Indian diversity in the UK: an overview of a complex and varied population

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CARIM-India Research Report 2013/14
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CARIM-India – Developing a knowledge base for policymaking on India-EU migration

This project is co-financed by the European Union and carried out by the EUI in partnership with the Indian Council of Overseas Employment, (ICOE), the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Association, (IIMB), and Maastricht University (Faculty of Law).

The proposed action is aimed at consolidating a constructive dialogue between the EU and India on migration covering all migration-related aspects. The objectives of the proposed action are aimed at:

- Assembling high-level Indian-EU expertise in major disciplines that deal with migration (demography, economics, law, sociology and politics) with a view to building up migration studies in India. This is an inherently international exercise in which experts will use standardised concepts and instruments that allow for aggregation and comparison. These experts will belong to all major disciplines that deal with migration, ranging from demography to law and from economics to sociology and political science.

- Providing the Government of India as well as the European Union, its Member States, the academia and civil society, with:
  1. Reliable, updated and comparative information on migration
  2. In-depth analyses on India-EU highly-skilled and circular migration, but also on low-skilled and irregular migration.

- Making research serve action by connecting experts with both policy-makers and the wider public through respectively policy-oriented research, training courses, and outreach programmes.

These three objectives will be pursued with a view to developing a knowledge base addressed to policy-makers and migration stakeholders in both the EU and India.

Results of the above activities are made available for public consultation through the website of the project: [http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/](http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/)

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Abstract

This country report of Indian migration to the UK broaches this broad and wide-ranging topic through a variety of perspectives. To begin with, the historical migration of Indians to Britain is treated in order to understand the long-term trends which set in motion the later waves of migration to the country we have seen since WWII. A demographic and socio-economic portrait of the UK’s Indian population is then built using a variety of statistical and qualitative sources, while the internal complexities of this group are continuously highlighted in order to avoid a simplification of the differences within the British-Indian community. Immigration to the UK has undoubtedly been influenced by over a century of fluctuating immigration policies and law, thus to truly understand the context of India-UK migration, the legal framework is explored in the following section which is then followed by chapters on the way Indian migrants have been treated by the British media and a summary of the most important religious centres and cultural associations they have produced. A report of this size could never be exhaustive, but through these various lenses the reader will gain a general picture of the ways Indians have migrated to Britain and how they have got by there.
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General introduction

For centuries, India has been a centre of global trade, and powerhouses such as Surat in present day Gujarat were key players in vast trade networks spreading across Asia, East Africa, Arabia and into South-East Asia well before the arrival of European merchants on its coasts in the late 15th century. At this point, certain parts of present-day India were already centuries ahead of Europe in terms of economic development and industry, a factor which questions traditional readings of migration as a response to labour shortages in industrialised nations (Poros 2011). To approach Indian migrations to the UK as a response to the needs of industry would not only be Eurocentric, but would largely miss the point in understanding why and how certain South Asians have left the sub-continent for a new life elsewhere.

All too often, the history of South Asian migration to Great Britain has been characterised as a response to the requirements of British industry in the post-war boom years. While this period of migration to the UK remains extremely important, the arrival of South Asians and their descendants has a far longer and complex history. Indian migrants to the UK have been sailors, nannies, husbands and wives, factory workers, refugees, political activists and revolutionaries, scholars, students, businessmen and princes. This country report will attempt to provide a very brief historical overview of India to UK migration, before turning to statistical data in order to create a portrait of the current profile of Indians and their descendants in the UK.

Terminology: factors to bear in mind.

Debates about terminology are not simply abstract discussions; the way terms are put into practice can have important effects on the way we see things and how subjects are treated (Foucault 2002). Sayyid (2008) reminds us that the principally western study of Indology has tended to reify and simplify Indian culture, taking brief snapshots of particular times and places and extrapolating this as representative of “India” as if this is some kind of primordial and unchanging entity. When discussing India therefore it is worth keeping in mind that this is an enormous landmass with a huge population and variety of languages, cultures and religions, many of whom have little or no history of migration to the UK, and any generalising statements are bound to miss the mark. In this paper, the terms South-Asia and sub-continent will be used when referring to the area that consists of present day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka; regions which were not necessarily separate countries until relatively recently. When referring to post-Partition India, the word India will be used as a general catch-all term for the sake of simplicity and given the scope of this paper, although when possible more detail will be added. Similarly, I have attempted to be more specific when I discuss Indian migrants, and refer to the specific sub-groups of Indians living in Britain, such as Punjabi, Gujarati or East African Asian when the data permits.

Early migrations: initial contact and empire

Migrations between the British Isles and the Indian sub-continent have been continuing since the early 17th century, and for most of this period the direction has largely been one way – that is, British citizens heading towards the sub-continent. British sailors, merchants, soldiers and businessmen were some of the first arrivals and were later joined by missionaries and clerks, teachers and bureaucrats of the British Empire. Nonetheless, since the early 1600s there has been a small but significant current of voyagers, migrants and visitors coming the other way, which increased dramatically at the beginning of the 20th century (Bates 2007, Visram 2002). Given the depth and breadth of the subject, this history will attempt to provide an analysis of the most general trends, while picking up on certain illustrative examples in order to explain how and why some of the most important South-Asian migrations to Britain have occurred.
The English East India Company (EIC) was one of a number of European trading conglomerates that ploughed the trade routes between East and West. Created under royal charter in 1600, the company held the monopoly on trade between the regions for over two centuries. The company first landed in Surat in 1608 and soon entered into competition with its Dutch and French rivals for domination of the trade routes. Over the next century the company expanded its interests in the subcontinent, especially from its base in Bengal.

During this early period of contact, the British began making use of Indian Lascars (sailors) due to their knowledge of the seas, but also due to the high rate of desertion and death by British sailors on ships heading to India. Despite a British law of 1660 which ruled that all EIC ships had to be manned by at least 75% British sailors, the reality was probably rather different, with large numbers of Indians sailing on the return journeys to Britain. However, as a result of the earlier law, many of these sailors found themselves stranded in London, unable to find a way to get back to India. Often left poor and destitute, the group soon became a common sight on the streets of the metropolis. During the same period, many Ayahs (nannies) and servants also found their way to England. The staff of the EIC led decadent lives in India, making their fortunes in trade and employing small armies of servants. On their return to England many chose to bring their favourite servants with them (Visram 2002, Ali 2008).

The 23rd June 1757 is generally regarded as the moment when the British Empire in India was born. Troops of the EIC beat the French-backed Nawab of Bengal in the Battle of Plassey. This victory permitted the British to gain control of large swathes of the sub-continent, exploiting the vacuum left by the crumbling Mughal Empire and setting in motion a domination which would last for almost two centuries. Over the next hundred years, Lascars continued to be hired by the British Navy and the EIC, and Ayahs continued to arrive in Britain in increasing numbers. Furthermore, these were joined by numerous independent visitors, activists, writers, teachers and businessmen (Ali 2008, Visram 2002, Bates 2007).

The suppression of the Indian mutiny of 1857, and the subsequent institution of direct crown control saw vast swathes of the subcontinent come under complete control of the Empire. The increasingly close ties between the two countries resulted in increasing levels of migration: many students arrived in order to attain the qualifications necessary for a post in the bureaucracy of the Empire, as well as in a variety of other domains such as medicine, engineering and law. Many of these students stayed on to practice their professions in Britain. Alongside these professionals, a burgeoning community of writers, political activists, journalists and businessmen were beginning to settle in Britain, and especially in England’s large cities. The East Indian Association was formed in 1866, and along with later organisations such as the Indian Society of 1872, was one of the first political organisations set up by South Asians in Britain which criticised the running of the Empire on moral, political and economic grounds. Dadabhai Naoroji became Britain’s first Asian MP. Born in 1825, Naoroji served as an MP for the liberal party between 1892-95 after having moved to Britain and setting himself up in business and later academia. He was vocal on issues such as Irish home rule and Indian independence. Daughters and wives from a small but distinct community of bourgeois Indians and mixed race families living in London also famously participated in the suffragette movement, aiding in the struggle for women’s right to vote in Britain. Furthermore, Queen Victoria herself had a close relationship with her special servant Abdul Karim, an Indian Muslim born in Jhansi (in modern day Uttar Pradesh) during the final years of her rein (until 1901), a relationship which notably caused friction in the royal court (Visram 2002).

The British abolished slavery in 1833 and subsequently turned to indentured labour to respond to labour demands in the empire’s various colonies. Indenture was a kind of debt bondage which had initially been used to encourage Europeans to go to the Americas prior to the American Revolution. Workers would sign an agreement whereby they would work for a set number of years while receiving food and accommodation, and at the end would receive their pay and a usually a ticket home. Many Indians participated in British indenture projects in the Caribbean islands, as well as East and Southern Africa, famously working on the East African Railway. While there has been an South Asian presence
in East Africa since at least the 13th Century, their numbers increased dramatically towards the end of the 19th century, either as indentured labourers who stayed on, or as free migrants, come to work in the bureaucracy of the Empire. These migrants came particularly from the states of Gujarat and the Punjab, often from specific villages and caste groups escaping poverty and famines and hoping for a new life in places where caste restrictions would play a limited role. Bhatias from Sindh and Kutch, Lohanas from Saurashtra and later Patidars and Visa Oswal Jains from central Gujarat were some of the many groups who made the journey to East Africa. The “destiny” of these East African Asians will be returned to later (Oonk 2007, Bhat 2007, Kliot 2007, Mehta 2001).

The World Wars and the period between – building the foundations of a community
The First World War had a heavy cost for India in terms of resources and men. Over a million individuals were recruited as soldiers, sailors and workers in the war machine and the Indian army saw its first service in European soil, seeing action in France, Belgium and Greece as well as Turkey, East Africa, Aden and beyond. While there were initial worries among the British higher command about using Indian soldiers in Europe – based on fears that this could lead Indians to believing they were equal to the British military – it was soon deemed that they were needed on the Western front and according to some historians their last minute arrival in northern France and Belgium in late 1914 saved an early defeat by Germany. Throughout the war, injured Indian soldiers were famously sheltered in the Brighton Pavilion, the eccentric India-inspired palace which had formerly been a royal residence (Image 1).

In this makeshift hospital Indian soldiers were famously well treated and welcomed by the locals. Special prayer rooms were set up to accommodate the different religions of the soldiers, as well as different menus representing the different beliefs of the communities represented in the army. While there was a genuine concern to treat these soldiers with respect, there may have also been political interests too – a desire to curry favour among Indians, and impress them with the metropolis in order to improve Britain’s image when these soldiers returned (Visram 2002).
Following the war, the vast majority of these soldiers did go home. Nonetheless a significant number chose to stay on in the post war years. They were joined by Lascars who had jumped ship, various travelling salesmen and students, businessmen and doctors. By the 1930s it is estimated there were between 5000 and 10,000 South Asians in Britain. This “community” was in many ways similar to the Indian community today – a wide range of origins in South Asia, reasons for migration, different classes, religions and occupations. Very often these groups had little in common beyond a common link to the sub-continent. By the 1920s there were estimated to be at least sixteen “Indian” restaurants in London, mainly opened by Sylhetti (in modern day Bangladesh) ships cooks who had jumped ship. Furthermore, various businesses had already been set up by Indians, perhaps most significantly being the Bombay Emporium of London set up in 1931 by a former Indian army officer who sold spices and other Asian produce. Today the business is still going strong and produces many products found on the shelves of British supermarkets. Activist organisations continued to play a significant role in the independence movement, such as the Indian Freedom Association which was established in 1925 to lobby for Indian home-rule (Visram 2002).

Contrary to Winston Churchill’s statement that Britain stood alone during WWII, she was in fact backed by her armies from all her colonies and allies in Africa, North America, the Caribbean, Australasia and most significantly in South-Asia. The Indian army was the largest player on the theatre of war, with up to 2.5million soldiers, sailors and workers. Furthermore, the resources and industry provided by India in the war effort, provided freely for Britain’s war were enormous, and although production leapt during this period, it may also have been a contributor to the 1943 Bengal Famine. Once again, the Indian military served across the world and many soldiers, sailors and workers ended up in Britain at the end of the war (Visram 2002).

How and why have certain Indians migrated to Britain? Focus on immigration since the 1950s

It is appropriate at this stage to pose some questions about the identity of this small yet diverse and burgeoning population of South Asians in Britain. The foundations laid by some of these groups permitted the creation of transnational networks that would permit the transfer of information, and human and cultural capital. The beginning of these networks would later form an important basis of the larger waves of South Asian migration to Britain.

Poros (2001) proposes a number of categories of migration networks, including “solitaries” (migrants with no previous ties to the country of arrival); “chains” (the most common type, built around interpersonal networks); “recruitment” (when migrants are hired by organisations) and “trusties” (migrants bound in complex relations of trust in high stake ethnic niches such as the diamond trade). These terms are useful for understanding the ways in which South Asians have come to Britain throughout history. While the historical links between the two countries provide a clear background for these migrations, Poros’ terms are illuminating in that they explain how certain migrants have migrated, and how very specific locations in sender and host countries are linked.

A small number of early Indian migrants were “solitaries”; occasional visitors and sailors who had jumped ship came simply for adventure and discovery. Meanwhile, “recruitment” was an important drive for much early South Asian migration; whether as Lascars, Ayahs, soldiers and teachers, as well as workers in Britain’s other colonies. During this early period, a small amount of chain migration occurred, especially during the inter-war period where a number of Punjabis worked as peddlers. What is known of these early migrants and settlers suggests that they came from a wide variety of origins on the sub-continent. Their reasons for migration appear diverse and normally they came as individuals.

It was thus Britain’s two World Wars that played an enormous role in the creation of chain migrations from India to the United Kingdom. The British developed an obsession with racial classification during their colonial expansion; scientific racism superseded initial Eurocentric ignorance as a justification for Empire-building. Along with other European nations of this period, it became a common belief that certain “races” were naturally superior to others. In India, the British
began recruiting their armies from certain northern regions of the sub-continent, significantly from the Punjab, Kashmir and Gujarat. According to the discourse, the peoples of these regions belonged to the superior *Martial Races*; they were born leaders and warriors. What’s more, many of these people were Muslim and Sikh; in case another rebellion such as the 1857 mutiny occurred it was considered better to have an army composed of minority religions, in order that soldiers felt a less powerful sense of nationalism. In the meantime, enormous numbers of Sylhettis joined Britain’s navy due in part to drought and reductions in inherited land size. Many of these soldiers and sailors settled in Britain following the wars of the early 20th century, and formed the basis of the migration chains which would later occur in post-war Britain from these regions on the sub-continent.

South Asian migration to Post-War Britain has seen a number of significant waves: initially, the post-war economic boom in Britain saw large numbers of Caribbean, then South Asian men, specifically from the Punjab, Gujarat and Kashmir. Secondly, the wives and families of these men came to join them. In the late 1960s and early 1970s another large wave of East African Asians, the so-called “twice migrants” (Bhachu 1985) arrived from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda following government repression in these newly independent states. Finally the late 1990s and 2000s has seen a huge rise in Indian students and professionals. In order to understand these migrations, historical contexts, as well as political realities and theoretical debates must be taken into account (Khadria 2006, Robinson 1986).

**Possible theoretical explanations of India-UK migration in the post-war period**

Push-Pull migration theories have their limits; they tend to attribute causes of migration *post-factum*, after the event has occurred (Portes & Borocz 1989), while traditional economic theories of migration typically treat migrants as victims of impersonal economic forces that drive their actions. Certain theorists argue that the focus should instead be on how migrants move. Furthermore, researchers should attempt to understand their movements using the same frame of reference migrants themselves apply – often quite different to the abstract economic impulses theorists attribute to their behaviour. That said, these theories can still shed some light when we hope to understand the background context of migrations, thus they will be applied when treating the following migration histories (Arrango 2000).

While Poros’ term of “recruitment”-inspired migration partly explains the enormous movement of South-Asians to Britain following WWII, Great Britain used active recruitment to attract migrants far less systematically than France and especially West-Germany with its guest-worker scheme. Although labour recruitment occurred more heavily in the West Indies, the vast majority of South Asian migration was relatively sporadic; it happened along migration chains. The basis of chains had been put in place by the numerous Indian ex-military that had stayed on in Britain following her wars. These ex-soldiers had largely been recruited from the Punjab, Kashmir and Gujarat; they were able to send information to family members and friends back home about the possibilities of work and money to be earned in Britain’s booming economy (Ali 2008, Robinson 1986).

These chains explain how the initial migrants came to Britain, yet push-pull factors are also important. In all of these regions, a very significant factor in migration has been overpopulation and a surplus of labour, on often unreliable and overworked land. While not necessarily a trigger of migration, such factors may accumulate with other pressures to increase the chances a population will migrate. In the Punjab and Kashmir the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan caused huge population disturbances which may well have meant these displaced populations became more likely to consider migration. Earlier projects, such as the empire’s canal colonies projects in the Punjab would also have uprooted the population. In Azad Kashmir, the creation of the Mangla Dam in the 1960s would also have displaced the population and in Gujarat, the system of land inheritance whereby land was divided equally between sons may well have pushed some individuals to look abroad in order to improve their economic chances (Robinson 1986, Poros 2011).
These migrations may also be partially explained by cultural factors. According to Robinson (1986) a common belief shared by different communities in (especially) northern India and the sub-continent in general is the concept of *izzet*, described as a belief in the value of gaining respect and honour for the family. One particular way of gaining *izzet* is through the acquisition of wealth and subsuming this to the family unit. Migration to Britain with its booming economy may well have been seen as a strategy to gain wealth and honour for the families of migrants.

**The “twice-migrants”**

Perhaps the next most important wave of South Asian immigration to the UK was the “twice migrants”. The newly independent states of East Africa began introducing increasingly discriminatory laws against their South Asian populations following the departure of the British. The South Asians had long held an ambiguous position in these societies, somewhere between the British rulers and the African natives. Asians often worked in government and bureaucratic posts, as well as a small number of businessmen who held large monopolies on industry in these countries. While by no means were the Asians in East Africa all rich or exploitative, certain politicians mobilised populist feelings against this community. Throughout the 1960s, many of these Asians felt the pressure of discrimination and began to up roots and move to Britain. They held British passports at this point, and while some moved back to India, the majority of these communities of principally Gujarati Hindu and Muslim and Punjabi Sikh origin had lived away from India for two or three generations, thus felt no particularly strong sense of Indian identity. The most striking wave however occurred in 1972. Idi Amin had recently taken control of Uganda in a military coup. He claimed to have had a dream where God told him to create an Africa for Africans, and he went about doing this by expelling the supposedly “foreign” Asians. Following independence, India’s policy on its PIOs had been to encourage them to see themselves as citizens of their new nations. Following a few weeks of frantic negotiation, Britain finally accepted to take on the bulk of the Ugandan Asians, a population of about 27,000 (Bhachu, 1985, Gupta 1974, Rutten & Patel 2007).

It is of course debatable whether these twice-migrants should even be considered as “Indian”, despite their (mainly) Gujarati roots. Herbert (2012) for instance, has attempted to develop the concept of diaspora by analysing the experiences of Ugandan Asians in London, and suggests that diaspora may well be better understood as a shared identity and sense of belonging to a particular group with a shared history. Her research suggests the Ugandan Asian diaspora appears not to strongly identify itself with India, rather, its memories of Uganda, the expulsions and the consciousness of being part of an international community are more central to the identity of this group. Herbert’s research, as well as other advances in the study of diaspora, questions the notion of an eternally fixed “Indian” identity. Nonetheless, the African Asian population in the UK maintain a significant ethnic identity and it is interesting to consider the role they play in British society, as well as to single them out in the statistics which follow.

**Summary of the current “state” of Indians in Post-WWII Britain**

The overall majority of Indian migrants during the first post-WWII phase worked in factories and construction (Ballard 1994) and when their women later joined them later on, many of them also worked in manual positions. Over the generations, Indians have dispersed widely into a variety of occupations, and appear to participate in the labour force almost as widely as their white counterparts. They have also largely merged into the middle class. The twice migrants arrived with limited resources, yet very soon merged into the British labour force, particularly participating in the industry of various towns of the Midlands. Very soon this group transferred into a wide variety of middle class populations. Newer Indian migrants have participated enormously in the UK’s high skilled service industries, while Indian students have often funded their degrees with part time work, later going into high skill work or returning to India or going elsewhere.
Indian diversity in the UK: an overview of a complex and varied population

Demographic characteristics of the Indian population

The data in this section comes from a variety of sources found on the website of the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the National Archives which publish data from a variety of surveys, such as the Labour Force survey, the Census and the International Passenger Survey. All graphs have been created by me from statistical sources.

According to Kertzer & Arel (2002) identity is something continually reactivated in social interaction with other individuals. When statistics classify individuals as a member of such and such an ethnicity, they have a tendency to shelve individuals into single categories. Social actors have a wide variety of perceived roles and statuses, thus the statistics that follow must be viewed reflexively, especially when considering groups who do not easily fit into specific groups, such as the Twice Migrants, mixed race individuals and second and third generation “Indians” who may feel no more “Indian” than their white peers.

The Indian category constitutes the largest ethnic minority in the UK. In 2011, the number of foreign born Indian nationals resident in the UK was 729,000, followed by Poland, Pakistan and the Republic of Ireland (Annexe 1). The majority of these Indians arrived in the UK prior to the increasingly restrictive immigration laws that came into effect towards the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, although the highest period of immigration was the ten year period between 1965 and 1975 when around 134000 Indians arrived in the UK, the East African Asians adding considerably to these numbers. This illustrates how migration laws influence patterns; the rapid increase of immigration over this period may well be a response to the implementation of laws – migrants had to choose whether to stay in the UK and bring their families over or return to India and lose the option to return. Immigration continued at a much lower rate over the next two decades and was largely due to family reunification.

When the British born offspring of these Indian migrants are taken into account this ethnic group represents the largest non-white minority in British society:

Graph 1. South Asian population in the UK 1951-2011

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>50000</td>
<td>50000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>100000</td>
<td>100000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>350000</td>
<td>350000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2011 the British Indian (immigrants and offspring combined) population of England and Wales was 1,412,958, just over 2% of the population of these countries. Bearing in mind that, in 2011, 729,000 of these were born in India, we can estimate that about 50% of people with Indian ethnicity were born in the UK, although a significant part of these “second generation” Indians will have East African roots. Indians are the largest non-white ethnic minority in the UK, and come after the “other white” population of immigrants at 2,485,942, which includes all Europeans. The British Pakistani population, at 1,124,511 constitutes the second largest non-white ethnic minority.
When considering the gender of the Indian population, a straightforward picture is not so easy; the different ways Indians have migrated to Britain over time has caused fluctuations in the gender balance. The overwhelming majority of migrants pre-WWII were male, and as a result a significant amount of out-marrying with the native population occurred (Visram 2002). Following WWII, once again the majority of South Asian migrants were men, and marrying with white British women continued (Robinson 1986, Ballard 1994). However, based on the 2001 census, Indian women had caught up in a relatively short space of time, and in fact there were slightly more Indian women represented in the census as the following chart illustrates:

**Graph 2. Gender and ethnicity – 2001 census**

![Gender and ethnicity – 2001 census](image)

Source: ONS (2003)

At 50.28%, there was a slightly larger female population in the Indian ethnicity category of the 2001 census. The 2011 census data on gender and ethnicity is still not fully available as this report was written but may soon be available on the ONS website, so latest figures are not known. However, other sources seem to suggest that the male population may well have slightly overtaken females again. Since the mid-1970s the gender figures on immigration had been roughly comparable, with a slight accent on women over men. However, since the early 2000s, while both male and female immigration leapt from the relatively low and stable figures that continued until the late 90s, there have been roughly double the number of male to female South Asians (India specific information does not exist) arriving in the UK. In 2011 for instance, roughly 40,000 male arrived in the UK, compared to only 21,000 women (Annexe 2).

Family reunification and natural growth can be attributed to the relatively equal gender proportions of the Indian population. The case of the East African Asians is quite different to that of other Indian migrants – in general they moved to the UK in complete family groups, thus we can presume an equal number of males and females of this group arrived during the late 60s and early 70s (Robinson 1986, Peach 2008).

As with gender, the age profile of Indians in the UK is hard to illustrate simply. The different types of migration of Indians have resulted in a relatively complex and intricate picture. On a gross level the Indian population is slightly younger than the native population as the following graph illustrates:
The Indian population are as a whole younger than their white counterparts. The largest proportion (18%) of Indians is aged between 35 and 44, compared to 21% of British who are aged 45 – 59. There is also a larger proportion of young Indian children than British, 8% of Indians are aged 0-4, compared to only 6% of White British. The curve of the Indian population is also smoother than that of the White British one; there are far more white British people aged 30+ than below thirty, while Indians are more evenly spread out along this age range.

As with gender, the different ways Indians have migrated to Britain may well have influenced this data. The recent boost in Indian students to the UK will almost certainly have skewed the above picture to create a younger looking profile. Furthermore, according to the limited data available that compares Indians and East African Asians, the Twice Migrants had a generally younger population than their Indian counterparts (Annexe 3).

In relation to gender and age, the spatial distribution of Indians in the UK is easier to measure. Overwhelmingly, Indians have migrated to large conurbations principally due to the availability of work, housing and of course the comfort of ethnic communities, however Indians appear to have moved away from “zones of transition” into suburbia and occasionally into the countryside (Robinson 1993, 1986). In terms of the individual nations of the UK, the vast proportion (93%) of Indians are found in England (Annexe 4), and of these the majority are distributed between London, the South East and the Midlands, as the next graph illustrates:
While Indians live all around the UK, their spatial distribution in London and the Midlands is almost certainly explained by industry and social networks. During the post-War boom there was much employment available in the industrial cities of the midlands such as Birmingham and Leicester, as well as the capital. Later, when the East African Asians migrated to the UK, many also moved to the midlands, and particularly Leicester and Blackburn, setting up their own ethnic clusters in cities that already had well established Indian communities. It is widely agreed that Indians and East African Asians have contributed enormously to the rejuvenation of the economies of these cities whose industries were previously in decline (Robinson 1986, 1993).

A final factor of demography is family size. As before, the different types of Indian migrations will have had an important effect on the statistics. East African Asians for instance have family size and shapes very similar to white British families, whereas families with a more direct migration route from India tend to have larger families (Annexe 5). The following graph illustrates the size of all families who come under the Indian ethnic category, using data from 2008-2010:

**Graph 5. Comparative household size by ethnic groups, 2008-2010**

![Graph 5](image)

Source: ONS 2012

Indian households appear to be in the mid-range between white British households which are the smallest and Bangladeshi households which tend to be the largest. With an average of 3.07 people per household, a figure which includes all living arrangements, including households with no children, Indian household sizes are comparable to many other immigrant groups, such as Black African and Other Asian Backgrounds. Indians tend to live in relatively similar types of dwellings to African Asians and White British people; the majority are spread equally between semi-detached houses and terraced homes, with a significant group living in detached houses (the most spacious housing type) and a minority living in flats, compared to other South Asian groups such as the Pakistanis who as a majority prefer terraced housing (Annexe 6). Indians tend to cohabit in a more traditional fashion than their white counterparts; 85% of Indian cohabitation is in the context of a married couple, compared to only 63% of whites. There are also fewer Indian single parents and almost no cohabiting couples, compared with white people (Annexe 7). Indians appear to choose the nuclear family model in the UK, and if an illustration of the most typical Indian family were to be drawn, it would be of a married couple with two young children aged between 0 and 10, living in a semi-detached home. Furthermore, over recent years, Indian women have been giving birth to a decreasing number of offspring (Annexe 8 and 9).
Socio-Economic profile

Untangling the statistics

As the previous section of this country report outlined, a uniform picture of Indian migrants in the UK is simply unattainable. Not only have Indians migrated to the UK for a whole host of reasons, and have entered the UK labour market at different positions, their participation in the labour market in relation to their initial entry-point has evolved as well. A wide range of factors must be taken into account to understand these varying chances; the “health” of the UK economy as well as that of the specific towns where Indians have arrived, the skills and previous experiences of the migrants themselves, the access of the migrants to social networks which help find work, racism and discrimination among others.

For instance, thousands of Ugandan Asians arrived in the UK in 1972 and settled (mainly) in London and certain midlands towns such as Leicester and Blackburn. Many came with almost no belongings and began working in unskilled occupations, yet within two decades this group had largely merged into the middle classes, owning businesses and participating in a wide variety of professional livelihoods. Their previous experience as migrants in Africa provided them with the skills and confidence to innovate in a new environment, as well as the fact many were highly educated in British style systems in East Africa meaning that the new environment did not feel quite so alien. They also migrated in family groups, meaning they could pool their resources together and most had friends and relatives who had moved to the UK earlier who helped give them a “foot-up” into the local labour market. While industry was suffering in the UK at this point, many of these immigrants took advantage of the closure of businesses and factories by local owners to set up their own enterprises, creating an “ethnic economy”. This group valued education and encouraged their children to go to university, thus within a short space of time they had leapt from one of the country’s poorest immigrant groups to one of its richest (Robinson 1993, 1986, OTHERS).

On the other hand, up to 62% of Indians who entered the UK labour market on a “Tier 1” skilled visa in recent years have ended up working in unskilled occupations in supermarkets and restaurants (UKBA 2010). The majority of these migrants are highly educated and from well off backgrounds, and many have previously been students in the UK. Their lack of success may partly be explained by the global economic crisis – access to skilled jobs having affected immigrants as much as locals. Furthermore, many lack previous work or migration experience and the kind of social networks that help find professional jobs. That said, many of these migrants have only been in the UK for a relatively short period; finding a highly skilled job in the current economic crisis inevitably takes time.

Summarising the economic profile of Indians is complex. The brute statistics do not take into account the differences between groups exemplified in the two previous examples of African Asian refugees and recent students, as well as second generation British Indians and would classify all these people as “Indian”. This is clearly unsatisfactory and the differences between groups in the “Indian” category must be untangled. What follows are generalised descriptions of the socio-economic profiles of the different waves of Indian migrants.

Based on qualitative and historical accounts outlined in the history section of this paper, it can be assumed that until WWII the majority of South Asian migrants were males, they were unskilled, either working as peddlers, factory workers and other low skilled labourers in catering etc. Many came from the Punjab and Kashmir (which was not divided at this point). They were joined by a relatively small number of students and doctors and a handful of academics and journalists.

Following WWII and independence, the first major wave of Indians and South Asians was mainly male and could be categorised as unskilled. Most came from rural backgrounds in the Punjab and Gujarat and worked in factories and construction in Britain’s booming post war economy. They were also joined by a small number of professionals and doctors recruited to work in the new National
Health Service (Poros 2011). Over time they began to move into different labour markets and many of their children are well now educated and have middle class professions.

The immigration of East African Asians had started slowly towards the end of the 1950s, often students sent by parents to study, or businessmen setting up trade networks between the UK and her former colonies. As the “Africanisation” policies started setting in, more and more families fled to the UK, especially from Kenya and Tanzania, later joined by the biggest wave of Ugandan Asians. It is hard to classify these people as economic migrants as in effect they were refugees. However, few considered themselves as such, and many brought over their business know-how from East Africa and set themselves up in business.

The first group of Indian and Asian post-war migrants were by and large male and they invited their wives to join them later. After immigration laws halted all immigration but family unification, the statistics clearly illustrate female headed immigration from South Asia for the next two decades. The African Asians, however, migrated as family units on the whole, women and children being as much a part of the process as men. Thus while Indian women tended to be “brought over” by the menfolk, African Asian women seem to have played a more central role in decision making and appear to have been involved in work outside the home since they arrived. The offspring of the African Asians were particularly well educated and now work in many different professional fields, as a whole (Robinson 1986/1993).

Immigration statistics do not tell us so much about where in India these migrants came from; this is simply not a question that is asked in surveys like the IPS or the census. However, using other sources we can glean a rough idea of their origins. Looking at visa application data sheds some light on the origins of the UK’s more recent Indian migrants, who are largely students. Annexe 10 suggests that Indian students come primarily from northern states, followed by western and southern regions of India. This is illustrative of the fact that more recent Indian migrants come from very diverse origins; the following table, from linguistic data collected in 1994 appears to show that older migrants were from much more concentrated areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>African Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylheti</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Berthoud & Modood 1997

This table shows cell percentages of the South Asian languages spoken by Indians and African Asians. Respondents were asked which languages they spoke, thus often there would have been more than one response. So for example, among the Indians, 33% spoke Hindi, and 62% spoke Punjabi, however at least some of the Punjabi speakers would also have spoken Hindi. Bearing in mind that the ratio of Indians to African Asians is about 3:1, we can infer from the table that the Punjab was probably the largest source of Indian migrants to the UK, at least until the end of the 1990s, and Gujarat was likely to be the second largest source. The African Asians clearly had principally Gujarati roots too.
Throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s family reunification continued at a steady rate. Since the end of the 1990s student immigration has leapt enormously, as has highly skilled immigration, in specialist areas such as ICT. However, as the UKBA paper cited above suggests, it is unclear how many of these “skilled” migrants end up doing “skilled” jobs. Of these student migrants and professionals, there are about twice as many men as women. It appears that women come independently of men, in order to complete their own study interests.

India-specific information does not exist, yet the following chart provides a general picture of reasons for immigration from the sub-continent since 1977; it is assumed that Indian migrants make up a majority of these statistics.

**Graph 6. “New commonwealth” (mainly India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) immigration to UK by reason, 1977-2011 (thousands)**

![Chart showing immigration by reason from 1977 to 2011](chart.png)

The data in this graph is of course only representative of the last thirty-five years, and corresponds with the closing of practically all immigration routes following 1971. As is clear from the graph, immigration for study, family reunification, a definite job or “work related” have all leapt since about 1997, and formal study in particular. This change is clearly in relation to the loosening up of immigration controls by the New Labour government, post 1997. Prior to this period the rates for all immigration types remained very steady for about two decades from 1977, and family reunification was, for the majority of this period, the principal reason for immigration.

While there is a limited amount of illegal Indian migration to the UK, numbers are fairly small. There is by definition a lack of reliable data on undocumented migrants in the UK, however an idea of their numbers might be gleaned from the statistics regarding detainees. In 2011 there were 2,599 illegal Indian immigrants detained in the UK, the vast majority were male. This could of course be something of an iceberg to the real figure. However, most of those detained are student visa over-stayers rather than people who have travelled all the way by lorry or on fake passports for example. The numbers of Indian asylum seekers are also miniscule compared to overall immigration, because since 2005, under pressure to reduce “false” asylum seekers, the UK considers India a “safe” country, which makes it much harder to claim asylum for Indians (Somerville & Dhudwar 2010) (Annexe 11 & 12).
These factors in mind, what do the statistics tell us?

On the whole, Indians are a very successful immigrant group. Their participation in work, education and levels of social integration are very high, not only compared with other immigrant groups but also with white British people. The obvious starting point when painting the socio-economic profile of Indians in the UK is labour force participation. Graph 7 illustrates labour force participation by ethnic group in 2012, divided by gender:

Graph 7. Labour force participation ages 16-64 by ethnicity and gender, 2012

Source: ONS 2012

The most striking conclusion from this graph is that, of all the ethnic groups present in the UK, Indian men have the highest rate of participation, higher even than the white British group (79.2% compared to 77% of whites). Indian women participate less than their white counterparts (59.8 compared with 67.9) yet participate more than women of all other ethnic groups, notably much more than Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, the inverse is evident in unemployment statistics (Annexe 13). Equally, Indian born men had higher average hourly wages (£16.92ph) than all other groups apart from Australians, while Indian women (£11.74ph) were only surpassed by Europeans and Australians (Annexe 14).

However, as ever, this data must be problematized. These statistics are blind to the “African Asians” and count them simply under Indian or “other”. Up to 26% of “Indians” in the 1991 census (when a question on ethnicity was first introduced) in fact have some sort of connection to Africa (Berthoud & Modood 1997). Furthermore they fail to demonstrate neither when the migrants came, nor their ages or religion and attach ethnicity to country of birth rather than cultural norms or identity, thus can only give the most general of ideas. The vagueness of the statistics once it comes to “second generation” or “mixed” families also results in an unsatisfactory picture.

Modood’s (1997) survey of British ethnic minorities does however fill some of these gaps when attempting to build a socio-economic profile of the UK’s Indian immigrants and their children. While the data is relatively old, it provides a more reliable and in depth picture than other surveys such as the British Lifestyle Survey or the Census. Furthermore, because the African Asians are largely of Gujarati, and therefore Indian origin, it seems worthwhile to use this data, as no other survey includes this group separately, yet both their migration routes and their experiences in the UK set them apart as a distinct group from other South Asian migrants.
Graph 8 is telling of this difference: while Indians and African Asians are often grouped under the general label of “Indian” in other surveys, it is clear that in terms of occupation they have, in many ways, very different profiles.

**Graph 8. Indian and African Asians compared – male employment by industry 1994 %**

![Graph showing male employment by industry](image)

Source: Berthoud & Modood 1997

It is evident that in some areas the two groups are broadly comparable – particularly in manufacturing, education and catering. Other areas, particularly banking and retail distribution see a higher African Asian representation, whereas construction and transport & communication employed Indians more. In general terms these two groups are broadly similar, and may be said to have more in common with each other than other Asian groups such as the Bangladeshis and the Pakistanis. For instance, between 1982 and 1994 both groups made broad forays into middle class, “non-manual” occupations compared to other South Asian groups who tended to remain in manual positions, despite some advances. Nonetheless, the African Asians made the biggest leap into middle class occupations (Annexe 15). Similarly, their participation in self-employment is roughly the same (about 30% for each group), yet higher than that of White British people at 21% (Annexe 16). On the other hand, there were quite distinct differences between women’s participation in employment between the groups. Notably, African Asian women participated much more in the market place than other South Asian groups, as the following table illustrates:

**Table 2. women’s (age 16-59, not in full time education) participation in the labour market 1994 %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>African Asian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working full time</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working part time</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking for work</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House or family</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled/retired</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Berthoud & Modood 1997
As the table demonstrates, African Asian women actually worked full time more than any other group of women, and Indians worked full time more than white women. Again, of all the groups, African Asian women were also least likely to be occupied with home-making, in sharp contrast with Pakistani women, where 70% of the group were found working in this sector of unpaid labour.

To understand these differences between groups would require a far longer study than proposed here. Fortunately Robinson (1986), among others, provides an in-depth study into the differences between South Asian groups in the UK. These socio-economic differences are explained by a wide variety of factors, including background in the sub-continent – different groups came from different backgrounds, some were educated urban dwellers, other were largely rural, meaning that they were more or less prepared for life in the UK. The concept of the “myth of return” has also been suggested. The hypotheses is that certain groups were happy to work very long hours in low-skill sectors as their single aim in the UK was to save money for their eventual return home, thus they never invested in advancing themselves in Britain. The African Asians, on the other had never had a “myth of return” and invested themselves fully into creating a new life in Britain leading to their apparent economic success there. Local differences in the economy of certain towns where Asians settled have also been an important factor – many Pakistanis settled in Bradford in the 1950s, yet by the 1970s industry had come to a halt in the city, whereas other groups such as the Indians and the African Asians happened to have settled in towns with more buoyant economies – they were simply lucky, according to some. Other researchers have considered religion as a factor in differences among groups, especially with regards to female employment. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK are mainly Muslim, while Indians and African Asians are mainly Hindus and Sikhs. Differences in beliefs about whether it is appropriate for women to work outside the home may also partially explain these differences. For Platt (2005), parental expectations and the imprint of social class should also be considered. Often, African Asians were from high social class positions in East Africa, yet saw these positions depressed on arrival. Nonetheless, their social habitus influenced them to push their children to participate more in education and get ahead. Other groups came from low class positions in sending regions, thus were not so pressed to return to their previous status positions. Finally, racism is also considered as an important factor and has often been met by groups who attempt to work outside of “ethnic niches”. Nonetheless, while racism remains an issue, it is often considered that class differences are most importance in impeaching social advancement in Britain.

Dustmann & Fabbri (2005) have argued that linguistic ability is a central factor in economic opportunities for immigrant groups, and it is clear once again that for both male and female African Asians scored highest on linguistic ability in 1994, being largely fluent, followed by Indians and Pakistanis (Annexe 17). Of course, of all explanatory factors relating to economic success, education is probably the most important. While immigrant Indians were marginally better educated than African Asians and other South Asian groups (Annexe 18), the following graph illustrates the importance the African Asians placed on educating their offspring:
It is quite clear that for African Asians, education was highly valued, and this must almost certainly have contributed to the higher socio-economic success of the group. Both men and women (64% and 52%) went on into post-compulsory education (college, age 16-18 and university, 18+), a higher proportion than all other groups. 54% of Indian males and 35% of Indian females continued into further education, while 62% of white males and 39% of white women also continued to study.

### Caste and migration

The body of knowledge on Indian castes in Great Britain remains scant and under-researched. There have been no uniform lists created that enumerate the different castes present in the country; in general researchers carrying out small scale studies have mentioned the caste names of the groups they researched, making the creation of a comprehensive list practically impossible. Based on the two principal regions of origin of Indians in Britain, Gujarat and the Punjab, it is possible to explore some of the groups who are most likely to be present in the UK, although this is far from exhaustive. According to Sato (2012) for example, most Punjabi Sikhs in Britain are *Jats* (the farmer caste), although there are also the Rajputs (a warrior caste), the Ramgarhias (the mason, bricklayer, blacksmith and carpenter castes), and the Ravidassias (Chamar, or Skinner and tanner, caste). There are also some Valmikis/Chuhras (the sweeper) and Bhatra (the fortune-teller). As for the Gujaratis, different religious groups from specific localities are present in the UK, often having come via East Africa. These include Patidars, Bhatias and Lohanas (Mehta 2001).

Interestingly, migration has allowed some castes to change their position in the hierarchy. For instance, Poros (2011) traces the fortunes of the Halari Oswals, a caste of peasant Jains who heard about opportunities in East Africa in the 1900s. The Halari Oswal Jains were facing a harsh famine at the end of the 19th century, while Jamnagari Oswals, a superior urban merchant caste living in the same region of Gujarat faced no such problems. The Halari Oswals moved to East Africa and set themselves up in business and soon amassed so much wealth they overtook the Jamnagari Oswals in the caste hierarchy, becoming Patidars. Many later moved to the UK.

Poros illustrates how caste can form the basis of chain migrations. As an endogamous social network, pioneer migrants invited family over, as well as looking for wives within the caste to bring to the new environment. There is an abundant literature on how networks facilitate migration, and caste being a type of social network, it is unsurprising that people from the same village and caste group invite people from the same group to join them. More research is needed on the workings of caste based migration however, as at present there is very limited literature on the subject.
While caste is found in all regions of the subcontinent and over all religions, it is also highly localised and attached to place and context, thus a chamar (leather worker) in one region may be seen as very lowly, in other regions he/she may be in a relatively respectable position. Because caste is so entwined with local relationships, hierarchies and contexts, it becomes complicated to understand how these hierarchies continue once taken out of these contexts. Jayaram (2006) studied the continuation of caste among Trinidadian Hindus, bought to the island as indentured labourers. He found that, due to the way indentured labourers were forced to mix, and that they were mainly young and male, caste as an institution initially broke down, yet later reconstituted itself in a simplified form, mainly for religious purposes. Indian migrants to Britain have not had the same experience as indentured labourers, so maintaining caste will have been easier, but the study is important as it reminds us to keep in mind that, from a social science perspective, culture is recreated. Caste is not necessarily eternally set in stone, yet can be recreated or challenged and reformed in a new context by actors. Migrants of high caste may be interested in reinstalling this system in the migration context in order to reproduce systems of dominance, lower caste or untouchable migrants (of which there could be between 200,000 and 480,000) (Rath 2013, Metcalfe & Rolfe 2010) in Great Britain may be more likely to reject caste in the new environment.

That caste exists in the UK is not under question; numerous studies prove this to be the case. Caste loyalty remains in the Indian community abroad, and respect for the hierarchy remains important. With Hindus, for example, priests are still strictly Brahmin in the UK. Depending on the family and their religious belief, marriages within caste continue to be seen as preferable by some. For example, Indian matrimony websites in Britain often continue to include caste as an option when searching for a partner (Herbert 2012, Blakely, Pearce & Chesters 2006).

The main point of contention in the UK is as to whether caste based discrimination exists there. A number of bodies, such as Caste Watch UK or Dalit Solidarity Network UK have campaigned over recent years for the introduction of caste as a form of recognised discrimination, in the same way as race or gender. The debate still rages on, and in March 2013 Peers in the house of Lords backed the idea of an amendment to the Equality bill which would treat caste discrimination in the same ways as other forms of discrimination (Rath 2013). However, as research remains scanty, most evidence appears to be anecdotal and it is not clear how widespread caste discrimination in the country really is. Some research indicates bullying according to caste happens in school between South Asian pupils, as well as unfair treatment at work and discrimination in access to services between South Asians. However, other South Asian religious groups have contested the idea that caste discrimination exists in Britain, and argue that internal community relations are out of the government’s remit. The debate continues.

Remittances

According to the World Bank’s latest estimates from 2011, $3.9 billion dollars (roughly 3 billion Euros) were remitted from the UK to India (Harris & Provost 2013). The UK has by far the highest NRI and PIO population in Europe, and accounts for an estimated 75% of remittance flows from this continent (Tumbe 2012). Remittances are principally used for family maintenance, although they are also used to buy land, invest in healthcare, education and religious/cultural associations. Indians in the UK are primarily of Punjabi origin, followed by those from Gujarat. Most remittances go to these two states as a result, although the state of Gujarat has been more proactive than the Punjab in attracting remittances from its NRIs. Many Indian migrants are put off investing in projects in India due to perceived corruption and inefficient bureaucracy and thus prefer to simply remit money to family members for their upkeep (Chanda & Ghosh 2012). East African Asians, due to their particular migration history are much less likely to send remittances to India or East Africa. Many felt betrayed by the Indian government who refused to help them during the crisis in the 1960s and 70s and are wary of recent attempts to attract their investment (Herbert 2012, Robinson 1986). Furthermore, the fact that up to half of the British Indian community was born in the UK, and that most of those born in India left the country
a relatively long time ago, bonds with villages and people in the country of origin have declined. As a result it is estimated that only 14% of British Indians remit money (Vargas-Silva 2011).

It is hard to know exactly how much money is remitted from the UK for a variety of reasons. Since 1979 there have been no formal methods of counting how much money is sent abroad and why. Furthermore, all counts of remittances can only include formal corridors, so alternate ways of sending money are not counted but could represent a large portion of remitted money. The popular Hawala system of money sending prevents a real count of remittances. This system works as follows: an Indian factory worker visits a private broker in the UK and gives him £100 and pays a fee. The Private broker then calls a contact in India and this contact gives the migrant’s family member the equivalent money in rupees, also taking a fee. No money actually crosses borders however, so there is no measurement of money sent. This method was particularly popular with earlier migrants as it was fairly cheap and efficient. However, due to the liberalization of money transfer methods, it is now estimated that most migrants use official corridors for sending money due to their security (Singh 2006). To send £120 from the UK to India costs £11.61 with Western Union or £12.28 with Moneygram (Vargas-Silva 2011), the leading money transfer organisations.

Estimating remittances is notoriously difficult. Knowing how much money is really sent to India is hard enough, let alone where it goes inside the country. An accurate picture is prevented due to the liberalisation of foreign exchange mechanisms since 1979, which mean that measurement has become very inefficient. Most migrants send small amounts of cash each time they remit; unless the quantity is particularly large they need not state why they are sending the money. Furthermore, up to $5000 can be carried on the person of a migrant through customs into India without declaration. Thus migrants may either bring money themselves or send it to family through their friends and this goes unrecorded. Finally all goods except gold and silver are not counted as remittances, so washing machines, automobiles, fridges, televisions and other expensive goods do not count as remittances despite their high values. At present, then, it is not possible to give a really detailed analysis of remittances by Indians from the UK to India (Singh 2006).

Marriage patterns

Of all the ethnic minorities present in the UK, South Asians demonstrate the highest propensity to marriage yet also out-marry the least; among Indians, only 6% marry people from other ethnic groups (Dale & Ahmed 2011). South Asian adults are not only more likely to be married than adults from other groups (as opposed to being single, divorced or cohabiting but unmarried) but they also marry younger than other ethnic groups. Women in particular marry at an early age – 67% of Indian women are married by age 25, compared to only 55% of white and 75% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi females (Dale & Ahmed 2011).

Within the “Indian” category, there are also important differences. East African Asians have largely similar marriage patterns to white British people (marrying later and having typically small nuclear families), while Indians who have followed a more direct trajectory from the sub-continent to the UK typically have larger families and marry younger. Furthermore, there are distinct differences between religious groups. Indian Muslims and especially females marry younger than their Hindu and Sikh counterparts in Great Britain. Sikhs, after Muslims, are the most likely to have arranged marriages, and up to a third of British Sikh marriages are arranged and involve bringing someone over from the Punjab. British Hindus have a much lower rate of arranged transnational marriages – only 9% (Dale & Ahmed 2011).

An in depth analysis of socio-cultural and religious differences in South Asian marriage patterns is not in the remit of this paper, thus any attempt to explain such differences will remain superficial. Hypothetically speaking, religious differences might begin to explain some of this internal diversity. Muslims, (particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi though some Indian) are often encouraged to marry with close relatives in order to reinforce family ties, whereas in Sikhism and Hinduism such practices
are not permitted (Dale & Ahmed 2011). As a result, Muslims may feel the need to search for a marriage partner among relatives in the homeland due to the lack thereof in the UK; on the other hand, a Sikh or Hindu British man will find it easier to meet a suitable partner among British female Sikhs and Hindus as he need not marry a relative.

The age of the migrant also influences their marriage patterns – younger Indians tend to have more choice in who they marry than older Indians did in the past, suggesting that the second generation have greater leverage in this question. Table 3 illustrates these differences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>African Asian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-34</td>
<td>35+</td>
<td>16-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents made the decision</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I had a say but parent's decision</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents had a say but my decision</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I talked to my parents but my decision</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I made my decision on my own</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't say</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Berthoud & Modood 1997

It is clear that for all groups, the younger generation have had more choice in choosing who they marry. Perhaps the largest quantitative change has been for Indians, where for the older group parents alone made the choice of partner in 55% of cases, whereas for the younger group this only occurred 18% of the time. In all cases, the African Asian group have had much more individual choice over marriage partners in both generations, though as with the general trend, the younger group have been freer to choose. Pakistanis by comparison have seen much less change between generations. Thus it appears that the marriage patterns of Indians have been more influenced by migrating to Britain than those of Pakistanis.

While time in the UK, away from the culture and traditions of the homeland and ties with family will undoubtedly influence the way Indians and their offspring marry, another very significant factor is education and socio-economic situation. Taking in particular the case of Indian women, the higher educated members of this group are, the more likely they are to delay marriage. They are also more likely to marry British born or raised Indians than someone “brought over” from the homeland. Uneducated Indian women, on the other hand, are much more likely to marry young and to marry someone from India. The empowerment of education, as well as the fact that university education is likely to lead to career jobs means these Indian women are least likely to submit to traditional roles (Dale & Ahmed 2011).

This leads to the question of how South Asians “bring over” their marriage partners. Until the 1980s, the majority of Indian women brought over to the UK were wives coming to join their migrant husbands. However, since the mid-1980s it has been second generation Indians marrying people from their parents or grandparents homelands, thus about 24% of second generation Indians are married to an immigrant; they go to the ancestral village, have an arranged marriage then bring their new partner back with them. The rest have married other British-born/raised Indians.

Immigration policies have produced unexpected results in Indian migration to the UK, and this is exemplified in marriage patterns (see section 4 Legal Framework for more details). Since the 1971 Immigration Act which prohibited all forms of immigration, Indians, who were initially temporary migrants, were forced to decide whether to stay in Britain and keep working or return to India, knowing they wouldn’t be able to return for work. As a result, many stayed on, and took advantage of the only loophole in the law – family reunification. This is the principal reason for which Indians
brought family over. Until the mid-1980s it was only possible to bring female spouses over, yet later men were also allowed and since then family reunification continued at a steady rate (roughly 3000 per year until the late 1990s see graph…), with a ratio of wives to husbands at about 60% to 40% respectively. Over this period, would-be spouses had to prove that their Primary purpose of migration was for marriage. However, in 1997 this rule was abolished and there was as a result a steady increase in family reunification until 2008. Since 2008 it has once again become more difficult to bring a spouse over. The age of the husband or wife has been increased from 18 to 21 and pre-migration English language requirements have been introduced as well as increases in probationary periods and income requirements. It is not yet clear exactly what long term effects such changes have had.

There have over the years been occasional reports in the popular press about forced marriage, largely among the South Asian population and on very rare occasions so called “honour killings” against family members who have ignored the wishes of the family with regards to their husbands and wives. However, the real statistics on forced marriages are simply unknown, and likely represent a very small value of the total number of Indian weddings (Gill & Anitha 2009).

Will transnational marriages continue to be a major form of Indian migration to the UK? Until the late 1990s the simple answer was probably not. As time away from “home” increased, ties with family in the subcontinent were decreasing. What’s more, Indian men and women had increasingly high levels of education, and as the statistics show, the more highly educated this group were, the less likely they were to accept a marriage with someone from their ancestral village. However, because Indian immigration to Britain since the late 1990s has become much more diverse in terms of origins and types of migration (in particular of students and highly skilled IT workers), this form of migration may continue in unpredictable ways.

**Ties with India**

As outlined in the history section, different political associations representing Indian interests have been active in the UK for over a century. To begin with these were principally lobbying bodies, pushing for independence during the colonial period. The India League, for instance, was set up in 1928 and attempted to mobilise the British people to support Indian independence. In the 1940s, the Federation of Indian Associations in Great Britain was principally formed of middle class Hindus residing in Britain and also campaigned for Independence, while the Indian Workers Association comprised mainly of working class Sikhs and Muslims of Punjabi origin struggled for better conditions for Indian labourers, as well as independence (Open.ac.uk 2012).

Coming forward to the present day, there are currently over 1000 registered associations whose interests represent a very wide range of topics relating to India (although it is estimated that only a quarter of these are really active). These organisations foster and rejuvenate ties with many regions in India with agendas focussing on a great range of issues including religion, caste, regional and local politics, health, culture, study and business. For example, *The Hindu Cultural Society or Indian Christian Organisation* help the diaspora in Britain stay in touch with each other and also with developments “back home”. *The Confederation of Gujarati Organisations or Punjab Unity Forum* focus on issues relating to regional alignments, while commercial or professional organisations such *British International Doctors Association or Indian Development group* also help facilitate the activities of transnational Indians who have an interest in the country’s development (Van Hear et al 2004).

Indian overseas political organisations are also present in the UK. There are branches of India’s main political parties present in the UK, such as *Overseas Congress and Friends of the Bharatiya Janata Party* who represent British Indian voices back home, while the less partisan Indo-British forum works to represent the interests of British Indians to the ruling party of the day back in India (Van Hear et el 2004).
The provision of funds by British Indians to certain Indian political groups has led to some controversy. The Indian government has clashed with Britain over claims that British Sikhs provided funds to movements supporting an independent Sikh state. The Khalistan movement emerged in the 1940s with the aim of creating an independent Sikh state in the Punjab and gained prominence following Operation Blue Star. This was a mission in 1984 which saw the Indian army attempt to eliminate suspected armed Sikh groups in the Punjab. As a response, Indira Ghandi’s two Sikh body guards assassinated her as an act of vengeance which led to an anti-Sikh pogrom. In response to violence against Sikhs in the homeland, many members of the diaspora helped raise funds for the injured, repair damaged Gurdwaras and possibly to help buy weapons. Since the 1990s the troubles in the Punjab have cooled down, although until the present day there continue to be reports that allege of British Sikhs sending money to help terrorist groups. The size of these donations, and whether they are really being used for armed rebellion is hard to estimate however (Dogra 2012, BBC 2008, Tatla 1993)

The RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) is a Hindu nationalist organisation whose ostensible aim is to create a Hindu-only nation in India. The party is accused of having links to fascism and of having an undue influence on the PJB and has been linked to a number of violent actions against religious minority groups and Dalits. The RSS is represented in the UK by HSS (Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh) which is a registered charity that raises funds through an associated humanitarian agency named Sewa International. This charity reportedly raised millions of pounds for humanitarian work from British Indians which was apparently redirected into the hands of the RSS and used for a number of extremist or sectarian actions. Following the 2001 Gujarat earthquake for instance, over £2 million was raised by British Indians, but this was used only for the reconstruction of Hindu villages and temples (as opposed to Muslim and Christian) and also for the formation of RSS cells. Similarly an estimated £260,000 was raised following the Orissa cyclone, yet this was used principally for the construction of RSS schools which allegedly proliferate a sectarian ideology. It is also alleged that money raised by this charity was used to fund violent militant groups during the 2002 anti-Muslim carnage in Gujarat (AWAAZ 2004, Van Hear et al 2004).

Nonetheless, many Indian organisations based in Britain do a great deal of good, supporting the creation of health and education systems, transport networks, religious centres, and encourage international development and investment in India. As a result, many Indian PIOs have called for representation in the Indian national assembly, as they feel their interests should be heard.

The legal context

The political context: laws, restrictions and loopholes

Since the 1905 Aliens Act, intended to reduce Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe, the UK has for over a century introduced relatively consistent laws discriminating against immigrants and immigration. The 1948 Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth Act was, however, one of a rare number of pieces of litigation which, for a period appeared to encourage immigration. According to this act, all subjects of the British Empire could travel anywhere within the empire, including to the metropolis. This law even went so far as applying to former colonies that had chosen to withdraw from the commonwealth – including India and Pakistan (the commonwealth is an international intergovernmental organisation which aims to facilitate trade and cultural links between former members of the British Empire). However, increasing fears about an inundation of immigrants led first to the Immigration Act of 1962 which limited immigration to certain categories of migrants, and specifically those with job offers. This law was further modified in 1968, stipulating that only those born in Britain, or with a grandparent born there could immigrate. Finally the Immigrant Act of 1971 attempted to stop all immigration, its only loophole allowing for family reunification (Khadria 2006, Thompson 2005, Hansen 1999, Platt 2005.). These immigration laws were not relaxed until the late 1990s, when Tony Blair’s New Labour government began to recognise that the British economy
needed highly skilled immigrants, and tended to show a positive prejudice towards Indian workers when opening up new visa openings. International education also became a priority and enormous numbers of Indian students were encouraged to study in the UK over this period (Khadria 2006, Poros 2011, Somerville, Sriskandarajah, Latorre 2009).

As a result of the increasing limitations on immigration, many of the post-war migrants had to make the choice of whether to stay in Britain or risk returning and not being allowed back. It appears that during this period many immigrants held relatively negative views about their new homes. Nonetheless, as is often the case, habit, the draw of money and benefits such as free healthcare, education and social security meant many stayed on despite racism, job insecurity and other limitations. These early migrants occasionally intermarried with locals, yet the vast majority chose to bring their womenfolk over to join them. As a result of the 1971 law, the majority of the growth of the Indian population in the UK has been due to natural increase. These initial migrants soon established their own communities and are now into their third and even fourth generations (Robinson 1986, Ballard 1994, Khadria 2006, Thompson 2005, Hansen 1999, Platt 2005).

The current policy framework for visa application to the UK, the Points based system (PBS) is managed by the UK border agency and did away with all previous visa application structures. It was introduced in 2008 with the aim of restoring public confidence in immigration controls, as well as to better manage immigration in order that it responded to needs in the UK labour market. All migrants from within the European Economic Area and one or two other special cases are exempt from the system. The system is structured under five principal categories, which each have different subsections responding to different types of immigrants. For each category, potential immigrants have to collect the number of points required for the category. In other words, depending on the tier, they need to provide proof of a number of different requirements, such as language ability, sponsorship by a UK resident, proof of a job offer with a certain wage and proof of a given sum of money in one’s bank account etc. Each of these requirements carries a certain number of points, and if the migrant can collect all the required points, they should in theory be able to attain the visa they wish for.

The “tiers” are as follows:

1. Tier 1 High value migrants
2. Tier 2 Skilled workers
3. Tier 3 Low skilled workers (never used as the EEA has always been able to provide enough workers of this type)
4. Tier 4 Student
5. Tier 5 Temporary workers and youth mobility

More information can be found on the UKBA’s website.

As of February 2013, India will be the first country to benefit from the UK’s super priority visa service, initially available in New Delhi and Mumbai, which will allow frequent travellers, such as businessmen to acquire a UK visa within one day. India is also the country with the highest number of British visa application centres, 12 in total, in major cities around the country. For lower priority travellers, visa applications are normally processed within 3 weeks and are treated by VFS Global, a commercial partner company of the UKBA in India. When applying for UK visas, Indian applicants must fill in an application form online and print it out, as well as make an appointment at one of the centres over the web. On attending their application appointment, Indians must bring their application form and medical proof that they do not carry tuberculosis. At the meeting they must provide biometric data, including a photo and finger print scan. Depending on the visa applied for, applicants must also pay a fee. A typical fee for a Tier 2 visa is between 3500 and 4500 rupees, roughly 45-60 euros (February 2013).
Despite a huge quantity of debate about reducing rates of immigration to the UK, as well as a great deal of mixed messages sent out to potential migrants in recent years, the definite overall trend is that, at least for India, the UK remains fairly keen to accommodate migrants from the country. Perhaps most tellingly, the following chart illustrates the increasing number of grants of settlement given to Indian citizens to remain permanently in the UK.

**Graph 10. Grants of settlement by country of birth (India), 2007-2010, thousands**

In 2010, 37,435 people born in India were allowed to reside permanently in the UK, more than double the figure for 2007 at 14,865, just 3 years earlier. There are several routes to settlement in the UK for non-EEA and Swiss nationals. The most common is 5 year’s residency in the UK, which in recent years has comprised about 50% of naturalisations. Marriage to a British citizen with 3 years abode is another important route, as is the registration of dependents to someone who has already acquired citizenship (primarily children but also occasionally parents, grandparents and other relatives). There are also other, less common routes, such as people from British overseas territories taking up full UK citizenship. In addition to these entry routes, migrants wishing to naturalize must pass certain language requirements (in English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic), demonstrate proof of ‘good character’ and pass the ‘life in the UK’ test which was introduced in 2005 and involves an examination where the applicant demonstrates their general knowledge of British culture and history. In 2010 India was the principal previous country citizenship for naturalised UK citizens; 15% of all grants of citizenship went to Indians. The demographic profile of naturalised citizens tends to be young and female, followed by young men and children (Binder 2012).

The most recent statistics for grants of settlement are not yet available, and they may have reduced as a result of policies aimed at cutting immigration put in place since the conservative party came to power in 2010. Nonetheless, in February 2013 during his visit to India, David Cameron appeared to be supportive of continued migration of Indian citizens to the UK, and as already mentioned announced the opening of a super priority visa application for certain categories of travellers. While the UK has always been reticent about immigration, it appears that if anything, it is willing to keep accepting more Indian immigrants.

**Media perception of the Indian community**

Given the breadth and length of Indian immigration to the UK a media content analysis of the way they have been portrayed in the press could fill volumes. Indians of different genders, classes, origins and castes have lived in the UK for four hundred years and thus will have been represented in different
ways at different times in different parts of the country. The UK press is an enormous institution, both at a national and regional level. Local newspapers tend to be more neutral in tone and report on local events, so in towns with higher Asian populations, newspaper stories relating to Indians are more likely. Local papers tend to simply report events and be less opinion based. National newspapers have clearer political agendas and report on India, Indians and immigration in differing ways. The more left-leaning papers, such as The Guardian or The Independent tend to portray multiculturalism and immigration positively or neutrally, right wing papers such as The Daily Mail, The Sun have a more negative take. As a very general statement, the economic success and rise into the middle classes of many Indians, their high educational attainment, high employment and invisibility in crime statistics has led to a generally positive though simplified view of Indians. As in other Western countries they are seen as quiet, hardworking and professional, as well as “keeping themselves to themselves”; the “model migrants” who pose no real problems to the structure of the host society. Occasionally issues relating to arranged marriage or caste may be reported on, but largely Indians are ignored in the same ways as Jews, Chinese or most white migrants. This is in contrast to other immigrant groups, who at various times have been more or less vilified in the press. The last decade has seen strong animosity in certain sections of the press towards British Muslims and particularly Pakistani Muslims, as well as “bogus” asylum seekers. In the 1980s and 90s Black British male youth were most often the target of the rancour of the press. Indians, on the other hand have never received such treatment on a significant or extended scale.

Given the size of the Indian population, they remain relatively unrepresented in UK media, and when they do appear they have often been treated in a simplistic and stereotypical manner. UK television has a number of presenters of Indian and South Asian origin in news and entertainment. There are also columnists and reporters of Indian and South Asian origin working in practically all UK national newspapers. Sometimes such reporters “specialise” on affairs and issues relating to South Asians, but not necessarily; they write on as wide a range of issues as any other journalist.

A limited number of films have explored the South Asian experience in Britain. Most notably East Is East (1999), set in Salford, follows the complexities of a mixed Pakistani-White British family. While a hit, and importantly bringing to a largely ignorant audience the day to day experiences of South Asians in the UK, the film is criticised for simplifying the Asian British experience and introducing stereotypical characters and situations such as the immigrant Muslim father who fears his children are being corrupted by the West. Hanif Kureishi’s My Beautiful Launderette (1985) explores the complexities of being a bisexual British Asian in the 1980s and explored the complexities of relationships between immigrants and locals. The smash-hit Bend It Like Beckham (2002) in which the main character, a British Indian girl who plays football, did a lot to counter a variety of stereotypes about British Indian women. This was an Asian who played football, who came from a comfortable middle class home and who was feisty – unlike the received idea of docile women with strict parents preparing for arranged marriages. A number of other films on the British Asian experience of course exist, yet these three are perhaps the best known.

In terms of literature, the British Asian population has been relatively well represented by numerous authors of Asian origin. Writers like Salman Rushdie and Hanif Kureishi have become household names, and more recent works such as Zadie Smith’s White Teeth (2000) have also become hits, representing to a wider public the experiences of British Asians. Various plays have also treated this community.

Until the 1990s, television appearances by Asians and Indians were relatively limited. In the 1960s and 70s they were often the butt of jokes, often with racist or at best essentialist depictions of Asians as very naïve and/or spiritual and eating curry. In the 1980s Asians (this being the best term – differences between culture, religion and country of origin largely being blurred out) began to be represented in popular series and soaps, though largely as agency-free individuals on the side lines of the plot. They were the quivering victims of bullies in televised schoolyards, girls awaiting arranged marriages or vaguely Asian families who occasionally popped up in soaps. By the 1990s, the new
“niche” Channel 4 had begun a fortnightly show “Eastern Eye” which was aimed at issues relating to Asian youth culture and the issues dealt with by young Asians. This programme was emitted late at night and was largely out of view to most audiences (Huq 2013).

Perhaps the most important series was the late 1990s Goodness Gracious Me! This classic sketch show featured an all-Asian cast and represented a very different image of Asians to earlier creations. Many of the jokes were built around the subversion or reversal of British stereotypes about Asians and their culture. A classic sketch which comes to mind sees a group of young Indians go to a British restaurant and dare each other to taste the most bland, un-spicy dish on the menu (a part of British macho culture is to eat the spiciest dish available at Indian restaurants). This series had a popular spin-off; The Kumars at no. 42 which saw a fictional Indian family invite celebrity guests to be interviewed, at the same time demonstrating, in a comical fashion, the inner workings of an Indian household in suburban England. Since the early 2000s there has been little else in terms of major south Asian representations on TV. The 2005 series, Meet the Magoons only lasted one series and followed a fictional Sikh family in Glasgow and their restaurant trade. 2012 saw Citizen Kahn, a comedy about a Pakistani Muslim man and his family in Birmingham which received mixed reviews. Occasionally other one-offs have also given an insight into the British Indian experience (Huq 2013). The 2009 reality TV show The Family for instance filmed a British Indian family 24/7 at home.

Radio representing British Indians and their lives, as with television, is relatively limited. As a country the UK is relatively sensitive to minority tastes and beliefs and unlike other major European immigrant destinations has often openly catered for different religious groups. However, when it comes to radio and television, the rules of the market are king except when the state has intervened to represent minorities, something it has done less and less over the last twenty years. Perhaps the main consistent exception here is the BBC’s Asian Network radio station which is broadcast nationally since 2002 (although previous versions have existed since the 1970s) and plays South Asian music and hosts various shows of interest to South Asians. The British radio market is both strictly controlled yet highly competitive, and the case is that very often small Indian or Asian radio stations are simply unable to gain a foothold in the market and are pushed out by bigger commercial stations, although many local radios have continued to broadcast over the years (Georgiou 2004).

As a result of this general lack of representation, many Indians have responded by creating their own newspapers, television channels and radios at the local level, responding to the needs of the community in hand. The unprecedented growth of the internet has made it easier than ever before to access news “from home” and many ethnic minority communities now make use news and lifestyle websites from their countries of origin (Georgiou 2004).

**Religious centres/cultural associations**

The Indian population of the UK have organised religious and cultural associations in some form or other for over 100 years, organising religious services and other cultural events wherever Indians have come together in significant numbers (Visram 2002). Nonetheless, the majority of such centres have sprung up over the last sixty years or so in response to the rapid growth of the population during this period. As a general statement, to begin with communities would perform religious events at home, later moving into converted spaces, such as disused churches, and more recently have constructed purpose built Mandirs, Mosques and Gurdwaras.

The Indian population continues to identify itself with certain religions, predominately Hinduism, closely followed by Sikhism and Islam as well as a smaller number of Christians and other faiths, as illustrated in Graph 11:
Among the UK’s Indians, there were 466,597 Hindus, 301,925 Sikhs and 131,662 Muslims in 2001. The Sikhs and Muslims come primarily from the Punjab, while the Hindus are mainly of Gujarati origin (70%), although many came via East Africa and a handful via the Caribbean, Fiji or Southern Africa. The Christians are principally of Keralan origin. The “other religions” group contains Buddhists and Jains and other religions less common in the UK (iskcon.org 2004).

The exact number of religious centres serving the Indian population in the UK is unknown, because many are invisible, taking place in the homes of believers out of sight of the wider community. For the Hindus, a broad estimate would put the number of Mandirs at around 200, of which a significant number are found in London, Leicester and Birmingham. A similar figure of about 200 is suggested for Sikh Gurdwaras. Again, the majority are actually based in similar places to Hindu temples; London and the South East, as these were places where Sikhs and Hindus have settled in particular, although there are of course Gurdwaras and Mandirs in practically all British cities and large towns.

After churches, mosques are the most common religious buildings present in the UK. Again, exact numbers are hard to measure but an estimate of 1,500 is suggested by Naqshbandi (2011) serving British Muslims of a variety of origins. It is unclear whether Indian Muslims attend different mosques to other Muslims, such as Pakistanis or Bangladeshis. Indian Christians have mainly been absorbed into the already available British churches, although some have found these establishments unwelcoming or unable to accommodate their worship tastes, thus have set up their own churches (Hindustan Times 2010).

The UKs urban landscape has changed enormously over the final decades of the 20th century, and the emergence of temples and churches of immigrant religions is certainly one of the most remarkable and visible of such developments. Some, such as the BAPS Shri Swaminarayan Mandir in Neasden, North London (pictured below), opened in 1995, are even considered places to visit on the tourist trail (Cargill Thompson 2007).
While the UK’s religious centres were initially set up in old disused buildings, they are now constructed on a grand scale, often costing millions of pounds, all paid for by members of the community. The striking Gurdwara Sahib of Leamington and Warwick (pictured below) opened in 2009 and cost £11million to build.

Source: Mandir.org 2013

Source: BBC 2009
Alongside religious buildings, Indian immigrants to the UK have also set up a wide variety of cultural activities and events. The celebration of Diwali in Leicester, for example, is one of the biggest events on the city’s calendar, with firework displays enjoyed by people of all different backgrounds. Melah’s and music festivals are a way especially young people have shared Indian culture with those in the surrounding community. Centres set up by migrants also provide information for the community, and help build bridges with other people in the places where Indians live. Such institutes provide information on the Indian community, as well as offering different kinds of courses on activities such as yoga, traditional dance or cookery which are also available to non-Indians.

Undoubtedly the aspect of Indian culture which has been most effective in building bridges with the host society in Great Britain has been through food and restaurants. There are Indian restaurants in practically every town and village of the UK, and these institutions have changed the way British people eat. Not only has a taste for Indian food become completely normalised thanks to these institutions, British people have also begun cooking this food in their own homes and accessing ingredients has never been easier as most Indian spices are available in supermarkets. “Chicken Tikka Masala”, an anglicised version of Indian cuisine, comprised of chicken in a lightly spiced tomato and yoghurt sauce is now even considered a central dish in the “national” cuisine (Panayi 2002).

The British brand of multiculturalism emerged out of the 1980s, partly as a response to rising levels of racism and right wing groups such as the National Front. While multiculturalism is a somewhat vague term, meaning different things to different people, it can largely be characterised as a project which aimed to respond to the new diversity present in British society, reformulating the discourse about what “Britishness” was. The idea was that, on a practical level, people living in Britain where no longer mainly white and followers of the Church of England. As a result the discourse about the nation should reflect these differences; instead of attempting to assimilate all immigrants and their descendants into “mainstream” society, their differences should be celebrated as part of a new concept of Britishness.

On the practical level, this would mean incorporating the voices and ideas of ethnic minority groups into public policy. One of the principal ways of hearing these voices was to approach faith leaders to provide information on the interests, hopes, desires and aims of ethnic minorities. As a result, religious leaders often became the voice of distinct ethnic minority groups – a perhaps unintended result of multiculturalism, which many see as one of its primary failings. For better or worse, it has often been the leaders of religious umbrella bodies, such as the Hindu Council UK or Sikh Council UK who have spoken on behalf of Indians. Whether or not these people can truly represent all people of Sikh or Hindu background is of course highly contentious. Nonetheless, the leaders of religious associations and centres of Indian migrants have developed an important position in speaking for this “community” when it comes to questions of public policy and community engagement (Zavos 2009).

Concluding remarks

Throughout this report, I have attempted to create a general portrait of the history and experiences of Indian migrants in Great Britain using secondary data and statistics and have also made extensive use of sources based on primary academic research. Given the size of this report, as well as the limitations of the data, it has been continuously stressed that a complete picture of the experiences of Indian migrants in the UK is simply not possible. I have also attempted to avoid reifying Indian migrants, and hope to have made clear some of the internal differences within this population, as well as taking into account that these migrants have changing and non-permanent identities. That said, while statistical data can never take into account the lived experiences of individuals, it can show distinct and quantitative differences amongst groups, and I have intended to bring to the reader’s notice some of the most telling of such differences in order to develop the most detailed picture possible given the confines of this paper.
Indian migration to the UK has undergone successive waves, constrained and influenced by changing legal, social, political and economic contexts. The Bengali Lascars who found themselves destitute on 17th Century London’s streets were hugely different to the middle class women who participated in the UK’s woman’s suffrage movement at the beginning of the 20th century. These settlers in turn had little in common with the Punjabi soldiers who stayed on in the UK between world wars and the things that brought them to Great Britain were very different to what bought Punjabi, Kashmiri and Gujarati industrial workers in the 1950s, Ugandan refugees in the 1970s and students and IT workers at the beginning of the present century. While undoubtedly influenced by long term economic and social trends, the migrations of Indian to Britain cannot be simply explained away as an automatic response to colonialism or the needs of Britain’s economy. The agency of individuals, their plans and their strategies are also essential when considering their choices in moving to Britain from their homeland.
Indian diversity in the UK: an overview of a complex and varied population

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Annexes

Annexe 1. Estimated Numbers of overseas born population UK by country of Birth 2011, thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2011 (thousands)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>United...</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
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Source: ONS 2012

Annexe 2. Immigration of South Asians to United Kingdom 1975-2011, by gender, thousands

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Female</th>
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<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONS 2012

Annexe 3. Age profile of Indian, African Asian and White population, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>African Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children 0-15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Age (16-59)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly (60+)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Berthoud & Modood 1997

Annexe 4. UK Indian-born population by country, thousands

Source: ONS 2012
Annexe 5. Number of children per family by ethnic group, 1994

Source: Berthoud & Modood 1997

Annexe 6. Housing types by ethnicity 1994

Berthoud et al. 1997

Annexe 7. Types of cohabitation by ethnic group, 1994

Source: ONS 2012

Annexe 8. Indian family structure, 2012

Source: ONS 2012
Annexe 9. Live births by mother country of birth, 2008-2011, thousands

![Graph showing live births by mother country of birth, 2008-2011.]

Source: ONS 2012

Annexe 10. Student & Tier 4 applications lodged in India by Visa Application Centre: Jan 2008 – June 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application Location</th>
<th>Female Applications</th>
<th>Issued</th>
<th>Refused</th>
<th>Male Applications</th>
<th>Issued</th>
<th>Refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmedabad</td>
<td>9706</td>
<td>5588</td>
<td>3735</td>
<td>25852</td>
<td>14725</td>
<td>10058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore</td>
<td>2122</td>
<td>1828</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>4881</td>
<td>4219</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chandigarh</td>
<td>8466</td>
<td>4329</td>
<td>3329</td>
<td>16017</td>
<td>7971</td>
<td>6236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chennai</td>
<td>3741</td>
<td>3147</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>17904</td>
<td>14707</td>
<td>2837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochin</td>
<td>6502</td>
<td>4634</td>
<td>1719</td>
<td>10957</td>
<td>8526</td>
<td>2265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>3470</td>
<td>2858</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>24417</td>
<td>19534</td>
<td>4386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalandhar</td>
<td>9470</td>
<td>4759</td>
<td>3859</td>
<td>18171</td>
<td>8501</td>
<td>7695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkata</td>
<td>1499</td>
<td>1311</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>3507</td>
<td>2767</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>8124</td>
<td>6501</td>
<td>1523</td>
<td>22668</td>
<td>17273</td>
<td>5030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>8847</td>
<td>6235</td>
<td>2077</td>
<td>23380</td>
<td>15676</td>
<td>6044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pune</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>3014</td>
<td>2398</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>63084</strong></td>
<td><strong>42164</strong></td>
<td><strong>17933</strong></td>
<td><strong>170768</strong></td>
<td><strong>116297</strong></td>
<td><strong>46441</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Freedom of information request 2012


![Graph showing illegal immigrants detained in UK by gender, 2009-2011.]

Source: ONS 2012
Annexe 12. Applications for asylum from India 2000-2010, thousands

Source: ONS 2012

Annexe 13. Unemployment by gender and ethnicity, percentage

Source: ONS 2012

Annexe 14. Hourly wage by ethnic group 2012

Source: ONS 2012

Annexe 15. Changes in employment type, men, by ethnicity, 1982-1994, % of populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Berthoud et al. 1997
Annexe 16. Self-employment % of population 1994, males

Source: Berthoud et al 1997

Annexe 17. Response to question « English spoken fluently or fairly well » % of population, 1994

Source: Berthoud et al. 1997

Annexe 18. Educational levels of Indian immigrants (first generation) 1994, % of population, male

Source: Berthoud et al. 1997