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Exit Options, Boundary Building,  
Political Structuring

STEFANO BARTOLINI

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**Exit Options, Boundary Building,  
Political Structuring**

Sketches of a Theory of Large-Scale Territorial  
and Membership 'Retrenchment/Differentiation'  
Versus 'Expansion/Integration'  
(With Reference to the European Union)

STEFANO BARTOLINI

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**BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)**



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European University Institute

Badia Fiesolana

I - 50016 San Domenico (FI)

Italy

Salomon saith: There is no new thing upon the earth. So that as Plato had an imagination, that all knowledge was but remembrance; so Salomon giveth his sentence, that all novelty is but oblivion. Francis Bacon, *Essays*, LVIII

## 1. Introduction

For a long time, European integration has only occasionally and intermittently affected domestic politics, and only in a few countries. The near future is likely to see the growing impact of this process on forms of political representation and patterns of competition, and on national political alignments, institutional developments and state structures. Whether integration progresses or instead is stopped or delayed, the debate over these issues and the tensions within each country associated with the differing attitudes of individuals, groups and territories are likely to produce significant political change.

In the literature on European integration a considerable shift in emphasis has occurred, moving from the early international relations debates about 'theories of international integration' to the most recent emphasis on 'theories of European policy making' and how this increasingly affects areas of domestic policies. Eventually, the idea has emerged that, 'policy by policy', European integration affects domestic 'politics'. At the same time, there is a tendency in Euro-studies to assume that the EU is a novelty, departing radically from previous forms of political organisation and, as a consequence, that very little -- if, indeed, anything at all -- can be learned from past historical development. On the contrary, however new the European unification process might be, a great deal can be learned and conceptualised about its future development, its mode of structuring, and its problematic pressures by looking at past experiences of

large-scale territorial expansion and retrenchment. Such learning 1) provides the capacity to structure the problem area and 2) allows the appreciation of the continued relevance of historical legacies which are likely to extend their influence to include contemporary processes.

That the EU, in its present and likely near future configuration, is not a state seems obvious to most; that it will never become one is more controversial, if we consider that it took 400 years for the nineteenth century system of states to emerge. Even more disputable is the conclusion that historical models of large-scale territorial differentiation and retrenchment of the past (in this part of the world and in others parts which are here disregarded through lack of competence) are of little relevance for conceptualising and interpreting the half-century of EU development. My contention is that, on the contrary, there are interesting insights to be gained from the insertion of the processes of EU integration within the broader scheme of European development from the collapse of the Roman Empire to the formation of modern nation states. If the process is not yet fixed in a new structurally stable configuration, and if the final outcomes are far from clear, the most pressing concern is not to find new labels and neologisms <sup>1</sup> to classify its changing morphology and interaction pattern, but rather to identify the main lines of development which help to clarify the general meaning of this historical process and also to discuss its possible outcomes.

Classic political development theory raises the following questions concerning the EU<sup>2</sup> :

1) *Is the EU an attempt at state formation?* Even if it has not progressed through war and acquisition of territory, to the extent that supra-national powers have accumulated at

the EU level and functional transfers are already in evidence, this can be defined as a state-formation attempt characterised by :

- limited administrative capabilities;
- high regulatory powers in selected fields;
- low fiscal capabilities;
- high juridical capabilities expanding from originally defined spheres of competencies.

From the historical point of view, there is nothing exceptional or new in this configuration of subsystem differentiation and autonomy, and past experiences may help to conceptualise the problems which emerge from the given configuration.

2) *Is the EU an attempt at state formation without nation building?*

A European 'nation' does not exist; a European identity as a 'level' of identity amongst others (national, regional, communal) may develop and constitute the basis for building some elements of a European citizenship. Yet, an historical recollection of how European cultural boundaries came to be defined in relation to military, politico-administrative and economic boundaries may help to dissipate some of the certainty of the German Constitutional Court as to the proper sequence of, and relationship between, *demos*, *telos* and *kratos*.

3) *Is the EU state formation without democratisation?*

Conflict and opposition formation and institutional democratisation were processes occurring within the consolidated state and impinging upon its cultural 'nationalisation'. A closer consideration of 'democratisation processes' of the past may clarify our ideas about requirements, limits and possibilities of the

EU's internal democratisation. The concern here is not about the normative dimension of the 'democratic deficit' - 'how democratic requirements can be handled within the EU'; 'how to establish new types of democratic institutions for supra-national policy making'; 'how to "democratise" existing decision-making': before dealing with these questions one should be able to conceptualise the types of interest differentiation, the corresponding conflict lines, and the resulting political oppositions alliances that are likely to be stimulated by the process of European integration.

This requires concentrating too much on the broader and more deeply rooted process of 'political structuring' of conflict lines within the newly devised borders of the EU. To consider this problem we cannot go shopping for empirical evidence of 'euro-groups', 'euro-parties', 'euro-movements' and the like. We must first speculatively conceive of how large-scale territory external boundary demarcation and internal institutional development generate a process of interest redefinition for individuals, social collectivities, membership organisations, corporations and bureaucracies. Then we can ask how this new conflict and interest re-definition can affect the existing national systems of corporate interest representation and of electoral political representation. Finally, we can extrapolate from this the likelihood that certain political forms will represent a lasting step toward the internal political structuration of the 'European political system'.

It has been asked how long social groups such as proletarians, professionals, consumers, etc., will 'tolerate such a benevolent hegemony (of the EU) before demanding a greater voice'<sup>3</sup>, and whether some form of social movement conflict is emerging, assuming that it is

necessary to have forms of 'europeanisation of conflict' next to the more orderly process of euro-interest representation.<sup>4</sup> We need, therefore, to designate the general constellation of conflict structures from which the threshold of 'toleration' of social collectivities and the level of contentious collective action may result. More generally, regional identity and regional institutional representation, welfare state restructuring, economic localism and industrial districting, traditional cleavage decline, EU judicial and juridical integration, efforts at economic convergence, etc. have been widely studied and discussed in the past few years. Less attention has perhaps been given at the macro-level to the systemic significance of these various phenomena, how they relate one to the other, what the general constellation is in which they assume their meaning and show their potential implication for broader problems of social and systemic integration.

If we define the 'historical macro-constellation' as the conceptual framework within which sectoral and subsystemic changes acquire their systemic and historical relevance, this paper is a beginner's attempt at drawing such a historical macro-constellation for the process of building the large-scale territory identified with the various terms of European Economic communities, European Union, etc. The first step -- which is outlined in this paper -- is to formulate some theoretical propositions about how processes of internal conflict generation and opposition development (what I call 'political structuration') relate to the processes of boundary demarcation in a large-scale territorial polity, and how both relate to the internal institutional hierarchy of the same territory. We need at least a sketch of a theory of 'political structuring' within territories characterised by varying degree of boundary closure and openness. The following steps -- so



far only drafted and left outside the scope of the current paper -- link this model to both historical and contemporary European development to draw indications about potential conflict lines emerging during this new attempt at European unification. Finally, the evidence of political structuring so far accumulated at the EU level should be discussed in this light.

What follows is therefore a preliminary discussion of the theoretical framework and conceptual tools of this project.

## **2. Exit options, boundary building, political structuring**

In dealing with the modern form of the state, it is customary to recall the threefold Weberian definition of any *politische Verbände*, conceived as a 1) hierarchically structured organisation for the maintenance of order; 2) within a defined geographical area; 3) through the use and the threat of physical coercion<sup>5</sup> -- in other words, to stress the element of a *bounded space*, of *internal organised community* and of *external strategies of demarcation* through signals of possession or physical defence against intruders. This definition has become so 'common sense' that its implications are often overlooked. The Weberian formulation establishes a powerful link between *the strategies of demarcation of the external boundaries of the geographical space or territory*, on the one hand, and *the differentiation of roles in the internal organisation of the population occupying the physical space*, on the other. More generally, a close link is posited between the territorial consolidation and the internal structuring of the *politische Verbände*. By 'internal hierarchical organisational structure' is meant the institutional form and the legitimation principle of the relationship between rulers and their subjects; by

'external territorial control' is meant the distinctions and differences in membership rights, privileges and obligations between natives and 'foreigners'.


The history of human organisations can largely be read as a series of continuous efforts to bring territorial borders to correspond and coincide with systemic functional boundaries, and to be in line with the consolidated socio-political hierarchies within the corresponding populations.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, we could read the same history as the way in which consolidated political hierarchies were shaped, reinforced, shaken or destroyed by the fate - successful or unsuccessful - of their territorial defence. Modern state-making was a form of such a process, whose success actually imposed its generalised imitation.

Drawing from the original definition, I provisionally propose the following scheme for the relationships among external boundary demarcation and internal political structuring.

(Figure 1 about here)

For the moment I would like to avoid the 'language of variables'. This scheme may be read along any of the arrows indicated. We might be primarily interested in studying how the internal hierarchical order is shaped by the combined effect of the existing boundaries and the exit options they allow, on the one hand, and the pressure of the existing internal political structuring on the other. Alternatively, we can shape our questions by wondering how the process of internal structuring of a territory is shaped by the

Figure 1: External boundary demarcation and internal political structuring



strategy of boundary building and exit options of the internal hierarchical order. Similarly, both the boundary building and the availability of the exit option can be read as a function of the other processes. In other words, 'independent' and 'dependent' variables are not fixed by the scheme.

Such a scheme clarifies two points. First, it posits the relevance of the network of relationships among these aspects. Second, it elucidates the fact that the neat distinction between 'external relations' of a territorial unit and its internal role differentiation and political dynamics -- or to put it differently, the neat distinction between 'international relations' and 'domestic politics' -- is simply the contingent historical result of a specific configuration of these relationships: the case in which a strongly differentiated internal hierarchical order manages to control the external territorial and functional boundaries -- and to correspondingly reduce exit options -- so closely as to insulate domestic structuring processes from external influences. In this process, the internal hierarchical order presents itself as the single organising principle of the internal domestic structuring and, at the same time, as the single autonomous centre for external relations. Any deviation from this pure type actually makes the distinction between 'foreign' and 'domestic' politics of limited, and sometimes misleading, use.

The relationship between *exit options*, *external boundary building* and *internal political structuring* is briefly discussed from an analytical point of view in the next three sections.

### 3. Exit options

Hirschman's great intuition<sup>7</sup> has been to: 1) conceive of exit and voice as alternative mechanisms for the individual's reaction to the performance of the various organisations and institutions of which he/she is part; 2) establish the negative association between the two, so that the opportunities for exit reduce the need or willingness to voice, while, on the contrary, the lack of the former may enhance the willingness and the need for the latter.

A critical appraisal and a development of his arguments may help their adaptation to my goals. Hirschman's concern is primarily with decline and deterioration in organisational performance and the mechanisms of recovery which exist. Exit and voice are analysed in their capacity as mechanisms of recuperation. He originally thought that exit mechanisms were typical of economic transactions, while voice mechanisms were typical of political interactions, where the usual alternative to voice is acquiescence or indifference rather than exit.

Exit is impersonal -- it avoids costly face to face relationships; it is communicated indirectly via statistics. Voice, as an attempt to change rather than to escape from an objectionable state of affairs, is not a private and 'secret' act, but requires articulation of critical opinions, personal direct involvement -- it is direct and visible, and it exposes the 'voicer'.<sup>8</sup>

Although there is a clear development in the successive writing of Hirschman towards a growing appraisal of the role of voice, as a first approximation voice is viewed as a residual of exit. Those who do not exit are candidates for voice; voice 'feeds on', that is, it is nourished by either inelastic demand (i.e. with slowness in exit when

deterioration occurs), or on the lack of opportunity for exit. As such the role of voice increases as the opportunity for exit declines, up to the point where, 'with exit wholly unavailable, voice must carry the entire burden of alerting management to its failing'.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the choice whether or not to exit will often be made in the light of the prospect for the effective use of voice. Consequently, one can imagine that the decision to voice will depend on the prospects of effective exit opportunity. In other words, exit and voice are alternatives.

Voice is normally more costly than exit. The time and money spent in the attempt to achieve changes in the policies and practices of the organisation is high -- much higher than exit costs. Given that Hirschman tends to conceive of voice as primarily an individual action, he conceives of only one case in which the cost imbalance in favour of exit is redressed: 'expressive' voice. Under certain conditions, voice can be perceived as an end and as an enjoyable activity, a benefit and a rewarding experience rather than as a cost. This is particularly the case for concern with public goods. In this case voice can become less costly than normally thought or expected under normal circumstances, and may have 'an occasional edge over exit'.<sup>10</sup> Beyond this particular case the conditions implying the resort to voice when exit is available depend upon : 1) the extent to which members are willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product; 2) the estimate members have of their ability to influence the organisation.

Loyalty, the third concept of Hirschman, is seen as something which can to a certain extent neutralise the tendency of quality conscious customers and members to be

the first to exit. In this sense, loyalty is a stimulator of voice and decreases the cost of the latter. Moreover, loyalty increases the cost of exit. Without loyalty, from Hirschman's perspective, exit is essentially costless. At the same time, exactly because loyalty postpones exit, its very existence is predicated on the possibility of exit. Loyalty appears to be a mechanism that, on one side, makes exit more costly, and, on the other, makes voice more effective. The ability to use voice effectively is increased by loyalty. In this sense loyalty is essential to the structuring of voice and democracy, for people with easy exit opportunities will normally not engage strongly in internal voice for improvement. 'Loyalty behaviour, as examined thus far, can be understood in terms of a generalised concept of penalty for exit. The penalty may be directly imposed, but in most cases it is internalised'. 'The applauded alert behaviour of the alerted consumer shifting to a better buy becomes disgraceful defection, desertion, and treason'.<sup>11</sup>

While in *Exit Voice and Loyalty* he regarded exit as essentially costless, when available, he later briefly discussed the potential costs of exit even in situations in which loyalty is absent.<sup>12</sup> Such costs which are not evident in consumers' choices become more obvious for inter-industry transactions, (trust, traditions, etc.) and are crucial in all forms of territorial exit.

This short review points out the immense potential of Hirschman's concepts, and at the same time their limitation when applied outside and beyond the frame of reference of the modern territorial state, a frame which he takes for granted in his early work and only partially revised in its successive elaboration. To apply his conceptualisation to any historical form of organisation (or, more precisely, to

any form of *authority arena* - see *infra* for this concept) some elaboration and modification is necessary.

*New exits and 'partial exit'*. Hirschman's main reference point is always the individual and his/her exit opportunities, and he sees the latter for within-state organisations. In fact, he defines 'stateless' as a situation associated with the regular practice and possibility of physical exit, which in turn is the cause of the non-emergence of large, centralised societies with specialised state organs (p. 251). In other words, exit option availability prevents the formation of modern differentiated states, which presumably rest on the limitations of such 'individual' exit.<sup>13</sup> He is rarely concerned with other units of exit (corporations, territories) because this implies exit from the state, something that he tends to see in the classic terms of migration and secession.<sup>14</sup> 'Exit is ordinarily unthinkable, though not always wholly impossible, from such primordial human groupings as family, tribe, church, and state.'<sup>15</sup>

Even in his dealing with exit from and voice for public goods, the question is whether to exit or to voice within state organisations. Within this limitation, the problem is that for public goods the member can stop being a producer but not stop being a consumer. While exiting from an organisation providing private goods terminates the relationship, in the case of public goods one can stop producing them via the organisational effort (exiting the producing organisations: parties, pressure groups, etc.) but cannot exit entirely from them as a consumer of public goods. Calculations become more complex and basically involve evaluating the cost of voice from within (remaining a producer of public goods) or voice from outside (exit public good producing organisations but continuing to voice



about best public goods). As it is always subject to public good quality, the customer who exits cannot avoid caring about such goods and he/she may be convinced not to exit in order to prevent further deterioration of the product quality.

This alternative between, on the one hand, within-state organisations' exit/voice options, and, on the other hand, migration and secession from the state is too radical for my purposes. Particularly in the present conditions of growing 'internationalisation' there is a lot to be gained from attempting to apply Hirschman's conceptualisation in the grey area of exit/voice options which extends between these two extreme and clear-cut cases: that is, exit/voice options which are neither fully and exclusively based on individual physical mobility (although they rest on its increasing possibility) nor fully and exclusively based on territorial defection (although indeed resting on the increasing credibility of such an option). Moreover there might be 'partial' forms of exit as opposed to these 'total' forms.

Hirschman conceives of exit as 'total exit': physically leaving a territory; seceding from a state; abandoning a membership organisation; stopping buying a good, etc. In these total exit examples everything is simultaneously withdrawn in one act. However, we need to conceive of 'partial exits' which historically are of great importance.<sup>16</sup> Within any form of authority arena there might exist or develop certain immunities, spatial or functional, into which the individual/corporation/group/territory can withdraw (the 'sanctuary' exit, the fugitive who is safe at the altar of the church, the Commune in the Middle Ages). There might also be *selective withholding* of functions or duties *de facto* or on an institutional basis (military

service, fiscal obligations; 'opting out'). Traditionally, certain regions were exempted from military services (Northern Ireland in W.W.II) or enjoyed extensive exception from taxation (e.g. Aragon as compared with Castillia in the Spanish Kingdom). For a long time, various communes and provinces, and certain 'orders' or 'classes' enjoyed exemption from taxation as territorial or functional islands.

*Voice structuring.* If intermediate and partial exit forms have to be considered to apply the concept to historical processes, voice too has to be revised and considered in a 'stronger sense' than envisaged by Hirschman. For Hirschman, voice is an individualistic prerogative in a second sense: as exit, it is determined by purely individual resources. While a number of structural constraints are important in determining the balance of exit and voice for individual commodities (availability of close substitutes, numbers of buyers, durability and standardisation of the article, and so forth), the propensity to resort to the voice option is mainly influenced, on the one hand, by the presence of exit alternatives that atrophy the development of the art of voice; on the other, by the presence of loyalty mechanisms and expressive motivations which may lower the cost of voice. Hirschman suggests that the range of voice options 'depends also on the general readiness of a population to complain and on the *invention* of such institutions and mechanisms as can communicate complaints cheaply and effectively'<sup>17</sup> but does not develop this point further. Institutions do not play a significant role in this picture, presumably because within the individualist perspective institutions themselves require voice to begin with in order to be built.

The text where he comes closest to facing the issue of the passing from individualised voice to collective and structured voice is in his detailed recasting of the events leading to the collapse of the GDR.<sup>19</sup> In this case, it becomes obvious that when exit is advocated collectively and not only practised individually, it naturally becomes a form of voice and the two get inevitably mixed and intertwined. It is somehow surprising to me that Hirschman finds this association or transformation of exit into voice as problematic and puzzling for his earlier schemes. He discusses how exit 'ignites' voice, but it is rather the lack of individual exit which ignites voice in the GDR events. Once private exit, rather than being silently practised, became publicly advocated it is *ipso facto* a public request and as such voice. This was obviously the result of the fact that too many people wanted to exit at the same time and that, as a consequence, they realised that the fulfilment of their individual expectations could no longer be hoped for without collective action.

From this recognition it seems almost unavoidable that one pass to a discussion of how voice is 'structured', that is, aggregated and made collective, and how much boundary building can influence this process. Although, obviously, voice remains an individual choice, its cost for the individual depends to a large extent on the level of structuration of organisations, movements and channels for the expression of complaints. Voice needs to be structured institutionally, in the dual sense that if it does not get structured it is unlikely to be heard, and that unless some structuring is achieved it cannot extend beyond highly motivated individuals to reach those for whom the initial costs are too high. The problem of voice structuring *within* the state is at the core of all participation literature,

which has often underlined how institutions can lower the costs of voice (participation) for certain categories of individuals who would otherwise be passive.<sup>19</sup>

Voice, therefore, requires the creation of channels through which consumers of both private and public goods can communicate their complaints. The 'capacity to invent channels of communications' is the process of structuring complaints. We could reformulate Hirschman's point by arguing that the lower the opportunity for exit, the higher the propensity to invent institutions of complaint communication; i.e. the propensity to structure and institutionalise voice. The institutionalisation of voice is the result of repeated experiences of non-exit options and ineffective individual complaints. In other words, I am arguing that voice cannot simply be identified in a rhapsody of words -- even if this may temper a population's desire for action -- but has to be defined in a stronger sense, with a more complex set of political arrangements by which the deterioration of the organisation's performance can not only be brought to its attention, but also modified. Voice, in short, means effective machinery for the modification of organisational performance. It must consist of channels of expression as well as an arrangement of consent and redress and also potentially of tailoring administrative devices. Voice requires structures which help the ease the course from complaint to the demand for redress and modification.

*Differential distribution of exit/voice options.* Exit and voice are individuals' choices but their costs vary for each single individual so that opportunities are differentially available to different individuals, groups, territories, etc. Hirschman devotes considerable attention to the implications of this differential distribution for

an organisation's capacity to improve or redress performance. He draws two main conclusions from his analysis:

- 1) As long as the most aroused and therefore the potentially most vocal customers are the first to abandon it, voice is not an effective mechanism of recuperation. It would be an effective mechanism only under conditions of full monopoly, when the customers are securely locked in.
- 2) The possibility that the differential distribution of voice options and possibilities may lead the participants to influence the process of product modification and adjustment to their advantage, as the same mechanisms of voice produce a non representative sample of citizens' preferences.<sup>20</sup>

Note, however, that the parallel phenomenon may be more important: exit, opportunities and options are distributed in a non-equal and very differentiated way, and are not the same for all people for any given good, service or territory, etc.. This leaves open the possibility that the dissatisfied-mobiles -- those who might exit -- make the organisation particularly sensitive to their exigencies, and indeed so much so that it tries to anticipate the course of action which will prevent their exit.

However, at the abstract level the discussion of the differential options for exit and for voice cannot progress further. In reality the actual chances of exit for individuals, groups, corporations, etc. are defined by specific mechanisms and techniques of boundary building. It depends essentially on which boundaries are open or closed, and who or which group would enjoy which opportunities for exit. Institutional barriers to exit are set at all levels of social organisation and justified on various grounds, from improving efficiency, to guaranteeing professional

credentials, to defending useful social institutions, etc.. Some of these boundaries may even be justified on the grounds that they serve to stimulate voice in deteriorating, yet recuperable organisations which would be prematurely destroyed through free exit.

The conclusion is that to give a historically specific content to the implications of the differential potential for exit of a broad set of actors, one needs to develop some sort of theory of institutional boundary building. Without such theory of boundaries, the speculations about consequences of differential distribution of exit (or voice) options remain fairly abstract, mostly linked to the general factor of the attitudinal orientation of the actor towards the 'quality of the product'.

*Voice against exit.* Voice may be paralysed by the exit of the potentially most interested. Such exit may help the local monopolist not to respond. However, voice could also be fostered by such exit if proper channels are available. That is, those who cannot exit may become vocal about their lack of such opportunity or about the indirect costs of other people's exit. Hirschman argues that exit only damages the possibility of responding by voice in the micro- and macro-terms spelled out above: that is, for the individual -- for whom exit opportunity lowers the interest in voice; and for the whole organisation -- for which exit options may lower the level or the quality of overall voice. In other words, he does not doubt that, if voice exists, it is a redressing mechanism, irrespective of the level to which exit exists. Put differently, he does not conceive of 'voice against exit'.

The exit of some may depress the overall voice by affecting the voice of the remaining, less endowed with such

capacity. But there is a second possibility: the exit of some may generate the voice of others. Exit undermines the voice of those who (can) exit, but what does it do to those who do not want or cannot exit? In the GDR case, the mass exodus contributed considerably to the voice of the loyal Germans who wanted not to exit but to stay (*wir bleiben hier*) and were worried by others' desire to exit. Hirschman interprets this process via the concept of loyalty: those unburdened by feelings of loyalty will be prone to exit, whilst those with loyalty will resort to voice. In the German case, however, there were two vocal groups: a) those who were loyal and did not want to exit (although they might do so); b) and those who had no loyalty feelings, would have liked to exit but could not do so, and felt negatively affected by the exit options of the others.

In concrete, the model needs to be applied to a more complex differentiation of groups and individuals, imagining that the options of some are not without impact on the options of others, and that the exit choice may well provoke reactions of voice in those who do not possess or who do not want to use this option. In other words, inequality of exit, on top of its consequences for organisational performance, may also be a source of conflict within a given organisation. How much exit should be allowed from an organisation could be considered in many cases as a controversial internal issue *to the extent to which the organisation itself can control its membership boundaries*. Lots of organisations, from professional orders to territorial entities, actually do have such power to a greater or lesser extent, and considerable controversy surrounds the management of their boundaries. Naturally, before organisational consolidation has occurred, exit opportunities may simply prevent such consolidation; but once this is achieved, growing and unequally distributed

exit options have to be regarded as the basis for potential conflicts among those who want to restrict those options and those who want to open them up. The latter realise that the exit options of the others 1) are precluded to them; 2) increase the internal resources of the potential exiters beyond their capacity to voice; and, last but not least, 3) may considerably reduce the resources and possibilities of success of internal voice by materially subtracting the resources necessary for responding to voice. The quality of schooling in suburbs is affected when the richer and most educated citizens leave, not only because those schools lose the most likely vocal defenders of quality standards, but also because they may lose the material resources through which a certain qualitative standard was guaranteed also to those who could not otherwise afford it.

One may expect that within an authority arena the most advanced, core and outward oriented individuals, groups and territories will be the ideological defenders of the openness of the organisation, while the more immobile and peripheral may be the centre of anti-openness ideology

*Organisational hierarchy.* A final elaboration concerns the role and the strategy of organisational hierarchies. They are not explicitly dealt with in Hirschman's work, where he tends to assume that they will be more or less forced to respond to environmental challenges coming either from exit or voice or both, when available. Yet there is at least one sense in which exit opportunities affect the organisational hierarchies strategy: in the presence of high opportunities for exit it is likely that organisational leadership will find it easier to resist, evade, and postpone the development of mechanisms for responding to voice. Voice in a strong sense, as indicated before, may be difficult to channel, organise and discipline in organisations which permit or are forced to accept high levels of exit. This



means that 'voice against exit' may be justified normatively as a defence of voice effectiveness.

In conclusion, I have argued that a richer variety of exit options, a stronger concept of voice, and a more elaborate relationship between exit/voice inequalities and internal conflict generation must be conceptualised. 'Voice structuring' and 'boundary building' are two essential components to be added to the exit/voice theory if one wants to apply it historically:

- 1) in a perfect and costless exit community or organisation, no structuring of voice will be necessary and indeed attempted (most of the markers, notwithstanding consumers' associations etc.);
- 2) some sort of 'closure' (that is, institutional exit limitation) is necessary for voice, not to express generally, but rather to structure via movements, institutions, routine practices, etc.;
- 3) *boundary building mechanisms* define the conditions of institutional closure which are at the same time exit (from existing boundaries) and closure (in new boundaries);
- 4) which boundaries are set up and which are removed decides who and which resources can exit or not and helps the historical and social definitions of exiters and voicers in a concrete case.

#### **4. Boundary building and boundary removing**

At the most general level exit is the crossing of an established boundary. Boundaries are of different types in different areas; they may be emotional and affective, social and cultural, legal, etc.. Systems whose membership is limited by spatially identifiable boundaries are territorial units. States are a special type of such territorial units.

Boundaries define the level of closure of various social relationships within and across authority arenas.<sup>21</sup> The conditions for the exit options are therefore set by the processes of internal and external boundary building of the latter. To the extent that they close a given social relationship, boundaries determine a clear distinction between the 'ins' and the 'outs', and this criteria of exclusion is based on unequal access to rewards, resources and opportunities, no matter what the basis for unequal access is.<sup>22</sup> In fact, the closure practices which derive from boundary setting can develop along various criteria: lineage, property, education, credentials, power and force, status, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, language, etc., and on the basis of different rules or codes of closure. Only certain boundaries and the corresponding exclusion rules are backed by the legal apparatuses of the state.

Boundaries define *collectivist* and *individualistic* criteria of exclusion and closure.<sup>23</sup> Collectivist criteria of exclusion are directly responsible for the transmission of advantage to other members of the group (e.g. family descendants, lineage, caste, race, religion, ethnicity and state membership). Individualistic criteria (property, power, credentials, achievements) are equally designed to protect advantages, but are less efficient than collectivist criteria in transmitting such advantage to the descendant or next generation or group members. A long term tendency can be identified for collectivist criteria of exclusion to be replaced by individualist criteria of exclusion in Western culture.

Positing the distinction between boundaries and associated closure rules and codes *within a given territorial political system* and boundaries and associated closure

rules and codes *between territorial systems*, I can reformulate the distinction made earlier between the demarcation of external boundaries of geographical space and the differentiation of roles in the internal organisation of the population occupying this physical space. At the same time, this assumes a strong relationship between the type of external boundaries and the means through which they are set up, on the one hand, and the same processes for internal boundaries, on the other hand.

Let us first look at types of external boundaries of territorial systems. In Table 1 I present a scheme of such boundaries which distinguish membership according to different criteria.

(Table 1 about here)

The table identifies four dimensions of boundary building among units in the economic, cultural, force and politico-administrative domains. Unfortunately, we do not have established names for these different types of boundaries. As I want to keep the term 'boundary' for the more abstract

Table 1: Types of territorial boundaries

	the boundary is defined in terms of:			
	market transactions	cultural traits	force military/coercion claims	politico-administrative claims
the limits surrounding the territories are defined as	fringes (confinium)	margins (finis)	frontiers (limes)	borders (terminus)
these limits are created and consolidated by the processes of	market-building	nation-building	state-building	functional regime building
focal point for operationalisation of the territory	economic rights, property rights, exchange options, factors' mobility, common currency	membership space characterised by the traits of the inhabitants (language, religion, ethnicity)	central repressive and extractive agencies	political-social rights, regulatory systems (education, welfare, labour market)

concept of 'closure code and rule', I might suggest other names to clarify the distinction and to avoid the tedious and continuous repetition of 'cultural boundary', 'economic boundary', etc. We might call the economic boundary a 'fringe'; the cultural boundary a 'margin', the military-coercion boundary a 'frontier' and the politico-administrative boundary a 'border'. Alternatively we could use some of the Latin rich terminology for the same concept.<sup>24</sup> However, these neologisms are rarely accepted and they often increase, rather than dissipate, misunderstanding. What I want to underline by this insistence on the terminological difference is the fact that one needs to keep these different boundaries as distinct as possible at the conceptual level.

The process of market building and the formation of economic boundaries has its focal point in the openness of transactions in a given geographical area and in the necessary correlates of property rights agreements, exchange options and factor mobility. The cultural boundaries define a membership space characterised by the traits of the inhabitants (language, religion, ethnicity, national identity, etc.). In principle, as we know, cultural identities are not necessarily concentrated geographically. However, I am interested here in the vast majority of historical cases in which some sort of territorial concentration and the cultural identity of the individual is defined and reinforced by the continuous interaction in the geographical space with the cultural equivalent. The 'force' boundaries define that geographical space within which a single central authority exercises its ultimate right to the physical coercion of the subjected population. The politico-administrative boundaries identify those primarily legal boundaries which differentiate among different functional regimes and regulatory systems such as

educational systems, welfare regimes, labour markets, courts' jurisdictions, etc..

It is difficult to think of these boundaries as analytically distinct for a variety of reasons. The first and more obvious is that our daily experience and our historical memory refer to a situation of large, if not complete, overlap of these different boundaries. The modern nation-state successfully integrated these boundary-building processes. Nation-states of the European type are characterised by boundaries which are simultaneously military, economic, cultural and functional. Crossing the boundary of the state one passes, at the same time, into the *imperium* of alternative extractive agencies, into a different economic market, into a different cultural community and into a different set of functional regimes as educational systems, welfare state, legal jurisdictions, and so forth. This (territorial) coincidence of different type boundaries has been their distinctive trait -- which distinguishes them from earlier or different forms of *politische Verbände* -- and their legitimacy principle. The modern nation-state is based, therefore, on a collectivist criterion of exclusion meant to monopolise certain advantages for the members of the state groups, in various but coinciding functional areas, along which citizens' rights and obligations are sharply distinguished from the rights and obligations of 'foreigners'. Such type of state may be subject to the decline of this collectivistic exclusion and become more universalistic.

The second reason why it is difficult to conceive these boundaries as separate is that, while we can easily construct the ideal type of their coincidence -- i.e. the ideal type of the sovereign, unitary, autarchic and culturally homogeneous state -- we find it difficult to

identify pure cases of each type of boundary. The primordial hunter-gatherer community had primarily cultural boundaries, as kinship links set almost insurmountable barriers to externals in all fields; but for long time it did not possess a distinct territoriality. A pure force/coercion/extractive boundary is represented by those 'imperial' territorial hierarchies which encompassed different cultural groups and included substantially closed different market areas. The Roman Empire had a clear perception of where its *limes* -- its military borders -- lay and where its *civitas* -- Roman citizenship -- ended. Furthermore, between *limes* and *civitas* there were several additional intermediate borders, for instance the politico-administrative borders of militarily subject populations which were left to run their internal matters according to their traditions and rules. Pure market boundaries existed beyond political administrative borders in those free-trade areas which encompassed city networks, such as the Hanseatic League, within which the respect of basic economic rights was guaranteed across cultural, military, and politico-administrative borders.<sup>25</sup>

The third reason is that when we analytically separate these boundaries we are left with no names to indicate the situations of their non matching. These lacks of coincidence have existed, and will continue to exist even if we are not able to properly label them. However, it is true that unless we name something we are unable to conceptualise it. *Stat rosa pristina nomenem. Nomina nuda tenemus*. More precisely we are familiar and we are able to label the situation of areas and/or groups for which force/coercion and politico-administrative territorial claims are incongruent with cultural identities: we call these 'cultural peripheries' and we distinguish between them as 'external', 'enclave' and 'interface' cultural

peripheries -- according to whether the cultural stigmata defining the area or group find support across the politico-administrative border or not -- or 'enclave cultural peripheries' -- whether they are surrounded or not by the central dominant cultural community.<sup>26</sup> It is more difficult to conceive and label those situations in which economic and politico-administrative borders or economic and cultural borders do not coincide: the case in which economic rights are spread across a politico-administrative border -- that is, a territory in which politico-administrative rights are incongruent with the economic rights and transactions; and the case in which cultural identities are incongruent with economic markets rights -- that is, a territory in which community membership space is incongruent with economic transactions and rights.<sup>27</sup>

Along each of these territorial boundaries the development of rules and codes of closure may set boundaries or their decline may remove boundaries. At the same time, new technologies for exit may actually force the removal of boundaries. In short, for each dimension exit options and boundary building interact. In Table 2,<sup>28</sup> the type of exit options and boundary building are summarised for each main subsystem.

(Table 2 about here)

These boundaries define sets of cross-boundary transactions and sets of control measures. The (potential) units of these transactions and control in different subsystems are goods and services, corporations, physical persons, messages, territories and even 'roles'. For each subsystem one can identify potential exit options and, at the same



Table 2: Exit options and boundary building

	exit option units	boundary building mechanisms
<b>economy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-goods</li> <li>-services               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- tourists</li> <li>- corporations</li> <li>- investors</li> <li>- customers</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- embargoes               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- tariffs</li> <li>- labour-market controls</li> <li>- credit/capital controls</li> <li>- nationalisation of economy</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>culture</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-messages, news</li> <li>-styles, ideas</li> <li>-fashion, fads</li> <li>-scribes, scientists               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- religious/ideological orders</li> <li>- intellectuals</li> <li>- missionaries</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-prohibition</li> <li>- censorship</li> <li>- loyalty-building rites/symbols</li> <li>-control of socialising agencies               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- nationalisation of culture</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>force/ coercion/ extraction</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- soldiers, armies</li> <li>- police</li> <li>-spies               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-underground movements</li> <li>-organised crime</li> <li>- tax                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- territorial secession</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- territorialisation of defence</li> <li>- territorialisation of policing</li> <li>- borders controls               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- territorial extraction system</li> <li>- restriction on residence</li> <li>- restrictions on travelling</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>politico- administra- -tive (funcio- nal regimes)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- voters</li> <li>- candidates</li> <li>- legal claimants (judges/cases)</li> <li>- sub-state governments</li> <li>- students</li> <li>- welfare recipients (?)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- protection of citizenship               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- national specific social rights</li> <li>- professional credential codes</li> <li>- national jurisdiction</li> <li>- national educational title system</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

time, boundary building mechanisms. As specific 'technologies' for exit may continuously develop, they generate pressures on existing boundaries. On the other hand, history also provides a continuous invention or re-invention of boundary building mechanisms.

The various works of Stein Rokkan on the geo-political model of European development try to work out the linkages between the strategies for differential external control and the consequences of such strategies for the configurations of political resources inside each territory. He initially started from the study of European party system formation during the 19th and early 20th century; that is, studying a specific process of political structuring.<sup>29</sup> However, the study of the structuring of cleavage systems and party oppositions was done *within established nation states*, although since the beginning it included rich references to the previous processes of state and nation formation. For this reason he later decided that in order to better understand within-state political-structuring, he had to devote itself more intensely to the study of the processes of state and nation formation. His overall model, scattered in so many publications, is therefore re-elaborated as a model of the (historical) interaction between external and internal boundary-building strategies in the history of the organisation of the different territorial systems.

In his analysis of the possible linkages between 'external boundary differentiation' and the 'opening up of internal channels for voice' he singled out a number of consequences for his democratisation process these consequences concerned. His analysis of 'social inputs' for the structuring of party systems and of the institutional democratisation outcomes were admittedly limited to the

main partisan oppositions -- and gave much less attention to corporate interests and social movements<sup>30</sup> -- and was largely confined to the final structuring of conflicts and institutional democratisation of highly closed nation-state systems. To profit from his insights and to apply them to different historical situations I need first to elaborate in somewhat more abstract terms the process of structuration and then to start to wonder what shape this structuration would begin to take, if any, in the context of different boundary compositions, coincidence, looseness and, consequently in the opening up of wider exit options.

### 5. Political structuring

Discussing Hirschman's framework I have argued the reasons why we need to conceive of voice as the articulation, mobilisation, organisation of individual voice propensities and as the setting up of arrangements for consent and redress. Even for those who are inclined to invest personal resources in voice options, voice requires structuring, identity and in particular collective identity, and also requires some organisation plus symbolic elaboration of the collective goal. I have labelled this as the process of 'political structuring' of a territorial community. Provided some original hierarchical authority exists, such a process of political structuring progresses along two dimensions and is composed of two sub-processes:

- 1) voice structuring = articulation, mobilisation, organisation of individual voice;
- 2) institutional differentiation = arrangement of consent and redress. By 'voice structuring' is meant the *political 'vertebration' of the community*; 'institutional differentiation' indicates the *role and function differentiation of the central hierarchy of the authority area*.

Discussing the process of closure and of boundary building, I have stressed the close connection between these two processes of internal political differentiation and the corresponding processes of external boundary building in different functional subsystems. It is too simple to conceive of an almost automatic transfer of the absence of exit options into voice activity; a theory of political structuring needs to be elaborated which is sufficiently general and abstract in its language and theoretical linkages to encompass processes which go beyond known within-state structuring and include the more general 'large-scale territory structuring'.

Contrary to natural arenas, as a field in which the power of each actor closely corresponds to the level and use of only his/her own resources, an authority arena is a field in which the power guaranteed to the social actor depends on the role and the function of a third actor installed to the central hierarchical organisation.<sup>31</sup> In other words, an authority arena (any authority arena: from the state to the professional order) is an arena endowed with an actor and a function (institution) specialised in the production of behavioural conformity.<sup>32</sup> The public goods distributed through this specialised function may be wider or restricted in type and scope in different cases and historical periods, but they normally include at least some *protection* (defence from others' offence through coercive sanctions); *arbitration* (control and limitation of the conflicts among qualified actors); *jurisdiction* (guarantees about the compliance to the commitments taken by social actors and their respect of the services and performances promised and dues); *regulation* (definition of the rules of the game); *allocation* (direct allocation of goods, services, duties) (later in the text referred to as P-A-J-R-A). It is implicit in what I have argued so far that the

capacity, scope and effectiveness of this production of public goods is fundamentally dependent on the control of the boundaries between the authority arenas and other authority arenas. The higher the control of the transaction across authority arenas, in principle the more extensive and effective is the capacity of autonomous production of public goods and the higher the capacity of the internal hierarchy to stabilise and legitimise its domination position. Therefore, the incentive of internal structuration of any authority arena (including the territorial systems I concentrate on in this paper) is also a function of this external closure and of the internal hierarchy scope and reach in the production of public goods.

Why does the closedness of a system produce internal structuring of the voice? The process of internal political structuring is not a purely imposed or coercive process due to the mere closure of exit options. This is indeed a precondition, in the sense that as argued, when exit options are maximum, internal voice is unlikely to be structured. Yet, even when exit options are limited or unavailable, the process of structuring which is more likely to occur develops also as a result of internal processes. Let me advance three points.

*External closure and politicising of the internal closure rules and codes.* Strengthening external territorial boundaries in one or more of the subsystems increases the development of internal exclusion rules and codes. As a matter of fact, internal closure rules and codes postulate the overall closure of territorial boundaries. Given that within each territorial unit the development of internal rules and codes of closure starts from *de facto* exclusion

based on unequal access to rewards, resources and opportunities (lineage, property, education, credential, power and force, status, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, language, etc.) and progresses through the recognition and legitimation of these criteria of exclusion as operated by the P-A-J-R-A policies of the hierarchical order, within each authority arena (and particularly in those of a territorial type), the political structuring takes place by politicising some closure rules and practices and by representing and organising interests around the defence of or the challenges to the monopolisation of certain positions.

*Resource convertibility.* The more the boundaries of an authority arena are closed and coincide, the more the resources within the system become 'convertible' one into the other. In closed systems the demands and the resources of the 'periphery' (cultural, economic and politico-administrative) are addressed to the centre and get converted into power resources at the centre. Similarly, social group identities and interest definitions are converted, if the system is closed, into elements of the central battle for control and power. If a system is open, whatever resources are accumulated by territories, groups, individuals etc. cannot be converted directly into centre resources, because concerned units can refuse to engage in the battle or confrontation over those resources; that is, they can exit. The centralisation of resources and convertibility of various resources (economic power, group identity, mass organisation, political or social movements) is possible only to the extent that the boundaries are sufficiently closed to create a 'system', that is to prevent actors from considering the option of not 'directing' their claims at the centre and of not

'converting' their resources into the power struggle at the centre.

*Systemic interaction.* Political structuring is an interactive process resulting from the systemic interaction (conflictual, co-operative, competitive, negotiational) of parts and elements which feel the impossibility of exiting the system. When this possibility of exit is perceived as real, the game is different. Calculations always compare options of voice structuring with options of directing the resources available towards other systems or outside and against the structuring system. If political structuring takes place through the progressive formation of front lines, of political alliances between groups of political entrepreneurs, corporate interests organisations, social groups, political movements and organisations, one basic rule is that the pre-existing or already existing alliances of the in-groups shape the possibilities for alliance of the out-groups. The process occurs through alliances which reduce and shrink the space for alternative alliances and counter-alliances. Once a given number of individuals, groups, territories or firms is locked in a specific authority arena from which it can not easily escape, the process of internal voice structuring produces *rising performances and a stabilisation of behavioural patterns 'path-dependant'*. In other words, the external closure tends to favour a system of internal rules -- a structure; at the same time actors accumulate experience, develop specific competencies within the institutional framework and also personal interests, and values and identities are defined during this process of structuring. The processes of external closure trigger off processes of internal learning and of internal redefinition of interests and identities which are a function of the accepted or acknowledged impossibility to exit from the institutional

structure. This process is mutual in the sense that, once external boundaries are closed, internal groups redefine their position, interests and values as a function of their being locked in the system and being therefore obliged to interact with the other, similarly locked-in actors. The external closure defines and imposes systemic interaction which itself defines identities and interests in terms of the compelling and compulsory relationships among internal groups.

In a situation of low boundaries and, therefore, generalised and costless exit options, there would be no need and probably no attempt at political structuration. The protection, arbitration, jurisdiction, regulation and allocation of the authority arena's central hierarchy would necessarily be extremely limited. To ascertain preferences through a political process based on some form of voice (voting, group action, pluralism, etc.) may become irrelevant. Citizens' preferences can be more effectively revealed by the consumer (of public policies) moving to the authority arena whose government package best satisfies his/her set of preferences. In other words, rather than have a given and pre-defined population and a government which tries to adjust its policies in terms of revenue, expenditure and tax to the population's preferences, governments could decide on a certain level of revenue and expenditure in order to attract consumers.<sup>33</sup>

In this situation, kings and states will have to compete by offering their services (i.e. the services of governing) so as to attract the greatest number of buyers in the form of taxpayers. Again, in this situation, the P-A-J-R-A policies would be primarily driven not by some form of political decision making but by the central hierarchy's guess about subjects' responses as to who provides the best deal in



terms of the desired quality and quantity of authority-arena public good production.

The 'full-exit' world is, therefore, a world in which there is no voice. Time is no longer spent in trying to convince the rulers to change their minds and policies. None would be able to force those with resources to share their resources with others through the development of political coalitions. No complex procedural techniques have to be developed to weight and combine the preferences of the affected, actually revealed by their 'walking out'.

Obviously this conclusion is based on the assumption that all subjects can and are willing to exit. Those people who cannot or who do not want to exit are not contemplated. If we do contemplate them, we must take into consideration that some people may believe that in order to realise their claims and values they need to close the social relationships and the corresponding border. Then, one needs to consider the political reactions of the immobile or of the less mobile.<sup>34</sup>

The historical plausibility of the full and generalised exit options model is irrelevant in this context<sup>35</sup> as it offers a clear picture of the internal political structuring implications of absence of the closure rule and boundaries. At the opposite side of the spectrum, the completely closed authority arena sets up such impermeable boundaries that the convertibility of resources, the raising of performances and a stabilisation of behavioural patterns and systemic interactions facilitate forms of internal institutionalisation of voice mechanisms, structures and channels. In between these two extreme cases, the process of boundary differentiation in various subsystems, boundary closure or its lowering affect the

perceptions, the interests and the values of different individuals, groups, etc., and provide for varying and different opportunities to structure voice.

Institutional differentiation of the internal hierarchical order is the second corner of the process of political structuring. If we want to keep our language at a high level of generality and abstraction we should not specify which type of institutional differentiation we are considering. We may leave aside the more traditional, purely ascriptive mechanisms of protection, arbitration, regulation, jurisdiction and allocation within the authority arena. One major type is of course the bureaucratic type, characterised by regulation by 'experts' or by people whose major qualification is some specific knowledge. These experts are in turn supervised to some extent by holders of the authority arena control, but only to a very little extent directly by the clients to whom they provide their services. The bureaucratic 'ideal type' stresses the 'rational' computational allocation and decision making which is worked out 'rationally' according to the exigencies of any given situation and belittles allocation by elected representatives, by organs of self-government, through processes of political or legislative decision or by exigencies of the impersonal mechanism of the market.<sup>36</sup>

If we want to be more specific, in this part of the world and in this era, the form of institutional differentiation of the authority arena which we are talking about is 'institutional democratisation'. In this 'representative' or 'public' type, the principles at least of protection, arbitration, jurisdiction, regulation and allocation are established by the public deliberation of 'representatives' of various types of constituencies (political

representatives, voluntary association, professional organisations, etc.) whose powers are defined by procedural principles and rules (such as one-person-one-vote; majority decision; appointment and revocability of executives).

In Table 3 the two components of political structuring are briefly summarised. The items in this table could be more historically specific. One could speak of protest, revolt and socio-political movements instead of 'aggregate voice'; of political membership organisations and of courts, parliaments and estate representation, rather than of structured voice. Institutional threshold could specify electoral inclusiveness, equality and fairness, majority rights control, executives' responsibility, etc.. Here I prefer to keep a fairly general connotative terminology, simply pointing out that voice may range from pious prayer to the direct exercise of majority rights, and in parallel to this, institutional differentiation may involve more or less complex mechanisms of hearing, consent and redress. This in turn allows the application of the scheme to historical phases and actors different from those which developed as a result of the combined effect of the industrial and political revolution of the 18th century.

(Table 3 about here)

If we limit our discussion to the within-state developments of the modern era, the precise timing of voice structuring and institutional democratisation is crucial. Some polities could advance along the path of institutional

Table 3: Socio-political inputs and institutional threshold of political structuring

POLITICAL STRUCTURING	VOICE STRUCTURING (SOCIO-POLITICAL INPUTS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- individual voice</li> <li>- aggregate voice</li> <li>- structured voice</li> </ul>
	INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION THRESHOLDS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- mechanisms of voluntary listening</li> <li>- guarantee or right to be heard</li> <li>- arrangements of consent</li> <li>- arrangements of redress</li> <li>- arrangements of modification</li> <li>- actual imposition of outcomes</li> </ul>


democratisation much before voice was extensively and effectively structured, as the British example reminds us. The same could be said for the France of the Second and Third Republic where institutional democratisation ran ahead of the voice structuration of the community (parties and corporate groups and the establishment of solid central alliances between them).<sup>37</sup> On the other side, a polity could be strongly structured from the political point of view, but non institutionally democratised. German society was highly politically mobilised and structured as of the 1860s but it was not until the 1920s that political democratisation followed. In much the same way, Norwegian and Swedish societies were characterised by the historical presence of strong socio-political popular movements throughout the entire 19th century, while important institutional barriers to democratisation (irresponsible government and above all second house privileges) persisted up to the beginning of the 20th century. Under these conditions, a polity can clearly be neither institutionally democratised nor politically structured (see Figure 2).<sup>38</sup>

(Figure 2 about here)

Figure 3 sums up the relationship I have tried to establish at the general level between external boundary building, exit options, and internal political structuring of every authority arena (included those of a territorial nature).

The early boundary building which is implied by the same formation of a new authority arena increases the cost of exit of the internal membership group. Of course, the early boundaries may develop in a limited functional domain. For instance, the early efforts at territorial state formation in Europe in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century developed mainly through the strengthening of the force-

Figure 2: Institutional democratisation and voice structuring



coercion boundaries, while in cultural, economic and politico-administrative terms a variety of internal and cross-border boundaries continued to exist. However, if and when the central hierarchy of the authority arena manages to strengthen its territorial control by raising new boundaries for goods, persons, messages, rights, credentials, etc. in new functional areas and making them progressively coincide with the territorial and/or membership space, exit options tend to collapse.


(Figure 3 about here)

What sort of boundaries tend to be raised and strengthened determines what sort of internal closure and exclusion rules and codes develop, are supported or opposed by the internal hierarchy, and get politicised. That is, as already stressed, the type of boundary building influences the type of internal structuring.

Early boundary building should not reduce the cost of voice. On the contrary, the same process of boundary consolidation may imply boundary insecurity, external pressure, internal voice repression, invocation of abstract ideals of authority legitimation and therefore voice-indifferent ideologies (for instance 'competence', or the 'nation', or 'class' or 'efficiency').

When external boundaries are consolidated, economic interest differentiation, cultural diversities and institutional privileges engender processes of internal political structuring of the authority arena which tend to considerably lower the cost of voice whilst at the same time keeping the cost of exit high, and perhaps increasing it to the extent that the process generates and strengthens expressive solidarities and collective ties. Only 'limited-

Figure 3: Costs of exit and voice in authority arenas





exit' allows the concentration and centralisation of resources and conflicts essential to the structuring of authority arenas.

If we read the curve in Figure 3 starting from the opposite end, the process involves the same phenomena, but in an inverse relationship. Removing or lowering boundaries -- as a deliberate choice or as a result of new exit technologies -- lowers the cost of exit for some people, resources, roles in the cultural, economic and politico-administrative spheres (e.g. world economy, international co-operation, new technologies etc.). Boundary fading increases the cost of voice. To begin with this happens because there are less resources looked in the authority arena. Moreover, all the processes which produce voice structuring -- resource convertibility, system interactions, rising performances and stabilisation of behavioural patterns -- affect the possibility and capacity to politicise the internal closure rules and codes. The mobility of factors limits the voice options of the non-mobiles. Finally, as a consequence, these processes tend to de-structure the historically existing structures of voice, whose main problem becomes a growing legitimacy crisis due to their incapability of channelling and satisfying demands and of controlling the environment. Lacking the appropriate resource control, opposition and conflicts find it difficult to structure at the central level. It does not make sense to compete functionally at the centre of the authority arena when there are no resources to be distributed there. Political organisations in this case can tend to become diluted in a less authoritative environment.<sup>39</sup>

As closure and structuration are linked theoretically, the same applies to exit and de-structuration. This is the

nucleus of a theory of *boundary-building and political structuring* and *exit-options and political de-structuring*.

However, boundaries and the corresponding exit-voice options are not only raised or lowered for existing units. Exiting something always means entering something else. In different functional areas, boundaries are moved to higher more encompassing territorial and membership authority arenas, or they may be narrowed down to retrenched territorial and membership arenas. Attempts at new boundary building at higher or lower levels may be helped by the same fact that actors and authorities at one level feel incapable of defending those boundaries at that level.

#### 6. Europe: de te fabula narratur?

I should have been writing about 'europeanisation and domestic politics'. But didn't I?

Various sources tell us the story of Abulgualid Mohammed Ibn-Ahmed Ibn-Mohammed Ibn-Rushd -- better known to the Western world as Averroé. In Cordoba in the middle of the twelfth century, while writing his comment on Aristotle's work which delivered his name to history, he kept wondering what the terms 'tragedy' and 'comedy' could mean. He finally concluded that Aristotle called 'tragedy' the art of eulogising, and 'comedy' the art of satire and anathema. Within the Islam -- which did not know of theatres -- nothing and nobody could help Abulgualid Mohammed Ibn-Ahmed's interpretative effort. With a certain poetic licence, I can imagine him wondering about these meanings whilst walking on the ruined stones of the Roman theatre of the magnificent city of Cordoba.

Studying European integration we walk over the ruins of innumerable previous attempts to integrate this part of the

world, whose significance is not, however, foreclosed to us by insurmountable cultural meaning boundaries. The half-a-century of European integration development is a long term process of new large-scale territorial differentiation characterised by the progressive lowering of internal boundaries and the slow rising of external new boundaries. The process liberates conflicting and contradictory energies and requests of exit and, at the same time, new demands of closure. This is the simple conclusion for which this paper constitutes the theoretical underpinning.

Which specific systemic boundaries are lowered internally and which ones are raised externally is and will be of paramount importance for affecting the forms of internal processes of voice structuring and institutional differentiation (democratisation). It is very unlikely that the forms of political structuring prevalent at the national-state level will be simply reproduced within the larger authority arena. As usual, the specificity of the new processes which develop under our eyes seem so many and momentous as to defeat any comparison with previous historical phenomena of the same genus. And yet the entire history of Europe, from the consolidation of the Roman Empire to its fall, from feudalisation to the birth of communal civilisation, from the establishment of a common Latin intellectual language to the vernacularisation of communication (and back to a new common language?); from the original kinship ties to the Christian cross-territorial community and back to the religious membership retrenchment of orthodox and Protestant reforms, is a continuous process of geographical and membership space retrenchment/differentiation and expansion/integration. I find it fascinating to read the richness of this history through the glasses of 'exit option', 'boundary building' and 'political structuring', and I find it appealing to

interpret the European integration with the same intellectual tools.

This paper should have therefore continued with three further sections, which I shall mention to indicate the direction in which I am pursuing my work

**1) European territorial and membership 'expansion-retrenchment'**

where the framework delineated above should be applied to a number of critical junctures in European history and in particular to the formation of nation-states.

**2) The European Union: exit options and boundary building**

where I should analyse in more detail which boundary-removing, boundary-redrawing and boundary-building processes have developed through the half-a-century of European community development.

**3) The European Union: Political structuring?**

where the corresponding possibilities and forms of internal political structuring are analysed in the light of the previous section.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The proliferation of new terms in Euro-jargon is sometimes disquieting. The EU has recently been defined as a 'confederal consociation' characterised by 'cohabitational pluralism' (D. N. Chrysoschoou, 'Democracy and Symbiosis in the European Union: Towards a Confederal consociation?', *West European Politics*, 17, 1994, pp. 1-14).

<sup>2</sup> P. Flora, *The National Welfare State and European Integration*, in L. Moreno (ed.), *Social Exchange and Welfare Development*, Madrid, CSIC, 1993, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> P. Schmitter, *Representation in the Future Euro-Polity*, Discussion Paper n. 23, Centre for European Studies, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1993, p. 38.

<sup>4</sup> S. Tarrow, 'The Europeanisation of Conflict: Reflections from a Social Movement Perspective', *West European Politics*, 18, 1995, pp. 223-251, p. 233. G. Marks, D. McAdam, 'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union', *West European Politics*, 19, 1996, pp. 249-278.

<sup>5</sup> M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1956 (1922), 2 voll., (p. 53 of the Italian edition, Milano, Comunità, 1977).

<sup>6</sup> S. Rokkan, D. Urwin, F. H. Aerebrot, P. Malaba, T. Sande, *Centre-Periphery Structures in Europe*, Frankfurt-New York, Campus Verlag, 1987, pp. 17-18.

<sup>7</sup> A. O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1970.

<sup>8</sup> *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, cit., pp. 15-16. Hirschman concludes that in all organisations: 'for competition to work as a mechanism of recuperation from performance lapses, it is generally best for a firm to have a mixture of alert and inert customers' (p. 24), with alert customers providing the information on the decline of the product; and the inert customer preventing this decline from having immediate and catastrophic effects with no possibility of recovery for the firm. He applies the same reasoning also to the state: 'Every state - and indeed every organisation - requires for its establishment and existence some limitations or ceilings on the extent of exit or of voice or of both. In other words, there are levels of exit (disintegration) and voice (disruption) beyond which it is impossible for an organisation to exist as an organisation. At the same time, an organisation needs minimal or floor levels of exit and voice in order to receive the necessary feedback about its performance' ; A. Hirschman, *Exit, voice, and loyalty: further reflections and a survey of recent contributions*, in A. Hirschman, *Essays in Trespassing. Economics to Politics and Beyond*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 213-235, pp. 224-225 (originally in *Social Science Information*, 13, 1974, pp. 7-26). He also applies the same principle to voice, so that even in this case, as for exit, a combination of inert and alert citizens, or an alternation of involvement and withdrawal, may be better for democracy than permanent activism or total apathy. So, for Hirschman, exit and voice as recovery mechanisms should better remain within certain limits and proportions. This line of Hirschman's reasoning is not directly relevant in this context.

<sup>9</sup> *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, p. 34.

<sup>10</sup> A. O. Hirschman, *Exit, voice, and loyalty: further reflections and a survey of recent contributions*, cit., pp. 213-235., p. 217. See also the same point elaborated in A. Hirschman, *Exit and Voice: some further distinctions*, in A. Hirschman, *Essays in Trespassing. Economics to Politics and Beyond*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 236-245, pp. 239-249.

<sup>11</sup> *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, cit., p. 79, 82, 83, 98.

<sup>12</sup> In A. O. Hirschman, *Exit, voice, and loyalty: further reflections and a survey of recent contributions*, cit., pp. 222-223.

<sup>13</sup> 'Exit, Voice and the State' *World Politics*, 31, 1978, pp. 90-107, reprinted in A. O. Hirschman, *Essays in Trespassing. Economics to Politics and Beyond*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 246-265, from which I quote, pp. 250-251.

<sup>14</sup> See in particular *Exit, Voice and the State*, op cit. where he says that 'The exit concept could, of course, be extended to cover cases of this sort. I shall, however, limit myself here to situations in which physical moving away of individuals or groups is an essential characteristic of the splitting up process' (p. 249).

<sup>15</sup> *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, cit., p. 79.

<sup>16</sup> For a discussion of Hirschman's 'exit' concept see S. E. Finer, 'State-building, state boundaries and border control: An essay on certain aspects of the first phase of state-building in Western Europe', *Social Science Information*, 13, 1974, pp. 79-126

<sup>17</sup> *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, cit., p. 43 (emphasis mine).

<sup>18</sup> A. Hirschman, 'Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the GDR', *World Politics*, 45, 1993, pp. 173-202.

<sup>19</sup> On the role of institutions as a device for lowering the costs of voice (participation) for certain groups of individuals see S. Verba, N. H. Nie, J. Kim, *Participation and Political Equality. A Seven Nation Comparison*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978.

<sup>20</sup> This is a point he had not discussed in *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, and which he develops in *Exit and Voice: some further distinctions*, cit., pp. 242-243.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, cit. (pp. 41-44 of the Italian edition, Milano, Comunità, 1977).

<sup>22</sup> R. Murphy, *Social Closure. the Theory of Monopolization and Exclusion*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 46 for an elaboration of the concept of 'exclusion'. Closure theory is built up from the scattered elements that can be drawn from the work of Weber and Marx. However, emphasising the relationship with Marxism and class theory, 'closure theory' is regarded by the author as a more encompassing approach of which class is only an element.

<sup>23</sup> For this distinction see F. Parking, *Marxism and Class Theory. A Bourgeois Critique*, London, Tavistock, 1979.

<sup>24</sup> Latin language and culture had a richer conceptualisation of boundaries than most of our 'national' languages have now. It would be worthwhile checking the classic philology to reconstruct the meanings of the various terms.

<sup>25</sup> The *van der düdeschen hanse* league, which came to include about 200 cities between the middle of the 14th and the middle of the 15th century, was based on specific economic agreements and mutual commercial advantages among the members. Although there was a long-term predominance of the Lubecca-led regional 'quarter', a political 'constitution' was never formalised. There were however rules of closure, discriminating against external through the principal mechanism of economic boycotting of their harbours.

<sup>26</sup> For a discussion of the different types of cultural peripheries see S. Rokkan and D. Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity. Politics of West European Peripheries*, London, Sage, 1983.

<sup>27</sup> Of course, Middle Age thinking was more 'flexible' in terms of subsystemic boundaries. For a rich series of examples of 'lack of coincidence' in the modern sense see O. Hintze, *Soziologie und Geschichte Staat und Verfassung*, edited by G. Oestreich, Goettingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1962; and O. Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988 (1900).

<sup>28</sup> This table is adapted from S. Rokkan 'Entries, voices, exits: Towards a possible generalisation of the Hirschman Model', *Social Science Information*, 13, 1974, pp. 39-53, p. 43. I have added the line corresponding to the politico-administrative subsystems -- which Rokkan sets together with the force-coercion subsystem -- and I have added and moved items of exit units and boundary mechanisms.

<sup>29</sup> See S. Rokkan, *Nation Building, Cleavage Formation and the Structuring of Mass Politics*, in S. Rokkan, *Citizens Elections Parties*, Oslo, Universitetforlag, 1970, pp. 72-144.

<sup>30</sup> Actually, he was criticised for having studied 'only one' of such structuration processes, giving little attention to the formation of corporate interest organisations. See R. R. Alford, R. Friedland, 'Nations, Parties, and Participation: A Critique of Political Sociology, *Theory and Society*, 1, 1973, n. 3, 307-328. See Rokkan's response to this criticism in 'Toward a Generalized Concept of Verzuiling', *Political Studies*, 25, 1977, pp. 563-570.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. M. Stoppino, 'Che cosa è la politica', *Quaderni di scienza politica*, 1, 1994, pp. 1-34.

<sup>32</sup> Incidentally, one can clearly see here the distinction between nuclear economic action and nuclear political action: nuclear economic action is that action made by an actor who does not need the behavioural conformity of others. A political action is that of an actor who needs to achieve the behavioural conformity of the others to realise his values, not as an occasional consent or acceptance, but as a stable and guaranteed conformity.

<sup>33</sup> A theoretical formulation of such a situation was elaborated by Charles Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure', *Journal of Political Economy*, 1956, pp. 416-424 concerning local government expenditures and tax levels, and by many others after him. The model is based on a considerable number of assumptions, namely (1) full mobility; 2) full knowledge of available revenue-expenditure packages; 3) high number of such packages offered; 4) non-localised production; 5) no spill-over effect of the public goods provided; 6) optimum size for each community defined by the number of residents for which the given package can be provided at the lowest cost.

<sup>34</sup> Because for a number of actors the 'full-exit' world is 'preferable', it is not surprising that it has become a normative model. In the language of the ideologues of the free- self-regulating market, what is here called 'political structuring' -- and in particular its 'voice-structuring' part -- is regarded as and labelled as 'rent-seeking' through legislation, pressure, protest, lobbying and the like. That is, voice is in most instances a rent-seeking exercise and policies aiming to secure specific results are seen as prone to become the target of rent-seeking activities even if they may not have been initiated this way. See M. E. Streit, 'The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From 'Rome' to 'Maastricht'', *European Law Journal*, 1, 1995, pp. 5-30 for a perfect example of this logic applied to a critique of the EU development. When the sentence is deprived of the derogatory term of 'rent-seeking' and it is replaced by the more traditional concept of 'self interest', it translates into the most basic statement of the democratic and pluralist credo: individuals, alone or in groups, are allowed, and indeed should, pursue their interest and try to satisfy their preferences, whatever they may be (including preferences for values such as equality, state economic intervention, economic protection and the like) and such enterprise, if liberty has to be preserved, cannot be limited by anybody to a pre-defined set of values (as the private economic exchanges in the market can be).

<sup>35</sup> See Ellis Goldberg, *Borders, Boundaries, Taxes and States in the Medieval Islamic World*, University of Washington, without date, for an interesting application of this logic to the state borders and state consolidation in the Medieval Islamic world. The historical application of the model to medieval Europe or Islam is, however, particularly implausible. The model assumes kings on one side, and merchants on the other -- that is, factors which are mobile by definition. In fact, in that period the by far higher contribution to royal revenues was coming from the land, and not from tax on trade. Therefore, it was far more essential to obtain, increase and control land to increase and maximise revenues.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. S. N. Eisenstadt *Modernization, Protest and Change*, Englewood Cliffs (N.J.), Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966, p. 9.

<sup>37</sup> Although the level of external boundary consolidation was very different in these two cases: France has contested borders up to W.W.II, while Britain has the same borders today as in 975. The implications of this for the timing of internal political structuring are obvious but cannot be discussed here in detail. Note only that, without considering how different these problems in the two countries were, one cannot understand why French historians are so obsessed with the demon of exit, whilst the British are equally obsessed by the angel of voice. This is pointed out very cleverly by S. E. Finer, 'State-building, state boundaries and border control: An essay on



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certain aspects of the first phase of state-building in Western Europe', *Social Science Information*, 13, 1974, pp. 79-126.

<sup>38</sup> Dahl's inspiration is obvious in this table. See R. A. Dahl, *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition*, New Haven-London, Yale University Press, 1971. He refers to the two dimensions of 'inclusiveness' and 'liberalisation' as both part of the democratisation process. My idea of voice structuring goes beyond pure electoral inclusiveness and refers to the extent to which the political community is indeed 'vertebrated' by a set of socio-political movements and membership associations. Similarly, the concept of 'inclusiveness' and 'liberalisation' works poorly if applied to the developing European polity, while those of 'institutional democratisation' and 'political structuring' seems more useful and appropriate.

<sup>39</sup> I have discussed this, as it affects contemporary political representation structures, and in particular political parties and their competitive drives in two yet unpublished papers: *Collusion, Competition and Democracy*, in R. Gunther, J. J. Linz and J. R. Montero (eds.), *Political Parties: Changing Roles in Contemporary Democracies*, forthcoming, 88 pp; *Notes on the macro-constellation of party rise, consolidation and decline*, Paper presented at the Haifa Conference on 'Structural and behavioural aspects of democratic development', 19-22 May 1997, 28 pp .



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