Chapter 31
Concluding Remarks
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On 1 January 2012, there were 20.7 million non-EU nationals residing in the EU (excluding Croatia). This represents 4.1 per cent of the EU-27 population. In addition, there were another 13.6 million EU nationals living in another EU-27 member state (that is, different from their country of citizenship). If we look at the statistics on the basis of citizenship, we can capture the migration phenomenon from a different perspective: out of the total EU-27 population (503.7 million), 33 million people are born in a non-EU country and 17.2 million persons are born in a different EU-27 member state from their country of residence.\(^1\)

Presenting simple, straightforward numbers and percentages is useful to grasp the relevance and diversity of this phenomenon. However, what the preceding chapters have highlighted is that it is nearly impossible to provide accurate information on the size and nature of the EU’s immigrant population. Despite these challenges, as we noted in Chapter 1, there are some common trends:

- Europeans have increasingly migrated from east to west, and people from around the world have increasingly migrated to EU member states.
- All member states, regardless of their geographical and population size, and irrespective of previous migration history, have experienced population movements that have altered the EU demographically, socially and politically.
- Migration is the main determinant of demographic growth in the EU and will unquestionably have far-reaching consequences and implications for the socio-cultural landscape of Europe, as well as for its labour markets and economies.

The 28 country chapters of this book have provided a brief insight into the diversity of the immigration situation within the EU. Against this background, this concluding chapter proposes a typology of countries based on their migration experiences and regimes and a typology of migration pathways. These typologies constitute an attempt at providing an overview and comparison among different EU countries, without over-generalising, and while being mindful of the specificities of each migration experience.

Comparing Migration Experiences

In this section, we propose a typology of migration experiences among EU countries which takes into account the following factors: relations between sending and receiving countries (like colonialism), past migration experience (earlier or recent conversion from senders to hosts, experience in migration management and integration policies), the size of the immigrant population

(in absolute and relative terms, that is as percentage of the overall population), and the factors that have triggered migration flows (geopolitical changes, political or economic factors).

**Old Host Countries**

During the first decades of reconstruction following the end of the Second World War, Northern and Western EU member states shifted from being senders (mainly to the United States, Australia or Canada) to becoming hosts. France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK have a relatively long immigration history related to their colonial past but also due to labour shortages after the end of the Second World War. These countries ran state or company-led recruitment schemes from Southern Europe as well as Northern Africa, Asia and the British Commonwealth. Recruitment of foreign labour was halted in the mid-1970s as a result of the oil crisis and the slowing down of their economies. Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden are also included in this group even though they have no special colonial ties to any countries. The migration pattern they have experienced is similar: economically motivated migration with migrants and their families gradually settling in large numbers.

These countries have a long experience in migration and admission policies and have developed elaborate (more or less successful) integration policies. At present, they are faced with ageing first-generation immigrants and the challenge of combating the social exclusion and marginalisation of second- or third-generation immigrants. They have increasingly adopted restrictive admission policies, while the value and success of their multicultural citizenship policies has been increasingly questioned in an environment of heightened security concerns. Integration policies are marked by new (and in many cases stricter) integration obligations towards new immigrants, for instance through obligatory language and civic orientation courses, or through the requirement of spouses to pass the integration test in the country of origin (before migrating).

In parallel, the economic difficulties or even crises that characterise most of these economies and the accompanying social frustration offer fertile ground to populist and far-right parties. This has been steadily leading to the exacerbation of xenophobic reactions on the part of the majority populations. Religion, and in particular Islam, is becoming increasingly visible as a dividing factor between populations of non-immigrant and immigrant backgrounds.

These old hosts have also been the preferred destinations for EU citizens from the newer member states since the 1990s and especially since the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds. Since the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis and eurozone crises, they have also become attractive for potential employment opportunities to young, high-skilled EU citizens from Southern EU member states.

**Recent Host Countries**

Since the 1980s, countries in the geographic periphery of the EU have seen their traditional emigration patterns reversed and have become destination countries. This is the case for Southern European states (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and for smaller countries in the western and northern periphery of the EU (Ireland and Finland).

In part, this reflects a gradual improvement in the economic situation and the living conditions in these countries. It has also, however, been an unintended side effect of the restrictive immigration measures taken by the older hosts since the mid-1970s. Moreover, immigration patterns in these countries have been significantly affected by the implosion of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the liberalisation of population movements from East to West.
Their immigration experience has been characterised by the absence of consistent migration policies, leading to a high number of migrants remaining in these countries unofficially or without proper documentation. This is particularly the case in Southern European countries which have land and sea borders that are difficult to patrol and control. The irregular or illegal status that is common to large segments of the migrant population has implications not only for their employment conditions but also for their effective integration in the host society. The large inflow of undocumented immigrants has led to repeated regularisation programmes.

Finland and Ireland have also recently been transformed from countries of emigration to host destinations and the largest influx came with the end of the Cold War. Traditionally, Finland has been a country with very restrictive migration policies, mainly due to its geographical position (bordering with the Soviet Union during the Cold War), while Ireland’s economic situation did not render it a destination choice for migrants. Political and economic changes in the 1990s altered this, leading to a significant change in the socio-demographic and economic landscape of both countries. Contrary to the Southern EU countries in this general category, Ireland and Finland have been more proactive in formulating integration policies for the influx of newcomers and in particular for the integration of asylum seekers and refugees.

Severe economic crisis accompanied by dramatic austerity measures have been unravelling in all the countries in this group (excluding Finland). This has harshly impacted their migration populations, particularly hit by high unemployment, a fall-back into conditions of irregular and insecure employment and welfare benefits that have either been restricted or even wiped out due to brutal public spending cuts. In some cases, immigration inflows have decreased, in others, return migration has been triggered. A further consequence of the crisis has been that emigration of the native population of these countries has been reactivated, particularly among young, qualified professionals and skilled workers. Empirical research in this field has been undertaken only recently so there is still limited insight into the size and characteristics of this phenomenon.

**Emigration Countries**

The third group of countries experienced major changes in migration patterns since the 1990s fundamentally as a consequence of the 1989 ‘Autumn of Nations’. These latest EU member states experienced large emigration towards the other EU states since the early 1990s and particularly since their EU accession. Thus, large numbers of Poles, Latvians and Lithuanians migrated to the UK and Ireland immediately after 2004 just as Romanians and Bulgarians emigrated in large numbers after 2007 (across the EU, but especially in Southern EU member states).

These countries have also become transit migration countries and in some cases are in the preliminary stages of becoming hosts of third country immigrants. The inflow of immigrants is primarily from former Soviet Union countries (and in particular from Ukraine and Moldova) or other neighbouring nations with which there was a formal relation (such as Yugoslavia).

In addition, small, albeit well-organised, immigrant populations in these countries come mainly from Asia and in many cases are the continuation of migratory movements during the Communist times. Thus, we find groups of Vietnamese or Chinese in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In addition, Central and Eastern European member states have also become an attractive destination for entrepreneurs from Western Europe and the United States. These immigrants are predominantly involved in economic activities in the tertiary sector as highly-skilled managers, experts, consultants or scientists.

In all cases, the new member states have adopted all the relevant *acquis communautaire* in the field of integration and developed national action plans for employment. However, the still
small sizes of their immigrant populations and the fact that they too have been hard hit by the knock-on effects of the 2008 global financial crisis means that these have not yet effectively been implemented.

**Small Island Countries**

The islands of Malta and Cyprus have experienced increased immigration, both as transit and host countries, since the 1990s. Cyprus has received both legal and irregular migration in a pattern similar to other Southern European countries. Malta, by contrast, has been concerned with large numbers of illegal migration and asylum seekers and refugees that reach its coasts on wrecked dinghies from Northern Africa. These two countries share their small size, which makes even a few thousand or tens of thousands of foreigners a large population; their lack of previous experience with migration management and integration policies; and the developing xenophobic and racist attitudes among their populations. Debates in these countries frame migration in terms of fear and threat. At the same time, both island countries continue to experience emigration of their youth who go to study abroad in other European countries and often remain there.

**Immigration Pathways**

The existing diversity in immigrant populations within the 28 EU member states is also the result of ‘older’ and ‘newer’ forms of migration. In the classification that we propose below, we include the old typical labour migrations that were triggered by economic inequalities between the sending and receiving countries and were managed through recruitment schemes and bilateral agreements. We also encompass new forms of migration that are more fluid, often irregular, involve circular or pendular movements between several countries, and are related to specific economic sectors of seasonal or heavy jobs.

To provide a structured scheme for comparison and categorisation, we have used the term ‘migration pathways’ borrowed from the work of Psimmenos and Kassimati (2003). The term pathways suggests sets of relationships, policies and opportunities that come together to form a specific pathway, a channel through which information and people flow between the sending and receiving country.

Based on this understanding and following from a comparative reading of the country overviews, we have identified nine such migration pathways that are analysed in turn below: the pathway of co-ethnics and returnees, the colonial and post-colonial pathway, the pre-1989 internal migration pathway, the labour migration pathway, the asylum seeking pathway, the pathway of temporary and seasonal migration, the ‘gold collar’ pathway, the pathway of irregular migration, and the intra-EU mobility pathway.

*The Pathway of Co-Ethnics and Returnees*

Favourable admission patterns for co-ethnics, returnees and their descendants are widespread across many member states. In each case, preferential reception schemes are justified on the basis of unique historical circumstances and are excluded from general restrictive immigration policies.

Two types of migrants can be distinguished within this pathway of migration: returnees and co-ethnics. Returnees are individuals born in the EU country, who have emigrated, and have subsequently returned, after a long absence abroad. Co-ethnics are descendants of emigrants or
members of co-ethnic communities abroad who result from past migration movements. Co-ethnics may also be populations which are ethnically and culturally kin to the receiving country but which have never, neither them nor their ancestors, lived in that country. In practice, the two categories are often merged while the logic that regulates policies towards them is the same: they are (or are perceived to be) of the same ethnic origin as the citizens of the receiving country.

While some EU member states have a large presence of returnees, others have a higher proportion of co-ethnics. Poland is one country that clarifies this distinction; persons who emigrated from Poland as adults and returned to the country after 1989 (mainly from the United States) are considered returnees (also referred to as expatriates), whereas co-ethnics are the descendants of settlers and deportees mainly from Kazakhstan. In the case of Germany, immigrating co-ethnics (Aussiedler) come mainly from Kazakhstan, whereas in Finland co-ethnics come from Estonia. Greece has received co-ethnics (Pontic Greeks) from the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Armenia, and a large number of ethnic Greeks from Albania. Portugal’s retornados are the descendants of former Portuguese settlers and come mainly from Angola and Mozambique. Swedish Finns and mainly Ingrian Finns have been regarded as return migrants with special status in Finland. Hungary is also a country with a high number of immigrants of Hungarian ethnic origin from Romania, Ukraine and former Yugoslavia. In the case of Italy, immigrants (mostly from Argentina) who can identify Italian parenthood up to three generations prior are still considered co-ethnics and have a preferential channel to naturalisation. Finally, there was a significant inflow of returnees towards the Baltic countries when independence was restored.

In all cases, the reception of co-ethnics and returnees is better than that of ‘other’ immigrants. They usually enjoy the right to naturalise through preferential channels and even if they do not have the right to naturalisation upon arrival, they enjoy privileged conditions compared to other migrants as regards the financial and institutional support provided to them by the state with a view to helping them settle down and integrate into society as smoothly as possible.

The Colonial and Post-Colonial Pathway

This pattern mainly pertains to member states with a colonial past and seems to have worked as a de facto substitute for the recruitment of workers. This is particularly the case for the UK, France, the Netherlands and, to a certain extent, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. Immigrants were granted access to their territory as citizens of the former colonies with certain sets of rights associated to their status. The United Kingdom received several immigrant groups from the Commonwealth states of the West Indies, Asia and Africa, while France received immigrants mainly from former African colonies and Asia. The Netherlands welcomed former colonial subjects from Indonesia and Suriname, and Belgium received migrants from its former African colonies such as the Congo (former Zaire), Rwanda and Burundi. Spain has large immigrant communities from Ecuador, Argentina and Peru, and the main countries of origin of immigrants in Portugal are from Portuguese-speaking African countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique) and Brazil. Initially, immigration from Africa and Asia mainly took place within the framework of post-colonial migration but the receiving countries gradually raised legal obstacles so as to curb post-colonial immigration.

In terms of immigrant integration, the colonial relationship has offered some advantages to the migrants in that they were usually familiar with the language, the culture, and even the institutions and political system of the colonial ‘mother’ country. It also brought with it important disadvantages such as prejudice, discrimination and racism that were built into the social and political system of the country of settlement and that were widespread among its population. Moreover, some
colonial populations had particularly traumatic and divisive experiences in their relationship with the ‘mother’ country (Algerians in France) that could not be easily forgotten or settled (emotionally and politically).

**Pre-1989 Internal Migration Pathway**

This pathway concerns countries located in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic region and Southeast Europe. During Soviet rule, large population movements took place and, as a consequence, large numbers of Soviet citizens (mainly but not always of Russian nationality) settled in areas that became independent states after 1989. In these countries, internal migration movements were typical of the Communist era.

Communist countries in Europe had no migration relations with countries outside the Warsaw Pact. The governing regime tightly controlled emigration and political reasons for emigration were often intertwined with economic motives. The Czech Republic (then part of Czechoslovakia) experienced immigration within the framework of ‘international aid cooperation’ schemes and the consequent intergovernmental agreements drafted between Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries including Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Cuba, Mongolia, Angola and North Korea. In contrast, it is worth noting that there was hardly any immigration to Hungary between 1949 and 1989 with the exception of two politically motivated movements when Greek and Chilean communists were granted asylum protection in the early 1950s and 1970s.

Throughout the large-scale industrialisation of the 1960s and 1970s, significant numbers of people from different parts of the Soviet Union (mostly from Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia) settled in the three Baltic states. As a consequence of nation state (re-)building, most of the settlers are now identified as foreign nationals. However, these populations are not the outcome of international migration but, rather, of formerly internal migration and the reshuffling of states and their borders.

What is common among these movements is that they all happened within the context of a centrally governed economy and an authoritarian society. They all resembled internal movements within some sort of ‘empire’ which was the Communist part of the world. In some cases, populations that used this pathway to migrate were offered the possibility to naturalise and to become fully integrated into their societies of settlement while in other cases, naturalisation has been very difficult and these groups remain labelled as foreign immigrants despite their long-term settlement in the receiving countries.

**The Labour Migration Pathway**

This pathway includes two main patterns of movement that have historically been interrelated: initial labour migration that came as a response to labour recruitment by the receiving countries and, later, family reunification or family formation migration. The latter had to do with the settlement of the workers in their host country and their wish to bring their family over or to form a family with a person from their same country of origin.

The labour migration pathway is probably the numerically most important one in Europe today. It has been the dominant form of migration in Western and Southern Europe since the 1950s. Recruitment programmes were implemented in the older host countries of Northern and Western Europe from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. These programmes, also known as guest-worker recruitment programmes, were established through bilateral governmental agreements mainly with
Southern European and Mediterranean countries (such as Morocco and Turkey). The recruitment was initially intended to be temporary and recruited workers were expected to return to their country of origin. However, the return aspect of the agreements was not implemented in a strict and consistent manner. Instead, policies allowing for the repeated renewal of residence rights were commonplace. In the end, this led to settlement and subsequent family reunification migration. This has been the case for immigrants from Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia who have settled predominantly in Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Luxembourg. Although Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal are EU member states today and immigrants in these countries enjoy free mobility within the Union, immigration from the former Yugoslav states, Turkey and North Africa is still of third country status. Today, family formation (marrying a partner from the parents’ country of origin) is an important source of new immigration linked to this historical recruitment pattern.

The Asylum Seeking Pathway

Since the mid-1970s, Western European countries have received a number of major migration flows from other parts of Europe that were initiated by political persecution and war. The first wave was from the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These migrants were perceived as legitimate refugees escaping Communist suppression and received preferential reception until the end of the 1980s. Due to restrictive passport regulations in most socialist countries, the largest refugee migration came from the least restrictive Polish People’s Republic. These migrants went primarily to Germany and secondarily to Italy, France and Greece when martial law was imposed in Poland in 1981.

The second most important refugee migration wave came from Turkey in the 1980s when members of the Kurdish minority and the religious minority of Alevits sought refuge predominantly in Germany, but also in Greece.

The third wave of asylum seeking migration was a result of the civil war in former Yugoslavia. Between 1991 and 1995, hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived in Germany, the UK, France, Austria, Italy, Ireland, Sweden and Slovenia. These refugees only received temporary protection as civil war refugees and the majority have returned to their home countries. However, a considerable proportion has remained in the receiving countries, among them Roma people who in particular have experienced problems of discrimination and intolerance in the countries of settlement.

From the mid-1970s until the early 1990s, the number of non-Europeans applying for asylum increased drastically throughout all EU-12 and EU-15 (at the time) member states. The majority of asylum seekers came from countries affected by political intolerance, ethnic conflicts, and civil or international wars. Accordingly, the main regions of origin were Latin America (Chile, Columbia, Ecuador), Africa (Ghana, Congo, Nigeria, Somalia), the wider Middle East (Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Morocco) and Asia (Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan).

As a response to the constant rise in the number of asylum applications, by the mid-1990s some European countries had made the relevant regulatory frameworks and assessment criteria more restrictive. This trend towards increasingly restrictive criteria for asylum seekers has continued throughout the 2000s. Asylum flows continued strong and were increasingly diversified, from Chechen refugees, to asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq following the so-called ‘War on Terror’, and more recently from Syria.

2 There were also some bilateral schemes with more geographically distant countries such as the scheme linking Germany and South Korea.
The Pathway of Temporary and Seasonal Migration

Temporary migration programmes have also been a permanent feature of migration regimes. The recruitment programmes of the 1960s were planned and propagated as temporary programmes, although not administered accordingly, and resulted in the settlement of recruited workers. After recruitment stopped in the early 1970s, temporary programmes were used with greater reluctance in many countries. However, with the implosion of the Communist regimes in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe and the liberalisation of population flows that resulted, older programmes increased in scope or new temporary programmes were introduced in order to find a legal way to respond to the pressure of migration.

Temporary immigrants from non-EU countries have responded to the structural imbalance of developed economies in Europe. They have occupied specific niches in the secondary labour market, becoming cleaners, home carers, construction workers and generally filling jobs in the lower-skilled, more labour-intensive and volatile sectors of the economy. Similar has been the case of seasonal migrants accepted mainly for jobs in agriculture, tourism or catering services. Temporary and seasonal recruitment programmes have been adopted by several EU countries (including for instance Austria, France, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Germany and the UK). The aim was to provide for a legal path for migrants to enter these countries and fill positions that were not taken by natives because they were low pay, low prestige and with difficult working conditions. Whether these temporary and seasonal labourers have remained temporary sojourners or have legally or illegally converted into long-term migrants is a question only partially explored, but this reality on the ground led to the Commission initiative for an EU Directive on seasonal work in 2010.

The ‘Gold Collar’ Pathway

Since the 1980s, there has been increasing temporary and permanent immigration of highly qualified professionals such as managers, investors and business persons, researchers in academia and industry, engineers in multinational companies, sport professionals and people in the arts. Immigration law often foresees preferential treatment for highly qualified people and even when there are no such provisions in the law, implementation practices tend to be different – and preferential – when it comes to multinational company employees or highly qualified professionals.

The 2010 Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020 Strategy have declared the EU’s borders to be open to highly-skilled and talented immigrants and, the 2009 Blue Card Directive has tried to facilitate this across the EU. Motivated by the need to increase competitiveness and innovation in order to meet the pressures of globalisation, high-skilled immigration has been particularly encouraged by Germany, France and the UK.

The Pathway of Irregular Migration

A large percentage of new immigrants in the EU are undocumented. Due to either the gradual establishment of restrictions on migration or the absence of an appropriate migration policy, a proportion of the immigrant population currently has or has had an irregular or illegal status. Some have entered host countries illegally, others have entered with a valid visa or residence permit and have overstayed or abused their visa. Depending on the control regime of the receiving country, some undocumented migrants may only work in unregistered jobs of the shadow economy whilst others may work in registered jobs. While old host countries generally reject regularisation campaigns as an option and react with further internal controls to curb irregular migration, recent
host countries have made regularisation or the so-called ‘amnesty’ programmes their main axis of immigration policy. Gaps in the regularisation laws, inefficient public bureaucracies, and the lack of incentives for employers to ensure or facilitate the legal status of many migrants, have complicated the situation. This has led to the perpetuated revitalisation of this pathway, which is constantly refuelled by new irregular immigration or where migrants live in limbo shifting frequently between legal and illegal status. In effect, a common story of many TCNs falling in this category involves illegal entry, regularisation of their status later but often inability to retain official status when the renewal of their permit is due for a variety of reasons ranging from lack of a proper work contract (such as full, formal employment with social security benefits, and so on) to not satisfying other requirements (for example, they risk bringing their family to the host country even if their family reunification application is rejected because their taxed income is not sufficient). This contributes to the marginalisation and exploitation of a significant part of the immigrant labour force.

The Intra-EU Mobility Pathway

One of the core freedoms provided for by the EU, particularly after the Maastricht Treaty (1993), is the ‘freedom of movement’ of EU nationals. In accordance, EU citizens have the right to live and work in another member state, and they are allowed to participate in municipal and European Parliament elections in their EU country of residence. Nevertheless, Eurostat data reports that in 2012 only 2.5 per cent of EU citizens live and work in another EU member state (Eurostat 2012).

The EU’s enlargements in 2004 and 2007 led to an increase of labour mobility within the Union in spite of the temporary provisions aimed at restricting immigration from the EU-8 and subsequently Bulgaria and Romania. Poles and Romanians now constitute the largest migrant populations in Europe, scattered in a large number of countries. The UK and Ireland were the most attractive destinations for migrants from the EU-8, while Spain, Italy and Greece were primary destinations for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens.

The global economic crisis and subsequent Eurozone crisis also affected intra-EU mobility. Since 2008, emigration from the newer to the older member states decreased according to OECD data, while return migration patterns also started to appear. Moreover, young, highly-skilled citizens from the Southern EU member states in crisis (Spain, Italy and Greece in particular) have been seeking employment in Northern EU member states (mainly the UK and Germany), in increasing numbers.

Integrating Migrants and Citizenship Policies

A full comparative overview of the conditions and regimes for immigrant integration in the EU countries would go beyond the scope of our chapter. Therefore, we have chosen to address one dimension that we believe is core to immigrant integration and that may also be considered as emblematic of the ‘integration philosophies’ (Favell 1998) currently present within the Union, namely the naturalisation options in the EU-28.

A comparative examination of immigrant integration practices regarding naturalisation regimes presents a rather disjointed picture. Immigrants encounter very different integration prospects and opportunities depending on the country in which they live, on the rights that may be linked to their specific country of origin and to their individual status, as well as to the implementation of rights at the local level.
All 28 EU member states have participation regimes that distinguish between their own nationals, EU citizens and TCNs. Only own-country citizens enjoy full political and civic rights while TCNs (non-citizens) are subject to different kinds of restrictions. Within the immigrant population, however, there are also numerous distinctions depending on the status of the individual, and the specific national group to which s/he belongs.

Most states have designed a variety of migration status levels for specific groups – temporary workers, asylum seekers, family members of settled immigrants, immigrants with renewable residence permits and permanent residents. Each type of permit may encompass a specific set of rights which more or less deviates from citizens’ rights, and which change from country to country, in spite of EU efforts to define minimum conditions (through the Single Permit and Long-Term Residence Directives). While legal permanent residents sometimes enjoy full equality except for enfranchisement at the national level, undocumented workers may be de facto excluded from all rights or may only be allowed to access specific services like emergency health care. Asylum seekers may be restricted in their mobility in various ways ranging from detention and an obligation to live in specified places, to being forbidden to leave a municipality or region.

Full political and civic rights and obligations may be acquired by TCNs through naturalisation. States primarily base citizenship on ancestry (jus sanguinis, generally characterised as ethno-cultural) rather than on place of birth (jus soli, meaning territorial), although most citizenship laws contain elements of both (taking into consideration residence or special ties). Member states also differ in their acceptance of double citizenship and, hence, their requirement for the migrant to abandon her/his citizenship of origin if s/he is to naturalise. Moreover, political agendas of governing political parties may alternate between more liberal naturalisation policies (to attract newly enfranchised voters) to more restrictive ones (in response to anti-immigration trends). Comparative research on citizenship regimes across the EU member states suggests different dimensions of inclusiveness – regarding long-term resident immigrants, second or later generations of immigrant descent born on the territory, and emigrants (Vink and Bauböck 2013). This leads to a very diverse European landscape of citizenship regimes driven by different conceptions of inclusiveness combining ethno-cultural and territorial criteria, and characterised by both expansive and insular regimes.

The naturalisation process is long and generally rather demanding in all countries, requiring a long list of documents that should accompany the application. Naturalisation rules often also include subjective conditions that are open to different interpretations during their day-to-day implementation by administrative personnel. Eligibility for naturalisation is basically defined on the basis of the length of stay. Other core determining factors include language proficiency, knowledge of the host country’s culture, proof of economic independence, good character, sound mind and a non-criminal record. Acquisition of citizenship via marriage with a national of an EU member state is subject to specific conditions, as are the procedures for refugees and asylum holders.

In practical terms this means that first-generation immigrants can request citizenship on the basis of length of residence in a country of the EU. Residence requirements vary among countries, but also in relation to country of origin and residence status (EU citizens, adopted foreigners, refugees, stateless persons, non-EU citizens, and so on). Children born to immigrants in the EU are usually considered to be ‘foreigners’, even though many EU member states have decreased residency and other naturalisation requirements for ‘second-generation’ immigrants and have extended automatic citizenship for the ‘third generation’. Refugees and foreigners with regular residence permits may request citizenship if they have permanently resided in the EU member state for periods between five and 10 years.

In the countries of CEE, the number of naturalisations was relatively high in the first half of the 1990s reflecting mainly returning emigrants who had lost their citizenship while abroad. Since
2000, this number has been much lower. A specific situation was created in the newly formed Baltic states, Croatia and Slovenia where immigrants from other regions of the former larger unit were not granted citizenship. While there is some preferential treatment for gaining citizenship in the Baltic states, in the case of Slovenia, no special provisions have been made to recognise the sizeable community of citizens from other former Yugoslavian republics and war refugees that have resided in the country for many years. In Croatia there was much pressure, especially after 2000, to liberalise the naturalisation procedure for this category of aliens.

In Latvia and Estonia (but not in Lithuania) after the restoration of independence, all those who were not citizens of the country in the pre-1938 period were declared aliens and had to apply for naturalisation. Requirements for the naturalisation procedure included five years of residence, a legal source of income, and a thorough knowledge of both the Constitution and the state language. Indeed, language became the main obstacle (and contested issue) for naturalisation as these ‘internal migrants’ from other parts of the Soviet Union were Russian speakers and had not needed, nor had they been required during Soviet times, to learn the language of the country in which they settled. While alienating part of their residents, the Baltic countries welcomed emigrants who wished to return and who could prove their link to the country through their own or their parents’ citizenship in the pre-1938 states. Most immigrants who arrived in Latvia and Lithuania during the Soviet period have now been naturalised, but the situation remains difficult in Estonia. The annual number of naturalisations has grown smaller, and the majority of the people who have received citizenship in recent years have been children.

In fact, for many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, naturalisation policies appear to be more strongly shaped by concerns about expatriates, diasporas and ethnic kin minorities in neighbouring countries than by immigration. It should be noted, however, that a number of older EU member states have also long pursued policies of preferential access to citizenship for persons who are considered ethnic or linguistic relatives. This has been the case for Germany, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. On the contrary, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Malta have privileged stronger *jus soli* regimes.

Thus, the particular state-building history of each country, combined with its migration experience, has contributed to a range of naturalisation regimes, leading to a diverse European landscape with different distributions between nationals and non-nationals in each member state.

**Final Remarks**

This chapter offered a comparative overview of immigration in the EU-28. More specifically, we have proposed a typology of countries based on their migration experience during the last decades. We have also constructed a typology of migration pathways, that is, sets of opportunities, policies, motivations and constraints that open a specific channel where people and information flow more easily and more intensely than when these conditions are not in place. Our two sets of typologies aim at providing a comprehensive description of the migration phenomena and attempt at creating up-to-date theoretical classifications that respond to contemporary European realities.

The last section of this chapter has given some brief insights into a core dimension of immigrant integration, notably the issue of naturalisation. Through naturalisation, migrants can access political rights and politically integrate in the receiving society as well as access additional freedoms (such as the freedom to live, work and travel in other EU member states). Needless to say, naturalisation only covers the formal aspects of a migrant’s integration. Issues of socio-economic marginalisation, discrimination and racism often continue to challenge their integration, along with
that of their offspring into the receiving societies well after citizenship acquisition. Managing immigration-related diversity in ways that promote social cohesion, social justice and democratic pluralism is thus one of the most highly contested issues across the EU today, and probably one of the most pressing democratic challenges for Europe’s inherently diverse societies. We believe that this book is an important step in the systematic exploration and comparison of contemporary European migration and their socio-economic, civic and political inclusion into the EU.

References


