

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

EUI WORKING PAPER No. 74

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND NEO-CORPORATIST PRACTICE

by

PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER

European University Institute
and
University of Chicago

BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

This paper should not be reproduced
in whole or in part without the
prior permission of the author

320

EUI
G20650

© Philippe C. Schmitter

Printed in Italy in December, 1983

European University Institute

Badia Fiesolana

I - 50016 San Domenico (Florence)

Italy

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND NEO-CORPORATIST PRACTICE

Philippe C. Schmitter *

European University Institute

and

University of Chicago

* Without the hospitality of Daniel Latouche, these ideas might never have found their way to the written page. Without the criticism of Terry Karl, they might not have been sufficiently intelligible to be worth reading. I thank them both and, hereby, absolve them from any further responsibility.

By all accounts, democratic theory is in a lamentable state. It has certainly not kept pace with, much less guided, changes which have occurred in the practice of politics over recent decades. It is as if the Western democracies, having defeated their anti-democratic foes in the Second World War (with the help of the Soviet Union) felt no further need to examine critically their changing political practices. Anything these polities did — any public institutions they created, any private arrangements they tolerated — were eo ipso democratic since they emerged consensually (or at least without violence or discontinuity) from within polities which otherwise respected basic civic rights and held regular contested elections.

In this context, much of what passed for democratic theory consisted of belated (and often apologetic) efforts at restatement, i.e. at justifying after the fact why particular practices or sets of

institutions should be considered "democratic" even if their inspiration was purely pragmatic or their intent purely utilitarian. And one must concede that this capacity for post factum incorporation has been one of the keys to the endurance of democratic theory. Just think of the institutions which were created for other, occasionally even diametrically opposed, motives that subsequently have become part-and-parcel of our contemporary conception of democracy: parliament, constitutions, mixed government, checks and balances, proportionality, factions or parties, interest organizations, consociational compromises, etc.

Of course, activists and scholars have dared to criticize some of the more indiscriminate of these "realistic" accommodations on the grounds that they so stretch the concept of democracy that it loses all logical connection with its past meaning. Perhaps the pinnacle of this sort of stretching was reached when the American pluralists extolled the virtues of "apathy" and "slack resources" in explaining why the U.S. polity was both stable and democratic. Unfortunately, these critical efforts at retrieval often have a reactionary cast to them. They imply (or explicitly urge) that the ensuing (and often well-entrenched) practices be somehow eradicated and the polity be returned to some more desirable (and often unprecedented) state of greater conformity to democratic principles. Since it is usually left unclear what likely configuration of power would produce such a purge or what possible transformation of citizen attitudes would have to occur for this to be accepted, such exercises remain largely

academic. They may stimulate heated discussion among philosophers and ideologues, but few lead to actual experiments in more democratic governance.

This essay is neither an effort at restatement nor at retrieval. It aims at a reconstruction of democratic theory. It will attempt to examine critically the implications and consequences of the emergence of neo-corporatist arrangements for the practice of democracy in advanced industrial/capitalist societies without "(indulging) in the fantasy of an unconstrained ideal order" (1). In other words, it accepts the fact that important structural changes have occurred in the way class, sectoral and professional interests are organized and in the way these organizations relate to each other and to the state in polities which have otherwise retained open, competitive electoral processes and civic liberties. However, it neither accepts these changes as democratic because they seem to have been spontaneously created and voluntarily agreed upon, nor does it engage in the wishful fantasy that they represent merely temporary aberrations doomed to collapse in short order before the opposition of democratic forces. Neo-corporatist arrangements are well-entrenched — much more so in some polities than others — and, at least at the level of popular consciousness, they have yet to be rejected as manifestly undemocratic. The task of constructive democratic theory in this context is twofold: (a) to examine critically the impact of neo-corporatist arrangements with an eye to modifying or minimizing them in order to make them more compatible with the enduring principles of

democracy; (b) to identify the agents or processes which might possibly promote such a more desirable outcome.

DEMOCRACY

Our obvious first task is to establish as clearly as possible what our standard of democratic performance is. Only then can we convincingly argue that a given arrangement is or is not compatible with it. Democracy is a principle, embodied in a set of rules, expressed through a complex of institutions, which is aimed at establishing or sustaining a certain quality of relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled. Its guiding principle is that of citizenship, i.e. the right to be treated by fellow human beings as equal and the obligation to respect the legitimacy of choices made by collective deliberation among equals. The decision rules which embody this principle have varied a great deal historically — varying from unanimity, to qualified majority, to concurrent minorities, to the presently predominant (but by no means universal) one of simple majority (2) — as have the eligibility rules for participation which define who is a citizen and how he/she can act politically. Secret balloting, universal suffrage, civic freedoms, regular elections and party competition are elements common to virtually all efforts at conceptualizing "modern procedural democracy" (3), while others such as proportional representation, public financing of parties and unrestricted access to information are not (yet) such integral components of the procedural minimum. Needless to say, the specific institutions, which have been used to

express the citizenship principle and to embody the procedural rules have varied even more over time and across units. Open assemblies, hereditary or appointed chambers, popularly elected presidencies, party caucuses, electoral primaries, worker's councils, advisory committees, federal states, referenda, ombudsmen, — just to name a few — have all been considered legitimate, if different, expressions of democratic institutions at one time or another.

The historically variant procedures and institutions for translating the principle of democratic citizenship into practice are presumably not ends in themselves (or else, why would they have been modified so much and so often?). Rather, they should be regarded as the means for establishing a particular sort of relationship between rulers and ruled. The ideal, of course, has always been to abolish this distinction so that citizens could practice self-government, i.e. not only be free and equal in their choices of what course or collective action to take, but free and equal in the carrying out of that course. Once increased size, international threat, decisional complexity, etc. make that ideal unattainable — wherever citizens accept the need for permanent governance by some specialized set of rulers — then the crucial criteria for evaluating democratic performance becomes the quality of that ruling relationship. What those criteria should be and in the event of conflicting capabilities which should have priority, have been the subject of much discussion and little agreement. First, it may be useful to distinguish whether the units of reference for evaluating democratic performance are

citizens or authorities. In other words, is democracy a quality inherent in the behavior of the individuals that compose it?, or of the collectivity that governs them? A second evaluative dimension focuses on the process of policy-making and distinguishes between the input and the output aspects of governing. This asks whether a given government is "of the people", or whether it is "for the people" -- whether it affords opportunities for citizens to become equally involved, or whether it does things which equally benefit them. Figure I is an effort to depict these contrasting (but not necessarily contradictory) dimensions graphically.

FIGURE I
THE QUALITIES OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT


I. The Aspect of Governance

"Of the People" "For the People"

II. The Unit of Reference:

Individual Citizens

Public Authorities



Participation is the virtue stressed by those who regard democracy primarily from the point of view of individual citizens playing an active and equal role in the making of collective decisions. Judged from the perspective of public authorities, government of the people should be accessible by treating the preferences and demands of all citizens — organized or unorganized, concordant or discordant, preceded or unprecedented — as equally qualified and worthy of consideration in the making of public choices. If one switches to the

second, vertical, axis of what governments do rather than who gets involved, the extent to which individual citizens can hold their rulers accountable through some process of regular consultation and non-arbitrary deliberation becomes the most democratic standard one can apply. Finally, responsiveness would seem to be the best term for designating the collective property of a democratic ruling class which guarantees that citizen needs will be met and, hence, that the exercise of public power will be legitimated.

Finally and most controversially, competitiveness seems to lay at the core of the entire modern democratic process, affecting both individuals and authorities as well as the input and output of governance. Classical democratic theory certainly didn't stress this quality. Rather the contrary, the presumption was that free deliberation among equals would produce a singular, ethically superior, consensus ("the public good"). Those who persisted in dissenting from it were expected to leave the community or renounce their citizenship. One quiet revolution in the modern conception of social order — later translated, so-to-speak, into democratic theory — was the notion that communities could persist, even thrive despite stable divergences of belief, interest, lifestyle, etc. in their midst. First, with the tolerance of religious dissent and, later and, however precariously, with respect to status, class, linguistic, ethnic, generational, gender and other cleavages, democracy became virtually identified with the acceptance of social pluralism and, consequently, with the institutionalization of such cleavages into

non-violent competition for office and influence. Presumably, competitiveness stimulates citizens to participate more actively, encourages authorities to be accessible to a greater multiplicity of demands, enforces more accountability on the part of policy-implementors and ensures that collective choices will be responsive to the full range of diversity present in a given society. Without it, the whole matrix of democratic qualities risks degenerating into formalistic ritual, choreographed consent, symbolic distortion and/or generalized apathy.

"Of course!", the reader may protest, "a truly democratic polity should be all these things: participatory, accessible, accountable, responsive and competitive. Why bother even to distinguish among them?" One answer is that some of these qualities may be antithetic under particular conditions. Another is that scarcity of resources may force citizens and/or rulers to choose one over the other. But for the purposes of this essay, what is important is that a given new institution or arrangement may contribute to satisfying one of these virtuous qualities — and, therefore, acquire a form of democratic legitimation — while undermining the others. This, as we shall see below, may well be the case of neo-corporatism.

DEMOCRATIZATION

Democratization in its most generic sense has involved the progressive extension of the citizenship principle to encompass a wider range of eligible participants and a wider scope of domains in

which collective choice among equals (or their representatives) can make binding decisions upon all. Tocqueville was probably correct in identifying this as one of the strongest underlying trends in modern times. There have been, of course, some horrendous exceptions to this generalization, even within the heartland of democratic practice. It is, however, significant that even contemporary dictatorships usually define themselves as "régimes d'exception" and justify their existence on the grounds (however dubious) that they are dedicated to returning the polity eventually to some higher or more purified form of democracy. Moreover, recent developments in Southern Europe and Latin America give us reason for renewed faith in the existence of such a telos, if only because tyrannical regimes seem incapable of resolving self-generated contradictions (4).

Democracy has survived because its defenders have managed to assert its principle/procedures/institutions/qualities against the competing claims of other formulae for making collective choices and ensuring public order. Democratization has progressed because its promoters have succeeded in extending those properties into economic and social domains previously governed by other allocation rules and authority principles. But even where it has been successfully defended or extended, democracy has always been compelled to make more-or-less enduring institutional compromises with a variety of antithetic practices. Social hierarchies based on tradition, market allocations of value, and specialized commands over knowledge are all intrinsically anti-democratic in the triple sense that they assign

actors to unequal positions, they define certain domains as "inappropriate" for public scrutiny and accountability, and they resign citizens to the acceptance of choices made by more prestigious, more knowledgeable, more powerful or better endowed others: notables, owners or experts. Nowhere among existing democracies has the principle of self-government among equals prevailed exclusively, and this is conveniently (if often misleadingly) symbolized by the insertion of a qualifying adjective before the term: e.g., representative-, liberal-, bourgeois-, social-, proletarian-, people's-, etc.

One reason for such standing compromises stems simply from the fact that contemporary democracies operate through a multiplicity of specific, historically-conditioned, political units — namely, secular, territorial states or, worse, large nation-states. Their pre-democratic heritage, their inveterate conflictualness, their sheer size and extension, their diffuse loyalties — all protect and encourage competing principles and make the democratic one more difficult to realize. Inherited status groups are respected for their past contributions; specialized elites are allowed to act with impunity on grounds of national defense or grandeur; representative agents are weakly connected to large and heterogeneous constituencies; nationalistic sentiments are manipulated in order to subordinate cultural diversities. If this were not enough, democracy itself has greatly increased the individual and group needs subject to collective choice and implementation and this, in turn, has

resulted in an enormous expansion and centralization of the permanent apparatus for processing these claims, namely the state bureaucracy. The whole production of public goods becomes increasingly indirect and technically incomprehensible to the average citizen.

Marxists rightly have stressed for some time the limits placed on the democratic principle and its varying procedures / institutions / qualities by the existence of private property rights which protect their owners, constitutionally or otherwise, from popular scrutiny or control. The subsequent development of large business corporations with unprecedented resources and capabilities for affecting whole populations, and the internationalization of exchange and production relations which can effectively circumvent the control of even the most democratic of domestic polities have certainly added further elements of credibility to this critique. Nevertheless, the recent revival of interest in "state theory" has contributed surprisingly little to democratic theory — this, despite Marx's early and explicit recognition of a contradiction between the equality of citizenship and the inequality of ownership. From an instrumental or a functionalist perspective, the Marxists' answer to the question of neo-corporatism's compatibility with democracy would seem to be so obvious as to be axiomatic. Given what is "known" about the distribution of "real" power in capitalist societies and bourgeois democracies, such institutional innovations can only be the product either of conscious intent by the ruling class to maintain its dominance, or of system constraints which ultimately must benefit the

minority of owners over the majority of citizens. Indeed, one prominent approach to neo-corporatism explicitly defines the phenomenon in terms of its function of subordinating the working-class to the imperatives of capital (5).

Recent discussions by Marxists in the conditions for establishing "class compromise" (6) and the role of "democratic antagonisms" (7) seem to be opening up new grounds within this tradition for a less aprioristic and, perhaps, less unfavorable treatment of neo-corporatism. Social democrats, of course, have been guilty, not only of harboring, but of promoting such thoughts for some time (8), although they have usually been prudent enough to keep the specific concept of corporatism disguised by euphemisms. What remains is for them to come more explicitly to terms with the limitations on democratic practice sketched above. These are imposed by the state form of political organization (especially in its increasingly centralized configuration) and by the technocratic basis of administrative power (especially in the realm of social welfare). With these elements in hand, we might then have an adequate theoretical basis for a critical evaluation of the impact of neo-corporatism.

* * *

From this brief Problemstellung, we can draw the following conclusions:

(a) The citizenship principle provides the constant and common element to all theoretical efforts to define democracy but cannot be used alone to evaluate democratic performance. Nevertheless, if neo-corporatism can be clearly shown to diminish equal treatment or to reduce citizen acceptance of choices made by equal collective deliberation, then it must be regarded prima facie as undemocratic.

(b) Because this principle has been and can be expressed through a variety of decision rules and political institutions, to accept or reject neo-corporatist arrangements on the grounds of their compatibility with any particular configuration of them — even such established ones as majority rule or parliamentary sovereignty — would be ahistorical. That would be to deny one of democracy's greatest strengths, namely, its capacity for dynamic adaptation to changing circumstances. Nevertheless, neo-corporatism should be, at the very least, compatible with the prevailing "procedural minimum" — civic freedom, universal suffrage, etc — since these are prerequisites for continued democratic experimentation with specific rules and institutions.

(c) The qualitative democratic relationships of participation, accessibility, responsiveness, accountability and competitiveness seem to provide us with the best criteria for evaluating neo-corporatist practices because they avoid the particularities and rigidities

inherent in established rules and institutions and because they offer a more comprehensive perspective — individuals and authorities, input and output functions — from which to judge the whole or net impact of such practices.

(d) Existing democracies involve compromises with other ways of allocating values and exercising authority and are all, therefore, "secondbest" approximations. A realistic and reconstructive critique of neo-corporatism should not be based on its presumed ability to eliminate completely these constraints — the state form of political organization, the competitive form of international relations, the administrative form of policy implementation, the commodity form of economic production — but on its observed capacity "to strike a better deal" when making compromises with them. From a dynamic point of view, the crucial question is whether neo-corporatism can better defend in the present and assert in the future the democratic principle of citizenship against competing ones than can other feasible configurations of decision rules or representative institutions.

NEO-CORPORATISM

The concept of corporatism, usually accompanied by some prefix such as "societal-", "liberal-", "bargained-" or, more recently, "neo-", burst upon the social science scene in 1974 (9) and has since grown

in prominence, to the point that it has been described by one author as "a growth industry" (10). Confused in political discourse with Fascism and authoritarian rule — not to mention with the French-Italian polemic usage which identifies it with the pursuit of narrow and immediate sectoral interests — and confounded in academic discussion by competing definitions and theoretical approaches, it has become a controversial subject, an "essentially contested" concept. Neo-corporatism (the neo is intended both to separate it from its historical predecessors — whether medieval or interwar — and to indicate its relative novelty) has been found everywhere — and nowhere. It has been credited with producing all sorts of goods — and charged with promoting all matter of evils. It has been described as an inexorable political trend — and called a passing academic fancy. Most of all, it has been difficult to define neo-corporatism clearly and consensually. One of its strengths has been its ability to speak to the concerns of scholars from different disciplines and orientations — each of whom, however, has tended to give his or her own twist to the concept. It has become virtually impossible to tell whether all of the contributors to this growth industry are talking about related, much less identical, phenomena.

For purposes of this essay, neo-corporatism refers to a recently emergent political arrangement — not to a new way of running the economy (11) or ordering the entire society (12). It is concerned primarily with the activities of permanently organized and specialized associations — not units of production (firms,

enterprises, corporations, etc.), not units of consumption (individuals, families, cooperatives, etc.), not units of status or affect (corps, colleagues, cliques, etc.) and not units of public authority (state agencies, ministries, parliaments, local governments, etc.). These associations seek to advance or defend interests by influencing and contesting collective choices. And they do this by intermediating between members and various interlocutors (mostly the State) without presenting candidates for electoral approval or accepting direct responsibility for the formation of governments (i.e. they are not parties, caucuses, coalitions, etc.). Any or all of the other above mentioned units of political action may have a significant effect on the emergence or viability of neo-corporatism by supporting, opposing, or circumventing it, but they are not an integral part of its defining properties. Indeed, it is arguable that neo-corporatist practices have proven compatible with a rather wide range of surrounding units.

However, neo-corporatist arrangements are not the only way in which intermediation between interest associations and authoritative interlocutors can be institutionalized. Indeed, if one leaves aside medieval precedents and the short period of state-enforced corporatization under interwar dictatorships, they are relatively recent and rare. For a considerable period, the predominant way of conceptualizing interest intermediation was "pluralism" and a very substantial and impressive literature on that topic was devoted to demonstrating that its arrangements were not just compatible with, but actively promotive of democracy. Much of the "cloud of suspicion"

which hangs over neo-corporatism is due not just to the objections of those "utopians" who reject organized intermediation and incorporation of partial interests into policy-making on the grounds that it is destructive of the direct citizen role in public affair and of government by popular assembly, but to the suspicions of "realists" that these new arrangements represent a serious distortion and perversion of "proven" pluralist processes.

So, it would seem particularly appropriate in this context to define (neo-) corporatism by contrasting it with (neo-) pluralism. Such an approach has been criticized by some as epiphenomenal, as too "institutional" and "political-sciency", but this is to underestimate both the depth and breadth of the latter. For pluralism has never been "just" a theory of representation and political institutions. It also addresses important issues of the constitution of civil society, the nature of its component values and interests and the self-organization of groups within it, as well as of the formation of public policy and its impact on citizen satisfaction and legitimation. It is no more "normative" in its bias than most, so-called, political economy models and since, in this case, its bias is unabashedly toward a particular type of "representative democracy", it provides us with a ready-made standard of evaluation.

Any mode of organized interest intermediation — pluralist, corporatist or, for that matter, syndicalist, monist, or whatever — must involve two contrasting aspects of the political process : (1)

an arrangement for communicating and transforming member preferences into claims on others; (2) an arrangement for monitoring and influencing subsequent behaviour involved in realizing those claims. In the terminology of systems theory, it involves both input and output functions. These two aspects can be labelled: representation and control. Associations which operate in this political space are in the Janus-like position of intermediating between and focusing simultaneously upon two distinctive publics or clienteles. On the one hand, they must structure themselves internally and engage in such relevant activities that they offer sufficient incentives to their members so that they can extract adequate resources in the form of dues, fees, taxes, donations, voluntary labor, compliance, etc. to ensure at least their survival, if not their organizational growth. On the other hand, they must offer sufficient incentives to their interlocutors (i.e. state agencies, other associations, political parties) to be able to obtain other resources: recognition, toleration, access, protection, concessions, subsidization, etc., that are also needed for them survive and certainly to prosper. In other words, as specialized intermediaries, interest associations face a complex set of choices stemming from the often contradictory logics of appealing to members and exercising influence over interlocutors. Although pluralist theorizing about this domain has tended to underplay the control aspect and to make rather benevolent assumptions about the motives and activities of interlocutors (to the point of almost eliminating the distinctive coercive powers and administrative autonomy of the state), it is not difficult to

reconstruct the more-or-less implicit assumptions about these elements of the political process and to contrast pluralist and corporatist conceptions of them.

FIGURE II

PROPERTIES DISTINGUISHING PURE PLURALIST
AND PURE CORPORATIST MODES OF INTERMEDIATION

Associational Role	I. REPRESENTATION (INPUT)	
Associational Resources	Pluralist —————	Corporatist
I. IN RELATION	Multiple units —	Monopolistic units
TO MEMBERS	Overlapping claims—	Differentiated domains
	Autonomous ————— interaction	Hierarchical coordination
	Voluntary adherence—	Involuntary contribution
II. IN RELATION	Mutual tolerance —	Explicit recognition
TO	Opportunistic ———— access	Structured incorporation
INTERLOCUTORS	Consultative ————— access	Negotiative role
	Shifting alliances— (log-rolling)	Stable compromises (package-dealing)
<hr/>		
	II. CONTROL (OUTPUT)	
I. IN RELATION	Persuasive ————— conviction	Interest indoctrination
TO MEMBERS	Institutional (or — leader) prestige	Organizational authority
	Discriminate ————— treatment	Coercive sanctions
	Selective goods —	Monopolistic goods
II. IN RELATION	Provision of ————— information	Organization of compliance
TO	Irresponsibility — for decisions	Co-responsibility for decisions
INTERLOCUTORS	Autonomous ————— monitoring	Devolved implementation
	Mobilization of — pressure (protest or disruption)	Withdrawal from concentration (secession)

Figure II outlines summarily the property space surrounding the role and resources of interest associations and contrasts the elements of a pure corporatist and a pure pluralist mode of structuring such relationships. The distinctions drawn are, needless to say, logical not empirical. They are subject to gradations and approximations, and no single existing polity exactly replicates the entire Gestalt formed by its dichotomous properties. More importantly, as a good deal of research has demonstrated, within any single polity the configuration of organized interests may vary considerably by policy arena. Even the same interest organization — business association, trade union or professional association — may be operating simultaneously in a more pluralist or corporatist fashion as it interacts with different agencies or levels of government. Much of the confusion in the literature stems from the propensity of scholars either to focus exclusively on representation rather than control or on relations with members rather than with interlocutors, or to "privilege" a particular issue arena and level of governance — one of the favorites has been national incomes policies — and to generalize on the basis of the presence/absence, success/failure of such specific arrangements.

Figure II should make it clear — if nothing else — that neo-corporatism is a very complex bundle of changes in the relationship of associations to member interests and public policy-making. What is more, at a given moment in time and for a given issue in contention, the elements within the matrix may be far from consistent (as, incidentally, may also be the case with more pluralist

configurations). For example, in a particular country or policy sector, associations may have a monopoly on representation, enter into hierarchical coordinative arrangements with each other and generate most of their resources involuntarily, but not have much control over the formation of member preferences, the formal authority to affect member behavior or the effective sanctions to apply if their rules are transgressed. Even where these properties exist with respect to members, interlocutors (especially state authorities) may refuse to grant them corresponding corporatist "rights". They may not officially recognize existing monopolies, establish formal systems of guaranteed representation or depend on associational approval for the taking of policy measures. And even where they do this, when it comes to the actual allocation of goods or administration of regulations, they may not use associations to govern the compliance of affected interests, make associations co-responsible for subsequent decisions or devolve upon them authority to carry out directly the necessary tasks.

Seen this way, neo-corporatism is a very complex "bundle" of changes in the relation of organized interests to policy-making. Moreover, precisely because it has evolved in such a piecemeal and uneven manner, over a considerable period of time in response to very different circumstances in class relations, sectoral conflicts, status rivalries, international pressures, etc., and also perhaps because it has not been accompanied by a powerful and explicit ideology justifying its presence and homogenizing its practice,

manifestations of corporatism are exceptionally diverse, difficult to capture, and subject to conflicting interpretation.

Let us set aside the considerable empirical problem posed by using such a logically consistent and abstract, ideal-typic, model to describe and analyze existing configurations. Contemporary research in Western Europe has been quite inventive in discovering and labelling mixed configurations with differing sets of participants at varying levels of policy-making (13). What is especially relevant here is the speculative question of emergent properties. Are the polities of advanced industrial/capitalist societies moving inexorably in the same general direction away from pluralism toward corporatism — inhibited only momentarily and circumstantially by differences in historical points of departure, prevailing class conjunctures, international vulnerability, state capacities, political culture, etc?. Or are they likely to remain frozen into different configurations varying not only according to entrenched subjective national experiences but also with persistent objective differences in the structure of interest conflicts which define their particular classes, sectors, professions, strata, entitlement categories, or "causes"? For a tentative answer to this question, we must look now diachronically, not synchronically, into the historical processes which have promoted these changes in associability and policy-making — where they have occurred at all.

CORPORATIZATION

Given the unevenness with which neo-corporatist arrangements are spread across countries and policy sectors and the variety in their structures, it may seem surprising that there are any general theories about how they may have come about, but there are. Moreover, there exist two strongly contrasting "hunches" which lead to virtually diametrically opposite evaluations with respect to democracy.

The one, particularly prominent in Scandinavia, tends to interpret neo-corporatism as part of a long-term and gradual historical process involving the rationalization of social relations. The emergence of monopolistic representation through the elimination of prior overlaps in functional domains or ideological programs, the subordination of previously autonomous organizations to the hierarchical control of sectoral or class "peak associations", the granting and formalizing of direct access to state agencies and the acquisition of negotiative status, the acceptance of co-responsibility for courses of action subsequently decided upon, and the use of associations as agents for policy-implementation — all these hallmarks of neo-corporatism are regarded as an extension to the realm of interest intermediation of organizational developments which first became prevalent elsewhere. Moreover, since much of this simplification, specialization, "explicitization", standardization, bureaucratization, etc. of relationships is the result of policies carried out at the express will of the people, or, better, through its majoritarian partisan representative: social democracy, there can be little or no doubt about its impact upon democracy. Indeed, from this interpretive

perspective, the historical development of bureaucracy and that of democracy go hand-in-hand. Their allocative and procedural principles may be different, even antagonistic, but they are intrinsically complementary. "Advances" in one of these choice/control mechanisms will call forth countervailing changes in the other. Neo-corporatism (or "societal bargaining" as Walter Korpi prefers to term it) is nothing but the inevitable, if not always intentional, sideproduct of such a dynamic process. As such, it is not merely compatible with democracy, but part of an advanced, better organized form of democracy in which capacities for collective action are more equally distributed and relations to authority rendered more predicable and public.

The obverse "hunch" — also presented, of course, as a confirmed theoretical generalization — is that neo-corporatism is a product of "the laws of capitalist development", or more accurately, of a crisis in the historical course of that development. What is the nature of the specific crisis that induces such a change in organized class relations is a matter of some controversy among neo-Marxists, e.g. a "legitimation deficit", a productivity-profit squeeze, a change in the requisites of competitive survival in the World System, a shift in class forces, a decline in bourgeois parliamentarism. But what is clear from this perspective is that neo-corporatism is a deliberate strategy on behalf of a propertied minority enjoying unequal benefits — not an unintended sideproduct of a majoritarian demand for more equal treatment. The benefitted class, i.e. capitalists, may not struggle explicitly to establish such institutions. Indeed, they may

stubbornly cling to their out-moded ideology of individualistic competition and voluntaristic cooperation, but "their state" functions predictably and reliably to ensure their social reproduction and, therefore, intervenes to protect their long-term, objective interests by promoting the formation of neo-corporatist arrangements. Since these will not operate without some degree of collaboration from "social partners", trade union leaders, consumer representatives, and so forth must be hegemonically convinced by internalizing the norms of reformist ideology and/or personally coopted by enjoying organizational payoffs to participate in them. Neo-corporatism is, therefore, intrinsically undemocratic, a major barrier to the attainment of a more participatory, just and responsive polity. Fortunately, however, according to these theorists it can only be a temporary expedient. Its dependence on cyclically-generated surpluses, its asymmetric distribution of benefits and its ultimate inability to master the contradictions of capitalist production will destroy it in the longer run. Whether it will be replaced by an advancement to a higher form of democratic socialism or recession to a lower form of authoritarian capitalism depends on "the balance of class forces" at the moment this intrinsic crisis manifests itself — and it is the function of radical democratic theory to promote the more desirable outcome.

C
Between these sharply divergent poles of analysis and evaluation lies a somewhat confused and eclectic bunch of interpretations of why neo-corporatism has emerged, who is likely to benefit from its persistence and what will be its probable future, while acknowledging

the broad, parametric effect of the "organizational revolution" (14) which swept contagiously across countries and social groups since roughly the 1890s, and the shift in internal class and external competitive relations which has occurred in advanced capitalist societies especially during the protracted, post-World War II expansion, these eclectic approaches tend to stress both the differential spread of the organizational phenomenon and its relevance to internal conflicts not strictly determined by the struggle between capital and labor. Neo-corporatism becomes less the predictable or inevitable product of some general trend than an opportunistic, pragmatic and often unintended response to disparate circumstances. It has been promoted (and occasionally inhibited) by episodic events such as wartime exigencies, peacetime reconstruction, foreign occupation and regime discontinuities; it has been affected by constant national differences in size, strategic location, resource bases, patterns of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, etc.; and perhaps most importantly, its emergence has depended on specifically political variables such as the electoral strength of Social Democracy, the centralization of administrative structures, the distinctiveness of recruitment and training of civil servants, the rootedness of territorial-parliamentary systems of representation, the ideological fragmentation of class forces, and the shifting substantive content of public policy. These are conditions which tend to vary much more across and within countries than do their respective levels of organizational rationalization or capitalist development. However, by introducing so much contingency into the pattern of its emergence and functioning, such eclectic

approaches to neo-corporatism make much more difficult the evaluation of its positive or negative consequences for democracy. Their answer (and mine) is likely to be a limp and inconclusive "it depends".

ASSOCIABILITY AND THE PURSUIT OF INTERESTS

The genus of which neo-corporatism is such a relatively recent species is associability — the propensity for groups of persons within a larger polity to join together in some more-or-less formalized way to pursue through collective action interests they believe they have in common. Political authorities are not always tolerant of such efforts. Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that, historically, they have most often been outright hostile to self-constituted, self-regarding and self-actuating "factions" defining them as subversive of public order and divisive of state sovereignty. This "worms-in-the-entrails-of-the-body-politic" view has recently resurfaced in the conservative literature on "overload" which claims that the alleged ungovernability of contemporary democracies is due to excessive activity by groups acting in selfish disregard for higher public purpose and usurping tasks which should be left to enlightened elites (15).

Nor have democratic theorists and political progressives always been supportive of associability. The sheer presence of such intermediaries could be seen as a factor distorting the relation between individual citizens and sovereign authorities — interjecting partial wills into the process of general will formation or protecting reactionary factions against the tide of historical

transformation. This theme of direct, unmediated democracy was articulated most emphatically by Rousseau and reached its apotheosis during the French Revolution in the Loi le Chapelier of 1791 banning "all types of associations among citizens of the same status or profession under any pretext or any form that exists". It returned again, over a century later, this time as farce, in the pretense within "popular democratic" regimes that the ruling revolutionary party represents all legitimate interests and that whatever associations are tolerated must be subordinate to its will.

Elsewhere the evolving practice of democracy began to recognize freedom of association as a basic civic liberty — part of the procedural minimum we discussed above. Beginning with the constitutional breakthroughs of the United States (1792), Belgium (1830), Switzerland and Denmark (1848-9), it became increasingly difficult to deny citizens the right to found or join associations on account of their class, race, condition of dependence, sex or age. Authorities did (and still do) use other legal pretexts to prevent certain groups from assembling and, most of all from acting collectively, e.g. "subversive intent", "restraint of trade", "breach of the peace", "violation of property". They also can employ other, less legal, impediments such as police harassment, denial of access to public facilities, tax penalties and outright violence, but within most social groups in Western Europe and North America citizens have been able for some time to create permanent organizations for the defense of their interests; recruit (and even reject) members as they see fit; establish their own institutions of self-governance; acquire

and accumulate property; sue (and be sued by others); engage in the activities of their own choosing; petition authorities when they please on the topics they prefer — subject only to certain modest requirements of formal registration and respect for the criminal law and tax code. More recently and less widely, associations have acquired the legal right to exclusive recognition as bona fide negotiators for their members, to be consulted before decisions within their interest domain can be made, to receive information and subsidies from state officials, and to participate directly in the implementation of public policy.

Most of these rights and attendant obligations were acquired by associations through struggle, compromise and pragmatic sanction, punctuated only occasionally by constitutional revision or landmark court decisions. Democratic theory only belatedly (and in some case, reluctantly — cf. Madison's famous 10th Federalist paper) caught up with these changes, although Alexis de Tocqueville had the genius to recognize the significance of associability at a relatively early stage of its development in what was then its most advanced site: the United States. His famous hypothesis has stood the test of time astonishingly well: "For men to become or remain civilized, the art of association must develop and perfect itself among them in the same measure as the equality of conditions among them grows" (16). From this perspective, one can deduce that the more freedom of action associations can enjoy, the more members they can recruit, the more activities they can engage in, the greater the coverage they can provide for citizen interests, the more democratic the polity is

likely to be, to become or to remain. Leaving aside that "démocratie" is not exactly what Tocqueville meant by "civilisation", this postulated linkage between associability and democracy seems to be one of the closest, most virtuous and best established we have - rivaled only by that between elections and democracy. How could one possibly attack such an assumption?

Robert Michels probably fired the first salvo when he pointed to the resources which incumbent leaders within associations could manipulate in order to maintain oligarchic control (17). The subsequent increase in size with the emergence of large-scale national organizations has entailed an inevitable loss of personal contact among members and a more indirect system of internal governance. As one distinguished French student of associability put it: "associations are subject to the same processes of growth and giantism as private enterprises" (18). All those imputed benevolent qualities of Tocqueville's which hinged on social intimacy and democratic experience became more dubious. Empirical inquiry subsequently discovered that only exceptional associations — even in relatively pluralist contexts — were able to sustain the sort of active participation, open competition and close accountability which made them into "schools of civic virtue" (19). The demonstrated prevalence of entrenched oligarchy also raised the uncomfortable possibility that association leaders might be collecting "political rents" for themselves in the form either of self-serving appropriation of group benefits or the public promotion of interests not shared by members.

The next serious general assaults on the associability-democracy citadel came from Mancur Olson in his Logic of Collective Action (20). Working within a voluntaristic and individualistic frame of reference, he argued that limitations on the ability to extract contributions for the provision of public goods would encourage associational entrepreneurs to offer increasing quantities of selective goods whose consumption could be restricted to members. In effect, interest groups would have to become more like business firms if they wished to recruit members and develop their resources further. This would distort their internal processes away from the democratic concern with mobilization and representation, thereby, diminishing the role of militant action, ideological conviction and voluntary participation in favor of passive conformity, material consumption and professional management. It would also tend to free association officials to pursue public goals not necessarily shared by members, thereby, increasing further the rate at which "political rents" were likely to be levied.

Olson's perspective also challenged the validity of one of the most central (and democratic) assertions of pluralist theory — namely, that given an equal freedom to associate and an equivalent intensity of interest, a spontaneous and dynamic process of countervailing would occur and, thereby, prevent any entrenched elite or stable coalition from dominating the policy process. Because the propensity for voluntarily contributing to collective action is unevenly distributed across interest categories of differing sizes and degrees of dispersion, "privileged groups" would naturally emerge

and large categories of interests would remain effectively latent — protected only by their episodic voting power or the benevolent intervention of elites on their behalf. Olson barely refers to the class bias intrinsic in such disparities, but Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesen­thal have developed this theme much more coherently and extensively in a recent article (21).

But these critiques of the free associability-political democracy nexus are, in a sense, "pre-corporatist." Convinced pluralists may recognize them as distortions or problems, but they treat them as "ameliorable" by legal reform or "avoidable" through political struggle. After all, underorganized latent interests do have access to alternative channels of expression, e.g., territorial and partisan representation or single issue movements. Other, "solidary" and "purposive", incentives can be used to recruit members and attract contributions (22). Individuals can still "vote with their feet" against unrepresentative leaders, and shift to alternative suppliers of desired goods and services (23). Competition between overlapping associations can serve as a functional substitute for internal oligarchy. Mobilization of latent groups by aspiring entrepreneurs or conspiring elites can serve as a check on dominant "power blocs."

NEO-CORPORATISM AND THE SCIENCE OF ORGANIZATION

Above we have noted with approval Tocqueville's argument that promoting "the art of association" was a necessity if democracy is to

X keep pace with social transformation. And neo-corporatist arrangements do seem to have a significant and independent effect upon the properties of participating interest associations. Their densities of membership go up almost to the point of saturation; their organizational resources increase and become more equally distributed across incorporated interests; their range of activities becomes more varied and authoritative; their scope of representation becomes more comprehensive. Since these arrangements have not been imposed by an authoritarian regime and asymmetrically manipulated from above to favor some interests over others — as was the case of interwar state corporatist experiences — and have been freely chosen, voluntarily maintained and occasionally renounced by organized groups seeking access to public authority, they would seem to embody the sort of adjustment that Tocqueville advocated. Moreover, again in contrast to the interwar period, the emergence of such arrangements was neither envisaged as a replacement for traditional liberal forms of territorial representation, nor have they proven incompatible with such hallmarks of democratic procedure as freedom of speech and press, respect for the constitution, electoral competition, public disclosure, etc. In factor, many of the countries scoring highest in various indicators of neo-corporatism: Sweden, Norway, Austria, the Netherlands, for example, have been in the vanguard of extending equal citizen rights into new domains and equalizing the benefits from public policies.

What Tocqueville could not anticipate and what his subsequent pluralist epigones failed to recognize is that the development of

permanent, specialized and professionalized intermediaries between citizen and state might transform "the art of association" into "a science of organization". Instead of merely re-presenting independently formed member preferences, associations could become institutions for inculcating and managing member interests. Instead of remaining multiple "vehicules for meaningful participation", they might increasingly become monopolistic "providers of indispensable services". What is more, instead of providing "havens of protection" for privately enjoyed satisfactions, they can come to constitute more and more "conduits of intervention" for publicly supplied coordinations (24). Tocqueville assumed that voluntary associations would provide lively, significant and alternative sources of individual identification and political experience — a sort of "secondary citizenship" outside the official one — and that their activities would lessen rather than increase the need for involuntary, authoritative coordination of individual behaviors within society. Neo-corporatism has the potentiality of altering the relationship of members to their associations and the role of the latter inside the official realm of authority. In other words, it might be undermining the "virtuous circle" between associability and democracy.

Of course, all forms of specialized and institutionalized interest politics violate at least two prevailing norms of democracy. As several analysts have pointed out (25), votes are counted — presumably equally if the elections are honestly conducted — but interests are weighed — presumably proportionately in relation to

X
 their functional importance or political clout. Moreover, in voting systems decisions are usually taken by compiling a supportive majority — however qualified. In interest bargaining, decisions are usually taken by forging a consensual compromise to which all actors agree — however reluctantly. The historical emergence of this mode of structuring political exchanges can be interpreted as an effort by minorities who wished their interests weighed and who were aware that their compliance was necessary for collective choice to be effective to protect themselves against majorities who wished their votes counted and who were confident that they could overcome dissenters by force of numbers. Interest politicians successfully pitted one procedural norm (freedom of association) against another (freedom of electoral expression) — and one decision rule (consensus) against another (majoritarianism).

All neo-corporatism has done is to take this differentiation within democratic polities much further. With its hierarchic coordination, state recognition, policy concertation and devolved authority, it has separated more effectively than before the interaction between interest associations and public authorities from the vagaries of electoral success and legislative choice. With its monopolistic representation, elimination of overlapping domains and quasi-voluntary membership, it has restructured the conditions of competition among associations by raising the cost of exercising "voice" through alternative channels and foreclosing the possibility of resorting to "exit". Without easy access to other channels of interest expression, effective choice between competing organizations

or a reasonable chance to create rival ones, individual citizens in neo-corporatist systems may find themselves deprived of the resources necessary to hold "their" representatives accountable and to ensure that policies pursued will be responsive to "their" concerns.

Presumably, this places a much more substantial burden on the quality of the political process within neo-corporatist associations than was the case in more pluralist systems with their overlapping structures and ease of entry and exit. The question becomes whether competition and participation are likely to be greater within monopolistic, heteronomous organizations than within multiple, autonomous ones. There is every reason to expect the contrary since — with compulsory membership, provision of indispensable services, public subsidization, devolved authority and/or mandatory licensing — neo-corporatist leaders can be largely freed from the constraint of inducing members to contribute and, hence, from the need to conform closely to members' preferences in order to extract those contributions. Moreover, their symbiotic relation to state authority encourages, if not requires, them to adopt a longer-term view based on technical calculation and expert opinion. This enhances the role of professional staff at the expense of voluntary labor and more "spontaneous" expressions of preference. Therefore, one can presume that, in the normal course of transacting interest business, leaders will tend to discourage member participation and to underplay the role of militant mobilization. Followers will learn that associations have less and less to offer in the way of affective interaction and collective solidarity. Whatever aspirations members still have for

"secondary citizenship", they are likely to take elsewhere, to political parties, community action groups, single issue movements, if they do repress them altogether.

Which is not to say that neo-corporatist practices in representation and policy-making are intrinsically anti- or undemocratic. It does suggest that, where they have emerged and become entrenched, they may be altering the quality of democracy. Their "science of organization" has already changed its decision rules and procedural norms.

NEO-CORPORATIST PRACTICES AND THE CITIZENSHIP PRINCIPLE

In our effort to develop normative standards for evaluating its performance, we defined modern, representative democracy as a general principle in search of a certain qualitative relationship between rulers and ruled. Connecting the two are decision rules, procedural norms and political institutions which have varied considerably over time — no matter how established and definitive they may appear at a given moment. Except in instances of dramatic re-founding after the collapse of an authoritarian regime or in periods of deliberate reform in the face of manifest crisis, these specific rules, procedures and institutions tend to change slowly, often imperceptibly and usually by consensus under the pressure of opportunistic situations, international diffusion, or evolutionary trends.

Neo-corporatism is a good example of such a transformation within democratic polities in which the "procedural minimum" has been respected, but substantial changes in such things as majority rule, parliamentary sovereignty, public deliberation, etc. have occurred. Perhaps precisely because these contemporary trends in the organizational structure of interests and in their relation to policy-making have not been backed by an explicit ideology — again in contrast to interwar, state or authoritarian corporatism — and because they evolved in such a piecemeal, uneven and almost surreptitious manner within distinct policy arenas, they have largely escaped evaluative scrutiny. Only once they have accumulated over time, so-to-speak, and are manifestly affecting a wide range of producer and consumer, as well as citizen, behaviors is the question of their compatibility with democracy likely to arise — and to attract the attention of scholars as well as activists.

Our first and most diffuse evaluative standard is whether these arrangements violate the principle of citizenship. Do they diminish the extent to which individuals have equal opportunities to act as citizens and to be treated as equals by their fellow citizens? Do they reduce the extent to which citizens feel obligated to respect choices made by collective deliberation among equals (or their representatives)?

If one equates the opportunity to act as citizen only with voting and the obligation to conform only to laws which have been certified by a sovereign legislature, then neo-corporatism is manifestly contrary to

the citizenship principle. It introduces elements of "weighted" calculation and consensual bargaining with privileged minorities which clearly violate the sacred norms of "one man, one vote" and "the most votes win". It generates binding commitments which either are never subject to parliamentary approval or involve a mere officializing of package-deals hammered out elsewhere. However, if one broadens the notion of equal political opportunity and treatment to include intra-electoral periods and extra-electoral processes, then neo-corporatism can be interpreted as extending the citizenship principle.

Basically, what it does is to resolve "the paradox of liberal associability" i.e. the fact that where the freedom to associate is equally accorded but the capacity to exercise this freedom is unequally distributed, those that most need to act collectively in defense of their interests are the least likely to be able to do so. Small, compact and privileged groups who are already better able to advance their interests through existing economic and social exchanges than larger, more dispersed and equally endowed ones, will find it easier to recruit members and extract contributions for a further defense of their interests in the political realm — if and when such a response is required. Hence comes the theme of the "institutionalization of bias" in pressure politics which has been decried by so many critics of pluralism (26). What neo-corporatism does is shift the basis of associability from a predominantly voluntaristic and individualistic calculus to one where contributions become more generally binding on all members of a relevant category

(or more difficult to avoid), and mutual recognition and official certification protect the role of specific collectivities at the expense of competing fragments or individual actors. In short, as "free-riding" and "free-booting" become increasingly difficult under such arrangements, virtually everyone can be made to contribute and conform to associative action. This can have the effect of evening out considerably the organizational capacity of competing groups, particularly capital and labor. In addition, most neo-corporatist forums are based on highly formalized systems of parity in representation and, not infrequently, produce policies which make the participating "social partners" co-responsible for their implementation. Under such conditions, organized socio-economic interests may never be equally counted, but they are likely to be more equally weighed that they would be if citizens invested voluntarily and individually their own disparate resources and personal intensities in the liberal "art of association".

The normative problem with applying this "science of organization" to interest intermediation is that it may make more equal the capacities for exerting influence of incorporated collectivities, at the same time it purposively excludes others which may be affected by their deliberations. So far, neo-corporatism has privileged interests organized along functional lines of production within a capitalist economy — classes, sectors and professions. Its relative success has depended on restricting the number and identity of participants and passing on the costs to those not directly represented in its deliberations : consumers, taxpayers, youths,

feminists, irregular workers, foreigners, cultural minorities, nature-lovers, pedestrians, prohibitionists, etc. Granted that the more comprehensive scope of the associations engaged in neo-corporatist bargaining may encourage them to take into account some of these "marginal" interests, for example, when a comprehensive trade union calculates the effect of its demands on its member interests as consumers or when a national business association agrees to moderate its position in deference to the need for environmental protection, (27), but this is a tenuous and contingent relationship - - hardly reliable enough in the long-run to lead to an effective equalization of influence for such categories of citizens. Existing corporatist associations which defer too much to such interests risk a paralysis of their own internal decision structures and/or a defection of their own core supporters.

One "democratic" answer would be to extend the process of corporatization to cover interests structured along distributional lines or causes generated by cultural and ideological diversity, but that hardly seems feasible. Establishing monopolistic, hierarchically coordinated and topically differentiated national associations for, say, consumers, taxpayers, youths, environmentalists and foreign residents would likely involve such extensive state intervention and subsidization that it would be difficult to avoid the appearance, not to mention the reality, of manipulation and cooptation from above. The officially recognized associations would be simply disavowed by their nominal members and lose all credibility for contracting in their names. In addition to which, many of these groups define their

very existence in ways that defy professionalized representation and bureaucratic encadrement. To be organized corporatistically would destroy the very basis of their collective identity. Finally, even if the organizational problem could be solved, bringing such a quantity and variety of recognized interlocutors into the policy-making process on a co-equal basis would destroy the properties of small group interaction, specialized competence, reciprocal trust and propensity for compromise which have contributed so much to the viability of existing neo-corporatist arrangements.

In summary, a pattern of more equalized and formally structured exchange among associations has emerged in some democratic countries -- a sort of corporatism for the functionally privileged -- which could be defended as a direct extension of the citizenship principle outside the electoral-parliamentary arena in ways that go beyond the formalistic opportunities afforded by liberal associability. Moreover, its operation has undoubtedly had the indirect effect of promoting policies which have extended citizen rights to protection against unemployment, to more extensive welfare services and to representation within institutions previously governed by other authority principles, especially business firms and state agencies. Citizens of pluralistically structured policies have suffered significantly greater inequalities in all these domains. Its unintended consequence, however, has been to consolidate a disparity between these more equally compétent and privileged class, sectoral and professional interests and less equally compétent and organized ones -- leaving a sort of residual pluralism for the distributionally

disadvantaged and the culturally underprivileged. Since there appear to be serious impediments to extending neo-corporatist practices to these latter interest domains and since at least some of these appear to be of genuine concern to the citizenry of contemporary democracies, neo-corporatism is neither fully compatible with the citizenship principle nor are decisions made under its auspices likely to go unchallenged by those who are expected to obey them. However, like so many of its forerunners in the history of democratic development, its norms and institutions may long be tolerated as a second best compromise : "a better system than those that preceded it and those that have hitherto followed it" (28).

A SHIFT IN THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY ?

By now, it should be fairly evident what neo-corporatism can do to the quality of democracy — at least from the evaluative perspective adopted in this essay. The reader will recall Figure I in which five qualities were generated from a matrix which distinguished dichotomously between two units of reference (individual citizens or public authorities) and two aspects of governance (openness to inputs "of the people" or processing of outputs "for the people"), and which placed one feature of democratic performance at the center, presumably linking all the other virtues in a coherent whole.

Expressed in its graphic terms, neo-corporatist arrangements shift performance to the right — away from a concern with participation

and accessibility toward a greater emphasis on accountability, and responsiveness. Individual citizens become less intensely and directly involved in political life; at the same time, organizations active in their interests become increasingly integral components of the policy process. The number and type of interlocutors with equivalent and effective access to authorities decrease considerably due to the recognition of monopolies, the creation of associational hierarchies and the formalization of functional systems of representation; at the same time those that are able to obtain such privileged status acquire more resources and become more indispensable to the management of public affairs so that arbitrary (and often self-serving) actions by state officials become less likely. Subjects of collective choice which were highly politicized, i.e. subject to intense citizen concern, public debate, group mobilization and extensive pressure become less so; at the same time that institutions of administrative and market allocation which were previously defined as outside the realm of democratic politics become subject to greater scrutiny by political associations.

In the midst of this shift from participation/accessibility to accountability/responsiveness lies a phenomenon which modern democratic theory has been ill-prepared to analyze or even to recognize — namely, the development of "private" or "class governance". Perhaps, one major reason for this stems from its historical roots in liberalism. Democratic theory was originally closely identified with the liberal struggle against the constraints that obligatory associability had placed on the economic and social

behavior of individuals : guild restrictions, state-chartered monopolies, licensing provisions, etc. It continued to regard all associations which subsequently grew up under its tolerance and encouragement as purely voluntary and autonomous, an embodiment of that original resistance to regimentation and loss of individual freedom.

Neo-corporatism changes not merely the resources of associations and the nature of policy-making. It can also radically alter the relationship between interest groups and their members. Instead of merely aggregating independently formed preferences and articulating them before authorities, its associations acquire an enhanced capacity for defining the interests of members and controlling their behavior. In the pluralist idiom, information is the key resource involved in interest exchange; in the corporatist mode, it becomes compliance. Associations do not just inform policy-makers about the intensities of preference and likely reactions of their members, expecting officials to react accordingly; they also agree — for a price — to deliver member compliance to contracts negotiated with the approval of public authorities. All this presumes, of course, that it will be to the long-term benefit of members to be forced to cooperate irrespective of their individualistic, short-term preferences. Occasionally and always reluctantly, neo-corporatist organizations may even have to wield directly the coercive powers necessary to keep dissident members (and even non-members where contracts are extended to cover a whole category) in line: fines, expulsions, refusal to provide services, loss of license, etc. Whether this authority is

generated consensually from within or devolved legally upon it from without, the net result is the same. The society acquires a set of parallel institutions of semi-private or semi-public governance capable of coordinating the behavior of some large social aggregates -- classes, sectors, professions -- without directly burdening or involving state authorities. This may provide one element for explaining why the more neo-corporatist polities have proven demonstrably more "governable" in recent decades than pluralist ones at a similar level of capitalist development and organizational complexity (29).

This leaves us with competitiveness, the quality of democracy which putatively ties all the others together. What happens to it under the auspices of neo-corporatism? Obviously, some forms are eliminated altogether or reduced to insignificance. Groups with overlapping domains no longer compete for members or for access to public authorities on the same issues. Factions within associations are less likely to risk investing their resources in founding alternative organizations, if only because other public and private interlocutors will persist in recognizing only the officially monopolistic one. Under a general process of incorporation, highly specialized or very particularistic, "maverick groups" will find it increasingly prudent to merge with larger and more established units or to accept coordination from overarching "peak associations" if they do not wish to suffer a progressive marginalization from the policy-process.

It is not clear whether the politics within neo-corporatist organizations is likely to become more competitive as that between them diminishes (30). Certainly, the rewards for winning office become more substantial with the increase in associational resources and semi-public functions, but that may only encourage entrenched oligarchies to defend their positions more assiduously and tempt state and party officials to intervene in order to ensure that interest interlocutors will continue to play the responsible and respectful role assigned to them. At the level of national peak associations, executive leaders become highly visible and influential figures who can count on help from "outsiders" provided they agree to stay within the rules of the corporatist game.

But this does not mean that competitiveness disappears altogether under such arrangements. Rather its effect tends to become more implicit than explicit, more potential than observable. One must never forget that neo-corporatism is a chosen, not an imposed, strategy for the promotion and defense of interests, and that it is not the only mode of intermediation between citizens and authorities. Associations can withdraw from negotiations patterned this way — and they can survive, even prosper, by engaging in classic pressure politics. Specific issues can be taken to other arenas — and they can be articulated through single issue movements or spontaneous protest actions. Association members are also voting citizens — and they can express their dissatisfaction by switching allegiance among existing parties or by supporting new ones. Parties which have promoted corporatist arrangements can lose elections —

and their successors in government may choose to dismantle or ignore those arrangements. Parliaments can assert their legal sovereignty -- and they can refuse to ratify the social contracts which are put before them. Members can refuse to obey the directives of their associations -- and the sanctions available may be sufficiently weak or difficult to wield that they can get away with such defections. The fact that such occurrences have been relatively rare in neo-corporatist polities does not alter the latent role that competitiveness continues to play in setting boundaries upon such arrangements. Participants in them are forced to anticipate that such reactions could occur and to adjust their bargaining behavior accordingly. They cannot act as if neo-corporatism were the only game in town. Observers, however, who predicted its imminent demise after each wildcat strike or electoral failure of Social Democracy have been generally disappointed. It even appears to be surviving under the conditions of increased national and international competitiveness induced by protracted recession and consequent failure to meet such performance goals as full employment and economic growth. Nevertheless, the politics of these countries has not settled into some "post-problematic" consensus. Controversial items still manage to get on their agendas for collective deliberation; citizens continue to be offered real choices; associational leaders know they must be accountable to member preferences -- just as they know they must be responsive to system imperatives.

Moreover, one cannot ignore the fact that many of the polities where neo-corporatist practices have become most firmly entrenched have either inherited (e.g. Switzerland) or experimented with (e.g. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Western Germany) a wide range of institutional innovations which have extended the equal rights of individual citizens in their direct interaction with public officials and partisan representatives: referenda, proportional representation, ombudsman systems, subsidies for political parties and citizen groups, elections to works councils, public disclosure laws, decentralized administration, protection of personal data, profit sharing arrangements and so forth. One can argue that not all of these have had that much of an impact (and some have been very selectively implemented), but one can hardly fault these systems for not trying. It is at least plausible that discussion of them and their eventual presence in political life has effectively compensated for some of the more insidious and less positive effects that creeping neo-corporatism has had upon the other democratic qualities of participation, accessibility and competitiveness.

Finally, one must acknowledge the almost complete absence of popular resistance to neo-corporatist trends in those countries. This is all the more remarkable since they have rarely been defended explicitly and globally. Ordinarily they have only been sanctioned pragmatically on a case-by-case basis. No one confesses to being a "Corporatist", or even to some euphemism thereof. There exists no explicit justification of its practice in terms of its conformity to

democratic principles or procedures. And yet citizens have by-and-large accepted it upon reflection. They might recognize that its emergence has altered their rights and obligations and they might occasionally grumble to survey researchers that "organized business", "organized labor" or "organized professions" seem to have too much influence, but few if any seem to feel that they have lost more than they have gained by entrusting the management of their interest politics to such intermediaries. Ironically, it is in those countries whose interest associations have been least corporatized that one most often hears the epithet: "Corporatist" thrown at opponents, and that intellectuals denounce all signs of its prospective emergence as a threat to traditional freedoms and democratic institutions.

THE SPECTRE OF VICARIOUS DEMOCRACY?

So, does this mean that the more neo-corporatist polities are already headed toward some new form of post-individualistic, vicarious democracy, with other advanced industrial/capitalist societies soon to follow? That the famous myth of the rational, well-informed and active citizen has finally been put to rest and been replaced by the spectre of the reasonable, well-staffed and recognized association as the basic unit of democracy? That the notion of a civil society composed of natural groups voluntarily entering into exchanges in the pursuit of their own autonomously defined preferences and capable of reproducing itself without the constant intrusion of the state has given way to a vision of a

semi-public society composed of artifactual organizations compulsorily negotiating compromises in the pursuit of their members' imputed interests and capable of sustaining itself only by symbiotic interdependence with public authorities?

Let us leave aside the probability that neo-corporatism and vicarious democracy may well be a solution to the problem of modern interest conflict confined to particular countries and national circumstances. Small size, high international vulnerability, well-established state legitimacy, centralized administrative structures, clear preponderance of class cleavage over other bases of social and cultural conflict, ideological hegemony of social democratic over liberal bourgeois values are all factors which seem to have contributed to the emergence of such a pattern, although they may not necessarily all be prerequisites for such an outcome in the future.

I suspect that the answer to the "paradox of corporatist associability" — to its ambiguous impact on the practice of democracy — eventually lies in the truth of what is one of the most central tenets of the theory of democracy, namely, that for a polity to be really responsive to the needs and concerns of its citizens, these individual citizens must participate actively and freely in the definition of those needs and the expression of those concerns. They must not only have the "enlightened understanding" of their interests which Robert Dahl so rightly stressed, but they must also have the resources and the desire to engage in the political struggle necessary to make sure their preferences are taken into consideration

either by those who govern or by seeking themselves to govern. Specialized experts, organic intellectuals, designated spokespersons, professional intermediaries, benevolent rulers, etc. may, in some contexts and for some period of time, be better informed and more capable of interpreting the interests of social groups, but unless they are kept accountable by an active citizenry, their theories and suppositions about what is good for their members, clients, followers, etc. are likely to prove erroneous in the long run. What is more, the organizational and political "rents" which these intermediaries extract for the service they perform will systematically distort the very content of demands made upon the polity.

The progressive assertion of interest politics, its conversion from an "art of association", into a "science of organization", may have greatly changed the identity of relevant actors. It may have expanded the resources and extended the range of such intermediaries. The emergence of a neo-corporatist mode may have increased the immediate governability, improved the aggregate economic performance and equalized access to policy-making in advanced capitalist societies, but the "vicarious democracy" which has accompanied these transformations may not prove so satisfying and in the long run so governable. Rulers may become more accountable under such arrangements, but to the wrong collectivities — not necessarily to the units with which persons voluntarily identify and from which they naturally derive a sense of shared existence, but to those which struggle, convenience, connivance and luck have allowed to become

formally organized, often at levels of aggregation far above that which would have been spontaneously forthcoming. Governments may also be more responsive, but to the wrong needs — not necessarily to those which individuals would themselves feel and become concerned about, but to those which professional intermediaries have defined and promoted as the "real" interests of their respective memberships or clienteles — often while including substantial sidepayments for themselves and the organizations which they control.

Whatever impact the organization of interest politics has had upon political performance, whatever has been the relationship between neo-corporatism and governability, whatever both have done to growth, equality and democracy, it is difficult to imagine that these changes have completely voided the old liberal adage that "each individual person is the best judge of his or her own interests." Ultimately, if not immediately, the polity will be judged by its ability to satisfy these interests — not just those which have been identified, given generic labels and packaged collectively by intermediaries and to which authorities have presumably been dutifully accountable and responsive. Moreover if, among these "really felt" interests of individual citizens, are distinctively political needs for active participation and close access to rulers, then one would have even more grounds for suspecting that the sort of "vicarious democracy" promoted by neo-corporatism will prove to be but a passing phase — hopefully, an appropriate and proportionate (if temporary) adjustment in the "art of association" that Tocqueville thought was so necessary to keeping our collective

existence "civilized" while our individual conditions were becoming "equalized".

FOOTNOTES:

(1) Stanley Hoffmann, "Some Notes on Democratic Theory and Practice", The Tocqueville Review, Vol.II, No.1 (Winter 1980), pp. 59-76.

(2) Norberto Bobbio, "Are There Alternatives to Representative Democracy?", Telos, No.35 (Spring 1978).

(3) Robert Dahl, "On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States", Political Science Quarterly, Vol.92, No.1 (Spring 1977), pp. 10-13

(4) Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, "Political Life After Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions About Tentative Transitions", in ibidem (eds.) The Transition from Authoritarian Rule: The Prospects for Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming).

(5) Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies", in P. Schmitter & G. Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, London: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 119-146.

(6) Adam Przeworski, "Material Bases of Consent: Politics and Economics in a Hegemonic System", Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. I (1980), pp. 23-68.

(7) Ernesto Laclau, "Democratic Antagonisms and the Capitalist State", in David Robertson & Michael Freeman (eds.), Frontiers of Political Theory, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980, pp. 101-139.

(8) cf. Leo Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Francis G. Castles, The Social Democratic Image of Society, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); John D. Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, (Atlantic Highlands, N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1980); Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).

X (9) Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict and the New Corporatism", in P. Schmitter & G. Lehmbruch (eds.). op. cit., pp 53-62. (This essay was initially presented in 1974); Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", Review of Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan. 1974), pp, 85-131; R.E. Pahl & J.T. Winkler, "The Coming Corporatism", New Society, (10 October 1974).

(10) Leo Panitch, "Recent Theorizations of Corporatism: Reflections on a Growth Industry", British Journal of Sociology 31 (June 1980), pp. 159-87.

(11) Jack T. Winkler, "Corporatism", European Journal of Sociology, Vol.17, No.1 (1976), pp. 100-136.

(12) Salvador Giner & Manuel Pérez Yruela, La Sociedad Corporativa, (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1979).

(13) See, for example, the various essays in Klaus Amugeon et al., Neokorporatistische Politik in Westeuropa, (Konstanz: Universität Konstanz, Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Diskussionsbeitrag Nr.1, 1983).

(14) cf. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Organizational Revolution (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), originally published in 1953; Samuel P. Hays, Response to Industrialism: 1885-1914, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), especially pp. 48-70; Robert Prestus, The Organizational Society, (New York: Vintage Books, 1962); Carl G. Gustavson, The Institutional Drive, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1976); Jerry Israel (ed.), Building the Organizational Society, New York: The Free Press, 1972).

(15) cf. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America", in S. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 287-330, for a criticism of this literature.

(16) Alexis de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie en Amérique, (Paris: Gallimard, 1961), Vol.II, p.117.

(17) Robert Michels, Political Parties, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949).

(18) Albert Meister, Vers une sociologie des associations, (Paris: Editions Economie et Humanisme, (1972), p. 42.

(19) S.M. Lipset, M. Trow and J.S. Coleman, Union Democracy, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956) in the locus classicus for this point.

(20) Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

(21) Claus Offe & Helmut Wiesenhal, "Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form", Political Power and Social Theory, Vol.I (1980), pp. 67-115.

(22) James Q. Wilson, Political Organization, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 30-91.

(23) Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

(24) Philip Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), pp. 37ff. for the first cited item in each of the above paired quotes.

(25) cf. Frederic S. Burin & Kurt L. Schell (eds.), Politics, Law, and Social Change: Selected Essays of Otto Kirchheimer, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969) and Stein Rokkan, "Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism", in R. Dahl (ed.) Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 70-115).

(26) Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Power & Poverty. Theory & Practice, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), esp. pp. 3-66.

(27) Mancur Olson, in his recent, The Rise and Decline of nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), attempts to elevate this contingent point into a major explanatory factor.

(28) Norberto Bobbio, op. cit. p. 29.

(29) Philippe C. Schmitter, op. cit., in S. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe.

(30) Charles Sabel, "The Internal Politics of Trade Unions", in ibid, pp. 209-248.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

EUI WORKING PAPERS:

- | | | |
|----------|---|--|
| No. 1 : | Jacques PELKMANS | The European Community and the Newly Industrialized Countries |
| No. 2 : | Joseph H.H. WEILER | Supranationalism Revisited - Retrospective and Prospective. The European Communities After Thirty Years. |
| No. 3 : | Aldo RUSTICHINI | Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest Rates |
| No. 4 : | Mauro CAPPELLETTI/
David GOLAY | Judicial Review, Transnational and Federal: Impact on Integration |
| No. 5 : | Leonard GLESKE | The European Monetary System: Present Situation and Future Prospects |
| No. 6 : | Manfred HINZ | Massenkult und Todessymbolik in der national-sozialistischen Architektur |
| No. 7 : | Wilhelm BURKLIN | The 'Greens' and the 'New Politics': Goodbye to the Three-Party System? |
| No. 8 : | Athanasios MOULAKIS | Unilateralism or the Shadow of Confusion |
| No. 9 : | Manfred E. STREIT | Information Processing in Futures Markets - An Essay on the Adequacy of an Abstraction |
| No. 10 : | Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI | When Workers Save and Invest: Some Kaldorian Dynamics |
| No. 11 : | Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI | A Neo-Cambridge Model of Income Distribution and Unemployment |
| No. 12 : | Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI/
Guglielmo CHIODI | On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution |
| No. 13 : | Gunther TEUBNER | Reflexive Rationalität des Rechts |
| No. 14 : | Gunther TEUBNER | Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law |
| No. 15 : | Jens ALBER | Some Causes and Consequences of Social Security Expenditure Development in Western Europe, 1949-1977 |
| No. 16 : | Ian BUDGE | Democratic Party Government: Formation and Functioning in Twenty-one Countries |
| No. 17 : | Hans DAALDER | Parties and Political Mobilization: An Initial Mapping |
| No. 18 : | Giuseppe DI PALMA | Party Government and Democratic Reproducibility: The Dilemma of New Democracies |
| No. 19 : | Richard S. KATZ | Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception |

No. 20 :	Jürg STEINER	Decision Process and Policy Outcome: An Attempt to Conceptualize the Problem at the Cross-National Level
No. 21 :	Jens ALBER	The Emergence of Welfare Classes in West Germany: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Evidence
No. 22 :	Don PATINKIN	Paul A. Samuelson and Monetary Theory
No. 23 :	Marcello DE CECCO	Inflation and Structural Change in the Euro-Dollar Market
No. 24 :	Marcello DE CECCO	The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in the '20s and the '70s
No. 25 :	Manfred E. STREIT	Modelling, Managing and Monitoring Futures Trading: Frontiers of Analytical Inquiry
No. 26 :	Domenico Mario NUTI	Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe - Prospects and Repercussions
No. 27 :	Terence C. DAINTITH	Legal Analysis of Economic Policy
No. 28 :	Francis C. CASTLES Peter MAIR	Left Right Political Scales: Some Expert Judgements
No. 29 :	Karl HOHMANN	The Ability of German Political Parties to Resolve the Given Problems: the Situation in 1982
No. 30 :	Max KAASE	The Concept of Political Culture: Its Meaning for Comparative Political Research
No. 31 :	Klaus TOEPFER	Possibilities and Limitations of a Regional Economic Development Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany
No. 32 :	Ronald INGLEHART	The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages Among West European Elites and Publics
No. 33 :	Moshe LISSAK	Boundaries and Institutional Linkages Between Elites: Some Illustrations from Civil-Military Elites in Israel
No. 34 :	Jean-Paul FITOUSSI	Modern Macroeconomic Theory An Overview
No. 35 :	Richard M. GOODWIN Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI	Economic Systems and their Regulation
No. 36 :	Maria MAGUIRE	The Growth of Income Maintenance Expenditure in Ireland, 1951-1979
No. 37 :	G. Lowell FIELD/ John HIGLEY	The States of National Elites and the Stability of Political Institutions in 81 Nations, 1950-1982
No. 38 :	Dietrich HERZOG	New Protest Elites in the Political System of West Berlin: The Eclipse of Consensus?
No. 39 :	Edward O. LAUMANN David KNOKE	A Framework for Concatenated Event Analysis

- No. 40 : Gwen MOORE/
Richard D. ALBA Class and Prestige Origins in the
American Elite
- No. 41 : Peter MAIR Issue-Dimensions and Party Strategies in the
Irish Republic, 1948 - 1981: The Evidence of
Manifestos
- No. 42 : Joseph H.H. WEILER Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State -
The Art of the Impossible and the Possible
- No. 43 : Franz URBAN PAPPI Boundary Specification and Structural Models of
Elite Systems: Social Circles Revisited
- No. 44 : Thomas GAWRON/
Ralf ROGOWSKI Zur Implementation von Gerichtsurteilen Hypo-
thesen zu den Wirkungsbedingungen von Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts.
- No. 45 : Alexis PAULY
René DIEDERICH Migrant Workers and Civil Liberties
- No. 46 : Alessandra VENTURINI Is the Bargaining Theory Still an Effective
Framework of Analysis for Strike Patterns
in Europe?
- No. 47 : Richard A. GOODWIN Schumpeter: the Man I Knew
- No. 48 : J.P. FITOUSSI/
Daniel SZPIRO Politique de l'Emploi et Réduction de la Durée
du Travail
- No. 49 : Bruno DE WITTE Retour à Costa. La Primauté du Droit Commu-
nautaire à la Lumière du Droit International.
- No. 50 : Massimo A. BENEDETTELLI Eguaglianza e Libera Circolazione dei Lavoratori:
Principio di Eguaglianza e Divieti di Discrimi-
nazione nella Giurisprudenza Comunitaria in
Materia di Diritti di Mobilità Territoriale e
Professionale dei Lavoratori.
- No. 51 : Gunther TEUBNER Corporate Responsibility as a Problem of
Company Constitution.
- No. 52 : Erich SCHANZE Potentials and Limits of Economic Analysis:
The Constitution of the Firm.
- No. 53 : Maurizio COTTA Career and Recruitment Patterns of Italian
Legislators. A Contribution to the Understanding
of a Polarized Political System.
- No. 54 : Mattei DOGAN How to Become a Cabinet Minister in Italy:
Unwritten Rules of the Political Game.
- No. 55 : Mariano BAENA DEL ALCAZAR/
Narciso PIZARRO The Structure of the Spanish Power Elite 1939-1979.
- No. 56 : Berc RUSTEM
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI Preferences in Policy Optimization and
Optimal Economic Policy.
- No. 57 : Giorgio FREDDI Bureaucratic Rationalities and the Prospect
for Party Government

No. 58 :	Manfred E. STREIT	Reassessing Consumer Safety Regulations.
No. 59 :	Christopher HILL James MAYALL	The Sanctions Problem: International and European Perspectives
No. 60 :	Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Daniel SZPIRO	Adjusting to Competitive Depression. The Case of the Reduction in Working Time.
No. 61 :	Philippe LEFORT	Idéologie et Morale Bourgeoise de la Famille dans le <i>Ménagier de Paris</i> et le Second <i>Libro de Famiglia</i> , de L.B. Alberti.
No. 62 :	Peter BROCKMEIER	Die Dichter und das Kritisieren.
No. 63 :	Hans-Martin PAWLOWSKI	Law and Social Conflict.
No. 64 :	Marcello DE CECCO	Italian Monetary Policy in the 1980s.
No. 65 :	Giampaolo ROSSINI	Intraindustry Trade in Two Areas: Some Aspects of Trade Within and Outside a Custom Union.
No. 66 :	Wolfgang GEBAUER	Euromarkets and Monetary Control: The Deutschemark Case
No. 67 :	Gerd WEINRICH	On the Theory of Effective Demand under Stochastic Rationing
No. 68 :	Saul ESTRIN Derek C. JONES	The Effects of Worker Participation upon Productivity in French Producer Cooperatives
No. 69 :	Berc RUSTEM Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI	On the Formalization of Political Preferences: A Contribution to the Frischian Scheme
No. 70 :	Werner MAIHOFFER	Politique et Morale
No. 71 :	Samuel COHN	Five Centuries of Dying in Siena: Comparisons with Southern France
No. 72 :	Wolfgang GEBAUER	Inflation and Interest: the Fisher Theorem Revisited.
No. 73 :	Patrick NERHOT	Rationalism and the Modern State.
No. 74 :	Philippe C. SCHMITTER	Democratic Theory and Neo-Corporatist Practice.

