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Theoretical Debates on Regional Security Governance

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Abstract

It is the aim of this paper is to explore the role pivotal states play as security providers and what impact they have in particular on regional security governance. The choice to base the analysis at the regional level is due to the relative stability some regions have been able to achieve and the way regional (in)stability can be seen as a sub-set of global governance. The paper will make use of the concept of security governance. Given the growing interaction between national and regional actors in the decision making of regional security governance, a state-centric approach is insufficient as a framework of analysis. Security governance covers threats that have to do with potential or actual violence: terrorism, war and counter insurgency, ethnic cleansing, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, massive human rights violence, and organised crime, as well as issues that have to do with natural disasters: famines, pandemics, cyber warfare, and even financial crises

Keywords

Regional security governance, pivotal states, international organizations, and regional organizations.

Introduction

While the United States still plays a dominant role in international affairs, other states such as Brazil, China and Turkey have seen their influence rise in the past ten years at both the regional and the global level. Two groupings stand out particularly in terms of their sheer size (weight of gross domestic product, population size, etc.). One is known as BRICS- Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which collectively makes up 43% of the world's population, accounts for 17% of global trade and spends \$240 billion on defence; comparative defence budgets for the EU and the US are respectively \$250 billion and \$664 billion (Gross, 2013:2). Two of these countries are also permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The other grouping is MINT- Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey. In lieu of the growing role these states hold in international affairs, this chapter will refer to these countries as pivotal states.¹ However, whether the growing power status of those pivotal states is synonymous with them being important security providers is an open question. In other words, are these states inclined to share in the burden of international stability and security or are they more interested in 'free riding' on these issues? If they do engage in the provision of security, in what ways (unilaterally or multilaterally) and at what level (regional or global) is this done?

To answer these questions requires analysis of the capabilities, threat perceptions and security activities (performance) of pivotal states. Capabilities relate both to economic, political and military resources, as well as to such things as membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). With few exceptions the eleven pivotal states suffer from domestic instability, such as drug trafficking and organised crime (e.g., Mexico), or religious and ethnic tensions/disputes (China, Egypt, Nigeria, Russia, Turkey) or high levels of inequality (e.g., Brazil, India and South Africa). This is often linked with low levels of political (democratic) development.

Threat perceptions involve considerations about the source (nature or geographic location) and target of threat (state or society). Among the main sources of threats are territorial conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional rivalries, terrorist activities, the fall-out from 'failed states', and the occurrence of organised crime.² *Prima facie* evidence shows that some pivotal states, depending primarily on the region in which they are located, are confronted by several such threats. A case in point is Asia, with the occurrence of territorial conflicts, such as between India and Pakistan, nuclear proliferation, such as North Korea, and regional rivalries, such as between China and India. In contrast, pivotal states in Latin America suffer less from such a wide spread of threats, but face disproportionately greater problems with drug trafficking and organized crime. A major problem for pivotal states in Africa is territorial conflicts/disputes and the fall-out of 'failed states'. Depending on capabilities and/or threat perceptions, pivotal states either engage in selective dimensions of security (e.g., conflict prevention) or fulfil a number of security dimensions (protection, peace enforcement, post-conflict peace building and conflict prevention). These engagements can either have a predominantly regional or global orientation and can manifest different interaction preferences, i.e., unilateral, bi-lateral or multilateral. Whilst pivotal states seek close links with regional security organizations, the aims and motivations for these might differ markedly. A further issue is whether one or more pivotal states are present in a given geographic region and whether they cooperate (e.g.,

¹ Whilst the examination the actual role of pivotal states (either individually or collectively) is not the focus of this paper, indirectly the paper relates to the following countries: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela, which have been chose for the project on *Security Governance in a Multipolar World: The Role of Pivotal States as Security Providers*. These countries can be deemed to play leading roles in regional and global security and their views on the subject of security threats and institutional response are important for assessing the prospects of international security governance.

² These threats, with the exception of regional rivalries, were identified as most significant in the EU's European Security Strategy of 2003.

Argentina and Brazil) or compete (e.g., China and Japan or China and India) in the provision of security.

It is the aim of this paper to explore the role pivotal states³ play as security providers and what impact they have in particular on regional security governance. The choice to base the analysis at the regional level is due to the relative stability some regions have been able to achieve and the way regional (in)stability can be seen as a sub-set of global governance. The paper will make use of the concept of security governance. Given the growing interaction between national and regional actors in the decision making of regional security governance, a state-centric approach is insufficient as a framework of analysis. It is for this reason that security governance has been chosen as the perspective for this research. The security governance approach accepts that security policies are not decided only by nation-states; state and non-state actors are both involved in citizens' protection, with the private sector steadily expanding its role in security (Kirchner 2006; Kirchner and Sperling 2007). Moreover, security governance introduces a broader definition of defence and security by going beyond the states' preoccupation with territorial defence and captures aspects of milieu goals (Wolfers 1952) relating to conflict prevention or post-conflict engagements. More particularly, it covers threats that have to do with potential or actual violence: terrorism, war and counter insurgency, ethnic cleansing, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, massive human rights violence, and organised crime, as well as issues that have to do with natural disasters: famines, pandemics, cyber warfare, and even financial crises.⁴

In the following, attention will first turn to the conceptual framework for the paper, clarifying the basic assumptions of security governance and demonstrating its relevance as a study tool for the analysis of regional and global security. The paper then deals with the specificities of regional security governance by contrasting it with global security governance, and finishes with a summary assessment of the concept of security governance and an outline of the empirical tasks which should be undertaken in order to test the empirical relevance of this concept in the study of pivotal states.

Conceptual Approaches: security governance and hegemonic theory

Security Governance

The fundamental problem of international politics – and security provisions in particular – is the supply of order and the regulation of conflict without resort to war. Westphalian anarchy provides states the benefit of autonomy and independence, but precludes the emergence of global or even regional governance to manage the attending liabilities and chronic insecurity and conflict that sometimes leads to war. The regulation of international politics, particularly the management of disorder, can be best thought of as a problem of governance as well as non-governance. The alternative forms of interstate regulation that have emerged and receded historically (balance of power, collective defence or concert) can neither account for nor ameliorate the range of threats states face today, largely owing to their inherent limitations, the most important of which is a preoccupation with

³ Whilst the examination the actual role of pivotal states (either individually or collectively) is not the focus of this paper, indirectly the paper relates to the following countries: Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, which have been chosen for the project on *Security Governance in a Multipolar World: The Role of Pivotal States as Security Providers*. These countries can be deemed to play leading roles in regional and global security and their views on the subject of security threats and institutional response are important for assessing the prospects of international security governance.

⁴ For a more detailed description of the broadened definition of security see Steglitz and Kaldor (2013:91) and Bourne (2013).

the military aspect of security and the unspoken assumption that all states will share the Westphalian preoccupation with autonomy and the aggregation of power.⁵

Security governance provides a framework for analysing policy-making and policy implementation in the security field, clarifying and capturing within group challenges as well as those of posed by a variegated set of 'others'. It notes that political actors have asymmetric capabilities to influence policy- and decision-making procedures. Moreover, security governance alerts us to the multiple actors and levels of security engagement and assumes that norms, rules and ideas are, besides interests, also influential in the shaping of security policies (Webber *et al.* 2004). In simple terms, security governance allows an understanding of the concept of security beyond the issue of defence, and above all, encompasses the 'more diverse, less visible and less predictable' (Kirchner 2006: 949) nature of security in the twenty-first century. The framework of security governance facilitates understanding of the interactions between states and regional institutions and how they individually and/or collectively manage not only international and regional crises, but also a variety of threats posed to national and regional security. Inspired by the academic work on multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001) and global governance (Rosenau 1992 and 2000), the security governance literature considers as its basic assumption that political actors do not have equal capacities in order to influence the policy- and decision-making procedures; the interactions of such different players with each other result in a 'polyarchical and heterarchical' system of governance (Webber *et al.* 2004). What is more, the security governance approach accepts that security policies are not decided only by nation-states; state and non-state actors are both involved in citizens' protection, with the private sector steadily expanding its role in security (Kirchner and Sperling 2007). The ideas, perceptions and norms held by the various security stakeholders (state, non-state, public, private, voluntary agents) affect the stances the latter hold in the policy-making procedure but are also reshaped due to a series of institutionalised interactions triggered by the need of effective governance (Kirchner 2006).

The core elements of security governance are: concerted efforts, coordinated management, distinct levels of authority and actors (private and public), formal and informal arrangements and common objectives to regulate and/or solve conflicts. Security governance has been expansively defined as 'an international system of rule, dependent on the acceptance of a majority of states that are affected, which through regulatory mechanism (both formal and informal), governs activities across a range of security and security-related issue areas' (Webber 2002: 44). Security governance performs two functions – institution building and conflict resolution – and employs two sets of instruments – the persuasive (economic, political and diplomatic) and the coercive (medium to high-intensity military interventions and internal policing). Taken together, four categories of security governance emerge: assurance, prevention, protection and compellence, which will be used in this study.

Assurance policies identify the efforts aimed at post-conflict reconstruction and confidence building measures. Policies of prevention capture the efforts to prevent conflict by building or sustaining domestic, regional or international institutions, which will contribute to the mitigation of international anarchy. Policies of protection describe traditional functions to protect society from external threats. Policies of compellence refer to the task of conflict resolution, particularly peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 13-15). An illustration on how each of the four policy dimensions link with the respective functions and instruments is provided in Figure 1. A related set of EUI papers will explore the extent to which the designated eleven pivotal states make contributions to the performance of regional organizations in those respective domains.

⁵ For further details on the distinction between Westphalian and post-Westphalian states see Sperling (2010: 6).

Figure 1 Policies of governance

		<i>Instruments</i>	
		Persuasive	Coercive
<i>Functions</i>	Institution-building	Prevention	Protection
	Conflict resolution	Assurance	Compellence

To date, the security governance approach has been empirically tested in a number of EU cases. These have provided explanations as to how the EU countries engage in burden-sharing on a number of external security policy dimensions despite different interests and capabilities (Dorussen *et al.* 2009), and how EU states develop common security cultures despite different external threat perceptions, different identity orientations ('self' versus 'other'), different policy instruments (persuasive versus coercive) and different interaction patterns (unilateral, bilateral, multilateral) (Kirchner and Sperling 2010). The specific analytical framework has also been employed in comparative analysis on how regional organisations in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America provide security across a number of security policy dimensions (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011), and under what conditions regional security organisations increase the scope and impact of security governance (Dorussen and Kirchner 2014).

It is in this line of comparative investigation that this paper is conceived with a focus on the role of pivotal states, situated in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Western Hemisphere, as regional security providers. Given the power aspirations of some of the pivotal states (if not existing powers, like China and Russia), there is a likelihood that they want to forge regional security governance in line with these aspirations and therefore seek to influence the role of regional security organizations accordingly. Hence the influence of pivotal states might differ depending on whether a given pivotal state either seeks to strengthen the role of security organizations, even if it means foregoing national sovereignty in the process, or to view them as an extension of its national interest. The latter would imply some sort of hegemonic tendency or, at a lower level, more veto player practice on the part of a given pivotal state within a regional security organization. The behaviour of a pivotal state might also be influenced by the presence of another pivotal state in a given geographic region, which is deemed a competitor in the provision of security. It is for this reason that considerations are to be given to hegemonic behaviour and hegemonic theory, which will be done in the following section.

Hegemony and Hegemonic Theory⁶

Political leadership is often seen as crucial for creating and sustaining international organizations. Hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger 1973, Krasner 1976, McKeown 1983) argues that periods of political stability and economic prosperity result from the ability and willingness of powerful 'hegemonic' states to regulate interactions in the international system. Hegemons establish and sustain international organizations in order to extend their political influence and to legitimize their norm-setting behaviour.⁷

⁶ This section draws on Dorussen and Kirchner (2014).

⁷ Keohane (1984) argues that the institutions, norms and regulated behaviour may well persist after the hegemon has lost its dominant position.

International organizations also provide a framework for member states to agree on appropriate burden-sharing in the provision of security as a collective or public good (Sandler 1992). On the basis of instruments and functions of security governance, Kirchner and Sperling (2007) differentiate between protection, prevention, assurance and compellence, each category with its distinct joint production function (Hirschleifer 1983). Dorussen *et al.* (2009) argue that the contributions of member states to assurance and prevention policies weigh equally, while the minimal contribution sets the collective level of protection, and the maximum contribution the collective level of compellence. It follows that free riding is most likely for compellence policies and least likely for protection, and thus the importance of hegemony for security governance should be particularly pronounced for compellence policies. Koremenos *et al.* (2001) similarly conjecture that scope increases with the severity of distribution and enforcement problems. Applying Kirchner and Sperling's (2007) distinction between assurance and compellence, Haftel (2013) finds that regional hegemony (Buzan and Wæver 2003) increases security cooperation, while rivalry between major powers in the region (Colaresi *et al.* 2007) limits it.

Pivotal states, together with major powers, can also impede the development of regional organizations. Since they are best able to protect their state sovereignty, they have less need for international organizations (Gowa 1989). They are also likely to veto any external attempts to limit their freedom to act in defence of perceived national interest. Pivotal or major power support for regional security organizations is often conditional on their ability to determine collective policies and does not imply any willingness to delegate sovereignty. Since hegemons face fewer enforcement problems, it follows from Koremenos *et al.* (2001) that hegemons may also *reduce* the scope of regional security organizations. Pivotal states or major powers often end up limiting the autonomy, or freedom of action, of regional organizations—even when they were instrumental in setting them up. In summary, hegemons may prefer weakly institutionalized arrangements with limited scope. Colaresi *et al.* (2007) argue moreover that a strategic rivalry involving the regional hegemon will further undermine regional security cooperation. The extent to which hegemonic practices prevail with regard to the designated eleven pivotal states will be part of the investigation in related EUI papers. What will also be subject to these explorations is whether pivotal states prefer regional security arrangements over global ones or vice versa. It is this distinction between regional and global security preferences to which the focus will turn next.

Regional or Global Focus

According to Buzan and Wæver, 'a regional security governance focus expresses the inherent territoriality of contemporary international security, but also provides the context that give meaning to local security problems and issues, as well as widening the analytical focus to (potentially) incorporate actors other than states' (Buzan and Wæver 2003). Regional security governance can be self-standing or connected with the settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements to keep the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) informed of their activities and seek its authorization to conduct enforcement measures (UN Charter: Ch. VIII, Art. 52). But as Williams (2005: 171) shows, regional arrangements have engaged in enforcement activities often without UNSC authorization, as was the case with ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990 and again in 2003, and in Kosovo in 1999.

Although manifesting various degrees of cohesion and effectiveness, regional security governance efforts have become established features in the international system. The same cannot be said of global security governance. Jervis (2002) has provided five conditions for international security governance. Under these conditions, national elites must: eschew wars of conquest and war as an instrument of statecraft; accept that the cost of waging such a war is perceived as outweighing any conceivable benefits; embrace the principle of economic liberalism rather than conquest or empire; establish domestic democratic governance; and respect the territorial status quo. While these conditions are met in the Atlantic security community, they are lacking in the wider international context. Keohane (2002) has identified three barriers to global governance. The first is cultural, religious and

civilizational heterogeneity on a global scale. The second and related barrier is the absence of a consensus on beliefs and norms at global level. The third barrier to global security governance is the absence of an institutional fabric that is thick enough to meet the challenge of governance.

In part due to difficulties encountered by the United Nations (UN) (e.g., veto power of individual states), global security governance has been more difficult to advance than regional security governance. But, despite the UN's deficiencies as a global security provider, its role of encouraging, supporting and legitimating regional organizations in the provisions of security should not be underestimated (Thakur and van Langenhove 2006: 235). For example, it is interesting to note that, in the area of peacekeeping operations, the member states in some regional organizations prefer to be actively involved with UN operations rather than developing regional collective mechanisms of compellence. Thus, out of 99,245 personnel deployed in UN operations in 2010, individual members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) contributed 39,372 personnel and the AU 18,303. In the case of NATO, its individual members contributed with 7,712 personnel to UN operations (Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011: 322). However, while it is safe to say that regional organizations have taken on a more prominent role as regional security governance providers, the degree to which they can actually deliver collectively remains also largely an empirical question (Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011: 15-16).

Role of International Organisations

The nature and role of international organizations (whether at regional or global level) has been the subject of extensive study (Green Cowles 2007). Under a diversity of analytical frameworks, research on international organizations has attempted to explain the causality of their nature (Acharya and Johnston 2007), their effect on democracy (Pevehouse and Russett 2006) and their institutionalization (Hansen et al. 2008). One of the key questions posed by international relations scholars has been whether international organizations affect the likelihood of war and peace amongst nations (Hasenclever and Weiffen 2006). To realists, international organizations are mere reflections of relative state power, ineffectual and at best operating at the margins, and hence have little or no ability to reduce conflict among members (Mearsheimer 1994/95). Some realists see international organizations as being used by the great powers to advance their interests in the international system (Foot et al. 2003). A more differentiated view is proposed by Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004), who maintain that not all intergovernmental organizations should be expected to reduce conflict and that only well-institutionalized organizations may have the mediating capacity to reduce conflicts among their members. In a similar vein, Pevehouse and Russett (2006: 994) suggest that 'a particular kind of intergovernmental organization is conflict reducing, and that those intergovernmental organizations produce their effect in conjunction with the regime characteristics of their members states'. More specifically, Pevehouse and Russett argue that 'intergovernmental organizations comprised mostly of democratic states will be more effective in reducing the risks of militarized interstate conflict among their members than will be other kinds of intergovernmental organizations' (Pevehouse and Russett 2006: 994). The contribution of this type of intergovernmental organization to peaceful conflict resolution is possible, the authors assert, due to credible commitments, dispute settlement, and socialization to peaceful behaviour (Pevehouse and Russett 2006: 979). Along the same lines of argument, Hansen et al.(2008: 296) suggest that 'international organizations (global or regional) will be more effective managers if they are highly institutionalized, if their members have similar foreign policy preferences, and if they have more democratic states'. Their findings indicate that while international organizations are not uniformly suited to promote cooperation and manage interstate conflict, 'more highly institutionalized and democratic international organizations experience greater success in brokering agreements over contentious issues' (Hansen et al. 2008: 314).

As the number and scope of regional organizations has spread over the last twenty years (Tavares 2009), the way regional organizations (collectively) perform their collective duties has become a focus

of attention. Of particular concern has been the extent to which regional organizations engage in or effectively perform functions of collective security governance. A governance approach captures well the notion that regional organizations are ‘explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behaviour’ (Koremenos *et al.* 2001).

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to demonstrate the relevance of the concept of security governance in assessing the (non)contribution pivotal states make to the provision of regional and global security governance, with the emphasis on the former. As the foregoing analysis has shown, states employ different interaction patterns (unilateral, bilateral and multi lateral) in their provisions for regional or global security governance. Security governance provides a framework for analysing policy-making and policy implementation in a multi-actor and multi-level setting. It facilitates understanding of the interactions between states and regional institutions and how they individually and/or collectively manage not only international and regional crises, but also a variety of threats posed to national and regional security.

The concept of security governance identifies four specific security dimensions for this purpose, which will serve to guide subsequent contributions to the envisaged volume on *Security Governance in a Multipolar World: The Role of Pivotal States as Security Contributors*. Policies of **assurance** relate to activities in post-conflict reconstruction and peace building efforts such as confidence-building measures. Specific policy measures involve: policing and border missions; post-conflict monitoring missions; and economic reconstruction aid. In assessing the contributions of pivotal states attention will be paid to what budgetary and personnel contributions are made to the operation. In addition, the questions will be asked: does the country under consideration reveal a geographic bias in its governance policies; and does the country prefer to act bilaterally or multilaterally? Policies of **prevention** capture efforts to prevent conflict by building or sustaining domestic, regional or international institutions that contribute to the mitigation of anarchy and the creation of order. They aim at eliminating the root causes of conflict. Common policies of prevention include arms control and non-proliferation measures as well as technical assistance for internal political and economic reform, ranging from establishing civil-military relations to enhancing the prospects for democratic governance to aiding the development of market economies.

Policies of **protection** consist of internal and multilateral efforts to fulfil the traditional function of protecting society from external threats. Five general categories of protection policies can be identified: health security, border control, terrorism, organized crime and environmental degradation. The country-specific analyses aims to reveal the relative importance of each category of threat, measured primarily by budgetary expenditures and policy initiatives seeking to manage threats (e.g., improved health surveillance or funds devoted to medical research) or to eradicate it (e.g., increases in personnel or budgetary resources to combat crime or terrorism). Policies of **compellence** represent the tasks of conflict resolution via military intervention, particularly peace-making and peace enforcement. These four tasks of security governance are often pursued concurrently. But for analytical reasons, each security dimension will be assessed in a distinct matter in the related EUI papers .

The country-specific studies, to be undertaken in separate papers, will assess national contributions to unilateral, bilateral and multilateral security interventions, to restore or create regional order or to remove a direct military threat to national security. Of importance in this respect is the question whether some of the eleven pivotal states rely disproportionately upon the military instrument relative to the other three categories of security governance.

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