APPLYING TOLERANCE INDICATORS:

ANNEX to the report on POLITICAL TOLERANCE FOR NATIVE MINORITIES

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ANNEX TO CLUSTER REPORT:

POLITICAL TOLERANCE FOR NATIVE MINORITIES

Indicators presented:

- Indicator 6.1 Ethnic and religious tolerance
- Indicator 6.3 Existence of provisions for minority candidates at the party level
- Indicator 6.5 Minority mobilization and claims-making
- Indicator 6.6 Representation of minority politicians in parliament

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## Detailed Comparative Country Overview for Indicator 6.1 Ethnic and religious tolerance

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| Bulgaria | Medium | Time period for assessment: 1997-2012  
Level of assessment: national, local  
There is only one official institution where minority communities are represented as organised collective actors. The National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Integration Issues was established in December 1997 (under the previous name National Council for Ethnic and Demographic Issues). The Council is a consultative and coordinating body without real administrative or political power. Its main task is to facilitate cooperation between government institutions and minority organisation, and assist the government in the preparation and implementation of policies dealing with ethnic and integration issues. The Council is the main body in charge of coordination and supervision of all activities carried out in the frame of the “Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015.” It monitors if policies of equal rights and development for all citizens are respected, and assists the preservation and development of culture, identity, religion, language, tradition and cultural heritage of Bulgarian minorities. An unofficial arrangement that was valid between 1997 and 2009 was that the chairperson of the Council was of minority origin. The current government has abandoned this practice and quite controversially, since 2009, the Council has been chaired by the Minister of Internal Affairs (ethnic Bulgarian).  
In 2012, the Council had 67 members and included representatives of Turkish, Roma, Aromanian/Vlach, Karakachan, Armenian, Jewish, and refugee communities, as well as of numerous NGOs active in the field of interethnic relations and minorities. The Council is often criticised for not fulfilling even its relatively modestly defined tasks and purpose.  
There are also Regional and Municipal Councils for Cooperation on Ethnic and Integration Issues. Their role is similar to the role of the National Council, but limited to the respective region or municipality in which they are located.  
Sources: Council of Ministers (2011); Hajdinjak, Kosseva, and Zhelyazkova (2012); and Vice Prime Minister (2012). |
| Greece | Low | Time period for assessment: 2013 with consideration of the past 90 years (since 1923)  
Level of assessment: national  
There is no provision for the official representation of native minorities or religious minority groups in the country. There is the Consultative Committee of the Turkish Minority in Thrace (re activated in 1997), the political organ of the only recognized minority in Greece, but this is a non-official umbrella body for a series of associations, which, however, remain unrecognised by the Greek state.  
Greece does not recognize the minority status of other communities, mainly of the Slavic speaking Macedonian minority in the north-western Greece and of the relatively large Roma population. However, whether a State officially recognizes a minority or not, is not sufficient grounds upon which to conclude whether it respects its obligations toward minority populations. |
The only officially recognised minority of Greece is a religious one: the Muslims of western Thrace (in the north-western border with Turkey), who are protected by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. They are Greek citizens with special constitutional and religious rights (Sharia). It is a small but politically significant population of about 120,000 Muslims (less than 0.2% of the total population). Comprising individuals of Turkish origin, Gypsies (Roma), and Slav-speaking Pomaks, they have transformed since the 1950s into a minority with ethnic consciousness mobilizing to assert a common Turkish identity. Discriminatory and exclusionary policies on behalf of the Greek state were abandoned in 1991 in the name of an approach guided by ‘legal equality – equal citizenship’. Though much attenuated since, past divisions and discrimination persist also in institutional forms.

Sources: Treaty of Lausanne (1923); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Dpt, Muslim Minority of Thrace (1999); Tsitselikis (2012); Triandafyllidou and Anagnostou (2008); and Triandafyllidou and Kokkali (2010).

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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Until 1989, minority issues barely existed due to their size and the communist authorities' strategies. The Communist Constitution granted non-discrimination, but in practice, minorities could only nurture their traditions using state-controlled ‘cultural associations’. Ethnic issues were perceived as threatening state interests, and, therefore, were strictly controlled and not pronounced. It seems that this mode of thinking lingers in some right-wing political circles to the present day, although its contemporary advocates refer rather to nationalistic historical traditions and thinkers. After 1989, minorities started to establish their own associations (mainly cultural and social, not political), which was their main form of representation in the public sphere. Both the will to democratise the political order and EU demands pressed policy makers to accept liberal laws concerning religious freedoms as well as ethnic and national minorities’ presence in the public sphere. Political liberalisation has encouraged minorities to become visible, but not all attempts are welcomed by significant parts of the majority society. Tolerance is declared yet it has little reflection in everyday practice.</td>
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<td>Sources: Łodziński (1994); and Łodziński (2005).</td>
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| Romania   | Medium | Time period for assessment: 1990-2012  
Level of assessment: national  
The Romanian government has a Department for Interethnic Relations established by Government Decision no. 111/2005. This institution focuses on the legislative and institutional building process for the protection of ethnic minorities in Romania and on building ethnic diversity by consolidating and widening support for a multicultural society.  
It performs the following tasks within the legislative process: elaborates and sends for approval to the Government strategies in order to maintain, develop and express the identity of persons belonging to national minorities; elaborates draft laws and other normative documents from its field of activity; advises draft laws and other normative documents that are related to the rights and duties of persons belonging to national minorities; and monitors the application of internal and international normative documents related to the protection of persons belonging to national minorities. However, research has suggested that even though existing legislation has established numerous institutions protecting the rights of minorities, this has not had a significant impact on policies in the field.  
In effect, the quantitative increase in the number of government agencies that have responsibilities among minorities has not yet led to a significant increase in the consequences of government policy in this area, given that these institutions often lack a clear assignment of functions and excuse their lack of activity by appealing to their very general responsibilities.  
| Sweden    | High  | Time period for assessment: 1977-2012  
Level of assessment: national, local  
In 1977, Sweden recognised the Sámi people as an indigenous people. The 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was endorsed by Sweden, and in 2010 the special status of the Swedish Sámi people was constitutionally recognised for the first time in the Instrument of Government.  
Already in 1993 the popularly elected Swedish Sámi Parliament (Sametinget) was established in order to grant the Sámi people cultural autonomy. Today, the parliament is considered to be the main body that ensures Sámi... |
self-determination. However, the status of the Sámi Parliament is an administrative authority under the Swedish Government. The parliament thus has two roles: it is an administrative authority whose tasks are strictly regulated by law, and it is a popularly elected parliament representing the Sámi people. The Sámi Parliament has only administrative power in particular areas, and no political power. Sweden has recognized the Sámi language as an official minority language (2000) and this recognition implies certain rights concerning education in schools and at universities, as well as the right to communicate with official authorities in one’s native language in areas where the Sámi people have lived for a long time (the landscape Norrland).

Since the Sámi Parliament’s establishment, its limited mandate, institutional arrangements and organizational structure have been heavily criticized by the Sami Parliament itself, Sami organizations, academics, NGOs and the UN for not fulfilling the Sami people’s right to self-determination as an indigenous people. The Sami Parliament’s dual role—mentioned above—has been particularly challenged.

Sources: Josefsen (2007); Lawrence and Mörkenstam (2012); and Robbins (2011)

Turkey

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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Time period for assessment: 1923-2012 Level of assessment: national</td>
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There is no legal regulation in Turkey permitting officially recognized minorities and others to represent themselves in the National Parliament. The Turkish Constitution outlaws the establishment of ethno-religious based political parties. Turks take pride in the regime of tolerance implemented by the Ottoman Millet System in a way that has revitalized the boundaries among religious communities. The same regime of tolerance was embraced by the modern Turkish Republic even though the Kemalist state was intended to be rupture from the Ottoman Empire. The regime of tolerance, which has been essentialized by the Turks, is essentially a myth; this myth of tolerance has been instrumental by the Republicanist state elite in order to conceal the mistreatment of ethno-cultural and religious minorities other than the majority of Sunni-Muslim-Turks.

At the national level, tolerance towards ethno-cultural and religious minorities is not very high; however, the situation is different at the local level as the European integration process has contributed to easing tensions between the majority and the minorities.

Sources: Gülalp (1996); Güven (2005); Kaya and Tarhanlı (2005); and Oran (2004).
### Detailed Comparative Country Overview for Indicator 6.3 Existence of provisions for minority candidates at the party level

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| Bulgaria    | Medium| Time period for assessment: 2001-2012  
Level of assessment: national, local  
There are no special provisions by political parties (e.g. in terms of selecting candidates in specific electoral districts or at the national level) for ensuring that some ethnic or religious minority candidates will be elected and participate in government. There are numerous political parties which represent minority interests – most of their candidates either on general or local elections are of minority origin. Some of the so-called national parties place minority candidates on their lists in municipalities, where most of the population is of minority origin, however, rather than being motivated by a genuine concern for guaranteeing proper minority representation. this is often a political strategy that aims to decrease the election result of minority parties.  
Sources: Hajdinjak (2008). |
| Greece      | Medium| Time period for assessment: 2013 with consideration of the past 90 years (since 1923)  
Level of assessment: national  
There is no legal provision for comprising minority candidates in national political parties. Nonetheless, all major parties nominate candidates from the Muslim minority (which is the only recognised minority group in the country) in their national election lists. This is not the case with the Slavic speaking Macedonian minority and the Roma.  
In 1989, Dr Sadik Ahmet won a seat in parliament as an independent Turkish candidate. In 1990, he was found guilty of provoking discord by claiming the existence of a Turkish minority in Greece. In the 1993 elections, the Greek Parliament introduced a 3 per cent nationwide threshold to enter parliament, an electoral percentage too high for the minority to reach it, effectively precluding the election of independent representatives of the minority. The Muslims of Thrace participate actively in Greek political life and a good number of them are members of political parties. Parliamentary representatives are elected on the ballot of all national political parties even though there is no relevant legislation. Their numbers range between one and three, yet so far, no one among them has held any government post. In almost all the successive Parliaments from 1927 onwards, the |
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<td>Muslim deputies (usually 2) were elected and participated actively in parliamentary work. Presently (2012), there are three minority representatives in the Greek Parliament.</td>
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<td>Sources: Triandafyllidou and Anagnostou (2008); Triandafyllidou and Kokkali (2010); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010); and Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association (2010).</td>
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|            |       | Time period for assessment: 2012  
Level of assessment: national, local  
Due to their numerical insignificance and low social visibility, minorities are still not seen as a significant part of the public sphere. At the same time, contemporary Parliamentary Election Law contains preferences for registered electoral committees of national and ethnic minorities recognized by the state - ‘ethnic’ organisations’ candidates do not have to meet the requirement of crossing a 5% threshold of votes nationwide in order to be elected to parliament.  
At the local level, regulations do not provide any preference for organizations or persons belonging to national/ethnic minorities - this means that only in areas where minorities live in large clusters, representation of minorities in local government is possible. |
|            |       | Sources: Nijakowski (2005); Łodziński (2005); and Jasińska-Kania and Łodziński (2009). |
| Poland     | Medium| Our research did not identify any specific provisions in the legal framework for political parties, requiring them to ensure that candidates belonging to an ethnic or religious minority be elected and participate in Parliament. |
| Romania    | Low   | Time period for assessment: 1990-2012  
Level of assessment: national  
There are no special provisions by political parties for ensuring that Sámi candidates will be elected and |
| Sweden     | Low   | Time period for assessment: 2012  
Level of assessment: national, local  
There are no special provisions by political parties for ensuring that Sámi candidates will be elected and |
Country | Score | Time period for assessment: 2012

|       |       | Level of assessment: national, local |

| Turkey | Medium | Even though the ethno-cultural and religious diversity of the Turkish society is not politically tolerated by the state institutions in general, political parties recognize this diversity. They do so because it ‘pays off.’ At the end of the 1980s, political parties which represented the Kurdish identity and defended the Kurdish cultural and political rights began to enter the formal political sphere. Under the Özal government, the abolition of the articles of Law 765 of the Turkish Penal Code, which restricted the freedom of expression, laid the ground for the formation of legal ethnic and religious parties. In addition, departing from their alliances with the leftist parties of the 1970s, the Kurdish political and intellectual elite abandoned the old communist slogans, the socialist economic programmes, and the aim of forming an independent Kurdistan, and replaced them with claims for cultural rights for the Kurdish people and the democratic consolidation of the democratic republic. During the 1990s, the attempts of the Kurdish political elite to represent Kurdish cultural and political rights by participating in national politics through political parties were undermined by closure cases in the Constitutional Court and public debates on the legitimacy of a party that was founded on the basis of the recognition of ethnic identity. As for the officially recognized minorities such as the Greeks (Rums), Jews and Armenians, there is not really a great chance for the visibility of minority origin candidates in general elections. However, in local elections there are quite a few candidates, as was noted in the last local elections. Sources: Öniş (2007); and Jongerden and Akkaya (2011). |
## Detailed Comparative Country Overview for Indicator 6.5 Minority mobilization and claims-making

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| **Bulgaria** | Low | Time period for assessment: 1991-2012  
Level of assessment: national  
Bulgarian Constitution (Art. 11 (4)): “There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent seizure of state power.” The 1990 Political Parties Act confirmed this restriction (Art. 2): “A political party may not be established when it is based on a confessional or an ethnic principle.” However, the current Law on Political parties, passed in 2005, contains no such article. The Constitutional prohibition of ethnic parties is on the one hand undemocratic and discriminatory, as it potentially denies a large number of the Bulgarian citizens a proper political representation. On the other hand, it forces political parties to work beyond the confines of a particular ethnic community.  
In practice, minorities (especially Turks and Pomaks, and to a lesser extent Roma) are active participants in politics and can freely put forward their political claims and grievances, as long as their political associations remain open to people from other ethnic and religious communities. The main (but not the only) political party representing minority interests is the Movement for Rights and Freedoms – always represented in Parliament since 1990 and three times member of a governing coalition.  
However, it is exceptionally difficult to give one uniform score to this indicator. In addition to conflicting evaluations of legislative framework and practical situation, we need to note and assess the perceptions of the society regarding the minority claims-making. While seen as fully legitimate for the larger part of the assessed period, especially after 2008, the attitudes towards political mobilisation of minorities are becoming increasingly intolerant and can be scored as LOW.  
Sources: Constitution of Bulgaria (1991); Hajdinjak (2008); and Hajdinjak, Kosseva, and Zhelyazkova (2012). |
| **Greece** | Medium | Time period for assessment: 2013 with consideration of the past 90 years (since 1923)  
Level of assessment: national  
There are no formal mechanisms that exclude minority mobilization and claims making, but legal provisions and an α |
Country | Score | Motivations for score regarding Indicator 6.5 Minority mobilization and claims-making
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Poland | Medium | *priori* unreceptive atmosphere impede equal political participation. The Muslim’s minority political claims refer to recognition of its ethnic (Turkish) character and cultural claims to the improvement of the minority education issue.

The ‘Party of Friendship, Equality and Peace’ represents the interests of the Turkish minority in Thrace. Aspida- Rom’, is a political party established in 2006 to campaign for the rights of the Roma. Those claiming minority Macedonian identity are represented by the Rainbow political party. However, those parties do not have seats in the national parliament, as minorities do not have the possibility of being represented in parliament through their own party and/or with an independent MP due to the introduction in 1993 of the 3% threshold so as to enter the parliament (this means nearly 300,000 votes, whereas for instance Muslim minority in Thrace is estimated at about 120,000). Moreover, there have been no minority representatives in any ministries or in other administrative bodies that would provide minority groups direct involvement in policy making.

At the same time, national authorities have placed legal restrictions on the names of associations involving certain ethnic minorities. The courts did not allow the registration of nonprofit associations of nationals who claimed to be of Macedonian ethnic origin, charging that the founders of such groups were seeking to undermine the country’s territorial integrity and cultural identity. Similarly, the courts have refused to register associations that included the term "Turkish" in their names. For instance, the Turkish Union of Xanthi, founded in 1936, was outlawed by Greek authorities three times, decision approbated in 2005 by the Supreme Court of Greece on the basis that 'it constitutes an attempt to affirm the presence of a Turkish minority in Greece'. In 2008, a decision of the European Court of Human Rights ordered the re-legalization of the association and convicted Greece of violating articles 6 and 11; however, the Greek authorities have refused to re-legalize it.

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<td>The largest minority group declared in the National Census of 2011 – the Silesians - is not recognised neither as a national nor an ethnic minority. Meanwhile, they are politically active, they have their organisations and leaders, and they are (relatively) present in local and national public discourses. As all Polish citizens, Silesians use their right to organise themselves, however, this is paradox that Silesians are not recognised by the authorities as a minority in legal terms, even though they claim they are. Assessing the national level is hardly possible as minorities are very small in numbers and ill-organised; thus, only a local perspective can be considered. Sources: Łodziński (2004); and Nijakowski (2008).</td>
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| Romania | Medium | Time period for assessment: 1990-2012  
Level of assessment: national  
Romania has established the formal mechanisms allowing members of minority groups to participate in politics and to formulate policies of interest to them. However, in certain cases, the general atmosphere discourages such initiatives, particularly when they address topics such as territorial autonomy. In 2012, the draft law on the status of national minorities has been intensely discussed by politicians from different spectrums. One of its main provisions establishes an Authority for Interethnic Relations which would replace the current Department for Interethnic Relations. The new authority would be under the control of the Parliament and have more stability. Another provision refers to granting cultural autonomy to the Hungarian minority. The draft is strongly supported by members of the parliamentary group formed by representatives of the ethnic minorities in Romania and by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. However, Prime Minister Víctor Ponta declared in May 2012 that his party supports the draft if the provision granting cultural autonomy is excluded. The draft law is currently being re-examined by the committee on human minority rights within the Parliament. Sources: Ziare.com,  
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| Sweden  | High   | Time period for assessment: 2012  
Level of assessment: national, local  
The Sámi people have a long history of ethno-political mobilisation. The Sámi political action stems both from the popularly elected Sámi Parliament, and from several interest organisations, of which the National Union of the Swedish Sámi (Svenska Samernas Riksförbund, SSR) is the most powerful. In these capacities, the Sámi take part in political life. Their political claims and grievances are considered to be as valid as any other political position, however, their rights as an indigenous people are constantly neglected and they are most often treated like any other interest group competing on the same land areas or as an ethnic/national minority “at the same level” as national minorities such as the Swedish Finns.  
The government imperative to consider the rights of other users of land, transforms the issue from one concerning indigenous rights, to one concerning the importance of balancing between different interests. Historically, this has been a forceful argument in order to justify continued limitations of Sámi rights, and a continued paternalistic policy but it seems just as vivid in contemporary Swedish politics.  
Although the Sámi are free to take part in political life in a way similar to the rest of the population and they can mobilize on the basis of their identity, their situation can still be interpreted as a specific case of the classical problem in democratic theory: the problem of permanent minorities. Permanent minorities run the risk of being without influence on decisions made by the majority, even when the decisions severely damage the minority’s traditional way of life or culture. If there are differences on fundamental issues, for instance, concerning the use of land and natural resources, the Sámi will always be outvoted.  
Sources: Allard (2006); Lantto (2000); and Lantto and Mörkenstam (2013). |
| Turkey  | Medium | Time period for assessment: 1923-2012  
Level of assessment: national, local  
Kurdish political claims reached their climax in the 2000s in parallel with their active mobilization in local and national politics. However, the 10 % threshold still exists in the national elections for all political parties. The most recent stage of Kurdish nationalism could be regarded as a period of civil disobedience initiated by the PKK and other Kurdish political actors. Kurds have undergone a process of reconciliation with the Turkish state as far as |
unresolved murders, education in the mother tongue, civil rights, and coming to terms with the past are concerned. Since 2008, the Kurds have been taking to the courts the unresolved murders committed by the para-military forces in order to uncover those responsible. This process of reconciliation has developed in parallel with the judiciary process of the Ergenekon Plot, which was tied by Kurdish intellectuals such as Ahmet Türk to the Kurdish question.

Kurds have been very active in renaming their children, their streets, villages, parks and urban quarters in accordance with the Kurdish nationalist mythology within the framework of historical reconciliation. The naming controversy underlines how formal nationalism of the state and minority nationalism mutually condition one another. The numerous interventions of the Turkish state to regulate and control the private lives of the Kurds have given new meaning to and politicized many cultural expressions, as in the case of Kurdish naming. In a way, the official discourse on Turkishness has influenced the ways in which Kurdish activists conceived Kurdish identity and pushed them to define it in more exclusivist political terms. For instance, thanks to the claims of the CHP’s new leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the name of the Mustafa Muğlalı Military Barracks was changed in March 2011. Mustafa Muğlalı was a general who killed 33 unarmed Kurdish villagers in the Özalp district of the city of Van in 1943. Interestingly, the name was given to the military barracks in 2004, when Turkey made remarkable reforms of democratization within the framework of European integration. Similarly, an AKP deputy, Mehmet Metiner, proposed changing the name of Sabiha Gökçen Airport in Istanbul because it is believed to be an insult to the Kurds and their suffering. Sabiha Gökçen was the adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; she was the first female pilot and believed to have dropped bombs in Dersim in 1938. These claims have become more visible at a time when the PM Tayyip Erdogan publicly announced his apology on 23 November 2011 for what happened in Dersim/Tunceli in 1937-1938.

Despite the fact that there is a growing tension between the mainstream political parties and the Kurdish nationalist movement at the national level, Turkey has gone through a very successful process of reconciliation with the Kurds, thanks to the local attempts of the Kurdish and Turkish civil society organizations and public intellectuals.

Sources: Aslan (2009); Olson (2009); Öktem (2004); and Hale and Özbudun (2009).
### Detailed Comparative Country Overview for Indicator 6.6 Representation of minority politicians in parliament

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| Bulgaria | High / Low | Time period for assessment: 2009-2012  
Level of assessment: national  
Politicians from the Turkish minority are fully represented in parliament (28 out of 240 MPs, or 11.7%, compared to 8.8% of their share of the Bulgarian population). All other minorities are severely underrepresented. There are no quotas or reserved seats for minorities and their parliamentary representation is based solely on the election result.  
Sources: Hajdinjak, Kosseva, Zhelyazkova (2012); and Web site of the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria. |
| Greece | High | Time period for assessment: 2013 with consideration of the past 90 years (since 1923)  
Level of assessment: national  
Politicians of the only recognised native minority in Greece, the Muslims of Western Thrace, are fully represented in parliament. Their representation at the most senior government levels has not been achieved. Other minorities are absent.  
Since 1920s, in every Greek election the Muslim minority of Thrace has given forth at least one deputy. Minorities have lost the chance of being represented in parliament through their own party and/or with an independent MP due to the introduction in 1993 of the 3% threshold so as to enter the parliament. However, even if part of national political parties, minority deputies represent only the minority and not their entire electoral constituency. On the other hand, the mainstream majority tends to see the electorate and the minority deputies as an unavoidable but also undesirable consequence of political rights and citizenship. In the current Parliament (2012), three Muslim MPs have been elected.  
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010); Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association (2010); Tsitselikis (2012); and Triandafyllidou and Anagnostou (2008). |
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| Poland  | Low   | Time period for assessment: 2012  
Level of assessment: national, local  
Despite the existing electoral preference (minority candidates do not have to meet the requirement of crossing a 5% threshold of votes nationwide in order to be elected), only the German minority was able to get more of a symbolic representation in the Polish Parliament (1 or 2 members of Parliament out of 460).  
The most problematic aspect of political representation of minorities in Poland is the issue of formal recognition of the group as a legitimate national or ethnic minority.  
The case of the Silesians (the biggest unrecognized minority in the country) serves is an example of post-transformational tensions between the policy and practice of national unity and the grassroots efforts of people in some regions to change the dominant cultural schemata. Attempts at implementing constitutionally granted entitlements to cultural visibility and the execution of civic rights are perceived either as unsubstantiated and unnecessary demands of an insignificant number of people, or as a result of the overambitious goals of some activists that manipulate history and people. They are presented as presenting a threat to a homogeneous society.  
Sources: Łodziński (2005); and Wódz and Wódz (1999). |
| Romania | High  | Time period for assessment: 1990-2012  
Level of assessment: national  
Decree no. 92/1990 provided that minority groups, whose organizations cannot obtain the necessary votes to secure a seat in the Parliament, will have the right to one mandate in the Chamber of Deputies. However, currently there are no more seats reserved for minorities, unless their candidates can meet a symbolic threshold. As of 2004 this threshold is 10% of the average number of valid votes required for the election of one deputy on national level. Nineteen minority organizations have passed this threshold in the current legislature.  
The biggest and most popular party representing the interest of an ethnic minority in Romania is the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania which currently has 20 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 7 seats in the Senate.  
The other ethnic minorities are represented in the Chamber of Deputies, by the following parties with one representative each: |
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<td>• Union of Poles in Romania &quot;Dom Polski&quot; (UPR)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Association of Italians in Romania - RO.AS.IT</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Democratic Union of Slovaks and Czechs in Romania</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Hellenic Union of Romania</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Democratic Union of Turkish-Muslim Tartars in Romania</td>
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<td>• Union of Ukrainians in Romania</td>
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<td>• Cultural Union of Rutens in Romania</td>
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<td>• Turkish Democratic Union of Romania</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Community of Lipovan Russians in Romania</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Association League of Albanians in Romania (ALAR)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Union of Bulgarians in Banat – Romania</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Union of Serbs in Romania</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Jews’ Communities Federation in Romania</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Thus, ethnic minorities are fully represented in at least one of the Chambers of the parliament, and the Hungarian minority (the biggest ethnic minority) is currently represented in both chambers of the Parliament.

Sources: Decree-Law of 14th March 1990; Department for Interethnic Relations; Senate; and the Chamber of Deputies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Time period for assessment: 2012</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Level of assessment: national, local</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Politicians of Sámi background are not represented or severely underrepresented in parliament. However, ethnic classifications of the Swedish population are not allowed (as well as religious and political registrations) which makes the question of fair representation in politics difficult to answer.
Motivations for score regarding Indicator 6.6 Representation of minority politicians in parliament

Even though there is a lack of knowledge in this respect, one can safely argue that there is a representation problem given the lack of interest in vital Sámi questions (and the lack of high profile politicians with Sámi background).

On a local level, however, the Sámi people may be present or even fully represented in municipal councils. Little research has been done in this field.

Sources: Josefsen (2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Time period for assessment: 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Level of assessment: national, local</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

There is no representation as such because Turkey is a difference-blind republican country. However, this situation is being challenged by the Kurds as the difference-blindness of the Turkish state is discriminating against the Kurds. In practice, Kurds are now trying to get into the national parliament through independent candidates as there is still a 10 % threshold in the general elections for the political parties to get into the parliament. After the independents get into the parliament, if they reach 20 MPs then they can establish their own group there. This is what the current Kurdish-origin Peace and Democracy Party is attempting to achieve in Parliament.

Sources: Jongerden and Akkaya (2011).
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Native Minority Claims: The Search for Acceptance
By Ayhan Kaya, Istanbul Bilgi University (2012)

ACCEPT PLURALISM Tolerance Indicators Toolkit
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Download your copy from: http://www.accept-pluralism.eu/Research/ProjectReports/ToleranceIndicatorsToolkit/ToleranceIndicators.aspx

Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Bulgaria
By Marko Hajdinjak and Maya Kosseva with Antonina Zhelyazkova, IMIR (2012)
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By Anna Triandafyllidou and Hara Kouki, European University Institute (2012)
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Tolerance of Cultural Diversity in Poland and Its Limitations
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ANNEX. Applying Tolerance Indicators: Political Tolerance for Native Minorities


POLAND

ROMANIA


SWEDEN


TURKEY


About ACCEPT PLURALISM – project identity

Acronym

ACCEPT PLURALISM

Title

Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe

Short Description

ACCEPT PLURALISM questions how much cultural diversity can be accommodated within liberal and secular democracies in Europe. The notions of tolerance, acceptance, respect and recognition are central to the project. ACCEPT PLURALISM looks at both native and immigrant minority groups.

Through comparative, theoretical and empirical analysis the project studies individuals, groups or practices for whom tolerance is sought but which we should not tolerate; of which we disapprove but which should be tolerated; and for which we ask to go beyond tolerance and achieve respect and recognition.

In particular, we investigate when, what and who is being not tolerated / tolerated / respected in 15 European countries; why this is happening in each case; the reasons that different social actors put forward for not tolerating / tolerating / respecting specific minority groups/individuals and specific practices. The project analyses practices, policies and institutions, and produces key messages for policy makers with a view to making European societies more respectful towards diversity.

Website

www.accept-pluralism.eu

Duration

March 2010-May 2013 (39 months)

Funding Scheme

Small and medium-scale collaborative project

EU contribution

2,600,230 Euro

Consortium

17 partners (15 countries)

Coordinator

European University Institute

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Person Responsible

Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou

EC officer

Ms. Louisa Anastopoulou, Project Officer,

Directorate General for Research and Innovation, European Commission