The Role of Europarties in Framing the European Union Foreign and Security Policy

Enrico Calossi and Fabrizio Coticchia
The Role of Europarties in Framing the European Union
Foreign and Security Policy

Enrico Calossi and Fabrizio Coticchia

EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/03
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society.

The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.

Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/

Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/

The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).

European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) Working Paper Series

The European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) was launched in the spring of 2006 as an independent and interdisciplinary academic organization. In 2008, EUDO became a fully-integrated part of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS). Its declared goals are: to produce a permanent and periodic assessment of democratic practices within the EU; to serve as a forum to exchange ideas and good practices; and to be a resource for policy-makers, academics and EU citizens.

EUDO focuses its activities around the themes of the four EUDO Observatories, which form the backbone of EUDO and constitute its main organizing principle. They are responsible for data and documentation gathering and are directed by EUI internal professors in conjunction with external EUDO experts. Each Observatory coordinates specific research projects. The four Observatories are: the Observatory on Public Opinion, Political Elites and the Media, the Observatory on Political Parties and Representation, the Observatory on Institutional Reform and Change, and the Observatory on Citizenship.

The EUDO working paper series started in December 2009 and aims at disseminating high-quality research on the above-mentioned issues. Not only the directors of the Observatories, but as well EUDO fellows and external experts as well as other scholars and practitioners are welcome to submit their work to the series.

For further information:
www.eudo.eu
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via delle Fontanelle 19
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole
Firenze, Italy
EUDO.secretariat@eui.eu
Abstract

The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty assessed new prerogatives to the European Parliament (EP) on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This has increased the role of the EP thus changing the balance of power with other EU institutions, as the Council of Ministers, the European Council and also the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). This new situation conveys more powers and responsibilities to the EP and to its main actors, i.e. the political parties. Even if also national parties have their own opinions on CFSP and CSDP issues, it is obvious that their supranational and EU level organisations, the so-called Europarties, devote to the foreign policy of EU much more attention.

Aim of this paper is to analyse whether Europarties share the same attitude towards the existence of a EU common foreign and defence policy, and what are the main conceptual frames adopted by each Europarty on some of the main EU foreign and defence issues.

Europarties’ positions are analysed through a discourse analysis approach in order to understand their ideas towards three fundamental institutional frameworks of the EU foreign policy: the Lisbon Treaty, the existence of the CFSP and the existence of the CSDP (and the European Defence Agency).

Moreover, a content analysis is conducted on Europarties’ electoral manifestos and on the main EU strategic documents in order to understand which are the main conceptual frames used by parties and by EU on the foreign and defence issues. In particular four categories concerning different aspects of the CFSP and of the CSDP are identified: nature of threats, foreign and defence policy tools, geographical areas of interest, multilateral organizations.

Results show that not only the non-mainstream Europarties, whose critical views towards the EU or some aspects of the EU were already known, but also amongst the EPP, the PES and ELDR there are some differences in their attitude towards the CFSP and the CSDP.

While the EPP and the ELDR seem to be clearly enthusiastic of the new CFSP and CSDP - as designed by the Lisbon Treaty - Socialists, even if they agree and underline the importance of the reformed CFSP, are more critical towards the CSDP. With respect to the four categories (nature of threats, foreign and defence policy tools, geographical areas of interest, multilateral organizations) the Europarties offer different attitudes and priorities to those expressed in the official documents of the EU. In particular, Europarties seem to have a completely different perception of which threats have to be considered the most dangerous. It is worth noting that every Europarty considers the climate change as the threat which deserves more space and attention while for the official documents the environmental issue represents only one of the menaces posed to the EU.

Keywords

Europarties; European Union; Foreign Policy; Discourse Analysis; Defence Policy
Introduction

The elections of the European Parliament of 2009 were conducted when the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was still active. The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty would have assessed new prerogatives to the European Parliament (EP) on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) issues (Paul 2008). This would have increased the role of the European Parliament (EP) and the balance of power between the EP and other institutions, as the Council of Ministers, the European Council and also the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), would have changed. This new situation would have conveyed more powers and responsibilities to the EP and to its main actors, i.e. the political parties.

Even for this reason, while the ratification of the Lisbon treaty became a point of discussion per se, political parties also devoted some attentions to the new CFSP and to one of its main sub-area, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Aim of this paper is to answer two different research questions:
1. Do Europarties share the same attitude towards the existence of a EU common foreign and defense policy?
2. What are the main conceptual frames adopted by each Europarty on some of the main EU foreign and defence issues?

Summarizing, in first two paragraphs we reconstruct the evolution of the EU foreign policy and the emergence of Europarties as actors of the European Union. In chapter 3 we define the qualitative analysis methodology we adopt in order to analyze Europarties’ positions on the CFSP and the CSDP, and we stress the growing importance of content analysis in political science and international relations research. In the fourth chapter we apply this approach to identify Europarties’ positions towards three fundamental institutional frameworks of the EU foreign policy: a. the Lisbon Treaty, b. the existence of the CFSP and c. the existence of the CSDP (and the European Defence Agency). In the fifth paragraph we conduct content analysis through a specific software in order to understand which are the main conceptual frames used by each Europarty in their electoral manifestos on the EU foreign and defence issues. In particular we have identified different categories concerning four aspects of the CFSP and of the CSDP: nature of threats, foreign and defence policy tools, geographical areas of interest, multilateral organizations. This allows us to assess the different Europarties’ positions and to compare their attitudes with the priorities expressed by the official documents of the European Union.

1. Common Foreign and Security Policy and beyond

Foreign policy has always represented one of the key elements of state sovereignty. This explicates why member states of the European Union have always been cautious in giving up their exclusive prerogatives in this field. Timid attempts to coordinate the foreign policies of European member states started already in 1970 with the European Political Co-operation (EPC), which was only an informal consultation process between member states on foreign policy matters (Cameron 2007).

* The authors wish to thank Luciano Bardi, Eva G. Heidbreder and all participants in the panel “The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Role And Attitudes of European Political Parties” at the “International Studies Association Conference”, San Diego, the 1st of April 2012.

Enrico Calossi wrote paragraphs 2, 4 and 5, Fabrizio Coticchia wrote paragraphs 1 and 3. Both the authors wrote Introduction and Conclusion.
The evident weaknesses in EPC (clearly appeared during the Yugoslav wars) showed the necessity to strengthen foreign policy. The Maastricht Treaty included the European Foreign Policy in the second pillar of the EU structure, based on intergovernmentalism. Furthermore the Amsterdam Treaty created the office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Moreover the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) aimed at enabling the European Union to play a relevant role in the global scenario. For such reason the EU has gradually adopted the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as instrument to undertake all the conflict prevention and crisis-management missions, which were defined by the Petersberg tasks in 1992. The political commitment necessary to implement the ESDP emerged at EU level at the Cologne European Summit in 1999, when 15 countries signed the agreement they had reached at the UK-FR Saint-Malo bilateral summit on the main objectives of the ESDP.

The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty would have (and has) increased the role of the European Parliament (EP) on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) issues.1

Beside to this, the Lisbon Treaty was foreseen to create the new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), overcoming the pillars system (Bickerton 2011). Some authors emphasise positive steps such as the communitarisation of Pillar Three (Ester Herlin-Karnell 2008) or the process of supranationalisation of criminal law. While others commentators highlight the everlasting strength of the intergovernmental approach, also in the area of “freedom, security and justice” (Santos Vara). As stated by De Capitani and Ferraro (2011) internal and external security still maintain diverse judicial regimes (supranational and intergovernmental), influencing the way through which the EU faces new security challenges.

Indeed, even before the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the EU had already acquired a multidimensional approach to security, focusing also on non-military threats. “After the end of Cold War, when homeland defence was the primary task of armed forces, European troops have been constantly involved in military operations abroad, facing a wide range of ‘new’ menaces to national security. Terrorism, organized crime, regional instability, illegal migration, drug and weapons trafficking are among the main threats defined by the European Security Strategy (2003)”2. In overall terms, the ESS seems to remain more a political declaration than an operational document: “The three major goals of stabilisation, human security and crime fighting emerged in distinct organisational fields in the EU. Stabilisation is mostly a goal pursued within the ESDP, human security through EU’s development assistance programmes, and crime fighting remains linked to JHA actors” (Schoeder 2002). The ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy’, adopted by the European Council in 2008, further widens the list of threats the EU should face, mentioning – among others – piracy at sea. The emphasis on “exporting” security strategies beyond EU borders has been reconfirmed even by the Council of the European Union: “Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation,

1 “The cross-pillarisation process promoted by the Lisbon Treaty aims to bring new coherence to the EU approaches in international relations. Policies concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Pillar One and Three) are put together in the same chapter, where majority voting becomes the rule” (Strazzari and Coticchia, 2012a, p.159).
3 The update reconfirms the same threats of the 2003 Security Strategy, with a shift in the relevance. At the aftermath of 11/9, terrorism was at the first place, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the second. The explicit reference to a specific threat in the Security Strategy allows the allocation of funds, necessary to any kind of response. The EU financial framework 2007-2013 will assign 0,8% of the budget to Freedom, Security and 5,4% for the EU as a global actor sector.
The Role of Europarties in Framing the European Union Foreign and Security Policy

"and civilian and military crisis management". This allowed the scholars to evaluate also the new responsibilities of the European armed forces. They are not only concerned to defend the territory of the European member states but they are also deeply focused on the instability at the EU borders. These are not the only instruments of intervention of the EU because other options are at disposal. In fact "the European Union is becoming far more active across its periphery, through a wide range of instruments, from Frontex to CSDP civil-military operations, to promote stability along its boundaries by contrasting 'new' threats" (Strazzari and Coticchia, 2012a).

2. Europarties as Actors of the EU Foreign Policy

Even if they have not played a role comparable to that of national governments, political parties have been important actors of the process of the European integration. Indirectly they have been important in providing the electoral support and legitimacy to the national governments which were the real actors of integration, but they have also performed direct European activities, even if at a minor level, establishing bilateral and multilateral relations. One of the privileged domains of their activities has been the European Parliament (formerly the Common Assembly of the ECSC and the EC) where, since the early times, the deputies elected by the national parties have been used to sit down according to their ideological lines rather than according the their nationality. Thus the European Parliament hosted the first partisan supranational organisation at the European level, i.e. the European Parliament Party Groups (Attinà 1990).

The first EP elections in 1979 fashioned the expectation for further developments. Foreseeing these crucial moment the main political families built up other organizations, external to the EP. Between 1974 and 1976 the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community, the Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties of the European Community and the European People’s Party were established. These organizations were operating as loose confederations of national parties which took decisions through the consensus method and were provided by poor levels of organization; even for these reasons they were called in literature as transnational (or European) party federations (Delwit, Kulahci, Van De Walle 2001). Afterwards every organisation gradually evolved and changed its name into “party” (Party of the European Socialists and European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party) and other parties entered the early European party system (the Confederation of Green Parties in 1984).

In 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht at Article 138a (later renumbered as Article 191) stated that "Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union". So the concept of a “political party at European level” entered the political scene.

Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) recognized the possibility of a mechanism through which Parties at the European Level could have been paid and established the European Parliament and the Council as the responsible institutions to be involved in this process.

In 2003 Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 defined what a “political party at European level” actually was and specified that funding should not go to national parties, either directly or indirectly. This meant that European funds should stay at the Europarty level and, as a result, the emerging Europarties started to organize themselves on a more European basis instead of acting as a mechanism of coordination or of funding for national parties.

Enrico Calossi and Fabrizio Coticchia

Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2007. These amendments strengthened the procedures to recognize and fund of the PELs\(^5\) and provided the new concept of “political foundation at European level”. These Eurofoundations (basically think-tanks) are meant to aid Europarties to elaborate long-term policies, overcoming the urgencies of the electoral moments. This revision also forbids the EP Party Groups to campaign for the European elections, assigning this responsibility only to the Parties at the European Level (even if national parties still continue to materially conduct these campaigns). The last change, provided by the Lisbon Treaty (2009), assigned to the Europarty winning the European elections the right to nominate to the European Council its candidate for President of the European Commission.

To conclude, nowadays parties operate at the European level into three different ways. The first one is the direct action of national parties which practically perform the electoral campaigns in the constituencies (i.e., the member countries), choose the candidates (Bardi et al 2010) and are provided by larger economic resources (Hix 2002). The EP party groups coordinate the activities of MEPs in the EP and can directly influence the operate of the Commission. Political Parties at the European Level (PELs) are responsible to conduct the electoral campaigns at the European level, that mainly means providing a common scheme of values and policies for the national sister parties.

For this reason scholars are allowed to apply the well known “three faces approach”, which had been used by Katz and Mair (1994) to interpret the different levels of national parties, to the Europarties. According to this approach the EP Party Group would represent the Party in Public Office of the Europarty while the Party at the European Level would correspond to the Party in Central Office and the National Parties to the Party on the Ground. Europarty as an whole would be the set of relations between the three faces.

For this reason, in this preliminary study, we have chosen to focus our attention on Parties at the European Level, the Europarty’s face which is responsible to conduct the electoral campaign and to create EU level electoral programs or manifestos.

In the period During winter 2008 – spring 2009, when the electoral manifestos for the EP Elections 2009 were presented, the following Parties at the European Level had been recognized: the European People’s Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES), the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR), the European Green Party (EGP), the Party of the European Left (EL), the European Democratic Party (EDP), the European Free Alliance (EFA), the EUDemocrats (EUD), and the Alliance for Europe of the Nations (AEN) (Calossi 2011)\(^6\).

Of all these parties the EDP and AEN did not present any electoral manifesto (the latter was disbanded some months later). Amongst the other parties the length and the accurateness of the electoral programs varied consistently. The EPP prepared the longest manifesto (“Strong for the

---

\(^{5}\) Nowadays the provisions to be recognized as Party at the European Level are: having legal personality in the Member State in which its seat is located; observing the founding principles of the European Union, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law; having participated, or intending to participate, in elections to the European Parliament; in at least one quarter of the Member States having received at least 3% of the votes cast at the most recent European Parliament elections or having already been represented by MEPs, Members of the national or regional Parliaments; publishing its revenue and expenditure annually; publishing a statement of its assets and liabilities annually; providing a list of its donors and their donations exceeding €500; not accepting anonymous donations; it must not accepting donations exceeding €12,000 per year and per donor; not accepting donations from any company over which the public authorities may exercise a dominant influence; getting at least 15% of its budget from sources other than its European Union funding; submitting its application by the 30 September before the financial year that it wants funding for.

\(^{6}\) The Alliance of Independent Democrats in Europe met the recognition threshold from 2006 to 2008 and other PELs obtained the status in the following years. The Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists and the European Christian Political Movement in 2010, the European Alliance for Freedom in 2011, the Alliance of European National Movements in 2012.
People” of 19,142 words). The second largest Europarty, the PES, proposed a 8,478 words long Manifesto (“People First: A New Direction for Europe”). That of the third mainstream party (the ELDR) was much shorter, being only 1117 and, according to the name “Top 15 for EP elections”, limits itself in giving some few political ideas and aims.

Amongst the smaller parties the longest document (5,445 words) was the platform of the European Left (“Together for Change in Europe!”). The Regionalists of EFA presented a Manifesto (“Vision for a People's Europe. Not a populist Europe”) of 4,279 words, which was longer than that of their allied the Greens (“A Green New Deal for Europe” of 3,856 words). The shortest was the “Political Programme of the EUDemocrats”, which concentrated all its 885 words in an anti-EU vision.

Our aim is to investigate whether Europarties agree on a common core of values. On the opposite, if they differentiate their attitudes, one could expect different attitudes on the basis of the left-right continuum or according to the mainstream-extreme dichotomy.

3. A Methodological Premise

The study of the discourse has considerably increased its role in international relations literature in last decades. According to a constructivist perspective, norms and expectations influence the way through which the state pursues its national interests (Wendt, 1999). Foreign policy is made by language (Waever, 1995) and the “speech act” has had considerable impact on security studies (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). As stated by Martha Finnemore (1996), much of international politics is about defining, rather than defending, national interests.

The analysis of political speech helps to illustrate the normative context where actors, such as decision-makers, are involved. This research focuses specifically on the political programs of the Parties at the European Level, aiming to stress the main conceptual frameworks regarding foreign and security policy that have been emphasized by each party. Moreover, by highlighting on a possible “common language” (Gourevitch, 2002) based on shared attitudes and beliefs between political actors, we can point out the core-values of decision-makers regarding Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). We consider conceptual frameworks as general codes through which the actors interpret complex issues (Wiener, 2007). These interpretive schemes simplify external reality through a selective process through which the actors emphasize only certain aspects (Snow and Benford, 1992). The elements on which the actors focus are the most salient (Entman, 1993). Thus different conceptual frames represent alternative ways to address a theme and, consequently, the policy-making process can be viewed as a struggle among different frames. The paper adopts content analysis in order to stress the main conceptual frames of the European parties in the field of foreign and security policy.

Content analysis (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; Druckman, 2005) is a widely used method for studying political communication and culture. The texts are material manifestations of speech and the analysis of language provides a better understanding of social reality (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). The discourse is no longer considered in literature as a simple reflection of reality but as its essential constituent part. According to Holsti, content analysis is defined as: “a technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying characteristics of specified messages” (1969, 25). The social sciences have developed manifold methodological tools, such as specific software, for content analysis (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). The use of software avoids many common methodological problems, applying the coding rules automatically and guarantying accuracy for comparison and replicability (Weber, 1990). Computers do not generate cognitive differences, something that can occur with ‘human coders’. The validity of classifications are naturally linked to the degree of correspondence between categories, words and concepts. The software has mechanisms that help the researcher to change the vocabulary (e.g. the identification of additional terms) without altering the final outcome.
For the purposes of the paper, content analysis has been performed with the software AntConc\textsuperscript{7} through which it is possible to highlight the frequency of the categories, keywords in context (KWIC) and the word frequency list (or wordlist).

The first level of analysis, the wordlist, simply provides the list of all terms included in all the texts analyzed by the software. According to the definition provided by AntConc, wordlist: “counts all the words in the corpus and presents them in an ordered list. This allows you to quickly find which words are the most frequent in a corpus”. (Anthony 2011) The total number of words token in each document provides the overall data out of which is possible to calculate the frequency of the difference categories.

The second level (frequency of categories) analyses how many times the categories of the vocabulary, created according to the main conceptual framework (e.g. the threat posed by organised crime etc.), appear in each document. The categories have been designed in order to answer specifically the following research question: what are the main conceptual frames adopted by each Europarty on EU foreign and defence issues? The paper has developed different categories concerning four set of problems: threats, foreign and defence policy tools, geographical areas of interest, multilateral organizations. The categories of 'threats' have been elaborated according to the challenges described in the European Security Strategy (2003) and in its 2008 update (on coding, tagging and categories see Appendix). We have distinguished foreign and defence policy tools adopting two diverse categories that focus on instruments related to soft and hard power. The literature (Nye 1990) provides the definitions and also possible indicators for soft and hard power. For instance, the Institute for Government (2007) has attempted to operationalize the concept of soft power through different benchmarks. We have used such indicators to build our categories with several terms related to the same meaning. The paper has designed the categories related to geographical areas according to the definitions provided by the European External Action Service (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/). Finally we have focused on the main existing international and regional multilateral organizations (on coding, tagging and categories see Appendix).

The categories have been modified and enlarged (with additional terms) during the coding procedures in order to increase their accuracy. The four issues (threats, tools, areas, alliances) allow to illustrate a comprehensive analysis of the conceptual frames used by the Europarties in the field of foreign and defence policy. The results regarding the frequency of categories show the percentages related to each party, emphasizing the diverse degree of attention devoted by the parties to different categories.

Finally, the third level of analysis, key-words in context, illustrates the extracted piece of text where the term is inserted for a length of three lines, allowing for a better understanding of its meaning.

After text analysis highlights different general attitudes towards CFSP and CSDP (Par.4), content analysis will illustrate the main conceptual frameworks through which the European parties interpret specific aspects (threats, tools, geographical priorities and multilateralism) of the European foreign and security policy.

4. Europarties’ Positions on CFSP and CSDP

As expressed in the introduction, the first aim of this paper is to analyze and classify Europarties’ positions on the European Common Foreign and Security and on the Common Security and Defence Policy. For our textual analysis we adopt the mechanisms proposed by Doty (1993): presuppositions,

predications and positioning. As stated by Naylor (2011, p.p.181-182): “Presupposition is assumed knowledge that is generally taken to be true [...] Predications established a particular kind of subject with particular qualities; that is, who or what a subject is and what is can or cannot do. Positioning link particular subject and object to one another [...] relationships are reestablished in terms of who they are and what their abilities or functions are based on hierarchical comparisons”. For instance, presuppositions can be made about the existence of a European foreign policy and predications can link positive qualities to the EU external dimension (“Civilian power”).

Therefore, according to these mechanisms we can distinguish four different attitudes (Sustainment, Sustainment with changes, Opposition, None position) towards Lisbon Treaty, CFSP and CSDP.

According to what it has been described in paragraph 2, the Lisbon treaty has played an important role in strengthening of the CFSP and the CDSF, especially in respect to the nomination of the High Representative of CFSP who would have provided Europe of a “single voice”. This was already perceived by Europarties even before the entry in force of the treaty. The rhetorical figure of Europe “talking with an unique voice” is widely used by the three larger parties (ELDR and EPP “speaking with one voice” and PES “common voice” and “single voice”). These parties represent also the first type of behavior towards the institutional framework which would have changed the European foreign policy represented by the Lisbon treaty. Populars, Socialists and Liberals support the approval and the implementation of the Lisbon treaty. The influence of the Lisbon treaty on the CFSP and the CSDP is clearly expressed by these parties.

The EPP states that “When the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, it will grant the EU legal status, more efficient and democratic institutions, a major competency in foreign affairs and, for Member States that wish it, some capacity for common defence” and further “The Lisbon Treaty makes a common foreign policy more effective”.

For the ELDR the Lisbon treaty would influence the European foreign policy equipping “the EU with the necessary tools for today’s global challenges”. For the Socialists the [Lisbon] “Treaty (...) would make Europe better able to tackle common challenges democratically, transparently and effectively”.

This linkage between the Lisbon treaty and the change of the EU CFSP and CSDP is underlined also by the European Left: “We campaign against the rearmament provision of the Lisbon Treaty, not only because of the lethal and ecologically destructive weapons, but also because it detracts funds from economic, social and ecological development.” For these reasons EL “reaffirms its ”No“ to the Lisbon treaty” and auspicious that “The EU citizens must discuss and decide on an alternative to the Lisbon Treaty”.

Even the EUDemocrats express their critics to the Lisbon treaty, promising to “monitor the implementation of the EU Constitutional Treaty (the Lisbon Treaty) in the European Union and highlight its problems in relation to the political independence of the member states”.

The two allied parties of Greens and EFA do not furnish any mention about the Lisbon treaty, while they obviously give some opinions about the CFSP.

Observing Europarties’ positions on the CFSP more in details we can see that EL, EFA and Greens do not mention directly this new policy of the EU, but clearly indicate what the EU should do in the international context.

EFA affirms that “Security and foreign policy should aim at conflict prevention and community development”. The fact that EFA sustains the existence of a common foreign policy of the EU is confirmed also by the support EFA would give to eventual “EU action to end the use of chemical and biological weapons as well as cluster bombs and other weapons of mass destruction”.
The Greens have similar auspices, as they indicate that “the European Union must lead by example in its engagement with the rest of the world: this implies a new style of foreign policy. It must devote its energy to solving root causes of international tensions and not just fighting their manifestations.”

The behavior of the EU as a “civilian power” is confirmed by the statement that “the EU should strengthen multilateral bodies and international law”.

Even the EL does not mention directly the CFSP but calls “for civil society in Europe and for the European Union to strive for political solutions”. That means that EU is not considered by itself enough to operate in the international context. Even the civil society is needed to solve the problems. Moreover the attention of the European Left is concentrated to auspicate a more “democratized” role for the United Nations, which should provide the “international law and to the principles” all the other actors in the international scenario should follow to.

As already said in the first lines all the mainstream Europarties agree with the idea of a CFSP.

For the ELDR “Member States’ interests can best be served through a Common Foreign and Security Policy, speaking with one voice through the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy”, since in a globalised world “no EU country can tackle the threats and challenges we are facing today on its own”.

The EPP, which obviously sustains the existence of the CFSP, tries to give some other reasons to maintain this common policy. Firstly, it affirms that “speaking with one voice is what our citizens and our global partners expect from us”. Moreover the CFSP is the only instrument that makes possible “to promote European interests in the world”.

Even the PES states the relevance of the “common voice” and that “strengthening the role of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy will be an important step forward in this respect”. The Socialists do not underline the importance of some European interests while worry that “if we fail, the EU and its Member States will become less and less relevant in world affairs”.

To conclude the EUDemocrats clearly “work against the development of a European Union Foreign Service that will undermine the member states foreign, security and defence policy.” This very brief and synthetic statement clearly expressed the EUD ideas about the EU Foreign and Defence policies.

The European Left too is expressly against the Defence policy. Even if the CSDP is not clearly reported the EL affirms that “the EU Defence Agency should be replaced by a disarmament agency designed to stop the arms race”.

The EFA does not refer expressly to the CSDP while affirms to see in favour the “establishment of an EU peace-keeping force”. Even the European Green Party agrees with the establishment of EU external interventions, but these should be represented by “a European Civil Peace Corps ready to make non-military interventions for humanitarian purposes would play an important part of this”. In this perspective, even if indirectly, the Greens seem to refuse a common military instrument for the EU.

The ELDR on the contrary “calls for major new efforts to strengthen and extend the European Security and Defence Policy by bringing together European defence-related resources and capabilities”.

The EPP underlines the incoherence of spending “half of the American military budget (...) to finance 27 armies, 23 air forces and 20 fleets without being able to send more than 2% of their troops into combat”. According to a cost–benefit efficiency, “rarely a ratio has been so low for such an
important issue”. For this reason is useful “to give new impetus to the current European defence architecture”. After that the EPP proposes a wide serious of programs to be put under the coordination of the European Defence Agency.

On the other side the Socialists do not seem to share such an enthusiastic behavior. For example they never use the word “defence”, while they prefer to underline the word “security”. EU should maintain its “its conflict-resolution, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts in crisis zones (…) within the framework of the United Nations”.

In summary, it is possible to see that the three mainstream (and bigger) Europarties agreed the changes introduced from the Lisbon Treaty. Of the minor ones, the more extremes oppose the Treaty while Greens and Regionalists do not have any references on this point. Even on the CFSP the mainstream Europarties share the same attitude of sustainment, only the EUDemocrats are in opposition while the European Left, Regionalists and Greens advocate for a sustainment with some changes. Few Europarties take a positions on the military aspects, but it is possible to note that the mainstream consensus does not operate on this issue. Only EPP and ELDR shared a clear sustainment of the CSDP while the left wing Socialists and Regionalists demand some changes of the current rules.

Table 1: Europarties’ positions on the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP and the CSDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Lisbon Treaty</th>
<th>Common Foreign and Security Policy</th>
<th>Common Security and Defence Policy (and European Defence Agency)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>EPP, PES, ELDR</td>
<td>EPP, PES, ELDR</td>
<td>EPP, ELDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment with changes</td>
<td>EL, EFA, EGP</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>PES, EFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>EL, EUD</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>EL, EUD, EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None position</td>
<td>Greens, EFA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Europarties’ positions on the categories

Content analysis emphasizes the ways through which the European parties interpret four relevant issues concerning the European foreign and security policy: threats, foreign and defence policy tools, geographical areas of interest and multilateral organizations. The results regarding the frequency of categories show the percentages related to each party, emphasizing the diverse degree of attention devoted by the parties to different categories (on coding, tagging and categories see Appendix).

Dealing with the threats we can see that the Liberals have been those who devoted the highest space (in percentage) to these frames. On the contrary the European Left has been the Europarty which gave the minor relevance to this aspect of the CFSP.
Table 2: Percentage saliency of “Threats” frames in the electoral manifesto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFA</th>
<th>EGP</th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>ESS2003</th>
<th>ESS2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber security</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Security</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed States</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organised crime</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional conflicts</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EU Democrats are excluded from the analysis since their electoral manifesto reported few references on this category.

Looking at the relative space which has been given by the Europarties to the single threats we note that the threat “Climate Change” was clearly over represented in comparison with the Strategic documents of the EU.

In particular, Greens (without any surprise) and their allies, Regionalists of EFA, gave the highest levels of attention to the environmental menaces. Liberals and Populists were those which the minor relevance. Those are also the parties which gave the highest attention to the terrorist menaces. The European Left and the EFA are those more coherent with the ESS2003 and ES2008 in according saliency the threats of the “Weapons of Mass Destruction”

Clearly underestimated by Europarties (according to the space which is devoted to them by the strategic documents) are the threats represented by Regional Conflicts and Failed States. EPP and PES seem to be more sensible towards the Organised Crime, but less than the strategic documents.

Table3: Percentage of the different threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFA</th>
<th>EGP</th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>ESS2003</th>
<th>ESS2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>53.49</td>
<td>59.09</td>
<td>45.24</td>
<td>39.29</td>
<td>37.60</td>
<td>44.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber security</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed States</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>10.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organised crime</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>12.84</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>14.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional conflicts</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>17.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>13.18</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>15.71</td>
<td>10.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>18.60</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>21.43</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>22.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liberals are those who dedicate the largest space to the frame of the instruments of the CFSP. On the contrary the two Europarties which often stress their “pacifist attitude” are those which grant the minor space. In particular, seeing also which kind of instruments is reported in the political discourse,

---

9 This paper limits the analysis to the measurement of the saliency. Otherwise even a first and proof reading has already underlined that for the EL the attention to the WMD is due to hoped disarmament of the superpowers (especially the US) rather than being concentrated over the risks of WMD proliferation amongst the “rogue states”.

10
we note that the ELDR is the only party to devote the majority of its space to the so called “hard” items (i.e. those related to the military dimension), while again Greens and Leftists dedicate quite all their references to soft power options. About the other Europarties EFA has a similar attitude to those of the pacifist one, while the EPP is close to the ELDR attitude and the PES poses itself in an average position between the two groups.

Table 4: Percentage saliency of “Instrument” frames in the electoral manifesto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFA</th>
<th>EGP</th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>PES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Percentage of the different instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFA</th>
<th>EGP</th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>ELDR</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>PES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>53.85</td>
<td>46.05</td>
<td>30.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft</td>
<td>84.62</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>90.00</td>
<td>46.15</td>
<td>53.95</td>
<td>69.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only four Europarties give some precise references to specific geographical areas (on coding, tagging and categories see Appendix), Even an important party as the ELDR does not give any significant references to the scenarios of the European Union.

Table 6. Percentage saliency of “Geographical” frames in the electoral manifesto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFA</th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>ESS2003</th>
<th>ES2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Enlargement</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-CIS</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med-ME</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the EU strategic documents the Mediterranean-Middle East is the zone which receives the highest attention. Doing a mean between ESS2003 and ES2008 Asia places itself in the second position while the countries of the former CIS are in the third one.

The prominence of the Med-ME area is shared also by the three of the Europarties: for the EL and the PES it represents the first priority while for the EPP it represents the second. On the contrary the Asian countries seem to be less important for the Europarties with the exception of the Socialists. Other two significant features to be noted are: the importance accorded by the European Left for North America (mainly to express negative remarks on the US) and the importance of the country of the possible and future Enlargement by the EFA (mainly to express the rights cultural and language minorities of this likely future EU member countries must maintain).
Table 7: Percentage of the different geographical areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFA</th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>ESS2003</th>
<th>ES2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Enlargement</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-CIS</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med-ME</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Europarties devote the highest attention to the non-EU organizations: the European Left and the ELDR. All the other parties have values from 3 to 4 times lower than those of EL and ELDR. From the point of view of the percentage of the reference we saw that the International organisations (UN, IMF, WTO, etc…) are largely the most quoted. That is true also for the ESS2003 and the ESS2008 but is not shared by the European Left which devotes a large attention also to the regional organisation. Most of these references regard the NATO and are characterized by a negative attitude.

Table 8: Percentage saliency of “Organisation” frames in the electoral manifesto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFA</th>
<th>EGP</th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>ELD</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>EUD</th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>ESS2003</th>
<th>ESS2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Percentage of the different organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFA</th>
<th>EGP</th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>ELD</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>EUD</th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>ESS2003</th>
<th>ESS2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56.52</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>64.71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92.31</td>
<td>68.75</td>
<td>63.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43.48</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td>36.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some Conclusions

Surely this study should be enforced by and enlarged to other political documents of the Europarties. Leader summits’ resolutions and documents of the Europarties’ congresses can be the worthiest to be investigated. A side to this it could be also interesting to insert into the analysis even the EP Party groups activities from the point of view of the proposal for resolutions but also, if possible, of the analysis of their vote behavior on foreign policy matters.

Notwithstanding, the content analysis has supplied us with some clues. A side to the non-mainstream Europarties, whose critical views towards the EU or some aspects of the EU were already known, even amongst the EPP, the PES and ELDR, the three ruling Europarties, there are some differences in the attitude they assume towards the CFSP and the CSDP. The EPP and the ELDR seem...
to be clearly enthusiastic of the new CFSP and CSDP as they were to be designed by the Lisbon Treaty. Socialists, even if they agree and underline the importance of the reformed CFSP, use different tones towards to CSDP. They do not disagree but seem to underestimate and not highlighting the military dimension of the CSDP.

Even the study on the saliency of the four categories offer an introductive view of the different attitudes and priorities of the Europarties. Often these are also quite different to those expressed in the official documents of the EU. In particular Europarties seem to have a completely different perception of which threats have to be considered the most dangerous. It is worth noting that every Europarty considers the climate change as the threat which deserves more space and attention while for the ESS2003 and the ESS2008 the environmental issue represents only one of the menaces posed to the EU.
Bibliography


Bickerton Christopher J. (2011), European Union Foreign Policy. From effectiveness to Functionality, Palgrave.


APPENDIX

“There is no simple right way to do content analysis” (Weber, 1990: 13)

The authors provide additional information on categories, tagging and all other aspects related to content analysis upon request.

The words are classified through categories because they have similar meanings. Such a process of ‘reduction’ and classification is called ‘tagging’ (Weber, 1990). Building a category, which means to operationalize abstract concepts focusing on specific conceptual frameworks, is methodologically problematic (Drukman, 2005). In that sense, it is crucial to reach the right trade-off between ‘reliability’ (coding accuracy) and ‘validity’ of the categories (Weber, 1990; Drukman, 2005). The level of internal consistency and accuracy depends on the ambiguity in the words meaning, the definition of the categories and the coding rules. The validity of classifications are naturally linked to the degree of correspondence between categories, words and concepts. The use of dictionaries helps to provide consistency across categories through synonyms and terms related to the shared theme. We have developed original categories in order to increase validity. The software helps to avoid many apply the coding rules automatically, guarantying accuracy. In this study, we employ the categories described in chapters 3 and 5.

The categories of ‘threats’ have been drawn according to list of challenges provided by ESS 2003 (and 2008): Climate change; Cyber security; Energy Security; Failed States; Organised Crime; Regional conflicts; Terrorism; Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). For instance, “Terrorism” collects different terms such as terrorist*, Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, jihad, etc.

We have distinguished “tools” focusing on the categories of “soft” and “hard” power. The literature (Nye 1990; Institute for Government, 2007) provides both definitions and possible indicators for the categories. For instance. “hard power” attains at: military*, defen*, troop*, battle*, etc.

The categories related to geographical areas have been defined according to the definitions provided by the European External Action Service (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/): Africa; Asia; EU Enlargement; Ex-CIS; Latin America; Med-ME; North America; Oceania. For instance, “Africa” covers Afric* and all the names of countries and regional areas of the continent (e.g. Gulf of Aden)

Finally we have focused on the main existing international and regional multilateral organizations. For instance, “Regional Organizations” collects terms such as: AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, OECD, MERCOSUR, ALBA and many others.

Finally, thought key-words in context (KWIC), we illustrate the extracted piece of text where the term is inserted, providing a better understanding of its meaning. In fact, a word isolated from its context may cause some misunderstanding. For instance, identical words can have a different meaning. Thus, interpretation and selection are essential tasks for guarantying effectiveness of content analysis tools. The concordance tool allows “to see how words and phrases are commonly used in a corpus of texts” (Anthony 2011).
Author contacts:

Enrico Calossi, PhD
Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche (Università di Pisa)
Email: enrico.calossi@sp.unipi.it
Observatory on Political Parties and Representation – European University Institute (OPPR-EUDO-EUI)
Email: enrico.calossi@eui.eu

Fabrizio Coticchia, MA, PhD
DIRPOLIS, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna
Via Cardinal Maffi 27
56127 Pisa
Email: f.coticchia@sssup.it