Metaphors Europe Lives by: 
Language and Institutional Change of the European Union

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Introduction

This paper develops a discourse analytical framework for addressing international relations and European integration from a constructivist perspective. It focuses on the role metaphors have in the international discourse treating them as both enabling and constraining conditions for the international practice. I apply the framework to the study of institutional change in the European Union analysing speeches of European leaders who contributed to the EU finality debate.

There are several ways in which this paper may contribute to the disciplines of International Relations (IR) and European studies (ES). Firstly, it operationalises and applies a constructivist approach, thus, strengthening a traditionally weak link between constructivism and empirical research. Secondly, the link is established by integrating discourse analytical categories (metaphors) and IR/ES categories (international structure) into a coherent framework. Thirdly, the concept of metaphor makes us look into what people say as well as how they say it. Hence, it brings an additional information to the traditional analysis in IR which only focuses on what is said. This helps us gain new insights on empirical level. Fourthly, on the basis of metaphorical analysis of main theoretical approaches to European integration I argue that the most conventional understanding of EU is connected with the story about the EU as a steady motion rather than with the frequently used story about the EU as a clash between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists. In this connection, I argue that it is the conceptualisation of the EU as motion which explains why

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2 It looks into 64 the speeches in the debate launched by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in May 2000 and finished in the fall 2003.

3 However, Hülsse (2003: 215) notices that most post-positivist IR studies address the contents only (what-questions) while ignoring the form (how-questions). The focus on contents then leads to a rather superficial analysis in which deep-structural foundations of the discourse are taken for granted. In contrast, if we look into how people speak these deep-structural foundations can be revealed.
the EU tends to be characterized be a variety of hybrid or self-contradictory labels such as “neither federal nor intergovernmental” or “federation of sovereign states.”

Moreover, the paper brings a couple of empirical results. The fact that most of empirical results are in line with previous findings, shows that the framework can be applied as an alternative to traditional approaches. However, several findings are new. To start with, the European finality debate does not provide a conceptual framework for a radical change of the EU institutions. In contrast, it lays grounds for a conventional change which would be driven by the need for an external EU action, and through which the EU would gain new state-like features. On the other hand, leaders from the EU candidate countries use much less frequently the language which implies the state-like features for the EU than the leaders from the current EU members. However, both groups seem to agree on what the basics of the EU institutional order are.

Three examples from the finality debate will clarify on what kind of metaphors this paper elaborates. Firstly, Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt (18.11. 2002) argued that the principle of separation of powers should be introduced into the EU saying:

“It is applied in every Member State of the Union where it constitutes the foundation of democratic decision-making. It thus matters to apply that principle also to the future architecture of the European Union.”

Secondly, Dutch prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende (29.3. 2003) criticized the proposal for a permanent presidency of the European Council claiming:

“We would end up with two captains on board: the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. And as a seafaring nation, we know that would never work.”

Thirdly, Estonian foreign minister Ilves (5.2. 2001) believes that the EU has to “balance the legitimate democratic concerns of the Large with the justified fears of the Small” member states.

Now, I call this way of thinking and speaking about the EU metaphorical. Why? Metaphors are usually understood as figures of speech which present one thing as another thing. Each of the three examples represents the EU in terms of the things which are different from the EU. Verhofstadt presents the EU as if it were a state, what works in democratic states should then work in the EU as well. Balkenende compares the EU with a ship. However, it is not the object of the ship which is most important but its motion which gets jeopardized by the second captain. Ilves understands the EU as a balance of power between its members. Hence, the examples point to three distinct understandings of the EU: as a state, as a motion, and as a balance of power. Each of them guides the thinking and the political practice of European integration in a different direction.

This paper is divided into three parts. It starts with elaboration of the general framework of metaphorical analysis which assumes that language both describes and shapes social reality and that it offers unique insights into social reality compared to other perspectives. On this basis, social structures are addressed as discursive structures. The discursive structures are understood as metaphors. This understanding relies on the Lakoff’s and Johnson’s concept of metaphor (Lakoff, Johnson 1980). Developing on that, I distinguish abstract, conceptual metaphors from specific metaphorical expressions. Moreover, I look into

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4 For example, Webster's dictionary defines metaphor as “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them.”
how deeply metaphors are conventionalized in language showing that some are taken as literal statements which are part of common sense while others are incomprehensible for most speakers. This metaphorical conceptualization of discursive structure is then integrated with Alexander Wendt’s conceptualization of international structure (Wendt 1999). The general framework concludes with the elaboration of the concept of “shared language” which is the language of international interaction from which the international structure arises.

In the second part of the paper, the framework is operationalized to identify specific metaphors which are used when speaking and thinking about the EU institutional order on the most general level. It reveals conceptual metaphors which are in the foundations of major theories of European integration and it relates them to a corpus of metaphorical expressions in the EU media discourse. The conceptual metaphor of the EU as MOTION turns out to be the most conventionalized in thinking and speaking about the EU. However, two alternative metaphors, the EU as CONTAINER and the EU as EQUILIBRIUM, matter as well. Unconventional metaphors of the EU are also identified. In the third part, these conceptual metaphors are then applied to the empirical analysis of selected speeches in the EU finality debate.

1. Language and metaphors in IR and European Studies

The study of the language can provide important insights into the social structure and institutions, and hence into politics. Drawing on “language turn” in social sciences and in international studies (Beer, Harriman 1996), language is seen not only as a simple mirror of social reality but as medium on its own, which contributes to the very constitution of the social reality. It is especially a variety of discourse analytical methods and approaches which enable us to study language and social reality as two interconnected phenomena (Schäffner, Wenden 1995: xiv).

My concept of discourse draws on Fairclough’s “social theory of discourse” (Fairclough 1992). In this perspective, discourse refers to “spoken or written language use” (Fairclough 1992: 62). It is a part of social practice as well, being not only a mode of representation but also a mode of action, “one form in which people may act upon the world and especially upon each other” (ibid. 63). Hence, discourse has both linguistic and social dimension being both language use and social practice.

Therefore, social structure has its important face in the shape of discursive structure represented by “systems of rules which make it possible for certain statements but not others to occur at particular times, places and institutional locations” (ibid. 40). However, these rules do not exist apart from actual discursive practice, they exist only thanks to their reproduction in this practice. From the reproductive perspective, some of the rules are naturalized and reproduced in the discourse as common sense beyond any doubts (ibid. 87). Still, discursive practice is not only reproductive with regards to the discursive conventions, it can be creative, changing the conventions and thus bringing about new social realities. Hence, the relationship between discourse and structure is dialectical as one depends on the other.

Ole Waever (1998: 106-112) uses as similar concept of discourse to build a connection between discourse analysis and analysis of international politics. The connection is based on analogy between discursive structures and international structure. He argues that discursive structures, like international structure, “condition possible policies” (ibid. 107) delimiting “what can and what cannot be said” (ibid. 108). This makes them interesting research objects on their own and not just means of second-guessing what is really going on.

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5 This category includes thinkers as diverse as late Wittgenstein, Austin, Searl, Foucault or Derrida.
6 I use Fairclough’s foucauldian definition of “discursive formation.”
beyond the talk. Also, like international structure, discursive structures are layered as we can distinguish between more sedimented, deeper structures and less sedimented layers closer to surface (ibid. 111). The more sedimented a layer is, the more difficult it is to change it. Moreover, the sedimented layer tends to be abstract being compatible with a variety of configurations at a less sedimented layers. However, despite a structural bias Waever’s approach tries to achieve a fair balance between structure and agency also addressing the issue of structural change.

This paper elaborates on these insights. It understands layered international structure as a layered discursive structure defined in terms of metaphors and it shows how metaphors can facilitate change. However, the paper is also related to discourse analytical studies of European integration (e.g. Waever 1998; Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998; Marcussen et al. 1999; Diez 1999; Rosamond 1999) sharing their main concerns (Waever 2004). Firstly, it shows a variety of metaphors used for interpretation of the EU, “many Europes” (Waever 2004), also including those which go beyond the state-centric framework. Secondly, it deals with European discourse, mediated by a shared European language, and not with national discourses. Thirdly, the study integrates a linguistic approach with its clear methodology for textual analysis, and a structural approach with its theoretical big picture (Waever 2004). The integration of micro and macro level follows the lines suggested by Wendt (1999).

The linguistic methodology is based on the analysis of metaphors which thanks to their cognitive value have a unique position as compared to other figures of speech. This is also reflected in the researchers’ attention paid to metaphors. A host of IR studies show that what tends to be perceived as common sense about international politics depends on metaphorical constructions (Lakoff 1992; Chilton, Ilyin 1993; Chilton, Lakoff 1995; Schäffner 1995; Musolff 1995; Chilton 1996; Milliken 1996; Hülsse 2003; Luoma-aho 2004).

By showing that such “natural” concepts as the sovereign state, security, balance of power or stability are in fact metaphorical, a possibility of alternative (usually also metaphorical) conceptualisation is opened. Hence, Chilton and Lakoff (1995) and Chilton (1996) argue that most of international thinking is embedded in the metaphorical belief that STATES ARE PERSONS or more generally that STATES ARE CONTAINERS. These metaphors enable us to think about states in terms of their bodies, reasons, health or to see states as closed boxes, houses or objects to natural forces. For example, Luoma-aho (2004) shows how the early 1990s debate about the Western European Union (WEU) was dominated by clashing metaphor of the WEU as either an ARM or a PILLAR of the EU for labeling the Union. Similarly, Hülsse (2003) argues that the metaphor of the EU as a FAMILY embedded most of German discourse on the EU enlargement.

However, while metaphors allow us to see and to understand certain things, they also prevent us from considering anything which does not fit into them. Lakoff (1992) points to

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7 While Waever takes his concept of international structure from Ruggie’s interpretation of Waltz (Ruggie 1983), I develop on Wendt (1999).
8 The reason why is that many contributions to the European debates can be better understood as responses to other contributions made in the debate, i.e. in terms of EU-wide interactions, rather than only as results of domestic discursive traditions. Thomas Diez (1999) outlines a post-structuralist meta-theoretical framework for an approach which also focuses on „EU language“ rather than on national languages however he does not develop the concept of the EU langague. Similarly, Rosamond (1999) addresses the EU discourse on globalisation without elaboration of the concept and addressing the European Commission only.
9 For an alternative integration of micro and macro see Hülsse (2003).
10 The classical tool box of rhetorics also includes metonymy, synecdoche, oxymoron and irony which also play an important role in our conceptualization of the world (Gibbs 1993).
11 Moreover, tropes often appear together. Single statement can have metaphorical, metonymical and oxymoronic elements. Later in the text, I address examples of metaphors which are oxymoronic.
the suppression of the information in the American discourse during the first Gulf War which did not fit into official metaphors of war as a rescue operation or as a self-defense. Similarly, Miliken (1996: 228-234) shows despite their criticism of American engagement in Vietnam realists failed to offer any consistent alternative guidance as they were captivated by the same metaphorical construction as the government they were criticising.

Therefore, to avoid a too narrow look at reality, alternatives to well-established metaphors are needed. These can be provided by novel extension of established metaphors or by completely new metaphors. For instance, Chilton and Lakoff (1995: 40) start with he metaphors of state as PERSON but they give it a new twist by different anthropological conceptualizations of the person. In contrast, Chilton (1996) argues for demetaphorization of the reified security concept based on the metaphor of state as CONTAINER which could be followed by a novel metaphorization of security in terms of physical safety of individuals.

2. Theory of metaphor

As argued the paper addresses discursive structures in terms of metaphors. Hence, the concept of metaphor needs to be defined. It is argued that metaphor is not only a matter of language (rhetorics) but also of thinking (epistemology) and of social practice (ontology). Following this, epistemological function is elaborated on discussing the relationship between metaphors, common sense and change. Like Waever’s, my understanding of discursive structure relies on the criteria of abstraction and sedimentation. However, they are treated as two perspectives which are separate from each other rather than mutually connected. Using the criterion of abstraction, I identify discursive structures with abstract conceptual metaphors on which a variety of specific metaphorical expressions rely. On the other hand, criterion of sedimentation tells us how deeply entrenched a particular metaphorical structure can be. On this basis, I classify metaphors as sedimented, conventional and unconventional.

Concept of metaphor

Metaphor was treated with certain ambiguity in European thinking. On the one hand, their insight and intuition were often appreciated. On the other hand, it used to be argued that metaphors should be avoided in a rational speech when serious matters are discussed. This scepticism about metaphors informs the commonsensical comparison theory of metaphor (Davidson 1979; Black 1990; Ortony 1993; Searle 1993) according to which the metaphor is

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12 As Kittay (1987: 2-4) shows, Aristotle makes both arguments. In his Rhetoric, he praises metaphors as generating new insights claiming that “it is from metaphors that we can best get hold of new ideas” (quoted in Lambourn 2001: 9738). However, his Metaphysics warns against their use in argumentation. Most philosophers shared Aristotelian doubts about metaphor while forgetting his observations about inventiveness of metaphors. Thus, metaphor was dismissed as an ornament of language which disturbs clear thinking. Locke’s famous dismissal (1961: 105-106; quoted in De Man 1978/1984: 197) of any figurative language in serious matters of knowledge is worth quoting at some length as it represents a traditional common sense understanding of metaphors. After conceding that figurative language may provide some “pleasure and delight”, Locke goes on arguing “But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions and thereby mislead the judgement, and so indeed are perfect cheat; and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourse that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided and, where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault either of language or person that makes use of them.”
merely a *rhetorical* way of reference to similarities which already exist in the objective reality and which can always be expressed with a greater accuracy in literal language.\(^\text{13}\)

In contrast, constructivist approaches to metaphor (Ortony 1992: 2) do not see language as an impartial mediator of the objective reality but rather as a medium which impacts on the cognitive processes. Also, constructivists are skeptical about distinguishing between literal and non-literal language (Black 1993: 22) and reject the possibility of translating metaphors into equivalent literal statements. They point to specific metaphors in which philosophical and scientific discourses are necessarily embedded and for which no translation into literal language exists (Boyd 1993: 486; Gentner, Jeziorski 1993: 447). Hence, in constructivist perspective, not only have metaphors a rhetorical function but they also have *epistemological function* (De Man 1978/1984).

The epistemological function lays grounds for the *ontological function* of metaphor. Metaphors shape our thinking, through our thinking they shape our actions, and through our actions they shape our reality. Ontological function refers to “realizations of metaphors” (Lakoff 1993: 241-244) by which objects are created and actions are taken to harmonize the reality with the particular metaphor. It can be especially observed in the social area including *social rules*, such as prohibition against “undressing someone with your eyes” being based on the metaphor *SEEING IS TOUCHING*, *law*, where corporations are made responsible exemplifying the metaphor *CORPORATIONS ARE PERSONS*, and *international politics*, where states arm to prevent death threats implying the metaphor *STATES ARE PERSONS*.\(^\text{14}\)

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) offer a radical elaboration of the constructivist perspective.\(^\text{15}\) They argue that our language and our thinking are based on metaphors. Far from being deviations from a normal language use and far from being alternatives to abstract reasoning, metaphors are necessary conditions of speaking and thinking. They show that statements which are usually seen as literal are in fact metaphorical. For example, the statement “prices have risen” is derived from metaphor MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN, or the statement “our relationship is not going anywhere” is based on metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY.

Such a radical position requires a re-definition of what we understand under the term metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson introduce a distinction between *conceptual metaphor* and *metaphorical expression*. Using the example of the latter metaphor, it can be defined as follows (Lakoff 1993: 208).

> “What constitutes the LOVE AS JOURNEY metaphor is not any particular word or expression. It is the ontological mapping across conceptual domains, from the source domain of journeys to the target domain of love. The metaphor is not just a matter of language, but of thought and reason. The language is secondary. The mapping is primary, in that it sanctions the use of source domain language and inference patterns for the target domain.”

\(^{13}\) Black (1990: 83-87) criticises Donald Davidson’s perspective on metaphor (Davidson 1979) arguing that it is based on the comparison theory.

\(^{14}\) In a similar vein, Schön (1993: 143-150) shows how two different conceptual metaphors of slums, SLUM AS A SICK COMMUNITY and SLUM AS A NATURAL COMMUNITY, shaped two different urban policies. The former policy sought to eliminate slums, while the latter tried to cultivate them. Thus, the metaphor has entered the social reality.

\(^{15}\) The *interactionist theory of metaphor* represents another possible constructivist view of the metaphor. It stipulates that metaphor projects what we know about one subject onto a different subject (Black 1993: 28). Rather than just describing pre-established similarities between two subjects and mediating them objectively, metaphor contributes to the establishment of the similarities and, thus, to the construction of our knowledge about the world. All the same, the interactionist theory is still too much indebted to the traditional, and more commonsensical, comparison theory. Metaphor is still seen as a departure from a “normal” language use and as lacking linguistic precision (Boyd 1993: 496).
Thus, conceptual metaphor serves as rule which say how to bridge one area of our experience (source domain) with another area of our experience (target domain). On the other hand, metaphorical expression is a specific statement which draws on a general conceptual metaphor (Lakoff 1993: 209). While conceptual metaphor connects conceptual areas, metaphorical expressions provide bridges between constitutive elements of these conceptual areas. For example, the statements “our relationship is not going anywhere” and “we are at crossroads” are two different metaphorical expressions but both refer to the same conceptual metaphor of LOVE IS A JOURNEY.

It is often the case that a particular metaphor can be classified as either metaphorical expression or conceptual metaphor. The metaphor of “states are persons” can be seen as conceptual with respect to the metaphorical expression of e.g. “family of nations”. However, it can also be considered as a metaphorical expression referring to the conceptual metaphor of STATES ARE CONTAINERS. Hence, there is no general criterion which would let us decide which level of abstraction should be used for addressing conceptual metaphors and the choice depends on particular research design and on the way we look for metaphors.

Conceptual metaphors can be searched in two ways – top-down and bottom-up. The top-down approach emphasizes the epistemological function of the metaphor. It does not engage actors’ discourse but it reviews the theoretical reflection of the given area identifying conceptual metaphors on which the reflection relies. In contrast, the bottom-up approach emphasizes the rhetorical function of the metaphor. It starts with specific metaphorical expressions, which can be found in the actors’ discourse. These expressions are then classified on the basis of shared features into groups which are associated with conceptual metaphors identified as overlaps of the metaphorical expressions in the group.

Both approaches complement each other in their strengths and weaknesses. The top-down approach reduces an immense variety of all possible metaphors to the few, which are relevant for the given area. Moreover, it can also offer radically new conceptual metaphors, which are hardly used in the political discourse but which outline possibilities of a radical change. Also, it ignores the rhetorical dimension, which makes it possible to address sedimented metaphors whose rhetorical function is not significant and which would be invisible from a conventional perspective on metaphors. However, due to its ignorance of the rhetorical dimension, the top-down approach does not provide any sufficient basis for associating conceptual metaphors with concrete metaphorical expressions. This is where the bottom-up approach comes in, offering a variety of metaphorical expressions grouped on empirical basis into metaphorical groups associated with conceptual metaphors.

Now, this concept of metaphor leads to a broad understanding of metaphor which is seen as ubiquitous. A traditional distinction between figurative and literal language does not apply here and the distinction between metaphor as a figure of speech and analogy as “a figure of thought” is also abolished. Moreover, my conceptualization of metaphor also includes comparisons which, unlike metaphors in the strict sense, stipulate only similarity and not identity between the two things.  

Still, this broadness does not deprive the concept of clear contents. By addressing metaphorical dimension of the given discourse I look into “bridges” which, at the level of conceptual metaphors, connect two different domains of socially shared experience of

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16 From now on, I will use capital letters when referring to conceptual metaphors. Statements which refer just to metaphors without any adjectives apply to both conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions.

17 For example, comparison would say that the EU is like a state while metaphor would say that the EU is a state. The distinction between metaphor and comparison may become important in different theories of truth. For example, approaches which insist on strict distinctions between literal and non-literal language claim that comparisons can be literally true while metaphors cannot. However, the distinction is not fruitful for the empirical analysis which this paper does.
participants to the discourse and whose existence can be traced in the discourse at the level of metaphorical expressions. In this perspective, any of the traditional distinctions (metaphor/analogy, metaphor/comparison, metaphors/literal language) would prevent us from seeing potentially interesting connections which guide thinking and speaking in the given area. Moreover, this broad concept gets narrower by operationalization which specifies either source or target domain we are interested in. Hence, the research does not address all possible bridges between two conceptual domains within the given discourse. It only deals with bridges which connect an *a priori* specified domain with other domains.

**Common sense and change**

The previous discussion points to two opposing readings of metaphor – in terms of stability and in terms of change. The first reading leads to the concept of common sense, while the second one presents metaphors as tools of change. However, both common sense and change are closely linked with each other.

The concept of metaphor implies a concept of common sense. In its epistemological function metaphor can serve as a bridge between familiar, source domain, and unfamiliar, target domain (Edelman 1971: 67). To address the source domain of familiar ideas, I introduce the concept of common sense. I understand it as a background knowledge which speakers usually assume to be well known by others and hence in no need of any further clarification. Therefore, it can offer well-understood templates, which provide source domains for a variety of metaphors making them understandable. However, common sense is a construction itself which is produced and reproduced discursively (Milliken 1999: 237-240), though, it became so conventional that it is taken for granted as something natural. Therefore, its templates can be seen as metaphorical as well.

Lakoff’s conceptualisation of familiar relies on “experiential base” which primarily refers to our non-verbal, physical experience. Later, to include social experience, Lakoff (1993: 240-241) comes up with the concept of “indirect experiential base” which is not grounded in the physical experience directly, but it is connected with it by generally accepted metaphors. Therefore, metaphors may enter experiential base after having been conventionalized. Still, the concept of experiential base emphasizes “correlational metaphors” which are based on non-verbal experience of our bodies (Zinken 2003: 508-50). As Zinken argues, a lot of metaphors in political discourse are “intertextual” rather than correlational. Intertextual metaphors are culturally grounded, and not physically grounded, the familiar is not represented by a bodily experience but by a cultural experience. Therefore, my concept of common sense includes both correlational and intertextual metaphors, which are taken for granted by the given community of speakers.

Bridging unfamiliar and familiar by metaphors generates knew knowledge thus opening a possibility of change. The common sense provides a stable, though not static, form of knowledge which can be used to create new meanings and understandings. It is a dynamic force that allows speakers to engage in complex discussions and express ideas that go beyond the immediate context of discourse.

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18 However, this should not be taken as the only function of metaphor (see for example Hülsse 2003: 213) as it would exclude metaphors which connect two familiar objects in an unfamiliar way or the ones which connect two unfamiliar objects.

19 It is produced by our bodies (sensual perception, mental abilities, etc.), our interactions with our physical environment (spatial orientation, movement) and our interactions with other people (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 133).

20 An example can be discursive construction of Polish communists as Knights of Cross in an anti-communist, Polish political discourse which draws on the accepted reading of the Polish historical experience with Knights of Cross (Zinken 2003: 515-517).

21 It has to be stable to provide common ground of knowledge for communication. However, it cannot be static as it has to reflect changing physical and social experience, which is communicated.
framework with respect to which metaphorical change can be defined. On the one hand, metaphor relies on common sense, on the other hand, it breaks its rules.

Several authors looked into its generating and acquiring new knowledge in various areas (Black 1993; Schön 1993; Lakoff 1993; Petrie, Oshlag 1993; Sticht 1993). These studies show how metaphors generate new insights and how they facilitate learning. Petrie and Oshlag (1993: 582) argue that metaphor gives an answer to the question of how it is possible to learn something radically new. They understand the radically new knowledge as the new knowledge which changes the scheme through which we gain any new knowledge. Possibility of gaining this knowledge means a possibility of learning something which changes the very conditions of our learning abilities. We will speak about reflexive learning or reflexivity. The metaphor can be a tool of reflexive learning providing “a rational bridge from the known to the radically unknown” (ibid. 584).

The reflexive potential of the metaphor is brought about by its being anomalous (ibid. 587) with regards to common sense. The metaphor brings about anomaly by relating two familiar subjects in a way which common sense does not recognize readily. Metaphor breaks the well-established rules of the common sense but, at the same time, it relies on the common sense; otherwise it could not be understood.

The relationship between creative metaphors and common sense is ambiguous. On the one hand, these metaphors break some of the rules of common sense; on the other hand, they are also embedded in common sense. Metaphor is a possible avenue of such a change being embedded in common sense, e.g. by addressing two familiar subjects, but at the same time transcending the common sense, e.g. by linking the subjects in an unfamiliar way.

**Conventionalization of metaphors**

As argued, common sense is stable but not static. Its dynamics comes from the conventionalization by which metaphors that were unusual at start may turn commonsensical if used intensively.\(^\text{22}\) I address different kinds of conventionalization by distinguishing sedimented, conventional and unconventional metaphors. I also show that this distinction has to be contextualised with respect to community of speakers who use the metaphors in their communication.

The classification starts with the traditional distinction between “dead” and “live” metaphors (Black 1993: 25). Dead, or sedimented, metaphorical expressions, such as “falling in love”, are not seen as metaphors at all. They used to be metaphorical but now they are considered as literal statements. However, “live” metaphors can be further classified into conventional metaphors in everyday speech and unconventional (novel, poetic) metaphors (Lakoff, Turner 1989). The former are “automatic, effortless, and generally established as a mode of thought among the members of a linguistic community” (ibid. 55), the common sense recognizes them as metaphors without any further explanation, while the latter do not function as normal communicative tools, they provide novel insights and as such they would not be generally understood in usual communication, e.g. Elliot’s metaphorical expression “Evening Is A Patient Etherized Upon A Table.”

Therefore, I suggest to distinguish three kinds of metaphors and metaphorical expressions:\(^\text{23}\)

- sedimented metaphors which are communicated as literal statements,
• conventional metaphors which are communicated as metaphors but which are commonly used and generally understood, and
• unconventional metaphors which are rare and in need of further explanation.

Both sedimented and conventional metaphors are part of common sense, the former as literal statements and the latter as generally accepted metaphors. Each kind is likely to fulfill different functions with respect to rhetoric, epistemology and ontology. Sedimented metaphors have minimal rhetorical functions, they are part of plain talk and are not recognized as ornamental, their epistemological functions are powerful but unacknowledged due to their being “natural”, they are very strong ontologically as they dictate rules of our practice. It is their ontological function, which dominates with respect to other kinds of metaphor. Conventional metaphors are rhetorical tools, however, they primarily provide new insights within the familiar framework which can be turned into reality. It is the epistemological function, which predominates here. Finally, unconventional metaphors are primarily accepted in their rhetorical function as they refresh established discourses. However, they will often be challenged in their epistemological function as they are necessarily vague and to some extent incomprehensible. Rarely will they have ontological function as actors will tend not to realize them due to the epistemological uncertainty.

The metaphorical classification, such as dead, live or novel, hints at the temporal dynamics of the metaphor. It is based on the view that metaphors are subject to the life cycle (Hülsse 2003; Lambourn 2001: 9739; Strong 1976/1984: 99). Each metaphor is born as novel, unconventional then if it is used for a sufficient time, it becomes conventional and after another period of use it may “die” turning into an unambiguous literal statement. Hence, metaphors are subject to reification process.

Even if the insight about the role of time makes sense in many respects, it does not mean that in general all unconventional metaphors are necessarily new or that sedimented metaphors are necessarily older than the unconventional ones. The transition between categories is primarily conditioned by the use of metaphors. This brings us to pragmatic considerations of users. The whole classification makes sense only with respect to “members of a linguistic community” (Lakoff, Turner 1989: 55). Hence it always refers to a particular group of people sharing their language and their experience in a particular time. Changes in their experience can accelerate, decelerate or even reverse the suggested direction in the life cycle. For example, the statement that people are saved by their guardian angels will be generally understood as a conventional metaphor nowadays whereas it was taken literally five hundred years ago. Hence, it is both conventionalization and unconventionalization which matter. In contrast, we take “sound waves” for granted even though such an utterance would be highly unconventional three hundred years ago.

3. Metaphorical Theory of International Politics

Having introduced discursive structure in terms of metaphors I connect it with Wendt’s conceptualisation of international structure as social structure (Wendt 1999).\textsuperscript{24} This\textsuperscript{24} Despite his rich conceptualisation of international structure Wendt does not develop any concept of discourse and he was rightly criticized for his neglect of language and communication (Zehfuss 2001). All the same, there are several reasons why to choose this theory. Firstly, Wendt’s perspective of practice actually relies on communication. In his discussion of master variables (Wendt 1999: 344-366) Wendt shows that communication plays quite an important role in specific mechanism of international change even though it is not theorized explicitly earlier. Moreover, there is a recognized potential for a dialogue between Wendt’s constructivism and “discursive constructivism” (Diez 1999: 612). Secondly, I focus on Wendt’s theorization of international structure, abstracting from other parts of the theory (e.g. scientific realism) which are not necessarily connected...
connection makes it possible to understand international politics by means of metaphors. Developing on these, I outline a perspective, which theorizes social structure as metaphorical structure of international interactions mediated by a shared language of international actors.

**Metaphorical structure and metaphorical change**

I claim that international structure and practice can be examined by means of metaphors. My elaboration of the concept of discursive structure has relied on the distinction between conceptual metaphor and metaphorical expression, on analysis of conventionalisation and on acknowledging their role as tools of change. Now I match this conceptualisation of discursive structure with Wendt’s understanding of international structure showing that the distinction between conceptual metaphor and metaphorical expression corresponds to Wendt’s distinction between macro-structure and micro-structure, and pointing out similarities between conventionalisation and what Wendt calls internalisation. Moreover, I show that metaphors allow for a more dynamic picture of international politics than what wendtian conceptualisation offers. The dynamics is defined with respect to common sense distinguishing between conventional and radical change.

Wendt’s understanding of international structure is open to its conceptualisation in terms of metaphors. He (1999:313) addresses the international structure as a culture, arguing that “the deep structure of an international system is formed by the shared understandings governing organized violence.” The “shared understandings” are conceptualized as norms and patterns of behavior, or roles these norms prescribe to actors. Implicitly, Wendt even identifies the “shared understandings” by means of metaphors distinguishing three kinds of international structure being identified by three distinct conceptual metaphors: STATES ARE ENEMIES, STATES ARE RIVALS, and STATES ARE FRIENDS.

However, he also argues for dialectical relationship between structure and practice saying that “social processes are always structured, and social structures are always in process” (Wendt 1999: 186). Despite these connections, a conceptual, but not an ontological, distinction between structure and process is still present in Wendt’s theory. He distinguishes two levels of structure: micro-structure and macro-structure (Wendt 1999: 147-153). Whereas the former refers to interactions between units, and hence to what I understand as practice, the latter refers to system-wide phenomena which are most of the time independent of a particular interaction.

This micro-macro distinction can be used to elaborate on the distinction between metaphorical expressions and conceptual metaphors. On the one hand, metaphorical expressions exemplify the actual discursive practice, they can be read and heard in the communication by which actors interact. On the other hand, conceptual metaphors are generalisations which are independent of single metaphorical expressions. Usually, they are

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with it. Thirdly, Wendt offers a theoretically rich understanding of international structure in a Giddensian tradition which informs both my conceptualization of metaphor, in terms of constructivist metaphors, and my conceptualization of the connection between discourse and practice, in terms of a dialectical relationship between structure and practice. Fourthly, Wendt relies on symbolic interactionist perspective on international practice, which makes the theorization of shared language possible.

25 The “international” can be understood in a variety of ways ranging from a particular bilateral relationship to the whole of international system as long as its particular delimitation can be associated with a “speech community.” Hence, we can distinguish many cases of international structure and practice characterized by their own discourses and metaphors. In this paper I focus on the EU and on a specific issue of its institutional reform.

26 He deliberately omits other possible features of international structure, such as distribution of capabilities, economic relations or institutional factors, from his theorizing as these gain their meaning and hence their political significance only if embedded within the particular culture.
neither heard nor read in the actual communication among the actors but they underlie the communication.

Principles of supervenience and multiple realizability show how it is possible to theorise structure and practice as conceptually different while at the same time ontologically the same. Wendt argues that macro-structure “supervenes” on micro-structure and that macro structural phenomena are “multiply realizable” at the micro-level. “Multiple realizability” refers to situations in which a variety of micro-structural configurations will realise the same macro-structural state. Wendt uses the examples of relationships between speech to language or brain states to mental states (Wendt 1999: 152) to show how several micro-structural states realise one macro-structural state.27

This can also be applied to the connection between metaphorical expression and conceptual metaphor. Wendt’s observation that multiple realizability and supervenience apply to the relationship between speech and language, among the others, is quite suggestive in this respect. There is a variety of ways of expressing a particular conceptual metaphor in the actual communication. Therefore, one conceptual metaphor is multiply realizable in a number of metaphorical expressions. It does not make sense to imagine conceptual metaphors without their metaphorical expressions and metaphorical expressions can be understood only in reference to their conceptual metaphors.

Also, Wendt characterizes international structure by the depth of internalisation, which explains why actors respect the norms defining the international structure. They may do this because they are forced to (first degree), because it pays off (second degree) or because they consider it legitimate (third degree). Now, there is one common point between three degrees of cultural internalization, and conventionalization of metaphors. Namely, if metaphors are sedimented, then they constitute the third-degree international culture. I have shown that master norms governing particular international culture can be understood as conceptual metaphors. The third-degree culture refers to norms, and hence metaphors, which are taken in particular period as “common sense about international politics” (Wendt 1999: 296). They are taken for granted as an undoubtable ground for our thinking about international politics, and that is exactly the role sedimented metaphors have in our language and our thinking at a general level.

However, there is no easy correspondence between Wendt’s degrees of internalization and other kinds of metaphor. As argued, conventional metaphors also enter this common sense. They play a role of a recognized dissident whose views are well known and whose positions are to some extent even accepted while not taken for granted. Dissenting conventional metaphors offer a favored “other” thanks to which a more precise definition of the dominant position is possible. The change generated by conventional metaphor is brought about by its extension into new areas which were previously controlled by sedimented metaphors. However, such a change is “conventional” as it corresponds to commonsensical expectations about the direction of transformation. By including conventional metaphors into the common sense, we gain a more dynamic conceptualization of the common sense about international politics than Wendt offers. However, it is still a rule-bound dynamics with a clear finality.

Drawing on Wendt’s conceptualization of the current international system as the one in transition from rivalry to friendship it could be argued that our common sense is based on

• a sedimented metaphor of STATES ARE RIVALS which serves as a default norm of international politics, and

27 Similarly, the principle of supervenience originally referred to the relationship between mind and brain. Macro (such as mind or language) supervenes on micro (such as brain or speech) when “sameness with respect to micro-states entails the sameness with respect to macro-state” but not the other way round (Wendt 1999: 156).
• a conventional metaphor of STATES ARE FRIENDS which applies to some limited areas of international interactions and which serves as a normative basis for international reform.

The transformative potential of the conventional metaphor then lies in its extension to further areas of international interactions. Unlike Wendtian conceptualization of the common sense, this concept understands international politics as a dynamic phenomenon specifying the direction of its evolution.

The role of unconventional metaphors is still different. They turn against common sense not as its accepted and digested critique but as something, which breaks its rules. Therefore, they offer a “radical change” departing from both sedimented concepts and their conventionalised alternatives. For example, both sedimented and conventional metaphors I have discussed so far in connection with Wendt are based on a conceptual metaphor STATES ARE PERSONS. Indeed, Wendt (1999: 196), who provides a nice example of a conventional alternative to the extant system, argues that the conception of states as persons “is so deeply embedded in our common sense that it is difficult to imagine how international politics might be conceptualised or conducted without it.” Difficult though it may be, it is not impossible, and unconventional metaphors occupy the place between the difficult and the impossible.

While conventional change relies on common sense (sedimented and conventional metaphors), radical change turns against it (unconventional metaphors). While the former is part of “rule-directed” politics operating within the given rules, the latter refers to “rule-altering” politics which aims at “the switching of the rule system” and at replacing them with new rules (Beck 1994: 35-36). However, as our discussion on metaphors as tools of change suggested even the most radical rule-altering has to be rule-directed at least to some extent. It has been argued (Marcussen et al. 1999: 617) that “new ideas about political order ... need to resonate with existing identity constructions.” For example, even if I claimed that states are RIVERS rather than PERSONS, it would be a conceptualization of state in terms of a well-know physical entity. But if this principle were violated by saying, for example, that STATE IS LOVE, a conceptualization would arise which would probably be too distant from what is commonly understood under “state” and “love” to be communicated in a successful way.

Transnational speech community and shared language

So far the issue of language has not been touched upon. Most studies on metaphors address one language in one national context. But this approach is at odds with my perspective of communication as a series of international, rather than national, interactions. The earlier example of the metaphor of sound waves shows that the concept of linguistic community defined by the language can be problematic providing it refers to mother tongue only. Sound waves are taken for granted by anyone who learned basics of standard physics no matter whether they speak English, German or Czech. In contrast, they will not be understood by someone who either has no idea about physics or who did not learn it in a standard Western way, irrespective of language.

Therefore, I develop such concepts of language and linguistic community which would reflect shared experience and knowledge of the speakers rather than their mother tongues. I introduce the concepts of shared language and transnational speech community exemplifying them with reference to European integration. Importantly, my conceptualisation of social structure in terms of metaphors does not relate to a particular national language. It relates to a shared language of the given transnational speech community which has developed its own structures resulting from international interactions which it has been mediating.
I introduce the concept of transnational society to account for a social unit representing all those who contribute to the discourse governing international interactions in the given area. I define it, elaborating on Sandholtz and Sweet’s (1998: 9) definition of transnational society with respect to the EU politics, as a network of actors who engage in social, economic, political or informational exchanges in the given area of international politics and thereby influence policy process in the given area. Hence, it includes politicians, officials, businesspeople, journalists, academics and experts who address the given area which can be EU, a particular bilateral relationship, international diplomacy, etc. Such a transnational society usually constructs its own common sense while relying on several languages or using its own language.

I use the concept of speech community (Gumperz 1968/1972; Gumperz 1972) to address the language and communication of transnational society. Speech community is defined as (Gumperz 1968/1972: 219):

“any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interactions by means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off from similar aggregates by significant difference in language usage.”

This group of people share knowledge which is (re)produced in its communication networks and, therefore, as Gumperz (1972: 16) observes, speech community tends to coincide with specific social units such as countries, tribes or religious groupings. However, speech community can include several languages as long as there is “at least one language in common and ... rules governing basic communicative strategies ... [are] shared so that the speakers can decode the social meanings carried by alternative modes of communication” (Gumperz 1972: 16). I use the concept of “transnational speech community” to address a speech community generated by the social unit of transnational society.

The term “shared language(s)” is used to address languages of the transnational speech communities. The basic insight into the nature of shared language is symbolic interactionist like Wendt’s account of international dynamics. Symbolic interactionism recognizes that actors create through their mutual interactions a shared symbolic system and shared language is an example of such system. However, sociolinguistics allows for a more specific elaboration of the concept. It notes that shared languages are likely to be different from standard national languages, they are shaped by functional rather than social or regional factors (Dittmar 1976: 110). They are categorized as “special parlances” which also include administrative codes and trade languages (Gumperz 1968: 469; Gumperz 1968/1972: 227; Dittmar 1976: 110). Their speakers use them as idioms for communication inside the transnational speech community while using another language outside (Gumperz 1968/1972: 222). Administrative codes, on the one hand, and trade languages, on the other hand, can serve us as two opposing ideal types of special parlance delimiting my conceptualization of shared language.  

28 Their definition of EU transnational society is “non-governmental actors who engage in intra EC exchanges – social, economic, political – and thereby influence, directly or indirectly, policymaking processes and outcomes at the European level” Sandholtz and Sweet’s (1998: 9).

29 This concept is broader than the concept of epistemic community (Haas 1992) which presumes a high degree of shared knowledge and beliefs among its members. Indeed, all transnational epistemic communities can be understood as kinds of advanced transnational speech communities, however the latter share only the language which makes communication possible and not the opinions which would bring about common standpoints on specific issues.

30 Administrative languages, such as Medieval Latin, are used exclusively, by small elites, they are different from “popular speech”, their use is accompanied by complex rituals and hence they can be learned “only through many years of special training” (Gumperz 1968/1972: 222). They are used by “a special administrative and
The relationship between shared language of the transnational speech community and mother tongues is complex. Shared language is to some degree independent of any language, which contributes to its constitution. Metaphors of the shared language do not have to correspond with the metaphors of the national language on the basis of which the shared language came into being. Hence, if particular discursive community chooses English as its shared language then some of its rules are likely to differ, at least to some extent, from general English. Discursive structures evolve in communicative interactions among international actors and hence the metaphors cannot be examined by only addressing a particular national language as such and ignoring these interactions.

On the other hand, “nationality” of shared languages cannot be suppressed. Some even argue that (Good 2001: 172) “[t]he idea of a konsensuales, international akzeptiertes Begriffsverständnis is both desirable and naive” and that politicians can be keen on exploiting different national understandings of the same words.31 There are two ways of accounting for the effects of domestic discursive structures on shared language. Firstly, despite differences between a shared language, such as diplomatic English or Euro-speak, and a national language, such as English, the structures of the former still significantly overlap with the structures of the latter.32 Secondly, even though the discursive contributions inside the transnational speech community are expressed or translated in shared language, they may follow the discursive structures of the mother tongue of the contributor. As Good (2001: 175) reminds one “cannot easily lift words out of context for international purposes and calmly codify, by dusting off the historical and cultural patina which has accreted round them.” Thus, Gorbachev’s phrase about the “Common European House” was translated into shared languages of European politics while the discursive structure in which it was embedded were Russian (Chilton, Ilyin 1993).

The empirical application of concepts of transnational speech community and shared language is quite open. This openness has functional and social dimensions. The functional dimension refers to the issue area, which is addressed in the discourse. For example, transnational speech community can be related to European integration in general or to a specific issue area such as Common Agricultural Policy. The social dimension refers to segments of the transnational speech community. For example, it can be defined as the community of experts or the community of politicians. Each of these communities may have either its own shared language or a “dialect” of a more general shared language.

Now, I address European integration at the most general level to show an example of transnational speech community speaking shared language. A series of studies has pointed to considerable socializing effects of European institutions on both European civil servants and national civil servants who are in touch with the institutions (Egeberg 1996, 1998, 1999; Trondal 2001; Drulák et al. 2003). One of the features of this socialization is the enhancement of functional identities, related to the problem area people deal with, and a consequent decline in territorial identities, related to the territory people come from. This can be understood as evidence of transnational society at the level of civil servants engaged in the EU. The identity

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31 The translations of the most innocent and common expressions, such as “house”, can shift meaning and cause problems especially if the expressions are used as metaphors, such as “common European house” (Chilton, Ilyin 1993).

32 For example, Nicholson (1969: 126) regrets the decline of French as a diplomatic language (despite his being a British diplomat!) claiming that the diplomatic community is losing “one of the most precise languages ever invented by the mind of man.”
of this transnational society matches a general understanding of the integration as a technocratic project where nationality does not matter too much and it is problem-solving that counts.

This feature can also be easily observed in the language, the so-called Euro-speak, “the purpose-built vocabulary of terms to describe (and shape) the reality of the EU” (Christiansen et al. 1999: 541) in which the integration is practiced on daily bases. The relationship between shared language, discursive community and common sense is nicely described in case of the EU by Christiansen et al. (ibid.):

“While actors clash over the meaning of specific issues, the expansion of a unique vocabulary into increasingly common knowledge contributes to bind them together and assists the construction of a European political class.”

From the linguistic perspective, Euro-speak relies on French and English. However, the fact that native speakers of these languages find it useful to translate, for example, French Euro-speak into “normal” French (Gondrand 1991), shows some independence of the shared language of European integration from national languages which constitute it. Arguably, most items of the Euro-speak are just technocratic short-cuts to be found in any institution, they refer to procedures and institutional structures without any impact on thinking about European order and hence without any significance to the present study. All the same, some of them are highly metaphorical and shape the way people think about the EU. These metaphors are primarily epistemological rather than just rhetorical, therefore, it is more fruitful to look for their origins in a particular conceptual system rather than in a particular native language. Hence, we can ask whether such notions as “acquis communautaire”, “engrenage”, “methode communautaire”, “pooled sovereignty” or “subsidiarity” (Schmitter 1996b: 133) are English or French, but it will often be more interesting to look into their conceptual background such as neofunctionalism or EU jurisprudence.33

4. Metaphorical structure of the EU

EU institutional structure is a special kind of international structure. It is surrounded by transnational speech community of politicians, experts, civil servants, activists, businesspeople and journalists who speak about the EU to one another using a shared language of European integration. This shared language about the EU institutional order lays grounds for the analysis of the EU structure by means of metaphors. In this respect, the EU is seen as a target domain which can be metaphorically bridged to several source domains. These source domains are identified by a couple of conceptual metaphors which inform much of the EU debate. I start top-down way by reviewing the ways the EU has been thought about through examining major theories in the field. This provides my perspective with a sufficient conceptual clarity. However, I also use the bottom-up method examining about a dozen of groups of metaphorical expressions, which were identified on the basis of a fairly broad corpus of the EU media discourse. I show that both perspective lead to similar conclusions.

33 Schumacher (1969) examines origins and evolution of some of the key concepts of European integration.
34 From functional perspective, the discourse about the institutional order is only one of several discourses generated by the European integration. However, this analysis focuses on the most general images of Europe which underlie both the institutional discourse and, to some extent, discourses in other areas of European integration. From social perspective, academics, journalists and political elites are addressed. Even though these groups may use distinct “dialects”, their language, its metaphors and common sense are shared across the boundaries.
The identification of the conceptual metaphors starts with analysis of the common sense about the EU which is different from common sense about international politics. I argue that the common sense about the EU is based on a sedimented metaphor of the EU AS MOTION as well as on two conventional metaphors of the EU AS CONTAINER and the EU AS EQUILIBRIUM. Following this, each of the three conceptual metaphors is elaborated on. Then, a possible conceptualization of the EU by unconventional metaphors is outlined.

**International common sense and European common sense**

EU order is different from international order. Despite significant overlaps each has a distinct transnational speech community, distinct shared languages and a distinct common sense. I argue that the common sense about international order is constructed by a sedimented metaphor of INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS EQUILIBRIUM and by a conventional metaphor INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS CONTAINER. These conceptual metaphors are associated with realist and liberal tradition of international thinking. Both conceptual metaphors also enter the common sense about the EU (EUROPE IS EQUILIBRIUM, EUROPE IS CONTAINER), however, none of them is sedimented there as both are conventional with respect to the EU. It is the metaphor of Europe as MOTION that can be seen as the sedimented metaphor of the common sense about the EU. I argue that this conceptual metaphor informs neofunctionalist theory.

The common sense about international order is constructed by metaphors whose source domain are EQUILIBRIUM and CONTAINER. The two metaphors used to be seen as the only options of structuring international order in the common sense of IR. As Butterfield (1966: 142) claimed: “there are only two alternatives: either a distribution of power to produce equilibrium or surrender to a single universal empire.” However, I argue that these two have never been seen as equally strong. While EQUILIBRIUM was sedimented, CONTAINER was conventional.

My argument draws on my previous argument that the common sense about international system can be summed up by the sedimented metaphor of STATES ARE RIVALS and by the conventional metaphor of STATES ARE FRIENDS. Now I re-phrase the two conceptual metaphors. With respect to target domain, instead of states I will use a more general term of international order. I also re-phrase the two source domains replacing rivals and friends with less anthropomorphic domains while keeping most of the original meaning.

On this basis, RIVALS turn into EQUILIBRIUM and FRIENDS turn into CONTAINER. The concept of equilibrium refers to a self-limitation of actors which Wendt (1999) refers to when contrasting self-limited rivalry with unlimited enmity. The sedimented metaphor of INTERNATIONAL ORDER AS EQUILIBRIUM embeds realist thinking about balance of power which entered the actors’ discourse as the statements about balance were understood literally. The metaphor of balance of power entered the international discourse in the 16th century as an attempt to understand European politics more geometrico. Waltz (1979) even claims that it is the only genuinely original idea of international thinking. This claim, contestable though it is, hints at the embeddedness of the concept in a shared language of international interactions which does not make any sense in purely domestic context. Bull (1977) considers balance of power as a central “institution of international society” which again points to international interactions as being qualitatively distinct from domestic ones. It is also a concept which is not easily pinned down. Martin Wight (1966: 151) showed nine distinct meanings in which balance of power is used. However, he also showed that this variety does not deprive it of its analytical value. I also argue that this variety gives evidence of its centrality in IR thinking as it is used as a well-established conceptual and rhetorical tool to deal with a variety of analytically distinct situations. The vagueness may contribute to its
popularity in non-academic discourse. As Schäffner (1995) shows, the link between balance, on the one hand, and peace and stability, on the other, provided a key conceptual metaphor in the late Cold War discourse. A host of references to multipolarity in the 1990s provide another evidence of the vitality of the concept in IR discourse.

The popularity of balance is very much connected with the role of realism as a source of international common sense for which several arguments can be found. Firstly, realism tries to summarize “practical rules shared by the diplomatic culture in the community of states as it developed over the last few centuries” (Guzzini 1997: x). Secondly, it offers “the paradigm of the study of international relations” (Guzzini 1997: 6-7). Finally, “the discourse of realism and practice of the modern states are mutually reinforcing” (Beer, Harriman 1996: 7) as both realism and state practice refer to state-centric world of rational actors following their interests. Therefore, no matter how contested as an IR theory it is, realism has traditionally served as a common sense of international politics in the eyes of practitioners representing states and believing in some sort of rationality.

The concept of CONTAINER is a traditional source domain for thinking about the state. In connection with the international order, it draws on both realist thinking about world-empire and liberal thinking about the reform of international politics by its transformation into sort of domestic politics. The source domains of FRIENDS and CONTAINER share the idea of actors being situated on the same ship. The metaphor of INTERNATIONAL ORDER AS CONTAINER has rarely been taken as literal but it was a main avenue for thinking about alternatives to the system based on balance.

The metaphor is based on analogy between domestic order and international order – domestic analogy (Suganami 1989). At least three reasons account for the power of domestic analogy in international thinking. Firstly, the metaphor of European unity precedes the Westphalian system which divides the continent into containers. Hence, it is part of the international common sense right from the beginning be it as res publica christiana or as the empire of Charlemagne. Secondly, language and political experience we use are national based on domestic realities. Thus, when addressing the international, one often relies on one’s national linguistic and political experience and uses this experience as a basis for metaphorical definitions of the international. Thirdly, international order is compared with conditions of hobbesian state of nature prior to the creation of the Leviathan (Suganami 1989: 12-14). To avoid the eternal interstate war, states have to either create a global Leviathan, in the shape of the world state or at least transfer some institutions and practices which worked at home to the international politics.

However, some of these reasons are quite contested. Critics of domestic analogy argue that conditions of order among sovereign states are not similar to conditions of order among individuals pointing to differences which make international anarchy more tolerable

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35 Domestic analogy was defined by Suganami (1989: 1) as “presumptive reasoning which holds that ... the conditions of order within states are similar to those of order between them; and that therefore those institutions which sustain order domestically should be reproduced at the international level.” I draw on this definition but I broaden it by adding to “should be reproduced” also “could be or are reproduced” making my concept of domestic analogy both normative and analytical.
36 Lakoff and Johnson argue that interactions with other people of the same culture produce natural experience. Arguably this natural experience can work as source-domain for targeting intercultural/international interactions. This is especially true when social and political elites are more familiar with their domestic system than with international one, as it is usually the case in a nation-state system. Therefore, their ideas about Europe are likely to appear “in national colours” (Marcussen et al. 1999: 617).
37 There is another group of scholars, including neorealists (Waltz 1979), who adhere to this reading of Hobbes while rejecting to consider any reform of international system understanding the international anarchy as by definition opposite to domestic hierarchy. They criticize practices based on domestic analogy as utopian but they share the domestic analogy „at the level of diagnosis” (Suganami 1989: 136).
than anarchy between individuals. In this perspective, the absence of the Leviathan among states does not have such nefarious consequences as is the case among individuals and that the models derived from domestic experience are more or less irrelevant to the international order (Bull 1977). Moreover, critics can point to the lack of connection with the political practice which has characterised realist thinking about balance. it stays as a conventional metaphor. Therefore, the CONTAINER metaphor serves as a favored tool of most proposals for international reform, without being taken as literally as EQUILIBRIUM.

Now, there is a very close logical and historical relationship between common sense about international politics and common sense about European politics. There was no distinction between the two before World War II. International politics was synonymous with European politics until WWI and European politics dominated international politics until WWII. Therefore, there is no distinction between European politics/discourse and a general IR politics/discourse before 1945. Realism embedded a common sense of European political practice as it did for international practice in general. European society still equaled more or less with international society.

After 1945 realism still played this role in international practice whose main centers shifted away from traditional European centers. Even though it still persisted to some extent in its role of common sense of European politics, it became much less relevant here especially in the context of European integration. It can be argued that the discourse of realism and practice of bipolar politics were mutually reinforcing but the same argument cannot be made with respect to realism and the practice of European integration. The conceptual metaphor of EQUILIBRIUM is not irrelevant for European politics but at the same time it is not a sedimented metaphor which would be taken for granted when speaking about the EU. I argue that it turned into a conventional metaphor which outlines a possible transformation of European politics from the current orthodoxy. The conceptual metaphor of CONTAINER might have become less relevant for Cold War international politics but it played a rather important role in thinking about European integration. Nevertheless, I do not consider it as the sedimented master metaphor of European politics either. I rather see it as a conventional metaphor pointing to a possible way of its transformation.

It is the neofunctionalist theory, which lay grounds for a common sense of European integration. It differs significantly from the two metaphors which have informed common sense about international politics. It puts in doubts both their implications and their foundations by arguing that European politics does not have to be understood in terms of CONTAINERS but as a MOTION. This also means that the metaphors of EU as a state or EU as a group of states do not represent a recipe for a radical change of the EU but rather they point to a possible direction of a conventional change.

The similar reasons which explained the relationship between realism and international common sense can be applied for explaining the role neofunctionalism as a provider of common sense about European integration. Firstly, neofunctionalism refers to

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38 These are mostly related to the fact that vulnerabilities of the state are defined differently than vulnerabilities of the individual (e.g. individuals have to sleep, they cannot be self-sufficient, etc.)

39 However, the difference between the two camps is often just a question of degree. Even the most fervent supporters of the domestic analogy see that domestic institutions cannot be completely transferred to international relations and the critics have to notice that e.g. many provisions of international law were imported from domestic law.

40 Sometimes, it was even turned upside down to support claims about the need for the balance of power. Hence, at times of Napoleonic pan-European hegemony, Friedrich von Gentz, who was one of the most articulate advocates of European balance of power, justified its plea for the balance by claiming that its principles are the same as the domestic principle of separation of powers (Gentz 1806/1970: 288). But usually, domestic analogy was used along the lines which are suggested by our definition.
practical rules of European integration in the 1950s, the so-called Monnet method (essential role of political and technocratic elites, sectoral approach, leadership by a supranational institution); Rosemond (2000: 50) speaks about “an obvious resemblance between the ‘Monnet method’ of integration and the propositions developed by neofunctionalist writers”. Secondly, neofunctionalism provided the paradigm for the study of European integration, the works of Haas and Morgenthau played analogical roles in their respective areas. Like realism, neo-functionalism tried to translate the experience of European integration into an American social theory (ibid.) Thirdly, a similar reinforcement between theory and practice can be observed in the sense of the adoption of this view by leading countries (Germany, Italy, Benelux, and usually France) and by the European Commission which gave Euro-speak “a distinctively neo-functionalist cast” (Schmitter 1996b: 133).

Despite repeated statements about their “death” or “obsolescence”, both neofunctionalism and realism continue to provide well-understood reference points in their respective discourses (Guzzini 1997; Rosamond 2000). On the one hand, politicians speak about the necessity to balance and they are still afraid of power vacuum or hegemony, on the other hand, they refer to the community method and expect or are afraid of spillovers.

**EU AS EQUILIBRIUM: balance of power and bargaining equilibrium**

The metaphor of equilibrium gained the widest currency in the realist conception of balance of power. However, balance of power is not the only expression of this conceptual metaphor. I argue that the realist approach to European integration of Stanley Hoffman or the liberal intergovernmentalist theory of Andrew Moravcsik can be subsumed under it as well.

I will not address all possible meanings of balance of power. I will only make three observations about this mechanism for the purpose of this paper. Firstly, it refers to international society, which is neatly divided into container-like states. Secondly, if the mechanism works, none of the containers gains a durable predominance which would allow him to extend itself incorporating other containers. Thirdly, realist tradition associates the balance with various benefits such as liberty, peace (or at least absence of great wars), harmony or stability. However, given the contests about those benefits and given the positive meaning, which is in general attributed to equilibrium, balance is often addressed as a value in itself.

Even though there have been interpretations of European integration in terms of balance of power (Morgenthau, Waltz), the idea of equilibrium among containers entered the language and the practice of European integration in a slightly modified way. I will call this modified version the “EU-equilibrium” framework and I will treat liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1998) as a generic example of this way of thinking. However, a host of earlier reflections on the European integration (e.g. Hoffmann 1966, Milward 1992) also correspond to basic assumptions of this framework.

Despite many other differences between the two theories, there are only two significant differences in conceptualization of European politics between balance of power approach, represented by e.g. Hedley Bull, and Moravcsik’s EU-equilibrium framework. It is the absence of war in Moravcsik’s framework and Moravcsik’s embrace of game theory; which represents a social scientific *more geometrico* of the late 20th century. Important though these and other differences are, they do not do any damage to my general argument that both theories draw on the conceptual metaphor of EUROPE AS EQUILIBRIUM AMONG

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41 France before De Gaulle and after Pompidou. Realist policies of De Gaulle (and Pompidou) made him sort of a maverick politician in the history of European integration, and gaullism incited a major crisis both in the practice of integration and in its neofunctionalist reflection.
CONTAINERS. Except for war, all remaining institutions of bullian international society such as balance of power, international law, diplomacy and great powers as well as relations between them can be linked to key concepts of moravcsikian EU which are Nash solution, institutions, bargaining and states. The concepts are different in the sense that Bull distilled them from history of European politics and international law whereas Moravcsik’s concepts are based on rational choice modeling. However, they carry out the same work.

First, containers are the only important actors in both perspectives, they are unitary and rational actors (Moravcsik 1998: 22-23). Even though Moravcsik’s framework addresses states in general, and not only great powers, he then focuses on states with the greatest bargaining power (France, Germany and the UK), hence, EU great powers. Second, Moravcsik’s intergovernmental bargaining applied to intergovernmental conferences represents a formalized model of diplomatic negotiations at European diplomatic congresses. The six features of his bargaining theory (Moravcsik 1998: 60-66), which are noncoercive, unanimous voting system, low transaction costs, asymmetrical interdependence as definition of power, credible threat of unilateral steps, flexible coalitions and issue linkage, also apply to the diplomatic practice. Third, international institutions are based on international law but their impact is more powerful than the impact of traditional international law. But their main function is still, according to Moravcsik, to ensure compliance with what states agreed on while governments are still in control (Moravcsik 1998: 73-77).

Fourth, both international institutions and international law can come into being only under the conditions of equilibrium. While international law needs balance of power (Bull 1977), international institutions come into being only if states find a Nash bargaining solution (Moravcsik 1998: 62). Balance of power and the Nash bargaining solution represent two rather different concepts, however, they both symbolize efforts to understand European politics, firstly as an equilibrium, and secondly more geometrico. Unlike the Nash equilibrium, the Nash bargaining solution is an equilibrium which is defined with respect to cooperative bargaining games, as such it is always Pareto-efficient (Morrow 1994: 112-116). Highly technical though this concept of equilibrium is, it basically refers to a distribution of gains among the states which is balanced in the sense that all can live with it.

Now, the expression of “Nash bargaining solution” is unlikely to make its way into current discursive practice of European integration; Moravcsik uses it rather sparingly himself. However, the fact that politicians and diplomats do not claim that their goal is to achieve the Nash bargaining solution at the next IGC does not necessarily mean that Moravcsik’s theory is out of touch with what is going on. On the contrary, a good deal of these politicians and diplomats are likely to share with Moravcsik the conceptual metaphor of EU as interaction of powerful container-like states which seek some sort of equilibrium by negotiation.

EU AS A CONTAINER: domestic analogy

As argued domestic analogy which refers to attempts at understanding and shaping Europe along the domestic models lays grounds for the CONTAINER metaphor. There are several streams of theoretical and analytical thinking about Europe which use domestic analogy. I address federalism, comparative politics, the thesis about European constitutionalism, and analytical use of domestic analogy across theoretical perspectives.

The EU is often understood in terms of domestic analogy. It is especially theories of federalism which wholly embrace domestic analogy. There is no need to review a variety of federalist arguments and approaches here as there is enough secondary literature on the topic (e.g. Burgess 1989; Rosamond 2000: 20-31). I just focus on their most important point which is the claim that Europe is or should be heading for a European state which will replace the
existing interstate system. Current federalists draw analogies between the EU and existing federal states or democratic states in general and they expect the EU to collect more and more state-like features. Earlier federalists were more radical in the sense that they expected that the European super-state would emerge from a constitutional “big bang” by which extant sovereign states abolish themselves. The telos of the super-state is usually explained by security, which is to prevent another European war, and by efficiency, which is to bring about a political structure corresponding to high levels of economic and technological development.

A more subtle use of domestic analogy is presented by the claim that it is more fruitful to study the EU by theories and concepts of comparative politics than by IR perspectives (Hix 1994, 1996). This influential perspective is based on the assumption that EU politics has evolved into a system which is comparable with domestic politics of democratic state, which is studied by comparative politics, rather than with international system studied by IR. A similar move, with arguably more important practical consequences, is the European constitutionalism thesis (Weiler 1999: 221) which claims that

“the Community has evolved and behaves as if its founding instrument were not a treaty governed by international law but, to use the language of the European Court, a constitutional charter governed by a form of constitutional law.”

The thesis refers to a series of decisions of the European Court of Justice which transformed a formerly international legal system into a system which seems to be closer to federal states than international organization. Domestic analogy serves both as an explanation of the transformation in the sense of that the Court behaved as a national constitutional court interpreting domestic law (Weiler 1999: 23) and as a basis for reflection of the consequences of these decisions. However, for Weiler the constitutionalism thesis is not only conventionalised but it is also sedimented in the EU practice: “it became axiomatic, beyond discussion, above the debate, like the rules of democratic discourse, or even the very rules of rationality” (Weiler 1999: 222).

There is also a host of studies dealing with particular EU institutions or member-states which cut across various theoretical perspectives and conceptualize particular EU institutions in analogy with domestic institutions of member states. Hardly any analysis of the European Central Bank can do without drawing a domestic analogy (Kaltenthaler 2002; Dyson, Featherstone 1999; Heisenberg 1999) and the Bank is even considered to be “unique among the institutions of the EU because it was deliberately modelled on one national institution, the German Bundesbank” (Heisenberg, Richmond 2002: 208). But domestic analogies are discussed with respect to other EU institutions, whether the Franco-German design of the Commission or the British approach to its reform (Stevens 2001, Dimier 2002), or the German “Bundesstaat conception” of the European parliament (Rittberger 2001: 699). The member-state perspective is addressed by, for example, Simon Bulmer (1997) who shows a strong correspondence between the German and EU constitutional orders, or Markus Jachtenfuchs (1999) who deals with correspondence between institutional orders of the biggest EU members and the EU itself.

To sum up, domestic analogy and, hence, the concept of Europe as a container has been shaping the thinking and the practice of European politics for a long time. European integration increased its significance in both respects. Firstly, there is a variety of theoretical perspectives which rely on it. Secondly, there is evidence that it informs the practice of influential actors, for example, in the areas of European jurisdiction and institution building. Moreover, in both areas we could identify a certain reinforcing logic between the theory and practice of domestic analogy even though such an argument has often been exaggerated by the critics of federal Europe.
EU AS MOTION: if it’s moving, it’s strange

Despite the strong position of metaphors which liken Europe to either one or several containers in the EU discourse and practice I argue that the metaphor which is sedimented in the EU common sense is very different. It is the metaphor of Europe as a MOTION, which I associate with neofunctionalist thinking. I examine problems of conceptualizing Europe as a motion arguing that one of the consequences is to liken the EU to what I call STRANGE OBJECT. Finally, I argue that parts of neofunctionalist legacy were taken over by several influential approaches in the current EU reflection.

Even though domestic analogy played an important role in neofunctionalist thinking, neofunctionalist approach is more radical than that. True, many neofunctionalists shared the idea that “an international society of states can acquire the procedural characteristics of a domestic political system” (Rosamond 2000: 56). However, neofunctionalists, unlike federalists, did not develop on the domestic analogy too much. As one of the leading neofunctionalists shows (Schmitter 1996a: 5), maxims of neofunctionalism, and he comes up with seven of them, represent “a quite considerable critique of the dominant modes of thinking about international relations.” This departure is signaled by the pluralist approach which recognizes a variety of important actors in the integration process where states are just one, even though rather important, kind of actors. But the gist of the departure is fully captured by his seventh maxim:

“Outcomes of international integration are neither fixed in advance by the founding treaty, nor are they likely to be expressed exclusively through subsequent formal agreements. They should be recognized as the transient results of an ongoing process, rather than the definitive product of a stable equilibrium.” (Schmitter 1996a: 6)

This maxim is in line with the generally accepted view that neofunctionalists were more interested in the process rather than outcomes of integration (Rosamond 2000: 55).

The radicalism of the departure is not often appreciated. It consists of conceiving EUROPE AS A MOTION rather than a kind of CONTAINER. The rejection of container scheme is at odds not only with the common sense about international politics but also with the common sense of traditional European thinking. Now, this deviation from common sense is one of the reasons why most students of European integration struggle with terminology as they feel that what is on offer fails to express what they have in mind. For example, Puchala complains, as many others do, about “conceptual confusion” about the integration which he explains by the need to account for a new phenomenon relying on traditional language centered on the concept of state (Puchala 1972: 267-270). One of the most fitting metaphorical expressions of the conceptual metaphor of a MOTION is probably the one which likens Europe to a cyclist who has to move on lest he fall down.

Given the problems we have with thinking in terms of motions rather than in terms of containers we are forced to fit most things into the container metaphor. Instead of as a motion, the EU is then conceptualized as a series of snap-shots, which temporarily freeze the motion. These snap-shots are then related to the usual common sense which leads to rather peculiar results. I argue that the snap-shots result in labels which are either

- empty, such as “unidentified political object” or “ever closer union”, which tries to contain the motion by giving it a final stage “union” but leaving the definition of the union empty,
hybrid, such as between “super-state and international organization” which use two conventional metaphorical alternatives as opposite extremes between which the actual EU should be situated, or

• oxymoronic, such as “international state” or “federation of sovereign states” which connects two conventional metaphorical alternatives in a whole which is self-contradictory in the general common sense.

Thinking about European integration provides a host of examples of such conceptualizations of Europe as a “strange object” which turned into conventional wisdom by now. When Ernst Haas (1958: 32-34) reviewed in the late 1950s how the observers of and actors in European integration defined the then emerging structures, he came across such answers as a pre-federal structure, partial federation, partial economic state, union of states with a federal framework, sui generis structure, midway between international and federal, neither federal nor inter-governmental. Similarly, a distinguished student of the European integration referred to “less than a federation, more than a regime” a quarter of century later (Wallace 1983). One of the most colorful labels in this tradition comes from Puchala who likens European integration to an elephant whom several blind men try to identify by touching (Puchala 1972: 267). He offers several labels himself such as “international state system” or “multi-arena system” whose actors are situated in “subnational-national-transnational-supranational political environment” (Puchala 1972: 283). However, as most others, Puchala is clear about what the European integration is not while being rather vague about what it is. The problem of finding containers into which motion would fit has no permanent solution. Hence, twenty years after Puchala, the president of the European Commission could still vaguely claim that the EU is “un objet politique non-identifié” (Schmitter 1996a: 1) and to make it more identifiable a few years later he offered an oxymoronic vision of “federation among strong nation-states” (Moravcsik 1998: 472).

Despite the neofunctionalist revival in the late 1980s (Rosamond 2000) it can hardly be claimed that it represents a dominant stream of thinking about Europe nowadays. All the same, two arguments can be made in favor of treating its metaphorical foundations as commonsensical for understanding European integration. Firstly, like realism, due to its theoretical dominance in the recent past neofunctionalism still shapes the practical common sense about European integration. Secondly, even though neofunctionalism is marginal in the current theoretical thinking, dominant theories of today also embrace the conception of Europe as a motion; for example, Moravcsik (1998: 52) speaks about the “supranational theory” derived from neofunctionalism which “continues to dominate much theoretical writing on European integration.”

It would be contestable to pin down any of the contemporary theories as dominant. However, I argue that there are at least three to some extent overlapping groups of approaches which are in their basic orientation heirs of neofunctionalism and which are influential modes of current thinking about the EU – European governance, institutionalism and constructivist approaches. Scholars in these traditions usually acknowledge their affinity to neofunctionalism despite often significant differences between neofunctionalism and these theories.

The notion of European governance is broad, it does not refer to a theory but to a wide family of analytical approaches. Moreover, the concept was also adopted in the political practice of EU actors. I consider the approaches to be associated with multi-level governance

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42 Jackson and Nexon (1999: 299) address a similar problem in IR thinking and they notice the role of oxymorons such as „dynamic statics“ in an effort to accommodate process and change in a substantialist framework.
and supranational governance as the most influential among them. Despite the variety of uses, several authors find it possible to make general remarks about the concept of governance (Jachtenfuchs 1997; Joergenssen 1997; Joerges 2002). On this basis I argue that the studies of European governance are based on the same two conceptual metaphors as neofunctionalism. Firstly, it refers to the hybrid nature of the EU coming up with the label of governance for something which is less than a federation and more than a regime (Jachtenfuchs 1997: 40-41). Secondly, it also understands Europe as a motion, at least in the form of decentralized reflexive governance (Jachtenfuchs 1997: 45). Even though governance approaches present a fundamental conceptual challenge to both intergovernmentalism and federalism (Joergenssen 1997: 2), they communicate rather well with neofunctionalism.

The ideas of hybridity and motion also underlie the framework of multi-level governance (e.g. Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996), which is probably the most influential of all governance approaches (Diez 1999; Kelstrup 1998: 38-43). For example, Christiansen refers to European constitution as a process as well as to plurality of actors beyond the sovereign nation state in his presentation of the approach (Christiansen 1997: 59, 65). Therefore, Kelstrup can consider the multi-level governance approach as a successor to neofunctionalism while acknowledging differences between the two approaches (Kelstrup 1998: 53). Similarly, students of supranational governance acknowledge their debts to neofunctionalism (Sweet, Sandholz 1998: 5-11). They stress the conceptualization of integration in terms of the motion of transactions and they stick to the notion of supranationality as a quality of integration, which is more than international while being less than federal.

The sedimented metaphor of MOTION/STRANGE OBJECT also informs highly influential institutionalist approaches to the European integration, especially historical (Armstrong, Bulmer 1998; Pierson 1998) and sociological institutionalism (Rosamond 2000: 116-117). By default, institutional approaches tend to be rather static focusing on institutions as durable structures, which enable and constrain actors. Their basic concepts such as “lock-in” or “path-dependency”, in case of historical institutionalism, and “social embeddedness” or “logic of orthodoxy”, in case of sociological institutionalism, point to stability rather than to motion. This means that the EU institutions are usually taken for granted in their uniqueness of strange objects, as “ontologically primitive” or as “independent variables”, and it is their effects which are examined. On the other hand, institutionalists provide strong arguments for the MOTION perspective as well. Pierson (1998: 30) shows the merits of historical institutionalism by arguing that it addresses historical process offering “a moving picture rather than a photograph” of the integration process. From a sociological institutionalist or constructivist perspective, Checkel (1999) bases his approach on the examination of learning involving cognitive and normative change.

One of the principal arguments for development of constructivist approaches to the European integration draws on the concept of motion. Thus, Christiansen, Joergenssen and Wiener (Christiansen et al. 1999: 538) argue that constructivist assumption that “social ontologies are the subject to change” provides an excellent starting point for examining the steady transformation of the EU. Moreover, they also stress “connections between key aspects” of constructivism and neofunctionalism, again, “transformative aspect” being the most important of them (ibid.: 530).

The finding that the EU orthodoxy is constituted by the metaphor of Europe as a MOTION may seem self-contradictory itself. How can a sedimented orthodoxy be identified

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43 However, the multilevel approach can be developed into several different directions (Schmitter 2003). For a federalist reading of the concept see Borzel and Risse (2000).

44 Rationalist institutionalism is more state-centric and hence it is based on the metaphor of Europe as several containers.
with something as radical as unceasing change? Two answers are possible. Firstly, MOTION itself cannot get sedimented but its snap-shots, STRANGE OBJECTS, can. They represent the sedimented orthodoxy of the conservative position on change, which sticks to obsolete snap-shots of the past configurations. Secondly, conservative position can also be expressed by reference to motion if the expected motion is understood as a mere repetition of the past motion. The change is conventional in the sense that it follows a well-established past pattern. In the sedimented perspective a stop to integration would be a more radical change than another spill-over.

**Unconventional metaphors: New Middle Ages**

By default, unconventional metaphors are not easily accepted by common sense. They use unfamiliar vocabulary or they connect familiar vocabulary in unfamiliar ways. Even radical thinkers introduce them as “metaphors” (van Ham 2001: 114); sedimented and conventional metaphors are usually addressed as reality out there. As argued, unconventional metaphors are likely to be appreciated in their rhetorical function but their necessary vagueness will weaken their epistemological function and, hence, deprive them of any ontological function. Therefore, most of them will never turn into conventional or sedimented metaphors.\(^{45}\)

A section addressing them can be either too long or too short. It will be too short if it focuses only on the examples which are relevant for political practice as there does not have to be any. It will be too long if its aim is to list any conceptualization of Europe which is against common sense. Trying to avoid both perils I focus on one conceptual metaphor which is both unconventional and familiar to students of European integration. It is the metaphor of Europe as new Middle Ages which has been around for some time (Bull 1977). Nevertheless, before focusing on this metaphor I suggest some other metaphors which also represent alternative ways of looking for unconventional metaphors.

A possible way of generating unconventional metaphors is to start with the EU orthodoxy and to revive its motion metaphor so that new strange objects can be defined which challenge previously established and already sedimented strange objects. Schmitter (1996b: 130-136) outlines this way, basing his thinking on modalities of participation of functional and territorial constituencies in the European whole. From this starting point, he comes up with the concept of “condominio”, among others, which goes in the same direction as neo-medievalist thinking but which refers to a kind of organization which is probably even more remote from the current common sense than what most neo-medievalists have in mind. An alternative way of finding unconventional metaphors could consist of a radical conceptual break at the start, such as addressing the EU not as an institutional or geopolitical entity but e.g. as a “chronopolitical” entity where, due to the technology, traditional management of space no longer matters and is replaced with the management of time (Der Derian 1992).

Neo-medievalists take a different perspective by looking at the EU, and its future, with the help of the model of the medieval empire, which was once sedimented but became obsolete with the consolidation of the state-system. While the concept of Europe as new Middle Ages is by necessity fuzzy - authors offer their particular understandings often at odds with one another - most of them seem to agree that “overlapping authority and multiple loyalty” are the defining features of the model (Friedrichs 2001; van Ham 2001; Zielonka

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\(^{45}\) Diez (1999: 609) discusses an interesting attempt by “integral federalists” to conceptualize Europe as a network as early as in 1948 concluding that their construction was “too far apart from that of the dominant discourse, the … point from which they argued too different and outlandish for those used to talking in terms of modern territorial statehood.” However, the metaphor of network is still around (Leonard 2000) and given that the concept of network serves as a source domain for conceptual metaphors in a variety of areas today, it may have much greater chance to influence thinking about Europe now than in 1948.
2000; Waever 1996; Ruggie 1986; Bull 1977). Moreover, most would also subscribe to the idea that neo-medievalists attempt to address parallel processes of integration, regionalization and the continuing persistence of nation states (Friedrichs 2001). However, this concern is also shared by the students of multi-level governance. As neo-medievalism and multi-level governance may seem close to each other, and it may be possible to interpret the multi-level governance in a post-modern manner (Rosamond 1999: 654), a brief discussion of their difference will help us present peculiarities of neo-medieval metaphor.

Van Ham (2001: 113) contrasts the two perspectives arguing that “multi-level governance is helpful, but remains confined to what occurs in ‘Brussels’.” This can be a useful starting point in the sense that multi-level governance focuses on the activities of official EU institutions which is also the reason why it provides a nice example of the current EU orthodoxy as I argued above. However, the most important difference concerns the treatment of boundaries which define the actors. Multi-level governance does not put into doubts delimitations and identities of the European actors - there is a plurality of them but we know who they are, where they are and how to locate them in a hierarchical order. This is at odds with the neo-medievalist conception of overlap concerning both competencies and constitution of actors and of unclear boundaries delimiting the actors. There is also an important difference in the way actors, policies and things in general are categorized between the two approaches. Whereas multi-level governance implicitly relies on traditional categories which either include or do not include certain subject, neo-medievalism seems to rely on “radial” categories (e.g. Lakoff 1987: 65, 83-84) which have fuzzy borders and allow for the third way between clear membership and non-membership in the given category.

Jan Zielonka (2000: 157) offers a possible summary of the most important features of the neo-medieval Europe. I address three of them. Firstly, EU external borders are soft and in flux, given the overlapping identities and unclear boundaries it is not totally clear who is a member and who is not. The category of membership is radial, there are some who certainly are members and some who are not but then there is the grey area of those who are members to some extent. Secondly, similarly, there are several types of citizenship “with different sets of rights and duties” (ibid.) Thirdly, legal, administrative, economic and military regimes are dissociated, each of them can be governed by a separate private or public agency which can further differ along territorial lines, and the mutual relationship between them is not subject to any clear hierarchy.

To sum up, new Middle Ages exemplifies an unconventional metaphor which has been introduced and studied by observers of European integration for some time. Given such an attention, it is probably better developed than other alternatives, however, it is still unclear and difficult to grasp in many respects. But this should not surprise us, as it is the direct result of its being unconventional and thus remote from our current common sense.

**Bottom-up conceptual metaphors**

So far, the conceptual metaphors have been identified in top-down manner. The conceptual metaphors of Europe as A CONTAINER, AN EQUILIBRIUM OF CONTAINERS, A STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION and NEW MIDDLE AGES have been found on the basis of the theoretical reflection of the European integration without dealing with actual metaphorical expressions in the EU political discourse. However, as argued, conceptual metaphors can also be found in a bottom-up way. This approach starts with the metaphorical expressions and groups them on the basis of related meanings into separate classes headed by conceptual metaphors which bring the single metaphorical expressions to a common denominator. In this way, alternative bottom-up conceptual metaphors can be gained. A possible set of such
bottom-up metaphors is provided by the EURO.META.CORPUS\textsuperscript{46} which collects metaphorical expressions about the EU from articles in 28 British and German dailies and weeklies in the period of 1989-2000 (containing 2132 entries). Drawing on this corpus I show the links between the top-down metaphors and the bottom-up metaphors gained from the corpus analysis.

The corpus comes up with twenty conceptual metaphors which conceptualize the EU in terms of: Air/Space Travel, Bicycle, Car, Train, Way/Speed, Maritime, Business/Accounting, Discipline/Authority/School, Games/Sports, Geometry, Group/Class/Club, House/Building, Body, Strength/Size, Table/Food, Love/Family, Myth, Machine/Motor/Model, Show/Performance, and War. Even though these metaphors look quite different from the suggested top-down metaphors, a closer look shows that they can be related to each other.

Hence, Musolff (2001: 179-181) groups the first six conceptual metaphors under the heading of “path/movement/speed metaphors” which account for almost one fifth of the corpus.\textsuperscript{47} The metaphorical expressions in this group refer to the EU as a MOTION symbolized by movement or speed of trains, ships, bicycles or other vehicles. Moreover, the direction of the movement is usually left unspecified which further emphasizes the integration as a process rather than as a specific entity. Therefore, it can be argued that the metaphor of MOTION has a prominent place in the corpus in line with its classification as a sedimented metaphor.

Europe as EQUILIBRIUM AMONG CONTAINERS is also widespread. Firstly, several conceptual metaphors unambiguously focus on the actors and their interactions. These include Games/Sports, Group/Class/Club, Show/Performance, Family and Food (which refers almost exclusively to Europe a la carte) as well as metaphors used for describing the hierarchy among the EU members such as Table (being mostly used when speaking about exclusion from Europe’s top table) or Discipline/Authority/School (e.g. where role models, bad pupils and head masters are distinguished). A good deal of metaphorical expressions under Business/Accounting also belong to this category as they refer to cost sharing among the members.\textsuperscript{48} Secondly, a lot of metaphorical expressions under the headings of War, Geometry, Body and Strength/Size correspond to the EQUILIBRIUM metaphors while other metaphorical expressions under these headings refer to different top-down conceptual metaphors. Hence, War sometimes metaphorizes interstate interaction, Geometry can refer to triangles or variable geometries, Body can be used with reference to single states (e.g. a sick Germany), as it is sometimes the case with Strength/Size.

However, it is the metaphor of EU as a CONTAINER which tends to prevail in those groupings. The most frequent metaphorical expression in the War group is “fortress Europe”, i.e. a container-like entity. Similarly, most metaphorical expressions under Geometry refer to “hard core” which is again a single container. The same single container is evoked when Europe is pictured a single Body described in terms of its Strength/Size. Finally, there are conceptual metaphors of House\textsuperscript{49}, Machine and Myth\textsuperscript{50} which are almost exclusively referring to one container.

\textsuperscript{46} The corpus is available at internet (http://www.dur.ac.uk/SMEL/depts/german/Arcindex.htm). It was created within a project „Attitudes Towards Europe“ of Durham University and Institut fur deutsche Sprache in Mannheim (Musolff 2001: 179).

\textsuperscript{47} The metaphorical expressions subsumed under Motor can be added to that.

\textsuperscript{48} However, most of these expressions do not work as metaphors of Europe at all (they do not conceptualize one area in terms of another area) as they simply describe preparations for the single currency.

\textsuperscript{49} This interpretation is consistent with German or British understanding of the house. However, as Chilton and Ilyin (1993) show, Russian understanding could point to equilibrium of containers as well.
To sum up, I have shown that top-down conceptual metaphors can be related to bottom-up conceptual metaphors and hence with actual metaphorical expressions. The fact that there are no metaphorical expressions or bottom-up conceptual metaphors related to unconventional metaphors can be explained by the orientation of the corpus which includes only articles reporting about the EU on daily or weekly basis, which are supposed to serve as basic information about what is going on rather than as sources of new visions. However, at least some presence of unconventional metaphors can be expected when examining the finality debate whose nature was supposed to be visionary rather than informative.

5. Methodology

I take a political speech as the basic unit of analysis. It is speech rather than a specific metaphorical expression spoken in the speech as the role and importance of the expression depends on the whole of the speech. However, it is not be possible to review the whole of the debate in a single volume not to speak about a single article. Therefore, I focus on a narrow slice of the debate represented by 64 speeches of the highest political leaders of EU member and EU candidate countries. Even though from quantitative perspective this sample is quite small in a huge stream of speeches and proposals, it is highly relevant from political perspective as it represents the views of all the governments concerned.

Authorship of these speeches is rather complex. Drawing on Goffman (1981: 44) three roles are distinguished in the text or speech production (Fairclough 1992: 78): animator (who actually speaks), author (who puts the words together) and principal (whose position is represented). In this case animators are political leaders whose speeches are examined, authors come from a collective body whose members include members of the EU discursive community (national EU experts) and principals are governments. This highly organized division of labor and the nature of its subjects guarantee that the speech as a whole, including both ideas and choice of the words, usually reflects not only individual attitudes of the animator but also ideas which are shared by a significant part of the given society.

The analysis can be divided into several methodological steps. Firstly, basic units of analysis are established. Each speech is analyzed as regards the relative importance of the conceptual metaphors it uses. Its metaphorical expressions are grouped under the heading of conceptual metaphors and these groups are compared with one another. This reduces the speech to a specific configuration of conceptual metaphors. These metaphorical configurations provide, on the one hand, empirical end-results and, on the other hand, a raw material for further analysis. Hence, they are discussed in terms of results, however, they are also summarized and aggregated for further analysis where their mutual overlap are investigated.

50 This category refers to „allusions to classical mythology.“ However, it is the myth of virgin Europe kidnapped by Zeus and of Augean stables waiting for Hercules which are most often evoked, both relying on the concept of container.

51 To find the most important speeches several methods were used. Usually, the speeches which were identified by more than a single method were then selected. Firstly, internet archive of newspapers were used which generated speeches mentioned in their articels. Secondly, in case of smaller countries, conventional search engines had to be relied on. Thirdly, several usefull collections of speeches in the Internet were tapped into such as:
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/eu_politik/aktuelles/zukunft/debatte_html
http://www.zukunfleuropa.gv.at/html/dokumente_01_04_02.htm
http://www.europa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/reden
http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/congov_el.htm
Basic units of analysis

The analysis of the speech follows the questions which are usually asked when figuring out what was said or written. What is the main message of the speech? What other important issues were mentioned? What is criticised or rejected? Where is the speech ambiguous? I try to answer these questions with respect to conceptual metaphors used in the speech identifying: dominant metaphor(s), coded as “1”, important metaphors, coded as “2”, also used metaphors, coded “3”, rejected metaphor, coded as “*”, unmentioned metaphor, coded as “4”, and ambiguous metaphor which is both embraced and rejected, coded as “?”. I use the term value for these codes. On this basis, each conceptual metaphor is assigned a value, which reflects its significance in the speech. If two conceptual metaphors are used with a comparable significance in the speech then both are assigned the same value. Each speech is then characterized by metaphorical configuration, which is a set of values expressing the significance of all the conceptual metaphors.

How is this significance assessed? Both quantitative and qualitative perspectives are applied here. Firstly, a frequent use of metaphorical expressions which can be attributed to the particular conceptual metaphor provides evidence of its significance for the speaker. Secondly, not only does quantity matter but also quality is important. Metaphorical expressions which are used to address the main idea or which are in the title of the speech are obviously more important than others.

This qualitative perspective is also essential as an insurance against overestimating the significance of the container metaphor. Container-scheme dominates Western thinking, for example, embedding our understanding of categories in the most general sense (Lakoff, Johnson 1999). If we say Britain is in the EU, we use a container metaphor of the EU because the use of the preposition “in” signals that the EU is a spatially closed entity. However, this understanding is too broad to give us meaningful results. Therefore, the uses of the container metaphor are counted only if the metaphorical expression evokes the image of a spatially closed container in a more explicit way.

To clarify the metaphorical expressions associated with the conceptual metaphors in the analysis I relate some of the metaphorical expressions used in the speeches to the conceptual metaphors, which were found in the previous section.

EUROPE AS A STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION

There is a variety of ways to express the idea that the EU is a STRANGE OBJECT. Several metaphorical expressions are part of the Euro-speak (e.g. “community method”, “Monnet method”, “supranational method”), some stress what was achieved so far (e.g. “keeping institutional balance”), others refer to Europe being unique (e.g. “a unique construction”, “sui generis institutional framework”, “a super-power of its own kind”) and still others point to hybrids and oxymorons (e.g. “constitutional treaty”, “pooling sovereignty”, “sharing sovereignty”, “sharing powers”, “federation of nation states”, “super-power but not superstate”).

The MOTION is expressed by vocabulary which refer to journey (e.g. “new steps”, “leaps forward”, “moving forward”, “brave steps into uncharted territory”, “avoiding a drifting off course”), to speed (e.g. “accelerate the integration”, “slowing-down the train”), to moving objects (e.g. “new locomotive”, “the flame of Europe”) or to change and to motion in general (e.g. “constant changes”, “continuous process”, “future direction of integration”, “permanent treaty-making”, “never-ending circle of treaty change”, “avant-garde”).
EUROPE AS A CONTAINER
The metaphorical expressions of CONTAINER understand the EU in terms of building or its parts (e.g. “European edifice”, “foundations”), in terms of a homogeneous space (e.g. “forging Europe”, “unification”, “abolition of dividing lines”, “single judicial area”), or in terms of body (e.g. “being at the heart of Europe”). Moreover, this category also includes all the explicit comparisons between the EU order and the internal order of the state (e.g. “European constitution”, “European foreign minister”, “separation of powers”, “checks and balances”, “federal model”, “European sovereignty”, “European society”) as well as statements which describe the EU as an actor (e.g. “being a driving force”, “speaking with one voice”, “European general interest”).

EUROPE AS AN EQUILIBRIUM OF CONTAINERS
The EQUILIBRIUM metaphor can be expressed in the traditional vocabulary of interstate relations (e.g. “balance of power”, “treaty” instead of “constitution” or “constitutional treaty”, “alliance-building”, “balanced institutional arrangements which serve the interests of all member states”, “co-operation between member states” or “partnership of democratic states” instead of their “integration”), in vocabulary which addresses the interaction of states and their mutual position (e.g. “contending national interests”, “equality between member states”) and in vocabulary tackling states as supreme actors (e.g. “restoration of former sovereignty”, “directoire”, “democracy is rooted in states”).

UNCONVENTIONAL METAPHORS
There is no trace after the unconventional conceptual metaphors suggested by the top-down approach in the speeches. However, a few metaphorical expressions do not fit any of the above conceptual metaphors. Hence, they can be considered as unconventional metaphors. Most of them relate to a conceptual metaphor of the EU as JOINT-STOCK COMPANY (e.g. “Europe able to deliver”, “ownership of Europe by citizens”, “mission statement of Europe”, “added value of Europe”).

I use Joschka Fischer’s speech which launched the debate as an example to show how the analysis proceeded (see below). The concept of Europe as a CONTAINER clearly dominates the speech. Not only can this be documented by the richness of container-dependent metaphorical expressions but it is also demonstrated by the fact that the also important metaphor of Europe as a MOTION is often “containerized.” For example, Europe is a movement but this movement is given a clear direction “onwards to its completion” in a federation (container) or avant-garde which implies motion is interpreted as “a center of gravitation”. Similarly, Europe should be based on “framework treaty” but, again, this is only a step towards a genuine constitution (container).

No category is completely unambiguous as the speaker both embraces and rejects metaphorical expressions based on the same conceptual metaphor. Fischer supports federation with a genuine government and parliament while being against “federal European state replacing the old nation-states.” Similarly, he rejects the division of Europe while supporting its differentiation. However, it is quite clear which way prevails. In our example, Europe as a CONTAINER is embraced despite the qualifications, and Europe as an EQUILIBRIUM AMONG CONTAINERS is rejected despite the qualifications.

Germany, Joschka Fischer, FM, 12.5. 2000
(2) EUROPE AS A STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION
movement Vorwärts zur Vollendung der europäischen Integration (against both Verharren beim Erreichen and Rückschritt), Verfassungsvertrag (on which the federation will be founded), Souveränitätstilteilung von Europa und Nationalstaat (as a basis), Europäische Regierung wird aus den nationalen Regierungen heraus gebildet, Bürger- und Staatenunion, Avantgarde als Lokomotive, Heranführungsmöglichkeit, Grundvertrag als Nukleus einer Verfassung (shows the direction from strange object to container)
Against: Methode Monnet, Gravitation ausserhalb der Verträge

(1) EUROPE AS A CONTAINER
Gebäude der europäischen Integration, Bauabschnitt der europäischen Union, wirtschaftliche Verflechtung (between France and Germany), überwölbende Ordnung, ein gemeinsamer Raum, Absorptionsfähigkeit, Parlamentarisierung, Regierung, Senatsmodel (for the second chamber of the parliament, refering to American and German experience), europäische Verfassung, Integrationsmagnet, Avantgarde als Gravitationszentrum
Against: ein souveräner Bundesstaat, der die Nationalstaaten ablöst, Kerneuropa (if closed)

(*) EUROPE AS EQUILIBRIUM OF CONTAINERS
weitere Differenzierung
Against: balance of power, Teilung Europas (Stacheldraht), Staatenverbund, Gleichgewichtssystem, gespaltetes Statensystem

(4) Unconventional metaphorical expressions

Another methodological issue concerns the language. I used English texts, some of them translations, if these were available. This may seem tricky as metaphors usually change during the translation in a significant way. However, I developed the concepts of shared language and transnational speech community to address this. I argue that the metaphors of the shared language of the given transnational speech community are to a large extent translation-independent inside the community. Otherwise, shared language could not serve as a tool of communication there.

I assume that each contribution can be understood in the context of two speech communities – national speech community and transnational speech community of the EU. Hence, French president obviously targets French politics when making a speech on Europe but he also targets representatives of the EU politics in other countries and the EU institutions. Which of the two targets matters more is an empirical question whose answer differs from case to case (Allen 2003: 87-88), and which this paper does not need to address. However, the important thing is that speeches serve as a means of communication inside the transnational speech community. They often refer to previous speeches in an explicit way, they are often given in English even though English is not the language of the national speech community of the speaker and, most of the time, they are presented in front of foreign or international audiences (such as European University Institute in Florence or College of Europe in Bruges). Therefore, the metaphors which are used in them are part of the shared language and as such they do not disappear with translation.

Summarizing, aggregating and overlapping

Even though metaphorical configurations of the speeches provide a lot of interesting information, more knowledge can be gained by their summarization and aggregation as well as by analysis of their overlaps. Each of these steps will be addressed.
Summarization provides the most general characteristics of the debate. It consists of a simple comparison of frequency of the values of the conceptual metaphors, which shows e.g. how often are container metaphors used as dominant metaphors of the speech in the whole debate. The results of summarization should provide us with a preliminary corroboration or refutation of our conceptual framework. Firstly, sedimented metaphors should be more common than conventional or unconventional ones. Secondly, I expect the metaphor of CONTAINER to play a more important role than the metaphor of EQUILIBRIUM. Thirdly, unconventional metaphors should be less frequent than conventional ones.

There are two possible ways of performing the summarization. Firstly, values can be counted having the individual speeches as the basis of the debate. Secondly, aggregated values of country’s position can be counted having countries as principal actors in the debate. If the aggregation process is not distortive both ways should lead to similar results.

Aggregation lays grounds for a more general analysis of the discourse. It transforms basic units of analysis into higher units of analysis. Here I transform metaphorical configurations of several speeches into one metaphorical configuration of a country. Given that the analyzed speeches express country’s official position, the aggregation of the speeches given by the leaders of the same country can give us an insight into the country’s position abstracting from individual, time- and space-dependent peculiarities of the single speech.

This is what most analysts do when trying to figure out what the country position is, they read several documents and they pick up topics which occur frequently there (rule of majority) or they try to find a middle position between two different perspectives (rule of average). The aggregation does a similar thing in a more formal way whereby formalization serves as a guarantee of a consistent data interpretation. It constructs higher units by attributing them aggregated values derived from the most frequent values or middle values of basic units.

Analyses of overlaps compares metaphorical configurations evaluating their similarities. This is based on the assumption that the use of the same metaphors implies like-mindedness. Complete overlap means that the two value configurations are identical, i.e. the two speeches or the two country positions use all the conceptual metaphors in the same way. Therefore, if two speeches are dominated by CONTAINER metaphors, STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION are important metaphors and both reject EQUILIBRIUM metaphors while avoiding any unconventional metaphors, then they overlap completely and they are like-minded in the most extensive sense. However, similarities can be observed in less perfect situations as well. Hence, I define a simple overlap as situation in which two metaphorical configurations share the same dominant conceptual metaphor. If they also share the second most important metaphor then I will speak about a significant overlap. Analyses of overlaps will be used when evaluating like-mindedness among the EU members on the basis of the aggregated values of their metaphorical configurations. It leads to identification of possible alliances of like-minded countries in the debate.

Finally, several caveats are in order. Firstly, the classification of metaphorical expressions under different conceptual metaphors and their consequent evaluation includes unavoidable arbitrary elements. I try to limit these by listing the metaphorical expressions which are associated with the given conceptual metaphor and by sticking to the list. Secondly, aggregation brings about hypothetical configurations of metaphors which unlike metaphorical configurations of basic units are not directly based on any specific speech or document. They represent an attempt at synthesizing several speeches. Thirdly, configurations of metaphors are interpreted as positions of speakers or countries. However, the term position usually refers to what actors say and not how they say it. Still, this approach is based on the assumption that both “what” and “how” questions matter and they often cannot be set apart as “how” often implies “what” and the other way round.
6. The European finality debate and its metaphors

The European finality debate

Even though politicians, scholars, journalists and intellectuals have reflected on, outlined and discussed the future of European integration since its beginnings in the 1950s, the scale and the intensity of the finality debate which preceded the EU Eastern enlargement is unprecedented. Not only did all the leaders of the EU members and most of the leaders of the EU candidates take part in it but the debate also incited a flood of proposals by representatives of civil society. There are several reasons for that. Firstly, looming enlargement put EU institutional reform on the agenda as the extant institutions, which were originally created for six states, were not deemed ready to accommodate 25 or 30 members. However, given their longevity any thought about their fundamental reform provoked a more general questioning about the direction of the integration process. Secondly, at least since the painful ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, there has been a growing awareness that the European integration cannot count on automatic public support and that the public should be more closely included into the discussions concerning the EU reforms.

Thirdly, the Nice summit in December 2000 gave rise to widespread criticism of the method of intergovernmental conference as an exclusive means of the EU reform. Hence, it has been agreed in Nice that the next round of institutional reform would be preceded by a pan-European, public debate which would define reform proposals. However, some important reference points of the debate had already been established several months before the Nice summit by a series of speeches of European leaders which was incited by the speech of the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer in May 2000. Nevertheless, it was the start of the Convention on the European Future in the spring 2002 which provided a decisive impetus to the growth of the debate and to its penetration into domestic political debates.

The uniqueness of the debate has been widely recognized by giving it a special name and by reflecting on the key contributions to the debate. Before I start analyzing the speeches, I relate the identified conceptual metaphors with the finality debate by using reviews of the finality debate in the three biggest EU members (Allen 2003; Defarges 2003; Wessels 2003). Firstly, I argue that the whole idea of finality is at odds with the sedimented, orthodox understanding of the EU. Secondly, I try to identify which of the conceptual metaphors seems to dominate the country’s contributions to finality discourse as well as which other conceptual metaphors shape these contributions.

The idea of European finality, or finalité politique as it was expressed originally, represents a revolt against the sedimented understanding of the EU as a motion/strange object. It was generally expected that the sedimented view of Europe as a “journey to an unknown destination” (Schonfield 1973, quoted in Cameron 2003: 47) would be completed with the specification of its “final destination” (Cameron 2003: 47). Such a final destination would allow for providing the EU with container-like qualities rather than emphasizing the motion of the journey. Cameron shows this container-orientation of the concept of finality when asking (Cameron 2003: 69): “How can Europeans agree on political finality when the geographical finality is unknown?” In other words, as long as the European space is not physically contained by final borders, its institutional future is open as well.

This is not surprising as both conventional alternatives to the sedimented orthodoxy (one container or equilibrium of containers) are based on the concept of container. Hence, Joschka Fischer starts the debate by attacking the EU business as usual, community method and existing institutions, and by imagining Europe as a single container in the shape of the
federation with brand-new institutions. As Wessels (2003: 143) shows, this federalist discourse has a deep tradition in German thinking and speaking about Europe. The single container metaphor also allows to borrow, “implicitly or explicitly, from Germany’s experience and institutional arrangements” (Wessels 2003: 151). The proposal for a Kompetenzkatalog for the EU is a good example of this thinking. On the other hand, the EU orthodoxy, insufficient though it is deemed, still has an important place in German finality debate (Wessels 2003).

However, not everybody was as keen on the quest for the final destination as Germany. France took the part of defender of the EU orthodoxy. French prime minister Jospin tried to neutralize the Fischer’s proposal for federation by coming up with the concept of “federation of nation-states.” This formula has been rightly recognized as “something of an oxymoron” (Defarges 2003: 122). It represents an attempt to replace the conventional metaphor of one container, introduced by Fischer, with the oxymoronic orthodoxy of the traditional EU discourse. However, the French position was also complemented with a conceptual metaphor of equilibrium among containers, unlike German single container, which is represented by the notion of “directoire” referring to a cozy club of several great powers, which run the EU (Defarges 2003: 128).

The EU orthodoxy was also supported by Britain. As Allen (2003: 79) argues, in his review of the British finality debate, “the British tend to see integration more as an ongoing process than as a journey toward a fixed destination” which is connected with a conservative position on change as “Britain has taken, until recently, a fairly fatalistic view of the EU, usually resisting change.” This adherence to the Europe as a motion is complemented by the image of Europe as a strange object, Allen (2003: 87) speaks about “the strange portrayal of an EU [by Blair] that is ‘superpower but not superstate’.” However, the British discourse is dominated by the conventional metaphors of Europe as equilibrium among containers, exemplified by the expressions of Europe being a “family” or a “partnership” of sovereign nations (Allen 2003: 80).

To sum up, a preliminary review of the finality debate in the three biggest EU members, done on the basis of secondary sources, revealed the following, ranking in importance of conceptual metaphors in the respective national debates:

- Germany – Europe as a CONTAINER prevails, Europe as STRANGE OBJECT (MOTION) follows,
- France – Europe as a STRANGE OBJECT (MOTION) prevails, Europe as an EQUILIBRIUM follows,
- Britain – Europe as an EQUILIBRIUM prevails, Europe as a STRANGE OBJECT (MOTION) follows.

Even this rough outline, which misses more subtle nuances of the actual contributions, provides several insights. Firstly, expectedly, the sedimented metaphor is the most widespread one; moreover, it is the only metaphor playing a prominent role in all the three countries. Secondly, metaphors allow for capturing the different EU perspectives of its three most important actors which were addressed by different approaches in the literature. However, only a more detailed empirical analysis can show us to what extent these insights can be corroborated by further evidence.

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52 This can be put down to the British traditional reluctance to engage, in Peter Hain’s words, in „an abstract discussion of philosophy or institutional change“ (Allen 2003: 95). But it is also connected with the fact that Britain is doing quite well under the status quo (Allen 2003: 94).
Positions of the EU candidate countries are much less intelligible than that. There are several reasons why candidate countries were more passive in the finality debate than the current members (Drulák 2002: 36-37). They are connected with the lack of inside experience with the EU institutions, the focus on the accession, and worries about alienating important EU members by clearly stating one’s own preferences prior to the final decision to enlarge. The finality debate often worked as a learning process in which candidate countries were expected to present their positions as a kind of homework confirming their capacity to formulate their own views on the EU. Previous studies (Brusis 2002; Drulák 2002) suggest that EU candidates are likely to

- subscribe for the EU orthodoxy – to benefit from the re-distributive policies and to prove their ability to learn,
- be against federalist proposals, due to negative historical experience with multinational federations and empires.

Hence, one can expect some embrace of the STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION metaphor and reluctance about the CONTAINER metaphor. Moreover, one can expect that the learning and socialization processes of the candidate countries have not been finished yet. Hence, the distinction between common sense about international politics (dominated by EQUILIBRIUM metaphor) and common sense about European integration (dominated by STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION metaphor) can be blurred in candidate countries. Therefore, if current EU members are taken as yardstick of full socialization into the EU, then candidate countries are likely to use STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION metaphor a bit less, CONTAINER metaphor much less, and EQUILIBRIUM metaphor much more than current EU members.

**Empirical results**

The results of the analysis of the speeches will be presented in two steps. Firstly, the most general features of the finality debate are shown. They provide evidence for our theoretical assumptions about the kinds of conceptual metaphors classified as sedimented and conventional. However, they also include observations concerning the kind of unconventional metaphors used and the dominance of CONTAINER metaphors when addressing EU external action. Secondly, addressing countries’ aggregated positions it is shown that the findings are consistent with literature on finality debate and the like-mindedness of several groups of countries is analyzed. Given the lack of space analysis of individual speeches is not presented.53

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General features

The tables 1 and 2 summarize the finality debate. The results confirm some theoretical assumptions while also bringing some new insights. They also point to several differences between EU members and EU candidates.

Firstly, the most frequent dominant metaphor is STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION which is what a sedimented metaphor should be. Moreover, most of the speakers also use the metaphorical expressions referring to STRANGE OBJECT and the ones referring to MOTION together which points to their mutual links. However, a few speeches distinguished between the two, usually embracing STRANGE OBJECT and rejecting MOTION.

Secondly, in the discourse of EU members, CONTAINER and EQUILIBRIUM play a roughly comparable role as dominant metaphors, however, CONTAINER clearly prevails among the important metaphors. Again, I expected CONTAINER to be more important than EQUILIBRIUM while both of them being conventional metaphors. However, a closer analysis of the EQUILIBRIUM metaphors reveal some unexpected insights as well. To start with, EQUILIBRIUM metaphors are less used than CONTAINER metaphors in a positive way (values 1, 2, 3), but if used positively it is more likely to be dominant than CONTAINER metaphors (4/7>3/12 in table 1). This can be interpreted as that CONTAINER metaphors tend to complement dominant metaphors, primarily STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION, while EQUILIBRIUM metaphors, if approved, are more often used as dominant metaphors themselves because they are seen as inconsistent with the EU orthodoxy. Also, EQUILIBRIUM metaphors are the most rejected ones. Hence, it is the EQUILIBRIUM metaphors, such as balance of power, and not the CONTAINER metaphors, such as European state, which are the most popular “other” against which speakers from the EU countries define their projects.

However, EU candidates, unlike the EU members, tend to see Europe as a group of states rather than a looming state as their second best option. They are less comfortable with the CONTAINER metaphor and more comfortable with the EQUILIBRIUM metaphor than EU members. EU candidates use EQUILIBRIUM metaphors more often than CONTAINER metaphors at the level of dominant metaphors even though, as important metaphor, CONTAINER is somewhat more frequently used than EQUILIBRIUM (Table 2). This different treatment of the two conventional metaphors corresponds to differences in the attributions of ambiguity. While members tend to be ambiguous about EQUILIBRIUM (three cases in Table 1), candidates are unambiguously ambiguous about CONTAINER (three cases in Table 2).

Moreover, EU candidates generally use the language of the EU orthodoxy but they do it less often than the EU members. EU members use it as a dominant metaphor almost three times as much as the second most important metaphor while EU candidates refer to EU orthodoxy only 70% as much as to the second most important metaphor. Interestingly, unlike EU members, EU candidates do not reject any metaphor at all.54

Thirdly, unconventional metaphors are almost absent which can be interpreted as an absence of discursive foundations for any radical change of the EU institutions. Thus, any

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54 This may be connected with the relative popularity of EQUILIBRIUM which is the most frequently rejected metaphor in the members’ discourse (Table 1) but it may also be a result of strategic considerations (avoiding to reject pet projects of important member countries) and of lack of self-confidence.
change is likely to be conventional rather than radical. One could expect more unconventional metaphors given repeated proclamations of bold proposals and brave steps by European leaders. However, the limits of these proposals and steps can be guessed by the observation of a leader who claimed in his speech that “a new thinking within the EU” is represented by the idea that chairman of the council could be elected. All the same, some unconventional metaphors appeared, none of the expressions, though, corresponded to any of top-down unconventional conceptual metaphors suggested by the conceptual discussion. The unconventional metaphorical expressions rely on the metaphor of a JOINT-STOCK COMPANY rather than on metaphors of network or new Middle Ages.

Fourthly, the conventional change, which is likely to prevail, is expected to consist in EU collecting attributes of the state. Its external dimension and external “others” may serve as almost exclusive engines of the integration. Most of the discussions of the external relations of the EU were expressed with reference to EUROPE AS A CONTAINER. This is to some extent unavoidable as the very idea of external relations implies a clear distinction between inside and outside and, hence, the image of container. However, Danish leaders managed to avoid it, otherwise, European leaders could not resist to portray Europe as an actor with state-like attributes. Hardly any speech failed to mention external relations and there was no other issue area where the image of CONTAINER would loom that uncontested.
Table 1: Frequency of metaphors in EU countries discourse (numbers of countries in whose aggregated position the given conceptual metaphor showed as dominant, important, etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>strange object/motion</th>
<th>container</th>
<th>equilibrium of containers</th>
<th>unconventional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dominant (1)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>important (2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>also used (3)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not used (4)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejected (*)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambiguous (?)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Frequency of metaphors in EU candidate countries discourse (numbers of countries in whose aggregated position the given conceptual metaphor showed as dominant, important, etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>strange object/motion</th>
<th>container</th>
<th>equilibrium of containers</th>
<th>unconventional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dominant (1)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>important (2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>also used (3)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not used (4)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejected (*)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambiguous (?)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Who is like-minded with whom?

The introductory discussion about the finality debate showed important differences between the three biggest EU members (Serfaty 2003). Now, I look into the aggregated national positions of EU members and EU candidates (Table 3) to find out whether the same differences can be identified in my empirical findings and to find out how like-minded the EU members are about finality issues. Two approaches are used in the analysis – starting with countries and starting with groups of countries. Firstly, I use the criteria of the simple overlap and of the significant overlap (see methodology) to identify possible groups of like-minded countries i.e. countries whose leaders use the same conceptual metaphors similar language when speaking about the EU future. Secondly, several groups of countries are chosen which are often identified in the EU discourse as politically relevant and their internal like-mindedness is investigated.

Starting with countries’ positions three more or less like-minded groups are identified.

**STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION dominates, CONTAINER is important**

nine member countries: France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Greece (container also dominates), Austria, Finland, Ireland (container is just used) and Luxembourg

seven candidate/five new member countries: Romania (ambiguity about container), Czech Republic, Slovakia (container also dominates), Lithuania, Cyprus (container also dominates), Malta (container is just used) and Turkey (container is just used).

**CONTAINER dominates, STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION is more important than EQUILIBRIUM**

three member countries: Germany, Belgium, and Greece
three candidate/two new member countries: Slovakia, Cyprus and Bulgaria (EQUILIBRIUM is more important than the EU orthodoxy).

**EQUILIBRIUM dominates, EU orthodoxy is at least as important as CONTAINER**

four member countries: UK, Spain, Sweden, Denmark

six candidate/five new member countries: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria (CONTAINER is more important than EU orthodoxy), Estonia (CONTAINER is more important than EU orthodoxy), Latvia and Slovenia.

These groups are familiar to the students of European integration as they roughly coincide with the usual fault lines in institutional debates represented by the three largest countries, Germany, France and the UK. Indeed, each of these great-powers has its own configuration, which puts it closer to other member countries than to another large country. This coincides with conclusions of secondary literature reflecting on the finality debate in the three countries (Serfaty 2003). Also, the fault lines from the EU politics can be found between candidate countries as well. The group of countries, which overlap with the UK is likely to expand the most after the first round of the Eastern enlargement while the group around Germany is likely to remain smallest. This in line with what was said about candidate countries’ misgivings about CONTAINER and their positive view of EQUILIBRIUM.

A possible conclusion of the previous analysis could be that a directoire of great countries is unlikely and if it happens it is not going to be based on like-mindedness. However, from this perspective, the same can be said about Franco-German couple. This only confirms a well-known argument that the couple is not based on like-mindedness as France and Germany co-operate in Europe despite having quite different views and not because they would automatically tend to the same perspective. The lack of overlap does not have to prevent an alliance from coming into being and the method of aggregation helps us suggest what position of such a grouping could be. Sometimes it happens that the aggregate position of the grouping overlaps with the position of one of its members. This member can be seen as an intermediary which can act as bridge-builder between others and which profits most from the co-operation. Now, I look into several groups of countries, which are often identified as sharing some important features and which are expected to be like-minded. Following alliances are addressed: Franco-German couple, directoire, founding countries, Benelux, Nordic countries, Baltic countries and Visegrad countries.

As suggested, there is no obvious overlap in configurations of metaphors between France and Germany as their positions are quite distinct indeed. However, an aggregate Franco-German position could be the one which has two dominant metaphors, STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION as “1” and CONTAINER as “1” (both metaphors figure as dominant and important metaphors in the countries’ positions), and where EQUILIBRIUM is ambiguous, i.e. labeled as “?” (France is for, Germany against). It would be a position of a mutual trade-off which would make both countries equally (un)happy.

Nevertheless, this rather ambiguous position, hesitating between CONTAINER and sedimented orthodoxy, and being unclear about EQUILIBRIUM, disappears if the UK joins in. An aggregate position of such a directoire would be “1” for STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION, “2” for CONTAINER and “3” for EQUILIBRIUM. This position overlaps significantly with the French position. Hence, France would be a clear beneficiary of the directoire playing the role of the intermediary between Germany and Britain. In contrast, neither Germany nor Britain can play the role of intermediary as their positions represent two extremes with respect to the French position.

However, there is more internal overlap among the EU founding countries than among the members of directoire. None of them uses the EQUILIBRIUM as dominant, two have it as...
important while four reject it. Moreover, EU sedimented metaphors and CONTAINER metaphors are either dominant or important. While directoire includes the widest possible variety of positions, all the founding members can overlap either with France or with Germany.

Obviously, there is no overlap among small countries whose diversity is as large as the diversity of the whole of the countries. However, some regional alliances can be looked into even though none of them includes countries, which would overlap on dominant metaphors at least. An aggregate position for Benelux would be “1” for STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION, “2” for CONTAINER and “*” for EQUILIBRIUM which happens to be the Dutch position as well. An aggregate position for three Nordic countries would be “2” for STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION, “?” for CONTAINER and “1” for EQUILIBRIUM which coincides with the Swedish position.

An aggregate position for Baltic countries would be “1” for STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION, “2” for CONTAINER and “1” for EQUILIBRIUM, however there is no obvious intermediary there. Interestingly, an aggregate position for Visegrad countries would be the same as the one of Baltic countries. There is no obvious intermediary in Visegrad group either, however Czech and Hungarian positions are closer to the aggregate position than Polish and Slovak positions. Given the complete overlap between aggregate positions of Visegrad group and Baltic group, the aggregate position characterized by the dominance of both STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION and EQUILIBRIUM, and by CONTAINER as an important metaphor can be interpreted as a medium position of Central and Eastern European countries which joined the EU in the first wave of the enlargement. The prevalence of EQUILIBRIUM over CONTAINER provides further evidence for my hypothesis.

To sum up, my approach points to the same results concerning the positions of the three largest EU members as are the results found in secondary literature. It shows that remaining countries, both EU members and candidates, more or less overlap with one of these. The position of the UK is likely to be strengthened most by the first round of the enlargement. A possible directoire is shown as rather unstable and to the benefits of France. In contrast, a group of founding countries is much more internally like-minded and it can even be argued that its members can be accommodated in space delimited by the positions of France and Germany. There is no trace of overlap among small countries and even their regional alliances are heterogeneous. Netherlands plays the role of intermediary in Benelux while Sweden does the same in Nordic group but the aggregate positions of the two groupings are completely different. In contrast, the aggregate position of Baltic countries completely overlaps with the aggregate position of Visegrad countries, it is dominated by the EU orthodoxy and EQUILIBRIUM metaphors.
Table 3: Aggregate table of EU members and EU candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>strange object/motion</th>
<th>container</th>
<th>equilibrium of containers</th>
<th>unconventional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

This paper starts with the assumption that social structures can be studied as discursive structures. While social structure is understood in terms of Wendt’s international structure, discursive structure is identified with Lakoff’s metaphorical structure. Both of them are integrated into “metaphorical theory of international politics.”

This framework allows us to reveal several metaphorical constructions of the EU. The most sedimented, and hence the least avoidable, metaphors makes us think about the EU in terms of a steady MOTION or in terms of STRANGE, basically undefinable, OBJECT. These metaphors are taken for granted in the shared common sense about the European integration. However, this common sense also includes two less sedimented, conventional metaphors: one understanding the EU as a closed CONTAINER usually inspired by a nation state, and the other seeing the EU as an EQUILIBRIUM AMONG CONTAINERS usually represented by nation states again. Finally, unconventional metaphors show connections between the EU and the European medieval system.

When these conceptual metaphors are applied to the analysis of speeches by the leaders of EU countries, who contributed to the debate about the European finality, several findings emerge. The metaphor of MOTION/STRANGE OBJECT indeed dominates the discourse while the metaphors of CONTAINER and EQUILIBRIUM follow. Unconventional metaphors are extremely rare and they do not coincide with the ones found in the theoretical literature. The absence of unconventional metaphors points to the absence of an intellectual framework which would embed a radical, intentional change of the EU institutions. Therefore, the change is likely to be conventional rather than radical going in the direction outlined by the CONTAINER metaphor which prevails over the EQUILIBRIUM. Interestingly, the EU external action looms as a main engine of the conventional change towards a container-like entity as the metaphor of CONTAINER seems to be almost unavoidable when addressing the external action. The findings also confirm that the national positions of Germany, France and the UK are quite distinct in the debate. However, if the three countries tried to find a general common position, the position would be very close to the one of France. Similarly, the positions of small states are extremely varied indeed, even though the aggregate position of Visegrad countries overlaps completely with aggregate position of Baltic countries.

Naturally, given the caveats one has to be careful not to overinterpret these results. The evidence on which they are based is rather indirect. All the same, the findings show that analysis of language, which pays equal attention to both what is said and how it is said, can yield interesting results. Even though majority of these results do not bring any unexpected findings, they bring some added-value to our knowledge, all the same. Firstly, they show that the metaphorical perspective can be used as an empirical method of discourse analysis and its results are reliable enough. Secondly, it is also valuable to find empirical evidence confirming previous findings or intuitive insights (e.g. France, Germany and Britain have radically distinct positions; No common position of small countries can be found; Most proposals for a radical institutional reform draw on analogy between the EU and the state; People are forced into this analogy when addressing the external action, etc.)

However, several findings are far from obvious. To start with, the empirical analysis confirmed that the metaphorical expressions grouped as STRANGE OBJECT/MOTION indeed dominate the discourse on the EU future. Even though this may seem trivial, this is not the way the mainstream of European thinking is conventionally pictured. Usually, it is argued that the mainstream is divided into two comparable streams, the former claiming that Europe is like a nation state writ large and the latter considering it as a more sophisticated kind of
traditional inter-state co-operation. However, my findings corroborate an alternative claim that these streams, important though they are, are overshadowed by a genuine mainstream which sees the EU as sui generis beast which is in a constant flux. Moreover, the use of metaphors implies that despite what some European leaders say about desirability of radical changes in the EU institutions the way they outline is likely to be more like a business as usual.

Finally, most findings about the accession countries can be seen as new or not obvious. I conclude, for example, that when comparing them with the current members then, on the one hand, their discourse is also dominated by the language of the EU orthodoxy, on the other hand, they are more cautious in the use of CONTAINER vocabulary and more open to the EQUILIBRIUM metaphors. On the one hand, novelty of such a finding may seem to be the consequence of the shortage of previous analytical reflections on the matter rather than a special virtue of this particular approach. On the other hand, the shortage of the analytical reflections on the candidate countries discourse can be explained by the relative vagueness of their contributions which makes it difficult to pin down their positions. In this connection, the metaphorical perspective is especially valuable. Not only does it look into the contents of the speech, which may be vague or underdeveloped but it also examines its form bringing an additional information to the analysis.
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