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Mediterranean Programme

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Abstract

The way in which Arab regimes deal with their Islamist opposition is an important piece in the broader puzzle of regime stability. In their attempts to tame the Islamist opposition, many Arab regimes have included Islamist actors into the political institutions. The frequent interruptions of the parliamentary presence of the Islamists, however, illustrate the risk embedded in inclusivist experiments for the regimes.

This paper aims at contributing to an understanding of the factors shaping the outcome of inclusion by studying the case of the Moroccan Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD). The case-study focuses on the interactions between the PJD’s organisational model and the institutional constraints it faces in order to account for the party’s course. The PJD’s experience was largely accompanied by an increase of the regime’s institutional control over them and by a tendency of the Islamists towards adaptation to the logics of the Moroccan system. Overall, it represents a case of inclusion that contributed to stabilising the regime.
I. Introduction

Since the 1980s, the stability of Middle Eastern and North African regimes has continuously been challenged by social, economic and legitimacy crises. As a result of these crises, the survival of Middle Eastern and North African regimes has come to depend to a large extent on how their ruling elites deal with oppositional actors. Among these actors, Islamist movements are the only ones with a large support base. Therefore, the way Arab regimes deal with Islamist movements is an important piece in the broader puzzle of regime stability.

From the late 1980s on, many of the Arab regimes put into practice adaptation mechanisms in order to cope with decreasing resources and increasing contestation. These mechanisms consisted of a range of classical political liberalisation measures such as the increase of press freedom and civil rights, the liberation of political prisoners, constitutional reforms, the holding of elections, the (re)animation of parliament, and the inclusion of formerly excluded actors into the political institutions. With the liberalisation of the political arena came increasing demands from Islamist movements for legal recognition as political parties and participation in the political process. As a result, many Arab regimes have authorised Islamist actors to participate in elections, sometimes as ‘independent’ candidates, alone or via a party platform, and sometimes by allowing them to found an own party. Indeed, in view of the Islamists’ strength, for those regimes that could no longer afford the costs of a dominantly repressive strategy, the matter was not whether to include them or not, but how to do it ‘safely’.

This ‘how’ question still appears to be unanswered: While in some cases the parliamentary presence of Islamists has been continuous since their inclusion (for instance, in Morocco), in most cases, this presence has been transitorily interrupted and sometimes fully aborted. Interruptions could take the form of jailing candidates who were likely to be elected (for instance, in Egypt 1995), or the Islamists’ boycott of elections (for instance, in Jordan 1997) as an outcome of strong regime manipulation of elections. Abortions and the high frequency of interruptions show the uneasiness of regimes about granting their most prominent opposition an institutionalised participation; it also illustrates clearly that the outcome of inclusivist experiments is not fixed.

What the basic elements impacting on the outcome of inclusion are, is still a puzzle. A major reason for this is that for a long period, research on Islamist parties and movements has gone into another direction. Resulting from the above mentioned liberalisation measures and the marked interest of Islamists to participate in elections, the democratisation paradigm that started to emerge in research on the future of the political order of Arab States spilled over to research on Islamist movements. Especially after the FIS’ electoral victory in Algeria, the relationship between ‘Islam and Democracy’ or ‘Islamists and Democratisation’ was foregrounded (see, for instance, Ahmed/ Zartman 1997, Kramer 1997, AbuKhalil 1994, Hudson 1994, Krämer 1993, Krämer 1999, Esposito/ Voll 1996, Brumberg 1997, Ghadbian 1997, Abootalebi 2000). Research and debates about the movements and their potential parliamentary activities were organised around the question of whether the Islamists’ claim for electoral participation was ‘only’ a strategic choice by anti-democratic movements in order to seize power or whether they reflected a ‘true’ commitment to the values of democracy (for an illustration of this debate, see the contributions in Kramer 1997, Ahmad/ Zartman 1997, Pelletreau/ Pipes/ Esposito 1994). In short, the question was whether the Islamists could accommodate to a democratic political game. Regardless of the answer provided, the method of investigation in most of this work has been an analysis of historical and contemporary ‘Islamic’ States, Islamist discourses or

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Koran- and Hadith-exegeses with respect to human rights and democracy. Beyond the part of it that is merely polemic, this has produced very interesting analyses of contemporary discourse and references of the Islamists. A first problem with this literature, however, is that conclusions are derived through a presumed causal link between the actors’ ideological base and their behaviour. The pertinence of this link, which merges two separate levels of analysis—ideas and action—and neglects the dilemma that actors face in overcoming this gap if they are to translate an abstract and coherent ideology into concrete programmes within institutional constraints, is dubious as such. Additionally, the question is itself hypothetical. None of these political systems is democratic, nor have regimes engaged in further democratisation processes. To date, no Islamist party has been legalised in a type of regime in which any initial party goals could actually be implemented via elections and it is unlikely that this will happen in the future. In sum, the question of the compatibility of Islamist ideology with a democratic system is at present irrelevant regarding the political order in these states.

In this paper, I argue that the study of the outcomes of inclusion of Islamist actors has more potential than the above literature to shed light on the political order in the Arab States. This is motivated by the empirical observation of the absence of democratisation processes and the sensible assumption that dealing successfully with the Islamist opposition can contribute to regime stability. This paper thus aims at contributing to an understanding of the outcomes of inclusion and, in particular, of the forces that shape such outcomes by studying one case of inclusion. The case considered is the Moroccan Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD), which seems to be a ‘successful’ inclusivist experience in that it has not been interrupted since its first electoral participation. The case-study focuses on the organisational features of Islamist parties and on their interaction with the institutional environment. As the link between ideas and action is not as straightforward as put forward by the approaches outlined above, ideology is considered here only in as far as it shows itself as a clear factor constraining the Islamists’ actions.

As the instability of inclusivist experiences shows, the outcome of inclusion is not straightforward. Broadly speaking, inclusion contributes to regime stability if—in the long run—it leads to the successful co-optation of Islamist actors. From the regime’s perspective, such a process would ideally take the following shape: Exposure to the institutional environment dilutes and compromises the movement’s demands and Islamists become truly integrated into the system; they become part of and similar to the political elite. Hand in hand with this process comes the decrease of the Islamists’ credibility as oppositional actors and as an alternative to the ruling elites. If inclusion signifies a general increase of the regime’s institutional control over these actors and their successful co-optation, the regime has one problem less to care about and inclusion shows itself as having a strong potential to contribute to regime stability. However, as suggested above, such an outcome is not automatic. Indeed, it is also possible that Islamists’ participation in elections allows them to broaden support and to increase their political weight and claims. As the regime’s interest in allowing participation can be assumed to be containment rather than increase of the Islamists’ weight, this leads to a high probability of interruption. In this case, it does not positively affect regime stability as—again—the regime has to afford the costs of a dominantly repressive strategy. It is therefore not possible to establish a general statement about a positive relation between inclusion and regime stability.

What is possible, though, is to theoretically identify and empirically study key elements that impact on the outcome of inclusion regarding the success or failure of co-optation. As will be suggested in this paper, among these key elements are the following two: The first is the party’s relationship with

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1 Regarding the study of political parties, Panebianco (1988: 4-5) argues that the presumption of a causal link between the official party goals (ideology) and party behaviour leads into a dead end of research: ‘If we consider it sufficient to rely upon the definitions that actors or institutions proffer of their own goals, we will never be able to go beyond simple descriptions of their ideological self-representations.’ Regarding the study of organisations, Etzioni (1975: 134) argues that objectives are cultural entities whereas organisations are social systems and that the cultural entities are always more consistent social systems. This is not to argue that ideology or party goals do not matter, but that one should be aware of these differences, which are well illustrated, for instance, in the history of socialist parties where revolutionary language coexisted with reformist praxis.
its founding organisation. Initial dependency on an outside organisation regarding its most crucial resources is a common organisational characteristic of Islamist parties. The extent to which a party can adapt to the institutional environment is to a large degree determined by the setting up and evolution of this relationship with its founding organisation. The second dimension is the impact of the institutional environment in form of both explicit pressure calling for an active strategy of compromising and the ‘centripetal’ forces of the norms reigning in the institutional environment, which can push towards a behavioural adaptation of the included actors. It is the interplay between these dimensions and the way in which Islamists respond to the challenges of the institutional and extra-institutional environment that will—from the regime’s perspective—to a large extent determine the ‘utility’ of Islamist inclusion. Inclusion will most probably have such utility if the party reaches some autonomy from its founding organisation and if adaptation and compromise dominate the party’s behaviour in the institutional arena. To be sure, there are many intervening variables and unpredictable factors that will impact on the outcome in a particular case. Moreover, the dimensions that the paper addresses are not exhaustive. In particular, the paper does not explicitly deal with the regime as an active player, but includes it in the ‘environmental factors’. However, I suggest that a study of a case along these dimensions can help to better understand the evolution and outcome of the particular case as well as shedding some light on the issues at stake in other cases.

The object of the case study, the Moroccan PJD, is the offspring of one of the two principal Islamist movements in Morocco. Inclusion occurred at a moment of political reforms. Among these were two constitutional reforms that conferred more power to political parties and parliament and led to a coalition government that was mainly composed of former opposition parties in 1997. Since its first electoral participation, the party continuously increased its organisational size and its representation in the political institutions: from 9/14 MPs in 1997 to 42 MPs in 2002, and from 100 in 1997 to 593 municipal councillors in 2003.\(^2\) As will be described in the paper, party evolution was largely accompanied by an increase of the regime’s institutional control and by a tendency of the Islamists towards behavioural adaptation to the logics of the Moroccan system. Overall, it can be said to represent a case of inclusion that contributed to stabilising the regime.

The paper is organised in the following way: The next section develops guiding assumptions regarding some basic elements and dynamics that shape the outcome of the inclusion of Islamist actors. Section III, the main part of the paper, provides a qualitative analysis of the Moroccan case: First by looking at the setting up and evolution of the relationship between the party and its founding organisation and, second, by discussing the scope and nature of its accommodation with the institutional environment. This section is based on interviews with PJD leaders at different levels of the party hierarchy, its members and elected representatives, on observations of the 2003 electoral campaign and the 2004 Party Congress, and on party documents as well as party and movement newspapers.\(^3\) Section IV summarises the main features of the case in view of its contribution to regime stabilisation. Section V concludes.

\(^2\) The initial figure after the parliamentary elections was nine. After two defections from other parties (out of which one was actually a member of the party’s founding organisation) and partial elections in 1999 and 2000, the group eventually comprised 14 MPs (12 are necessary to form a parliamentary group).

\(^3\) 30 interviews were conducted in 2003 and 2004. In the following they will be quoted anonymously with an indication of the interviewee’s position in the party hierarchy and the date of the interview. National leader means a member of the party’s highest organ, the General Secretariat, intermediate leaders are members of the provincial secretariats and local leaders are members of local secretariats (for more details on the party’s organisational chart, see section on party organisation in the paper). For the elected representatives, it will be indicated whether the interviewee is an MP, and in that case when he entered parliament (i.e. 1997 or 2002), or a Municipal Councillor. It will also be indicated whether the interviewee is as well member of the executive bureau of the PJD’s founding organisation, the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR). The quotes are mostly kept in French, which is the original interview language. Quotes from Arabic newspapers are translated into English.
II. Institutional and Extra-Institutional Forces as Determinants of Party Behaviour

This section aims at identifying some of the basic elements and dynamics that are likely to impact on the outcome of the inclusion of Islamist actors. As suggested above, inclusion can contribute to regime persistence in cases where it decreases the Islamists’ credibility as oppositional actors and reforming force and increases the regime’s institutionalised control over them. Whether and to what extent this occurs can be captured by assessing the nature and scope of accommodation of the newly included actors. Accommodation, as used in this paper, is defined as a more or less passive adaptation or as a purposeful act of convergence of individual/collective actors towards their respective environment (Schultze 2002: 8). Accommodation in its passive and active dimensions encompasses both contributions to regime persistence this paper deals with: In its passive dimension, adaptation of the party or more specifically of the party’s elected representatives to the political style of the environment means less distinctiveness of the Islamists as a political alternative and damage to their claim of ‘proximity’. In its active dimension, here seen as a strategy of compromise with the regime, accommodation, on the one hand, means the increase of institutional control, and, on the other hand, damages claims of reforming the country’s political institutions. The following paragraphs present first, those forces potentially pulling in the direction of accommodation and, second, those forces that potentially work against it.

Drawing on the literature on social movements and political parties, one can identify three major forces pulling in the direction of accommodation with the institutional environment. The first is the specific nature of institutional constraints for oppositional actors in authoritarian regimes, the second is the impact of the institutional norms which encourage the behavioural adaptation of the deputies, and the third is related to the growing size and changing composition of organisations. All three factors play to transform a party from an ideologically inspired enterprise into a survival inspired one.

A central objective of opposition parties in authoritarian regimes with elections is to decrease the likelihood of being re-excluded and of the abortion of the liberalisation experiment that brought them into the game in the first place. In fact, in accounting for the Islamists’ motivation for participation in elections, scholars have stressed the long standing experience of repression in form of jail, torture, execution or forced exile (see, for instance, Fuller 1997: 151 and Ghadbian 1997: 74-75). Institutional constraints are usually defined as ‘those relatively stable factors which structure party arenas and consequently influence their organisations’ (Panebianco 1988: footnote 9, chapter 11). In the case of opposition parties in authoritarian contexts such constraints not only include the structure of the electoral and parliamentary arenas but very importantly the ‘veto player’ (be it the military, the king, or a ruling party) and a number of domestic taboos (Mainwaring 2003: 8-12). Hence, in authoritarian regimes, legal political actors have from the outset a certain ‘bias’ towards compromise, which they might prioritise as well in the future over actively pursuing their programmatic goals. Moreover, in these regimes there can be unpredictable changes in the definition of what is permissible (Anderson 1997: 19). Therefore, an authoritarian environment pushes not only for an active but also for a cautious strategy of compromise with the ‘veto player’ if actors want to remain inside the game.

The second environmental component considered is parliament. Parliament as an institution contains certain behavioural norms—explicit and implicit ones—that are likely to encourage adaptation, even of actors that are initially highly critical of precisely these norms. A first component encouraging adaptation is the existence of institutionalised modes of action through which one achieves gains in parliament. Offe (1990: 240-245) has argued that the logic of parliamentary politics is one of technicalities, of budgetary constraints and of forming strategic alliances in order to achieve policy gains. Especially in the case of a party joining a governmental alliance, this logic exerts a learning pressure on the parliamentary representatives and results in a more pragmatic and policy-oriented stance. The nature of the parliamentary arena in authoritarian regimes where vast policy-areas are out of reach makes it less straightforward that parliamentary activity has similar effects. On the other hand, though, even if the potential gains are smaller, parliamentary institutions, regardless of what type, are not meaningless. If Islamists want to increase the short term benefits of inclusion (in form of office and larger redistributive gains for their clientele but also of a stronger impact on policy-making) this requires first an
understanding of how things work in this environment, and, second, to adopt—at least to some degree—the prevalent mode of action by which one achieves such benefits. Therefore, provided there is such an aim at direct benefits there is a strong potential for adaptation to the logics that reign in parliament. A second component of behavioural adaptation, that is relevant in the context of this paper, relates to the temptations of individual benefits. With respect to communist parties, Duverger (1963: 190-191) made the point that a deputy is socially different from the militants; the longer someone is a deputy, the more increases the distance between the deputy’s and the militants ‘general mode of existence’ and the less the deputy might be willing to return to his former mode of existence. This suggests that, by changing someone’s social relations and status, the fact of being in parliament transforms actors into members of the elite, and, that the more a deputy gets used to this status, the more he might be inclined to preserve it.

A third element that can reinforce both types of accommodation is the growth and bureaucratisation of organisations. In a synthesis of literature, Panebianco (1988: 17-20) suggests the following ideal type of party evolution: Party organisations begin their career as a ‘system of solidarity’. This system is characterised by the homogeneity and equality of its members with the shared goal being the realisation of the common cause. At this stage, collective incentives for participation—identity, solidarity, ideology—prevail. As the party grows in size and organisational evolution is accompanied by internal diversification and routinisation, different forms of inequalities within the organisation are created and the nature of participation changes. The party ends up as a ‘system of interest’, one which is composed of competing actors with diverging interests and where selective incentives—status and material—account strongly for participation. Within this process, the importance of the initial party goals declines. In the absence of an ‘idea’-based shared goal, the common minimum goal of the involved actors is the survival of the organisation. This in turn implies, that it will adopt a strategy of adaptation towards the environment, because ‘it has too much to lose by adopting an aggressive and adventurous policy’ (Panebianco 1988: 19). As mentioned, this is an ideal type and whether a particular party evolves in a similar way depends on a number of factors, in particular on its environment, its initial configuration and the way it institutionalises (see paragraphs below). At the same time, though, it captures dynamics and tendencies that historically have operated in many parties and therefore should be considered. In the context of this paper, one can suggest that the more a party evolves towards a ‘system of interest’, the stronger is the potential for adaptation and increase in the perceived benefits of organisational survival while the importance of the original aims decreases.

In sum, the literature assigns first an important role to the particular way in which actors respond to environmental challenges for shaping the scope and nature of accommodation: On the one hand, regarding the actors’ responses to the explicit pressure to compromise and accept the rules of the game dictated by the regime and on the other hand, regarding the MPs interaction with a certain culture that reigns in the institutional environment. Second, the literature points at the important role of organisational evolution for the party’s transformation into a survival driven enterprise.

Against these forces, though, stand the origins of Islamist parties regarding their organisational characteristics and their emergence from a social movement for which political action is only one among a broader variety of activities.

The organisational characteristics of party origins—a party’s ‘genetic model’—are seen to constitute specific resources and constraints for its modes of action.4 Islamist parties usually emerge from a wider social movement and are founded by what the literature has called an ‘external sponsor’, i.e. an organisation that precedes and pursues a distinctive interest through party formation. This has been the case for most Islamist parties as the regimes’ reluctance towards including oppositional collective actors into political institutions led to the occurring of party formation after the movement organisations’ consolidation. In none of the cases it has implied the absorption of the movement organisation into the party. The party is thus designed as the institutional branch of the movement organisation. That is, from the latter’s perspective, the

4 See Panebianco (1988: 50-53) for the concept of the genetic model, and Duverger (1963; introduction) for the difference between internal and external party origins.
party’s activities are perceived as only one element of the organisation’s general political and social activity, i.e. the party is an instrument of the movement designed for a special field of social action.

Parties with an external sponsor in their genetic model are initially dependent, since vital resources are partly controlled by other organisations (Panebianco 1988: 55): The party’s organisational loyalties are indirect, the external organisation is the leadership’s source of legitimation, and the party depends on external resources for mobilisation, support, financing and human resources. This relationship of dependency is also seen to undermine the party’s institutionalisation (Panebianco 1988: 63). Institutionalisation comprises the development and formalisation of an organisation’s channels of articulation and decision-making procedures, and the development of its identity and boundaries with the environment—including the founding organisation. In the absence of some degree of institutionalisation, the party remains in a subordinate role; it lacks autonomy for political choices and continuously has to give voice to the outside organisation.

For the historical cases of parties arising of movements that aimed at a fundamental change of society and political institutions—mainly socialist and communist parties—Duverger has argued that their relation with the parliamentary environment has strongly been shaped by suspicion, and by the aim of exerting strong control over the parliamentary representatives in order to counter their adaptation (Duverger 1963: 191-196). This suggests that in particular actors which aim at the transformation of society and politics and whose credibility is strongly related to their difference to the elite might be well aware of the perils of accommodation.

Ongoing dependency on the founding organisation does not necessarily go against active accommodation with the regime. As mentioned above, some compromise and the aim of getting shelter from repression is at the very start of inclusion and probably goes beyond those movement members that directly engage in politics. The founding organisation itself might prefer that the party adopts a prudent strategy as this also protects its other activities (cf. Langohr 2001: 594). But as political action is precisely only one in the framework of a wider set of activities, the movement organisations’ credibility can be damaged if the party and its representatives become undistinguishable from the country’s political elite. Hence, the outside organisation is likely to fear damaging spill-over effects and might aim at preventing a too large convergence of the party’s representatives with the behavioural patterns of the country’s political elite.

Therefore, decreasing dependency on the founding organisation can be regarded as a pre-requisite for the success of Islamist inclusion—from a regime stability perspective: First, because behavioural adaptation is less likely to occur if the outside organisation keeps controlling the party and its elected representatives. Second, because it is less likely that it opens up to new members and evolves towards a system of interest if the party remains just a parliamentary arm of the movement without an independent organisational structure and without clear boundaries to the movement.

In sum, two dimensions will—from the regime’s perspective—play an important role for the success of inclusion: first, the actor’s responses to institutional constraints pulling towards active compromising and passive adaptation, and, second, the setting up and evolution of the party’s relationship with its founding organisation. In the light of the above discussion, I suggest that the greater the autonomy a party reaches from its founding organisation and the more behavioural adaptation, compromise and concerns over organisational survival dominate the party’s logic of action, the greater potential have inclusive approaches to contribute to regime stabilisation.

The following sections now explore the case of the Parti de la Justice et du Développement in Morocco along these lines.
III. The Inclusivist Experience of the Moroccan PJD

A. The Relationship with the Founding Organisation: Increasing Autonomy or Prevailing Dependency?

This section discusses the setting up and evolution of the PJD’s relationship with its founding organisation. First, it describes the genetic model of the PJD. Second, it looks at the shape and evolution of the PJD’s organisational structures. Third, it evaluates the capacity and limits of the PJD’s independent resources regarding mobilisation, support, material and human resources. Finally, it assesses the degree of autonomy that the party has achieved within its first decade of existence.

1. The PJD’s Genetic Model

The movement which gave birth to the PJD emerged from the Jami‘yyat al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya (Islamic Youth Association), founded in 1970 by Abdel Karim Mouti’. As in other states, it was initially encouraged by the regime as a counterweight to the left and was legalised in 1972. The Islamic Youth Association recruited its members mostly in universities and in secondary schools. The organisation was dissolved in 1976 and Mouti’ fled to exile, after some members were accused to have assassinated Omar Benjelloun, the leader of a leftist labour union. The majority of its members, initially loyal to Mouti’ regrouped in al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), created officially in 1983 (unofficially in 1981) by Mohamed Yatim, Abdallah Baha and Abdelilah Benkirane (Tozy 1999a: 233).5 This organisation changed its name to al-Islah wa al-Tajdid (Reform and Renewal) in 1992.6 From the 1980s onwards, the members discussed the desirability of and potential means for political participation. Different options were considered but the one preferred, the creation of an own political party was rejected by the authorities in 1992. Consequently, the second best was made concrete—integration into one of Morocco’s numerous dormant parties.

In 1992, when the Islah’s leaders reached a—regime authorised—agreement with Dr. Khatib the president of the Mouvement Populaire Démocratique et Constitutionnel (MPDC, change of name into PJD in 1998) to integrate his party, the party’s organisational resources were limited to the president’s villa; its local and provincial federations existed only on paper.7 The members of al-Islah wa al-Tajdid started to renew and create local and provincial party bureaus, mainly in the cities where the movement was itself rooted. In 1996, an extraordinary Party Congress rendered the agreement and renewal process explicit through the appointing of movement leaders to the party’s highest committee, the General Secretariat. In the same year, al-Islah wa al-Tajdid merged with another Islamist association.8 The emerging organisation, the founding organisation of the PJD, was baptised Harakat al-Tawhid wa al-Islah (Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR)).

The genetic model of the PJD can be summarised in the following way: Though the PJD and the MUR were legally separate organisations from the very beginning, the party’s starting position with respect to

5 According to Tozy (1999a: 93), the followers of the organisation split into three fractions: A first fraction that claimed for a complete rupture, with a minority of them joining the extremist group al-Jihad and the majority approaching Sheikh Yassin—the founder of al-'Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Benevolence), the other major Islamist organisation in Morocco. A second fraction—the neutrals—joined local religious associations. Eventually there is the third group in which a big part of the present-day party leaders were organised. While in exile, Mouti’ tried unsuccessfully to maintain the organisational structure and his control over the group’s activities. His interventions from exile were constantly putting the group under pressure, for instance by a publication in 1981 in which he called for violence and harshly criticised the monarchy and its policies regarding the Sahara issue (cf. Shahin 1998: 188).

6 In the organisation’s newspaper, the change of name was explained as necessary to eliminate any misperception about a potential claim of representing exclusively Islam (cf. al-Raya, n° 15, 2.2.1992, quoted in Shahin 1998: 200 (footnote 67). None of the two organisations was legalised but the authorities tolerated its activities.

7 The MPDC—a split from the Mouvement Populaire—was founded by Dr. Khatib in 1967. It has never participated in elections.

8 Rabitat al-Mustaqbal al-Islami. This organisation is itself a unification of local religious associations in which members of the Islamic Youth integrated after its dissolution: the Islamic Association at Ksar el-Kebir and the Association for Islamic Predication at Fes.
the MUR was one of dependency. The entire organisational body was based on the MUR’s structures and resources. Even though only around 15% of the MUR’s members decided to engage directly in party activities, the overwhelming majority of the national, provincial and local party leaders and militants came from the MUR. The most prominent movement leaders became party leaders while still holding their posts in the executive bureau of the MUR. The practices of the 1996 extraordinary congress show that the party organisation was not very elaborate: the channels of articulation between the different levels and organs were not defined, the boundaries between movement and party not clear-cut. Local, provincial and national representatives were appointed, not elected. In the campaign for the 1997 parliamentary elections, the party depended almost entirely on the MUR’s mobilisation resources: The media coverage was performed by the MUR’s newspaper, and its militants carried out the door-to-door part of the campaign. Only with regard to the financing of the campaign, did the party receive a contribution from the state.

In sum, despite the special feature of integration into another party, which forced the MUR’s leaders to take into consideration some of the party’s old guard in the distribution of posts and as candidates for elections, the starting configuration of the Moroccan PJD corresponded to the described model of party origins. As I have pointed out, political party literature suggests that this type of genetic model can lead to a continuous situation of dependency vis-à-vis the outside organisation political party and to a weak institutionalisation of the party organisation. To assess whether the PJD has reached some degree of autonomy from the MUR, the following section discusses the evolution of the party’s formal organisational structures and the scope of dependency and autonomy of its resources.

2. Setting-up and Formalisation of Organisational Structures

Over the past eight years, the PJD has developed and solidified its organisational structures. National Party Congresses were held in 1998, 1999 and 2004. In the 1999 congress, held after the setting up and election of the local and provincial secretariats, the members of the General Secretariat were elected for the first time. At that point, it had local structures in 52 prefectures and provinces and the party’s National Council had set up detailed party statutes. It had become a complex organisation with a high number of party organs and procedural prescriptions.

The party is structured as follows. The local structures can be described as something between a branch and a cell; in other words they are less closed than a cell but not purely expansive either, the quality of the members is more important than their quantity, and in general, the party asks for more than the simple enrolment of its members but for active engagement. The political education of party members and the public, is viewed as important, but so too are the organisation of leisure and charity activities, and the electoral campaigns.

The party has legislative bodies on the local, the provincial and the national level. The corresponding executive bodies, the so-called secretariats, are elected by the legislative bodies on the same level. Each body supposedly communicates with the body at the next level (see organisational chart below). Additionally, there are several institutions that have been given the task of planning and organisation, such as the regional co-ordination council and the administrative commission. Members of these organs are appointed by the General Secretariat.

The main links within the party are of a vertical nature. As to horizontal links with other organisations, it is important to note, that the MUR does not have any formally institutionalised representation (i.e. in form of quotas) in party committees. While informal relationships are relevant in Morocco, in the absence

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9 In the interviews, figures between 70 and 90 % as the initial share of movement members among the overall membership were indicated. I suggest that the higher figure is more realistic, especially among the simple members and the local and provincial secretaries. It is mainly in the General Secretariat, where the MPDC’s founding generation or their sons are initially represented in form of quotas.

10 Except from its presidency, where Mohamed Yatim, becoming a member of the party’s General Secretariat was replaced by Ahmed Raissouni who, though in the party’s National Council has so far not shown any further ambitions for party or public office.

11 According to the party’s treasurer, the party received 4 Million Dirham for the 1997 elections. Interview, 6.11.03

12 Except three of the MPDC’s old guard that were added by the General Secretariat itself.
of a formalised representation of the MUR in the party institutions, one cannot say that it is—as an organisation—dominating the party’s decision making. Generally speaking, the General Secretariat is the most powerful party organ. The second most powerful organ is the National Council, mainly composed of the intermediate leadership level. All decisions of principle are to be taken in the national Party Congress.13

Organisational Chart of the PJD according to Party Statutes 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative</th>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Communication/Co-ordination</th>
<th>Functions/Prerogatives</th>
<th>Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Secretariat (GS)</td>
<td>Administrative Commission</td>
<td>steering the ordinary affairs organisation of the administrative responsibilities appoints the regional co-ordinators supervises/controls the course of the provincial bureaus and the activities of their employees</td>
<td>Secretary General and his vice treasurer and his vice the president of the National Council S consulting members members in a number specified by the NC can be added by the GS itself provincial secretaries and regional co-ordinators headed by the Secretary General or his vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Congress</td>
<td>National Council (NC)</td>
<td>advisory/counselling institution for co-ordination and communication</td>
<td>members of GS and provincial secretariats members of NC regional co-ordinators members of provincial councils local secretaries MPs deputies of municipal councils and regions; deputies of professional chambers and of the councils of the labour unions and regions the GS can add up to 5% of the total amount of members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Council of Regional Co-ordinators</td>
<td>decides the party’s general directives and basic political choices elects the Secretary General and has to approve the GS in general elects president and vice-president of the National Council</td>
<td>president of NC and his vice members of the current and previous GS provincial secretaries their vices regional co-ordinators three representatives elected by National Congress representatives of other organisations (decided by GS) MPs after consultation with the GS, the Secretary General can add up to 10% of the members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Coordination Council</td>
<td>communication and co-ordination between provincial secretariats and the GS</td>
<td>regional co-ordinators headed by the Secretary General or his vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial Secretariat</td>
<td>Provincial Congress</td>
<td>co-ordination of the activities within the region</td>
<td>the provincial secretaries and their vices in the concerned region headed by the regional co-ordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Secretariat</td>
<td>Local Congress</td>
<td>deliberates on the provincial well-being ensures communication between the local secretariats, the regional co-ordination council, and the GS</td>
<td>members elected by provincial congress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 This power configuration has been subject to change during party evolution. I will come back to this issue in the section on the party in the institutional environment.
3. Capacity and Limits of Independent Party Resources

The PJD has developed parallel structures to the MUR: a youth organisation and a ‘commission for women and the family’. The latter is not very active, but the youth organisation is; it has its own statutes and it organises conferences, debates and leisure activities at the national and local levels. Moreover, in 2002, the party founded the Forum du Développement, a forum of cadres, who are either members or supporters of the party. Its tasks are to develop party policies, to support the parliamentary group and to give a technical and political training to the party’s elected representatives. All three are financed exclusively by the party. The PJD has also established an own newspaper—al-’Asr. So far it is less widely read than al-Tajdid of the MUR and only published weekly, but the role it plays in the electoral campaigns is becoming more substantial. The party has expanded and diversified its sources of income: Membership subscription fees, plus the reallocation of at least 22% of the MPs’ and municipal councillors’ revenue to the party (out which half goes to the national, half to the local level), and the governmental funding for the electoral campaigns.

Parallel organisations, party newspaper and the diversification of party income suggest a certain degree of autonomy. Greater dependency prevails regarding the party’s need for movement support for its electoral success. Regarding the role played by the MUR for guaranteeing the PJD’s electoral success, two issues need to be considered. First, the active support of the MUR during the electoral campaigns and second, the electoral support created through charitable and leisure activities, in which the PJD relies on co-operation with the MUR.

Regarding the first issue, Ahmed Raissouni, the MUR’s president until 2003, stressed in an interview after the 2002 elections that the success of the party was ‘due to the cultural, social and propagandist assets of the movement’ and to the fact that ‘all the members of the movement were pushed to militate in favour of the PJD’s candidates’. Albeit one can consider the MUR’s president as biased, the active support of the MUR in the electoral campaign was certainly still very important in the 2002 parliamentary elections. In the 2003 campaign for the communal elections, however, the PJD’s national office aimed at co-ordinating and unifying the campaigns and provided the local sections with a remarkable amount of independent propagandist means.

As to the second issue, the role of the MUR for creating support among the electorate is certainly more crucial than in the simple carrying out of the electoral campaign, especially at the local level. In the end, the strong electoral support for the PJD is to a large extent due to ‘proximity’ with an electorate that usually conceives of its political elites as distant and self-interested. Interviewees stressed, that the PJD has—not only a political but also a social and educational project and that its electoral success is the outcome of a work that has been carried out over many years. Among these, they emphasised leisure and charity activities that are carried out in co-operation with the MUR or its close associations. Regarding this issue, it is difficult to ascertain

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14 While the campaign for the legislative elections 2002 was mainly carried out by al-Tajdid (programme, detailed profile of the candidates and interviews with the heads of the lists, summaries of the PJD’s parliamentary activities from 1997—2002 and interview with the MPs), al-’Asr was aiming at a similar style of coverage in the campaign for the communal elections in 2003.

15 The membership subscription fees are 200 Dirham per year for working, 100 for associated members (for the differences between these two types of membership, see below). According to the party’s treasurer the party received 17 Million Dirham for the 2002 elections and 4 Million Dirham for the 2003 communal elections. Interview, 6.11.03

16 Interview with A. Raissouni in al-’Asr, 7.10.02. Raissouni was forced to resign from the MUR’s presidency after an interview, in which his statements were interpreted as questioning the king’s religious status as commander of the faithful.

17 Long before the campaign had officially started—in Morocco, this is two weeks before the elections—local co-ordinators had been invited to the national office to discuss the campaign. The General Secretariat provided financial aid to the local offices for carrying out their campaign and they drafted a common programme for the elections. All the constituencies were provided with videotapes that showed a summary of the party’s history and the local co-ordinators were encouraged to develop their own. In all the constituencies, PowerPoint presentations of the candidates were shown and national leaders came to speak. Flyers with the party programme and the candidates were distributed. Interestingly, in none of the meetings that I saw, was a MUR representative invited to speak.
how developed the independent PJD’s capacities are. However, it is unlikely that the PJD is yet at an organisational stage at which it could perform such activities without the MUR’s support, or that the PJD could sustain these activities if the MUR explicitly withdrew from supporting the party.

The MUR’s position about continuing to provide broad support, however, is not clear-cut. At least, there seems to be a concern over its becoming absorbed into and subordinate to the party’s activities:

Nous, dans les dix années qui sont passées, on a trop investi dans le parti […] alors que l’action politique, dans notre ligne, dans notre concept, ce n’est qu’une partie de notre action, on ne veut pas trop focaliser sur le côté politique, nous comme association culturelle, éducative, on préfère s’attaquer à ces volets, aux voltes éducatifs, aux volets da’wi, ce qui se rapporte à la prêche des données de l’islam, de l’étique, de la culture musulmane. […] quand on s’investit dans un parti, le parti demande toujours plus.

These concerns relate to more than just the absorbing of the members’ energy. Looking at the party’s and movement’s human resources respectively, there is a tendency of movement members to engage actively in party politics—initially about 15% and by 2003 about 25%. A drying out of the movement’s human resources in favour of the party means for the MUR that it might, in the future, be less relevant for the party’s success and maybe, as a result, to lose voice in the party. For the party, it means that it can rely more directly on these resources without needing the MUR as an intermediate. If this tendency prevails, one dimension of the party’s development towards autonomy could take the form of the absorbing of the MUR’s human resources.

Another interesting dimension of the evolution of the party’s human resources is its diversification. Admission to the party is not conditional on membership in the MUR or any other Islamist organisation. In spite of the PJD’s elitist concept of membership, which aims at a strict selection mechanism with an enrolment in two steps, de facto the party has opened up. The diversification of the membership is illustrated by the profile of the electoral candidates for the 2002 elections (see figure 1), where only around one third of the candidates were clear cut members of the MUR. Given that 90% of the 2002 candidates were chosen by the party base, their profile is a good proxy for a changing composition of the party membership in the absence of membership figures. Even if one adds the 23% of members of other Islamist associations, the figures show that the original group has lost ground. Indeed, the PJD is now considered as a party, by means of which one can achieve office and status. There is a strong demand to become a member and especially to become a candidate for elections. A first wave of requests occurred around the 2002 legislative elections, with a strong drop after the May 16th attacks which reversed again with the 2003 communal elections. Of course, a number of the new members that come either from the MUR or are ‘not militants, but consumers of the movement’ might still mainly be driven by the party’s collective incentives. But an increasing number of the newcomers are also driven by selective ones.

18 It has to be noted as well that outside the electoral campaigns, the PJD cannot rely on the MUR’s support to mobilise for whatever political issue on the national level. Only in issues relating to ‘identity’, it was possible to rely on the movement to put extra-parliamentary pressure on the government. Interview with national party leader, 10.10.03
19 Interview with national party leader/ member of the MUR’s executive bureau, 12.11.03
20 Interview with national party leader/ member of the MUR’s executive bureau, 11.12.03
21 The party statutes distinguish between the ‘participating’ and the ‘working’ member. The initial admission as participating member is conditional on two recommendations and, according to the statutes, participating members have no access to any of the party’s legislative or executive bodies. After one year, permitting both an evaluation of the adherent’s efforts and his screening, he can be upgraded to a working member.
22 An electoral candidate of the PJD explained the difference between a militant and a consumer in the following way: ‘Moi je suis un jeune de ce parti—je suis ancien du mouvement, par contre je n’ai jamais été un militant de ce mouvement, dans le mouvement on m’apprenait a faire la prière, [c’est] la différence entre un militant et un consommateur.’ Interview with a candidate for the communal elections, 8.8.03
23 There are at least some cases, where material incentives pre-dominated and where the PJD’s leaders favour the candidates for similar reasons. One example is the case of the current deputy from Khenitra, son of the owner of an important Moroccan business group, who had run as a candidate on the ticket of another party before. Mohamed Chaabi had joined the party about one year before the elections but the members had not chosen him as the head of list. In fact,
Overall, one can conclude that the PJD is slowly developing independent human resources, be it through the absorption of MUR members into the party organisation or through the increasing adherence of members that have no affiliation with the MUR or with the Islamist movement at all. While this can principally show tendencies not their pace, the direction of the process is clear: The MUR increasingly loses importance as a provider of the party’s human resources.

Figure 1, Affiliation of Electoral Candidates 2002 (n=234)

The difference between ‘No Affiliation Indicated’ and ‘No Affiliation’ is that in the former case it could be that candidates are members of Islamist associations but have not indicated it whereas in the latter, it is known, that candidates have no link with the movement.

4. The Relationship PJD-MUR between Informal Dependency and Growing Autonomy

In sum, the evolution of the relationship between the party and its founding organisation displays a mixed picture. On the one hand, the presence of a founding organisation has not prevented the party from actively developing and formalising its organisational structures. Moreover, it currently depends much less on the MUR’s support for the electoral campaign and for financing than it initially did. The brief look into the PJD’s membership has also indicated that the party is diversifying and developing independent resources. Clearly, then, the PJD is today more than just the parliamentary arm of the MUR.

On the other hand, however, it still depends strongly on the movement to create the type of general support that distinguishes it from the other parties in the eyes of the broad electorate. Joint activities with the movement organisation that are directed to the wider public are crucial if the PJD is to benefit further from the strong electoral support it received in the last elections. It therefore has to give some voice to the MUR or at least to avoid any direct confrontation. A first tentative conclusion would therefore be that a relationship of ‘informal’ dependency remains between party and movement organisation and that the former’s success currently depends on the support of the latter.

If one is to speculate about the future of this relationship, the clearest indicator of a growing distance between the party and the MUR is the diversification of the PJD’s membership. It is also the aspect with the greatest potential of long lasting impact on party evolution. So far, the phenomenon of double membership on the top-level of the two organisations—though decreasing—prevails and guarantees the MUR’s informal influence on the party. After the initial head of the list (who is also a member of the General Secretariat) offered the pole position to Chaabi, the General Secretariat imposed him as head of list in 2002. This decision was defended with the argument that Chaabi ‘had kept his promises’ and built a commercial centre afterwards, and will construct a university residence in Khenitra. Interview with intermediate leader, 9.11.2003

24 Until the MUR’s congress in December 2002, seven members of the General Secretariat were also members of the MUR’s executive bureau, since then, the figure is four.
institutionalised representation of the MUR in the party’s committees, the changing profile of the membership impacts in the long run on the composition of the party institutions taking strategic political decisions. It is possible that in the Moroccan context legal separation and the absence of an institutionalised link between the two organisations might actually be in the interest of the founding organisation, as it would be less affected if the party was banned. The outcome, however, is an increasing separation of the two organisations.

B. The Party’s Interactions with the Institutional Environment

This section discusses the PJD’s interaction with the institutional environment. The first part analyses to what extent the norms and values of the Moroccan political establishment have impacted on the behaviour of the PJD’s MPs. First, it looks briefly at the particular threats for the PJD in the case of its MPs’ convergence with the logics of conventional party politics in Morocco and explains through which mechanisms the party leadership aims at containing such convergence. Second, it discusses to what extent these mechanisms have been successful.

The second part looks at the evolution of active compromising with the regime. In particular, it is shown how increasing environmental hostility has encouraged increasing compromise with the power centre and strengthened the influence of the PJD’s most cautious fraction.


a. The Implications of the PJD’s ‘Political Capital’: Strategies of Control

How crucial it is for the PJD to avoid an adaptation of its MPs to the ‘reality’ of Moroccan politics becomes apparent if one compares the dominant mode of function of political parties and parliament in Morocco with the central claims of the PJD. In Morocco, converging with the logics of other political parties mainly implies devaluing the party in favour of the individual status. This can take the form of ‘transhumance’ for which Moroccan MPs are famous, meaning that MPs often defect from one party to another. Often it also takes the form of a materially motivated voting with another party or for other parties’ candidates—for instance, in the electing of the presidents of the municipalities, who are elected by the municipal councillors. Other features include the minor importance given to the party’s programme in the parliamentary activities and a general use of the MPs status to receive and distribute favours (cf. Santucci 2001). And, indeed, a central claim of the PJD is what they call the ‘moralisation’ of the political life, including the fight against corruption and favouritism. The PJD’s ‘sincerity’ and ‘honesty’ are considered by themselves to be the core of their political capital:

Je pense que le capital, le vrai capital du PJD c’est la sincérité, c’est son message et son discours réel. C’est le meilleur capital, si on perd cette vertu, alors on peut nous considérer comme un parti comme les autres.25

The way, in which the deputies relate to the parliamentary arena represents another major claim of the PJD, that of changing the logics of political parties and parliamentary work:

Ce n’est pas seulement un représentant du peuple, un parlementaire, non ça ne suffit pas, […] il doit défendre la population, il doit transmettre le souci de la population au sein du parlement, et ça se fait par la moralisation de la vie d’un parlementaire et par son devoir de faire des propositions et de contrôler le gouvernement, participer à ce que le conseil des représentants soit un vrai conseil qui contrôle le gouvernement, faire une valeur ajouté au lieu d’être un parlementaire qui est toujours absent, avoir le titre de parlementaire pour titre honorable au lieu de le considérer comme une obligation de la population pour qu’il travaille et ça c’est un problème des élus qui quittent le territoire, ils quittent le territoire pas géographiquement mais physiquement, ils ne sont pas présent.26

25 Interview with MP 1997, 15.2.03
26 Interview with intermediate party leader/ municipal councillor since September 2003, 12.11.03
Party leaders at the national and intermediate level believe that giving ‘the example of a good MP’ is an important task of the party’s parliamentary activities. It is crucial to create and preserve this kind of image of the MPs—as the party’s showcase—to maintain the support of three major groups. The first group is the MUR membership itself. As suggested above, the party still depends on their collaboration to create electoral support. The second group is the rank-and-file of the party, in particular, the part that has an Islamist movement background. Given that for both groups, collective incentives for participation are dominant, it is likely that both would withdraw their support, for instance in case of a repeated implication of MPs in corruption or if they cannot see how the party goals show up in the parliamentary activities. Finally, there is the PJD’s electorate. The strong electoral support of the PJD goes well beyond the militants of the Islamist movement in Morocco and is according to the PJD’s leadership own estimation to a large extent constituted of people who are interested in a higher level of administrative transparency and a decrease in corruption. If the PJD turns out to be a party like the others, this support—which guarantees the party political influence—will diminish tangibly.

The scope of the party leaders’ fear of losing political capital and support is illustrated by the different mechanisms that they have installed to prevent both the de facto adaptation of the MPs and the perception of rank-and-file or supporters in the wider sense that the MPs might benefit individually from their status. In relation to the MPs, the current party leadership has visibly taken on the role of guard dogs over the party’s and MUR’s ideological/ programmatic heritage.

One first major focus of these control strategies targets the party’s parliamentary activities and aims at ensuring that these are in line with the party’s objectives. Some of these are enacted through the internal code of the parliamentary group: One powerful mechanism imposed by the internal code is the MPs’ obligation to voting discipline in the commissions and the general assembly. Additionally, the internal code allows the General Secretariat to take binding decisions on the votes and strategy of the parliamentary group if an issue is particularly important, and it prescribes that the positions adopted by the group must conform to the general policy of the party. Taken together, this means that the leadership can de facto impose its decisions on the parliamentary group. Moreover, the General Secretariat intervenes strongly in the appointment of the parliamentary group’s key offices, i.e. its head and the (vice-)presidents of the parliamentary commissions. A part from the mechanisms of the internal code, another way of ensuring that the policies pursued in parliament are in line with the party programme is the creation of the Forum du Développement (FDD). It is organised alongside the parliamentary commissions and is headed by a member of the General Secretariat. The latter is also an MP (since 2002) and a member of the MUR’s shura council. Among the FDD’s objectives is:

Répondre dans l’immédiat à toutes les questions relatives qui se posent a notre activité politique dans sa dimension gestion de l’affaire publique, donc la loi de finance, les différents projets de loi, les différentes questions orales qui relèvent du contrôle de l’exécutif. […] Ils [les membres du FDD] interviennent [dans la formulation des questions], ce n’est pas à eux de le faire, mais ils interviennent pour […] corriger, pour reformuler, pour enlever ce qui n’y devrait pas être, et même parfois pour valider.31

27 Interview with national party leader/ MP 2002, 8.11.03
28 Party leaders analyse their electorate with respect to their preferences in the following way: There is a first group that supports the entire project of the party. This group is against governmental participation of the PJD. The second group is mainly interested in the values of sincerity and transparency and is hesitating about the implications of joining the government. The third group is composed of the frustrated voters of other parties and vote for the PJD as a new party. This group wants the party to join government to see whether this would change whatsoever. Interviews with national party leaders, 25.11.03/ 14.12.03
29 The gross salary of a Moroccan MP is 30.000 DH (3000 Euro), while for example the employees of the PJD’s parliamentary group earn between 2000–4000 DH (200–400 Euro). The average monthly income in Morocco is around 1400 DH (140 Euro).
30 The Moroccan parliament has six permanent commissions: Finance and Economic Development, Productive Sectors, Justice/ Legislation and Human Rights, Social Sectors and Islamic Affairs, Interior/ Decentralisation and Infrastructure, Foreign Affairs and National Defence. The PJD being now the third force in parliament, is entitled to the presidency of one commission (currently Legislation and Human Rights) and the vice-presidency of another one (Productive Sectors).
31 Interview with national party leader, 8.11.03
Albeit the MPs are not obliged to consult the FDD, in practice it intervenes strongly in the drafting of parliamentary questions and bill propositions and therefore counters the MPs’ autonomy.  

The second major focus of the control mechanisms is the maintenance of the MPs’ moral appeal. In that respect, the internal code obliges them to attend all the plenary sessions and those of the parliamentary commissions, and it imposes the duty of parliamentary output on them, detailing that each member of the parliamentary group has to draft one oral question per week, one written question per month, and to propose one bill per legislative year. Finally, while important for party financing, the MPs’ obligation to relocate at least 22% of their remuneration to the party clearly aims at creating a public image of the PJD non-profit MP.

All three mechanisms—the internal code, the creation of the FDD on the regional level, and a contribution from their salaries to the party—were also set up at the end of November 2003 for the party’s 593 new municipal councillors.

b. The Scope and Nature of Behavioural Adaptation

The party leadership’s appears to be fairly aware of the perils of inclusion. The next question to answer, however, is how successful these control strategies actually have been?

Altogether, adaptation in the form of overt corruption, transhumance and devaluation of the party programme has been effectively countered. Similarly, as well as guaranteeing a real control over the elected representatives, the control mechanisms work successfully as symbols for the party members and militants. Local party representatives consider the control of the MPs as an important and distinctive characteristic of the party. A regular comment made by party members is that in the PJD, the contract is not between the electorate and the elected, but between the electorate and the party. Likewise, the financial contribution of the MPs to the party organisation largely prevents the suspicion of a party elite gaining material benefits from its status. It was constantly mentioned as being a moral contract between the MPs and the party, while, in reality, it is a written one.

However, whereas the internal and public image of the PJD’s MPs has been kept clean, a closer look reveals some first tendencies towards adaptation. First, it has to be noted that there is a significant difference in the size and profile of the first and the second generations of MPs. From 1997—2002, the parliamentary group was small and most of its members had known each other for a long time. The members of the parliamentary group were not only—except one—all affiliated to the MUR, but mostly also members in its highest committees (see table next page). Accordingly, adaptation was not a problem between 1997 and 2002. In fact, the image of the PJD as the defender of the moralisation of the parliamentary life and of the population’s interest vis-à-vis a corrupted political elite was successfully established during the first legislative period. For instance, in a symbolic move against the phenomenon of absenteeism, the PJD started to circulate a liste de présence where its deputies signed in for the general assembly and the parliamentary commissions or when they were late or absent, explained the reasons for their absence.

In contrast to this first group, the picture of the parliamentary group of 2002 displays a decreasing affiliation of the now 42 MPs with the MUR. Out of the 42 only 25 are definitely members of the

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32 It is difficult to assess the whole scope of its intervention, while some MPs responded that the FDD was doing ‘everything’, others were stated that they also had recourse to experts who are not part of it. In any case, the importance of this instrument is likely to increase considerably if the PJD participated in government.

33 Until now, only one case of corruption of a municipal councillor is known, who was immediately excluded from the party.

34 Information on the profile of the electoral candidates is taken from the electoral campaign carried out in the MUR’s newspaper al-Tajdid and the party’s newspaper al-Asr during September 2002, as well as from the interviews.

35 This list is published in the party newspaper. Moreover, in the Wednesday sessions of oral questions which are broadcasted on Moroccan TV, they have insisted on the enacting of § 164/165 of the Moroccan parliament’s internal regulation, that authorises the parliament’s president to sanction absent MPs.
MUR and another four are members of Islamic associations of various types (figure 2). As pointed out before, due to its strong electoral support, the PJD is now considered as a party through which one can gain access to status and membership in the political elite. It has therefore, brought people into parliament who are less morally constrained by a movement heritage.

**Table 1: Offices in MUR, Elected Candidates 1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Bureau</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shura Council</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple Member</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2: Affiliation of Elected Candidates 2002**

It is probably largely due to its increasing size and changing profile, that there is now a decreasing tendency for MPs to comply with the party’s explicit rules. This tendency is particularly clear in two areas. The first is an apparent reluctance to carry out the high level of active work asked of the MPs. While the PJD’s MPs ask the most oral questions in parliament, their ambitions for drafting a bill proposition or a written questions appears to be much lower.\(^{36}\) The second is the reported reluctance of the MPs to reallocate the required 22% of their salary back to the party. By the end of 2003, around 20 MPs were in arrears with their payments.\(^{37}\)

In addition to this decreasing compliance with the explicit rules, there is a grey zone where the movement towards convergence with the behaviour of the Moroccan political elite is very marked. As noted before, besides the fight against clientelism and favouritism, proximity with society is one of the central messages of the PJD. One of the outcomes of this promise is that the MPs, including those who are members of the General Secretariat, now face on a daily basis and indeed respond positively to their voters’ and members’ requests to use their belonging to the political elite to distribute individual and collective favours. These include the intervention in favour of the transfer of public employees from one city to another, the promotion of someone’s career or hiring, the obtaining of legal recognition and finances for associations, the acceleration and obtaining of all sorts of requests from the administration and, finally, requests for intervention in judicial cases. Only activities representing the last type of demand are explicitly rejected by the members of the General Secretariat. In the other cases, MPs seem to be trapped by their promise of proximity and the logics of the system.

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\(^{36}\) Only one of the interviewed MPs had already drafted a proposition, together with other colleagues.  
\(^{37}\) As a member of the General Secretariat explained, in order to make them pay, the General Secretariat decided to exclude them from the Party Congress last April if they had not regularised their financial situation. Interview, 7.4.04
This proximity takes an institutionalised form. All MPs have opened local bureaus where the requests and problems of the citizens are collected and transferred to them; the MPs then write reports accounting for what they have done in the respective cases. The existence of these bureaus, their response to the peoples requests and the fact that—unlike the usual customs—they do not change their mobile numbers after the elections, was emphasised positively, as implementation of their proximity promise. However, this is a quite striking adaptation to the logics of Moroccan politics and its reproduction. And, in the long run, it is likely to decrease their potential as a force of rationalisation and reformation of the functioning of the political game in Morocco.

2. Active Accommodation: The Rise of the Organisational Survival Fraction in the Aftermath of May 16th

As has been suggested in section II, political parties operating in non-democratic regimes may be forced from the very start to pursue a prudent strategy towards the institutional environment if they are to secure their legal status. Unlike the issue of behavioural adaptation where the main groups are quite easy to identify (more or less party leadership vs. MPs) the question of how strongly the party has to compromise with the power centre seems to cut across many groups. At the beginning of their parliamentary inclusion, it was mainly one fraction of the PJD’s leadership that anticipated the need for compromise and the difficulties of the national and international environment, while one fraction within the party leadership, plus the majority of the rank-and-file and the intermediate leadership level, appeared to be more uncompromising. On the whole, however, environmental factors have enabled the most compromising fraction to dominate the party’s strategy towards the regime. This evolution is clearly illustrated if one looks at three crucial moments of party evolution: First, the decision to withdraw from supporting the government in 2000; second, the party’s low profile strategy in the 2003 communal elections; and third, the Party Congress in 2004.

From 1998-2000, the PJD practised ‘critical support’ towards the government.38 In practical terms, this meant that—without detaining a ministerial portfolio or the right to vote in the governmental council (headed by the Prime Minister) or the council of ministers (headed by the King)—the parliamentary group took part in the consultations that the government carried out with the parties of the majority, voted for almost all the governmental bills, and abstained from publicly criticising or mobilising against it. This position was abandoned in 2000, after two governmental projects that particularly conflicted with the party’s core ideology. The following passage combines most of the arguments that were given for remaining in the governmental majority and is revealing of the way that one group of the party’s leadership conceived of issues at stake in the party’s national and international context:

Pourquoi ? Parce que le PJD c’est un parti qui a une situation spéciale. Ce n’est pas un parti politique comparable aux autres partis politiques, cette sensibilité islamiste rend le paysage politique et les composantes politiques à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur très sensibles à ce parti. C’est la première chose, la deuxième chose c’est aller à l’opposition alors que tout les grands partis sont dans le gouvernement c’est-à-dire que vous êtes face à face au peuple. C’est bizarre qu’un politicien vous dit cela, mais je le dis en prenant compte des spécificités du parti. Parce que du fait que vous êtes seuls dans l’opposition est vous êtes aussi un parti de sensibilité islamiste, c’est-à-dire qu’il y a tout le peuple qui viendra vous voter. C’est une loi dans la politique, c’est l’usure du pouvoir, les autres sont dans le pouvoir, ils n’ont rien fait, c’est le jugement qui va faire le peuple parce que les possibilités de financer les programmes sont très limitées, alors c’était très claire que le gouvernement Youssoufi ne va pas faire quelque chose d’extraordinaire. De ce fait là, moi personnellement, et des gens comme moi pensaient à ce qu’il allait se passer en 2002. On était en 2000, et on pensait déjà aux élections de 2002. […] Aller à l’opposition ça veut dire que vous allez être le premier parti au Maroc. Alors […] vous allez être sollicité pour gouverner. Alors que le parti était en train d’édifier ses structures internes, était en train d’essayer d’élaborer son

38 The government held a majority without them, the fact of including them was mainly aiming at reducing critique towards the reform projects in which it engaged.
programme, alors que les conditions géostratégiques n’étaient pas favorables à ce qu’un parti qui ait une sensibilité islamiste se transforme en 1ère force politique. Alors on disait, il vaut mieux rester près de la majorité, on n’est pas dans le gouvernement mais on est près du gouvernement.39

Striking in this reflection is the fear of becoming the strongest political party combined with the fear of losing shelter in the case of leaving the government. The way in which the political environment of the PJD is analysed shows a strong concern to avoid the spotlight of attention. It seems that this fraction was mainly preoccupied with protecting the organisation and much less with a possible decrease of electoral support.

In contrast to such considerations, the intermediate level represented in the National Council particularly pushed for the abandoning of the critical support way before the decision was eventually taken.40 Interviewees on the intermediate and local levels insisted most strongly on the fact that governmental projects and especially the Plan d’intégration de la femme au développement were threatening the Islamic identity of the country.41 In this first conflict on the scope of necessary compromises, the more uncompromising group managed to impose its position and the PJD moved to the opposition benches.

After the May 16th attacks in 2003, however, a more prudent strategy towards the institutional environment was considered necessary by a larger amount of the party’s decision-makers. After May 16th, the PJD was increasingly exposed to quite explicit pressures. The survival threat showed up in rumours about a party ban, in a harsh campaign of the left and the state media against the PJD, which was held to be morally responsible for the attacks. The new survival-driven strategy was particularly tangible in the 2003 communal elections, which took place four months after May 16th.

After negotiations with the Ministry of Interior, the party adopted a very low profile in the elections. For reasons related to both the PJD’s low organisational capacities and its fear of reproducing the Algerian example, limited participation in the elections had been the party’s strategy from the beginning. But while the party had covered more than half of the constituencies in 2002, in 2003, a large number of lists were withdrawn and participation was reduced to less than 10%. Moreover, partial participation was now enacted in such a way that the party could not win a majority, i.e. the presidency, in any city.42

The 2003 elections also marked the turn to a technocratic approach to politics. Unlike 2002, where 90% of the candidates were chosen by the base, the General Secretariat invented a complicated

39 Interview with national party leader/ member of the MUR’s executive bureau/ MP 2002, 12.11.03
40 Interview with the PJD’s Vice-President, 12.12.03
41 The Plan d’intégration de la femme au développement (PIFD) was supposed to be the implementation of the Prime Minister’s engagement for an amelioration of the social and legal condition of women. It had four principal axes: Schooling and the fight against illiteracy in the rural areas, Reproductive Health, fight against poverty and the amelioration of the economic role of women, and the amelioration of the legal and political status of women. Out of the 215 clauses of the project, 14 aimed at the reform of the moudawanna, i.e. the Moroccan family code. These 14 clauses led to a strong mobilisation of the Islamists (the party, the MUR, but also of associations who are not legalised and of some religious scholars). The PIFD never became a law project. Faced with the strong opposition and the Islamists’ mobilisation against the plan, some of the governmental parties, especially the Istiqlal who was trapped in its own Islamic referential and conservative supporters—started to step back from supporting it. In the end, unable to find neither a compromise nor to impose the plan, the government asked for the king’s arbitrage, who transferred the issue to a Royal Commission.
42 This means that they would only cover a limited number of constituencies in a given city. For instance, in Rabat they covered three out of five possible constituencies. This low profile has led to conflicts within the PJD, as part of the base conceived of it as too compromising. The conflict was especially visible in Tangier, where the local party leaders’ refusal to withdraw two lists ended in non-participation.
procedure that allowed it to intervene strongly in the composition and ranking of the electoral lists.43 It imposed a profile of ‘competence’ and a balance of professions within these. Party leaders explained the change of procedure as deriving from their dissatisfaction with the profile of their current parliamentary group, which is composed of around 75% of primary and secondary teachers. Another important determinant, however, was undoubtedly that in the post May 16th context, it was advisable to engage in technical rather than in political aspects of the campaign and political activities. Some members of the General Secretariat had already opted in favour of the candidates’ ability—rather than their popularity within the party base—in the 2002 elections, but at that time, they had not been able to reach a majority on this position.44 The strong intervention in the 2003 selection process indicates that their considerations have gained importance in the party leadership.

The course of the Party Congress in April 2004 illustrates that this strong accommodative attitude has recently also gained acceptance within the intermediate leadership. Whereas in 2003, one provincial secretary stressed that a major issue of the congress would be the ‘total’ revision of the party’s statutes, in which he especially emphasised the restriction of the power of the General Secretariat, such a revision has not taken place.45 On the contrary, the modus operandi for the election of the General Secretariat—which was approved by the National Council—shows a growing de-democratisation of the party’s internal structures. In these elections, the congress deputies could choose between only three candidates that had been pre-selected by the National Council for the office of the Secretary General. The remaining members of the General Secretariat were proposed by the newly elected secretary general and approved by the National Council. Contrary to the party statutes, the congress delegates did not participate in this decision.

Thus, it looks as if the compromising faction has won sufficient support for their approach to the PJD’s electoral participation. However, the change of their internal electoral procedures as well as the fading prerogatives of the Party Congress, which was reduced to a discussion forum instead of taking the ‘crucial decisions’ that the statutes confer on it, suggests that this support might not be accepted by the base. Instead these changing procedures and prerogatives show a party executive that is increasingly suspicious of the vote populaire, the outcome of which might threaten the organisation. In the words of the new Secretary General: ‘one needs to find a balance between the interests of the party and the interests of the militants’.46 In sum, the risk of the discontentment of the base is judged less important than the risks deriving from an increasingly hostile environment towards the PJD.

IV. The Implications of Islamist Inclusion for Regime Stability: Insights from Morocco

As initially suggested, a positive contribution of inclusion to regime stability can only be presumed if the inclusion of Islamist actors leads to a decrease of their oppositional force and an increase of institutional control over them. This, however, is not an automatic outcome of inclusion, but depends on a number of interacting factors. As explained in section two, two major factors impacting on the outcome are the Islamist party’s relationship with its founding organisation and the way it relates to the institutional environment. Through a summary of the principal features of the inclusivist experience in Morocco in the perspective of its contribution to regime stability, the following section aims to contribute to a refinement of our understanding of the relationship between Islamist inclusion and persistence of rule. The following discussion centres on two major questions: first, to what extent

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43 A commission elected on the local level would draw a first list. Then, a second commission in which members of the General Secretariat were present discussed the composition and ranking of the lists. Then, a third commission, this time headed by a member of the General Secretariat took the final decision. This procedure had been approved by the National Council.
44 Interview with national party leader, 10.9.03
45 Interview with intermediate party leader, 6.12.03
46 Interview with the (at that moment) vice-president, 12.12.03
inclusion led to a decrease of Islamists’ public appeal, and, second, to what extent can inclusion be said to have increased the regime’s institutional control over them.

As regards the first issue, so far, there is no decrease in the Islamists’ public appeal. On the contrary, participation in elections has allowed them to gain support that goes well beyond their core constituency and therefore to gain weight in Moroccan politics. In this respect, it was probably important that the strong control mechanisms effectively countered a marked behavioural adaptation of the parliamentary group and that, consequently, the PJD is still perceived as the ‘clean’ party whose representatives have not been involved in any corruption scandal. Ironically, the limitation of participation, imposed by the regime, might actually have contributed to maintaining their appeal, as the PJD has so far had neither national governmental responsibility nor for running any of the major cities.

In the long run, though, considering the changing composition of the party’s membership and electoral candidates, plus the growing number of its representatives in the national and local political institutions, it is probable that the control mechanisms will not be sufficient to neutralise the forces pulling towards adaptation. Regarding this, the PJD’s increasing autonomy from its founding organisation plays an important role. In the absence of an institutionalised presence of the MUR in party committees, it is conceivable, that the power-balance in the party might at some point shift in favour of newcomers. This has two implications: First, there would be an increase in electoral candidates who are not morally constrained by the movement heritage, and, second, if this changing composition in the party membership eventually leads to a decreasing affiliation of the party’s leadership with the founding organisation, the control mechanisms might be relaxed. As a consequence, they might converge more strongly with the political style of the Moroccan political elite.

Moreover, the pressure resulting from the members’ and the electorate’s perception of an MP as someone who can obtain individual and collective favours has led to the adoption of a form of institutionalised clientelism which looks similar to the behaviour of the Moroccan political elite. While this might have some potential to increase the PJD’s appeal in the short run, in the long run it surely decreases the credibility of the claim of being a rationalising and innovative force. Moreover, to the extent that an Islamist party reproduces these structures, it is not threatening the system’s general mode of functioning. One contribution to system stability therefore takes the form of a reproduction of social and political structures.

Regarding the question of institutional control, the regime has now achieved a strong grasp on the party. This grasp results from the fact that, for the majority of the party leadership, organisational survival in the pure sense, has become a major goal. The predomination of concerns about organisational survival was especially marked with the increasing environmental hostility after May 16th, since when a technocratic approach to electoral participation has gained weight. The literature on Western social movements and political parties looks at accommodation more as a passive process of adaptation occurring against the will and intentions of collective actors. In the Moroccan case, however, accommodation partly takes the form of a deliberate and active strategy. If one recalls that compromise is already a pre-requisite of inclusion it is not surprising that concerns about preserving its legal status have affected the party’s logics from the very beginning. Besides the constraints inherent in political activity in an authoritarian regime, it is the current national and international pressures towards Islamist movements and parties that make such a circumspect strategy a survival imperative.

At the same time, one can suppose the existence of a threshold. One line of it is probably defined by organisational size. That is, a party’s organisational size has to reach a point where the potential losses of being banned are so high, that organisational survival actually becomes the dominant concern of a majority of the party’s leaders and members. The fact that the party developed and solidified its organisational structures and developed its human resources has probably played an important role in this. Had the PJD not invested as much in its organisational development and had not started to institutionalise, the desire to protect the party organisation might have been less powerful. However, in the Moroccan case, the predominating worry over organisational survival has made inclusion particularly beneficial to the regime and has largely increased the institutional control and the scope of
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compromises the regime can obtain from them. Additionally, the shifting of movement activists towards party activities points at an interesting sub-dimension of this process as it increases the number of Islamist militants that operate under institutional constraints.

In sum, one can suggest that inclusion contributed to defusing the Islamist challenge in Morocco. In order to assess the full scope of the contribution of inclusion to regime stability, one would also have to look at the impact of the Islamist parliamentary presence on the other actors of the Moroccan political arena. This would go beyond the scope of the paper and would, in fact, deserve a deeper analysis. But, without going into detail, I would like to point out some aspects regarding its effect on the claims for political reform made by other actors. As I have mentioned in the introduction, the Islamists’ inclusion occurred at a moment of political opening in Morocco that brought about the government of alternance in 1998. With this government, the former opposition parties—with whom the late King Hassan II had had a conflictual relationship since independence—were eventually integrated. This event, assessed as a de facto implementation of the political liberalisation measures of the 1990s, was qualified as the launching of a ‘democratisation process’, ‘transition’, or ‘political transformation’ of the Moroccan political system (see, for instance Leveau 1998 and Tozy 1999b). Some years later, the role of the Moroccan monarchy as a ruling and governing institution looks more secure than ever.

While other factors—such as the conflicts among the former opposition parties—have contributed to this stabilisation, the inclusion of the Islamists has certainly played an important role in it. Their impact is exemplified by the government’s behaviour in the reform of the Moudawanna (see footnote 39 in this paper). Challenged by the PJD’s mobilisation against their reform project, the former opposition parties, who had criticised the king’s political role as too strong and interventionist over the last four decades, resorted to the king’s arbitration. Taking refuge in the king’s intervention to solve issues of polarisation obviously enforces the king’s authority and image as the supreme arbitrator.

Apart from enforcing the king’s role as supreme arbitrator of the political game, none of the former opposition parties is reengaging in any of its earlier claims for further democratic reform, a fact which can at least partly be attributed to the PJD’s presence in the electoral game. In de facto democratic elections—with the PJD’s full participation—leading to an accountable and sovereign government, the PJD’s current electoral appeal and therefore its political influence would most probably be superior to theirs. Hence, the former opposition parties prefer to accept the strong political role of the monarchy to protect their own interests. In this respect, the parliamentary integration of the Islamists looks like an institutionally framed version of the regime’s earlier encouragement of Islamist activities in the universities, in order to counterbalance the left. The outcome of this parliamentary version is that both groups of actors—the former ‘democratic’ opposition to the palace, coming in the wider sense from the independence movement and from the secularist associations, as well as the Islamists themselves—focus in their political struggle mostly on the respective other, i.e. the political competitor on the same level, while all of them consider the monarchy in its actual shape as necessary for maintaining political stability in Morocco. For the regime, this is obviously a comfortable situation. In this respect, the outcome of political liberalisation and Islamist inclusion in Morocco also provides a good illustration of the effects of the last decade’s political adjustments and of the scope of misinterpretation when these are assessed as ‘democratisation process’.

V. Concluding Remarks

In the Moroccan case, the inclusion of Islamist actors at a moment of general political opening with the animation of parliamentary politics looks as if it has been a useful and economic means of stabilising the regime.

The features of the Moroccan case need to be compared to other cases in order to elaborate more on the factors shaping the outcomes of inclusion and on the conditions under which inclusion contributes to regime stability. Morocco is often considered as exceptional, especially with respect to the Islamist issue—given that one of the pillars of legitimacy of the Moroccan monarchy is based on religion. In light of this, it has been argued, that it is more capable of dealing with its Islamist opposition than the so-
called secular regimes. But whatever the nature of the regime, participation in elections has been and will be conditioned on an explicit acceptance of the status quo and the numerous requests for party legalisation in these regimes testify that the question of a regime’s legitimacy base is not related to it. What would be more interesting to look at in such comparisons is to what extent features not considered in this paper matter for the outcome of inclusion. The movement’s strength in the respective state, for instance, could be an important factor. That is, the stronger the movement and its means for mobilisation, the riskier it could be to allow participation in elections, and, in particular to legalise it. Another interesting aspect which was only raised shortly in the last section is to consider the structure of the opposition in the respective state. The presence of other relatively organised non-regime parties gives the regime the opportunity to play these actors against each other whereas its absence makes it likelier that the Islamists focus their activities towards criticising the regime appointed government. Eventually, it is important to assess how the strategy of the ruling elites after inclusion shapes its outcome.

As to how to approach such further studies, in view of the Moroccan case, it is legitimate to maintain that an analysis of Islamist ideology does not provide an explanatory model to grasp an Islamist party’s course. Instead, as suggested by the literature on political parties and social movement evolution, the PJD’s course can partly be explained as an interaction of the party’s origins with the general pressure towards adaptation and compromise. While it would be important to consider the aforementioned aspects, one can suggest that this literature offers more potential for insights than relying on ideology as the most important independent variable. Therefore, further studies could benefit from exploiting this potential.

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