and its distance from SPD shortening. The FDP on the other hand saw its support explode in 1961, but was back to

its normal levels in 1965, and its coalition with CDU was fraught with tensions, primarily with conservative Catholics and the CSU.

Table 2
Difference between CDU and SPD, Bundestag elections, vote percentage, 1949-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>CDU/CSU&gt;SPD %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from tables in Vogel et al (1971)

In 1966, an economic recession and tensions within the coalition forced Erhard to resign. The CDU and the new chancellor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, formed a grand coalition with the SPD, with Willy Brandt taking over as foreign minister and Karl Schiller of the SPD as minister of finance. This coalition was meant to serve only instrumental goals: For conservative Catholics within the Union it was an opportunity to create a new electoral law that would cause the destruction of the FDP and revert the CDU’s loss of influence within the middle-class. For more liberal Protestants of the CDU it was an opportunity to find a more powerful coalition partner that would allow reforms of rigid domestic and foreign policies against conservative Catholics. For the SPD, it was an opportunity to gain credibility as a governing party. None of the two parties disputed the main binary pattern of competition of the party system; the Grand Coalition was a needed respite before normal competition would ensue again.\(^{53}\) To its horror, the FDP realized that the bourgeois-social democratic competition could take place without it. The specter of a new electoral law, particularly popular among vindictive Christian Democrats, lay like a Damocles sword above the party’s head.

POLITICAL IDENTITIES AND FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES IN GERMANY

The CDU was a broad coalition of Catholics and Protestants, however throughout the 1950s the party’s roots and the presence of Adenauer left no doubt about the predominance of Catholic preferences, especially in foreign policy. Historically German Catholicism had been very reluctant towards the Prussian and Protestant dominated Reich. Due to its regional epicenter in Western Germany, Catholicism developed an

\(^{53}\) On the Grand Coalition in general, see Lehmbruch (1968); on party strategies during the Grand Coalition and ahead of the elections of 1969, see Edinger (1970).
affinity for Europe understood as the enlightened ‘Abendland’ – a Carolingian vision of a unified Western Europe and a close cooperation between Rheinland and France. In the post-World War II context, with Eastern Europe under Soviet influence, this Catholic vision of the Abendland was updated with anti-Communism and re-packaged as unqualified support for European integration – ‘Europe’ meaning the democratic, free, capitalist and ‘civilized’ West. In both its traditional and newer incarnation, the Catholic concept of foreign policy closely reflected unease with German nationalism and its roots in Central Europe (Glatzeder 1980: 55; Clemens 1989: 22-23). The anti-Communism of Catholicism (understood as a refusal of atheism, materialism and totalitarianism) also infused the CDU with a big support for NATO and close alliance with the US against the Soviet Union.

This identity construction, with the Soviet Union, the East and Communism (but also Prussia, German nationalism and the Nazi past) as hostile ‘others’ (Engelmann Martin 2002), found its expression in Adenauer’s unequivocal policy of Westbindung, or complete participation in all structures of international integration of the West. His firm position within the Cold War context offered West Germany respectability towards some of its old enemies (and still formally occupiers) and complemented his domestic policies of democratic rule and the social market economy (Pridham 1977: 24-26, 34; Bellers 1979: 366). In this view, his decision to bring about a sharp differentiation with the SPD must be seen both as a conscious choice for binary politics (against the crosscutting fragmentation of Weimar), and a symbol of his position towards socialism of all kinds internationally – two interrelated goals.

However the CDU was no Catholic party – and West German foreign policy’s main concern was still the national question of Germany, reunification between a capitalist Western Federal Republic and a communist Democratic Republic. The conscious decision of the CDU to appeal to Protestant middle-class voters was in many ways an effort to integrate those strata, which had mostly supported Hitler in the new democratic system. In such a context, securing democracy within the new state required a delicate balancing act from Adenauer: He could not ignore the question of the loss of the Eastern territories of the Reich to Poland, the Soviet-imposed division of Mitteldeutschland and the demands of around 12 million refugees without risking the rise of nationalism and the fragmentation of anti-socialist forces – an outcome that would essentially replicate the dreaded Weimar arrangement (Clemens 1989: 16; Cordell and Wolff 2005: 38-39). On the other hand, he considered domestic democracy and international respectability interlinked and sublime goals of his policy – and, one might add, he was in no rush to bring about the abolition of a German state where Catholics were finally free from the Prussian yoke (Lösche 1994: 113; Granieri 2003: 16). He decided to support Westbindung, a policy that in the eyes of many cemented the division of the country due to Soviet hostility (Tilford 1975: 1; Glaessner 2005: 47), with a ‘policy of strength’ towards the East. He claimed he was for reunification, but only ‘within freedom’,
implying that any approach towards the Soviet Union or the East Berlin regime was endangering the democratic order of the Federal Republic; and that only a policy of confrontation with the East could force the Soviet bloc into concessions. He went further by claiming that because of its democratic nature, West Germany was the sole legitimate expression of the will of the German people and hence the continuation of the German state. In this vein, he refused to recognize the DDR and embarked on an international diplomatic crusade to keep other states from doing so (claim to sole representation or Alleinvertretungsanspruch) (Clemens 1989: 18-30).

By maintaining this moralizing tone towards the communist bloc, claiming continuity with the Bismarckian Reich (Tilford 1975) and refusing to recognize the territorial losses of Germany, Adenauer managed to include German nationalist and refugee groups in his foreign policy vision even though it put swift reunification on the backburner. This foreign policy in turn further reinforced the domestic catchall strategy of the CDU – the unity of pro-European Catholics with conservative and nationalist Protestants – symbolized in the policy of the social market economy (Buchhaas 1981: 223; Clemens 1989: 18; Granieri 2003: 14). However, the glue that kept this alliance together was essentially a reactive value: anti-Communism (Paterson 1975: 28). As long as the Cold War made Adenauer’s adversarial ‘policy of strength’ inescapable, this delicate balance between values of domestic governance, the creation of a broad domestic coalition and contradictory policies towards the West and East seemed to make sense (Lehmbruch 1968: 183). The problem was that from the early 1960s onwards this foreign policy set was under increased pressure from the advent of Cold War détente.

Détente was a structural imperative, emanating from the almost destructive outcome of superpower competition in various hot spots during the early 1960s (mainly Berlin and Cuba). Building on other relevant works (see Romano 2009) I conceptualize détente as a policy on behalf of Europeans to overcome the Cold War division of the continent. For Western European polities this meant the activation of conflicting visions of what exactly a ‘reunified’ Europe should look like. Clashes over détente were essentially clashes over the future security architecture of Europe and the values attached to European integration (Hacke 1975: 23). Détente in Europe was being claimed by two contending visions of European unification. The one vision was emanating from France and was imprinted by De Gaulle’s thought and policies. The other was represented by a broad array of actors supporting the closer relation between Europe and the US and the promotion of détente in Europe in a way that did not contrast with the interests of the wider Western alliance (Bozo 1998: 343).

Gaullism was far from being a consistent ideology. De Gaulle was promoting the interests of France first and foremost, and Europe was a required framework for the promotion of France’s leadership. De Gaulle was the first European leader to actively promote détente as a goal and ideal for the future European order (Wall 2008: 136). From the early 1960s he was propagating the vision of a Europe ‘from Atlantic to the Urals’.
His was a dynamic and aggressive détente, in the sense that it was Euro-centric and was going against both American and Soviet interests in Europe. In the early 1960s De Gaulle picked up the vision of European integration around the EEC, promoted the ‘Europe of the fatherlands’ and essentially called for the creation of a strong and independent Western Europe, capable of checking American initiatives in the continent (Granieri 2003: 3).

A more conservative redefinition of the need for détente came from the US, NATO and pro-Atlanticist European governments. The idea here was that détente in Europe was best served by a direct communication and negotiation between the blocs, with the West possibly recognizing the insecurities of the Soviet bloc concerning the viability of regimes in Eastern Europe and the permanence of borders (Bozo 1998: 359; Wall 2008: 147). The American conception of détente was a conservative one because it focused on management rather than transformation. If détente was to lead to the easing of tensions in Europe, this was to be done through negotiations and a slow pulling of Eastern regimes to the European orbit through increased contacts and normalization of relations (Bozo 1998: 348-349). The point of reference for the Atlanticist détente was the publication of the Harmel report in December 1967, a NATO document which was published ahead of the expiration of the alliance founding treaty in 1969 (Haftendorn 2008: 104) and which stated that NATO’s goal in Europe was, apart from security, the promotion of détente (Bozo 1998: 356; Haftendorn 2008).

With time, an alliance of Protestant reformists from within the CDU and the FDP concerned with the effects of Adenauer’s policy on reunification and West Germany’s relations with its allies started undermining his foreign policy tenets. The well-known Atlanticist-Gaullist controversy within the bourgeois coalition of 1961-1966 reflected the limits of the integration of Catholic and Protestant political identities. Unlike Catholics, Protestants held a vision of Europe that spanned the borders of a Carolingian Catholic Europe. Under a climate of ensuing détente in the early 1960s, they were also unwilling to see the commitment to Europe as antithetical to the strength of the country’s Atlantic links with the US and NATO. They were afraid that the Southern Catholics’, primarily among them the CSU’s, affinity for a small Europe was running away with them towards a Gaullist vision of an independent Europe, equally separated from the US and the USSR. What was worse, this vision of small Western Europe was misreading De Gaulle’s true intentions and was jeopardizing the prospect of reunification (Bellers 1979; Granieri 2003).

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54 On the Atlanticist-Gaullist disagreement within the Union through a lens laying major importance on religion, see the very thorough and engaging study by Granieri (2003). Bellers (1979: 350-402) also touches upon the issue.

55 Unlike the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church was much more vocal on the issue of reunification, thus providing Protestant thought with a gesamtdeutsch ideology (i.e. a view of the German nation still informed by the Bismarckian understanding of unity of the Reich) (Paterson 1975: 32).
Protestants within the CDU represented traditional concerns of the old national camp that was afraid of the Catholic conservative anti-Communist side taking over the agenda of foreign policy completely. In essence, they tried to reclaim the agenda of the Bismarckian state from the Catholics. The FDP on the other hand represented an even stronger aversion towards Adenauer’s tenets – his commitment to a closed, protectionist and ‘clericalist’ EEC and his overcompensation of nationalism in the East to the detriment of reunification. Being the heir of the parties that mostly stood for national integration, the FDP was the party mostly committed to national unification. For this reason it was willing to entertain ideas of more flexible policies towards the Soviet bloc despite its ardent anti-Communism. Unlike the Catholics’ pro-Western credentials and the anti-Communism of the conservatives, the FDP looked back to a tradition of activist diplomacy that took into consideration German national interest beyond ideals of European cooperation.

If the SPD had a religion it was Protestantism (Buchhaas 1981: 237; Mintzel 1990: 158; Lösche 1994: 135). Within this context, the party also held a vision of European integration more congruent with the FDP than the CDU. It looked positively to the UK and Scandinavia, which would temper the Catholic and conservative character of the EEC. As a reformist mainstream party, the SPD adhered completely to Westbindung after 1960 and, with Willy Brandt in the forefront, rode the wave of détente, highlighting its Atlanticist credentials. The détente of the Kennedy years allowed the SPD to frame its patriotic message within a progressive message of reform of both foreign and domestic policy. Détente encouraged an approach towards the East for the goal of reunification. The party also resisted the idea that European integration and NATO were inconsistent – as long as integration was not seen as a defensive union of Gaullist Western European countries. Just like the CDU in the 1940s, the SPD seemed to be finding an equilibrium between its domestic reformist and progressive message, its commitment to international peace, its Protestant-informed open view of Europe and Atlanticism, and its patriotic commitment to reunification within democracy.

In conclusion, we see that the cleavage-based political identities within West Germany informed foreign policy ideas and preferences consistent with these identities’ visions of domestic society. However, the translation of these identities into foreign policies did not take place automatically. It was a combination of political agency and its interaction with the international system. In this particular case, the foreign policy tenets of West Germany during its first 20 years of existence reflected a specific pattern within the party system. By employing the divisive language of the early Cold War, Adenauer cemented CDU’s political dominance within a binary logic of the party system pitting a

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56 For FDP’s early foreign policy positions Glatzeder (1980) is the most concise guide.
57 Factors that made Protestantism very relevant within the SPD were the Protestant church’s agony over the spiritual state of the East German population and its neutralist inclinations. The Catholic Church’s conservative orientation was also evident in its support for West German rearmament. The Protestant Church has always been much more associated with pacifist goals (Risse-Kappen 1988: 65).
pro-Western bourgeois camp against a suspect neutralist SPD – a policy whose usefulness for the Union became evident in the early 1960s when it maintained its position of strength vis-à-vis the rising SPD by mopping up the vote reservoir of smaller right-wing parties (Partch 1980: 92). The aggregation of the multiple cleavages into this new axis of competition was helped by the international circumstance and made possible a specific set of foreign policies. For as long as the framework of competition was this bourgeois v.s. socialist pattern, West Germany’s policies towards the Eastern block and its conception of the question of reunification was only slightly modified by the ongoing détente of the 1960s. The value of reunification within one free German state was the starting point for all three major parties, as well as the discursive framework within which even daring proposals for revision were taking place. In other words, this normative anchor was the axis around which discussion was taking place and the ideational framework that informed interpretations of relations with the East for all relevant actors. It would take the rise of a new dimension of competition, a new ‘language’ of politics, for détente to be translated into a fundamentally new Ostpolitik.

THE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: GOVERNMENT CHANGE AND OSTPOLITIK

The new Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany concerns the radical reappraisal of the basic principles of its policy towards its Eastern neighbors and the Soviet Union. Officially West Germany did not give up on the promotion of the goal of German unity within a framework of liberal democracy, and the preservation of peace was explicitly not antithetical to the continuation of close ties with the West. The underlying logic of these goals, as well as the emphasis among them, however changed radically: The Federal Republic officially gave up its (theoretical, however always rhetorically present) demands on the lost lands of the German Reich, as well as official support for refugee demands; it let go of its demand to speak and represent as the only legitimate state entity the German nation internationally by recognizing the factual existence of the DDR; and, even though it did not recognize legally the state of East Berlin, it accepted that there were two states of the German nation (Glaessner 2005: 52-53). These steps were codified in three treaties signed with the Soviet Union, Poland and (most controversially of all) DDR over a period of two years (1970-1972). In all, the Federal Republic completely gave up the old tenet of legally claiming the re-creation of the German Reich within the 1937 borders, thus politically, and psychologically, cutting any links with the Bismarckian era (Tilford 1975). Unification was still the ultimate goal, however it was relegated to second order after the prevalent demand for peace and modernization of relations with the East.

This sensational change, symbolic on countless levels and very consequential for the relations of the Federal Republic and its people with its neighbors, history and the state’s own identity, was brought about shortly after the creation of a coalition between the SPD
and the FDP following the elections of 1969. This was the first coalition of its kind, and the first time that West Germany had a prime minister that did not belong to the CDU. The new foreign policy became the main policy of the government and the most salient political topic of West German politics. Due to the fact that the Ostpolitik was not just a general diplomatic activity, but was codified in international treaties, domestic politics became extremely pertinent due to the need for ratification from the Federal Parliament, the Bundestag (Roberts 1972: 438). The potential for political drama increased due to the fact that the Social-Liberal coalition enjoyed only a slim majority of 6 seats, which would diminish over time due to defections.

The feud between Atlanticists and Gaullists within CDU in the early 1960s had already reflected different degrees of devotion to the existing ‘policy of strength’: Whereas the Gaullists wanted to maintain pressure on Eastern Germany and Soviet Union in order to bring about reunification through competition and attraction to a strong integrated Western Europe, the Atlanticists saw the meaning of Westbindung in precisely following the new US policy of détente and severing some of the most dogmatic aspects of the policy towards Communist countries. The FDP also sided with the Atlanticists in this discussion. In effect, by the mid-1960s the issue of Ostpolitik divided German political elites in two camps cutting across partisan allegiances. The Gaullists defended a foreign policy along the lines of the 1950s; however, their support was dwindling and was confined essentially to the very conservative CSU, CDU politicians from the Catholic South and West, and the joined parliamentary group. The Atlanticists encouraged a more flexible policy towards the East so that the goal of unification would be adapted to a reality of increasing contacts between the two superpowers and their preference for peace in Europe. This was a broad coalition comprising Northern Protestants of the CDU and most members of the party’s Youth organization and infantile party bureaucracy, the FDP and the SPD (Granieri 2003).

The creation of the Grand Coalition in 1966 under Kurt Georg Kiesinger further strengthened the Atlanticists – and so the idea that German-East relations should adapt to the climate and imperative of détente – within the government. Even though the impetus for the creation of this coalition were domestic issues such as the economy and justice reform (Haftendorn 2008: 106), and so the entry of the SPD in the government was generally welcomed by the conservatives within the CDU who were tired of FDP’s heckling, the SPD used this opportunity to promote its foreign policy conception. The symbol of this strategy was the occupation of the post of foreign minister by the party’s leader and perennial Chancellor-candidate Willy Brandt. His aim was to continue the ‘policy of small steps’ inaugurated by his predecessor, CDU politician, Gerhard Schröder, a goal to which also the ostensibly conservative Kiesinger acceded. However, until 1969 the terms of the debate were firmly set, and the differences in policy did not represent differences of hierarchy of the main goal: reunification without compromising West Germany’s domestic regime and its links with the Western camp. Non-recognition
of borders in the East and the East Berlin regime were still official Federal policy (Pridham 1977: 175; Roth 1995: 60; Haftendorn 2008: 106).

After three years of relative bipartisan stability on foreign policy (Pulzer 1971: 9), the two main parties parted ways ahead of the election of 1969. The Grand Coalition had been a temporary arrangement for everyone involved: Ideally for some in the Union it would lead to a perfect binary system of competition, with the FDP being absorbed by the CDU. For the SPD the ideal scenario would also be the creation of a coalition without the CDU. A new Grand Coalition would be the worst possible scenario for both parties, and an event only probable if the far-right NPD stole enough votes from the FDP and entered in the Bundestag instead\(^58\). In other words, both main parties entered the campaign with a clear understanding that they were running against each other. In this vain, the CDU tried to revert from its policy of adaptation to the demands for more flexibility in Ostpolitik by making ‘security in the 1970s’ its main message, and with foreign policy the marker of a campaign centered on the defense of the nature of the regime and the main economic, political and social arrangements that characterized West Germany until then (Edinger 1970: 556; Pulzer 1971: 14; Roberts 1972: 436-437). However the SPD shifted the campaign to domestic issues, where it presented a rejuvenating profile of domestic reform in the economy, education and justice (Edinger 1970: 556; Pulzer 1971: 14). The other two smaller parties of the election, on whose success to enter the Bundestag future coalition potentials would be dependent, the FDP and the NPD, made foreign policy a flagship of their campaign\(^59\).

The outcome of the election was a surprise: the much anticipated failure of the FDP to enter the Bundestag and the much feared success of the NPD to do so did not materialize; both parties crossed and failed to reach the 5% limit by a few percentage points respectively. A few days later the FDP acted on the pledge it made for the first time before elections to enter into a coalition with the SPD. Willy Brandt became Chancellor and FDP leader Walter Scheel became foreign minister. In his first speech as Chancellor Brandt gave an indication of his government’s agenda: His would be a reforming government that would ‘dare more democracy’ (mehr Demokratie wagen) in Adenauer’s republic (Hacke 1975: 27; Pridham 1975: 46). However, while his party’s electoral focus was on issues of domestic governance (which were also seen as more urgent by the public) (Paterson 1975: 37), his first statement contained a revolutionary element, clearly influenced by the new ideas propagated by the FDP. His was the first

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\(^{58}\) The NPD was essentially a right-wing expression for alienation from the Federal Republic. It was an effort to reinvigorate the national cleavage, thus representing a sense of insecurity and discomfort of the German nation with the West German state (Lehmbruch 1968: 203; Warnecke 1970: 635; Paterson 1974: 134). Its anti-Soviet and anti-American message was a crude adoption of the theme of détente (Czempiel 1970: 623; Von Beyme 1970: 217). For the role of the indeterminate national question on the resurgence of the radical left as well, see Shell (1970: 659).

\(^{59}\) The elections of 1969 were essentially about domestic issues (Roberts 1972: 436) – in fact this was considered at the time a sign of growing maturity and that political life was no longer about critical and passionate decisions (Czempiel 1970: 607; Von Beyme 1970: 207).
statement by a Chancellor that did not mention unification by name as a goal of West Germany’s foreign policy. After this, both Brandt’s chancellorship and the politics of the opposition were to be dominated by foreign policy, thus bringing West German politics into an era of polarization that had not been seen since the Adenauer-Schumacher feud over rearmament in the early 1950s.

Table 3
1969 Bundestag election results, vote percentages and seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>46,1</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>42,7</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF (radical left)</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table in Vogel et al (1971: 308)

Foreign policy and Ostpolitik completely consumed Brandt and his government (Roberts 1972: 443; Laux 1973: 513). Despite severe criticism from the opposition, defections from the meager parliamentary majority in the Bundestag (mostly from the FDP) and losses in various state elections (again, with the brunt mostly being borne by the FDP), Brandt and Scheel proceeded swiftly (some, even from within the government, would say hastily) to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union and Poland in 1970. Both treaties affirmed the signing parties’ commitment to peace and détente, renunciation of violence and West Germany accepting the validity of existing borders in central Europe (Roberts 1972: 437-438). In this way, the Federal Republic gave assurances about borders that did not even touch upon her territory (the DDR had concluded a treaty to that effect with Poland in the 1950s); however, the symbolism of a state that laid claim to the legacy of the German Reich relinquishing any claims for the sake of peace (and in the case of Poland, recognition of past atrocities) was stark. In the fall of 1972 West Germany concluded a Basic Treaty with the DDR, thus ending a 25-year period of mutual diplomatic isolation and an international campaign against the legitimacy of the Communist regime in East Berlin. The Basic Treaty once again recognized the stability of mutual borders and regimes, and the two German states were now also free to enter the UN. The Federal Republic did not officially recognize East Berlin, however it came very close. The treaty basically amounted to a practical mutual recognition and for all intents and purposes the two states were now entering a period of normalized diplomatic
contacts (Clemens 1989: 107-108). According to Brandt’s formulation, there were ‘two states in the German nation’\(^6\) and practical politics did finally reflect this.

Ostpolitik, thus, was not an abstract foreign policy change reflected in a changing diplomatic mood or inter-governmental activities; because it was codified in these three treaties, the prospects of the new foreign policy were intimately tied with the reality in the Bundestag, which would have to ratify them. In this way, West German party politics entered a phase of intense interaction with international politics: the debates on the ratification of the treaties were closely followed internationally, and after Brandt and the Americans agreed to link ratification of the treaty with the Soviet Union to the successful completion of the talks on the status of Berlin, the outcome of ratification in the Bundestag would impact directly on superpower-relationships (Edemskiy 2009; Ruchniewicz 2009). Failure to ratify the treaties would mean that the West would lose leverage over the Soviet Union in the Berlin talks, with unforeseen consequences on the development of talks and détente.

From the outset the CDU/CSU was very reluctant towards Brandt and Scheel’s diplomatic activism. However the party was far from unified in its criticism of the government. Whereas old Gaullists, chiefly Catholic conservatives around CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss and old Chancellor Kiesinger, developed a principled and pronounced rejection of any opening up of relationships with the East, mainstream opinion within the CDU including the ex-foreign minister Schroeder converged around a position of critical reluctance towards the government. This part of the Union was the heir to the old Atlanticist camp and continued to support the idea of a breakthrough in German-East relations, as well as to worry about alienation between West Germany and her Western allies. The flexible CDU never gave up the idea of reunification as an ultimate goal; however, it feared much less the effect of contacts with the East on West Germany’s interests and identity as a Western liberal democratic state.\(^6\) The end result was that this camp was unwillingly adjusting to Brandt’s argumentation about ‘change through rapprochement’, ‘reunification through peace’ and ‘détente as an important goal’, retaining only a conservative timidity towards the speed and ambition of actual changes.

Balancing between these two views was the new CDU strong man, Rainer Barzel. Leader of the parliamentary group after 1969, he successfully outmaneuvered Schröder by beating the latter’s protégé Helmut Kohl to the party leadership and effectively coopted Strauss to gain the title of joint Union Chancellor-candidate in 1972, doing away with the obsolete Kiesinger.\(^6\) Despite these tactical successes, the conciliatory at heart Barzel (Risse-Kappen 1988: 98) was caught within the Union’s complex institutional reality. Having been a party of government all its life, the CDU was devoid of a strong party mechanism and was still very reminiscent of a party of notables. Power and

\(^6\) See here generally Clemens (1989).
\(^6\) For an account of intra-CDU/CSU politicking, of Barzel’s rise to power and of Ostpolitik’s role in this, see Hacke (1975: 61-68).
authority of decisions still lay within the parliamentary group, which was still very conservative in outlook (Pridham 1975: 52). Thus reformists like Kohl rising through the party organization had still very little input in party policy formulation. Second, any CDU politician striving for national power would have to confront the concrete bloc of the CSU, led by the flamboyant Strauss (Von Beyme 1970: 205; Clemens 1989: 16-17). Whereas Barzel sensed that the uncompromising position of the conservatives was at odds both with West German public opinion and the Federal Republic’s allies, he had to carefully balance and take into account the institutionally powerful conservative wing as well (Hacke 1975: 70-71).

Barzel tried to overcome this predicament by strongly opposing the government’s foreign policy on tactics and management. His idea was that the CDU’s input was needed in the negotiations. Sensing the party’s eagerness for a swift return to power, inflated by a series of regional election debacles for the coalition and the certainty that the CDU would once again mop up the votes of the right (NPD) to win a majority (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 76), Barzel tried to maintain the idea that the CDU was a necessary component of power. However this policy was not only offering a temporary respite to Barzel’s predicament but also contained an inherent contradiction: by engaging in a critical approval of the government’s broad directions, he was indirectly acceding to its redefinition of the basic values of its foreign policy. Barzel could not solve the dilemma that constructive opposition against Brandt’s and Scheel’s radical rearrangement of foreign policy priorities also essentially meant acceptance of such priorities; claiming that he could do the ‘same things in a better way’ was logically incoherent with his party’s clinging to the old tenets of Adenauer’s foreign policy.

Encouraged by the steady erosion of SPD-FDP majority in the Bundestag, Barzel tried to have it both ways while doing himself a favor: In April 1972, he caused a constructive vote of no-confidence against the government, which meant that in case of defeat of the government he would rise to the post of Chancellor himself. His promise was that he would renegotiate the treaties to include more clearly his party’s concerns about the recognition of the DDR and Germany’s claims in the East. In this way, he could avoid a severe split within his own group by postponing the actual vote on the treaties themselves. Barzel seemed certain of victory, however his plan dramatically backfired when he lost by one vote, and consequently the treaties stood as they were. In the actual vote, Barzel and the CDU/CSU abstained, but not before they pushed through a joint resolution, which contained reservations to the treaties. A week later though the government’s precarious position became evident when a vote on the budget produced a tie. Brandt decided to dissolve the parliament and call elections in the fall in order to achieve a bigger majority.

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63 Barzel’s strategy was codified in his famous aphorism ‘So nicht!’ (not like this). As Clemens succinctly observes, so nicht amounted more to ‘yes, if’ (Clemens 1989: 94).
64 It was later revealed that two CDU/CSU members of the Bundestag had been bribed (Larres 1995: 48).
65 For a concise account of these events, see Clemens (1989: 97-106).
The elections of November 1972 were almost exclusively about Ostpolitik (Roberts 1972: 434; Cordell and Wolff 2005: 43). They were recognized at the time as the ‘most polarized elections in the history of the Federal Republic’ (Conradt and Lambert 1074: 61; Paterson 1975: 37), a far cry from elections in Adenauer’s serene times. The SPD and the FDP campaigned strongly in favor of the Ostpolitik, branding it a flagship-policy for their vision of a reformed and more democratic Federal Republic, at peace with its neighbors and in harmony with its allies. Under conditions of polarization, the CDU fell back to an all-out opposition of the treaties, representing them as a negation of all West Germany had stood for until then and, hence, a danger to her constitutional and democratic order as well (Hacke 1975; Glaessner 2005).

The election results were a debacle for the CDU. For the first time, the party was overtaken by the SPD as first party. The FDP also did particularly well, increasing its vote and easily entering parliament. Given the complete disappearance of the NDP, whose votes obviously went to the CDU, the extent of the latter’s erosion towards the governing parties became staggeringly obvious. The election result was interpreted as an unambiguous approval of the Brandt/Scheel Ostpolitik and a general sign of political maturity and civic identification of the West German populace with the Federal Republic as a democratic state, with a new and distinct liberal identity beyond traditional German nationalism. For Brandt and Scheel it was a personal vindication, given that their insistence on Ostpolitik went against a cascade of defections, electoral losses and intra-government disunity. It also was a critical election result in the development of the West German party system, as the ambiguous governmental change of 1969 was resoundingly approved, and the CDU/CSU would now have to reconsider its role as a real opposition, and not a government-in-waiting party. In this way, two-party system, which had seemed threatened first by CDU/CSU’s ambitions and then by the prospect of a permanent Grand Coalition, was finally unequivocally established as the perceived main direction of competition (Laux 1973: 523; Pridham 1975: 57).

Table 4

1972 Bundestag election results, vote percentages and seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>45,8</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>44,9</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Laux (1973: 516)

66 A time when elections were characterized as ‘plebiscites for refrigerators’ (cited in Paterson 1975: 27).
DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: CLEAVAGES, PARTY STRATEGIES AND DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION

The Social-Liberal coalition was the culmination of at least 10 years of undergoing changes in the West German party system. First came the SPD’s decision in 1959/60 to officially accept the main tenets of CDU’s domestic and foreign policy, the social market economy and Westbindung. This was part of a general ideological renewal of the SPD following the party’s weakness against the ever-rising CDU, which in 1957 won the absolute majority of the popular vote. The SPD, guided by a new generation of leaders around Willy Brandt, decided to embark on a more flexible strategy in order to attract voters beyond its core working-class audience (primarily of Protestant background). The main element of the new SPD message was democratic reform and renewal of rigid and conservative power structures of the Federal Republic in the economy and justice. This message of renewal was transposed to the field of foreign policy as well where the party, without giving up on its long-held goal of reunification, proposed more flexible policies towards the East and closer cooperation with the West (Bellers 1979: 285-287; Cordell and Wolff 2005: 66). This message tapped into the SPD’s tradition as a party with a progressive, pan-European view of European security. It combined a progressive Atlanticism and an internationalist pacifism (thus allowing the party to associate itself with the popularity of new US President Kennedy’s approach on détente), and it allowed the SPD to claim a more nuanced and refined version of its original goal of reunification.

At around the same time the FDP, equally distressed with CDU’s incessant rise, also underwent domestic changes. Its new leadership, first under Thomas Dehler and, after 1960, under Erich Mende, decided to draw the party away from the position of a right-wing support of the CDU and instead position it in the center between the two big parties. The original goal was to make the FDP an indispensable partner of the CDU, a ‘liberal corrective’ of Adenauer’s conservative ideas. Whereas the FDP made only modest changes in its socioeconomic profile, it highlighted its new course by shifting towards a foreign policy of accommodation with détente and opening towards the East. This was to showcase the party’s ability to move the rigid CDU into new directions; however the broad framework of foreign policy preferences (reunification within a German state under freedom, continuation of the legal personality of the pre-War Reich, and claims in Eastern Europe) remained essentially the same. The FDP was poised to show its ability to conceive of more imaginative ways to pursue these goals within a shifting international environment. Apart from that, its position within the bourgeois camp, as well as its, and the SPD’s, verbal commitment to the hierarchy of foreign policy goals as implemented by Adenauer, remained unambiguous (Pulzer 1971: 5; Juling 1977: 26-29; Glatzeder 1980: 67-84; also generally Mende 1972).
The combination of SPD and FDP strategies had a detrimental effect on the CDU/CSU. The elections of 1961 and 1965 produced Christian-Liberal coalitions, but both showcased a steady erosion of CDU support. The SPD was expanding its appeal among Catholic workers, thus breaking the long-standing confessional divide in the left\(^{67}\), as well as white-collar and new urban strata. The FDP also showed a similar increase in its influence, which was however more erratic. The extent of the success of both parties was further underlined by undergoing social changes such as the numerical strengthening of the services sector. However, it was mostly party strategy that allowed both parties to capitalize on such social change. The CDU for its part entered a period of introspection, whereby its internal confessional harmony was upset by the détente debates of the early 1960s\(^{68}\). More and more, it seemed to be becoming the party of rural and small ownership, of parochial economic and social forces.

The impetus for a deep restructuring of the party system and its gradual alignment with evolving social processes was the creation of the Grand Coalition in 1966. The Grand Coalition was supposed to be a power-sharing agreement between the two big parties after the CDU/FDP coalition had run into severe internal infighting and had proved unable to deal with the first economic crisis in the history of the Federal Republic. Further, the Grand Coalition reflected the CDU’s understanding that severe problems of governance such as the economy and justice could only be dealt with from a strong majority in the Bundestag. Despite fears that the West German party system would develop into some kind of permanent cartel government such as Austria (where ironically the permanent grand coalition was dissolved also in 1966) (Lehmbruch 1968: 190-193; Pulzer 1971: 8-9), both parties were clear that their coalition was going to be a temporary measure. The CDU’s main ambition was to include in the package of reforms (some of which required constitutional revision) a new electoral law that would lead to FDP’s exclusion from the Bundestag (Lehmbruch 1968: 185-186; Pridham 1977: 158). The SPD initially agreed with the plan, but in the end it balked, fearing that it would result in an entrenchment of CDU majority in government (while at the same time the FDP was becoming a more attractive coalition partner) (Jesse 1990: 73).

The Grand Coalition represented the biggest danger for the FDP in its history until then. The party was faced with the prospect of a new electoral law and the outright hostility of the only party it had considered a viable, if imperfect, coalition partner. The party fell victim to the entrenchment of the binary axis of competition between bourgeois and socialist camps, which in the past had served it well making it a needed coalition partner of CDU. Now, many saw the emergence of a perfect two-party system along the British example as an inevitable outcome – indeed, it was welcome as the culmination of

\(^{67}\) Also aided by a conscious strategy of rapprochement with the Catholic Church such as the concordat that was signed between the two sides. See Partch (1980: 91). At the same time, the Catholic Church itself became more receptive towards SPD overtures (Schmitt 1990: 187).

\(^{68}\) On theological and interconfessional debates within the CDU see generally Buchhaas (1981) and more particularly pp. 298-303.
a process of concentration that would cement centripetal competition and stability of the West German democratic regime (Pridham 1977: 28).

This prospective change of the structure of the party system, and the existential threat it posed to FDP, was the opportunity for a new leadership of the party around Walter Scheel to impose its new ideas as well as radically renew the party’s outlook. The main idea was to emphasize FDP’s equal distance from both big parties and preserve its position of needed coalition partner in both directions. Whereas Mende had tried to sharpen FDP’s profile without taking it away from the bourgeois camp, Scheel sought to rearrange West German politics in a way that the FDP would find its pivotal position again.

Scheel ousted Mende as leader of the FDP in 1968 in Freiburg. Already in 1967 a new programmatic document, the Hanover Action Program, reiterated party commitment to détente, peace and improvement of human conditions between the two Germanies. Scheel’s strategy was not taking place in a historical void: most of the changes he imposed on the FDP’s domestic and international preferences could be traced ideologically and philosophically to the party’s social liberal tradition. It is no coincidence that Scheel’s bases of support within the party lay in Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg and Bremen, the strongholds of social liberal thought. Instead, in areas such as Rheinland and Bavaria, liberalism was at the same time the traditional political expression of Protestant nationalists in a two-front struggle against what they perceived to be anti-nationalist Catholics and socialists; in the North on the other hand liberalism had coincided closely with religious affiliation and social class, pitting Protestant rural and middle-class groups against socialism. In this respect, Scheel was trying to impose a view on his party that was at odds with the political experiences and historical traditions of most of the regional expressions of liberalism.

With the Grand Coalition consumed with domestic reform, Scheel chose foreign policy as the marker policy of FDP’s new profile. For the first time one of the established parties of the Federal Republic broke with accepted tenets of foreign policy, calling for a radical reappraisal of West German goals and expectations in relations with the East. The FDP took over its pro-détente and pan-European notions and expanded them in proposals for a de-facto recognition of DDR, normalization of relations with all Communist neighbors and for reappraisal of the goal of reunification from an aggressive pursuit of absorption of the ‘delegitimized’ East Berlin regime into an acceptance of realities and an emphasis on practical improvements for everyday contacts of people living in the two German states. This idea culminated in the official submission in the Bundestag of a plan for a treaty with the DDR – which would also imply a formal acceptance of the Federal Republic of its unique status as a new democratic German state beyond the burden of the succession of the German Reich. This break with the stated goals of West German foreign policies went beyond what reformists within the CDU and the SPD had been

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69 For a vivid account of the FDP infighting, see Mende (1972: 220-227).
willing to ask for up to that point, and increased the distance between the FDP and the Union camp even further (Von Beyme 1970: 194-196).

For the SPD, this radical reformism in foreign policy was a signal that the FDP was ready to break out of the bourgeois camp and potentially form a reformist coalition against CDU. The SPD itself had nurtured similar thoughts on foreign policy; however, the party’s historical baggage made it difficult to renounce reunification as the ultimate goals. Brandt’s foreign policy concept, formulated in conjunction with Egon Bahr and revealed in a speech in 1963, was summed up in the slogan ‘Change through Rapprochement’. The essence of the argument was that the DDR and division was a fact of life, and that reunification was not served by a polemic attitude, which would strengthen the resolve of the East Berlin regime and maybe even contribute to the creation of some kind of East German civic identity, but by a shrewd policy of communication and openness, which would allow human contacts between the two sides to penetrate the borders and make East Germany slowly shift towards the Western orbit (Roth 1995: 58). This plan fell within a general concept of détente in Europe and an overcoming of the division between the blocs through negotiations (Von Beyme 1970: 215-216; Bellers 1979: 67-68). However, while in government in 1966-69, the SPD’s ambitions were checked by the CDU; and anyway, formal recognition of the DDR regime was still not an accepted solution by the general public.

This gradual rapprochement between SPD and FDP was made evident in the election of Gustav Heinemann to the Federal Presidency in 1969 with the support of both parties. It was not however approved by what seemed to be the majority of FDP cadres, most of whom disliked this turn towards the left (Von Beyme 1970: 195-196). It also became the target of CDU animosity. Indeed, seeing that bridges with the FDP had been terminally damaged, the Union knew that the only way to return to power by itself was for the FDP to miss the 5% threshold for entry into the Bundestag. The Christian Democrats were confident that in a two-party Bundestag, they would hold the majority. At the same time, Scheel’s turn alienated many of the party’s traditional voters, especially rural and nationalist Protestants in Northern Germany. The rise of the power of the nationalistic and authoritarian NPD can be interpreted through this as well (Roberts 1972: 444).

In the elections of 1969 issues of domestic policy dominated. The FDP and the NPD were the only parties that ran almost exclusively on a foreign-policy platform. The FDP was representing new ideas and a will for a normative re-founding of the Federal Republic’s position in the world; the NPD on the other hand mobilized almost exclusively on the national cleavage, expressing a similar unease with the political identity of the Federal Republic but from a nationalistic, anti-NATO and anti-Communist

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70 Heinemann, a Protestant who broke ranks with the CDU in the early 1950s because of his gesamtdeutsch ideas and his skepticism towards Adenauer’s uncommitted turn to the West (Mende 1972: 45), was a vivid symbol of what was bringing the SPD and the FDP closer together (Pulzer 1971: 11).

71 ‘We want to change Germany’ was the party’s far-reaching election slogan (Mende 1972: 230).
viewpoint. The SPD on the other hand tried to capitalize on its status as a governing party by presenting the image of a moderately reform-minded and competent party, whose ‘team of experts’ was capable of remedying the economy (Edinger 1970: 557-558). The party avoided the potentially divisive issue of foreign policy and tried to maintain its image as an establishment party (ibid: 563).

The Union for its part also campaigned mostly on domestic issues, primarily by promoting the Chancellor Kiesinger as the right leader. However, the party chose a defensive slogan as its main message: ‘Security in the 70s’ (Pulzer 1971: 14). Also running on its first official platform since the Hamburg Program of the early 1950s, the Berlin Program of 1968, CDU made an awkward attempt to address the widespread demand for domestic reforms by incorporating some timid provisions in its economic and social policy (Buchhaas 1981: 309-315). However, the party decided to highlight its image as the traditional governing party, capable of protecting West Germany from potential perils – domestically and abroad (Roberts 1972: 436-437). Committing itself to peace and détente, the party nevertheless maintained the classical idea of Adenauer that peace was only possible as a result, not a precondition, of reunification (CDU, Berliner Programm: point 17). Aiming to exterminate the FDP, the Union tried to neutralize its reformist message by highlighting ‘security’ as the supreme value – thus maintaining the traditional link in its thought between anti-Communism at home and abroad, and between defense of liberal democracy and the market economy with a principled foreign policy (Czempiel 1970: 622-623). The Union was ‘going for broke’ with its strategy, with the ultimate goal of attaining the absolute majority (Edinger 1970: 555) and maintaining the competition between ‘freedom’ and ‘socialism’ as the defining feature of party competition. Ultimately, détente was dropped altogether from CDU’s election program (Czempiel 1970: 611).

Responding to this direct challenge, the FDP played its last card. For the first time it formally committed to a coalition before the elections, by signaling its preference towards the SPD a few days before election-day. Once it became evident that the FDP had managed to enter the Bundestag by a few votes, and that the NPD had failed to do so, Brandt and Scheel missed no time in announcing their coalition. West German politics was ushering into a new era, with far-reaching consequences for foreign policy.

OSTPOLITIK, VISIONS OF DOMESTIC SOCIETY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW DIMENSION OF COMPETITION

The new Ostpolitik of the Brandt/Scheel government was a unique occurrence to the extent that it was a major departure not only from the orthodoxy of West German foreign policy but also from the criticisms of the mainstream reformists. The simultaneous reversal of West Germany’s land claims in the East and of its claim to sole representation of the German people called for a thorough reappraisal of the goals of West German
foreign policy and, by extension, of its identity as a German state. Détente and peace replaced stark anti-Communism as the values of foreign policy, and the goal of reunification was reconceptualized as the promotion of human contacts and the joint feeling of belonging to the German nation to the citizens of both Republics (Von Beyme 1970: 215-216). This reevaluation of West Germany’s self-understanding was intimately linked with a new logic of relations with the Soviet Union, the DDR and Poland. To this extent, domestic reform was reflected in and reinforced by credible reformist ambitions in the international sphere.

For the SPD, foreign policy always coincided with the ambition to realize domestic economic and social goals (Paterson 1974: 129; Bellers 1979: 53-54). In the 1950s the party’s unease with the capitalist and anti-Socialist order of Adenauer’s republic was also reflected in its insistence on reunification, if need be in a trade-off with West Germany’s integration in Atlantic security structures. From 1960 onwards the party’s foreign policy profile was harmonized with the modest reformism of its domestic policies. This foreign policy reformism drew on the main political identities that the party represented by virtue of its history, but it also aimed to broaden the appeal of SPD’s message: it was consistent with the party’s Social-democratic pacifism, with Protestant-informed Atlanticism and pan-European views prevalent in the German North, but it updated its democratic patriotism from a state-based view of the German question into a nation-based view, whereby rapprochement with the East was being considered as the precondition, not the result, for reunification (Paterson 1975: 31; Pridham 1977: 176; Klitzing 2009: 87). The foreign policy argumentation was offered by Bahr and Brandt, but this change in preferences was essential for the party to escape the suspicion of latent pro-Communism which had served Adenauer so well in election campaigns. By providing valid foreign policy argumentations, the SPD was indirectly supporting its own vision of a more democratic and receptive Federal Republic.

However, the party’s careful reformism was reflected in constructive criticism, engagement of West Germany’s allies (such as Kennedy) and an emphasis on its own belief in the important continuities of West German foreign policy, such as Westbindung and the goal of reunification without endangering the democratic regime. Both during the foreign policy controversies of the early 1960s and during its spell in government in the late 1960s, the SPD did not stray from this path of reformism. In the elections of 1969 foreign policy did not even feature prominently in its campaigning; the party felt that the crux of its message was about domestic reforms in the economy, justice and education. Foreign policy could be much of a dividing issue, and it was deemed to be the prerogative of the Union parties, which could use it to mobilize conservative support. Instead, SPD tried to create the image of a ‘party of technocrats’. In its 1969 election

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72 Already in 1945, Kurt Schumacher: ‘The contest over foreign policy is at the same time the contest over internal policy and the social content of the political order...Foreign policy sets the limits to the possibilities of our economic and social policy’ (cited in Granieri 2003: 9).
program, SPD defined moderately ‘maintenance of peace’ as ‘cooperation and coordination of policy with the West and arrangement with the East’ (Czempiel 1970: 609-610). The election results vindicated this strategy, as the party made a ‘major breakthrough among white-collar workers’ (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 67). SPD’s foreign policy activism, which started immediately after the new government entered office, must be seen as a surprise then, given the party’s positions and electoral needs up to that point.

The FDP on the other hand entered government precisely on the strengths of its foreign policy conceptions. Its abrupt turn to the left was highlighted by the aggressive promotion of its new foreign policy preferences. Social liberalism in the past had been recognized as the more flexible (and sincere) current of German liberalism in issues of European integration and cooperation (Winking 1991). Since 1966 and the party’s expulsion from government it decisively gained the upper hand within the FDP and the result was a spectacular break with the party’s policies up to that point. These changes must account for the losses the FDP suffered in the elections of 1969 that almost cost it entry into the Bundestag – the bulk of its conservative, rural and Protestant followers deserted it to the NPD and CDU/CSU (Von Beyme 1970: 194-196). Once in government though, the FDP became the main driver of the new Ostpolitik. With time, it developed a coherent doctrine of reform, and in the Freiburg Theses of 1971 (FDP, Freiburger Thesen zur Gesellschaftspolitik) a direct reference to Friedrich Naumann and the progressive heritage of liberalism was made in the introduction. Modern liberalism was to evolve into a promoter of ‘democracy’ and more socially conscious policies. Once the ‘liberal corrective’ of the bourgeois camp, the FDP was now posing as the liberal corrective of the reformist camp. In its electoral call for the 1972 elections (FDP, Vorfahrt für Vernunft), the party stressed that the ‘SPD requires liberal control’.

For the CDU/CSU the link between foreign policy and domestic governance could not have been more critical. It could be said that even the success of the party’s electoral strategy and its ability to overcome confessional and class barriers, with the end effect of it attaining a dominant position in the center-right part of the spectrum, was largely due to its clear positioning in the Cold War as a fundamentally anti-Communist force. With the creation of the Grand Coalition, the Union was essentially conceding the need for reforms and this was reflected in the foreign policy of ‘small steps’ carried on by Schröder and then Brandt. In its Berlin program, détente was again seen as the result of progress on the German question, not a precondition for it. The Soviet bloc was still presented as the ‘other’ of West Germany’s political identity. And this identity needed managerial improvements, rather than far-reaching changes (as evidenced in the discussion over labor participation in firm management) (Pridham 1977: 179-180):

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73 See the FDP 1967 Hannover Program and the 1969 Nuremberg election program.
74 For an insider’s account of the different conceptions within the FDP about its programmatic development, see Mende (1972).
‘Freedom and unity for the whole German people is the goal of German policy. The right to self-determination for the German people, the state unity of Germany must be pursued together with the overcoming of the division of Europe. A lasting peace is not possible without the solution of the German question.’

In the elections of 1969 the conservatives within the Union imposed a rollback of the party’s reformism. The message of ‘security’ tried to neutralize the general appeal of the reformist policies of the SPD by highlighting yet again the link between stability of the democratic regime and a firm foreign policy. It was a defensive move by the party, since it felt the approach between SPD and FDP. In a sense though, it was also tactically ambitious and far-reaching. The CDU, namely, entered the election hoping to complete the elimination of the FDP from federal politics. The message of gradual reform within the same framework of Westbindung and the social market economy was hoped to attract enough voters from the FDP, make the CDU the only force of a majoritarian bourgeois camp and ensure an absolute majority in the Bundestag.

Once Ostpolitik was underway, the emergent dimension of competition became crystallized: the government embedded its new foreign policy within a moralistic and reformist discourse that clearly made the connection between the new foreign policy and the reevaluation of the political identity of the Federal Republic as a democratic state. The Social-Liberal coalition did not only contain two parties that had for long advocated changes in foreign policy. It also included parties whose long trajectory in West German politics had led them to meet in a common message of overall reform of both domestic institutions and the state’s position in the world. Together, both parties now formed part of a reformist progressive camp of West German politics. By virtue of policy priorities, profile and position within the party system, both parties had their fortunes inextricably tied. An aggressive strategy of maintaining and entrenching their position within the party system was the only way left. Ostpolitik was to serve this goal.

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75 CDU Berliner Program, point 1. Also see the chapter ‘Reform of Democracy’ and the chapter about the Social Market Economy.
Table 5
Mean support for CDU/CSU and SPD among Nonmanuals (middle-class and farmers), selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Support for CDU/CSU %</th>
<th>Support for SPD %</th>
<th>Difference CDU&gt;SPD %</th>
<th>Sum CDU+SPD</th>
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</tbody>
</table>


The CDU/CSU on the other hand found itself in the opposition for the first time after 20 years. This was a shock for which the party was definitely not prepared (Clemens 1989: 15). With foreign policy being a major policy issue, the Union parties faced the prospect of severe infighting again. However, the internal structure of the party and the inescapable logic of partisan competition determined the patterns of opposition to Ostpolitik. Whereas in the 1960s the moderate Atlanticists had proved to be more decisive, and in the end carried the day under Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger who were responsive to their concerns (Bellers 1979; Clemens 1989), after 1969 they found themselves in the defensive since a moderate critical opposition towards the Ostpolitik was deemed inconsistent with the goal of a swift return to power. Indeed, almost all important players within the Union used criticism towards the Ostpolitik at one point or another. Barzel himself chose to contain the discussion to tactics and management, rather than engage on a principled opposition of Ostpolitik, which would entail polarization on domestic politics as well. However, this position was untenable and internally incoherent as Ostpolitik directly threatened to undo CDU’s broad coalition and to undo the normative anchor of the party system that had allowed it to dominate (Roberts 1975: 87). A string of good results in regional elections, rising student radicalism and government infighting boosted the conservative argument that opposition to the Ostpolitik was the best way for the party to return to power, put a halt to the government’s reformism and usher in a new era of Christian Democratic dominance (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 76). The NPD’s strong showing in 1969 and the FDP’s woes seemed to prove their contention that opposition to the Ostpolitik would allow the CDU to absorb these nationalist votes and recreate the cross-class coalition of Catholics and nationalists which had served it so well before by stressing the link between West German political identity and the

77 See Hacke (1975).

For conservatives within CDU and CSU, Ostpolitik posed a structural threat to the identity of the Federal Republic as a democratic state attached to the Western alliance. For them, the Ostpolitik had essential domestic repercussions (Risse-Kappen 1988: 128). As it was taking place within a climate of student unrest and rise of far-left radicalism, CDU conservatives feared that the Ostpolitik was a half-open door to Communist infiltration in the Federal Republic (Laux 1972: 512; Pridham 1975: 49-50). For example, the government’s call for more ‘human contacts’ was seen by these CDU elements not as a way to influence Communist societies, but as an invitation to Communist influence in West German society (Hacke 1975: 35; Tilford 1975: 14; Clemens 1989: 60). For the CDU this old link established by Adenauer between domestic order and international orientation still held. If West Germany’s unequivocal orientation towards the West was being put in danger, also the political identity of West Germany as a liberal democracy was affected (Pridham 1975: 52):

‘He who concedes equal treatment to the leftist totalitarianism in East Berlin, he will become witness and facilitator – even unwillingly – of the assault of left extremists on our freedom.’

Clearly for these conservatives the world still functioned in a bipolar confrontational mode. If West Germany’s political identity was the product of the relentless Cold War competition of the 1940s and 1950s, détente and Ostpolitik could very well loosen the ties between West Germans and democracy (Clemens 1989: 262; Roth 1995: 82-83).

Conservatives were acutely aware of any links between the climate of upheaval created by Ostpolitik and signs of leftist agitation in West German society. This link is difficult to establish in retrospect, even though it is undeniable that Ostpolitik coincided with, drew on, and further reinforced a sense of renewal of West Germany. Consequently, the discursive framework within which party competition was taking place until then was changing to the detriment of CDU’s entrenched position of dominance. The conservative wing of the Union responded to this with a strengthened emphasis on the old arguments about threats to the social order of the Federal Republic. The difference this time was that the importance of the national question of Germany as a glue for the Adenauer coalition, as well as the electoral need to turn to the right in light of a centre-left coalition in government, infused the old arguments about Communism, democracy and totalitarianism with a distinctly Bismarckian and nationalist flavor –

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80 Conservatives’ effort to brand Ostpolitik as a Communist threat by stealth, soon reached hyperbolic proportions (e.g. the Brandt-Scheel-Honecker popular front) (Hacke 1975: 93; Tilford 1975: 14), and proved to be out of touch with the majority of the population (Czempiel 1970).
ironic if one considers that most of these arguments were made by Europeanist Catholics (Von Beyme 1970: 200) accusing Social Democrats and Liberals as traitors of the national cause (Roth 1995: 80):

‘We will oppose, ladies and gentlemen, the limitation of the homeland feeling to the Federal Republic. I have no intention of becoming a Federal Republican. We are Germans and intend to remain so.’

The end result was that the CDU was driven away even more from the normative center (or the ‘new political middle’ according to Conradt and Lambert, 1974) – or in other words, it was fighting a new battle with old weapons.

The ambivalence of the CDU between the ideas expressed by the conservatives and pressing electoral needs, and the effort to adapt to the new reality, is evident in the reformed Berlin Program, as revised in 1971 in Düsseldorf (CDU, Berliner Programm, in der Form der zweiten Fassung vom 18. Bundesparteitag). In foreign policy, peace and the division of Europe are recognized as important systemic conditions that will influence the course of reunification. Contacts with DDR and negotiations with the USSR are accepted as valid methods for the ultimate goal of reunification. Central and Eastern European countries are recognized as potential members of a free European community, however until then free Europe needed to strengthen its integration and unity. The ‘final settlement’ of the borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia is also recognized as an important issue, however it needed to wait for a general peace treaty. ‘Freedom and unity’ would be maintained as the goal of West German foreign policy. The same timid and half-hearted reformism is evident in the parts on domestic policy as well, which also do not stray from the main tenets of the social market economy.

The elections of 1972 were dominated by the issue of Ostpolitik. Following his failure to be elected Chancellor through the Bundestag, Barzel’s position was compromised and he ran on a platform dictated by the conservatives of his party. He tried to balance between his contention that Ostpolitik was important, but conducted much more carefully and slowly, and the conservatives’ view that the very foundations of Ostpolitik were wrong. It was natural that the campaign of CDU would be plagued by incoherence against a government galvanized by the challenge it had just survived (Clemens 1989: 107-109). It is telling that, according to opinion polls, a majority of the electorate still considered the CDU more capable in economic matters (Paterson 1975:

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82 However see Partch (1980: 103) who claims that Ostpolitik was only important to voters who switched from CDU/CSU to SPD. He maintains that economic as well as law and order issues were more important for voters. This statement however needs to be seen as a refined understanding of election outcomes as a combination of expression of stable cleavages and party strategies and voter fluctuation. In this sense, even Partch would indirectly agree that Ostpolitik was the most important difference-maker in the election of 1972 if it influenced the voters who produced the most important result of the election, namely the SPD’s attaining first-party status.
however the general demand for change, and the more specific appeal of Ostpolitik, helped the coalition to decisively win the elections. The CDU, much like the SPD in 1969, turned to a ‘team approach’ in its campaign and indeed tried to neutralize the Ostpolitik issue by highlighting the dangers of high inflation through the prism of ‘instability’ (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 71-72). This tactic did little to stave off the upcoming defeat. The governing camp emphasized foreign policy, since this was the policy sector where the government had shown any success (ibid: 65). For the first time in German history, debates among the four party leaders (Brandt, Scheel, Barzel and Strauss) were organized and Ostpolitik and foreign policy in general occupied 40% of the time devoted to them (Baker and Norpoth 1980: 337), with the economy, inflation and terrorism following suit. In other words, and despite CDU hopes, the elections of 1972 were decided on a very friendly ground for the government.

The elections of 1972 cemented trends in patterns of expression of cleavages through parties and finalized the realignment of party competition around a new anchor of competition. The SPD managed to hold on to its middle-class following, which had been nurtured and increased during the 1960s, while it increased its appeal even further among the working-class to almost absolute dominance. This increase came mostly thanks to its Catholic voters. In other words, the confessional barriers within the working class had finally been brought down, while the CDU’s claim to being a cross-class alliance was now under severe doubt. The CDU on the other hand further increased its appeal among rural voters as well as traditional groups of the middle-class. If we take into account the fact that the Union almost completely absorbed NPD support from 1969, we can see that its 25 year-long interconfessional strategy was finally complete. Most of the traditional rural and urban Protestant groups that usually voted for the FDP were now within the CDU/CSU, thus completing the latter’s effort to unite broad middle-class groups over the religious barrier. However, this success came to the expense of its appeal among Catholic labor, as well as ever expanding groups of young urban professionals. It is among these last groups that the FDP drew most of its gains. In 1972 the party essentially found itself with a wholly new following of younger, more educated and more progressive voters than what had been the case for most of its history. By virtue of social outlook, the FDP’s conversion into a center party, a long process that had started in the mid-1950s, was now complete. As we saw, by virtue of all parties’ framing of foreign policy positions within coherent visions of domestic order, Ostpolitik was decisive in SPD’s sustained strength, in CDU/CSU’s transformation into a more conventional conservative party, and in FDP’s conversion into a liberal party of the center. Cumulatively, these foreign policy elections stabilized the predominance of the Social-Liberal coalition as the dominant force of German politics, especially if we consider that the razor-thin majority mastered by them

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83 According to Clemens (1989: 106-107), even the staunch opponent of the Treaties Strauss was in favor of switching the Union campaign to domestic issues. However there was little room for changing the terms of the debate by then.
in 1969 was also based on the one third of FDP voters who, according to opinion polls, still preferred a coalition of their party with the CDU. On a regional level, the cumulative effect of the elections of 1969 and 1972 was evident in two of the Federal Republic’s most important regions. In Bavaria, CSU’s interconfessional strategy was essentially completed in 1972 after Strauss’ principled opposition to Ostpolitik allowed him to attract Protestant groups that had until then voted for the conservative Bavarian branch of the FDP (Mintzel 1990: 164-166). Indeed, Bavaria was the only Land where the Union increased its vote share in 1972. In the Ruhr, SPD’s expansion towards national-minded and reformist Protestant and secular middle-class groups was complete by 1972, and it was enhanced by increasing inroads into the local Catholic labor vote, partially let down by CDU’s turn towards a middle-class profile, thanks to Brandt’s inspirational marrying of the goals of national reunification and domestic reform (Rohe 1990b: 137-140). In both cases, patterns of political dominance were laid down that only in recent years began to be upset. However, they also presented, in a kaleidoscopic fashion, the wider realignments of voting behavior brought about by party strategies on foreign policy.

Table 6
Mean support for CDU/CSU and SPD among Catholics, selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Support for CDU/CSU %</th>
<th>Support for SPD %</th>
<th>Difference CDU&gt;SPD %</th>
<th>Sum CDU+SPD %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>57,5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30,5</td>
<td>84,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>57,5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32,5</td>
<td>82,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>57,5</td>
<td>33,5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41,5</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>90,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Conradt and Lambert (1974: 84). Percentages in approximation. Source: Allensbach

The year 1972 had defined the SPD as a Volkspartei where the labor and Protestant imprint was still dominant. Now the CDU/CSU was a Volkspartei of the center-right, its penetration of conservative Protestant strata complete and its dominance among the Catholic middle-class absolute, but with less appeal among secular urban and working-class groups. Both of these developments reflected party strategies of engaging with the party system and the main axis of competition, as well as prior historical traditions and constraints. The converging result of these dynamics was the reinterpretation of the main

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84 For an extremely elucidating analysis of the social basis of the results of the 1972 elections, see Conradt and Lambert (1974).
axis of competition from one allowing the CDU/CSU to dominate as the leading force of a majoritarian bourgeois camp to one allowing the SPD and the FDP to enjoy a majority as exponents of a majoritarian democratic and reformist camp (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 75). These developments partially reflected underlying social processes of course, but these only accentuated what were the intended results of partisan agency. To the extent that this reform of the stakes of competition included a reevaluation of foreign policy goals, Ostpolitik was essential in this process. Being a foreign policy issue though, Ostpolitik was also to be judged on its merits as a policy convincingly aligning West German interests with international developments. For this reason we will now turn to the normative translation of international systemic developments, namely détente, into policy prescriptions integrated within visions of domestic society.

DÉTENTE, PARTISAN AGENCY AND THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLICY ON WEST GERMAN POLITICS

The normative contestation of Ostpolitik was highly determined by the ability of partisan actors to effectively support their foreign policy preferences and their visions of domestic society with an argumentation that proved that their policies were congruent with developments in the international sphere. Both sides had to prove that the reevaluation of goals and values was responding to systemic developments in West Germany’s environment. In this way, they would have been able to translate international systemic developments through their own preferred discursive lens into policy imperatives that matched their efforts to rearrange or maintain the main axes of competition. In other words, partisan agency mediated a dense interaction between domestic and international politics: international developments were arguments for foreign policy change, but also supported political and social realignments within the party system that in return rendered new policies possible.

In the late 1960s, the German problem as posed by Adenauer (a prerequisite for peace and stability in Europe, i.e. an adversarial concept against the Soviet bloc) was becoming incompatible with détente. In the absence of a better concept, for conservatives the only option seemed to be clinging on to an outdated Gaullist vision of a strong Western Europe applying pressure on the Eastern bloc by keeping the hard reality of division open to potential changes (Wall 2008). The camp of Ostpolitik on the other hand was meticulous in employing détente and peace as a goal in and of itself in order to justify its policies. This required a thorough reevaluation of the priorities of West German foreign policy goals, which in return were congruent with their ideas about overall reform of the political identity of the West German state. The first party to develop this intellectual construction was the FDP. Caught in opposition against the two major parties, and with its future in jeopardy, the FDP under Walter Scheel formulated a foreign policy

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85 Such as the ongoing secularization of Catholic labor (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 71).
whose main value was ‘peace’ and ‘détente’ rather than unification. The FDP could afford to be so forward-looking, as its vulnerable position within the party system allowed it to look elsewhere to sharpen its profile and break out of CDU’s orbit (Juling 1977: 36; Engelmann Martin 2002: 102).

For the SPD détente was also a valuable normative resource, especially since its social-democratic ideology made it normal to appeal for peace in Europe. Throughout the 1960s the SPD and Brandt personally invested heavily in détente and a pro-Atlanticist policy, especially in an effort to make the party look more mainstream and acceptable to broader masses of voters (Bellers 1979). However, the official policy of the SPD did not see détente as the overarching goal of foreign policy. Brandt and Bahr’s concept of ‘change through rapprochement’ was meant to serve the goal of German reunification, something which Brandt himself never relinquished and which caused various concerns among observers of West German foreign policy such as Henry Kissinger. However, ‘change through rapprochement’ was a long-term goal at best; in the short term, it offered a valuable bridge between SPD’s traditional pro-unification policy and its new emphasis on détente. The SPD balanced between these two goals in its long march towards respectability and ultimately governing-party status throughout the 1960s. This ambivalence towards the national question and foreign policy was a very important part of the party’s strategy. It was only when the SPD found itself in government with the FDP, and the opportunity to permanently realign West German politics appeared, that it decided to engage détente as the main normative resource of its argumentation.

For the CDU, and especially the conservatives within its fold, the prevalence of détente as a positive value was a potentially disastrous disadvantage. Especially problematic was the emerging sense of disagreement between the Union and West Germany’s Western allies. What had once been the ultimate tool of political dominance, West Germany’s anchoring within the Western alliance (Paterson 1975: 26-28; Clemens 1989: 26-28), was now turning into a huge disadvantage. Especially disconcerting was the attitude of the US that, even under a Republican administration, saw the German problem as a hindrance towards the ultimate value of détente. Adenauer’s view that reunification would bring peace in Europe was now reversed and the Christian Democrats were now in danger of seeing their adversaries reaping the effects of international respectability and statesmanship (Bellers 1979: 345; Cordell and Wolff 2005: 14).

However the Ostpolitik of Brandt and Scheel was not without its own controversies. Among the Federal Republic’s allies a sense of unease dominated about Brandt’s sensational initiatives and the newly found ambition and independence of West German foreign policy. The Americans, also influenced by the obsessions of Kissinger, were always worried about the extent of West Germany’s commitment to its Westbindung.

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86 For the persistent historical debates on whether Brandt’s Ostpolitik was a sincere pro-unification nationalist policy or a policy that entrenched stasis, see Larres (1995); also the discussion in Roth (1995: 233-238, 340-344) and Suri (2003).
The French on the other hand were annoyed that their own concept of dynamic détente was being high jacked by the Germans. In short, the Federal Republic’s allies found themselves in a predicament, as West Germany was finally practicing détente with determination, only now they were afraid that this might be a way through which German nationalism and Schaukelpolitik would rise from their graves (Niedhart 2008; Klitzing 2009).

The Union parties sought to make the most out of this ambivalence, since it seemed to offer the opportunity to match their own concerns about Ostpolitik with a fact of international life, namely West Germany’s allies’ concerns with Brandt’s enthusiasm for direct dealings with the Soviets. The argumentation that emanated from the camp of Christian Democrats was that Ostpolitik would go against not only the interests of the West German state and the German nation in general, but also that it would jeopardize West Germany’s place within the Western alliance. Indeed, the claim to lands beyond the Oder/Neisse line and DDR’s uncertain status were seen as heritage from the post-War days, as issues that would need to be settled by joint negotiations between Germans and the winners of World War II (Clemens 1989: 60-61). In this way, the CDU/CSU was also trying to play into any phobias the Americans might have had, while gaining an endorsement for their policy of restraint. Barzel also tried to convey this message directly to the Americans (Wall 2008: 145). The paradox here was that, whereas the CDU and CSU conservatives were at odds with the Americans and NATO in the 1960s (Paterson 1996: 54), they now presented the main danger of the Ostpolitik to be the isolation of West Germany from its western allies and, primarily, America (Roberts 1972: 445; Morgan 1975: 100). In this, they were assisted by the very reserved position of the Nixon administration, and Henry Kissinger personally, towards Ostpolitik, Brandt and his close associate Bahr (Niedhart 2008: 125-126; Wall 2008: 141):

‘[Socialist neutralists] are slowly pulling the Federal Republic out of close cooperation with the Atlantic West and are slowly leading it to cooperation with the Communist world’.

For the Americans the Ostpolitik was potentially a revolutionary policy that was straying from the American concept of controlled and superpower-to-superpower détente (Clemens 1989: 58; Wall 2008: 134; Klitzing 2009: 81-83). Kissinger was also very worried about the resurgence of any kind of German nationalism, West German go-it-alone attitude and Bahr’s ideas of change in the German question (Von Beyme 1970: 217; Morgan 1975: 100; Klitzing 2009: 85). The CDU was using this American conservative attitude to strengthen its argument that the Ostpolitik was not serving, rather that it was endangering, Westbindung. If Westbindung was a precondition for the liberal democratic order of West Germany, a threat against it would also endanger that domestic

order (Tilford 1975: 14; Pridham 1977: 176). Hence attack on Ostpolitik was also an attack on the government’s reformism on the domestic front, which was presented as a threat, not a needed change of the Federal Republic’s political structures (Pridham 1975: 46).

In essence the Union parties were trying to overcome their inability to match domestic discourses, foreign policy preferences and international systemic realities. For the more conservatives, a solution was to highlight the realities of the Cold War beyond wishful thinking about détente, negotiations and cooperation in Europe. Their main argument was that the international conditions that forced Adenauer to formulate his ‘policy of strength’, namely the uncertain legal status of the two German states and the reliance of West Germany on the victors of the World War (now both allies and foes), still held: the Federal Republic had to refrain from activities that jeopardized its anchoring within the Western alliance because this anchoring would determine whether any future settlement about Germany would satisfy not only the goal of unification, but also the goal of democracy and liberty. It also had to refrain from activities that were strengthening the position of the Soviet Union and DDR in any future such negotiations (Clemens 1989: 55-88). In other words, conservatives within CDU were still clinging to a Cold-War image of the international system and tried to overcome the reality of détente by focusing on the deep structure of bipolar adversity between the two camps.

Ultimately the Ostpolitik camp resolved any sources of discontinuity between their aims and those of the Allies, which could offer argumentative opportunities to the Union conservatives, by firmly embedding their foreign policies within a European political framework and discourse. Détente and peace were operationalized as policies for ‘Europe’, i.e. as policies that would overcome the division of Europe and create the conditions under which the German question would be resolved (albeit the commitment of some of the government actors such as Scheel to the actual goal of unification within one German state was quite questionable at the time). This European discourse gave détente an actual content, and it made it something tangible.

After its success in attaching its foreign policy values to the emerging détente of the early 1960s, the SPD’s foreign policy vision of a pan-European security architecture received further boost from the publication of the Harmel report, when Brandt was already foreign minister of the Federal Republic. The Harmel report codified détente as a goal of the Western alliance, thus vindicating SPD’s view that détente was actually congruent with West Germany’s international commitments and interests, not a negation of them (Czempiel 1970: 613-614; Risse-Kappen 1988: 42). The Harmel report also allowed the SPD to later present Ostpolitik as an important step towards the security of the Western alliance. The Brandt-Scheel government was practicing what the Harmel report had said to be the goal of NATO in Europe: extending détente through a controlled process of negotiation with the governments of the Soviet bloc. Similarly to the feud over Europe in the 1960s, the SPD was again in a position to show that its Ostpolitik was not
in opposition with Westbindung. Instead, it was a perfect proof of its devotion to the system of alliances Adenauer had created (Hafendorf 2008: 109-111). The SPD took the argument a bit further by actually claiming that the Ostpolitik was nothing more than the extension of Adenauer’s Westbindung to the East (Morgan 1975: 101; Engelmann Martin 2002: 153). Just as Adenauer saw West Germany’s international respectability and status passing through normalization with its Western partners (Glaessner 2005: 49), Brandt completed this process by having West Germany face up to its political and moral obligations towards its Eastern neighbors (Roth 1995: 70).

The SPD’s effort to position the Ostpolitik within a consciously defined European and Western framework can also be seen in Brandt’s efforts to portray his policies as falling completely within the framework of Alliance politics (Roberts 1972: 444; Clemens 1989: 241; Glaessner 2005: 169). Brandt was making a big point of the fact that he was keeping all of West Germany’s allies, and most notably the US, informed and updated of his moves (Niedhart 2008: 121-122; Wall 2008: 133). The truth is of course that Brandt had taken West German initiatives a step further (Morgan 1975). He usually did not ask for consultation but merely informed allies of his intentions (Niedhart 2008: 124; Klitzing 2009: 102-103). Yet the point remains: Ostpolitik was Adenauer’s Westpolitik drawn to its logical conclusion, i.e. achieving West German respectability in international diplomacy (Niedhart 2008: 127) and furthering Western goals through West German foreign policy (Engelmann Martin 2002: 156). It was within the framework of Ostpolitik that Brandt for example agreed to the creation of European Political Cooperation and called for further enlargement of the EEC (Morgan 1975: 99; Moeller 1996: 39; Klitzing 2009: 88); it was an effort to alleviate any impressions that West Germany was ‘going it alone’ in its efforts to establish new relations with the East.

Similar to the SPD, the FDP presented détente as a desired policy in and of itself (Czempiel 1970: 614). But in what kind of Europe? In the Atlanticist-Gaullist conflict in the early 1960s the FDP had positioned itself clearly in favor of Atlanticist solutions, favoring enlargement of the EEC and the strengthening of NATO (Juling 1977: 32; Glatzeder 1980: 96-97). This position can be attributed to the party’s anticlerical, anti-Catholic origins. A small Europe around France and West Germany did not appeal to the Liberals (Bellers 1979: 397-402). German liberalism also had a tradition of focussing on Central Europe, dating back to its nationalism and imperialism. But apart from these general attitudes, no coherent concept of Europe arose in the FDP because none was needed: if West Germany was to employ détente it could do so by itself, paying lip service to its Atlantic alliances but without expecting to be constrained by them (Mende 1972: 245; Glatzeder 1980: 97-101). All this changed with Scheel. His decision to take pragmatism in Ostpolitik to its logical extent could only make sense if it was presented as part of a European order:

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88 Also see the SPD’s 1969 election program, which defined ‘maintenance of peace’ as ‘cooperation and coordination of policy with the West and arrangement with the East’ (cited in Czempiel 1970: 610).
'From the outset we reached the paradoxical position, to be looking for integration in the West and at the same time for national restoration in the East...To have both of these together means a failure of both policies. The new word for our new position is: Détente...To overcome the division, this is not an isolated process between West and East Germany, but a part of the process to overcome the division of Europe.\(^{89}\)

Perhaps more than the FDP’s advanced German plans to establish diplomatic relations with DDR and negotiate with the Soviets, it was the party’s adherence to Europe that marked the most impressive change in the FDP’s conceptions. Scheel used Europe as a legitimizing discursive tool in his effort to show that the German question and West Germany’s position vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc could be reconceptualized (Cordell and Wolff 2005: 73). The Europe of the FDP reflected German liberalism’s Atlanticism and Mittel-Europa focus. But it nevertheless was there, an important parameter in the interpretation of détente (Czempiel 1970: 621). For the FDP West Germany was not to initiate negotiations with the Eastern bloc only to achieve concrete benefits in return. Instead, such a policy would assist détente in Europe understood as overcoming Cold War divisions, securing peace and increasing contacts between the two blocs:

‘Europe – not just Western Europe but both, East and West – must become a capable Whole and be responsible for itself...[this alternative] is our constructive decision for the overcoming of Germany’s division, for the overcoming of Europe’s division, for a final peace in this part of the world.\(^{90}\).

The FDP’s Ostpolitik then, radical as it was in relation to the main ideas that underscored West German foreign policy until then, was framed as a continuation of an essentially European policy, a policy aiming at the creation of a European framework within which the German question would find its solution (Winking 1991: 88-91). In parallel with the SPD, the FDP was presenting détente as a policy for Europe, and because of that as a natural West German goal. Both parties adhered to the inversion of the Adenauer conception: the solution of the German question as a consequence, not a precondition, of détente.

Nevertheless, there were nuances in the party’s conversion (Clemens 1989: 267). In the elections of 1969 the FDP made a point of its independent position in the German question vis-à-vis the two parties of the Grand Coalition, by putting forward a dissenting profile in foreign policy, emphasizing West Germany’s interests (interpreted of course through the lens of détente) and the need to keep its independence from possible

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\(^{89}\) Scheel at the FDP conference in Freiburg, 1968 (cited in Bellers and Winking 1991: 267-268).

influences of its allies. But again, Europe was used as the legitimating framework for a self-conscious foreign policy of interest promotion (Czempiel 1970: 612):

‘[The Federal Republic] must free itself from one-sided dependence on its allies; at the same time, she must engage Cold War enemies as partners of a European peace order. This is why our foreign policy goal must be a European peace order.’

Summing up, Ostpolitik translated détente into policy proposals consistent with the main actors’ visions of domestic society, i.e. coherent images about West Germany’s domestic governance and position in the world. However, these actors also needed to support these visions of domestic society with a firm reading of the material and ideational structures of the international system. These readings reflected efforts of partisan actors to align party competition according to their party systemic needs. For SPD and FDP, détente was an important discursive resource that matched the ideas codified within them, served their party strategies and supported the realignment of the West German party system in a direction that served domestic and foreign reform. For the conservatives in the Union parties, their effort to maintain the old direction of competition, which was born out of the ‘hot’ Cold War of the 1950s, led them to downplay détente and overemphasize the pitfalls of a hyperactive Ostpolitik, the fears of allies and the shrewdness of their adversaries.

The elections of 1972 proved that a broad social coalition for reform and a dominant narrative of international politics were inextricably linked as a recipe for political realignment. The analysis thus far had shown that the conditions for foreign policy change, namely the creation of this powerful narrative on détente and Europe, were only met once party strategies and party system dynamics created the right condition of ideas and incentives. As this part has shown though, the actual existence of international systemic changes is an invaluable asset to the creation of domestic coalitions and the realignment of the terms of domestic debate itself.

DISCUSSION

Whereas the main axis of binary competition between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats was maintained, the Grand Coalition of 1966 nevertheless created questions as to the exact meaning and content of this competition. With discussions about a new electoral law pointing to the will of the two major parties to turn the party system into a perfect two-party system, the small Liberals found themselves in a nightmare-situation. If the party system until then had functioned as a competition between the bourgeois and the socialist camp, the powerful Christian Democrats seemed more interested in doing away with the pesky Liberals and dominating the bourgeois part of the

91 FDP 1969 election program, page 16.
spectrum. With the SPD moving more towards the center after Godesberg, the Liberals also risked losing their identity as a modernizing party. Without changing its main features, the existing party system seemed to be pushing the FDP into oblivion.

The party’s position made a change of outlook and profile necessary. The FDP needed to forge a middle ground between both big parties and make itself useful to both as potential coalition partner. The rise of the social liberal current under Walter Schell emphasized the party’s affinity for radical reform projects in the economy, the justice and education. These new domestic preferences cued preferences on foreign policy as well. Social liberalism differed from the nationalism of national liberalism in that it saw the German nation as a cultural and not a political fact, and it saw the essence of the relationship with the DDR in communication and human contacts. This was in accordance with a vision of domestic society that went beyond the anti-Communism and conservatism of Adenauer’s years.

The importance of the rise of social liberalism within the FDP for the creation of the Ostpolitik is shown by the fact that the SPD itself, despite its declared willingness to loosen up some of Adenauer’s foreign policy tenets, went into the election of 1969 focusing more on domestic issues. Among the three major parties, the CDU and FDP campaigned on foreign policy, but from fundamentally different viewpoints. Because of this, it can be assumed that it was the FDP’s entry into government that also pushed the SPD to go along with a far more radical course of foreign policy than the one it had already practiced during the Kiesinger years. Since 1960, the SPD’s acceptance of the realities of domestic governance of Adenauer’s republic was connected with the acceptance of Westbindung. Yet the way it embarked on concluding treaties with East Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland was not a foregone conclusion based on the party’s record until then.

The creation of the Social-Liberal coalition was an important change in the patterns of the West German party system – it did not change the basic binary nature of competition between the two big parties, but it did realign preferences and representation of interests between them. Under the new dynamics, the party system produced a change in foreign policy that would not have been conceivable under any other coalition. The new logic of competition now was not between a pro-Western and anti-Communist bourgeois camp and an isolated Social Democratic party, but between a reformist camp and a conservative Christian Democratic party. Just like the party system in its first shaping produced the policy of Westbindung, in its renewed format it gave rise to the Ostpolitik.

Ostpolitik contributed to the change of meaning of the main binary axis of competition – but in a sense it also renewed it and strengthened it. It reinforced already evident changes in the patterns of expression of cleavages through political parties. The main effect of this process was the slow decrease of the importance of denomination in party politics and the halting of CDU’s expansive strategy. Both the initial idea of change
of the electoral law in 1966 and the narrow result of the 1969 election were instances when the party system could have maintained its existent dynamics of competition – and allowed the CDU to occupy a position of dominance similar to the one enjoyed by ruling conservative parties in Italy and Japan (Kitschelt and Streeck 2003: 6-7).

CDU’s growth was based on its interdenominational character on the one hand, and its cross-class appeal inherited from its Catholic character on the other. However this broad coalition was held together by anti-Communism, whereby foreign policy was extremely important. The translation of détente into an issue of domestic governance by the SPD and the FDP put into question the glue that kept together the Adenauer coalition, as well as the dimension of competition that had allowed the party to dominate West German politics. Its unequivocal opposition to Ostpolitik was no foregone conclusion given the party’s factionalism. With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the party could not but fight this last battle.

The elections of 1972 cemented SPD’s inroads into the Catholic labor vote and FDP’s shedding of its conservative Protestant character. Ostpolitik left CDU a religious middle-class party. It was no longer a dominant all-encompassing Begemoth – just a strong catchall Volkspartei. In this way, what could have developed into a system of limited pluralism, with a big CDU in the center of the party system and smaller parties revolving around it in perpetual opposition, remained a system of binary competition. This case shows that initial changes in the party system, such as the realignment of patterns of coalition and opposition of 1969, may be enough for the rise of new foreign policy preferences – however the process of foreign policy contestation drives these changes further and institutionalizes them within new permanent features of the party system. Westbindung was supportive of the party system of 1949-1969 and Ostpolitik was as much the expression as a pillar of the renovated party system of 1969. Ostpolitik was the symbol of the new axis of competition: reform of authoritarian social structures (‘democracy’) versus conservative economic and social values.

For the purposes of this dissertation, it suffices to point out Ostpolitik’s contingent nature. It was the outcome of a complex combination of Cold War détente and the marrying of reformist agendas of the SPD and the FDP. Its linkage with the coalition’s domestic agenda may explain Brandt’s obsession with foreign policy – which ironically drew criticism for his alleged ignorance of domestic issues. Ideas about changes in the relations with the Soviet bloc circulated since the early 1960s, even inside the CDU. The specific content of the 1970-1972 treaties (complete normalization of relations with the DDR, recognition of the Eastern borders etc), their ideological foundation (Germany as a cultural nation, reunification as a distant goal), and their justification as congruent with the value of détente, make them a distinct creation of Willy Brandt and Walter Schell.

This case study tries to vindicate the hypothesis that it takes a combination of new systemic imperatives on parties and a realignment of patterns of expression of societal cleavages through partisan competition to make political parties formulate new foreign
policy preferences and contest foreign policy. There are thus a host of other alternative explanations that need to be refuted.

First is the question whether, if we focus on domestic politics as necessary condition for foreign policy change, new alignments of cleavages or systemic pressures on parties are each by themselves enough for the emergence of new foreign policy preferences and ideas. Is Ostpolitik the result of a simple realignment of societal interests within the party system? As we saw, the West German party system was undergoing change for some time already in the 1960s and the change of coalition patterns reflected this. Main changes were the withering away of Catholic labor support for the CDU in favor of the SPD and the gradual inroads of the Union parties in the conservative Protestant groups that were traditionally supporting the FDP – both of these changes amounted to a general decline of CDU’s catchall appeal beyond an essentially center-right space. These changes may account for a different constellation of foreign policy ideas expressed by the parties – and more specifically their position on the issue of German reunification and the idea of the German nation.

However these changes are not enough to explain why Ostpolitik happened when it happened and took the direction that it did. First, all three main parties expressed ends of cleavages that represented reformist ideas towards the Eastern bloc and the DDR. The Atlanticists within the CDU, largely Northern Protestants, strived to reform Adenauer’s tenets throughout the 1960s. The FDP had experimented with ideas about normalization of relations with the East since the 1950s according to social liberal ideas. And the SPD had ridden the Kennedy bandwagon and made détente a basic value of its new foreign policy profile from early on, employing its traditional Atlanticism and pacifism. In other words all parties had ideological resources and societal commitments that allowed the emergence of reformist ideas of foreign policy. Yet institutional and political conditions where decisive in the timing of their expression. Atlanticists within the Union could not break the ‘alliance of chairmen’ Adenauer and Strauss (Granieri 2003), and later relinquished control as the party went into opposition and fought for the remnants of its political dominance. Reformist ideas could only take hold of FDP once the party’s position in the party system changed to the worse, and the SPD formalized a radical agenda on foreign policy only after it found itself in a government freed from the checks of the Grand Coalition. In other words, things within the parties were changing, but it was only when the patterns of their interactions changed that these new constellations of political identities could burst to the open in the shape they did.

On the other hand, it would also not be accurate to ascribe the change to systemic pressures on parties only. As we saw, the impetus for change was brought on by the creation of the Grand Coalition, the change within the FDP and the rise of the social liberal current. The patterns of opposition on Ostpolitik also reflected changes in parties’ systemic position. The Union’s vehement opposition, a departure if one considers the party’s internal heterogeneity and its ambivalent attitudes towards change throughout the
1960s, also was informed by the party’s entering opposition for the first time in 20 years and its effort to maintain the systemic features that had allowed it to dominate politics up to that point. However, as the previous paragraph shows, the new preferences that arose were contingent on prior rooting of parties within specific cleavages. For the FDP its effort to distance itself from the CDU and occupy a central position did not take place in an ideological vacuum; instead, the party looked back to the traditions of social liberalism, democratic radicalism and reformism that formed until then the minority current of the party. The SPD, once in government, sought to underwrite its differences from Adenauer’s regime with a discourse of democratic, pacifist and reformist values. And the CDU did not practice opposition for opposition’s sake but instead looked for argumentations and morale-boosting in conservative, nationalist values about the German nation and state.

The above thus vindicates the use of party system dynamics as an important analytical category for the emergence of new foreign policy preferences. Changes in the representation of ideas and identities through parties and changes in the position of parties within policy space are interrelated developments. Changes in one dimension bring about changes in the other. For a realignment of expression of societal interests to have consequences for policy outputs, it is important that it has systemic consequences – that it impacts the patterns of the party system. Similarly, in order for adaptation of parties to spatial changes to have policy relevance, it is important that it results in the expression of meaningful alternative ideas and preferences that would not have been expressed otherwise. In other words, party systems impact foreign policy when they themselves undergo systemically relevant changes that affect policy outputs.

However, even if we establish what kinds of changes we think are meaningful for a party system to have new policy outputs, the question remains whether they are by themselves enough for change of foreign policy. The case of Ostpolitik suggests that changes in party systems are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of new foreign policies. The changes in the party system identified here could have taken place without creating a change of foreign policy – indeed, they were very meaningful for other policy sectors such as justice, education and the economy. The two big West German parties went into the election of 1969 thinking they were competing in the field of domestic policy. However, there was a systemic change, which called for policy response. Cold War détente was a structural development, which, just like the Cold War itself, lent itself to various discursive interpretations. Ostpolitik responded to a demand from within the field of foreign policy – the international system. Foreign policy change required the impetus from the international system, which in return served as a justification for the promotion of the various foreign policy preferences.

This argument also indirectly puts to rest the question as to whether the international dimension was sufficient by itself for the change of foreign policy – a classical realist argument. However, we need only remember that détente was already underway for some
years (definitely from 1962 onwards) and that it was recognized as an important parameter and a reason for foreign policy change by a wide coalition comprising the SPD, a large part of FDP and the Atlanticists of the Union. However, that coalition only streamlined West German foreign policy with the imperative of détente after the institutional setting of the domestic party system allowed the expression, alignment and successful promotion of new foreign policy preferences.

The Social-Liberal coalition of 1969 was no simple realignment of coalition patterns between parties. Instead, it was the result of long-standing converging party strategies that both reflected and engaged with changes in the social composition of the West German electorate and the expression of social cleavages through party politics. In other words, the government change of 1969 was a systemically relevant evolution in the direction and the logic of the West German party system – even though the overarching structural feature, the binary competition between a bourgeois and a social-democratic party, remained the same. However, this government change reflected a foundational change in the stake of competition, as well as the normative anchor that structured the expression of preferences, the filtering of international changes into new policy ideas, and the promotion of new policies. Whereas in the past the essential question of domestic governance had been ‘liberal democracy and market economy v.s. socialism’, it was transformed to ‘market economy within more democracy v.s. market economy within more conservative governance structures’. In this way, whereas the previous dominant axis of competition produced a bourgeois majority that negotiated within its camp the various aspect of the overriding choice of Westbindung, the new axis created a reformist majority which matched its ideas of a new political identity of the Federal Republic with a foreign policy that sought to accommodate her neighbors, as well as the German people’s past.

The new Ostpolitik was the end result of this domestic shift though when presented as a dominant ideational setup that promised to adjust West Germany’s foreign policy with a shifting international environment, it also became an asset in the effort of SPD and FDP to decisively push through their common vision of domestic society. It was this potential impact on the normative anchor of partisan competition that had so served it in the past that pushed the CDU/CSU towards high politicization of opposition against the Ostpolitik. The end result was a new equilibrium between parties with renewed outlooks, competing along a structurally stable, but normatively changed axis of competition, and a foreign policy made possible by domestic realignment of ideas and interests supported by the new stake of competition between contending visions of domestic society.

The importance of this argument becomes more evident if we juxtapose it to other accounts of Ostpolitik. Here I will concern myself particularly with the work of Engelmann-Martin (2002). Hers is an effort to systematize the analysis of a historical phenomenon under the constructivist literature – in particular, that part of constructivism that lays emphasis on national identities and the ability of actors to engage with dominant
discourses. Engelmann-Martin’s argument about Ostpolitik is that Brandt and Scheel successfully appropriated West Germany’s ‘European’ identity construction that until then had served the CDU under Adenauer.

For Engelmann-Martin this dominant discursive framework remained the same during the 1960s, but it was used by the Social-Liberal coalition in order to promote the opposite policy as Adenauer’s. By showing that the West was striving for détente, the new government could legitimately claim that a hardline policy against the East was actually putting West Germany at odds with its allies. A new Ostpolitik could be shown to be more in line, indeed to be the logical outcome, of Adenauer’s policy of anchoring West Germany in Europe. Instead, the CDU/CSU found itself in the awkward position of supporting a policy that seemed to increase residual nationalism and to isolate the Federal Republic. These were precisely the kinds of developments Adenauer was seeking to do away with. The theoretical conclusion is that Ostpolitik was an identity-based societal outcome, heavily dependent on its presentation as a continuation of the normative construction ‘Europe’ that defined Germany’s political identity.

In many ways my analysis is in agreement with that of Engelmann-Martin. Her account of SPD’s and FDP’s adaptation to the dominant identity construction of CDU is in broad agreement with my view of political parties as enabled political actors with the ability to engage with discursive constructions. Her view of foreign policy outcomes as socially constructed events is also in line with my theoretical assumptions, while her emphasis on détente as an external powerful normative condition for winning the debate was partially an inspiration for the argument of this dissertation and the importance of the ‘external argument’ in foreign policy contestation. Here I am claiming that my account does not seek to discredit, but rather to critically enhance Engelmann-Martin’s own story about the success of Ostpolitik.

First is the obvious issue of the eventual institutionalization of the European identity construction across the party system. As Engelmann-Martin herself acknowledges, this was to a large extent a result of party strategies, especially of the adaptation and the effort of the SPD and the FDP to escape the dominating presence of the CDU/CSU. Engelmann-Martin does not negate the importance of party politics in her thesis. Yet party system dynamics seem to be the key transmission mechanism through which an identity construction goes from being divisive (as Westbindung was in the early 1950s) to being dominant; the party system seems to be the key institutional space within which the variation in the strength of different political identities can be ‘measured’.

Second is the question of ‘European’ identity construction itself. Following Engelmann-Martin’s narrative one is left with the impression that ‘Europe’ is a uniform and diachronical normative framework, conditioning contestation of West German foreign policy the same way from the early 1950s to the early 1970s (indeed, to the early 1990s since Engelmann-Martin’s second case-study is the decision of Germany to support EMU). Yet she herself accepts that West Germany was a substantially different
place over these 20 years: ‘The constructivist argument would be that as the West German society completed a process of ‘Westernization’, including processes of modernization and democratization, the Federal Republic also became a more ‘Western’ state through its foreign policy of Ostpolitik’ (p. 159). In other words, the German state’s very political identity was evolving over time, and dominant understandings of what ‘West’ and ‘Europe’ meant must have evolved with it.

Indeed, as we saw Europe was understood much differently by a politician identified with the adversity of the Cold War like Adenauer than by a pan-European pacifist like Brandt. Again, the dynamics of the party system offer a more accurate image of national identities, not as stable structures over periods of time but as fluid constructions where meanings can be attached and reattached constantly. Here, the emphasis on the development of the normative anchor through the 1960s from one based on anti-Communism to one based on internal democratization is shown to account accurately for a more dynamic relationship between normative structures and actors. Also here, party politics seem to be the crucial mechanism through which new policies become institutionalized; such a focus on mechanisms of change is generally lacking in Engelmann-Martin’s work, as there the narrative sees actors as just capable of appropriating discourses without reference to the institutional space within which they function and which usually determined the pace, success and incentives of such a process.
CHAPTER 3
CANADA 1984-1993: FREE TRADE AND PARTY SYSTEM COLLAPSE

This isn’t so much about free trade as it is about the heart and soul of this country. It’s about the definition of Canada.

Canada’s ambassador to the UN and NDP politician Stephen Lewis, Winnipeg 198892

OVERVIEW AND ARGUMENT OF THE CHAPTER

In November 1988 Canadian voters went to the polls to elect a government knowing that their choice amounted essentially to a verdict on whether Canada would embark on the most far-reaching foreign policy change of its history: the ratification of a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. Voting for the ruling Conservative party (or Progressive Conservatives, PCs), which had instituted this agreement, meant approval of this foreign policy change. Voting for the opposition Liberals or New Democratic Party (NDP, a social-democratic party) could result in halting this change – the Liberals had promised to ‘tear up’ the agreement and to only engage in free trade with the United States under better terms, while the NDP was in principle against any such venture. The polling booth gave the victory to the Tories, and so the FTA was ratified.

International commercial policy preferences of the various political identities of Canadian politics are the result of a mix of cultural, economic and ideological factors. Foreign and trade policy of Canada was always affected by the interplay between these political identities, as these policies reached deep into questions of the political identity and institutional arrangements of the Canadian state. Historically, a coalition around Anglophone economic interests from the center of Canada imposed a policy of protectionism against the United States reflecting both the interests of Canadian industry and the wish to maintain Canada as an independent society in North America demarcated from the United States. While protectionism was implemented by the Conservatives in the 19th century, by the 1980s the main proponents of protectionist and nationalist sentiments were the Liberals, the party most identified with the 20th century identity of Canada as a progressive welfare and multicultural state.

The process of unfolding of Canadian protectionism can be traced in the long process of alignment of pro-free trade ‘continentalist’ political identities under the mantle of the Conservative party of Brian Mulroney. The dynamics of the party system eventually brought together the geographical and linguistic extremes of the country (the Prairie West and Quebec), both united in an agenda of developing a closer relationship with the United States and reforming the dominant structures imposed by Anglophone

nationalism of central Canada. As the analysis will show however, there was no simple linear connection between political identities represented within the Conservative party and the decision for going through with the FTA. Instead, the new Mulroney government oscillated for a year before coming out in favor of free trade. The key difference maker was the publication of the report of an independent parliamentary committee that showed how free trade not only served economic goals but could also help put the question of Canadian unity on renewed, and more firm foundations. This presented Mulroney the opportunity of not only promoting a policy that pleased his constituencies but also to redefine the stakes of party competition in a way that would make his party the guardian of a new conception of institutional relations between the central government, the provinces and linguistic communities. In other words, free trade was pursued only after the self-perception of the Conservative party changed and the prospect to redefine the stakes of party competition became apparent.

THE POLITICAL CLEAVAGES STRUCTURING CANADIAN POLITICS

Canada was first created as a Union of Upper and Lower Canada (Ontario and Quebec) in 1840 by Great Britain and expanded with the Confederation in 1867 that attached the Maritime and Western provinces. The very creation of Canada represented a policy of Great Britain and a willingness of the majority of inhabitants of the new country to demarcate British North America from the US (Cooper et al 1988: 4; Lipset 1990: 1-4). According to the initial political arrangement of 1867, Canada was to be a centralist democracy following the Westminster model of government, with a House of Commons elected through a first-past-the-post system and an appointed Senate. Organized political and electoral life started soon thereafter, even though it would take years before elections were to be held simultaneously across the vast country.

The first cleavage that shaped Canadian politics concerned the institutional design of the new state. This cleavage gave rise to two dominant political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals. The Conservatives were the party, to whom most of the founding fathers of Confederation belonged, committed to close ties with Great Britain, supporting authority and privilege, and believing in the agency of a strong central government to unite the new country. Much like conservatives in Europe at the time, Canadian Conservatives were reluctant towards capitalism and open markets. The Liberal party on the other hand represented more radical democratic and more liberal economic demands. It believed in free markets and its bourgeois outlook made it an adversary of the more patrician Conservatives.

The two parties dominated Canadian politics from early on and, with the help of a conducive, institutional framework (an electoral system that punished small third parties

93 In this section, information has been drawn from Christian and Campbell (1974), Johnston et al (1992: 35-77) and Martin (2005). More detailed references will be made accordingly.
and parliamentary rules that imposed strict party discipline), practiced a politics of accommodation and absorption of new demands. The first two-party system had to absorb the second basic cleavage of Canadian politics: Quebec. The fact of a geographically homogeneous minority with a completely different ethnic and religious background than the rest of the population meant that the task of political parties in Canada was not only winning office, but also keeping the country united (Gibbins 1982: 110; Carty et al 2000: 36).

Upper and Lower Canada, Ontario and Quebec, are the cradle of Canada, the historic center of the country. It was there that the basic cleavages of Canadian politics were formulated and, through their interaction, where the first durable binary axis of competition was created. Yet Canada expanded vastly beyond this cradle, both towards the Atlantic and the Pacific. From early on, Canada also had a regional cleavage, pitting the center against the two peripheries. Atlantic Canada, the Prairie West and British Columbia represent distinct regional identities cuing a vast array of particular (and sometimes uncomfortable) economic and political demands. Especially the West (Prairies and BC) from early on represented a direct challenge to the political imprint of the new nation as negotiated in central Canada. Being a region settled by populations of different ethnic background than Ontario and Quebec (mostly East European), largely dependent on agriculture and, in the case of BC, orientated towards the Pacific and Asia as well, the West clearly formed an outlier within Canada. This status meant that the West could be relied upon to portray a political behavior expressing discontent and disharmony with policies emanating from central Canada.

The political activism of both parties brought about the merger of the state identity, linguistic/religious and regional cleavages into a binary dimension of competition where the main stake was the maintenance of national unity. This normative anchor meant that economic policies were to be judged according to their impact on the question of unity, but it also meant that national unity was a powerful argument for the promotion of specific socioeconomic preferences. In this context, changing historical patterns of dominance of one or the other party basically reflect their ability to constantly redefine the question of national unity according to strategic readings of the demands and interactions of cleavages (McDowall 1994: 91).

From 1867 until World War I the Canadian party system was dominated first by the Conservatives (until 1896) and then the Liberals (until 1911). Conservative leader John

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94 The classical treatment of the effect of the electoral system on Canadian party politics is Cairns (1968). A more extensive discussion on the role of the Westminster institutional setup in the shape and dynamics of the Canadian party system is Gibbins (1982).

95 For a very interesting discussion of the dialectic between the identities of central and Western Canada and the ethnic, economic and social preferences they codify, see Cooper (2002). Ontario is seen here as the political, economic and normative point of reference against which regional discontent is mobilized. Here also see Holmes (1974: 621). For an outline of the reasons usually associated with Western alienation, see Henry (2002: 77-79). For a recent general discussion on the role of the regional cleavage in party politics, see Knutsen (2010).
A. Macdonald created a coalition of conservative Anglophones and Francophones based on affinity for hierarchy and a willingness to build a distinct society that would resist the pull of the radical and populist United States. After the Manitoba school crisis brought to the fore the inherent inconsistencies of the Tory coalition, the Liberals, led by Wilfrid Laurier, won over Quebec. The Francophone Laurier tempered the party’s traditional anticlericalism to lure Quebec and along with reliable support in the pro-free trade West, created a new winning coalition. Unlike Macdonald’s, this coalition was based on a vision of national unity consisting of more balanced relations with the US and Great Britain, more overtures towards free trade to please the West (Marchildon 1994: 22-23) and a respect for provincial community characteristics (Quebec). In this way, the question of national unity gave rise to the signature practice of Canadian parties dealing with the multitude of cleavages in Canada: brokerage of provincial interests within the party and the government.

In 1921 the Liberals returned to power under new leader William Mackenzie King. The new Liberal coalition brokered along the linguistic cleavage, harnessing the solid support of Quebec, the regional cleavage, continuing to enjoy success in the West, and the emerging class cleavage, as King developed a concept of proactive liberalism that aimed to marry traditional economic liberalism with ideas about a more activist state in light of increased urbanization. Making the Liberals a party differentiated on all cleavages, both central and peripheral, both French and English, both capitalist and reformist, King was able to realize his goal of making them the natural party of government. Their dominance would last until 1957. Still, the elections of 1921 were important for another reason: even though the main binary logic of competition remained intact, from then onwards the Canadian party system would be characterized by the sustained presence of significant third parties. All of these parties had their birthplace in the West, and more specifically the agrarian Prairie provinces (Carty et al 2000: 64-66).

The brokerage coalition of the Liberals dominated the party system until 1957-8, when the Tories (now named Progressive Conservatives, PCs), under the leadership of John Diefenbaker, won the election, realigned the expression of political identities and yet again redefined the normative anchor of national unity. Diefenbaker’s dream was to forge a new Canadian identity that would finally accommodate his native West with the original conservative, pro-British political identity of Canada. Diefenbaker lost power in 1963 to a reinvigorated Liberal party, however his tenure had one lasting effect: it realigned the patterns of expression of the regional cleavage. His policy of agricultural price support was the first time that central Canada subsidized a Western industry, while the tariff up to that point forced the West to subsidize the industry of Ontario (Hinich et al 1998: 416). Diefenbaker’s policies completely changed the partisan expression of the regional cleavage, making the West a bastion of PC support and leaving the Liberals with virtually no traces of support to the west of Ontario.

The Liberals under Lester Pearson returned to power reclaiming Quebec, but this was a very different Liberal party and a very different Quebec. The period in opposition gave the opportunity to a new generation of party cadres from Toronto to take over the party from the old brokers and modernize it. Also, by the time Pearson became Prime Minister, the Quiet Revolution was in full swing in Quebec. The Quiet Revolution concerned the rise of a new political and economic elite with a new national self-awareness that sought to modernize Quebec and rebalance the relationship between English and French Canada (Martin 1994: 147-149). The normative anchor of national unity was different than before since the linguistic/ethnic cleavage had now turned into a national/constitutional one. In electing a youthful Francophone academic, Pierre Trudeau, as their leader in 1968, the Liberals hoped to find an answer to these demands. Trudeau’s answer was the creation of a new Canadian civic identity that would accommodate the Québécois as individual citizens, recognizing their individual rights but without fragmenting the institutional unity of the Canadian polity. The outcome of these considerations was an official policy of bilingualism and multiculturalism. By recognizing Canada as a bilingual nation, Trudeau hoped to absorb Quebec’s demands and to create the preconditions for Francophones to remain Canadians. This policy was met by the approval of federalist elites in Quebec but with the vehement opposition of the separatists. Trudeau’s strong personality and the Liberals’ electoral dominance redefined the stake of national unity into what became known as the era of pan-Canadian ideological politics. The 1960s and 1970s was the time when political parties were asked to formulate coherent political propositions that would appeal potentially to as many Canadians as possible over regional and language barriers. In effect though this period of nationalization of Canadian politics did not undo the huge geographical discrepancies in the patterns of support for political parties. Increasingly the demands of fiscal and institutional accommodation of Quebec ran against the interests of the West.

Following the failed Quebec referendum on sovereignty in 1980, Trudeau tried to solve the issue of Canada’s constitutional identity by ‘repatriating’ the constitution from Great Britain and charting a Bill of Rights in 1982. These documents were to institutionalize his approach towards Quebec’s position in Canada as a problem of accommodation of individual rights, as well as codify relations between the provinces and the English capital Ottawa. The separatist government in Quebec refused to sign the new constitution, thus precipitating a constitutional crisis (Salée 1997: 84). Around the same time, Trudeau tried to counter the mounting economic crisis by founding the National Energy Program (NEP), which would allow the central government to tap on the

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97 On the cultural aspect of the Quiet Revolution see Holmes (1974: 626), and on the economic/sociological one see Gilpin (1974: 868).
98 The move from regionally isolated party competition and region-specific campaigning to pan-Canadian themes and competition was also greatly assisted by the advent of new communications technology such as the television (Cross 2002: 117-118).
energy resources of provinces such as Alberta. This served to deepen the rift between Trudeau and Western Canada (Nossal 1985: 68; Thomas 1988: 124-125)\textsuperscript{99}.

Trudeau left office in 1984 and the Liberals elected John Turner, a member of the Toronto financial community, as the next Prime Minister. Already in 1983 the Tories had elected Brian Mulroney as their leader, a bilingual Quebecker of Irish origin. This gave the ostensibly Anglo PCs their first competent Francophone leader in history. When Turner called elections in 1984 he suffered a bad defeat. Canada rallied behind Mulroney’s optimistic message of national reconciliation and economic rejuvenation. The elections of 1984 seemed to give Mulroney a true national mandate, as every region and every social group supported his election as a welcome change from the Trudeau years. Most strikingly, next to a hegemonic position in the West, the Tories now also enjoyed the support of Quebec (Kornberg and Clarke 1988).

\textit{Table 7}

\textit{1984 Canadian General Election}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Vote Share</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservatives</td>
<td>50.0 %</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>28.0 %</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>18.8 %</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.2 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table adapted from Martin (2005) and www.elections.ca}

These elections could be seen as a continuation of the pan-Canadian politics of the past, with one party finally managing to unite all political identities around a national message of renewal and unity (Pammet 1989: 125). The PCs had bridged almost all meaningful cleavages of Canadian society. However, Mulroney’s strongest commitments along the regional, linguistic, and state identity cleavages were contradictory; the ‘national reconciliation’ he had promised meant different things in Alberta, tired of the constitutional bickering of central Canada, than in Quebec, longing for a recognition as a distinct collectivity within Canada. In the past the ability of party leaders to dominate the axis of national unity had partially relied on their ability to also embed the visions that united their coalitions within corresponding foreign policies. Could it be that the political identities represented within Mulroney’s coalition were more united on foreign policy...

\textsuperscript{99} The question of energy relations between Canada and the US after the early 1970s had already caused the first rift in the relations between Ottawa and Western Canada (Keohane and Nye 1974: 602).
preferences than on domestic issues? And if yes, could it be that these preferences cued a coherent vision of domestic society around which to anchor party competition?

Table 8
An Analytical Periodization of Canadian Party Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Stake of competition (national unity)</th>
<th>Dominant party</th>
<th>Dominant leader</th>
<th>Political identities in ruling party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1867-1896</td>
<td>Creation of an independent society</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>Macdonald</td>
<td>Anglophone conservatives, Central Canada industry, Francophone Catholics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-1921</td>
<td>Emerging brokerage</td>
<td>Transitional period</td>
<td>Laurier</td>
<td>Transitional period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1957</td>
<td>Brokerage</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Francophones, West, urban strata of Central Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1963</td>
<td>Emerging civic nationalism</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>Diefenbaker</td>
<td>West, Anglophone conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1984-?</td>
<td>Civic nationalism: Strong state, multiculturalism</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>Mulroney</td>
<td>Quebec, urban strata of Central Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES

Canada was born as the border between Great Britain and the US, with a deliberate intention of upholding the anti-revolutionary ethos of the Empire against the republican United States (Holmes 1974: 612-613). Because of this position, Canada always had to balance between the commitment to Empire and the practicalities of life next to the United States (Holsti 1982: 101; Owram 1994: 118). This balancing had a domestic outreach as well: Canada’s initial self-conception as part of the British Empire was reflected in a specific institutional setup and specific ideas that reproduced this link through political practice. By extension, pro-American feelings were associated with a democratic, radical and libertarian ethos that sought to undermine what was seen as the essential ‘Tory strain’ of Canadian identity (Lipset 1990). Foreign policy preferences then always corresponded to distinct visions of domestic society.

Protectionism and the National Policy were essential components of the pro-Imperial policies of the ruling Conservatives in the second half of the 19th century. The creation of a West-East axis of economic interaction fell within an Imperial conception of a direct
British link from the Atlantic to the Pacific (‘all red route to India’) (Johnston et al 1992: 39). As part of a nation-building project, the National Policy codified the key preferences of the political identities John Macdonald (Prime Minister 1867-1873, 1878-1891) wanted to rally behind the project of the new state. These preferences included Protectionism and latent anti-Americanism that pleased Tories and royalists who mistrusted the emancipatory ethos of the United States (Gibbins 1988: 341), Francophones who found in hierarchical Canada a convenient shield against the revolutionary Americans, fledgling economic and manufacturing interests from central Canada that needed protection from American competition, and the big mass of the Canadian population that would consume cheap agricultural products from the West (Christian and Campbell 1974: 86-87; Granatstein 1985: 12-17 and elsewhere; McDowall 1994: 89).

Foreign policy was also important in latter stages of the development of the Canadian party system. The long transitional period between the collapse of the Macdonald coalition in 1896 and the emergence of the modern Canadian party system of brokerage in 1921 was influenced by foreign policy events (Johnston et al 1992: 45-51). Foreign policy was an important part of Liberal Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier’s (1896-1911) domestic balancing act. He did not undo the National Policy and committed Canada to service of the Empire, albeit with a more independent profile (Christian and Campbell 1974: 168; Johnston et al 1992: 46-47; McDowall 1994: 90). The only time Laurier strayed from this path was when he dared to put a free trade agreement with the US to the test of the polling booth in 1911. Laurier miscalculated the potency of the British link and anti-American feelings as electoral weapons. Molded in the flag of the Empire, the Conservatives won the election and the National Policy stood (McDowall 1994: 101)\(^{100}\).

The Quebec conscription crisis of 1917 ended any pretenses the Tories could have had to Québécois hearts and minds. By imposing mandatory conscription in Canada for a war in Europe, the Conservatives cut themselves out of Quebec and essentially became a party of Anglo-Protestant Canada (Christian and Campbell 1974: 87-89; Hinich et al 1998: 414). Foreign policy was a major part in Mackenzie King’s (1921-1930, 1935-1948) catchall strategy during his long reign as Prime Minister. As a Liberal enjoying overwhelming support in Quebec, he maintained ideas about closer links with the US and progressive loosening of the British link. Great Britain’s rapid decline in world status after World War I made this strategy easier (Christian and Campbell 1974: 90; Owram 1994: 119). His verbal commitment to free trade principles allowed the Liberals to stave off the challenge of populist agrarian movements in the West that threatened to mobilize the regional cleavage (Carty et al 2000: 16-19). However, protectionism was a policy

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\(^{100}\) For a vivid account of the election of 1911 and the interaction of manufacturing economic interests and pro-imperial groups in luring the Tories in an anti-free trade position against an agreement that seemed fairly beneficial to Canada, see Granatstein (1985: 20-25). For an analysis of the 1911 election as a foreign policy election, see Welch (2005: 177-184).
more and more conducive with the interests of the ever-growing urban strata of central Canada that the Liberals attracted through their slow slide to the left. The formidable Liberal machine of 1921-1957 then was not only brokering assiduously domestic preferences, but also foreign policy ideas (Christian and Campbell 1974: 54-57; McDowall 1994: 103; Cooper 2002: 92).

The latest example of this came with King’s swansong as Prime Minister in 1948. Shortly after World War II, the Americans offered Canada a favorable free trade deal that would allow Canada to tap on the booming US market. There was no more an Imperial connection to speak of, so King would not have to be afraid of his opponents using the Empire as an opposition tactic. However the lessons of the lost free trade election of 1911 remained pertinent for King. Looking back at it, he could realize that the Imperial feeling of the time only enhanced a nascent national identity that was defined first and foremost in contradiction to the United States (Granatstein 1985: 25). Even without the Imperial link, a decision for free trade would threaten to split the country. In the end, King, fearing for his legacy and his party, stepped back from an agreement he had consented to.

The Liberals were not immune to reverting back to their continentalist views if the moment demanded it. As opposition to Diefenbaker (1957-1963), they milked the sense of unease Canadians felt with his anti-Americanism and romantic attachment to the dying cause of the British Empire (Martin 2005: 151-152). When Lester Pearson (1963-1968) became Prime Minister, restoring relations with the United States became one of his main goals. However Pearson was perhaps the last exponent of the Liberal version of brokerage of domestic and foreign political identities. The intensification of the regional cleavage (with the West finding itself in opposition after following Diefenbaker to the PCs), the linguistic cleavage (with the nationalist awakening of Quebec) and the class cleavage (with the rise of the NDP and university radicalism) also meant that the new Liberal coalition of the 1960s was representing a vastly different array of foreign policy preferences – and that this coalition had to be nurtured with a different set of foreign policies.

Trudeau’s (1968-1979, 1980-1984) nation-building project eventually became inseparable from a foreign policy of antagonism towards the United States and protectionism (Booth 1988: 143). The rise of a certain left-wing Canadian Anglophone nationalism concerned with national unity (Holmes 1974: 618), the extent of US-ownership of Canadian business and Canada’s degree of association with an expansive superpower (Gilpin 1974: 862-863), was best expressed by the NDP (Holsti 1982: 97). The New Democrats’ new allies in the trade union movement of Ontario trumped the

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101 For a thorough analysis of King’s decision to kill the proposed free trade agreement with the US in 1948 see Welch (2005: 185-193). Apparently King could not be certain that even a favorable agreement would not energize nationalist feelings and lead to a defeat that would irrevocably harm the Liberal party and his own legacy.

102 It is worth noting that Trudeau’s nationalism translated into antagonistic policies towards the US only gradually. In the mid-1970s he was still seen as a moderate nationalist with a pragmatic view of the Canada-US link (Holsti 1982: 94-95).
party’s agrarian origins and created the most reliably anti-American force of Canadian politics (Christian and Campbell 1974: 145-147; Owram 1994: 128-129) – and anti-Americanism also meant staunch support for multilateralism and protectionism, in which organized labor also saw an insurance against excessive competition (Owram 1994: 136-137). In the process, the Liberals saw the need to support the new identity that would accommodate Quebec with a policy of high visibility of the central government, and placating anti-American feelings with critical foreign policy rhetoric and increasing relations with alternative centers of power (Holmes 1974: 614; Holsti 1982: 90-92).

Following the Nixon shock of the early 1970s, Trudeau sought to decrease the Canadian economy’s exposure to the United States (Gilpin 1974: 866; Keohane and Nye 1974: 595-597). The creation of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) in 1973 was a response to the sentiments of economic nationalism prevalent at the time (Welch 2005: 194-195). The Third Option built upon the established patterns of Canadian trade policy (multilateralism and protectionism against the US), and sought to underline the process of creation of a new Canadian identity. It also sustained the existing patterns of Canadian political economy by privileging the original constituencies that benefited from the tariff and on whose political identities Trudeau relied to forge the new Canadian nationalism (Gilpin 1974: 863-864). This meant that Trudeau’s concept was far from unifying: both of his domestic and foreign policies exacerbated some cleavages even if they were bridging others. Most evidently that was the case with the Western provinces, for which bilingualism, economic nationalism and constitutional bickering made little sense. The creation of NEP in the early 1980s symbolized everything that was wrong with Trudeau’s plan for the West (Gilpin 1974: 866-867; Johnston et al 1992: 67-68).

A second front where Trudeau’s policies were proving very divisive was Quebec. Even though the Liberals were receiving the solid support of the province in national elections, in provincial politics the national cleavage was running deep between federalists and separatists (Carty et al 2000: 24). In Quebecois separatist political thought, sovereignty required a novel concept of an independent Quebec’s foreign policy. Increasingly it came to be seen that a continentalist context was more suitable to Quebec’s needs than the increasingly activist Canadian state – a view that came to be shared by federalists as well (Holmes 1974: 627). The Quiet Revolution had produced a vibrant Francophone business community that, just as the separatist Parti Quebecois, saw in the increased opportunities in the United States (Gilpin 1974: 869; Doern and Tomlin 1991: 235).

The sum result of the interaction between political identities and foreign policy was a reformulation but further strengthening of multilateralism and protectionism as the normative framework of Canadian foreign commercial policy (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 62-63) – thus roughly following the constant reinterpretation of the normative anchor of domestic politics. Protectionism was the glue and output of a ruling coalition seeking to bridge the national, linguistic, cultural and class divides of the country (Holsti 1982:
217). The price for these twin domestic and foreign policies was an exacerbation of the regional cleavage, with the West (as the periphery) remaining the only significant political identity expressing continentalist preferences, politically imprisoned within the PC party, still committed to the National Policy.

The party system of the 1970s did have an effect on the creation of rival foreign policy projects. Permanently in opposition, and with a foothold only in the West, the Tories started moving from being the old party of anti-American conservatism to being the party of pro-Americanism in foreign affairs (see below). However, the normative anchor of the party system reflected a systemic alignment of cleavages that overwhelmingly favored the Liberals, the new party of Canadian nationalism – and in as much also reinforced the dominant ideas and interests attached to protectionism. Protectionism not only symbolized Canada’s historical independence towards the United States, but it also always appealed to a formidable combination of powerful domestic political identities. As a steady part of the normative anchor of national unity – first as a balancing element in brokerage and then as an important practical complement of a strong state building a new Canadian identity – the National Policy was the inescapable normative framework within which evaluations of commercial policy (and evaluations of political risk associated with free trade) were taking place (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 229-230).

Even though the Mulroney election in 1984 expressed in many ways a profound wish for change among the Canadian electorate, it did not necessarily mean a change of the normative anchor. The result produced a national mandate for change, much like the patterns and interaction of parties in the previous 15 years had been on issues of national importance. Improving relations with the US on a symbolic level was one easy way for Mulroney to portray the new ways of the Canadian government (Booth 1988: 151). In terms of political identities though, two groups were dominating Mulroney’s huge parliamentary majority. One side of the regional cleavage, the West (Gibbins 1988: 338), was expressing steady pro-US sentiments – now, more than just price support for its agricultural production, it was asking for new markets for its products and energy resources (Granatstein 1985: 14). Mulroney had captured an impressive majority in Quebec as well, however most of his loyal supporters came from the anti-Trudeau wing of Québécois politics, looking for a more relaxed constitutional framework for Quebec.

In this way, the Mulroney government became the first in history to express solid pro-free trade interests in such a decisive way (Carty et al 2000: 38). However Mulroney did not move on free trade despite his overtures to the USA. His foreign policy seemed securely embedded within the identity of protectionism and multilateralism despite manifest inabilities of these intellectual tools to measure growing challenges like USA protectionism and the failure of GATT. Mulroney himself had won the PC leadership contest in 1983 on a platform of protectionism (Merkin 1996: 258; Clarke et al 2000: 53) in order to win the support of voters from Ontario (Clarkson 2002: 27). Mulroney would
soon come to see that changing the terms of the debate in domestic politics and thus keeping his coalition together would require a daring transformative approach in foreign policy as well.

Table 9
An Analytical Periodization of Canadian Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Stake of competition (national unity)</th>
<th>Dominant party</th>
<th>Foreign policy output (Great Britain)</th>
<th>Foreign policy output (USA)</th>
<th>Commercial policy output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1867-1896</td>
<td>Creation of an independent society</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>Imperial link</td>
<td>Demarcation</td>
<td>Protectionism – National Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-1921</td>
<td>Emerging brokerage</td>
<td>Transitional period</td>
<td>Imperial link contested</td>
<td>Bilateral relations contested by parties</td>
<td>Protectionism – Defeat of free trade in 1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1957</td>
<td>Brokerage</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>Imperial link receding</td>
<td>Increased political and economic links</td>
<td>National Policy with sectoral free trade, GATT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1963</td>
<td>Emerging civic nationalism</td>
<td>Conservatives (transitional period)</td>
<td>Imperial link reviving</td>
<td>Tension</td>
<td>Revival of protectionism against the US and increased trade with Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1984-?</td>
<td>Civic nationalism: Strong state, multiculturalism</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>Imperial link extinct</td>
<td>Initially increased ties, gradually increase of tension</td>
<td>After mid-1970s revival of protectionism, seeking alternative trading partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: GOVERNMENT CHANGE AND FTA

Until 1985 the nationalist-continentalist cleavage did not correspond to the patterns of partisan competition – at least when it came to an aspect of it, commercial policy with the United States. The party system had managed to absorb the most vocal interests in favor of free trade into broad consensus-based coalitions – or else condemn them to opposition. This is particularly true of the regional cleavage, which, unlike the linguistic or class cleavage, ruling parties always sought to suppress or mute instead of integrating. Some degree of protectionism towards the US served the bridging of most major
important cleavages (language, political identity of the state, religion/culture, class), so much so that one can wonder whether it was not that the West’s free trade aspirations were frustrated because of the imperfect way with which the regional cleavage was structured by parties, but whether the very nature of the West’s demand – free trade – contributed to the exacerbation of the regional cleavage (McDowall 1994: 98).

In the elections of 1984, relations with the United States were a moderately important issue, free trade though was nowhere on the radar. Mulroney was very vocal of his intentions to bring Canada closer to the United States (Booth 1988: 151). This was considered a handy marker-issue of Mulroney’s all-encompassing reformist message and his promise to change Trudeau’s ways in the economy, constitutional matters and relationship between communities. The elections of 1984 had a very important systemic result: thanks to Mulroney’s appealing promises on constitutional matters, Quebec shifted support to the PCs and for the first time since the 1950s the West and Quebec were represented within the same governing coalition. Only this time, the special weight of the West within this coalition was expected to be bigger, and Quebec was represented not as a timid element of brokerage but as a province with confident elites and specific constitutional and fiscal demands. The novelty of this coalition was lost amid the cascade of Mulroney’s victory, which represented a genuine desire for change among Canadians and reinforced at the time the impression of an undifferentiated electorate (Kornberg and Clarke 1988). Yet the institutionalization of the regional cleavage (the West) within the PC party, and the tactical willingness to take advantage of the national cleavage (Quebec), meant that these two political identities would play a decisive role in the working of the government (Gibbins 1988: 334).

The first year of Mulroney’s government represented an abrupt fall from grace. His administration was marred by scandal and a distinct sense of helplessness (Gibbins 1988: 337-339; Westell 1989: 2-3). His first actions were to dissociate his government from some of the most evident signs of Trudeau’s regime. He abolished the NEP, a key Western demand, and turned the FIRA from an investment-screening agency into an investment attraction agency (Thomas 1988: 128; Macdonald 1991: 157). On a foreign policy level, Mulroney’s foreign minister, Joe Clark (himself a Prime Minister in 1979-1980 with a careful agenda of improving the Canada-US relation, Holsti 1982: 206), undertook to mend the ties with the powerful neighbor without undoing the essential normative framework of Canadian multilateralism and diplomacy (Booth 1988: 151-152). The new climate in Canada-US relations was sealed in the Shamrock Summit in Montreal in March 1985 between Mulroney and Ronald Reagan (Westell 1989: 8; Doern and Tomlin 1991: 25). Yet almost a year into his term, Mulroney had precious little to show for the two main goals he outlined in his Throne Speech: national reconciliation and economic development.

The only consolation was that opposition leader John Turner was not doing much better; if anything, he was facing even more pressing problems leading a party in
disarray, divided on its future course (with Turner wanting to back away from Trudeau’s legacy, but the ex-Prime Minister’s shadow remaining) (Martin 2005: 175). The void was happily filled by NDP and its optimistic leader, Ed Broadbent. Broadbent, the most familiar and most popular party leader in Canada, had formulated a party strategy based on a mildly populist message centered on issues of integrity and distance between the big parties and the concerns of the electorate (Clarke et al 2000: 51). In the summer of 1987 Broadbent and the NDP’s appeal reached its peak, when opinion polls gave it first place of voter intentions, with Liberals second and Tories third (Westell 1989: 14).

The golden opportunity for Mulroney to reverse the course for his government came with the publication of the findings of the Macdonald Commission in September 1985. The Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada had been established by Trudeau with the original aim of exploring alternatives in the economic model of Canada. Its chair, Donald Macdonald, had been a nationalist Liberal, whose attachment to an independent Canada could not be put into doubt (Clarkson 2002: 29). The Macdonald report amounted to numerous volumes of hearings, testimonies and scientific research, and its recommendation to the Canadian government to engage in closer trade integration with the US was as close an authoritative endorsement of free trade as it could be. The Macdonald report supplied not only an economic rationale to free trade, but also an intellectual marrying between free trade and Canada’s goals as an independent state in North America (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 52-56). Most analysts agree that, for Mulroney, this was the point of personal conversion to the cause of free trade, as well as the golden opportunity to create a policy that would portray his pro-US stance in practice while showcasing his new vision for Canada (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 29, 57; Clarkson 2002: 28-30).

Shortly after the publication of the report, the Canadian government officially requested initiation of talks about trade liberalization with the United States on October 1st (Westell 1989: 8). Negotiations began in May 1986 and lasted for more than two years. In the United States the issue was little more than a bleep on the news radar, even though Congress was very vigilant about potential repercussions of trade deals. In Canada however, the development of the trade negotiations was the most important item of the news agenda along with constitutional negotiations throughout Mulroney’s first term in office (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 44). Negotiations were very difficult and as late as the summer of 1987 they seemed doomed to fail. Because of this it was somewhat surprising that in October of 1987 the Mulroney government announced that it had reached an agreement on a comprehensive free trade agreement with the US. On December 11th the full text was released and on January 2nd 1988 Reagan and Mulroney signed it (Welch 2005: 197).

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103 For a concise account of the obstacles and bureaucratic dynamics of the negotiation, see in general Doern and Tomlin (1991) and Merkin et al (1996).
Free trade was to capture the public’s imagination, but at around the same time Mulroney was making strides on the more mundane constitutional issue as well. As he had promised national reconciliation, Mulroney undertook to bridge the divide between Quebec and the rest of Canada by initiating a negotiation between the federal government in Ottawa and the premiers of all regions, including Quebec. Negotiations lasted throughout Mulroney’s term of office and produced the Meech Lake Accord (MLA) in April of 1987. This was a comprehensive constitutional package deal that recognized Quebec as a ‘distinct society’ within Canada and extended important competences to the regions (Westell 1989: 4-5). The MLA served the goal of imposing a wholly anti-Trudeau solution to the question of national unity. Its focus ceased to be the central government, and instead shifted to an idea of unity between provinces, regions and communities brokered through political elites. Since it enjoyed the unequivocal support of a new federalist government in Quebec, the MLA seemed to be the last best hope for Canadian unity and for that reason it was supported also by the Liberals and the NDP, despite these two parties’ traditional centralist and civic Canadian nationalism.\(^{104}\)

With the FTA and the MLA, Mulroney had by the end of 1987 two concrete policy proposals to show. Both reflected the preferences of the main political identities institutionalized within the PCs and the party’s position within the axis of competition. Yet only one, free trade, became an object of partisan competition, even though the MLA was also a departure from previous established conceptions of Canadian nationalism. As we will see, foreign policy had a much better chance of not only matching the policy preferences of different political identities, but also of practically supporting a new constitutional arrangement as well. Conversely, for the opposition, the FTA was a convenient symbolic issue with which to seek to preserve the old ideological axis of party competition.

The new FTA immediately became the object of close scrutiny in the Canadian media and public. Generally it was a very far-reaching document that included provisions holding the prospect for a thorough restructuring of the Canadian state and economy. Apart from gradual tariff elimination in various manufactured products, there were three important novelties that set this agreement apart from other similar agreements, as well as some of the key provisions of GATT at the time. First, the FTA liberalized many important sectors of agriculture and energy, a key demand of the Canadian Prairie West provinces that now saw the huge market to the south open up to them; second, the FTA liberalized services, one of the first trade agreements to include such a provision (Clarkson 2002: 51); and finally, third, the FTA was to establish special binational conflict-resolution panels that would produce binding verdicts on any differences arising over the implementation of the FTA (Merkin et al 1996: 259; Welch 2005: 204).\(^{105}\)

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\(^{104}\) On the Meech Lake Accord, see among others Vipond (1989).

\(^{105}\) On the importance of the dispute-resolution panels as significant novelty of the agreement, see Winham and DeBoer-Ashworth (2002). For a presentation of the main provisions of the treaty, as well as their implications for Canadian economy, see Doern and Tomlin (1991: 70-99).
Even during the negotiation stage, the FTA had caused abrupt cleavages within Canadian society. Reminiscent of the intense days of national debates in the 1960s, Canadians of all stripes had come together to combat or support the new trade agreement. The most prominent supporter of the FTA in the public sphere was Canadian business, and particularly the Toronto financial establishment that had graduated from a stance in favor of protectionism; new Quebec political and economic elites, primarily centered in Montreal; farmers, particularly in the West; most economists in academia, as well as policymakers with links to the above groups. Pitted against them was a colorful alliance of churches (especially the Catholic Church of Canada)\textsuperscript{106}, feminists, intellectuals and publicists with links to old nationalist organizations, unionists, especially in Ontario, and various grass-roots organizations with socialist and progressive leanings (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 208-222; Welch 2005: 199-200).

Despite this polarization within Canadian society, the FTA escalated into an issue of partisan competition only gradually and in conjunction with the tactical evaluations of party leaders. Based on the authoritative endorsement of free trade by the Macdonald Commission, Mulroney framed the FTA as a policy initiative that was better serving the cause of Canadian independence, economic prosperity and access to international markets for Canadian products than the traditional mix of multilateralism and protectionism. As an international treaty, the Canada-US FTA was to pass through Parliament where the PCs had an overwhelming majority. Yet ratification of the FTA was to go through a roller coaster that few had foreseen when the first provisions of the agreement became public.

As the party of committed internationalists like Lester Pearson, pro-US politicians like Laurier and King, and progressive nationalists like Trudeau the Liberals were expected to be split on the question of free trade (Clarkson 2005: 155). Despite their loss in 1984, however, they still identified as a national party with the potential and duty to bridge the linguistic and the class cleavage. They had close links to the business sector that had grown to support free trade, yet they were also close to social strata that looked at a strong central government as a source of policies for economic and social integration. At the same time, they were also a party in disarray after going into opposition for the first time in 20 years. Continentalist and nationalist ideas were lurking within the party, and, if anything, it was thought that John Turner, with his ties to the business community and his effort to differentiate himself from Pierre Trudeau, would be close to the idea of free trade (McDowall 1994: 112; Welch 2005: 200). Yet the exact opposite is what happened.

Shortly after the publication of the elements of the agreement, John Turner did what many thought was the unexpected and came all out against free trade (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 230-233). The FTA was not promoting a reformulation of Canadian interests but was actually hurting these very interests by surrendering Canadian sovereignty to a

\textsuperscript{106} On Canada’s Catholic Church’s left-wing turn after World War II, see Lipset (1990: 88).
continental framework dominated by the Americans and by diluting the distinct Canadian nature of governance symbolized in an advanced welfare state. In essence Turner thought that discussion about FTA was not about two contending interpretations of a commonly understood Canadian interest, but about two different understandings of what Canada is and wants altogether (Clarkson 1989: 33-34). In summer of 1988 John Turner put his strategy into practice by ordering the Liberal members of the Senate to block ratification of the FTA (Clarkson 2005: 145). Faced with institutional deadlock, Mulroney had no option but to call elections for November 1988 with the express goal of getting the FTA ratified.

The elections of 1988 were the first in Canadian history to be dominated so much by a single issue. Free trade became the obvious tangible stake of the election. Voting for the PCs meant endorsing eventual ratification of the agreement. Turner on the other hand had vowed to ‘tear up’ the agreement. Amidst all the apocalyptic talk about the dangers the FTA presented to Canada’s independence and its ability to sustain distinct socioeconomic policies, Turner’s opposition to free trade was more nuanced. Being a governing party, the Liberals had to balance their opposition to the FTA with a constructive policy of Canada-US relations that also appealed to wider segments of the Canadian population than the core anti-free trade constituency (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 232). Paradoxically, this nuanced position was linked more with a principled anti-free trade position than the one of the NDP, which tried to embed its complete rejection of any economic integration scheme with the United States within a general message of economic justice and good governance. In terms of foreign policy, the major departure for the NDP was its assurance not to institute Canada’s promised departure from NATO in its first term in office (Whitehorn 1989: 46-49; Doern and Tomlin 1991: 233-235).

As the campaign kicked off the Tories were in a position of inherent strength: Their standing in the polls had improved markedly thanks to the MLA, which had won praise from all sides of the political and linguistic divide, and the FTA, which at the time of signing had the support of half of the population (more than enough for a party to win a parliamentary majority in a first-past-the-post system) (Johnston et al 1992: 144-145). This pattern was radically upset by the televised Anglophone debate between the three party leaders. Most expected Ed Broadbent to capitalize on his party’s strong standing and secure NDP’s place as a big player. However John Turner surprised everyone again. He forced a heated exchange with Mulroney on the issue of free trade that framed the FTA as a choice between an independent Canada and a province of the USA. Mulroney caught up with the challenge and the result was a relentless back and forth on the

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107 As has been argued, very rarely in Canadian history has a single issue dominated so much a campaign as did the FTA in 1988: 89% of the voters cited free trade as the most important issue of the election (Maser 1989: 55; Clarke et al 2000: 55) – not only that, but the FTA was not a valence issue, i.e. an issue where the goals were widely shared among all parties but where they disagreed on the methods (e.g. the economy), but a substantial issue, a question of ‘for’ or ‘against’ (Pammett 1989: 122-124; Clarke and Kornberg 1992: 39; Clarke et al 2000: 54-55).

108 For a concise account of the campaign period, see Johnston et al (1992: ch. 1).
meaning of the FTA for the future and character of the country (Maser 1989: 62-63). In this way the debate became a turning point of the campaign. It turned the FTA from a policy issue into a monumental decision of different visions about Canada, and it established the Liberals as the sole serious standard-bearer of nationalism in the Canadian campaign.

The immediate result of the debate was an upheaval of the patterns of the campaign. Opinion polls showed an explosion of Liberal support that catapulted them to first place (Johnston et al 1992: 27-28). The NDP again clearly became the third party of Canadian politics. The Tories were shaken out of their complacency and Mulroney was forced into a more aggressive and symbolic defense of the FTA (Clarkson 2005: 150). Turner delivered with even more vehemence his opposition to the FTA as a contradiction to Canada’s basic interests of independence and unity. However Turner’s message started to become stale and it offered no viable alternative. The result of the elections did not look much different than what would have been considered possible two months before, however the dynamics of the campaign brought about a much more intense discussion on the FTA and its linkage with the Canadian model of union and the nature of Canadian nationalism.

**Table 10**

*Canadian General Election 1988*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Vote Share</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservatives</td>
<td>43.0 %</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>31.9 %</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>20.4 %</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.7 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>295</td>
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Adapted from Martin (2005) and [www.elections.ca](http://www.elections.ca)

The outcome of the 1988 election seemed to usher in a new era of systemic patterns of competition. The binary pattern seemed to sustain its challenges, as the NDP was safely coerced into the left corner of the party spectrum and proved unable, even under the most favorable circumstances, to present itself as a valid alternative for government

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109 Most typical is the now infamous anti-FTA commercial of the Liberals that showed two trade ‘negotiators’ erasing on a map the borderline between Canada and the US (Krause 1989: 22; Welch 2005: 205).
office. Yet the elections also seemed to redefine the meaning of the anchor around which this essentially binary competition revolved. Party strategies had turned the issue of economic relations with the US, and the contestation of the meaning of Canadian goals like independence and prosperity, into a question of two contending visions of national unity. A unitary vision of a Canada identified with visible federal policies versus a decentralized vision of economic power delegated to the market and political power delegated to the provinces. Even though the FTA had been presented as an ideological issue of pan-Canadian interest, the victory of the Tories ensured that the issue was used for the creation of a new normative definition of national unity. Coupled with the MLA, the FTA had brought about the breaking down of a unitary language of politics in Canada. The PC coalition seemed to bridge both the regional and the linguistic cleavage, however for the first time in history a governing party was doing this without a firm foothold in the normative center of Canadian politics, Anglophone central Canada (Johnston et al 1992: 110). In 1988, with the FTA sanctioned in the ballot box and the MLA on its way to ratification by provincial parliaments, it seemed like Mulroney had built a formidable coalition.

DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: CLEAVAGES, PARTY STRATEGIES AND DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION

The free trade story of the 1980s begins in the 1960s, when two important realignments in the party system took place. The first one considered the change of the relationship between the main parties and the regional cleavage. Up until then, the Liberals were the main beneficiaries of the votes and seats of the two regional extremes of the country, the West (British Columbia and Prairies) and Atlantic East (Maritime provinces). Since the 19th century, the West had been alienated from the Tories, the then established and founding party of Canada identified with a tariff policy that forced the Western provinces to consume expensive manufactured products from Central Canada and to trade its agricultural products with the rest of Canada without any price supports. With the election of John Diefenbaker of Saskatchewan as leader of the opposition, the Tories at once became the party of discontent. After the Diefenbaker years, the West largely lent its support to the Tories (Johnston et al 1992: 56-59).

The second key development of the 1960s concerned the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, which brought to the foreground the linguistic/ethnic cleavage. The nationalist elites that sprang out of the Quiet Revolution eventually split into a federalist and a separatist faction during the 1970s. In electoral terms the Quiet Revolution did not change much in national politics – Quebec remained a bastion of Liberal support. This support, however, put different kinds of demands on the Liberals and the Canadian party system altogether. As the character of the linguistic cleavage changed, and Quebec’s problem transformed from one of cultural/religious peculiarity to one of nationalistic
awakening, any party’s fortunes in Quebec and its claim to status of guarantor of national unity were dependent on its delivering on the issue of the constitutional structure of Canada.

In the new party system formed in the 1960s, and which continued into the early 1980s, the Tories were in a position of structural weakness. The creation of the pro-free trade coalition of the 1980s can be traced to the dimension of competition that condemned the Tories in the party system of the 1960s and 1970s and their concurrent effort to energize cleavages that might push them out of this predicament. In effect, the signature policies of Trudeau’s Liberals (bilingualism and multiculturalism, state intervention, economic protectionism and anti-American foreign policy) created such adverse forces among the Conservatives that the free trade coalition of the 1980s can be considered as much as a Mulroney creation as a Trudeau one.

As we have seen, Trudeau’s project had an inescapable international dimension. It was taking place in an era of vexing discussions about US involvement in the Canadian economy. Trudeau’s nation-building project was galvanized by targeting US investment, as for example with the creation of FIRA in the mid-1970s. Trudeau reversed the traditional decentralisation of Canadian liberalism and instead identified the creation of a new progressive Canadian identity with an activist welfare state and a rebalancing of Canadian federalism (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 17). The traditional Liberal brokerage gave way to a conscious divisive strategy on behalf of Trudeau along the regional cleavage (Cooper 2002: 104). Trudeau matched his grand constitutional project with an endorsement of the Third Option, and instituted the NEP, which allowed the central government to harness the rich energy resources of the West (especially Alberta). All of these policies were deemed essential for Trudeau’s program, reflected the position of his party along the main cleavages, galvanized his coalition, but also deeply insulted the West, heightened tensions with the US and resulted in a policy of high deficits, high inflation and passionate politics that deepened the ethnic and regional divides.

The Tories gradually adjusted their opposition strategy according to their position within the new axis of competition. First came Trudeau’s multiculturalism: Even though the Tories ascribed to bilingualism as recognition of the new self-awareness of Quebec, they remained committed to a view of society that was more akin to the ‘traditional Canadian mosaic’ – meaning that different groups and communities had to be respected and represented as distinct entities (Christian and Campbell 1974: 109). This old-fashioned conservatism was matched with the PCs’ new identification with periphery interests: while the Liberals turned from a party of the provinces into a party of central government, the Tories made the opposite move from a party of central authority into a party of the provinces and the geographical extremes (Gibbins 1988: 336).

The state activism, economic protectionism and centralism of the Trudeau years were seen as a divisive mix that increased the distance between central Canada and the periphery. The PCs for example opposed the NEP, a veritable symbol of Trudeau’s bias
against the West. Even though they were not yet ready to renounce the National Policy (another key Western demand), they had however started moving now against principled protectionism. Another interesting reversal was that, whereas they had always been the party of the Imperial connection, the PCs positioned themselves against Trudeau’s anti-American overtones (Johnston et al 1992: 67-68; Martin 2005: 162). Finally, knitting all these policy reversals together, in the early 1980s the PCs followed the path of other conservative parties in the Anglo-Saxon world. With state activism and protectionism clearly failing to stave off a recession in the early 1980s, the Tories focused on a message of economic renewal with more emphasis on the market and liberalization of the economy (Smith et al 1988: 48-49).

When Brian Mulroney became leader of the PCs in 1983 then, the party already had a general anti-Trudeau agenda in place. The Tories, however, were still significantly inhibited on the linguistic cleavage. The Liberals continued to base their sustained first-and-national-party status on solid Quebec majorities in national elections. Mulroney won the Conservative leadership contest on an explicit promise to deliver Quebec\footnote{‘There are 102 ridings in the country with a Francophone population over 10 per cent. In the last elections the Liberals won 100 of them, we won two. You give Pierre Trudeau a head start of 100 seats and he’s going to beat you 10 times out of 10’ (quoted in Johnston et al 1992: 170).}. In this way, the PCs now had a credible alternative to the Liberals on the national question that also fell in line with their position on the other cleavages (decentralism and smaller role of the state): By promising a vague ‘national reconciliation’, Mulroney courted Quebec separatists with the promise that he could give them a different accommodation model within Canada than Trudeau’s individualist multiculturalism (Robertson 1985: 27).

By the mid-1980s the party system dynamics and partisan adaptation strategies had brought about a realignment of expression of cleavages within parties that made the Conservatives a formidable free trade coalition. They were now a party with a neoliberal agenda of economic reform. They were now also a party with an ideological affinity for better relations with the US, something which made not only political but also economic sense. US trade and investments were supposed to supplant statist activism as a motor of economic growth (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 29-30), and were especially appealing to the Western part of the country. State downsizing meant increasing the role for the provinces, which also meant bigger incentives for each province to explore North-South economic links. This rebalancing of center-province relations also spoke to Mulroney’s vague project of ‘national reconciliation’, as it held out the prospect of incorporating Quebec as a separate quasi-state entity in a new constitutional arrangement (Johnston et al 1992: 72-73).

Already in 1984-85, free trade seemed like a project that was perfectly consistent with the ruling coalition’s rooting in all major Canadian cleavages (socioeconomic, regional, linguistic) and with this rooting’s commensurate domestic policy vision of economic growth and a new model of national integration. Yet Mulroney had been
elected as leader of the PCs on an anti-free trade platform. For a year in office he oscillated even though Trudeau had experimented with sectoral free trade before him (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 23). The Tories were always the party of the National Policy, a party of national integration that was traditionally afraid of continental integration. Mulroney could have moved towards free trade from the beginning but balked. On the other hand, he did not need to do so either – free trade promised to be a divisive issue, as it had always been in Canadian politics (Welch 2005: 201). What finally made him change his mind?

The decisive point is generally acknowledged to be the publication of the Macdonald Report in late 1985 (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 24). One year into his reign, his government was marred by scandals and signs of incompetence. They had been elected in an historic landslide in 1984 on a general mandate of economic reform and national unity that seemed to have the approval of every major Canadian social group (McDowall 1994: 109). Until 1985 Mulroney had nothing to show for all this. The Macdonald report changed everything. First and foremost, the report provided a national argument in favor of free trade. It countered the established orthodoxy that free trade was detrimental to Canadian independence. Instead, by holding out the prospect for more economic growth and a more equitable distribution of benefits to all provinces, free trade was deemed by the Macdonald report to be able to practically support the two key aspects of the Conservative vision of domestic reform: a stronger economy, and a new model of decentralized national integration (Welch 2005: 199). The report was also a powerful instigator within the North American framework of emerging ideas about regional integration as a response to trends around the world (Marchildon 1994: 10-11).

In the summer of 1985, with the findings of the Macdonald Commission now final and public, Mulroney was quoted as saying that he would use free trade to beat Liberal opposition leader John Turner (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 29). Free trade spoke to acute party systemic pressures on the Conservatives. Their strong national mandate from 1984 was proving to be an illusion. The Mulroney coalition was no natural agent of national integration like the Trudeau one (Johnston et al 1992: 36). Instead, by virtue of its position on the regional and linguistic cleavages, it was dependent on the two Canadian regions most afar from each other on constitutional matters. Apart from a common aversion to strong centralist policies, the West and Quebec were bitterly divided on multiculturalism, social outlook and constitutional preferences (Robertson 1985: 35-36). But there was one issue the two Conservative pillars could agree on: free trade (McDowall 1994: 110-111). The West had graduated from an agrarian region dependent on price support in the 1960s, to a region aggressively looking for markets for its agricultural products and its energy resources (Gilpin 1974: 866). Quebec had gone from a closed clericalist and agrarian society in the 1950s to a modern sophisticated economy with interest in closer integration with the continental market.
Given the inherent instability of this coalition, free trade promised not only to stitch together the West and Quebec as the two most free trade-friendly regions, but also to alter the stakes of competition altogether by giving teeth to the as yet vague project of ‘national reconciliation’. By choosing to identify his coalition with all-out free trade with the United States, Mulroney was essentially opting for the building of a ‘hyper-brokerage’ coalition between the social and constitutional extreme regions of Canada (Cross 2002: 117). In this way, the PCs were not moving along the existing axis of competition; in effect they were aiming to yet again reformulate the normative anchor of party competition. A pan-Canadian civic and ideological vision of politics had served the Liberals in the past. Now the Conservatives were looking to benefit from their ability to deliver on the question of which party could mediate better between distinct regional interests.

In 1987 the two signature policies that would come to define the first term of Mulroney’s government had been formulated. The Meech Lake accord codified the constitutional preferences of the Tory coalition: increased powers for the regions, an elected Senate (both Western demands) and a ‘distinct society’ status for Quebec. All of these policies served the basic cleavage-informed preferences of the Tories: downsizing of the federal state, group-based integration of regional demands and quasi-statehood for Quebec. However consistent with Mulroney’s vision of group-based negotiated federalism, of which his own party would be the broker, these policies pitted the West against Quebec in many ways. In late 1987 this contradiction could be resolved with the unveiling of the external complement of this domestic arrangement: the Canada-US FTA (Johnston et al 1992: 105-107). With Meech Lake and FTA the Tories were now firmly redefining the stakes of party competition on a regional basis in accordance with the political identities institutionalized within them. Once prisoners of binary competition, they were now hoping to see foreign policy make them beneficiaries of it.

By the same token, Liberal opposition to the FTA and the use of free trade as a differentiating marker between the two parties only became conceivable when the issue was seen impacting on the systemic organizing order of party competition. John Turner had preempted Mulroney’s redefinition of the question of national unity by supporting the MLA (as the NDP had done as well for the same reasons). Yet this decision was far from uncontroversial within his own party, as members of the Trudeau-ite wing (and among them, Turner’s competitor for party leadership, Jean Chretien) were uncomfortable with this policy of fragmentation of the civic identity of Canadians (Clarkson 1989: 31; Maser 1989: 60). But Turner could hope that by neutralizing the constitutional issue, party competition would focus on issues of performance and efficiency of the government. The FTA presented a new danger to the Liberals – and a bigger opportunity to Turner: it threatened to institutionalize a language of regional brokerage and provincial opportunities as the stake of political competition, thus inhibiting ideological parties identified with centralist, pan-Canadian policies. The
opportunity for Turner was that opposition to the FTA could unite his party behind the effort to reenergize the progressive and protectionist coalition of the 1970s and so resurrect the language of unitary pan-Canadian politics that had served Trudeau in the past (Clarkson 2005: 145).

FTA, VISIONS OF DOMESTIC SOCIETY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW DIMENSION OF COMPETITION

The choice for complete free trade with the United States represented a major change in the patterns of Canadian foreign policy. Not only did it break with the orthodoxy of foreign policy that had reigned until that point, but it also went way beyond any alternatives had been hitherto proposed – such as sectoral trade integration. Such a change would not have a chance to be successfully implemented if it did not prove to be a viable reformulation of the institutionalized interests that Canadian foreign policy was preserving, namely independence and commercial prosperity. Yet, normative reevaluation of these interests reinforced an agenda of domestic reform: the prospect of the FTA was in close congruence with an integrated policy set aimed at domestic rebalancing between the central government and the provinces, and between the state and the market (Clarkson 2005: 163). In this way, the content and the timing of the FTA, as well as opposition to it, cannot be understood in isolation from the domestic preferences, interests and combinations of the political identities partisan actors represented.

The main change lay in the incorporation of Québécois interests in a governing coalition on a completely new basis than what it had been until then. Mulroney’s promise of national reconciliation sounded welcome but vague in most parts of the country, but in Quebec it had a very specific meaning: Mulroney drew the main bulk of his support from elites lured by the promise of a constitutional arrangement that would guarantee a separate collective recognition of Quebec within Canada – an anathema to Trudeau’s individualistic concept of Canadian nationality. The Francophone pillar of the Mulroney coalition matched this new idea of Canadian unity with specific continentalist preferences in economic policy: the United States was both an attractive market and the framework of North America was deemed less constraining for the development of Québécois identity.

Mulroney tried to bridge all these different domestic preferences in the MLA: the accord gave Quebec the ‘distinct society’ status its political elites (both separatist and federalist) so much craved, while it extended powers to the provinces, thus satisfying the demands of resource-rich Western provinces like Alberta. Yet the MLA was only a temporary solution for Mulroney. It essentially codified two contradictory sets of domestic preferences, as the West despised the preferential treatment Quebec had been receiving all these years. Furthermore, the MLA was endorsed by the Liberals as well as by the NDP, thus its value as a marker of Mulroney’s achievements was neutralized. Free trade with the United States, however, promised to solve both of these predicaments. The
publication of the Macdonald report must be seen in a party-competition context as the turning point in which Mulroney saw the emergence of a new normative anchor of party competition and the strategic retreat of the PCs around two limited but reliable pillars of support (Quebec and the West) as the solution to the question of heterogeneity within his coalition (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 227). From late 1985 onwards, the PC coalition was no longer an alternative manager of Canada’s problems, but the arena within which a completely new evaluation of these problems (both domestic and foreign) was being made. This transformation was complete by late 1987, when both the MLA and the FTA were finalized: the FTA promised to embed the new model of Canadian federalism within a framework that offered more opportunities to the provinces.

Once the election campaign of 1988 started, the Tories framed free trade as being part of a general theme of ‘change’. ‘Managing change’ was to be the main characteristic of both the PCs and Mulroney personally. On the one hand, it pointed to past achievements such as strong economic growth and constitutional harmony. On the other hand, and most importantly, it portrayed a future of opportunities for a united and prosperous Canada. It was obvious that the FTA was presented as an achievement as much as the Meech Lake accord, both proofs that ‘the party had the vision, a leader and a team capable of meeting domestic and international challenges’ (Krause 1989: 16). Conservative advertising became more partisan after the polarizing Anglophone debate, however the general framework of packaging the FTA within a consistent setup of policy successes and governing principles for the future of Canada was maintained. The link between FTA and Meech Lake was the guiding principle of the Tory campaign throughout: Mulroney’s achievement and promise was a Canada that was ‘united’ and ‘prosperous’ (Maser 1989: 56).

John Turner’s decision to tie his and his party’s fortunes to the opposition to free trade should not necessarily be seen as an a priori inescapable outcome. Turner himself oscillated before reading the FTA, reaching the conclusion that it was bad for Canada and framing it as a threat to Canada’s distinct identity and independence. For Turner, opposition to the FTA offered the opportunity to preserve the normative anchor of national unity that had allowed the Liberals to dominate Canadian politics for most of the 20th century. As long as these were the stakes of the normative anchor of national unity, the Liberals’ position of strength was assured. The link between the FTA and a new model of national unity meant that Turner could frame opposition to free trade as part of a distinct vision of national unity.

John Turner addressed many problems at once with his decision to vocally oppose the FTA. He addressed his perceived leadership deficit, he united his party and he chose an issue that promised to put the Tories in the defensive and yet again corner the New Democrats on the left. Turner’s decision after 1984 to break with Trudeau’s nationalist legacy was expressed in his agreement to the Meech Lake accord and the attribution of ‘distinct society’ status to Quebec (Clarkson 2005: 138-139). This was a conscious
decision on behalf of a party whose strength had always been to bridge the two linguistic communities, however it also was very divisive within the party (Johnston et al 1992: 106). After 1984, and Mulroney’s sweep of Quebec, dealing with Quebec as a distinct political entity was the new rule of the game. Turner recognized this, however his decision was not well received by the proponents of the old policy of multiculturalism and bilingualism who opposed any special status for Quebec – most notably, Trudeau himself (Westell 1989: 5). Agreeing to Meech Lake was Turner’s hope that he could neutralize Mulroney’s advantage on ‘national reconciliation’ (Johnston et al 1992: 249).

On the other hand, the cleavages represented within the Liberal party also bore the seeds of opportunity: Liberal identifiers were far less divided on commercial policy, where both Québécois and non-Québécois ones were consistently more anti-US than Conservatives; and on economic policies, where they were both close to fairly centrist positions (Johnston et al 1992: 102-104). If with Meech Lake Turner had conceded that the game was played on Mulroney’s terms, free trade promised to reenergize an axis of competition defined by socioeconomic matters and put forth a discussion about Canada that would supplant the interpretation of the question of national unity as successful brokerage among regions with one as the creation of an acceptable civic socioeconomic identity, slightly to the left of centre (Clarkson 2005: 145). The fact that opposition to the FTA placated nationalists within the party and could rally it behind Turner was a further proof of how the issue served the Liberals’ systemically defined goals (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 231-232). The hope was that on an issue where the public was almost equally divided (Johnston et al 1992: 107-108), the Liberals would deconstruct the Tories’ self-image as guarantors of national unity and neutralize the effect of the NDP from the left.

In this vain, the Liberals, made the link between free trade and domestic policies explicit. For the Liberals the FTA represented a direct threat to everything Canada stood for and an identity that was by and large created by the Liberals themselves during their long years in power. The Liberals identified the threat to Canada’s welfare state and social programs such as the comprehensive health insurance system and other provisions (Young 1989: 52-53; Johnston et al 1992: 154-155). Opposition to the FTA was part of a generally progressive electoral platform that included among others tough new environmental laws, new tax policies and tax breaks on mortgages (Maser 1989: 56). The Liberals identified the main differences between Canada and the United States with socioeconomic issues, and thus the FTA served to renew the Liberals’ old winning strategy of identifying socially progressive policies with a pan-Canadian vision of Canadian nationalism and civic identity:

‘The Mulroney trade deal will fundamentally alter our way of life. The Mulroney trade deal endangers our social programmes and regional development programmes, and sacrifices our farmers, our industries, our fishermen, our miners, our lumber workers, our auto workers and our textile workers to satisfy Brian Mulroney’s desire to
fulfill the American dream. I will not let Brian Mulroney, by a stroke of the pen, sell out our sovereignty, our national heritage, our distinctive cultural identity [...] [A] vote for the Liberal party is a vote for a stronger, fairer, more independent, unique, strong, proud Canada.\footnote{Turner’s speech blueprint, quoted in Maser (1989: 58-59).}

The Liberals’ pattern of opposition did not only reflect their old policy commitments to the expansion of the Canadian state, but also their identification with a Canadian identity that spans provincial borders and is based on a clear-cut demarcation from the United States. Essentially, the Liberals attempted to shift the debate along the old axis of competition that had served them so well in the past. Opposition to the FTA was an accurate reflection of the Liberals’ position on the axis of competition. Just as the FTA promised to stitch closer the Tory coalition, Turner hoped that opposition to it would reenergize the coalition of voters that was in favor of a visible central government, of the welfare state and of a unitary conception of Canadian identity. For a party associated so much with Canada’s existing social and economic arrangements, a change in foreign policy of this magnitude represented an important threat because it would alter the terms of domestic debate altogether.

For the NDP the FTA also represented a threat to the normative anchor of unitary ideological politics the party was moving along. Indeed, the FTA was a bad issue for the party on many accounts. As an issue that redefined the question of Canadian unity into a question of communitarian and geographical brokerage, it inhibited the NDP, which was historically weak in Quebec and had always sought to suppress agrarian Prairie populism under an ideological socialist message. As an issue that could cause a nationalist backlash amongst progressive, anti-American Canadians, it threatened to galvanize polarization between Tories and Liberals and to leave the NDP as a third-rank afterthought (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 234). In other words, the FTA threatened to create a new language of politics that would leave the NDP structurally weakened – but defending the language of pan-Canadian nationalism also threatened to strengthen the Liberals as the more effective standard-bearer of progressive Canadian identity (Johnston et al 1992: 108-109). Between the two, the NDP, which had already accepted the MLA and so had already made an effort to break out of its linguistic and class fortress, chose to follow a middle course of a message of ideological renewal hoping to capitalize on its leader’s positive image. To be sure, the NDP made the argument that the FTA threatened Canada’s national character, but it tried to use the issue of free trade as a link to other issues it felt it had an advantage on (such as the environment or healthcare) (Whitehorn 1989: 48).

When it became obvious that the FTA had become the main issue, the New Democrats had little choice but to identify with the ‘no’ side and take recourse to their old nationalist and pan-Canadian identity. They began calling the Tories the party of Wall Street and faithful servants of American interests that were diluting Canada’s distinctive
characteristics, and in a desperate effort to escape the Liberals’ shadow they identified Turner with Bay Street (the Canadian Wall Street in Toronto) as well. In this way, the NDP was reinvigorating the old link between progressivism and nationalism it traditionally embodied. At the same time, however, once it resorted to this it became obvious that its dreams of breaking out of its bastion in the left were over:

‘The priorities of John Turner and Brian Mulroney are the same – they are the priorities of Wall Street or Bay Street. The priorities of New Democrats are your priorities’.112.

The dynamics of the campaign and Turner’s successful bid to polarize over the question of the FTA as a choice of a model of Canadian unity left the NDP with even less of a prospect of breaking out of its structural position on the left of the socioeconomic axis and on the English side of the language divide. Trying to preserve the existing normative anchor of pan-Canadian ideological politics by defending Canadian progressive identity was the best defensive strategy available.

The translation of the issue of free trade into a value and question of the model of national unity impacted the alignment of identities through political parties and, consequently, the direction and meaning of party competition. By being framed deliberately by partisan actors as a choice between a Canada of provinces and communities, or a unitary and centralist Canada, the FTA cemented, accelerated or halted specific alignments of political identities within parties, thus giving rise to a new language of politics.

The interaction of the free trade issue with the new normative anchor of brokerage politics became sharply evident in the election campaign – revealing the Tories’ strength in their devoted power bases but also foreshadowing the fragility of their coalition. The intense back-and-forth between nationalist Quebecois PC politicians like Lucien Buchard (later leader of the separatist Bloc Quebecois) and Ontario Premier David Peterson of the Liberals highlighted the advent of regional politics and the clear geographical underpinnings of the free trade issue. Whereas Buchard called the FTA a chance for Quebec that threatened to be denied by the negative stance of selfish Ontario (Martin 1994: 158-159), Petersen himself accused Buchard of plotting the disintegration of Canada (an allusion to the latter’s pro-sovereignty stance in the 1980 referendum). ‘I think it’s destructive to the fabric of this country to pit region against region’, he said (Maser 1989: 66). Buchard’s region-centric viewpoint was undoubtedly shared by Westerner Canadians as well, whereas Peterson expressed the typical pan-Canadian identity prevalent in Ontario. Alberta premier Lougheed struck similar tones in his support for free trade. Also engaging with Peterson, he made the point that a rejection of free trade because of Ontario’s denial would fatally harm national unity. In his view, the

FTA represented the best chance for the Canadian periphery to take part in national wealth as much as Central Canada, a point made by the Macdonald Commission as well (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 52). As for Mulroney himself, his image as a guarantor of national unity would not allow him to engage in petty region-bashing; yet, he did not fail to point attention to Ontario’s export-led growth and the apparent inconsistency with that province’s elites’ opposition to the FTA (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 227):

‘Prosperity means the same thing in Alberta as it does in Quebec [...] Mr. Turner wants to isolate Canada, to have us alone and vulnerable in a changing world. We have a plan to secure your future, to build a stronger, more sovereign Canada’.

Quebec was the crucial battleground for the attainment of Mulroney’s set of goals, and there the dynamics of the connection between Meech Lake and the FTA were the most evident. Liberal Premier Bourassa went out of his way to support Mulroney, not only due to the links of the Quebec Liberal Party with the Quebec business class, but also due to his willingness to see the Meech Lake accord, which granted Quebec the much craved ‘distinct society’ status, implemented. Quebec sovereignists on the other hand were already part of the Mulroney coalition since 1984, as in him they found a possible alternative to Trudeau’s policies. This allowed the Parti Quebecois to actually overcome the resistance of affiliated trade unions against the FTA and throw its lot behind the agreement. The interplay between free trade and the question of national unity becomes even clearer if one compares the attitude of Quebec with that of Ontario, a province with similar patterns of economic links to the United States but which went against the FTA as a policy threatening Canada’s existence. The result was an even greater win for the PCs in Quebec, despite losing support everywhere else in the country – clearly free trade allowed them to harness support from both sides of the main cleavage within Quebec. Not exactly the outcome of principled personal beliefs, the undercurrent of Ontario-bashing seemed to stem naturally from the exigencies of Mulroney’s strategy of bridging divergent regional interests. The conclusion was inescapable: free trade was bound to rely on and further enhance a province-based view of Canadian politics. Mulroney did not fail to draw a direct link between Meech Lake and the FTA. In Montreal for example he stated that a Liberal government would ‘kill’ both accords, thus establishing yet again the

113 In 1991 Macdonald himself justified free trade on national-unity grounds as well, pointing to the way trade in energy placated the West after the divisive policies of Trudeau that sought to divert rents of energy resources from the US to Ottawa (Macdonald 1991: 157).
115 For an exciting account of the way political forces inside Quebec treated the free trade issue, see Martin (1994). He sees the eventual bipartisan consensus in favor of free trade as the result of interaction between economic interests represented by the two main Quebec parties and their different views on Quebec nationalism. Differently than what happened in English Canada, in Quebec the national/linguistic cleavage actually suppressed contestation of the FTA. As Martin writes, ‘from the point of view of Quebec nationalism, the Meech Lake Accord and free trade must be understood in tandem’ (ibid: 159).
practical and conceptual connection between the two agreements (Maser 1989: 68). This strategy was controversial but effective: Pammett’s data (1989: 126-127) revealed clear regional patterns of support for the FTA, and showed that the two provinces where the PCs won decisively (Alberta and Quebec) were also the ones where the FTA was the most supported and was considered the most important issue. Pammett also shows (ibid: 124) that among the voters who cited free trade as the most important issue, the PCs net lost 8.3% among vote-switchers, but maintained a huge advantage among voters who stuck with their 1984 party choice. The net result was the PCs retaining a solid plurality among FTA issue voters. The combined effect of these two developments points to the importance of the FTA as a polarizing issue that contributed to the erosion of the huge Tory majority of 1984, but also galvanized PC support around a hard pro-free trade core centered in Quebec and the West.

Table 11: Quebec results in 1984 and 1988 with difference, Canada and English Canada 1984 and 1988 seat results

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<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote%</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote%</td>
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<td>14.4</td>
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Adapted from Martin 2005 and [www.elections.ca](http://www.elections.ca)

Table 12: Elections results in the Western Provinces, 1984-1988

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<td>PCs</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vote%</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote%</td>
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<td>44.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Seats</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote%</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>77</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Martin 2005 and [www.elections.ca](http://www.elections.ca)
The results of this strategy were evident in Ontario, the industrial heartland of Canada, the cradle of the National Policy and the hub of the diverse, urban, welfare-minded and immigrant strata that formed the pillar of the nationalist coalition of the Liberals in the 1970s (Gilpin 1974: 861-862). Despite falling victim to Mulroney’s charms in 1984, by 1988 the Liberals were back on course to claim prominence in the province as they had before the Tory tide. The polarization over free trade may have split the anti-free trade vote between the Liberals and the NDP, but Turner’s strategy had reinvigorated traditional pro-Liberal strata and the party had found its own pillar of support in the emerging party system of regional brokerage (Johnston et al 1992: 192). Indeed, Ontario’s opposition to free trade was almost beyond belief, given the province’s vibrant economic fortunes at the time. This was further proof of the interaction between region, economy and the national question in structuring the response to the free trade issue. Despite the endorsement of NAFTA by the Liberals in the 1990s, their protracted electoral dominance and their claim to national party status was based on their strength in Ontario, itself a product of Turner’s nationalistic campaign (Johnston et al 1992: 252; Carty et al 2000: 78).

Table 13

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote%</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCs</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote%</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote%</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Martin 2005 and www.elections.ca

The FTA saga left all three major Canadian parties much more regionalist in nature and appeal than they had ever been – and this reflected a thorough redefinition of the stake of national unity as a structuring question of party competition. Mulroney’s decision to embed his constitutional vision within a wider discourse of a new political economy and balance between state and market, federal and provincial governments, and Canada and the United States, turned the PCs into a party of the regional and linguistic cleavage, but with shallow grounding in the geographical and normative center of Canadian nationalism – the first winning coalition of its kind (McDowall 1994: 93).

116 Column data adapted from Martin (2005: 168) and refer to the 1993, 1997 and 2000 elections. PCs share is the sum of PC and Reform/Alliance average in Martin's table.
However, in 1988 this seemed to make perfect tactical sense. With the FTA ratified and the MLA accepted by all sides of the political divide, Mulroney seemed to have realigned the party system towards a normative anchor of brokerage between distinct regional interests, whereby success would be defined by the ability of parties to balance and harness the concrete support of political identities on a collectivist basis.

The success of Mulroney’s rationale was evidenced in its effects on the patterns of support of the Liberals and the NDP, two parties that strived to define the stake of national unity in ideological, pan-Canadian terms. The Liberals’ stress on national identity as a unitary concept turned them into a party of central Canada, the cradle of Canadian nationalism and the point of reference against which the linguistic and regional cleavage were being mobilized. The NDP’s effort to subsume the FTA issue under a general populist message of integrity reflected the party’s effort to break out of the extremes it occupied on the class and linguistic cleavage, being primarily a party of trade unions and English Canada. Yet polarization over the FTA meant that the NDP was also left with a more regionally focused pattern of strength than ever before (agrarian Prairies and industrial Ontario). The FTA made both parties campaign on a non-particularistic, pan-Canadian, ideological basis, yet the dynamics of the issue imposed on them an adaptation to the new normative anchor of communitarian and geographical brokerage (Johnston et al 1992: 254).

FREE TRADE, REGIONAL INTEGRATION, MULTILATERALISM AND PARTISAN AGENCY

Being an issue of foreign policy, free trade with the US was to be judged on its merits as a viable adaptation strategy to changing international conditions like US protectionism, the ongoing stagnation of GATT and the rise of regional integration schemes as alternatives to international multilateral trade cooperation. Yet the framing of these alternatives that would cue policy responses was not value-neutral. Instead, Canadian political parties read different normative imperatives into these structural conditions according to the dimension of competition they sought to bring about or preserve in order to make new policies possible – or block them. In this way, partisan agency of translating international structural developments into domestic discourses entrenched ongoing realignments of political identities in the party system and played a decisive role in the final outcome of foreign policy change.

The patterns of international argumentation were to a very large extent laid by the Macdonald report. The Royal Commission codified arguments in favor and against protectionism as the hitherto default policy of Canada towards the US and in this way rekindled the old debate between nationalists and continentalists. Both main parties had historically flirted with both sides of the commercial policy divide, but arguments about Canada’s international environment only aligned along partisan lines once the
constellation of political identities cued specific tactical adoptions of specialized and technocratic readings of the international environment. In this sense, the Macdonald report was very important not only because it offered free trade as an important policy initiative to the Mulroney government, but also because it supported it with an integrated argumentation that provided a reading of Canada’s international environment congruent with a new definition of the stakes of domestic competition. The anti-free trade camp was to miss such authoritative readings of the international argumentation throughout.

For the argumentation in favor of the FTA the Mulroney government relied on a reading of this policy as a reaction to inescapable international developments, and more precisely the insufficiency of the traditional multilateral framework for ensuring Canadian exporters’ access to the US market. Even though it did seek to portray the FTA as the catalyst for the creation of a Canada based on national reconciliation and a corresponding economic system of downsizing of the federal state, the critical difference-maker was its ability to link foreign economic policy with important inputs from the international environment. This linkage with the international environment made the FTA seem both politically unavoidable and value-neutral, and opinion polling showed that attitudes towards the issue of access to the American market had the biggest impact on how voters evaluated the FTA (Johnston et al 1992: 158-159):

‘Economics, geography, common sense and the national interest dictate that we try to secure and expand our trade with our closest and largest trading partner – protectionist measures are always self-defeating’.

Indeed, the international dimension was a key part of the process of argumentation precisely because the domestic part of the Conservatives’ policy of economic adaptation (extended industrial restructuring) promised to be much more painful. Access to the US market sounded much more appealing and was also a stronger basis of argumentation for a foreign policy initiative (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 34):

‘[Turner’s pledge to scuttle the trade deal would leave Canadians to] hang in the wind of American protectionism’ (Mulroney, quoted in Maser 1989: 72).

Arguments like the fact that, without the FTA, Canada would be the only industrialized country without guaranteed access to a market of one hundred million or more (Johnston et al 1992: 157), created a sense of inevitability of the FTA, against which few substantial arguments could be mounted. In this way, the potentially painful part of Mulroney’s national reconciliation (the substitution of the integrating role of the

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state by the growth-generating role of the market and the provinces) was subdued under a discourse of promises for affluence emanating from abroad.

The Mulroney government argumentation relied on the Macdonald Report precisely because it bridged the old divide between continentalism and nationalism. The Macdonald Report showed how free trade made sense from a policy point of view, because it addressed a foreign policy challenge, and framed this policy proposal within a discourse that took into account Canada’s distinct needs and prospects as an independent society:

‘The problem is that Canadian tariffs may not be any longer high enough to serve a nation-building, protectionist function, but nevertheless may be high enough to allow many Canadian producers to avoid the stimulus of world class competition. Thus Canada may need to rethink its bilateral relationship vis-à-vis the United States in light of the changes that multilateral trade policy has made on that relationship’ (Stairs and Winham 1985: 9).

Macdonald himself was a person of impeccable nationalist feelings, so his recommendation for free trade was devoid of any suspicions about his allegiances. The report provided the codification of the pro-US arguments in foreign economic policy in a way that made them seem compatible with Canadian independence and the regional and international realities in which Canada functioned (Macdonald 1991: 155-156). In this way, the government could effectively counter any allegations that the FTA was a sell-out to the Americans or a harbinger of dissolution of Canada’s economic and social policies:

‘[T]he integrationist perspective, while it may be motivated by concerns for nation, is not merely a variation of traditional economic nationalism. [I]ntegrationism focuses on different policy instruments as means to national ends, with distinctly divergent political advocacies [...] [T]he economic nationalist’s main concern is the degree of American ownership of the economy; for the integrationist it is Canada’s trading relationship with the United States’ (Nossal 1985: 82).

At the same time, the report was reassuring since it was claimed that bilateral free trade was in fact consistent with Canada’s policy of trade liberalization in the post-war era (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 27)\(^\text{118}\).

The FTA’s opponents on the other hand did not have so many weapons in their hands, precisely because they could not square their preferred policies with persuasive

\(^{118}\) Welch (2005: 212-213) also attributes fundamental importance to arguments about access to the US market. In his conceptualization, it was arguments about loss-avoidance more than ones of gain-making that held the biggest persuasive power.
readings of the international situation or of the agreement itself (Winham and DeBoer-Ashworth 2002: 36). For the Liberals and the NDP a principled multilateralism was all they could offer to the debate as an alternative, even though they were distinctly vague in terms of detail and relevance. Indeed, GATT had become some kind of a useful fallback position for opponents of closer integration with the US without requiring further elaboration. After the Macdonald Report, this complacency was no longer enough. The burden of proof now lay with the opponents of FTA to show how they intended to maintain Canada’s international position in light of a struggling integration in the GATT framework and increasing proclivity towards protectionism in the United States, Canada’s biggest trading partner. It was very difficult to escape the reality that the stalling of GATT in the 1980s was making Canada pay for the trade disputes of others and that, because of this, ‘multilateralism […] seemed rather more like a problem than a solution’ (Welch 2005: 198). Indeed, nationalists were increasingly associated with ‘intangible’ arguments and a conscious divergence between spiritual and material goals (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 222-224). A contribution to the Macdonald Report foreshadowed the patterns of the debate:

‘But in large measure it is because of the pervasiveness, vehemence and durability in the Canadian political culture of the emotional ideology of nationalism that bears little relation to the material interests of the individuals who hold these sentiments’ (Nossal 1985: 91).\footnote{Also see Robertson (1985: 82).}

For the Liberals the situation was particularly testing because they had to reconcile a passionate opposition to free trade with a probable return to governmental power and so management of the relationship with the United States. According to Clarkson, Turner’s amazing conversion into an anti-free trade crusader took place because ‘[i]mmediately following the publication, early in October 1987, of the FTA’s main outlines, [Turner] read it and came to the firm conclusion that it was, in itself a bad deal: Canada’s negotiators had given up too much and gotten too little in return’. However, ‘[m]ore seriously, it would imperil the country’s survival as the autonomous state he thought it had become in the golden age of Turner’s political heroes, Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent’ (Clarkson 1989: 33-34). In other words, even though Turner may have seen practical problems with the FTA, his instincts and needs as well as those of his party were to fight this foreign policy issue on the domestic front. Despite explosions of driven inspiration, such as the Senate blocking of the law or the Anglophone debate, Turner’s inability to offer a viable alternative caught up with him and the Liberals: ‘Rejecting advise that he should supplement his flag-waving attacks on free trade by explaining his alternative solution, he kept to his one dimensional line that Canada’s survival was at risk. Turner carried on his single issue campaign in an emotional bubble […] As the last
two weeks of the campaign wore on, he failed to broaden his attack beyond its narrow, one-note range [...] or to present the Liberals’ positive alternative to the FTA’ (Clarkson 1989: 38).

Opponents of the FTA offered the most coherent theoretical counter-argumentation when they made the link between the FTA and Canada’s international identity as a state committed to multilateralism. They would shape the foreign policy stake as one between multilateralism and openness to the world, and self-limitation in a ‘fortress North America’ (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 222). This line of argumentation countered Mulroney’s claim that the FTA would open Canada to the world and force its economy and people to engage with, and adapt to, exciting challenges. In and of itself this line of argumentation sought to accommodate FTA within the general discourse of Canadian foreign policy multilateralism. The argument about Fortress North America tried to fill the void of foreign policy argumentation by highlighting an alternative stake of foreign policy: Canada’s position in the world and how it defines its interests and identity in comparison to a strict regional perspective. Yet on this account as well, the government had a decisive counter-argumentation, presenting the FTA as falling within the Canadian tradition of multilateralism and so being a mere reformulation of the existing normative framework of Canadian foreign policy and assorted goals:

‘[T]hat this House supports the negotiation of a bilateral trading arrangement with the US, as part of the government’s multilateral trade policy, while protecting our political sovereignty, social programs, agricultural marketing systems, the auto industry, and our unique cultural identity’ \(^{120}\).

Summing up this section, it becomes obvious that the two sides of the free trade debate provided normative readings of the international situation affecting Canada’s trade relations that corresponded to the version of the normative anchor they wanted to energize. The FTA served to link a specific reading of the international situation (most importantly the threat of US protectionism) to a specific vision of domestic constitutional and economic governance, and so also to support the new definition of the stake of national unity that served the unity of the PC coalition. During the election campaign the PCs presented the United States as an opportunity and not a threat, and regionalism as a needed departure from Canada’s traditional reliance on GATT that, nevertheless, fell within the familiar internationalist tradition of Canadian foreign policy. Both of these readings of the international situation coincided with the needs of the political identities with continentalist preferences (the business sector, Quebec, Western provinces like Alberta), helped the PCs harness solid support from them and, by extension, contributed

\(^{120}\) Motion offered by the government in the House of Commons, March 16 1987, quoted in Welch (2005: 200, emphasis added). Already in 1984 the new PC minister for international trade had said he was looking to continue discussions on trade relations with the US, but without ‘creating fortress North America’ (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 22).
to the establishment of the new normative anchor of national unity based on the increased role of the market and the provinces. By the same token, the Liberals and the NDP presented the FTA as a policy that was failing to deal with the threats to Canadian sovereignty and identity the way protectionism and multilateralism had been doing until then. Presenting the US as a threat to distinct Canadian policies and regionalism as a negation of Canada’s traditional orientation towards values of the international system corresponded with the Liberals’ and the NDP’s effort to maintain the meaning of the stake of national unity as being the creation of a progressive civic identity supported by an enabled central government. Ironically this strategy earned the Liberals a firm foothold in the province most identified with mainstream Canadian nationalism, Ontario, thus making them as much a regional party as the PCs and so validating the emergence of a new fragmented competition of party politics.

EXCURSUS: THE ELECTIONS OF 1993 AND FREE TRADE

To attribute the breakdown of unitary party politics in Canada in the historic 1993 elections to foreign policy is a very counterintuitive proposition indeed. After all, the FTA had subsided as an important issue in voter evaluations almost to the point of disappearance by 1993 (Clarke et al 2000: 137). Instead, these elections were determined by a lethal mix of economic recession, general antipathy towards elitist politics and constitutional deadlock that exacerbated regional political identities, which in the end broke through in the party system (Lemco 1995). Yet the FTA election of 1988 is generally considered to be a crucial step in the long chain of events that led to the collapse of national politics in Canada in the period of 1984-1993. If anything, this is also a counterintuitive conclusion if we consider that the elections of 1984 produced a national result if there ever was one and that the FTA was an issue that captured the imagination of the whole nation, over regional, linguistic and class barriers. But, if we see the 1993 result not as a breakdown of politics, and rather as a further development of the normative anchor of regional brokerage created in 1988 thanks to the FTA feud, then the importance of foreign policy and the impact of Canada’s international and regional environment on domestic politics become more evident (Doran 1994a: 3-5).

The elections of 1993 are unique in the history of electoral politics in mature liberal democracies (Mair 1997: 218-219). They produced a parliamentary majority for the Liberals, but apart from that nothing was familiar. The PC and NDP support was decimated by the emergence of two region-based parties: The Bloc Québécois was a party running only in Quebec with the explicit aim of promoting secession and independence of the province. The Reform Party mobilized exclusively on the regional/peripheral cleavage, expressing itself as a party of Western discontent with a populist and neoconservative bent121. Both parties essentially deprived the Tories of the

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121 For the origins and first years of BQ and Reform, see Carty et al (2000: ch. 3).
geographical foci of their strength, thus bringing about one of the greatest defeats a governing party has ever suffered in the history of electoral politics. Reform’s monopolization of the Western agenda also hurt the NDP, which lost official party status in the House as well. All in all, the Canadian party system had been transformed from a system of nominally ideological parties striving to bridge cleavages and to unite the country into a system of particularist parties thriving on the exacerbation and intensification of these cleavages (Carty et al 2000).

Table 14

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Parties</th>
<th>Vote Share</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>41.2 %</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc Quebecois</td>
<td>13.5 %</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>18.7 %</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>6.9 %</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservatives</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.7 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Martin 2005 and www.elections.ca

Free trade can be seen as an important contributor of this party system change in three different stages. The first stage is the one with which this chapter has been concerned: the translation of the challenges Canada’s international commercial policy was facing into two distinct visions of domestic governance and national unity, under the guise of support and opposition to the FTA, allowed the institutionalization of a new normative anchor of party competition that legitimized the uniform expression of communitarian and regionalist interests in party competition and their brokerage as the new meaning of national unity. Political parties were now judged on the supreme task of maintaining national unity according to their ability to accommodate particularist interests represented in solid fashion: Quebec’s constitutional status, the West’s economic grievances etc. The finalization of the emergence of this new normative anchor became even more evident in the 1988 results of two parties that claimed an ideological and pan-Canadian profile. Both the Liberals and the NDP came out of these elections tied
to specific regional fiefs that happened to coincide with their positions on the class, regional and linguistic cleavage. In this sense, 1993 was not so much a break as a continuation of 1988: the party labels under which regional and linguistic interests were expressed had changed, yet the logic of party competition as an expression of particularistic and disjointed political identities had already been established in the FTA election. Free trade, with its promises of more just economic accommodation between provinces and downsizing of the capabilities of the central government, can be said to have contributed conceptually and practically to the dismemberment of universal, ideological politics in Canada.

Yet the breakdown of the Tory coalition, the main beneficiary of the new normative anchor and the epicenter of the new party system, was a largely unexpected outcome. The beginning of the end of the Mulroney coalition was the failure of the Manitoba legislature in ratifying the MLA before the deadline in 1989, thus leading to the collapse of the agreement. Mulroney spent most of the rest of his term trying to broker yet another constitutional deal, leading to the signing of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. Charlottetown was put to a referendum the same year and was resoundingly rejected, despite endorsements by all three main national parties. The main beneficiaries of the Charlottetown campaign were the BQ and Reform, both parties that decided that the constitutional brokering by established parties and elitist politics could not accommodate the needs of Quebec and the West anymore (Carty et al 2000: 39 ff; Clarke et al 2000). Telling is that Charlottetown was approved only in Ontario, the geographical, historical and ideological point of reference against which the regional and linguistic cleavages were being mobilized.

How did the FTA affect this painful erosion of the Mulroney coalition? Here work on public opinion offers insight into potential mechanisms of influence of foreign policy on electoral change. It turns out that the constitutional events of 1989-1992 expressed as much as they reinforced, a mounting sense of general public discontent with party politics, primarily due to worsening economic conditions and disapproval of the government’s performance. To the extent that the FTA was associated with economic malaise (Macdonald 1991: 159), and the Mulroney government was in turn identified with the FTA, free trade can be said to have contributed to the erosion of public support for the PC government, which in turn fed a general discontent with politics and accounted for a big part of the negative vote to Charlottetown. Especially the effect of the economy, and indirectly of attitudes towards free trade, seems to be decisive in the Charlottetown ‘no’ (Clarke and Kornberg 1994) that paved the way for the Bloc and

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122 According to work done on opinion polling at the time, the FTA lost salience rapidly after 1988 (a sign of its successful institutionalization) (Clarke et al 2000: 37, 300) but remained an important background condition that contributed to the Tories’ unraveling. Being an issue of economic nature, the FTA was partially attributed the blame for the recession that plagued the Canadian economy after 1988. Whereas shortly after the 1988 election 50% of the population supported the FTA, by 1992 that support had fallen to 35% (Clarke and Kornberg 1994: 950). Since the Tories were identified with the FTA, that policy change contributed to the erosion of their standing (Clarke et al 2000: 77-79, 84-85).
Reform’s success in the following year (Clarke et al 2000: 197; Martin 2005: 170). In 1991-92, amidst a deep economic recession, free trade seemed like another initiative of a political system that had failed miserably in reaching the goal of national unity. This can be seen as the second stage in which foreign policy contributed to the 1993 result.

The third stage of the impact of foreign policy in 1993 also reveals important continuities with 1988 as the year in which the fate of national politics in Canada was sealed. The FTA was not a salient issue in these elections. Interestingly enough, however, it formed an important part of the Liberal manifesto at the time. Indeed, shortly after their decisive victory in 1993, the Liberal government of Jean Chretien embarked on a policy of deeper regional integration by enthusiastically signing up to NAFTA (Welch 2005: 208). The elections of 1993 again left the Liberals as the sole party with the claim to national status and unifier. But the national-party status the Liberals enjoyed after 1993 relied more and more on their ability to build majorities in Ontario, the cradle and normative epicenter of Canadian nationalism (Carty et al 2000: 82; Wearing 2002: 158-159) – indeed, Liberal dominance in Ontario was established thanks to Turner’s nationalist campaign in 1988. Yet the Liberal program of 1993 saw in free trade an established and viable economic project within which to embed a policy of economic renewal based on further liberalization of the economy and a further strengthening of the market and provincial authorities against central statism (Clarkson 2005: 165). Under the Trudeau-ite nationalist Chretien, the Liberals essentially embraced the new normative anchor of regionally disjointed political discourse and adapted their policies to fit the new definition of the stake of national unity.

In summation, foreign policy did not seem to play a major role on the threshold elections of 1993. Yet the outcome of 1993 was not a momentary event. BQ and Reform expressed the breakdown of the PC coalition of 1988, and that coalition was forged by foreign policy. The challenges of Canadian trade policy had been distilled by the political identities, preferences and tactical needs of partisan actors into a new language of competition that centered on brokerage of communitarian interests. This language could have sustained unitary politics based on the three main parties, but the breakdown of constitutional negotiations in the early 1990s sealed the faith of the main bearer of the new language of politics, the PCs. The Liberal party of 1993 was a specimen of successful accommodation to a new language of politics created partly by foreign policy, and their continued dominance until the mid-2000s was further reinforced by a new mix of regional integration (NAFTA) and distinctively Canadian multilateral diplomacy. Yet even this dominance bore the imprint of the politics of regional brokerage cemented by the FTA election of 1988, as Liberal success hinted not on bridging but on intensifying main cleavages (regional, linguistic/national and increasingly class) all at once. The party system of 1993, a unique occurrence among liberal democracies, was a surprising break

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123 For the importance of constitutional issues in the creation of Reform, see (Laycock 2002: 132-133).
from the past only to those who had failed to see the effects of foreign policy on domestic politics in 1988.

DISCUSSION

The elections of 1984 seemed to perpetuate the binary competition of a party system made up of ideological parties tackling issues of pan-Canadian interest. The PCs won in a landslide that reflected the wish for change of the Canadian electorate. These elections were considered to be very important at the time, but merely for the fact that the existing language of politics (the normative anchor of national unity) favored a different party than the Liberals. This was a very important change to begin with, but it could not be seen as more than an electoral reversal within the same patterns and logic of party systemic competition. Yet the Tory coalition was not made up of a vast majority of a de-aligned electorate. The PCs had clear bases of support within important political identities of Canadian politics, social groups that chose the Conservative party on the basis of policy and ideological preferences. The Western provinces, reflecting the regional cleavage, were already a reliable partner of the PCs since the 1960s, while the election of Brian Mulroney as PC leader in 1983 reflected the rather crude pragmatic ambition to finally make the party electable in Quebec. This led to creation in 1984 of a novel coalition in Canadian politics: for the first time a governing party was primarily dependent and responsive to two different political identities that were mobilized against the historic, geographical, normative and economic center of traditional Canadian nationalism (McDowall 1994: 93).

For as long as Mulroney’s government was functioning under the premises of pan-Canadian politics, trying to project a general vision of change and reform, it failed to produce any distinct policies and performed badly in opinion polls. Especially in foreign policy, Mulroney sought to improve the hardened relationship with the United States and was quite successful in bringing about symbolic changes; yet free trade did not figure anywhere on the agenda. Led by a Prime Minister who had won the party leadership on a pledge against free trade, and was elected on the strengths of a party system that institutionalized the mix of multilateralism and protectionism as accepted values of Canadian interest, the PC message of change did not extend to the field of international commercial policy. Following the powerful adage of Canadian politics since 1911 (that free trade is an electorally toxic issue), the PCs were conforming to the established patterns of party competition and this (yet again) trumped the preferences of continentalist political identities in Canada.

The decisive moment seems to be the publication of the Macdonald report in mid-1985. It not only provided Mulroney with an elaborate economic justification of free trade on a seemingly bipartisan and technocratic basis, but it also showed how free trade served Canadian independence and, by giving opportunities for more equitable economic
development between provinces, assisted the development of a new constitutional design – a key promise of Mulroney under the header of ‘national reconciliation’. With the publication of the Macdonald report, Mulroney saw an opportunity to realign party competition according to the mix of preferences promoted by the main political identities represented in his party. With the negotiations of the FTA being finalized a mere six months after the conclusion of the widely accepted Meech Lake accord, the PC government now stood for a completely new set of ideas about domestic governance in Canada – and this governance was reflected and embedded in a foreign policy initiative that supported it practically and theoretically.

Party system dynamics had already aligned pro-free trade political identities in a conducive way for the expression of a coherent free trade vision, but this expression only took place once the argumentative framework of party politics started being structured around a new potential meaning of the stake of national unity: brokering among communities instead of individualist civic nationalism. Only under such important systemic dynamics does a new foreign policy become intellectually possible. As the feud over the FTA became a struggle of imposing a new axis of competition, or maintaining the old one, it also served to make the initial realignments of cleavages permanent and systemically relevant. The 1988 FTA election made the broad loose coalition that brought Mulroney to power a more limited assembly of two essential pillars of support. Indeed, whereas the Tories lost almost everywhere in the country, they retained solid support in places where the FTA was considered both very important and very positive (Alberta and Quebec).

The imposition of a new normative anchor of party competition seemed to strengthen the traditional binary pattern of the Canadian party system. The FTA had staved off the rise of the NDP and renewed the meaning of national unity in a way that seemed to match the preferences of the two political identities that were the most disenchanted with the normative point of reference of Canadian identity, the West and Quebec. With the FTA and the MLA in place, the Tories in 1988 were poised to become the new national party of Canada, while the Liberals would be inhibited but still competitive in a system of brokerage across regions. However, the old binary system failed to absorb and structure the new normative anchor of competition. The constitutional events and the economic crisis of 1991-1992 precipitated the collapse of Mulroney’s coalition – the FTA played an important mediatory role between public discontent and the rise of regional parties. Yet the party system created after 1993 was new only in shape; its content and terms of discussion had already been laid down in 1985 and cemented in 1988. The Liberals dominated this new party system by dominating specific sides of the regional, the national/linguistic and the socioeconomic cleavage. Their claim to national party status was a function more of the fact that the political identities they mobilized coincided with the geographical and economic center
of Canada— from the point of view of the West and separatist Quebeckers, the Liberals after 1993 were yet another regional party.\footnote{Canadian nationalists have explicitly linked regional integration in North America with centrifugal forces within Canada. See e.g. Bienefeld (2000). For Sigurdson (1994: 257, 273) the perceived loss of autonomy of the central government in Ottawa due to globalization was an enabling condition for the conceptual development and success of the peculiar blend of neoconservative, post-modern and regional politics of the Reform Party. Reform’s continentalism was more than anything a reflection of its regional identity: In their work on attitudes of Reform’s activists, Archer and Ellis (1994: 298-301) found that they are most divided on foreign policy and relations with the US. However, the most supportive of closer relations with the US were activists from Alberta and British Columbia.}

Party system dynamics do not only explain the creation of a policy. They also explain the ideational and institutional reasons for opposition to this policy. As we saw, the translation of the challenges to multilateralism and protectionism through the FTA into an issue of domestic governance by the Tories allowed them to usurp the role of a party of national unity and label the stake of competition according to Mulroney’s conception of national reconciliation. If multilateralism had been a pillar of Liberal strategy in the 1940s and 1950s, and protectionism the same in the 1970s and 1980s, the FTA was threatening to undo this advantage of the Liberals to embed their appeal to diverse groups within a coherent policy vision of domestic and international politics. Much as the simple realignment of pro-free trade political identities within the PCs could not produce pro-free trade ideas before Mulroney envisioned a reformed normative anchor of party competition (the solution to his personal image problems and the heterogeneity of his coalition), so was opposition to the FTA a function of John Turner’s hope that the old meaning of competition (pan-Canadian nationalist vision) could reenergize the combination of political identities that had served the Liberals in the past. This systemic need explains why the Liberals went against the FTA when so many factors pointed to a more nuanced (if not positive) stance.

As part of the long road from unitary ideological pan-Canadian politics to particularistic regionalist fragmented party competition, the FTA and the elections of 1988 can be seen as one step in the direction of breakdown of party politics. Yet, if anything, the FTA put into place new firm alignments between political identities and the party system. The PCs may have failed to maintain the pillars of their support, but these pillars were forged as political identities with relevant demands within a new axis of competition through the FTA election and Mulroney’s tactics. The realignment of the West and Quebec were important systemic developments in their own right, but their solid expression became a permanent relevant systemic feature through the pains of the intense FTA contestation (which by extension also brought about a unitary expression of Ontario in party politics). The result was a new equilibrium between a new foreign policy and a new normative anchor: FTA was the symbol and pillar of a party competition that sought to accommodate divergent regional demands within a new economic and constitutional balance.
The FTA, as a policy initiative with a specific content at a specific point in time, was a contingent result that can only be understood when considering the complex nature of the interaction between Canada’s international environment (the decline of the multilateral solution and its impact on the regional trade setting), and the conjunction of the economic and (to some extent) constitutional preferences of two political identities that met in a roundabout manner in a mobilized agenda against Canada’s centralist political identity. Reflecting the wholesale change of the normative anchor of domestic partisan discourse, free trade was institutionalized as part of Canada’s traditional foreign policy identity of trade openness, international cooperation and maintaining independence through prosperity. The realignment of domestic and foreign policy preferences within the party system only makes new foreign policies conceptually intelligible and institutionally possible when this realignment has systemic consequences for the way political parties interact and the language that structures this interaction. This is always a demanding proposition, and it needs to be shown to account for foreign policy change more effectively than simpler and apparently more parsimonious explanations.

It could be, for example, that only the realignment of political identities within the party system was in and of itself sufficient to produce the patterns of support and opposition to the FTA that became evident in 1988. By the mid-1980s the dynamics of partisan competition had significantly changed the profile of the voters the two main parties were attracting, with the ostensibly more protectionist Tories moving into a discourse of neoliberal reformism and the more libertarian Liberals attracting more and more the support of new immigrant, urban and welfare dependent social strata. In terms of the regional cleavage, the two parties had also already switched positions since the 1950s, as the Liberals had become the party of the center of Canadian nationalism and the PCs the party of the disgruntled periphery. In terms of the linguistic/national cleavage, both parties were against Quebec separatism, but the PCs were able to appeal to more sovereignist Québécois who were tired of Trudeau’s bilingual and constitutional policies. In other words, the PC coalition that got into power in 1984 was the perfect free trade storm, bringing together political identities with strong continentalist agendas.

However, these important changes within parties should not lead to anachronistic readings of the partisan structuring of the free trade issue. Indeed, by 1985 no one could have anticipated with certainty that the PCs would embark on a free trade agenda, and by 1987 no one could have anticipated that it would be the Liberals who would mount a passionate patriotic battle against free trade. As an established nation-building party, the PCs were still in 1985 seen as a party of the Canadian geographical and normative mainstream. Mulroney’s ‘national reconciliation and economic renewal’ had appealed to almost everyone, but still had to be filtered into concrete policies. Where he would go with them was still an open question. The Liberal party, led by an ex-businessman with ties to the increasingly continentalist Toronto business sector, had already tried sectoral free trade in 1983 and had shown signs of backtracking from Trudeau’s anti-American
views under Turner. Yet both parties surprised the electorate, by staging a passionate standoff on an issue that was barely on the agenda a few years earlier. The powerful continentalist interests within the PC party only took over once Mulroney decided that his constitutional policies had an inescapable link to a new model of Canadian political economy – and that free trade actually united the West and Quebec more than constitutional issues did. And Turner’s opting for the Trudeau tradition instead of the Laurier (or at least King) tradition was a function of his understanding that with free trade the very context within which party competition would take place was changing. In other words, the constellation of political identities within parties produced new foreign policy ideas and opposition to them once it was seen to bring about a thorough reformulation of the normative anchor around which partisan competition was structured.

Concurrently, the systemic pressures on parties and their changing relative positions cannot account for the FTA alone. This would be a more powerful explanation of the Liberal vehement opposition to the FTA. It is normal to expect a party that found itself in opposition after dominating politics for almost 60 years to react abruptly to any policy that seemed to go against what it had created. Especially after adhering to the MLA, John Turner was in dire need of a differentiating issue that would establish his leadership within his own party and pressure Mulroney more effectively. The PCs on the other hand were moved into a free trade position by virtue of 20 years of opposition politics. Economic liberalism, pro-Americanism and provincial independence became political preferences of the PCs almost despite themselves: the sharper Trudeau’s policies became, the more the PCs moved against him. But free trade did not come about simply by virtue of interaction between parties-as-black-boxes. The Liberals looked back to their tradition of emancipatory sovereignty and progressive nationalism, only this time it was against the US and not Great Britain. The PCs looked for argumentation in their tradition as a unifying party and what they saw as their duty to stitch Canada together as a community of communities, thus updating their traditional conservative, communitarian ideology.

Having now established again what kind of domestic circumstances are needed for the creation and successful institutionalization of foreign policies, the question of the relationship between these domestic changes and the conditions of international structural change surrounding a country (Doran 1994b: 240-241) still remains. The case of the FTA suggests that dynamics of party systems are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of a new foreign policy. As we saw, the impetus for free trade to enter the agenda was the Macdonald report that recommended free trade as a response to specific threats to Canadian prosperity and trade competitiveness emanating from abroad. The failure of GATT and the constant threat of US protectionism created specific theoretical and practical challenges to the established tenets of Canadian trade policy up to that point. What is more, these structural challenges were decisive in the eventual outcome of the FTA contestation, as both sides had to position themselves towards them and use them as argumentative resources. The party system dynamics that led to the creation of
the Mulroney coalition and the emergence of a new stake of national unity produced new policies in constitutional and economic issues anyway; change of foreign policy was clearly responding to objective needs coming from the international sphere.

Could the FTA have come about solely due to the international circumstance facing Canada at the time? The collapse of multilateralism and protectionism towards the US was clearly a fact of life for Canada. Coupled with the recession of the early 1980s, it created a veritable situation of crisis for the Canadian economy and society. Yet already in the early 1980s the Canadian political system proved to be blocked from entering new avenues of thought in the field of free trade. Trudeau could not go beyond the idea of sectoral free trade, even though this was substantially problematic from a practical point of view. When Mulroney won the leadership contest of the PCs in 1983, protectionism against the US seemed to be a true bipartisan value of Canadian foreign policy. At the same time, free trade ideas were never absent from Canadian public discourse or party politics, yet they never came close to realization. Even at the times of acute crisis of the early 1980s, free trade ideas were identified with political identities of the geographical and social fringes of Canadian politics. Something decisive had to change in 1984-1988 for a complete continentalist foreign policy to take hold of one party and then of the country as a viable solution to the crisis of Canadian foreign policy.

In summation, the realignment of pro-free trade political identities under the PC banner was not a simple realignment of the expression of political cleavages in the party system. Instead, this realignment was the result of party strategies of adaptation to systemic demands of competition and deep social processes. The triumph of 1984 concealed the fact that the PCs were leading a combination of interests that were profoundly uncomfortable with the established tenets of Canadian domestic and foreign policies. After the publication of the Macdonald report, the stake of national unity was meant to be redefined in order to capture the needs and demands of the different political identities of Canadian society. The question was not which party would be able to build a set of pan-Canadian policies that would accommodate as many citizens as possible, but rather which party could broker the interests of different regional interests in specific constitutional and economic policies. Whereas the previous normative anchor that revolved around the creation of a unitary civic identity through state activism had reinforced protectionism, the new normative anchor created a geographically fragmented party system where free trade, as a policy that gave provinces the ability to harness the economically promising north-south axis, was one of the few unifying policy initiatives.

What contribution to the specific case at hand does the argument of this chapter make and what do rival explanations of the Canadian FTA decision tell us about foreign policy change in general? Of the literature concerned with the FTA, the most compelling and overarching explanation is given in the comparative analysis of free trade decisions in North America in Marchildon (1994; the same argument is supported in the same volume by Doran 1994b: 234-237). The theoretical question guiding their volume is
precisely why, when surveying the positions of political parties on free trade in Canada, the US and Mexico, one observes that in each country it is usually the parties that are least associated with free trade historically that ultimately end up initiating free trade decisions. This is indeed an interesting observation, and as we already saw it holds true for Canada as well.

For Marchildon, decisions in favor of free trade are a combination of party ideology and government incumbency; government parties tend to succumb to international pressures and opposition parties tend to take on the nationalist mantle against economic integration. Following this, Marchildon speculates that the Liberals would have pursued free trade if they had been in government (and, we are left to assume, the Tories would have opposed it). This argument is a variation of a party system argument, since it accounts for relationships between parties, and it indeed postulates what could be a very common objection to the general argument of this dissertation: that the only party systemic dynamic that really matters is a position of a party as government or opposition; government parties implement what they must and opposition parties oppose as they should. In this view, established traditions and societal commitments of parties matter only inasmuch as party leaderships need to invent argumentations that would justify their positions with reference to partisan identity.

As it has been shown, this argument does not match up with the commitments, historical trajectories and systemic interests of partisan actors in Canada. Most of all, it does not explain how, if external pressures and policy failures do force inescapable choices onto governments in favor of free trade, in Canada free trade was only implemented years after the country’s commercial policy faced big inconsistencies and the economy was stagnating. It may be true that the dynamics of opposition may have pushed the Turner Liberals towards a much more principled opposition to the FTA than what would have been the case if they were in government. But that is also the point: looking carefully at the trajectory of both parties in the Canadian party system, it is obvious that the Liberals were in no position to institute an initiative as far-reaching and radical as the FTA. By the same token the PCs may not have supported anything similar while in opposition, but the FTA in the shape it took was clearly a creation of a specific societal coalition united by a common vision of a model of Canadian unity. While Marchildon emphasizes the pressures emanating from abroad, he fails to see how the interaction of international factors with constellations of the domestic discursive space really gives rise to foreign policy change. While he makes an interesting contribution towards the direction of incorporating relations between parties (and not just policies of individual parties) in analyzing domestic sources of foreign policy, his government/opposition view needs to be complemented with a historical and societal view of the field within which this dynamic is embedded.
CHAPTER 4
GREECE 1993-2000: RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TURKEY AND
THE EMERGENCE OF A CONVERGENT TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

OVERVIEW AND ARGUMENT OF THE CHAPTER

At the end of 1999 Greece instituted a far-reaching change in its foreign policy towards Turkey. It accepted allowing the EU to grant Turkey candidate member status. The agreement reached in the EU Council in Helsinki included the provision that Turkey’s accession procedure would be tied to the process of resolving bilateral disputes with Greece and with allowing Cyprus to proceed with its accession despite of the island’s division. In many ways, the decision in Helsinki marked a turnaround in Greek-Turkish relations, which from then on shifted from a cold war dynamic to one of détente – if not rapprochement.

This chapter will trace that change in the ongoing developments that were transforming the Greek party system throughout the 1990s. The modern Greek party system is characterized by a three-camp structure (Right, Center and Left) and (until recently at least) an inescapable tendency towards binary competition between poles that bring together or cut through the established camps. The interaction of these two structural characteristics has meant that for most of its history Greece has had deeply polarized party systems – this polarization also structured rival foreign policy preferences. Until the end of the Cold War the party system had institutionalized a foreign policy of integration in Western institutions (NATO and EEC/EU) but with tensions, and of tension with Turkey but with variations.

The decision for foreign policy change and its eventual institutionalization across the party system sprang out of the activities of reformist leaderships in the two major parties (PASOK and ND). These engaged with ongoing societal changes under the level of the party system, and managed to reformulate the normative meaning of bipolar competition from one between a bourgeois Right and a radical Left pole to one between center-right and center-left party-poles pursuing the stake of modernization. Foreign policy change was presented as a needed complement to the process of economic rationalization ahead of European Monetary Union (EMU), and leaders of the two parties used argumentation on the Helsinki decision to impose the goal of modernization over the existing Right-Left axis. Convergence over foreign policy was expressed in the creation of a convergent party system dominated by two parties with very similar policy and social outlooks, and a complete marginalization of the parties to the left of PASOK that still held on to a radical populist agenda.

The decisive point leading to foreign policy change and the eventual institutionalization of a new approach in foreign policy supported by a convergent party system was the advent of a new conception of party competition within the ruling
PASOK party. Modernizers won over the socialist radical party mechanism with the implicit promise that policy modernization and Europeanization in economic and foreign policy would update the party’s traditional winning strategy as exponent of the Center camp under conditions of bipolar competition, and broaden its appeal in line with developments in Greek society. Once this happened, the foreign policy change in Helsinki became both conceptually possible for the ruling modernizing faction and an electorally rewarding strategy for the party as it would entrench modernization as the main stake of party competition. The extremely close outcome of the 2000 elections and PASOK’s victory validated the new foreign policy approach and imposed PASOK’s favored reinterpretation of political competition across the party system.

THE GREEK PARTY SYSTEM: SOCIAL CLEAVAGES, POLITICAL IDENTITIES, DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION

The modern Greek party system is the outcome of the interaction of two deep historical cleavages that shook Greece in the 20th century. First was the National Schism of 1915, caused by the personal disagreement between King Constantine and Prime Minister Venizelos about Greece’s strategy in World War I. Second was the Civil War between nation-minded Loyalists and Communists in 1944-1949. The interaction of these two cleavages gave rise to a three-way system of Left, Center and Right, which in turn informed a polarized version of binary competition (Mavrogordatos 1983b: 17, 1984: 156). Indeed, interaction between these three camps has always resulted in an inescapable binary dimension of competition (Mavrogordatos 1984: 163), and partisan actors’ interactions with social cleavages and political issues must be understood within a context of imposing their favored normative formulation of binary competition (Moschonas 1994: 166; Lyrintzis 2005: 244-245).

The first crucial turning point in Greek party politics was the National Schism between Venizelists and anti-Venizelist Royalists in 1915. The National Schism erupted when Liberal Prime Minister Venizelos disagreed with King Constantine over Greece’s place in World War I. Venizelos wanted Greece to join the Entente and so, quite naturally, ally itself with the camp that opposed its two traditional rivals, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Constantine insisted on a policy of neutrality, justified with the belief that Germany would win the war and with the need to protect large Greek populations still living in the Ottoman Empire. The National Schism represented a bitter conflict over the meaning and end-goal of Greek irredentism in the early 20th century. Venizelos represented the aspirations of the strong merchant, entrepreneurial and financial business Greek middle class that lived in the big cities and ports of the Ottoman Empire. Constantine juxtaposed the romantic nationalism of Old Greece, the heartland of

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125 The best and most concise introduction to modern Greek political history is Clogg (2002).
126 On the National Schism see, among many, Mavrogordatos (1982).
the small Greek kingdom within its pre-1912 borders (Mavrogordatos 1983a: 129), to this cosmopolitan vision of Greek nationalism.

After the National Schism, World War I and a failed campaign in Asia Minor, the competition between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists was reformulated as a competition between a reformist, progressive and republican camp and a conservative, royalist one\textsuperscript{127}. This competition absorbed most significant social cleavages, resulting in the creation of two cross-class coalitions but with opposing traits. The Venizelist camp united bourgeois strata with interests in market economy and petit bourgeois groups with radical social agendas, peasant populations that had benefited from Venizelos’ agrarian reform, and (most significantly) the solid voting bloc of more than one million Greek refugees, bitter foes of the anti-Venizelists who had first opposed their redemption and then tragically mismanaged the military effort with the end result being defeat in the hands of the Turks and a massive exodus in 1922. The anti-Venizelist camp comprised more conservative and inward-looking interests, such as middle class strata with employment closer to the state, small owners and rural populations who were not touched by agrarian reform. Along the ethnic cleavage, to the refugees’ Venizelist support the anti-Venizelists juxtaposed the solid support of a multitude of ethnic and religious minorities that were incorporated into Greece with the military expansion of 1912-1919. The most striking differentiating characteristic between these two seemingly similar coalitions were the regionally different voting patterns: Anti-Venizelists drew their support from Old Greece (today’s southern and central Greece and the Ionian and Aegean islands, the old kingdom until 1912), whereas Venizelists from the New Lands (today’s northern Greece, Crete and islands in north and eastern Aegean), the regions they had liberated and where most of the refugees were settled.

The politics of the inter-war republic were dominated by the various exponents of the Venizelist camp. Venizelos himself returned to active politics in 1928 and led his reformed Liberal Party to a huge victory and a four-year rule characterized by a renewed emphasis and a rejuvenating urge for the modernization of Greece. However this project crashed as the global economic crisis reached Greece and the economic situation deteriorated. After 1932 Greece entered a new period of political instability, the novelty of which was the rise of the Communist Party (KKE). Greek Communism upset the alliance of the liberal bourgeois and radical petit bourgeois pillars of Venizelism. This was skillfully nurtured by the anti-Venizelists who, within a climate of union dissent and street riots, presented themselves as the only guarantors of bourgeois normality, while Venizelists were framed as soft on Communism. The erosion of the broad Venizelist coalition gradually led to the loss of power and in 1936 to the establishment of a royalist

\textsuperscript{127} By far the best account of inter-war politics in Greece is Mavrogordatos (1983a), a truly masterful presentation of the strategies, cleavages and ideologies represented within the political identities that arose from the National Schism. Information about this period used in this chapter is drawn from him.
dictatorship led by veteran officer and politician of staunch anti-Venizelist feelings Ioannis Metaxas.

While the KKE had upset Greek politics already in the 1930s by energizing a particular version of the class cleavage, it got its big opportunity for dominance with World War II, Greece’s defeat and the Axis occupation of 1941-1944. KKE’s role in resistance against the Germans (with the setting up of a broad resistance front called EAM) allowed it to propagate a program of radical social reform married with a discourse of popular sovereignty and national independence. In this way what was a secretive and persecuted party turned, thanks to EAM, into the strongest political force in Greece (Moschonas 1994: 164) on the eve of liberation in 1944. However, unlike other European Communist parties that used their resistance credentials to facilitate their legitimacy and strengthen their electoral fortunes, KKE overplayed its hand, eventually leading to an all-out civil war and a conservative backlash. From 1950 onwards, democratic politics resumed in Greece and the left was allowed to participate under the banner of the United Democratic Left (EDA), a party combining (sometimes uneasily) control by the exiled KKE and the non-doctrinaire EAM tradition.

Following a transitional period, the Greek party system assumed a three-camp structure that has characterized it in some ways until very recently (Moschonas 1994: 162-163)\(^\text{128}\). The main cleavage driving party competition was the cleavage of the Civil War, pitting the isolated EDA against the loyalist pole comprising the old anti-Venizelist and Venizelist camps. The anti-Venizelists were most successful in taking advantage of this axis by reinventing themselves into a staunchly anti-Communist Right, entrusted with security of the regime, alignment with the US and the West, and economic reconstruction. The only conceivable (i.e. allowed) governing alternative would have to come from the old Venizelist camp, which was, as in the 1930s, helpless in the face of polarization between Left and Right (Pappas 2001: 77).

The new structure absorbed and energized old and new social cleavages. Perhaps the most consequential cleavage of the inter-war period, the ethnic one, was radically transformed and mitigated. EDA’s appeal to refugees was closely correlated with their place of residence and social outlook (Moschonas 1994: 181), as EDA came to dominate the working class suburbs (frequently old refugee settlements) around big cities. ERE (the party of the Right) on the other hand inherited the patterns of support of the pre-war anti-Venizelist camp but with much greater support among urban strata. Squeezed in between were the Venizelist liberal parties, whose twin ideological pillars (bourgeois liberalism and social radicalism) were effectively coopted by Right and Left. Perhaps the biggest change was the mitigation of the regional cleavage. The old divide between Old

\(^{128}\) Most of the information on the post-War democracy in Greece is taken from Nicolacopoulos (2001) unless otherwise stated. The particularly successful title of his book, characterizing the semi-authoritarian regime of the time as a ‘cachectic democracy’ (I choose here the translation of the title given by Spourdalakis and Tassis, 2006: 497), captures astutely the essence of the regime and has gained currency in lay discourse as well. A reference work in a language other than Greek is Meynaud (1965).
Greece and New Lands was rapidly getting smaller. Especially the experience of the Civil War in Macedonia and the presence of Prime Minister Karamanlis (who hailed from Macedonia) caused a gradual but visible realignment of North Greece towards the Right (Featherstone and Katsoudas 1985: 32), as well as an intensification of the urban-rural cleavage between the Right and Left.

The Right dominated the party system in 1952-1963 effectively energizing the Civil War cleavage and its strength within the loyalist pole. However foreign policy controversies (see below), constant strains with the para-political power establishment (monarchy and security apparatus) and ongoing social changes undermined its dominance. Most significantly, from 1961 onwards it had to face a unified Venizelist camp, united under the banner of the Center Union (EK), led by veteran radical Venizelist politician Georgios Papandreou. The EK was initially created to challenge ERE from within the loyalist pole, and to keep EDA (that had made dangerous surges in the late 1950s) isolated. But eventually EK came to be seen by the vast majority of its old and new following not as an alternative manager of the system but as a bearer of demands for democratization and increased social justice, thereby isolating ERE (Moschonas 1994: 167-168).

EK was elected into power in 1963 and its government was dominated by exponents of bourgeois loyalist politics and the liberal Venizelist tradition. However Papandreou’s government was trapped within a system of polarized pluralism (Pappas 2003), between the Right’s insecurities about the danger of Communism and the Left pushing for reforms. Even more importantly however, the polarization of the party system was reproduced within the EK itself, thus reenergizing the old internal inconsistency of Venizelism between liberal bourgeois loyalism and radical petit-bourgeois reformism (Mavrogordatos 1984: 168; Moschonas 1994: 169-170). In 1965 Papandreou and young King Constantine II disagreed over control of the army. In the ensuing constitutional crisis, the vast majority of EK’s notables and a group of parliamentarians defected to form loyalist governments, with the support of ERE, thus avoiding elections after Papandreou’s resignation. The EK, now dominated by a younger guard of radicals and progressives lead by Papandreou’s son Andreas, became united with the Left in a democratic and reformist front against a loyalist bourgeois pole comprised of the Right and the liberal pillar of the old Venizelist camp. It was precisely in order to keep this new arrangement from being expressed in the polls that the army moved to institute a junta in 1967.\(^{129}\)

The seven-year junta interregnum interrupted the process of consolidation of a bourgeois Right v.s. radical Antiright normative anchor (Featherstone and Katsoudas 1985: 39). The first years after the return to democratic rule in 1974 can be seen as a period of consolidation both within the three camps and across the party system. The...

\(^{129}\) For an analysis of the gradual transformation of party competition from a Loyalist-Communist into a Right-Antiright axis from a party systemic perspective, see Moschonas (1994).
years 1974-1981 were dominated by Karamanlis, who returned from exile in 1974 amidst the Cyprus crisis and the collapse of the junta. Karamanlis showed a different face than he had during the 1950s, legalizing the KKE, organizing a referendum that abolished the monarchy and founding a party, New Democracy (ND), with the outwardly characteristics of a moderate center-right party, combining conservative, liberal and even social-democratic values (Lyrintzis 2005: 245). More interesting were the developments in the old Center camp. Here Andreas Papandreou’s party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), came to dominate various efforts by bourgeois, liberal and reformist politicians to create an independent center party with a social-democratic tendency. Instead, Andreas managed, with his inflammatory and anti-systemic rhetoric, to pick up where the EK of 1967 had left off, bridging the radical centrist tradition with EAM’s national resistance and independence ethos. In this way, consolidation within each camp was followed by a stabilization of the party system around an emerging axis of competition that continued where the junta had once interrupted things (Mavrogordatos 1984: 157-161).

The elections of 1981 were the absolute vindication of Papandreou’s strategy of turning PASOK into the main party of an anti-bourgeois, populist, social-radical and ‘democratic’ pole – and indeed of crystallizing and defining this very pole. PASOK won an impressive majority, thus forming the first socialist government in the history of Greece. Papandreou’s strategy was all the more successful in that he managed to appropriate diverse ideological traditions (the Left’s resistance, the Center’s governing reliability, his father’s fight for democratization) and channel them through a rhetoric of vehement Antiright polarization (Mavrogordatos 1984: 160-161; Featherstone and Katsoudas 1985: 37-38; Kalyvas 1997: 92). Indeed, polarization and presentation of PASOK-ND competition as an apocalyptic showdown between an authoritarian Right and the ‘people’ became a self-perpetuating strategy of PASOK in the 1980s (Moschonas 1994: 174-179; Kalyvas 1997). From 1981 onwards, a polarized two-party competition between PASOK and ND came to symbolize the new axis of competition, thus gradually isolating KKE (Pappas 2001, 2003; Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006: 508-9, 511). Polarization was further increased when ND elected as its leader Constantine Mitsotakis, an old minister of EK who had left the party in 1965 to become member of loyalist governments. Papandreou and Mitsotakis’ personal hatred, dating back to the crisis of 1965, animated party competition. Mitsotakis took leadership of ND and promoted the party’s ideological renewal, moving it away from the authoritarian conservative origins of the Right towards an economically liberal profile, in tune with developments among center-right parties in other countries (Alexakis 2001: 107-114).

During the 1980s PASOK and ND’s competition reflected and exacerbated polarization along the socioeconomic cleavage: PASOK was a solidly petit-bourgeois and working-class party with strong support among farmers and traditional centers of Venizelist or leftist influence, while ND was a predominantly bourgeois, upper-middle
class and middle class party with support in traditional rural heartlands of the right-wing such as Southern Greece. In this way, each party had become a solid bloc of complementary social interests (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 265-266; Vernardakis 2011: 87-91). While social developments like urbanization were slowly eradicating old particularities like ethnic or regional differences, slowly absorbed in a coherent socioeconomic axis, polarization galvanized the strength of the political identities the main parties represented and infused policy competition with a heavy ideological dimension. Polarization between PASOK and ND on issues of economic liberalization, trade union influence, public sector expansion and corruption was accentuated by historical references to previous issues of democratization, national independence and authoritarianism (Moschonas 1994: 190-191), and an updated practice of clientelism (Kalyvas 1997: 99; Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006: 509).

Mitsotakis’ strategy to revamp the ideological message of the bourgeois pole allowed ND to return to power in 1990. However ND’s government was plagued by a small majority in Parliament, and the emergence of the polarizing foreign policy issue of the name of the newly independent, neighboring Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, that did not allow it to implement its ambitious program of neoliberal economic reform. Instead, its stay in power revealed for the first time an ideological rift within the party between Mitsotakis’ economic liberals and adherents to the traditional Right-wing orthodoxy of the party who made references to Karamanlis’ legacy (Alexakis 2001: 110). The rift affected the totality of government policy, with the Karamanlists rejecting Mitsotakis’ class-conscious neoliberalism and promoting a more nationalist tone in foreign policy (see below) (Keridis 1999: 38; Alexakis 2001: 116-177). In the end, the rift within the party over the name issue led to the secession of a small faction under Antonis Samaras, the fall of the government in 1993 and the calling of elections that PASOK and Papandreou won resoundingly (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 272-273).

The elections of 1993 were the last elections of the polarized binary competition era that had started in 1981. They were also the last elections where the patterns of support of the two parties made them ‘mirror images’ of each other in terms of social outlook (ibid: 273). However the party system, though still dominated by the binary competition between PASOK and ND expressing two rival poles of ‘Right’ and ‘Antiright’, was far more unstable than before. The crisis within ND reflected important inconsistencies within the bourgeois pole that policy polarization with PASOK had only managed to

130 From the discussion above it becomes obvious that the main cleavages and political identities in Greece are the results of political processes that overlaid social developments, instead of reflecting and responding to them directly. This has to do mostly with the particularities of the economic and social development of Greece. In what is essentially a fairly homogeneous society of small ownership (Mavrogordatos 1984: 166), the big political cleavages of the past (National Schism and Civil War) and the stakes they represent mobilize coalitions of different socioeconomic outlooks, if not classes (Moschonas 1994: 161, 170). From the 1970s onwards, these political identities became infused with a socioeconomic dimension, thus making the socioeconomic cleavage the best heuristic tool for the tracing of these identities’ meaning and evolution (ibid: 191-195).
conceal temporarily. PASOK found itself in an uncertain position due to its leaders’ ill health and inability to match the old anti-Right discourse with a policy of economic populism anymore (Vernardakis 2011: 3-8). On top of this, a latent axis of competition between reformists and populists within each camp started becoming apparent (Tsoukalis 2000: 41; Nicolacopoulos 2005: 272). Both its rise and the way the big parties absorbed it into the existing binary structure of competition can be accounted for largely with reference to interactions between the foreign policy preferences of the different political identities. It is to these preferences, and how dominant formulations of the normative anchor of party competition historically structured them and affected foreign policy outputs, that I now turn.

Table 15
An Analytical Periodization of Greek Party Politics since 1922

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Political Camps</th>
<th>Systemic features</th>
<th>Poles of competition and cleavages structured</th>
<th>Degree of polarization</th>
<th>Meaning of competition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922-1936</td>
<td>Venizelists, anti-</td>
<td>Bipolar competition between two party-families, fragmentation within each family</td>
<td>Venizelists v.s. anti-Venizelists (socioeconomic, ethnic and regional)</td>
<td>Small, but increase after emergence of KKE</td>
<td>Regime form (structuring other issues as well)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1963</td>
<td>Right, Center, Left</td>
<td>Bipolar competition v.s. Left, competition within the anti-Left pole</td>
<td>Loyalists v.s. Left (socioeconomic, decreasingly ethnic and regional, increasingly urban/rural)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Economic and political system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1981</td>
<td>Right, Center, Left</td>
<td>Polarized pluralism, slow reformulation of meaning of bipolar competition, varying fragmentation within each camp</td>
<td>Transition from Loyalism v.s. Left to Right v.s. Antiright (socioeconomic absorbing urban/rural and remnants of ethnic)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Economic and political system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1993-?</td>
<td>Right, Center, Left</td>
<td>Bipolar competition, consolidation of party-camps</td>
<td>Bourgeois Right v.s. radical Antiright (socioeconomic)</td>
<td>High but decreasing</td>
<td>Economic system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES

Since its creation in 1830 and for a century afterwards the Greek state’s sole foreign policy goal was the integration of all Greeks and the recreation of a powerful Greek state around the Aegean Sea. Apart from this common reference point however, Greek nationalism contained many different ideological currents and ideas. The gradual consolidation of Athens as the epicenter of Greek nationalism, to the detriment of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople after the middle of 19th century, affected the relative strength of foreign policy conceptions inside of Greece and amongst Greek communities abroad (Veremis 2003: 49-50). The dominance of a secular understanding of nationalism meant the identification of Greek irredentism with domestic modernization, as a prerequisite for the time of military conquest at some point in the future, but increasingly also as a goal equally important with territorial expansion and liberation of unredeemed Greeks. Rival foreign policy preferences in Greece did not only concern irredentism per se, but also contending visions about the way an agrarian society could approach the social and economic standards of more developed states. Rival visions of modernity can best be detected in foreign policy by surveying the different international alliance preferences of the various political identities within Greece.

The goal of irredentism (later reformulated, according to circumstances, as safeguarding national sovereignty and, after 1974, also as defense of territorial integrity, captured in modern Greek public discourse under the moniker ‘national issues’) cuts across the goal of modernization. Generally Greek irredentism and its intellectual offspring remain to this day the normative frame of reference of Greek foreign policy. The strength of rival modernizing projects is affected by the way their imperatives serve the goal of national integration, independence or territorial integrity, and political identities promoting specific modernization plans of Greece can tap on the normative argumentation of national integration (or defense thereof) to support their visions of domestic society. Whereas modernization projects can take on many guises, for most of Greece’s history, and especially since 1922, the point of reference has been Western/European inspired modernization (functioning democracy, rationalized economy etc.). Contestation of the foreign policy goal of modernization then usually takes the shape of a competition between a liberal (claiming for itself the term ‘modernizing’) and an anti-Western (sometimes self-proclaimed ‘patriotic’) intellectual wing. In this way, one can see the (Western) modernist / (anti-Western) traditionalist cleavage on the conception of the Greek nation and the meaning of Greek irredentism run through the history of Greek nationalism (Valinakis 1989: 18; Heraclides 2007: 52-54), from the Athens-Patriarchate antagonism in the 19th century to today’s strains in Greece’s relationship with Europe.

The National Schism had at its core a foundational question of foreign policy: the exit to a war. For both Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, rival visions of Greek irredentism coincided with different visions on the content and pace of Greek modernization. Especially for Venizelos, territorial expansion was a prerequisite for (and not just the

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131 A short summary of this process, with a thick literature catalogue, is given in Heraclides (2007: 48-54). The reference work on the dialectic between religion and Enlightenment in the early stages of Greek nationalism is Kitromilides (2000).

132 On Greece’s strategic alliance dilemmas, see Tsakonas (2010: 31).

133 To paraphrase Kyrkos Doxiades (cited in Moschonas 1994: 196), matching ideological goals with a national (i.e. foreign policy) discourse is a prerequisite for political dominance.
outcome of) a process of domestic modernization. The inter-war party system dominated by Venizelists reproduced and institutionalized Venizelos’ essential foreign policy preferences that would lead to close alignment with the Western powers as a guarantee for security and economic and political modernization (Valinakis 1989: 60).

The civil conflict of the 1940s was a clash of international orientation as well. The loyalist pole’s unequivocal pro-Western orientation reflected the will to maintain the outcome of the Civil War and stave off Communism. Greek irredentism, now mutated into Greek nationalism, was an important part of the ideology of the semi-authoritarian post-Civil War democratic regime, as it highlighted KKE’s patronage from Greece’s enemies in the Balkans, hence the self-description of loyalists as being ‘national-minded’ (Moschonas 1994: 164-165). KKE’s perceived ‘anti-national’ policies reinforced the ideological purge of leftists (ibid: 195). As the ideological differences of the Cold War intensified traditional competition of rival irredentisms in the Balkans, Greek foreign policy identified the country’s northern neighbors as the key danger to its security (Valinakis 1989: 45-47). Instead, relations with Turkey, now a NATO ally, were cordial (Veremis 2003: 111-113). The party system of the 1950s, dominated by the loyalist pole and the Right camp, also institutionalized a firm policy of Westbindung, first with NATO and then with the EEC (Loulis 1984: 376). In permanent opposition and suppressed, EDA could only present a policy of neutralism and pacifism (Valinakis 1989: 46).

The strains in the coherence of the loyalist pole coincided with the strains on this equilibrium of foreign policy. The cause was the Cyprus question, the last major issue of Greek irredentism. The demand of Greek Cypriots for unification with Greece animated the Greek public and, nominally, all Greek parties were committed to it (Veremis 2003: 113-115). However, the Right-wing government of Karamanlis at the time could not ignore the fact that this demand ran against the interests of the colonial power, Great Britain, another NATO ally. In this way, Cyprus fundamentally tested the ability of the Right to normatively link the foreign policy goals of nationalism and domestic capitalist modernization, expressed through unequivocal integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions (Loulis 1984: 376-377, Valinakis 1989: 72-81).

The long transitional period between 1963 and 1981, interrupted by the junta of 1967-1974, completed the transition from a party system polarized around the dividing line of the Civil War to a party system divided between bourgeois and radical-populist poles. The big beneficiary of this transition, Andreas Papandreou, initially relied heavily on foreign policy to embed his emancipatory, nationalistic and resistance discourse. Andreas’ clear-cut positions on foreign policy, combining anti-Americanism, anti-Westernism, Non-Aligned and Third World sympathies, dependency theory and anti-Turkish feelings framed within an ideological socialist discourse (Loulis 1984: 378-379; 134)

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134 See especially here the passage ‘The National Schism as class conflict’, studying the socioeconomic dimension of the creation of the Venizelist and anti-Venizelist political identities in Mavrogordatos (1983a: 127-130).
Heraclides 2007: 142), were instrumental in his success in bringing together the political identities of the EAM Left (with its resistance tradition) and the radical Center (with its Venizelist tradition of emancipatory and progressive nationalism) (Mavrogordatos 1984: 160; Moschonas 1994: 196). If the first party system of the new republic (1974-1981) can be characterized as being polarized (Pappas 2003: 105-106), then foreign policy was the field where this could be noted most obviously (Kalyvas 1997: 83, 85).

After 1974, Karamanlis made accession to the EEC the overarching goal of his government. His decision to anchor Greece in Europe must be seen as part of an overarching concept of Greek society and economy, congruent with the loyalist pole’s and the Right’s willingness after the war to underpin liberal democracy and economy domestically with strong alliances to the West externally (Economides 2005: 476; Tsakonas 2010: 41). Many were hoping at the time that Greece’s entry would help Greece more effectively counter the threat from Turkey (now seen as more dangerous than Balkan Communist neighbors) (Valinakis 1989: 244; Heraclides 2007: 79; Tsakonas 2010: 33)135. Instead, Karamanlis followed a policy of negotiation, lessening tensions with Turkey precisely because he did not want strained Greek-Turkish relations to be an excuse for the EEC to prevent Greece from joining (Valinakis 1989: 248; Heraclides 2007: 109-111, 135).

PASOK was elected into government in 1981 with pledges to take Greece out of the EEC and NATO (Loulis 1984: 379-380; Tsardanidis 1998: 297). Neither occurred, however Papandreou initiated a policy of obstructionism and maverick positions in both institutions. In Greek-Turkish relations, Papandreou abandoned Karamanlis’ efforts to maintain some points of contact with Turkey and froze all negotiations. PASOK’s position, reflecting the party’s populist nationalism, was that Greece and Turkey did not have any issues to discuss. Eventually, by the late 1980s, PASOK came around to the view that Greece only recognized one bilateral issue with Turkey, the demarcation of the continental shelf, and that the only way for this to be resolved was through recourse to the ICJ in The Hague (Tsakonas 2010: 46-47). Papandreou’s foreign policy became renowned for its unpredictability and resulted in Greece’s isolation within the EEC and NATO and the rise of tensions with Turkey136. In this way, Papandreou’s foreign policy

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135 Starting in 1973 (before the Cyprus invasion) Turkey gradually developed a broad palette of ‘issues for negotiation’ concerning sovereignty in the Aegean on land, sea and air. By the mid-1990s the issues Turkey considered ‘open’ were: a) The demarcation of the continental shelf, b) demarcation of territorial waters, c) demarcation of air space and operational control over the Aegean, d) militarization of Eastern Aegean islands, e) sovereignty over specific islands and islets. Whereas Turkey’s traditional position always was that Greece and Turkey should discuss these matters and resolve them through negotiations, Greece has steadily denied any linkage, has supported adjudication by the ICJ and, as we will see, ended up recognizing the continental shelf as the only problem (Athanassopoulou 1997: 77). For a thorough presentation of the legal parameters of these issues and an effort to present ‘both sides of the story’, see Heraclides (2007: 217-382).

cemented the link between anti-Westernism and the irredentist/nationalist pillar of Greek foreign policy (Kalyvas 1997: 87; Heraclides 2007: 140-141).

The complete polarization between PASOK and ND in the 1980s in terms of social outlook (Kalyvas 1997: 89) and domestic policies was also reflected in differences of foreign policy preferences. Now a coherent bourgeois conservative-liberal party, ND presented itself as the European party, highlighting the importance of Greece’s belonging to all the important international institutions of the West. It opposed Papandreou’s foreign policy adventurism with its policy of pro-Europeanism and prudence vis-à-vis Turkey (Tsakonas 2010: 48). In many ways, the Greek party system domestically continued reproducing the Cold War division, which since the 1950s had concurrently also favored the Antiright pole that could claim, as PASOK did, that a fundamentalist Western orientation inhibited the ability of Greece to promote its traditional national interests.

ND’s and Mitsotakis’ ascent to power coincided with the end of the Cold War, the fall of Communism and the outbreak of war in the Balkans. The explosion of the Macedonia name issue among the Greek public added a new dimension to the irredentist pillar of Greek foreign policy, as Greece found itself entangled in a potentially explosive Balkan imbroglio. Whereas a pro-Western consensus seemed to emerge between the two parties, with PASOK’s gradual conversion to more orthodox social-democratic positions in economic matters (Lyrintzis 2005: 247), the name issue created a new tension between Greece’s commitment to the West (and by extension the domestic policies that such a commitment entailed) and the newly salient exigencies of its irredentist-cum-nationalist heritage. Whereas Mitsotakis strove to find a diplomatic solution to the name issue within a European framework (Economides 2005: 483), a broad coalition from the whole of the party spectrum pushed him to an intransigent position that eventually cost him his place. This difficult situation also sabotaged Mitsotakis’ efforts at rapprochement with Turkey (Heraclides 2007: 161-164).

Even more interestingly, the name issue energized a tension around the irredentist pillar of Greek foreign policy that cut through all main political identities. In the ruling ND, it underpinned already existing differences between liberals and Karamanlists on economic policy, thus causing the first rift within what seemed like a homogeneous bourgeois pole. On the Left it contributed to the division between a staunchly anti-European and increasingly nationalist KKE and a reformist, pro-European and moderate party of the reformed Left. In PASOK, it exposed the fading glory of Papandreou’s

Whereas polarization over foreign policy was an integral part of Papandreou’s strategy of consolidating a binary competition between a Right and an Antiright pole in the 1960s and 1970s, it receded markedly when PASOK came to power. Indeed, some authors emphasize the decrease of importance PASOK laid on ‘national issues’ (Moschonas 1994: 196-197) and continuities of foreign policy behind sensationalist initiatives by Papandreou (Valinakis 1989: 193-196). For an account emphasizing more the elements of rupture and tension on Greek-Turkish relations under Papandreou, see Heraclides (2007: 140-160).
populism. Papandreou’s political agency since the 1960s and the dynamics of party competition in the 1970s and 1980s had made the interaction between the two pillars of foreign policy be crystalized in two coherent approaches, what could be called liberal pragmatism and populist nationalism; for the first time in the early 1990s these seemed not to strengthen existing cleavages between political identities, but to cut through them and create cross-camp coalitions (Keridis 2001: 2).

In summation, different political identities have always cued coherent foreign policy preferences according to their preferred visions of domestic society. In the same way that political identities crystallize societal cleavages (like the socioeconomic one), they also impinge foreign policy preferences on the different social forces that are identified with them. Since the 1980s, for example, one can say that the foreign goal of Western modernization has been prioritized among the middle class strata that identified with the bourgeois pole, whereas the petit bourgeois and working class following of the Antiright pole was galvanized by an emphasis on Greek irredentism and its contradictions with Westbindung. From 1981 onwards, PASOK’s dominance of the party system had institutionalized a hostile policy towards Turkey and a difficult relationship with Europe (Lyrantzis 2005: 249). ND on the other hand was the party of bourgeois ‘responsibility’ at home and abroad, yet once in power it found itself bitterly divided. In 1993-1996 these policies seemed further entrenched by the confusion caused by the end of the Cold War. That within a few years Greece was to implement a completely new policy of rapprochement with Turkey was a surprising outcome by any account.

Table 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Poles of competition</th>
<th>Polarization</th>
<th>Foreign policy outputs towards Turkey</th>
<th>Foreign policy outputs towards the West</th>
<th>Degree of contestation of foreign policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922-1936</td>
<td>Venizelists v.s. anti-Venizelists</td>
<td>Low but increasing</td>
<td>Rapprochemen t</td>
<td>Alignment with Western powers (mainly England)</td>
<td>Low (institutionalization of Venizelist foreign policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1963</td>
<td>Loyalists v.s. Left</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Alliance, deterioration after 1955. Issue: Cyprus</td>
<td>Western camp, NATO</td>
<td>High (Cold War division reproduced domestically)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1981</td>
<td>Loyalists v.s. Left to Right v.s. Anti-right</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Deterioration, almost complete rupture after 1974. Issues:</td>
<td>Western camp but increasingly contested, substitution of US for Europe</td>
<td>High (contested anchoring in the West, relations with Turkey cutting across alliance strategies)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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138 On PASOK’s Macedonia name issue policies, see Tsardanidis (1998: 312-313).

At the December 1999 EU Council in Helsinki, Greece lifted its objections to granting official candidate status to Turkey. The Council conclusions included specific provisions about Turkey’s obligations towards membership, most importantly decoupling Cyprus’ accession course from the political problem on the island and committing Turkey (and Greece) to bilateral negotiations about sovereignty issues of the Aegean until 2004, after which recourse to the ICJ would be made for issues on which no agreement had been reached (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 7; Tsakonas 2010: 92-93).

The Helsinki Council constituted the most significant and high-profile foreign policy change of Greece in almost 20 years on two counts: First, it introduced a much different view of how Greek foreign policy juggled the challenges of dealing with Turkish demands on the Aegean (and Cyprus) and the opportunities offered by membership in the EU (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 7-8). Helsinki introduced a bold concept that saw in Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations the best way for Turkey to reform itself and mitigate its demands, and for Greece to find a new standing among its European partners. Second, Helsinki institutionalized a more daring approach in the management of Greek-Turkish relations. Even though nominally Greece remained committed to its position that the only issue in the Aegean concerned the continental shelf, which should be judicially resolved (a position formulated in the 1980s, as a Papandreou corrective to Karamanlis’ policy of contacts with Turkey in the 1970s) (Athanassopoulou 1997: 77), in Helsinki the PASOK government of the time essentially invited the pressure onto Greece to seek a universal arrangement with Turkey on all matters in the Aegean (Tsakonas 2010: 19). The gamble was that this new approach in Greek-Turkish relations would institute a negotiation process in which, thanks to constant EU control on Turkish reforms and Cyprus’ open road to accession, Greece would keep tight control on Turkish demands.

The end of the Cold War as well as huge transformations in the Balkans upset the equilibrium of Greek foreign policy up to that point. The polarization in the party system between the bourgeois Right and the radical Antiright (whether latent as in the 1960s and
1970s or obvious as in the 1980s) had produced a policy of deepening Greece’s integration with the West (culminating in the 1981 EEC accession) (Couloumbis 2000: 376), and a policy of ‘countering Turkey on all levels and by all means’ (Valinakis 1989: 196). Despite the contradiction between these two policies (and its exacerbation through the fact that the party system reproduced them as opposition between the opposing poles), the Cold War framework offered opportunities for partial relief of this tension (evidenced in the improvement of Greece’s relations with the Eastern bloc both under Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou or the ability of NATO and the US to mitigate Greek-Turkish tensions) (Economides 2005: 474, 479). Instead, the end of the Cold War added a northern dimension to Greece’s security predicament from the east, 15 years after the country and all major political forces had agreed that the Balkans were a more or less stable parameter in Greece’s planning (Tsardanidis 1998: 303; Ifantis 2004: 248-250; Economides 2005: 478-479).

Whereas Papandreou’s term in 1993-1996 was relatively moderate in terms of economic measures, his foreign policy towards Turkey retained its antagonistic nature, mostly evident in the creation of a Joint Strategic Doctrine with Cyprus (Heraclides 2007: 165). Greek-Turkish relations, severely burdened by a protracted state of crisis in both countries’ politics, slowly escalated to confrontation, leading up to the Imia crisis (when Greece and Turkey faced off over sovereignty of some disputed islets on their Aegean Sea borders, a severe military crisis defused only after direct American mediation), a mere month after Papandreou had dramatically resigned from his hospital bed and a self-styled modernizer with an expressed willingness to improve Greek-Turkish relations, Costas Simitis, had taken over as Prime Minister. The crisis revealed that the nascent modernist/populist cleavage now also ran through PASOK, as Simitis found his management of the crisis blocked by disagreements with key ministers, some of whom had challenged him for the post of Prime Minister and were claiming the nationalist heritage of Papandreou (Athanassopoulou 1997: 79).

Simitis became leader of PASOK in the dramatic party convention of the summer of 1996, directly calling snap elections for September 1996. Greek-Turkish relations were a relatively salient issue in the elections (Athanassopoulou 1997: 86-88), with ND leader Miltiades Evert (who had succeeded Mitsotakis after the 1993 elections) using a nationalist discourse to accuse Simitis of accepting Turkish hostility in the Aegean. Simitis defended his policy by linking traditional Greek positions about sovereignty and rights in the Aegean with a pragmatic approach and the need to support Greece’s positions diplomatically. PASOK won the elections of 1996 against ND handsomely, even though it lost votes to the Left and saw a split party claiming Papandreou’s legacy in domestic and foreign policy, DIKKI, enter the parliament as well. ND lost votes but at

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least saw the breakaway party of Samaras (POLAN) fail to enter Parliament (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 276).

The march towards Helsinki was long and arduous for Greek-Turkish relations. Overall bilateral relations improved in the years following Simitis’ electoral win, but not without setbacks. For Simitis and his team the problem was that, for reasons of internal party politics, many prominent members of the populist Papandreist wing still held important cabinet posts and controlled key PASOK organs. The result was that Simitis faced the most hurdles in his effort to normalize relations with Turkey in his own party. He clashed with his ministers of defense, both of whom had been rivals in the 1996 Prime Minister election, over the implementation of the Joint Defense Doctrine and the stationing of defensive missiles in Cyprus, in the end imposing a compromise solution and moving the missiles to Crete (Athanassopoulou 1997: 96; Heraclides 2007: 176-177). In 1997, during the NATO summit in Madrid, Simitis signed a declaration with Turkey committing both countries to a peaceful resolution of ‘all legitimate differences in the Aegean’. This raised voices of dissent within PASOK, both in the government and the parliamentary group, as it went against Greece’s official position that there was only one difference in the Aegean, the continental shelf, and that the only solution was juridical adjudication, not negotiations (Athanassopoulou 1997: 93-94; Heraclides: 175-176; Tsakonas 2010: 69-70).

In early 1999 bilateral relations were shaken again when Turkish secret agents abducted Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan from the Greek embassy in Kenya, thus revealing a broad clandestine network within the government that had undertaken to foster him in Greece. The crisis caused Theodoros Pangalos (a modernizer but also anti-Turkish politician) to be dismissed from the post of foreign minister and the rise to the post of George Papandreou (son of Andreas), fellow modernizer of Simitis and a politician known for his US sympathies (Tsakonas 2010: 73). With the modernizers now in firm control of the foreign ministry, Greece proceeded to a more active stabilization of relations with Turkey. Finally, the government was particularly assisted in this through developments in Greek public opinion, especially after two earthquakes hit Turkey and Greece and caused an outpour of sentiment on both sides in September 1999 (Heraclides 2007: 181-182, 190-191; Tsakonas 2010: 75).

The Helsinki Council decisions were the result of an intense diplomatic and negotiating procedure between Greece, Turkey and the EU member-states. Greece had previously used its veto rights in the EU in order to block or hamper developments towards closer links between Turkey and the EU. In other words, Greece had always held a reactive view of EU-Turkish relations: Turkey was to be punished for previous actions and forced into better behavior through Greece’s strength (Tsoukalis 2000: 47; Tsakonas 2010: 48-51). This policy strained Greece’s relations with many pro-Turkish member

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141 Previously Greece had vetoed an EU aid package to Turkey right after Imia (early 1996) and the inclusion of Turkey in the list of candidate countries in late 1997 unless certain conditions were met. The
states (Athanassopoulou 1997: 80-81), but also allowed others to hide behind Greece’s veto and avoid hard decisions on Turkey’s accession procedure (Heraclides 2007: 178; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 7).

The time, in 1999, was particularly ripe for a new policy as the EU discussed its enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. This moment offered Greece a particularly interesting timing, as it was in a unique position to link the demands of Turkey with the accession process of Cyprus – a particularly contentious matter in the EU, since many did not like the idea of a divided Cyprus entering the EU and thus the political problem of the island becoming Europeanized (Tsakonas 2010: 83-85). In Helsinki Simitis forced his hand by threatening to veto the whole enlargement if Cyprus were not included. The EU consented and pressured Turkey to accept the final arrangement in the Council conclusions (Heraclides 2007: 195-196; Tsakonas 2010: 91-92). At once, Greece had brought the relations in the triangle Greece-Turkey-EU to a completely new basis. Turkey was to be monitored by the EU not only for its domestic reforms (which were hoped to create a more democratic, and hence more peaceful Turkey) but also for its conduct towards Greece and Cyprus. For Greece, the price was the acceptance that bilateral issues were subject to negotiations, which meant that compromise solutions would include arrangements on issues that Greece officially did not ‘recognize’ (Tsakonas 2010: 94-95).

The Helsinki decisions became the object of intense public scrutiny in Greece. As was the case with the Macedonia name issue, fault lines seemed to run through parties as much as they divided them. The crucial difference, however, was that after three years of Simitis government, where the goal of entry into the Euro zone had become the cardinal goal of economic policy and widely accepted by the Greek public (Vernardakis 2011: 26, 39), the liberal pragmatist interpretation that a Europeanized foreign policy could equally (if not better) serve Greece’s goals vis-à-vis Turkey became dominant. This was particularly the case within PASOK, where Simitis had consolidated his position, and with elections approaching, few of his Papandreist foes were in the mood to challenge his leadership and become a nuisance in the party’s reelection campaign (Tsakonas 2010: 96-97).

ND and its new leader, Costas Karamanlis (nephew of Constantine Karamanlis), were in a particularly tricky position. Modernizing the image of the party was considered the prime goals of the new leadership, elected in 1997 (Pappas and Dinas 2006: 483-484). A major part of this was reenergizing ND’s traditional identification with Europe and making the party the pillar of pro-Western orientation and domestic modernization once again. However, this narrative had been successfully appropriated by Simitis’ PASOK; Helsinki seemed to vindicate Simitis’ policy at least in the sense that that a policy of
Europeanization and interest promotion in Greek-Turkish relations and Cyprus was conceptually possible. This left little room to ND on the European aspect of the argument, but it could be open to legitimate criticism on the extent to which Greece’s long-standing interests were indeed served by Helsinki. Whereas ND had also returned to an official position of loosening of tensions with Turkey as well, the implication of its foreign policy criticism could be that, whereas Europeanization was an important goal, it did not justify backtracking on basic interests by all means (Heraclides 2007: 198, also fn 46; also see Molyviatis 2002).

The problem for Karamanlis was that some of the most coherent defense of Helsinki came from within his own party – and most predictably from so-called ‘liberals’, exponents of a bourgeois conception of the party and defenders of its identity as a coherent bourgeois pro-European pole. Most prominent among them was ex-Prime Minister and President Emeritus of ND Mitsotakis, who praised the Helsinki agreement as a pragmatic approach that reconciled Greece’s interests in bilateral relations with the need to remain close to Europe. Mitsotakis’ finance minister and neoliberal ideologue Stefanos Manos, and Mitsotakis’ daughter and ND heavyweight Dora Bakoyannis also praised the agreement, thus increasing the sense of cacophony within the broad center-right (Heraclides 2007: 198, fn 44; Tsakonas 2010: 98).

Helsinki was a flagship policy of the Simitis government on the way to the next parliamentary elections – normally due in the fall of 2000, but called early for April 2000. Even though foreign policy as such did not figure highly in the pre-electoral agenda, Helsinki was an example of Simitis’ pragmatic approach to politics and his unequivocal commitment to modernization and the goal of accession to the Eurozone. PASOK’s electoral campaign centered on the question of experience and of which of the two parties had the most coherent concept for the country. In this respect, Helsinki was one policy area where ND could be presented to be incoherent and unreliable vis-à-vis PASOK’s clear-cut conception and managerial capabilities. ND on the other hand neutralized foreign policy as a campaign issue by emphasizing its own identity as the European party par excellence, its support for Cyprus’ European accession and for normalization with Turkey, and for better relations with the Balkan countries (2000 ND Foreign Policy Programme).

The elections of 2000 were extremely closely contested. As in Greece the electoral law essentially secured an absolute majority of seats to the first party 142, PASOK’s and ND’s competition became a dead heat. Despite PASOK enjoying numerous advantages as a governing party (control of governmental services, better access to the media, milking Simitis’ standing as the most suitable Prime Minister in opinion polls), ND almost managed to upset it and beat it to the first place. In the end, PASOK won the

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142 Since 1958 all Greek elections have been held under varieties of a ‘strengthened proportionality’ system. The goal of this system has been to allow the first party to form a parliamentary majority and, by implication, to increase the effect of bipolarity in the party system (Mavrogordatos 1984: 163). Since 1993 all electoral laws of this variety contain a 3% entry clause to Parliament.
election with just 1% of the vote more than ND. Both parties increased their appeal and combined they polled 87%, thus reversing the tendencies of weakening the bipolarity that had become evident in 1996. The big loser of the elections was the Left, and especially DIKKI that had failed to enter Parliament (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 277).

Even though foreign policy was not the big determinant of the election outcome, we can still ponder how ND would have altered the plan laid down in Helsinki had it won the elections. Instead, PASOK’s victory meant that ND hastily accepted PASOK’s policies and they were thus institutionalized as part of Greek foreign policy identity. Greece’s European link, the need to secure membership in the Eurozone, and normalization with Turkey. The new balance between the modernist and the irredentist pillar of foreign policy – i.e. the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations and the prioritization of Greece’s Western ties over a principled pursuit of the maximum goals in bilateral relations with Turkey – became institutionalized by virtue of PASOK’s victory. In this, as in many other respects, the party system had entered a period of irreversible policy convergence between the two main parties (Lyrintzis 2005: 254).

DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: CLEAVAGES, PARTY STRATEGIES AND REFORMULATION OF THE DIMENSION OF COMPETITION

The foreign policy change recorded in Helsinki was the visible expression of a deep realignment within the party system, of the relationship between the main political parties and the reformulation of the normative anchor of party competition. The fact that Greece decided to combine the imperatives of Europeanization and pursuit of differently stratified national goals was in and of itself an impressive evolution given that just a few years earlier Greek foreign policy was functioning under premises of antagonism with neighbors and defiance towards Europe. It can however be compared with the equally impressive evolution of the binary competition between PASOK and ND from one of apocalyptic polarization, until the early 1990s, to one of policy convergence and loosening of the differences of their social outlook at the end of the decade. Foreign policy change was both the outcome and, to a certain extent, a condition for this evolution of the bipolar party system from political and social polarization between opposing poles into a convergent competition between very similar parties.

The era of polarization between PASOK and ND finished essentially with the elections of 1993, the last ones contested by Papandreou and Mitsotakis. These would be the last elections where two coherent blocs of divergent class and social outlooks faced each other. ND suffered a defeat, a breakaway party formed over the single issue of Macedonia managed to enter Parliament and Mitsotakis, was forced to stand down. The Macedonia name issue exacerbated the division within ND as the main bourgeois party between conservatives, claiming the legacy of Constantine Karamanlis and, through him, of the anti-Venizelist camp, and liberals claiming the bourgeois-modernizing legacy of
Venizelos, mostly coalesced around Mitsotakis. That division was total, in the sense that it pitted two coherent policy visions that spanned economic and foreign policy (Pappas and Dinas 2006: 487). Karamanlists matched an aversion to Mitsotakis’ class-conscious neoliberal policies with a nationalistic posture on the Macedonia issue. Without distancing themselves from Europe (which was Karamanlis’ greatest legacy after all), they seemed to favor policies that only hardly fit in with the imperatives of Greece’s economic rationalization and convergence of foreign policy with Europe. The pinnacle of the Karamanlists’ influence came when their leader, and bitter rival of Mitsotakis, Miltiades Evert was elected as leader of ND. Evert proceeded to radically alter the party’s course by vocally distancing himself from the record of the Mitsotakis government in the economy, while it heightened its nationalist rhetoric in foreign policy (Vernardakis 2011: 210-211).

Table 17
The Last Elections of an Era: The Elections of 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Votes %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAN (ND breakaway)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN (reformed left)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though PASOK won easily in 1993 and Papandreou returned triumphantly to power, he was not the same man as he had been in the 1980s. PASOK embarked on a policy of fiscal consolidation much like Mitsotakis had (Lyrintzis 2005: 246). The only thing that was left to remind anyone of the party’s 1980s radicalism was a nationalist overtone in the foreign policy towards FYROM and Turkey. But even then, the party had graduated from the years when the framework of the Cold War allowed foreign policy adventurism. Just as Karamanlis had in the 1970s, PASOK was discovering Europe as a possible alternative locus of foreign policy (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006: 500-501).

The 1993-1996 period is considered a transitional period for the Greek party system (Vernardakis 2011: 3-6). The Greek public started presenting visible signs of fatigue with party politics. Ideological self-placements on the Left-Right scale, reflecting historically the coalescence of voters around the three camps rather than ideological preferences, started presenting less polarization, and the appeal of parties (despite still strong degrees of partisan attachment) withered away (Mavris 1997: 179-182; Pappas 2001: 92-93; Vernardakis 2011: 165). In this climate, the conditions for increased voter volatility between political parties were created. This in turn created receptivity among the public for new ideas and the conditions for partisan actors to promote coherent policy visions
more efficiently (Alexakis 2001: 119-121). Both made the position of what had seemed like pervasive and systemically entrenched populism precarious.

Papandreou’s ailing health precipitated a government crisis and a months-long thriller about his succession throughout 1995. A constellation of institutional and strategic factors arose then to favor the relatively small faction of the modernizers within PASOK to take over around Simitis. While hospitalized since the end of 1995, Papandreou finally agreed to step down as Prime Minister, while retaining his post as PASOK leader. This meant that the new Prime Minister would be elected from PASOK’s parliamentary group, thus giving the winner an important head start in the race to lead the party as well (Vernardakis 2011: 241). Despite the fact that all three of Simitis’ opponents were renowned political heirs of Papandreou’s economic populism and nationalism, he managed to carry the vote and be elected Prime Minister in January 1996.

The importance of party system dynamics for this development becomes evident if one considers that Simitis’ surprise victory was to a large extent attributed to PASOK’s MPs calculation as to who would be better able to lead the party to victory against ND (Keridis 2001: 7). With Papandreou’s populism now more effectively represented by Evert, a continuation with Papandreou’s ideology would threaten to force PASOK to compete in a crowded field with uncertain results (Mavris 1997: 182-183; Vernardakis 2011: 242). Simitis instead promised a coherent modernization plan across the board that would allow PASOK to outflank ND in its game (Europe and the rationalization of the economy) and to bring the party closer to the catch-all, cross-class tradition of Venizelism that had briefly characterized PASOK at the time of its impressive victory in 1981 (Mavrogordatos 1983b; Vernardakis 2011: 21, 26). Simitis’ modernization project envisaged a thorough restructuring of the economy along neoliberal lines (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006: 503-504), which in turn was packaged in a new grand design for Greece’s convergence with Europe (symbolized as the entry in Economic and Monetary Union as the ultimate goal). ‘Modernization as Europeanization’ challenged almost all established policy preferences of PASOK and its identity as representative of the radical Antiright pole of Greek politics. But Simitis also promised to make PASOK more appealing to a big part of a reform-minded middle class (the younger parts of which had been created due to PASOK’s generous welfare policies of the 1980s) that was unrepresented under the current constellation of the party system (Keridis 2001: 7-8; Vernardakis 2011: 38-39).

Simitis’ strategy was eventually vindicated with his win in the party convention in the summer of 1996 against his main Papandreist foe and in the elections of September 1996 against Evert. These elections were notable for the marked decrease of polarization it brought between the main parties, increased voter volatility that spanned all three political camps and, as a result of Simitis’ win within PASOK, the creation of a PASOK breakaway party claiming Papandreou’s legacy (DIKKI) and an increase of the vote for the two leftist parties, KKE and the Coalition of the Left (SYN) (Mavris 1997: 184-186;
Nicolacopoulos 2005: 276). In all, the 1996 elections produced an interesting change in the outlook of the social coalitions supporting the two main parties. Simitis’ promises of modernization and Europeanization attracted a substantial part of the middle class (and even the upper middle class) audience from ND. It was enough to make up for losses to the Left that exclusively came from PASOK’s lower strata audience. Evert’s populism on the other hand allowed ND to retain its support among lower-income strata (Mavris 1997: 186-193; Vernardakis 2011: 102-106).

Table 18
Transition and Uncertainty: The Elections of 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Vote %</th>
<th>Change over 1993 %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>+2.2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIKKI(PASOK breakaway)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>+4.4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAN</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>+0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the elections of 1996 the two parties, distant heirs of the Venizelist and anti-Venizelist political identities and structural positions in the party system, rediscovered their cross-class appeal that had previously characterized Greek politics for most of the time before the advent of ideological polarization in the 1980s (Keridis 1999: 36). In a roundabout way, the Right camp was slowly reverting to its traditional identity as home of conservative and protectionist groups, while PASOK, as a continuation in the policy space of the centrist camp, was putting back together a dynamic coalition of both liberal modernizing and petit-bourgeois radical elements (Nicolacopoulos 1997: 205-207). These results were both an opportunity and a risk for Simitis as the rise of the Left made PASOK dependent on the success of modernization, but it also meant that lagging progress would raise impatience with the traditional PASOK mechanism. Even though the memory of the Imia crisis was still fresh in the minds of Greeks in 1996, enough so as to force Simitis to maintain a hard line electoral discourse, the electoral result essentially put in place a coalition that could be kept together only if PASOK delivered on its expressed goals of modernization and Europeanization (Athanassopoulou 1997: 87-88; Mavris 1997: 195). This was far from a certain prospect given the party’s internal composition and unease among most cadres with the prospect of PASOK abandoning its role as the leading force of an anti-bourgeois pole.

Policy confusion reigned in ND after the 1996 defeat, and it was resolved only with the election of a youthful leader, Kostas Karamanlis, in 1997. Karamanlis sought to
rationalize the party’s turn towards populism under Evert. Faced with Simitis’ consistent vision of modernization and Europeanization that threatened to take over ND’s traditional flagship policies, Karamanlis decided to build on Evert’s inroads into the petit-bourgeois vote in order to highlight the hardships emanating from Simitis’ policy, while he unequivocally committed his party to EMU and the European orientation, criticizing the government on the practicalities and tactics of this policy (Alexakis 2001: 118). This policy of ‘triangulation’ (pressuring PASOK both from the right and the left) sought to make ND a cross-class coalition of pro-European middle-class and disenchanted radical strata, a task greatly dependent on Karamanlis’ personal charisma (Pappas and Dinas 2006: 491).143

The bumps and lags in the implementation of the new Europeanized foreign policy coincided with the struggles Simitis and the modernizers faced with the implementation of their domestic program (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 14). Throughout 1997 structural reforms were hard to implement (Vernardakis 2011: 46) and, after Karamanlis’ election as leader of ND, PASOK was constantly lagging in opinion polls until the Fall of 1999 (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 277). PASOK lost the 1998 municipal elections and the June 1999 European elections – which also meant the first victory of ND in a decade (Pappas and Dinas 2006: 482). These last elections appeared to cement the process of fragmentation of the party system, as PASOK and ND won less than 70% of the votes combined, and the parties of the Left won 21%. Even though this percentage was more striking theoretically than it was politically relevant (due to the very different ideological baggage of the parties of the Left), it still signaled how precarious the reconciliation of PASOK’s radical heritage and new policy orthodoxy was – and by extension, the risks entailed for a party reliant on exploiting its central position in the party system increased substantially (Vernardakis 2011: 58-60).

In summation, calling the 1993-1996 period ‘transitional’ today, as Vernardakis does, is accurate but constitutes an ex post facto reading of party systemic developments. From a contemporary viewpoint, the transitional period continued in many ways beyond the 1996 election. PASOK’s problematic implementation of its new foreign policy in 1997-1998 could very well be attributed to the uncertain position of Simitis and his team within PASOK and Greek society in general (Athanassopoulou 1997: 98) and the difficulty of the party to absorb the policy changes and the new strategy they entailed. In other words, the 1996 coalition Simitis had created was rather precarious, as was his ambition to make modernization the new normative anchor of party competition. While ND had reverted to a pro-European policy of modernization and economic rationalization as well, PASOK was in danger of losing its main strategic advantage, which was its dominance of the majoritarian radical populist pole of the Right-Antiright axis that structured Greek politics. The successful normative reformulation of the stakes of this

143 ND’s electoral strategy was the brainchild of John Loulis, Karamanlis’ chief communications advisor (Vernardakis 2011: 54). See Loulis (2004).
axis (which would allow PASOK to update its traditional policy of exploiting its center position while maintaining the bipolar character of party competition) (Mavrogordatos 1984: 161; Moschonas 1994: 176-177) and the implementation of a new foreign policy would prove to be mutually constitutive processes.

HELPS INK, VISIONS OF DOMESTIC SOCIETY AND THE NORMATIVE REFORMULATION OF BIPOLAR COMPETITION

The decision of Greece to consent to the EU giving Turkey candidate member status in Helsinki in December 1999 was a major departure, not only from what had been up until then established orthodoxy of Greek foreign policy, but also from the most advanced proposals for negotiation and moderation that had existed before. Whereas the basic goals of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey remained unaltered (as bequeathed from the long tradition of irredentism and nationalism), i.e. retaining the territorial integrity of Greece in the Aegean and ensuring the security of the Republic of Cyprus while promoting reunification of the island (Tsakonas 2010: 53), there was a thorough reevaluation of the values and means to achieve those goals (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 9). The new logic of relations with Turkey, encapsulating the idea that improvement of relations, more communication and embedding of bilateral differences and the Cyprus question within a European framework, served precisely the strategic goals the previous policy of adversity had failed to address. This new logic also reflected PASOK modernizing wing’s consistent project of ‘Europeanization’: liberalization and rationalization of economy domestically, and anchoring of Greece in the core of European integration, chiefly the EMU (Keridis 1999: 45-46; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 9-10). From this it becomes evident that for the Simitis government domestic and foreign policy goals were closely interlinked (Tsakonas 2010: 54-55), and in this way the patterns of opposition and support for Helsinki reveal an emerging axis of competition around the project of Europeanization of Greek society and politics.

The rise of new foreign policy ideas within the PASOK government, the ruling party at the time, as well as Greek society at large cannot be divorced from the concomitant rise of the twin concepts of ‘modernization’ and ‘Europeanization’ as main goals of PASOK’s economic and social policy. Indeed, in many ways the main determining battle was not between PASOK and its opponents, but between the two big camps that had been crystallized during the protracted crisis of succession of Andreas Papandreou in the end of 1995 and early 1996 (Tsardanidis 1998: 304-305). During his first three years in the leadership of PASOK (1996-1999) Simitis had to constantly strike a balance between his own proclivities towards liberal policies and a pragmatic foreign policy, and the representatives of the rival wing of Papandreists (Athanassopoulou 1997: 84, 86). This split went beyond personal ambitions or even ideological differences within the same party; deciding in favor of one or the other direction was also a choice between a
perpetuation of the Right-Antiright axis of competition (Kalyvas 1997: 93-94) or a reformulation of it by allowing the modernization-populism latent axis to overlie it.

The sudden rise of the Helsinki conception of foreign policy goals was so rapid in the second half of 1999 (Heraclides 2007: 194; Tsakonas 2010: 75) that it can only be compared with the equally rapid consolidation of the modernizing project within the government itself (Tsakonas 2010: 77) and a recovery from two years of lagging economic reforms and poor showing in the opinion polls. The impressive improvement of relations with Turkey after September 1999 was perhaps the most vital element of this sturdy return from the brink of failure: it captured in a highly emotive policy initiative both Simitis’ bold approach towards Greece’s problems and his ability to play a game of high stakes and win. Indeed, the time of the Helsinki Council was also seen as the final turning point after which PASOK was in the driver’s seat, being trusted by the public opinion on two issues that seemed to resonate positively (EMU and foreign policy) (Kathimerini, 16/12/1999b; Vernardakis 2011: 26). This parallel process of the consolidation of the modernizers’ agenda inside PASOK made the decision to initiate a sensational foreign policy change in Helsinki institutionally and politically possible. In hindsight, Simitis himself has admitted that securing his position within PASOK and projecting his goals on the party’s agenda made a crucial difference for the pursuit of Greek-Turkish rapprochement to its logical extent (Tsakonas 2010: 77).

In turn, Helsinki became a policy initiative that promised to complete an important systemic change. PASOK’s electoral strategy of the past was based on an anti-Right polarizing rhetoric that established the party as the main expression of the ‘democratic’ pole (thus usurping the strength of the Left) while it attracted the support of voters of the Center camp still mobilized by an anti-Right ethos. By identifying PASOK with the modernizing side of the latent cross-party modernizing-populist cleavage (Keridis 1999: 45), and by redefining the meaning of ‘progressivism’ as against conservative forces of stagnation (Lyrintzis 2005: 251; Vernardakis 2011: 21), PASOK could reinvent the meaning of anti-Right strategy and complement it again with a centrist strategy – this time towards new middle class, non-ideological strata looking for efficient governance and economic rationalization (Vernardakis 2011: 9-10, 38-42). Once the modernizing faction imposed its agenda, and by extension this new particular reading of the party’s structural position, within PASOK during the fall of 1999, a policy initiative that would cement the party’s new dual identity and reshape the party system accordingly became both possible and desirable. Given that foreign policy successes like the ‘earthquake diplomacy’ had played a major part in the consolidation of the modernizing agenda within PASOK, foreign policy could be such a policy initiative.

144 It is characteristic that, whereas Helsinki was met with huge popular approval in December 1999, in October 1999 50% of the population still were claiming in opinion polls to be against lifting the veto on Turkey (Tsakonas 2010: 216, note 309).
Just as Simitis had to fight, first and foremost, within PASOK to consolidate modernization, and by extension Europeanization of foreign policy, as the unequivocal policy of the party, ND only found its place within the new dimension of competition gradually and after it had healed some of the wounds left behind from the painful division between conservatives and liberals. While the party’s new youthful image brought it back from the wilderness (as evidenced in its victories in the 1998 prefectural and 1999 European elections), by late 1999 ND was trapped in an awkward position as it had to practice opposition against policies with which it agreed with in essence. Karamanlis opted for a persistent strategy of proposing better means towards the same goals, while promising to mitigate some of the consequences of Simitis’ one-minded policies. This pattern was to repeat itself in foreign policy as well: whereas Karamanlis’ strategy of turning ND back to the essential modernizing bourgeois image the Right enjoyed under Karamanlis the elder and Mitsotakis also went through an emphasis on the need for improved relations with Turkey and moderation in foreign policy, the need to placate populist nationalists inside the party and expand the party’s appeal to popular strata threatened by modernization also dictated a critique of initiatives that seemed to run away with Europeanization to the detriment of firmly defined Greek positions.

The imposition of modernization as PASOK’s main policy also caused a movement on the Left of the party, the sum result of which was the increase of the self-demarcation of the parties of the Left from what they presented as an undifferentiated bipolar block committed to neoliberalism and austerity. With PASOK turning slowly into a more bourgeois party, the parties of the Left tried to claim for themselves the role of genuine representatives of the Antiright side of the old normative anchor. In this context, they were also maintaining the main foreign policy rhetoric of the radical populist pole about sovereignty, independence and unwillingness to yield Greece’s rights for the cause of European or Western integration (Keridis 1999: 48).

In summary, the patterns of support and opposition to Helsinki captured the establishment of a new meaning of bipolar competition by late 1999 with accuracy. This new meaning was the result of the persistence of the existing Right-Antiright axis that separated PASOK and ND and informed a big part of their social outlook still, and the interaction of this axis with the new cleavage between modernizers and populists that seemed to cut through the old leftist radical pole, separating PASOK from the other parties of the Left. Foreign policy is an accurate marker of this emerging axis in that not only is a big part of the differences between modernizers and populists attributed to their differences on Europe, but this cleavage first became evident during the foreign policy controversies of the early 1990s, when differences on the Macedonia name issue cut through ND, PASOK and the Left.

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145 On the persistence of the Right-Antiright axis vis-à-vis the crosscutting modernization cleavage, see also Moschonas (1994: 202). The same author of course accepts that this axis can be reformulated or updated through interaction with other cleavages (ibid: 208-210).
Consequently, from mid-1999 onwards there was an undergoing process for the establishment of a ‘convergent two-partyism’ (Vernardakis 2011: 57) between PASOK and ND, with both parties manipulating the old as well as the new axis of competition: PASOK would energize the anti-Right rhetoric of the past in order to compensate for the hardships associated with the austerity it was imposing, whereas ND would seek to combine modernization with social justice in an effort to bridge the old bourgeois-radical divide (the results of this strategy had already become evident in the elections of 1998 and 1999, Alexakis 2001: 122-123). The victims of this strategy were the parties of the Left, whose anti-modernization and nationalistic discourse ensured them their isolation from the vast pro-European bloc without allowing them to counter either the dominance of PASOK within the Left-radical pole or ND’s successful inroads into it. The heated foreign policy discussion of December 1999 was one important stop in the course of revitalization of bipolar competition around the stake of modernization between 1996 and 2000.

The domestic program of PASOK, practiced since 1996 but only raised to the status of unequivocal identity of the party from 1999 onwards, was summarized under the buzzword ‘modernization’. It included a program of privatizations, market liberalization and a balancing of the state budget. Given the neoliberal nature of this specific interpretation of modernization, which had proven already very divisive during the Mitsotakis term (1990-1993), Simitis needed a more inspirational and unifying theme within which to embed his program. Just as Karamanlis had in the 1970s, Simitis found it in Europe. ‘Europeanization’ became the inseparable element of his program of modernization, with domestic neoliberal reforms presented as needed for Greece to enter the EMU. Greece in the hard core of Europe became the overarching goal, and all other policies (domestic and foreign) had to serve it (Tsardanidis 1998: 315; Kranidiotis 2000: 32; Economides 2005: 481-482; Heraclides 2007: 184). Europeanization itself was a very powerful and persuasive concept precisely because it appealed to dynamic constituencies in politics, the media and academia (Lyrintzis 2005: 251; Vernardakis 2011: 38-42).

The government spent most of December justifying the decision in Helsinki and establishing the link between the normative redefinition of Greek foreign policy priorities (if not goals) and the practical imperatives of domestic modernization. The decision to put the relationship with Turkey on a completely different footing was presented as a crucial step of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy that portrayed the country’s willingness to embed its political culture within a European framework (Kranidiotis 2000: 35). Improving relations with Turkey was supposed to portray the ability of the Greek political class, society and institutions to absorb European norms of behavior ahead of Greece’s entry into the EMU (Keridis 2001: 13; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 14-15). The government’s success in tying Turkey’s future behavior to European conditionality standards served as an insurance that Greek foreign policy would see the EU as the sole framework for bilateral relations in the future (Tsakonas 2010: 96-97). On
a more practical basis, improvement of bilateral relations promised to support the project of budgetary consolidation by allowing the lowering of defense spending, one of the largest burdens in the state budget since the deterioration of bilateral relations after the 1970s that had to decrease if Greece were to reduce its deficits ahead of joining the EMU (Couloumbis 2000: 382; Heraclides 2007: 173-174; Tsakonas 2010: 62-64). In this way, Helsinki aggressively put the stake of ‘Europeanization’ in the epicenter of political competition. The popularity of this concept among Greek public opinion (Vernardakis 2011: 26, 39) was expected to positively affect the more specific agenda of economic liberalization and rationalization.

The Helsinki Council and its effective packaging within the Europeanization discourse and the goal of the EMU caught ND off guard. From the beginning, Karamanlis was bound to follow where Simitis was going: PASOK had effectively appropriated the cause of bourgeois transformation of the economy and society, thus depriving Karamanlis of the main instruments of his conscious effort to bridge the Karamanlist and liberal wings of his party. The opposition strategy of ND foresaw a rediscovery of the party’s pro-European profile and its commitment to liberalization of the economy, and in this way there was not really much to say about the government’s goals towards EMU and modernization. By the same token, improving relations with Turkey had traditionally been the prerogative of ND governments and a historical trademark of the Right camp as it tried to secure Greece’s Western anchoring since the 1950s. The transformation of ND’s profile also meant then that the party was devoid of effective opposition arguments against Helsinki, as it also understood that improving relations with Turkey was an important precondition for closer anchoring to Europe (Heraclides 2007: 198; Tsakonas 2010: 98).

The analogy of the opposition tactics of ND in domestic and foreign policy accurately captured Karamanlis’ desire to make ND the party of ‘the middle ground’, a term introduced by him and which was meant as an ideological synthesis that would bridge the Right’s cross-class collectivist tradition, the updating of this tradition through his uncle’s pro-European modernization, and the more aggressive class-based bourgeois liberalism of the liberal wing of the party. This concept could bridge ND’s essentially pro-European neoliberal economic program with a more caring discourse towards modernization’s losers. By the same token, ND’s opposition to the Helsinki decision represented the effort of Karamanlis to update the bourgeois pole’s traditional moderation in foreign policy with a renewed emphasis on the concerns of the more radical/populist social strata, about Turkish aggression and Greek independence and territorial integrity:

‘The sloppiness and experimentalism with which dialogue with Turkey is attempted today, is a serious cause for concern. It should not be forgotten that the institutional and

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146 Indeed, as evidence of ND’s fragmentation in the debate, parts of the liberal-conservative press tried not to discredit Helsinki, but to actually claim it for ND. See Eleftheros Typos (13/12/1999).
social structures of Turkey are chronically unstable. This makes on the one hand Turkey unable to express a strong political will for its true Europeanization, and on the other hand weakens its credibility as an interlocutor’ (The Government Program of New Democracy, March 2000: 31).

Conversely, a typical exponent of the bourgeois liberal wing of the Right-wing camp (but not a member of ND anymore), Stefanos Manos praised the agreement, not only as a foreign policy choice that ‘served national interests’ but also because a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey would open up opportunities for Greek business in Turkey. In this way, ‘Hellenism would again reach its historical limits of action’ (in.gr, 11/12/1999a). Manos’ argumentation then presented a foreign policy choice as an opportunity for economic growth in Greece, thus bringing up memories of Venizelos’ rationale for the rapprochement with Turkey in the 1930s.

Immediately after Helsinki, the government’s fortunes seemed to have turned dramatically, so much so that it was a foregone conclusion that Simitis would call snap elections before the October 2000 expiration of his term. He indeed did so, calling elections for April 2000. The campaign period revealed that for the first time the two parties were so close in policy terms – yet this similarity also meant that they were running neck and neck to capture first place. Both parties agreed on the fundamental goal of EMU and what this entailed (reduction of deficits, reduction of inflation, market liberalization etc.) (Lyrintzis 2005: 254); yet a difference of approaches was still discernible. Where PASOK’s links with public sector unions and a class of state-reliant businessmen meant that the party’s modernization did not go beyond fiscal consolidation and deregulation of a few key sectors (like banking) (Vernardakis 2011: 43), ND emphasized its commitment to more thorough structural changes and a focus on private enterprise (Lyrintzis 2005: 245; Vernardakis 2011: 54).

Helsinki was a marginal issue in the election campaign, reflecting the essential agreement of the two major parties on the key issue of Greece’s international orientation, the effort to be part of ‘hard core Europe’. Karamanlis, in particular, was hoping to keep out of public discourse an issue that had proven Simitis’ statesmanship and had contributed to the consolidation of the modernizing faction within PASOK and public opinion. The dominance of the economy did not allow PASOK to make Helsinki a proper issue of the electoral campaign, however foreign policy was always in the background reminding of Simitis’ ability to link the domestic with the international imperatives of Europeanization. Simitis himself had called Helsinki ‘the happiest moment of his first term’ (Rizospastis, 4/4/2000) and a month before the elections dedicated the introductory speech of his pre-electoral press conference to Helsinki and foreign policy. The leitmotiv of Simitis and PASOK was that Helsinki demonstrated the government’s ability to incorporate European norms and bring Greece closer to Europe while serving long-standing Greek interests:
The first central goal [of our foreign policy] is the further strengthening of Greece’s position and role in the EU [...] With our entry in the common currency, the euro, we ensure the equal position of Greece within the strongest group of member-states [...] Our strategic goal is to promote the process of overcoming problems in Greek-Turkish relations by taking full advantage of the decisions of the Helsinki Council. I don’t have to add that after Helsinki Greek-Turkish relations are in a completely new framework. Greece’s argument and support in its relations with Turkey are the values of the Union [...] 147.

In this way, if anything, Helsinki contributed to the general image of capable management and reliability which PASOK cultivated for itself and the argument that ND was too inexperienced to take over at a delicate time for Greece’s EMU prospects. Indeed, the split between the Karamanlist and the liberal wing within the ND became the topic of a campaign ad for PASOK, thus highlighting that ND was not ‘ready’ to lead the country and that a loss of PASOK would put Greece’s European convergence policy in peril148. ND’s perceived inexperience and populism were a recurrent theme of PASOK’s campaign:

‘I ask you, does Greece’s international position compare with its international position in 1996? Today we are a country with strength, with status, with voice. Today we are a force of peace in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe. Where would we be if we had heard the cries of the opposition’149?

Just as the patterns of support and opposition to Helsinki revealed a growing tendency of convergence between the two main parties, with PASOK’s unequivocal commitment to Europeanization and ND’s enhancing of its economically liberal message with more populist undertones, so did Helsinki contribute to the eventual marginalization of the forces to the left of PASOK as they were left alone defending a populist nationalist stance that highlighted the contradictions between Greece’s national goals and its European orientation. For DIKKI, a PASOK offshoot with the declared goal of continuing the Papandreist revolution of the 1980s in domestic and foreign policy (Keridis 2001: 9), Helsinki was understandably an important cause. DIKKI expressed its absolute disagreement with Europeanization in both domestic and foreign policy, citing dangers for the standing of the Greek popular classes and the independence and sovereignty of the Greek state.

149 Simitis speech at PASOK’s major electoral rally, Athens, April 7 2000.

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KKE’s position was also revealing of the party’s strategy after the fall of Communism and the 1993 electoral debacle. KKE slowly started complementing its ideological rigidity with an idiosyncratic blend of nationalism and authoritarianism – what Lyrantzis (2005: 256) has called ‘nationalist-populism’ and Marantzidis (2009) has accurately described as a new ‘ethnopolulism’ (also Vernarkias 2011: 299-301). In foreign policy terms, this meant supporting positions that fell squarely within the Greek populist nationalist tradition such as anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism in general (which it had supported already since the 1970s and 1980s, Heraclides 2007: 160), and seeing Helsinki both as a policy underlining Greece’s anchoring within a neoliberal capitalist EU and as a policy sacrificing Greek rights for the sake of Western orientation.

Helsinki caused the most interesting developments in the party of the reformed Left, the Coalition of Left and Progress (SYN). SYN had started off as a self-conscious pro-European reformist party of the Left. This meant that the rise of Simitis within PASOK placed enormous pressure on the party, with many cadres leaving altogether to join PASOK. Those who stayed squabbled between a modernizing/center-left faction and a post-communist/radical faction (Vernarkias 2011: 276-283). Predictably, Helsinki divided SYN precisely along these lines also reflecting different approaches towards modernization. The moderates supported Helsinki as another step in the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy and polity in general, whereas the leftists had a position closer to the one of the other Left-wing parties, seeing the agreement as a concession to Turkey and a threat to Greece’s independence. The president of the party (himself a moderate) had to verbally balance these two views, but the cacophony increased the sense that SYN was basically two parties in one, split neatly on almost every aspect of domestic and foreign policy (To Vima, 10/12/1999 and 12/12/1999). Nevertheless, the party generally portrayed a profile more associated with moderation and pacifism than the belligerent DIKKI or the revolutionary KKE (To Vima 11/12/1999).

The 2000 election results reflected the rise and consolidation of a renewed two-partyism around a reformulated normative anchor. PASOK managed to narrowly beat ND by almost 70000 votes to the first place and form a government with a 6-seat majority in parliament. The results reflected a huge majority in favor of the basic decision for Greece to enter the euro-zone (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 277).
Table 19
Resurgent Two-Partyism: The Elections of 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Vote %</th>
<th>Change over 1996 %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>+2.3</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>+4.6</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIKKI</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAN</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even more impressive is the post-election analysis of the two parties’ social outlooks. The consolidation of modernization as the new official ideology of PASOK allowed the party to make impressive inroads towards middle-class and, to some extent, upper middle-class social strata, which had been almost exclusive property of the bourgeois Right pole until then. This, together with the party’s sustained dominance of the working class and petit bourgeois vote thanks to the existence of the always-vocal Papandreist wing, allowed Simitis to complete the construction of a cross-class coalition that had started in 1996. Here foreign policy was important in a rather unlikely way: While foreign minister Papandreou was a devoted modernizer, his defense of Helsinki offered Simitis valuable credibility in the eyes of Papandreist nationalists and populists within PASOK. The reason was apparently that Papandreou was seen as the keeper of his father’s nationalist legacy. In this way, his argumentation actually made Helsinki a further uniting factor of PASOK’s new coalition when it could also have been divisive (Tsakonas 2010: 78, 96).

ND on the other hand improved its position in relation to 1996, but this increase of votes was not the result of linear movements. Instead, increased volatility, which after 1996 had become an entrenched phenomenon of Greek politics (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 276), meant that ND had lost many upper middle-class votes to PASOK, but also that it was able to compensate them with impressive (for its standards) penetration of the petit bourgeois, working class and farmer vote (Vernardakis 2011: 113-119 and elsewhere). The success of ND’s socially conscious discourse against PASOK’s fundamentalist program of modernization was evident, for example, in that it managed to attract as many votes from populist leftist DIKKI as PASOK did150.

150 For an analysis of electoral flows between parties in the elections of 2000, see Zafiropoulos (2001). His analysis reveals that increased individual voting volatility continued being a pervasive phenomenon of the Greek party system after 1996. Very interestingly, ND presented an equally formidable ability as PASOK to attract votes from DIKKI, SYN and even KKE, while PASOK attracted many of the votes that had gone
Table 20
From Social Blocs to Electoral Alliances
Estimation of party strength in selected urban prefectures by socioeconomic area in the 1993, 1996 and 2000 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PASOK 93 %</th>
<th>ND 93 %</th>
<th>PASOK &gt;ND 93 %</th>
<th>PASOK 96 %</th>
<th>ND 96 %</th>
<th>PASOK &gt;ND 96 %</th>
<th>PASOK 2000 %</th>
<th>ND 2000 %</th>
<th>PASOK &gt;ND 2000 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Result</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>+7.6</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>+3.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Middle Class Areas</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>-52.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>-21.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>-17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class Areas</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>+2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petit-Bourgeois Areas</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>+9.2</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>+8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class Areas</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>+26.0</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>+16.1</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>+14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Vernardakis (2011: 98-99, 113-115).151

These data reveal that the strategies of the two biggest parties now allowed them to manipulate the old Right-Antiright axis and the new populism-modernisation cleavage in order to build cross-class coalitions around the normative anchor of domestic modernization and Europeanization. Both parties had their traditional social and geographic strongholds (PASOK remained stronger among its traditional petit bourgeois clientele and ND did as well among its upper class following), thus to a certain extent maintaining the old Right-Antiright division – especially exploited by PASOK when it reverted to its polarizing discourse to energize its petit bourgeois following. But party strategies and the manipulation of the modernizing-populist cleavage also allowed the two parties to bridge the traditional Left-Right division – essentially exchanging votes in each other’s strongholds to create cross-class coalitions with similar outlooks (Vernardakis 2011: 164). While the Right-Left axis remained a strong marker of voters’ and parties’ self-placement (Vernardakis 2011: 173-174), and the modernization axis was
to POLAN (ND’s breakaway party) in 1996. This data show that the robust two-partyism established after 2000 relied on both big parties’ ability to find votes all over the political spectrum and all over the socioeconomic sphere.

151 Vernardakis’ Greek terminology of the social strata is translated literally as ‘upper class, ‘upper middle class’, ‘middle class’ and ‘working/popular class’ respectively.
effectively suppressed due to PASOK’ and ND’s agreement in principle on Greece’s European course, the party strategies of modernizers within PASOK and Karamanlis within ND led to the emergence of a renewed robust two-party system.

The new normative anchor of bipolar competition straddling, while not completely eliminating, the old division in a bourgeois and a radical pole only arose gradually. This reevaluation of the stakes of competition – which party can better manage modernization while retaining a degree of welfare for the people (Keridis 1999: 33) – was conceptually underpinned by a reevaluation of Greece’s place in its region and its strategy towards Turkey. Foreign policy successes supported the process of consolidation of the Simitis team within PASOK, and Helsinki was the final step in the consolidation of modernization and Europeanization as the stake of party competition (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 14-15). Patterns of support and opposition to Helsinki closely corresponded to PASOK’s and ND’s efforts to build broad cross-class (if somewhat colorless) coalitions, with the modernization of the economy as a point of reference (Nicolopoulos 2005: 277; Pappas and Dinas 2006: 482; Vernardakis 2011: 160-163). The slight tilt towards populism in ND’s economic discourse (Tsoukalis 2000: 41) was matched with a slight tilt towards the nationalism pillar of foreign policy in the party’s critique against Helsinki. In sum, foreign policy change was the result of the rise within PASOK of a new conception of party competition that created new patterns of interaction among parties – and effective argumentation in favor of this foreign policy change with regards to visions of domestic society completed the transition to the new normative anchor in both main parties. Being a foreign policy issue however, Helsinki had to be justified with reference to international systemic requirements on Greek foreign policy – especially towards a public with historically high (and sometimes passionate) interest in foreign affairs.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND PARTISAN AGENCY: HELSINKI AS A LINK BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC REALIGNMENT

The end of the Cold War, Turkey’s new strategic ambitions (as evidenced in its role during the Gulf War and in a new security partnership with Israel) and newfound regional aspirations, the collapse of the Balkans and the disagreements between Europe and the United States about the management of these new realities caught Greece completely off guard (Tsoukalis 2000: 44-45; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 8). The Macedonia name issue captured a wider social reality in Greece in an intense way. It captured the inability of the party system and the public to reconcile this radically changed regional environment with Greece’s twin foreign policy pillars of belonging to Europe and defending territorial integrity and independence. Seen as an issue of reverse defensive irredentism, Greek concerns over Macedonia painfully portrayed that in the post-Cold War environment Greek foreign policy had lost its equilibrium between the demands of
modernization and Western integration, and defense of the country’s irredentist gains and integrity (Keridis 2001: 11; Economides 2005: 479-480). The collapse of the Mitsotakis government was a stark instant of this uncertainty over Greece’s international orientation energizing political identities that cut through existing political alignments.

Relations between Greece and its neighbors continued to deteriorate under a spiral of rival nationalisms throughout the mid-1990s, culminating in the fateful Imia crisis of January 1996. The consensus among Greek foreign policy analysts is that this crisis, taking place merely days after Costas Simitis had taken over as Prime Minister, prompted a thorough reevaluation of Greece’s foreign policy priorities, mostly the degree of enmity in bilateral relations with Turkey (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 10). However, the Imia crisis was revelatory of structural processes that had plagued the region for some time already (Tsakonas 2010: 34-40). This point of crisis allowed for a different reading of the post-Cold War framework and Greece’s membership of the EU as opportunities, not constraints on its achieving the basic goals of foreign policy.

The EU Council decision of Helsinki in December 1999 allowed the government to finalize and project on the Greek public its own version of the new strategic environment Greece was facing. In this way the modernizer reading of Greece’s post-Cold War international environment translated international structural imperatives into domestic partisan competition and supported the creation of a powerful modernizing pole in the Greek party system around PASOK, which in turn propagated and institutionalized a new understanding of foreign policy goals.

In the modernizers’ discourse, the apparently unruly international environment of the post-Cold War era was presenting a multitude of opportunities for Greek foreign policy and not necessarily threats (Tsakonas 2010: 54). This was a position that had first surfaced within the liberal wing of the Mitsotakis government but was never carried through due to the division within ND and the Papandreou victory of 1993. This discourse started resurfacing again after 1996, first from within the system of ideological and academic justification of Europeanization that took advantage of the Imia crisis to present its view as a viable alternative to the adversarial policy of the past. The institutionalization of this view of Greece’s international environment (which could be summarized in the view that adversarial foreign policies did not help Greece fulfill its traditional foreign policy goals while pulled it away from Europe) proceeded gradually with the consolidation of the modernizing agenda within PASOK (Athanassopoulou 1997: 89-91).

The justification of Helsinki was based on an aggressive propagation of the link between Greece’s traditional foreign policy goals – defense of territorial integrity and independence – and its sustained presence within Europe. According to the government argumentation of the time, the Helsinki decision filtered the new international circumstances surrounding Greece into a European framework that allowed the country to promote its goals more efficiently:
‘Greece is a European, a Balkan and a Mediterranean country [...] The PASOK government capitalized on this triple identity of the country [...] The basic goal of foreign policy is the maximization of Greek interests by turning the country into a significant force of peace and stability, development and cooperation in the European and regional system.’

Especially the part of the agreement on Cyprus was promoted as an example of the congruence between Europeanization of Greek foreign policy style and priorities and long-term goals. Helsinki ensured that Cyprus’ accession procedure would be decoupled from resolution of the political problem of the island, thus disarming any doubts about Cyprus’ accession among Europeans and neutralizing Turkish opposition. The exchange given (Cyprus’ and Greece’s pledge to work intensely for a solution before entry into the EU and the granting of a candidate status to Turkey) was considered reasonable since Turkey would have to modify its intransigent position on Cyprus in order to capitalize on its candidate status. Europeanization of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations is also shown to be supportive of a more refined conceptualization of Greek national interests (Economides 2005: 484). It was supposed to force European norms on Turkey, thus substantially reducing Turkish aggression and increasing Greek security, as well as create a framework for negotiations between the two countries that was effectively controlled by Greece (due to its presence inside the EU). Indeed, Europeanization of bilateral relations meant that Greece could use the EU as a lever of pressure on Turkey while negotiations were underway. In this way, a complex web of mutually enforcing norms, evaluation procedures and interest promotion was being created (Heraclides 2007: 197-198; Tsakonas 2010: 80-81).

Helsinki was the more visible example of a general change of style and priorities in Greek foreign policy. While a more positive relationship with Greece’s neighbors was deemed by members of the Simitis circle positive to the extent that it assisted Greece’s course towards EMU (Tsoukalis 2000: 49-50), the government employed an interests-based argumentation that tried to justify Europeanization with the fulfillment of traditional goals of Greek nationalism. This was a testament to the strength of the existing normative framework of the conduct of Greek foreign policy since at least 1974. The insistence that, however improved bilateral relations would become, Greece should maintain a strong military deterrence against Turkey, while (somewhat paradoxically) clinging to the familiar mantra that the only difference in the Aegean concerned the continental shelf in public (Heraclides 2007: 202; Tsakonas 2010: 99-100), showed that even an ambitious reformer like Simitis could only engage with the existing framework of Greece’s foreign policy, not alter it completely. Maintaining these elements of the

adversarial view of Greece’s international environment served to placate Papandreists
within PASOK and to maintain the ability of the party to dominate the radical Antiright
camp, where nationalism and populism still held appeal (Tsakonas 2010: 97):

‘Our firm positions are well known. Greece does not demand and does not relent on
anything. Creating relations of cooperation with the neighboring country is absolutely
desirable as part of a general process for the stability and development of the region. But
deepening of cooperation needs to take place within the framework of respect for the
principles of international law and treaties. For the problem of delimitation of the
continental shelf the road to the International Court of Justice in the Hague is always
open’.

At the same time, PASOK’s foreign policy discourse also heavily promoted
international law as the general framework of policymaking, while modifying them in
order to make a contribution to world order, peace etc. (Kranidiotis 2000: 31). There
were elements of rupture and continuity in this, with regards to the matching of domestic
and foreign policy preferences of PASOK. On the one hand, PASOK’s constant
references to the UN and international institutional order was a continuation of the
discourse of Europeanization which sought to link the different arenas of Greek foreign
policy (i.e. Balkans, Turkey, Middle East etc. that were not part of the EU). In this way,
this discourse also served the goal of expanding PASOK’s appeal domestically to the
groups who saw benefits from a change of style in Greek foreign policy that brought
Greece closer to Europe and Western normality:

‘Greek foreign policy supports the principles of democracy and respect for
international law, the enhancement and development of human and social rights. It is a
policy that starts from the principle of respect of borders and territorial integrity of
everyone. The unrelenting defense of our sovereignty rights. It is a foreign policy of
principles, morals and rights’.

The emphasis on international institutions can arguably be connected with a more
socially liberal outlook PASOK was building for itself, thus reinterpreting the meaning of
‘progressivism’ in Greek politics, which until then was completely identified with

153 Speech of Simitis in the presentation of PASOK’s program ahead of the elections of April 9 2000,
Athens, 29 March 2000. Also see the references of Simitis to the ongoing buildup of the Greek army and to
deterrence as a needed complement of the policy of a ‘strong Greece’, here and in his speech in the main
154 On Simitis’ foreign policy and ‘Europeanization as normalization’, see Economides (2005: 481-487).
155 Speech of Simitis in the presentation of PASOK’s program ahead of the elections of April 9 2000,
Athens, 29 March 2000. The Helsinki conclusions also made a reference to the UN Charter as the
framework within which resolution of border disputes between candidate and member-states had to be
made (Tsakonas 2010: 93).
economic matters (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006: 503-504). This post-material turn in PASOK’s vision of itself as a social-democratic party both domestically and internationally was definitely a break from the party’s populist past (Vernardakis 2011: 172, 181). At the same time, emphasis on international order was also a reiteration of an all too familiar element in Greek foreign policy, namely the identification of Greek foreign policy goals with ‘law’ and ‘rights’. While this was done in the past in a rather impatient way (Tsoukalis 2000: 49), the new approach of the government served to embed Greek foreign policy goals within a more nuanced understanding of international law and so claimed to be promoting them better. To that extent, as with the interests-based discourse mentioned above, emphasis on international legality served to bridge the party’s old (nationalist and radical) and new (European and bourgeois) self\textsuperscript{156}.

The interpretation of the international environment offered by ND reflected the party’s attempt to find an opposition edge against the government while agreeing with the essentials of the Helsinki approach. Reflecting Karamanlis’ strategy of bridging the Karamanlist with the liberal wing of his party and a return to the party’s traditional moderate stance on foreign policy, ND also promoted a view of the post-Cold War environment as one offering opportunities for Greece to pose as a stable democracy in a difficult regional environment and to use her position within the EU to shape her environment to her liking. This presentation of the post-Cold War environment of Greece allowed ND to boost its pro-Europeanization profile, basically by buying into the government’s argument that domestic modernization and accession into the Eurozone (which had already become ND’s objectives) also went through Europeanization of foreign policy. In this respect, ND’s criticism towards PASOK both for Helsinki and for its foreign policy in general (e.g. in the Balkans) was mostly a criticism of practicalities and, if anything, a criticism of moves not bold enough to take advantage of opportunities in the regional environment:

‘Our goal is to turn Greece into an active participant of European developments [...] The Greek government formulates foreign policy impulsively, without coherence and preparation, and based on circumstances. [...] Developments in the Balkans in recent years take place in the absence of Greece and congratulations belong to Greek businessmen who dared to penetrate new markets in time’\textsuperscript{157}.

\textsuperscript{156} This discussion also challenges a certain staple of Europeanization analysis of Greek foreign policy. According to this mantra, Greek foreign policy reverted from a language of ‘rights’ in the 1980s and 1990s (implying a rigid and quasi-religious understanding of Greek foreign policy goals) to a language of ‘interests’ with Simitis (implying a nuanced understanding of what Greece really wants and can achieve) (Keridis 2001). As analysis here shows, Simitis never completely let go of the legalistic language to embed his foreign policy argumentation, just like foreign policy discourse of the past was never divorced from a view of interests and rationalism in Greek-Turkish relations.

\textsuperscript{157} Karamanlis speech presenting ND’s foreign policy program (in.gr, 15/3/2000).
At the same time, ND’s perception and translation of international realities in domestic politics also reflected the party’s more eclectic approach towards the concept of modernization and Europeanization. The populist legacy of Evert was accommodated within a neo-bourgeois policy outlook that combined modernizing and liberal fundamentals with a touch of the Right’s traditional cross-class paternalism. Within this policy mix (captured in the party strategy of the ‘middle ground’), ND also had to infuse its essential foreign policy orientation towards Europeanization of the country’s foreign relations with an element of the dominant nationalist populist bent of Greek foreign policy that dominated Greek foreign policy since the 1980s. This meant that ND combined its essential acceptance of the Europeanization of Greece’s style and priorities with a more traditional reading of the dangers accruing Turkey and the need to defend Greece’s rights in the Aegean. In the discussion about Helsinki for example, Karamanlis accused the government of giving Turkey everything it wanted without asking for a tangible gesture of moderation in return:

‘Turkey won immediately important and clear benefits, while Greece, despite it strong negotiating position, retreated from stable national positions at the most critical moment […] [T]here are no terms in the texts, Turkey has been accepted without any specific term’.

The intellectual deconstruction of Helsinki was then undertaken by Karamanlis’ foreign policy advisors, Molyviatis and Valinakis. Writing for the official journal of ND’s policy institute in 2002 and summarizing ideas that had already been echoed in a more fragmented manner in 1999-2000, Molyviatis (2002) delivered a thunderous condemnation of the government’s handlings in Helsinki, basically by reproducing the dominant view of bilateral relations since 1974 as ones of mutual distrust and competition:

‘Since 1973 Turkey has set the goal to revise the Aegean Sea regime […] The result of this negotiation will be, according to Turkey’s intention, to undermine today’s status quo in the Aegean and the establishment of a regime of equal co-sovereignty between Greece and Turkey […] Compromise is indeed a frequent method of international difference resolution. It is however unacceptable and non-implementable in the Aegean […] [C]ompromise means mutual exchanges, while in the Aegean Greece only has things to give and nothing to take’.

Since the beginning then, ND reproduced a more sanguine view of the foreign policy challenges facing Greece, recognizing that adjustments were needed in order to rebalance

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158 Karamanlis speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (Kathimerini, 16/12/1999).
159 Also see Valinakis (2000).
Greek foreign policy with the demand of domestic modernization and alignment with Europe, but that these adjustments should stop just before vital Greek interests were affected, which were supposed to remain unaltered and unaffected from developments in the country’s strategic environment (Molyviatis 2002: 37, 39-41). Despite the party’s renewed enthusiasm for Europe, in foreign policy a certain timidity towards Europe and a policy of unconditional projection of Greek interests on the European framework appeared (Marakis 2000):

‘[ND is] in favor of a European and democratic Turkey [but] the process that starts after Helsinki, without real binding terms on Turkey, constitutes a dramatic reversal from the careful stance our country has held for 25 years, with the policy of the Karamanlis, Papandreou and Mitsotakis governments, and it is very probable that the EU will adopt, on our critical national issues, a policy of equal distances between Greece and Turkey’\textsuperscript{160}.

Finally, Helsinki offered the parties of the Left the opportunity to develop their own foreign policy concepts and readings of Greece’s international environment. These were a combination of anti-Westernism, since Europeanization was deemed an unacceptable burden on Greece’s interests and abilities to meet them, and inherent hostility towards Turkey, reflecting the traditional view of the radical pole in Greek society that Greek and Turkish nationalisms were inherently hostile. The ideological justifications differed from party to party of course. Whereas DİKKİ’s stance against Helsinki was supported by a traditional nationalist and populist view of Greek-Turkish relations that emphasized Turkish aggression in the Aegean and Cyprus, KKE saw the demand of Europeanization on Greek foreign policy as emanating from a US-dominated international environment\textsuperscript{161}:

‘Mr. Simitis has given up on the basic doctrine of our foreign policy, namely that we do not discuss anything with Turkey apart from the continental shelf. With the Helsinki decisions […] Turkish demands are legitimized as Greek-Turkish differences, and through secret diplomacy, in the absence of the people, the Parliament and the parties at that’\textsuperscript{162}.

\textsuperscript{160} Karamanlis speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (\textit{in.gr}, 16/12/1999). Another interesting link was the apparent continuity between ND’s policy and Andreas Papandreou’s old dictum that any kind of dialogue with Turkey can only start after certain conditions have been met, usually concerning Cyprus (Tsardanidis 1998: 301; Heraclides 207: 143); see references to Cyprus and Papandreou in Molyviatis (2002: 36-37). On the Cyprus-Aegean Sea linkage, see Heraclides (2007: 70-75). On ND’s policy once it became government in 2004, which reflected precisely the doubt that an unfettered projection of Greek interests on Europe would be successful, see Tsakonas (2010: 241-263).

\textsuperscript{161} KKE Secretary General Papariga speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (\textit{in.gr}, 16/12/1999).

\textsuperscript{162} DİKKİ President Tsovolas speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (\textit{Kathimerini}, 16/12/1999).
SYN’s view was far more accommodating: emphasizing peace and anti-nationalism as its main values and seeing in the post-Cold War environment the opportunity for the building of more lasting structures of cooperation within Europe. This position, however, was one of the last victories for the party’s center-left wing, whose eventual erosion towards PASOK would continue after the 2000 elections with SYN turning increasingly more radical, populist and (in a sense) nationalist thereafter.

In summation, Helsinki was deemed a success precisely because it was seen as a viable policy towards achieving specific goals, and this was achieved by persuasive agency on behalf of partisan actors who presented the case that Europeanization of foreign policy towards Turkey reconciled the historically difficult relationship between the two pillars of Greece’s foreign policy in a new post-Cold War environment (Heraclides 2007: 211-212): a pro-Western alignment, and the defense of the gains of Greek irredentism and sovereignty. Helsinki unleashed a thorough reevaluation of the style and priorities of Greek foreign policy up to that time, so much so that in the elections of 2000 a foreign policy consensus around a completely new axis of Europeanized relations with Turkey existed between the two parties for the first time (Tsakonas 2010: 98-99). Associating this new policy with positive values like peace, cooperation and economic opportunities allowed PASOK to carry the debate over ND, which itself was already rediscovering its bourgeois and moderate roots.

The elections of 2000, institutionalizing for the first time an impressive policy convergence in both domestic and foreign policy issues between the two main parties (Pappas 2001: 91), and also introducing as a permanent feature a new cleavage between the two main parties and the radical Left next to the old Right-Antiright axis, portrayed the existence of a broad coalition in favor of Europeanization. A big part of the creation of this coalition, however, was due to the intellectual strength of Europeanization, presented as an outcome of domestic economic modernization and as a viable strategy that allowed Greece to continue pursuing all its foreign policy goals while adapting effectively in a new post-Cold War environment (Kranidiotis 2000: 31). In the end, partisan agency transposed a new international systemic reality into different options of domestic party politics, fundamentally transforming the party system.

DISCUSSION

The Greek party system was in a state of flux after the elections of 1993. The certainties of the previous 20 years, the polarization between Right and Left, and the dominance of political life by political dinosaurs like Constantine Karamanlis, Andreas Papandreou and Constantine Mitsotakis, all seemed to be coming to an end (Tsoukalas...)

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163 SYN President Constantopoulos speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (in.gr, 16/12/1999).
164 For a discussion of the effects of such policy on Cyprus, see Couloumbis (2000: 379-380).
The bipolar party system established in 1981 seemed unable to establish viable alternative programs for the Greek economy and foreign policy. The end of the Cold War in the Balkans had opened up a whole new array of foreign policy issues and burdened existing ones, with the end effect that Greece was unable to reconcile its European orientation and its national foreign policy goals. While party identification remained strong amid voters, phenomena of political apathy appeared for the first time.

However, out of this dysfunctional political system dominated by economic and political populism, by the end of the decade a rejuvenated two-party system channeling political and economic preferences into robust pro-European directions appeared. This result was the outcome of a non-linear process of successive developments within the Greek party system’s dynamics. Partisan agency energized and engaged with pre-existing political identities and managed to rejuvenate the existing bourgeois Right-radical Antiright axis of competition by combining it with the cross-party latent modernization-populism cleavage. As the stakes of both of these axes of competition structured foreign policy options as well, the success of party agency to reformulate and then impose a new normative anchor of the Greek party system necessarily went through the development and implementation of new foreign policy ideas.

Indeed, the catalyst for the unraveling of the old polarized two-partyism between PASOK and ND of the 1980s was foreign policy – the advent of the Macedonia name issue – and the successful implementation of a new normative anchor of convergent two-partyism was only completed with the unequivocal institutionalization of a Europeanized foreign policy towards Turkey. The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 was the most visible symbol of this foreign policy change, and the patterns of partisan opposition and support to it in the ensuing elections of April 2000 (as well as the extremely close result of these elections) determined the positions the two major parties would take around the reformulated normative anchor. PASOK became a party of economic modernization and rationalization with only passing references allotted to its socialist identity, and ND returned to its bourgeois liberal roots but with an unmistakable hint of nationalist populism as a differentiating trait. Changes in both parties signaled their ability to engage with and build on ongoing social changes in order to maximize their appeal.

Party system dynamics, as a combination of parties’ strategies in policy space and their engagement with social cleavages, are sufficient to account for the foreign policy change that took place in Helsinki. The decisive event was the emergence within PASOK of a modernizing leadership around Kostas Simitis, whose election as leader of the party and Prime Minister took place against all odds as his Papandreist socialist opponents had seemed to dominate PASOK’s agenda until then (Athanassopoulou 1997: 97-98; Heraclides 2007: 181). This development can best be understood within the context of party competition. With hindsight, Simitis’ election represents a brilliant decision on
behalf of PASOK rank-and-file to renew and update the party’s traditional position as the centrist party within a three-camp constellation of a bipolar competition between Left and Right (Kalyvas 1997: 93-94). Here, the fact that ND had reverted to a populist version of its Karamanlist conservative roots under Miltiades Evert seems to have played the key role (Vernardakis 2011: 242).

With the election of Kostas Karamanlis in the leadership of ND in 1997, the final stage in the convergence of the party system began. Karamanlis’ opposition strategy aimed first and foremost to unite his own party, split as it was between its Karamanlist popular Right and its liberal bourgeois wing. Karamanlis’ agreement with the essentials of economic rationalization and political and economic convergence with Europe aimed at reuniting ND around a project of bourgeois modernization. At the same time, his strong opposition to the effects of PASOK’s neoliberal policies gave ND a more social-conscious profile and allowed it to outflank PASOK from the left – thus also pleasing the classless inclusionism of the Karamanlists. In the elections of 2000, PASOK and ND squared off, having had the most similar policy profiles in their history. The end result vindicated the strategies of both parties, as both PASOK’s inroads into the bourgeois vote continued and ND effectively penetrated the lower-income strata for the first time. Without shedding its radical left identity, PASOK was rebuilding a strong centrist coalition under a bourgeois modernizing outlook akin to the one of Venizelos; and without sacrificing its identity as the bourgeois party of Greece, ND found the cross-class appeal of the traditional Right once again.

In this way, by 2000 the Greek party system had normatively realigned (if not structurally) around a new anchor, revolving around the question of which major party has the best recipe for achieving the commonly agreed upon goal of modernization and Europeanization. While the borders between Left and Right (and historical references to these identities) remained intact, this competition was overlaid and rejuvenated with an engagement with the question of modernization of the Greek economy and, eventually, with the structuring of the modernization-populism nascent cleavage. However, this road was not linear, as the narrative in the previous paragraph might suggest. The transitional period that started in 1993 lasted in many ways beyond the 1996 election: Simitis’ authority within PASOK was always challenged by the Papandreists, his modernization program was faced with resistance and his foreign policy was marred by incoherence and conflicting agendas between ministers; and Karamanlis only managed to slowly heal what seemed in 1996 like a permanent schism within ND from 1998 onwards. For both parties, foreign policy was to cement the uncertain social realignments and strategic moves of the mid-1990s into permanent systemic fixtures by 2000. In the words of

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165 It is perhaps more than a coincidence that during Simitis’ term, references and symbolic gestures towards Venizelos’ legacy on behalf of the government and the party of PASOK increased impressively. The apex was naming the new modern Athens airport after him in 2001.
Nicolacopoulos, ‘a possible de-alignment’ had been turned into ‘a slight re-alignment’ (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 276).

To the extent that improving relations with Turkey was an integral part of Simitis’ effort to bring Greece closer to Europe, failure in foreign policy threatened to undo the whole project of modernization and Europeanization. By the same token, the rapid sequence of events in 1999 (from the Ocalan crisis that allowed George Papandreou to become foreign minister to the earthquakes) and the strengthening of the modernizers within PASOK paved the way for the Helsinki Council, a decision branded as an unmitigated success by the press thanks to Simitis’ persuasive argumentation, thus establishing modernization as the reference point of domestic political discourse. As the prefectural elections of 1998 and the European elections of 1999 had showed, there was nothing permanent about the electoral coalition Simitis had put together in 1996. Yet in 2000 he not only retained it, but expanded it. With the hardships of economic adjustment forcing Simitis to adopt an apologetic tone about his domestic policies, Helsinki and the merits of Europeanization it symbolized, gave PASOK the triumphant tone it needed for its campaign. Vocal populist dinosaurs of the party’s backbenches would take care during the campaign to fire up PASOK’s traditional petit bourgeois basis about the dangers of the ‘return of the Right’, thus recreating the formidable electoral ‘polarizing centrist’ strategy of PASOK (Moschonas 1994: 188) for a new era.

Foreign policy was equally important for Karamanlis to impose unity on his party and modernize the shrinking electoral coalition Evert’s incompetence had relegated ND to in 1996. His unequivocal commitment to Europe gave ND the foreign policy unity it had enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s as a liberal bourgeois party, and the acceptance of the need for better relations with neighbors realigned ND with the modernist camp of the latent cleavage. Helsinki caught ND off guard and energized the internal split of the party yet again. However, it also gave the party the opportunity to match its principled support of Europeanization with a touch of foreign policy populism and emphasis on Greece’s traditional foreign policy identity of reticence and suspicion towards Turkey. This nuance matched well with ND’s tactic of triangulation of PASOK, as it complemented its effort to approach the working class and petit bourgeois strata, always attracted to economic and foreign policy populism. In this way, Helsinki was a cumbersome but needed stage through which the updating and expansion of ND’s cross-class identity of 1996 was established in 2000.

The case of Greek foreign policy change (as codified in Helsinki) can be seen as a contingent result, a combination of party system dynamics and changes in Greece’s international environment. By trying to impose their preferences and making the best of systemic parameters of party competition, partisan actors translated the exigencies of the new environment of Greek foreign policy into new and contending visions of domestic society, realigning party competition according to the divergent readings of Greece’s new strategic environment. Just like the Cold War supported polarization in the 1950s
between loyalists and leftists and in the 1960s, 70s and 80s between bourgeois and radical poles, and just like nationalist and ‘civilizational’ readings of the fluid post-Cold War environment (Coulombis 2000: 378; Ifantis 2004: 255; Economides 2005: 481) seemed to realign the Greek party system towards a normative anchor around populism in the early 1990s, the imposition of Europeanized readings of Greece’s foreign policy challenges in the late 1990s contributed to the establishment of a new normative anchor around Europeanization and modernization. Through partisan agency, the post-Cold War structural reality was translated into a normatively reformulated bipolar competition.

The above discussion also addresses the question of whether party system dynamics or international structural change were by themselves sufficient conditions for foreign policy change. As analysis here has shown, there was a significant time lag between the end of the Cold War and the rise of Europeanization as a solution to Greece’s foreign policy challenges. This process (which lasted almost a full decade) was only completed through adequate developments in the Greek party system. However, domestic party system developments could have taken place without foreign policy change. Indeed, between 1974 and 1999 the twin pillars of Greek foreign policy (the connection to Europe and a policy of controlled tension with Turkey) had survived the existence of a polarized multiparty system (1974-1981), a polarized two-party system (1981-1993) and a two-party system in flux (1993-1999). Differences between PASOK and ND were mostly differences of emphasis: neither PASOK went through with its threats to exit the EEC/EU, nor did ND manage to overcome anti-Turkish sentiments and go beyond basic contacts with Turkey. Clearly, the post-Cold War environment was posing overwhelming strains on Greek foreign policy making, and Helsinki was addressing an obvious problem. In sum, domestic and international conditions were each necessary but not sufficient conditions for foreign policy change to take place.

Even though this chapter seems to answer the key questions of the dissertation rather well (mutual constitution of foreign policy and domestic party system, the role of domestic politics in foreign policy change, party system dynamics as the required kind of domestic development for foreign policy change to occur), the question still remains of whether it adds to our understanding of this case (and by extension of other similar ones) in a significant manner. For the case of this chapter, we can briefly look how explanations of this chapter differ from other analyses of the Helsinki decision.

The most textured analysis is provided by Tsakonas (2010) whose input I consider to be very valuable. His idea is that foreign policy change is the outcome of the interaction between two kinds of strategic culture: the national culture of a state and the personal (‘agentic’) culture of politicians and policymakers. In the case of Greece, the difference was the ‘resolution culture’ of Simitis and fellow modernizers who managed to push through important changes in a way that, not only reshuffled Greece’s foreign policy, but also changed Greece’s culture from being an ‘underdog’ to being an ‘instrumental’ culture. In this way Tsakonas tries to position discussions about Europeanization of
Greek foreign policy within a wider IR literature bringing together rationalist (realist and liberal) and constructivist premises. Discussion of domestic politics is made with reference to both institutional factors facilitating imposition of foreign policy change (here also see Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010) and domestic political identity-formation as a result of foreign policy contestation.

Tsakonas definitely expands with theoretical ambition the standard analysis of Helsinki in Greek literature that focuses on Europeanization and also tries to set the role of personalities, like Simitis, within a broader analytical framework. By acknowledging the role of domestic politics as a qualification of the way state actors conceive of a state’s foreign policy challenges, and by taking party politics as arenas for contestation of foreign policies seriously, Tsakonas’ argument is not far posited from the argument presented here. However I think that the argument of the present chapter adds substantially to Tsakonas’ account.

First, without delving in long historical debates, it is important to note that Tsakonas takes a rather unproblematic view of culture, even though it features so prominently in his argument. While agentic culture seems to make all the difference, and is rightly identified as a way of influencing strategic culture more generally, national culture is seen not as a source of ideas and policies but as a space within which policy entrepreneurs act uninhibitedly. The process by which new ideas rise and interact with older ones is reduced to simple accounts of policymaking and, in the end, institutionalization of new policies is reduced to an unproblematic combination of personal agency and socialization from abroad. For example, the persistence of the foreign policy identity of ‘continental shelf as the only bilateral issue’ persisted throughout the Helsinki years. Clearly this was a powerful identity construction, and, despite Simitis’ and George Papandreou’s vocal opposition to ND’s decision after 2004 to suspend the talks that PASOK had started in 2002 with Turkey under the Helsinki framework, it is worth pondering how any agreement with tangible gains for Turkey in the Aegean could have been sold to Greek public opinion (Ifantis 2004: 262).

Second, and related to the above, Tsakonas accepts in a rather unproblematic way the premises of rationality and liberal/democratic peace as contained in the research theme of Europeanization166, which however only matches other theoretical assumptions of his framework (constructivism, norms, identities etc.) with difficulty. A key assumption of the Europeanization literature is that states Europeanize their foreign policies because it is in their interest to do so – Tsakonas duly jumps on this assumption to claim that Helsinki was introduced, and won out the argument, because it was in Greece’s interest to put relations with Turkey on a new footing. Tsakonas then asserts that an interests-based foreign policy change necessarily would have been implemented

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166 See here the work of Mark Schimmelfenig among others. Also, the short theoretical discussion in Economides (2005: 471-473) applying Europeanization to Greek foreign policy.
along the lines of EU’s liberal project, including improving bilateral relations, promoting economic cooperation etc., because these were in Greece’s interest anyway.

Even though this account of Europeanization is supported by Tsakonas with an impressive breadth and depth of empirical data, I believe that his focus reveals, if anything, the normative and ontological biases of a certain part of academia and policymaking community in Greece at the time. Indeed, an interests-based account of Europeanization sees foreign policy change as a value-neutral choice of a group of leaders with a ‘can-do’ mentality implementing the best available set of norms and policies around, namely those of Europeanization. However, PASOK’s Europeanization was a coherent modernization project straddling domestic and foreign policies. The choice for a specific program of neoliberal adjustment was presented as a choice for Europe – policies that portrayed the positive policy impact of a strategy of Europeanization (like Helsinki) were then assiduously used to feed support back into debates about hard domestic choices like austerity, thus facilitating PASOK’s party systemic strategy.

Again, this problem goes back to the unequal engagement of Tsakonas’ argument with the question of domestic culture/identity. Change-minded actors do not only engage with domestic structures in an instrumental way (trying to manipulate and escape constraints while identifying opportunities) but also become constituted by them as they adapt, adjust and reformulate domestic constellations of political identity (Economides 2005: 488). This, along with political agency, gives rise to perceptions of interests, which then inform specific readings of the international situation and promote foreign policy changes that feed into change in other policy areas as well (Keridis 2001: 3). An unproblematic assumption of pre-given interests of foreign policy runs against a conventional constructivist approach, and an a priori acceptance of Europeanization as a project of peace and moderation only reproduces specific actors’ readings and usage of this project. Without negating Tsakonas’ contribution, the party-system based approach used here has accounted better for the constructivist assumption of co-constituted but enabled policy actors, while it has problematized the degrees of persistence and change of dominant foreign policy identities and perceptions of interest. Put simply, if provocatively, Europeanization is what (and when) domestic political dynamics make of it.
PART III

EMPIRICAL, THEORETICAL AND
METATHEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE ANALYSIS
CHAPTER 5

INTRODUCTION

The previous three chapters applied the theoretical framework developed in the beginning of the dissertation in order to highlight the crucial turning points in cases of party-based foreign policy contestation and change in three different countries (and political systems) during the 20th century. There seemed to be an important addition of the theoretical framework developed here to the understanding of each of these three cases: as was shown in the concluding sections of each chapter, a party system-based view of the process of foreign policy change complements and even rivals established accounts of each of these three occurrences of foreign policy change. However, these three cases are supposed to yield theoretically relevant and empirically generalizable conclusions, and for this reason the narrative in each case followed closely the analytical categories identified in the theoretical discussion (according to the methodological imperatives of structured focused comparison). This chapter will serve as an addendum to the theoretical comparison by collecting and systematizing the empirical insights as they arise from the comparison and by complementing the comparative design.

First, I will discuss some empirical patterns that arise from the comparison. While these patterns were not particularly anticipated by the theoretical framework or the comparison, they offer a crucial first entry into a discussion of theoretically relevant implications of the narratives of the three cases. At the same time, they will also serve as an introduction to a more general test of how the framework proposed in this dissertation works in other cases of contested foreign policy.

The deep historical analysis of the three cases of foreign policy change intended to translate the theoretical and epistemological assumptions presented in the beginning of the dissertation into a research program: only deep narratives can reveal the interactions between different analytical categories and the way contingent processes of change unfold. In this vein, I have eschewed the parlance of hypotheses and testing, and preferred a more modest framework of understanding and unraveling processes (contra explaining outcomes and instances). Having said that, I was always very aware of some very basic questions concerning the logic of comparison. Firstly, all three cases focused on foreign policy change. While it has been recognized that in research designs that test theoretical frameworks of necessary conditions (such as the one here) the outcome of the various cases can be the same (such as here, where all cases led to foreign policy change) (Levy 2008: 9), the question of how (or whether) party politics affects contestation
processes that lead to foreign policy stability (i.e. an alternative outcome of the cases) is a valid one. At the same time, a question of generalization beyond the cases analyzed here is also presented (a small-N problem in methodological jargon). For all the within-case insights offered by the theoretically informed narratives, it is important for theoretical and empirical relevance beyond the scope of these three cases to show that the theoretical framework can travel in place and time within the scope conditions of the initial argument (i.e. mature liberal democracies with developed party systems and parliamentary systems of government).

Here I will aim to fulfill both goals (comparative logic and generalizability) by engaging in a plausibility probe of the theoretical framework across a number of cases of foreign policy change and stability. The idea is that, without delving deeply into historical detail and specific processes, this exercise will show that a party system-focused view of foreign policy contestation in democratic polities accommodates logically and analytically the main questions raised in the comparative research. The goal will be to show that domestic party politics matter crucially in processes of interaction between states and their international surroundings, and that the dynamics of party systems absorb and determine whether international pressures will lead to foreign policy change or not. Readers with a high degree of familiarity of these cases may detect flaws or simplistic generalizations in the narratives provided here. Yet the point of a plausibility probe is to offer a first pass to theoretical propositions when time and space are lacking for deeper inquiries. Here I use a plausibility probe not as a tool to check the plausibility of a theory before engaging in deeper research (ibid: 7), but as a way to see how the parallel processes detected in the three cases presented above also become apparent in other cases. Looking at cases of foreign policy stability despite changes in the international environment of states will allow complementing the comparative framework with cases of alternative outcomes, thus highlighting the importance of party system dynamics as necessary conditions for foreign policy change even further.

PARTY-BASED FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS OF THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

1) Exchange of policy positions between parties

One striking feature in all three cases is that foreign policy contestation and change were undertaken by parties holding policy positions that were different than what one would expect based on their traditions and historical viewpoints. In the case of Ostpolitik in West Germany, it was the two parties that had always prioritized swift reunification after World War II, the SPD and the FDP, that changed course to embark on a policy of recognition of borders and the DDR regime (in all but name). On the other hand, it was the party that had opted for a continuation of division of Germany for the sake of
safeguarding a liberal democracy, the CDU/CSU, that viscerally opposed the Ostpolitik on the grounds that West Germany was giving up on the goal of reunification. Similarly, in the case of the FTA in Canada, it was the party of protectionism, the Conservatives, that orchestrated and imposed a comprehensive free trade agreement with the US, while the party of free trade, the Liberals, vehemently opposed it. Finally, in the case of the Helsinki Council and the granting of EU candidate status to Turkey, it was the party of nationalist populism, PASOK, that implemented a comprehensive policy of incentives and moderation in Greek-Turkish relations, while the traditional party of bourgeois foreign policy moderation, ND, opposed important aspects of the Helsinki strategy. Are these impressive changes to be explained by the argument that it is the government/opposition dynamic that makes the governing party decide on what course of action needs to be taken and the opposition oppose this course of action for the sake of being different? Is foreign policy an important policy tool to pursue domestic goals beyond ideological commitments? Do parties formulate positions on foreign policy issues empirically, without reference to other policy preferences or historical traditions?

The narrative in all three case studies has shown that partisan preferences on foreign policy are determined by a mix of preferences and ideas already institutionalized within parties, political identities parties represent or want to attract, strategic calculations cued by a party’s position in policy space, and dynamic agency of individuals engaging with all the above. True, parties may end up supporting positions that are completely different than what they were proposing some time before, but this is not the result of aimless wandering or even radical adaptation to new policy circumstances; in both cases, political parties would be in grave danger of losing their credibility. For such important policy changes to take place, partisan actors need to effectively match a rhetoric that reproduces the party’s traditional ideological and party-systemic self-placement, while providing a valid argumentation of how a change of policy preferences would improve the party’s structural position in party competition. In all three cases, the changing of party positions did not take place in a vacuum, but was rather the outcome of long processes whereby the foreign policy preferences of various political identities were molded into new policy positions under the weight of the exigencies of party competition.

Indeed, one could make the argument that political parties were remarkably consistent with regard to the ideological and structural constraints on their freedom of policy improvisation. The SPD always maintained that it was fighting for the establishment of more progressive structures of domestic governance of the Western Republic, the Tories embedded the FTA within a rhetoric of groups-based national reconciliation, and PASOK redefined the meaning of progressivism and anti-conservatism in Greece from one of economic populism to one of modernization and rationalization. In defense of party politics, one can say that, despite constant evolution of international and domestic factors affecting policy formulation, partisan actors have also felt compelled to (and saw opportunities in) embed normatively new policy ideas into
long-standing heuristic schemata, whether ideological (‘our party has always been progressive, nationalist, socialist etc.’) or party-systemic (‘our party has always opposed the other party, has always been on the left/right side of the continuum etc.’).

The above discussion has important consequences for the study of foreign policy based on domestic politics. It shows that tracking foreign policy preferences solely based on (declared) domestic ideologies or rooting in societal cleavages is insufficient at best, and extremely risky at worst. Ideologies and the representation of identities acquire concrete meaning within a relational context of party competition and accepted terms of debate. While being on the left in West Germany in the early 1950s meant to be in favor of reunification and of trying to overcome the Cold War barriers within Germany, by the late 1960s it came to mean being in favor of overcoming the Cold War division in Europe while accepting borders and legitimacy of the DDR regime. To track both of these foreign policy positions to SPD’s patriotism, progressivism, association with Protestant values and Atlanticism is correct; yet explaining both of these policy positions with direct reference to these ideas/identities ex post without reference to processes and surrounding institutions does not add significantly to our understanding. In this specific example, it was the general axis around which discussions revolved that had evolved in West Germany and this in turn informed new interpretations of the same identities.

A second corollary of the observation that parties had exchanged positions in the three foreign policy debates I studied is that apart from the domestic context (dynamics of the party system), the second vital component of the discursive framework within which new foreign policy positions are formulated is the international systemic constellation, usually present in the shape of tangible foreign policy challenges. While shifting terms of debate and the reinterpretation of parties’ ideological and societal commitments may account sufficiently for policy changes in various policy areas, for foreign policy the field is more complex – and more intriguing. On the one hand, foreign policy change needs to be shown to respond effectively to an actual problem, a challenge to the state’s established equilibrium between its own self-understanding and its place in the world. On the other hand, changing international systemic constellations present openings for the emergence of new interpretations and the effort of partisan actors to alter the terms of the debate in a way that allows favorable reinterpretations of political identity preferences, new combinations and the attraction of other identities. As we saw, Cold War détente, the failure of the international trade regime and the end of the Cold War in the Balkans all presented states with new problems and challenges to their existing policies – but they also affected deeply existing constellations of domestic political forces and established terms of debate. Partisan actors saw opportunities as much as they saw problems in the face of such profound systemic shifts.

This discussion then must also urge us to go beyond simple accounts of foreign policy change that start with policymakers’ understanding of existing foreign policy failures and then embarking on determined efforts to change things for the better. First, as
we are painfully reminded of every day, policy failure is by no means a guarantee for policy reevaluation and change. Second, even if it were correct, such a view condemns research to complacency, as it focuses on a rather simplistic account of why change occurred, instead of urging us to understand how change took the one or the other form. But most importantly, foreign policy change analysis with reference to domestic politics and international systemic shifts cannot but account for the interaction of the two.

For example, to claim that the beginning of the process towards Greek-Turkish rapprochement began with the Imia crisis is true, but it is not the whole story, nor does it say anything about why Greek foreign policy change took the direction it did, culminating in Helsinki. The fact is that Greek foreign policy was demonstratively problematic in light of the big changes that were underway in the Balkans, as well as that a Prime Minister with well known reformist views, Kostas Simitis, had already been elected Prime Minister. If anything, the Imia crisis derailed Simitis’ program, as he had to balance between his views and an explosion of nationalism within his own party. In the end, it was the ability of Simitis to package his policy views within a viable program for the perpetuation of PASOK’s stay in power that allowed him to carry the party and implement his policies. In sum, partisan changes of foreign policy preferences are profoundly influenced by changing terms of debate domestically and internationally, but the way these are translated into new policies is a function of political agency and the impact of the imperatives of party competition.

2) Foreign policy ideas do not float freely

A problem related to the practice of tracking foreign policy outcomes backwards and in a linear fashion to domestic ideologies, is doing the same with tracking them to different foreign policy ideas or ‘schools of thought’. As we saw, in all three cases relevant literature had identified divergent cognitive or ideological frameworks that allowed domestic actors to make sense of changes in the international environment. In this way, parties and partisan actors were divided into Gaullists and Atlanticists in West Germany, in nationalists and continentalists in Canada, and in anti-Western populists and pro-Western modernizers in Greece. These labels are fairly useful for a researcher to classify foreign policy attitudes in a state’s domestic environment (even though one should be careful not to attach independent political standing to these foreign policy ideas, as in most cases they were assigned to actors by observers and few of those actors at the time would characterize themselves using these terms). The problem is that, in and by themselves, they tell us very few things as to who and why they do carry these foreign policy ideas, as well as how any one of them becomes dominant or fails.

The comparative analysis has shown that these foreign policy ideas are inseparable from the social and political context of domestic politics. As classifying tools of various foreign policy preferences, foreign policy ideas are nothing more than the conceptual
systemization of preferences that have been cued from domestic political identities. This means that the varying fortunes and degrees of influence of foreign policy traditions and schools of thought can be understood as a reflection of the interaction between and among the political identities that contain them. In other words, foreign policy ideas do not float freely, but make their appearance, and influence policy prescriptions, according to the political fortunes of their institutional hosts. While it can be shown that these foreign policy ideas exert their most influence as systems of thought held by important individuals, I would contend that it is more fruitful seeing them as social creations, as the expressions of important domestic political identities that in turn affect individual thoughts, beliefs and choices of action.

The above shows that a more critical engagement with the discursive environment of foreign policy formation and contestation can indeed yield more interesting results than what a simple presentation of one or the other school of thought as more or less suitable to the problem at hand. This is the tendency for example when analyzing the foreign policy change Greece undertook after years of tension with Turkey and uneasy relations with the West (EU and US). The modernization/Europeanization project of the Simitis government is presented as the most suitable response to the dead ends of Greek foreign policy following the end of the Cold War and the increase of tension with most of Greece’s neighbors. Accounts of this foreign policy change tend to ascribe an inherent discursive strength to the project of modernization, hence the popularity and eventual successful institutionalization of the Helsinki change by the PASOK government. However such an approach is not that different from the approach we discussed above about foreign policy challenges and solutions: It sees the process of rise and creation of new foreign policies as a simple matching of the supply of new ideas with demand for solutions. In the case of Greece for example, the discursive dominance of the Europeanization approach is seen as a natural outcome in the end of the 1990s, when for example an ND government in the early 1990s with a similar agenda of economic liberalization and foreign policy moderation was met with intense opposition and ultimately failed. Clearly, the strength, resilience and systemic position of institutional hosts (in our case, political parties) matters a lot and can account greatly for the different degrees of influence of the same foreign policy system of ideas over time.

The success of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy cannot be divorced from the popularity of the project of Europeanization and modernization of the Greek economy domestically. Yet this popularity itself was not unrelated to the alignment of political identities within policy space on a specific point in time. The fact that modernization was carried over by PASOK, a party positioned in the center of the party system and with the ability to match a polarizing discourse against ND with a centrist expansionist strategy, allowed it to become part of a wider policy set that presumably expressed the new face of the ‘democratic camp’ of Greek politics. The fact that the signature policies of modernization (economic neoliberalism and foreign policy moderation) had until then
been the prerogatives of the Right, or that this policy served to completely isolate PASOK from the parties on its Left, was irrelevant to the extent that the exigencies of survival and retaining government office in the end forced party unity on PASOK. Coupled with ND’s similar move towards economic modernization and foreign policy pragmatism as dictated by the needs of electoral renewal and internal unity, this allowed pro-Western modernization to become the dominant paradigm of Greek foreign policy thought. The fact that this process was completed almost 10 years after the end of the Cold War (the international systemic shift), and three years after the advent of Simitis to power (the personnel change) and the Imia crisis (the policy failure), is a good indication for the fact that the persuasiveness of ideas is never self-evident or automatic.

3) The time lag between the establishment of favorable domestic political conditions and the final emergence of a foreign policy change

Another striking similarity in the process of foreign policy change jumps out in the comparison of the three cases we have examined here. In West Germany there was a significant time lag between the rise of new foreign policy preferences and their decisive propagation on behalf of the SPD and the FDP. While the SPD was the first party to formulate a coherent foreign policy alternative in accordance with the spirit of détente, its careful electoral strategy forced it not to promote this concept too aggressively. In the years of the Grand Coalition, the SPD was forced to limit its foreign policy ambitions in light of CDU and CSU obstructionism. While new foreign policy ideas became the main message of the FDP ahead of the elections of 1969, the SPD again ran on a platform of moderate reformism. The new Ostpolitik then arose rather abruptly the moment the new Social-Liberal coalition was created after the elections of 1969. In Canada, while the Tories of Brian Mulroney won a resounding victory in 1984, free trade was nowhere on the radar of government policy. Despite the fact that the Tories had enjoyed solid support in parts of the country that were expected to support a free trade agenda, Mulroney did not seem to consider a free trade agreement beyond some ad hoc measures of normalization of Canadian-US relations. Also here, the emergence and the veracity of the proposed foreign policy change after the publication of the Macdonald report in 1985 was impressive given the calm climate of just a few months before. In Greece the situation was different in that the Simitis government had a declared goal of loosening of tension with Turkey from the beginning, but its endeavors were sabotaged from within PASOK and from outside developments. In any event, the decision to lift Greece’s objections to the granting of EU candidate status to Turkey was a departure from the declared and expressed goals of the government of just a few months before. Unlike the other two cases then, Greece is unique in that the government expressed the willingness for a certain degree of change long before that change was actually implemented. This did not make it easier, however, to go through with its plans.
In all three cases, foreign policy change took place rather abruptly, unexpectedly and impressively – if not always in substance (Brandt and Simitis at least had made their views known before) then definitely in degree. Obviously something had to change between the time of the alignment of foreign policy preferences and political identities within parties, and the eventual propagation of new foreign policies and their successful implementation. I believe that what made the difference in all cases was the ability of partisan actors to take the initial social realignments and raise them to the level of systemically relevant changes of the meaning of interaction between parties. It was the emergence of these new system-level features that made the propagation of new foreign policies not only intellectually and conceptually possible, but a self-sustaining electoral strategy as well, for some parties.

In West Germany Ostpolitik became possible only when the two parties that supported it, the SPD and the FDP, found their fortunes inextricably tied as partners in a coalition that, for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, did not include the CDU. While the elections of 1969 had revealed important social realignments in terms of representation of social strata by the three main parties, it was only when a system-level change (the creation of a new kind of coalition between the SPD and the FDP) came about that the parties found themselves inside a completely new understanding of the meaning and stakes of party competition. The precarious nature of the coalition and CDU’s unqualified opposition to it made the Ostpolitik a game of high stakes, where parties were fighting to determine the very stake of party competition (democratic reform or anti-Communism as the political identity of West Germany). Intense propagation of foreign policy change was the prerogative of parties that wanted the normative anchor to change: before 1969 that was the FDP; for the SPD it was only after 1969, when the potential of foreign policy to alter the terms of the debate to its benefit became apparent.

In Canada the time lag concerned the time between the national landslide of the Mulroney Conservatives in 1984 and the emergence of their self-understanding as a party representing a radically new region-and community-based understanding of national unity and the role of the state. The turning point here was the publication of the Macdonald report in 1985, which provided the opportunity to initiate a sensational policy measure to a struggling government. The report presented free trade not only as an economically viable program, but also as a remedy to the question of unity of the Canadian state and nation. Just as Brandt and Scheel had, Mulroney saw in foreign policy change a strategy for self-preservation through energizing a new meaning of party competition. Whereas the Tories were already representing groups with heavily continentalist preferences (the Prairie West and Quebec), they only became the champions of these select identities once their foreign policy preferences seemed to align with a redefinition of the question of national unity that had historically structured party competition in Canada. Just like in West Germany, the systemically relevant change was not simple realignments in the patterns of expression of political identities, but the
strategic positioning of one party vis-à-vis domestic cleavages and other parties that made a strategy of altering the stakes of party competition a needed electoral strategy. Once this happened, success of implementing a new foreign policy and electoral preservation were mutually reinforcing processes. The election of 1988, with its stark regional patterns, reflected the advent of the new normative anchor of Canadian politics.

Finally, in Greece the foreign policy agenda of the modernizers within PASOK was unequivocally put through once Europeanization as a strategy for domestic modernization was imposed within PASOK as the most promising strategy to reinvent the party’s advantageous positioning in the center of the party system. The time lag concerned not so much the imposition of modernization as the stake of party competition system-wide, since ND from 1997 onwards ascribed to this goal anyway, as its imposition within PASOK proper. Indeed, the split between modernizers and traditionalists within PASOK boiled down to two fundamentally different understandings as to what party competition in Greece was about: the radical forces of petit bourgeois non-privileged strata against the authoritarian plutocracy of the Right (as traditionalists thought), or the forces of social and economic progress against the forces of conservative stagnation (as the modernizers claimed)? The increasing popularity of Simitis and the concept of modernization in public opinion gradually won over the PASOK mechanism in the second half of 1999, so much so that Helsinki was warmly welcomed as a much needed complement of PASOK’s reinvention strategy. With ND already on board in principle, if not in appearance, the new normative anchor was promptly reflected in the elections of 2000.

The time lags that existed between the initial creation of reformist coalitions and the eventual self-perception of these coalitions as bearers of a different understanding of the stakes of party competition explain the slow but steady transition from initial policy proposals to sensational foreign policy changes. Once the systemic potentials of the new coalitions were perceived, partisan actors sought to cement new interpretations of political competition that were favorable to their political projects and party fortunes through advocating new foreign policy initiatives, and if successful this new meaning of partisan competition became institutionalized throughout the party system. Successful institutionalization of new foreign policy then signaled a successful transition to a new normative, system-wide, anchor of party competition, and in this sense foreign policy can be seen as an important determinant of transitions from one stage of party system to another. This is another similarity that arises from careful comparison of the cases.

4) Coherence between international and domestic systemic realignments

The comparative analysis of the process of foreign policy change has revealed important links between international and domestic politics. In the theoretical chapter I claimed that the process of foreign policy change must be seen as an instance of translation of international norms into domestic party competition. I believe that in all
three cases the analysis of the process of argumentation has shown that the patterns of support and opposition to a new foreign policy reproduced specific readings of the state’s international systemic environment within domestic discourse. Without claiming that foreign policy determined voting patterns in a specific way or that attitudes towards foreign policy issues affected social realignments in the party system (statistical methods would have been needed for this), I am however making the point that party systems as institutional spaces codifying terms of engagement between parties were obviously affected by foreign policy and the international system.

All three cases can be seen as instants of creation of a new equilibrium between domestic and international politics, as the party system was structuring policy choices and making sense of a state’s foreign policy environment. In this vain we can think of Ostpolitik as the process by which the West German party system caught up with détente and stopped reproducing domestically the hot Cold War mentality of anti-Communism as the stake of party competition. FDP’s exodus from the bourgeois camp and the consolidation of democratization and institutional renewal as stakes of party competition can be seen here as a rebalancing of the normative anchor of domestic politics with international realities, namely the decrease of tension and the loosening of the Cold War framework in Europe. In Canada the collapse of the party system of civic nationalism in favor of a reformulation of national unity as the balance between regions and communities was the domestic expression of Canada’s important move internationally to opt for regional trade integration in North America. As North American regionalism allowed Canadian provinces to independently explore options for trade integration with adjacent US regions, the consolidation of a region-based party system after the 1988 free trade elections translated the new international systemic reality of Canada’s trade policy into stakes of domestic party competition. Finally, the Helsinki Council and the consolidation of Europeanization as a goal for both foreign and domestic policy of Greece reflected the country’s adjustment to the post-Cold War regional reality and the effort to reconcile defense of essential nationalist goals of foreign policy with a fundamental wish to maintain the Western orientation of the country. While the polarized party system of Right and Left reproduced within Greece the apparent tension between the nationalist and modernizing agendas of Greek foreign policy in the Cold War environment, and the party system-in-a-flux of the early 1990s translated into Greek politics the exacerbation of this tension in the fluid post-Cold War environment, the foreign policy change of the late-1990s appeared to reconcile defense of Greek interests in the Aegean with European orientation through a reevaluation of the post-Cold War environment and so allowed the convergence of the two-party system around modernization.

Emphasis on party systems reveals in all three cases that, just as foreign policy change takes place within some basic elements of continuity, the impact of the international system on domestic politics is mitigated by existing party systemic realities.
Indeed, one can trace the forces of continuity of foreign policy in the elements of continuity of domestic party systems. Despite the realignment of coalition patterns in West Germany, the party system retained its basic 2+1 party structure during the 1970s, as well as the relative positioning of parties along the right, the center and the left of the policy axis. The Ostpolitik controversy affected the meaning of party competition, not the structural elements or the binary direction of the party system. Canada’s 2+1 party system was violently shaken after 1988, leading to the famous 1993 elections and party system collapse, however the fundamental binary direction of competition and the stake of national unity as the organizing principle was always considered an ideal, a return to which was only inhibited by the inability of parties to align with it. And in Greece the foreign policy convergence of the late 1990s served to rejuvenate the bipolar competition between PASOK and ND and maintain the party system’s elementary structural features and direction of competition for one more decade, albeit within a reformulated normative framework.

Comparative analysis highlights the role of partisan agency in the process of translation of international systemic shifts into new meanings of partisan competition at home. Careful examination shows that the eventual victory of reformers in all cases – self-evident as it may seem today, especially from a standpoint of analyses focusing on policy failures and alleged attractiveness of ideas – was not at all assured at the time. The Social-Liberal coalition went through a painful series of losses in regional elections in West Germany before recovering in time for the 1972 elections, the Mulroney government in Canada only took off in opinion polls after three years in power, and finally, Simitis’ project in Greece seemed hopelessly pressured between a recovering opposition and internal strife in 1998-1999. It was the ability of partisan actors to frame foreign policy choices in a way that galvanized winning domestic coalitions, and engage with party systemic factors in opportunity structure-like ways, that ultimately determined how deep international systemic features penetrated domestic politics. The means to achieve this were foreign policy argumentations with firm reference to international conditions and persuasive readings of the state’s international environment.

5) A universal process of party-based foreign policy change?

In chapter 1 I proposed an analytical model of party-based foreign policy contestation. That model saw this process starting with party system dynamics that led to the emergence of new policy preferences on behalf of political parties and, through the interplay with specific foreign policy challenges, of new preferences in foreign policy as well. Contestation of foreign policy was supposed to be made with partisan actors engaging with the institutional structure of the party system. Successful institutionalization of new foreign policies also meant the institutionalization of the initial party system dynamics into new lasting party system features. A close scrutiny of the
three cases here shows that this model accounts for the actual process of foreign policy change quite well. Indeed, there seem to be striking analogies between the different stages of party-based foreign policy change across cases. The following table summarizes this:

Table 21
A Mechanism of Party Based Foreign Policy Change: Cross-Case Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage in the process of foreign policy change</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emergence of new foreign policy preferences</strong></td>
<td>Ostpolitik as international complement of democratization</td>
<td>FTA as expression of a decentralized, region-communitarian conception of Canadian nationalism</td>
<td>Foreign policy Europeanization as expression of domestic modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New normative anchor and party outlooks</strong></td>
<td>Governance of the Federal Republic beyond anti-Communism. CDU a more typical conservative party, SPD more cross-class party, FDP more urban party</td>
<td>Balance between Ottawa and provinces. 1993: Collapse of the PC coalition and the party system. The Liberals sole national party, proliferation of regional parties.</td>
<td>Balance between modernization of the economy and welfare of the people. PASOK and ND acquiring very similar social outlook. Rejuvenation of two-partyism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What stands out in the above table, and what summarizes the essence of this dissertation’s argument, is the important dividing line between stage one and stage two: the passage from a simple process of societal realignments beneath the party system that do not affect patterns of coalition and opposition, directions of competition and logic of interactions between parties, to system-level changes that affect some (or all) of the above and profoundly alter the way (first some, then all) partisan actors conceive of the
stakes of competition and themselves (the time lag referred to above). In foreign policy terms, the first stage is no more consequential than parties promoting new foreign policies in an effort to improve their fortunes within the confines of the discursive structure of the party system (and the established foreign policy identity of the state in question prescribing specific goals and means). The second stage is when foreign policy change becomes intellectually possible and institutionally imperative. It becomes intellectually possible because the emerging change of the logic of party competition energizes different readings of parties’ traditions and the coalitions of political identities they have come to represent. Institutionally imperative because within this new logic some parties function under new systemic imperatives of competition, and foreign policy helps them adapt and bring about reformulations of the meaning of party competition. As political agency plays an important role for this passage, foreign policy contestation becomes above all a struggle for the imposition of a new language on the party system as a whole.

The importance of this point in time when the passage from simple party system volatility into system-wide changes takes place is made evident if we consider short counterfactuals in all cases when the passage to a new logic of party competition had been halted. What if in West Germany, after the elections of 1969 the formation of the Social-Liberal coalition was not possible and CDU was not forced to shed its anti-Communist identity of the Adenauer era? What if in Canada the Mulroney government continued functioning as a pan-Canadian coalition without prioritizing the distinct preferences of the geographical and linguistic extremes (West and Quebec) and eventually lost their distinct solid support? What if in Greece Papandreists had continued to control PASOK and had derailed Simitis’ effort to make modernization the party’s, and by extension the party system’s, point of reference? It becomes obvious that in all those cases, passage to a new logic of party competition could have been averted, and with it foreign policy change. This conclusion allows us to map a specific research strategy when looking at cases when domestic dynamics actually halted foreign policy change despite overwhelming international systemic pressure for change. We would have to look at how party system dynamics persisted below the party system, on the societal level, and how the overarching logic of party competition remained intact (be it because it withstood pressure from partisan agency, or because no such willingness for change existed in the first place), thus blocking the expression and promotion of viable new foreign policy preferences. Some of these possibilities will be considered in the short case studies that follow.
**Austria:** The case of Austria presents an interesting puzzle from a foreign policy perspective, that of a non-change of foreign policy when international conditions seemed to require it and where domestic conditions allowed it. As is well known, Austria’s foreign policy identity is defined by neutrality, i.e. the self-understanding of the country that it does not take part in international alliances with military and political ambitions other than the UN (Pelinka 2004: 208, 211). While neutrality was a self-imposed limitation, Austria’s political class accepted it as a precondition for their state to acquire an otherwise independent status after World War II (Schultz 1992: 174; Meyer 2007: 2-3), and it quickly arose to the level of an essential element of Austria’s national identity (Pelinka 2004: 211-212; Wodak and Kovács 2004: 212; Meyer 2007: 6).

As an expression of Austria’s geopolitical position, neutrality was translated in domestic politics as a fundamental foreign and domestic policy consensus. A country ravaged by deep historical and ideological cleavages in the inter-war period, Austria arose from the disaster of World War II as a state with a consensus-based political system. The two arch-enemies of the past, the Catholic-conservative and the labour sub-cultures, expressed in the People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), set up a system of permanent accommodation whereby election results only rubber-stumped power-sharing between the two parties. This system of division of political spoils between the ÖVP and the SPÖ, known as Proporz, distilled the realities of Austria’s position as a small open economy in the Western world and a state with a specific position between the two Cold War blocs. Neutrality became the external expression of the Proporz, as it underlined in the field of foreign policy consensus between the two sides (Schultz 1992: 173-175). Left out of the Proporz accommodation was the third Austrian political family, the heterogeneous assemblage of anti-clerical and anti-socialist liberals (Luther 2000: 427-428).

However, neutrality was not merely a stable concept but rather a discursive resource with which political actors in Austria engaged (Wodak and Kovács 2004: 217). Since neutrality’s initial legal formulation left considerable room for redefinitions (Schultz 1992: 175; Meyer 2007: 3), it was absorbed and structured into party competition according to the main dimensions of competition. Following the overarching dimension of competition between the Proporz and non-Proporz parties, neutrality was historically supported by the ÖVP and the SPÖ as an expression of loyalism and consensus-driven politics. Instead, the liberal/nationalist family, under the banner of the FPÖ party, was always much more daring in proposals to temper with neutrality (Schultz 1992: 175). This dimension cut across the socioeconomic Left-Right axis. In this dimension, neutrality was structured in increasing order moving from right to left: the FPÖ, generally
considered to be lying to the right of the ÖVP (Luther 2000: 428-429), was the most anti-neutrality party, expressed particularly in support for closer association between Austria and the EEC (Luther 2000: 430). The ÖVP was more daring in tempering with neutrality than the SPÖ, reflecting its affinity for the market-based project of European integration. For years, SPÖ was particularly identified with the policy of ‘active neutrality’ that positioned Austria as an active player of the Cold War context (Schultz 1992: 178; Wodak and Kovács 2004: 218). Forces to the left of the SPÖ were the most neutralist, reflecting their pacifism and affinity for socialism (Pelinka 2004: 212).

From the mid-1980s onwards, Austria found more breathing space in engaging with the demands of neutrality. On the one hand, the main alternative to strict neutrality, the EEC, embarked on a process of closer economic and trade integration that challenged Austria’s economic planning (Schultz 1992: 187-189). On the other hand, the strict Cold War framework that had served as a note of caution to any efforts to temper with neutrality was disintegrating rapidly (Wodak and Kovács 2004: 212). Under these conditions, the ÖVP-SPÖ coalition decided in 1989 to apply for EEC-entry (Schultz 1992; Pelinka 2004: 213). Austria’s elite needed to engage with neutrality, which still commanded strong support among the population, and claimed that EEC accession allowed Austria to have leverage over decisions that affected it profoundly, hence better defending neutrality itself (Schultz 1992: 191).

The puzzle of the Austrian case consists in the fact that throughout the 1990s international and domestic conditions changed in ways that would make neutrality obsolete and could have lead to the unthinkable, Austria entering NATO. The end of the Cold War was followed relatively quickly by the enlargement of NATO and the development of diplomatic and military capabilities by the EU – to which Austria acceded in 1995 (Wodak and Kovács 2004: 218). Entry into the EU substantially affected the ability of the Proporz parties to reproduce the set of economic policies that underlined political consensus in Austria (Luther 2000: 438), while the end of the Cold War severed the limitations on the expression of alternative political projects in Austrian politics.167 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Proporz parties were governing in a grand coalition that was gradually eating away strength from them while parties to the right and left, the FPÖ and the Greens, were benefiting (Williams 2000: 138). Especially the rise of FPÖ after 1986 under the leadership of mercurial Jörg Haider was stunning (Müller 2000: 191; Luther 2003: 137). In this way, the party with the most unabashedly pro-NATO agenda was the big winner of the process of dismantling of consensus politics and higher ideologization of party competition. Under Haider, the FPÖ moved to fundamentally Eurosceptic positions (Pelinka 2004: 213-215), yet it also sought to underline the main Proporz-Anti-proporz axis that Haider’s populism was exploiting by presenting itself as

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167 See the excellent analysis, basically amounting to a strikingly accurate prediction, in Schultz (1992: 197).
the party of policy innovation (Luther 2000: 437-439) – in foreign policy, this meant an unorthodox support for NATO entry (Meyer 2007: 12).

The importance of foreign policy for the realignment of the patterns of the Austrian party system did not only concern the gradual weakening of the Proporz dimension of competition, but also the rise of more ideological and adversarial politics around the Left-Right axis. The support of Haider for NATO accession was particularly puzzling, given his keen populism and the unpopularity of what would be the official abrogation of neutrality among the Austrian public (Neuhold 2003: 14). Yet it not only served to underline the FPÖ’s distance from the SPÖ and the ÖVP’s centrist policies, but also to drive a wedge between them and exploit the ÖVP’s increasing flirtations with a more active security policy (Luther 2000: 430; Pelinka 2004: 217). At the same time, the Greens had given up on their anti-EU stance after 1995 but retained their fundamental support for neutrality (Meyer 2007: 13) while the SPÖ also continued to support neutrality as the basis of all discussions on Austria’s foreign policy (Williams 2000: 136-137; Pelinka 2004: 216-217). In this way, Haider’s active support for NATO can be seen as serving important party systemic goals of the FPÖ, namely the infusion of ideological adversity in Austrian politics and the realignment between Left and Right, whereby the FPÖ would be a needed partner of the ÖVP in government formation (Müller and Fallend 2004: 803). When, after the watershed elections of 1999, the ÖVP and the FPÖ controversially agreed on a coalition under Wolfgang Schüssel (Luther 2000: 432-433), security policy seemed to be one of the main points of agreement between the two parties (Müller 2000: 193; Meyer 2007: 10-11). How did neutrality survive this seemingly overwhelming constellation of factors in favor of Austria’s entry into NATO?

With the creation of the ‘black-blue’ ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, Austrian politics entered a period of marked polarization and confrontation (Luther 2003: 138). The acrimonious process of coalition building in 1999-2000 (Müller 2000: 199) had estranged Schüssel from the SPÖ (Müller and Fallend 2004: 808-809), while the Social Democrats seemed to be closer to the Greens in condemning the presence of the FPÖ in government. Austrian media reported on the creation of two rival blocs, a ‘black-blue’ confronted with a ‘red-green’ one (Müller and Fallend 2004: 818). In policy terms, the two blocs were separated in their socioeconomic preferences, with the center-left opposition accusing the new government of neoliberal economic and strict immigration policies (Müller and Fallend 2004: 810-812; Luther 2008: 4). In foreign policy, the new government also tried to make its mark according to its general theme of renewal and innovation, and in 2001 it submitted to parliament a report on Austria’s new strategic doctrine. The doctrine sought to rationalize and absorb the significant changes in Austria’s foreign policy, including making contributions to the EU’s military capabilities and partaking in various NATO policies short of membership. Yet, neutrality was yet again affirmed as Austria’s overarching foreign policy identity (Krüger 2003: 11-12; Meyer 2007: 6-9). By 2002 and with the reelection of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition (but with a stunning reversal of strength in
favor of ÖVP to the detriment of FPÖ) (Luther 2003: 144), NATO-accession was nowhere on the radar (Meyer 2007: 14-16).

How is the resilience of neutrality to be explained with reference to party politics when the consensus-based political system of Austria was shaken to its foundations in the late 1990’s? With Austria’s international environment being structured into and contributing to the polarization of Austrian politics in two ideological camps, one would have expected at least one of the two to pursue the cause of foreign policy modernization as an underpinning of domestic reformism (Wodak and Kovács 2004: 239). It is true that events like the 1999 NATO Kosovo campaign (Meyer 2007: 5), the rise of the Bush administration and the advent of the ‘war on terror’ in the early 2000s contributed to the Austrians’ reverting even more forcefully to their familiar neutrality – expressed as staying outside of NATO at the very least (Neuhold 2003: 17). Yet other cases in this dissertation have also demonstrated that foreign policy change can still advance in the face of skeptical (or at least divided) public opinion – indeed, that was the case with all three cases we looked at thoroughly to varying degrees. Our theoretical model would have expected a government expressing a new normative anchor of domestic politics under conditions of international change to see foreign policy as a useful instrument of embedding political dominance.

The answer could lie in the fact that the Austrian party system, despite ideological polarization and the dominance of the Left-Right axis in the early 2000s, never shed its essential Proporz dimension. Much as Austrian politics seemed to be restructured around a bipolar competition that separated the SPÖ and the ÖVP (Luther 2003: 142-143), the truth is that each party saw in gains for its own ‘camp’ a means towards a more fundamental end, the entry into government under the best possible conditions (Müller and Fallend 2004: 822). This end arguably took precedence over the eventual victory of each party’s ‘bloc’.

The resilience of the Proporz /Anti-Proporz dimension was discernible in two ways: First, following the elections of 2002, when the black-blue coalition won the majority again, Schüssel engaged in coalition talks with all three parties that had entered parliament – even the Greens (Müller and Fallend 2004: 804). Given the problems his government had experienced in the previous years, the renewal of the coalition with the FPÖ was no foregone conclusion for Schüssel. By the same token, the fact that it was renewed reflected more the understanding that ÖVP could dominate the new government, than that the party felt constrained by some kind of bipolar competition (Luther 2003: 147; Müller and Fallend 2004: 828). At the same time, while the dynamics of opposition had given the image that SPÖ and Greens were close in policy terms, the existence of an alternative red-green bloc was more a matter of speculation than reality (Müller and Fallend 2004: 826). Indeed, in 2002 and in the subsequent elections of 2006 the SPÖ saw in a red-green majority the way to strengthen its position in eventual coalition
negotiations – primarily with the ÖVP (Luther 2003: 143; Müller and Fallend 2004: 821-822, 828).

The second indication that the Proporz cleavage always lurked underneath the suddenly prominent ideological competition was FPÖ’s, and particularly Haider’s, helpless proclivity towards populism. The 2000-2006 Schüssel governments never gave the impression of being a coherent entity (Müller and Fallend 2004: 832; Luther 2008: 3-6), mostly because the FPÖ found it difficult (for various reasons) to adapt to the exigencies of government. Since populism was the main strategic choice of Haider to highlight the failures of Proporz coalitions, its survival after 2000 meant that the FPÖ itself was not any more committed to the idea of an ideological competition than the two big parties were. Interestingly, among the many shenanigans Haider undertook during this time to provoke reactions, foreign policy initiatives were particularly prominent (Müller and Fallend 2004: 818-821). The highlight came in 2002, when he twice visited the embattled Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, thus also showcasing FPÖ’s final divorce from the Atlanticism of the 1980s and 1990s (Luther 2003: 140).

The above analysis shows that party system dynamics are decisive not only in cases of foreign policy change, but also as filters in fending off pressures from abroad and embedding foreign policy stability. While changes in Austria’s international environment were translated into a new balance between the two dimensions of Austrian politics (with ideological contestation gaining to the detriment of Proporz consensus), the dynamics of the Austrian party system were never transformed to the extent that Left-Right ideological competition completely replaced the proclivity of ÖVP and SPÖ to search for governing solutions instead of ideologically-charged coalitions (Müller and Fallend 2004: 832; Luther 2008: 16). Interestingly enough, the FPÖ itself failed to embed its rhetoric in an ideological framework and eventually found it easier to revert to anti-Proporz populism.

According to my theoretical framework, and as shown in the three deep case studies, new foreign policy ideas arise under conditions of the rise of new dimensions of competition – i.e. when domestic party systems undergo significant changes. The creation of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition could be considered one such change, whereby politics in Austria would be structured around a Right-Left dimension and this dimension would also organize foreign policy options under a neutrality-anti-neutrality dimension. The course of events though showed that this coalition did not signal as much a thorough change in the logic of party competition as a relative strengthening of the socioeconomic dimension of competition vis-à-vis the old Proporz dimension of competition. To the extent that this dimension remained relevant as well, the ÖVP did not seek to entrench the bipolar competition of 2000-2006 (Neuhold 2003: 17; Wodak and Kovács 2004: 239) and thus alienate potential coalition partners in the SPÖ and the Greens (Luther 2008: 16-17). Given how cherished neutrality was among the Austrian public (however its actual content watered down in practice) (Krüger 2003: 10; Neuhold 2003: 16; Wodak and
Kovács 2004: 238), to seek to undo its last vestiges and pursue NATO membership would antagonize and, ultimately, galvanize the opposition into a coherent pole of alternative governing potential\(^{168}\). In the end, the infusion of new elements (participation in CFSP and NATO’s Partnership for Peace) into neutrality (Krüger 2003: 12) closely reflected the updating, but not abandonment, of Proporz with elements of adversarial and ideological competition.

**Australia and New Zealand:** The significance of party system dynamics as necessary conditions for foreign policy change can be also demonstrated when looking at states facing similar international structural exigencies but that instituted different responses to them. In cases like these, comparisons would have to differentiate between instances of change and instances of non-change and focus on the effect of domestic political constellations. An overview of the cases of Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s will be given as an example of comparison between instances of change and non-change under similar international circumstances.

The puzzle here consists of the question of why two states with similar political identities, faced with similar changes in their international environment, instituted changes in their foreign policies to a very different degree. More specifically, the question concerns security policy and the reasons why the seemingly more powerful of the two, Australia, resisted very strong pressures from Asia and retained its essential security policy orientation towards the USA (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 178), whereas the less powerful, and traditionally very reliant on privileged partnerships with strong sponsors (first Great Britain and then USA), New Zealand chose in the late 1980s to abrogate a defense treaty with the USA. I contend that the discussion about foreign policy change in both cases was driven by domestic politics dynamics, and that the final outcome in each case (non-change in Australia vs change in New Zealand) was determined by the way party competition absorbed and structured different foreign policy options.

For years Australia saw itself as a quintessentially British and Western society (Dalrymple 2003: 211). This self-conception of Australia was expressed in a defense policy that laid premium on close alignment with Great Britain and, after the onslaught of the Cold War, the USA (expressed in the military alliances ANZUS and SEATO) (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 173; Wesley and Warren 2000: 14-15), an economic policy that was based on access to the countries of the Commonwealth, and an immigration policy that prioritized British/European settlers and shut out Asians (Wesley and Warren 2000: 21). After World War II, this policy set was carried over by the dominant conservative Liberal Party, usually in coalition with the rural National Party. Careful signs of change started being detected in the 1970s, when successive governments of Coalition and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) started energizing relations with

\(^{168}\) See the summary of parties’ positions on the new strategic doctrine in 2001 (Krüger 2003: 12-13).
countries of East Asia (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 171; Gurry 1998: 81-84; Wesley and Warren 2000: 22). A decisive change in tone and substance came, however, in the 1980s, when an ALP government explicitly tried to reorient the domestic and foreign policies of Australia away from its white Anglo past towards a more open and multicultural direction.

The ALP governments of 1983-1996, first under Bob Hawke and later under Paul Keating, boldly built on the increasing integration of the Australian economy with its regional surrounding and promoted the idea that Australia’s welfare and prominence depended on a serious effort to come closer to Asia. Australia needed to make a serious effort in order to entrench its ability to profit economically from trade with Asia (Dalrymple 2003: 80-81). To this end, the ALP claimed that Australia need not only reorient its foreign and trade policies, but also that a thorough reformulation of the country’s self-understanding was needed (Gurry 1998: 85). For Australia to portray its commitment to Asia, an active policy of multiculturalism at home was required that would challenge established views of Australia’s history and society (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 174-175; Dalrymple 2003: 80). The ALP’s foreign policy activism came hand in hand with a policy of restructuring of the Australian economy, away from the sheltered protectionism of the past and towards a policy of decreased state intervention and strong reliance on exports and international competitiveness (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 387-388; Wesley and Warren 2000: 22).

In other words, Australia’s foreign policy under Hawke and Keating was part of a consistent reform program that sought to undo many of the communitarian vestiges of Australian polity, bringing in a generally more liberal ethos both in the economy (liberalization) and society (multiculturalism). Under Keating’s foreign minister, Gareth Evans, integration with Asia was elevated to the point of a goal in itself, with policies like immigration and education expected to serve it completely (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 175; Dalrymple 2003: 97-99). It was this apparent abandonment of the West that drew Samuel Huntington’s attention in the Clash of Civilizations, whose few pages dealing with Australia became a hot topic of discussion there (Dalrymple 2003: 93, 125-126).

In practical terms, the new turn in Australian foreign policy was reflected in a much more active participation in multilateral negotiations between East Asian states. This approach was to be a break from classical bilateral relations with each Asian state and traditional conceptions of security dangers in Asia (George and McGibbon 1998; Gurry 1998: 85-86), and it would allow Australia to shape the regional environment as much as it would be affected by it (Higgott and Nossal 1997). Indeed, from the beginning Australia’s strategy sought to blend elements of continuity with signs of impressive change. While under the ALP team Australia’s immersion into East Asia was to be unequivocal, at the same time the government sought to shape the framework of regional governance by including states beyond the core of Australia’s neighbors in South East Asia. Australian actors preferred the term ‘Asia Pacific’ to ‘East Asia’, signaling that the
region they tried to integrate into had to include states like New Zealand, Japan and the USA (Dalrymple 2003: 88-94).

The culmination of Australia’s multilateral activism was the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) in 1989, an economic forum bringing together the dynamic economies of South East Asia with which Australia enjoyed burgeoning economic links, and states like USA and Japan with which it maintained traditionally close political and economic relations (Dalrymple 1997: 252; Wesley and Warren 2000: 22-23; Dalrymple 2003: 82-87). At the same time, Australia maintained a rather pro-Western (and implicitly anti-Asian) backbone in its security policies (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 177). The only activity in the security field to match reformism in the political, diplomatic and economic fields was the signing in 1995 of a defense treaty with Indonesia, Australia’s foremost geopolitical competitor (Dalrymple 1997: 243; Higgott and Nossal 1997: 182). Under the enthusiastically pro-Asia Evans, Australia seemed ready to continue headlong with its integration into East Asia, even overlooking issues of domestic governance and human rights there (George and McGibbon 1998: 401-402; Dalrymple 2003: 214-216).

At this point, however, the course of Australia’s foreign policy was interrupted by the elections of 1996, which after 13 years deposed the ALP and brought to power the center-right Coalition under Liberal John Howard. Under the Coalition, Australia maintained the content of the previous foreign policy – fostering links to Asia as dictated by the increasing reliance of the Australian economy there and the opportunity to enhance its international standing (Dalrymple 1997: 243; Wesley and Warren 2000: 19, fn. 19) – but significantly modified the shape and method of this policy: the new government prioritized bilateral relations, thus adding a dose of pragmatism in what was seen as an overly idealistic multilateralism under Labor (Dalrymple 1997: 251; Trood 1998: 185, 190; Dalrymple 2003: 144). In the second half of the 1990s the difference was one of degree rather than kind, as Howard insisted that Australia should not be ‘forced to choose between its history and geography’ (Dalrymple 1997: 244-245, 252; Higgott and Nossal 1997: 178). By this he meant both that Australia should not shed elements of its identity for the sake of integrating into Asia, and that relations with Asia could be compatible with relations with the West (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 180; Dalrymple 2003: 151).

The tone of Australian foreign policy changed even more in the early 2000s, as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the global war on terror was also translated into Australian politics - as adversarial identity politics. Howard decisively aligned Australia with the USA on issues like the war in Iraq and the practices of the Bush administration, together with a more nationalistic and anti-immigrant rhetoric domestically (McAllister 2003: 448; Johnson 2007: 200-201). While he verbally never doubted Australia’s commitment to close relations with Asia (Dalrymple 2003: 152), by the end of his time in power, in 2007, Australian foreign policy seemed to have erased most of the symbolic and
ideological capital generated by the enthusiastic embrace of Australia’s ‘Asian Pacific identity’ by Hawke, Keating and Evans (Kevin 2002). Overall, seen in the long run, a clear variance can be detected between more pro-Asian and more pro-Western overtones of foreign policy closely following the partisan identity of the government in Canberra (Dalrymple 2003: 222). Given the self-understanding of the Hawke and Keating governments as reformist and entrepreneurial agents of Australia’s identity and place in the world, one can speak of an incomplete foreign policy change, especially in the political and security field.

Compared to Australia, New Zealand’s foreign and security policy underwent very tangible changes during the same period. While New Zealand faced quite different structural conditions than Australia, and in fact conditions that would make foreign policy change particularly costly, it nevertheless proceeded with a thorough reevaluation of its defense policy and its relations with the USA. Much like Australia, New Zealand had traditionally seen itself as a loyal extension of the British and European presence in the Pacific. Yet even more than Australia, a sense of vulnerability due to geography and small population, made New Zealand a reliable ally of Great Britain well beyond the waning of British appeal. During the Cold War, this was reflected in close alignment with the USA, a relationship formalized in the creation of the ANZUS defensive treaty in the 1950s. Also differently than Australia, New Zealand’s international environment did not invite change – if anything, the country lacked significant alternative geopolitical loci, unlike Australia (Dalrymple 2003: 133).169

Despite these constraints, New Zealand did reposition itself in the waning days of the Cold War much more forcefully than Australia. A succession of events throughout the 1980s led to the gradual disillusionment of New Zealand with its Western allies, culminating in the 1987 suspension of military cooperation with USA in the framework of ANZUS. The catalyst for this change of security policy was nuclear policy, and especially the question of the presence of nuclear-equipped vessels in the Pacific. Whereas the government headed by the conservative National Party in the late 1970s and early 1980s proved to be staunchly pro-Western within the context of the Cold War (Vowles 1990: 87), a new Labour government under David Lange, elected in 1984, reversed policy rapidly. The Lange government objected to visits by nuclear vessels in New Zealand ports, essentially bringing the whole point of ANZUS into doubt.

The crisis came to a head in 1985, when French agents blew up a Greenpeace ship stationed in Auckland and when the New Zealand and US governments exchanged squabbles over the visits of nuclear-equipped vessels (Dalrymple 2003: 76). In both cases, the Labour government emphasized the disappointment with the stance of New Zealand’s traditional Western allies. The crisis escalated in 1986, when the USA

169 Dalrymple (2003: 139) though also contends that ‘New Zealand has a population approximately equal to that of Melbourne and its location gives it the comfort of feeling immune from any external threat’. I would contend that New Zealand has historically felt much more vulnerable than that, hence its persistent historical attachment to the values of the British Empire.
suspended its military obligations to New Zealand under ANZUS, and in 1987, an election year, when the government declared New Zealand a nuclear-free zone (Vowles 1990: 81). In the usually harsh words reserved for bitter occasions between former partners, the United States government referred to New Zealand as ‘a friend but not an ally’. By the late 1980s, and within a matter of a few years, the most loyal outpost of Western and Anglo-Saxon solidarity in the South Pacific had completely reversed course. This is a clear example of a foreign policy change that contrasts sharply with the oscillations of Australia between its Asian Pacific and its Western self.

What is striking in both cases of foreign policy activism is the close alignment of new foreign policy preferences with corresponding new domestic policy sets. Both in Australia and New Zealand new foreign policy ideas were represented by political parties that had just entered government after years in opposition, representing new political identities of domestic politics and seeking to underwrite their new position of dominance with a redefinition of the stakes of political competition. Both in Australia and New Zealand, the patterns of contestation of foreign policy reflected closely contestation over the rise of new normative anchors structuring party competition and a struggle over discursive dominance in domestic competition. I believe that wholesale foreign policy change in New Zealand expressed the successful attempt of the Labour Party to redefine the stakes of competition, while in Australia the persistence of the essential normative underpinning of the party system also meant that ALP’s foreign policy ideas were being absorbed in a normative anchor that contained alternatives with significant societal support and systemic relevance.

In New Zealand, the story of the forceful challenge against US nuclear presence in the South Pacific starts in many ways in the camp of Labour’s opponents, the conservative National Party. Between 1975 and 1984, National was in government under the leadership of the charismatic but abrasive Robert Muldoon. For years New Zealand had been the most regulated and protected economy among developed countries. It was also a devout Western ally, an aspirant British society with important alliance commitments to the United States. Muldoon’s period in office was characterized by an inflated application of these traditional tenets, i.e. increased government regulation (Schwartz 1994: 532; Nagel 1998: 228-229) and a polarizing commitment to the cause of the Cold War internationally. While the New Zealand party system, perhaps the last perfect example of two-party system in a democratic polity back then, was considered to reflect almost entirely a socioeconomic class cleavage between middle class and labour (Bean 1988: 304; Nagel 1998: 231-232), Muldoon’s policies and his image meant that National became uncharacteristically identified with a kind of working class conservative populism. This caused concern among urban middle class voters who would have been more comfortable with a more patrician style and a more liberal approach to the

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170 According to Dalrymple (2003: 76), Hawke had explicitly tried to dissociate his opening to Asia from New Zealand’s foreign policy adventurism. He also ‘had no personal liking for Lange’. 

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economy. Muldoon’s defeat in the 1984 election in the hands of Lange’s Labour was due in no small part to a defection of precisely this constituency (Vowles 1990: 82; Nagel 1998: 236-239).

The new Labour government represented a novel coalition in New Zealand politics. As the institutional features of the party system – perfect two-partyism and a first-past-the-post electoral system – forced societal interests to ally with one of the two major parties (Nagel 1998: 225-226), Labour became home to a dynamic group of urban voters with post-materialist concerns (Bean 1988: 316; McAllister and Vowles 1994: 387), united with Labour by their common disdain for Muldoon’s policies (Schwartz 1994: 535). These voters had reservations about Muldoon’s social conservatism. They also could be more open to calls for reform of the economy along liberal lines (Schwartz 1994: 547; Nagel 1998: 239-241). The slide of Labour on the socioeconomic axis following its engagement with a rising post-materialist cleavage (in essence the opposite move to the one Muldoon had instituted for National with his paternalistic protectionism) (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 395; Nagel 1998: 233-236) was evident in its economic policies. Under the auspices of minister of finance Roger Douglas, Labour implemented a radical reform program of deregulation, austerity and trade openness that went against established tenets of New Zealand economy (Vowles 1990: 81).

While this reform program spoke to the needs of some of Labour’s new followers, the government’s ability to absorb the post-materialist cleavage in the socioeconomic Left-Right and redefine the meaning of progressivism in New Zealand politics went through a concerted effort to satisfy the progressive proclivities of the new constituency of the party (Schwartz 1994: 535-536; Nagel 1998: 246-248). Foreign policy, and especially the question of nuclear vessels in the Pacific, was an important proxy of the post-materialist cleavage (Vowles 1990: 88; McAllister and Vowles 1994: 389). While Labour was very active in social legislation concerning gender and environmental issues as well (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 392), it nevertheless found that the nuclear/foreign policy issue perfectly captured the concerns of its young urban following. Emphasizing this issue could overcompensate for the fact that it was following a basically right-wing policy on economics – indeed, it was the only issue that could appeal to both the party’s leftist labour traditions and its new libertarian image (Nagel 1998: 255).

Seen from a narrow perspective, this looks like a standard use of diversionary foreign policy: Labour’s victory in the polarizing 1987 elections derived from the salience of the nuclear issue and the ability of Lange to harness the support of constituencies in academia, intelligentsia and affluent urban districts that were willing to overlook the consequences of Labour’s neoliberal economic policies (Vowles 1990: 87-88; Schwartz 1994: 547; Nagel 1998: 253). Yet from a party systemic perspective, the Labour victory in 1987 represented the institutionalization of a new dimension of

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171 For a presentation of the key aspects of the reform program in New Zealand and Australia (see below), see Schwartz (1994: 539-544). For New Zealand also see Nagel (1998).
competition (Schwartz 1994: 536), and foreign policy had a decisive role to play in this (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 393-395). The redefinition of New Zealand’s self-understanding demanded by the new security policy was not an afterthought of the policy change. Rather, it was a coherent program of domestic reform and the willingness of Labour to entrench its reformism within a new normative anchor of party competition (i.e. the waning away of the dominance of the class cleavage) (Bean 1988: 320-321; Vowles 1990: 89) that made foreign policy change institutionally possible and ideologically conceivable.

In Australia the political/institutional setting differs in some crucial aspects from New Zealand. Unlike New Zealand and most other Anglo democracies, Australia uses an electoral system that gives strength to two big parties but also allows the significant representation of other parties (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 395). Following the patterns of most English democracies, the main competition in the Australian party system is between the conservative Liberal Party, representing middle class interests, and the Australian Labour Party, closely affiliated with trade unions (Bean 1988: 320). The National Party, in permanent coalition with the Liberals, is the expression of the interaction between the regional and the socioeconomic cleavage. The Australian party system then is structured under a bipolar competition along the socioeconomic left-right cleavage (McAllister 2003: 446), itself absorbing other historical cleavages of Australia (Wesley and Warren 2000: 16). After World War II, Australia was run mostly by the Liberal Party that implemented a Keynesian policy of regulation, largely in a bipartisan accord with Labor (Johnson 2007: 204). Both Australian political parties were also in accord about the need to anchor Australia close to the Western bloc of the Cold War (Wesley and Warren 2000: 13). Much more than New Zealand, Australia quickly shed most of its political and psychological ties with Great Britain172.

Between 1949 and 1983 the ALP was in the opposition for all but three years. The election of Hawke in 1983 though represented the advent of a clearly assertive Labor with a coherent reform agenda. Much like the New Zealand Labour Party, Australian Labor instituted a far-reaching policy of dismantling of the regulatory structures that had governed Australian economy in the past and tried to create the preconditions for electoral dominance (Schwartz 1994: 535-536). At the same time, the ALP (traditionally a party with reservations towards immigration) became an enthusiastic exponent of multiculturalism and of socially liberal policies. Also like its New Zealand brethren, the ALP embedded its economically liberal and socially progressive message in an activist foreign policy towards Asia. Even more interesting, the Australian party system seemed to undergo a similar process of interaction, with Labor eager to absorb the preferences of a rising young urban class and to embed its liberalizing economic policies in a new

172 However a difference in emphasis always existed. The Coalition was always much more principled in its loyalism towards the West, whereas the left wing of Labor was much more outspoken in its criticism of the US (Ravenhill 1998: 321).
understanding of progressiveness (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 399; Dalrymple 2003: 74).

Exactly like in New Zealand, a new approach in foreign policy was not a simple response to immediate international structural constraints – Australia’s reliance on the Asian market was increasing for years already (Dalrymple 2003: 77-79). Instead, ALP interpreted these constraints according to its own position in the party system and intensified a change in foreign policy that was a coherent part of a project both of opening up the economy to international trade and competition (Schwartz 1994: 531; Dalrymple 2003: 80), and of domestic modernization of social attitudes (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 399; Gurry 1998: 86). Also like New Zealand, the new foreign policy overcompensated for ALP’s neoliberal turn in the economy and gave to its domestic reformism a progressive tilt.

Despite these similarities, there were crucial differences in the party system dynamics of the two countries that critically affected the pace and extent of foreign policy change in Australia. Due to the opposition strategies of the Liberal Party and the existence of smaller liberal parties, the ALP was never able to monopolize and completely appropriate the post-materialist vote like New Zealand Labour had done. Unlike the National Party under Muldoon, the Liberal Party had never shed its quintessentially center-right and middle-class outlook. In this way, it was able to keep close track of ALP’s reformism and sustain its appeal towards new urban strata – by the same token, the ALP never transformed itself into a coherently libertarian party like Labour in New Zealand (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 386-387). The sum effect of this was that the post-materialist cleavage was absorbed into the socioeconomic Left-Right without supplanting completely the old normative anchor of class-based politics (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 395).

The election of 1996, when Labor finally lost after 13 years in government, portrays the limited effect of the new foreign policy on the normative anchor of the Australian party system. Coalition’s victory was also an expression of Australians’ unease with the speed and ambition of Keating and Evans in repositioning Australia in East Asia (Dalrymple 1997: 245; Dalrymple 2003: 135). The dynamics of political opposition had made the Liberal Party under John Howard a strong opponent of changing Australia’s identity as a Western society. While the need of engagement with Asia was recognized, this should not lead to a change of Australia’s traditions and outlook (Gurry 1998: 86; Johnson 2007: 199). Analogously, the Liberals’ ability to keep engaged in the values of liberalization of the Australian economy (Johnson 2007: 196-197), unlike the protectionist opposition of National under Muldoon in New Zealand, also meant that the Right in Australia retained access to the post-materialist constituencies (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 399). Unlike New Zealand, the normative anchor changed only incrementally (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 389-392) and the Liberals maintained a
distinctive conservative profile, which underpinned their version of liberalizing economic and pragmatic foreign policies.

The ability of the Liberals to take advantage of the partially redefined normative anchor was evident during John Howard’s long and polarizing reign in 1996-2007. While his reign was characterized by many pragmatic policies in the field of economy, immigration and foreign policy, there was a difference of style, emphasis and atmosphere as evident as the one during Hawke and Keating (Dalrymple 2003: 108-109; Johnson 2007: 200). Elected the same year as the breakthrough of Pauline Hanson’s populist anti-immigrant party, Howard spoke out more against multiculturalism and the negative impacts of a very close association with Asia (Dalrymple 1997: 245-247; Ravenhill 1998: 324). In 2001, he basically won the election on a hard agenda against Muslim immigration and the dangers of terrorism (McAllister 2003: 451-454). All the while he cultivated relations with Asia, talk of Australia becoming the ‘sheriff deputy of the USA’ in the region increased (Dalrymple 2003: 136).

The comparison of these two cases allows us to see the importance of party system dynamics as prerequisites for the emergence of new foreign policy preferences and institutionalization of new foreign policies. In terms of the table presented above, in one case (New Zealand) the first stage produced a new alignment of domestic preferences under stable party system mechanics and the interest of one party (Labour) in redefining what party competition was about and, by extension, the position of New Zealand in the world (second stage). In the other case (Australia), changes in the first stage were not as systemically relevant as to alter the direction or meaning of party competition – the socioeconomic normative anchor of competition was retained and variations in foreign policy outputs within a steady framework of defined interests closely followed the succession of parties in office. This difference may explain the ultimate difference in the extent of changes of security policy between Australia and New Zealand: while Australia was under more pressure and had more incentives to unequivocally throw in its lot with East Asia, it was the more vulnerable and traditionally subservient New Zealand that broke ranks with its powerful partner. To this day, party competition in Australia reproduces this essential split over foreign policy and the identity of the country all the while governments of both parties pragmatically foster links with Asia, while party competition in New Zealand embeds a basic consensus about its identity as a Pacific nation.

The Netherlands: An argument that could be made against the model presented here is that the foreign policy cases studied were highly salient, political and symbolic, or with important domestic outreach and repercussions. In such cases, the logic of contestation of domestic issues applies anyway, hence the cases presented here were effectively ‘domesticized’ and their study does not add to a substantial understanding of how specifically ‘foreign’ policy issues become structured. In this way, the argument of this
dissertation would not counter effectively two rival viewpoints. On the one hand, there is the Blondel and Nousiainen (2000) argument that foreign policy does not fall under the premises of party politics at all as foreign policy is too unpredictable to be determined by partisan developments. Following this logic, Blondel and Nousiainen would dispute my argument with the assertion that ‘hard’ foreign policy issues stay outside of the realm of real politics and that this thesis would have to show that it accommodates cases of foreign policy change with small domestic ramifications but also important practical repercussions in the conduct of foreign policy (that may be less visible and important to the voting public). A contrasting argument that also calls into question the exclusive focus on highly salient foreign policy issues is made by Hofmann (2009). Her argument is that foreign policy issues are being structured according to foreign policy-specific ideas that are institutionalized within political parties because they are essentially dissociated from the material stake of domestic politics. She then could dismiss the argument of this dissertation by saying that the high salience issues I looked at had high material domestic repercussions (like the Canadian FTA), so domestic political identities were naturally called upon to make sense of them. While she disagrees with Blondel and Nousiainen in that she accepts the role of political parties in foreign policy, Hofmann’s argument creates the same predicament for this thesis, i.e. it requires a demonstration that political identities matter also for low salience foreign policy issues with low redistributional impact.

As an example of depoliticized foreign policy change I look at the new focus of Dutch security policy during the 1990s. Traditionally Dutch foreign and security policy has been oriented towards seafaring powers, reflecting the needs of the Netherlands’ as a country heavily reliant on sea trade. This identity has also informed the need to check the strength of states with ambitions to dominate Europe – particularly Germany. Out of this the second traditional element of Dutch foreign policy arose, the reliance on neutrality and international multilateralism as a counterweight to great power politics. This traditional policy set was significantly modified after World War II, when Dutch neutrality had not prevented Germany from invading the Netherlands. Under the Cold War context, the Netherlands threw in its lot with the Atlantic Alliance. While European integration was valued as a check on the ambitions of bigger European powers, a wider security/political role for Europe was seen as a diversion from the main focus of Western security, NATO (Sie Dhian Ho and van Keulen 2004: 4; van der Harst 2007: 128; de Wijk 2007: 150-152, 159).

The end of the Cold War posed a significant challenge for Dutch security policy. The collapse of the Eastern bloc cast a shadow of doubt over the main preconditions of Dutch security policy, the constant engagement of the USA in Europe and the checking of the ambitions of continental powers (Sie Dhian Ho and van Keulen 2004: 4). A persistent focus on Atlanticism was deemed unrealistic under the new circumstances, but a turn towards some kind of Eurocentric security policy was also not possible both
because of the Dutch traditions and because the European security framework remained highly problematic in the 1990s (de Wijk 2007: 152). More as a reflex towards the new geopolitical conditions, the Netherlands had presented a very integrationist position in security matters during the negotiations for the creation of the EU in the early 1990s, but soon reverted to more moderate positions (Pijpers 1996: 253-255; Tonra 2001: 169; Sie Dhian Ho and van Keulen 2004: 5).

A more decisive and visible turn in Dutch foreign policy came after 1994, when a novel coalition entered power in The Hague. For years Dutch party politics reflected the logic of consociationalism. In this vein, while the Dutch party system was very fragmented, it was characterized by both centripetal competition and governing by broad coalition governments. Party competition was structured around a socioeconomic class dimension (pitting middle class against working class) and a religious dimension (first pitting Catholics against the dominant Calvinists, but progressively redefined as a competition on social issues between Christians and secularists) (Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003: 48-49). The Christian Democratic party CDA was the pivot of all coalitions, sometimes reflecting a more liberal economic policy when the conservative liberal VVD was its partner and sometimes promoting more protectionist welfare policy when the labour PvdA was its partner (Irwin and van Holsteyn 1997: 114-115). While all major Dutch parties supported both Atlanticism in security policy and European integration as an economic union, the custodian of this foreign policy set were the Christian parties, which consistently formed part of the government (van der Harst 2007).

After the elections of 1994, a unique constellation of Dutch politics arose. For the first time, PvdA and VVD formed a government together without the presence of a Christian party (Irwin 1995). Serving as a kind of a link between two parties that were considered to be the most removed from one another on economic matters (Irwin and can Holsteyn 1997: 115) was the smaller D66, a ‘social liberal’ and avowedly pro-European party (Irwin and van Holsteyn 1997: 106; van der Brug 1999: 181). The formation of this coalition (called ‘purple’ because of the red of PvdA and the blue of the VVD) signified an important change in the direction of competition within the Dutch party system: this apparently paradoxical coalition portrayed the degree to which the Dutch party system was disengaging from the rigid battle lines of class and religion and entering a period where government efficiency and issue salience would influence the dimensions and stakes of competition (Irwin and van Holsteyn 1997). While the purple cabinet enjoyed amazing popularity (expressed in its reelection in 1998 against a demoralized CDA) (van der Brug 1999) for eight years, the price of its economic success was the entry into the public debate of newer issues concerning values and identities, most prominently the question of immigration (Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003: 53-55).

The new coalition also made a mark in foreign policy, as the Netherlands showed a more pronounced willingness to contribute to the development of political and military capabilities outside of the NATO framework. While, as we saw, in the early 1990s
governments under CDA had entertained the idea, it was not until 1994 and the creation of a truly novel coalition that the new post-Cold War environment was interpreted as requiring a clear strengthening of European defense and security institutions (Homann 2000: 185-186; Stahl et al 2004: 421). In fact, the CDA-led government’s proposal to integrate foreign policy into the supranational structures of the new European Union at Maastricht expressed more a traditional Dutch preference for the Community method as a check on great power ambitions than a new vision of a truly enabled Union in the security field (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2000: 129-130).

The new government’s pro-European activism was pronounced in two phases. Firstly, in 1994-1995 a new foreign policy report was published that emphasized the need for the Netherlands to endorse Europe and to be part of rising efforts to give the EU a security component (van Mierlo et al 1995; Sie Dhian Ho and Van Keulen: 5). Foreign minister and D66 head Hans Van Mierlo was particularly instrumental in emphasizing Europe as the new locus of Dutch security policy (Sie Dhian Ho and Van Keulen 2004: 5; de Wijk 2007: 152-153). Purple’s Europeanism received a new impetus after the ravishing endorsement of the coalition in the 1998 elections and the St. Malo summit of the same year between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac. During its second term, the PvdA-VVD-D66 government endorsed and promoted the EU’s Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), to the extent that one could speak of a ‘dramatic policy change’ (Stahl et al 2004: 423; de Wijk 2007: 154). In comparison with the preferences of other ‘Atlanticist’ EU members like Denmark at the time, the Dutch stance created an even bigger contrast (Tonra 2001: 159-168).

Throughout the 1990s, European foreign and security policy was an issue of low salience in Dutch politics. While important international developments like the Yugoslav wars received much attention (Stahl et al 2004: 432), the minutiae of institutional developments in the EU did not. However, the new bolder direction of Dutch foreign policy can be ascribed to a very considerable extent to the creation of the Purple coalition. The most important may have been the role of the very pro-European D66, which served as the conscience or ‘glue’ of the coalition (van der Brug 1999: 183). Policy polarization between PvdA and VVD extended to the foreign policy field as well, as PvdA was coming out of a period of significant anti-NATO sentiments in the 1970s and 1980s (Pijpers 1996: 250; Tonra 2001: 74), while VVD remained the most Atlanticist party of the Netherlands. As a self-styled reformist and outsider party, D66 added significantly to the government’s foreign policy direction (especially with van Mierlo in charge of foreign affairs in 1994-1998). While the Dutch public at the time had a conspicuously indifferent attitude towards technical issues of European security, party politics was still the crucial filter between international systemic imperatives and foreign policy change.

The foreign and security policy innovation of the 1990s proved to be resilient beyond the life of the Purple coalition and it permanently impacted the orientation of
Dutch foreign policy – adding confusion but also reducing dogmatism (Pijpers 1996: 257; de Wijk 2007: 163). Comparative analyses of European security policies in the 2000s emphasize a new permanent ‘Europeana’ tilt in what remains a fundamentally ‘Atlanticist’ security policy (Stahl et al 2004; Stahl 2005). Unlike states that demonstrated their intense Atlanticism (like Denmark), the Netherlands treaded a more careful line during the Iraq war crisis in 2002 and 2003 (Stahl et al 2004: 421-422). This was both due to the very volatile domestic political environment of the time (Stahl 2005: 22-23; de Wijk 2007: 157-159), but also due to a residual ‘Europeanism’ in defense and security matters that positioned the Netherlands more towards the middle of the Atlanticist-Europeanism axis (Stahl 2005: 27, 34). Seen in a long-term perspective, the Dutch decision to provide ‘political but not military’ support to the US intervention in Iraq (Stahl 2005: 15, 23) was not only a reflection of traditional Dutch attachment to orthodox ideas of international legality (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2000: 130) but also a symptom of a slide away from unconditional Atlanticism – an understanding that coming closer to Europe also necessarily entailed a degree of distancing from the United States (de Wijk 2007: 154).

While it is true that the Netherlands retained an overarching commitment to NATO (Pijpers 1996: 265), the security policy of the Purple coalition represented a significant change in Dutch foreign policy in that a clearly European dimension was absent before. As such, it mirrored the existence of a novel coalition in The Hague that expressed the realignment of Dutch politics around issues of policy efficiency and the creation of new socioeconomic identities away from older economic and social cleavages. The anti-Purple backlash of the early 2000s that accompanied the rise of Pim Fortuyn and issues of immigration and integration, further entrenched this axis of competition (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003). But this axis, under conditions of consensus politics practiced by the embattled mainstream parties, also effectively absorbed the new direction of foreign policy of the 1990s and made a more balanced foreign policy between Europe and NATO a pertinent question of future Dutch security policy (Sie Dhian Ho 2004: 9-10; de Wijk 2007: 163-164). Even the pervasive Euroscepticism that characterizes radical politics in the Netherlands in the last 10 years, and continues to underpin the new direction of party competition, is a testament to the change of discursive frame within which foreign policy options are being considered (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2000: 131-132).

CONCLUSION

The four cases presented here aimed to fulfill two different goals. The first was to complement the comparative analysis that forms the backbone of this dissertation and showcase the viability of the analytical framework in diverse cases where the outcome (foreign policy change) or crucial initial conditions (politicianization of foreign policy issues) varied. The case studies had the scope and ambition of a plausibility probe, i.e.
offering a narrative in broad strokes that nevertheless employed the main analytical categories of the comparative analysis (political identities, systemic parameters of party competition, feedback loops between domestic and international politics etc.). As a complement to the deeper case studies of the previous chapters, the plausibility probe further supports the main assertions of the theoretical framework through the logic of comparison. These assertions are that domestic party politics are the necessary condition for international systemic changes to be translated into new foreign policies; and that the kind of domestic changes that makes new foreign policies conceivable includes a combination of systemically relevant realignment of political identities and changes in the systemic parameters of party competition.

As the case of Austria showed, the institutionalization of new stakes of party competition and a new discursive framework – a normative anchor – of party politics is needed for foreign policy change to become possible. The comparison between New Zealand and Australia portrayed how the rise of new political identities (here the post-materialist social groups) is not enough to change the discursive framework of foreign policy contestation without permissive systemic and institutional conditions in party competition. The extent and nature of domestic change in turn determined the ultimate channeling of international change into new foreign policies. The Dutch case finally showcased the role of changes in the parameters and terms of domestic political debate for the development of new foreign policies even when specific foreign policy issues were not salient politically.

The second goal that the plausibility probe aimed to fulfill here was to show that the analytical framework of this dissertation can ‘travel’ across time and space within some basic scope conditions (basically the existence of a parliamentary system of democratic government). While I am far from making the claim that the world works uniformly according to a theoretical framework of my design, I think that the basic ideas of this thesis – that domestic politics matter in the creation of new ideas of foreign policy, that international and domestic politics are intrinsically linked, and that one has to take the discursive framework of domestic party competition seriously – are straightforward enough to find application in diverse cases. In exercising the requisite caution associated with a plausibility probe, we can still say that the general empirical generalizations generated by the three thorough case studies seem to survive the test of these four additional short narratives.

In all cases party systems were the quintessential repositories of ideas and self-views of countries’ position in the world. Foreign policy ideas had to find suitable hosts to be expressed through. But even then (as in the case of Austria and Australia), the institutionalization of new foreign policy may be halted by the stickiness of dominant frameworks and underlying ideas of party competition. In all four cases foreign policy entrepreneurship by partisan actors can be seen as an effort to absorb international systemic changes and, through them, support new patterns of party politics. Even where
foreign policy change in the end did not take place (Austria) or was incomplete (Australia), the process of contestation of foreign policy impacted the systemic features of party competition and altered important features of the respective party systems. Of course domestic change receives important impetus from the bottom, from the societies political parties profess to represent. Yet partisan actors are constituted by and engage with structures both below and above them (the foreign environment of a state). Finally, none of the four additional cases portrayed the interesting phenomenon of the three main case studies, i.e. the exchange of foreign policy positions between parties. Still, it is an interesting observation that in two cases (New Zealand and Australia) foreign policy innovation accompanied domestic policies by parties that were completely opposite than the ones they had pursued in the past (I refer to the process of economic liberalization under Labour parties) – indeed, foreign policy change was a needed complement of these parties’ domestic policies from a practical and symbolical perspective.

In sum, the theoretical expectations presented in the first chapter seem to be confirmed in all cases and the theoretical framework can travel with relative ease across time and space. Foreign policy change of democratic parliamentarian polities can be better understood as the result of interaction between two necessary conditions: international and domestic systemic change. The focus will now shift to the theoretical and metatheoretical implications of this argument, which will be presented in the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: THEORETICAL AND METATHEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE RESEARCH AND THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

In the theoretical chapter I discussed the potential theoretical implications of the argument and the ensuing comparative research for three broad strands of political science literature. In IR, the question concerned important issues about the role of ideas, institutions, identities and agency in world politics. In FPA, it was about the importance of party politics in foreign policy and the process of preference formation that took history, identities and ideas seriously. In comparative party politics, I was interested in showing that party system dynamics can have policy outputs in the field of foreign policy, as well as that party systems can be affected by international events. My research was inspired by a combination of liberal/domestic and constructivist/ideational analytical frameworks from within IR. By taking a deeper look into the domestic politics of foreign policy, I am making a methodological point about the usefulness of comparative analysis in the study of foreign policies and the development of narratives of policy change. Altogether, my research is informed by a frame of mind that sees politics (and international relations in particular) as a multi-textured process that we can only begin to understand if we trace the complex interplay of agency, ideas and institutions across levels of analysis. For International Relations specifically, this leads to a plea for a more daring engagement with other literatures and specific empirical questions.

While I will address all of these issues in this final chapter, I will also go one step further and trace the implications of the empirical research for a more general question of metatheoretical nature, that of the interrelationship between systems embedding social action. As I focused on party politics as a systemically embedded phenomenon, the question opens up as to how this research can be framed within a more general sociological framework. By using some elementary concepts from open systems theory, I will try to show the importance of this research for foundational questions not only of agency/structure but also of social systems. I will start by answering the main questions posed in the theoretical chapter, and in the following sections I will continue with a treatment of the implications of a systems-based view of party-based foreign policy change along the lines suggested here. I will also address residual questions of an epistemological and methodological nature.
ANSWERING THE THEORETICAL QUESTIONS OF THE THESIS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND PARTY POLITICS

a) Identities, ideas, agents and International Relations

The comparative analysis and the plausibility probe starkly revealed the ideational nature of the politics of foreign policy. In all three major cases, the preferences and ideas of important domestic political identities were translated into a competition over new foreign policies once the normative anchor of party competition – the language of politics that informs partisan actors with understandings of what party competition is all about – was significantly altered. Only when the SPD and the FDP joined in government, when the Canadian Conservatives understood themselves as agents of a decentralized version of Canadian nationalism, and when PASOK absorbed Simitis’ modernization in its leftist ideology, did the political identities represented within these parties cue ideas towards foreign policy change.

In more general terms, this shows that the ideational framework within which political preferences are expressed is crucial not only for their propagation but also, in a step earlier, for their actually coming into being. While important individuals or party factions in all cases had hopes of thorough foreign policy change, specific projects of foreign policy change virtually came into existence in the minds of leaders, party actors and public opinion only when new foreign policy projects became clearly aligned with corresponding rival projects of domestic policy along new lines of competition. These new lines of competition built and overlay existing powerful axes of competition rather than replacing them completely – but still, the change was meaningful enough for new political projects of change to arise.

As discussed earlier, this view crucially complements standard accounts in transnational relations literature about the power of ideas, individuals and domestic institutions in world politics. All these things clearly matter in foreign policy change, but in order to understand how and when they do, one must look at the general ideational framework embedding their expression and interactions. This framework gives meaning to different preferences not as idiosyncratic interests but as coherent policy sets for the governing of a polity. This argument comes very close to the literature about national identity and how it conditions and delineates frameworks of argumentation of foreign policy. Yet one problem with this literature is that it is very easy to fall into impressionistic narratives whereby national identity is very difficult to pin down and its effects only loosely understood. One of the implications of the argument presented here is

\[^{173}\] As we saw, the foundational text in identity research is Jepperson et al (1996). Goldstein and Keohane (1993) dealt with identity and politics earlier, yet their positivistic take on the topic gained little traction in the literature. Some recent examples of research on identity and foreign policy include Ashizawa (2008), Bukh (2009), Legro (2009) and Lucarelli (2006).
that ‘national identity’ (much like ideas of individual political identities vying for influence), in democratic polities at least, can be pinned down by looking at institutional spaces codifying terms of engagement between political forces and a language of politics.\footnote{‘Domestic political institutions provide the rules of the game for citizens and state officials […], identify what is legitimate and what is not [and] help national actors define their interests domestically and internationally’ (Cortell and Davis 2000: 79).} Party systems are such institutions, and IR scholarship interested in national identities and the normative frameworks of foreign policy decisions would be well advised to employ the vast amount of work comparativists have done in coding, measuring and untangling the content of political competition in democratic states. Saying that this or that country is traditionally ‘Atlanticist’ or ‘neutralist’ or ‘Europeanist’ or ‘Anti-American’ etc. is both a shaky abstraction and a problematic starting point for research when one could instead rely on accurate data and/or historical accounts that present the range of rival opinions codified in party competition.\footnote{For the example I used, see Stahl (2005). Also see the discussion on Engelmann-Martin’s identity-based analysis of Ostpolitik at the end of the West German chapter.}

A second problem with the identity literature is its static nature. Identity presupposes or generates a research bias towards stability – in any case, it is not a concept inviting research on change. Some works that tackle this best actually start by untangling identity as the sum of different identity elements; foreign policy change in these works is used as an opportunity to understand how actors engage with domestic identities and dominant discursive frames to promote their preferences (Barnett 1999; Hopf 2002; Wæver 2001). Once the non-unitary nature of domestic identity is accepted, one is bound to accept that the formulation of foreign policy choices is not a passive expression of preferences within a pre-given framework, but rather a dynamic process whereby actors engage with the given discursive framework, sometimes even altering it all the while they are being constituted by it. The sociological discussion of the agency/structure debate\footnote{On coconstitution of agent and structure in constructivism also see Checkel (1998).} enters here as the most promising theoretical framework for making sense of this interaction between societal interests and normative anchors that structure discussion.

As we saw, according to the agency/structure problematique, political agents engage with the normative structures they are embedded in as much as they are constituted by them. This is a dynamic interrelationship that may well lead to both significantly altered agents and structures. Here, the question of time plays an important role when trying to understand agent/structure interactions. Deep historical narratives can untangle policy/agent equilibria at a given point in time by looking at the step-by-step mutual constitution of agents who promote preferences and the normative frameworks that embed societal competition of interests (Checkel 1998: 337). In the three cases presented in the dissertation, partisan actors were constituted as much by the normative structure of the party system as they effected change on this structure through the promotion of new policies. Indeed, successful institutionalization of foreign policies in all three cases also
signaled the final passage to a new interpretation of party competition. Through contestation of rival foreign policy projects, the SPD, the Tories and PASOK cemented the change of the normative anchor that structured party competition all the while initial changes in this anchor had made the expression of new foreign policy projects possible. This interaction solves the apparent contradiction of a focus on both normative frameworks of contestation and policy change, as it allows for an evolutionary and mutually reinforced change of both actors and structures.

The intention of my argument is of course far from discrediting or verifying ‘theories’ in general. My concern is with developing and then applying to practical problems a theoretical framework that can be shown to be more or less suitable for understanding specific questions at hand. In this vain, I would say that the three cases have shown that a framework combining liberal and constructivist premises about the role and nature of domestic politics accounts satisfactorily for the role of political parties in foreign policy. Along the lines of the liberal strand of IR theory as developed by Moravcsik, it becomes obvious that domestic preferences (both of material and ideational nature!) matter for foreign policies, but in a more complicated way than is depicted by Moravcsik. His theory becomes even more powerful if it is embedded within a constructivist framework that will inform it with a more textured understanding about the environment of preference contestation, the role of ideas and the importance of the international environment as a feedback loop on domestic politics. The combination of liberal and constructivist premises can bridge precisely the empirical and epistemological divide between stability and change discussed above. Social constructivism embarks from the acceptance that a complex web of ideas and discursive constructions embeds existing patterns of policies and the study of change needs to take this into account, lest it degenerates in vacuous explanations like ‘change happened because new preferences arose’ or ‘because a new government took power’ (Cortell and Davis 2000: 69).

This theoretical framework, provisionally and humbly dubbed here ‘liberal constructivism’ 177, does not exhaust itself in the study of party politics and foreign policy. It can potentially help us understand other aspects of domestic politics and their role in foreign policy such as bureaucracies, economic interests, and even the role of individuals. The aim here is to incorporate in a coherent epistemological understanding the duality of stability and change, a proxy (or a heuristic) of the other essential pair, that of agency and structure. The validation of this liberal constructivist framework constitutes a plea for further emphasis on domestic politics in IR discussions because this holds the promise of increasing the scope and enriching the vigor of different theoretical strands. This analysis is not only a vindication of a framework combining liberal and mainstream constructivist

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177 Not to be confused with Risse-Kappen’s liberal constructivism, where the term ‘liberal’ is used in its ideological meaning (Checkel 1998: 334).
premises, but also constitutes a straightforward criticism of post-structuralist views of the role of ideas in domestic politics.\textsuperscript{178}

As already implied in the theoretical chapter, post-structuralists hold a rather schizophrenic view of the social world.\textsuperscript{179} While they are engaged in a commendable effort to both uncover and undo, through science, the structures of power that reproduce themselves in discourses and identities, they also see these structures of power as thin layers upon which material reality is based. In this framework, analysis oscillates between focusing on apparently all-powerful and all-too-stable structures and an interest in sweeping changes based on the discursive agency of political entrepreneurs. As is sometimes the case with conspiracy theories, the mood swings between resignation in front of powerful discursive frameworks and a willingness to underpin and effect change by recording it \textit{per se}. In practical terms, post-structuralist analyses of foreign policy oscillate between stability and change, and between agents and structures, without really ever standing firmly on the middle ground and without building bridges between the two extremes.

My analysis here shows that this is an overtly pessimistic view of politics. In all three cases we looked extensively at how discursive structures (the normative anchors of the respective party systems) did not prove any more determinant than what partisan actors made them to be. In all three cases, active agency on behalf of self-conscious actors promoting preferences and ideas, and looking for political gains as dictated by the systemic parameters of party competition, in the end managed to crucially modify what only some time before seemed like overwhelming normative frames of competition.\textsuperscript{180} The SPD managed to alter the emphasis on anti-Communism as the basis of competition in West Germany, Mulroney undid the pan-Canadian framework of party competition, and Simitis successfully molded the imperative of modernization in the polarizing strategy of PASOK. In all cases, the discursive reproduction of patterns of power over agents were effectively interrupted, which contradicts even more post-structuralists’ views if we take into account that for them discursive frameworks are little more than discourses, whereas here they have been conceptualized as complex structures including ideas, historical processes and institutions.

At the same time, change was shown here to be a more complex and path-dependent process than what a simple substitution of rival dominant discourses would imply. In all cases partisan actors had to respect existing understandings and principles that governed party competition such as the relational positions of parties and patterns of opposition between them. The simple promotion of alternative discourses would not have been enough inside institutional spaces that codify not only terms of debate but also prior

\textsuperscript{178} Checkel (1998) also differentiates between constructivism and post-structuralism (in his terminology ‘post-modernism’).

\textsuperscript{179} As a reminder from the theoretical chapter, I am referring here mostly to works falling within the tradition initiated by Campbell (1992). In foreign policy a good example is Hansen (2006).

\textsuperscript{180} Here also see Blyth (2003: 698).
understandings of interests and relations between political identities. In all three cases, it is more accurate to speak of bounded agency that built on some prior features as much as it sought to change others.

Indeed, partisan actors used the durable elements of the respective normative anchors and in redefining them turned the tables on their opponents. By embracing the pragmatic class-inclusive and interconfessional strategy of CDU/CSU, the SPD redefined the meaning of bipolar competition in West Germany. Mulroney convinced of the usefulness of the FTA by presenting it as a veritable project of national reconciliation, i.e. in using the unitary discourse of the Liberals even though his understanding of what this meant was the complete opposite than the Liberals’ pan-Canadianism. In Greece, PASOK’s turn towards modernization did not abandon the party’s embrace of a polarizing competition against ND as enemy of the progressive pole comprising of the Center and Left of Greek politics. Instead, the realization of parts of Simitis’ project became possible only when he showed that this was a viable renewal of PASOK’s winning formula. Once the contestation of foreign policy was complete, in all cases party systems had been infused with new elements, but the basic patterns and formats of competition remained the same. This duality between stability and change of the party systems is consistent with an understanding of a dynamic interaction between structures and agents, a far more complex process than a simple alteration of discourses over time. Put simply, continuity did not preclude change, but in fact contained already within it elements of change.

What becomes evident then from this discussion is that a middle-ground research strategy holds the promise of more interesting narratives than one wavering between the extreme poles of stability and change. Stability and change need to be understood as processes themselves, dynamic concepts that do not denote neat situations in specific points in time but roughly defined periods where stability or change simply prevail, without the one precluding the other. In this universe, the prospects for change are actually far bigger than what post-structuralists would think. As much as agents are constrained by existing discourses, they can also engage with them, identify cracks and inventively appropriate concepts and narratives in order to promote their own ideas and interests. Revolutionary change in this world is barely ever possible – but significant change is indeed feasible. This may be a less inspirational message than the one conveyed by post-structuralists, but it is far more hopeful than what a constant condemnation of all-powerful discourses constituting hopeless actors allows for.

The inclusion of constructivism in a theoretical analysis of the domestic politics of foreign policy presents another implication. Employing constructivism in the analysis of a specific empirical question necessitates accepting its philosophical and epistemological premises. Key among them are its ontological holism and idealism (Wendt 1999). Seeing the social world through the eyes of constructivism implies an acceptance of the unity of

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181 This is a variation of an argument also found in Buzan and Wæver (1997).
182 Within constructivist literature, this emphasis on agency has been made e.g. by Checkel (1999).
politics across levels of activity (and analysis). This means that studying the effect of party politics on foreign policy through constructivist lenses requires an incorporation of the international dimension in questions of policy change. Constructivism in turn would see these levels of activity (domestic politics, policymaking, international system) connected through their common idealist nature (i.e. concepts and intersubjective understandings giving meaning to tangible, material things).

In the three cases of foreign policy change I looked at, the international dimension played a prominent role, not only by providing the impetus for foreign policy change (détente, the failure of the international free trade regime, and the end of the Cold War in the Balkans), but also by constantly affecting the process of promotion of new foreign policy preferences. Indeed, international developments were framed according to domestic political projects, and ideas and norms attached to changing international systemic constellations served as discursive resources for the promotion of internally consistent ‘visions of domestic society’. I pinned down this interaction by looking at a very specific feature of party-based foreign policy contestation: the employment of the ‘international argument’ by policy entrepreneurs. The SPD/FDP government presented Ostpolitik as a necessary response to the need for détente and peace in Europe; the Canadian Tories presented the FTA as an embrace of commercial regionalism when the multilateral trade regime had failed and Canada was faced with the prospect of losing foreign markets; and Simitis presented Helsinki as a solution to the question of reconciling Greece’s anchoring in the West with the territorial securing of the country in the Aegean in light of the new geopolitical environment in the Balkans. In all cases the proponents of change presented international shifts in terms that strengthened their domestic position (Cortell and Davis 2000: 77), however the objective existence of these changes was a necessary condition for the formulation of alternative foreign policy projects.

This view of foreign policy contestation does not upset the analytical insights provided by the agency/structure problematique – if anything, it strengthens them. Including the international dimension in the analysis in the shape of feedback loops into domestic competition means that the structure that embeds and constitutes actors is even more complex. It includes not only systemic features of party competition, ideas and identities codified in this competition, and institutional features of domestic politics, but also ideas and material structures of the international system. Through political identities, the normative anchor of domestic party competition acquires an international dimension as well. For example: in West Germany the Cold War underpinned the bipolar competition between Adenauer’s CDU and the SPD; in Canada anti-Americanism supported Trudeau’s definition of party competition as a pan-Canadian affair; in Greece tensions with the West and Turkey cemented the anti-Right polarization and PASOK’s dominance.
This of course meant that policy entrepreneurs had to deal with even more complicated and overwhelming structures in their efforts to redo party politics – it also meant that these same structures offered more opportunities and more resources for agents to change things. In all cases, international systemic change became the catalyst for ongoing party system dynamics to rise to the level of new institutionalized features of party competition. Reformers in all cases (Brandt, Mulroney, Simitis) became enabled by international systemic change to promote coherent definitions of the stakes of party competition and the character of their states. In this way, party systems in West Germany, Canada and Greece came more in line with the international environment surrounding these states – and foreign policy projects that had seemed unthinkable just a few years before (recognizing the DDR regime, free trade with the US, allowing Turkey to become an EU candidate) were accepted as valid solutions to new challenges.

The incorporation of the international dimension, and generally the engagement with metatheoretical debates in IR, can make important additions to discussions that until now focused on a simple inside-out view of foreign policy. I will treat this issue and its consequences for FPA in the following section. For IR itself though, it is a validation of an eclectic approach that combines methodological realism with a problem-driven theory-building ontology. Again, the point is not to validate constructivism to the detriment of other approaches, but rather to show that there are different ways of understanding a specific problem, in this case the effect of domestic politics on foreign policy change. At the same time, this research strategy seeks to reflect back on schools of thought and theories, expanding their scope of applicability.

For mainstream constructivism for example, it is quite a challenge to explain change (when the focus on identities and ideas privileges a stability-centered mindset) and also to be applied in a middle-range theory that is looking at domestic politics (as it is essentially a system-level theory, much like neorealism) (Checkel 1998: 338-342). Yet engaging with concepts in new ways also yields interesting results in terms of what these concepts can analyze. We already saw for example that our theoretical framework can readily help us understand change through the agent/structure debate. Now we can also see how constructivism’s logic can be replicated in domestic politics. In Kratochwil (1982) it was shown that there is a crucial difference between idiosyncratic preferences of each state and bona fide interests that are respected by the community of states. The difference between preferences and interests is that the first turn into the second only after their congruence with the general common principles of the system of states is demonstrated – and in turn, they can be legitimately promoted when this congruence is exploited. By the same token, political preferences on domestic and foreign policy have to abide by a certain logic that governs competition between political forces183, and, when it comes to

183 ‘It is probably not enough to invoke an international norm as supporting a narrow domestic material interest. Instead, one must connect the particular interest with the nation’s more general beliefs and durable national priorities’ (Cortell and Davis 2000: 77).
foreign policy, the passage from domestic political preferences into new national interests is critically determined by the ability of the bearers of these preferences to portray their agreement with the values and norms that govern the function of the international system. Ostpolitik, the FTA and Helsinki were presented not as the creations of specific domestic political identities (even though they were very much so), but as pragmatic evolutions of the self-positioning of states in the world and a way to align them with rising ordering principles of the international system.

b) Not just from the inside out: Implications for Foreign Policy Analysis

I have avoided to position this dissertation exclusively vis-à-vis the FPA literature and instead opted for a more open IR framework. FPA has yet to escape the dictums of its behavioralist origins and a rather atheoretical view of foreign policies as outcomes of domestic interactions. A standard FPA account would then duplicate the existing problems in the literature of political parties and foreign policy, namely the view of parties as monistic actors carrying preferences and ideologies and directly effecting change in policy outcomes. If it took account of party systems, an FPA argument would probably only focus on a comparison of their mechanic effects (number of relevant parties, pattern of competition) on different national foreign policies (for example, how does a two-party system differ from a multi-party system in its foreign policy conduct). This dissertation only engages with FPA to the extent that it wants to complement and promote ongoing efforts to make this literature open to wider understandings of ontology and theoretical inquiry. While it has been formulated almost 20 years ago, Carlsnaes’ (1992) incorporation of sociological discussions in a theoretical analysis of FPA remains the most ambitious and interesting effort to broaden the agenda of the literature. I believe that some insights from the empirical research here are highly relevant for this effort as well.

Carlsnaes inserts the agent/structure debate in the field of FPA. He sees foreign policy change as the result of a constant mutual constitution between political agents and their environment. Foreign policy change in a given point in time can be seen as the outcome of such a process, whereby actors and structure end up significantly altered. This process of ‘structuration’ can be traced in a reverse research trajectory, as a researcher must untangle the interactions between enabled and structured agents and embedding structures. Much like constructivism, Carlsnaes sees agents engaging both with domestic and international webs of ideas and institutions in their efforts to promote their preferences. Carlsnaes’ contribution is also among the first to call for thick narratives guided by a precise theoretical framework in structured and focused comparisons.

This dissertation has responded in part to the research agenda put forward by Carlsnaes. One valid criticism to his research plan is that his agenda of untangling in reverse the process of structuration is overly ambitious. Indeed, Carlsnaes does not
provide an answer as to how far back we need to go in order to reconstruct the agent/structure relationship. In my case studies, I answered the question ‘how far back?’ with ‘from when it all started’. All three cases provided a macro-historical account of the societal and systemic interactions that led to the specific equilibria of party systems at the time of foreign policy change. The important thing of course is to make historical accounts in a focused and strategic manner; in this case, we are mostly interested in the way party politics and foreign policy constituted each other throughout the years. It was shown that the German, Canadian and Greek party systems evolved in broad accordance with shifts in the international conditions of these countries, with specific foreign policy issues (security in a Cold War Europe, free trade with the USA, bilateral relations with Turkey) serving as transmission belts of international structural developments in domestic politics. At the same time, party system dynamics produced recalibrations of national foreign policies. In between the two, partisan actors were engaging with both domestic and international institutional spaces.

Even more importantly, Carlsnaes’ research agenda implicitly accepts the need to incorporate the possibility of the international system reflecting back into the domestic arena after foreign policy change. All three cases of foreign policy change we looked at in detail can be seen as comprising multiple webs of interaction between agents and structures. On one level, a state as such can be seen as engaging with its international environment, with foreign policy change decisively shaping international or regional systemic constellations: while West Germany responded to détente, it was the finalization of Ostpolitik that gave détente a more final and specific direction. By the same token, Canada’s embrace of the FTA crucially affected the nature of North American regionalism and Greece’s decision in Helsinki altered the course of Euro-Turkish relations. On another level one can see political parties as actors engaging with domestic party systems and the international system as structures, responding to them but also altering them. On an even lower level, one can think of individuals as being the agents of interest, the party-based actors, leaders of factions and policymakers who become constituted by party competition and indirectly the international system itself. Foreign policy change can then be seen as successful attempts by these individuals to alter their surrounding environments, yet these environments themselves contributed mightily to the development of new foreign policy preferences to begin with. Ultimately, foreign policy change can be seen as a bona fide societal event, as individual agency becomes transmitted through intra-party politicking, party politics and foreign policy making all the way to new foreign policies and significantly altered patterns of international politics.\(^{184}\)

Having said that, FPA still presents some concerns that any research of the domestic politics of foreign policy is best advised to address. Very important here is the question of

\(^{184}\) This also addresses a lacuna within constructivism, namely the ability of constructed agents to reflect back on structures (Checkel 1998: 335).
institutional arrangements within which domestic political processes are embedded. While a loose ideational ontology can account for these within a general argument about structures constituting actors, a ‘harder’ narrative of the specific effects of institutional arrangements (laws, rules of the game etc.) on processes of contestation is also required. This is not only an insight of FPA, which has traditionally been concerned with bureaucratic and institutional aspects of the foreign policy-making process, but can also be found in related literatures like transnational relations. There, recourse is usually made to the concept of ‘state-society relations’ that in turn was mostly developed within the field of International Political Economy\textsuperscript{185}. State-society relations are usually used as a control or an independent variable when explaining foreign policy outcomes\textsuperscript{186}. While I did not focus on state-society relations in this sense, crucial institutional features mediated between society, the party system and the state in all cases and were treated accordingly.

The point of comparative analysis was to untangle specific processes of foreign policy contestation and change. In this sense, choosing varied cases (West Germany, Canada and Greece) did not only have the point of covering as many types of liberal parliamentary democracies as possible (European consensus, Westminster and South European types), but also of capturing as many variations of institutional settings as possible\textsuperscript{187}. In this way, the theoretical framework of party-based foreign policy change was shown to function in a heavily constrained state with federalism and bicameralism (West Germany), in a semi-strong state with strong parliamentary government and assertive societal (provincial) counterweights (Canada), and in a country with strong politics vis-à-vis society and weak state vis-à-vis politics (Greece). These institutional features served as background conditions for the narratives, yet in crucial junctures institutional arrangements played important role in the outcomes of the cases. Even more significantly, hard institutional features did not just form structures within which agents acted, but, in broad agreement with our constructivist framework, these agents engaged with these institutional features and employed them in order to promote their goals. Since this dissertation is concerned with electoral politics, the most relevant institutional feature underpinning party systems is the electoral system and the way it facilitates the creation and victory of social coalitions. In all three cases this particular aspect of the institutional structure embedding political competition not only affected party politics, but also served as an important resource for the successful implementation of change.

In West Germany the electoral system contained two important features: First, a 5% threshold for entry in the Parliament. Second, a complicated system of seat allocation that

\textsuperscript{185} The key text of this kind in transnational relations literature is Risse-Kappen (1994). The focus of IPE on domestic political structures started mainly with Katzenstein (1985) and Gourevitch (1986).
\textsuperscript{186} Domestic structure is also used as a comparative tool to check the opposite effect, that of international norms on domestic politics (Checkel 1997). See below for a discussion of points of reference for comparison.
\textsuperscript{187} If I had to answer, I would say that this makes my research design fall within the ‘most different cases’ type; for a recent discussion, see Levy (2008: 10).
combined first-past-the-post single seats with proportional representation on federal state
(Land) basis. Under this system, voters could vote strategically by voting for a party that
was not sure of passing the 5% threshold in the proportional ballot while voting for the
candidate in their single-seat constituency who represented the big party they felt closest
to. In this way, voters could make sure that one of the two big parties they preferred the
most (CDU or SPD) would win a seat while they also helped potential smaller partners
enter the Bundestag. This system underpinned the anchoring of the FDP in the bourgeois
camp, as throughout the 1950s and 1960s voters of this camp would strategically vote the
CDU or the FDP depending on how strong they wanted the one or the other party to be in
the coalitions they were forming together. Scheel’s decision to move the FDP to the left
after 1966 contained precisely the danger that the party could miss many of the strategic
votes of the broad anti-Socialist camp that allowed it to win 5% of second-preference
votes.

The electoral law played a decisive role in the creation of the SPD-FDP coalition in
1969, as the FDP managed to enter parliament with a paper-thin margin while the
nationalist NPD failed to do so by an equally small amount of votes. The 5% threshold
made a coalition possible and a few hundred thousand votes made the difference between
this and other more probable outcomes (a CDU/CSU government in a two-party
Bundestag or a grand coalition if the NPD entered). In 1972, it was the SPD’s turn to reap
the benefits of the electoral law that the CDU had enjoyed for two decades. With the FDP
now firmly in the orbit of a progressive coalition against the CDU, it was time for FDP
and SPD voters to take advantage of the electoral law: supporters of the government
voted massively for SPD candidates in the single-seat districts, while many SPD
supporters voted for the FDP in order to ensure its presence in the Bundestag. This vote
splitting reflected the congruence of the two parties galvanized by the Ostpolitik: the SPD
outvoted the CDU in the single seats by more than 6 to 4 (Conradt and Lambert 1974:
66). While vote splitting had been observed in the past, its extent in the foreign policy
elections of 1972 was unique at the time and has rarely been repeated since. Forming a
big part of the reasons that gave the Social-Liberal coalition victory, the West German
electoral system was an active institutional feature that throughout the 1960s both
structured party strategies and formed a resource of these same strategies.

In Canada the electoral system is simpler. It provides for simple single-seat
constituencies (called ‘ridings’) where victory is assigned with the first-past-the-post
method. While in other Westminster democracies this system has contributed to the
establishment of convergent competition between parties, in a country with huge
geographical disparities like Canada it has contributed to the exacerbation of these
disparities through the development of fragmented geographical representation in the
party system. The role of the electoral system as a mechanism of fragmentation of the
Canadian polity had been recognized from early on (Cairns 1968). It meant that partisan
actors would by necessity engage in a process of brokerage of regional interests in order
to build majorities rather than practicing pan-Canadian non-sectional politics. Ironically, even the self-described dean of pan-Canadianism, Pierre Trudeau, practiced politics that drove the regional wedges even deeper.

The electoral system played on a small role in electoral landsides like the one that brought Brian Mulroney to power in 1984 other than inflating the extent of victory. Yet in conditions of polarization around the FTA issue in 1988 the electoral system assumed its role again as a crucial determinant of party strategies. For Mulroney, the decision to make the forthcoming election a referendum on the FTA made sense not only because the main political identities represented within the Conservative party held strong continentalist preferences, but more because these identities were strategically dispersed in a way that would allow the Tories to win a majority even while losing votes. While they lost support everywhere in relation to 1984, they retained their strength in epicenters of pro-free trade feelings (like Alberta) and even increased their appeal in Quebec. The electoral system exacerbated the Tory strategy of turning Canadian party competition into a competition between regionally based communities. Mulroney could also rely on the electoral system to help his cause in a more straightforward way, namely by making the Tories the only proFTA party, he could expect the anti-free trade vote to be split between the Liberals and the NDP, which in a majoritarian system would mean an almost certain victory if the Tories would retain their pole position.

In Greece the electoral system reflected and strengthened the traits of the three-camp party system and the binary direction of competition. It was a system of proportional representation that ensured the representation of small parties that made it beyond a 3% threshold, but it was unbalanced in a way that it allowed the first party to form a majority in parliament (provided it scored at least above the mid-30s, which back then was a foregone conclusion for the two major parties of Greek politics). In this way the electoral system reinforced the bipolar competition between ND and PASOK as the overriding trait of the party system, since it assured whichever of the two parties came up first (virtually even by a single vote ahead of the other) a working parliamentary majority. For the modernizing leaderships of both parties in the late 1990s, the prospect of winning the election depended on their ability to maintain the broad social appeal of each party as a veritable pole of Greek politics. Especially for Simitis, it was essential to prove that absorbing the demand of economic and foreign policy modernization into PASOK’s message was congruent with the party’s traditional strategy of anti-ND polarization.

In 1996 already, Simitis’ moving of PASOK towards the center meant that the party won simply by staying ahead of ND, despite losing votes to the Left. The Helsinki council presented both Simitis and Karamanlis with delicate challenges, as their respective strategies would meet significant opposition within their parties. Both PASOK’s Papandreist nationalists and ND’s liberals were certain to undermine the leaderships’ choices to support and oppose Helsinki respectively. Yet in the end the dynamics of polarization between the two parties assured that the leaderships’ foreign
policy decisions became institutionalized as PASOK’s and ND’s official positions. As throughout Simitis’ first term neither party created conditions of dominance in opinion polls, the prospect of victory for each remained very real and, under the specific electoral system, this required expanding support to the detriment of the other – a goal enough to force internal dissenters into discipline. In the end, PASOK won by the slightest of margins in Greek political history (roughly 70000 votes) and this meant that Helsinki was institutionalized as part of Greek foreign policy identity.

This discussion shows that many of the issues raised in FPA and transnational relations literature remain pertinent even for a research project that takes a view of the social world as made up of complex interrelations where ideas and identities matter. Ideas and identities are meaningful, but obviously they acquire strength when they assign meanings to consequential and tangible social structures. To theorize about the interplay of ideas or the contestation between preferences and identities as if these take place within an institutional void is highly perilous, if not plainly inaccurate. So much of domestic-politics analysis in foreign policy research is correct and domestic institutional settings (sometimes grouped under the moniker ‘state-society relations’) matter. The argument of this thesis does not negate this insight but has taken it very seriously.

Yet again, I would say that I do take this argument one step further. It became obvious above that domestic institutional settings are neither intermediate variables between domestic preferences and foreign policy outcomes, nor even independent variables determining these outcomes. Rather, domestic institutional settings are themselves subjects and objects of the political agency of partisan actors – they determine as much as being employed and shaped by them in their effort to promote preferences and ideas. As the example of the effect of the electoral system in the three cases showed (the most pertinent institutional feature when talking about electoral politics), it was an essential part of the domestic normative structure that determined the direction and meaning of party competition; at the same time, it was an important resource in the hands of actors that sought to alter elements of this normative structure. As a general theoretical insight, we can say that looking at hard, tangible institutional features does not negate our ideational, holist and multidirectional ontology. Instead, it critically complements it and it is shown to be easily absorbed into the agency/structure mindset.

One final concern of FPA to be addressed is the question of the primacy of party politics as such, a question I touched upon briefly in the theoretical chapter. I claimed there that in democracies party systems form an institutional space through which preferences of bureaucracies or pressure groups and new policy ideas need to pass in order to find their way into policy. In the three main cases I considered, non-party actors were indeed important in various stages of the foreign policy change: In West Germany,
the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry was known to be opposed to Brandt’s innovations and the leaks of documents at crucial moments of negotiation were attributed to disgruntled elements of this ministry (Clemens 1989). In Canada we already saw how the FTA debate captured the imagination of the country, leading to the creation of numerous pro- and anti-free trade associations and pressure groups. Before the FTA, important actors like trade unions or the finance sector held well-known positions and had obvious access to various political parties. In Greece the narrative of foreign policy Europeanization starts with the activities of academics around Simitis and with the work of civil society organizations promoting more contacts with Turkey (Heracleides 2007; Tsakonas 2010). However in all these cases foreign policy change only became possible once the dynamics of party competition allowed the matching of new foreign policy ideas with successful political projects that took account of the opportunities offered by the structure of party competition. Even in the case of severe bureaucratic resistance in West Germany, not much could be done against Ostpolitik after its impressive electoral approval in 1972. To sum up: Party politics seem to have analytical primacy as the space within which ideas and preferences stemming from other sources compete, and the pace and outcome of this competition is crucially determined by the systemic dynamics peculiar to the world of party politics.

c) Foreign policy and party politics: Dimensions of competition and types of representation

The argument of this dissertation on party politics concerned mainly two questions. The first question concerned the ability of party systems to have policy outcomes in foreign policy just like they do in other areas of public policy. This was shown to be the case, even though the argument here is more complicated than one that matches ideological identity with specific outcomes (e.g. leftist governments with expansion of the welfare state) (Schmidt 1996). I will return to the issue of the socioeconomic Left-Right and foreign policy outcomes later. For the time being, suffice it to say that in my view party politics does affect foreign policy. The second question this dissertation sought to answer was the impact of foreign policy, and through it of international politics, on domestic party politics. This is a question first explored by Valen (1976) and recently taken up with renewed rigor in comparative research189. Here it was shown that the impact of the international system on domestic politics was pronounced, specifically in two stages: First, by strengthening existing party system dynamics (e.g. providing an opportunity for FDP’s turn to the Left in 1966-1969 or contributing to the convergence of Quebec and the West under the same party in 1984); and then by serving as a powerful

189 The most ambitious work in this respect, and the most influential in this dissertation, is Kriesi et al (2006). More specialized recent work on international influence on domestic politics can be found, among others, in Golden (2004), Potrafke (2009) and Swank (2005). Gourevitch (1978) first took the question of international influence on domestic politics from the field of political economy into a broader literature.
argument in the process of foreign policy contestation, thus cementing party system
dynamics into new durable systemic arrangements and new normative anchors of
competition.

But if the impact of foreign policy, and indirectly of the international system, on the
main dimensions of competition is pronounced, a more counterintuitive question arises
that is, nevertheless, still closely related with this finding. What if, through party-based
contestation of foreign policy, changes in a state’s international systemic environment
influence the passage from one model of popular representation in the party system (i.e. a
party type) to another? The main argument of this thesis certainly did not seek to engage
with this question. Yet empirical evidence from the three cases is intriguing in this
respect, and it would be worth it to entertain the question. From the outset, I would say
that evidence from West Germany, Canada and Greece vindicates the suspicion that
foreign policy plays an important role in the development and passage into new party
types and new ways of representation within a party system.

Comparative party research since Duverger (1954) has been particularly concerned
with the ways political party organization connects with and represents social interests.
Without going too deep into a massive literature that would require a second dissertation,
it suffices here to say that political parties have developed their organizational structure
in accordance with the way and the extent they sought to represent specific social groups.
Early parties were no more than parties of notables, representing the few politically active
citizens when entry into politics was limited due to educational or other criteria. Soon
parties of notables gave their place to mass parties that sought to integrate into political
life strata mobilized by new cleavages (class and religion). The mass party laid emphasis
on the constant mobilization, participation and ultimately representation of societal
groups in politics and government. After World War II the party-society relationship
began to change due to the desire of party cadres to emancipate themselves from constant
societal control while in government. Thus arose the type of the catchall party, whose
main mission was no longer the representation of the masses (even though it retained
many of the reflexes and institutions of the mass party) but the electoral success of the
party and its rationalized administration towards that goal – including the control of the
party in office by a specialized party administration and the dominance of the party-in-
office over the party-on-the-ground. After the 1970s, in the Western world at least, a new
type of party seems to have replaced the catchall party, namely the cartel party. The cartel
party lays premium on its constant presence in government and its ability to attain
resources through a symbiotic relationship with the state. Whereas the mass and, to a
smaller extent, the catchall parties were expected to represent and promote mass demands
towards the state, today mainstream parties have coalesced around a centrist cartel that
stresses the inability of the state to implement differentiated policies and their
organizational structure is geared towards *ex post facto* legitimation of predetermined decisions\(^{190}\).

What is important here is that this development of the organizational types reflected significant ongoing social changes, as well as that the advent of each new type signified the creation of different kinds of policy pressures on the state. In other words, policy and party type have always been closely interlinked; by extension, direction and content of policy competition in a party system, and party type, can also be thought of as intricately related. The passage into different party organization types creates new pressures for policy change – e.g. the rise of Labour parties significantly affected social legislation in Europe. But premade decisions also need different party types to be promoted towards society and to receive the stamp of popular legitimacy. Many of the compromises that characterized the creation of the European welfare state in the post-War era critically hinged on the consolidation of the catchall party and its ability to justify decisions with reference to electoral gains. In other words, these transitions receive impetus from below (social developments that create different demands of representation) and above (shifting of the normative point of reference of party competition and the need to support policy shifts with congruent patterns of party-society relationship) (Blyth and Katz 2005: 40-43). In sum, it is not a reach to hypothesize that fundamental reorientations and redefinitions of the stakes of party competition as the ones witnessed in the cases here are accompanied by the development of new types of organization and societal representation.

Quite intriguingly all three cases of foreign policy change and party system dynamics examined here correspond to significant shifts in the patterns and dominant types of societal representation through the respective party systems. In West Germany changes in the foreign policy positions of the three main parties deeply affected the direction and stretch of policy competition, and these changes were accompanied almost by necessity by the creation of new organization types. Already the decision of the SPD in Bad Godesberg to mitigate its radicalism (an acceptance of Westbindung being a key part of this programmatic change) also presupposed the organizational development of the party towards the catchall type that the CDU was already presenting in some respects. By the same token, the bruising defeat the Union parties suffered in the Ostpolitik debates and the 1972 elections required their adaptation to a new normative anchor of competition imposed by the victorious Brandt government. The new reformist leadership that consolidated its position after 1974 around Helmut Kohl recognized that this required an organizational rejuvenation of the party first and foremost in order to adapt to its new (actual and potential) audience and to legitimize its new policies (among them, slowly

\(^{190}\) For an analysis of the development of party organization and the rise of the cartel party, see Katz and Mair (1995).
ascribing to Ostpolitik). Thus, the Ostpolitik debates did not only finalize the emergence of two Volksparteien around a convergent axis of competition but facilitated the consolidation of the catchall (and eventually the cartel) type in the German party system.

In Greece the situation was similar: The consolidation of a convergent two-partyism that absorbed into the Left-Right axis the modernization-populism cleavage was crucially determined by PASOK’s and ND’s stance on the Helsinki issue and the outcome of the 2000 elections. The policy convergence of the two parties was underpinned by their common course away from the mass mobilization function they had performed in the 1980s and 1990s and towards the mutual convergence around the cartel party type. This change of organizational type was closely related to both parties moving away from ideological policy profiles and towards catchall strategies. After the mid-1990s, the modernizing leadership of PASOK sought to move it away from being a uniformly petit bourgeois and working class party as a way to promote the goal of Europeanization within the party. At the same time, the new leadership of ND self-consciously sought to absorb the discontent with the modernizing project and thus dilute the primarily middle class profile of the party. In both cases, policy reversals required the shedding away of the class-based mass representation function in favor of an election-geared organizational and ideological flexibility (Vernardakis 2011: 205-276).

The situation was less clear cut in Canada, where the two national parties always balanced diverse regional and linguistic demands, their claims to ‘true national parties’ notwithstanding. The NDP was an exception in terms of organizational structure precisely because it saw itself as a mass party of organized labour that saw regional and community cleavages as parochial. The main organizational novelty brought about by the consolidation of a new normative anchor of competition following the FTA elections of 1988 must be sought probably in the new patterns of representation promoted by the regionalist parties that arose out of the dismantlement of the Tory coalition. Both the West-based Reform party and the Bloc Quebeccois introduced new features in Canadian politics, combining populist reliance on personalized leadership (Preston Manning for Reform, Lucien Bouchard for the Bloc), renewed emphasis on mass mobilization and reliance on new communication techniques with a catchall potential. In all, while both the old Conservative party and the Liberals had organizational structures that responded to the territorial fragmentation of the Canadian polity, the new parties of the early 1990s developed organizational patterns that decidedly broke with the brokerage or pan-Canadian patterns of the old national parties. Here as well, the consolidation of a new normative anchor that eroded the pan-Canadian axis of competition led to developments

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191 For a linking of developments in Ostpolitik with organizational changes in CDU, see Clemens (1989: 153-156). For a general discussion of CDU’s organizational history up until around that time, see Pridham (1977).
on the policy level (articulation of regionalist demands) that were accompanied by new models of mobilization and representation.\(^{192}\)

All three cases then offer some evidence as to the contribution of foreign policy to the emergence of new types of party organization and popular mobilization and representation. This seems to be less far-reaching than what could be assumed initially. Indeed, the link between the actual policy stretch within the party system and different dominant models of mobilization and party organization has been made before (Blyth and Katz 2005: 42-46, 53-55). Since in all cases examined here foreign policy contestation contributed to the passage to different stakes of party competition, it is normal to expect also the development of different organizational structures by parties that were looking to improve their positions within the party system. The question is whether we can construct a more general argument about the impact of international politics on the relationship between parties and societies much like we did about its impact on the actual context of policymaking and the normative anchor of party systems.

First of all, the international context is very often acknowledged as very important for the development of new types of party organization. Blyth and Katz (2005) for example explicitly relate the emergence of the catchall party in the post-War years and the consolidation of the cartel party in post-Cold War era to prevailing conditions in international political economy. Political parties still had the ability to deliver to their mobilized supporters in the years when international arrangements allowed for Keynesian policies, whereas the advent of globalization both constrained governments and served as convenient pretext for parties to present neoliberal policies as ‘inescapable’ and focus on their perpetuation in power. To the extent that shifting international conditions constrain and reformulate the boundaries of potential policies, one can anticipate that new types of party organization will follow these shifts. The examples of West Germany and Greece actually also show that the impetus towards new types of party organization can be made due to developments in the political and security field, whereas the example of Canada is a snapshot of Blyth and Katz’s political-economy argument.

This discussion then reveals yet another way the international system impacts domestic politics beyond the content and patterns of contestation of policy. From a macro-perspective, one could say that shifts of international structural patterns become absorbed by domestic politics not only in the shape of new normative anchors of party competition but also in the shape of new types of popular mobilization, party organization and policy legitimation. Much like the impact of international systemic shifts on the domestic patterns of policymaking takes place in two stages, as stated above, change in the type of popular representation through the party system also seems to be affected in two stages. First, international systemic shifts contribute to changes in the social bases of party systems, changing the policy preferences and (by extension) the

\(^{192}\) Important insights about shifts in party organization and mobilization after 1993 are provided in Carty et al (2000).
expectations of representation by voters. In West Germany for example détente contributed throughout the 1960s to the slow erosion of the appeal of the anti-Communist strategy of CDU, to the increased attractiveness of a catchall strategy by the SPD and generally to an increased feeling of reformism by a society where both religious and class bonds were being loosened. In all cases international systemic shifts underpinned and strengthened preexisting social developments that were bound to alter the relationship between parties and society. In a second stage, international systemic shifts are taken up by actors on the top, i.e. partisan actors who seek to entrench new patterns of party competition according to their systemic needs. Here new patterns of party organization are developed deliberately in accordance with the policy shifts required. In Greece for example the policy changes required by the absorption of the demand of modernization by PASOK and ND also necessitated their transformation into catchall and, eventually, cartel parties.

So the main argument of this dissertation seems to extend to the question of party organization as well and to vindicate the argument by Blyth and Katz concerning the congruence between dominant international systemic structures and party-society relations. In an abstract macro-view it has been acknowledged that, for example, the Cold War era was the time of the mass party turning into the catchall party, and that the post-Cold War era saw the advent of the cartel party. The three cases presented here seem to make this argument more concrete, identifying party agency as the critical filter through which international developments and societal changes become absorbed into permanent systemic features. Foreign policy contestation becomes one of the filters through which international developments affect not only the normative point of reference of policy debates in a party system, but apparently the relationship between party system and society as well. At this stage, this argument can only serve as invitation to further research that escapes the scope of this dissertation.

METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE DISSERTATION

a) Methodological implications: Foreign policy change as the basis of comparison

This dissertation has undertaken a research that follows a counterintuitive logic of comparison, as I prefer to follow Welch (2005) and accept foreign policy change per se as the crucial criterion for the selection of cases. As I explained in the theoretical chapter, there are many sound epistemological and methodological reasons why to focus on cases of foreign policy change as laboratories of processes and interplaying factors. Foreign policy change itself becomes the anchor of comparison around which the construction of narratives can be built, the significance of necessary factors can be assessed etc. Yet this strategy carries important analytical repercussions: focusing on foreign policy change as
the anchor of comparison neutralizes the need to use other factors in this function, yet these factors are the ones that have precisely been predominant in comparative analyses of the impact of domestic politics on foreign policies\(^{193}\). One such factor for example has been the Right-Left continuum of party politics that supposedly offers a basis for cross-nation comparison of foreign policy outputs. It has been primarily used in an effort to associate the ideological profile of parties with attitudes towards foreign policy issues or questions of international interest. As we saw in the theoretical chapter, Rathbun (2004) presents the most concise employment of this method. It is important to portray why making foreign policy the basis of comparison is a better strategy than relying on objective measures of domestic politics not only from a theoretical but also from an empirical viewpoint\(^{194}\).

There are many good arguments for why comparative analysis of foreign policy should rely on the Right-Left analytical axis for the deciphering of patterns and regularities in foreign policy outputs. A recent argumentation in favor of the Right-Left cleavage as a uniform conceptual framework for understanding rival preferences across issues of world politics, is made by Noël and Thérien (2008). They provide a powerful literature overview in a host of issues of world politics, and demonstrate that the Right and Left span borders and world regions and provide a viable tool for mapping policy positions on foreign policy. This is an argument that runs in the same vein as that of Rathbun (even though, in my view, it provides a more refined conceptualization of what Right and Left mean) and it definitely demonstrates how, for specific purposes, a unique axis of domestic politics is a useful basis for comparison. Yet a closer look at the cases we examined in this dissertation shows that creating uniformly applicable axes of domestic politics for comparative purposes is a problematic proposition – regardless of whether one is looking at foreign policy change or just trying to interpret a foreign policy output. Let us examine briefly why, using specific examples.

I will start with the only ‘economic’ case I studied, the Canadian FTA. Here the Right-Left scheme seems to absorb the question of trade liberalization quite well. Moving from Right to Left, support for the FTA decreases and opposition increases, as one would expect. The Conservatives on the Right initiated the policy, the Liberals opposed it after oscillation and the NDP on the Left was fundamentally against it. Yet as we saw Canadian politics was only to a certain extent structured along a socioeconomic Right-Left axis – this interpretation thus only applies unproblematically to the self-styled ideological and non-regionalist NDP. But opposition between the Tories and the Liberals

\(^{193}\) It is striking how neglected foreign policy change is even in IR literature, even in completely abstract discussions about theories. Fearon (1998) for example in his interesting discussion of the relationship between IR and foreign policy, differentiates between ‘domestic’ arguments that explain sub-optimal foreign policies and ‘domestic’ arguments that explain ‘differences in states’ foreign policies’ (i.e. differences between states) or particular foreign policy outcomes. A longitudinal dimension of difference of foreign policies of the same state is not explicitly considered.

\(^{194}\) I already discussed the possibility of making party system mechanics the basis of comparison in a previous section.
(determining to a considerable extent the content of party competition in Canada) mostly revolved around the normative anchor of national unity, the accommodation of Quebec and the building of trans-regional coalitions. Of course Noël and Thérien would say that Right-Left absorbs other cleavages and issues as well, structuring them along a unique axis beyond distributional issues.

This is the direction I have chosen to take here of course, but the question is really whether these nation-specific axes of competition (even if perceived in Right-Left terms) are comparable cross-nationally. Could one say that Right-Left in Canada signified not only a continuum starting from neoliberalism (Tories) to socialism (NDP), but also one ranging from region-based decentralisation (Tories) to pan-Canadian nationalism (NDP)? It does seem to be the case, even though to intellectually associate pan-Canadian nationalism with the Left and decentralism with the Right across time and context of the party system would stretch the argument too far. Regardless, for such a policy issue of profound redistributional consequences, the impact of the Right-Left divide is only discernible in a quite roundabout way and certainly not as direct as expected. Summing up, yes, one can collapse Canadian politics in one axis on a specific point in time; and yes, one can even use the Right-Left scheme to describe the points of this axis; but generalization on Right-Left grounds beyond the point that a Conservative government attached neoliberal economic arguments to a policy of many other repercussions, remains debatable.

Moving to the security issues examined here, Noël and Thérien (and I would imagine Rathbun as well) could see in the Ostpolitik and Helsinki decisions and contestation patterns a typical Left-Right opposition between pacifist, pragmatic and inclusionary progressive foreign policies and nationalistic, authoritarian oppositions. Again, this can be a plausible heuristic for a superficial, case-by-case analysis, however it overlooks crucial caveats. First, it conveniently brushes aside the fact that just a few years prior to the foreign policy change Right-Left structured foreign policy options in a completely opposite way; both in West Germany and Greece it was the Left that was nationalistic and hawkish, while the Right was pragmatic and multilateralist. Second, the Right-Left

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195 A counter-argument might be given about the ability of the Right-Left to accommodate even non-economic and non-ideological cleavages such as linguistic or religious ones. During the Cold War, for example, it was very common to associate different sides of ethno-religious conflicts with the Right or the Left. For example, one could associate the white minority of South Africa during apartheid with the Right and the ANC with the Left, just like in Lebanon it was common to talk of the Christian Right fighting the Palestinian Left. What is interesting here is that the accommodation of these conflicts in the Right-Left axis seems to owe a lot to the international structure of the Cold War. It was normal to associate allies of the Western bloc with the ‘Right’, even more so when their ethnic or religious opponents were molding their demands in a leftist rhetoric. Yet this is only a testament to the strength of the international system to go ‘all the way down’ in domestic politics and align them; the confusion that ensued after the end of the Cold War shows that the Right-Left universalist frame of mind was a symptom of a particular era (nevertheless, see Noël and Thérien (2008:166-197) for an application of Right-Left to the post-Cold War era, even though their argumentation concerns mostly issues of redistributional global justice. How the Left-Right accommodates the explosion of sectarian, religious and ethnic politics since 1989 is largely left unanswered).
dimension is far from uniform in both cases. In West Germany, between 1966 and 1972 it was the centrist party, the FDP, that was far more advanced in progressive positions than both the Right (CDU) and the Left (SPD). In Greece, the parties to the Left of PASOK maintained a far more nationalistic position that after 2000 overcame even that of ND. In both policy issues Right-Left was not a straight line. Third, it is unclear whether attitudes commonly associated with the Right or the Left consistently aligned with the policy positions of the various parties. For example, the verdict is still out on whether the Ostpolitik was a progressive, leftist policy of rapprochement with the Eastern bloc on behalf of the SPD, or a pragmatic policy updating the party’s traditional Gesamtdeutsch nationalism. All in all, while Right and Left definitely formed salient points in the axes of competition of West German and Greek politics, they were charged with very specific connotations that allow cross-country generalizations only with a great deal of cautiousness.

This all is not to say that Right-Left is useless. To the extent that it structures party competition in so many historical and local contexts, it is clearly a powerful heuristic for voters, politicians and researchers alike. What I doubt is the ease with which specific values are extrapolated to the field of various foreign policy issues. I think that Right-Left is very useful for within-case analysis, precisely because it forms a part of the party system constraints on partisan actors wanting to implement change. Both Brandt and Simitis had to frame their preferred policies with reference to their parties’ position on this axis – Ostpolitik was framed as a step of democratization of the Federal Republic and Helsinki was presented as a policy of redefined progressive values. It may not be a reach to suggest that in both cases ‘the Left’ seems to have served as an argument for pushing through nationalistic (Ostpolitik) or neoliberal (Helsinki) policies, rather than the opposite (leftism informing Brandt and Simitis’ conceptions of foreign policy).

So, if Right-Left is so problematic, is cross-time and cross-country comparison of the domestic factors of foreign policy meaningless? Here I can answer only for the specific issue that concerns me, namely foreign policy change. It seems that the only safely generalizable conclusion is that domestic politics matter, and that prior patterns of ideological conflict in national settings condition support and opposition for policy initiatives. While the urge of IR and FPA scholars to draw conclusions about uniform patterns of world politics, foreign policies etc. according to universal analytical units (Right and Left for instance) is understandable, one should pause and appreciate the wealth of insights comparative party politics have made available for comparative work in international relations. Finding regularities, patterns and analogies not in mechanistic matches of values, ideologies and parties with presumed policy options understood in binary terms (e.g. peace or war, equality or liberty), but in processes, mechanisms and capabilities of political agency is, in my mind, no small feat. Broad-brush arguments like the ones of Noël and Thérien are very useful in putting research topics on the agenda – their holistic view of domestic and international politics is something this dissertation
most definitely embraces. On a macro-level, a Right-Left view of foreign policies may work just as well, but it is clearly insufficient for the purposes of more specific questions like the one of foreign policy change. In the end, making an ontological question, and not an elusive standard of generalization, the basis of comparative research is a step absolutely worth taking.

b) Epistemological consequences: Constructivist international politics, positivistic party politics and their combination

This dissertation walks a very fine line between two approaches of political science with fundamentally different (maybe even opposing) epistemological and historical foundations. On the one hand, I make use of tools and concepts developed within a post-positivist framework of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis, looking at ideas, coconstitution of actors and structures, spanning levels of analysis and making modest theoretical claims. On the other hand, I fill the shell of the constructivist metatheoretical framework with the insights of a hard positivistic sub-discipline, that of comparative party politics and more specifically party systems theory; here, it is all about comparison, application of concepts on specific cases (deductive method), acceptance of the primacy of the systemic level on the constituent elements (political parties), and the detection of uniform patterns of interaction that hopefully provide insights across cases and throughout time. It is indeed a challenge to maintain a sane state of mind epistemologically when going back and forth between two traditions that seem completely at odds with each other. Indeed, it may be that the small interest from IR and FPA in political parties is also due to the fact that the recent ‘turns’ in both literatures towards more ideational, sociological and post-positivist traditions (Houghton 2007; Kubálková 2001) only match the epistemological assumptions of the party politics literature with difficulty.

That said, I believe that there is one essential point of contact between these two literatures, one that allows the smooth incorporation of comparative party politics in what is basically an International Relations argument: the conceptualization of both the domestic and international environments of policymaking as systems as such. The systemic nature of both levels is very consequential for this argument, as was discussed in the theoretical chapter. Understanding domestic party politics as a system allows seeing party politics embedded within an institutional space that contains practices and arrangements, codifies terms and patterns of engagement, and reproduces structural constraints on the activities of politicians. Seeing the international environment (i.e. the source of foreign policy change and the ultimate recipient of new policies) as a system also allows for a more textured understanding of the space that embeds nation-level politics, namely one that includes material arrangements of power and the ideational directions of conflict that underpin it. While a constructivist view in IR and a party
systems theory view of domestic politics are divided by fundamental epistemological differences, they also bring to the table a very similar tendency to view the respective arenas in a more holistic way. Beyond this impressionist finding, however, the question remains: what is it in these literatures that makes the systemic view so similar in practical terms across levels of analysis?

As discussed already in the first chapter of the thesis, the party systems literature is far less mechanistic and far more nuanced than what a crude structural argument would suggest. In fact, it makes very clear that the systemic attributes of a domestic party system (patterns and format) have an inescapable normative underpinning that is in a dynamics relationship with the systemic over-structure. In Sartori’s classic statement, the systemic features of a party system like the number of relevant parties directly affect the intensity of ideological conflict within the system. Despite his ardent positivism, Sartori leaves space for a more nuanced understanding of what conditions the ‘mechanics’ of every system, i.e. a normative and ideological base within which party competition and the arithmetic effects play themselves out. And for Mair (1997: 15) political parties have an interest in reproducing the existing dimension of competition in which they function through ‘the establishment of a language of politics in which one particular conflict is prioritized, and in which any potentially alternative alignment of forces is either absorbed or marginalized’ 196. While comparative analysis of party systems is clearly interested in deciphering patterns and regularities, it is acknowledged in the background that these patterns regulate the expression of conflicts and stakes of competition that are fairly unique from national setting to national setting. This is a more refined view of the concept of the ‘party system’, one that sees a discursive underpinning behind a very materialist structural argument 197; I would argue though that this refined view is very consistent with a general conceptualization of domestic party politics as a system, precisely because the notion of a social system or institution entails a normative dimension that gives meaning and sustains the material arrangements that regulate interaction between its elements 198.

By the same token, I employ here a view of the international system that is very much analogous with the conceptualization of domestic party systems. Indeed, underpinning the material interactions of nation-states are ideational dimensions of conflict and competition that give rise to, give meaning to, and help sustain more or less stable

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196 Interestingly Mair also makes use of an argument put forth by Katzenstein (1985) to show how the structure of national electoral markets and the patterns of interaction among parties are also derivative of a country’s international position and size. The international system has an effect on electoral competition in that its demands and challenges may structure the dominant ‘language’ and define the range of electoral choices.

197 See e.g. works by Capoccia (2002) on anti-system parties and by Minkenberg (2001) on the radical Right in Europe; both take a relational view of national party systems, acknowledging that extremity, anti-systemness etc. are determined by national context and the direction/content of party competition from case to case. This also ties in with the discussion in the previous section about the universality of the Right-Left.

patterns of interaction between players. While (neo)realism does offer a viable (and intuitively plausible) account of why states behave the way they do, it silences the fact that patterns of competition and cooperation in various arenas are supported by shared understandings of the stakes of this competition – much like party actors at home, state actors can only realize internationally their ‘interests’ against alleged foes and with the help of presumed allies when they have the same ideas with these foes and allies of what the ‘game’ is about. Also much like domestic party actors, state actors have the ability to energize or silence specific interpretations of what the game is all the while they remain within a commonly understood grand structure of rules and meaning of interaction – more often than not, these ideational dimensions of international conflict correspond closely to domestic ideological divisions that span borders\textsuperscript{199}.

To understand the ramifications of this view of the international system, let us return to examples derived from our three main case studies. In all three cases the underlying idea that structured international systemic interactions changed significantly. In the case of West German Ostpolitik, the bipolar competition of the Cold War was affected by the rise of the demand of détente and the redefinition of the nature of competition in Europe. In this changing context, competition between the two blocs was not about achieving some illusionary victory in the near future but about promoting conflicting demands within a rising new arrangement of stability in Europe. In this way, the overlying East-West superpower competition remained dominant but was cut across by a new frame of competition pitting Euro-centric Gaullists against Atlanticists in the West, and stability-minded Moscow against insecure East European regimes in the East. While structural imperatives of bipolar competition remained very relevant on all actors, there was no denying that a more textured and refined understanding of the stakes of competition had emerged after the mid-1960s.

In the case of Canada and free trade, throughout the 1980s it had become obvious that a wider change in the arrangements of international trade, closely related to the retreat of the rigid Cold War framework, was underway. These changes made trade nationalism against the United States as well as trade multilateralism towards the rest of the world obsolete and counterproductive policies. Both were undermined by the rise of economic regionalism of a neoliberal bent that drew its strength as much from rising ideas of economic liberalization as from the loosening of intra-West ties throughout the 1980s in the face of receding threats from the Eastern bloc. The failure of the GATT regime was a stark proof of this rising tendency that cut across the existing multilateral arrangements of international trade. While trade liberalization remained the stake of state interaction in the trade sector, it was qualitatively altered due to the regional alternative. Again, while

\textsuperscript{199} See for example the analysis of Wight about the ancient Hellenic system of states and the emphasis he lays on the democracy-oligarchy and hellenism-medism axes. The interaction of these two cleavages (cutting across borders and arenas of domestic politics) on different points in time affected the patterns of interaction among Hellenic city-states and Persia. At the same time though, these axes were still ‘ideological struggles within a single community’ (Wight 1977: 105-106).
material imperatives on states (their ‘interests’) remained largely unaltered, the normative
and, subsequently, the political environment within which these played out was
undergoing significant change. Just as in Cold War Europe, the choice in Canada
between a view of the world of international trade as one of competing regions and one of
multilateralism was driven by political projects with domestic aims.

In our last case, Greek-Turkish bilateral relations were severely recast after the end of
the Cold War and the ensuing upheaval in the Balkans. While Greek-Turkish competition
in the Aegean was to a large degree a controlled affair underneath the overwhelming
Cold War framework and the influence of NATO, the end of the Cold War ushered in a
period of flux whereby the actual underlying principles of state competition took
significant amount of time to be crystalized. This was the time when culturalist readings
of international affairs, looking at religions and civilizations as the new fault lines of
world politics, competed with more sanguine views about the expansion of liberal norms
of domestic governance and the creation of lasting ties of regional cooperation. Again,
the international system did not prescribe much more on its own than a crude
understanding of interests and security; a more nuanced reading was required by
domestic actors to make sense of the new realities. This reading was not value-free; it
was a highly political process whereby agents would seek to promote redefinitions of the
stakes of international interaction that corresponded to their values and long-term
interests.

The above shows that a systemic view allows for a uniform, coherent viewing of
international and domestic politics as institutional spaces reproducing patterns of
interaction and supported by commonly shared understandings of the stakes of
competition. Both the domestic party system and the international system embed actors
within specific understandings of the meaning and stakes of politics, and these actors
have the ability to inventively link international with domestic structures and alter them
accordingly. The cross-level unity of politics is expressed in the common systemic nature
of domestic and international politics, and more specifically a view of systemic
interactions as supported by commonly accepted terms of engagement and stakes of
competition that can nevertheless also be up for redefinition. In sum, the intersubjective
nature of the framework within which political actors engage is the main ontological
similarity between domestic and international politics\(^{200}\).

Such a holistic view of the two layers of systemic activity also allows us to
conceptualize cases of foreign policy change as cases of systemic interaction, whereby
each systemic level affects the other through the mediation of political agency. From a

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\(^{200}\) On the inter-subjective nature of party politics see Budge (1994). Building on Schelling, he claims that
competition between parties needs a cognitive anchor that will allow them to interpret the dynamics of
competition and will usually lead to an equilibrium that will allow the systemic relations to reproduce
themselves even in conditions of constant competition. A common understanding of each party’s
ideological boundaries denotes shared understandings about their strategy in coalition formation, just like
in electoral competition.
macro-perspective, one can see foreign policy change in all cases as the process through which domestic party systems became ‘harmonized’ with the new stakes of international politics. This is the concept of domestic-international equilibrium discussed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis. Through the Ostpolitik, the West German party system passed from a structure of competition reproducing in domestic politics the ‘hot’ Cold War to one reflecting the more nuanced understanding of cooperation and adversity in Europe. Through the FTA debate, the Canadian party system passed from a pan-Canadian axis of competition to one representing a balance between regional communities that felt more empowered within a continentalist framework. Through the Helsinki debate, the Greek party system passed from a monolithic competition between Right and Left to a competition that structured within the Right-Left spectrum a new cultural axis of competition between libertarian modernization and nationalistic populism that to a large extent was expressive of competing readings of the post-Cold War environment (liberal v.s. culturalist). In all cases the underlying logic of the international system seemed to reach into domestic politics, and changes of this logic reverberated deep into the normative framework of party competition as well.

OPEN SYSTEMS THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY

The discussion about the systemic nature of domestic and international politics raises the question of whether the main empirical and theoretical arguments of this thesis can be systematized on a higher level of abstraction. Here I will try to assess how the conclusions of the comparison can be interpreted by general systems theory and how our empirical findings can contribute to abstract theoretical conceptualizations of organizations and systems. I will particularly focus on insights from open systems theory, a branch of organizations literature taking inspiration from, and finding application in, management, biology and economics (among other disciplines). Generally, open systems theory sees systems (organizations or institutions) as open to their environment and their workings as significantly influenced from outside. As a general concern then, open systems theory seems to fit the problem presented in this thesis quite well. Moving on to some of the more specific insights of various approaches within open systems theory, we can say that an open systems view cues the following basic assumptions:

a) The basic distinction is between systems/organizations and their environments. However this does not dictate a rigid separation between the whole and its parts, whereby only one of the parts is seen as a system. Instead, the environment can be seen as a system in its own right, and the systems we are looking at as subsystems of the wider whole, as well as containing subsystems themselves (Luhmann 1984: 5-7; Scott 2003: 90-91). An open systems view is very much congruent with a view of systems as being hierarchical, building up from the simple systems contained in other systems to complex and self-perpetuating systems encompassing others (Scott 2003: 83-85).
b) Very consequential for analysis is the choice of where to draw the boundaries between systems and environments. Sometimes this is not obvious, and what one designates as the system (i.e. the point of reference for research) and the environment determines the way system-environment relations will play themselves out in the analysis (Luhmann 1984: 17, 29-30).

c) The very notion of boundary (and not border) between system and environment is also very important. A boundary designates a more or less porous area between the system and the environment, an area of interchange and contact as much as one of partition and delimitation (Luhmann 1984: 28-29; Scott 2003: 89). Boundaries exist also between systems and subsystems, thus reproducing within and across systems endless system-environment constellations (Luhmann 1984: 18, 181-182).

d) The key characteristic of open systems is their constant interaction with their environments – which themselves can be conceived of as systems or sums of other systems (Luhmann 1984: 30). The logic of open systems theory is precisely that systems evolve or change through their interaction with their environments. Either in the shape of information or in the shape of resources, the environment decisively affects the inner workings of a system (Luhmann 1984: 37-41, 184; Scott 2003: 133). The role of environment is important in processes of change as well as perseverance of the system. In fact, survival and change are closely related aspects of a system’s function; in most cases, a system’s survival goes through adaptation, and adaptation means change. Change and stability are thereby closely connected, and in both cases the role of the environment is very important (Luhmann 1984: 50-52, 192). As a source of additional complexity, contingency and fluidity, the environment is decisive in the processes of change and survival of a system; without the environment, a system would not be able to diversify and reproduce its main functions, nor to adapt to changing conditions (Scott 2003: 100-101) – achieving in Luhmann’s terms ‘dynamic stability’ (Luhmann 1984: 49).

e) Looking at system/environment constellations, one should not look for the outputs of a system but rather try to evaluate the general outcomes that arise as the ‘the joint product of organizational performance and environment response’ (Scott 2003: 144; also Luhmann 1984: 202). Systems and environments are in constant processes of interaction, whereby outputs of systems can affect the environment as much as the environment impacts the system (Luhmann 1984: 177; Scott 2003: 141-143). In Scott’s words (2003: 149): ‘Organizations are viewed as interdependent with environments in a number of senses. Participants’ perceptions of their environments together with the attention structures of organizations result in enacted environments that are products of both environmental features and organizational information systems. Environments directly affect organizational outcomes, which in turn affect subsequent perceptions and decisions. Environments influence organizations, but organizations also modify and select their environments. And environments supply the materials and ingredients of
which organizations are composed’. With this, open systems theory comes very close to sociological work on structuration and the agent/structure debate (Scott 2003: 100).

From the above it becomes obvious that the argument of this thesis can persuasively be put in terms of open systems theory. As will become evident down the line, many of the insights of open systems theory crucially complement the findings of the comparative research. I will now present how the findings of this dissertation fit in this very preliminary outline of open systems theory.

As discussed above, this thesis takes a systemic view of domestic party politics and the international environment. The international system can be seen as being made up of many different subsystems – usually these take on the shape of regional constellations of international politics (e.g. Europe, Southeast Asia etc.) but here I propose that we see national party systems as subsystems of the international system. To the national party systems we looked at (West Germany, Canada and Greece), the international system serves as the environment. Moving further down, we could have taken the view of political parties as subsystems themselves but this would have added unneeded complexity to the argument. Instead, political parties and partisan actors are seen as simple elements of the lowest degree within the first-order system, the party system. The elements are expected to adapt to, and engage with, the logic of patterned interactions within the system, but they are also the ones that act on behalf of the system towards the environment and other systems. Indeed, the West German or Canadian party system does not act on its own as such; it is the parties and actors within it that do. This serves, if anything, as an important reminder against personification and reification of organizations. As was emphasized time and again, the party system’s adaptation and change takes place through the agency of partisan actors and is contingent upon their abilities and willingness to promote change.

The open systems emphasis on boundaries is very important and also fits in easily with a view of international politics influenced by constructivism. When it comes to the relationship between party systems, and between party systems and their international environment, the concept of the boundary is self-evidently important. As Caramani (2004) shows with his exhaustive historical research, the shape and character of each distinct party system in Europe was shaped early on, during the period of nation-state formation. Wars, state creation or expansion crucially determined the shape of a polity, the cleavages expressed within it and the relative strength of different social or ethnic groups. In other words, where the boundary was drawn between nation-states (party systems), and between party systems and the international environment, weighed heavily

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201 ‘The actions of states, or, more accurately, of men acting for states, make up the substance of international relations’ (Waltz 1959: 122; emphasis added). Also see Cortell and Davis (2000: 78) who speak of historical contingency and the role of human agency in how international norms become absorbed in domestic politics.

202 For an early treatment of the concept of the boundary in IR, see Kratochwil (1986).
on ensuing developments. Thinking of our three cases, the historically contingent limits of the specific polities affected the relative strength of societal forces and policy outcomes at critical junctures. For West Germany, it was the fact that a state was formed where German Catholics for the first time since 1871 enjoyed such a degree of influence. For Canada, it was the relative weight of the Francophone community and the East-West direction of Canadian nationalism within the North American continent that antagonized the West. For Greece, it was first in 1912-1919 geographical expansion, and then in 1922 the coming of the refugees, that crucially affected the nature and character of politics there. In all of these cases, the new boundaries signaled at the same time lines of closure, delineating new polities and creating practical limits within which ‘domestic’ politics would take place, as well as points of opening, signifying the place of these polities in regional and global systemic settings that would heavily influence domestic politics down the way.

The interaction and mutual constitution of international and domestic systems has been a staple of this dissertation, as has the emphasis on change, both international systemic and domestic. What an open systems view adds to the preceding discussion however is the view of systemic change as a mechanism of adaptation and survival. This expands our understanding of the process of party system change significantly, as it alerts us to the fact that small changes in the character of party competition may actually serve to entrench and perpetuate the party system in its main structural characteristics. In his discussion of party system change Mair (1997: 14, 87-90, 211-214) already alluded to the converging strategies of political parties in a system with a view at preserving its main features, i.e. the number of relevant parties and the established patterned relations between them. In the theoretical chapter I made reference to the concept of party system change as explained by Mair and also left the possibility open that accepting less than wholesale party system change may be a rewarding strategy for established parties in order to absorb pressures and update the existing constellations of the party system. What open systems theory does now is complement this view by insisting on the role of the environment as source of strategies that seek to combine change with stability.

In West Germany, Ostpolitik served to update the binary competition between CDU and SPD that had functioned as the basis of the party system since 1949. While the opposition over foreign policy was essentially a conflict between two different readings

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203 Caramani’s argument is that the process of delimitation of the spaces of national party competition heavily determined the more or less uniform development of party competition across Western Europe towards the socioeconomic Right-Left axis, as well as that it explains residual differences due to linguistic, ethnic and other cultural cleavages in specific cases. This process ‘took place before the social, political, and technological changes that previous literature has identified as the main causes of the process of nationalization: universal suffrage, PR [proportional representation], mass political communication, and nationwide issues that emerged from the two world wars and the Cold War[.]’ (Caramani 2004: 290). With the exception of the last factor, Caramani’s argument can be seen as an open-systems juxtaposition to largely closed-system explanations about the rise of modern politics in Western Europe. See especially chapter 7 of his book.
of the stakes of party competition, the passage into the new interpretation of these stakes (supported by SPD and FDP) and its eventual acceptance by CDU meant that the key structural characteristic of party competition was to continue in the 1970s. Indeed, while the developments in the West German party system during the Ostpolitik crisis were no doubt monumental (the FDP moving into a coalition with the SPD, the collapse of CDU’s normative dominance of party competition etc.), it is worth considering that these changes were as much an adaptation of the existing party system to ongoing international and domestic changes (Cold War détente and diminishing importance of traditional cleavages). How stable would the West German party system have been in the 1970s if the rigid bourgeois-socialist reading of binary competition of the Adenauer era had survived? Already cracks had begun to appear in the 1960s with the rise of the nationalist NPD and of the extreme Left. Throughout this time – essentially the era of the Grand Coalition – the West German party system seemed unable to absorb increasing strains caused by the rise of new social demands and the uncertain position of the country in the international field.

While the Ostpolitik feud of 1969-1972 clearly reflected adversarial strategies of actors wishing to overtake their competitors, it can also be seen as a convergent strategy to the extent that it unleashed a discussion about German nationalism and Germany’s position in Europe, as well as the ‘extent of democracy’ in the Federal Republic, within the secure confines of CDU-SPD competition. Despite the high drama leading up to the 1972 elections, it was precisely these elections that signified the final consolidation of the three main parties against their anti-system competitors (whose vote share collapsed between 1969 and 1972 and remained miniscule up until the early 1980s). From a party system perspective, the SPD-FDP victory if anything cemented the binary nature of party competition, also at a time when elements of the CDU were hoping for a return to the predominant-party system days of the past.

Also in Canada, foreign policy served a preservation function as much as a change function. With the Tories leading a disappointing government and the Liberals helpless under the leadership of John Turner, both major Canadian parties were feeling the pressure of the NDP. Yet the FTA changed all of this. As much as it was a brilliant coup on behalf of Prime Minister Mulroney to redefine the meaning of party competition in Canada, and for this it was met with Turner’s unequivocal opposition, both leaders saw in foreign policy a very helpful tactical weapon in times of hardship. For Mulroney it served to galvanize the two pillars of support to the Conservative party (Quebec and the West) around an image of a decentralized Canada despite their differences on the specific content of this image. For Turner on the other hand it allowed the reenergizing of the traditional Liberal self-image as the defender of Canadian values and a strong national identity. Both saw in the FTA an opportunity to isolate the NDP, something that promptly occurred once the media became caught in the apocalyptic and personal face-offs between Mulroney and Turner. It is the main argument of the exciting book of Johnston
et al (1992) that the free-trade character of the 1988 elections came about not only because of adversarial strategies of opponents, but also because of convergent strategies of parties sharing a common interest in binary politics in Canada.

While the FTA ended up changing the normative underpinning of party competition in Canada, it actually contributed to entrenching the bipolar competition between Tories and Liberals at a time when party system stability seemed very precarious. Of course, as we saw, the FTA contributed in significant ways to the breakdown of the party system in the early 1990s, transposing the demands of continentalist regionalism within Canadian politics. Yet even this breakdown can be seen as an evolution of the updated two-partyism that was safeguarded with the free trade election of 1988 around the question of national unity – Reform and Bloc Quebecois were direct descendants of the new Conservative party after all, and one of the victims of the 1993 elections was the NDP, whose ambition to supplant regional cleavages with pan-Canadian ideological issues was dealt the decisive blow not in 1993 but in 1988. Despite different structural expressions of this centralist-regionalist divide (from a two-party system in 1988 to fragmentation in 1993), it still updated the traditional bipolarity of Canadian politics around the question of national unity.204

The same dialectic between change and adaptation/preservation seems to have been at play in Greece as well. With a new modernization-populism cleavage (partly arising due to foreign policy issues like the Macedonian question) cutting across the Greek version of the Left-Right axis of competition, both major parties found themselves in a problematic position, their uniform class-based profiles no longer corresponding to ongoing changes among the electorate. PASOK’s embrace of modernization in 1996-1999 created pressures from the Left, thus putting its ability to dominate an anti-Right pole of Greek politics in danger. ND on the other hand saw PASOK enter its hitherto reliable bourgeois milieu and undermine its profile as the party of European orientation and economic reform. Under processes of partial dealignment of Greek citizens from the party system, the two big parties were as much concerned with outdoing each other as they were with preserving their joint dominance of the party system. At the moment when the two-party system seemed the most fragile in almost 20 years, foreign policy significantly helped both parties reposition themselves along a new axis of competition, reconciling their old strategic positions with new definitions of their policy profiles.

The ability of PASOK to deliver on the demand of Europeanization, evidenced in the course towards EMU and starkly symbolized in the Helsinki decisions, allowed the party to redefine its anti-Right polarization strategy by absorbing the question of

204 Mair (1997: 218-219) also sees the Canadian party system after 1993 as containing an essential structural continuity to the extent that one of the two governing parties (the Liberals) remained strong and the regional parties remained in opposition. For him there was more an unfulfilled potential of party system change than change per se. While I have argued that important changes in the direction and content of competition occurred in the Canadian party system in 1988-1993, it is true that there was no complete party system change in Canada. Of course both views can be reconciled within the open systems argument about congruence between selective change and adaptation/survival of systems.
socioeconomic modernization. ND’s opposition to Helsinki signaled the party’s willingness to repackage its pro-European reformism within a more populist profile. Both moves resulted in PASOK and ND losing their class purity and turning into pure vote-driven catchall parties. Yet at the same time, they also redefined their competition and faced off challenges by the Left or even voter apathy. In the 2000 elections the two parties polled together their biggest percentage of votes, also winning the greatest absolute number of votes between them ever. The foreign policy question of balancing national interests with Europeanization gave rise to a fundamentally different, but significantly rejuvenated, two-party system in Greece.

In sum, an open systems view of party system dynamics brings us, in an interesting turn of events, back to some of the main concerns of the party systems literature. More specifically, it forces us to see the significant changes party systems underwent in all three cases as cases of adaptation and preservation of systems. From an open systems perspective, the role of the environment in providing resources and opportunities to system actors was crucial in their ability to maintain the overarching systemic features of party competition. As stated previously, in all three cases party systems were essentially ‘streamlined’ with new international systemic features and it becomes obvious here that this streamlining involved as much change as it did continuity. In many ways, these well-documented cases of change (which were seen as such at the time) served to entrench existing party system formats and patterns even more. Plus ça change…

The open systems view is very much consistent with the sociological view of the agent/structure debate we focused on before. What is particularly interesting here is open system theory’s concept of ‘outcomes’ that is juxtaposed to system ‘outputs’. Outcomes designate precisely the fact that system outputs only acquire meaning when they meet and interact with the activities of the environment – in a sense, outputs of systems themselves. In this sense, outcomes of system-environment interaction capture and codify significant changes brought about both on the system and the environment through their mutual influence. As discussed above, the real empirical significance of the foreign policy changes we are looking at is how they impact the environment of the states and how they bring about changes in the international system – international politics can be seen as the outcome of interaction between different foreign policies after all.

In the open systems view then the foreign policy changes we studied are best seen as parts of holistic outcomes that unite system and environment-level developments. As we have already seen, Ostpolitik contributed decisively to the stabilization of détente in Europe; the Canadian 1988 election paved the way for the creation of regional integration institutions in North America; and the narrow victory of PASOK in 2000 essentially ratified Helsinki and put EU-Turkey relations on a completely new footing through the candidate membership process. In all these cases the actual outcomes extended beyond national foreign policies and included new arrangements of regional constellations of
power and new norms of international systemic interaction – to go along with new arrangements in the ordering principles of the relevant subsystems (the party systems).

Regardless of the various theoretical repercussions of open systems theory, seeing foreign policy change through this lens adds credibility to the sociological direction taken in this dissertation and opens up a new agenda in the future for both IR and comparativist scholars to theorize about domestic politics. It shows how a closed-system view of party systems is both empirically problematic and analytically limiting. While in recent years a wave of research has focused on the impact of various international processes (Europeanization, globalization etc.) on domestic party politics, a macro-historical perspective that sees party systems as crucially determined by historical processes and the shape of their boundaries with the outside world is lacking. The open systems perspective offers the conceptual tools to take the systemic perspective of party politics one step further, towards the study of the mutual construction of domestic and international politics. The study of foreign policy change as an instance of visible interaction of the two is a good place to start with this research but other avenues may be explored as well. I will close this section by juxtaposing an open-systems perspective of party system change with two of the most famous and parsimonious abstract models of party system change: the economistic Right-Left model of Anthony Downs and the crosscutting axes of competition model of James Sundquist.

Downs’ abstract model of party competition relies on economic premises such as the rationality of office-seeking parties and the material concerns of interest-driven voters. Yet Downs’ model is more refined than that since it acknowledges as the most important determinant of party strategies and party systems outcomes ‘the distribution of voters along the political [Right-Left] scale’. Changes in this distribution are ‘among the most important political events possible’ and parties do not only adjust to this distribution but also try to alter it by luring voters towards their own positioning on the scale (Downs 1957: 139-140). In other words Downs rightfully sees party and voter rationality playing out not in a neutral void but in an all-important context. This context determines whether such changes as the rise of new parties will take place. For simplicity’s sake Downs assumes that partisan actors will engage with the political background of the party system directly, i.e. he leaves little space open for structure-on-agent contingency. But while this omission is understandable since it would dilute the basic insight of the model, what is striking is how much more the model can be enriched if one sees the abstract political system of Downs as an open system.

As we saw in our analysis, the international environment can profoundly affect the two main mechanisms of domestic political change identified by Downs. First, change in the distribution of voters along the main political/ideological scale can take place in other ways than the enfranchisement of new voters (the only exogenous mechanism mentioned by Downs). As we saw, Mair (using the Katzenstein argument), as well as scholarly works on national political identities, have talked about the international reference of the
ideological context of domestic politics. A change of voter distribution may very well reflect profound changes in the state’s position in the world from a security, economic etc. perspective. Second, change may be effected by political parties seeking to alter the normative environment, within which they function. Again, partisan actors can do this through new foreign policy positions mobilizing different political identity elements that have international referents. As research here has shown, both of Down’s potential mechanisms of systemic change have an ‘environmental’ dimension. An open-systems view of party competition significantly enriches Downs’ model.

Sundquist on the other hand is more concerned with party system change, and more specifically realignment, which he defines as ‘a durable change in patterns of political behavior’. Realignment has less to do with volatility of electoral results than with the ‘basic party attachments of the voting citizens [...] It is the pattern of those predispositions, of party identification within the electorate, that defines the alignment of the party system’ (Sundquist 1973: 5-6). Sundquist uses the term ‘organic change’ to define the kind of developments he is interested in. In the abstract models he constructs, different potential outcomes are derived according to the way party leaderships absorbs the rise of new issues that cut across the axis that had structured their competition until that point. Whichever the structural outcome, a new party system arises with ‘a new rationale, and a segment of the electorate has formed, or is in the process of forming, new party attachments on the basis of that rationale’ (ibid: 28).

Sundquist’s model has a lot in common with the theoretical perspective of this dissertation. First is his ‘softer’ understanding of party systemic change that includes the change of the ‘rationale’ of the party system – what I have dubbed the ‘normative anchor’ – even below a lasting systemic structure (his empirical interest is obviously with the realignments below the stable US two-party system). A second point of agreement is the acceptance that party systems are the outcomes of historical processes and that a normative anchor at a point in time absorbs older and newer cleavages – a ‘collage of successive overlays’ (ibid: 10). Finally, his acceptance of historical contingency and rejection of historical cyclical arguments (ibid: 36) fit very well with the emphasis this dissertation has laid on contingency. However, I believe that this model also stands to gain from an open-systems view. Most striking is the nature of the cleavages Sundquist sees as holding the potential to upset existing arrangements: ‘Realignments occur when the crosscutting issue is intrinsically moral – like slavery – or when an issue that may be basically nonmoral becomes infused with moral overtones’ (ibid: 30). Also given the emphasis Sundquist places on the cross-pressures applied on voters due to multiple issues, one can see that foreign policy is an issue that, under his model, should hold huge potential to bring about realignment. Not only is it very often infused with moralistic tones, but foreign policy also holds the potential to absorb and systematize different issues and cleavages within overarching stakes of competition about the near-totality of a state’s orientation – what I called here ‘visions of domestic society’. An open-systems
view of Sundquist’s realigned polity would accept foreign policy’s role as the transmission belt of environmental pressures on the normative anchor of party competition and their contribution to realignments.

THE DECLINE OF PARTY GOVERNMENT AND THE FUTURE OF PARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY

In literature on political parties a pervasive theme in the last years has been the apparent decline of ‘party government’. By this is meant the gradual loss of the ability of political parties to deliver on their pledges and commitments to their electorate, and the accompanying change of the nature of popular representation in liberal democracies from one of projection of societal interests in government towards one of top-down promotion of predetermined policies to the people. Expressions of the decline of party government are, amongst others, the indistinguishable policies of mainstream parties in office, the convergence of party competition around the proverbial ‘center’ and symptoms of dealignment such as voter volatility, the rise of anti-system parties and increase of voter apathy. As discussed previously, the relevant literature has increasingly settled on the ‘cartel party’ thesis, whereby the concept of the cartel party captures both the convergence of mainstream parties towards self-perpetuating strategies and the minimized ability of citizens to influence policy making through parties, as these focus on their symbiotic relationship with the state. While phenomena like globalization are considered to have an important effect on the ability of states, and by extension governments and parties, to perform many of the policies they were used to performing in the past, scholars also account for the adaptation of partisan actors themselves who used fatalistic discourses in various junctures to allow party democracy to move from the logic of representation, to that of office-seeking to today’s management of non-change 205.

All this is a way of saying that during the last 30 or so years political parties are apparently becoming less important for policymaking. Coupled with processes of individualization of Western society that weaken collective identities such as the ones created by the societal cleavages of the industrial era, the role of political parties role as the transfer mechanism of collective demands is becoming less and less important. Yet if this tendency is a fact, what does it say about the argument brought forth in this dissertation? After all, if parties are increasingly less able (or willing) to promote new policies, and if old cleavages are receding and new ones are expressed in alternative ways than partisan mobilization, why focus on them as agents of potential foreign policy change? Would it not be normal to expect that our model, with its focus on cleavages, collective political identities and partisan agency, would become less and less relevant as the very existence of party government slowly fades away?

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The answer I give is twofold: first, I would argue that looking at party competition as a heuristic of the main directions of opposition and contestation of policy in democracies still makes sense. Despite the apparent convergence of centrist parties, party systems still align along meaningful axes of competition – if anything, the cartelization of the center has brought about in recent years a resurgence of parties occupying the extremes that stretch the policy space and keep ideological politics relevant (Bornschier 2010). The convergence of the cartel parties of the center-right and the center-left does not eclipse the ability of a party system to structure different views on a new policy issue. As evidenced with issues of immigration, economic policy, and even foreign policy (e.g. in the case of so-called humanitarian interventions), the direction of competition may not reflect old established ideological axes so much as versions of a nascent cartel v.s. populism axis – but competition there is. In addition, one should not underestimate the ability of centrist parties to differentiate from each other if circumstances demand this – more often than not, this will be made precisely in order to contain among themselves the range of possible attitudes towards a policy issue and so stave off challenges from extremists or populists. But even with this goal in mind, contestation of policy issues will necessarily follow prior ideological and societal commitments.

In relation to this, one should keep in mind that party-based foreign policy change does not necessarily follow adversarial, ideological politics. For example, both the Ostpolitik and Greece’s decision to grant EU candidate status to Turkey resulted from centrist policies of parties looking to broaden their electoral base. Adversity in the party system resulted because other parties were looking to defend the normative anchors of party competition that existed before; yet from SPD and PASOK’s perspective, the redefinition of their own profile and of the stakes of the party system looked to increase their appeal beyond their traditional societal and ideological agendas. Foreign policy change then may result as much from centrist strategies as from the pursuit of ideological goals. Summing up, the current tendency in party politics of mature democracies towards cartelized politics among centrist parties precludes neither ideological politics that create oppositions on new issues nor the emergence of new policies if these are meant to increase the support of mainstream parties.

What about the second question: Do politics today still function following mobilized collective identities? Should an IR or FPA scholar expect new foreign policy ideas to rise within the field of mass electoral politics? Or do the individualization of Western societies, the cartelization of the centrist parties and the personal nature of populist leadership mean that the root of political identities and policy ideas is only still to be found among the hitherto favored arenas of foreign policy research (individuals, bureaucracies, institutions)? First of all, individualization and breaking down of old established political identities (classes, religion or confessions etc.) rarely mean that an electorate becomes completely unstructured. While types of organization vary with time, and it is improbable the Western world will experience anything like the role of trade
unions or churches of the 19th-20th centuries again, the breakdown of these traditional identities only creates space for new ones to emerge. The example of the Green parties of the 1980s emerging from the environmentalist movements of the 1970s comes to mind here.

But even this model of mass mobilization may be a demanding threshold that applies to a few countries of North-Western Europe. In our cases, we saw that political parties in Greece built strong class-based political identities in the 1980s from above and on the basis of political, rather than socioeconomic, cleavages. While mass mobilization from below may be lacking, political identities can emerge when a cleavage becomes crystallized and partisan actors position towards it. As we saw in the case of New Zealand, there was no organizational expression of the post-materialist cohort that meant so much to Labour’s decision against nuclear vessels and led it to victory in 1987; yet the emergence of this social group allowed partisan actors with predefined ideas to find an electoral and social pillar through which to push forward their ideas. In the case of Greece, it also seems that Simitis’ project was sold to PASOK with a very specific target in mind, namely the middle-class electorate that was becoming dealigned from the polarization of the two parties after the mid-1990s. While these new political identities of individualist strata did not express themselves through mass organization, they did offer a very important tangible social referent to projects of change. New policy ideas then may not emerge in our postmodern era within new institutional structures of mass mobilization, yet policy ideas floating within the party system still need to show themselves to correspond to societal groups, indeed to create new political identities themselves, in order to make a difference. In a roundabout way, the match between societal groups and policy ideas still matters.

Nevertheless, even in today’s Western societies opportunities for mobilization around new issues and the building of new durable political identities exist, especially in times of crisis. As research on the radical Right (Minkenberg 2000) and Left (March 2009) has shown, extremist parties do not just represent the so-called ‘modernization losers’ but also mold their electorates into durable political identities, mobilized around demands of ethnic or economic justice. The financial crisis of the last four years in Europe has only increased the electoral potential of populist parties of the Right and Left and served to galvanize the new political identities mobilized by ‘pro-democratic anti-party-system parties’ (Blyth and Katz 2005: 55). Both a reservoir of new policy ideas and sources of organizational innovation, the new populist parties in Europe even come with well-developed foreign policy ideas of their own that underline their differentiation from centrist cartel parties and stretch policy space in foreign policy as well (Chryssogelos 2012). In other words, even though today’s context is much different, relying on a conceptualization of domestic party competition along the lines of Bartolini and Mair’s understanding of cleavage-based party systems with significant space for partisan agency is a viable strategy. IR and FPA scholars can rest assured that the cycle of voter
mobilization, political identity creation and policy innovation in the field of foreign policy in Western party democracies is far from over. Consequently, party systems remain a very relevant institutional space within which the rise of new foreign policies and the patterns of foreign policy contestation are adequately reflected.


**West German Party Documentation**


**Greek News Resources (in chronological order)**

‘They Cannot Even Agree on Helsinki in SYN’, *To Vima*, 10/12/1999 (in Greek: «Ούτε για την στάση στο Ελσίνκι συμφωνούν στον Συνασπισμό, To Βήμα, 10/12/1999»).


‘Yes from SYN, no from KKE and DIKKI’, *To Vima*, 11/12/1999 (in Greek: «Ναι από Συνασπισμό, Όχι από KKE και ΔΗΚΚΙ», *To Βήμα, 11/12/1999*).


‘Mitsotakis: Decision in Helsinki Undoubtedly a Greek Success for the Cyprus Question’, *in.gr*, 14/12/1999 (in Greek: «Μητσοτάκης: Αναμφισβήτητη Ελληνική επιτυχία η απόφαση του Ελσίνκι για το Κυπριακό»).

‘Discussion of Party Leaders in Parliament on Foreign Policy’, *in.gr*, 16/12/1999 (in Greek: «Συζήτηση αρχηγών στη Βουλή για την εξωτερική πολιτική»).


*Other Sources of the Greek Case*
