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of 24 European Countries

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A Comparative Analysis
of 24 European Countries**

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This paper presents the research design and some results of a comparative analysis of the value systems of 24 European countries. The data used are from two sets. The first is the 1990 World Values Survey. This survey included 50 countries, of which 30 were, at least partly, in Europe. We had to leave out six of them: Switzerland and Slovenia, as the data were not available; Turkey and Iceland, the far North-Western and South-Eastern corners, as we judged them to be too much special cases, outliers; and the two Irelands, as their value system proved to be so much dominated by religiosity that it was not possible to perform the type of analysis we were conducting. The analysis thus included the following countries: France, Britain, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, Portugal, Austria, Moscow, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia. (1) The other data source were the national representative surveys conducted by the Center for Value Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, led by Elemér Hankiss and Róbert Manchin, in 1977-8, 1982, 1990 and 1993.

Theoretical Framework

In our view, the sociology of values suffers from the fact that interest in the field was divided in the past into two, unconnected if not hostile camps. One was the mainstream, structural-functionalist sociology whose central concern, following Durkheim and Parsons, were values interpreted as integrative social norms. This approach of general theory was not well amenable to empirical analysis, and this was only reinforced by the Durkheimian hostility to "individualism". On the other side, it was attacked as "idealist" by the very influential Marxising currents in sociology. The other perspective was psychological, represented by Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of needs, or the works of Allport and Rokeach. This fitted much better with the methods of empirical analysis, but had the opposite deficiencies: it was too individualistic, did not connect well to general sociological concerns, and lacked a historical framework.

Our suggestion is that by a switch of perspective at the very foundations of the sociology of values, it is possible to work out a theoretical framework that is sensitive to historical and macro sociological considerations, amenable for empirical study, and instead of being for or against individualism gives an account why values, as opposed to norms, could and should be studied through individual value preferences.

The approach suggested is based on the following consideration. So far, the sociology of values started with the positive assertion of values or norms that were presumed to determine conduct. This approach was liable to become dogmatic and apologetic, stating either plain truisms about universal human or social "needs" for consensus, or legitimising existing norms due to their functional role. However, we get a different and historically sensitive perspective if we do not set out to discover eternally existing and universally valid norms, but concentrate on those historical moments when a social order is dissolving. Such an event not only renders norms visible, but also poses the actual problem of the establishment of norms, of the restoration of order as a top priority. Looking at in this manner, we arrive at a period that is both historically and theoretically crucial for the study of values, the axial age. (2)

During a relatively short time period centring around 6th BC. a major spiritual renewal occurred simultaneously in India, China, Israel, Persia, and Greece, laying the foundations of all current world religions and philosophies, in response to a situation of widespread political, social and spiritual unrest. (3) A central element of the responses was the idea that due to the collapse of existing arrangements, individuals should not only be protected and consoled under such conditions of distress, but that the locus of order should be shifted from the whole community, its customs and laws, to the inside of the individuals. It is the individual, its conscience, its soul, its values that should be made into the new, unshakeable axis of the world. Hence the term "axial age", and hence why the philosophical study of values is called "axiology".

The axial age refers to one historical period, the period to which such highly influential thinkers as Weber, Nietzsche, Voegelin, Mumford, or Foucault have all returned. (4) But the limitation in time and place can be erased if we conceptually extend the period by coining the term "axial moment". An axial moment occurs whenever there is a global collapse of the established order of things, including the political system, the social order of everyday life and the system of beliefs - a very rare event -, and a major spiritual revival that as an answer locates the source of order inside the individuals. Such a period happened in the first centuries (collapse of the Roman republic and rise of Christianity), in the 5-7th centuries (collapse of the Roman Empire and rise of Islam), in the 15-16th centuries (the waning of the Middle Ages, Renaissance and Protestantism), and finally the two major stages of the dissolution of absolutist politics and the traditional European social order, Enlightenment and socialism.

The last three axial moments, the sources of modern democracy, Protestantism, the Enlightenment and socialism have certain distinctive features. Each were associated not only with a major revolution, but also with a short but highly influential period of ideological terror (the puritan "saints" in England, the Jacobins in France, Stalinism in Russia), and were also contemporaneous with the three major stages of the development of the extra-legal state mechanism, absolutism, the Enlightened absolutism and fascism. Taken together, all European countries were covered, at least in one moment of their history, by these mechanisms of ideological terror and state absolutism, with the singular exception of Ireland. Apart from axiality proper, the traces of these events should also be present in the respective value systems.

A conceptualisation of history as the succession of axial moments gives us a clue for the empirical analysis of social values. Axial belief systems, as opposed to traditional social norms, can be studied by an analysis of individual values, even through sociological surveys, as they only work to the extent that individuals actively reflect on them, form their identity around them. The mapping of such values requires, however, strong co-

operation and effort from the respondents, a special kind of "reflexive survey method". Finally, the current value systems in any axial civilisation or country will be the actual product of the different, still present layers of axial development. A proper study of values therefore not only can take individuals as its objects of analysis, but it also must take them seriously as reflecting subjects.

Methods

A fundamental methodological consequence of this perspective is that instead of studying individual values, or even groups of values, brought together on the basis of theoretical and empirical considerations, like factor analysis, it is necessary to study value or subjectivity types. This means that the basis units of analysis will not be variables but cases, individual respondents. The aim is to find out whether there are groups of people who share similarities in the selection of all their values. Such an analysis of types or forms of subjectivity has the additional benefit that it can be connected to those, quite influential theoretical approaches that place the emphasis on "types of man" or "forms of subjectivity", like Nietzsche, Weber or Foucault.

This perspective is defined as q-analysis. However, instead of using the methods of q-analysis proper, we opted for cluster analysis that suited our purposes better. (5)

On the Rokeach test

In comparative research on social values, the Inglehart test is the most widely used measure. The World Value Survey also offers the possibility of doing comparative work on a wide range of diverse items. However, our prior studies have convinced us that there is an excellent value test that combines the advantage of a highly sophisticated in depth psychological perspective with the possibility of analysing social values. This is the test developed by the American social psychologist Milton Rokeach. (6) Rokeach developed a set of 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values,

corresponding to the ends - means distinction, asking respondents to rank separately the two sets of values from 1 to 18. The Appendix contains the exact wording of the test.

The merits of the Rokeach test are usually recognised, though it is often accused of being too general, ahistorical and abstract, while the values of individuals are assumed to be connected more to specific issues than to overarching values. However, the main problem with the test is that it is very time-consuming, as it does not simply evoke attitudes, opinions or behaviour already formed but asks respondents to reflect about the value preferences they use in their life. Therefore, the administration of this single test takes about 15-20 minutes which, given the present costs of a national representative sample is considered as prohibitive. The test is only used for student samples or in small groups. A 1968 NORC study done by Rokeach himself is the only published nationwide application.

However, in Hungary, the Center for Value Sociology managed to ask the Rokeach test on a national representative sample four times, in 1978, 1982, 1990 and 1993. The respective sample sizes were 807, 2938, 1320 and 1538, with missing values ranging around 25%. However, we faced the problem that although we had empirical evidence for the Rokeach test for about 5000 individuals, we lacked comparative data.

The estimation of value types

In order to overcome this deficiency, we came up with the idea of estimating the Rokeach values in the other countries of the WVS with the help of the Hungarian results. This idea was based on two considerations. First, we had a high number of cases and were confident that we would be able to do a fairly exhaustive study of the test, minimising response error. Second, we were interested in classification into types, and our assumption was that in such a case, it is more likely that one can get well-behaving estimates than if we were to estimate single values of groups.

The exact derivation of the types is a long and methodologically tiresome story, of which we will only give the main outlines. First, we derived value or subjectivity types for the Hungarian data, using cluster analysis. Because of the exploratory nature of this method, we proceeded in several successive steps, analysing first the four sample years individually and then, using an initial configuration based on these results, we proceeded to an analysis of the whole data set. After reviewing several variants, we opted for a ten-cluster solution, dividing the whole sample into ten value types. Table 1 contains the description of the ten types.

The types thus derived were in line with the factor analysis of the data sets, accomplished earlier, and also compatible with our theoretical perspective. On this basis, both the instrumental and the terminal values can be divided into two broad chains, each containing three sets of values, with some overlap. The four chains are represented in Tables 2-5. For the terminal values, the first chain contained the more abstract goals, consisting of the ideological (Enlightenment), the Christian and the ethical (social democratic) values (see Table 2), while the second the more concrete, mundane sets of traditional, pragmatic-material and hedonistic values (Table 3). The instrumental values consisted of the chain of the more abstract, active sets, the intellectual, the pragmatic and the ethical values (Table 4), and the more passive and mundane sets, the traditional-disciplinary, the Christian-communitarian and the hedonistic values (Table 5).

A direct combination of the two sets, by pairing the most similar sets from each the terminal and instrumental chains, gives us immediately six types. Thus, putting together the intellectual and the ideological values, we have the Enlightenment rationalist type (CL1), and we also can easily construct three further types, the ethical social democratic (CL3), the hedonist (CL6) and the traditional-disciplinary (CL8) type. We only have problems with the remaining two, the Christian and the pragmatic-materialist types, as these values change chains in the terminal and instrumental values. The reason, however, is not difficult to find. It was the revolutionary impact of the Protestant Ethic that

downplayed the traditional communitarian Christian values and emphasised pragmatism and material well-being inside an axial belief system. As Hungary is a predominantly Catholic country, it is not surprising that the remaining two basic types were defined as Christian (CL5) and materialist (CL7).

The other four types were variants of the six main types, due to the special importance of ideological values in the Hungarian sample. In our prior studies, we were already able to establish that in the Rokeach test, these are the values of Enlightenment rationalism that individuate most the official values of existing socialism. These were the values where the population averages showed that preference was much higher in Hungary than in the US. (7) The internal analysis of the Hungarian data also showed that these values were considered to be especially important among party members and the better educated, with those who attended the special party schools being especially highly ideological. (8)

It is the extra presence of the ideological factor that defined the remaining four types. First, apart from the opposition between Enlightenment rationalist and traditional-disciplinary values, there was a type that was not only strongly intellectual, but also hostile to ideology. This can be called the "dissenting intellectual" (or, in the West, post-Enlightenment) strategy (CL4). The other, diametrically opposite type was non-intellectual and traditional-communitarian in its instrumental values, but was highly ideological. This can be identified as a "socialist petty bourgeois" (CL2).

The ideological values also duplicated two other, also diametrically opposed strategies, the social democratic and the hedonist. While the "classical" social democratic type was hostile to ideology and close to Protestant pragmatism, signalling and also characterising the old communist-social democrat divide, there was a type which, apart from adhering to the central social democratic values, was also quite strongly ideologically oriented. Finally, similarly, while the "standard" hedonistic group was hostile to ideology,

there was an additional group that was also ideological. We will call these types as "ideological social democrat" (CL9) and "ideological hedonist" (CL10). Table 6 contains the summary description of the ten types, and also the codes that will be used for them in further analysis.

In the second stage, we developed a model to estimate these value types for the Hungarian data. We used discriminant analysis, trying to distinguish the ten types using variables from the 1990 WVS. Apart from the Inglehart and the child-rearing tests contained in this survey, we used measures of religiosity, attitudes with respect to breaking social norms, and some questions related to work and politics. In the first stage, we have included exploratively all items of the sets in our model, while in the second stage, those that proved to be statistically insignificant were left out. In order not to lose too many cases, we replaced missing values by the respective national averages. In this manner, we were able to place correctly 34% of our cases, which, taken into the fact that we had ten groups, was quite satisfactory, as it meant that, one the average, for each value type, 7% of the respondents belonging to the type fell into each of the nine other, "wrong" types, while 34% into the correct one.

A comparison of the estimated and the original percentages shows a general correspondence, though in a few cases, the differences were not negligible (see Table 7). Therefore, we went ahead to estimate the types for the other 23 countries. Such a procedure has considerable dangers. The usual risks of estimation were increased by the fact that missing values again had to be replaced by national averages, and that the types were developed for a Catholic and former socialist country, often considered a unique case, and it is doubtful whether the types are applicable for the other countries. The estimates obtained are contained in Table 8.

A first look at the table indicates the face validity of the estimates. Thus, the religious type is most prevalent in the still strongly religious Catholic countries like Poland, Portugal, Italy or Spain and especially the two Irelands, (9) while it was minimal in

most of the former Communist and the Protestant (especially Nordic) countries. In a similar manner, the social democratic type is the highest in Czechoslovakia and Sweden, while the ideological social democrats and ideological hedonists are most prevalent in the former Soviet Union. However, the table contains additional points of interest. Thus, the country with by far the smallest percentage of social democrats is Hungary, shedding some light on the strange collapse of the social democratic party there, or the value type that we called "ideological petty bourgeois" was especially strong in the Catholic countries, indicating that this value type may function there as a post-Catholic value type.

The table could be analysed further, but now we shall proceed on a more explanatory track. Our main research question is to establish empirical relationships between patterns of background variables and patterns of value types. For this purposes we have set up a latent variable model. (10)


The model

The model has two blocks, the first containing the patterns of background variables, the second the patterns of value types, and the relations refer to the path coefficients leading from the background variables to the value types (see the Figure below).

The model is based on theoretical considerations and the extensive analysis of the Hungarian data. On the left side of the model, concerning the factor structure of the background variables, it assumes that there will be a correlation between higher education and city dwelling, forming a modernisation background factor, and younger and male respondents, exhibiting a higher degree of activity, forming an ascriptive factor. There should be a corresponding separation on the right side between the value types. One factor is mostly characterised by modernisation value differences (Enlightenment rationality and ideology), while the second factor is composed of more ascriptive value types, influenced by (individual) life-cycle or (socio-historical) period effects. Finally, in the middle, there are two

"direct" path coefficients between the corresponding background and value factors, and two "cross" coefficients.

Figure 1. The model



General hypotheses

In line with our theoretical approach, the first basic hypothesis is that values, understood as fundamental axial codes governing individual conduct, do matter, and in many different ways are more important than economic well-being or the level of modernisation. The present structure of the value system should be a hierarchical configuration of these axial layers, starting with the leftovers of traditional values, continuing with the impact of Christianity, then of Protestantism, the Enlightenment, and finally of socialism. In particular, we expect that the mark of Communism would establish a strong dividing line among the countries, comparable to the Catholic-Protestant divide.

Second, not only should values matter, but this would depend on their conditions of establishment. An axial moment presupposes an internal collapse of (belief in) the previous order. In the

absence of such a crisis, a prior dissolution of the ordering codes, the imposition of a new axial belief system remains inefficient and superficial, will only be experienced as a coercive dictatorship. In such countries, resistance to the new ideology should be stronger. Thus, those countries where socialism was established at the beginning of a world war and not in its aftermath, during the general collapse, and where national culture and especially the dominant religion remained strong, the impact of socialism must be visible different. Thus, we expect that the most specific differences compared to the other socialist countries will be shown by the Baltic countries, especially Lithuania, and by Poland, and not the economically or socially more modernised or politically more liberal countries like Hungary, East Germany or the former Czechoslovakia. (11)

Third, especially since 1989, there is a lot of discussion about the crisis of our age. One could easily dismiss such concerns as, indeed, the idea of crisis is almost contemporaneous with the history of modernity. Still, it would be short-sighted to overlook the signs around us. In our theoretical arguments, we redefined history as the history of axial moments. Our final general concern is the question whether, on the basis of our data, we can perceive signs of an axial crisis.

Operationalised hypotheses

In order to facilitate the interpretation of results, we will formulate our hypotheses separately for the factor loading of the two patterns, and then for their relationships, the path coefficients.

1. The background pattern

Hypothesis 1. We assume that the relative importance of education will be greater than that of urbanisation, as this is the most important source of socialisation in modern societies. This should be especially pertinent in the former socialist countries, where formal schooling gained exclusive importance. We further

assume that in countries with German type of settlement pattern, due to the strong city-town-village differences, urbanisation would be also quite important, as opposed to the Latin countries, where such differences are much smaller.

Hypothesis 2. We also assume that the relative importance of age will be greater than that of gender. However, sex difference should still be present in more "backward" countries, where traditional patterns survived. Thus, we expect higher gender weights in the East European and the Catholic countries, and especially where the two considerations intersect, in Poland.

2. The value pattern

Hypothesis 3. The analysis of the Hungarian data showed that the value type of Enlightenment rationality and ideology (CL1) was the official ideology of socialism. Therefore, we expect that this type will play a much higher role in the East than in the West, and especially that it will be much more positively correlated with the modernisation value factor, while the socialist "petty bourgeoisie" type (CL2) should be strongly negatively correlated in the East.

Hypothesis 4. We expect that the coefficients for the religious value type (CL5) would be positively correlated with age, reflecting the general trend of secularisation, and should be especially high for those Catholic countries that are still relatively highly religious.

Hypothesis 5. We assume that the coefficients for the materialist value type (CL7) should be negatively correlated with age, reflecting the simple fact that people in the early stages of their career are more concerned with establishing the material framework of their existence, and should also be much stronger in the former socialist countries, reflecting both differences in the level of well-being and the general post-communist mood. Similarly, we expect the hedonistic type to be more prevalent among the young respondents, but here we assume that the major dividing line will not be along East-West but along Catholic-

Protestant differences, with larger age coefficients in the Catholic countries, as hedonism is a component of secularisation.

Hypothesis 6. The coefficients for social democratic values should be positively correlated with age wherever we can hypothesise a decline in the hold of this ideology, and negatively in those countries where it was still powerful in 1990. In the first group, we can certainly place Sweden, West Germany and the countries of the former Soviet Union, while in the second, some Southern and East European countries - the reason being that the distinction between social democracy and socialism was much more pronounced in the latter countries of the East. Finally, we assume that the ideological social democratic type will be much more important in East than in West Europe.

3. Path coefficients

Hypothesis 7. Our first assumption about the path coefficients is that the model is correctly specified, and that the "direct" path coefficients will be higher than the "cross" path coefficients. However, this hypothesis should be coloured by the fact that, in line with the available evidence, the path coefficients should be relatively higher for the modernisational background variables in East Europe and for age in West Europe, reflecting the strong importance of formal schooling under socialism, and the increasing relevance of generational differences in the West.

Hypothesis 8. Our final hypothesis is that while we expect that in general higher education and younger age will show some similarity even after discounting for the higher educational attainments of the younger cohorts, in cases of a generational conflict, there may be a reversal, approaching the values of the better educated and the old. This should be the case of most East European countries, where the older generations had much stronger allegiances to socialism; of France, reflecting 1968; and for Sweden, due to the current decline of social democracy.

Results

Table 9 contains the results of the LVPLS analysis. (12) We will first proceed to assess step by step the operational hypotheses, and then draw the broader conclusions.

Hypothesis 1. This hypothesis was fully supported by the data. (13) In most countries, the coefficient for education was close to one, indicating an almost perfect correspondence between this variable and the general factor. The urbanisation coefficient, as predicted, was small for most of the East and South European countries, while high for the North of Europe, except Norway, and especially the German-speaking countries, with Austria being the only case of the sample where urbanisation proved to be more important than education. The low importance of urbanisation in Britain is also not surprising, while its high importance for Latvia may be due to the special demographic composition of the country. (14)

Hypothesis 2. The rather obvious assumptions of this hypothesis were also met. In most cases, age proved to be a much more important variable in setting up the ascriptive factor than sex. It was especially true for the Protestant countries, where the effect of gender was negligible. Gender effect was still high, though, in the Catholic countries (Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Italy), and in East Europe (the exception of Moscow does not count, as in this case it mattered that it was only a city sample). As expected, the importance of gender was especially strong in Poland where it dominated age. There were three unexpected gender coefficients. First, apart from Poland, gender effect was predominant in Latvia as well, probably due again to special demographic reasons. Second, Norway was the only country where the coefficient was negative, indicating that there the value preferences of women were more similar to those of the young than the old. Third, Sweden was the third country where gender proved to be more important than age. The reason why Sweden proved to be an outlier case will be discussed later in detail.

The results of the first two hypotheses were more than reinforcements of common knowledge. They rather point out the location where certain traditional, pre-axial concerns still survived.

Hypothesis 3. The results for the first value set not only confirmed our hypothesis, but shed additional light both to the East-West and the Catholic-Protestant differences, and even provided further support for the closeness between Enlightenment rationality and official socialist ideology. First, most of the socialist countries did manifest the expected pattern of factor loading, with the coefficients for both CL1 and CL4 being high and positive while that of CL2 high and negative. There were exceptions, though. First of all Poland showed a completely different pattern, very close that of Portugal and Spain. Second, the East German sample behaved here just like the West German one. Third, the coefficient for CL2 proved to be positive even for Lithuania. Finally, there were minor deviations from the standard pattern even for Latvia and Estonia.

Second, there was indeed a very marked East-West difference in the coefficients for the "socialist petty bourgeois" value type (CL2). While in East Europe, just like in the Hungarian pilot study, people with a low education were predominant in this type, the opposite was true for most West European countries. The combination of accepting the ideological terminal values of the Enlightenment, but keeping the instrumental communitarian values of Christianity was in Western Europe more characteristic of the better educated strata. There were three exceptions: France, the home of classical Enlightenment; and two Northern countries, Denmark and Norway.

Third, the strong East European predominance in the coefficients for CL1 was matched by the coefficients of CL4, the non ideological intellectual type, where the coefficients for all West European countries were very high, again with the exception of France.

The data showed an additional general pattern. Among the West European countries, the factor loading of CL1 was positive and

relatively high mostly for the Catholic countries (France, Austria, Portugal, Spain), while very low or even negative for the Protestant countries (Finland, Norway, Holland, Britain), with some exceptions. This indicates the presence of two different strategies for the secularised, better educated strata in the Catholic countries: full-scale Enlightenment rationality (CL1) or non-ideological (post-Enlightenment) intellectualisation (CL4), while for the Protestant countries, the first hardly existed. Even on the basis of a study of value preferences done in 1990 it is possible to show that the full-scale Enlightenment ideology had little effect in the Protestant countries. As we'll see, the second, and - so far - predominant alternative was given there by social democracy.

Hypothesis 4. This hypothesis was fully supported by the data. This result is not self-evident. It may well happen in a country where religiosity is high that this value type does not play a major role in the manner social background variables define the differences in value types. Our results indicate that the decline of religiosity in the younger cohorts is higher in the more religious countries, supporting the continuation of secularisation.

Hypothesis 5. This hypothesis was confirmed without any exceptions. The coefficient for any East Europeans country, including the outliers, Poland and Lithuania, was higher than for any West European country, though for all countries, and again without exception, it was negative. This shows two things. First, the correspondence between material considerations and value types is indeed close for the particular segment of the value system where such considerations are relevant. Second, the Inglehart hypothesis should be qualified. If we do not measure attitudes, but basic value orientations by subjectivity types, we can observe that materialism is somewhat higher among the younger than the older generation, for simple life-cycle reasons.

The coefficients for the hedonistic type, as expected, were also negative, with one exception, but the very clear pattern present in the data proved to be different from the expectations. In fact, hedonism seems to be the Western equivalent of materialism in

the East. The coefficients for most of the West European countries are very high, well above the level of the East European countries, though the dividing line here is not as crystal clear. Concerning the exceptions, in the East, the positive coefficient of Latvia is probably due to the strong gender effect, while the high negative one of Moscow is to the special kind of sample (all respondents are from a capital). In the West, the low coefficient for Norway is probably also due to the gender effect, while the unexpectedly lower coefficients for the Catholic countries indicate that in our times, hedonism has become more of an alternative to social democracy than to religiosity.

Hypothesis 6. About this hypothesis, we first have to remark that in the case of the social democratic values, we have a specification problem with our model. In general, these values were preferred much more by male than female respondents, but due to the general collapse of social democracy, its supporters are more numerous among the older generations. Therefore, the general age-gender relations are reversed. This explains why the factor loading of these value types are often rather low.

Concerning the classical social democratic type (CL3), our hypothesis stands up most for Sweden, due to the spectacularly high drop in this value type among the younger cohorts. Apart from Sweden, significant losses are indicated for the Netherlands and Denmark - also social democratic strongholds -, and most of the former Soviet Union, and somewhat less for West Germany. At the opposite pole, among the countries where in 1990 this value orientation still appealed for the young males, we indeed found countries from the South and East of Europe (Italy, Portugal and perhaps Spain; and East Germany and especially Czechoslovakia)

The second part of the hypothesis was confirmed concerning age (the only exceptions were the usual outliers, Poland and Sweden), but not the assumed, simple East-West pattern. The coefficient was indeed high for the countries of the former Soviet Union, and low in the Catholic Western countries, but low also for the other East European countries, and high again for most of the Protestant

countries. The reason could be that as this value type was a combination of the social democratic and the communist values, its importance declines wherever either of these value systems lost ground in the last decades. This actual loss was higher in the former Soviet Union than in the other East European countries, and in the Protestant and therefore more social democratic Northern countries.

Hypothesis 7. The path coefficients confirmed the specification of our model, though much more for East than for the West Europe. First, the none of the direct coefficients had the opposite sign, except for a negligible reversal for Poland (-.01). Second, with the exception of Lithuania, the former Czechoslovakia and especially Poland, the "direct" path coefficient were considerably greater in the East European countries than the "cross" coefficients. In Western Europe, this held true for the ascriptive factor, but in general not for education. The only country where the pattern was exactly the same as in East Europe was France. Third, the age effect was indeed much greater in West than in East Europe.

The two results together show that the straightforward separation between the respective background and value sets holds true only for the East. However, the general specification of the model was still valid for most countries concerning the signs, and also due to the huge direct ascriptive effect.

Hypothesis 8. This takes us to our last hypothesis, where we assumed a certain reversal of signs in special cases. For our theoretical purposes, this was one of the most important parts of our analysis, and we were extremely pleased with the results. First, apart from the case of Finland (a negligible coefficient of -.01), there were two countries where the path coefficient of the modernisation background factor on the life cycle was positive, Britain and Sweden. The case of Sweden has confirmed our expectations that due to the substantive loss of social democratic values there, the values of older people, against the general tendency, were much closer to those of the better educated. A similar pattern is present in Britain, indicating a possible

generation conflict at the heart of the social value system there. This may be a significant finding as, if Sweden was the forerunner of social democracy, Britain was twice the leader in the social spread of the reformation (the break with Rome in the 16th and Puritanism in the 17th centuries).

The same reversal occurred in the most "typical" East European countries, and almost completely in the manner predicted by our general hypothesis. The reversal was present at the heart of the former Soviet Union (Russia, Moscow, Belarus), and in those East European countries that did not have an exceptional status in terms of axial resistance (Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia). However, in the Baltic countries and in Poland, the reversal was not present, indicating that wherever the legitimacy of the Soviet regime was always dubious, the collapse of the system did not lead to a generation conflict. (14) Finally, the only Western country showing the same pattern was again France, indicating the retreat of classical Enlightenment rationalism in its birthplace to the better educated segments of the older generations.

Conclusion

After a review of the operationalised hypotheses, we can now turn back to our general theoretical concerns.

1. Our results showed that values do indeed matter. They have their own patterns that do not simply follow differences in economic well being or of other modernisation attainments. A strong correlation exists between value types that have particular affinity with well-being, materialism and the general happiness principle, but in most areas of the value system, these are the axial belief systems that act as the structuring force of the value system. As for the rest, the major structuring differences were the marks left by Protestantism and Communism.

2. As opposed to some arguments to the contrary, we were able to demonstrate that the main differences among the East European

countries in value preferences do not follow the pattern of political and economic development, but are dominated by two axial concerns: the survival of an axial belief system that was able to oppose Communism (Poland), and a permanent hostility to Communism due to the fact that it was established solely by external force, and not in an axial moment (the Baltic countries, especially Lithuania). This leads to the rather surprising result that the four countries of the sample that never differed from the standard post-Communist pattern were Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary; while, even more significantly, the only Western country that, at least for the modernisation half of the model, exhibited the same pattern was France. Similarly, the differences within the West European value systems had nothing to do with different levels of modernisation or well-being, but solely with axial concerns: survivals of the Catholic-Protestant divide, the presence of Enlightenment rationalism, and finally the additional impact of social democracy.

3. Our final, and most controversial, theoretical idea concerned the recognition and identification of our age as a moment of axial crisis. Though one could assert that such a claim is impossible to substantiate, and especially not with the techniques of survey questionnaires, our results do strongly indicate that we are entering an axial moment. According to our data, all the basic axial systems of belief are in retreat, moreover - and indeed this may be the most significant result of our overview - each is so especially in its main strongholds, often accompanied by generation conflicts. Thus, religiosity is lower among the younger generation everywhere than among the old, but it is especially so in the still highly religious areas. Enlightenment ideology and rationality is mostly on the retreat today in France, its birthplace. The official socialist value system is collapsing in the former East Europe, while the social democratic value system is collapsing in Sweden. Finally, evident generation conflicts are present even in the value system of England, the home basis of Puritanism and also the working class movement.

However, one could object that if some values are in retreat, it is in the nature of things - and also follows from our technique of analysis - that other values should come forward. This objection requires two comments. First, our results showed that all axial belief systems are now in decline together, and that this decline is concentrated on the former strongholds. Second, our results confirmed the trend that all that is new bears on itself the tag "post" (post-industrial, postmaterialist, postmodern, post-Fordist, postcommunist, etc.). The value types gaining ground are the "post-Enlightenment" individualistic-intellectual value type (CL4), the "post-religious" value type (CL2), the "post-communist" materialist value type (CL7); and finally simple hedonism (CL6).

Our age has often been characterised, and happily, as the end of ideology. It seems, however, that these are not simply the global, all-encompassing, macro-level ideologies that are vanishing, but those axial techniques and beliefs that were the foundations of our civilisation, and that were located not in the Durkheimian and Marxian macro societal level, but at the level of individual subjects, aiming to give them spiritual strength in times of distress. All that has remained today of these techniques is individualistic rationalism and hedonism. The source of strength and security has been transferred from the individual itself to the taken for granted rational automatisms of the economic, social and political subsystems. It is a matter of the future to see how long these automatisms, these "palliatives" (the word is from Sismondi) of the welfare state and the mixed economy will be able to thwart the coming axial crisis.

Notes

(1) Seen today, the list may contain some peculiarities. However, at the time of the survey, East and West Germany were still separate countries, and the separate handling was important also for theoretical reasons; Czechoslovakia was still unified, and it was not possible to divide the sample due to its size; while the investigators decided to create a separate sample for Moscow.

(2) About the axial age, see Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953), Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man* (N.Y., Collier, 1956), and S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.) *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilisations* (N.Y., State University of New York Press, 1986).

(3) In the timing and interpretation of the event, we rely largely on the work of the Hungarian thinker, Béla Hamvas, who wrote about the phenomenon before Jaspers, and gave a slightly different reading. See Béla Hamvas, *Scientia Sacra* (Budapest, Magvető, 1988, 2nd ed Szentendre, Medio, 1995) [1943-44]. Concerning the coexistence, see the practical contemporaneity of Buddha (560-483) in India, Confucius (551-479) in China, and Heraclitus (550-480) in Greece.

(4) It is important to note that both Weber and Foucault had an identical and largely unexplained turn in their last, most mature period toward axial religions and philosophies, though none of them used the concept. For Weber, see his *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religions*, including the studies on China, India and Ancient Israel; for Foucault, see the published volumes two and three of the *History of Sexuality* and the lectures given at the *Collège de France* between 1980 and 1984 about Greek and Roman philosophy and Early Christianity, unpublished in writing but available in tape at the *Foucault Archives*.

(5) On cluster analysis, see Everitt, Brian, *Cluster Analysis* (London, Heinemann, 1984), and Aldenderfer, Mark S. and Blashfield, Roger K., *Cluster Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1984).

(6) See Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (N.Y., The Free Press, 1973).

(7) See Elemér Hankiss, Róbert Manchin, László Füstös, and Árpád Szokolczai, "Continuity and Break: the Analysis of the Value System of Hungarian Society, 1930-1978". Research report, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1982.

(8) See Árpád Szokolczai, 'On the characteristics of the value choices of students', in Ildikó Hrubos (ed.), *The Social Conditions of Engineers and Economists* (Budapest, Department of Sociology, University of Economics, 1987).

(9) The reason why the two Irelands had to be left out was that due to the high degree of religiosity, its value system was too distant from all the other countries. This finding supports our previous consideration about the special case of Ireland, the absence of influential and convincing terrorist ideological and absolutist impact.

(10) About LISREL, see J. Scott Long, *Covariance Structure Models: an introduction to LISREL* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1983).

(11) For an opposite perspective, see William M. Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli and Kirsten Hill Maher, 'Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implication for Democracy', *British Journal of Political Science* 24 (1994), 2: 183-223.

(12) Because the value types are dichotomous variables, it was not possible to use LISREL modelling proper, as the maximum likelihood estimates assume normality, and used the LVPLS method, a very robust programme using partial OLS estimates. In fact, the estimation of the model was quite precarious, as the Rokeach types were not only dichotomous variables, but had highly skewed distribution, and membership in one of the types implied a value of 0 for all the others. Therefore, any direct correlation between the value types was spurious, and was replaced with a zero in the correlation matrix. Consequently, the factor loading of the value types are purely based on similarities in the pattern of relationship with the background variables. Furthermore, in some countries where very few respondents belonged to CL8, the model became unstable. Therefore, for comparative purposes, all coefficients of the final model are from runs excluding CL8. Nevertheless, for information, we have reinserted the available coefficients for CL8 into the table.

(13) In some countries, unfortunately no codes were available for urbanisation.

(14) The closeness of East Germany to West Germany is difficult to explain here.

Tables

Table 1. The ten value types

Type	Values preferred well above average	Values selected well below average
CL1	peace, equality, <u>national security</u> , freedom, <u>imaginative</u> , <u>logical</u> , responsible, courageous, capable, broad-minded	comfortable life, polite, happiness, <u>cheerful</u> , obedient, <u>clean</u> , <u>loving</u> , forgiving
CL2	peace, equality, national security, freedom, <u>obedient</u> , <u>forgiving</u> , polite, self-control	love, family security, inner harmony, broad-minded, imaginative, <u>intellectual</u> , logical, responsible
CL3	<u>accomplishment</u> , <u>self-respect</u> , social recognition, friendship, capable, helpful, self-control responsible	<u>peace</u> , national security, love, loving, <u>clean</u> , polite, happiness, pleasure, cheerful
CL4	<u>inner harmony</u> , wisdom, love, self-respect, beauty, <u>logical</u> , <u>imaginative</u> , <u>intellectual</u> , broadminded	<u>national security</u> , peace, equality, comfortable life, <u>obedient</u> , forgiving, clean, polite, ambitious
CL5	<u>salvation</u> , <u>forgiving</u> , <u>loving</u> , obedient, helpful, polite, clean, cheerful, honest, peace	exciting life, freedom, <u>imaginative</u> , <u>independent</u> , <u>logical</u> , courageous capable, broad-minded
CL6	<u>exciting life</u> , <u>pleasure</u> , <u>love</u> , happiness, comfortable life, <u>cheerful</u> , loving, clean, polite	<u>national security</u> , <u>peace</u> , equality, freedom, self-control, responsible
CL7	<u>comfortable life</u> , happiness, national security, <u>independent</u> , capable, imaginative, logical, intellectual, peace, love	<u>equality</u> , <u>forgiving</u> , <u>helpful</u> , obedient, polite, loving, freedom, self-respect, social recognition
CL8	<u>happiness</u> , family security, peace, love, national security, obedient, clean, ambitious, helpful, loving	<u>social recognition</u> , <u>capable</u> , <u>imaginative</u> , <u>intellectual</u> , beauty, friendship, self-respect,

CL9	<u>social recognition</u> , equality, peace, national security, honest, helpful, broad- minded, responsible	comfortable life, pleasure, happiness, exciting life, friendship, <u>cheerful</u> , for- giving, loving, imaginative
CL10	<u>peace</u> , national security, freedom, comfortable life, <u>cheerful</u> , <u>clean</u> , polite, loving	social recognition, inner harmony, accomplishment, equality, <u>responsible</u> , <u>self</u> <u>control</u> , obedient

Note: especially huge differences from average were underlined

Table 2. The abstract chain of terminal values

Ideological	Christian	Social Democratic
EQUALITY	SALVATION	ACCOMPLISHMENT
PEACE		SELF-RESPECT
FREEDOM		SOCIAL RECOGNITION
NATIONAL SECURITY		

Table 3. The mundane chain of terminal values

Traditional	Material	Hedonistic
FAMILY	COMFORTABLE LIFE	EXCITING LIFE
	PLEASURE	
HAPPINESS		FRIENDSHIP
		LOVE

Table 4. The abstract chain of instrumental values

Rational-mental	Pragmatic	Ethical
INTELLECTUAL	CAPABLE	COURAGEOUS
IMAGINATIVE	BROADMINDED	HONEST
LOGICAL	INDEPENDENT	RESPONSIBLE
		SELF-CONTROLLED

Table 5. The mundane chain of instrumental values

Traditional-disciplinary	Christian-Communit.	Hedonistic
POLITE	HELPFUL	CHEERFUL
OBEDIENT	LOVING	
CLEAN	FORGIVING	

Table 6. Summary description of the value types

CL1	Enlightenment rationalist (official socialist)
CL2	socialist petty bourgeois (in the West, post-religious)
CL3	classical social democratic
CL4	dissenting intellectual (in West, post-Enlightenment)
CL5	Christian
CL6	hedonist
CL7	materialist (post-communist)
CL8	traditional-disciplinary
CL9	ideological social democrat
CL10	ideological hedonist

Table 7. The original and estimated distribution of value types in Hungary (in %)

	CL1	CL2	CL3	CL4	CL5	CL6	CL7	CL8	CL9	CL10
Orig	9.1	5.8	4.8	10.5	13.8	15.0	15.6	7.7	6.3	9.7
Est	10.3	8.5	8.3	9.1	14.4	8.2	10.0	13.3	8.9	9.1

Table 8. The estimated distribution of value types in 26 countries

	CL1	CL2	CL3	CL4	CL5	CL6	CL7	CL8	CL9	CL10
Rus	5.2	11.1	21.4	7.8	6.4	6.7	7.5	.9	19.3	13.7
Mos	5.1	5.9	24.7	12.3	4.8	9.1	11.7	1.7	13.6	11.1
Bela	6.1	5.2	23.8	5.8	6.1	7.2	11.5	1.3	20.4	12.5
Esto	10.2	2.9	26.8	9.8	3.4	7.0	14.3	1.9	13.1	10.6
Latv	13.5	4.2	27.9	10.9	4.4	6.2	16.4	1.9	5.5	9.1
Lith	15.3	8.2	21.2	8.0	12.1	7.3	7.5	4.7	3.3	12.4
Bulg	10.7	13.2	15.7	12.2	6.0	8.6	11.3	2.0	9.4	10.9
Hun	10.3	8.5	8.3	9.1	14.4	8.2	10.0	13.3	8.9	9.1
CS	3.6	16.4	33.7	1.5	12.0	11.7	3.7	.8	3.1	13.6
PL	3.4	11.8	14.7	7.1	30.8	34.3	2.9	1.5	1.3	2.1
E-G	24.1	6.4	21.9	11.9	7.6	6.5	9.5	2.5	5.7	4.0
W-G	12.9	13.6	20.7	13.7	9.6	11.6	8.9	1.4	2.1	5.6
Ostr	17.0	8.2	23.8	10.8	15.1	7.5	5.2	2.9	3.3	6.2
Finl	7.0	13.8	12.9	13.1	6.1	19.4	8.8	1.4	4.4	13.1
Swe	11.6	1.5	28.4	17.8	3.4	12.6	3.6	.7	14.6	5.8
Nor	16.1	4.0	16.3	23.3	10.6	6.7	7.7	.8	6.7	7.8
Den	12.8	2.5	21.3	17.9	7.5	15.4	10.2	1.7	5.3	5.4
Hol	8.3	22.0	17.3	14.4	9.2	11.7	7.2	.4	3.0	6.5
Brit	8.2	4.3	18.4	10.7	17.2	11.9	6.3	3.7	8.7	10.6
N-Ir	7.6	4.3	10.9	6.9	50.0	4.3	1.6	3.0	7.9	3.6
Irel	6.4	3.1	12.5	6.3	55.5	3.9	1.8	2.9	2.3	5.3
Belg	2.9	23.6	17.1	9.0	16.3	12.0	5.3	2.1	3.8	7.9
Spa	3.8	10.3	13.0	17.1	24.7	12.1	3.6	4.6	5.4	5.4
Port	1.8	20.7	14.7	7.2	30.6	5.6	2.0	5.7	9.1	2.7
Ita	3.6	14.6	26.6	9.1	25.0	5.9	4.6	2.8	3.9	4.0
Fra	3.5	19.3	26.1	7.4	9.5	14.5	6.0	2.6	4.8	6.4

Table 9. LVPLS coefficients for 24 European countries

	Educ	Urb	Sex	Age	MM	MA	AM	AA	CL1	CL2	CL4	CL8	CL3	CL5	CL6	CL7	CL9
Rus	88	36	57	80	15	-08	02	25	56	-58	59	NA	13	70	-39	-48	32
Nfo	100	NA	15	98	12	-05	07	20	85	-28	44	02	05	37	-68	-33	54
Bel	100	NA	54	87	12	-04	02	25	79	-43	44	-70	39	66	-27	-39	43
Latv	78	55	97	27	12	-05	-10	23	46	-19	87	-46	51	43	14	-65	33
Est	98	17	38	90	14	-05	-14	17	23	-82	53	-49	06	31	-20	-52	76
Lit	100	NA	49	84	10	-17	-10	24	61	40	69	-43	22	77	-46	-34	19
BG	92	16	30	98	21	-15	11	20	59	-63	50	NA	-05	82	-36	-42	17
HU	99	05	43	89	24	-05	01	24	57	-39	73	-43	-06	61	-33	-71	02
CS	93	26	26	95	07	-19	03	18	56	-73	-39	19	-22	85	-22	-41	09
PL	100	NA	95	31	-01	-19	-11	11	26	53	80	-42	04	82	-16	-51	-21
E-G	83	48	36	89	11	-07	-11	25	-07	16	98	-65	-11	89	-26	-37	38
WG	79	52	28	93	05	-12	-10	28	-17	30	94	-46	09	78	-56	-07	25
Ost	61	72	55	82	11	-23	-11	21	49	26	83	-55	-03	87	-45	-19	-07
Fin	100	NA	15	99	08	01	-11	31	-52	56	65	-35	24	66	-49	-18	50
Swe	84	44	75	64	05	17	-07	16	45	67	59	-73	73	-20	-51	-24	-32
N	88	33	-26	96	03	-09	-27	14	-23	-26	94	-07	-04	77	-25	-07	58
DK	83	45	17	96	10	-10	-12	21	34	-36	87	-41	19	80	-51	-03	27
Hol	85	47	08	100	00	-14	-17	18	-16	56	81	-54	31	61	-40	-24	56
Br1	100	18	22	98	01	06	-14	31	00	34	94	-63	09	68	-57	-27	36
Bel	83	46	15	98	04	-09	-15	28	04	78	62	-06	15	86	-43	-08	22
Sp	91	28	39	90	06	-06	-19	39	20	49	85	-36	-08	87	-42	-19	14
Prt	89	26	45	88	20	-26	-10	26	36	56	75	-27	-21	87	-37	-22	11
It	93	25	58	81	07	-10	-09	32	08	14	99	-35	-32	85	-38	-18	06
Fra	96	22	32	99	10	-07	04	23	89	-45	02	50	13	60	-75	-10	21

Appendix

The Rokeach test

A. Terminal values

1. A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
2. A WORLD OF PEACE (free of war and conflict)
3. HAPPINESS (contentedness)
4. WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
5. FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of the loved ones)
6. INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
7. EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
8. A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
9. AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
10. NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
12. MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
13. PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
14. SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
15. FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
16. A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the art)
17. SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
18. SALVATION (saved, eternal life)

B. Instrumental values

19. IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative)
20. COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs)
21. BROADMINDED (open-minded)
22. OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful)
23. INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflexive)
24. SELF-CONTROLLED (restrained, self-disciplined)
25. RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
26. CAPABLE (competent, effective)
27. CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)
28. LOGICAL (consistent, rational)
29. FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
30. INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
31. HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
32. HONEST (sincere, truthful)
33. LOVING (affectionate, tender)
34. CLEAN (neat, tidy)
35. AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
36. POLITE (courteous, well-mannered)



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