
Jean Beaman
European University Institute
Max Weber Programme


Jean Beaman

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Abstract
In this paper, based on 45 interviews with adult children of North African immigrants in the Paris metropolitan area, I discuss those individuals who, despite their educational and professional successes, remain excluded from mainstream French society. In particular, I explain how this segment of France’s second-generation defines being French and how they relate to these definitions. Respondents distinguish between the cultural and legal dimensions of French as an identity. Despite being born in France, they are often perceived as foreigners and therefore have their “Frenchness” contested by their compatriots. This population must navigate two seemingly separate social worlds – Maghrébin culture versus French society. As they have French citizenship, children of North African immigrants are therefore technically French. Yet they often find that they are denied a cultural citizenship, one which would enable them to be accepted by others as French. Ultimately, many of the North African second-generation seeks to assert not an oppositional identity, but a French one. Taking cultural citizenship into consideration provides a more nuanced understanding of the socio-cultural realities of both being a minority in France and how citizenship operates in everyday life. This research indicates how race and ethnicity remain significant in French society and how France’s minorities remain linked to minority populations worldwide.

Keywords
Immigration; Maghrébin; North African; identity; cultural citizenship; France.

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Jean Beaman
Max Weber Fellow, 2012-2013
Introduction

Drinking tea in her living room one Saturday afternoon, Noura, a 30-year-old of Algerian origin who lives in an HLM (habitations à loyer modéré or subsidized housing complex) in the Parisian banlieue, or suburb, of Drancy, explains to me the importance of valuing France’s Republican motto of liberté, égalité, fraternité:

[But] that does not mean being that faithful to the Republic because the Republic has many faults. The French Republic was colonialist. [France] committed many crimes in many countries. There was inequality, even today there is inequality. France does not ensure the same rights to all French people. But attachment to the motto, meaning liberté, égalité, fraternité, you can put everything behind that. For the majority of French people, liberté, égalité, fraternité, that is what being French means to them … We have to combat this myth that to be French means you have to be white, or you have to have a Judeo-Christian background … There should be no hierarchy between children who come from a long line of French relatives and children of immigrants.

Noura recognizes particular Republican values and ideals inherent with being part of the French Republic, even if she does not always agree with them. How she frames what it means to be French reveals the gap between the France she would like to live in and the France she actually sees herself inhabiting. Noura’s parents immigrated to France when they were adolescents. Her parents are now divorced; her father is a retired factory worker and her mother is a childcare worker. As a child, Noura knew little of her parents’ lives in Algeria. She has since learned, through her mother, of the atrocities committed by the French during the Algerian War – how her grandmother was tortured, and how her uncle was shot by French soldiers because he was considered a militant. Noura describes herself as an active Leftist, and currently volunteers for an anti-racism organization in Paris. She is determined to work for a France in which liberté, égalité, fraternité is implemented in practice. In doing so, she asserts a legitimate place for herself and other children of North African immigrants in French society.

Noura’s narrative captures the complexity of French identity for children of North African, or Maghrébin, immigrants. In this paper, based on interviews and participant observation in Paris and its banlieues, I discuss how descendants of immigrants from former French colonies in the Maghreb define what it means to be French, including the boundaries they draw around French as an identity and the degree to which they assert a French identity. While the Maghrébin second-generation are legally French because of their citizenship, they are denied cultural citizenship. Part of understanding their social location relies on the distinction between the legal and cultural dimensions of French identity – that is, between being a French citizen and actually being accepted as French by others.

As French Republicanism emphasizes the connection among citizens over any other characteristic or categorization, issues of national identity are especially relevant in France. Its Republican model frames the nation as one in which “only individuals are citizens, citizens are equal, and therefore all individuals are equal citizens” and “ethnic, regional, or religious categorizations are ignored” (Bertossi 2007:3). Being French is supposed to supersede all other identities, including the religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional. The question of defining French identity remains in the zeitgeist today. In November 2009, then-President Nicolas Sarkozy and Eric Besson, former Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Solidarity Development, launched a public debate on French national identity, with the stated purpose of “constructing a better shared vision of what French national identity is today” and “reaffirming Republican values and pride in being French.” Official communications from this Ministry emphasized questions such as “What does it mean to you to be French today?” and “What do issues of diversity mean for our national identity?”1. In addition to

1 See www.debatidentitenationale.fr, the campaign’s official government website. Official communications from the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and the Development of Solidarity also emphasized the following questions: What are the elements, symbols, and values of French national identity? What is the role of the French nation? Why should we welcome and/or integrate foreigners into our Republic and our national community? What is the
criticisms that this debate reflects anti-immigrant sentiment and ignores France’s ethnic and racial minorities (Cowell 2009, Erlanger 2009, Erlanger 2010), it is also evidence of the continuing significance of reifying a definition of French identity.

I refer to McCrone and Bechhofer’s definition of national identity as not just citizenship, but also as involving “cultural markers of birth, ancestry, and accent as well as residence” (2010:921). Our national identity is influenced by how others regard our claims to that particular identity. The rejection by others of such a claim to national belonging leads to social exclusion. Applying this definition allows me to consider the cultural and legal dimensions of French as an identity, as well as the markers that are read as communicating such an identity.

I argue that, despite feeling socially excluded, many children of Maghrébin immigrants still assert being French as part of their identity. The North African second-generation has been denied cultural citizenship, which would allow them to be accepted as French by others. This contradicts what would be expected under the French Republican model. By cultural citizenship, I am focusing on the cultural markers that allow an individual to traverse the cultural-symbolic boundaries around a particular national identity. Per political scientist Cathy Cohen’s (2010) formulation, I position the North African second-generation population as “citizen outsiders”– which encapsulates their dual status as both inside and outside of French citizenship (Beaman 2012). While the North African second-generation can be citizens of France as a nation-state, they lack full inclusion into mainstream society. In particular, I focus on the middle-class segment of this second-generation population – a group who, despite their educational and professional accomplishments and achievement of a middle-class status, nonetheless feel excluded from conventional definitions of a French person. Ultimately, I show how many Maghrébin second-generation individuals desire both full cultural citizenship and to be seen as French by others, with all that that connotes.

In what follows, I present a background of the North African population and the methodology used. I will then outline how my respondents define French identity, the role of French Republicanism in how they define French as an identity, and how they locate themselves vis-à-vis these definitions. Finally, I discuss cultural citizenship and how it relates to the contemporary situation facing this population, as well as the implications of these findings for thinking beyond France.

Background
Despite having a long history of immigration, France rarely acknowledges such a history and invokes its Republican ideology, particularly in the context of immigration, in order to promote a monolithic version of its identity. French Republicanism emphasizes the connection among citizens over any other characteristic or categorization. Under the French Republican model, acknowledging diversity is seen as propagating difference. Yet despite the Republican emphasis on the renunciation of racial and ethnic categorization, some scholars of French history, including Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall (2003), Michel Wieviorka (2002), and Riva Kastoryano (2004), have argued that France has long relied on racial and ethnic boundaries in constructing its national identity.

France’s North African second-generation originates from France’s relationship with the Maghreb through the colonization of Algeria in 1830, of Tunisia in 1881, and of Morocco in 1912 (Bowen 2004; Kramer 2004; Laurence 2001). Algeria would remain in French control until 1962, and Tunisia and Morocco until 1956. Though emigration from the Maghreb to France began as early as the early 1900s, World War I brought immigrants from these colonies en masse to France for work. These immigrants, who were expected to be only temporary residents, often settled in the outlying banlieues of major cities because of the presence of cheaper housing and factory employment. The number of Maghrébin immigrants continued to increase with World War II, the end of France’s Fourth Republic in 1958, and the Algerian War of Independence in 1962.

As the result of an economic recession and declining employment opportunities, France temporarily suspended immigration of non-European workers in 1974. This led to migrant workers settling permanently with their families in France, as opposed to returning to their home countries
French in the Eyes of Others

According to the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE), which conducts the French census, more than half of the immigrants who arrived before 1974 came for employment-related reasons; and another one third came to join their husbands or family. Second-generation North African immigrants descended primarily from this population (Silberman et al. 2007). Immigration has increasingly been framed as a social problem, one which seemingly threatens the identity of the French Republic. The growing attention paid to immigrants is not due to numbers, as the actual number of immigrants has remained relatively constant since 1930, but rather to its changing demographics, as presently more immigrants are from former North African colonies than from other regions.

Citizenship and nationality have been historically distinct in France, as French nationality does not mean automatic citizenship and all the benefits this confers. Citizenship is defined by the French Constitution, and nationality is defined by the Civil Code. Currently, those born in France to Maghrébin immigrants generally become citizens at 18 years old. In this way, the second-generation can be seen as having “virtual citizenship at birth” (Simon 2012).

Because the French census does not ask about the racial or ethnic origin of those born in France, there is a paucity of available data on second-generation North African immigrants. However, a few recent studies have begun to fill this gap by combining data on individuals’ country of birth and parent country of birth. As of 1999, about 26 percent of second-generation immigrants are of Maghrébin origin. To be more precise, about 14 percent are of Algerian origin, 9 percent are of Moroccan origin, and 4 percent are of Tunisian origin (Tribalat 2004). Historian Tyler Stovall refers to second-generation North African immigrant youth as representing “a self-destructive hybrid threat to France’s racial status quo” (2003: 354). According to anthropologist John R. Bowen, this population is “caught between parents who never convinced their children that there was much to long for in a ‘home country’ of bloody revolution, and native French who would never accept them into the club” (2006: 67). The Maghrébin second-generation is therefore an appropriate site to examine the complexities of citizenship, cultural identity, ethnicity, difference, and marginalization in French society.

Existing research on this North African second-generation has focused on disadvantage inherited from the first-generation, particularly in terms of specific outcomes, including educational attainment and employment prospects. Additional research has found that many individuals of North African origin experience discrimination in employment, especially hiring, which they perceive as based on their name, skin color, or residential location – all seen as proxies for ethnic origin (Silberman 2011). According to a 2008 joint INED and INSEE study, Trajectoires et Origines, 37 percent of second-generation Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants, aged 18 to 50, have sometimes or often experienced unequal treatment or discrimination in the past five years. 39 percent of second-generation Algerian immigrants felt similarly. In addition, there is evidence of a strong mismatch between individuals feeling French and perceiving that others see them as French. According to French demographer Patrick Simon:

This dissonance is undeniably a source of tension and generates feelings of rejection. While the French population is ethnically and religiously diverse, this diversity is not yet fully incorporated in the representation of Frenchness. Thus, visible minorities are perceived as not belonging to the French mainstream and are frequently singled out as others. The term othering refers to the process of labeling members of the community on the basis of their visibility, primarily skin color, but also language, accent, self-presentation, or surname, which contribute to signaling otherness and thus lead to questions about origins (2012: 13).

The North African second-generation is less likely than “whites”2 to have professional type work, and also to have a lower annual income on average (Lombardo and Pujol 2011). Yet, as of 2003, about 15

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2 I use the term white French or white throughout this paper to refer to français de souche, or those of native French-European origin for simplicity’s sake, even though I recognize that “white” is not a commonly used racial term in French society. Even though much of the extant literature uses the term native French, I use “white,” since the children of immigrants, being born in France, are also native French people.

**Methods**

The research presented here is based upon data from 45 semi-structured interviews with children of North African immigrants in the Parisian metropolitan region, or Île-de-France. My respondent sample consists of 24 men and 21 women. Respondents range in age from 24 to 49 years old (the average age being 32 years old). In terms of North African origin, 25 of them are of Algerian origin; 12 are of Moroccan origin; and 8 of them are of Tunisian origin. Three respondents come from mixed-race relationships, meaning one parent is white and the other parent is Maghrébin. The majority of my respondents’ parents emigrated from the Maghreb between 1950 and 1970, primarily for economic reasons. Many of these parents have low levels of educational attainment, speak little French, and communicate mostly in Arabic. Usually the fathers worked in low-skilled jobs, such as construction and manufacturing, while the mothers were homemakers or did domestic labor. 35 percent of respondents live in Paris and 65 percent live in the *banlieues*, mostly the inner-ring départements of Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne, and Hauts-de-Seine. All respondents have French citizenship, and about a third of them have dual citizenship (with the country of their Maghrébin origin).

I focus here on middle-class individuals, those who have achieved upward mobility vis-à-vis their immigrant parents. I delineate middle-class by my respondents’ educational attainment levels and professional status. In terms of education, I focus on those who passed the Baccalauréat (BAC) exam and attended college (whether or not they actually graduated). In terms of employment, I focus on those who have a professional type of employment (in the French socio-professional category of *cadre*).

I recruited respondents by contacting various organizations and associations, as well as by advertising on relevant internet forums and websites. I employed snowball sampling, because of the difficulties in obtaining access to a large respondent sample (Small 2009). Because of my outsider status (i.e. being neither French nor Maghrébin), snowball sampling, in which existing respondents generate potential respondents, was crucial for getting me “inside” this population. Because of this sampling method, this research is somewhat limited in its ability to generalize to the entire second-generation Maghrébin population. My sample is, therefore relatively homogeneous in terms of educational attainment and employment status. Interview questions addressed a variety of topics related to second-generation North African immigrant experience, including ethnic, cultural, and national identity; social networks; employment; family history and parental background; relationship to parents’ country of origin; educational experiences; religious identity; and perceptions and experiences of marginalization and discrimination. I conducted the interviews in French and digitally recorded them, unless respondents requested otherwise. A native French-speaking professional later transcribed the interviews. All names and identifying information have been changed per university Institutional Review Board guidelines.

My position as an outsider, not only as a researcher, but also as an American, undoubtedly shaped how my respondents perceived me. Interactions between researcher and respondents can be thought of as “construction sites,” where the identities of both parties are negotiated based on similarities and differences in background and social location (Horowitz 1986; Venkatesh 2002). Similar to what other American researchers have experienced conducting research overseas (see Killian 2002; Pickering 2007), being American was often an advantage in my interactions with respondents. They assumed that I was unfamiliar with Maghrébin and French culture, so they explained in detail things that they might otherwise have not explained at all. Though researchers are never “ideologically free” (Keaton 2006), I remained cognizant throughout the research process not to impose my own understanding over that of my respondents.
Defining French Identity

As many of my respondents define what it means to be French, they distinguish between the cultural and legal dimensions of French identity. The differentiation between the cultural and legal dimensions is evidence of the tenuous social locations of many children of Maghrébin immigrants. When individuals invoke the cultural dimensions of French identity, they include references to values, customs, traditions, practices, and what sociologist Ann Swidler terms “symbols, stories, rituals, and worldviews” (1986:173). This dimension of French identity encompasses what is perceived as specifically French, that which could not be applied to any other nation.

Saïd, a 30 year-old sociology doctoral student of Algerian origin, explains the interplay between these two dimensions:

There is the theory and there is the practice … There was a French philosopher named Renan who said that everyday you have to want to be French. You accept to live together, it is a future community … But for me being French is a desire, a desire to live together despite our origins. That is the theory, but in practice being French when you are of immigrant origin, outside of Europe, because when you are of Swiss origin, or Swedish origin, or British origin, there isn’t a problem, you are seen as French and no one talks about integration. However if you are of Maghrébin origin, that is different, there are barriers. And in the eyes of others, you see that you are not always seen as French.

While Saïd acknowledges that he is a French citizen and therefore is technically French, he still identifies a discrepancy between this definition and the degree to which he personally can identify as French, and have that identity accepted by others. Part of claiming a national identity is having compatriots accept that identity. When I ask him the degree to which he actually feels French, he responds:

Yes, I feel French, I want to be French, but what is certain is that in the eyes of others, we are not always seen as French. That is the hardest part, because me, I want to be French, there is no problem with that. The problem is that people have to see me as French. If I say yes, I am French, I am French. But I cannot get into a nightclub, I submit my CV [in order to obtain employment] I don’t receive any response, I am discriminated in [terms of] housing, and then at that moment you are in fact telling me that I am not French, all these problems mean that I am not French … So there are many youth in working-class neighborhoods who are sick of this. For them it is the reverse, they say, “You don’t see me as a French person, ok we are not French, so we are Muslim, we are Algerian, we are Moroccan, we are Tunisian, I will wear a jacket with the Algerian flag on the back” … and that transforms into aggressiveness and to me that is what the riots in November 2005\(^3\) were all about.

Here, Saïd discusses what many of my respondents reference – the dilemma between wanting to be seen as French by others and the inability to be seen this way. Often, because individuals like Saïd do not see themselves as fitting into cultural notions of what a French person is like, they find it complicated to negotiate being both French and Maghrébin. Saïd also highlights the consequences of marginalizing and excluding immigrant-origin individuals.

Nasser, a 36-year old of Algerian origin who works as a journalist for a major French television station, and lives near the Stade de France in the banlieue of Seine-Saint-Denis, references particular stereotypes in explaining French identity. “Many people think being French, it’s being white, eating pork, going to mass every Sunday morning, being Catholic and so on,” he explains. “But me, I say being French is not that, for me being French is simply working in this country, paying

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\(^3\) On 27 October 2005, two teenagers – one of Tunisian origin and the other of Malian origin – were electrocuted in an electricity substation as they fled police in the Parisian banlieue, or suburb, of Clichy-sous-Bois. They were apparently trying to avoid the constant police identity checks targeted towards youths. A few days later, police emptied a tear-gas grenade inside a local mosque and refused to apologize. These events led to riots, which spread in banlieues throughout France for about three weeks (see Koff and Duprez 2009 for an overview of the vast literature on the causes of these riots).
taxes, it’s just living here.” By framing French identity in this way – that is, focusing on the legal dimensions – Nasser actively combats the racialized nature of French identity, in particular the association between whiteness and “Frenchness.”

Born to an Algerian-immigrant mother and a Moroccan-immigrant father, Zara remembers understanding she was *estranger*, or different, at a young age, growing up in Perpignan:

How did I first learn I was different? There are moments you remember, for example when I was young at school I remember having henna on my hands, you know the tattoos people have, and my schoolteacher got really upset with me because . . . at the time I was 7 years old, so it was about 20 years ago, and the teachers did not even know what henna was, and I remember my schoolteacher punishing me because she thought that I colored my hands with felt-tip pens. It really traumatized me. It was such a horrible feeling.

Now 28 years old and living in Seine-Saint Denis, Zara remains troubled by experiences such as this one, where her ethnic and religious identifications remind her that others do not often see her as typically French. Yet, she feels that France is her first country. She sees herself as a participant in everyday life in France, which, according to her, is necessary in order to be French:

Being French is being a citizen, meaning behaving in a citizen-like manner towards what happens in France, and having the power to decide what happens, via the vote for example. Being French is having a voice in France, being heard in France, because unfortunately even with French residence you are not necessarily treated as if you were French.

As a social worker in Paris’s 19th arrondissement, specializing in helping youth find employment, she has witnessed this phenomenon and the lack of opportunities for those of North African origin firsthand. Zara is actively involved in several cultural and professional associations related to her Maghrébin origin, and frequently visits her extended family in Morocco. Yet, she could never imagine herself actually living there. “I love Morocco, but I mean, I could never live there. Everything about it is different; it is a completely different way of life.” Even though Zara is marginalized as a minority in France, she nonetheless sees being French as a core, inescapable element of who she is.

**The Relevance of French Republicanism**

The majority of my respondents (about 67 percent) reference French Republican values, as embodied in the French motto *(liberté, égalité, fraternité)*, when they define what it means to be French. Youssef, a 30-year old insurance agent and aspiring journalist of Algerian origin explains:

> For me, being French means to believe in the ideals of France, meaning loving France and all its freedoms, France of Lights, France of equality, France of everything that makes France universal. She [France] has values that transcend differences . . . that pierce through differences. You can be black and be white or gray, at any given moment you share those values. You could be Muslim, Christian, whatever you want, if you share these values, you are French.

In emphasizing these values, Youssef draws boundaries around being French that include him, and also claims a privilege associated with being French. He sees it as an advantage to live in a democratic and occidental society. As he was growing up, Youssef’s parents continually told him that his home was here in France. Because his parents emphasized this, he feels like he has fewer issues with his identity than other children of North African immigrants. As he sees it:

> [Former French President François] Mitterrand once said ‘We are all from the country of our childhood. That means that me, I spent my childhood here, I didn’t spend it elsewhere, and there is no one who can take this from me.

Even though he realized at an early age he was different from whites, Youssef came to see that as a richness – being both Arab and French. Yet this richness also created difficulties. Youssef remembers wanting to be a journalist when he was younger, but a teacher telling him early on in school that he
would never be good enough to be a journalist. This is one of his earliest memories of being treated differently because of his Maghrébin origin. He locates himself in the space between the messages and values that his parents shared with him and the messages that he received at school; that is, between being both Maghrébin and French. Despite facing symbolic exclusion, he still feels fortunate to be French, and to have been raised in France. France’s values are what set its national identity apart from other societies. For Youssef, to recognize one’s French identity is to recognize and acknowledge these values.

Similarly, according to Aurelien, a 32-year old of Algerian origin who works as a Human Resources consultant, being French is everything associated with Republican principles and the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen). “It is great French men, great authors. Rimbaud. Hugo,” explains Aurelien, who lives with his wife and baby daughter in Paris. “It is an image and a country in which liberté, égalité, fraternité would not be vain words.” He sees himself as embodying both French and Maghrébin cultures, yet coming from a quartier populaire [working-class neighborhood] in the banlieue of Meaux he feels marked as different by others.

As Aurelien, Youssef, and others invoke principles of French Republicanism in how they define French identity, they simultaneously critique how such principles are actually implemented in French society. They do not reject Republicanism as an ideology; rather they accept it despite feeling excluded from its implementations. Therefore, they critique French society – and often, their particular circumstances – within the confines of French Republicanism, rather than establishing or accessing an alternative framework.

Am I French?: Locating Oneself in French Republican Society

Kamel, a 33-year old divorced father of Algerian origin, with a seven year old daughter, remembers receiving the most salient messages about the Republican values of liberté, égalité, fraternité and what it means to be French at school. As he grew up in the “Republican school,” he considers himself to be as French as anyone else, despite others seeing him differently. “I had the same scholarly training as the majority of French people, so I think we are all in the same group, in theory. Yes, we each have our own paths, but me, I consider myself as French as anyone else,” he explains. Although Kamel remembers feeling excluded growing up, as he was one of the only Maghrébin-origin residents in his neighborhood, he still never felt anything but French. Kamel positions himself directly within the confines of his definition of French. That he was educated similarly to other French people confirms for him the salience of being French for his construction of self.

Because education in France is relatively centralized, schools are crucial sites in which to produce French citizens and instill Republican principles (Bowen 2008, Keaton 2006). Children of North African immigrants often receive the most significant messages of what it means to be French at school, as their parents were not educated in the French Republican system. Schools also reify a particular national history and national cultural repertoire, one which often excludes the contributions of immigrant-origin populations (Keaton 2006; Lamont 1992). As such, they are often sites of otherness for this population, as this is where the Maghrébin second-generation are first made to feel inferior and different compared to their white classmates (Noiriel 1996). School serves two identity-related functions for this population – it enforces a particular definition of a French person and also distances them from this definition. Children of North African immigrants often experienced a dual education system, as shown earlier regarding Youssef – one education received in French schools and another education received at home. In constructing their own identity, these individuals must reconcile these two educations.

Moreover, Nacira, a 25-year old high school biology teacher of Algerian origin, connects to her French identity through her own educational experiences and her experiences as a teacher. The older she gets, the more she accepts herself as French:

For me, it [being French] is really bound to where you did your studies, and I realize that the references that I have are references linked to the French Republic. When I think, I think in French, when I dream, I dream in French, and even if the French system has its faults, it also has its advantages … For me, being French, it is bound to the education you have in this country. And
even now when I teach, I teach how a French teacher teaches, with the same tools, the same resources, etc.

Because Nacira was educated in France and sees the country of education as a salient marker of cultural membership, she sees being French as a constitutive element of her identity. This is despite whether or not others accept her claim to cultural membership or her critiques of how French Republicanism is actually practiced, particularly the inequalities between schools in bourgeois areas of Paris and schools in the Seine-Saint Denis département where she teaches.

Finally, Karim, a 35-year old of Algerian origin, who works in the banlieue of Levallois where he also was born and raised, clearly distinguishes between the discourse around French identity and the reality of who can legitimately affirm such an identity. Because he feels he has been constantly told that he does not fit within the definition of a French person, he struggles to actually claim such an identity:

To actually be French you have to forget yourself a little bit, adopt the behaviors that are imposed on us. There is a path to follow to become French . . . but us, I’m speaking about me, as a French person of Algerian origin . . . when I am in France, I don’t feel French French. So it is for this reason that France has to accept all French people as they are, and not as they wish they were . . . In fact, the French really don’t accept us, they tolerate us, that’s all. But I have a million more reasons to be here than Nicolas Sarkozy, meaning that in the last few centuries there wasn’t a shared history between France and Hungary, right? But between France and Algeria, I mean, we used to be a French colony . . . But even if I don’t want it [being French] to be true, even if I say no, it’s not true, it is a part of me, if not I wouldn’t be here. And even everyone who says ‘I am not French,’ even me I’ve behaved like that and said that I wasn’t French. But I am French, whether they want it or not, I am French . . . So that means that we are here, we are really here. But that’s why I say that it would good if the French make an effort towards us, meaning giving us opportunities. What can’t I, Karim, Algerian, I am educated, I went to a French school, I am not any dumber than anyone else, how come when I apply for a job they pick a French person and not me? The day that that changes we can say that France has evolved, but for now, it is not the case, and we are very far away from that.

Here I stress that, despite feeling excluded, Karim still wants to assert a French identity. Even though he has tried to deny it, being French remains a part of his identity. He still sees himself as French, despite being made to feel otherwise. Rather than developing an oppositional identity, he instead asserts a French identity and a legitimate place for himself in society.

Towards Cultural Citizenship: France and Beyond

As the examples above illustrate, simply being a French citizen is not a sufficient marker of who is seen as French and who is not. Comparing national boundary patterns between the United States and France, Lamont argues that French citizenship serves as a salient boundary between in-groups and out-groups in France (Lamont 1995). However, by focusing on the second-generation, I show that citizenship does not confer the same benefits for other populations as it does for whites, as children of immigrants often experience marginalization similar to their immigrant parents. They are denied cultural citizenship.

To refer to cultural citizenship is to acknowledge the relationship between culture and citizenship and consider citizenship beyond its legislative status (Vega and van Hensbrock 2010). By acknowledging this relationship, I emphasize how different groups can be denied citizenship on cultural grounds. Traditional conceptions of citizenship are based on a common culture that makes some legal citizens more or less accepted than others. Citizenship is therefore based on social membership, solidarity, and belonging. Cultural citizenship signals social belonging. I position cultural citizenship as a different kind of citizenship, one which is undergirded by racial, ethnic, and cultural difference. Here, I follow cultural anthropologist Renato Rosaldo’s formulation based on Latinos in the United States:
Cultural citizenship refers to the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native language) with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one’s right to belong, in the sense of participating in the nation-state’s democratic processes. The enduring exclusions of the color line often deny full citizenship to Latinos and other people of color. From the point of view of subordinated communities, cultural citizenship offers the possibility of legitimatizing demands made in the struggle to enfranchise themselves. The concept of cultural citizenship includes and also goes beyond the dichotomous categories of legal documents, which one either has or does not have, to encompass a range of gradations in the qualities of citizenship (Rosaldo 1994: 57).

Rosaldo argues that cultural citizenship presumes a (universal) citizenship that is based on white men, where those who are different are excluded. For Rosaldo (1994), Latino identity has been shaped by their experiences of discrimination, as well as their efforts towards full inclusion in American society. Thinking of these second-generation individuals in France, like Latinos in the United States, as being denied cultural citizenship reveals the ways in which they are kept on the margins of mainstream French society.

My framing of cultural citizenship builds upon Rosaldo’s formulation, and specifically focuses on the cultural markers that allow an individual to traverse the cultural-symbolic boundaries around a particular national identity. This conception is also informed by Tony Miller’s definition which acknowledges the cultural requirements for obtaining citizenship, and includes the “maintenance and development of cultural lineage through education, custom, language, and religion, and the positive acknowledgement of difference in and by the mainstream” (2001: 2). He delineates three zones of citizenship: the political, which refers to the right to reside and vote; the economic, which refers to the right to work and prosper; and the cultural, which refers to the right to know and speak. Cultural citizenship is not just about rights and freedoms, it is also “the articulation of identity and belonging and other components of citizenship, such as participation and responsibility” (Delanty 2002:66). Moreover, “cultural citizenship is a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and civil society” (Ong 1996: 738). Considering cultural citizenship allows for a more nuanced understanding of how citizenship operates in everyday life, particularly elucidating how those individuals with citizenship can remain marginalized.

Cultural citizenship also allows us to unpack how citizenship is socially and culturally constructed. Specifically, “citizenship is both a cultural and anti-cultural institution … citizenship positions itself as oppositional to specific cultures, even as it is constituted by quite specific cultural values” (Volpp 2007: 574). The cultural attachments seen as associated with being of North African origin are positioned as oppositional to being a full member of the French citizenry. In this sense cultural citizenship, builds upon the notion of multicultural citizenship, which is opposed to universal citizenship and recognizes that formal equality through citizenship rights can mask actual disadvantage (Castles 1997; Joppke 2001). Therefore additional rights should be given to particular groups (Kymlicka 1995). My notion of cultural citizenship differs from this in that I am not arguing for a differentiated citizenship, nor for different kinds of citizenship rights to be applied, but rather for recognition of the non-legal dimensions of citizenship.

France’s Republican model has historically excluded and marginalized particular populations, including children of North African immigrants. Cultural citizenship becomes an issue in France because of the way in which culture is seen as homogeneous in the French Republican model. There is one way to be French. French national identity has long been intertwined with cultural identity (Murray 1997). “To be French, you cannot be a bearer of excessive cultural difference” (Volpp 2007: 597). As Castles (1997:9) notes, “The contradiction of the ‘Republican model’ is that it appears to be purely political, yet it brings culture in through the back door.” France’s imagined community sees citizenship as something that supersedes all markers of difference and is without racial or ethnic character. It is therefore radical to think of cultural citizenship in the French context as it implies that citizenship is not the only marker of difference.

Indeed, French citizenship is not sufficient to allow certain individuals to traverse the cultural-symbolic boundaries around French as an identity. If my sample of second-generation North African immigrants feels excluded from mainstream society despite their citizenship, it suggests that they lack
cultural citizenship due to their ethnic origin. They have been denied full membership and participation in society (Stevenson 2001). These individuals are “citizen outsiders” or cultural opposites; they are marked as culturally different and therefore cannot be seen as equal citizens. The experiences of this population reveal how one cannot become French in a cultural sense.

Yet, the North African second-generation does not cultivate an oppositional consciousness or identity. Even as they wrestle with what being French means, and what it means to be a minority in French society, they still desire to claim a French identity that is accepted by others. The North African second-generation asserts, rather than rejects, a French identity. The examples I have presented here suggest that one reason why these individuals do not adopt an oppositional identity is their fidelity to the French Republican model. Many middle-class children of Maghrébin immigrants want to be seen as French by others, and therefore seek to reconcile how they see themselves with how they feel others see them. Because these individuals lack the option of having their French identity affirmed and acknowledged by others, they remain in a marginal social location despite their middle-class status and accomplishments. The distinction between their assigned versus asserted identities allows these individuals to continue to identify as French only with a caveat.

Cultural citizenship is also useful for thinking about minority populations outside of France, including African-Americans and other immigrant-origin populations, and the different ways such populations can remain outside the mainstream. Ultimately, for “othered” populations, such as the middle-class North African second-generation, citizenship is often not a sufficient marker of social inclusion.
References


